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4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Barcelos (Portugal). 5. On 21 September 2007 the applicant lodged a request to be granted permanent disability with respect to work before the Public Prosecutor of the Barcelos Labour Court as a consequence of a labour accident that he had suffered (domestic proceedings no. 697/07.0TTBCL). 6. Following the applicant’s request, the Public Prosecutor initiated the conciliatory stage of the proceedings with a view to an agreement between the parties. 7. On 12 February 2008 the applicant was submitted to a medical examination in accordance with a Public Prosecutor’s order. After the examination, other medical specialty exams were requested by the Public Prosecutor. 8. The hearing with a view to the agreement took place on 19 January and continued on 26 February 2009. On this date the conciliatory stage ended without an agreement between the parties. 9. On 18 March 2009 the applicant requested the Barcelos Labour Court to continue with the judicial stage of the proceedings against the insurance company and his employer. 10. Between 12 May 2009 and 18 April 2010 several procedural steps took place, mostly notifications, a preliminary hearing, medical examinations and provision of information from the parties and others to the Labour Court. 11. The hearing started on 7 May 2010 and continued on 11 and 18 October 2010. 12. On 16 November 2010 the Barcelos Labour Court delivered its decision, which was challenged by the applicant’s employer. 13. On 30 January 2012 the Court of Appeal adopted its decision. The applicant appealed against it. 14. On 30 January 2013 the proceedings ended with the judgement of the Supreme Court of Justice.

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4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lived in Solnechnogorsk of the Moscow Region prior to his arrest. 5. Between 30 June 2011 and 13 June 2012 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-50/3 in the Moscow Region in connection with the criminal proceedings against him. The prison was overcrowded. Thus, cell 29 measuring 30 sq. m was equipped with 10 sleeping places and accommodated up to 15 inmates. In support of his allegations, the applicant submitted statements by two cellmates and a plan of the cell he had drawn up. 6. On 9 December 2011 the Balashikha Town Court of the Moscow Region found the applicant guilty of drug-related offences and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 7. On 16 December 2011 the applicant lodged a preliminary statement of appeal. The full statement was introduced on 29 December 2011 and contained the following paragraph: “I request that the appeal complaint be examined in my absence”. 8. On 21 February 2012 the Moscow Regional Court held an appeal hearing and upheld the conviction. The applicant was absent from the hearing, but his counsel was present and made oral submissions.

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5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Kyiv. 6. On 24 August 2011, as part of the Independence Day festivities, there was a wreath-laying ceremony at a monument to Taras Shevchenko, a famous Ukrainian poet and public figure, with the participation of the then President of Ukraine Mr Yanukovych. 7. The applicant, as a member of the opposition party Batkivshchyna, took part in a public gathering organised by it on the occasion of Independence Day. According to her, the beginning of the meeting was delayed because of the aforementioned wreath-laying ceremony. 8. After the ceremony the applicant approached the wreath laid by Mr Yanukovych and detached part of the ribbon bearing the words “the President of Ukraine V.F.Yanukovych” without damaging the wreath itself. This was meant to express her opinion that Mr Yanukovych could not be called the President of Ukraine for a number of reasons. 9. The case file contains several copies of photos of the applicant in the aforementioned setting. In four of them she is seen near the wreath detaching the ribbon from it in a careful and concentrated manner, without changing the position of the wreath. In another photo the applicant holds the already detached ribbon in front of her and seems to be either laughing or saying something. There are many people next to her. In the last photo the applicant seems to be trying to tear the ribbon apart. Her face expresses either effort or contempt. 10. The applicant’s action was video recorded by one of the police officers in charge of maintaining public order. The aforementioned photos may also have been taken by the police. 11. On the same day the police officer in question established the applicant’s identity and reported the incident to his superiors. 12. On 25 August 2011 the applicant was apprehended (for less than three hours – see paragraph 16 below) and taken to the Shevchenkivskyy district police station, where a report was drawn up indicating that her actions amounted to petty hooliganism in breach of Article 173 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant, who was not allowed to consult a lawyer, refused to sign that report. 13. On 30 August 2011 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv, at a hearing attended by the applicant and the lawyer retained by her in the meantime, found the applicant guilty of petty hooliganism on account of the incident of 24 August 2011 and sentenced her to ten days’ administrative detention. The court explained that it had decided to apply such a penalty given the nature of the offence, the applicant’s cynical attitude towards it and her failure of admit her guilt. The applicant submitted at the hearing that she had been expressing her civil position and that she had not damaged the wreath, but had merely taken a piece of the ribbon to show her children and grandchildren and also her acquaintances who had voted for Mr Yanukovych. 14. On the same day the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal on her behalf. He argued that the applicant’s action had been an expression of her civil position and that it had been neither prompted by hooligan motives nor aimed at disturbing public order or breaching the peace. The appeal further referred to Article 10 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law, according to which the notion of “expression” concerned not only words, but also actions intended to convey a certain message or information. Referring to paragraph 16 of Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court no. 10 of 22 December 2006 (see paragraph 18 below), the lawyer also submitted that the penalty imposed was excessively severe. 15. On 21 September 2011 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, at a hearing attended by the applicant’s two lawyers, upheld the first-instance court’s decision in a final ruling. By that time the applicant had served her sentence in full.

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5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Kursk. 6. On 16 December 2008 the applicant, a high-ranking police officer at the time, was arrested on suspicion of misappropriation of funds and abuse of power. 7. On 17 December 2008 the applicant was charged with abuse of power and fraud. 8. On 18 December 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk authorised the applicant’s detention pending investigation. The court noted, in particular, as follows: “It follows from the materials submitted that the investigating authorities have grounds to charge the applicant with [abuse of power and fraud] which entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. ... When deciding to remand [the applicant] in custody, the court also takes into account that the circumstances justifying deprivation of liberty are reasonable suspicion [that the applicant committed the offences he is charged with] and the investigator’s argument that, if at large, [the applicant] would put pressure on witnesses, attempt to destroy evidence and interfere with the investigation. The investigating authorities consider that, if at large, [the applicant] might put pressure on witnesses. This fact was confirmed by witness Sp., who stated that [the applicant] and B. wilfully and knowingly kept him in an office [at the regional migration service] from 5 p.m. on 7 November 2008 to 0:30 a.m. on 8 November 2008 in order to make him change his testimony, write an explanation and tender his resignation ... Witness V. submitted that ... [the applicant] had put pressure on him. [The applicant] ordered an internal inquiry in respect of V. allegedly for V.’s failure to prepare certain documents. On 3 December 2008 ... [the applicant] removed V. from office. Furthermore, it follows from the materials submitted that, according to Sp., on 8 November 2011, after he had left the building of [the regional migration service] he had been assaulted and sustained bodily injuries ... When questioned, Sp. submitted that the assault, in his opinion, had been connected with the criminal investigation against [the applicant] and Sp.’s testimony [against him]. Following complaints lodged by Sp. and V., who feared for their lives, the investigating authorities considered including the said witnesses in the state protection programme. Furthermore, it follows from the materials ... submitted by the investigating authorities that [the applicant] had attempted to hide documents ... prevent witnesses from being questioned ... and reconcile testimonies in order to evade criminal liability. This has been confirmed by the materials obtained in the course of interception of the [applicant’s] telephone communications. Furthermore, [the court] accepts as substantiated the argument made by the investigating authorities that [the applicant] had attempted to influence the investigation in order to evade criminal liability. He is currently head of [the regional migration service], and for a long time has been in charge of [the regional department of the interior]. Because of his position, he has connections in law enforcement and could interfere with the preliminary investigation by putting pressure on witnesses who report to him and who have not been questioned yet. ... Regard being had to the above, the court accepts the argument of the investigating authorities that, if at large, [the applicant] who is charged with [serious] criminal offences, would continue putting pressure on witnesses and other parties to the proceedings, attempt to destroy evidence and otherwise interfere with the criminal investigation. The court does not consider it possible to apply a less severe measure of restraint to [the applicant].” 9. On 13 February 2009 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 April 2009. The court reiterated verbatim its reasoning of 18 December 2008 and added as follows: “... It was also established that [the applicant] had tried, with the assistance of his subordinates, to influence the director of Secret Service LLC in order to make the latter falsify the documents necessary for the investigation of the crime in connection with supply and assembly of equipment for the server room in the [regional migration service]. ... Regard being had to the new circumstances concerning the activities of [the applicant] and B., the court also accepts the investigator’s argument that, if at large, [the applicant] would attempt to put pressure on witnesses and conspire with the other perpetrators who are at large. ... ... the court also takes into account the information about the [applicant’s] character, his age, family and state of health. The defence has not submitted any information showing that [the applicant] is unfit for detention in a remand prison.” 10. On 3 March 2009 the Kursk Regional Court upheld the decision of 13 February 2009 on appeal. 11. On 22 April 2009 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 July 2009. The court reiterated verbatim its reasoning of 13 February 2009. On 14 May 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 22 April 2009 on appeal. 12. On 22 July 2009 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 October 2009. In addition to the reasons indicated in the relevant court orders of 18 December 2008 and 22 April 2009, the court noted that the applicant was charged with nine counts of abuse of power and four counts of misappropriation of funds and embezzlement. It indicated as follows: “... the persons suspected of involvement in the same crimes, when questioned (I. was questioned on 4 March 2009, Naz. was questioned on 25 June 2009, Nag. was questioned on 26 February 2009 and Nek. was questioned on 17 March 2009), submitted that [the applicant] had put pressure on them in order to make them change their testimonies.” 13. On 11 August 2009 the Regional Court upheld, in substance, the decision of 22 July 2009 on appeal. However, it reduced the period of the applicant’s detention by one month, noting that the three months’ extension of the applicant’s detention had been excessive. 14. On 23 September 2009 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2009. It noted as follows: “Regard being had to the offences [the applicant] is charged with, the court considers that the investigators have sufficient reasons to believe that [the applicant] who is charged with having committed premeditated crimes of medium gravity and serious crimes, realizes that he might be facing a lengthy prison sentence and might put pressure on witnesses who have been questioned [by the investigator] in order to make them change their testimonies. The investigator’s argument is supported by the statements made by Sp. which show that on 7 November 2008 [the applicant] and B. willfully and knowingly kept Sp. in an office [at the regional migration service] from 5 p.m. on 7 November 2008 to 0:30 a.m. on 8 November 2008 in order to make him change his testimony, write an explanation and tender his resignation ... . As a result, Sp. was unlawfully dismissed. On 29 December 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk reinstated him in his job. Furthermore, it follows from the materials ... submitted ... that [the applicant] attempted actively to hide documents ... , to prevent witnesses from being questioned ... and took steps to reconcile witnesses’ testimonies and coordinated the actions of Nag., I., Kr., Naz. and Nek. in order to prevent them from telling the truth ... . When questioned, I., Nag., Kr., Nek. and Naz. confirmed that the applicant had put pressure on them to make them change their statements. Regard being had to the above, [the court considers] that the investigating authorities have reasons to believe that, if at large, [the applicant] might continue putting pressure on witnesses and other parties to the proceedings. ... [T]he court also takes into account the [applicant’s] character. It notes that for a long time [the applicant] has held high-ranking positions in the [regional department of the interior] and has connections in law enforcement. [The court] finds that the investigating authorities’ argument that, if at large, [the applicant] might interfere with the preliminary investigation is justified. The court also takes into account the information about the [applicant’s] age, family, state of health and the gravity of the charges. There is no information showing that [the applicant] was unfit for detention in a remand prison, and the defence did not submit anything to this effect either.” 15. On 13 October 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 23 September 2009 on appeal. 16. On 23 November 2009 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 16 December 2009. The court noted as follows: “To date the factual circumstances underlying the [applicant’s] remand in custody have not changed or ceased to exist. It follows from the materials submitted that [the applicant] is charged with a number of premeditated offences that are classified as serious and of medium gravity. Regard being had to the circumstances of the crimes [the applicant] is charged with, the gravity of the charges, the [applicant’s] character and the fact that, prior to the arrest and remand in custody, [the applicant] attempted to influence witness Sp., to put pressure on witness V., to hide documents which were important for the criminal case (those facts were confirmed by witnesses Sp., V. and others), and the materials of the operative and investigative activities, the investigating authorities have rightfully concluded that, if at large, [the applicant] might put pressure on witnesses or otherwise interfere with the investigation. The fact that [the applicant] was dismissed from his post does not mean that [he] is unable to put pressure on witnesses. He has information about his former subordinates. ... Regard being had to the above, the court concludes that there are no grounds to change the measure of restraint previously imposed on [the applicant] and considers it necessary to extend the [applicant’s] detention ... ” 17. On 10 December 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 23 November 2009 on appeal. 18. On 14 December 2009 the District Court held a preliminary hearing of the case against the applicant, B. and I. The case file compiled by the investigators comprised thirty-seven volumes. The court ordered that the applicant remain in custody pending trial, noting as follows: “... [the applicant] is charged with a number of serious premeditated offences ..., one of which entails a custodial sentence of up to ten years. Accordingly, being aware that he might be sentenced to a significant term of imprisonment, [the applicant] might abscond and interfere with the administration of justice and delay the determination of the criminal charges against him. Furthermore, the arguments put forward by the prosecutor that, if released, [the applicant] might put pressure on witnesses are not without merit. As it follows from the materials in the case file, prior to being remanded in custody, [the applicant] had tried to put pressure on witness S. and some others in order to make them change their testimonies. He had attempted to conceal the documents which were important for the criminal case in order to coordinate the testimonies given by him and other persons. There are therefore grounds to believe that he might continue to interfere with the administration of justice. Accordingly, there are no grounds to replace the measure of restraint imposed previously with his undertaking not to leave town. As regards the [applicant’s] dismissal from his post, this fact alone is not sufficient to grant the motion submitted by the defence.” 19. On 14 January 2010 the Kursk Regional Court upheld, in substance, the decision of 14 December 2009 on appeal, specifying that the applicant should be detained until 14 March 2010. 20. At 5.45 p.m. on 15 March 2010 the District Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody until 15 May 2010. The court noted as follows: “... [the applicant] is charged with a number of serious intentional offences ... Regard being had to the offences with which the applicant is charged; their gravity; his character; the fact that prior to being remanded in custody, [the applicant] had attempted to put pressure on witnesses V. and Sp. in order to make them change their testimonies (the latter has not been questioned yet), to conceal the documents which were important for the criminal case and to give instructions to the witnesses as to the contents of their testimonies (which was confirmed by witnesses V., Kr., Nag. and Naz., the court considers that, if at large, [the applicant] might put pressure on witnesses in order to interfere with the course of justice. The fact that the [applicant] has been dismissed from his post does not mean that he would be unable to influence the witnesses, since he has information on his former employees. The court accordingly considers that it is necessary to remand the applicant in custody.” 21. The applicant appealed, alleging, inter alia, that the previous detention order had expired on 14 March 2010 and he had been detained for several hours on 15 March 2010 unlawfully. 22. On 6 April 2010 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 15 May 2010 on appeal. The court did not discern any unlawfulness as regards the application of the rules of criminal procedure by the District Court when processing the applicant’s detention. 23. On 30 April 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 15 August 2010. The court reiterated its earlier reasoning that the applicant might put pressure on witnesses, if he were released. 24. On 1 June 2010 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 30 April 2010 on appeal. 25. On 23 July 2010 the District Court found the applicant guilty of two counts of abuse of power and two counts of embezzlement, and sentenced him to four and a half years’ imprisonment. 26. On 16 November 2010 the Regional Court upheld, in substance, the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 27. On 27 April 2011 the Bor Town Court of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region released the applicant on parole. 28. On 16 March 2010 the regional prosecutor’s office issued the administration of the remand prison where the applicant was being detained with a writ of execution, noting that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had ended on 14 March 2010 and he had been detained on 15 March 2010 unlawfully. The prosecutor urged the administration to take measures in order to rectify the violation of the applicable laws and to institute disciplinary proceedings against the persons responsible. 29. On 15 April 2010 the warden of the remand prison informed the prosecutor that two persons responsible for the failure to release the applicant once the detention order had expired on 14 April 2010 had been subjected to a reprimand. 30. On 25 January 2012, in a letter addressed to the District Court, the warden confirmed that the applicant should have been released immediately on the expiry of the court order authorising his detention until 14 March 2010 and that his detention on 15 March 2010 had been unlawful.

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5. The applicants were both targeted in undercover operations designed to investigate bribe-taking launched by the police under sections 6 and 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act of 12 August 1995 (no. 144-FZ). 6. The facts of each individual criminal case, as submitted by the parties, are summarised below. The factual details of the undercover operations are not in dispute and the applicants admitted that they had received the money in return for promises to render certain services. However, the applicants contested the Government’s position as to the reasons for the undercover operations and the circumstances leading to them. In particular, they contended that they had accepted the money only because the police had incited them to do so, and they would not have done it under any other circumstances. 7. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zarechnyy, in the Penza Region. At the time of her arrest, she was working as a dermatologist‑venerologist in the outpatient unit of the municipal hospital in Zarechnyy. 8. According to the Government, the police in Zarechnyy received confidential operational information implicating the applicant in the illegal acceptance of money for issuing and extending false sick-leave certificates. On 19 November 2007 it was decided to conduct an undercover operation targeting the applicant, with the aim of documenting her illegal activity. The police proposed Ms A. to participate in the operation as their agent. 9. According to the applicant, she had not been implicated in any bribe‑taking prior to the operation and the police had had no grounds to suspect her. On 20 November 2007 her colleague and former fellow classmate from medical school, X, had come to her office while she was seeing patients. He had been accompanied by a young woman, Ms A. He had asked the applicant to provide Ms A. with a sick-leave certificate as she had herpes on her leg. The applicant had examined the woman, confirmed the diagnosis, prescribed treatment and issued the sick-leave certificate. The applicant thought that she had recognised Ms A. as the mother of a girl she had treated on a previous occasion. On 23 November 2007 Ms A. had come to the applicant’s office by herself and the applicant had agreed to extend her sick-leave as her condition had not yet been cured. Ms A. had been given the certificate and had handed 500 roubles (RUB – 11 euros (EUR)) to the applicant. The applicant had taken the money as she thought that Ms A. was offering it as a token of appreciation for having successfully treated her daughter previously. Immediately after Ms A. had left, the police had entered the applicant’s office and asked her and the nurses who were present to show them all the money in their possession. The applicant had taken out her wallet and while the police were searching the office she had remembered about the money that Ms A. had given her. She had become frightened and had moved the money from the pocket of her uniform into her left boot, where the police eventually discovered it. 10. On 26 May 2008 the Zarechenskiy Town Court of the Penza Region examined the applicant’s case. The applicant admitted that she had taken the money because she had thought of it as a gift from a grateful patient. She maintained that the police had incited her to accept the money. In particular, they had sent their agent to her office together with a colleague of hers whom she had known well since their student years in medical school and at whose request she had issued the sick-leave certificate to Ms A. 11. Ms A. testified at the trial that on 19 November 2007 she had agreed to help the police conduct an undercover operation investigating bribe‑taking. She had telephoned her acquaintance X and told him that she needed a sick-leave certificate to justify her stay at home while she redecorated her flat. X had agreed to help her and she had come to the hospital outpatient unit with him the next day. She had had with her RUB 2,000 (EUR 42) in cash and a recording device given to her earlier by the police. She had given X RUB 500 (EUR 11) for his intermediary services and also RUB 500 (EUR 11) to pay the applicant, who did not examine her at the time but nevertheless issued the sick-leave certificate. On 23 November 2007 she had returned to the applicant’s office. The applicant had not examined her but had extended her sick-leave certificate for RUB 500 (EUR 11) which the applicant had placed in the pocket of her uniform. 12. X testified that Ms A. had repeatedly called him requesting the false sick-leave certificate. He had agreed to help her and had received RUB 500 (EUR 11) from her. He had called several doctors but they had refused to help and he had decided to ask the applicant to issue the certificate. On 20 November 2007 he had come to the applicant’s office and she had handed him the certificate for Ms A. for RUB 500 (EUR 11) without actually examining Ms A. 13. The police officer in charge of the undercover operation also testified at the trial. In particular, he stated that following the receipt of confidential information implicating the applicant in bribe-taking, an undercover operation had been launched to verify and to document the applicant’s unlawful activity. 14. On 26 May 2008 the Zarechenskiy Town Court of the Penza Region granted the prosecutor’s request to drop the charges against the applicant in relation to the episode of 20 November 2007 for lack of evidence. It found the applicant guilty of bribery committed on 23 November 2007 and imposed a suspended sentence of three years in prison with three years’ probation. 15. On 6 August 2008 the Penza Regional Court examined the applicant’s case on appeal and upheld the conviction. The court dismissed the plea of entrapment and held that the police had had good reason to conduct the undercover operation as they were in possession of incriminating information against the applicant which revealed a pre‑existing intent to commit bribery. 16. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Cheboksary, in the Chuvash Republic. At the time of his arrest, he worked as a narcology psychiatrist at a regional narcology centre. 17. The Government submitted that in early 2008 the police had received information which had implicated the applicant and other staff members at the regional narcology centre in the issuance of false forensic medical examination reports in return for monetary consideration. On 17 July 2008 the police decided to conduct an undercover operation in order to expose and document the applicant’s unlawful acts. One of the police officers, Mr Y., was chosen to participate in the undercover operation and to bribe the applicant into altering the results of Mr Y.’s blood test and issuing a false forensic medical report. 18. The applicant contested the Government’s allegations. In particular, he claimed that the incriminating information had been ambiguous and had referred to medical personnel at the local narcology centre in general. It did not specifically identify him as an individual who was taking bribes. Moreover, the police were not in possession of any complaints from persons allegedly aggrieved by his unlawful acts. 19. The applicant further maintained that on 18 July 2008, when he started his shift at the regional narcology centre, traffic police officers had brought Mr Y. to his office for a blood alcohol test. The applicant had conducted preliminary tests that had shown that Mr Y. was under the influence of alcohol. Mr Y. acknowledged that he had drunk some alcohol the day before. Meanwhile, the officer who had accompanied Mr Y. had stepped out of the room and Mr Y. had repeatedly asked the applicant to help him obtain a favourable blood test result as he feared that the alcohol level in his blood would exceed the legal limit and he would have his driving licence revoked. The applicant had categorically refused at first and had sent the applicant to a laboratory for a blood test in the presence of police officers. Mr Y. had then returned to the applicant’s office and resumed his requests for help. He had offered to pay the applicant and had stated that his earnings and ability to support his family depended on his having a driving licence. On 19 July 2008 the applicant had again seen Mr Y. in his office, where he had repeated his requests. The applicant had then agreed to try talking to the laboratory staff and speculated that Mr Y. would need to pay RUB 6,000 (EUR 126) or 7,000 (EUR 147) to the laboratory technician. However, the nurse working in the applicant’s office had commented that at least RUB 10,000 (EUR 210) would be needed, as the laboratory technician would not accept less. Mr Y. had then paid the applicant RUB 10,000. The applicant had used RUB 5,000 (EUR 105) to pay the laboratory technician to alter the results of Mr Y.’s blood test and had paid RUB 1,500 (EUR 32) to the nurse to ensure her confidentiality. On 25 July 2008 the applicant had received a further RUB 4,000 (EUR 84) from Mr Y. and they had agreed on an additional RUB 2,000 (EUR 42) to be paid at a later date. Immediately afterwards, the police had entered the applicant’s office, charged him with abetting bribery and arrested him on the spot. 20. On 29 May 2009 the Moscovskiy District Court of Cheboksary examined the applicant’s case. The applicant testified that he had at first refused to help Mr Y. with his request. He conceded that he had taken the money from Mr Y. but only because Mr Y. had described his difficult personal situation and had strongly urged and incited the applicant to help him. 21. Mr Y. testified that on 18 July 2008 he had consumed 200 grams of vodka in the presence of the police officers who were to participate in the undercover operation. He did not know the name of the applicant at the time. Following some documentary formalities, they all proceeded to the local narcology centre, where the applicant had first established that he tested positive for alcohol. When he and the applicant were alone, he had asked the applicant to tamper with the results of his blood test to prevent him losing his driving licence. The applicant had refused and had sent him off to the laboratory for a blood sample. He had then urged the applicant to help him out once again, had offered him money, and the applicant had at last agreed. On 19 July 2008 he had met the applicant in his office. The applicant had told him that he needed to pay RUB 6,000 (EUR 126) or 7,000 (EUR 147) to the laboratory technician. However, Mr Y. had given RUB 10,000 (EUR 210) to the applicant as the nurse in the applicant’s office had commented that the technician would not take less than that. The applicant had later informed him that the technician would modify the test results accordingly. On 25 July 2008 he had paid RUB 4,000 (EUR 84) to the applicant in addition to the money given earlier and had agreed to pay a further RUB 2,000 (EUR 42) later, at the applicant’s request. 22. The police officer responsible for the undercover operation testified that in early 2008 the police had received information implicating the applicant and other staff members at the regional narcology centre in bribe‑taking. In July 2008 an undercover operation had been planned and launched with the participation of one of the police officers, Mr Y. In the course of the operation, the applicant had agreed to tamper with the results of a forensic medical test in return for financial remuneration from Mr Y. The undercover operation had been both audio-recorded and videotaped and a body search of the applicant at the end of the operation had revealed that he had marked banknotes on his person. 23. On 29 May 2009 the Moscovskiy District Court of Cheboksary convicted the applicant of abetting bribery and sentenced him to imprisonment for two years and six months and to a three-year ban on federal and municipal employment. The court dismissed the applicant’s plea of entrapment in its entirety as it found that the police had conducted the undercover operation in a lawful manner. The applicant appealed, pleading police incitement to commit the offence of which he was convicted. 24. On 30 July 2009 the Chuvash Regional Court found the applicant’s entrapment claim unsubstantiated and upheld his conviction on appeal.

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4. The applicant company is a Portuguese limited liability company. The second and third applicants are the applicant company’s managing partners (see Annex for details). 5. On 17 September 1999 the Porto Criminal Department for Investigation and Prosecution (Departamento de Acção e Investigação Penal) started an investigation into the applicant company’s fiscal activity between 1994 and 1997. 6. Following the investigation, two sets of fiscal criminal proceedings were instituted before the Porto and Barcelos Criminal Courts. 7. On 20 December 1999 the applicants were made defendants (arguidos) in both sets of proceedings. 8. On 5 November 2003 the public prosecutor brought charges (acusação) against the applicant company and third applicant in the Porto Criminal Court for tax fraud in relation to activities dating back to 1997, when the applicant company was registered in Porto. 9. On 27 September 2005 the trial began. The hearing was adjourned to October and then to 27 March 2006 due to the absence of some of the defence witnesses. 10. On the day of the hearing, the applicant company’s and third applicant’s representative resigned. The hearing was adjourned pending his replacement. 11. In June 2006 the applicant company and third applicant gave power of attorney to the same lawyer. 12. On 14 November 2006 the applicants informed the Porto Criminal Court that they had sought a judicial review before the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court of a tax adjustment applied to them regarding the applicant company’s fiscal activity between 1994 and 1997. 13. On 29 November 2006 the Porto Criminal Court suspended the fiscal criminal proceedings in accordance with Article 50 § 1 of the Legal Framework for Non-Customs Tax Offences (Regime Jurídico das Infracções Fiscais não Aduaneiras – “RJIFNA”). 14. On 19 December 2008 the applicants applied to the High Council of Magistrates (Conselho Superior de Magistratura) for an order to have the criminal proceedings expedited (pedido de aceleração processual). 15. On 5 May 2009 the High Council of Magistrates dismissed their application on the grounds that the delay in the proceedings, under the law, was attributable to the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court rather than the Porto Criminal Court. The Council pointed out that the applicants should have therefore lodged their expedition application with the High Council of the Administrative and Fiscal Courts. 16. The proceedings are still pending before the Porto Criminal Court. 17. On 28 April 2003 the public prosecutor of the Barcelos Criminal Court brought charges against the three applicants for tax fraud and abuse (fraude fiscal e abuso de confiança fiscal) in relation to activities that had taken place between 1994 and 1996, when the applicant company was registered in Barcelos. 18. On 1 October 2003 the applicants contested the proceedings. On the same date they applied for them to be suspended until a final decision was adopted in relation to the judicial review pending before the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court (see paragraph 13 above). 19. On 17 November 2003 the Barcelos Criminal Court ordered that the proceedings be suspended in accordance with Article 50 § 1 of the RJIFNA and requested information from the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court regarding the progress of the judicial review. 20. On 14 December 2006 the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court informed the Barcelos Criminal Court that the proceedings brought by the applicants against the tax adjustment were still pending. 21. On 23 April 2007 the Barcelos Criminal Court suspended the proceedings until a final decision was adopted by the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court. 22. On 20 October 2008 the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court informed the Barcelos Criminal Court that the judicial review was still pending. 23. On 19 December 2008 the applicants applied to the High Council of Magistrates to have the proceedings expedited. 24. On 13 January 2009 the High Council dismissed their application on the grounds that the fiscal criminal proceedings had been suspended in accordance with the law. It also considered that their request should have been made to the High Council of the Administrative and Fiscal Courts. 25. The proceedings are still pending before the Barcelos Criminal Court. 26. On 10 October and 27 October 2006 the applicants instituted proceedings in tort (ação de responsabilidade civil extracontratual) against the State in the Porto and Braga Administrative and Fiscal Courts (case nos. 2533/06.6BEPRT and 1789/06.6BEBRG respectively), claiming damages for the excessive length of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. 27. According to the latest information received by the Court on 14 February 2014, the proceedings are still pending.

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5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Saransk. 6. In 2005 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Mordoviya (“the Ministry”) seeking compensation for damage to his health caused during his service in the police (“the compensation”). 7. On 7 November 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Saransk (“the District Court”) found in the applicant’s favour and ordered the Ministry: (a) to pay the applicant the compensation due to him for the period from 19 November 2004 to 31 October 2005 in the amount of 77,250.12 Russian roubles (RUB); and (b) starting from 1 November 2005, to make monthly compensation payments to the applicant of RUB 6,892.92 with subsequent indexation in accordance with the law. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 22 November 2005. 8. However, on 12 October 2006, following a request lodged by the Ministry, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mordoviya (“the Presidium”) quashed the final judgment by way of supervisory review and dismissed the applicant’s claims. The Presidium found that the first‑instance court had erroneously applied and interpreted substantive legal provisions which had resulted in their significant violation. The Presidium held that there was no basis under domestic law for awarding the applicant the compensation sought and that he was entitled instead to insurance payments. The applicant did not provide the Court with information as to whether he had applied for those payments and/or was receiving them. 9. The District Court’s judgment of 7 November 2005 had been duly enforced until it was quashed by way of supervisory review.

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5. The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently detained in HMP Whatton. 6. On 25 April 2007 he received an indeterminate sentence for public protection (“IPP sentence”) following his conviction of the sexual assault of a fifteen-year old girl. The offence had been committed while the applicant was on licence in the community following his release from a sentence for indecent assault against girls under the age of sixteen and while he was undertaking the Sex Offender Treatment Programme (“SOTP”) in the community. A minimum term (“tariff”) of four years was fixed. 7. The applicant was initially detained in HMP Armley. It was recommended in 2007 that he complete the SOTP. 8. In June 2008 he was transferred to HMP Rye Hill. He completed an Enhanced Thinking Skills (“ETS”) course in 2008 and the core SOTP on 8 March 2009. On an unknown date, he completed an Alcohol Awareness course. 9. In August 2009 a Structured Assessment of Risk and Need (“SARN”) report identified that further work was required to reduce the applicant’s risk of reoffending. It was recommended that he complete the extended SOTP and, possibly, a Better Lives Booster (“BLB”) programme. The extended SOTP consisted of seventy-four interactive sessions plus some individual work and generally lasted for around six months. 10. At a Parole Board review on 7 September 2009 the Panel said that much offending work still had to be done in order to reduce the applicant’s risk and that he should therefore remain in closed conditions. 11. In September 2009 the applicant was transferred to HMP Acklington. He claims that he had been informed that the extended SOTP was available at that prison. 12. A memo dated 24 August 2010 from the Programmes Department of HMP Acklington confirmed that the applicant had been assessed as suitable to attend the extended SOTP and that he would have to be transferred to another establishment to complete the course as it was not offered at HMP Acklington. 13. On 27 August 2010 the applicant completed the Thinking Skills Programme (“TSP”) at HMP Acklington. 14. In January 2011 a pre-tariff-expiry paper Parole Board review took place. By letter dated 24 February 2011 the applicant was informed that the Parole Board had not recommended his release. His request for an oral hearing was refused. 15. The letter explained: “... The [Intensive Case Management] decision provides a detailed account of the index offence and your previous offending record ... You are given credit for the offence related work you have undertaken but further work in the form of an Extended SOTP (and possible a BLB programme thereafter) is considered necessary to further address your risk factors ... It is clear that significant risk reducing work is required in closed conditions before you can progress further.” 16. By letter dated 6 April 2011 the National Offender Management Service informed the applicant that the Secretary of State agreed with the Parole Board recommendation. She considered that a number of risk factors were outstanding, namely sexual offending, feelings of grievance, distorted thinking, alcohol misuse and outbursts of anger. She was of the view that the extended SOTP was necessary to reduce the applicant’s risk level. She also indicated that an assessment for the BLB programme was necessary following completion of the extended SOTP and recommended that the applicant continue addressing his alcohol misuse. The letter expressed the expectation that the relevant interventions, or other equivalent risk reduction work, would be completed prior to the next Parole Board review. It clarified, however, that the Secretary of State could not guarantee to place the applicant on the courses identified as there were limits on the availability of resources. 17. The review period was set at twenty-one months and was made up the following: transfer to an establishment to undertake the extended SOTP; participation in the extended SOTP; participation in post-course reviews; consolidate and test the skills learned; continued development and practice of appropriate risk strategies; assessment for the BLB programme; continued monitoring of alcohol misuse and relapse prevention work if necessary. The review was scheduled to commence in March 2012 and conclude in November 2012, with an oral hearing in September. 18. On 26 April 2011 the applicant’s tariff period expired. 19. The applicant sought advice on possible judicial review proceedings in respect of the delay in providing access to the extended SOTP. A letter was sent to HMP Acklington by his solicitors. On 22 September 2011 he was transferred to HMP Whatton. 20. On 10 October 2011 the applicant requested information from HMP Whatton as to when he would begin the extended SOTP. He was informed in reply that he would be contacted to arrange an assessment as soon as possible. 21. Meanwhile, the applicant’s solicitors wrote to HMP Whatton seeking information on when he would be allowed to participate in the extended SOTP. By reply dated 28 October 2011, the deputy extended SOTP treatment manager explained: “In order that we can be responsive to the needs of Mr Dillon, it is essential that we allow him a period of settling in at HMP Whatton before an assessment for the Extended SOTP can take place. Assessments and placements are prioritised on a number of factors including tariff expiry, risk level and treatment readiness. However, please be assured that an assessment will take place as soon as practically possible. We anticipate delivering 4 Extended Programmes in 2012 and Mr Dillon will be considered for one of these programmes, if he is found suitable. The extended programme lasts 5 months. A SARN report will then have to be completed within 26 weeks of treatment being completed. The SARN report will identify any further treatment that is necessary.” 22. On 12 November 2011 the applicant indicated to HMP Whatton his concern that he might not be adequately prioritised for the extended SOTP, referring to the expectation that the course would be completed by his next Parole Board review. He requested confirmation that he would be prioritised for the extended SOTP. 23. By reply dated 18 November 2011 he was informed that HMP Whatton made “every attempt to ensure prisoners are treated fairly and have access to offending behaviour programmes”. However, the letter noted that there were limited resources and that there was a large number of IPP prisoners and life sentence prisoners at HMP Whatton whose tariffs had expired. 24. On 6 January 2012 the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Governor of HMP Whatton to notify him of the fact that judicial review proceedings were being contemplated. They sought an undertaking that the applicant would be given access to an extended SOTP scheduled to begin in April 2012. 25. On 19 January and 6 February 2012 the applicant was reassessed for participation in the extended SOTP. In a report dated 6 February 2012 he was found not to be sufficiently motivated to undertake the course. The report noted that the second meeting had had to be terminated on account of the applicant’s use of abusive and disrespectful language and his loud and aggressive tone. It explained that while, given the applicant’s tariff expiry date, he would have been prioritised for the April 2012 extended SOTP course, it was considered that he was not ready for secondary treatment at that time. It was recommended that the applicant complete individual work with his offender supervisor to consider, inter alia, the costs and benefits of engaging in the extended SOTP and to address his outstanding treatment needs. Further assessment would take place in June/July 2012. 26. The applicant subsequently pursued a request for a place on an extended SOTP scheduled to commence in August 2012. 27. On 13 June 2012 the Parole Board notified the applicant of its decision on the papers not to direct his release or to recommend his transfer to open conditions. The Parole Board set out the details of the index offence and noted that the applicant had committed the offence while on a three-year extended licence following another conviction for sexual offences (see paragraph 6 above). It considered that he had breached the trust placed in him and expressed concern that this might not bode well for the applicant’s likely compliance with licence conditions. The Parole Board reiterated the applicant’s risk factors and turned to examine the evidence of any change during sentence. It explained: “You completed the Core SOTP in 2009 and the Thinking Skills Programme in 2010. It was then recommended that you complete the Extended SOTP. Once this has been completed you will be assessed for other programmes such as the Better Lives Booster Programme and the Healthy Sexual Functioning Programme. You are reported to have attended for a programme assessment for the ESOTP at HMP Whatton but prison records state that this was a challenging meeting and that you were not sufficiently motivated to commence the group. You do not agree with this assessment. You will be offered the opportunity to attend for suitability assessment in the future. You have also been put forward for the CALM programme due to the violent offences on your record and difficulties in managing your emotions.” 28. The Parole Board agreed that the applicant posed a high risk of harm to children. It commended the applicant on his completion of the ETS and core SOTP. However, it concluded: “... [T]here is a considerable amount of accredited offending behaviour work still recommended for you to complete to reduce your risks to a level that can be safely managed in less secure conditions. In the first instance it is recommended that you complete the Extended SOTP and CALM and that following the SARN you may need to be assessed for the Better Lives Booster Programme and Health Sexual Functioning Programme. Clearly this will take some considerable time and whilst core areas of risk remain unaddressed there is no merit in an oral hearing being held ...” 29. The applicant was reassessed for the extended SOTP in July 2012. He was found to be suitable to participate. 30. In late July 2012 the applicant was informed that he was being considered for a place on an extended SOTP commencing in October 2012. 31. The applicant completed the extended SOTP in March 2013. He was advised that a SARN report would be completed within the next six months to identify any further work that needed to be done. The SARN report was completed in March 2014.

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5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in HMP North Sea Camp. 6. On 8 January 2008 he was convicted of attempted kidnapping. He received an indeterminate sentence for public protection (“IPP sentence”). A minimum term (“tariff”) of one year and nineteen days was fixed. 7. In July 2008 it was identified that the applicant was required to complete the Controlling Anger and Learning to Manage it (“CALM”) course to reduce his risk. 8. On 12 December 2008 he was transferred to HMP Stocken in order to participate in the CALM course. 9. The applicant’s tariff expired on 26 January 2009. 10. In March 2009 he commenced the CALM course. He completed it on 28 May 2009. 11. On an unknown date he completed the Alcohol Awareness and assertiveness and decision-making courses. 12. On 17 February 2010 an oral hearing took place before the Parole Board to review the applicant’s detention. On 26 February 2010 the Parole Board notified him that it had decided not to order his transfer to open conditions or release. It concluded that his level of risk remained incompatible with his safe management in open conditions. 13. By letter dated 21 June 2010 the National Offender Management Service informed the applicant that the Secretary of State agreed with the Parole Board recommendation. His review period was set at eighteen months. The review was therefore scheduled to commence in February 2011 with an oral hearing by the Parole Board in August 2011. 14. In September 2010 a sentence plan review took place and identified a further course, the Sex Offenders Treatment Programme (“SOTP”), for completion by the applicant. He had failed to admit before September 2010 that there was potentially a sexual element to his offence. Prior to commencement of the SOTP, a Structured Assessment of Risk and Need (“SARN”) was to be conducted. 15. In October 2010 the applicant complained to the prison requesting information on when the SARN would take place. On 17 November 2010 he was informed that he would have to be transferred to another prison establishment for assessment because of resource issues. 16. On 17 December 2010 he was moved to HMP Acklington for assessment. 17. On 20 January 2011 his solicitors sent a letter before claim to the governor of HMP Acklington and the Secretary of State indicating that judicial review proceedings were being considered in respect of the delay in arranging the assessment for the SOTP. 18. On 25 January 2011 the applicant’s offender supervisor contacted a forensic psychologist in training in order to discuss the applicant’s case. They agreed that an initial SOTP assessment should be completed. 19. By letter dated 8 February 2011 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that the assessment of his suitability for the SOTP would be completed by the end of February 2011. He would then be placed on a waiting list for the appropriate course. 20. The SOTP assessment was completed on 6 April 2011 and concluded that the applicant was motivated to engage in sex offender treatment. 21. On 7 April 2011 the forensic psychologist in training sought clinical guidance on the applicant’s case from the Operational Services Intervention Group (OSIG”). The OSIG decided that a Risk Matrix 2000 (“RM2000”) was required as well as a Treatment Needs Analysis (“TNA”) to assess the level of dynamic risk posed by the applicant. 22. On 23 June 2011 a forensic psychologist in training interviewed the applicant and told him that he had been referred for a TNA and RM2000. The applicant was informed that his case would be progressed over the next three months. 23. On 30 July 2011 the Parole Board reviewed the applicant’s case on the papers. By letter dated 18 August 2011 it informed him that it had not directed his release or recommended his transfer to open conditions. It explained: “The panel is satisfied that until you have undertaken the offending behaviour work that will be identified by the forthcoming assessments and ... a full assessment has been completed of your response to treatment it will be difficult to conclude that you have addressed the core factors that caused you to offend.” 24. On 31 August 2011 the TNA was completed. 25. By letter dated 28 September 2011 the National Offender Management Service informed the applicant that the Secretary of State agreed with the Parole Board recommendation. She considered that risk factors, namely sexual offending, thinking skills and behaviour and alcohol misuse, were outstanding. The letter clarified that the Secretary of State could not guarantee to place the applicant on the courses identified as there were limits on the availability of resources. 26. The applicant’s next review was set to commence in August 2012 and be completed by April 2013. The review period was made up of, inter alia, appropriate assessments, completion of sexual offender behaviour work, participation in the post-course review and the preparation of the SARN report. 27. At some point he was transferred to HMP Northumberland. 28. On 9 November 2011 he was told by prison staff that he was on a list of prisoners being considered for the next SOTP. 29. On 24 November 2011 the TNA and Treatment Pathway reports were completed. The applicant was deemed suitable for the SOTP. The reports were disclosed to him on 2 December 2011. 30. On 22 December 2011 his solicitors wrote to the governor of HMP Northumberland requesting that immediate steps be taken to place the applicant on the next SOTP. They expressed the view that there had been no progress since the April 2011 assessment. 31. On 3 May 2012 the applicant commenced the SOTP. He completed the course in November 2012. 32. A new target date of June 2013 was set to assess whether an oral Parole Board hearing ought to be held in his case. The outcome of the review is not known 33. A SARN report was produced on 3 April 2013. 34. On 4 October 2013 the Secretary of State accepted the applicant’s request for an exceptional transfer to open conditions. He was transferred on 5 November 2013.

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8. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9. On an unspecified date the first applicant left Afghanistan for Pakistan, where he met and married the second applicant. The couple subsequently moved to Iran, where they lived for fifteen years. 10. On an unspecified date the couple and their children left Iran for Turkey and from there took a boat to Italy. According to the findings of the Italian police and the identification forms annexed to the observations of the Italian Government, the applicants (the couple and their five oldest children) landed on the coast of Calabria on 16 July 2011 and were immediately subjected to the EURODAC identification procedure (taking of photographs and fingerprints) after supplying a false identity. The same day the couple and the five children were placed in a reception facility provided by the municipal authorities of Stignano (Reggio Calabria province), where they remained until 26 July 2011. On that date they were transferred to the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers (Centro di Acoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo, “CARA”) in Bari, in the Puglia region, once their true identity had been established. 11. According to the applicants, living conditions in the centre were poor, particularly on account of the lack of appropriate sanitation facilities, the lack of privacy and the climate of violence among the occupants. 12. On 28 July 2011 the applicants left the CARA in Bari without permission. They subsequently travelled to Austria, where on 30 July 2011 they were again registered in the EURODAC system. They lodged an application for asylum in Austria which was rejected. On 1 August 2011 Austria submitted a request to take charge of the applicants to the Italian authorities, which on 17 August 2011 formally accepted the request. On an unspecified date the applicants travelled to Switzerland. On 14 November 2011 the Austrian authorities informed their Italian counterparts that the transfer had been cancelled because the applicants had gone missing. 13. On 3 November 2011 the applicants applied for asylum in Switzerland. 14. On 15 November 2011 the first and second applicants were interviewed by the Federal Migration Office (“the FMO”) and stated that living conditions in Italy were difficult and that it would be impossible for the first applicant to find work there. 15. On 22 November 2011 the FMO requested the Italian authorities to take charge of the applicants. In their respective observations the Swiss and Italian Governments agreed that the request had been tacitly accepted by Italy. 16. In a decision of 24 January 2012 the FMO rejected the applicants’ asylum application and made an order for their removal to Italy. The administrative authority considered that “the difficult living conditions in Italy [did] not render the removal order unenforceable”, that “it [was] therefore for the Italian authorities to provide support to the applicants” and that “the Swiss authorities [did] not have competence to take the place of the Italian authorities.” On the basis of these considerations it concluded that “the file [did] not contain any specific element disclosing a risk to the applicants’ lives in the event of their return to Italy.” 17. On 2 February 2012 the applicants appealed to the Federal Administrative Court. In support of their appeal they submitted that the reception conditions for asylum seekers in Italy were in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that the federal authorities had not given sufficient consideration to their complaint in that regard. 18. In a judgment of 9 February 2012 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the FMO’s decision in its entirety. The court considered that “while there [were] shortcomings in the reception and social welfare arrangements, and asylum seekers [could] not always be taken care of by the authorities or private charities”, there was no evidence in the file capable of “rebutting the presumption that Italy complie[d] with its obligations under public international law.” With more particular reference to the applicants’ conduct it held that “in deciding to travel to Switzerland, they [had] not given the Italian authorities the opportunity to assume their obligations with regard to [the applicants’] situation.” 19. On 13 March 2012 the applicants requested the FMO to have the proceedings reopened and to grant them asylum in Switzerland. They submitted that their individual situation had not been examined in detail. The FMO forwarded the request to the Federal Administrative Court, which reclassified it as a “request for revision” of the judgment of 9 February 2012 and rejected it in a judgment dated 21 March 2012, on the ground that the applicants had not submitted any new grounds which they could not have relied on during the ordinary proceedings. The applicants had based their request mainly on a more detailed account of their stay in Italy and the fact that their children were now attending school in Switzerland. 20. In a letter of 10 May 2012 which reached the Registry on 15 May, the applicants applied to this Court and sought an interim measure requesting the Swiss Government not to deport them to Italy for the duration of the proceedings. 21. In a fax dated 18 May 2012 the Registry informed the Swiss Government’s Agent that the acting President of the Section to which the case had been assigned had decided to indicate to the Swiss Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that the applicants should not be deported to Italy for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.

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4. The applicant was born in 1970. 5. On an unspecified date in the second half of 1994 the applicant was arrested and detained in investigation detention facilities in Kyustendil and Sofia in the framework of a criminal investigation against him. On 25 November 1994 he was transferred to Pazardzhik Prison. 6. On 11 July 1996 the Kyustendil Regional Court found the applicant guilty of a number of violent offences committed between May 1993 and August 1994 and sentenced him to death. On 4 February 1999 the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction but, following the abolition of the death penalty with effect from 27 December 1998 and the concomitant introduction of the sentence of life imprisonment without commutation (see paragraph 30 below), replaced his sentence with life imprisonment without commutation. 7. On 27 January 2000 the applicant was transferred from Pazardzhik Prison to Bobov Dol Prison, where he has been serving his sentence ever since. By order of the prison governor, he was placed alone in a constantly locked cell, as required under the legal provisions governing the regime of life prisoners (see paragraph 30 below). 8. In a decision of 30 November 2001, which became final on 25 April 2002, the Sofia Court of Appeal decided that the applicant was to serve his sentence under the “special regime” applicable to life prisoners at that time (see paragraph 30 below). 9. On 19 April 2007 a special commission in charge of deciding on changes in a prisoner’s regime decided to place the applicant under the “enhanced regime” (see paragraph 30 below). 10. On 1 June 2009, when the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 superseded the Execution of Punishments Act 1969, the applicant was placed under the “severe” regime (see paragraph 30 below). His continued to be kept isolated from the rest of the prison population, as normally required under the relevant provisions of the 2009 Act and the regulations for its application (ibid.). The above-mentioned commission has apparently not decided to place the applicant together with the main prison population, as permitted under those provisions under certain conditions (ibid.). 11. In Bobov Dol Prison, the applicant was kept in an individual cell measuring thirteen and a half square metres. The Government submitted that not later than 2007 significant improvements had been made to that cell. In particular, central heating was installed and the old wooden window frames were replaced by modern ones measuring 138 cm by 50 cm and providing enough temperature isolation and access to sunlight. According to evidence put before the Kyustendil Administrative Court and its judgment of 9 June 2011 (see paragraph 28 below), those works were completed in October or November 2006. 12. At all relevant times the applicant’s cell contained an in-cell toilet and a water tap. 13. The applicant’s assertions in respect of the material conditions of his detention are voluminous and lack clarity in that grievances apparently relating to different periods of time are not clearly distinguished. The applicant alleged that during unspecified periods of his incarceration in Bobov Dol Prison he had encountered the following problems: food had been substandard and insufficient in quantity, with some meals containing pieces of plastic, hairs and fur, and the meat meals often containing meat substitutes or no meat at all; the plates in which the food was being served had been dirty and greasy; tap water had been muddy; there had been iron pieces bulging from the bed-spring which had made his bed very uncomfortable, and the bedding provided had been unclean; the taking of a shower (twenty minutes per week) and applicant’s visits to the doctor had been counted as part of his daily outdoor activities; the yard in which he took his daily outdoor exercise had not had toilet facilities, which had prevented him from relieving his needs before the end of the exercise period, and inmates had not been provided with waterproof clothing when spending time outdoors; guard dogs had been placed several metres from the window of the applicant’s cell and with their constant barking at night had prevented him from sleeping; other inmates and the applicant himself had found and killed rats in the cells; the temperature in the applicant’s cell had not risen above twelve degrees Celsius in winter and the heating coal provided in winter had been insufficient; there had been no heating in the bathroom and inmates had been freezing when taking showers in winter; the applicant’s cell lacked sufficient sunlight; for a long time the cell’s floor had been left riddled with holes and not covered with linoleum; and the cleaning products provided for the in-cell toilet had been insufficient, consisting of a mere two spoonfuls of chlorine a month, which had made the smell unbearable as the main part of the cell was only separated from the toilet area by a screen. 14. The evidence submitted by the applicant in support of those allegations consisted of his own statements, a statement written in the same handwriting as in all other letters sent by the applicant but co-signed by two other inmates on an unspecified date, and copies of more than fifty complaints that the applicant had sent to the prison administration and various other authorities between 2000 and 2009 and of some of the replies received. The vast majority of those complaints concerned the food served in prison: concrete instances in which the applicant had allegedly not received a full portion, yoghurt had been missing, the food had had a bad taste or smell, or meat had not been provided or had been of low quality. Some of those complaints had been acknowledged as well-founded by the prison administration and the applicant had been assured that measures would be taken. 15. In some of those complaints the applicant raised concerns in relation to the poor quality of coal given to inmates before the installation of a central heating system in October 2006, the fact that bed linen or clothes had not been properly washed, the choice of products available for purchase at the prison canteen, and the fact that a refrigerator in the canteen used to store personal food items had not functioned for a certain period of time. 16. For their part, the Government denied the applicant’s allegations concerning the material conditions of his detention. They said that the quality and quantity of food served to inmates had been fully adequate, and that hygienic conditions in the prison canteen, including in relation to cutlery, had been maintained in line with the applicable standards. Water in the prison had not been muddy; it came from the same pipeline as the water supplied to the town of Bobov Dol. Inmates could also buy bottled mineral water from the prison canteen. The allegation that iron pieces had protruded from the applicant’s bed was not true, and his bed sheets had been changed and washed every week. Bathing time had not been counted as part of the outdoor walk time; unlike other inmates, who had only had one hour of daily outdoor walk time, life prisoners had been allowed one and a half hours. The only reasons for interrupting that walk had been rowdy conduct or bad weather; in the latter case, more outdoor time had been made available later on. The yard designated for the daily outdoor walk did not have a toilet for security and hygiene reasons. Such a toilet was in any event not needed because that yard was adjacent to the applicant’s cell, which was equipped with a toilet. If the applicant had felt an urgent need to go to the toilet during his daily walk, he could have always used that one, and would have never been prevented from doing so. The prison administration was not under a duty to provide inmates with waterproof clothing; when such clothing had been provided as a matter of courtesy, the inmates had very quickly damaged it. It was not true that guard dogs had been kept near the applicant’s cell; such dogs had not been used at all in the zone at issue. Nor had there been rats inside the applicant’s cell; its door, windows and piping had been built in a way not permitting rats to come in, and the prison administration was under a duty regularly to carry out pest control. The applicant’s cell had had central heating since 2007, and the temperature inside the cell and the bathroom had been around eighteen degrees Celsius. The cell’s window, which, like all windows in Bobov Dol Prison, had had its old wooden frame replaced with a new PVC one, did not have any covers preventing sunlight from coming in and could be freely opened, and the cell’s floor was covered with linoleum which was in a good condition. Cleaning products were distributed weekly. Cable television was available in the cell. Lastly, works were under way for enlargement of the area for outdoor walks. 17. Apparently in view of the fact that the applicant is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without commutation, he is always handcuffed when taken out of his cell, including inside the prison. The handcuffs are removed once the destination has been reached, if security conditions permit. In particular, the applicant is handcuffed when taken out of his cell for his daily outdoor walk, but the handcuffs are removed during the walk. 18. It does not appear that the applicant has ever been involved in violent incidents in prison or disciplined for violent or aggressive conduct. There is no indication that he has ever tried to abscond from prison either. 19. The facts summarised in this subsection were set out by the applicant in two separate applications to this Court lodged by him in August 2010 (application no. 53109/10) and September 2011 (application no. 67629/11). In those applications he complained about various issues, such as an alleged lack of access to a court, the outcome of proceedings for damages, the impossibility to vote in the October 2011 presidential elections in Bulgaria, and an alleged interference with his right to correspondence. 20. From the materials submitted by the applicant in those two cases it transpires that in 2010-11 he brought a number of claims for damages under section 1 the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (see paragraph 30 below) before the territorially competent Kyustendil Administrative Court. Those claims concerned dozens of allegations concerning various aspects of the conditions of his detention and specific incidents allegedly breaching his rights. 21. The claims that directly relate to the subject matter of the present case concerned, inter alia: the allegedly poor quality of tap water in Bobov Dol Prison; the allegedly insufficient heating; the allegedly insufficient surface of the area for outdoor walks; the alleged failure of the prison authorities to transfer the applicant to a collective cell with a view to enabling him to have contacts with other inmates; the alleged failure of the prison authorities to provide any educational courses for the applicant or to enable him to take part in artistic, cultural, sport, religious or other activities; the fact that the applicant had been routinely handcuffed when taken out of his cell; and allegedly frequent body searches by prison guards. 22. Other claims concerned matters such as an alleged refusal of the prison authorities in 2010 to provide the applicant with copies of receipts showing that he had paid for mail sent by him; alleged delays and obstacles in respect of mail that the applicant had wished to send; an alleged refusal to allow the applicant to use a combined MP3/radio device as opposed to separate radio and MP3 devices, which were allowed; an alleged refusal of the prison administration to wash the applicant’s underwear, etc. 23. In relation to several claims, the Kyustendil Administrative Court instructed the applicant to clarify the link between the facts described in his statement of claim and the alleged damage, and to submit a declaration of means. As the applicant did not comply with those instructions, the court discontinued the proceedings in respect of some of the claims. 24. At least four cases proceeded to judgment on the merits. 25. In a case decided on the merits on 25 February 2011, the Kyustendil Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for damages concerning the fact that tap water in Bobov Dol Prison had on occasions been muddy and unfit for drinking. The court noted that although there was evidence that sometimes, especially after heavy rains, the quality of that water had been bad, the laboratory analysis had confirmed that it had been safe for drinking. The prison was connected to the general water supply system and got the same water as that supplied to households nearby. The applicant’s allegations, for instance that he had endured acute stomach pain and had required medical assistance, had not been made out. Moreover, the applicant had had the possibility to buy bottled mineral water from the prison canteen or, if he did not have the necessary means for that, boil tap water using a device which he confirmed that he had in his cell, or filter it. The applicant’s appeal on points of law against that judgment was not examined by the Supreme Administrative Court as he failed to pay the requisite fee of BGN 5 for the processing of the appeal (see опр. № 9496 от 28 юни 2011 г. по адм. д. № 8190/2011 г., ВАС, ІІІ о.). 26. A case decided on the merits by the Kyustendil Administrative Court on 1 March 2011 concerned a specific incident on 2 September 2009 in which prison staff had entered the applicant’s cell for a search accompanied by a dog trained to find narcotic drugs. The court dismissed the applicant’s claim that he had endured stress because of his fear of dogs. There was no evidence that the dog, which had been kept on a leash, had been handled in an inappropriate manner. That case ended in a judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14 November 2011 (реш. № 14766 от 14 ноември 2011 г. по адм. д. № 8803/2011 г., ВАС, ІІІ о.) whereby the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the Kyustendil Administrative Court’s judgment was dismissed. 27. Another case decided on the merits by the Kyustendil Administrative Court on 17 March 2011 concerned thirty-three separate allegations relating to various aspects of the conditions of the applicant’s detention. It appears that in his statement of claim the applicant had made confused assertions about the periods of time to which those claims related and that he eventually only claimed non-pecuniary damages in respect of a limited period of time in the first half of 2010. The court dismissed all of the applicant’s claims. With regard, in particular, to the surface of the area for daily outdoor walks, it found that it was one hundred square metres. It went on to note that the bodily searches to which the applicant had been subjected had not involved any undressing or inappropriate touching of his private parts but patting, through his clothes, with a view to determining whether or not he had had on him any unauthorised items. The systematic handcuffing of the applicant was not in breach of the Execution of Punishments and Pre‑Trial Detention Act 2009 or the regulations for its application, was not inconsistent with the applicant’s prison regime, could be considered necessary in view of the seriousness of the offences in relation to which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment, and had not been intended to humiliate the applicant. With regard to the claim that the applicant had not been transferred to a multi-occupancy cell despite the possibility to do so for life prisoners serving their life sentence under the “severe” regime, the court found that those matters fell within the discretion of the special commission for the execution of sentences; there had therefore not been a failure on the part of the prison authorities to observe a binding legal obligation. The same went for educational courses. The applicant’s appeal on points of law against that judgment was not examined by the Supreme Administrative Court as he failed to pay the requisite fee of 5 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (the equivalent of 2.56 euros (EUR)) for the processing of the appeal (see опр. № 9090 от 23 юни 2011 г. по адм. д. № 8057/2011 г., ВАС, ІІІ о.). 28. The applicant’s claim concerning the allegedly low temperatures in his cell related to two winters: the periods between October 2005 and April 2006, and the period between October 2006 and April 2007. The court ordered an expert report, which showed that the amount of coal provided to inmates in Bobov Dol Prison in 2005-06 had been adequate and that central heating had been installed in the prison in October 2006. In a judgment of 9 June 2011 the Kyustendil Administrative Court found that the prison administration had provided the applicant with enough coal to secure a temperature of approximately twenty degrees Celsius in his cell during the first period, and that central heating had been installed before the second period. The applicant’s claim was therefore dismissed. That judgment was apparently not validly appealed against. 29. From other materials submitted by the applicant it appears that in 2012 he tried to bring a number of further claims under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (see paragraph 30 below) in relation to various instances in which his rights had allegedly been breached by the prison authorities. None of those claims was accepted for examination by the Kyustendil Administrative Court as a result of apparent failures on the part of the applicant to formulate his claims properly and pay the requisite court fees. In a series of decisions given in 2012-13 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decisions not to examine the claims on the merits.

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5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Wrocław. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant is a film director, historian, and author of press articles often commenting on current issues. The Government contested that the applicant could be considered a journalist. 8. On 20 April 2007 the applicant participated in a debate on a regional radio station, Polskie Radio Wrocław. During the debate he stated as follows: “... among the informers (informator) of the [communist-era] secret political police is Professor [J.M.] – this information confirms the theory that among those who speak out the most against lustration are people who have good reasons for doing so.” 9. On the same day the applicant called Mr J.M. an “informant” (konfident) on television. The matter was widely commented on in the media. 10. On 17 May 2007 a special commission set up at Wrocław University to examine the problem of covert surveillance of academics issued a statement in the case of Mr J.M. The statement included a list of documents concerning Mr J.M., which had been found in the archives. The commission concluded that those documents had not led it to the unequivocal conclusion that Mr J.M. had been a collaborator with the secret police. 11. On 24 May 2007 Mr J.M. brought a civil action for protection of his personal rights against the applicant. 12. On 3 July 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the action. It ordered the applicant to pay 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to a charity and to reimburse the claimant PLN 5,800 for the costs of the proceedings. The applicant was also ordered to publish an apology for having damaged the claimant’s good name in six national and regional newspapers, on three national TV channels and on Radio Wrocław. The court considered that the applicant had clearly used several expressions indicating that the claimant had been a secret collaborator with the communist-era secret services. The main question to be considered was whether such statements could be considered true. 13. The court noted that Mr J.M. was a distinguished linguist and well‑known person in Poland. He was a member of the Polish Language Council and for many years had been presenting a programme on television. The court established that between 1975 and 1984 Mr J.M. had been summoned by agents of the secret services on five occasions for interviews in connection with applications he had made for passports and returns from stays abroad. This was not contested by the claimant, who had himself made this information public. In 1978 Mr J.M. had been formally registered as a secret collaborator (a “TW”). Other notes from the Institute of National Remembrance (“IPN”) archives indicated that until 1989 a two-volume file on the claimant had existed; however, the file could no longer be found at the Wrocław branch of the IPN. The court noted that the case of Mr J.M. had been examined by a special commission set up at Wrocław University to examine the problem of covert surveillance of academics, but that the commission had been unable to reach any unequivocal conclusions. 14. The trial court heard the applicant and the claimant as well as a number of witnesses: historians (specialists on lustration), former agents of the secret services assigned to recruiting collaborators at Warsaw University, and employees of the IPN. Some of them testified that many files on secret collaborators had been destroyed when the regime fell in 1989. A few witnesses testified that they had not known of any case of fictitious registration of somebody as a secret collaborator or of a situation in which the services had kept a file on somebody for many years even though he or she had not actually been collaborating. The director of the Wrocław branch of the IPN testified that he had heard of an instance of fictitious registration of somebody as a TW. However the probability of such a situation was very low. He also declared that on the basis of the available documents, he would not have concluded that the claimant had been a communist police informant. Another historian called to testify declared that it had been impossible to draw any unequivocal conclusions. A third historian stated that the claimant had been a “real agent of the security service”. A fourth historian testified that the internal files of the secret services were reliable; the regime would only falsify documents for external purposes. The same witness considered that on the basis of the information available to him, he would also have concluded that Mr J.M. had been an intentional and secret collaborator with the communist-era secret services. Two other witnesses, former agents of the secret services, were unable to remember whether they had recruited Mr J.M. as a secret collaborator. 15. The applicant submitted that once he had discovered that Mr J.M. was on the list of secret collaborators with the secret services it had been his duty to inform the public about it. His intention had not been to offend the claimant. He had acted in the general interest, taking part in a public debate on matters of considerable importance to society. Moreover, his assertion had been provoked by public statements made by the claimant, who had questioned the importance of lustration. The applicant also argued that he had not alleged that the claimant had caused harm to other people or that he had been paid for his services. The information provided by him - that J.M. had been a collaborator - had therefore been truthful and given in the public interest. 16. Nevertheless, the court noted that no documents confirming that the claimant had agreed to be a collaborator or that he had actively reported to the secret services were available. The court referred to the definition of collaboration contained in the 1997 Lustration Act and reiterated that collaboration had to be intentional, secret and consist of passing on information. It concluded that registration by the secret services alone was not sufficient to consider that someone had been a secret collaborator. 17. The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. He argued that the registration of Mr J.M. as a secret collaborator by the services, in light of generally known facts, had allowed him to conclude that he had been a collaborator. Mr J.M. had remained registered as a TW for eleven years, his files had been destroyed, and the secret services had not been known for falsifying their internal files. According to historians, in 1989 the services had only destroyed the files of important collaborators. The applicant underlined that he had acted in the general interest as the claimant had been a public figure who had recently criticised the process of lustration. 18. On 29 October 2008 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It further ordered the applicant to pay the claimant PLN 2,000 as reimbursement of the costs of the appellate proceedings. The court accepted all the findings of the first-instance court regarding the facts of the case. It considered that when personal rights had been breached by a statement of alleged facts, the illegality of such action could be excluded only if the statement contained truthful information. Acting in the general interest did not exclude responsibility for making untrue statements. In the present case there was no evidence, in the form of either documents or witness statements, proving that Mr J.M. had indeed actively collaborated with the secret services. Therefore, in the light of the material collected in the case, the court concluded that the applicant had not proved the veracity of his statements. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not fulfilled his duty to act with particular diligence and caution in making serious allegations on the basis of unconfirmed circumstantial evidence. 19. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment and requested that a hearing be held. 20. At the hearing, held on 10 September 2009, the Supreme Court announced the judgment and gave an oral summary of the reasons. It dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal but amended the text of the apology and limited its reach to one national daily newspaper and Radio Wrocław. The applicant was ordered to reimburse the claimant a further PLN 2,000 for the costs of the cassation proceedings. The text of the apology to be published by the applicant was as follows: “I apologise to Professor J.M. for having made, on 20 April 2007, the untrue assertion that he had been an informer of the [communist-era] political police”. 21. Following the announcement of the judgment the applicant’s lawyer requested the court to prepare written reasons and to deliver them to him. The Supreme Court’s judgment with reasons, fifteen pages long, was received by the applicant’s lawyer on 30 November 2009. 22. In analysing the interplay between two competing rights – the right to freedom of expression and the right to protect one’s good name – the court referred to a resolution of the Supreme Court (18 February 2005, III CZP 53/04 OSNC 2005, nr 7-8, p 114). According to the conclusion of this resolution a journalist’s actions would not be considered illegal if they were made in the public interest and the duty to act with due diligence was fulfilled. Imposing an obligation on a journalist to prove the veracity of each statement would unjustifiably limit the freedom of the press in a democratic society. However, the Supreme Court considered that this approach could not be applied to the applicant’s case as his statement had been of a private nature and the applicant could not be considered to be a journalist with a socially necessary duty to inform. Therefore, the interpretation of the law adopted by the lower courts was correct. Making false allegations was illegal, whereas the question of due diligence would be taken into account only when assessing the fault of the defendant. 23. The court agreed with the facts as established by the lower courts in particular as regards the conclusion that the statement made by the applicant had not been true. Following the approach taken in the case thus far, the court considered that making an untrue statement that offended the personal rights of a person would always be contrary to the law. Breaching someone’s personal rights would not be against the law only if the statement could be proven to be true. An untrue statement would remain illegal even if all efforts had been made to diligently collect and examine its factual basis. In consequence, whether the applicant had acted in good faith and in the public interest or believed that the statement had been true did not influence the illegality of his action and could only be considered when assessing his financial liability for offending the personal rights of Mr J.M.

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5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Roman. Physical conditions of detention and conditions of transport 6. On 29 September 2011 the applicant was arrested after criminal proceedings had been opened against him for bribe taking. On the same date he was detained in Bacău Police Department’s detention facility. 7. On 29 November 2011 he was moved to Bacău Prison. 8. On 20 June 2012 he was released. The criminal proceedings opened against him are still pending before the domestic courts. 9. In Bacău Police Department’s detention facility and Bacău Prison the applicant had to share a cell with smokers, even though he was a non‑smoker and was suffering from a heart condition. He was unable to rest because the other detainees would smoke continuously from 7 a.m. to 2 p.m., and the cell would be covered by thick smoke. 10. The cell did not have enough furniture, and lacked coat hangers, shelves and cupboards. Clothes had to be stored on the floor, under beds, where no cleaning was carried out. The bathrooms lacked shelves and privacy, as the washing area and toilet facilities were not separate. In addition, the cell was damp, measured 15 sq. m., had a volume of 50 cubic metres, contained six beds, and was occupied by ten detainees. Cleaning and dehumidification materials were provided by his family, and in the absence of any action on the part of the prison authorities, he and the other detainees had to clean the cell themselves. The cell was not heated during the cold season, and as a result of the extreme cold the applicant had to ask his family to provide him with warmer bed linen. Also, the cell was infested with fleas, lice, bed bugs and mosquitoes, but the detainees were not allowed to disinfect it, even at their own expense. 11. The detention facilities did not provide detainees with any areas for washing, drying or cleaning their clothes. He was forced to wear dirty clothes, or if he did wash them, he had to wear them damp. 12. The bed linen provided by the authorities was unusable, was not suitable for the time of year and was not changed during the entire time he was detained. 13. Warm water was available twice a week for two hours each time therefore not all detainees could wash. He was unable to shave on a daily basis. Detainees did not have access to a barber, toiletries were not provided by the authorities and he had to purchase shaving products at his own expense. 14. The food was poor, insufficient and served in unhygienic conditions by detainees not wearing the appropriate equipment for serving food. The cutlery and plates were rusty and dirty, and the cell did not have a table and chairs for detainees to be able to sit down and eat their meal. 15. He was taken out of his cell for a walk only twice a week for thirty minutes; between ten or twenty inmates would be in the prison courtyard at a time. The courtyard was covered by a metal mesh, measured 25 sq. m, had no bathroom facilities and did not receive any sunlight. 16. The applicant was transported to and from court and was held in the courthouse cells with smokers. 17. In Bacău Police Department’s detention facility the applicant was detained in a cell which measured 12.82 sq. m and contained four beds. The cell had central heating and was ventilated. The sanitary facilities were outside the cell and were accessible to everyone twenty-four hours a day. Detainees had access to a shower, a sink, and a toilet that was separate from the rest of the bathroom. They were allowed to shower and do their laundry twice a week. 18. In Bacău Prison the applicant was detained in six different cells. Five of them were in the infirmary. 19. From 29 November to 5 December 2011 the applicant was detained in a cell which measured 26.09 sq. m and contained twenty-three beds. From 23 February to 7 May 2012 he was detained in a cell which measured 33.05 sq. m and contained eight beds. From 8 to 14 May 2012 he was detained in a cell which measured 26.61 sq. m and contained nine beds. From 15 to 28 May 2012 he was detained in a cell which measured 32.09 sq. m and contained six beds. 20. All the detention cells had central heating, sanitary facilities, windows, electricity and were furnished. The beds had mattresses, pillows, bed linen and blankets provided by the detention facility. Detainees were also allowed to receive bed linen from their families. 21. Detainees had unlimited access to cold water. They also had access to warm water every day, based on a pre-approved rota. 22. The cells were heated daily during the cold season from 5 to 9.30 a.m. and 7 to 11 p.m. 23. They were disinfected three times a year or whenever needed, by specialist contractors. In addition, detainees were provided with cleaning materials and had a statutory duty to clean their cells. They were also provided with toiletries for their personal hygiene. Starting from December 2011 each individual had to sign for the toiletries they were given. 24. The detention facilities had cells assigned exclusively to non‑smoking detainees. 25. Without providing supporting documents, the Government submitted to the Court that when the applicant had been transferred to Bacău Prison, he had declared that he was a smoker. In addition, on 6 and 16 December 2011 and 8 May 2012 he had purchased cigarettes, and on 13 December 2011 he had bought lighters. 26. The applicant was transferred only to courthouse cells and not to any other detention facilities. The vehicles had windows and heating. 27. As a general rule, detainees were forbidden from smoking during transfers. Smokers were separated from non-smokers in the courthouse cells. 28. Between 14 December 2011 and 20 June 2012 the applicant was transferred sixteen times to and from court, for distances of 2 and 62 kilometers.

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5. The applicant was born in 1986 and is currently detained in Zamość Remand Centre. 6. On 15 October 2010 he was arrested on suspicion of having committed a number of offences connected with handling drugs and psychoactive substances in an organised criminal group. 7. On 17 October 2010 the Rzeszów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody for three months. The court relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question and on the reasonable risk that he would obstruct the proceedings, because the offences had been committed in an organised group. The court did not share the prosecutor’s view according to which there had been a reasonable fear that the applicant might abscond or go into hiding. The court found no reasons to hold so. 8. The applicant’s detention on remand was extended by the Rzeszów Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 13 January, on 11 April and on 11 July 2011. In these decisions, in order to justify the extension of the detention, the court repeated the previous reasons relied on. In the decision of 11 April 2011 the court further noted that, taking into consideration the number of offences that the applicant had been suspected of, further detention was additionally justified by a heavy penalty that might be imposed on the applicant if convicted. 9. Subsequently, on 6 October 2011, the detention was extended by the Rzeszów Court of Appeal until 30 November 2011. The court relied on the same grounds as previously and additionally noted that the applicant’s case was particularly complicated which justified extension of the detention beyond the statutory time-limit of 12 months. 10. On 7 November 2011 a bill of indictment against the applicant and several other co-accused was lodged with the Zamość Regional Court. 11. On 23 November 2011 the Zamość Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention for further three months, until 29 February 2012. No new grounds were relied on. 12. Further extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention was ordered by the Lublin Court of Appeal on 30 May 2012. The Regional Court had requested a three-month extension. The court granted the prosecutor’s request only in part for two further months that is until 4 August 2012 and found that since the trial court had scheduled hearings only until the end of June 2012, the detention could not be extended until September. The court further considered that the time-limit until 4 August 2012 should be sufficient to complete the proceedings before the first-instance court. 13. On 1 August 2012 the Lublin Court of Appeal again granted the Regional Court’s request only in part and extended the applicant’s detention for two further months and not for three months as requested by the Regional Court. The court relied again on the same grounds, analysed the course of the proceedings and considered that the time-limit until 4 October 2012 should be sufficient to complete the proceedings. The court also justified the extraordinary extension of the detention by the complexity of the case resulting, among other things, from the nature of evidence; there were anonymous witnesses to be heard and part of the evidence constituted material classified as confidential. 14. On 27 September 2012 the Lublin Court of Appeal, relying on the same grounds as previously, extended the applicant’s detention until 4 January 2013. The court additionally noted that large part of evidence in the trial constituted the accused’s’ conversations recorded confidentially as a result of their confidential control. The accused as well as their counsels had demanded that the recordings be heard in extenso at the hearing which influenced the duration of the proceedings. 15. On 28 December 2012 the Lublin Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 2 April 2013. The court relied on the same grounds as previously, analysed the course of the proceedings and found no undue delays but noted that the detention had already lasted considerable time and that the trial court should intensify its activities to complete the trial until the expiry of the time-limit of the extended detention. 16. On 27 March 2013 the Lublin Court of Appeal again extended the applicant’s detention until 4 July 2013 finding that although the trial court had regularly scheduled hearings, some objective obstacles did not allow it to complete the proceedings. 17. On 26 June 2013 the Lublin Court of Appeal again extended the applicant’s detention until 4 October 2013; the extraordinary extension was again justified by the complexity of the case. 18. On 2 October 2013 the Lublin Court of Appeal, relying on the same grounds as previously, again extended the applicant’s detention until 7 December 2013. 19. The applicant appealed against this decision. 20. On 5 November 2013 the Lublin Court of Appeal amended the challenged decision and held that the applicant could be released upon payment of bail in the amount of 50,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), (approximately 12,000 euros (EUR)). The court found that this preventive measure would be capable of securing the proper conduct of the proceedings, it failed however to explain in details the reasons behind this decision. It only noted that the bail should not only be dependent on the financial possibilities of the person interested but also secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. Since this decision was given in a result of an appeal, no further appeal was available to the applicant. 21. On 4 December 2013 the Lublin Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 7 February 2014. 22. On 14 January 2014 the Zamość Regional Court gave judgment and convicted all six members of the group. The applicant was found guilty of leading an organised criminal group smuggling marihuana from the Netherlands to Poland and organising sale of marihuana and ecstasy pills on the territory of Poland. He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine. 23. Following the applicant’s appeal, the criminal proceedings against him are currently pending before the second-instance court. The applicant remains in detention. 24. The applicant appealed against the decision of 17 October 2010 imposing the pre-trial detention on him as well as against all decisions extending his detention. 25. In their decisions upholding the extensions the courts relied on the original grounds for the applicant’s detention. The courts emphasised the need to apprehend other members of the criminal group and to obtain additional evidence supporting the case against the applicant. In the courts’ view, the applicant, if released, would try to obstruct the proceedings by passing vital information about the preliminary proceedings onto the other members of the criminal group and by influencing witnesses. The courts concluded that in the context of the applicant’s case, which concerned organised crime, detention on remand remained the only security measure capable of guaranteeing the proper conduct of the proceedings.

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5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Ljubljana. 6. The applicant was detained in the closed section of Ljubljana prison from 5 May 2009 to 26 May 2009, in the remand section from 25 August 2009 to 11 February 2010, from 11 March 2011 to 22 March 2011 and from 8 June 2011 to 11 January 2012 and again in the closed section from 24 August 2012 to 4 December 2012. 7. On 25 August 2009 he was held in cell 90 measuring 18.07 square metres (not including a separate 1.75 square metre sanitary facility), shared with four other detainees and with 3.2 square metres of personal space. From 26 August 2009 to 11 February 2010 he was held in cell 50 measuring 8.07 square metres (not including a separate 1.23 square metre sanitary facility) and cell 52 measuring 8.04 square metres (not including a separate 1.25 square metre sanitary facility), alone with almost 7 square metres of personal space or with another detainee with 3.4 square metres of personal space. 8. The cell for two detainees, where the applicant was held in the remand section, contained one bunk bed, one bigger and one smaller table, two chairs, two wardrobes and two 89 x 54 cm windows, which detainees could freely open or close. 9. As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the remand section of Ljubljana prison, material conditions inside the cells and sanitary conditions, see the judgment in Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia, nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, §§ 10 to 23, 20 October 2011. 10. As to the out-of-cell time in the remand section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that detainees in the remand section were confined to their cells day and night, save for two hours of daily outdoor exercise, and an additional two hours per week in a recreation room (Mandić and Jović, cited above, § 78). The Government stated that from 9 February 2011 on detainees could spend three hours per day outdoors. 11. On 18 December 2009 the applicant lodged the application complaining about the prison conditions of his detention from 25 August 2009. In the supplement to his application of 17 September 2013, he complained also about the conditions of his detention from 5 May 2009 to 26 May 2009, from 11 March 2011 to 22 March 2011, from 8 June 2011 to 11 January 2012 and from 24 August 2012 to 4 December 2012.

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5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Ljubljana. 6. The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed and semi-open sections of Ljubljana prison and in the open section Ig, Ljubljana prison. 7. In the period between 19 May 2009 and 1 July 2009 he was held in the closed section: in cell 117, measuring 17.66 square metres (not including a separate 1.68 square metre sanitary facility) shared with three to five other inmates and with 2.66 to 3.99 square metres of personal space and in cell 2 measuring 16.18 square metres (not including a separate 1.7 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 2.9 to 4.8 square metres of personal space. 8. In the period between 2 July 2009 and 31 October 2009 he was held in the semi-open section: in cell 139, measuring 19.36 square metres (not including a separate 1.76 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 3.5 to 5.8 square metres of personal space and in cell 146 measuring 16.89 square metres (not including a separate 1.76 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two, three or four other inmates and with 3 to 5 square metres of personal space. 9. In the period between 1 November 2009 and 18 February 2010 he was held in the open section Ig in cell 1, measuring 41.64 square metres (not including a separate 13.90 square metre sanitary facility) shared with three to seven other inmates and with 3.5 to 6.9 square metres of personal space. 10. As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the closed and semi-open sections, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011. 11. As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50‑square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (Štrucl and Others § 86). 12. As to the out-of-cell time in the semi-open section, the Government submitted that the cell doors in the semi-open section of the prison were unlocked, except from 9.45 p.m. (on Fridays, Saturdays and before holidays from midnight) until 6.00 a.m. (on Saturdays, Sundays and during holidays until 8.30 a.m.). During this time prisoners could move freely in the corridor (35.7 square metres), living quarters of co-prisoners or in the indoor or outdoor exercise areas, in accordance with prison rules. The Government contended that this regime had been in place for several years. 13. As to the open section, cells were open twenty-four hours per day and prisoners could, except when sleeping, move around freely, inside the open section (in a dining room, classroom, recreation room) and in outdoor areas (a park and sports ground). Further, the prisoners were allowed to exercise for four hours per day, they could do shopping in a shop outside the prison, their visits were unsupervised and their correspondence with people from outside the prison and the use of a telephone were not limited and supervised. The open section had a capacity for twenty seven prisoners in five cells. The prisoners shared sanitary facilities with five showers, five washbasins in the lavatory, three toilets on the ground floor and four toilets on the first floor of the section and a laundry room with a washing machine and a drier, which prisoners could freely use. Prisoners in the open section were also entitled to unsupervised visits outside prison for five hours during weekends, unsupervised leave and annual leave if working in Ljubljana prison. 14. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5- 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

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5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Ljubljana. 6. The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed section of Ljubljana prison in the period between 5 August 2009 and 5 October 2009. He was held in cell 119 which measured 17.51 square metres (including a separate 1.74 square metre sanitary facility), with four or five other prisoners, having between 2.63 and 3.15 square metres of personal space. From 5 August 2009 to 15 September 2009 and from 24 September 2009 to 5 October 2009 six prisoners were held therein, from 15 September 2009 to 24 September 2009 five prisoners were held therein. 7. As regards the general characteristics of the cells, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011. 8. As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50‑square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (Štrucl and Others § 86). 9. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5‑5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

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5. Mr Peter Azzopardi, was born in 1950 and lives in Naxxar. The registered address of Canadian Brothers Limited is also Naxxar. 6. Canadian Brothers Limited was the holder of the utile dominium (by way of sub-emphyteusis) of land in Msida, Malta, measuring approximately 772 sq.m., which it intended to develop for commercial purposes. The applicant, that is, Mr Peter Azzopardi, as director for and on behalf of Canadian Brothers Limited had lodged a development application but no development permit had been issued. 7. By a declaration published in the Government Gazette on 11 October 1974 the President of Malta declared that 901 sq.m. (including a rural room) and 240 sq.m. of land – which included the land held by the Canadian Brothers Limited – were to be expropriated (acquired by a title of absolute purchase). The taking of possession of the land was undertaken following a request by the Director of Public Works in connection with the construction of a reservoir. 8. On 19 June 1992 the applicant was served with a Notice to Treat offering the sum of approximately 18,050 euros (EUR) for the acquisition. Other parties who had an interest in the property (including heirs, as a result of the demise of some individuals) were also served with a Notice to Treat. Of those interested parties, some accepted the sum offered while others objected to the amount by means of a judicial letter dated 15 September 1992. The applicant contested the amount offered and – by means of a judicial letter filed on 25 September 1992 – made a counter-claim for approximately EUR 559,050. 9. The law at the relevant time did not provide for any procedure allowing the applicant to initiate proceedings for compensation. The initiation of compensation proceedings was an action which could be undertaken only by the authorities, and to which no time-limit applied. However, in the 1990s it was confirmed, through case-law, that if a request was made by anyone in a position similar to the applicant’s the courts of civil jurisdiction had the competence to set a time-limit within which the authorities – namely the Commissioner of Land (“CoL”) – was obliged to initiate such proceedings, and this by application of Article 1078 of the Civil Code. 10. According to his affidavit, the applicant repeatedly solicited the authorities to process his case, but to no avail. By the year 2000 the competent authority had still not instituted proceedings before the Land Arbitration Board (“LAB”) to determine the relevant compensation and the applicant therefore instituted constitutional redress proceedings (see below). 11. In the meantime, in December 2002, the CoL filed an application informing the domestic courts that the Notice to Treat was missing from the court archives and requesting the appointment of new curators to replace those who were deceased. 12. Pending those proceedings, on 12 January 2004 the public authorities instituted proceedings before the LAB to determine the compensation due. To date those proceedings, to which the applicant is a party, are still pending. 13. In 2006 the law governing the determination of compensation was amended. In particular, interest was no longer calculated at 5% per annum on the value of the land as determined by the LAB but rather on the mean value between the value on the date of the taking and the value on the date of the determination itself. Secondly, following an amendment in 2004, the compensation awarded could not exceed the amount of compensation demanded by the party in its counter-claim to the Notice to Treat. 14. The applicant submitted that such changes were to the detriment of the person whose land had been expropriated and who had been suffering delays in proceedings. Moreover, the applicant argued that in any event the LAB was not in a position to determine adequate compensation as it could not take inflation into consideration. 15. The applicant continued to pay a ground rent (in his capacity of sub- empyhteuta) equivalent to EUR 183.51 per year throughout the relevant period. 16. Before the constitutional jurisdictions, the applicant (Mr Peter Azzopardi on behalf of Canadian Brothers Ltd.) claimed that he had suffered a breach of his rights under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He submitted that as a result of the inaction of the authorities he had been deprived of the property without receiving the compensation to which he was entitled and that such compensation had not been determined within a reasonable time. 17. By a judgment of 12 November 2010 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the Government’s objection of non- exhaustion of ordinary remedies (in respect of Article 1078 of the Civil Code) and found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It noted that compensation proceedings had not been instituted by the authorities three decades after the taking of the land and that, forty years after such taking, the applicant had still not received any compensation, the value of which, moreover, appeared not yet to have been determined. It awarded EUR 25,000 in non-pecuniary damage resulting from the said violations, but considered that compensation for the property was to be determined by the competent Board. 18. Both the CoL and the applicant appealed. By a judgment of 11 November 2011, the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment. It again rejected the Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. As regards the merits, it noted that the dispute between the parties had started in 1974 and that thirty-seven years later the applicant was still awaiting compensation for the taking of the land. While it was true that under Maltese law there was no right of action based on the Convention rights before 1987 and the court therefore had no jurisdiction to decide on facts which occurred before that date, the court nevertheless had to have regard to the stage reached in the proceedings up to that date. It noted that there was a delay of thirteen years before and sixteen years after 1987, during which time compensation proceedings had not been initiated. This undoubtedly amounted to an unreasonable delay under Article 6 of the Convention. Moreover, there was no valid reason justifying the delay in paying compensation for the expropriation. This therefore also constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as a result of which the applicant was entitled to compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Constitutional Court confirmed the amount awarded by the first-instance court but refused to issue any instructions to the LAB in relation to the method of calculation of the compensation, as requested by the applicant, noting that it was for the Board to make such an award and that the applicant could take the appropriate steps if he was not satisfied with the sum eventually awarded. 19. The compensation awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage was paid on 5 January 2012. 20. On 12 January 2004 the public authorities instituted proceedings before the LAB to determine the compensation due. Those proceedings were still pending in February 2014, after more than forty hearings and adjournments, in part due to the applicant, the Board and the architects. Up to that time the technical members of the LAB had estimated the value of the land (utile dominium) in 1990 to be EUR 272,623.20. The applicant contested this estimate, which he considered was of no relevance in the context, since according to the law it was the 1992 value which had to be taken into consideration. According to the applicant, land values had increased further by 1992, and he would thus suffer a disadvantage if a land valuation from an earlier date were taken. Moreover, that value was not comparable to the price of other similar plots of land in the area sold at the time. On 26 November 2012, following acceptance of the applicant’s request, the applicant filed before the LAB a set of questions addressed to the architects. In January 2014 the architects in question had still not replied and the case continues to be adjourned for that reason. In October 2014 the case was still pending.

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5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Hagen in Germany. 6. The applicant was arrested on 8 April 2007. His identity papers proved to be forgeries. On 9 April 2007 the Hagen District Court (Landgericht) issued an arrest warrant against the applicant based on possession of forged documents. 7. On 11 April 2007 the General Public Prosecutor took over the investigation. On 23 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) quashed the arrest warrant and issued a fresh arrest warrant based, inter alia, on the suspicion of membership of a foreign terrorist organisation (the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front, DHKP-C). 8. On 21 June 2007 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s appeal against the arrest warrant. 9. On 30 August, 30 October 2007 and 14 February 2008 the Federal Court of Justice upheld the arrest warrant and ordered that the applicant’s detention be continued. 10. On 27 May 2008 the Federal Court of Justice issued a new arrest warrant. According to the new warrant, the applicant was strongly suspected of having played a leading role in the activities of a foreign terrorist organisation, and of having committed two counts of murder and six counts of attempted murder. The applicant had, in particular, telephoned witness G.G. from Germany to instruct him to carry out a terrorist attack which took place in Istanbul on 1 April 1993 and in which two policemen were killed. The applicant was further suspected of having ordered several terrorist attacks carried out by detonating explosives in Turkey between January 2001 and July 2005. 11. On 17 June 2008 the Federal Court of Justice ordered the extension of the applicant’s detention. 12. On 24 June 2008 the General Public Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant comprising 286 pages plus a list of evidence covering another 81 pages, based on the same grounds as the arrest warrant dated 27 May 2008. 13. On 2 October 2008 the Federal Court of Justice ordered the applicant’s continued detention. 14. On 21 November 2008 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht, no. III-2 STS 1/08), sitting as a first instance court for proceedings concerning State security, decided to open the trial against the applicant. The hearing started on 15 January 2009 and took place on 95 days. 15. On 28 April 2009 witness G.G. was heard by a court in Istanbul in the presence of all parties to the proceedings. 16. On 9 June 2009, after 16 days of court hearing, the Court of Appeal quashed the arrest warrant insofar as it had been based on the suspicion that the applicant had ordered the attack which had taken place in Istanbul on 1 April 1993 and ordered the applicant’s continued detention based on the remaining grounds of the arrest warrant. The Court of Appeal considered that witness G.G., relied upon by the prosecution, had not confirmed the testimony he had given to the Turkish authorities in 1993. Conversely, he had stated that he had been tortured by Turkish civil servants and had been forced to sign a prepared protocol. He did not know the applicant. Under these circumstances, no strong suspicion persisted that the applicant had ordered the above-mentioned criminal act. 17. The Court of Appeal considered that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having committed the other crimes of which he was accused. There was, in particular, sufficient documentary and witness evidence supporting the allegation that the applicant, as a leading member of a terrorist organisation, was responsible for causing explosions and committing other criminal acts. The Court of Appeal inter alia referred to the minutes and decisions of the founding congress which established that the applicant had been elected as a member of the central committee of the DHKP-C in the beginning of 1999. 18. The Court of Appeal further considered that the applicant might abscond and that there was a risk of collusion. The court observed that the applicant, who had been residing illegally in Germany, had neither a fixed residence nor sufficient social ties to ensure his appearance before the court. There were thus no milder means available to secure his presence at the trial. 19. The Court of Appeal further considered that the proceedings were expedited as required in cases involving pre-trial detention. The Court of Appeal included a detailed account of the trial, explaining that on several occasions witnesses could not be questioned by the court because they exercised their right not to testify. The court had heard testimony from nine witnesses and was then hearing four further witnesses. In order to establish whether the applicant had committed the crimes of which he had been accused, testimony from Turkish witnesses was of paramount importance. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal had to make several enquiries by way of letters rogatory in Turkey. 20. On 4 August 2009 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) rejected the applicant’s complaint. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having ordered several explosions causing injuries and death. The court further confirmed that the danger of the applicant’s absconding, and of collusion, remained. The continuation of his detention was not disproportionate in view of the importance of the subject matter and of the considerable punishment to be expected in case of a criminal conviction. Furthermore, the length of the proceedings was due to their complexity, as had been set out in detail by the Court of Appeal. 21. On 6 October 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, no. 2 BvR 2133/09) refused to consider the applicant’s complaint against the decisions of 9 June and 4 August 2009, without giving further reasons. 22. On 17 February 2010 witness S.G. and one further witness were heard in Istanbul. 23. On 17 May 2010 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal extended the arrest warrant on the grounds that there was again a strong suspicion that the applicant had ordered the attack during which two policemen were killed in Istanbul in April 1993. This assessment was, in particular, based on testimony given by witness S.G., who had stated that G.G. had informed him in 1993 that the applicant had given him the order to carry out the attack against the policemen. The Court of Appeal considered that this statement was consistent and credible. Furthermore, there was corroborative evidence from witnesses who had confirmed that the applicant held a leading position in the terrorist organisation at the relevant time. 24. The Court of Appeal further found that there remained a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the other crimes of which he was accused. Referring to its previous decisions, the Court of Appeal considered that the danger of the applicant’s absconding persisted. This danger had further been aggravated by the fact that another Chamber of the Court of Appeal had, in the meantime, allowed the applicant’s extradition to Turkey. According to an intelligence report dating from 2009, a leader of the terrorist organisation had ordered that the applicant be taken out of the country immediately if released from detention. It was furthermore known that the terrorist organisation had the necessary means to put this plan into action. 25. The Court of Appeal finally considered that the prolongation of the pre-trial detention was not disproportionate, having regard to the importance of the subject matter and to the seriousness of the penalty to be expected in case of a criminal conviction. 26. On 23 September 2010 witness S.G. was once again heard in Istanbul. 27. On 10 February 2011, on the sixty-eighth day of the hearing, the Court of Appeal closed the hearing of evidence and heard the prosecutor’s pleadings. Upon defence counsel’s request, the hearing of evidence was re‑opened and the Court of Appeal limited the charge to two counts of murder committed in April 1993, while discontinuing the proceedings concerning the other charges originally brought against the applicant. 28. On 27 September 2011 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of two counts of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On the basis of the evidence presented during the hearing, the Court of Appeal found it established that the applicant had ordered the assassination of the policemen by telephone from Germany at the end of March 1993. The court primarily based the applicant’s conviction on testimony from witness S.G. The Court of Appeal further considered that this finding was in line with the command structure inside the terrorist organisation and was not called into question by G.G.’s allegations that he did not know the applicant. During his hearing before the Turkish court, G.G. had refused to make any more specific statements. Under these circumstances, the vague statement that the applicant did not have anything to do with the attack was not sufficient to call S.G.’s testimony into question. 29. The Court of Appeal finally considered that the length of detention and of the main hearing did not violate the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention. The specific circumstances of the instant case did not allow for an earlier termination of the proceedings. This was due to the extent and the complexity of the criminal charges. Apart from two counts of murder, of which he had been convicted, the applicant had been accused of holding a leading role in a foreign terrorist organisation and of having participated in causing a considerable number of explosions in Turkey. The case-files consisted of approximately 130 large volumes. As the applicant had been arrested by chance, the examination of the relevant facts could begin only after his arrest. The Turkish authorities had submitted a large number of documents such as expert opinions, sketches and records of witness testimony, which had to be translated and examined before the issue of the indictment on 24 June 2008. Due to the volume of the case-file and to the complexity of the subject matter, the main proceedings could not be opened before 21 November 2008. During the hearing, the progress of the taking of evidence had been determined by several requests by letters rogatory to the Turkish authorities. Members of the court and representatives of the parties travelled to Turkey four times in order to attend the hearing of witnesses before Turkish courts. Each taking of evidence by letters rogatory took considerably more than half a year. Following this, the taking of evidence was closed on 10 February 2011, but re-opened altogether three times at the request of the defence. The reading out of the applicant’s last word alone took four days. 30. On 29 November 2012 the Federal Court of Justice quashed the judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal and remitted the case to another Chamber of that court. The Federal Court of Justice considered that the assessment of the evidence by the Court of Appeal had been erroneous as that court had wrongly assumed that the testimony given by S.G. on the circumstances of his alleged conversation with G.G. was consistent and without contradictions. 31. The Federal Court of Justice further considered that it could not be ruled out that this error had been decisive for the Court of Appeal in reaching its verdict. There were further reasons to review critically S.G.’s testimony. Firstly, S.G. had not directly witnessed the applicant ordering the attack, but was merely a hearsay witness. Furthermore, the witness was not heard by the trial court, but by a Turkish court at the trial court’s request. Finally, S.G., who had been arrested in Turkey in 2002, had collaborated with the Turkish police and had thus benefited from a milder sentence and early release from prison. 32. On 17 January 2013 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal (no. III‑6 STS 3/12) ordered the applicant’s continued detention. The further detention was justified because the applicant was under strong suspicion of having committed a serious crime and because there was the risk that he might abscond. That court considered that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having ordered the attacks carried out on the policemen on 1 April 1993. This was not called into question by the Federal Court of Justice’s decision to quash the judgment. The potential contradictions in the statements made by witness S.G. had to be examined in the new main proceedings. The Court of Appeal further considered that there were no milder means available to secure the applicant’s appearance before the court and that the length of his detention was not yet disproportionate. The fact that the Federal Court of Justice had quashed the judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal did not lead to a violation of the obligation to expedite the proceedings, as there was no obvious procedural error. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal had respected the obligation to expedite the proceedings by preparing the requests for letters rogatory in order to begin the main hearing by the end of April or the beginning of May 2013. 33. On 19 March 2013 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint. That court confirmed that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having ordered the attack in Istanbul. This suspicion was primarily based on testimony given by witness S.G. during the main hearing on 17 February and 23 September 2010 and statements made by witness G.G. during his interrogation by Turkish police on 2 May 1993. This was not called into question by the fact that the judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal had been quashed on the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The contradiction in S.G.’s testimony did not concern the core content of his statement, which remained unchanged. 34. The Federal Court of Justice further observed that witness G.G. had stated, during interrogations by the Turkish authorities on 2 May 1993, that the applicant had given him the order to carry out the attack on 1 April 1993. The court considered that it was not prevented from taking into account this statement by G.G.’s repeated claims that he had made this statement under torture, as his vague and general allegations were not confirmed. 35. The Federal Court of Justice finally considered that the length of detention (almost six years) was not disproportionate. The court gave a full account of the proceedings and concluded that the length of the proceedings was primarily determined by the complexity of the subject matter and by the very strong international dimension of the case. Conversely, there had not been any considerable delays imputable to the trial court. 36. On 15 May 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court (no. 2 BvR 790/13), relying on its Rules of Procedure, refused to accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication. 37. On 6 May 2013 the fresh hearing of the applicant’s case started before the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal. 38. On 4 October 2013 the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s continued detention on the basis of the arrest warrant of 27 May 2008. 39. On 4 February 2014, following a new request lodged by the applicant on 20 January 2014, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal quashed the arrest warrant and ordered the applicant’s release from detention. The applicant was released on that same day. 40. The Court of Appeal considered that the further execution of detention would be disproportionate. According to that court the applicant remained firmly suspected of having ordered the attack of 1 April 1993, in which two policemen were killed. This assessment was based on the testimony given by S.G. in the first set of proceedings as well as on further corroborative evidence. The Court of Appeal considered that to prolong the detention would be disproportionate. In cases involving pre-trial detention, the criminal courts were under a constitutional obligation to expedite the proceedings (Beschleunigungsgebot). This principle had to be applied even more strictly given the long duration of the applicant’s detention. The Court of Appeal considered that it could not foresee when it would hear witness testimony from S.G., who was the primary witness for the prosecution. In spite of several reminders, the requests for letters rogatory lodged with the Turkish authorities in April and September 2013 had not so far been disposed of. As it was unclear when the witness could be heard, the Court of Appeal considered that it was unable duly to expedite the proceedings as would have been necessary in view of the fact that detention had already lasted almost seven years. The Court of Appeal noted that the statements made by witness G.G. to the Turkish Authorities in 1993 could not be used because it could not be ruled out that they had been obtained by torture. 41. In August 2014, the criminal proceedings were still pending before the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal.

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5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kranj. 6. The applicant was detained in the remand section of Ljubljana prison from 31 May 2008 to 29 August 2008. He was again detained in the remand section of Ljubljana prison from 23 April 2009 to 27 January 2010. 7. In the period from 23 April 2009 to 24 April 2009 he was held for two days in cell 59 alone or with another detainee. From 25 April 2009 to 25 May 2009 he was held for thirty-one days in cell 99 measuring 8.44 square metres (not including a separate 1.39 square metre sanitary facility), alone with 7.05 square metres of personal space. From 26 May 2009 to 27 January 2010 he was held for eight months and three days in cell 50 measuring 8.07 square metres (not including a separate 1.23 square metre sanitary facility), alone with 6.84 square metres of personal space or with another detainee with 3.4 square metres of personal space. 8. The cell for two detainees, where the applicant was held, contained one bunk bed, one bigger and one smaller table, two chairs, two wardrobes and two 89 x 54 cm windows, which detainees could freely open or close. 9. As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the remand section of Ljubljana prison, material conditions inside the cells and sanitary conditions, see the judgment in Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia, nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, §§ 10 to 23, 20 October 2011. 10. As to the out-of-cell time in the remand section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that detainees in the remand section were confined to their cells day and night, save for two hours of daily outdoor exercise, and an additional two hours per week in a recreation room (Mandić and Jović, cited above, § 78). 11. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5- 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

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5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Trlić. 6. The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed and semi-open sections of Ljubljana prison. 7. In the period from 25 August 2009 to 22 September 2009 and from 4 November 2009 to 12 November 2009 he was held in the closed section: for two days in cell 4, measuring 18.75 square metres (not including a separate 2.44 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 3.26 to 5.4 square metres of personal space and for thirty‑six days in cell 2 measuring 16.18 square metres (not including a separate 1.7 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 2.9 to 4.8 square metres of personal space. 8. In the period between 23 September 2009 and 3 November 2009 he was held in the semi-open section for forty-two days in cell 137, measuring 17.94 square metres (not including a separate 1.75 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 3.2 to 5.4 square metres of personal space. 9. As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the closed and semi-open sections, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011. 10. As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50‑square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (Štrucl and Others § 86). 11. As to the out-of-cell time in the semi-open section, the Government submitted that the cell doors in the semi-open section of the prison were unlocked, except from 9.45 p.m. (on Fridays, Saturdays and before holidays from midnight) until 6.00 a.m. (on Saturdays, Sundays and during holidays until 8.30 a.m.). During this time prisoners could move freely in the corridor (35.7 square metres), living quarters of co-prisoners or in the indoor or outdoor exercise areas, in accordance with prison rules. The Government contended that this regime had been in place for several years. 12. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5-5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

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4. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in the Krasnodar Region. 5. On 29 November 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. On 27 October 2011 and other dates he was additionally charged with membership in a criminal syndicate and other offences. 6. On 27 January, 19 April, 19 July, 20 September, 17 October and 25 November 2011, 19 January, 16 April and 19 October 2012 and on other dates the authorised period of the applicant’s detention was extended. Each time the courts relied chiefly on the gravity of the charges against him. On 1 November 2012 the Krasnodar Regional Court considered and rejected, in a summary fashion, the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ appeals against the extension order of 19 October 2012. 7. The jury found the applicant not guilty of the offences he was charged with. On 19 June 2013 the applicant was acquitted and released. On 30 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the acquittal on appeal. 8. Invoking his “right to rehabilitation” under Article 133-135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant brought a claim against the Federal Treasury for the loss of income and reimbursement of legal fees. He did not seek any compensation for non-pecuniary damage. By judgment of 28 January 2014, the Krasnodar Regional Court granted his claim in part.

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8. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Iaşi. 9. The applicant, who was admitted to the Bucharest Bar Association in December 2004, was involved, as a party, in several sets of civil and criminal proceedings. 10. In February 2003 she was informed by E.E., a prosecutor attached to the Iaşi District Court, that she was suspected of incitement to false testimony. She was specifically suspected of having persuaded the witnesses in a different set of criminal proceedings to give false testimony. The development of those proceedings is described in paragraphs 37 to 57 below. 11. At about 9 a.m. on 28 May 2003 the applicant went to the prosecutor’s office attached to the Iaşi District Court. According to her, she wanted to submit a complaint to the superior of the prosecutor investigating the case against her. According to the Government, the applicant went there at the prosecutor’s invitation in order to be informed of the content of the criminal file against her (prezentarea materialului de urmărire penală). 12. The applicant argued that the prosecutor had seen her for only a few minutes at the entrance to his office and that afterwards she had been taken by a police officer to a room on the first floor, where she was kept waiting. 13. The Government claimed that when the prosecutor declined the applicant’s request to have photocopies of all the documents in the criminal file, she had refused to remain in the prosecutor’s office. Consequently, at 9.30 a.m. the prosecutor issued an order to appear (mandat de aducere) to prevent her from leaving the building and instructed police officer M.L.E. to ensure that it was complied with. The Government submitted a copy of the order to appear. They also claimed that the applicant had refused to comply with the order, and had continued to behave inappropriately, using malicious language against the prosecutors and the police. The police prevented her from leaving the building. At 10.40 a.m. the applicant was received by the chief prosecutor. She was then allowed to write a complaint in the waiting room of the building. 14. Subsequently, at an unknown time the same day, E.E. ordered the applicant’s immediate confinement to the Iaşi Psychiatric University Hospital (“the Socola hospital”) for an assessment of her mental state. The reasons given were the following: “Given that [the applicant] has shown an exaggerated propensity to complain and that her language has become extremely vehement, facts that give rise to doubts as to her psychological state, and having regard to Articles 116, 117 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 14 of Decree no 79/1971, I order that a psychiatric assessment be conducted ...”. 15. While she was still in the building, the applicant made a handwritten complaint against the confinement order. In her complaint, she also mentioned that she had been held in the building since 11 a.m. After her confinement she lodged other similar complaints. 16. At about 2 p.m., as the applicant refused to go to the hospital, prosecutor E.E. asked the police to execute the confinement order. According to the applicant, several police officers dragged her by the hands and lifted her by force into a car, in which she was then taken to the hospital. She sustained several bruises and other injuries. According to a report drafted by the Iaşi police the same day, four police officers (other than M.L.E. – see paragraph 13 above) carried the applicant in their arms to the car. She resisted and tried several times to hit her knees against a wooden doorframe. 17. The applicant was photographed by the press while being taken away from the premises of the prosecutor’s office. She submitted to the Court several articles that had appeared in the local press. They included a photograph of the applicant on her knees in a doorway while being dragged out of the building by two police officers. 18. At about 3 p.m. on 28 May 2003 the applicant was presented to the doctor on duty at the Socola hospital. 19. On 5 June 2003 the applicant underwent an examination by a panel of three doctors at the Socola hospital. The examination report concluded that she was mentally sound and aware of her acts. She was released from the hospital on the same day. 20. On 9 June 2003 the applicant was informed by a note from the chief prosecutor attached to the Iaşi District Court that her complaint against the confinement order had been dismissed by a decision of 6 June 2003. The prosecutor’s note did not indicate any reasons for the dismissal of the applicant’s complaint. 21. On 29 May 2003 the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination. The doctor reported that she had various bruises on her arms and legs which could have been caused by being hit with blunt objects and by pressure exerted with the fingers, and estimated that she needed three or four days’ treatment. 22. Following the incident, the applicant submitted numerous requests with various authorities, such as the police, the prosecutor’s office, the Ministry of Justice and the President of Romania. Those relevant to the case are summarised below. 23. On 3 June 2003, the applicant wrote to the Iaşi County Police asking to be informed of the legal grounds of the actions taken by the police on 28 May 2003. She also requested the names of the police officers who had escorted her by car from the prosecutor’s office to the Socola hospital. 24. On 26 June 2003, the police informed her that she had been escorted to the Socola hospital by virtue of an order delivered by the prosecutor under Article 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), but that they could not disclose the names of the police officers because they were not their employees. 25. On 4 August 2003, the applicant wrote to the Iaşi Police (Second Precinct) with a similar request (see paragraph 23 above). 26. On 13 August 2003, the police informed her that the officers who had escorted her were indeed employed by the Iaşi Police (Second Precinct), but that they could not disclose their names without a specific instruction from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Iaşi District Court. 27. The applicant lodged several complaints against E.E. and other prosecutors who had examined her case, and against M.L.E. She generally complained of abusive behaviour, insults, defamation and the disclosure of confidential information with reference, among other things, to the 28 May 2003 incident. It appears that the prosecutor’s office attached to the Iaşi Court of Appeal examined most of those complaints and decided not to prosecute. The applicant did not challenge the decisions not to prosecute before the courts. 28. One particular complaint of the applicant’s was examined by the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”). The complaint, directed against M.L.E., E.E. and three other prosecutors, referred, among other things, to ill-treatment, torture and illegal deprivation of liberty. 29. On 19 June 2003, the applicant was heard by a prosecutor. She gave evidence on the circumstances of her complaint, identifying the individuals against whom she had complained. 30. On 21 July 2003, the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court decided not to prosecute, on the grounds that the individuals under investigation had not committed the alleged offences. 31. The applicant challenged the prosecutor’s decision before the High Court under Article 2781 of the CCP (see paragraph 66 below). By a decision 15 April 2005, the High Court referred the case to the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor’s office. By a decision of 16 December 2005 the chief prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint, on the grounds that her complaints had already been examined or were under examination at that time. The applicant was informed of that decision on 27 December 2005. 32. The applicant did not challenge the decision of 16 December 2005 before the courts. 33. In November 2003, the applicant brought an action against the Iaşi District Court, the Iaşi Court of Appeal and the prosecutor’s office attached to the Iaşi Court of Appeal, claiming that they had unlawfully examined a complaint she had made in February 2003. At a later date, she extended her complaint against the Romanian Government, the Ministry of the Interior, the Romanian Gendarmerie, the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Public Finance. She claimed that they had been responsible for the actions of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Iaşi Court of Appeal. 34. On 15 January 2004, the applicant extended her complaint against a judge, several prosecutors, police officers and gendarmes, claiming that they had been involved in her confinement in the Socola hospital. 35. By a decision of 20 February 2006, the Iaşi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It noted, in particular, that, with regard to the individuals allegedly involved in her confinement in the psychiatric hospital, the provisions of the Administrative Litigation Act were not applicable and that the applicant should have lodged a criminal complaint. 36. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. By a decision of 16 January 2007, the High Court dismissed her appeal for lack of specification. 37. On 13 December 2003 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Iaşi District Court issued an indictment against the applicant and eight other individuals (“the co-accused”). The applicant was charged on several counts: defamation, incitement to give false testimony, unlawfully practising activities specific to the profession of lawyer (practicarea ilegală a activităţilor specifice profesiei de avocat), fraud, forgery and use of forged documents. 38. The case was initially assigned to the Iaşi District Court. The applicant challenged the latter’s impartiality before the High Court and asked for the file to be transferred to a different court. On 5 March 2004, the High Court assigned the case to the Cluj Napoca District Court (“the District Court”). 39. Fifty-six hearings were held before the District Court. Most of the postponements were for procedural issues (irregularities in notifying the parties, missing case file, failure of proposed witnesses to appear before the court) or at the request of the co-accused or civil parties. The hearing was postponed about twenty-five times at the applicant’s request, owing either to a change of counsel, to her inability to appear before the court for medical or professional reasons or to her challenging the judge reviewing her case. A few of the applicant’s requests overlapped those made by the prosecution or the co-accused. 40. On 18 March 2005 a District Court judge made a written note in the case file that some documents relating to the charge of “fraud” were missing. 41. On 24 March 2005 in the District Court the bill of indictment was read out in the presence of the applicant and her chosen counsel. The applicant’s counsel asked that the co-accused be heard separately by the court in order to avoid them influencing each other. Six of the co-accused were heard during that hearing. The applicant and her counsel asked them a few questions. Two of the co-accused did not appear in court and so could not be heard. The court acceded to the applicant’s request to hear the testimonies of four witnesses. She undertook to produce the home addresses of the witnesses in question. 42. On 6 September 2005 the District Court heard testimony from the applicant. She criticised the manner in which the criminal investigation had been conducted: the prosecutors had refused to carry out a graphology test, had influenced the witnesses and had communicated confidential information to the press. She also complained that her defence rights had been disregarded. 43. On 21 March 2006 the District Court approved, in the applicant’s presence, her request to have eight additional witnesses heard. The court also heard another co-accused. The applicant’s request to have all the co‑accused, the civil parties and the plaintiffs heard once again was dismissed on the grounds that their testimonies had been taken in accordance with the law. 44. On 5 September 2006 the District Court heard the last co-accused in the proceedings in the applicant’s presence. 45. The District Court also heard six of the witnesses proposed by the applicant. The other witnesses did not appear in court for various reasons (for example, they had refused to appear or were too ill to do so). 46. On 24 April 2007 the applicant declared before the District Court that the offences with which she had been charged had become statute‑barred but that she wanted the proceedings to continue in order to prove her innocence. 47. During the proceedings before the District Court the applicant requested numerous times that the case be remitted to the prosecutor. However, all her requests were dismissed for lack of grounds. She also asked for a graphology report to be prepared, but her request was dismissed because such a report had already been prepared during the criminal investigation and there was no need for a new one. The applicant raised an objection of non-constitutionality, which was dismissed as ill‑founded. She also argued that the proceedings in respect of the charge of false testimony should be discontinued as a final decision on the subject had already been made, but her objection was dismissed on the grounds that a prosecutor’s decision could not be likened to a judicial decision. 48. The first-instance proceedings lasted until 23 July 2009, when the District Court delivered a judgment in the case. It established that the applicant had committed all the offences with which she had been charged, but discontinued the criminal proceedings against her on the charges of incitement to false testimony, false accusation and carrying out activities specific to the profession of lawyer, noting that criminal liability for those offences was time-barred. It also found the applicant guilty of the charges of fraud, forgery and use of forged documents, and gave her a three-year suspended sentence. The court found that the evidence adduced during the prosecutor’s investigation was corroborated by the evidence adduced directly before it, namely statements by the accused persons, the civil parties and the witnesses, including the witnesses proposed by the applicant. The court further established that the applicant had forged three documents issued by a law office with a view to certifying her alleged status as an apprentice lawyer, and had pretended to be a lawyer in order to represent five people before the courts. She had forged the signatures of two of her clients on documents she had used in the proceedings concerning those clients. The District Court also ordered the applicant to pay damages to the civil parties. 49. The applicant, the prosecutor and the civil parties lodged an appeal before the Cluj County Court (“the County Court”). The applicant made written submissions in support of her appeal, requesting leave, among other things, to give a statement before the appellate court. 50. The County Court held four hearings in the case. The applicant did not attend, but was represented by court-appointed counsel. 51. During the final hearing on 12 April 2010, the applicant was represented by court-appointed counsel. The court noted that the applicant had submitted a power of attorney for counsel of her choice, indicating that he could not be present at the hearing in question and asking for its postponement. The court decided to proceed with the review of the case even though the applicant and her chosen counsel were not present, indicating that the applicant had been lawfully summoned at the addresses she had given and that she could be represented by the court‑appointed lawyer. The latter asked that the criminal proceedings against the applicant be discontinued or, in the alternative, that a milder sentence be applied. 52. The County Court delivered its decision on 27 April 2010. It found that the sentence applied to the applicant was too mild, given the offences with which she was charged. It further held that the way in which she had committed the offences revealed that she was highly dangerous. Taking into account her behaviour after having committed the crimes, and her constant denial of guilt, it held that finding her guilty was not sufficient warning for her and that it was therefore fitting that she should serve a prison sentence. It accordingly sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment. 53. The County Court also found that for two of the crimes of which the applicant had been convicted by the first-instance court (forgery and use of forged documents) her criminal liability was time-barred, and discontinued the proceedings regarding those charges. 54. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, submitting written observations. She raised the following arguments, inter alia: ­ she had not been heard by the lower courts; ­ the case file was incomplete as, according to a note by the first‑instance judge, the documents relating to the fraud charge were missing from the file; ­ two of the co-accused had stated before the first-instance court that they had been forced during the criminal investigation to declare that she had incited them to make false statements; ­ the lower courts had breached her right not to be tried twice for the same acts, since by a final decision of 7 November 2002 the Iaşi County Court had found that her co-accused had not given false testimonies; ­ one of the civil parties had never made a request to join the proceedings as a civil party; ­ her requests for evidence had not been approved; and ­ numerous procedural errors had vitiated the entire proceedings and her right to defence had not been respected during the criminal investigation and before the courts. 55. The case was registered before the Cluj Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). The Court of Appeal held two hearings in the case; the applicant did not attend them. 56. During the final hearing on 20 October 2010, the applicant was represented by a different court-appointed lawyer from the one who had represented her in the appeal proceedings (see paragraph 50 above). The court-appointed counsel indicated that the applicant had instructed her to ask for a postponement of the hearing. The Court of Appeal dismissed her request. The applicant’s representative asked for her acquittal or for a milder sentence. 57. By a final decision of the same date, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as manifestly ill-founded. The court found that the applicant’s right to defence had been respected throughout the proceedings. The court further held that the lower courts had examined extensive evidence, correctly determined the facts of the case and established her guilt beyond any doubt. It also held that the sentence given to her had been correctly determined. 58. On 3 June 2006, the applicant complained to the Iaşi County Police that police officers had called the press during her removal from the prosecutor’s office to the Socola hospital on 28 May 2003. On 27 June 2003, the police dismissed her allegations and found that the applicant herself had called the press from her mobile phone. 59. The applicant also lodged several complaints, both criminal and civil, against the journalists who had published articles following that incident. She submitted before the Court copies of first-instance judgments by which two journalists had been ordered to pay her 4,640 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage. She also lodged a complaint against the photographer who had allegedly taken the photograph that featured in the impugned articles. The Năsăud District Court dismissed her complaint on 24 November 2004, reasoning that that photographer was not the one who had taken photographs of her, and that taking a person’s photograph was not, in any event, a punishable offence. 60. The applicant did not provide any information as to whether those judgments became final or were appealed against. Nor did she inform the Court whether she had received the non-pecuniary damages ordered by the courts.

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5. The applicant was born in 1976. He is currently detained in Iaşi Prison. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant was convicted of rape and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 7. According to the medical documents submitted by the parties, the applicant started serving his prison sentence on 9 August 2004. 8. In his initial letters to the Court the applicant contended that conditions had been overcrowded and squalid in the Romanian prisons. In addition, he submitted that the cells had lacked sufficient air, had been infested by insects and rodents, and constituted a major health hazard. Also the food was insufficient and inadequate and the detainees did not have a place on which meals could be served. 9. Between 28 September 2004 and 10 October 2012 the applicant had been detained on six occasions in Târgu-Ocna Prison Hospital for periods of time varying from one week to more than three months in cells measuring 50.6 sq. m. The number of detainees he had to share the cells with changed every day. For the last seven days of his detention he had been detained in cells with nine beds. The rest of the time he was detained in cells with sixteen beds. The number of detainees had not been higher than the number of beds. 10. From 5 January 2005 to date the applicant was detained on fourteen occasions in Iaşi Prison in various sections of the prison. During his detention he was afforded between 1.33 and 3.98 sq. m of living space. 11. Between 6 July 2006 and 10 January 2007 the applicant was detained three times in Rahova Prison Hospital, for six days on each occasion. During his detention he was afforded between 6.2 and 7.46 sq. m of living space. 12. Between 24 August 2006 and 13 March 2008 the applicant was detained four times in Jilava Prison for periods varying from twelve days to more than three months. During most of his detention he was afforded between 1.54 and 3.65 sq. m of living space. During the last month he spent in the aforementioned detention facility, he was occasionally afforded 5.80 sq. m of living space. 13. From 15 September to 16 November 2006 the applicant was detained in Arad Prison. During his detention he was afforded between 3.46 and 5.77 sq. m of living space. 14. Between 30 September 2011 and 20 November 2012 the applicant was detained on three occasions in Tulcea Prison for periods between two weeks and two months. During his detention he was afforded between 1.69 and 4.96 sq. m of living space. 15. Between 10 October 2011 and 12 July 2012 the applicant was detained on two occasions in Timişoara Prison. During his detention he was afforded between 2.33 and 2.60 sq. m of living space. 16. From 18 November 2011 to 27 April 2012 the applicant was detained in Botoşani Prison. During his detention he was afforded between 2.31 and 3.52 sq. m of living space. 17. Between 11 September and 5 November 2012 the applicant was detained on two occasions in Vaslui Prison. During his detention he was afforded between 1.98 and 2.45 sq. m of living space. 18. From 14 to 21 November 2012 the applicant was detained in Focşani Prison where he was afforded 4.72 sq. m of living space. The number of available beds in the cell was forty-six and the number of detainees was fifty-two. 19. All the detention cells had sanitary facilities, were fitted with one or more windows and were connected to electricity and running water. They could be ventilated by opening the windows and were equipped with storage areas. In addition they were furnished with beds, tables and chairs, amongst other items. 20. The detention cells were disinfected daily with chlorine. The detainees were provided with cleaning materials and they were responsible for cleaning the cells. At least every trimester the prison authorities or specialised contractors carried out work to eradicate rodents and insects. In some prisons, like Focşani Prison, the prison authorities undertook measures to eradicate bed bugs. The bed bugs had been spotted occasionally by detainees, but had not developed into a general problem. In Iaşi and Jilava prisons the walls were also painted at regular intervals or whenever necessary. The latter prison authorities also provided the detainees with waste baskets and collected garbage daily. 21. The food was prepared hygienically and was fresh. Its quality was inspected daily by a representative of the prison personnel, a member of the medical staff and a representative of the detainees. It also had the legally required quality and number of calories. 22. On 10 August 2004 the applicant underwent a medical examination to determine his medical condition at the time of incarceration. According to the medical paper issued on the same day, he was suffering from a psychological disorder. No other medical condition was identified in the medical paper. 23. From 28 September 2004 to 5 January 2005 the applicant was a patient in Târgu-Ocna Prison Hospital. He was diagnosed with tuberculosis, reactivated chronic sinusitis and antisocial personality disorder. He was provided with treatment for these conditions and given a special food diet. He was discharged from the hospital to Iaşi Prison upon request, after his condition had improved. He was recommended anti-tuberculosis treatment under strict supervision. 24. From 6 to 22 June 2005, from 19 January to 1 February 2006, 21 March to 6 April 2007 and 16 to 26 September 2008 the applicant was hospitalised repeatedly in Târgu-Ocna Prison Hospital for medical evaluation of his condition following his tuberculosis. He was examined, provided with treatment and a special diet. 25. On 15 November 2006 and 10 January 2007 the applicant was diagnosed and treated for otitis, amongst other things, in Rahova Prison Hospital, having initially refused treatment. His condition improved and he was discharged with the recommendation to avoid getting water in his ears and to steer clear of infections. Subsequently, his condition was monitored and treated repeatedly. 26. On 13 October 2011 the applicant was examined by the Timişoara Prison doctor and was diagnosed with a deviated septum. 27. On 16 March 2012 the applicant was examined by a specialist doctor at the Botoşani Emergency County Hospital. He was diagnosed inter alia with sinusitis and was provided with treatment. 28. From 2 to 9 October 2012 the applicant was again hospitalised in Târgu-Ocna Prison Hospital. He was diagnosed and treated for toxic hepatitis, chronic obstructive bronchopneumonia, microcytic anaemia and breathing difficulties. The fact that he was a smoker was considered a risk factor. According to his discharge papers, he was discharged at his own request and ignoring medical advice to remain hospitalised. His condition had evolved favourably. He had been advised to avoid smoking or inhaling toxic agents, and to obtain treatment with antibiotics or other stronger medication if needed during periods of respiratory infection. 29. After he had been discharged from the prison and civilian hospitals, the applicant’s medical condition continued to be monitored and treated regularly in prison and civilian hospitals every time he agreed to be examined, tested and to take his medication. 30. On 12 March 2007 the applicant asked the Iaşi Prison authorities to release a copy of his medical file in order for his family to be able to send it to the Romanian Ministry of Health. In his request he had mentioned that the prison doctor had refused to examine him and provide him with medical treatment. 31. On 5 June 2011 and 5 March 2012 the applicant allegedly lodged two separate sets of complaints with the Iaşi and Botoşani District Courts, respectively, concerning the inhuman and degrading conditions in Romanian Prisons. However, his complaints allegedly remained unanswered. 32. On 20 May 2013 the Rahova Prison Hospital informed the Government that the illnesses that the applicant had complained about before the Court, namely anaemia, breathing difficulties, sinusitis, otitis, deviated septum, bronchopneumonia and toxic hepatitis – some of them chronic – had not been generated purely by the ambience the applicant lived in. Consequently, the fact that he had developed the said illnesses during his detention had been only a coincidence. 33. On the same date the prison authorities informed the Government that, except for his request of 12 March 2007, the applicant had not lodged any other complaints before the relevant domestic non-judicial or judicial authorities in respect of the alleged lack of adequate medical care.

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6. The applicants were born in 1945, 1981, 1971 and 1972 respectively and live in Yerevan. 7. The applicant Levon Ghasabyan (hereafter, the first applicant) owned a flat which measured 57 sq. m. and was situated at 25 Byuzand Street, Yerevan. The remaining three applicants – the first applicant’s family members who resided in the same flat – allege that they enjoyed a right of use in respect of that flat. 8. On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan to be taken for State needs for town-planning purposes, having a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. A special body, the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency (hereafter, the Agency) was set up to manage the implementation of the construction projects. 9. On 1 December 2004 the first applicant’s flat was valued upon the request of the Agency by a valuation organisation. The market value of the flat was estimated at 23,640 United States dollars (USD). 10. By a letter of 14 January 2005 the Agency informed the first applicant that his flat was subject to expropriation and that it had been valued at USD 23,640, and offered him this amount as compensation. An additional sum of USD 14,827.01 was offered to him as a financial incentive if he signed an agreement within five days. 11. By a letter of 18 January 2005 the first applicant expressed his consent to sign an agreement but disagreed with the amount of compensation offered. 12. On 20 January 2005 the Agency lodged a claim against the first applicant, seeking to oblige him to sign an agreement on the taking of his flat for State needs and to have him and his family members evicted. 13. On 3 March 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the Agency’s claim, ordering the first applicant to sign an agreement for the total amount of USD 23,640 and that he and his family members be evicted. 14. On 15 March 2005 the first applicant lodged an appeal. The remaining three applicants allege that they unsuccessfully sought to be recognised as parties to the proceedings, despite the fact that they enjoyed a right of use in respect of the flat in question and the fact that their eviction was ordered by the District Court. 15. On 12 April 2005 the Civil Court of Appeal granted the Agency’s claim upon appeal and dismissed that of the first applicant. 16. On 27 April 2005 the applicants jointly lodged an appeal. 17. On 26 May 2005 the Court of Cassation examined the appeal only in its part concerning the first applicant and decided to dismiss it. 18. On an unspecified date the awarded sum was paid to the applicants.

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6. The applicants were born in 1953 and 1961 respectively and live in Yerevan. 7. The applicants and a third person jointly owned a flat which measured 55.7 sq. m. and was situated at 25 Byuzand Street, Yerevan. 8. On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan to be taken for State needs for town-planning purposes, having a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. A special body, the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency (hereafter, the Agency) was set up to manage the implementation of the construction projects. 9. On 7 September 2004 the applicants’ flat was valued upon the request of the Agency by a valuation organisation. The market value of the flat was estimated at 20,080 United States dollars (USD). 10. In January 2005 the Agency informed the applicants that their flat was subject to expropriation and that it had been valued at USD 20,080. An additional sum of USD 14,734.70 was offered to the applicants as a financial incentive if they signed an agreement within five days. 11. The applicants did not accept the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation offered. 12. On 20 January 2005 the Agency lodged a claim against the applicant Sedrak Baghdasaryan, seeking to oblige him to sign an agreement on the taking of the flat in question for State needs and to have him, and the others residing in the flat, evicted. 13. On 10 March 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the Agency’s claim, ordering the applicants to sign the agreement for the total amount of USD 20,080. 14. On 24 March 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal. 15. On 17 May 2005 the Court of Appeal granted the Agency’s claim upon appeal. 16. On 31 May 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law in which they argued, inter alia, that the deprivation of their property was not prescribed by law as required by Article 28 of the Constitution and that there was no public interest in depriving them of their property. 17. On 7 July 2005 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicants’ appeal. 18. On an unspecified date the awarded sum was paid to the applicants.

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5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in İzmir. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant’s daughter, Gülperi O., worked as a nurse at the Aegean University Hospital in İzmir. She was married to O.O., who worked in the pharmacy at the same hospital. 8. According to the applicant, the couple had frequent rows and O.O. used violence against Gülperi O. on a number of occasions. 9. At 5.30 p.m. on 18 July 2005 O.O. brought Gülperi O. to the accident and emergency department of the Aegean University Hospital and told the doctors and nurses at the hospital that she had taken an overdose of two medicines called “Prent” and “Muscoril”. 10. A police officer at the hospital took a statement from O.O. at 6.45 p.m. In his statement O.O. was reported as having stated that he and Gülperi O. had had a row earlier in the day; she had attacked him and he had hit her. He had then left home and some time after his return at 3.00 p.m. Gülperi O. had felt unwell. He had then brought her to the hospital. 11. It was stated in a report prepared by police officers that a police officer had spoken to the prosecutor over the telephone at 6.50 p.m. and that the prosecutor had instructed that police officer to question Gülperi O. and her husband, O.O. 12. At the time of her admission to the hospital, Gülperi O. was conscious but drowsy. Doctors and nurses, who had been informed about O.O.’s assertion that she had taken an overdose of the two medicines, pumped her stomach. When her pulse slowed down the doctors unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate her. Gülperi O. died at 10.10 p.m. 13. The doctor and the prosecutor who subsequently examined her body were unable to establish the cause of death and they decided, in view of the fact that the deceased’s husband, O.O., had told the police officers that he had hit her, that a post-mortem examination was necessary. 14. The post-mortem examination was carried out the following day and samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body were sent for forensic analysis. 15. On 20 July 2005 the police prepared a report summing up their inquiry. It was stated in this report that Gülperi O. had committed suicide by taking an “overdose of medicines”. 16. On 22 July 2005 the applicant’s husband, Mr Elaattin Kanter, lodged an official complaint with the İzmir prosecutor against O.O., and alleged that O.O. had been responsible for the death of his daughter. Mr Kanter stated in his complaint petition that O.O. had beaten Gülperi O. up on a number of occasions and, as a result, she had been thinking of divorcing him. However, O.O. had apologized and had persuaded her to change her mind by promising to her that he would not be violent towards her again. Mr Kanter informed the prosecutor that Gülperi O. had telephoned her sister during the afternoon of the day of her death, and that they had had a normal conversation; she had not been suicidal at all. 17. Mr Kanter alleged that O.O. had forced Gülperi O. to take the medicines and had subsequently dumped her body at the hospital. The family had heard nothing from O.O. since that date and he had not even attended the funeral. 18. On 25 July 2005 the İzmir prosecutor questioned the applicant and her husband. The applicant told the prosecutor that O.O. had beaten up her daughter before and that as a result she had had to be hospitalised twice with suspected head injuries. Mr Kanter told the prosecutor that his daughter had never been suicidal and that in his opinion O.O. had been responsible for her death. 19. On 29 July 2005 police officers forwarded photographs of Gülperi O.’s body to their head office with a covering letter stating “...find attached photographs of Gülperi O. who committed suicide by taking an overdose of medicines”. 20. Also on 29 July 2005 the İzmir prosecutor questioned the hospital personnel who had been on duty on the day in question and had tried to resuscitate Gülperi O. A doctor told the prosecutor that O.O. had told him that Gülperi O. had taken “Muscoril” and “Prent”. 21. On 19 December 2005 the İzmir prosecutor informed the Registry Office for births, marriages and deaths that Gülperi O. had taken an overdose on 18 July 2005 and had killed herself and that her death could be entered in the records. 22. According to a report drawn up by the Forensic Medicine Institute on 30 December 2005, no medicines, other drugs or alcohol had been found in the blood and other bodily samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body. 23. On 30 January 2006 the Forensic Medicine Institute published its report on the post-mortem examination and other forensic examinations carried out on the samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body. According to the report, there was advanced oedema in her lungs and there were no drugs or other foreign substances in her body. The cause of death was established as “acute alveolar swelling and intra-alveolar haemorrhage” in the lungs. 24. On 13 February 2006 the İzmir prosecutor in charge of the investigation sent a letter to the Forensic Medicine Institute and asked whether suicide or some form of illness could have been the cause of death. 25. In its response to the İzmir prosecutor the Forensic Medicine Institute confirmed on 24 February 2006 that there had been no foreign substances or medicines ‒ including “Prent” and “Muscaril” (see paragraph 9 above) ‒ in Gülperi O.’s body. The Institute also stated in its letter that, should the judicial authorities conclude that Gülperi O. had committed suicide by taking an overdose, then those judicial authorities should also conclude that the medicines she had used were of a type which could not be detected in forensic examinations of samples taken from internal organs. 26. On 28 February 2006 the İzmir prosecutor decided to close the investigation. In the decision the prosecutor stated that “the post-mortem report of 30 January 2006 states that Gülperi O. died as a result of lung complications caused by medicinal intoxication”. In the opinion of the prosecutor, Gülperi O. had committed suicide because she had had an argument with her husband. 27. On 4 April 2006 the applicant lodged an objection with the Karşıyaka Assize Court against the prosecutor’s decision. The applicant drew the Assize Court’s attention to the prosecutor’s failure to question O.O., despite the fact that by his own admission he had beaten Gülperi O. up on the day of her death. She also argued that the prosecutor’s conclusion that her daughter had committed suicide by taking an overdose ran contrary to the conclusions set out in the two reports issued by the Forensic Medicine Institute. She added that the prosecutor had not visited the flat where Gülperi O. used to live with O.O., even though they had informed the prosecutor that the flat had been a mess and that windows had been broken. She alleged in her petition that the prosecutor had accepted from the outset that Gülperi O. had committed suicide and that that had been the reason why she had not conducted an investigation into the allegations brought to her attention. 28. On 20 June 2006 the applicant and her husband, assisted by a lawyer, submitted another petition to the Assize Court in which they set out additional arguments in support of their request for the prosecutor’s decision to be set aside. 29. The objection was dismissed by the Karşıyaka Assize Court on 11 July 2006. The Assize Court considered that the prosecutor’s decision had been correct and in accordance with domestic law and procedure. 30. When notice of the application was given to the respondent Government, the Court asked the Government ‒ pursuant to the parties’ duty to cooperate with the Court under Article 38 of the Convention ‒ to invite the Forensic Medicine Institute to prepare a report, based on the above-mentioned existing medical reports and the prosecutor’s decision of 28 February 2006, and to render an expert opinion as to whether there exist medicines which cannot be detected in forensic examinations of samples taken from internal organs and which could nevertheless have caused the fatal lung problems. The Government were also asked, should the Institute’s answer be in the negative, to invite the Institute to elaborate, on the basis of the documents in the investigation file, on the cause of the lung problems which, according to the report of 30 January 2006, caused the death. 31. The Government complied with that request and submitted to the Court two reports prepared by the Forensic Medicine Institute on 16 April 2013 and 15 July 2013. 32. In these two reports, three experts working for the Forensic Medicine Institute confirmed that the samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body had been checked against the list of known substances in their database ‒ including the two medicines named specifically by Gülperi O.’s husband, O.O. (see above in paragraph 9) ‒ and stated that she had not died as a result of having taken any of those substances. It was also stated in the report that the possibility could not be completely ruled out that she might have taken another toxic substance which was not in their database. 33. The experts at the Forensic Medicine Institute also stated in their reports that they did not agree with the conclusion reached in the autopsy report of 30 January 2006, namely that Gülperi O. had died as a result of “acute alveolar swelling and intra-alveolar haemorrhage” in the lungs. In their opinion, the “acute alveolar swelling and intra-alveolar haemorrhage” was a histopathological finding often caused by anoxia (total oxygen depletion), and could thus not be stated as the cause of death. In the opinion of the three experts, it should have been stated in the autopsy report of 30 January 2006 that the cause of Gülperi O.’s death could not be established.

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5. The applicant was born in 1937 and lived in Aistersheim. 6. The applicant owned a landholding of some 150 hectares, which is an approved hunting ground (Eigenjagd). According to the Upper Austrian Hunting Act (Oberösterreichisches Jagdgesetz), every six years, the District Authority has to establish the boundaries of the Upper Austrian hunting grounds. In this respect, requests may be filed by landowners to have adjacent land allocated to their hunting grounds where, for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of hunting rights, boundaries need readjustment (Arrondierungsantrag). On 29 September 2004 the applicant filed such a request for readjustment in respect of the next six years’ hunting period, i.e. from April 2005 to March 2011. 7. On 28 December 2004 the Grieskirchen District Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) partly granted the applicant’s request and assigned specified plots of third persons to the applicant’s hunting grounds, but dismissed her request concerning some other parcels of land. 8. On 21 October 2005 the Upper Austria Regional Government (Landesregierung) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). 9. On 15 March 2006 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint due to lack of prospects of success and referred the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) on 18 April 2006. On 2 May 2006 the Administrative Court requested the applicant to complement the complaint. The applicant submitted her additional comments on 21 June 2006 and requested an oral hearing. On 31 August 2006 the Upper Austria Regional Government submitted its additional comments to the Administrative Court. 10. On 29 September 2008, after having held an oral hearing on the same day, the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint as unfounded. That decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 13 October 2008.

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4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Portorož. 5. On 13 March 2010 the police issued a payment order fining the applicant 540 euros (EUR) for two traffic offences under Section 27(1) and (3) and Section 135(3) and (5) of the Road Traffic Safety Act. From the police’s description of the facts and evidence it appears that on 13 March 2010 at 9:45 am while trying to overtake X’s car, which had been improperly parked, the applicant failed to make sure that he could do so without endangering X’s car and with the rear right end of his car he hit the rear left end of X’s car. Allegedly, after the collision the applicant left the scene of the accident without submitting his personal data to X who was not present during the accident or notifying the police that he had been involved in an accident. X stated to the police that an unknown witness told him that the person responsible for the accident was driving a dark car with the number plate LJ 37-33. On the basis of this information the police checked two vehicles with number plates LJ 37-33V and LJ 37-33L. These vehicles did not show any sign of damage. On 14 March 2010 X informed the police that he had found a dark car with the number plate KP L3-733. The police established that the owner of the car was the applicant. On the same day the police interviewed the applicant and checked his car. They found that the damage on the applicant’s car corresponded to that of X’s car. They further found that Y was present in the applicant’s car during the accident. 6. On 31 March 2010 the applicant lodged an objection. He argued that he did not detect any collision between the two cars and that, accordingly, he had not informed X or the police of the accident; that there had been many passers-by on the road who had witnessed how he had been manoeuvring the car but nobody had warned him of any kind of abrasion or dent caused to X’s car; that he lived at the address of the scene of the accident and would have never left the scene even if he had caused the damage; that he had been informed of the accident only the following day when called by the police, and that together with the police he had checked his car visually and discovered a scratch of 10 to 15 cm in length for which he did not know when it appeared. According to the applicant, due to X’s improper parking any vehicle could have hit his car; from the damage on X’s car it was clear that the applicant could not have caused the damage with his car. The applicant reiterated that if he had detected the accident he would have reported it and this fact could have been proved by witness Y which was present in his car. He described in detail the events of 13 March 2010, namely approximately at 9.30 am he drove out of the parking spaces, he wanted to turn to the right but two cars prevented him from doing so because they were actually parked on the road; the cars parked posed a threat to road traffic safety because the space between them would have not allowed an ambulance or any other emergency vehicle to pass; in such a situation the applicant was forced to position his car at an appropriate angle to enable him to pass safely between the cars; he had to fold both side mirrors; otherwise he would not have been able to pass the two parked vehicles without collision; he manoeuvred his car at almost zero speed and was not aware that he had caused an abrasion or damage to any other vehicle. 7. On 14 April 2010 the police issued a reasoned decision finding the applicant guilty of the abovementioned minor offences. 8. On 29 April 2010 the applicant lodged a request for judicial review. He complained that the police had not sufficiently established the facts; he had not left or escaped the scene of the accident; he had not been aware of any collision and, consequently, he did not inform X and the police thereof in accordance with Section 135(3) of the Road Traffic Safety Act. He further stated that he wanted to turn right onto the carriageway but he was prevented from doing so by two cars parked on the carriageway – on the left and on the right sides of the road. One of the cars was X’s car. When he wanted to drive out of the garage he could not do so and was forced to manoeuvre for quite some time to position the car at an appropriate angle and had to straighten the car almost completely to be able to pass freely between the two cars. In order to do it safely he had to fold in both side mirrors because otherwise he would have not been able to pass the parked cars without colliding with them. During the manoeuvring he was not aware that he had caused an abrasion or damage to the cars. The manoeuvring speed was minimal. There were many passers-by who witnessed the manoeuvring but did not warn him of any accident. In order to prove these allegations the applicant proposed that he and Y be heard. He further stated that police had not considered the fact that he lived at the address of the scene of the accident and therefore he had no interest in leaving the scene. He drove to a filling station, went shopping and visited his parents. As evidence he submitted a fuel purchase receipt and a shop receipt and proposed the hearing of his parents. He further argued that if he had left the scene of the accident intentionally he would have concealed the scratches on his car. Even if he had collided with X’s car he would not have been aware of it since his car was a diesel-fuelled car which tended to vibrate heavily. Moreover, his radio was always turned on which reduced the likelihood of noticing the collision. In order to prove this he proposed that he and Y be heard. He argued that he was not aware of the date when the scratch appeared on his car since the car was seven years old and had many other scratches. Since X’s car had been improperly parked any vehicle could have collided with it. The police did not clarify on the basis of which fact they had concluded that the scratch on his car corresponded to the damage on X’s car. In the applicant’s view X had been frenetically searching for the culprit and as soon as he found a black car with few scratches he reported him to the police and the police believed X without hearing any witness and without considering all of the circumstances of the case. 9. On 12 September 2011 the Ljubljana Local Court rejected the request for judicial review without holding a hearing. The Local Court held that it had no reason to doubt the findings of the police who conducted an interview with the applicant and a visual inspection of his car during which they noticed damage which corresponded to the damage on X’s car. According to the court, it was clear from the documents of the case-file, in particular the photographs of X’s car, that the damage had been caused by the applicant’s car and the applicant’s complaints in this respect remained general and subjective. In particular, the allegations that the accident would have been reported by passers-by or that the applicant would not have left the scene of the accident if he had noticed it were subjective and could not be verified. The applicant could not be released from his responsibility for the minor offence by stating that he had not been aware of the collision because this was, again, a subjective allegation. Every participant in road traffic, in the circumstances described by the applicant, was expected to be particularly alert and to detect the collision. Regarding the allegation that X’s car was parked on the road and that it had endangered the traffic safety the court stressed that only the applicant’s behaviour was at issue. It held that according to Section 135(5) of the Road Traffic Safety Act a traffic offender who had left the scene of the accident should have immediately notified the injured party or the police the information referred to in that Section. The court therefore did not have to reply to the applicant’s allegations that he had not left the scene to an unknown place as they were legally irrelevant. Finally, the evidence submitted by the applicant could not change the conclusions of the police and it was only an attempt to delay the proceedings since the motions for evidence did not comply with the required legal standards regarding the subject-matter about which the witnesses proposed might have testified. 10. On 9 November 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 11. On 26 March 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible.

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4. The first applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Rinschnach. The second applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Linz. 5. In 1997 the Wels Regional Court (Landesgericht Wels, “the Regional Court”) instituted preliminary investigations (Vorerhebungen) against the two applicants and several other persons on account of the suspicion of aggravated fraud (schwerer gewerbsmässiger Betrug) by having set up and managed an internationally operated gambling system which was based on a pyramid scheme. 6. On 19 January 1999 the Regional Court decided that the proceedings against the applicants were to be separated from those of the co-suspects to avoid delays. 7. On 9 December 1997 the Regional Court issued an international arrest warrant (Steckbrief) in respect of the first applicant. He was in detention on remand from 26 to 27 May 1998. 8. On 18 February 2008 the first applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the proceedings under Section 91 of the Courts Act (Fristsetzungsantrag). The Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht, “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the request on 11 September 2008, stating that it could only be directed against delays caused by the courts, not the Public Prosecutor. 9. On 2 May 2013 the Regional Court acquitted the first applicant of all charges. The decision was served on his counsel on 15 October 2013. 10. On 18 April 1997 the Regional Court issued an international arrest warrant in respect of the second applicant. He was in detention on remand from 22 May 1997 until 6 August 1999. 11. On 12 April 2002 the preliminary investigations against the second applicant were closed and the file was transferred to the Wels Public Prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft, “the Public Prosecutor”) for further processing. However, no indictment was brought against him. 12. On 4 December 2007 the second applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the proceedings under Section 91 of the Courts Act. The Court of Appeal dismissed the request on 11 September 2008, stating that it could only be directed against delays caused by the courts, not the Public Prosecutor. 13. On 2 April 2010 the Public Prosecutor brought an indictment against the second applicant. The second applicant lodged an appeal against the indictment and a motion requesting the discontinuation of the proceedings. On 28 February 2011 the Court of Appeal rejected the indictment, but did not discontinue the proceedings. 14. On 13 October 2011 the Public Prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against the second applicant.

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6. The applicants were born in 1946, 1954 and 1985 respectively and live in Yerevan. 7. The applicants jointly owned a flat which measured 44.1 sq. m. and was situated at 25 Byuzand Street, Yerevan. 8. On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan to be taken for State needs for town-planning purposes, having a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. A special body, the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency (hereafter, the Agency) was set up to manage the implementation of the construction projects. 9. On 7 September 2004 the applicants’ flat was valued upon the request of the Agency by a valuation organisation. The market value of the flat was found to be 16,350 United States dollars (USD). 10. By a letter of 14 January 2005 the Agency informed the applicants that their flat was subject to expropriation and that it had been valued at USD 16,350 by an independent licensed organisation. An additional sum of USD 12,638.55 was offered to the applicants as a financial incentive if they signed an agreement within five days. 11. The applicants did not accept the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation offered. 12. On an unspecified date the Agency lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their flat for State needs and to have them evicted. 13. On 1 March 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the Agency’s claim, ordering the applicants to sign the agreement for the total amount of USD 16,350. 14. On 15 March 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal. 15. On 30 March 2005 the Civil Court of Appeal granted the Agency’s claim upon appeal. 16. On 13 April 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, in which they argued, inter alia, that the deprivation of their property was not prescribed by law as required by Article 28 of the Constitution. 17. On 26 May 2005 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicants’ appeal. 18. On an unspecified date the awarded sum was paid to the applicants.

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5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Budapest. 6. At the material time the applicant was a managing director of a tour operator limited liability company, HTC Kft. 7. On an unspecified date criminal investigations were opened against HTC Kft and another limited liability company on suspicion of bankruptcy fraud. On 8 September 2000 the Budapest VI/VII Police Department ordered the search of the applicant’s flat and vehicle, since there were grounds to believe that as the managing director of HTC Kft, he kept certain company documents at home. 8. On 14 February 2007 the applicant was heard as suspect on charges of bankruptcy fraud. 9. On 18 May 2007 the Budapest VI/VII District Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment against the applicant, charging him with bankruptcy fraud. 10. The first hearing was held by the Pest Central District Court on 3 November 2009. 11. On 21 April 2012 the Pest Central District Court acquitted the applicant. The judgment became final on 1 August 2012.

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5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Split. 6. On 17 May 2004 the applicant’s father was hit by a car while attempting to cross a motorway. He suffered serious bodily injury and died at the scene. 7. On the same day the Split Police Department (Policijska uprava Splitsko-dalmatinska) interviewed two witnesses and the driver of the car, Z.K. The police also carried out the necessary tests to measure Z.K.’s alcohol level, which showed that he had been intoxicated at the time of the accident. 8. The police informed an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) of the accident. Later that day the investigating judge, assisted by a road traffic expert, carried out an on-site inspection. 9. On 18 May 2004 the road traffic expert submitted his report to the investigating judge, finding that in crossing the motorway the applicant’s father had caught the driver of the car by surprise, which had caused the accident. 10. On 19 May 2004 the investigating judge obtained a medical report concerning the applicant’s father, indicating that he had been intoxicated at the time of the accident. 11. Meanwhile, the case file was forwarded to the Split Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Splitu – “the State Attorney’s Office”) for its assessment of the relevant facts. 12. On 18 June 2004 the State Attorney’s Office obtained a medical report confirming that the driver of the car Z.K. had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. 13. On 20 December 2004 the State Attorney’s Office asked the investigating judge of the Split County Court to open an investigation in respect of Z.K. on suspicion of causing a road accident resulting in death. 14. Before deciding on that request, the investigating judge questioned Z.K. on 19 January 2005. He denied the charges, arguing that when the applicant’s father had crossed the motorway he had been caught by surprise, and had had no way of avoiding the accident. 15. On 7 February 2005 the investigating judge declined to open the investigation on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed. This was upheld by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 22 February 2005. 16. The case file was then returned to the State Attorney’s Office, which was informed of its right to appeal against the decision of the Split County Court. There is no evidence before the Court that the applicant was informed of this decision. 17. The State Attorney’s Office decided not to appeal. There is no evidence before the Court that the applicant was informed of this decision. 18. On 16 June 2006 the applicant inquired with the Split County Court about the progress of the case. He indicated that the last information he had received had been the on-site inspection report. He explained that he had been away for a while, so if any new documents had been forwarded to him it was possible that he had not received them. 19. On 3 July 2006 the investigating judge of the Split County Court informed the applicant that the investigation into the circumstances of his father’s death had been discontinued. 20. On 7 July 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the Split County Court’s decision refusing to open the investigation into the accident. 21. On 19 September 2006 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal and ordered the investigation. The Supreme Court held that the Split County Court’s conclusion had been premature, since several crucial facts concerning the accident had remained unanswered. It therefore instructed the investigating judge to question witnesses and to take whatever further investigative measures which were necessary, such as a reconstruction of events. 22. On 16 November 2006 the investigating judge questioned two witnesses and concluded the investigation. He also informed the applicant that he could, if he considered it appropriate, indict Z.K. in the criminal courts on charges of causing a road accident. 23. On 24 November 2006 the applicant, acting as a subsidiary prosecutor and through his lawyer, lodged a request to prosecute with the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) against Z.K., on charges of causing a road accident resulting in the death of his father, punishable under Article 272 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 41 below). 24. The first hearing scheduled for 6 December 2006 before a single judge of the Split Municipal Court was adjourned because the parties failed to appear, as they had not been properly summoned. The trial judge indicated that he would issue another written order for the next hearing. 25. Having received no subsequent summonses, on 21 October 2009, the applicant urged the Split Municipal Court to schedule a hearing, arguing that he had attempted to contact the court several times to ask it to expedite the proceedings. 26. At a hearing held on 3 December 2009 Z.K. pleaded not guilty and the hearing was adjourned. Two witnesses appeared at the hearing but were not questioned. 27. A further hearing scheduled for 15 February 2010 was adjourned because the investigating judge had failed to forward its case file to the Split Municipal Court. 28. At a hearing on 14 April 2010 the single judge of the Split Municipal Court questioned Z.K. again, who reiterated his not guilty plea. The judge also questioned the applicant and the two witnesses. 29. Another hearing was held on 18 June 2010, at which the trial judge questioned Z.K. and the expert witness. 30. On the same day the Split Municipal Court acquitted Z.K. on charges of causing the road accident. 31. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Split County Court, which on 17 May 2011 quashed the first-instance judgment because of the procedural errors in the composition of the trial court. The relevant part of the judgment reads: “... the first instance court did not sit in a proper formation because the trial was held before a single judge instead before a panel composed of a judge and two lay judges. The offence under Article 272 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code is punishable by imprisonment between one and ten years, and under Article 18 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the offences punishable by imprisonment of more than five years, the Municipal Courts must sit in panels composed of a judge and two lay judges. ... It should be also noted that for the offence under Article 272 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code, that is in issue in the present case, because of the prescribed penalty, the trial should be held according to the rules of ordinary, and not summary, procedure, and that such [ordinary criminal] proceedings can be held only on an indictment, against which the accused has the right to lodge an objection, and not based on a request to prosecute.” 32. In the resumed proceedings, on 15 September 2011 the Split Municipal Court asked the applicant to specify whether he had submitted an indictment (optužnica) or a request to prosecute (optužni prijedlog). The relevant part of the letter reads: “In accordance with Article 269 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the submission named [request to prosecute] is being returned to the [subsidiary] prosecutor for amendment in accordance with Article 268 § 1 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That is to say, the subsidiary prosecutor must indicate whether or not his submission is actually an indictment.” 33. The applicant replied on 28 September 2011 indicating that his submission was an indictment rather than a request to prosecute. 34. On 30 November 2011 the Split Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that the applicant’s indictment had not been drafted properly, as it did not contain the statement of reasons on which it was based. The relevant part of this decision reads: “The subsidiary prosecutor on 24 November 2006 submitted a request to prosecute against the accused Z.K. .... Under Article 269 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure such submission, titled request to prosecute, was returned to the [subsidiary] prosecutor for amendment under Article 268 § 1 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The representative of the subsidiary prosecutor submitted before this court his amendment of the [above-noted document] indicating that the title “request to prosecute” should be changed to “indictment”, and that he had no other amendments. Since the [subsidiary] prosecutor failed to comply with Article 268 § 1 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (a statement of reasons describing the circumstances of the case after the investigation, indicating the evidence necessary to determine the relevant facts, presenting the defendant’s defence and the prosecutor’s position on the defendant’s defence), this court decided [to discontinue the proceedings].” 35. The applicant lodged an appeal on 9 December 2011 with the Split County Court, contending that he had only been invited to indicate whether he had instituted the proceedings by a request to prosecute or an indictment and that he had replied to that question accordingly. He also pointed out that the courts had accepted his indictment in 2006, conducted the proceedings and decided the case on the merits. Together with the appeal, the applicant submitted an amended indictment containing the statement of reasons. 36. On 17 April 2012 the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Split Municipal Court. 37. On 16 May 2012 the Split Municipal Court ordered the applicant to pay Z.K.’s legal costs and expenses in the amount of 17,500 Croatian kunas. This decision was upheld by the Split County Court on 11 June 2012. 38. Also on 11 June 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) regarding the manner in which the criminal law mechanisms had been implemented in his case. 39. On 20 September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the decisions of the lower courts did not concern the applicant’s civil rights or obligations or any criminal charge against him.

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5. The Association, which has now been dissolved, was a non‑profit‑making non-governmental organisation (NGO). It was active between 1991 and 2003. Mr Azer Samadov was Chairman of the Association, and Mr Ilgar Allahverdiyev was a member of its management board. They were born in 1961 and 1973, respectively, and live in Baku. 6. The Association was registered by the Ministry of Justice (“the Ministry”) on 12 January 1995 and acquired the status of a legal entity. 7. Clause 1.1 of the Association’s Charter defined it as an association with voluntary membership of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan, conducting its activities within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as its own Charter. 8. According to clause 2 of its Charter, the main aims of the Association included the repair and maintenance of abandoned mosques and other places of worship, organising pilgrimages to Islamic shrines, providing material and moral aid to orphanages as well as elderly, ill and disabled people, and publishing books with a religious content. 9. The Association’s actual activities included the repair and maintenance of several mosques and projects aimed at promoting respect for human rights and building a civil society. The Association also engaged in a number of humanitarian activities, such as assistance to disabled children, campaigning against drugs and alcoholism, and a programme dedicated to promoting tolerance between representatives of different religions in Azerbaijan. 10. The highest governing body of the Association was the general assembly of members, held once a year, as provided for in clause 4 of its Charter. At the general assembly, the members elected the Association’s chairman and the three members of its management board. They also discussed and commented on the Association’s annual activity and submitted their proposals for its future activity. 11. It appears from the documents submitted to the Court that at the general assembly held on 8 August 1997 the members discussed the Association’s annual activity and decided to assist financially orphaned children and economically disadvantaged sections of the population and to raise awareness about the historical and religious values in the society. 12. The Association held its next general assembly on 4 January 1998. According to the minutes of the assembly, after having discussed the Association’s annual activity, the members decided to repair the Juma mosque in Baku and to participate actively in the process of building a civil society in the country by raising this issue in the media. They further decided to inform the public about the unlawfulness of the existing monopoly in organising pilgrimages to Islamic shrines. It was also decided to provide pilgrims with relevant information about the organisation of their visits. 13. On 29 December 2001 the Association held another general assembly at which the members adopted the Association’s annual activity report and decided, inter alia, to hold a conference on Prophet Muhammad on the occasion of his birthday and to prepare for the forthcoming seminar on the dialogue between civilizations, which would be held in Baku. They also agreed on the necessity to write articles in the media about subjects relating to existentialism and humanism. 14. On an unspecified date in 2002, the Ministry commenced an inspection of the Association’s activities in order to determine whether its activities had been carried out in compliance with its Charter. 15. According to an undated inspection report, the Association had twenty-seven members who did not pay any membership fees. The sources of the Association’s financing were not clear. It did not have a bank account. It was also noted in the report that, despite having a different registered legal address, the Association’s actual headquarters were located in a mosque. The Association’s chairman was also the head of a religious community and all of the Association’s members were also members of that community. The inspection concluded that, generally, it was difficult to establish whether the Association functioned as a non-governmental organisation or a religious organisation. 16. On 4 February 2002 the Ministry sent an official warning to the Association, claiming that its primary activities involved religious propaganda and agitation. The Ministry noted that, in accordance with the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds), public associations were not allowed to engage in religious activities. The Association was requested to remedy this breach of the law and, within ten days, report to the Ministry about the measures taken. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows: “Religious activity is without any exception the duty and function of religious organisations and their status is governed by the Law on Freedom of Religion. In accordance with Article 7 of this Law, religious organisations are ‘voluntary organisations established for the purpose of spreading religious belief and religion’. In accordance with Article 1.4 of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds), this Law is not applicable to religious organisations. Therefore, any religious activity on the part of your association is unlawful.” 17. On 3 August 2002 the Association replied to the Ministry, claiming that it had carried out numerous social programmes providing assistance to the population, as well as activities related to the establishment of a civil society and the promotion of human rights. The Association denied any involvement in religious activities, noting that the Ministry had failed to specify which of the Association’s activities was qualified as “religious activity”. Moreover, the Association pointed out that Azerbaijani legislation did not provide any precise definition of what constituted a “religious activity”. 18. On 6 September 2002 the Ministry sent a second written warning to the Association, demanding that it cease its unlawful activities. It appears from the letter that the Ministry considered as “religious activities” some of the decisions taken by the Association’s general assembly. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows: “Although it was denied in your letter of 3 August 2002 that the Association engaged in religious activities, the decisions of the Association’s general assembly, as well as some provisions of the Association’s Charter, confirm that it carries out religious activities. In fact, at the general assemblies held on 4 January 1998, 7 January 1999 and 29 December 2001, religious matters were included in the agenda and discussed, and relevant decisions were taken. We reiterate that non-governmental organisations have no right to engage in religious activities.” 19. On 3 October 2002 the Ministry sent a third written warning. It pointed out that, despite two prior warnings, it had not been informed about any measures taken by the Association to comply with the Ministry’s demands that the Association cease its religious activities. 20. On 2 July 2003 the Ministry lodged an action with the Sabail District Court. It claimed that the Association unlawfully engaged in religious activities and requested the court to order its dissolution. In support of its claim, the Ministry noted that the fact that the questions relating to pilgrimages to holy shrines and the activity of the Caucasus Muslims Board (Qafqaz Müsəlmanlar İdarəsi, the official governing body of Muslim religious organisations in Azerbaijan) had been discussed at the Association’s general assembly proved that the Association had been engaging in religious activities. 21. In reply to the Ministry’s action, on an unspecified date the Association lodged an objection with the court, claiming that it had not engaged in religious activities. In particular, the Association submitted that decisions such as holding a conference dedicated to the birthday of Prophet Muhammad or criticising the Caucasus Muslims Board’s monopoly in the organisation of pilgrimages to Islamic shrines did not constitute religious activities. The Association also noted that all of its activities had been carried out in compliance with its charter, which the Ministry had never requested it to modify. 22. On 28 August 2003 the Sabail District Court ordered the Association’s dissolution. The court found that the Association had unlawfully engaged in religious activities and, despite three warnings by the Ministry, had failed to take any measures to cease such activities. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: “It appears from minutes no 5 of the Islam-Ittihad Association dated 4 January 1998 ... that the fifth and eighth points relating to questions on the agenda concerned, respectively, ‘active participation in building a civil society’ and ‘pilgrimages to holy shrines’. One of the participants in the assembly, A.N., took the floor on this matter, stating that the Association should take an active stance in building a civil society in the country and proposed to participate in it actively by appearing in the media. This proposal was voted on and adopted unanimously. It appears from minutes no 6 of the Islam-Ittihad Association dated 7 January 1999 ... that the sixth point relating to questions on the agenda was about ‘the Caucasus Muslim Board’ and M.Q., who took the floor on this matter, criticized the position of the Caucasus Muslim Board. Those who participated in the discussions said that this organisation had a monopoly on Islam in the country and that its officials had weakened the social and moral situation of the country, which was already low, by accusing each other of corruption in the media ... In accordance with Article 7 of the Law on Freedom of Religion, ‘religious organisations are voluntary organisations established for the purposes of spreading religious belief.’ Article 8 of this Law provides that the religious community is a voluntary religious organisation of devout persons associated for exercising together prayer and meeting other religious needs ... The court considers that in compliance with this requirement of the Law any religious activity by non-governmental organisations is unlawful. Under Articles 1 and 4 of the Law on Public Associations, a public association may not be established for political purposes. Moreover, a non-governmental organisation may not carry out activities contrary to the aims provided for in its charter ... At the court hearing the respondent failed to submit to the court any reliable evidence proving that it did not really engage in any religious activity.” 23. On an unspecified date the Association appealed against that judgment, reiterating that it had not engaged in religious activities. It complained that the court had put the burden of proof on the Association, holding that the respondent had failed to prove that it had not engaged in religious activities. It also complained that although it had been dissolved on account of its alleged engagement in religious activities, the relevant legislation provided no definition of “religious activity”. 24. On 20 November 2003 the Court of Appeal dismissed the Association’s appeal. The wording of the appellate court’s judgment was identical to the first-instance court’s judgment. 25. On 26 February 2004 the Association lodged a cassation appeal, reiterating its previous complaints. It also submitted that actively participating in building a civil society and criticising the activity of a religious authority were not unlawful activities. 26. On 21 July 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

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4. The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently detained in the Tekirdağ F-type Prison. 5. According to the arrest report, signed by thirteen police officers, on 18 March 2009 at 2.15 p.m. the applicant was stopped by police officers for an identity check. He resisted and opened fire, killing a police officer. The other police officers used force to neutralise and arrest him. Several fake identity cards were found in the applicant’s bag. 6. At 5.15 p.m. the applicant was sent to the Bursa Şevket Yılmaz State Hospital for a medical examination. The medical report indicated that there were superficial grazes on the applicant’s back and bruises to the frontal region of his head, caused by blunt instrument trauma. It further specified that the abrasions on the applicant’s wrists could have been caused by handcuffs. The report concluded that the injuries on the applicant’s body were not life-threatening. 7. The applicant was then taken to the Kestel District Police Station. According to the form explaining the rights of arrested persons, the applicant was reminded of his rights, including his right to have the assistance of a lawyer, to remain silent, and to inform his family members of his arrest. According to a report signed by seven police officers, the police tried to conduct a fingerprint examination in order to identify the applicant, but he resisted, shouted slogans, tried hitting his head on the machine and kicked the nearby furniture. The applicant alleged that he had been beaten at the police station. 8. The applicant was subsequently transferred to the anti-terrorism branch of the Bursa Security Headquarters, where he was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment. According to the applicant, in the basement of the Bursa Security Headquarters, his testicles were squeezed and he was beaten, subjected to hanging by his arms, hosed with cold water, exposed to cold air circulation and forced to lie in an ice-covered blanket. 9. According to a police report, on 19 March 2009 at about 7 p.m. the applicant was taken by four police officers to Istanbul, where he had offered to show the officers a house used as a cell by the MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party), an illegal organisation. It was reported that, as the applicant could not find the house, they returned to the Bursa Security Headquarters on 20 March 2009 at 4.15 a.m. This report was signed by four police officers, but the applicant declined to sign it. 10. On 20 March 2009 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer at the Bursa Security Headquarters in connection with the killing of a police officer and his alleged involvement in the MLKP. The applicant exercised his right to remain silent. 11. On the same day, the applicant was taken to the Bursa Forensic Medicine Institute. During his examination, the applicant complained that he had been ill-treated whilst in custody. He stated that he had been beaten, hung by his arms and hosed with cold water and alleged that ice cubes had been placed over his body. The medical examination revealed that the applicant had a haematoma under his left eyelid, a red-coloured bruise measuring 5 x 10 cm and swellings in his occipital region, and purple‑coloured bruises on his right eye and periorbital region. It was also noted that the applicant had several bruises on his left eyebrow, on the zygoma, on both sides of his mouth, between his eyebrows, on his left arm and both wrists, and also on his penis. The doctor noted that the bruises on the applicant’s wrists could have been sustained as a result of the use of handcuffs. It was further noted that the applicant had complained about shortness of breath, headaches and pain in his ribs. The doctor requested consultations from the thoracic surgery, neurosurgery and internal medicine departments. 12. Later on the same day, the applicant was interrogated, in the presence of his lawyer, by both the Kestel Public Prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Kestel Magistrates’ Court and exercised his right to remain silent. On the basis of the evidence in the case file, the judge ordered his detention on remand. 13. On 21 March 2009 at about 1.40 a.m. the applicant was taken to the emergency department of the Bursa Uludağ University Hospital. In the hospital he was examined by several doctors, specifically from the neurosurgery, general surgery, thoracic surgery and radiology departments. The radiology examinations did not reveal any abnormality in the bones, lungs or heart. The general surgeon indicated that there was no need for surgery. Finally, the thoracic surgeon noted in his report that the applicant had no respiratory problems but that he had several bruises on his body, specifically on his back. He also stated that no fractured ribs had been observed. According to the information in the file, the applicant left the emergency department at about 4 a.m. 14. Later on 21 March 2009 the applicant was also taken to the emergency service of the Bursa State Hospital as he had complained of a pain in his chest. Following consultation of doctors from general surgery, neurosurgery and radiology departments, a doctor from the emergency service issued a report concluding that the applicant’s eighth and ninth ribs had been fractured and that he was suffering from post-traumatic injury. He was accordingly admitted to the emergency department for monitoring and observation. 15. On 30 March 2009 the applicant filed a complaint with the Bursa Public Prosecutor and alleged that he had been ill-treated in custody. In his petition, the applicant maintained that he had been beaten at the Kestel Police Station. He also maintained that following his transfer to the Anti‑Terrorism Branch of the Bursa Security Headquarters, his testicles had been squeezed, he had been beaten, subjected to hanging by his arms, hosed with cold water, exposed to cold air circulation and forced to lie in an ice-covered blanket. The applicant further stated that he could identify the police officers who had ill-treated him if he met them face to face. 16. Upon receiving the applicant’s complaint, the Bursa Public Prosecutor initiated an investigation into his ill-treatment allegations. In this connection, the applicant gave a statement on 31 March 2009, and claimed in a detailed account that he had been ill-treated during his custody. The applicant further maintained that he would be able to identify the police officers who had ill-treated him. 17. The public prosecutor interviewed seven police officers who had been on duty at the time of the applicant’s arrest and during his custody at the Kestel Police Station and the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Bursa Security Headquarters. They all denied the accusations against them. The police officers who had arrested the applicant stated that they had used proportionate force to neutralise him. 18. At the request of the public prosecutor, on 8 April 2009 the applicant was once again taken to the Bursa Uludağ University Hospital for a medical examination. As the gendarme officer refused to leave the consultation room, the doctor did not perform the examination. The gendarme officer issued a report stating that the doctor had not complied with the Protocol for Prisons signed by the Ministries of Justice, Health and Interior, dated 6 January 2000 ‒ according to which a gendarme officer is obliged to stay in the consultation room during the medical examination in a hospital of a person who has been remanded in connection with terrorism‑related crimes ‑and the examination was then carried out in the absence of the gendarme officer. The doctor prepared a detailed report stating that there were several bruises on the front of his left arm which appeared to be self-inflicted. Similar marks were also noticed on his abdomen. Healed scars were observed on both wrists. Bruises on the fingers and right knee were also noted. 19. The doctor further ordered certain medical tests but according to the information in the case file, the prison authorities did not allow the applicant to go to the hospital on the appointment dates and transferred him to the Tekirdağ F‑type Prison. 20. On 15 April 2009 the Forensic Medicine Institute issued a medical report about the applicant based on the medical reports dated 20 March 2009 and 21 March 2009 issued by the Uludağ University Hospital. It was concluded that his injuries were not life-threatening and would heal with simple medical care. It was also noted that no fractured ribs had been observed. No reference was made to the medical report dated 21 March 2009 issued by the Bursa State Hospital. 21. In the course of the investigation, the public prosecutor also requested the video camera recordings taken during the applicant’s periods in custody in Kestel Police Station and the Bursa Security Headquarters. The Bursa Security Directorate informed the public prosecutor’s office that the camera recordings were only kept for eight days. 22. On 3 November 2009 the public prosecutor issued a non-prosecution decision. In his decision the prosecutor held that the injuries observed on the applicant’s body had been sustained during the scuffle at the time of his arrest. The prosecutor also concluded that the force used to neutralise the applicant had been in compliance with Article 16 of Law no. 2559 on the Duties and Powers of the Police. 23. On 1 December 2009 the applicant filed an objection against the public prosecutor’s decision. He repeated that he would be able to identify the police officers who had ill-treated him. On 23 March 2010 the Yalova Assize Court rejected the objection. 24. In the meantime, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for killing a police officer. By a judgment delivered on 20 January 2012 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. The case file contains no information regarding the current status of these proceedings.

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6. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Espoo. 7. The applicant had a husband and two daughters in Russia. In 1988 one of the daughters moved to Finland and has lived there permanently since then. She is a Finnish citizen. The other daughter went missing in 2003 and is probably dead. The applicant raised her granddaughter, who was born in 1986, from the age of 3 or 4, when the child’s mother went missing. 8. In November 2006 the applicant suffered a stroke in Russia. Apparently her right side was then paralysed. At the time, she lived with her husband, until he died in 2007. Thereafter the applicant apparently lived with her granddaughter and her family near Vyborg. 9. On 7 December 2008 the applicant arrived in Finland with a tourist visa issued for a period of 30 days, without having lodged a prior application for a residence permit at a Finnish Representation. Since then she has been living with her daughter in Espoo. 10. On 17 December 2008 the applicant applied for a residence permit on the basis of family ties to her daughter. 11. On 31 July 2009 the Finnish Immigration Service (Maahanmuuttovirasto, Migrationsverket) refused the applicant a residence permit and ordered her removal to Russia. 12. The applicant appealed to the Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen), presenting new medical evidence about her state of health. 13. On 8 April 2010 the Helsinki Administrative Court quashed the Immigration Service’s decision and referred the case back to it for re‑examination as new evidence had been presented in the matter on which it could not take a stand as a first instance. 14. On 29 April 2010 the Immigration Service again refused the applicant a residence permit and ordered her removal to Russia. It found that, according to the domestic law, the applicant was not entitled to a residence permit on the basis of family ties as she was not a family member (a spouse or a minor child) of a person living in Finland. Other relatives than family members were issued a residence permit only in exceptional circumstances, mainly if the purpose was to continue close family life in Finland or if the relative was completely dependent on a Finnish citizen living in Finland. The applicant and her daughter had not had any family life since 1988 when the daughter had moved to Finland. A residence permit could not be granted on the basis of health reasons either. It did not appear that the applicant could not receive proper medical treatment or care in Russia. The applicant’s age, her state of health and the fact that her relative lived in Finland were not sufficient reasons to issue her a residence permit. 15. The applicant appealed to the Helsinki Administrative Court, requesting that the Immigration Service’s decision be quashed. She claimed, inter alia, that she had not received proper treatment in Russia and that such treatment could not be provided. She had no relatives in Russia who could take care of her. This meant that she would have to be put in a nursing home, the standard of which was generally poor in Russia. Her daughter could not move back to Russia either as she would have to leave her job in Finland and take her daughter with her. It was not even certain that they would be issued a residence permit in Russia. The applicant’s mental condition was such that she could not endure removal and separation from her daughter. Separation would lead to her death either through sickness or suicide. 16. On 27 May 2010 the Helsinki Administrative Court ordered a stay on removal for the duration of the proceedings before it. 17. On 16 September 2011 the Helsinki Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. In its reasons the court noted that the essential question was whether the applicant was completely dependent on her daughter who lives in Finland. The applicant’s state of physical and mental health was attested by proper medical certificates. However, it was not shown that the applicant could not receive proper medical treatment or care in Russia, in her own language. The applicant was thus not completely dependent on her daughter in Finland, nor did she have any close ties to Finland. The applicant had close ties to Russia where she could also receive treatment. The fact that treatment would be more expensive there was not a ground to grant a residence permit. The applicant’s daughter could help her financially and could also visit her in Russia. 18. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen), requesting that she be granted leave to appeal and that the court order a stay on removal. 19. No stay on removal was ordered by the Supreme Administrative Court. 20. On 14 June 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.

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4. On 25 December 1997 the applicant became a member of the executive board of Yurtbank, and subsequently on 25 March 1998 he was appointed as Director General of the bank. 5. On 19 August 1998 Yurtbank founded the Yurt Security Offshore Bank in the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”). Subsequently, Yurtbank branch offices in Turkey started collecting deposits to be transferred to offshore accounts in the “TRNC”. 6. On 4 October 1999 the applicant resigned from his post as Director General and subsequently on 30 November 1999 he resigned from membership of the executive board. 7. On 21 December 1999 the Committee of Ministers decided to transfer the management and control of Yurtbank to the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduat Sigorta Fonu). As result, a new executive board was set up and an inspector was appointed to study the administration of Yurtbank. 8. On 6 October 2000 the inspector submitted his report. Following an inspection of all the bank’s accounts, the inspector found it established that the Yurt Security Offshore Bank owed 32,898,662,376,959 Turkish liras (TRL), 5,105,982 US dollars (USD) and 7,514,387 German marks (DEM) to account holders. The report stated that these sums had been used by Yurtbank to provide loans to companies owned by Mr A.B., the main shareholder of the bank. The applicant’s name was also included in the list of persons who had authorisation to make the transfers. It was however stressed that the inspection had not revealed any direct or indirect responsibility on the part of the applicant in the impugned transfers. 9. On 2 November 2000 the new executive board filed a criminal complaint against the former board members, including the applicant. It was alleged that fifteen people, including the applicant, had established a criminal organisation to commit fraud. The complainants stated that the former board members had set up an offshore company with the aim of collecting deposits which they subsequently used to provide irregular loans. In that connection, it was indicated that the deposits collected for the offshore account had never been transferred to the “TRNC”. 10. On 14 November 2000 the applicant was arrested in Istanbul on suspicion of aggravated fraud. According to a form explaining arrested persons’ rights which the applicant signed, he had been informed of the charges against him and of his right to remain silent. In the form it was further noted that legal assistance could not be provided to persons accused of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 11. On 17 November 2000 the applicant was questioned without a lawyer present. In his police statement, the applicant explained that although he had been the Director General of the bank, he had not been directly involved in offshore banking activities, which were administered by a separate directorate. He stated that Yurtbank had acted as a correspondent bank for Yurt Security Offshore Bank. He explained that he had not put pressure on the managers of branch offices to collect deposits for offshore accounts but had known that the managers received bonus payments depending on the number of deposits they had collected for offshore accounts. He further explained that, using the deposits saved in offshore accounts, the bank had signed loan contracts with companies which were owned by the main shareholder of the bank, Mr A.B. In concluding these loan agreements, the bank had not requested any security and the agreements had been concluded on the basis of verbal authorisation, without any documents being submitted. The applicant stated that when he had become aware of the illegal activities he had quit his post as Director General of Yurtbank. 12. On 21 November 2000 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and subsequently the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court. Before the public prosecutor, and without a lawyer present, the applicant repeated his police statement. When the applicant was brought before the investigating judge, the judge allowed the applicant’s lawyer to enter the hearing room. However, he was not allowed to take the floor or advise the applicant. During questioning, the applicant repeated his police statement and pointed out that there was no legislation or court decision that banned offshore banking activities. Following questioning, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 13. On 10 January 2001 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court against thirty accused persons, including the applicant. The prosecutor accused the applicant of forming a criminal organisation and of committing aggravated fraud under Articles 313 and 504 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765 – now repealed). In this connection it was alleged that a company owned by Mr A.B. had constructed real estate and that before the construction was finished the persons intending to buy the properties had been provided with real estate loans by Yurtbank, in which Mr A.B. was the main shareholder. In the process of concluding these loan agreements, the requisite legal documents and security had not been requested from the potential buyers, and by granting irregular loans the accused persons had allegedly committed fraud. It was also alleged that offshore banking activities had been used as a cover in order to provide illegal and irregular loans to the companies owned by the bank’s main shareholder, Mr A.B. 14. On 19 March 2001 the Istanbul State Security Court held its first hearing. In the presence of his lawyer, the applicant submitted his written defence submissions to the court. He stated that he accepted the statements taken from him in custody and pleaded not guilty. 15. On 18 June 2001 the applicant was released pending trial. 16. Following a change in the domestic legislation, the case was transferred from the Istanbul State Security Court to the Istanbul Second Assize Court on 24 December 2001. 17. At a hearing held on 10 October 2002 the trial court appointed three experts. In particular, the experts were asked to clarify whether irregular loans had been provided to companies owned by the main shareholder of the bank; whether the accused board members could be held responsible for those allegedly illegal transactions; and whether in providing the loans the bank had complied with the domestic legislation and obtained the prior authorisations and documents that were legally required. The experts were further asked to investigate the legality of the offshore activities of Yurt Security Offshore Bank. On 14 July 2003 the experts submitted a lengthy report to the court. At the outset, they pointed out that there was no domestic legislation which banned offshore banking activities in Turkey and that the establishment of Yurt Security Offshore Bank had been in line with domestic law and the “TRNC” legislation. 18. At a hearing held on 4 December 2003, the court ordered another expert report. On 13 January 2004 the report was submitted to the court. The experts concluded that, in the circumstances of the present case, it could not be concluded that the accused persons had committed aggravated fraud. In that connection they referred to the fact that when depositors opened offshore accounts it was clearly indicated in the relevant documents that these were offshore accounts, and therefore the depositors should have been aware of the fact that their deposits were not protected by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund. 19. On 15 January 2004, pursuant to a change in the banking legislation, the Istanbul Eighth Assize Court became the competent specialised court to deal with cases concerning the Banking Activities Act (Law no. 4389), and the applicant’s case was accordingly transferred to that court. The new court requested a third expert report in order to calculate the damage sustained by the third-party interveners. In a report dated 14 October 2004, the experts pointed out that from 21 December 1999 onwards the accused persons, including the applicant, had been responsible for a total sum of TRL 15,832,536,971,373. 20. In the course of the hearings, several witness statements were taken, including from the managers of branch offices, who testified that they had been pressurised into collecting deposits for the offshore accounts. The applicant and his co-accused also submitted several legal opinions to the court drafted by university professors, attesting to the legality of offshore banking activities. 21. On 17 December 2004 the Istanbul Eighth Assize Court delivered its judgment. It held in the first place that it could not be established that the accused persons had intended to form a criminal organisation. It accordingly acquitted them of this charge. As to the accusations that the applicant had been involved in aggravated fraud on two counts, namely by providing illegal real estate loans and by using offshore banking activities to cover up fraudulent loans, the court found the applicant guilty as charged under Article 504 § 3 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765). The applicant was accordingly sentenced to a total of five years and ten months’ imprisonment and a fine. In delivering its judgment, the court based its findings on the bank’s inspection reports, the expert reports, the police statements of the applicant and his co-accused, and witness statements. The court found it established that in his capacity as Director General of Yurtbank the applicant had given authorisation for the granting of irregular loans to companies which were owned by Mr A.B. 22. On 7 February 2005 the applicant appealed. 23. On 22 April 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation submitted his written opinion on the merits of the case. This opinion was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 7 June 2005. After holding a hearing, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court in so far as it concerned the term of imprisonment, stating that the sentence should be reassessed in the light of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) that had entered into force in June 2005. It also upheld the acquittal of the applicant on the charge of forming a criminal organisation. 24. The case was accordingly remitted to the Istanbul Eighth Assize Court. On 29 September 2005 the applicant requested the court to hear evidence from several witnesses, including directors of the bank and certain experts, in particular a certain İ.F. The court rejected his requests on the same day, stating that the proceedings were at a stage where no more evidence was necessary. Nevertheless, at a hearing held on 27 October 2005 the witness İ.F. was heard and he made submissions regarding offshore banking. In his testimony, İ.F. explained the development of offshore banking and maintained that, in his opinion as an expert, the acts in question had not constituted an offence at the time when they were committed by the applicant. 25. On 29 November 2005 the first-instance court delivered its judgment. In lengthy reasoning, taking into account the decision of the Court of Cassation, it decided to sentence the applicant to one year and fifteen days’ imprisonment and a fine for providing illegal real estate loans, and then suspended this sentence. As to the charge of aggravated fraud through offshore banking activities, the court sentenced him to two years and one month’s imprisonment and a fine under Article 158 § (f) of the new Criminal Code, indicating that this was the most favourable provision applicable to the applicant’s case. In this connection, it was noted that the main shareholder of the bank, Mr A.B., had committed fraud by way of banking activities. The court further stated that although the applicant had not been officially working for the offshore bank, in his capacity as the Director General of Yurtbank he was aware of the fraudulent actions, and had actively participated in the unlawful activities by using Yurtbank’s resources. 26. The applicant appealed against the judgment of the Assize Court. On 9 February 2006 the opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of Cassation was notified to the applicant’s lawyer and on 13 April 2006 the applicant submitted his written observations in reply. 27. On 19 October 2006 the Court of Cassation discontinued the proceedings concerning the suspended sentence in respect of illegal real estate loans, holding that the statutory time-limit had expired. The appeal court further upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in respect of the applicant’s conviction for aggravated fraud by way of banking activities.

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5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Kragujevac. 6. The applicant was employed by “Društveno preduzeće Industrija mesa ‘Crvena zvezda’” Kragujevac (hereinafter “the debtor”), which was, at the relevant time, a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital. 7. On 15 October 2002 the Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud) in Kragujevac opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 1079/02). 8. The applicant duly submitted his claims for the payment of due salary arrears and related employment benefits. 9. On 25 August 2003 and 11 October 2004 the Commercial Court accepted some of the applicant’s claims. Those decisions became final on an unspecified date. 10. On 20 February 2009 the Commercial Court terminated the insolvency proceedings. That decision was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia on 27 March 2009 (no. 21/09) and became final on 16 July 2009. 11. On 26 February 2010 the debtor ceased to exist. 12. The court decisions rendered in the applicants’ favour on 25 August 2003 and 11 October 2004 remain only partly enforced to the present day.

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6. The applicant is an Iranian national who was born on 12 October 1977 in Teheran and currently lives in Einsiedeln, Switzerland. 7. The applicant entered Switzerland illegally on 26 June 2011 and applied for asylum the next day. He had two hearings before the Federal Migration Board (Bundesamt für Migration – hereafter “the Migration Board”). 8. The first hearing was a summary interview at the Migration Board’s “Centre for Reception and Procedure” (Empfangs- und Verfahrenszentrum) in Basel on 6 July 2011. The applicant gave an account of the alleged events in Iran leading to his escape from his home country. This account was summarised by the Migration Board’s interviewer in official minutes. At the beginning of this summary, the interviewer noted: “For lack of staff, the facts - summarised under no. 15 of the minutes - were not established in detail.” (“Es wird aus Kapazitätsgründen auf eine vertiefte Abklärung zu Pt. 15 verzichtet.”). An interpreter was present during the hearing and the minutes were translated for the applicant prior to his signing. 9. During the hearing the applicant stated that, following serious ballot‑rigging after the Iranian presidential elections on 12 June 2009, anti-regime demonstrations had started to take place. He had participated in almost all these demonstrations until the beginning of March 2011. He claimed that he and his friends had organised peaceful demonstrations every Tuesday. As the demonstrations had been brutally oppressed by the Iranian regime, he and his friends had documented the demonstrations and had circulated this documentation to people. He further claimed that during the last demonstration he had attended, at the beginning of March 2011, several of his friends had been arrested. He alleged that they had been tortured and that one of them had probably mentioned his name to the Iranian authorities and had told them about his participation in the demonstrations. Consequently, on 10 May 2011, a summons issued by the Revolutionary Court of Teheran had been delivered to his residence, namely his parents’ house in Karaj, by a court courier. He had not been present at the time of delivery as he had been on a visit to his sister’s house in Teheran. The summons had ordered him to appear in court on 12 May 2011. Fearing that he might be arrested upon his appearance, he had not presented himself in court but had hidden at his sister’s home and at the homes of various friends in Teheran. As a result of his non-appearance before the court, agents of the secret service had come to his parents’ house the following day (13 May 2011) in order to arrest him. Because of his absence, his father had been arrested instead. The applicant had been left a message that he should report to the district police, otherwise his father would remain in detention. For fear of arrest and on his family’s advice, he had fled the country without legal exit papers in June 2011. 10. In order to support his account during the first hearing, the applicant submitted the allegedly original summons of the Revolutionary Court of Teheran of 10 May 2011. He also submitted documentary material pertaining to the anti-regime demonstrations, which had allegedly been produced by him and his friends. 11. The second, more detailed hearing took place at the Migration Board’s office in Berne 21 months after the first hearing, on 5 April 2013. A member of the non-governmental Aid Organisation of the Protestant Church of Switzerland (Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirche Schweiz) was present as a neutral witness in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the minutes of the hearing in the event that he had witnessed any irregularities, but did not note down any such observations. Again, an interpreter was present during the hearing and the minutes were translated for the applicant prior to his signing. 12. The applicant again gave an account of the alleged events in Iran leading up to his escape. With regard to the events on the day when the summons had allegedly been delivered to his parents’ house (10 May 2011), the applicant now described that members of the Ettelaad security service had come to his parents’ house in his absence in order to search for him. They had searched the house, opening chests of drawers and cupboards. As they had been unable to find him, they had issued the summons while at his parents’ house and had left it behind. Confronted with the fact that he had not mentioned the house search of 10 May 2011 during the first hearing, the applicant responded that he had in fact done so, that he had recounted the same facts during the first hearing and that it was not his fault that this fact had not been recorded in the minutes of the first hearing. 13. Furthermore, asked about his hiding place prior to his escape from Iran, the applicant stated during the second interview that he had stayed at his sister’s home the whole time. When confronted with his testimony from the first hearing, the applicant explained that he had been with friends as well and added that these people had been friends from work and not friends he knew from the demonstrations. 14. With regard to the aftermath of the last demonstration he had attended in March 2011, the applicant stated during the second hearing that he did not know that the Ettelaad security forces were planning to arrest him. He again alleged that one of the friends arrested during the demonstrations had told the security forces who had participated in these demonstrations. Asked when this friend who had given his name had been arrested, the applicant responded that he did not know and that it had not necessarily been this arrested friend directly who had given his name to the security forces. Arrests of that kind usually started a whole chain reaction: the arrested person would give some names, then these people would be arrested and questioned and give further names, and so on. 15. Questioned further during the second hearing about any special occurrences with regard to his last demonstration in March 2011, the applicant stated that the demonstrations had all been rather similar. People had been arrested and agents of the government had beaten up people during the last demonstration just as during any other demonstration. Asked whether he knew the people who had been arrested, the applicant responded that he just knew these people from the street. They had not been people from his region. Teheran was a big city and people had come from everywhere. Confronted with his testimony from the first interview, in which he had claimed that friends of his had been arrested, the applicant stated that the people demonstrating together were all friends in a way and that he had used the term “friends” in that sense when giving his account of the events during the demonstrations. 16. On 10 April 2013 the Migration Board dismissed the applicant’s request for asylum and ordered him to leave Switzerland by 7 June 2013. The Migration Board reasoned that the applicant’s statement of facts was not credible as his descriptions of the events in Iran had not been consistent during the two hearings. The descriptions diverged considerably from each other with regard to decisive points of the applicant’s story. During the first hearing, the applicant had neither mentioned the appearance of the Ettelaad security forces at his parents’ house, nor had he mentioned the house search, nor the fact that it had been the Ettelaad who had issued a summons directly at his parents’ house on 10 May 2011, but had simply stated that a courier of the court had brought the summons. Furthermore, the accounts of the applicant’s hiding prior to his escape from Iran diverged from each other, as the applicant had first stated that he had hidden at his sister’s home and at friends’ homes, whereas he had claimed to have stayed exclusively at his sister’s home during the second hearing. Finally, the applicant had only mentioned the arrest of his friends during his last demonstration only in the account he had given during the first hearing and not during the second interview. The Migration Board took into consideration that the applicant had submitted some documentary material including the alleged summons of 10 May 2011, but was of the view that these documents could not dispel the doubts about the applicant’s account. The documentary material gave only a general account of the demonstrations, but not specifically anything about the applicant’s alleged participation, and a summons alone could not prove any public persecution. 17. On 15 May 2013 the applicant, now represented by counsel, appealed against the decision of the Migration Board to the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). He asked the Federal Administrative Court to quash the decision of the Migration Board, to grant him asylum, to find that the execution of the expulsion order would be an improper and unreasonable measure, and to grant him legal aid. 18. In his appeal the applicant claimed that upon the advice of his counsel he had phoned his family in Iran and had asked whether any further summons had been received. On that occasion he had learnt that he had again been summoned to appear before the Revolutionary Court of Teheran on 5 February 2013. He had also learnt that the Revolutionary Court had convicted him in absentia on 7 May 2013 because he had participated in demonstrations against the Iranian regime and had criticised the regime in slogans. The court had sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment and 70 lashes. The applicant claimed to be in possession only of copies of the summons of 5 February 2013 and the judgment of 7 May 2013 because his family suspected state surveillance and feared that the mail would be checked if they tried to send him the originals by post. The applicant submitted the copies of the alleged new summons and of the alleged judgment to the Federal Administrative Court. In his appeal, he also asked the Federal Administrative Court and the Migration Board whether the authenticity of the two documents could be assessed by the Swiss Embassy in Teheran if the originals were handed in or shown there. 19. In his appeal the applicant also argued that the deviations between his two statements of the facts could be explained by the different nature of the two hearings. The first hearing had been only a summary hearing and the applicant had been asked not to go into detail. It was therefore understandable that he had not described the house search of 10 May 2011 until the second hearing. With regard to his hiding prior to his departure from Iran, his two reports were correct and consistent. He had stayed at his sister’s home but he had also met friends from work and spent time with them. With regard to the events during the last demonstration, he had in essence stated the same facts during the two hearings, namely that he and his friends had documented the demonstration and had handed out leaflets, that many participants, including his friends, had been arrested, and that he believed that one of the arrested persons had passed on his name to the Iranian authorities. The applicant further argued that when assessing his two statements, it had to be taken into consideration that almost two years had elapsed between the two hearings and that no one was able to describe events in exactly the same way after such a long time. Finally, the applicant claimed that the second hearing had not been fair, as the interviewer had constantly interrupted him and treated him as if he were lying. 20. On 22 May 2013 the Federal Administrative Court delivered an interim decision in which it declined the applicant’s request for legal aid, reasoning that his application lacked any prospects of success. In its preliminary assessment of the case, the Federal Administrative Court found that the applicant had not convincingly shown that he was persecuted by the Iranian State. His statements of the facts as given during the two hearings by the Migration Board diverged from each other with regard to essential points and his story was therefore not credible. The summons of 5 February 2013 and the judgment of 7 May 2013 had no probative value as the applicant had submitted only copies of these documents. 21. On 2 July 2013 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. In accordance with section 111 and section 111a of the Swiss Asylum Act of 26 June 1998 (hereafter “the Asylum Act”, see paragraphs 30ss. below), the case was decided by a single judge and the judgment contained only a summary reasoning. An oral hearing was not provided for in the rules of procedure. In accordance with section 111a of the Asylum Act, the Federal Administrative Court also abstained from the possibility of exchanging observations between the parties. The Migration Board was hence not given an opportunity to comment on the submission of the copies of the alleged summons of 5 February 2013 and the judgment of 7 May 2013 or on the possibility of having the alleged original documents – which were allegedly in the possession of the applicant’s family – checked by the Swiss embassy in Teheran. 22. The Federal Administrative Court decided that the applicant had no right to asylum. It further stated that there was no reason not to execute the expulsion order as the applicant had not been able to prove that he had been subject to state persecution in Iran. His accounts of the events during the two hearings diverged with regard to essential details and the applicant had not managed to explain these discrepancies to the Federal Administrative Court’s satisfaction. The time that had passed between the two hearings could not explain the contradictions, since the applicant had not been expected to describe the events in Iran in exactly the same way but rather in a consistent manner. Furthermore, contrary to the applicant’s allegation, there was no indication that the second hearing had been unfair. The hearing had been attended by a member of the Aid Organisation of the Protestant Church of Switzerland as a neutral witness. This person had not made any remarks about irregularities witnessed during the hearing, although he could have done so. The minutes had been translated for the applicant and signed by him. He had therefore had the opportunity to correct any statement had he found that it had not been noted down correctly. 23. The court further found that it could not draw any conclusions from the submitted copy of the summons of 5 February 2013 or the copy of the judgment of 7 May 2013 in the applicant’s favour, as copies had no probative value. The court did not mention the first summons of 10 May 2011, the authenticity of which had not been questioned in the decision of the Migration Board. 24. On 22 July 2013 the Migration Board issued a new expulsion order requiring the applicant to leave Switzerland before 19 August 2013. 25. On 15 August 2013 the applicant lodged his application with the Court and asked for Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to be applied in order to stay the enforcement of his expulsion. He stated that he had participated in demonstrations against the Iranian regime following the presidential elections of 2009 up until March 2011 and that he had handed out leaflets on these occasions. He further alleged that the Ettelaad security forces had searched his parents’ house with the purpose of arresting him. Moreover, he claimed that he had been summoned twice to appear before the Revolutionary Court of Teheran and that the same court had sentenced him in absentia on 7 May 2013 to seven years’ imprisonment, the payment of a fine, and 70 lashes of the whip because of his participation in the demonstrations. 26. In support of his claims the applicant attached to his application of 15 August 2013 documentary material on the demonstrations in Iran, written in Persian, copies of the alleged summonses of 10 May 2011 and 5 February 2013 and a copy of the alleged judgment of 7 May 2013. 27. On 10 October 2013 the applicant informed the Court that he was now in possession of the original summons of 5 February 2013 and of the judgment of 7 May 2013, as his sister’s husband had finally dared to send the documents by special delivery in August 2013. He also provided the Court with English translations of the summons of 5 February 2013 and the judgment of 7 May 2013. A translation of the summons of 10 May 2011 was not submitted. A translation was included in the minutes of the applicant’s second hearing, however, and this had been submitted to the Court. 28. According to the translation of the summons of 5 February 2013, the applicant was summoned to appear before the 10th division of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Teheran on 5 February 2013 at 9 a.m., because of “participation in demonstrations against the public safety and the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. The summons was signed by an “investigating authority” on 3 February 2013. 29. The translation of the judgment of 7 May 2013 of the Revolutionary Court of Teheran reads in its material part: “Charge: Undertakings and activities against the sacred order of the Islamic Republic of Iran Judgement In the case of the accused Mr. M.A., the court – due to the charge sheet of the 10th division of the public prosecutor’s office for the General and the Revolutionary Court of Teheran, due to the existing exhibits and his file, due to the credible report of the intelligence service and the clarification as well as the investigations of public prosecutor’s office mentioned above, due to the testimonies of the persons under arrest as well as due to the especially useful information on file, moreover because of the punishable participation in illegal gatherings, because of the disturbance of the peace and the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of being a troublemaker and the writing of slogans, calling for resistance against the polity by distributing flyers and non-appearance before court despite being summoned, as well as due to the waiver of defence in court – comes to the conclusion that his guilt has been established. For these reasons, in application of Art. 502 of the Islamic law, he is sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment, 70 strokes of the whip and to a fine of 15 Million Rial which is to be paid to the treasury. An appeal against this judgment delivered in absentia is possible within ten days after disclosure. After this period of time, a request for reconsideration can be submitted to the competent courts of the province of Teheran.” The translation also states that the judgment had been “disclosed on 15 May 2013”.

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4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. On 21 May 2004 at 08.15 two household workers (“M.R.” and “I.B”) discovered the body of the applicant’s daughter (“S.J.”) at her home in Ventspils. She had a rope around her neck, the other end of which was thrown over the top of a door and tied to the door handle on the other side. 6. At 08.20 M.R. and I.B. reported the incident to the Ventspils City and District Police Department of the State Police (“the Ventspils State Police”). Three police officers from the Ventspils State Police were dispatched to S.J.’s home. S.J.’s husband (“A.J.”), who worked as a policeman-driver for the Ventspils State Police, arrived separately. 7. The Government have provided details of the investigation which followed. Their account has not been disputed by the applicant. 8. From 09.40 to 10.35 officers G.A. and A.G. from the Ventspils State Police examined S.J.’s home. They prepared the procedural record, photographed the scene and seized material evidence. Later that same day S.J.’s body was transported to the Ventspils City Morgue and A.G. requested an autopsy and forensic medical examination of the body. He also submitted an internal report to the Head of the Ventspils State Police which stated that he and G.A. had arrived at the scene, established that S.J. was dead, arranged for the transportation of the body, examined the scene, and took statements. In the report he noted that the persons transporting S.J.’s body to the morgue had removed the rope from around her neck. 9. In a letter dated 23 May 2005 a Prosecutor from the General Prosecutor’s Office admitted to the applicant that the examination of the scene by A.G. had not been done “qualitatively” or in compliance with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law. He had been subjected to disciplinary action and prosecuted under Article 319(1) of the Criminal Law (Failure of a State Official to Perform His Duties) and under Article 327(19) (Forgery of a Document by a State Official). The second prosecution would appear to relate to the forgery of a Doctor’s signature on a document purporting to set out an expert’s conclusion. A.G. was later released from criminal liability. 10. In the same letter the Prosecutor from the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that another officer from the Ventspils State Police (“A.M.”) had been subjected to disciplinary action for violating the Criminal Procedure Law when verifying the fact of S.J.’s death. It is not clear whether or not the disciplinary action related to the examination of the scene on 21 May 2004. 11. On 24 May 2004 the police took statements from the applicant and S.J.’s sister (“B.L.”), both of whom expressed the opinion that S.J. had no reason to commit suicide. 12. On 25 May 2004 a forensic expert, having examined S.J.’s body, concluded that she had died on 21 May 2004 and attributed the cause of death to mechanical asphyxiation. The report stated that there was no evident sign of violence, aside from the strangulation, although it noted that S.J. had bruises on her shoulder, hands and legs and three scratches on her right palm which could have been acquired up to three days prior to her death. 13. The following day the police obtained statements from a neighbour (“M.N.”) and two of S.J.’s colleagues. M.N. recalled that between 22.00 and 22.15 on 20 May 2004 she had observed a red vehicle similar to the one driven by A.J. parked in the courtyard of the building where S.J. and A.J. lived. Another neighbour (“Ma.N.”) subsequently recalled seeing such a vehicle in the courtyard from 22.00 to 22.30. 14. S.J.’s colleagues confirmed that she had finished her shift in the shop she worked in at 22.00 and headed to an office where she had a second job as a cleaner. Another witness later confirmed that she had arrived at the office at 22.15 and left at 22.45 ‑ 22.50. 15. The Government submitted that on 27 May 2004 the Kurzeme Regional Division of the Organised Crime Combating Department (“the OCCD”) requested a list of incoming and outgoing calls to S.J.’s mobile phone from her operator. 16. On 30 May 2004 the son of S.J. and A.J. (“Av.J.”) made a statement. He said that A.J. had picked him up at home at 18.00 on 20 May 2004. He had remained with his father until 23.00, when his father returned to work and he went to the home of his sister (“D.J.”). A colleague of A.J. later reported going with him to the cafeteria in the police station at 23.00 and the chief officer on duty that night confirmed that A.J. had remained with the squad until his shift ended at 07.00 on 21 May 2004. He also told the investigators that after midnight the police station was locked and the main gate closed, with the consequence that no person – or vehicle – could leave the premises without his permission. 17. On 1 June 2004 Officer A.M. performed a further examination of S.J.’s home. He examined marks and traces left by the rope on the door and seized several samples for forensic traceology examination. 18. On 8 July 2004 a household worker gave a statement to the police confirming that on 20 May 2004 A.J. had returned home at 18.00 to collect Av.J. On 20 July 2004 D.J. confirmed that A.J. and Av.J. had arrived at her home at 23.00 that night. 19. On 21 July 2004 the State Forensic Expertise Centre reported that the groove marks on the upper fragment of the door had been chafed into the wooden surface by the rope attached to S.J.’s neck. Those marks could only have been made by pulling the weight of S.J.’s body towards the door handle, to which the rope was subsequently tied. 20. On 23 July 2004 the OCCD initiated criminal proceedings to investigate the aggravated murder (murder with mercenary intent) of S.J. From this point onwards, Inspector V.L. of the OCCD was responsible for the investigation under the supervision of the General Prosecutor’s Office. A.L. was the Prosecutor in charge and he reported to A.B., who was the supervising Prosecutor. 21. On 23 July 2004 A.J. was interrogated as a suspect and he was informed that he could not change his registered place of domicile. Av.J., D.J. and B.L. were questioned as witnesses. 22. A couple of days later, M.N. and Ma.N. were again interviewed about the red vehicle parked in the courtyard of S.J.’s home. Both indicated that they had believed the vehicle to be the one driven by A.J. 23. Throughout the following months witnesses were interviewed, including A.J. (who was questioned repeatedly), his relatives and acquaintances, S.J.’s relatives (including the applicant), the couple’s neighbours, a number of police officers, S.J.’s employer and some of her colleagues, her household workers and her dentist. The General Prosecutor’s Office also instructed the OCCD to order further forensic tests, although records indicate that many were in fact ordered by the Ventspils State Police. 24. Attempts were made to establish the exact time of death but on 11 August 2004 the forensic expert indicated that “considering that the forensic medical examination of S.J.’s body had been performed four days after it was found and that livor mortis appears within the first hour of death, a more precise time of death could not be established”. 25. A.J.’s uniform and the seat covers of his service car were seized on 9 August 2004 and DNA samples were taken from him. On 9 September 2004 the expert reported that there were several different DNA samples on the rope used to hang S.J. but none belonged to A.J. The expert was unable to establish the gender identification of the samples. On 16 September 2004 an expert concluded that some fibres found on S.J.’s coat possibly came from A.J.’s car seat but the results were inconclusive. 26. Further tests were also carried out on S.J.’s body, but no injuries were found which would indicate a struggle or self-defence. 27. Furthermore, S.J.’s bank records were requested, as were details of all red vehicles matching the description of the one seen at the scene of the crime. S.J.’s family members were also questioned repeatedly about whether or not she had kept a personal diary. On 23 March 2005 the diary appears to have been handed over to the police and attached to the criminal file. 28. On 1 December 2006 a further forensic traceology report suggested that there was a “high probability” that if S.J. had committed suicide the grooves on the top of the door would not have appeared as they did. 29. On 21 March 2007 A.J. was again declared a suspect. Further DNA tests were performed on the rope and experiments were carried out to determine the driving time from Ventspils Police Station to S.J.’s home. The results of the latter test appeared to confirm A.J.’s alibi and on 13 November 2008 the decision to once again declare him a suspect was quashed. 30. On 11 January 2011 a new OCCD investigator (“A.Jo.) assumed jurisdiction over the case file. 31. On 20 August 2007 the OCCD acknowledged D.J. (the applicant’s granddaughter) as a victim in the criminal proceedings. 32. On 26 May 2004 the applicant wrote to the Head of the OCCD alleging that S.J. had been murdered. The OCCD informed the applicant on 2 July 2004 that the circumstances of S.J.’s death were still being investigated. 33. The applicant subsequently submitted further complaints to the Prosecutor’s Office concerning the conduct of the investigation. In the course of these complaints, he implied that A.J. was directly or indirectly implicated in S.J.’s murder and that his colleagues on the police force were deliberately obstructing the investigation. 34. On 22 December 2004 A.Mi., a senior Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court, informed the applicant that an in-depth investigation was being carried out. It was being conducted in an impartial manner and there was no evidence of any deliberate obstruction by the police. A.Mi. noted that the investigation was complicated and was supervised by another prosecutor from the same office (“A.L.”). 35. On 23 May 2005 a Prosecutor from the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that the investigation was still ongoing and that the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient to bring charges against any specific persons. The Prosecutor admitted that A.G. had not carried out the initial examination of the scene of S.J.’s death “qualitatively”, that both A.G. and A.M. had violated the requirements of the laws on criminal procedure and that the two officers had received disciplinary penalties. In addition, criminal proceedings had been initiated against A.G. for criminal inaction of a State official (section 319 of the Criminal Law) and for the forgery of official documents (section 327 of the Criminal Law). However, on 14 March 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court had decided to release A.G. from criminal liability pursuant to Article 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 36. On 17 July 2007 the applicant wrote to A.L., the supervising Prosecutor, and asked to see certain expert reports and other specific information concerning the investigation into S.J.’s death. More particularly, he asked for additional information concerning the violations committed by the police officers A.M. and A.G. He also enquired when the case would be sent to a court. 37. On 20 August 2007 the Prosecutor replied to the applicant. He informed him that the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing and a forensic biological analysis of DNA was being carried out. Further investigative steps would be planned after receiving the results of that analysis and it was therefore impossible to predict the date of the completion of the pre-trial investigation. The applicant was further informed that under the Law of Criminal Procedure he had no right to read the case file or to receive copies thereof. The only persons who had such a right were the accused and the victims, but only after the completion of the criminal proceedings. With regard to the violations committed by the police officers, the applicant was advised to contact the Ventspils State Police. 38. On 10 September 2007 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General concerning the Prosecutors’ responses of, inter alia, 22 December 2004, 23 May 2005 and 20 August 2007. He principally complained that the investigation was being deliberately delayed in order to protect S.J.’s murderer(s). 39. The applicant’s complaint was forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court. On 1 October 2007 he received a response from A.Mi. informing him that the investigation and the gathering of evidence were continuing “in order to establish important facts”. Unspecified expert reports had apparently been ordered and their results were expected no earlier than December. Finally, the applicant was informed that his “allegation that the investigator and the supervising Prosecutor were not sufficiently active and were uninterested in establishing the truth were unfounded”. 40. On 26 October 2007 the applicant submitted a further complaint to the Prosecutor General. He criticised the Office of the General Prosecutor’s decision to forward his complaint to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court. He also denounced the response of 1 October 2007 as “passive and unfounded” and considered that the fact that it did not address the substance of his complaints demonstrated that A.Mi. was not interested in establishing the truth about S.J.’s murder. 41. On 13 November 2007 the Prosecutor General gave a final response to the applicant’s complaint. In the relevant parts of the response the applicant was informed: “... [the senior prosecutor A.M.] in his response of 1 October [2007] informed you that the investigation of the criminal case ... was ongoing, that expert reports had been ordered, and that after receiving expert reports further investigative steps would be planned. While criminal proceedings are pending, the materials in the criminal case file are an investigative secret (section 375 of the Law of Criminal Procedure), which is why it is impossible to give you more specific information concerning the investigative steps that have been taken and will be taken. It might be for that reason that you have formed an incorrect opinion that the investigation is being intentionally delayed and not conducted with the aim of establishing the culprit; however, such an opinion does not find support in the steps actually taken in the criminal proceedings. In the course of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case ... a sufficient amount of investigative steps were carried out: more than 15 expert reports were ordered and received and the need to order [additional] expert reports and the planning of further investigative steps was determined by the [findings of the] expert reports already received. In addition, the preparation of expert reports took significant time; more than 40 witnesses were questioned and other investigative steps carried out. Unfortunately the pre-trial investigation to this date has not allowed us to establish the circumstances [of S.J.’s death] or the culprit.”

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5. Ms Borovská and Mr Forrai (“the first and third applicants”) were born in 1948 and 1927 respectively, and live in Košice. 6. Ms Buzová (“the second applicant”) was born in 1937 and also lived in Košice. On 17 April 2014 the Court received a letter from the applicants’ lawyer informing it that, on 27 October 2013, the second applicant had died and that the inheritance proceedings were pending. 7. This application and three others (nos. 18803/10, 42812/10 and 44019/11) concern the regularisation of the relationship between ownership and use of real property located in the cadastral area of Košice-Sever. 8. Certain land in that area was expropriated in the 1980s by the (then socialist) State and a public sports centre was built on it. The sports centre comprises buildings and various other facilities, such as a tennis court, a grandstand, a water station and paved areas. 9. After the post-1989 political, constitutional and legal changes, litigation took place with a view to resolving various property claims made by the original owners (or their legal successors) against the entities that owned or operated the sports centre or various parts of it. 10. The land concerned is divided into a number of plots with various owners, many of whom are linked by family relations and history, and who had the same legal representation in the above-mentioned proceedings. Their lawsuits followed a similar pattern, but sometimes had varying results. They included the following proceedings. 11. The applicants in the present case are successors in title to a plot of land in the above-mentioned area, having inherited their title from the original owner, who died in 1959. 12. On 22 August 1994 the applicants lodged an action against the owner of a sports centre seeking to obtain a court order for the removal of the constructions on the land. The principal line of argument was that the expropriation decision of 24 February 1984 was invalid in law. The applicants were therefore the lawful owners of the land in question, in particular plot no. 10610 (recorded on sheet no. 1460 in the “old” records), and the defendant had no lawful title to have the constructions on the applicants’ land. 13. The action was subsequently amended to state that, alternatively, the applicants sought a judicial ruling establishing an easement on their land for the benefit of the owner of the sports centre in return for financial compensation payable to the applicants. It was also extended to two more defendants: the municipality concerned and a private company. 14. The action was examined and determined at first instance by the Košice I District Court (Okresný súd). In its judgment (rozsudok) of 11 August 2008, the District Court acknowledged that (i) the expropriation of 1984 was legally ineffective on account of procedural flaws; (ii) as a consequence the applicants were the owners of the land in question; (iii) the constructions on it had been built without a valid legal title in so far as the land was concerned; and (iv) the applicants were entitled to seek redress under general civil law, that is to say Article 135c of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended), which was not subject to any statute of limitation, unlike the special legislation on restitution, which contained specific time-limits (see paragraph 24 below). 15. The District Court further held that, for practical reasons, it was out of the question to regularise the situation by establishing that the applicants were the owners of the constructions and ordering them to pay the current owners financial compensation. Furthermore, in the circumstances, it was likewise not practical to order the physical removal of the constructions in question. 16. However, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the District Court found that no easement could be established on the land. The bone of contention was the legal nature of the constructions concerned. Unlike in construction law, in civil law these constructions could not be considered as “buildings” (stavba) in legal terms. An easement over land could only be established for the benefit of the owner of a building in the given sense. In that connection, the court relied on Article 135c § 3 of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended) (see paragraph 21 below). The court also noted that it was bound by the legal classification of the applicants’ claim and concluded that, since the constructions on their specific plots of land were not buildings, the claim had to be dismissed. 17. The applicants challenged the first-instance judgment by means of an appeal (odvolanie) to the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd). They argued in particular that the District Court had failed to appreciate that the property in question was part of a large complex serving a single purpose, that a number of claims had been raised in respect of that property, that those claims had been fully or partly successful, that the legal nature of the claims was identical to those raised by the applicants; and that the only difference was the technical parameters of the specific plots at stake. The applicants pointed out specifically that, in its judgment in case no. 15C 251/94, the District Court had established an easement in respect of plots of land comprising the sports centre on which similar constructions had been built, exactly as claimed by the applicants in the present case. The court had made no distinction between plots with and those without “buildings” on them (see paragraphs 25 et seq. below). 18. On 11 February 2010 the Regional Court, sitting in chambers, dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the first‑instance judgment, albeit on different grounds. It concurred with the District Court that the expropriation of 1984 was legally ineffective. As a consequence, the State was to be considered as having appropriated the land in question without legal title within the meaning of section 6(1)(p) of the Act on adjustment of ownership rights in respect of land and other agricultural property (Law no. 229/1991 Coll., as amended – “the Land Ownership Act”). The restitution of land in such circumstances fell under the regime of the said legislation and any claims for it had had to be lodged by 31 December 1992 at the latest (see paragraphs 22 et seq. below). The Regional Court observed that the applicants had failed to pursue that course of action and held that asserting their property rights under general civil law, as the applicants had done, was not permissible. The applicants’ argument concerning the differing judicial practice went unanswered. The Regional Court’s judgment became final and binding on 16 March 2010. 19. On 5 May 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) under Article 127 § 1 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). They considered the dismissal of their action arbitrary and alleged that their rights under, inter alia, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (access, fairness, adequate reasoning) and the constitutional equivalent of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated. Among other things, they argued that – on the specific facts – their case fell outside the purview of the restitution laws cited in the Regional Court’s judgment and that the existence of the restitution laws as leges speciales did not exclude the application of the rules on protection of property rights under the Civil Code as a lex generalis. In addition, the applicants submitted that judicial practice had varied. They referred to the District Court’s judgment in case no. 15C 251/94 and its judgments in a number of other cases concerning the same sports centre, in which the application of general civil law in an identical context had been accepted. Although they had raised this specific argument before the Regional Court, the latter had taken no position on it and its reasoning had been generally inadequate and arbitrary. Moreover, the applicants emphasised that it had been sixteen years since the introduction of their action, a protracted period for which they bore no responsibility. They considered that, therefore, any case-law that may have meanwhile been established should not be detrimental to them. 20. On 3 June 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It observed that it was not a court of further appeal against decisions of the ordinary courts. It cited extensively from the Regional Court’s judgment, finding no constitutionally relevant unfairness, arbitrariness or irregularity in it. The applicants’ argument concerning the differing judicial practice went unanswered. The decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 30 July 2010.

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5. The particulars of the applicants appear in the appendix. 6. This application and three others (nos. 18803/10, 42812/10 and 48554/10) concern the regularisation of the relationship between ownership and use of real property located in the cadastral area of Košice-Sever. 7. Certain land in that area was expropriated in the 1980s by the (then socialist) State and a public sports centre was built on it. The sports centre comprises buildings and various other facilities, such as a tennis court, a grandstand, a water station and paved areas. 8. After the post 1989 political, constitutional and legal changes, litigation took place with a view to resolving various property claims made by the original owners (or their legal successors) against the entities that owned or operated the sports centre or various parts of it. 9. The land concerned is divided into a number of plots with various owners, many of whom are linked by family relations and history, and who had the same legal representation in the above-mentioned proceedings. Their lawsuits followed a similar pattern, but sometimes had varying results, and included the following proceedings. 10. The applicants in the present case are successors in title to a plot of land in the above-mentioned area, having inherited their title from the original owners, who died in 1970 and 1997. 11. On 17 May 1994 the latter of the original owners lodged an action against a sports club seeking to obtain a court order for the removal of the constructions on the land. The principal line of argument was that the expropriation decision of 24 February 1984 was invalid in law. The applicants were therefore the lawful owners of the land in question, in particular of plots nos. 10620/1 and 10620/2 (recorded on sheet no. 6946 in the “old” records), and that the defendant had no lawful title to have the constructions on the applicants’ land. 12. The action was subsequently amended to state that, alternatively, the applicants sought a judicial ruling establishing an easement on their land for the benefit of the owner of the sports centre in return for financial compensation to be paid to the applicants. It was also extended to two more defendants: the municipality concerned and a private company. 13. The action was examined and determined at first instance by the Košice I District Court (Okresný súd). In its judgment (rozsudok) of 2 April 2009, the District Court acknowledged that (i) the expropriation of 1984 was legally ineffective on account of procedural flaws; (ii) as a consequence, the applicants were the owners of the land in question; (iii) the constructions on it had been built without a valid legal title in so far as the land was concerned; and (iv) the applicants were eligible to seek redress under general civil law, that is to say Article 135c of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended), which was not subject to any statute of limitation, unlike the special legislation on restitution, which contained specific time-limits (see paragraph 23 below). 14. The District Court further held that, for practical reasons, it was out of the question to regularise the situation by establishing the applicants as the owners of the constructions and ordering them to pay the current owners financial compensation. Furthermore, in the circumstances, it was likewise not practical to order the physical removal of the constructions in question. 15. However, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the District Court found that no easement could be established on the land. The bone of contention was the legal nature of the constructions concerned. Unlike in construction law, in civil law those constructions could not be considered as “buildings” (stavba) in legal terms. An easement over land could however only be established for the benefit of the owner of a building in the given sense. In that connection, the courts relied on Article 135c § 3 of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended) (see paragraph 20 below). The court also noted that it was bound by the legal classification of the applicants’ claim. It concluded that since the constructions on their specific plots of land were not buildings, the claim had to be dismissed. 16. The applicants challenged the first-instance judgment by means of an appeal (odvolanie) to the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd).They argued, in particular, that the District Court had failed to appreciate that the property in question was part of a large complex serving a single purpose and that the claims raised in respect of that property were structurally identical and had been raised separately only because they concerned different plots of land with different owners. 17. On 10 May 2010 the Regional Court, sitting in chambers, upheld the first-instance judgment, albeit on different grounds. It concurred with the District Court that the expropriation of 1984 was legally ineffective. As a consequence, the State was to be considered as having taken the land in question without legal title within the meaning of section 6(1)(p) of the Act on adjustment of ownership rights in respect of land and other agricultural property (Law no. 229/1991 Coll., as amended – “the Land Ownership Act”) and as having subsequently acquired its title by way of prescription. The restitution of land in such circumstances fell under the regime of the said legislation and any claims for it had to be lodged by 31 December 1992 at the latest (see paragraphs 21 et seq. below). The applicants had failed to pursue that course of action. Asserting their property rights under general civil law, as the applicants had done, was not permissible. In support of its conclusions, the Regional Court referred specifically to the judgments of the Supreme Court concerning appeals on points of law in unrelated but similar cases nos. 3 Cdo 120/03 (of 29 April 2004) and 4 Cdo 130/2007 (of 25 February 2009) (see paragraphs 30 et seq. below). 18. On 29 July 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) under Article 127 § 1 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). They considered the dismissal of their action arbitrary and alleged that their rights under, inter alia, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (access, fairness, adequate reasoning) and the constitutional equivalent of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated. Among other things, they argued that – on the specific facts – their case fell outside the purview of the restitution laws cited in the Regional Court’s judgment and that the existence of the restitution laws as leges speciales did not exclude the application of the rules on protection of property rights under the Civil Code as a lex generalis. In addition, the applicants submitted that judicial practice had varied. They referred to the District Court’s judgment in case no. 15C 251/94 and its judgments in a number of other cases concerning the same sports centre, in which the application of general civil law in an identical context had been accepted. Their specific arguments about such differing practice had gone unanswered. Moreover, the applicants emphasised that it had been sixteen years since the introduction of their action, a protracted period for which they bore no responsibility. They considered that, therefore, any case-law that may have meanwhile been established should not be detrimental to them. 19. On 12 May 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill founded. It cited extensively from the Regional Court’s judgment and concluded that its assessment of the case conformed to the Constitution. As to the applicants’ argument concerning the differing judicial practice, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicants’ action had been lodged sixteen years before the Regional Court’s judgment; that, since then, the decision-making practice had evolved; and that, at the relevant time, it had supported the Regional Court’s interpretation. The decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 28 June 2011.

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4. The applicants were born in 1947, 1952, 1965, and 1921 respectively and live in Perugia, Fano, and (the third and fourth applicant) in Lecce, respectively. 5. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicants are the owners of a plot of land in Galatina. The land in issue, an area of 6,241 square metres, was recorded on the land register as folio no. 76, parcel no. 29. 7. On 10 July and 9 August 1985 respectively, the Mayor of Galatina issued two decrees authorising the Municipality to take possession, under an expedited procedure and on the basis of a public-interest declaration, of 560 and 894 square metres of land in order to begin the construction of low-rent housing. 8. By two writs served, respectively, on 17 September and 8 October 1990, the applicants brought actions in damages against the Galatina Municipality before the Lecce District Court. The applicants alleged that the occupation of the land was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without there having been a formal expropriation of the land and payment of compensation. They claimed a sum corresponding to the market value of the land as well as compensation for the area of land that had become unusable as a result of the building work. They further claimed a sum in damages for the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation. 9. On 13 November 1991 and 15 January 1992, the court ordered two expert assessments of the land in connection with the two sets of proceedings. 10. On 22 November 1996 the applicants submitted a motion pursuant to Article 186 quater of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure requesting that the court issue an order for the immediate payment of the requested compensation by the Municipality. 11. On 13 December 1996 the court concluded that sufficient evidence existed for it to proceed with the order. The court granted the motion and merged the two sets of proceedings. By means of an order delivered on the same day, the Lecce District Court drew on the expert reports to conclude that the market value of the land on the date of its irreversible alteration (31 December 1985) corresponded to ITL 355 000 000 (EUR 342,199). On this basis, the court ordered that the applicant was entitled to compensation equivalent to the latter sum, adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest, for a total amount of ITL 600 000 000 (EUR 309 874,139). The claim concerning the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation was dismissed. 12. The order was served on the Galatina Municipality on 24 March 1997 and thereupon became immediately enforceable. 13. In April 1997 the Municipality submitted a motion, pursuant to Article 186 quater of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, expressing their intention to waive the delivery of the final judgment (“rinuncia alla pronuncia della sentenza definitiva”). The motion was served on the applicants on 4 April 1997 and filed with the registry on 31 May 1997. By virtue of the foregoing provision, once the motion is served and filed with the registry, the order becomes final and can, therefore, be subject to appeal. 14. On 2 June 1997 the Municipality appealed against the order before the Lecce Court of Appeal, their main contention being that the portion of land subject to expropriation was actually less than the size identified in the Lecce District Court’s order. The Municipality, therefore, requested that a new expert valuation be submitted and that the Court of Appeal recalculate the final sum to be awarded to the applicants under Law no. 662 of 1996, which had entered into force in the meantime. The Municipality further requested a stay of execution of the Lecce District Court’s order. 15. On 4 June 1997 the applicants lodged a cross-appeal arguing that the appeal proceedings should be declared null and void on the ground, inter alia, that the application of Article 186 quater of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure entailed a violation of their defense rights. The applicants also sought the dismissal of the Municipality’s appeal on the ground that it was manifestly ill-founded. No claim concerning the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation was raised. 16. On 30 July 1997 the Lecce Court of Appeal ordered a stay of execution of the Lecce District Court’s order. 17. On 27 August 1997 the applicants filed a motion seeking the enforcement of the order. 18. On 30 July 1997 the Lecce Court of Appeal confirmed the stay of execution of the Lecce District Court’s order. 19. On 13 July 1999 the Court of Appeal ordered an expert assessment in order to verify the size of the land in question and calculate the amount of compensation under Law no. 662 of 1996. The report was filed with the court’s registry on 2 February 2000. 20. According to the expert, the land that had been actually occupied, coupled with the portion that had become unusable due to the building works, was less extensive than the size established in the Lecce District Court’s judgment and amounted to 2,132 square metres. He further concluded that the lawful occupation had ended, for a first portion of the land, on 2 August 1994, and, for a second portion, on 6 September 1994. The expert concluded that the market value of the land in 1994 corresponded to ITL 67,000 per square metre and assessed the compensation due to the applicants under Law no. 662 of 1996 at ITL 83 308 412 (EUR 43,025). 21. By a judgment of 4 April 2001, filed with the court registry on 4 June 2001, the Court of Appeal held that the applicant was entitled to compensation in the sum of ITL 83 308 412 (equivalent to EUR 43,025) to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest. The court dismissed the remaining claims. 22. On an unspecified date in 2001 the applicants received the payment of EUR 56 130,81. 23. On 12 November 2001 the applicants appealed on points of law. 24. By a judgment of 13 February 2004, filed with the court registry on 15 July 2004, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal.

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6. The applicant was born in 1936 and lived in Żary. She is currently residing in a social care home in K. 7. The applicant, who is a widow, was living alone in an apartment in Żary. She was receiving a pension from the Social Security Board. She has a daughter, with whom she apparently had had no contact for several years. 8. On 24 March 1981, at the request of the applicant’s daughter, the Zielona Góra Regional Court declared the applicant to be partially incapacitated. The court established that she had been suffering from psycho-organic dementia syndrome with elements of paranoia and that she had a tendency to abuse alcohol and medications. It reasoned that it was necessary to declare her to be partially incapacitated because she needed help in making the right decisions, particularly as regards her treatment and the amount of money she spent on alcohol. 9. On 19 December 2007 the Żary City Centre for Social Services (Miejski Ośrodek Pomocy Społecznej) requested the Żary District Court to place the applicant, against her will, in a social care home. The City Centre for Social Services submitted that the applicant was suffering from mental disorders, did not go to doctors and behaved in a way that departed from “socially accepted norms”, which posed a threat to her health and life. The Centre explained that the applicant had been “walking in the streets incompletely dressed, untidy and dirty. She smelled, talked to herself and often looked as if she was under the influence of alcohol”. A medical certificate dated 3 December 2007 was attached to the request. The certificate had been issued by a psychiatrist on the basis of an examination of the applicant in the psychiatric ward of the Żary Military Hospital. It had been found that the applicant had been suffering from organic personality disorders (organiczne zaburzenie osobowości) and that she needed constant care. However, she did not require hospital treatment. 10. The Żary District Court scheduled several hearings at which the applicant failed to appear. Therefore, it was decided to hear the applicant at her place of residence on 25 March 2008. On that day contact with the applicant was difficult; her answers to some of the court’s questions were illogical. She made it clear, however, that she did not want to be placed in the social care home. At the end of the hearing she refused to sign the relevant document and told the people present in her apartment to get out. 11. On 19 June 2008 the Żary District Court decided to place the applicant in a social care home. The court based its decision on an opinion given by a psychiatrist, I.S., who had examined the applicant once, on 8 May 2008, and had diagnosed her with chronic schizophrenia and a disorder of the central nervous system. The doctor found that until the time of the examination the applicant had been in the care of a social guardian, R.D. However, the doctor claimed that “care was not provided properly or was not provided at all”. The applicant had been neglecting the basic principles of hygiene and nutrition, which might lead to infections or undernourishment. He stressed however that she did not pose a direct danger to her own or other peoples’ health or life. The doctor also found that the applicant needed to be under the constant care of a third person. The relevant part of the opinion read as follows: “Through her behaviour she poses a risk to her life, i.e. in certain circumstances leaving her without constant care significantly raises the probability of risk to her life. It is not however a direct risk, but it results rather from the applicant’s neglect of basic hygiene principles, place of residence and nutrition. [The applicant is therefore exposed to] a risk of malnutrition, [and] infections.” The court also examined the possibility of the applicant’s stay at her home and referred in this respect to the possibility of taking care of the applicant by third persons and to the assistance provided by the Local Social Care Centre. The relevant part of the court’s decision read as follows: “...there are no members of family or third persons who could take care of the applicant on permanent basis. In particular the applicant’s daughter declared that she did not want to look after her mother on permanent basis and that she would not take her mother to her place... ... The expert opinion is clear in so far as it states that (the applicant) needs constant care lack of which poses a danger to her life. ... As regards the assistance from the employees of the Żary Social Care Centre it is to be noted that this assistance is not of a permanent nature. This means that social employee does not spend the whole day with a person concerned and does not take care of that person on permanent basis because, as a rule, social employees [...] assist at the same time many persons living in the area covered by their activity. The applicant in turn, requires permanent care which cannot be secured by the social employees.” 12. The applicant was placed in a social care home in K. on 10 September 2008. 13. It appears that the District Court granted the applicant a legal aid lawyer in 2007. However, according to the applicant’s submission the lawyer was not present at the hearing before the first-instance court and de facto she was not represented in the judicial proceedings. 14. On 8 December 2008 the applicant’s daughter appealed against the decision of 19 June 2008. She also requested that her mother be granted a legal aid lawyer and that she be served with the decision of 19 June 2008 with written reasoning. 15. On 29 December 2008 the Żary District Court dismissed the request for a legal aid lawyer, finding that the applicant’s daughter had sufficient knowledge and abilities to represent her mother before the court. It also rejected the appeal and the request for the reasoning of the first-instance decision. 16. On 7 February 2009 the applicant lodged another appeal against the decision of 19 June 2008 and requested leave to appeal out of time. 17. On 3 March 2009 the applicant was granted a legal aid lawyer. Since she was not satisfied with the lawyer who represented her, on 2 June 2009 she was granted another lawyer, who subsequently requested that the court grant the applicant leave to appeal out of time. 18. On 25 August 2009 the Żary District Court granted the applicant’s request for leave to appeal out of time. 19. On 7 December 2009 the Zielona Góra Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The minutes of the court decision reveal that nobody was present at the hearing on that day. The same minutes state, however, that “the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, was informed that she could request reasons for the decisions in writing if she lodged a relevant request within seven days from the day of publication [of the decision].” The applicant submitted that she had not been served with the court’s decision and that she had found out about it by chance two years later. In the meantime she lodged a complaint with the court about the excessive length of the proceedings. Her complaint was rejected by the Zielona Góra Regional Court on 31 October 2011. 20. When the applicant learned that her appeal had been dismissed she requested the leave of the Regional Court to lodge a request for written reasons for the decision out of time. She also requested leave to lodge a cassation appeal out of time, to be exempted from the court fees and to be granted a legal aid lawyer who would prepare and lodge a cassation appeal on her behalf. 21. On 21 November 2011 the Zielona Góra Regional Court dismissed her request for leave to appeal out of time and therefore she could not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 22. On the same day the Zielona Góra Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for exemption from the court fees and for the appointment of a legal aid lawyer to lodge a cassation appeal on her behalf. 23. On 20 November 2008 the applicant’s daughter requested the District Court to vary the measure applied to her mother and to amend the decision of 19 June 2008. 24. The Żary District Court ordered that the applicant be examined by a psychiatrist in order to check whether she needed to remain in the social care home. It also ordered that the applicant be heard by the Gorzów Wielkopolski District Court by way of judicial assistance. 25. The applicant was examined by a psychiatrist on 6 April 2009. The relevant part of the psychiatric opinion reads as follows: “In her current mental state the applicant does not need to be admitted and treated in hospital. ... As a result of her sickness she requires help in day-to-day matters, first of all, taking care of her treatment process and controlling her expenses so that she does not spend money on alcohol. She also needs assistance in preparing meals, personal hygiene and shopping. ... The applicant needs the twenty-four-hour care that may be offered in a social care home. It is admissible that she be placed in a family home provided that the family is able to assure twenty-four-hour care. ... There has been no change in the applicant’s mental state or circumstances which constituted the basis for her placement in the social care home. The applicant does not require to be placed in a psychiatric ward ... She does not pose a direct danger to her own or a third person’s health or life.” 26. On 6 April 2009 the applicant was also heard by the Gorzów Wielkopolski District Court. The hearing lasted fifteen minutes. The applicant’s statement reads as follows: “I am afraid that I could be locked up. I would need a sanatorium where they treat heart disease. I do not feel at ease in the social care home because the people there are not normal, they are constantly asking for cigarettes and I do not smoke. Medical care is assured there. The doctor is a colleague of mine, because I was manager of a chemist and he was the doctor. I take the medication promazyn because I was exposed to radiation during the war, but now I am fine. I am in good hands, I need my home, my daughter comes to see me. She comes every week. I lived in my home in Żary for 30 years. My daughter, when she became an adult, used to come to see me and she helped me out. I want to stay in my apartment in Żary, which is situated not far from my daughter’s apartment.” 27. On 15 June 2009 the court summoned the applicant’s daughter in order to establish whether she was capable of providing care for her mother. She failed to appear, so a further hearing was scheduled for 10 August 2009. The applicant’s daughter again failed to appear. The court then decided to close the case, finding that the facts had been sufficiently established to make a final decision. 28. On 20 August 2009 the Żary District Court dismissed the request lodged by the applicant’s daughter to vary the measure applied to the applicant. Neither the applicant, her daughter, nor the applicant’s guardian was present when the court announced its decision. The decision was not appealed against and became final on 10 September 2009. 29. On 5 April 2009 the applicant requested the Żary District Court to reopen the proceedings which had resulted in her placement in the social care home. If it was not possible to re-open the proceedings, she requested that the respective decision be varied. 30. On 21 May 2009 the District Court rejected her request. The court found that there were no grounds for reopening the proceedings. It further informed the applicant that, under section 41 of the 1994 Psychiatric Protection Act, an applicant placed in a social care home or members of his or her family could request that the court vary the decision on placing him or her in the social care home. The court disregarded the applicant’s alternative request in that regard. 31. On 9 February 2009 the applicant requested the District Court to supplement the decision of 19 June 2008 and allow her to leave the social care home for one hour a day in order to go to a shop, as well as allow her to stay in her room all day. 32. On 25 August 2009 the Żary District Court dismissed the request to supplement the original decision, finding that those matters fell outside the court’s jurisdiction and that they were provided for by the internal regulations of each social care home. 33. On 19 July 2009 the applicant again asked the court to vary the measure applied to her. She also requested legal aid; she submitted that she could not afford to appoint a lawyer at her own expense because 70% of her pension was retained by the social care home. 34. On 1 October 2009 the Żary District Court refused to grant a legal aid lawyer, finding that the applicant was able to deal with her affairs herself and that her case was not complicated from a legal or factual point of view. 35. The applicant appealed against that decision. 36. On 18 November 2009 the Zielona Góra Regional Court quashed the challenged decision and granted the applicant a legal aid lawyer. 37. As regards the applicant’s request to vary the measure, a hearing took place on 6 November 2009 in the presence of both the applicant and her lawyer. Following a request by the lawyer, the court decided to stay the proceedings. They were resumed on 5 February 2010. 38. On 15 March 2010 the Żary District Court dismissed the applicant’s request. The applicant did not appeal against that decision and it became final on 6 April 2010.

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5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Igar. 6. Between 25 April 2004 and 3 December 2004 the Fejér County Regional Centre for Taxes (the “Tax Authority”) carried out a tax audit of the applicant for the assessment of the years 1999-2001. The Tax Authority drafted an audit report on which the applicant submitted comments. 7. Having regard to the audit report, the testimonies of the applicant and her father and the applicant’s comments, the Tax Authority levied on her additional personal income tax in the amount of 10,961,884 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 39,100 euros (EUR)), tax surcharges in the amount of HUF 5,480,808 (EUR 19,500) and interest in the amount of HUF 6,551,884 (EUR 23,300). The Tax Authority dismissed the testimonies of the applicant and her father to the effect that the disputed funds, invested in her company as an equity loan, had been given to her by her father as personal credit. Relying on a targeted tax inspection (célvizsgálat) of the father, the Tax Authority observed that, despite an invitation to do so, the applicant’s father had failed to provide any documentary evidence of the fact that at the material time he had been in possession of the disputed amount. 8. On appeal, the second-instance tax authority upheld the first-instance decision on 5 May 2005. It stressed that the applicant’s father had only alleged but not proven in any manner the origin of the disputed amount and noted that since the tax scrutiny had been carried out to investigate the absence of an adequate source of revenue on the taxpayer’s side (adózói forráshiány), it was for the applicant to prove the origin of the amount in question. The Tax Authority also noted that it was implausible that the applicant’s father had provided a large loan to his daughter so that she could provide a financial service to a cooperative whose majority shareholders were her own parents. The applicant sought judicial review of these decisions. 9. On 28 February 2006 the Fejér County Regional Court sitting as a single judge held an oral hearing and then overturned the decisions of the Tax Authority. The court based its decision essentially on testimony given by the applicant’s father as to the origin of the money in question. The court noted that, contrary to the findings of the Tax Authority, the applicant’s father was under no obligation to prove the existence and origin of his income and property which had served as personal credit for his daughter. The Tax Authority filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, insisting in particular that the applicant’s allegations should have been supported by bookkeeping evidence, an argument already developed in the tax administration proceedings. In reply to these arguments, the applicant submitted, in a memorandum to the Supreme Court, that, in her view, her father’s statement was of as good probative value as any bookkeeping evidence would have been. She did not request an oral hearing, a possibility provided under section 274(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. On 12 April 2007 the Supreme Court, sitting as a three-judge panel, granted the Tax Authority’s petition for review, without holding an oral hearing. The Supreme Court observed that in the circumstances – that is, because the plaintiff was required to refute the Tax Authority’s tax estimate – the burden of proof lay, statutorily, with the applicant to prove, providing credible evidence (hitelt érdemlő bizonyíték), the origin of the amount (as per leading case no. 2006/104). It found the testimony given by the applicant’s father implausible, given that it was not accompanied by any bookkeeping evidence demonstrating any transfer of funds, any bank statement, any contract or the like. It held, in particular, that although the applicant had made a statement about her father’s assets at the time of the alleged transaction, she had never produced any evidence about the availability of a sufficiently large amount of money on his side. It further noted that “it seems to be very implausible ... for a father to lend a large amount of money to his daughter so that she can provide financial services to a cooperative owned (mostly) by her parents. He could have done this ... directly, without his daughter’s involvement”. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant could not give any reasonable explanation for this complicated scheme and held that although the applicant attempted to refute the Tax Authority’s findings, the evidence proposed, consisting of a mere statement made by her father, was insufficient. In sum, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicant’s assertions fell short of being supported by “credible evidence” within the meaning of section 109(3) of Act no. XCII of 2003 on the Rules of Taxation. Consequently, it reversed the Regional Court’s decision and found for the Tax Authority, relying on section 275(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. No further remedy lay against this decision. This decision was served on the applicant on 21 May 2007.

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6. The applicant was born in 1965. 7. The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. On 11 December 2002 the Jēkabpils District Court (Jēkabpils rajona tiesa) found the applicant guilty of aggravated theft. The judgment of the District Court did not indicate that the applicant had a lawyer. 9. The applicant was given a prison sentence of two years. Having taken into account the applicant’s seven prior convictions the District Court imposed a final prison sentence of three years and six months. 10. On 24 January 2003 the Zemgale Regional Court (Zemgales apgabaltiesa) partially upheld the applicant’s appeal against the above-mentioned first-instance judgment. The judgment of the District Court indicated that the applicant’s lawyer, G.L., had participated. 11. The Regional Court reclassified the charge as theft of a small amount and reduced the prison sentence to six months, reducing the final prison sentence to three years and one month accordingly. 12. On 27 January 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the appeal judgment with the Criminal Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court. On 14 February 2003 he supplemented his appeal. 13. The Government submitted, and the applicant did not argue otherwise, that in his appeal on points of law the applicant had not expressed a wish to participate in the cassation hearing. 14. At its preparatory session on 20 February 2003 the Senate of the Supreme Court decided to accept the appeal for review on points of law and scheduled the hearing for 11 March 2003. 15. On 21 February 2003 the Senate of the Supreme Court wrote to the applicant informing him that the cassation hearing had been scheduled for 11 March 2003. The notification was also addressed to the lawyer, G.L. 16. The letter also stated that the applicant had the right to participate in the cassation hearing. However, in the event of non-appearance by the parties the hearing could be held in their absence. 17. On 27 February 2003 the applicant made a request to participate in the cassation hearing “in order to provide the necessary explanations”. 18. As submitted by the Government, on 3 March 2003 the applicant’s request was received at the registry of the Senate of the Supreme Court. 19. On 4 March 2003 V.E., a judge of the Senate of the Supreme Court, wrote to the director of Daugavpils Prison, where the applicant was held at the time, in the following terms: “Concerning [the applicant’s] request about the possibility of participating in the court hearing of 11 March, please inform [him] that it is impossible to ensure [his participation]. He made no such request in his appeal on points of law. His request to participate in the hearing of 11 March was received at the Supreme Court only on 3 March. [A]s escorts from the Daugavpils Prison to Riga depart only on 4 and 12 [March], it is no longer possible to organise his transport to the hearing of 11 March.” 20. On 11 March 2003 the hearing took place before the Senate of the Supreme Court. 21. The only party present was the public prosecutor. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer participated. 22. The decision of the Senate of the Supreme Court dated 11 March 2003 indicated, inter alia, that the Senate had heard the prosecutor’s opinion that the lower court’s judgment should be left unmodified. 23. The Senate of the Supreme Court upheld the appeal judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. That decision was final. 24. On 11 February 2004 the Jēkabpils District Court, in view of the amendments to the Criminal Law (Krimināllikums), which were applicable retroactively, decided that the applicant should be released from prison as he had already served his sentence.

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5. The applicants are: (1) Ms Roza Kharayeva (also known as Bugayeva), who was born in 1968, (2) Mr Ayndi Bugayev, who was born in 1972, and (3) Ms Zayna (also spelt as Zaynap) Maluyeva (also known as Bugayeva), who was born in 1961. The first applicant lives in Goyty and the second and third applicants live in Grozny, Chechnya. 6. The applicants are the siblings of Mr Andarbek Bugayev, who was born in 1977. 7. At the material time Mr Andarbek Bugayev and his family resided in Khankala, in the Grozny District. As the main military base of the Russian federal forces was located nearby, Khankala residents used special passes to enter and leave the town. 8. On the night of the incident, 27 July 2004, Mr Andarbek Bugayev was at home alone as his family was visiting their relatives who lived in the same settlement. At around 3 a.m. or 4 a.m., a group of masked men in camouflage uniforms armed with machine guns arrived at Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s house and searched the premises. Then they put Mr Bugayev in one of their two UAZ vehicles and drove away. No witnesses were present during the abduction. On the following morning Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s relatives found his passport on the floor in the house. 9. According to the applicants’ neighbour Ms R.M., on that night, at about 4 a.m. the same group of men broke into her house. They introduced themselves as military officers conducting an identity check. After having searched the house, the men left. Sometime later the witness heard noise from the house of Mr Andarbek Bugayev and someone asking in Russian “Are there any drugs or guns here?” On the following morning she asked the men who worked on the rail road contruction site and who were walking by her house to work, to have a look inside of Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s house. The men returned shortly and told her that the house was empty, that everything there was upside down and that Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s passport was on floor at the door. 10. The applicants have had no news of Mr Andarbek Bugayev since 27 July 2004. Their submission to the Court was based on the accounts of their neighbour Ms R.M. and Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s wife Ms Z.I.S. none of whom were present during the abduction. 11. In their submission concerning the facts of the case the Government did not dispute the circumstances of the abduction as presented by the applicants. At the same time they stated that Mr Andarbek Bugayev “...had been abducted by unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms who had driven in UAZ vehicles”. 12. On 30 July 2004 the third applicant complained about her brother’s abduction to the Grozny district department of the interior (the Grozny ROVD). She stated that Mr Andarbek Bugayev had been abducted from home “between 3 and 4 a.m. on 27 July 2004 by unidentified armed men”. 13. On the same date, 30 July 2004, the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. They also questioned the applicants’ relatives Ms L.Ar. and Ms M.E. and the wife of Mr Andarbek Bugayev, Ms Z.I.S. All of them stated that they did not witness the abduction and had no information as to who could have been involved in the incident. 14. On 5 August 2004 the Chechnya Federal Security Service (the Chechnya FSB) informed the police that Mr Andarbek Bugayev was an active member of illegal armed groups. 15. On 27 August 2004 the senior operational search officer Mr M.A. reported to the head of the Grozny ROVD of the following: “... upon the orders given by the investigator Mr M.T. from the Grozny town prosecutor’s office in connection with the investigation of the abduction of Mr A.Bugyaev in Khankala, I took operational search measures as a result of which it was established that Mr A. Bugayev had been released and currently is outside of the Chechen Republic. ... I have spoken to a number of his neighbours ...who had confirmed that Mr Bugayev had been released and left [the area]. It was impossible to question the relatives of Mr Andarbek Bugayev due to their absence ...” 16. On 28 August 2004 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office refused to initiate a criminal investigation for the lack of corpus delicti. The applicants were informed of the decision on the same date. 17. On 10 August 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office overruled that decision and ordered the Grozny district prosecutor’s office to open criminal case no. 44206. 18. On 6 September 2005 Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s wife, Ms Z.I.S., was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned (see paragraph 27 below). 19. On various dates between August 2005 and October 2005 the investigators forwarded a number of requests to various law enforcement agencies and detention centres asking whether they arrested or detained Mr Andarbek Bugayev. No replies in the positive were received. 20. On 18 November 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators and the applicants were informed thereof. 21. On 25 May 2009 the investigation was resumed and the first applicant was also granted victim status in the criminal case. 22. On 30 May 2009 the investigation was again suspended and the applicants were informed thereof. 23. On 16 July 2010 the first applicant lodged a court complaint alleging that the investigation was ineffective; as a result, on 4 August 2010 the proceedings were resumed. 24. On 8 September 2010 the Chechnya Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint on the grounds that the investigation had been resumed. 25. On 3 September 2010 the investigation was again suspended and the applicants were informed thereof. 26. The criminal investigation is still pending. 27. On 17 September 2004 the investigators questioned the third applicant who stated that she had not witnessed the abduction, that she and her relatives had tried to find witnesses to the incident but to no avail. She had learnt from “the rumours and the neighbours” that the abduction had been perpetrated by armed servicemen in masks and camouflage uniforms. 28. On 22 September 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s brother Mr K.B. who stated that he had not witnessed the events but learnt of them from his relatives and neighbours. 29. On 6 September 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s wife, Ms Z.I.S, who stated that she had not been at home during the abduction, but had learnt about it from her neighbours. 30. On 16 September 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s neighbour, Ms R.M., who stated that on the night of Mr Andarbek Bugayev’s abduction two men in camouflage uniforms had arrived at her house and quickly checked it. They had introduced themselves as servicemen from the military commander’s office. The men, who had spoken Russian, had been masked and had no distinguishing features on their uniforms. The witness further stated that she had no information as to who could have abducted Mr Andarbek Bugayev. The witness did not state that she had heard the same men visiting the Bugayevs’ house that night. 31. On 16 September 2005 the investigators also questioned the second applicant who stated that he had leant of the incident from the third applicant and that he had no information concerning the reasons for the abduction. 32. On 23 October 2005 the investigators questioned again the applicants’ wife Ms Z.I.S. who stated that she had not witnessed the abduction but learnt of them from her relatives and neighbours. She also stated that she and her relatives had tried to find witnesses to the incident but to no avail. 33. On 25 October 2005 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative Ms Z.Kh. who stated she had found out of the abduction from her relatives. According to the witness, the abduction had been perpetrated by a group of eight or nine armed men. 34. On 25 May 2009 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated she had learnt of the abduction from her relatives and that that night her brother Andarbek Bugayev had been at home alone.

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5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Oktyabrskiy, Bashkortostan Republic. 6. On 10 March 2004 the police opened an investigation against Mikhail Timin, the applicant’s brother, and two other individuals, on charges of extortion. Mr Timin was arrested on the same day and taken to the temporary detention centre of a police station. 7. On 11 March 2004 at 7.25 a.m. Mr Timin complained of headaches and cramps in his legs, allegedly resulting from ten days’ drinking. Paramedic A., who had been called by the administration, examined Mr Timin and diagnosed him with alcohol intoxication. She also advised that he be taken to hospital for inpatient treatment. It appears that there was some delay in his transfer to hospital pending the arrival of the convoy officers who would take him. He was taken to a rehabilitation clinic at 10.15 a.m. Doctor Kh. examined and diagnosed him with alcohol withdrawal syndrome and seizures and he was administered treatment. The doctor found him fit for detention and he was discharged from the clinic. He was then taken back to the temporary detention centre. 8. At the temporary detention centre Mr Timin did not feel well and the guards once again summoned an emergency response team, which arrived at 3.24 p.m. Paramedics I. and Z. examined and diagnosed him with alcohol intoxication. They recommended that he be given inpatient treatment. The administration of the temporary detention centre did not take him to the clinic, as they had failed to provide a convoy. 9. On 12 March 2004 the Oktyabrskiy Town Court of the Bashkortostan Republic (hereinafter “the Town Court”) authorised Mr Timin’s detention pending investigation. He attended the hearing at court. According to investigator Kam., who asked for him to be remanded in custody, he had not complained of any health issues either at the time of his arrest on 10 March 2004 or at the hearing on 12 March 2004. 10. Upon his return to the temporary detention centre, Mr Timin was placed in cell no. 3 together with E., S. and Sh. The inmates complained repeatedly to the guards about his aggressive behaviour (he assaulted Sh.) and asked the guards to transfer him to another cell. At 8.45 p.m. he was transferred to cell no. 10, where he was detained in isolation. He did not calm down and continued shouting, swearing and banging on the door. 11. On 13 March 2004 at 6.25 a.m. one of the guards heard some noise coming from cell no. 10 and looked through the peephole. He saw Mr Timin lying on the floor. The guard entered the cell, checked for a pulse but there was none. When the emergency response doctor summoned by the guards arrived, Mr Timin was pronounced dead. 12. On 13 March 2004 the police carried out an inquiry into the circumstances of Mr Timin’s death and concluded that the guards had failed to properly carry out surveillance over him. The relevant report was then forwarded to the prosecutor’s office, which commissioned a forensic examination to establish the cause of his death. 13. On 16 March 2004 the prosecutor’s office refused to open a criminal investigation into the death. Investigator A. indicated that Mr Timin had died as a result of acute coronary insufficiency exacerbated by alcohol withdrawal syndrome. 14. On the same date the head of the town department of the interior found that the chief of police, his deputy and the police officers on duty at the time of Mr Timin’s death had failed to carry out their duties properly, in particular, they had failed to monitor the detainees closely. The officers were subjected to a disciplinary sanction (a reprimand). 15. A forensic examination of Mr Timin’s body was completed on 7 April 2004. The findings of the examination were presented in forensic report no. 89. The expert noted numerous bruises and abrasions on the body which, in his opinion, were not fatal. His conclusion was that Mr Timin had died of acute coronary insufficiency exacerbated by alcohol withdrawal syndrome. 16. On 21 July 2004 the town prosecutor quashed the investigator’s decision of 16 March 2004 and remitted the matter for a further inquiry. In particular, he noted: “[The decision of 16 March 2004] is premature, unlawful and ill-founded ... According to the forensic medical examination report, [the expert] noted numerous injuries on Mr Timin’s body (fourteen bruises and injuries). However, this fact was not considered in the course of the inquiry. [The investigator] failed to establish under what circumstances Mr Timin had sustained the injuries. In the course of the additional investigation it will be necessary to re-examine the [forensic] documents and to put [further] questions to the forensic expert ... It follows from the logbook records of the temporary detention unit that [Mr Timin] was in need of urgent inpatient treatment. However, owing to the absence of the convoy officers, he was left in the temporary detention centre. In this connection, it is necessary to question the staff [there].” 17. On 25 July 2004 investigator V. commissioned an additional forensic expert examination to clarify the cause of the injuries on Mr Timin’s body. 18. On 31 July 2004 investigator V. refused to open a criminal investigation and reiterated the findings of the previous inquiry. 19. On 14 September 2004 the additional forensic examination was completed. According to report no. 65, the injuries on Mr Timin’s body had: “... resulted from the impact of blunt solid objects, or a collision with them. It cannot be ruled out that the ... injuries on the rear of the body could have resulted from [Mr Timin] falling on his back ... He could have caused the injuries on the front of the body himself. [The injuries] occurred within a short time of one another. It is not possible to determine the order of their appearance.” 20. On 20 September 2004 the acting town prosecutor quashed the decision of 31 July 2004, noting that it had been taken prematurely before the additional forensic examination was completed. 21. On 21 September 2004 investigator V. yet again refused to open criminal investigation, reiterating that Mr Timin had died from acute coronary insufficiency exacerbated by alcohol withdrawal syndrome. As regards the injuries, the investigator considered that they might have been self-inflicted, given that Mr Timin had thrown himself against the door of the cell and had had an altercation with other inmates. The investigator questioned the guards, who denied that they had beaten Mr Timin, and G., one of the detainees, who claimed that he had seen through his peephole five or six policemen enter Mr Timin’s cell at around 2 or 3 a.m. The investigator rejected G.’s testimony, noting that it would have been impossible to see the door of Mr Timin’s cell through the peephole of G.’s cell. 22. On 31 March 2005 the Town Court found the decision of 21 September 2004 unlawful. The court stated that the investigator had failed to question the medical practitioners who had treated Mr Timin on the day preceding his death. In compliance with the court’s decision of 31 March 2005, on 16 May 2005 the town prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 September 2004 and ordered a further inquiry. 23. On 21 May 2005 investigator V. again refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Timin’s death. On 13 October 2005 the Town Court found the decision unlawful, noting that the investigator had failed to (i) question the medical practitioners who had treated Mr Timin; (ii) identify the staff of the temporary detention centre who had been present when he had been examined by the medical practitioners, in order to elucidate why he had not been transferred to a medical facility in contravention of the emergency response team’s recommendation; and (iii) identify the alleged perpetrators. On 8 November 2005 the acting town prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2005 and ordered a further inquiry into the matter. 24. On 11 November 2005 investigator V. refused to open a criminal investigation, reiterating his previous findings practically verbatim. The town prosecutor quashed the decision on 30 November 2005, and on 7 December 2005 ordered a further inquiry and transferred the case to investigator M. It was noted that investigator V. had failed to identify and question various witnesses, including the detainees and medical practitioners. 25. On 17 December 2005 investigator M. refused to open a criminal investigation. On 15 June 2006 the Town Court quashed the decision because he had failed to notify the applicant of it. 26. It appears that the applicant subsequently lodged several complaints requesting a criminal investigation into the circumstances of her brother’s death. The complaints were dismissed on 26 July and 28 September 2007, but these decisions were quashed by the regional investigative committee on 19 October 2007 because the investigator’s inquiry had been incomplete. In particular, it was noted that the investigator had failed to question the medical practitioners who had examined and treated Mr Timin on 11 March 2004. 27. On 28 October 2007 investigator F. refused to open a criminal investigation, reiterating his predecessors’ findings concerning the causes of Mr Timin’s death. The superior investigator quashed the decision on 5 December 2007, noting yet again that the medical practitioners who had treated Mr Timin on the day before he died had not been questioned. 28. On 15 December 2007 investigator F. again refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Timin’s death. His decision was quashed by the regional investigative committee on 10 December 2008. In particular, it was noted that on 11 March 2004, following the recommendations of the medical practitioners who had examined Mr Timin, it had been incumbent on the temporary detention unit to take him to hospital for further treatment. It was further noted that the inquiry conducted by investigator F. had failed to establish the reasons as to why Mr Timin had not been taken to hospital, in contravention of the recommendations of the medical practitioners. Nor had the medical practitioners been questioned. 29. On 11 February 2008 the Ministry of Health of the Bashkortostan Republic completed an inquiry into the circumstances of Mr Timin’s death. Their findings were summarised in a report: “1. Regard being had to the dynamics and clinical picture of [Mr Timin’s] condition and objective data, it can be concluded that [he] developed alcohol withdrawal syndrome with seizures. Treatment was prescribed in accordance with his condition and was aimed at managing the symptoms. 2. The rehabilitation clinic ... acted in compliance with [applicable legislation] which provides that, as a rule, psychiatric treatment is administered voluntarily, upon the request and approval of a patient. Mr Timin did not have a history of alcohol-related [illness]. At the time, he was not psychotic and could understand his actions and control them. There were no grounds for [his] involuntary admission to hospital ... Mr Timin’s condition, when he was released from the rehabilitation clinic and transferred back to the temporary detention centre, was satisfactory. As regards the period from 10.50 a.m. on 11 March to 13 March 2004, there is no information showing that [his] condition deteriorated.” 30. On 26 December 2008 investigator R. refused to open criminal proceedings into Mr Timin’s death. He based his findings on forensic reports, medical documentation and witness statements, including those made by the inmates, guards and medical practitioners. 31. On 28 August 2009 the Town Court dismissed a complaint by the applicant alleging that the investigator’s decision of 26 December 2008 was unlawful. On 22 October 2009 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic upheld the decision on appeal. 32. On 14 September 2011 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic quashed the decisions of 28 August and 22 October 2009 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The court noted, inter alia, as follows: “... in the course of the inquiries [the investigators] failed to duly take into consideration the fact that on 11 March 2004 at 3.24 p.m., following the second examination of Mr Timin, the medical practitioners considered that he should urgently consult the drugs counsellor. However, he was not allowed to do so. This was confirmed by emergency response doctors Z. and I., who diagnosed Mr Timin with alcoholic intoxication with epileptic seizures. They recommended that he be taken to hospital, but the administration of the temporary detention centre refused to do so. [The investigators] did not consider why the administration ... had not complied with the doctors’ recommendation to take Mr Timin to the rehabilitation clinic ... It follows from the material of the inquiry that Mr Timin did not receive timely or thorough medical assistance; the doctors did not diagnose him correctly, because the administration of the temporary detention centre did not provide the necessary information about [his] behaviour and health condition. This point should have been verified and assessed.” 33. On 3 November 2011 the Town Court found the investigator’s decision of 26 December 2008 unlawful and quashed it. 34. On 13 December 2011 investigator N. of the investigative committee refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Timin’s death, concluding that he had died of ischemic heart disease and coronary insufficiency. He discerned no corpus delicti in the actions of the administration of the temporary detention centre or the medical practitioners who had treated him. In his report, he relied on the forensic medical documents, statements made by the police officers from the temporary detention centre and the paramedics who had treated him. 35. On 29 February 2012 senior investigator Akh. of the investigative committee opened a criminal investigation on charges of abuse of power. He noted, in particular, as follows: “From 11.50 p.m. on 10 March 2004 to 6.25 a.m. on 13 March 2004 unidentified police officers at [the temporary detention centre] caused Mr Timin the following injuries: two elongated bruises on the right temple, a bruise on the left of the chest ... , a bruise on the outside left shoulder ... , a bruise on the rear left elbow ... , a bruise on the rear left shoulder ... , a bruise on the back of the left hand ... , a bruise on the rear right shoulder ... , five abrasions on the rear right elbow ... , bruises on the second and third fingers of the right hand, a bruise on the right knee ... , a bruise on the right lower leg ... , a bruise on the left lower leg... The injuries ... can be classified as light health damage.” 36. It appears that this investigation is still pending.

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4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Krasnoyarsk. 5. The applicant was prosecuted for drug dealing and running a criminal syndicate, together with seven co‑defendants. He was first arrested on 12 October 2005 for selling heroin but released two days later on the undertaking to appear. 6. On 11 November 2005 the applicant was remanded in custody. Subsequently, the criminal case against the applicant was joined with a number of other investigations into drug dealing. On 8 June 2006 the charges against the applicant were re‑formulated. He was charged with creating and operating a criminal syndicate, twelve counts of drug dealing, three counts of attempted drug dealing and money laundering. 7. The facts concerning the applicant’s pre-trial detention are summarised in the table below. Decisions 1st instance court 2nd instance court 1st detention order (pre-trial stage) 11.11.2005 Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: not specified. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“It is impossible to apply another preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant was an individual entrepreneur and a Russian citizen. The court did not specify the authorised period of the applicant’s detention. 2nd detention order (pre-trial stage) 22.12.2005 Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court noted that the investigation was not finished. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to lift or change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant was an individual entrepreneur and a Russian citizen, that he was married and had no criminal record. The court did not address the applicant’s argument that being at large he had not absconded and had appeared before the investigator on his requests. 3rd detention order (pre-trial stage) 16.03.2006 Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The need to conduct investigative actions referred to by the investigator which were: to detect and question other suspects; to obtain results of chemical, psychiatric and phonoscopic examinations; to identify the members of the criminal organisation; to formulate final charges against six co-defendants; to question them, to have them study the expert examination reports; to attach to the case file audio tapes of telephone conversations; to question witnesses; to have the co-defendants and their advocates study the case file, to prepare the bill of indictment; to conduct other investigative action which may prove necessary. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to lift or change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant had no criminal record and that he was married. It did not address the applicant’s argument that being at large he had not absconded and had appeared before the investigator on his requests. The court also did not address the applicant’s argument that the charges against him were ill-founded. 4th detention order (pre-trial stage) 27.04.2006 Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court established that the investigator had conducted a considerable number of procedural actions: he interrogated 123 witnesses and 8 co‑defendants; he conducted 24 chemical forensic examinations, 4 narcological forensic examinations of the co-defendants, 2 biological forensic examinations, 2 dactyloscopic forensic examinations; he ordered psychiatric examinations of six co-defendants and medical examination of witness K.; he carried out 8 face-to-face confrontations between the co-defendants and witnesses, 6 searches in homes of the co-defendants, he examined audio records of telephone conversation between co-defendants and ordered their phonoscopic examination, he issued charging documents against eight co-defendants, he obtained character references for the co-defendants etc. The court noted that additional time was needed to have the co-defendants and their advocates study the case file. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to lift or change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant had no criminal record, had a Russian citizenship and that he was married. The court did not address the applicant’s argument that the charges against him were ill-founded. 5th detention order (pre-trial stage) 17.07.2006 Sovetskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court established that the investigator had conducted a considerable number of (unspecified) procedural actions. It noted “the need to obtain results of psychiatric and phonoscopic examinations, to have the co-defendants and their advocates study the expert reports and the case file, to bring final charges against five co-defendants and to question them, to admit as evidence audiotapes of telephone conversations; to sever the case against an unidentified accomplice, to prepare the bill of indictment, to conduct other investigative action which may prove necessary”. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to lift or change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant had no criminal record and had a Russian citizenship. It did not address the applicant’s arguments that being at large he had not absconded and had appeared before the investigator on his requests, that he had a family, a permanent place of residence and that the charges against him were ill-founded. 6th detention order (pre-trial stage) 17.10.2006 Krasnoyarsk Regional Court No information Reasons Risks: not specified. Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court noted that eight co‑defendants, including the applicant and their advocates, were studying the case file and additional time therefore was necessary. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“no reasons to change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant had no criminal record and had a Russian citizenship. It did not address the applicant’s arguments that being at large he had not absconded and had appeared before the investigator on his requests, that he had a family, a permanent place of residence and that the charges against him were ill-founded. The court used “the circumstances did not change” formula. 7th detention order (trial stage) 28.12.2006 Krasnoyarsk Regional Court No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court noted that it had received the case for adjudication on 13 December 2006. (On 28 December 2006 the court ordered remittal of the case to the prosecution to remedy some shortcomings of the investigation.) Alternative preventive measures: not analysed. Other aspects: Collective detention order in respect of 6 co‑defendants. The court used “the circumstances did not change formula”. 8th detention order (pre-trial stage) 11.09.2007 Supreme Court of Russia Reasons Risks: not specified. Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The courts stated that eight co‑defendants, including the applicant and their advocates, were studying the case file and that additional time therefore was necessary. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The Regional Court noted that the applicant had no criminal record and had a Russian citizenship. The courts did not address the applicant’s arguments that being at large he had not absconded and had appeared before the investigator on his requests and that the charges against him were ill-founded. The courts used “the circumstances did not change” formula. The appeal court stated that it was not its task to assess the evidence against the applicant and decide whether the charges against him were well-founded. It noted the complexity of the case (eight co‑defendants, case file in 29 volumes). 9th detention order (pre-trial stage) 12.09.2007 Krasnoyarsk Regional Court No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: gravity of the charges. Conduct of the proceedings: The court noted that the defence was studying the case file and that additional time therefore was necessary. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed. Other aspects: The court found no change in the reasons for detaining the applicant since the first detention order. It noted that the applicant had a job as a security guard at a private company, a permanent place of residence in Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Region), that he had no criminal record, and was married. 10th detention order (pre-trial stage) 10.12.2007 Krasnoyarsk Regional Court No information Reasons Risks: not specified. Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court noted that eight co‑defendants, including the applicant and their advocates, were studying the case file and additional time therefore was necessary. Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant had a Russian citizenship and no criminal record. It did not address the applicant’s arguments that being at large he had not absconded and had appeared before the investigator on his requests, that he had a family and a permanent place of residence and that the charges against him were ill‑founded. 11th detention order (trial stage) 11.03.2008 Krasnoyarsk Regional Court No information Reasons Risks: Specific factual circumstances: Conduct of the proceedings: The court noted that it had received the case for adjudication on 27 February 2008. (On 14 April 2008 the court ordered remittal of the case to the prosecution to remedy some shortcomings of the investigation.) Alternative preventive measures: not analysed (“No reasons to lift or change the preventive measure”). Other aspects: The court noted that the applicant had a Russian citizenship and no criminal record. 8. On 25 August and 26 November 2008 and on other dates the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court granted further extensions of the authorised detention period. 9. According to the information submitted by the Government, on 29 April 2010 the Zheleznogorskiy District Court convicted the applicant who remained detained until that date.

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5. The applicant union is a trade union of medical practitioners incorporated under Croatian law. Its registered office is in Zagreb. 6. On 8 December 2004 the Government of Croatia on the one side, and the Autonomous Trade Union for the Health Service and Social Protection Service of Croatia, the Croatian Professional Trade Union of Nurses, the Trade Union of Workers in the Health Service, Social Service and Disability Pension Insurance of Croatia, and the applicant union on the other, concluded the Collective Agreement for the Health and Health Insurance Sector (Kolektivni ugovor za djelatnost zdravstva i zdravstvenog osiguranja – hereinafter “the Collective Agreement” or “the main Collective Agreement”). Its clause 102 stipulated that the agreement would enter into force on 15 January 2005 if approved by a majority of the votes cast in a referendum, in which at least one third of those employed in the health-care institutions and the Croatian Health Insurance Fund voted. The Collective Agreement was approved in the referendum held on 5 January 2005 and entered into force, as envisaged, on 15 January 2005. 7. In order to regulate issues specific to doctors and dentists, on 8 December 2004 the Government of Croatia and the applicant union also concluded the Collective Agreement for the Medical and Dentistry Sector (Strukovni kolektivni ugovor za liječničku i stomatološku djelatnost), which formed an annex (hereinafter “the Annex”) to the above-mentioned main Collective Agreement. Clauses 6 and 98(2) of the Annex stipulated that if doctors approved it in a referendum, it would enter into force on 15 January 2005. 8. On 15 December 2004 the Autonomous Trade Union for the Health Service and Social Protection Service of Croatia and the Croatian Professional Trade Union of Nurses instituted civil proceedings against the State and the applicant union, seeking to declare the Annex null and void because it had not been entered into by all the trade unions that had concluded the main Collective Agreement, contrary to the law (for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 26-30 below). 9. On 29 December 2004 the Government of Croatia adopted an instruction whereby it (a) instructed the State Attorney’s Office to acknowledge the plaintiffs’ claim in those proceedings because it was well-founded, with a view to having the Annex declared null and void, and (b) instructed the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to immediately commence negotiations on the conclusion of a new collective agreement for the medical and dentistry sector. 10. Meanwhile, on 21 December 2004 the referendum committee issued a decision to hold the referendum mentioned in the Annex (see paragraph 7 above). 11. However, on 31 December 2004 the President of the Socio-Economic Council (Gospodarsko-socijalno vijeće) – a tripartite body consisting of representatives of trade unions, employers and the Government – set aside the decision on holding the referendum. 12. The referendum was nevertheless held on 5 January 2005. Of 11,016 doctors, 8,290 voted; 8,255 voted “yes” and twenty-five voted “no”. 13. On 18 January 2005 the President of the Socio-Economic Council issued a decision not to recognise the results of the referendum. 14. In a letter to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of 23 March 2005, the applicant union announced a strike for 11 April 2005. It stated that the strike was being organised in order to (a) protect the social and economic interests of doctors by insisting that the Government of Croatia honour its obligations arising from the Annex, (b) have the results of the referendum on the approval of the Annex recognised, and (c), as an subsidiary ground for the strike, address issues specific to doctors and dentists within the healthcare system by demanding that a collective agreement for the medical and dentistry sector be concluded. In particular, as regards the last-mentioned ground the applicant union stated as follows: “– addressing issues specific to doctors within the healthcare sector by concluding a collective agreement for the medical and dentistry sector. As a subsidiary ground for the strike, the Croatian Medical Union notes that the [main] Collective Agreement for the Health and Health Insurance Sector does not address issues specific to the medical and dentistry professions. Therefore, on the instruction of the Government of Croatia and in accordance with the opinion of the Socio-Economic Council ... of 31 March 2004, the Annex to that Collective Agreement addressing issues specific to doctors was concluded at the same time [as the aforementioned collective agreement]. In that way, issues specific to doctors within the healthcare and health-insurance sectors were comprehensively addressed. Given that at present the Government of Croatia refuse to apply the Collective Agreement for the Medical and Dentistry Sector [i.e. the Annex], and issues specific to the medical and dentistry professions, including a salary increase and other pecuniary rights of doctors, are not addressed in the [main] Collective Agreement for the Health and Health Insurance Sector, a subsidiary ground for the strike is to demand that the Government address issues specific to jobs and professions of doctors and dentists within the healthcare and health-insurance sectors.” 15. On the same day the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare invited the applicant union to conclude a new collective agreement for the medical and dentistry sector in the form of an annex to the main Collective Agreement. The draft of the new annex was enclosed with the Ministry’s letter. The Ministry emphasised that the draft envisaged a salary supplement amounting to 10% of the basic salary of doctors and dentists in 2005 on account of their increased responsibility for the life and health of patients. It also added that the other trade unions, parties to the main Collective Agreement agreed with the draft, and invited the applicant union to inform it within seven days whether it accepted the draft. 16. On 30 March 2005 the applicant union informed the Ministry that, regrettably, the proposed draft did not address the important issues specific to doctors and dentists within the healthcare sector. 17. On 5 April 2005 the Government of Croatia adopted a decree whereby it unilaterally increased salaries of doctors and dentists by 10% in 2005 (see paragraph 38 below). 18. On the same day, 5 April 2005, the State brought an action against the applicant union in the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu), asking the court to prohibit the announced strike. The plaintiff argued that the announced strike would be illegal because it would seek to enforce the Annex, which had never entered into force given that the decision to hold the referendum required for its coming into force had been set aside (see paragraphs 7, 11 and 13 above). 19. By a judgment of 8 April 2005 the County Court found for the State and prohibited the strike. It held that seeking compliance with the obligations arising from a collective agreement or the recognition of the results of a referendum were not permitted grounds for a strike under section 210(1) of the Labour Act (see paragraph 32 below). The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “From the cited provision [that is, section 210(1)] it follows that, by using the formulation ‘in order to protect and promote the economic and social interests’, the legislator clearly excluded enforcement of the rights stipulated in a particular collective agreement as a permitted ground for a strike because ... the individual and collective enforcement of rights stipulated in a collective agreement is regulated by sections [191] and [202] of the Labour Act. ... As regards the subsidiary ground for the strike ... it has to be noted that the defendant’s representative stated at the main hearing that this ground had been listed as subsidiary in case [the Annex was in the meantime declared invalid] in the [parallel] proceedings pending before the Municipal Court. ... Finally, it has to be concluded that a strike is legally allowed only in industrial disputes on ... matters that are not legally regulated, and not in those which [are]. Given that the defendant insists on compliance with the [Annex], it is evident that the matters [in dispute] ... are regulated by that Annex and that the procedure for [its] entry into force is also legally regulated, for which reason the substantive requirements for organising the strike are not satisfied.” 20. The applicant union then appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). 21. On 11 April 2005 the applicant union held the strike as planned because under the domestic law its appeal prevented the County Court’s judgment from becoming final. According to media reports the applicant union alleged that almost 90% of some 8,000 doctors and dentists had participated in the strike whereas the Minister of Health claimed that only 25% of them had actually been striking while the others had merely expressed solidarity. The Minister also stated for the media that 85% of the services had been rendered and that work stoppages occurred in one out of five clinical centres, one out of seven university hospitals and in six out of 22 general hospitals. The strike lasted until 13 April 2005 when the applicant union called it off in order to comply with the County Court’s subsequent provisional measure of 12 April 2005 prohibiting the strike (see the next paragraph). 22. Following a request by the State, on 12 April 2005 the Zagreb County Court imposed a provisional measure prohibiting the strike until that court’s judgment of 8 April 2005 became final, that is, until the Supreme Court decided on the applicant union’s appeal against the judgment. On 21 April 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant union’s appeal against the decision imposing the provisional measure. 23. By a judgment of 27 April 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant union’s appeal against the County Court’s judgment of 8 April 2005 (see paragraphs 19-20 above). It held that the Annex was invalid because it had not been entered into by all the trade unions that had concluded the Collective Agreement, contrary to section 186(1) of the Labour Act (see paragraph 32 below), and that therefore any further action based on that agreement, including the strike, was unlawful. The relevant part of the Supreme Court’s judgment reads as follows: “Given that the Annex was found to be invalid, that is, unlawful, any further actions by the signatories of such an unlawful collective agreement, such as calling for and holding a referendum ... as well as the two first grounds for the strike, which are also based on the unlawful Annex, are also unlawful. The view of the first-instance court that it was not necessary to address the third, subsidiary, ground for the strike is correct. This is so because, as stated by the defendant’s representative at the hearing held on 8 April 2005, this ground had been listed as subsidiary in case [the Annex was in the meantime declared invalid] in the [parallel] proceedings pending before the Municipal Court, a condition which has not been met.” 24. On 30 May 2005 the applicant union lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the Supreme Court’s judgment alleging violations of, inter alia, its constitutionally-guaranteed right to strike and its freedom of association guaranteed by the Convention. In so doing the applicant union relied on Article 60 of the Constitution (see paragraph 31 below) and Article 11 of the Convention. 25. On 17 December 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant union’s constitutional complaint and served its decision on the applicant union’s representatives on 26 January 2009. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “Having established that the [contested] judicial decisions were based on the relevant provisions of the Labour Act, the Constitutional Court finds that those decisions were not in breach of the complainant’s constitutional right [provided] in Article 60 paragraph 1 of the Constitution nor [were they in breach] of the international-law provisions the complainant relied on.” 26. Meanwhile, as already noted above (see paragraph 8) on 15 December 2004 the Autonomous Trade Union for the Health Service and Social Protection Service of Croatia and the Croatian Professional Trade Union of Nurses brought a civil action in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the State and the applicant union, seeking to declare the Annex null and void. 27. On 19 October 2006 the Zagreb Municipal Court found for the plaintiffs and declared the Annex null and void. 28. On 16 December 2008 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant union’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final. 29. On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed a subsequent appeal on points of law (revizija) lodged by the applicant union. It endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts which had found the Annex invalid because it had not been entered into by all the trade unions that had concluded the main Collective Agreement, contrary to section 186(1) of the Labour Act (see paragraph 32 below) and clause 21 of that collective agreement (see paragraph 36 below). 30. On 16 March 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant union.

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5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Hässelby, Sweden. 6. By a decision of 1 June 2004 the Tax Agency (Skatteverket), noting that the applicant ran two restaurants together with her husband, Mr Shibendra Dev (who also lodged an application before the Court; no. 7362/10), found that they should each declare half of the proceeds and the costs of that business. As the applicant, in her tax return, had not declared all her income and had, moreover, not declared it in the correct manner, the Agency revised upwards her income for 2002 (i.e. the taxation year 2003), finding her liable to pay tax on undeclared business income (inkomst av näringsverksamhet) amounting to 764,945 Swedish kronor (SEK; approximately 83,000 euros (EUR)). It also increased her liability to value-added tax (mervärdesskatt; “VAT”) for 2002 by SEK 379,365 (approximately EUR 41,000). Finally, as the information supplied by the applicant in her tax return was found to be incorrect and the revision had had to be made under a discretionary assessment procedure, given the business’s deficient accounting, the Agency ordered her to pay tax surcharges (skattetillägg), amounting to 40% and 20%, respectively, of the increased income tax and VAT. 7. Following the applicant’s appeal, the Tax Agency, on 18 March 2005, made an obligatory review of its decision but did not change it. 8. On 10 January 2007 and 29 October 2008, respectively, the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) in Stockholm and the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm upheld the Tax Agency’s decision. 9. By a decision of 20 October 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) refused leave to appeal. 10. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant on 5 August 2005 in regard to the above conduct. 11. By a judgment of 16 December 2008 the Stockholm District Court (tingsrätt) convicted the applicant of an aggravated bookkeeping offence (grovt bokföringsbrott). She was given a suspended sentence and ordered to perform 160 hours of community service. The offence concerned the same period as the above-mentioned tax decisions, that is, the year 2002. The District Court found that the bookkeeping of the restaurant business had been seriously deficient and that the applicant and her husband had been responsible for failing to account for considerable proceeds and VAT, which had involved large profits for them. In regard to the public prosecutor’s claim that the applicant was guilty also of an aggravated tax offence (grovt skattebrott), the court considered that it could not be ruled out that, as she claimed to have relied on her husband running the business properly and their accountant having entered the correct figures in her tax return, she had been unaware that her tax return contained false information. Thus, it had not been shown that she had intended to give incorrect information, for which reason the indictment was dismissed in this respect. 12. The applicant did not appeal against the District Court’s judgment, which consequently acquired legal force on 8 January 2009.

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4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. On 5 May 2004 the applicant was arrested by four police officers on suspicion of bribe-taking. The police officers took him to the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Police Station, where he was held overnight. According to the applicant, the police officers beat him for several hours, forcing him to confess. 6. On 6 May 2004 the applicant was taken to the Kharkiv City Prosecutor’s Office. He complained of ill-treatment to a senior prosecutor from the above office. The prosecutor referred the applicant for a forensic medical examination. 7. On 7 May 2004 the applicant was diagnosed with concussion and admitted to hospital. 8. On 8 May 2004 the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination, which established that he had numerous bruises on his face, chest, legs and arms, as well as a damaged tooth. 9. On 11 May 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on charges of bribe-taking. They were eventually terminated on 27 April 2007 for lack of corpus delicti. 10. On 2 June 2004 the applicant lodged another complaint of ill-treatment with the Kharkiv City Prosecutor’s Office. 11. On 23 June 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office about the failure to examine his complaint of 2 June 2004. 12. On 12 August 2004 the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. That decision was quashed by the higher prosecutor on 7 October 2004 and an additional inquiry was ordered. 13. On 28 October 2004 the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant, which was conducted between 28 December 2004 and 13 January 2005. The experts’ opinion confirmed the previous medical findings (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above) and concluded that the injuries had been the result of blows with blunt objects and had been inflicted during the period indicated by the applicant. The experts further opined that it could not be excluded that the injuries had originated in the circumstances indicated by the applicant, as they could all have been inflicted by fists. 14. On 23 September 2005 the Kharkiv Frunzenskyy District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. That refusal was quashed by the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office on 31 May 2006. 15. On 15 June 2006 the Kharkiv Frunzenskyy District Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. In a letter dated 10 August 2008, the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that the decision of 15 June 2006 had been quashed and that the prosecutor who had conducted the inquiry would be subjected to disciplinary sanctions for the improper performance of his duties. 16. On 29 March 2007 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor’s Office issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations. That decision was subsequently quashed. 17. On 8 January 2008 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. That decision was quashed by the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Court on 17 October 2011 and the case was remitted for further inquiries. 18. On 17 February 2012 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor’s Office once again refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. 19. On 19 June 2012 the above decision was quashed by the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Court, which sent the case file back to the prosecutor for further inquiries. The court noted, inter alia, that it had previously remitted the case for further inquiries, but that its instructions had not been followed. Furthermore, the applicant had not been questioned and the medical evidence had not been assessed. The first-instance court’s decision was upheld on appeal by the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal on 9 July 2012. 20. On 31 August 2012 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The applicant challenged that decision in the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Court on 20 September 2012. 21. On 19 November 2012 a new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force. On 12 December 2012, in accordance with the provisions of the new Code, the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office entered the relevant information in the newly established “Integrated Register of pre-trial investigations” and started criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. 22. On 6 February 2013 the prosecutor issued a decision to terminate the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. 23. On 4 March 2013 the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 6 February 2013. 24. On 4 April 2013 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 6 February 2013. 25. On 7 June 2013 the applicant asked the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office to supervise the investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment. 26. On 14 July 2013 the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. 27. On 30 September 2013 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant about the decision of 14 July 2013. 28. On 8 October and 3 December 2013 the applicant asked the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office to send him a copy of the decision of 14 July 2013. 29. On 12 February 2014 the prosecutor sent the applicant a copy of the decision of 14 July 2013. 30. On 21 February 2014 the applicant challenged the decision of 14 July 2013 before the investigating judge of the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Court. 31. On 15 April 2014 the Kharkiv Dzerzhynskyy District Court quashed the decision of 14 July 2013 and remitted the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. The court concluded that the investigator had not followed the instructions of the appellate court indicated in its decision of 4 April 2013 on remittal of the case for further investigation, and had terminated the criminal proceedings without conducting the necessary inquiries or carrying out a comprehensive examination of the circumstances of the case.

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5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Pskov. 6. From 5 January 2000 to 22 March 2001 the applicant worked at the Pskov Department of the Federal Debt Centre. On 22 March 2001 the Debt Centre terminated his employment due to its liquidation, failing to pay him certain compensation amounts. On various dates the domestic courts granted the applicant’s claims and awarded him compensation of salary arrears, indexation amounts, non-pecuniary damage and postal expenses. The particulars of the respective judgments may be summarized as follows: Domestic court Date of the judgment Final on Awarded amount, Russian roubles (RUB) Justice of the Peace, Court Circuit no. 28 of Pskov 27 June 2003 15 July 2003 20,634.50 Justice of the Peace, Court Circuit no. 28 of Pskov 15 September 2003 15 October 2003 2,421 Pskov Town Court, Pskov Region 13 September 2004 28 September 2004 3,470 Pskov Town Court, Pskov Region 12 May 2005 24 May 2005 1,529.42 7. The applicant submitted writs of execution in respect of the above judgments to the Ministry of Finance in 2003–2005. The writs were returned to him in September 2005. The applicant sought before the courts the clarifications as to the enforcement of the four judgments, but his claims were refused. He filed the writs anew with the Ministry of Finance in December 2006 and September 2009 and they were sent back to him without execution in June 2007 and December 2009 respectively. 8. In 2010 the applicant claimed compensation for the lengthy non‑enforcement of the judgment of 27 June 2003 under the Federal Law no. 68-ФЗ “On Compensation for Violation of the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time or the Right to Enforcement of a Judgment within a Reasonable Time” (“the Compensation Act”, see paragraph 12 below). On 10 December 2010 the Pskov Regional Court granted his claim and awarded the applicant RUB 30,000 (approximately 730 euros (EUR)) for non‑enforcement of the judgment, and RUB 200 for legal expenses. These amounts were fully paid to him on 16 March 2011. The judgment of 27 June 2003 remained unenforced. 9. In February 2012 the applicant again sent the writs of execution to the Ministry of Finance. The latter brought court proceedings seeking clarifications and amendment of the judgments, in the part related to the way of execution and rectification of calculation errors. By separate rulings of 29 March 2012 the Pskov Town Court and the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 28 of Pskov amended the initial judgments as claimed. 10. On 18 April 2012 the four initial judgments in the applicant’s favour were enforced in full.

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7. The applicant was born in 1954 and prior to his arrest lived in the town of Makhachkala, Dagestan Republic. He is currently being detained in a temporary detention facility in Rostov-on-Don. 8. In 1993 the applicant, at the material time the deputy Prime Minister of the Dagestan Republic, survived an assassination attempt. However, his spine was badly wounded and he became paralysed. He cannot walk and is confined to a wheelchair. He also lost his ability to urinate or defecate without special medical procedures, such as catheters and enemas. 9. Since 1998 the applicant has been mayor of Makhachkala, the Dagestan Republic. 10. Сriminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of organised aggravated murder and attempted murder of State officials, including several prosecutors, investigators, a member of the town council and the head of the investigative committee in the Dagestan Republic. The investigation was assigned to a group of senior investigators and criminologists from the investigative committees of various regions of the Russian Federation and led by the deputy head of the Russian Federal Investigative Committee, a major-general. The applicant was arrested on 1 June 2013. 11. On the following day the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial, citing the gravity of the charges against him and the risk that he might abscond, interfere with the investigation, in particular influence witnesses, and reoffend. The District Court’s decision was based on the applicant’s official powers and his significant contacts with various persons involved in the investigation, as well as his consequent ability to influence the investigation. The court referred to the case-file materials, according to which a number of defendants arrested on suspicion of participating in the murders were also public officials and law-enforcement agents, investigators or police officers. They had identified the applicant as the “master-mind” of the murders, had provided details of the murders and had argued that certain victims had been murdered in retaliation for their failure to obey the applicant’s orders. 12. At the same time, the District Court dismissed the applicant’s arguments pertaining to his poor state of health, his stable family situation, his age and his standing in the community, having considered that they did not outweigh the reasons warranting his detention. The District Court was also not convinced by the description given by the head of the Makhachkala police department portraying the applicant as “an example of compliance with the law and public order”. 13. The decision of 2 June 2013 was upheld on appeal on 3 July 2013 when the Moscow City Court found the District Court’s finding reasonable and convincing. The City Court also noted that no alternative measure, such as house arrest or a written undertaking, could ensure the proper course of the criminal proceedings. 14. On 26 July 2013 the Basmannyy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 11 November 2013, having again linked the gravity and nature of the charges against him, as well as his standing in society, to the likelihood that he would obstruct the course of justice, reoffend or abscond. The District Court once again relied on the applicant’s connections to support the conclusion that if released he would tamper with the evidence. At the same time, the District Court took into account a medical opinion issued on 17 July 2013 (cited in detail below), according to which the applicant’s state of health did not preclude his detention in the conditions of an ordinary detention facility. It also noted that there was no evidence that the authorities had delayed the pre-trial investigation. The District Court concluded by stressing that the case was particularly complex, involved a large number of defendants and required a series of investigative steps to be taken. 15. On 20 September 2013 new charges were brought against the applicant. He was charged with firearms trafficking and attempting to organise a terrorist attack on a public official, his political rival. According to the investigation, the applicant and his accomplices had intended to shoot down, with a portable anti-aircraft rocket launcher, a civilian aircraft in which the public official was to travel from Makhachkala to Moscow with other passengers. 16. On 7 November 2013 the Basmannyy District Court accepted the investigators’ request to extend the applicant’s detention again until 28 February 2014. The District Court noted the gravity of the charges, including the new ones, and the fact that the applicant was facing a sentence of up to life imprisonment. It once again cited the risks of the applicant absconding, reoffending and obstructing the course of justice, and expressed concern for the safety of the witnesses and victims. The District Court noted that the investigation of certain criminal offences with which the applicant was charged was at an active stage and that the risk of his interfering with the investigation, if he were released, was well-founded. More than eleven defendants had been arrested and certain suspects were yet to be apprehended. The District Court placed particular weight on the complexity of the case and the progress that the investigators were making with it. 17. The District Court also examined in detail the arguments put forward by the defence in favour of the applicant’s release and the application of a more lenient measure of restraint. It concluded that neither his family ties nor his state of health outweighed the reasons for his continued detention. In particular, the District Court relied on the medical opinions of 17 July and 7 August 2013, which had found that the applicant’s illness was not among those listed in Governmental Decree no. 3 of 14 January 2011 preventing the detention of a suspect. It further stressed that on a daily basis at least three medical specialists from municipal and State medical facilities (“generalists, surgeons, neurologists, urologists, endocrinologists, proctologists, an infectious diseases specialist, and a rehabilitation specialist”) had examined the applicant and that he had received the prescribed drug treatment in full. Moreover, he had undergone all the necessary laboratory testing and clinical examinations in certified civilian laboratories in Moscow and on 5 November 2013 he was to undergo yet another expert examination to determine whether he was suffering from any illness warranting his release. Having cited a long list of the applicant’s illnesses, the District Court noted that there was no evidence that his condition had deteriorated or that he required treatment in a specialised medical facility. The District Court dismissed as unreliable various expert opinions and medical records prepared by specialists, including foreign ones, in various related fields of medicine and produced by the defence in support of their argument that the applicant’s life was being put at risk by his prolonged detention in the conditions of an ordinary detention facility and in the absence of adequate medical assistance. 18. On 25 February 2014 the Basmannyy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 1 June 2014. Having again assessed the materials presented to it by the investigation and the defence, the District Court concluded that the risks of the applicant influencing witnesses, reoffending, obstructing the investigation by other means and absconding were still present. In particular, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were at a crucial stage of collecting evidence and there was a risk that, using his connections in the criminal underworld, the applicant might try to influence witnesses and victims who feared him. The District Court also cited the medical reports of 17 July, 7 August and 8 November 2013, which supported its conclusion that the applicant’s state of health did not preclude his further detention. 19. It appears that the applicant’s detention was further extended. However, neither party provided the Court with an update. 20. On 9 July 2014 the North-Caucasian Military Court found the applicant guilty of conspiring to organise a terrorist attack and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The applicant was stripped of all State awards and commendations. It appears that the criminal proceedings on the remaining charges against the applicant are still pending. 21. Numerous medical certificates and expert opinions submitted by the parties show that the applicant is suffering from a spinal cord injury, paraplegia, chronic urinary tract infection, chronic pyelonephritis (kidney infection), chronic urinary retention, rectal prolapse (a condition in which the rectum protrudes out of the anus), paraproctitis (an inflammation of the cellular tissues surrounding the rectum), ischemic heart disease, chronic heart failure, hypertension, a thyroid gland disease, hepatitis C and non-insulin-dependent diabetes. 22. At the request of the applicant’s representatives a panel comprising experts in neurology, urology and general medicine examined the applicant’s medical records dating from the period between 2001 and 2008. Their report dated 2 July 2013 found that, due to his inability to satisfy his most basic needs (such as moving, urinating or defecating) without help and to his very serious diseases, the applicant required constant medical supervision, treatment and assistance and that he should therefore be placed in a specialised medical facility. His detention in a temporary detention facility could aggravate his condition and, in the absence of a swift reaction to such an aggravation, could result in his death. The report also found that the applicant was suffering from diseases which, according to Governmental Decree no. 3 of 14 January 2011, were incompatible with detention. 23. On 17 July 2013 a panel of three doctors from State hospital no. 20 in Moscow examined the applicant at the investigator’s request. Having studied the applicant’s medical history, the results of his recent clinical blood and urine analyses, as well as the results of his ultrasound scan and MRT examinations, the doctors confirmed the diagnoses and found that the applicant “was not suffering from any of the serious diseases included in the list of serious illnesses precluding detention of a suspect or an accused”. The report did not indicate the field of medicine in which the doctors specialised. 24. In response to a request by the investigator, on 25 July 2013 the director of the medical unit of temporary detention facility (SIZO-2) in Moscow, where the applicant was detained, prepared a certificate describing the applicant’s state of health. Citing extracts from the medical records, the director reported that the applicant was examined by him almost every day and also by various specialist doctors, including a urologist, a neurologist, a surgeon, a cardiologist and an endocrinologist. Blood and urine tests were regularly performed. He was prescribed and administered various medications. The applicant used disposable catheters to urinate. He performed that procedure himself, as he had done before his arrest, up to ten times a day without the facility administration having the possibility of ensuring the requisite level of asepsis. An enema was carried out by a doctor two or three times a week to make the applicant defecate. The applicant’s condition was stable and no deterioration in his health had been noted, although he had continued to raise various health complaints. 25. At the same time, the director of the medical unit also noted that, because the applicant was confined to a wheelchair, he could not be transported to the medical unit of the detention facility. He was therefore held in an ordinary cell where he was visited by the doctors and where all the necessary medical procedures were performed. In particular, the neighbouring cell which was used to perform the enemas was not suitable for that medical procedure as it was difficult to ensure the requisite sterility. The director stressed that lack of sterility could result in a serious complication. 26. The applicant’s lawyers submitted the medical report of 17 July 2013 for assessment by two medical specialists: a deputy president of the Russian Scientific Society of Medical Experts, academician and honorary doctor of the Russian Federation, Mr K.; and a member of the Russian and International Neurosurgeons’ Association, academician and highly respected professor-neurosurgeon, Mr S. On 25 July 2013 the two experts issued their review of the report. Having noticed the lack of information on the medical qualifications and specialisation of the three doctors who had issued the report, the two experts considered that the report contained a number of “significant and important contradictions”. In particular: - a urologist had not examined the applicant or participated in the preparation of the report of 17 July 2013, even though the applicant was suffering from a serious urological disorder; - although the three doctors had been provided with a complete set of medical records comprising the applicant’s medical history, including those related to his injuries and complications, the report was only based on “fragments of that information”; major complications arising from the applicant’s condition, such as chronic cystitis and pyelonephritis, remained unassessed; - Governmental Decree no. 3 of 14 January 2011 listed, among the serious illnesses precluding the detention of a suspect, “serious progressive forms of atrophic and degenerative illnesses of the nervous system accompanied by a stable disorder of the motor, sensory and vegeto-trophic functions”, which fully corresponded to the applicant’s diagnosis. However, that medical condition had not been taken into account by the three doctors who had prepared the report of 17 July 2013; - the applicant was also suffering from a life-threatening post-traumatic pathology of the kidneys and urinary tracts. However, despite the fact that a similar condition was also listed by the Governmental decree among the illnesses precluding detention, the three doctors had paid no attention to it. 27. The two experts concluded that the report of 17 July 2013 was incomplete and was not objective, as it did not fully reflect the “true picture of [the applicant’s] pathology, which undoubtedly fell within the serious illnesses precluding detention pending trial, as determined by Governmental Decree no. 3 of 14 January 2011”. 28. On 7 August 2013 the three doctors from hospital no. 20 issued another report confirming the findings in their previous report of 17 July 2013. The doctors again concluded that the applicant’s condition did not warrant his release as he was not suffering from any illness listed in Governmental Decree no. 3. The findings of the two reports were similar, the only difference being that part of the second report was based on more recent clinical tests and examinations of the applicant. 29. On 13 August 2013 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to authorise his transfer to a specialised medical facility as an interim measure. 30. The applicant claimed that the medical assistance he was receiving in the temporary detention facility was insufficient in view of his very serious diseases, which required constant medical supervision by specialised medical staff. The facility’s medical staff were not competent to deal with such serious conditions. The treatment he was receiving there did not correspond to the treatment he had received before his arrest. Moreover, he was unable to satisfy his most basic needs without help. In particular, when he wanted to defecate, he had to wait, suffering, until an external specialist was called, as the facility staff were not qualified to carry out an enema. According to the applicant, such inadequate medical assistance could result in a brutal aggravation of his condition and ultimate death. 31. On 16 August 2013 the Court decided to indicate to the Russian Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the prison system with a view to determining: (1) whether the treatment he was receiving in the detention facility was adequate for his condition; (2) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a detention facility; and (3) whether his current condition required his placement in a hospital. 32. On 26 August 2013 the Government responded to the Court’s letter of 16 August 2013, having submitted a handwritten copy of the report prepared when the applicant was examined on admission to the detention facility SIZO-2 in Moscow; documents showing that the detention facility was licensed to provide medical services to inmates; certificates issued jointly by the head of the detention facility and the director of its medical unit describing the state of the applicant’s health and listing the medical procedures to which he had been subjected; extracts from the applicant’s medical history dating back to 2007; a certificate issued by the same two officials informing the Court that there was no risk to the applicant’s life and limb and that his condition was considered stable; a handwritten copy of the applicant’s medical record drawn up in the detention facility in which the most recent entry had been made on 21 August 2013 by a prison doctor; a record drawn up during the applicant’s stay in hospital no. 20 in Moscow from 11 to 17 July 2013, noting the applicant’s diagnosis and assessing his condition as moderately serious; a medical record from a psychiatric prison hospital where he had stayed from 12 to 17 June 2013 and where he had been treated for an “adaptation disorder affecting emotions and behaviour”; copies of the two medical reports issued on 17 July and 7 August 2013, respectively, by a medical commission of three doctors from hospital no. 20 who, having cited the applicant’s medical history and the results of his examinations by various specialists and clinical tests performed in the hospital in July 2013 and the beginning of August 2013, concluded that the applicant was “not suffering from an illness included in the list of serious illnesses precluding detention of suspected or accused persons”. 33. The Government also answered the three questions which, in its letter of 16 August 2013, the Court had asked them to address to independent medical experts. In particular, having provided an answer to the first question related to the adequacy of the applicant’s treatment, the Government stressed that the applicant had been placed under dynamic medical supervision by the medical personnel of the detention facility in relation to illnesses of the musculoskeletal, endocrine, hepatobiliary and urinary systems. They acknowledged that the applicant, as a wheelchair- bound inmate, required systematic care and permanent medical attention, which were being provided to him in a special cell. He was performing the remaining hygiene procedures himself. The Government submitted that the applicant received the necessary medical attention and that no additional medical procedures were required. 34. In their response to the second question about the compatibility of the applicant’s state of health with the conditions of the detention facility, the Government stressed that the applicant was under the medical supervision of the personnel of the detention facility and was also being seen by various civilian medical specialists. The prison doctors were fully complying with the treatment plan developed by the civilian specialists. 35. In replying to the third question as to whether the applicant needed to be transferred to a hospital, the Government relied on the two reports issued by the three doctors from hospital no. 20 on 17 July and 7 August 2013, according to which the applicant was not suffering from any condition included in the list of serious illnesses precluding the detention of suspected and accused persons in detention facilities, as provided for by in Decree no. 3 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 January 2011. 36. On 29 August 2013 the Court reminded the Russian Government that on 16 August 2013 an interim measure had been imposed under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in accordance with which independent medical experts were to examine the applicant and provide their expert opinion on the three questions, assessing the quality of the applicant’s treatment, the compatibility of his state of health with the conditions of the detention facility and the need to transfer him to a hospital. The Government’s attention was also drawn to the fact that the failure of a Contracting State to comply with a measure indicated under Rule 39 may entail a breach of Article 34 of the Convention. 37. On 13 September 2013 the Government submitted an English translation of their submissions of 26 August 2013. 38. The applicant submitted a large number of medical reports and opinions issued by various Russian and foreign experts. In particular, he provided the Court with a copy of an opinion issued by Dr P. of the Nurnberg Centre of Gastroenterology in Germany, where he had undergone treatment on a number of occasions since 2004. The doctor who had attended to the applicant on those occasions stressed that he was in need of permanent medical supervision by qualified specialists. The lack of such assistance, in the doctor’s opinion, was life-threatening. He also noted that the conditions of a detention facility were not suitable for a person in the applicant’s state of health. 39. The applicant also provided the Court with an assessment report issued on 15 August 2013 by a deputy president of the Russian Scientific Society of Medical Experts, academician and honorary doctor of the Russian Federation, Dr K., in response to the medical opinion prepared on 7 August 2013 by the three doctors from hospital no. 20. Dr K. again criticised the opinion for the same defects as those identified in the previous report of 17 July 2013. 40. According to another report prepared on 2 August 2013 by Professor B., a surgeon from the Caspari Clinic in Munich, Germany, the applicant required complex daily medical examinations and procedures to control his diabetes, hepatitis C and urological problems. The doctor, who had treated the applicant in December 2012 and January 2013, insisted that the lack of such care would be critically dangerous for the applicant’s life. 41. Another medical expert from Germany, a urologist from a hospital in Dillenburg, in his opinion of 5 August 2013, described the complexity of the applicant’s health condition and listed the treatment which he should receive on a daily basis. He concluded that the applicant’s detention in the absence of such treatment posed a threat to his life. 42. Two more specialist reports were issued in November 2013: the first, by a professor of urology/andrology from Salzburg, Dr J.; and the second by a professor of surgery and intensive surgical medicine from the Paracelsus Private Medical University of Salzburg, Dr W. The reports were based on the applicant’s medical record and answers to their questions prepared by the applicant’s defence team. Having noted the poor sanitary conditions in which the applicant had to undergo necessary procedures and his “reduced immune system”, their prognosis for him was “very bad”, with the likelihood that “over time he would suffer from antibiotic-resistant urinary tract infection that [could] cause urosepsis with a very high risk of [death]”. Dr J. concluded that from the medical evidence before him, the applicant already had a permanent urinary tract infection which would probably soon develop into urosepsis. There was a 60% to 90% chance of developing septic shock and death in such a case, even in optimal clinical conditions. That chance became far more probable in a prison environment. The risk was even higher than for otherwise healthy paraplegic men given that the applicant was suffering from diabetes. Having listed various medical procedures and recommendations for treatment, Dr J. concluded that the applicant’s life “was in acute danger” and that “high-quality medical management of [the applicant’s] problems [was] mandatory”. Dr W. concluded his analysis of the applicant’s health and the treatment to which he was being subjected with the following assessment: “In my 40 years of professional experience as a surgeon, I have never encountered such inhuman, demoralizing and humiliating treatment of [a disabled person] bound to a wheelchair. A paraplegic patient has the same life expectancy as a [non-disabled] person, provided the measures described above are followed. Based on the documents presented to me, I have no reason to assume that this is the case. Given the circumstances described here, one may expect the patient to experience severe and agonizing pain. Due to the non-existent medical care, one may anticipate severe complications or his demise.” 43. On 17 December 2013 Dr W. amended his expert opinion. Having again listed all the illnesses with which the applicant had been diagnosed by the Russian prison authorities, Dr W. stated as follows: “From the medical view it is absolutely insignificant if one or more of those diseases are not in the list of serious diseases preventing the holding in custody of suspects or accused of the commission of crimes. On the other hand, it is proved in international medical literature that the combination of all these serious diseases causes an enormous life threatening situation for [the applicant]. The patient is really very critically ill.”. 44. In the meantime, relying on the Court’s letter of 16 August 2013, on 27 September 2013 the applicant’s lawyers asked the investigators in the case to provide the applicant with an opportunity to be examined in person by a number of medical experts from various civilian hospitals, including those who had prepared the reports assessing the doctors’ opinions of 17 July and 7 August 2013. The lawyers insisted that the named specialists had agreed to provide their expert opinion in response to the three questions put by the Court before the Russian Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 45. On 3 October 2013 the lawyers received a letter from the senior investigator “fully refusing” their request. Having pointed out that the applicant had already been examined twice by doctors from hospital no. 20, a civilian hospital, and that the doctors had concluded that the applicant was not suffering from an illness included in the list of serious illnesses precluding detention pending trial, the senior investigator dismissed the request. 46. The lawyers sent a similar request to the director of the applicant’s detention facility. The director responded that he did not “in principle” object to such an examination by medical experts, but that the decision authorising the examination could only be taken by the investigator. 47. The applicant was again sent for an examination to hospital no. 20, where the three doctors confirmed their previous findings of 17 July and 7 August 2013. The new report issued on 5 November 2013 was very similar. 48. The lawyers also submitted to the Court a large number of certificates issued by the administration of the detention facility showing that the applicant’s daily needs in terms of medicines and medical materials, including catheters, were covered by his relatives. The director of the detention facility also confirmed that fact in his letter of 23 October 2013. 49. On 1 April 2014 the applicant was transferred to temporary detention facility no. 4 in Rostov-on-Don. A prison doctor attending on the applicant in that facility issued a record listing a number of visits to the applicant by various medical specialists and registering the applicant’s mounting complaints. In the same record she stated that while the applicant remained under permanent medical supervision and was subjected to regular clinical examinations, with his condition, due to those procedures, being satisfactory, any of his illnesses at any time could lead to a significant deterioration in his health and become acute or chronic, with an unpredictable prognosis for his life expectancy.

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6. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Murmansk, Russia. 7. In November 2008 the Murmansk Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Russia instituted criminal proceedings against him on suspicion of fraud. The applicant had been working as a police officer and was suspected of having obtained by fraud a number of sick leave certificates justifying his absence from work. 8. On 24 November 2008 the applicant arrived in Ukraine. 9. On 1 December 2008 he was placed on the list of wanted persons by the Murmansk Regional Department of the Interior. 10. On 3 December 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Murmansk ordered the applicant’s arrest. On the same date an international arrest warrant was issued. 11. On 19 April 2010 the applicant was arrested by the Ukrainian police with a view to his extradition. 12. On 22 April 2010 the Prymorskyy District Court of Odessa (“the Prymorskyy Court”), following an application from the prosecution authorities, remanded the applicant in custody for forty days pending the extradition procedure. 13. On 29 or 30 April 2010 (both dates are mentioned in different case-file materials) the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine (“the GPOU”) received a request from its Russian counterpart about the applicant’s extradition and the extension of his detention pending extradition. As noted in that request, there were criminal proceedings against the applicant pending in Russia on suspicion of fraud. The extradition request did not contain any further details in that regard, but mentioned that “a detailed description of the charges against [the applicant was] in the enclosed documents”. It is not known what enclosures were attached to the request in question. 14. It appears from the judicial ruling of 30 July 2010 (see paragraph 25 below) that on 11 May 2010 the GPOU received another request from the Russian prosecution authorities about the applicant’s detention and extradition. There is no mention of that request in any other documents in the case file. 15. On 19 May 2010 the Prymorskyy District Prosecutor’s Office applied to the Prymorskyy Court for an extension of the applicant’s detention “pending resolution of the issue of his extradition”. 16. On 21 May 2010 the Prymorskyy Court allowed that application. 17. On 26 May 2010 the applicant appealed. He complained that he had not been familiarised with the charges against him, that no time-limit for his detention had been set, and that the Prymorskyy Court had announced the contested decision following a hearing at which he had not been present. 18. On 3 June 2010 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal in a hearing at which two prosecutors were present, but in the absence of the applicant. The prosecutors submitted that the applicant’s extradition to Russia was all but settled and would take place shortly thereafter. Having regard to those arguments and noting that an international arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant, the appellate court upheld the lower court’s decision extending his detention pending extradition. 19. On 21 June 2010 the Malynivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office applied to the Malynivskyy District Court of Odessa (“the Malynivskyy Court”) for an extension of the applicant’s “extradition detention” pursuant to the legislative amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in force since 17 June 2010 (see paragraph 37 below). 20. On 23 June 2010 the Malynivskyy Court allowed the above application and ordered that the applicant’s extradition detention be extended “pending resolution of the question of his extradition and the actual transfer”. 21. On 25 June 2010 the applicant appealed against the above ruling. He submitted that the time-limits for his detention remained unspecified, that he was still unaware of the charges against him, that his detention had been unreasonably long and that the court had not taken into account the fact that he had two young children. 22. On 8 July 2010 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal allowed his appeal in part. It quashed the aforementioned ruling on the grounds that the respective provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide for any extension of extradition detention. The case was remitted to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. 23. On 21 July 2010 the Malynivskyy Court allowed the applicant’s request for a lawyer to be appointed for him. As a result, the hearing was adjourned till 30 July 2010. 24. On 27 July 2010 the Malynivskyy Prosecutor’s Office lodged a new application with the court for the applicant’s extradition detention pursuant to the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. This time it concerned the imposition of such detention, rather than its extension. 25. On 30 July 2010 the Malynivskyy Court, following a hearing in the presence of the lawyer appointed for the applicant, allowed the prosecutor’s application. The ruling mentioned that the Russian prosecution authorities had lodged a request for the applicant’s extradition on 11 May 2010, without any reference to the similar request of 30 April 2010 (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above). The court relied on the aforementioned CCP amendments effective since 17 June 2010 and stated that the extradition inquiry case-file materials complied with the applicable legislation. Lastly, the court noted that it had not established any impediments to the applicant’s extradition to Russia. 26. On 21 August 2010 the applicant complained to the Malynivskyy Court that his detention was unlawful and asked to be released. The case file does not contain a copy of this complaint. 27. On 30 August 2010 the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation sent an updated extradition request in respect of the applicant, of which there is no copy on the case file. It appears that, in addition to the initial fraud charge, six other counts of fraud were imputed to the applicant (see paragraph 28 below). 28. On 1 September 2010 the GPOU decided to extradite the applicant to Russia in connection with six episodes of fraud but rejected the extradition request in respect of one such episode. That decision was explained by the fact that Ukrainian criminal law normally does not prescribe imprisonment as a penalty for fraud. However, where fraud has been committed repeatedly, it can be punished by imprisonment. In the applicant’s case there were six “repeated fraud” episodes. The GPOU decision referred to two extradition requests relating to the applicant: one of 30 April 2010 regarding one episode of fraud and one of 30 August 2010 regarding six further episodes (see paragraphs 13 and 27 above). 29. On 10 September 2010 the applicant complained to the Malynivskyy Court that his detention was unlawful and had been unreasonably long. He argued that the Ukrainian authorities had not been diligent in dealing with the extradition requests in his respect, in contravention of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. The applicant further referred to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and submitted that his earlier complaint, of 21 August 2010, had never been examined. 30. On 17 September 2010 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Malynivskyy Court concerning the alleged unlawfulness of his detention and asked to be released. 31. On 22 September 2010 the Malynivskyy Prosecutor’s Office applied to the Malynivskyy Court for an extension of the applicant’s extradition detention. It referred to the aforementioned decision of 1 September 2010 and noted that the issue of the applicant’s actual transfer back to Russia was being decided. 32. On 28 September 2010 the court granted that application in a hearing attended by the applicant. It noted that the GPOU’s decision of 1 September 2010 had not been challenged and had come into force. Furthermore, pursuant to the respective prosecutor’s instructions, the applicant was to be transferred to Russia by 29 October 2010. As reported in the minutes of the hearing, the judge read out the applicant’s complaints of 21 August and of 10 and 27 September 2010, and the applicant reaffirmed them. The court ruling did not, however, mention those complaints. 33. On 30 September 2010 the applicant challenged the above ruling on appeal. He noted that, while the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for extradition detention of up to eighteen months, it did not establish any time-limits for submitting and examining the associated extradition request. Accordingly, the applicant argued that the Ukrainian authorities should abide by the 1993 Minsk Convention, which provided for a one-month time-limit for submitting an extradition request once the person was detained and a maximum two-month extension of that time-limit for supplementing the extradition request if need be (see paragraph 38 below). He emphasised that in his case a duly completed extradition request had not been submitted until 30 August 2010, whereas he had been in detention since 19 April 2010. The applicant therefore argued that he should be released immediately. Lastly, he submitted that the charges against him were ridiculous and that it was in his own interests to go to Russia so that his trial could be completed without delay. 34. On 8 October 2010 the appellate court, while allowing the applicant’s appeal in part, modified the first-instance court’s ruling as follows: instead of the extension of the applicant’s extradition detention, which was not provided for in the legislation, his continued detention was found to be lawful, since its maximum time-limit of eighteen months had not been exceeded and there were no grounds for the applicant’s release. 35. On 12 October 2010 the applicant was extradited to Russia.

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5. The applicants were born in 1950 and 1953 respectively and live in Chişinău. 6. Both applicants were politicians at the time of the events. The first applicant was mayor of Chișinău and the leader of an opposition political party. The second applicant was a Member of Parliament (“MP”) and member of an opposition party. 7. On 30 November 2004 and 3 March 2007 the then president of the Republic of Moldova Mr V. Voronin (hereinafter “the President”) participated in two television programmes on two privately owned channels, one of which had national coverage. He was interviewed by journalists on various topics such as the economy, justice, foreign relations and elections. The President stated, among other things, that “during the ten years of activity as a Mayor of Chisinau, Mr Urecheanu did nothing but to create a very powerful mafia-style system of corruption”. When referring to the second applicant and to other persons, the President stated that all of them “came straight from the KGB”. 8. Both applicants brought libel actions against the President, seeking a retraction of the impugned statements and compensation. The first applicant sought compensation of 0.1 Moldovan lei (MDL), while the second applicant claimed MDL 500,000 plus payment of her court fees and legal costs. The President’s representative opposed the actions arguing that the impugned statements had been covered by his immunity. 9. On 11 January 2005 the Buiucani District Court discontinued the proceedings in the case lodged by the first applicant on the grounds that the President enjoyed immunity and could not be held responsible for opinions expressed in the exercise of his mandate. The court gave the following reasoning in its decision: “Having examined the materials of the case and heard the parties, in the light of Article 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court considers it necessary to strike out the case. Thus, Article 81 para. 2 of the Constitution provides as follows: ‘The President of the Republic of Moldova shall enjoy immunity. He may not be held legally responsible for opinions expressed in the exercise of his mandate’. It its judgment Nr. 8 of 16 February 1999 on the interpretation of Article 71 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that legal responsibility encompasses responsibility under criminal, civil and administrative laws. In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court gave an extensive explanation to the expression “opinions expressed in the exercise of his mandate” used in Article 71 of the Constitution, holding that it means the point of view, opinions and convictions expressed in the exercise of his mandate in respect of matters and events from public life. In such circumstances of fact and law, the court considers it necessary to strike out the case against the President of the Republic of Moldova, V. Voronin, on the ground that he cannot be held liable under civil law.” 10. On 25 April 2007 the Centru District Court discontinued the proceedings in the case lodged by the second applicant on the grounds that the President enjoyed immunity. The court gave the following reasoning in its decision: “Having heard the arguments of the parties and having analysed the materials of the case, the court considers well founded the plea of the representative of the defendant to strike the case out. The Constitution guarantees a large immunity to the chief of the state. Thus, Article 81 para. 2 of the Constitution provides as follows: ‘The President of the Republic of Moldova shall enjoy immunity. He may not be held legally responsible for opinions expressed in the exercise of his mandate’. For elucidating the limits of this constitutional immunity, the court refers to judgment Nr. 8 of 16 February 1999 of the Constitutional Court. Giving its interpretation to Article 71 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that legal responsibility encompasses responsibility under criminal, civil and administrative laws. The Constitutional Court also gave an explanation to the meaning of the expression ‘opinions expressed in the exercise of his mandate’ ruling that it means the point of view, opinions and convictions expressed in the exercise of his mandate in respect of matters and events from public life. From the meaning of the judgment of the Constitutional Court, the court considers that the independence of the opinions of the President of the Republic of Moldova in the exercise of his mandate is absolute and perpetual. In her action lodged with the court, plaintiff V. Pavlicenco relies on Articles 16 and 1422 of the Civil Code and asks for the President of the Republic of Moldova to be held liable under civil law, namely for the opinions expressed by him publically in a programme in the exercise of his mandate. In view of the circumstances described above, bearing in mind the principle of the presidential immunity enjoyed by the President of the Republic of Moldova and of the impossibility to hold him responsible under law, the court comes to the conclusion that the present case must be struck out of the list of cases because in this case the President of Moldova cannot be held liable either by a court or by any other bodies.” 11. Both applicants appealed, arguing that Article 81 § 2 of the Constitution afforded immunity to the President only in respect of opinions he expressed and not in respect of statements of fact. Moreover, they argued that the impugned statements made by the President had not been in connection with the exercise of his official functions, and that the court of first instance had failed to determine whether that had been the case. In support of that argument, the second applicant pointed to the President’s official duties as enumerated in the Constitution, and to the fact that some of the topics discussed during the television programme, such as problems in the economy, foreign affairs and the functioning of parliament, fell outside the scope of the President’s official functions. The second applicant also stressed that the accusation made against her (that she had belonged to the KGB) was very offensive, and had been made by a very important person in the State at a prime-time hour on a channel with national coverage. Even if the President had been exercising his official functions when participating in the television programme, the defamatory accusations made against her could not be considered part of those functions. Both applicants complained that the first-instance decision had unjustifiably limited their right of access to court, in breach of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention. 12. On 3 February 2005 and 14 June 2007 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the judgments at first instance.

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5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Bratislava. 6. On 5 February 2010 the applicant was accused of fraud. The alleged crime was considered particularly serious. 7. On 24 and 31 August 2010 the applicant examined the case file in the presence of his lawyer and accepted that plea bargaining negotiations should be started. 8. On 20 September 2010 a plea bargain agreement (dohoda o vine a treste) was concluded in the presence of the injured parties, which contained an admission of guilt by the applicant and details of the sentence to be imposed on him. It was submitted to the Nitra District Court for approval. 9. At a hearing held on 20 October 2010 the applicant replied in the negative to questions put to him by the judge in respect of the above‑mentioned agreement. The court therefore refused to accept it and returned the case at its preliminary stage. Its decision was delivered to Nitra prison, where the applicant was being detained, on 8 November 2010. 10. On 3 November 2011 the Prosecutor General’s Office dismissed a request by the applicant for certain public prosecutors to be excluded from the Nitra Regional Prosecutor’s Office. 11. On 21 January 2011 the public prosecutor gave detailed instructions to the police as to what further investigations were to be carried out into the case. 12. On 8 February 2010 the District Court remanded the applicant in custody with effect from 5 February 2010. His detention was considered necessary for the reasons set out in Article 71 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely that there was a risk of him absconding and committing further offences. 13. On 10 April 2010 the applicant filed a request for release with the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. It was transferred to the District Court on 28 April 2010, but dismissed on 20 May 2010. The applicant filed a complaint the same day. 14. The District Court transferred the file to the Nitra Regional Court on 6 August 2010, which dismissed the applicant’s complaint on 18 August 2010. It returned the file to the District Court the following day. On 8 September 2010 the District Court dispatched the Regional Court’s decision, which was deemed served on the applicant on 16 September and his counsel on 23 September 2010. 15. In the meantime, on 4 August 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 5 November 2010. 16. On 25 October 2010 it dismissed the applicant’s second request for release, which he had filed on 19 August 2010 with the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. On 19 November 2010 the Regional Court dismissed his complaint against that decision, which had been lodged on 25 October 2010. Its decision was served on him on 26 November 2010. 17. On 20 January 2011 the applicant again petitioned the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for release. He argued that there were no relevant grounds for his continued detention. On 28 January 2011 the public prosecutor transferred his request to the District Court, which, after hearing him, dismissed it on 9 February 2011. 18. The District Court noted that the applicant had admitted his actions in preliminary proceedings. As he was suspected of committing the offence using a false identity, there was still a specific risk that he might abscond if released and thus hamper the further investigations into the case which had been ordered. The fact that he had a family and a permanent residence could not outweigh this consideration. Furthermore, the offence was punishable by a prison term of ten to fifteen years, and had been committed within a period of probation following an earlier conviction. The District Court found his continued detention justified for the purposes of Articles 71 §§ 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19. At the hearing the applicant orally lodged a complaint and requested that the court dealing with it hear him in person. He submitted the reasons for his complaint in writing on 23 and 25 February 2011. 20. The applicant argued, in particular, that he had no reason to abscond. Prior to his detention he had lived with his partner, who had given birth to their child in the meantime. He had an income, as he was a partner in a limited liability company which was in operation. The argument that he had used a false identity was unsubstantiated and the fear he would continue committing offences unjustified. He requested that his complaint be examined at a public hearing, as he wished to point to specific facts and the reasons he had mentioned in his application for release. He further argued that the District Court judge had refused, on the grounds that he knew their content, to examine decisions he had wished to submit when being heard on 9 February 2011. 21. On 3 March 2011 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint after having examined it in camera. It confirmed the reasons the District Court had considered his continued detention necessary. Its decision stated, in particular, that there was still a risk of him absconding, as he had used a false identity to commit the offence and was under the threat of severe punishment. At the same time, his continued detention was justified by the fear he would continue the criminal activities for which he was prosecuted. The Regional Court considered his arguments about the unlawfulness of his continued detention irrelevant. His family and social situation could not affect the position in view of the nature of the offence, given that it had been committed within a period of probation following an earlier conviction, and he had previously been convicted of criminal offences committed deliberately. The decision stated that no facts had been established, for the purposes of Article 302 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to justify hearing him in person. 22. On 12 May 2011 the District Court dismissed a fresh application by the applicant for release and extended his detention until 21 July 2011. On 17 May 2011 the Regional Court dismissed his complaint against that decision. 23. He was released from detention on 5 September 2011. 24. In a complaint lodged on 27 September 2010, the applicant alleged a breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, in that the ordinary courts had not decided his request for release of 10 April 2010 speedily. 25. On 7 October 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible to the extent that it concerned delays in the proceedings before the District Court. It noted that the Regional Court had only actually dealt with the case for thirteen days. There was therefore no appearance of a breach of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the proceedings before it. 26. In a judgment of 20 December 2010 the Constitutional Court found a breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in respect of the proceedings before the District Court. The judgment stated that it had kept the file from 28 April to 6 August 2010, that is, for more than fourteen weeks. Another twenty days had lapsed before it sent the Regional Court’s decision to the applicant. There was no justification for such a long time being spent on the applicant’s request for release. 27. The Constitutional Court awarded 1,000 euros (EUR) to the applicant as just satisfaction and ordered the District Court to reimburse his costs. 28. On 29 March 2011 the applicant complained that the Regional Court had breached his rights under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to its decision of 3 March 2011. 29. Firstly, he alleged that there had been no relevant reason for his further detention. In particular, reference to the offence of which he was suspected and the severity of its punishment did not in itself justify the deprivation of his liberty. He argued that he had not resisted arrest and had cooperated with the investigator; similarly, he had not tried to avoid the earlier criminal proceedings in which he had been given a conditional prison sentence. Furthermore, his partner, whom he had planned to marry, had given birth to a child in the meantime. Their daughter had serious health problems. No specific reasons had been put forward to justify the conclusion that there was a risk of him absconding or avoiding the pending criminal proceedings. The applicant considered the argument that further investigations had to be carried out irrelevant, and concluded that the ordinary courts had not indicated any specific fact-based grounds for his continued detention. Secondly, he complained that, despite an explicit request, the Regional Court had not heard him. Lastly, he alleged that he had been detained without any relevant legal grounds from 5 to 8 November 2010. 30. On 14 June 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 related to the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 5 to 8 November 2010 admissible. 31. On the same day it rejected the remaining complaints as manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons. Since the Regional Court had also referred to and accepted the reasons for the District Court’s justification of the applicant’s detention, the relative scarceness of the reasons for its decision did not amount to a breach of his rights under Article 5 of the Convention. Since the District Court had heard him prior to deciding his request for release, neither the domestic law nor Article 5 § 4 required, in the circumstances, that the Regional Court also hear him in person when deciding his complaint. In particular, in his complaint he had not relied upon any new facts or arguments in respect of his request for release. 32. In its judgment on the merits of 13 September 2011 the Constitutional Court concluded that there had been a breach of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention, in that the applicant had been detained unlawfully during the period 5 to 8 November 2010 and the Regional Court had failed to duly address that issue. The decision acknowledged that following the applicant’s refusal to confirm the plea bargain agreement before a judge and the return of the proceedings at the preliminary stage, a new seven-month detention period had started running in accordance with the relevant law. However, the earlier decision to extend his detention had expired on 5 November 2010, and the District Court’s decision of 20 October 2010 had not been sent to Nitra prison, where the applicant was being held, until 8 November 2010. During that time the applicant had therefore been detained without a decision justifying the continued deprivation of his liberty. 33. The Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for just satisfaction. It did not consider it necessary to order his release, as at the time of its decision his detention was covered by a decision of the ordinary court concerned. The Regional Court was ordered to reimburse his costs.

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4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Naples. 5. While he was in judicial separation proceedings from his wife (D.L.), a provisional residence order was issued to both parents in respect of the couple’s two children (G.L. and M.T.). 6. On 29 August 2007 the applicant asked the guardianship judge to issue him with a new passport, requesting that the name of his son, G.L., also be entered in it. His former wife objected, arguing that the applicant was not making the maintenance payments ordered by the president of the court at the time of the judicial separation. 7. By a decree of 18 September 2007, the guardianship judge rejected the applicant’s request, holding that it was inappropriate to issue the requested passport, given the imperative of protecting the children’s right to receive the maintenance payments. In this regard, he emphasised that the applicant, who was supposed to make a maintenance payment of 600 euros (EUR) per month, paid only a small amount (EUR 45 to 90) and that there was a risk that he would shirk his obligation completely if he were to travel abroad. 8. By a decision of 26 October 2007, the guardianship judge ordered that M.T.’s name be removed from the applicant’s passport. 9. On 31 October 2007 the Naples Police Commissioner (questore) ordered the applicant to hand in his passport to the police station and amended his identity card, making it invalid for foreign travel. 10. The applicant appealed to the Naples Court against the guardianship judge’s decision. He alleged that: – under the measures ordered by the president of the court at the time of the judicial separation, the children had been due to spend the period of 10 to 26 August, during the school holidays, with him; on that basis, he had planned to take them to Sicily by plane; however, this required that the names of his two children be included in his passport; – on account of his former wife’s objection and the guardianship judge’s decree, he and his children had been unable to go on holiday; – the children’s names were included in the mother’s passport; – the dismissal of his request amounted to a penalty that was not prescribed by law. 11. On 7 February 2008 the applicant asked the Naples guardianship judge to issue him with a new passport, explaining that his former wife had retained his identity card and his passport in the family home. 12. By a decree of 29 February 2008, the Naples guardianship judge dismissed the applicant’s request on the ground that he had not paid the maintenance sums due in respect of his children, and that it was to be feared that he was leaving the country only in order to evade his obligation entirely. The applicant also appealed against that decision to the Naples Court, alleging a breach of his right to freedom of movement. 13. By a decision of 5 February 2009, the Naples Court joined the appeals and dismissed them. The court noted, firstly, that the legal basis for the guardianship judge’s decision was Law no. 1185 of 21 November 1967, as amended by the Passports Act 2003 (Law no. 3). 14. The court found that the guardianship judge did indeed have jurisdiction to rule on the applicant’s request for a passport and on the inclusion in it of his son’s name. As to the merits of the appeal, the court noted that the applicant was not complying with his obligation to pay maintenance and that this circumstance was one of the lawful grounds for refusing to issue a passport, in the children’s interests, in accordance with section 12 of the Passports Act. 15. On 4 November 2008 D.L. was ordered to pay a fine of EUR 100 for failing to bring the children to an appointment with the applicant. 16. By a decree of 8 April 2009, the guardianship judge issued D.L., at her request, with a passport in which the names of the two children were included. 17. On 21 August 2012 the applicant asked the Naples guardianship judge to issue individual passports to his children, in application of Legislative Decree no. 135 of 2009. 18. D.L. objected, arguing that the children did not need these passports; that the applicant had made no maintenance payments since 2007; and that, indeed, criminal proceedings were pending in that regard. 19. By a decision of 3 October 2012, the guardianship judge rejected the applicant’s request. He considered that the proceedings for the separation of the applicant and D.L. were still pending and that, in the light of the considerations put forward by D.L., with whom the children resided, it was appropriate to stay any issue of passports to the children. The applicant did not appeal against that decision.

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5. Mr İhsan Güler and Mr Sinan Uğur were born in 1964 and 1947 respectively and live in Ankara and İzmir respectively. 6. At the relevant time they were active members and regional leaders of the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP)), which was subsequently dissolved by the Constitutional Court. The applicant Mr Güler, former mayor of the district of Başkale (Van), was at the relevant time the chairman of an association called KÜRT-DER (Kürt Demokrasi Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği – association for Kurdish culture, democracy and solidarity). 7. On 21 August 2006 the applicants took part in a religious ceremony (mevlût)[1] on the premises of the DTP in Altındağ (Ankara), in which they paid tribute to three members of the PKK who had been killed by the security forces. 8. The participants read out passages from the Koran and said prayers, and showed a film about the lives of the deceased. The DTP’s regional representative gave a short speech, which can be summarised as follows: “Our fears and worries continue. People are still being killed. In such a context, we would like this mevlût to be a moment of peace and fraternity.” 9. On 3 October 2006 the Muş public prosecutor’s office received an anonymous letter of denunciation, together with a CD containing a recording of the ceremony in question. The writer, who said that he had been a participant himself but had subsequently regretted it, explained that the ceremony had been held in memory of “the martyrs of the PKK”. 10. Following an investigation by the public prosecutor’s office, the applicant Mr Güler was arrested and taken into police custody on 28 December 2006. He was released the next day. 11. Both applicants were committed to stand trial before the Ankara Assize Court. In their defence they stated that they had taken part in the ceremony for the observance of their religious duties. 12. In a judgment of 24 September 2008 the Ankara Assize Court, relying on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on the prevention of terrorism, sentenced the two applicants to ten months’ imprisonment. 13. In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, firstly, that the persons in whose memory the ceremony had been held were members of a terrorist organisation and that they had been killed by the security forces during an operation against that organisation. It also took the view that the choice of venue for the ceremony – the premises of a political party –, and the fact that the PKK flag had been spread over the tables and photos of members of the organisation had been displayed, contributed to raising serious doubts as to the actual reasons for the gathering that had been given by the applicants in their defence. 14. Further to an appeal on points of law by the applicants, their conviction was upheld by a final judgment of the Court of Cassation on 8 March 2010. The applicants were imprisoned for the duration of their sentence. ...

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6. In 1998 the applicant’s property rights to a previously nationalised part of his late father’s land near Vilnius were restored. On 5 June 2002 the Vilnius Region Administration restored his rights – restitution in natura – to the remainder of the land measuring 0.53 hectares, situated in the village of Gineitiškės. This plot of land was then entered in the land registry in the applicant’s name. 7. In January 2005, having discovered that the decision of 5 June 2002 was based on erroneous data prepared by a State-hired land surveyor and had possibly breached the rights of other former landowners, the General Prosecutor’s Office instituted administrative proceedings to have the applicant’s title to the plot annulled. The applicant was a third party to those proceedings and argued that the restoration process had been lawful, without, however, raising the question of an adequate compensation in the event that his title to the plot was extinguished. Shortly before the initiation of the case, the Vilnius Region Administration had admitted that its decision had been unlawful and had informed the applicant that it needed to rectify the error; however, it appears that the latter had disagreed. 8. On 8 September 2005 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the prosecutor’s complaint. However, on 12 December 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court remitted the case for re-examination. 9. On 20 April 2006 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court granted the claim and annulled the decision of 5 June 2002. Finally, on 15 January 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the lower court. The courts established that the original plot of land to which the applicant had ownership rights was actually situated in another, albeit nearby, area of Gilužiai village. Thus, the return of the plot in 2002 was declared unlawful as it breached the Law on the Restoration of Citizens’ Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property. 10. Following the courts’ decisions, the plot of land was taken away from the applicant and returned to the State. No compensation was awarded to the applicant. However, he reserved the right to have his ownership rights restored. 11. By a decision of 2 February 2009 the Vilnius Region Administration restored the applicant’s ownership rights in natura by granting a new plot of land measuring 0.53 hectares in Gilužiai village.

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4. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Elazığ. 5. On 19 October 1999 the applicant sat an examination in order to become a public servant. She was successful in the examination and on an unspecified date she was informed by the State Personnel Department attached to the Prime Minister’s office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Batman branch of TEDAŞ, the state-run Electricity Company, the first of the five choices that the applicant had made in the course of the examination procedure. 6. On 5 July 2000 the human resources department of the Batman branch of TEDAŞ informed the applicant that she would not be appointed as she did not fulfil the requirements of “being a man” and “having completed military service”. 7. In a letter dated 9 August 2000 and addressed to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the human resources department of TEDAŞ requested the Ministry to provide a list of new persons to be appointed instead of a number of persons, including the applicant, who could not be recruited for various reasons. As regards the applicant and three other persons, B.U., R.B. and A.O.C., the human resources department of TEDAŞ informed the Ministry that they were women and therefore could not work as security officers. In the letter, it was stated that security officers had the task of protecting depots, switchyards and transformer stations in rural areas far from city centres, against attacks and in case of fire and sabotage. They were obliged to work day and night and to use weapons, including those with long barrels, and physical force in case of an attack. It was therefore considered that women were not suitable for the post of security officer. 8. On 18 September 2000 the applicant lodged an action against the general directorate of TEDAŞ with the Ankara Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the decision of the Batman branch of TEDAŞ with all its financial consequences. In her deposition, the applicant noted that being a man was not a requirement for appointment to the post in question and that she fulfilled all the requirements for that post. The applicant also noted that she had been deprived of the opportunity to be appointed to one of the other four posts that she had indicated following the refusal in question and that she could not sit the examination again in 2000 as she had succeeded in 1999. 9. On an unspecified date the general directorate of TEDAŞ submitted to the administrative court that one of the requirements for the post in question had been declared by the State Personnel Department as “having completed military service” and that therefore only men could be appointed to the post. The applicant, being a woman, could therefore not be recruited as a security officer. 10. On 27 February 2001 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Batman branch of TEDAŞ. The court held that the requirement of “having completed military service” should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in TEDAŞ. The court also noted that another woman, Y.P., who had also brought a case against TEDAŞ for the same reasons as the applicant, had been appointed to the post of security officer after she had lodged the case. 11. Subsequent to the judgment of 27 February 2001, the applicant was offered a contract by the Batman branch of TEDAŞ. On 11 July 2001 she took up her duties. On 1 March 2002 she was transferred to the Elazığ branch of TEDAŞ as her husband lived and worked in that city. 12. On 8 May 2001 TEDAŞ lodged an appeal against the judgment of 27 February 2001, requesting the Supreme Administrative Court to order a stay of execution of the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court and to subsequently quash it. The representative of TEDAŞ submitted, inter alia, that the announcement of the post of security officers in the Batman branch contained the requirement of “having completed military service” and not “in respect of male candidates, having completed military service”, unlike the post in the Gaziantep branch of TEDAŞ, which first rejected Y.P. According to the lawyer, this expression demonstrated that the post was reserved for male candidates only and that therefore the status of the applicant was different from that of Y.P. 13. On 27 June 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the request for a stay of execution. 14. On 31 March 2003 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court, holding that the requirement regarding military service demonstrated that the post in question was reserved for male candidates and that this requirement was lawful having regard to the nature of the post and the public interest. The high court therefore found that the administration’s decision had been in accordance with the law. 15. On 1 August 2003 the applicant requested rectification of the decision of 31 March 2003. In her petition, she submitted that the post of security officer was not reserved for male candidates and that therefore the high court’s decision was in breach of the principle of equality. 16. On 17 March 2004 the applicant was dismissed from her post at the Elazığ branch of TEDAŞ. According to the letter sent by the deputy head of the human resources department of TEDAŞ to the Elazığ branch, the applicant’s contract was to be terminated on account of the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court dated 31 March 2003. 17. On 22 March 2004 the applicant lodged a petition with the Supreme Administrative Court. She maintained that she had lost her post and requested the high court to order a stay of execution of the decision of 31 March 2003. She noted, in her petition, that the post in question should not be reserved only for men, since certain acts, such as a body search on women, should be carried out by female officers. 18. On 16 April 2004 her request was dismissed by the Twelfth Division. 19. On 11 October 2005 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court further dismissed the applicant’s request for rectification. 20. On 21 February 2006 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case, taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. 21. On 24 April 2006 the applicant appealed. In her deposition she noted that there were three other similar cases brought against TEDAŞ by female candidates for the same reasons as hers and that one of these cases, brought by R.B., who had also not been appointed to a post of security officer in the Batman branch of TEDAŞ on the same grounds as those applied to the applicant, was pending before the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions. She further noted that she would have lost the opportunity to apply for another public post, had the high court decided in favour of TEDAŞ. 22. On 6 December 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions (Danıştay İdari Dava Daireleri Genel Kurulu) issued a decision in favour of R.B. The General Assembly held that the requirement of “having completed military service” should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that the refusal to appoint R.B. to the Batman branch of TEDAŞ had therefore been unlawful. 23. On 12 February 2008 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 21 February 2006, holding that the latter was in accordance with the law. In its decision, the court noted the content of the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions but did not comment on it. 24. On 17 March 2008 the applicant requested rectification of the decision of 12 February 2008, maintaining that the decision in question constituted a breach of the principle of equality and the right to a fair hearing since the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions had ruled in favour of R.B. She further claimed that there had been discrimination, since pursuant to the Constitution no distinction could be made in public employment. 25. On 17 September 2008 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request.

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4. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Kadzidło. 5. The applicant’s parents owned land within the administrative borders of Warsaw. It was expropriated by way of an administrative decision issued on an unspecified date under the provisions of the Decree on Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw of 26 October 1945. In February 1949 the applicant’s legal predecessor requested to be granted a right of perpetual use (użytkowanie wieczyste) for another plot of land situated in Warsaw as compensation provided for by the provisions of the 1945 Decree. His request was dismissed by way of an administrative decision given in 1961 and ultimately upheld in 1968. A judicial decision given in 1975 confirmed that the applicant was his parents’ general heir. 6. On 16 July 1993 the applicant requested that the decision given in 1961 be declared null and void. 7. On 20 September 1994 the Minister of Construction and Land Planning (Minister of Gospodarki Przestrzennej and Budownictwa) gave a decision. It noted that in 1961 the authorities had failed to examine whether the substantive conditions for granting the owners the right of perpetual use of the land specified in section 7 of the 1945 Decree (see paragraph 46 below) had been met at that time. He declared, referring to Article 156 § 1 item 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP) (see paragraph 39 below), that decision null and void in so far as it related to the part of the land concerned which was used as family gardens. In so far as this decision related to the part of the land which had already been used for construction purposes, he considered that the contested decision had given rise to irrevocable legal consequences within the meaning of Article 156 § 2 of the CAP (see paragraph 41 below). Therefore under Article 158 § 2 he could merely declare that it had been issued contrary to law within the meaning of this provision. 8. The municipality of Warsaw did not lodge an appeal against this decision. It accordingly became final within thirty days after its service on the applicant. 9. The applicant instituted three separate sets of proceedings, seeking compensation for damage caused by the expropriation decision. 10. On 10 October 1994 the applicant, referring to the decision of 20 September 1994, requested the authorities to re-examine the original motion submitted in 1949 to be granted a right of perpetual use in respect of the land covered by the part of the expropriation decision declared null and void (see paragraph 7 above). On 28 October 1994 the Land Planning Division (Wydział Gospodarki Przestrzennej) of the Warsaw City Hall requested the Warsaw-Mokotów Town Hall to provide certain information concerning the land concerned. 11. On 3 March 1995 the applicant complained to the Minister of Construction and Land Planning about the authorities’ failure to give a decision in his case. 12. On 7 September 1995 the Minister of Minister of Construction and Land Planning stayed the compensation proceedings instituted by the applicant under Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraphs 29-33 below). He observed that the decision given on 20 September 1994 (see paragraph 7 above) made it necessary in law to re‑examine the former owners’ request for grant of the right to perpetual use submitted in 1949 and that it created a compensation claim for the applicant. It referred to the applicant as “the claim’s owner” (właściciel roszczenia). 13. In March and May 1996 the applicant complained to the Minister of Construction and Land Planning about the authorities’ failure to give a decision in the case. 14. On 25 November 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court gave a decision obliging the Mayor of Warsaw to whom the case had meanwhile been transmitted to give a decision on the merits of the case within one month. 15. On 24 February 1997 the Mayor of Warsaw refused to allow the application submitted in 1949 and joined by the applicant (see paragraph 5 above). The applicant appealed. 16. On 19 July 1997 the Local Self-Government Board of Appeal (Samorządowe Kolegium Odwoławcze) set the first-instance decision aside and remitted the case. 17. On 31 December 1997 the Mayor again refused to allow the applicant’s application. The applicant appealed. On 21 January 1999 the Board of Appeal set the first-instance decision aside and remitted the case. An exchange of correspondence between the applicant and the authorities ensued. 18. In January 2004 the Mayor of Warsaw informed the applicant that he had instituted proceedings with a view to having the decision given in 1994 that created for the applicant an entitlement to compensation (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above) declared null and void. In September 2004 the Minister of Construction refused to grant the Mayor’s application, finding that the contested decision was lawful. 19. On 13 December 2004 the Warsaw Town Hall (Urząd m. st. Warszawy) informed the applicant that the Mayor could not give a decision on the merits of the case unless the applicant indicated, by way of an initial request to obtain a construction permit, how he intended to use the land in question. 20. In September 2006 the applicant complained about the authorities’ failure to give a decision on the merits of the case. On 15 November 2006 the Board of Appeal obliged the Mayor to issue a decision by the end of February 2007. 21. On 15 March 2007 the applicant again complained about the administrative authorities’ failure to examine his case within a reasonable time. 22. On 24 April 2007 the Mayor refused to allow the applicant’s application. The applicant appealed. On 30 July 2007 the Board of Appeal quashed the decision, finding that it was unlawful both on procedural and substantive grounds, and remitted the case. 23. On 15 January 2008 the applicant again complained about the administrative authorities’ failure to give a decision. On 29 August 2008 the Board of Appeal found in a decision that his complaint was ill-founded as the file of the case had been forwarded to the civil court and the administrative authorities could not deal with the case. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Supreme Administrative Court. 24. On 28 October 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court obliged the Mayor of Warsaw to give a decision on the merits of the case within a two‑month time-limit. 25. On 3 June 2011 and on an unspecified later date the applicant complained to the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court about the Mayor’s failure to give a decision on the case in compliance with the judgment of that court obliging her to do so. On 14 July 2011 and 27 September 2012, respectively, the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected his complaints for failure to comply with the applicable procedural requirements. It noted that the applicant was obliged, under Article 154 para. 1 on the Law of Proceedings before Administrative Courts, to call upon the Mayor to comply with the judgment obliging her to give a decision prior to lodging another complaint about her inactivity with the administrative court. 26. On 22 June 2011 the Mayor of Warsaw stayed the proceedings, pending a physical delimitation of the land concerned by a land surveyor. The applicant appealed against this decision. 27. On 13 September 2012 the applicant called upon the Mayor, under Article 154 para. 1 of the Law of Proceedings before Administrative Courts, to give a decision in compliance with the judgment of 28 October 2010. There was no reply to his request. 28. The proceedings are pending. 29. On 10 October 1994 the applicant instituted proceedings under the then applicable Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by the unlawful decision given in 1961. 30. On 7 September 1995 the Minister of Construction stayed the proceedings, considering that the outcome of the use of land proceedings described above (see paragraphs 10 – 28 above) was decisive for the proceedings under Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 12 above). The applicant appealed. 31. On 17 April 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s appeal against the decision to stay the proceedings, holding that the other set of proceedings had no incidence on the issue of compensation for damage caused by the original expropriation decision. 32. In September 1997 the applicant complained about the Minister’s inactivity. 33. Ultimately in 2001 the President of Housing and Urban Development Office (Prezes Urzędu Mieszkalnictwa i Rozwoju Miast) refused to award compensation to the applicant. 34. In June 2001 the applicant and other legal successors of the former owners of the land expropriated in 1961 lodged a claim with the Warsaw Regional Court for compensation for damage caused by that decision. 35. By a judgment of 9 December 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded compensation to the applicant and other plaintiffs. The State Treasury represented by the General Attorney Office (Prokuratoria Generalna) appealed. 36. On 8 July 2009 the Warsaw Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, amended the contested judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim. 37. On 14 October 2010 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the applicant’s cassation appeal.

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5. The applicant was born in 1965. He is currently detained in Jilava Prison. 6. By a decision of the Romanian prime minister from 29 November 2002 to 20 December 2004 the applicant occupied the post of Secretary of State for the State Secretariat for the Problems of the December 1989 Revolutionaries (“the State Secretariat”). 7. On 7 December 2002, as a result of his appointment to the post of Secretary of State, the applicant delegated his duties as president of the Revolutionary Association “Club 22” (“the Association”) to the vice‑president of the said organisation. Under the terms of the agreement signed on the same date, he did not delegate his right to be a signatory on the bank account and various other duties of utmost importance for the organisation and its members, which were to be determined by mutual agreement at a later date. 8. In an interlocutory judgment of 25 May 2005 the Romanian Court of Auditors (Curtea de Conturi a României) examined the report produced after inspection of the financial documents and the activity of the State Secretariat for the year 2004. It noted inter alia that, although the applicant was dismissed from his post on 20 December 2004, he continued even after that date to sign and authorise payments on behalf of the State Secretariat. By unlawfully using his power to authorise payments, he approved 2,907,902,590 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 75,190 euros (EUR)) from public funds in the form of financing for the Association as a subsidy covering rent and utility charges incurred by the Association, despite the lack of any contractual agreement with the aforementioned Association as required by law. Consequently, the Court of Auditors referred the case to the Bucharest Court of Appeal and the Public Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court of Cassation in order to investigate the applicant’s administrative and criminal liability respectively. 9. On 25 January 2006 the National Anticorruption Department brought criminal proceedings against the applicant and a co-accused for improperly using his influence and information acquired by virtue of his position in order to obtain unwarranted material gain for himself or others. It held that on 21 and 22 December 2004 the applicant, although his post of State Secretary had already been revoked, authorised payments of approximately EUR 75,000 from the account of the Secretariat to the account of the Association of which he was a president. Although required by law, no formal agreement had been signed between the two organisations and, although he was not registered as a tenant, the applicant was living in the building occupied by the offices of the Association. 10. On an unspecified date the National Anticorruption Department indicted the applicant and his co-accused for improperly exploiting his influence and information obtained by virtue of his position for the purposes of acquiring unwarranted material gain for himself or for others and sent his case for trial. 11. At hearings on 31 May and 23 October 2006, the Court of Cassation examined the applicant’s and some of the parties’ submissions in respect of the procedural aspects of the case. 12. At a hearing on 1 November 2006 the Court of Cassation, sitting as a panel of three judges, heard the applicant in respect of the charges brought against him. In addition it allowed the applicant’s request for a financial expert report, documents and testimonial evidence to be added to the file. 13. At hearings on 29 November 2006, 21 February, 21 March, 23 April and 26 September 2007, the Court of Cassation heard the witnesses in the case. In particular, it heard C.C., G.M., G.N.V., F.Z., G.B., D.H., M.L.N., C.G., N.R., and T.M. In addition, the court examined the parties’ submissions and their requests for evidence and noted that documents had been added to the file, including the expert report requested by the applicant. 14. The applicant was present personally at the hearing of 29 November 2006 when the witness G.N.V. was heard. 15. From 26 October 2007 to 20 November 2008 the Court of Cassation held six additional hearings at which it examined various submissions made by the parties, allowed the parties’ objections to the expert report available on file, ordered a new financial expert report after the expert had answered the parties’ objections, and allowed the additional objections made by the parties to the new financial expert report. 16. By an interlocutory judgment of 12 January 2009 the Court of Cassation referred the applicant’s case to the Bucharest District Court on the grounds that the applicant’s mandate as Member of the Romanian Parliament had expired and the Court of Cassation was no longer competent to examine his case. 17. None of the Court of Cassation judges who had examined the applicant’s case prior to its referral could continue to examine his case after the date of the transfer. 18. From 23 March to 1 June 2009 the Bucharest District Court, sitting in a single judge formation, held four hearings at which it examined some of the parties’ procedural requests, allowed them to examine the expert’s answer to their additional objections, heard and examined the applicant’s request for additional explanations from the expert, and examined documents necessary to clarify the findings of the expert financial report. On 1 June 2009 the court noted that the judicial stage of the investigation of the case had ended and adjourned the proceedings for the parties’ pleadings on the merits of the case and for debate. 19. On 4 June 2009, at the debate stage of the proceedings, the Bucharest District Court, sitting in the same single-judge formation, heard the parties’ pleadings in respect of the merits of the case. It also allowed the applicant to address the court last. In addition, it adjourned the proceedings to 15 June 2009 pending the delivery of the judgment. 20. By a judgment of 15 June 2009 the Bucharest District Court, sitting in the same single-judge formation, convicted the applicant for improperly exploiting his influence and information acquired by virtue of his position for the purposes of acquiring unwarranted material gain for himself or for others and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, without hearing him or any of the witnesses directly. On the basis of the available documents, financial invoices and legal provisions it held that, in order to cover the rent and the utility costs incurred by the Association, the applicant and his co‑defendant had unlawfully set up a State-run and State-funded programme designed to help all organisations similar to the Association who had difficulties in covering their utilities. Subsequently, he approved the Association’s request for funding and ordered the payments of the available public funds to the said organisation. The applicant and his co-defendant had approved and ordered the payments knowing that no legal agreement existed with the Association and that no invoices supporting the Association’s request for funding had been submitted. 21. The court noted that C.C. and F.Z. also testified regarding the way the funds had been paid, stating that the Association had been the only organisation who had applied for funding and that a legal agreement or contract was required for it to access the funds in question. The same conclusion had been reached by the second expert report, which also found that the statement made by G.N.V. on behalf of the Association did not amount to a contractual agreement. Moreover, the applicant’s co-defendant had stated when confronted by the applicant that she had cautioned him about the absence of the legal agreement, but she had been asked to sign the payment orders on the grounds that G.N.V.’s statement had amounted to such an agreement. 22. The court further held that under normal circumstances the availability of the public funds should have been publicised so that all the organisations concerned could have applied for them. However, the applicant failed to put this into effect. With this in mind, the court found relevance in T.M.’s testimony that he was not aware of the program and that the applicant had denied the existence of the funds when he had been asked about them by the witness. The court noted that T.M.’s testimony had been confirmed by C.G. and G.B. At the same time, on the basis of G.N.V.’s and G.M.’s testimonies, it notes that it was the applicant who had initiated the program following the G.N.V.’s request for help on behalf of the Association. 23. The Court also noted on the basis of the available documents as well as the applicant’s and his co-defendant’s statements that he had also continued to look for additional funding by drawing on funds from other programs in order to cover all the Association’s debts. However only part of the funds made available to the Association went towards the rent. The rest was redirected to a bank account controlled by the applicant. 24. The court also held ‒ on the basis of the available lease contracts and the applicant’s statements ‒ that the applicant had been living in the building that housed the Association. By relying on G.N.V.’s testimony it rejected the applicant’s submission that he was not the only member of the Association living in the building. The court considered the applicant’s living circumstances relevant because it clarified the applicant’s motivation for his actions. The applicant appealed against the judgment. 25. On 19 April 2010 the applicant asked the Bucharest County Court to rehear the witnesses T.M., C.G. and G.N.V. He argued that he had not been present when the three witnesses had been heard by the court. In addition, he needed to rehear the three witnesses in order to clarify the facts, because the first-instance court had changed the meaning of their testimonies. Furthermore, he had brought criminal proceedings against T.M. for perjury. 26. On the same date the applicant also asked the Bucharest County Court to hear three new witnesses for the first time. He argued that these witnesses would be able to clarify the way in which the representatives of the other organisations and of the financial experts perceived the administrative acts produced by the applicant, and that this would prove that he had not misled the State authorities when he initiated the program and that all the documents drafted or signed by him had been made public and available for everyone to read. Also, the new witnesses could clarify certain circumstances concerning the agreement drawn up by G.N.V. on behalf of the Association. 27. On the same date, the Bucharest County Court refused the applicant’s requests. It informed the applicant that he could provide the court with updates on the criminal proceedings brought by him against T.M. In addition, it held that the applicant’s request regarding the first three witnesses in fact concerned the interpretation of evidence, given that the witnesses’ testimonies and the reasoning of the first-instance court had been available in writing. The second-instance and the third-instance courts were charged with the interpretation of evidence. Consequently, help in the form of the witnesses’ testimony was not needed, given that they had given and signed them under oath. The three witnesses had been heard during the criminal-investigation stage of the proceedings and before the first-instance court, where the applicant’s legal representative could have asked them questions aimed at clarifying the circumstances of the applicant’s case. 28. As regards the applicant’s request for the hearing of three new witnesses, the court considered it unnecessary for the case because no witness would be able to assess and clarify the understanding of the experts or of the representatives of the other organisations. 29. On 21 February 2011, during the debates, the applicant asked the Bucharest County Court to verify whether on the date of the deliberation of the case, the Bucharest District Court had in fact allowed him to address the court last. 30. On the same date, the Bucharest District Court refused the applicant’s request on the grounds that the evidence in the file attested that the applicant had been allowed to address the court last. In addition, it had allowed the applicant to address the court last in respect of the merits of the case. 31. By a judgment of 1 April 2011 the Bucharest County Court, after having examined the applicant’s submissions and arguments, dismissed his appeal as ill-founded. The applicant and the witnesses were not heard directly by the County Court. It held inter alia that the criminal proceedings brought by the applicant against T.M. for perjury were not sufficiently relevant, given the overwhelming evidence supporting the accusations brought against the applicant. In addition, the non-public nature of the information used by the applicant was not a factor that influenced his conviction, given the nature of the offence he had been charged with. The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. He reiterated his complaint that he had not been allowed to address the first‑instance court last. 32. By a final judgment of 7 February 2012, after having examined the applicant’s submissions and arguments for his appeal on points of law and without hearing him or the witnesses, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed it as ill-founded. It held inter alia that according to the relevant criminal procedure rules, an accused is to be heard last by the court before the debates are declared closed. During his pleading the accused may not be questioned in order to allow him to submit all the arguments he wishes to make in support of his defence. Consequently, the applicant’s rights to defence had not been breached given that the court, pending the delivery of the judgment, had allowed him to submit written observations before it. The applicant lodged an extraordinary annulment appeal (contestaţie în anulare) against the judgment. He argued that although he had been heard by the Court of Cassation on 1 November 2006, none of the courts who convicted him had heard him directly although they had a lawful duty to do so. 33. On 24 February 2012 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s annulment appeal. It held that it could not conclude that the applicant had not been heard by the first-instance court, given that he was heard by the Court of Cassation and that ‒ in accordance with the relevant criminal procedure rules ‒ the court to which the case had been referred could use the acts and measures undertaken by the court from which the case had been referred. In addition, he had been present and had been assisted by a legal representative before the second-instance court. Consequently, according to the relevant criminal procedure rules, the last‑instance court had not been subject to a duty to hear him. 34. In his first letters, the applicant contended before the Court that in the Bucharest Police Department’s detention facility, Jilava Prison Hospital and Rahova Prison his cells had been overcrowded and had not been separate from the bathroom facilities. In addition, in Jilava Prison the detention cells had been overcrowded and he had been forced to lie on the bed constantly on account of the lack of space; the hygiene conditions had been inadequate and the sanitary installations defective; there had never been any running warm water and he had been allowed to wash only twice a week together with another hundred persons; the outdoor physical exercise had been limited to only one hour a day and the food had been inadequate. Lastly, the prison authorities had transported him regularly for approximately one hour to attend domestic courts together with other detainees in vehicles which had lacked windows or artificial light and any form of ventilation. 35. On 2 August 2013, after the case had been communicated to the Government, the applicant informed the Court that he wished to relinquish his claim concerning the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

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5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Salaspils. 6. The applicant, who had been working as a bailiff (tiesu izpildītājs) since 1996, was arrested and eventually convicted of corruption offences. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The events leading up to the final decision adopted by the Senate of the Supreme Court on 17 March 2006 unfolded as follows. 7. On 9 November 2001, following a request by a private company, R.L., for its claim to be secured in a commercial dispute with another private company, M., a court issued an order for M.’s moveable property to be seized. On 15 November 2001 the director of R.L., O.V., submitted a writ of execution of the said decision to the Riga City Vidzeme District Bailiffs’ Office (Rigas pilsētas Vidzemes priekšpilsētas Tiesu izpildītāju kantoris). The applicant was the senior bailiff of that office, but the specific matter was entrusted to another bailiff of the same office, G.P. On 19 November 2001 G.P. seized M.’s property, which chiefly consisted of fur coats, transported it to another location, and entrusted its storage to O.V. On the same day representatives of M. contacted the applicant, asking him to ensure that the coats were stored in proper conditions, to prevent any damage. The applicant alleged that he then decided to entrust the storage of the seized property to an independent third party, whose costs would have to be reimbursed by R.L. Accordingly, the applicant directed his secretary to prepare documentation for the request of an advance payment from R.L. for the expected costs of the storage. The next day the applicant signed a document requesting an advance payment of 500 Latvian lati (LVL), which he considered would be sufficient to cover the costs of transporting the fur coats to an independent storage facility and obtaining an estimate of the value of the coats from an expert. 8. On 28 November 2001 the order of 9 November for the seizure of the property was quashed and a court ordered the immediate return of the seized property to M. On 5 December 2001 the bailiffs’ office sent a letter to O.V., informing him that the seized property must be returned to M. On 7 December 2001 R.L. lodged an ancillary complaint against the decision of 28 November. Under Latvian law as it stood at the relevant time, the lodging of such a complaint had suspensive effect. 9. It appears that on 14 December 2001 O.V. submitted a complaint to the police, alleging that the applicant and G.P. were asking him to pay a bribe of LVL 500, failing which the seized property would be returned to M. in accordance with the decision of 28 November. On the same day a recording was made of a telephone conversation between S.Ž. (a lawyer for R.L.) and G.P. The relevant part of the conversation ran as follows: “S.Ž. Listen, [G.P.], [O.V.] called me. G.P. Well, not me, I have a court decision that he has to return this property, it says “return”. Do you understand? And I cannot do anything else about that. 10. On the same day a recording was made of a telephone conversation between the applicant and S.Ž. Also on the same day O.V. and S.Ž. visited the applicant in his office. Their conversation was secretly recorded. 11. On 17 December 2001 O.V. went to the bailiffs’ office to receive a document confirming that the decision of 28 November had been suspended pending examination of an ancillary complaint lodged by R.L. 12. It appears that on 18 December 2001 a prosecutor from the Office of the Prosecutor General approved an investigative test (operatīvais eksperiments) to look into suspicions against the applicant and G.P. 13. On 18 December 2001 O.V. went to the bailiffs’ office. The applicant alleged that O.V. refused to accept from G.P. a copy of the document which had been prepared the previous day, and instead insisted on speaking to the applicant, who was not in the office at that time. When the applicant arrived at the office O.V.’s conversation with him was secretly recorded. The relevant part of it ran as follows: “O.V. I have money. The applicant How much is there? O.V. Listen ... you count [the money], so that well, just in case, you divide it yourself, I don’t know how much will be given to [G.P.]. 14. The applicant indicated that during the conversation O.V. had tried to hand him the money, and later placed it on his desk. He also stated that he assumed that O.V. must have placed the money under some books on his desk when he left the office to stamp the prepared document, as the money was not on the desk when he returned to the office. 15. After O.V. left, the applicant was detained by the police. The applicant stated that he did not provide any explanation of what had happened to the money, since he thought O.V. had taken it with him to pay G.P. He was then handcuffed and traces of a luminescent substance which had been used to mark the money offered by O.V. were observed on his hands under a special light. 16. After some time the police officers told the applicant that they had received authorisation to search his office. The case file contains a copy of a decision (dated 18 December 2001) to search the applicant’s office. The decision is on a standard pre-typed form (the top right-hand corner contains an indication that it is “Form 33”) with the blanks filled in typescript or by hand. One of the pre-typed fields is to be completed to indicate which court should subsequently be informed of the decision authorising a search. In the top left corner of the decision is a signed prosecutor’s resolution authorising the search. The resolution is dated 18 November 2001. The search was filmed. During the search LVL 500 was found on the applicant’s desk under some books. 17. On 19 December 2001 the police informed a judge of the Riga City Centre District Court that a search had been authorised and carried out. 18. On 29 January 2002 the applicant was charged with extortion carried out by an organised group and with wilful abuse of official position. The criminal proceedings that had been initiated against G.P. were terminated on 15 February 2002. In April 2002 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the first-instance court (the Riga Regional Court). 19. The Riga Regional Court delivered its judgment on 18 March 2005. The court found the applicant guilty. It held that on 20 November 2001 the applicant had requested a bribe from O.V. to allow the fur coats belonging to M. to be kept in O.V.’s possession. The bribe was held to have been requested as an advance payment of non-existent storage costs. 20. When testifying in court the applicant indicated that the payment requested from O.V. had been entirely legitimate. He admitted that the conversations that had been surreptitiously recorded had indeed taken place. However, the applicant insisted that the recording had been tampered with and that the portions of the conversations attesting to the legitimacy of the requested payment had been edited out. In respect of the day when the alleged bribe had been paid, he indicated that he had not been in the office when O.V. had arrived. Nevertheless, G.P. had telephoned him and indicated that O.V. was in the office, where he was refusing to accept a copy of the decision suspending the execution of the decision of 28 November 2001 and insisted on talking to the applicant in person. When the applicant arrived at the office he had a conversation with O.V. During that conversation the applicant inquired whether O.V. had made the required advance payment. In response, O.V. produced some banknotes and placed them on the applicant’s desk. The applicant explained that the money had to be paid to G.P., and left O.V. in his office while he went to ask his colleagues for a seal. When the applicant returned to the office he saw that the money had disappeared from the desk and assumed that O.V. had taken it back. The applicant insisted that he had not touched the banknotes in question and said he could only assume that the special dye had appeared on his hands “in some other way”. 21. The first-instance court did not give credence to the applicant’s testimony. It based his conviction on statements by the victim O.V. and ten witnesses. The relevant parts of their statements were as follows. O.V. stated that he had informed the police about the applicant’s attempt to extort a bribe because he did not have enough money to pay that bribe. The police had then performed various undercover operations, specifically the recording of the conversations between the applicant and O.V. and his lawyer S.Ž. On 18 December 2001 O.V. had received from the police LVL 500 in banknotes which had previously been marked. He also had an audio recording device. When O.V. arrived at the office, the applicant was not there. He arrived soon afterwards and went into his office with O.V. According to O.V.’s statement, the applicant took hold of the money, but did not count it, and instead placed it between some books on his desk. 22. S.Ž. testified as a witness and stated that she had been present at meetings when the applicant had directly requested payment of a bribe. After O.V. had reported the attempted extortion of a bribe to the police, the police had performed various undercover operations. 23. A police officer, R.B., testified that O.V. had complained to the police that a bribe had been extorted. In order to check that information and obtain evidence, telephone conversations and conversations between people were recorded. R.B. had handed over the recordings to the officer in charge of the investigation (izziņas izdarītājs). The content of the recordings had not been edited. In the course of an investigative test specially marked banknotes had been given to O.V., who had handed them to the applicant. Two other police officers including V.B., who had been in charge of the investigation, also denied that the recordings of the conversations had been edited. 24. In her witness statement G.P. stated that when O.V. had arrived at the bailiffs’ office on 18 December 2001 the applicant had initially instructed her by telephone to give O.V. a copy of the decision suspending execution of the decision of 28 November 2001 and to receive a payment of LVL 500 from him. However, O.V. had wanted to see the applicant in person and had waited for him to arrive. G.P. considered that there was no legitimate reason to request a payment from R.L., since no costs had actually been incurred or were expected to be incurred in connection with the storage of M.’s property. 25. The first-instance court also took into account a number of documents. One of the documents mentioned in the judgment was “a draft of a decision ... [which] attests that [the applicant], on 19 November 2001, prepared a notification for [R.L.], indicating that the writ would not be executed unless a payment of LVL 500 was made to the bank account of the Riga City Vidzeme District Bailiffs’ Office [to cover] the costs of the storage of the seized property”. 26. The first-instance court also considered a number of procedural documents related to the recording, analysing and transcribing of the applicant’s conversations, the marking of the banknotes issued to O.V., the detection of traces of the special dye on the applicant’s hands, and the search of his office. The recorded conversations were summarised in the judgment by stating that the applicant had requested a payment of LVL 500 to ensure that O.V. could continue to store the seized property. An expert had established that the recordings of the conversations had not been edited. 27. Lastly, the first-instance court concluded that the evidence presented had been “gathered, confirmed [nostiprināti] and verified in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure”, and also that it was sufficient. It did note, however, that during the pre-trial investigation certain procedural documents had been drafted and procedural steps taken which had “various imperfections”. Nevertheless, the court found that, taking into account the body of evidence presented to it as a whole, these “imperfections” became irrelevant. 28. Taking into account the evidence presented to it, the court decided to amend the charges brought against the applicant. The charge of extorting a bribe was accordingly changed to that of demanding a bribe, which was the offence of which the applicant was then found guilty. The sentence imposed consisted of five years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property. 29. On 21 March 2005 the applicant appealed against the judgment of the first-instance court. He emphasised that on 17 and 18 December 2001 it had been O.V. who had insisted on meeting him in person in order to obtain a decision suspending execution. The applicant firstly noted that there were no practical or legal reasons for O.V. to demand such a decision, since the suspension of execution of decisions was an automatic corollary to the lodging of an ancillary complaint and did not require a separate decision. He also stated that it was noteworthy that O.V. could have obtained the decision from G.P. on two occasions, but instead had insisted on meeting the applicant in person. Taking those considerations into account, the applicant concluded that the only motivation for O.V.’s actions was the instructions he had received from the police. The applicant also complained about the first-instance court’s refusal to request the production of documents pertaining to the investigative measures taken in his case (operatīvās darbības lieta). He asked the appeal court to obtain the relevant documents from the police. In respect of the recordings of his conversations, he indicated that the unavailability of proper documentation made it impossible to determine by whom, when and where the conversations had been recorded. Accordingly, the applicant argued that the recordings should not be admissible in evidence. The applicant also disputed the legality of the search of his office, stating that his signature confirming that he had read the decision authorising the search had been forged. 30. The Supreme Court adopted its judgment on 5 January 2006. It quashed the applicant’s conviction for abuse of an official position but upheld the conviction for demanding a bribe. The sanction remained unchanged. 31. Before and during the appeal hearing the applicant and his counsel raised a number of issues pertaining to the legality and admissibility of evidence. As to the plea of incitement the appeal court held that “the testimony of [the applicant] that he was subjected to incitement (pret viņu veikta provokācija) ... is not confirmed by anything and is patent speculation”. As to the evidence used by the first-instance court more generally, the appeal court pointed out that “the examination and assessment of the evidence in the first-instance court was carried out without [sic] observing the requirements of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] while assessing the relevance and admissibility of the evidence”. It was further noted that although the first-instance court had established that certain errors had been committed while procedural documents were drafted and other procedural steps taken, the Supreme Court considered that those errors did not render the evidence in question inadmissible, since the information supported by that evidence was reliable and confirmed by other facts of the case. The appeal court concluded that the procedural defects identified by the first-instance court had not caused that court to adopt an unlawful and unfounded judgment. 32. More specifically, with reference to the recordings of the applicant’s conversations the appeal court examined the police documentation concerning the investigative steps taken, and established the following. On 14 December 2001 the police had issued S.Ž. and O.V. with a dictaphone to record telephone conversations. On 17 December the initiation of an investigative operation was approved (tika apstiprināta operatīvās izstrādes ierosināšana). On 18 December an investigative test was approved in accordance with section 15(3) of the Law on Operational Activities. This was carried out in conformity with the legislation in force at that time. The appeal court further considered that the audio recording of the conversations of 14 December (thus before the operative investigation was initiated) was admissible as evidence, since the recording had been requested by O.V. and S.Ž. in accordance with section 7(6) of the Law on Operational Activities. Similarly the appeal court upheld the first-instance court’s conclusion that the search of the applicant’s office on 18 December 2001 had been authorised by a prosecutor and conducted legally. It emphasised that neither the applicant nor his counsel nor other persons present at the time of the search had expressed any objections. 33. On 9 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which he amended on 14 February. In it he focused, inter alia, on arguments that his conviction had been based on illegally obtained and inadmissible evidence. More specifically he argued that: - the courts had relied on evidence which was obtained on 14 December 2001, namely before a prosecutor had approved an investigative test; - the police had used undercover agents, who had offered him a bribe. This activity had not been supervised in any way; - section 7(6) of the Law on Operational Activities could not serve as a legal basis for recording the conversations of 14 December 2001; - the courts had not assessed whether O.V. and S.Ž. had incited criminal activity. The applicant argued that the incitement and the courts’ refusal to review this issue violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; - the search itself had been illegal, since it had been authorised by a public prosecutor and not by a judge; public prosecutors could authorise searches only in urgent cases. The courts had not assessed whether the specific occasion created such urgency. 34. The applicant’s counsel also submitted an appeal on points of law. This asserted, among other things, that the search of the applicant’s office had been conducted illegally, since it had not been authorised by a judge. 35. The final decision in the applicant’s criminal case was adopted by the Senate of the Supreme Court on 17 March 2006. The Senate dismissed the appeals submitted by the applicant and his counsel. As regards the admissibility of the evidence, the Senate held as follows: “The conversations of [O.V.] and [S.Ž.] were not recorded as part of an undercover operation. The conversations recorded by [O.V. and S.Ž.] themselves and not by a body performing operational activities [nevis operatīvās darbības subjekts], which is why Article 1761 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law on Operational Activities are not applicable to the recordings. Accordingly the [applicant’s] complaint that [the evidence is inadmissible owing to a violation of human rights] is unfounded. As regards the search, from the materials in the case file ... it appears that it was carried out after authorisation by a prosecutor, in conformity with the requirements of the third paragraph of Article 168 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [A] judge was [subsequently] informed in accordance with the procedure and within the time-limit established by law; accordingly, there is no reason to declare this procedural step unlawful.” 36. On 30 April 2004 the applicant requested the State Police to assess the legality and adequacy of the procedural actions performed in the course of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case against him. On 13 May 2004 the applicant was informed that jurisdiction over such questions lay exclusively with the prosecutors’ offices. 37. On 20 June 2005 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General. On 22 July 2005 a reply was given by a prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor General. The reply contained a reference to section 18(2) of the Law on Operational Activities, in accordance with which investigative operational activities could be launched before the initiation of a criminal case. The prosecutor explained that the investigative test had been authorised on 18 December 2001. As regards the recording of the applicant’s conversations, the prosecutor explained that this had been done by O.V., who was a private individual. According to the prosecutor, recording of conversations by a private individual – even if they were recorded by devices supplied by the police – did not constitute an investigative operational activity and consequently no authorisation by a judge or a prosecutor was necessary. Lastly, the prosecutor refused to inform the applicant of specific decisions and dates of decisions taken in the course of implementing operational activities, as “that information may not be used in criminal proceedings, since it has been declared a State secret”. 38. On 15 August 2005 the applicant received a decision on his appeal against the reply he had received on 22 July. The reply was signed by a hierarchically superior prosecutor. In contrast with the previous response, this time a distinction was made between the conversations that had been recorded before and after the approval of the investigative test on 18 December 2001. According to the prosecutor, the Law on Operational Activities was not applicable to recordings of conversations made by private individuals, since the provisions of section 17(3) of that Law did not apply in such a situation. The recordings of the applicant’s conversations made before 18 December were legally permissible for that reason. As regards the recording made on 18 December 2001, it had been carried out in conformity with section 28(1)(2) of the Law on Operational Activities (this provision authorised law-enforcement officers “to create and utilise information systems and technical means [to carry out operational activities] and to record information”). 39. On 29 August 2005 the same prosecutor who had provided the reply of 15 August amended her reply. She clarified that the conversation of 14 December 2001 had been recorded by one of the parties to that conversation and that that had been done “while operational activities were being carried out but not in the course of an investigative operational process”. In any case, the reply indicated that the recording of the applicant’s conversations did not need to be authorised by a judge (the exact wording of the reply appears to relate to the text of the Law on Operational Activities as in force from 1 October 2005 and thus after the completion of the pre-trial investigation and the adoption of the judgment of the first-instance court). 40. The final reply on this subject was given to the applicant by the Prosecutor General on 21 September 2005. The Prosecutor General in substance upheld the lower-level prosecutors’ replies, adding that certain operational activities could be carried out “in a general way” (vispārējā veidā) without officially initiating an investigation (bez operatīvās uzskaites lietas ierosināšanas). Furthermore, those activities could be carried out with the consent of the supervisor of the investigator concerned, which did not have to be given in writing. Lastly, the Prosecutor General pointed out that the decision authorising an investigative test and the outline of that test contained information concerning the organisation and methods of carrying out such operations, and therefore constituted a State secret (see paragraph 49 below), which was, however, accessible to the investigators and judges dealing with the related criminal investigation.

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5. The applicant was born in 1967 and before his conviction lived in the Volgograd Region. 6. On 28 March 2003 the Novoannenskiy District Court of Volgograd (“the District Court”) convicted the applicant of theft and robbery. The applicant was given a suspended sentence of four years’ imprisonment, conditional upon three years’ probation. 7. On 1 December 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and manslaughter. 8. On 3 December 2003 the District Court held that the applicant should be detained on remand. The court held as follows: “The applicant is charged with two crimes, one of which is a grave crime representing a high risk of public danger. [He] had previously been convicted of a grave crime, and had not completed his sentence. All these crimes were committed by [the applicant] in a state of alcoholic intoxication. [The applicant] has no family, does not work, and abuses alcohol. [He] has no means of subsistence, which may result in his committing other crimes. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and the [applicant’s] personality, the court has grounds to believe that if not detained [the applicant] may continue his criminal activity, and abscond from the investigation and the court ...” 9. On 27 December 2003 the pre-trial investigation was completed and charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 161 § 2 and 109 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 10. On 1 January 2004 the Novoannenskiy District Prosecutor (“the District Prosecutor”) approved the bill of indictment. 11. On 18 January 2004 the applicant applied to the District Court seeking to have the custodial measure replaced by an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 12. On 2 February 2004 the District Court, having repeated the reasoning applied on 3 December 2003 and having noted the absence of any grounds for altering the preventive measure, dismissed the applicant’s request. On 6 April 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the decision of 2 February 2004 on appeal. 13. On 17 May 2004 the applicant’s criminal case was sent to the District Court for trial. 14. On 1 June 2004 the District Court scheduled the opening date of the trial and ordered that the preventive measure should remain unchanged. 15. On 15 June 2004 the District Court referred the case to the District Prosecutor in order to enable the applicant, his co-accused and the victims to study the case file. The court further held that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant should remain unchanged. 16. On 28 June 2004 the District Prosecutor resubmitted the case to the District Court for trial. 17. On 12 July 2004 the District Court scheduled the opening date of the trial and held that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant should remain unchanged. 18. On 23 July 2004 the applicant submitted a written waiver of his right to legal representation. 19. On 4 August 2004 the District Court convicted the applicant of robbery and manslaughter and, having taken into account the applicant’s previous sentence of 28 March 2003, sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 20. On 18 January 2005 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 4 August 2004 in so far as the charges of robbery were concerned, upheld the rest of the judgment on appeal and reduced the sentence to four years and one month’s imprisonment. 21. Later the applicant brought proceedings seeking to have his conviction of 4 August 2004 reviewed in the light of newly-discovered circumstances. However, on 25 December 2007 the Regional Court in the final instance dismissed his request. 22. On 11 July 2008 the District Court convicted the applicant of robbery and illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment, conditional upon four years’ probation. 23. The applicant appealed, but later withdrew his appeal. His subsequent attempt to have the judgment reviewed by way of supervisory review was unsuccessful. 24. Following a request from the applicant, on 27 November 2007 the District Court recognised the applicant’s right to inherit after his mother’s death.

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5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Kamna Gorica. 6. The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed and semi-open sections of Ljubljana prison. 7. In the period from 7 June 2009 to 31 August 2009 he was held in the closed section: for five days in cell 117, measuring 17.66 square metres (not including a separate 1.68 square metre sanitary facility) shared with three to five other inmates and with 2.66 to 3.99 square metres of personal space and for eighty-one days in cell 7 measuring 16.7 square metres (not including a separate 1.68 square metre sanitary facility). The Government submitted that in cell 7 the number of prisoners varied between three and five and when there were three prisoners therein the applicant had 5 square metres of personal space. 8. In the period between 1 September 2009 and 12 November 2009 he was held in the semi-open section in cell 137, measuring 17.94 square metres (not including a separate 1.75 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 3.2 to 5.4 square metres of personal space and cell 136, measuring 18.44 square metres (not including a separate 1.78 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 3.3 to 5.6 square metres of personal space. 9. As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the closed and semi-open sections, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011. 10. As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50‑square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (Štrucl and Others § 86). 11. As to the out-of-cell time in the semi-open section, the Government submitted that the cell doors in the semi-open section of the prison were unlocked, except from 9.45 p.m. (on Fridays, Saturdays and before holidays from midnight) until 6.00 a.m. (on Saturdays, Sundays and during holidays until 8.30 a.m.). During this time prisoners could move freely in the corridor (35.7 square metres), living quarters of co-prisoners or in the indoor or outdoor exercise areas, in accordance with prison rules. The Government contended that this regime had been in place for several years. 12. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5- 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

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5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. 6. On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the activities of a criminal gang allegedly organised by V., a high-ranking police officer at the time. The members of the gang were suspected of numerous thefts of goods and foodstuffs from various storage facilities. One of the episodes under investigation was a fraudulent attempt by the members of the gang to sell scrap metal, which belonged to a private company, to a scrap metal processing plant. According to the official version, the attempt to sell the scrap metal was carried out by V., the applicant, who was also a high-ranking police officer at the time, and G., another member of the gang. On an unspecified date in November 2000 V., the applicant and G. met with M., a director of the scrap processing plant, and fraudulently represented to him that the scrap metal belonged to K. and that they were acting on her behalf. M. agreed to purchase the scrap metal and on 23 November 2000 he sent a group of workers to the company’s site in order to have the scrap metal removed. G.’s boyfriend Yer., another member of the gang, was also present at the site at the time. The removal of the scrap metal was interrupted by B., one of the private company’s directors. Yer. phoned G., who told him to go to the police station to notify V. of the incident. Then both Yer. and G. returned to the site to settle the issue with B., who had complained to the police about the attempted theft of the scrap metal. B. also informed Vosh., the company’s managing director, of the incident. Acting in his official capacity, V. assigned the investigation into the attempted theft of scrap metal to Yem., who decided to question M. However, V. interviewed M. himself and brought Yem. M.’s statement. Yem. questioned K., who submitted that she had nothing to do with the removal of the scrap metal from the company’s premises. 7. On 8 May 2002 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody. On 3 December 2002 he was released on bail. 8. On 9 December 2002 the applicant was formally charged with more than ten counts of financial fraud, theft and embezzlement committed in collusion with eight members of the gang. 9. The trial opened in January 2003. At the end of the trial the prosecutor dropped all the charges against the applicant except the attempted theft of scrap metal. 10. The applicant maintained his innocence. The testimony he gave at the trial was summed up as follows in the judgment: “... he has known V. since 1996 due to his service in the Ministry of the Interior[.] They have been friends. Since the late nineties he has known G. too, whom he met from time to time at different places and visited her at her home for work purposes. In the summer of 2000, V. asked ... to take him to the site [where the scrap metal was] in order to meet G. G. asked him and V. to help the buyer of the scrap metal to ensure its safety. He and V. promised to ask one of the police patrol teams to secure the scrap metal. They informed accordingly the buyer who arrived later to inspect the scrap metal. He did not talk to anyone about stealing and selling the scrap metal. He did not conspire with such intent and he did not take part in any negotiations about that. He did not receive any proceeds from the sale of the scrap metal or any advance payment. Nor did he take any measures to conceal the crimes committed by G. She falsely accused him of the involvement in the attempted theft of the scrap metal.” 11. The trial court questioned B., Vosh., and Yem. It further admitted into evidence the statements made by M., Yersh., and K. when questioned by the investigator. As regards witness M., the court noted that he had been away on a business trip and could not attend the court hearing. It considered that this absence amounted to an extraordinary circumstance that would permit the reading-out of his earlier statement. Despite the applicant’s objection, the court dispensed with summoning M. again for questioning and proceeded with the reading-out of his statement. According to the Government, the information concerning M.’s absence was communicated to the court by M.’s wife by telephone. 12. According to the written statement, used by the court, M. stated as follows: “... he has been the General Director of the Steel Company LLC since 1995. It specializes in buying scrap metal from individuals and legal entities in the region. One of the long-term suppliers for his company was [G.]. In the spring of 2000 [G.] proposed being a middle person between the Steel Company LLC and her acquaintances who intended to sell a large quantity of scrap metal. She suggested that [he] meet with those persons to discuss the terms and conditions of the transaction. As was suggested by [G.], at the end of May 2000 he met with those persons at the site where the scrap metal was located ... . He met two men whose names were Aleksandr and Vladimir. They claimed that the scrap metal belonged to them and offered him to buy it. Subsequently, [G.] told him that those men were high ranking police officers ... . During the meeting Aleksandr asked him to make an advance payment for the scrap metal in the amount of RUB 150,000. [He also said] that it was for the Steel Company LLC to saw and dismantle the metal structure. When he asked them to show the documents confirming their title to the scrap metal, Aleksandr and Vladimir “stepped back” and explained that they were also middle men and that the scrap metal belonged to another person. [G.] did not take part in the discussion. He suggested that they could get back to discuss the transaction once they had the necessary documents. Then he left. In mid-November 2000 [G.] contacted him again as regards that scrap metal. She explained that police officers Aleksandr and Vladimir would present all the documents for the scrap metal and that she would draft the purchase contract. Several days later [G.] brought [a draft contract] which indicated that the scrap metal belonged to K. ... . According to [G.], the owner of the scrap metal was at the seaside and would contact him later ... . [G.] convinced him that the transaction was legal as the middle men and “underwriters” were high ranking police officers. He has known [G.] for her good reputation. He trusted her assurances as to the guarantees provided by the police officers and signed the contract. He asked his employees to start sawing the metal structure. Then a criminal investigation was opened. [G.] came to see him and explained that the police officers Aleksandr and Vladimir had set her up and that she had paid each of them RUB 10,000 from the amount his company had paid her for the metal. A day later, Vladimir came to see him. He asked him to make a written statement and said that he would resolve all the problems and that the criminal case would be closed. He responded that he had no problems because all his actions had been in compliance with law.” 13. According to the applicant, the trial court refused to summon K., O. and P., witnesses for the defence. 14. On 14 June 2005 the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy Town Court found the applicant guilty of an attempted theft of scrap metal. The applicant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. 15. The Town Court’s findings as regards the applicant’s guilt were based on the testimonies of B., Vosh. and Yem., who were questioned during the trial. The court also referred to the statements given by K. and Yer. during the pre-trial investigation. Lastly, it relied on the statement made by M. during the pre-trial investigation. 16. The text of the judgment remained silent as to G.’s testimony regarding the attempted theft of the scrap metal. It was indicated that she had pleaded guilty to that charge. 17. Lastly, the trial court examined and admitted as evidence the following documents: (1) B.’s complaint to the police about the attempted theft of the scrap metal; (2) his company’s financial statements; (3) a contract for removal of the scrap metal signed by G. and M.; (4) G.’s telephone records; (5) M.’s statements recorded by V. and (6) the police order appointing V. to the post of the head of the police station. 18. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 14 June 2005. He complained, inter alia, about M.’s non‑attendance. 19. On 27 September 2005 the Kamchatka Regional Court upheld, in substance, the applicant’s conviction but reduced his sentence to four years’ imprisonment.

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5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1983 respectively and live in Moscow. Both applicants are political activists and opposition leaders. The first applicant is also a well-known anti-corruption campaigner and a popular blogger. The second applicant is a leader of the political movement “Solidarnost”. 6. On 4 December 2011 general elections of the State Duma took place in Russia. 7. On 5 December 2011 the applicants took part in a public demonstration (a meeting) at Chistyye Prudy, Moscow, to protest against the allegedly rigged elections. The demonstration had been duly authorised by the mayor of Moscow. The number of participants at the meeting was estimated between 5,000 and 10,000. During the meeting, conducted by the second applicant, the first applicant addressed the participants with a speech calling for fresh, fair elections and describing United Russia, the election frontrunner, as “a party of crooks and thieves”. 8. After the demonstration the applicants were arrested. The parties disagreed as to the circumstance of their arrest, and their respective submissions are summarised below. 9. The applicants claimed that at the end of the meeting they had headed, with other people, towards the Kuznetskiy Most metro station, where the first applicant had left his car. They were walking along the pavement, leaving the road clear for traffic. Suddenly their way was blocked by the riot police (сотрудники внутренних войск и OMOН). Without any introduction or demand, the police surrounded a group of about one hundred protesters, including the applicants, pressing them against a building. The surrounded group chanted “One for all, and all for one!”. The riot police then began to arrest the protesters. According to the applicants, no one put up any resistance. They obeyed the police and followed them to the police bus. 10. According to the Government, at the end of the meeting the second applicant called on the participants to march down Myasnitskaya Street onto Lubyanskaya Square and then to the office of the Central Electoral Commission. At 8.30. p.m. about sixty people, including the applicants, began walking down Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, Bolshaya Lubyanka Street and Rozhdestvenka Street. They walked along the road, obstructing the traffic and chanting slogans such as “This is our city!” and “Down with the police state!” At the crossroads of Pushechnaya and Rozhdestvenka Streets the police blocked the march and ordered the marchers to stop. They pushed thought the cordon and went on until they were stopped by the police again at 2 Teatralnyy Proyezd. They ignored the repeated demands of the police to stop and thereby prevented the police from carrying out their mission of securing public order. Confronted with this persistent behaviour, the police arrested the applicants. 11. Both applicants were arrested at about 8.45 p.m. and were taken to a police bus. 12. At about 9.40 p.m. the applicants were taken to the Severnoye Izmaylovo District police station, Moscow. At 11.40 p.m. the first applicant was subjected to a body search, which lasted until 12.15 a.m. His personal affairs, including his mobile phone, barrister licence, watch, money, credit cards, driving licence and some items of clothing were seized. The second applicant was searched as well, and his mobile phone, belt, watch, whistle and a badge reading “Against the Party of Crooks and Thieves” were seized. The list of the seized objects was recorded in the search report. The applicants have been unable to retrieve them, although those objects were not attached to the case file. 13. The applicants requested that their lawyers, who had arrived at the police station and had presented their authority, be allowed to see them, but their request was refused. The applicants were not allowed to make a phone call to their families either. 14. Both applicants lodged complaints at the police station alleging that their rights had been violated during their arrest and detention. 15. At about 12.45 a.m. on 6 December 2011 the applicants were transferred from Severnoye Izmaylovo police station to the Vostochnyy District police station, Moscow, where they arrived at about 1.45 a.m. on the same day. They requested to see a lawyer and to make a phone call, but this was refused again. The first applicant lodged a complaint about the refusal. 16. At 2.30 a.m. on the same night, the applicants were transferred to the Kitay-Gorod District police station, where police reports were drawn up stating that the applicants had been escorted to the police station in accordance with Article 27.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. At 2.40 a.m. further police reports were drawn up in which it was decided to remand the applicants in custody under Article 27.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicants were charged with an administrative offence for refusing to comply with a lawful order of the police, in breach of Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The charges were based on the identical statements of two police officers, I. and F., who alleged that they had ordered the applicants to follow them to the police bus to give statements on the administrative offence but that the applicants had pushed them away and had therefore been arrested. 17. At the Kitay-Gorod police station the applicants requested permission to see their lawyers and to telephone their families, but their requests were refused. 18. The first applicant remained in custody at the police station until 3 p.m. on 6 December 2011, and the second applicant until 10 a.m. on that day. 19. The applicants claimed that the conditions of detention during their transfer between the police stations and in the cell at the Kitay-Gorod police station were inhuman and degrading. In particular, they claimed that they had spent six hours being driven to different police stations without being given any food or drinking water. At the Kitay-Gorod police station they were placed together in a cell measuring about 6 sq. m with concrete walls, a metal grill, a concrete floor, no windows and no furniture except for two narrow wooden benches. The cell was poorly lit and had no ventilation. There was no sanitary equipment, beds or bedding. The applicants did not receive any food or water until later on 6 December 2011 when they were allowed to receive a parcel from their families containing drinking water and crackers; no other food was allowed in the parcels. 20. The Government submitted that the applicants had spent about one hour in transit to the Vostochnyy District police station and then about forty-five minutes in transit to the Kitay-Gorod police station, which was not long enough to require the provision of meals. According to the Government, the applicants were detained at the Kitay-Gorod police station in an administrative-detention cell measuring 12.3 sq. m equipped with artificial lighting and mandatory ventilation. They claimed that the applicants had been provided with a sleeping place – a wooden bench – and bedding, which they had refused. They provided a photograph of the cell with a metal grill, a close-up photograph of the bench, showing with a measuring tape its width of 47 cm, and another photograph showing the same bench covered with a blanket and with a pillow placed on it. The Government further contended that the cells had to be cleaned and disinfected twice a day and that pest control had to be carried out once every three months, in accordance with the cleaning service agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and a private company. The Government provided a copy of the service agreement in support of that statement. They alleged that the applicants had not complained about the conditions of their detention. According to the Government, the applicants had been offered food at the Kitay-Gorod police station, but had refused to take it. 21. On 6 December 2011 the applicants were brought before the Justice of the Peace to have their charges examined in administrative proceedings. They met their counsels for the first time shortly before the hearing. The case of the second applicant was examined first, and then the case of the first applicant. 22. The administrative case was examined by the acting Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 370 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow, Ms B. At the beginning of the hearing the second applicant challenged the judge on the grounds that she had previously found him guilty of an administrative offence and sentenced him to five days’ administrative detention. After that conviction the second applicant had lodged numerous complaints about Ms B. and had campaigned against her in his online blogs. The Justice of the Peace dismissed the challenge against her. 23. The second applicant requested leave to call and examine five witnesses, including I. and F., the police officers who had drawn up the arrest reports; K., the on-duty police officer at the Kitay-Gorod police station; Mr B., a fellow activist; and the first applicant. The request was granted in respect of I., F. and B. 24. The second applicant complained of unlawful detention during the first six hours after his arrest, poor conditions of detention at the Kitay‑Gorod police station and the acts and omissions of the officials at the Severnoye Izmaylovo police station. However, those complaints were not examined. 25. The Justice of the Peace questioned the witnesses. Police officers I. and F. stated that after the public meeting the second applicant had participated, together with some sixty people, in an unauthorised march from Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, through Bolshaya Lubyanka Street, Kuznetskiy Most Street and down Rozhdestvenka Street. The marchers had been obstructing the traffic, chanting slogans and ignoring police orders made on a loudspeaker to stop the march. They (I. and F.) had required the second applicant to follow them to the police bus in order to draw up a report on the administrative offence, but he had ignored them, so they had seized him by the arms; he had resisted, refusing to present his documents and calling out to the crowd. 26. The second applicant pleaded not guilty and contested the police officers’ testimonies. He testified that he had been arrested at the indicated address while walking alongside other people returning from the authorised meeting. He insisted that he had been arrested without any warning or orders from the police. 27. Witness B. testified that he “had been present during Mr Yashin’s arrest” and that “the policemen had not given Mr Yashin any orders before arresting him”. 28. On the same day the Justice of the Peace found the second applicant guilty of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police. She based her findings on the witness statements of I. and F., their written reports and the report on the administrative arrest. She dismissed the testimonies given by the second applicant and B. on the grounds that they had contradicted the police officers’ testimonies and reports. The second applicant was convicted under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 29. The first applicant’s case was examined after the second applicant’s trial by the same Justice of the Peace, Ms B. In the interval between the two hearings the first applicant’s counsel was able briefly to access the case file of the second applicant and meet the first applicant for the first time. 30. According to the applicants, the proceedings in the first applicant’s case began in the absence of members of the public, who were prevented from entering the hearing room. Many were barred from approaching the courthouse, which was cordoned off by the police. Later, during the proceedings, eight journalists were allowed in at the first applicant’s insistent requests. The Government contended, on the contrary, that the proceedings in this case had been open to the public. 31. At the beginning of the trial the first applicant requested that the case be transferred, in accordance with the statutory rules, to a court at his place of residence; that the hearing be adjourned in order to give him time to prepare his defence; that the verbatim records of the hearing be kept open; that copies of the complaints that he had lodged at the police stations the previous night be made available to him; and that five eyewitnesses of his arrest, including the second applicant, be called and examined. 32. The Justice of the Peace dismissed all of the requests, except one: that T. and A. be called as witnesses. The first applicant then challenged the Justice of the Peace, unsuccessfully. 33. I. and F. gave testimonies identical to those they had given in the second applicant’s case. The Justice of the Peace disallowed the following questions to I. and F put by the defence counsel: “What orders did you personally give to Mr Navalnyy?”, “Who gave the order to arrest Mr Navalnyy?” and “Why were two policemen’s reports identical?” 34. The first applicant pleaded not guilty and contested the police officers’ testimonies. He testified that he had been returning from the authorised meeting, walking, together with other people, not marching or chanting any slogans. However, the police had repeatedly obstructed their way and had then arrested them. He insisted that he had not received any orders from the police and had not resisted the arrest. 35. Witness T. testified that he had seen the applicant’s arrest. It had been noisy and he had not heard the police officers giving the first applicant any orders before arresting him. The police had announced through a loudspeaker “Your actions are unlawful” while surrounding a group of people, and had then begun arresting them. He had not seen the first applicant resisting the arrest. Witness A. testified that he had been walking down Teatralnyy Proyezd and had seen people in uniform arresting the first applicant on the pavement; during the arrest the police had announced through a loudspeaker “Your actions are unlawful”; witness A. had not seen the first applicant resisting the police during the arrest. 36. The first applicant requested that two video recordings of his arrest, shot by T. and A., be admitted as evidence. He also requested that the court obtain and examine the video footage which the police had at their disposal. Those requests were dismissed on the grounds that the court had no technical means of playing the recordings and that it would be unacceptable to use the devices provided by the defence. Those requests were not joined to the case file on the grounds that they had been submitted at the wrong stage of the proceedings. 37. According to the first applicant, most of the questions put by the defence to the witnesses were disallowed by the Justice of the Peace. She also refused to entertain his complaints concerning the lack of access to a lawyer, the refusal of a statutory phone call after the arrest, the allegedly unlawful detention during the first six hours after the arrest, the seizure of his possessions during the search, and the inhuman and degrading conditions of transfer and of detention at the Kitay-Gorod police station. 38. On the same day the Justice of the Peace found the first applicant guilty of having disobeyed the lawful order of the police. As in the second applicant’s case, she based her findings on the witness statements of I. and F., their written reports and the report on the administrative arrest. She dismissed the testimonies of the applicant, A. and T. on the grounds that they had contradicted the police officers’ testimonies and reports, and that no reasons for mistrusting the latter had been established. The first applicant was convicted under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 39. On 6 December 2011 both applicants lodged appeals, claiming that their arrest and conviction for the administrative offence had been in breach of domestic law and in violation of the Convention. They contested the findings of fact made by the first instance as regards the events following their departure from the authorised meeting. In addition, they complained about the manner in which the first-instance hearing had been conducted, in particular, about the refusal of the Justice of the Peace to grant their requests, to admit the video materials as evidence and to call all the witnesses requested by the defence. They also challenged the grounds on which the court had dismissed the testimonies of the applicants and the defence witnesses. The applicants also complained of unlawful detention during the first six hours after their arrest, lack of access to a lawyer and the conditions in which they had been transferred between the police stations and remanded in custody at the Kitay-Gorod police station. 40. On 7 December 2011 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow examined the applicants’ appeals in separate proceedings. In both cases the court dismissed the complaints about the refusals to hear witnesses and to admit the evidence requested by the applicants. It also rejected the applicants’ requests to have those witnesses called. It rejected the request to admit the video recordings in evidence because of their “unknown provenance”, and it refused to keep a verbatim record of the hearing because it considered it unnecessary. It granted the request to join a photograph of the first applicant’s arrest to the case file. On the same day the Tverskoy District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the first-instance judgment in both cases, citing the same reasons. 41. In the first applicant’s case the court held, in particular: “The Justice of the Peace has correctly established that Mr Navalnyy had disobeyed a lawful order of a police officer ..., in particular: at 8.45 p.m. on 5 December 2011 at 2 Teatralnyy Proyezd, Moscow (near Metropol hotel), after an authorised public event (meeting), in a park of Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, he participated with a group of about 60 people in a march that had not been notified to the executive authorities, went out on the road and continued walking from Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, down the side streets to Bolshaya Lubyanka Street, Kuznetskiy Most Street, and Rozhdestvenka Street in the direction of Red Square; by doing so he obstructed the traffic and created a risk of accident while shouting out “Shame!”, “This is our city!”, “Russia without Putin!”, “Down with the police state!”. In order to intercept the march a [police] cordon was set up at the crossroads of Pushechnaya and Rozhdestvenka Streets. Repeated lawful orders to stop and end the march were given through a loudspeaker; despite that, Mr Navalnyy with a group of people pushed through the cordon and came out onto Teatralnyy Proyezd while continuing to chant slogans, and there they were met by the police cordon. [He] did not react to the repeated lawful orders to stop these acts and disperse, continued his unlawful acts drawing the attention of citizens and the press. During his arrest Mr Navalnyy, in reply to an invitation to proceed to the police bus for the issuing of an administrative offence report, began to push away [I.] and [F.], trying to cause panic among people, and by doing so [he] manifested his refusal to comply with the lawful orders of the police and prevented them from carrying out their duties, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. ... Despite his denial, Mr Navalnyy’s guilt is proven by the report on the administrative charges ..., the statements of the police officers [I.] and [F.] [and] their testimonies given to the Justice of the Peace at the court hearing. The Justice of the Peace gave a correct and convincing assessment of this evidence, which led to the conclusion that Mr Navalnyy had deliberately refused to comply with the police officers’ lawful order to stop his actions breaching public order, and continued them in defiance of [the police order]. This evidence, which is relevant, admissible and credible, is consistent. No bias on the part of the aforementioned witnesses or grounds for them to slander Mr Navalnyy have been established [by the court], including the appeal instance; therefore the explanations of Mr Navalnyy, as well and the witness testimonies of A. and T., have been duly rejected for want of reliable corroboration; the ruling of the Justice of the Peace is sufficiently reasoned in this respect. ... ... As follows from the [escorting report] and the [detention report], the [police] had sufficient grounds for arresting Mr Navalnyy and for escorting him to the Kitay‑Gorod police station, Moscow, in particular, the impossibility of drawing up an administrative offence report on the spot. The reports comply with the requirements of the law, in substance and in form. At the same time the court dismisses the arguments of the defence concerning the unlawful deprivation of liberty during six hours as unsubstantiated. As follows from the case file, after his arrest at Teatralnyy Proyezd, at 2.30 a.m. on 6 December 2011 Mr Navalnyy was taken to the Kitay-Gorod police station, Moscow, where the administrative material against him was issued. On 6 December 2011 the administrative case was remitted to the Justice of the Peace. The police officers have complied with the terms of administrative detention provided for by Article 27.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences. ... During the [appeal] hearing ... Mr Yashin was examined as a witness. He testified that at the time of Mr Navalnyy’s arrest he had been with him at Teatralnaya Square. At the time of arrest [they] were on the pavement near the underpass, and did not commit any unlawful acts. About 100 people were blocked by the riot police. Then both Mr Navalnyy and Mr Yashin were arrested, virtually simultaneously. At this point the police officers did not give any orders, there was no disobedience on the part of [the applicants]. The police officers [I.] and [F.] did not take part in their arrest; their court testimonies were false. Giving its assessment of the witness testimony of Mr Yashin, the court finds it unreliable and dismisses it because it contradicts the testimonies of [I.] and [F.], which are logical, consistent, concordant and objectively corroborated by the written evidence ...” 42. The judgment held in the second applicant’s case was essentially the same, including the similar testimonies of the other applicant.

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5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Zagreb. 6. By a judgment of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) of 4 July 2005, upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 15 October 2008, the applicant was sentenced to one year and seven months’ imprisonment on charges of drug abuse. 7. Basing its judgment on the applicant’s convictions by the Zagreb County Court of 12 December 2006 and the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court of 19 February 2007 on charges of robbery and drug abuse, on 17 July 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) sentenced the applicant to a single prison term of one year and three months. 8. On 2 September 2010 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court took into account the above convictions and sentenced the applicant to a single prison term of two years and eight months. 9. The applicant started to serve his prison sentence, which had originally been imposed by the Zagreb County Court on 4 July 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), in Bjelovar Prison (Zatvor u Bjelovaru) on 22 March 2010. 10. Following a request by the Bjelovar Prison administration of 17 December 2010 and a decision by the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo pravosuđa, Uprava za zatvorski sustav) of 30 December 2010 the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison (Zatvor u Zagrebu) on 5 January 2011. 11. During his stay in Bjelovar Prison the applicant was accommodated in four different cells. 12. According to the applicant, three of the cells measured 17.13 square metres, including the sanitary facilities, and he had shared those cells with seven other persons (cell no. 5 between 22 March and 4 August 2010); four other persons (cell no. 4 between 4 and 10 August 2010); and five other persons (cell no. 1 from 3 September 2010 until 5 January 2011). The fourth cell, no. 11, measured 6.24 square metres and he had had to share it with one other person between 10 August and 3 September 2010. Those cells had open sanitary facilities, were dirty and did not have sufficient lockers for all inmates. Moreover, he had not been provided with sufficient medical care, which had caused him additional distress. 13. According to the Government, during his stay in Bjelovar Prison the applicant had on average 3.46 square metres of personal space. In particular, he stayed in cell no. 5/I, measuring 21.75 square metres, for 141 days with four to seven other persons. He then spent twenty-two days in cell no. 11/1, measuring 9.72 square metres, together with one other person. He was then placed in cell no. 1/O, measuring 19.7 square metres, where he stayed for 125 days; and cell no. 4/O, measuring 22.36 square metres, where he spent two days. The Government did not provide information about the exact number of inmates placed together with the applicant in the two latter cells. 14. The Government also submitted that cells nos. 5/I, 1/O and 4/O had toilets that were completely separated from the living area, and that the toilets were equipped with their own ventilation systems. In cell no. 11/1 the toilet was separated from the living area by a wall measuring 168 centimetres in height and the cell had its own ventilation system. All the cells had installations providing access to drinking water, and all had windows allowing access to daylight and fresh air. During the winter, the cells were heated through a central heating system. They were constantly maintained and in 2007, 2009 and 2010 the necessary refurbishment and improvement of the prison facilities was carried out, which the Government substantiated with photographs. 15. The Government also explained that for three hours per day, between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. the applicant had been allowed to circulate freely outside his cell. In addition, he had had the opportunity to use a gym, which had been open from 8 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m., and a basketball court, which had been open on working days from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. and at weekends both in the morning and in the afternoon. The prison was equipped with a badminton court, table-tennis tables and chess boards, which the applicant had also been able to use. He could also have borrowed books from Bjelovar library, which provided its services to the prison, and he had been allowed to watch television and to borrow films. 16. As to the applicant’s medical care, the Government submitted that on 17 February 2010, before his transfer to Bjelovar Prison, the applicant had claimed that he had no serious health issues. He had confirmed this when examined by a doctor in Bjelovar Prison on 1 June 2010. On 29 September 2010, at his request, the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist, to whom he complained of problems with sleeping but refused to accept any treatment. On 5 October 2010 the applicant again refused to accept treatment. During his stay in Bjelovar Prison the applicant was provided with dental treatment eight times and examined by a prison doctor six times. In support of their arguments, the Government provided the applicant’s relevant medical records. 17. On 14 September 2010 the applicant complained to the Government’s Office for Human Rights (Ured za ljudska prava Vlade Republike Hrvatske) about the conditions of his detention. He alleged in particular that Bjelovar Prison had been overcrowded, that the cells had been dirty and poorly ventilated, that they had not been appropriately equipped, and that the medical treatment had been inadequate. The applicant’s complaint was forwarded to the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice, as the body competent to deal with the matter. 18. On the same day, citing the inadequate conditions of his detention, the applicant invited the Bjelovar Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Bjelovaru) to make a friendly settlement agreement before he lodged a civil action with the competent court. 19. On 21 September 2010 the applicant complained to a sentence-execution judge of the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru, sudac izvršenja) about the conditions of his detention, reiterating his arguments. 20. On 10 December 2010 the Bjelovar Municipal State Attorney’s Office declined the applicant’s request for a friendly settlement on the grounds that it had not found any violation of his rights concerning the conditions of his detention. 21. On 11 October 2010 the sentence-execution judge of the Bjelovar County Court dismissed the applicant’s complaints as ill-founded. She explained that the information received from Bjelovar Prison did not suggest that the applicant had been placed in overcrowded cells, and that, as regards the general conditions of Bjelovar Prison, she had herself visited the prison facilities and had found that in general they had not been inappropriate. She also emphasised that every cell had a sanitary facility which was clean and well maintained, and the cells were equipped with fresh water taps. The judge also emphasised that the applicant had been examined by a dentist several times and had also been provided with psychiatric care. Lastly, the judge pointed out that the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to practise sport and free access to outdoor areas. 22. The applicant appealed against that decision to a three-judge panel of the Bjelovar County Court on 18 October 2010. 23. On 21 October 2010 the three-judge panel of the Bjelovar County Court examined the applicant’s appeal and, endorsing the reasoning of the sentence-execution judge, considered that in essence the applicant’s rights had not been breached. 24. On 5 November 2010 the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice replied to the applicant in respect of his complaints of 14 September 2010 (see paragraph 17 above). It explained that during his stay in Bjelovar Prison he had been placed in four cells: nos. 5/1, 4/0, 2/0 and 1/0, which had measured 21.2 square metres, 19.8 square metres, 6.3 square metres and 17.2 square metres. It did not specify any further details. It accepted that there had been an issue of overcrowdings in general, but said that any problem in that regard had been compensated for by allowing inmates freedom of movement and the opportunity to participate in daily activities. Furthermore, it argued that the Bjelovar Prison facilities had been regularly maintained and renovated, notably in 2008 and 2009. The inmates were provided with sufficient outdoor exercise, namely a variety of sports activities and free access to outdoor areas for three hours per day, between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. In addition, it emphasised that the applicant had been examined by the prison doctor six times, by a psychiatrist once and by a dentist eight times. 25. On 9 November 2011 the applicant complained to the Bjelovar County Court about the decision of its three-judge panel of 21 October 2010 (see paragraph 23 above). 26. On 22 November 2011 the applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), relying on Article 14 § 2 (equality before the law), Article 26 (equality before the State authorities) and Article 29 (right to a fair trial) of the Constitution, and complaining of inadequate medical treatment and lack of personal space in Bjelovar Prison, as well as discrimination following the alleged misinterpretation of the relevant law by the Bjelovar County Court. 27. On 30 December 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Bjelovar Prison administration to continue with his education while serving his prison sentence. 28. On 5 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads: “In his constitutional complaint, the appellant was unable to show that the Bjelovar County Court had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue of the complainant’s constitutional rights. Thus, there is no constitutional law issue in the case for the Constitutional Court to decide on.” 29. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 20 June 2012.

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5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Bibinje. 6. On 6 July 2009 the Zadar County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zadru; hereinafter: the “State Attorney’s Office”) indicted the applicant in the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru) on charges of continuous offences of rape and indecent behaviour against a child. 7. During the proceedings the applicant denied the charges, arguing that he knew the victim and her family, who lived nearby, but had never engaged in any sexual or indecent behaviour with her. 8. On 23 April 2010 the Zadar County Court found the applicant guilty on three counts of rape, one count of sexual intercourse with a child and one count of indecent behaviour, and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. The trial bench found that the evidence of several witnesses and expert reports confirmed the victim’s accusations against the applicant, and that the charges brought against him should be classified not as a continuous offence but as cumulative offences of rape, sexual intercourse with a child and indecent behaviour. 9. On 28 May 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first‑instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the factual and legal grounds for his conviction and sentence, and complaining of numerous substantive and procedural flaws in the trial and the judgment. In particular, he argued that he had not had an opportunity to effectively challenge the victim and witnesses during the trial, that a psychologist expert report had not been properly drafted, that the judgment lacked the relevant reasoning, and that the trial bench had erred in the legal classification of the acts at issue and in its factual findings, leaving some crucial facts undetermined. He thus requested that the first-instance judgment be quashed and the case be remitted for a retrial. He also asked that he and his lawyer be invited to the hearing before the Supreme Court. 10. During the appeal proceedings the case file was forwarded to the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske), which submitted in its reasoned opinion that the appeal be dismissed. That submission was never forwarded to the defence. 11. On 12 May 2011 the Supreme Court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer and the Deputy State Attorney, holding that the applicant’s presence was not necessary. During the hearing, the Deputy State Attorney reiterated her reasoned opinion. The applicant’s lawyer complained that there had been a breach of procedure. 12. On the same day the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded, reversing the legal classification of the cumulative offences to one continuous act of sexual intercourse with a child, and sentencing the applicant to twelve years’ imprisonment. 13. On 4 July 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). Relying on the Court’s case-law, he complained, inter alia, that during the appeal proceedings the submission of the State Attorney’s Office had never been communicated to the defence and that he had not been given an opportunity to be present at the appeal hearing. The Supreme Court had been invited to examine all the legal and factual aspects of the case, which should not have been done without his presence at the hearing. He also stressed that the defence had not learned about the submission of the State Attorney’s Office until the appeal hearing, and thus had been deprived of an effective opportunity to reply to it. 14. On 10 November 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as ill-founded, holding that there had been no reason, nor requirement in terms of the relevant domestic law, to forward the submission of the State Attorney’s Office to the defence. As to the applicant’s absence from the appeal hearing, the Constitutional Court noted: “... [T]he Supreme Court examined the appellant’s appeal in the presence of his defence lawyer, who had been invited to the hearing. The Supreme Court partially accepted the appeal and reduced the sentence. Therefore its decision was not to [the appellant’s] detriment. Thus the Constitutional Court finds that the Supreme Court correctly decided not to ensure the appellant’s presence at the appeal hearing.” 15. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 23 November 2011. 16. During the criminal proceedings against him in the Zadar County Court, the applicant was initially remanded in custody in Zadar Prison (Zatvor u Zadru). 17. On 6 September 2010, because of a problem of overcrowding in Zadar Prison, the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo pravosuđa Uprava za zatvorski sustav) ordered that the applicant be transferred to Pula Prison (Zatvor u Puli). He was transferred on 10 September 2010 and remained in detention on remand in that prison until 25 August 2011 (see paragraph 30 below). 18. According to the applicant, during his stay in Pula Prison he was placed in a cell measuring in total 23.5 square metres, sometimes with five other persons but for most of the time with seven other persons. The cell was equipped with eight beds and eight cupboards, which, given the number of persons, prevented any normal circulation in the cell. He was locked up in such circumstances for twenty-two hours a day. In the winter the heating in the cell was not sufficient and in the summer it was too hot, so that the prisoners, who were allowed to take a shower only once a week, smelt unbearable. The hygiene conditions were poor, as inmates were not provided with sufficient cleaning products and some also smoked in the cell. In addition, food in the canteen often went bad because the refrigerators did not work well. There was only one toilet in the cell, which was not sufficient for eight persons. The applicant therefore had to use a bottle or some other means instead of using the toilet, because the drugs he had been taking for high blood pressure meant that he needed to use the toilet frequently. That caused laughter and mocking among the other prisoners. Moreover, he was distanced from his family. At the beginning, he was allowed only a ten‑minute telephone call with his family per week; later, he had the right to only a fifteen-minute call per week. 19. The Government submitted that the applicant had been placed in a cell measuring in total 23.5 square metres with five to seven other persons, depending on the period at issue. The cell toilet, which the applicant had been able to use at any time, had been separated from the living area. The cell had been appropriately heated and air-conditioned. In addition, it had allowed access to daylight. The hygiene conditions had been very good and Pula Prison had been regularly treated against insects and rodents. The dining area had been separated from the living facilities and the applicant had had the opportunity to buy products from the prison canteen. He had also had the possibility to take two hours’ walk per day in the fresh air and to practise sport activities. The applicant had been allowed to telephone his wife, first for ten minutes per week, and then for fifteen minutes per week. During his stay in Pula Prison the applicant had been provided with full medical care. In particular, he had been examined by a dermatologist on 18 January 2011, by a surgeon on 28 January 2011, by an internist and a specialist in neurology on 17 February and 7 March 2011, and by a psychiatrist on 1 December 2012. 20. On 29 September 2010 the applicant complained to the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice, the governor of Pula Prison, and the sentence-execution judge of the Pula County Court (Županijski sud u Puli) about the manner in which he had been transferred and admitted to Pula Prison and the conditions of his detention in that prison. In particular, he alleged that during the transfer he had been threatened with being shot and had not been medically examined upon arrival in Pula Prison. He also complained that he had been placed in a cell with seven other persons and that the hygiene conditions in the cell had been very poor. He stressed that by his transfer to Pula Prison he had been distanced from his family. 21. On 28 October 2010 the Pula County Court obtained a report from the Pula Prison administration concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention. According to the report, Pula Prison had no information about the applicant’s transfer, which had been organised by the Zadar Prison administration. As to the applicant’s admission to Pula Prison, it was true that he had not been examined by a doctor on the day of his admission but only on the next working day, and that he had not been provided with treatment during the weekend of his admission. However, at that time the Pula Prison administration had not yet received the applicant’s medical documentation, so they had not known about his medical condition and he had not complained about any health problems. The Pula Prison administration also reported that the applicant had been placed in a cell measuring approximately 22 square metres with seven other persons. According to the report, that was contrary to the required standards, but the prison was in any event overcrowded, so it could not be changed. 22. On 17 November 2010 the president of the Pula County Court informed the applicant’s representative by letter about the Pula Prison administration’s report of 28 October 2010, and stated that his complaint had been forwarded to the Zadar County Court because the proceedings were pending before that court. 23. On 26 November 2010 the Zadar County Court requested the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice to transfer the applicant back to Zadar Prison as soon as practicable. 24. On 9 December 2010 the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant’s representative by letter that it considered the applicant’s complaints ill-founded in any respect. It stressed that the applicant had refused any medical examination and had undergone treatment just before his transfer to Pula Prison. Upon his arrival at Pula Prison he had not asked to be medically examined. Furthermore, the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice considered that there had been nothing unlawful in warning the applicant that firearms could be used if he attempted to escape during the transfer. It also considered that the hygiene conditions in Pula Prison were good, although it made no reference to the complaint about overcrowding. 25. On 24 January 2011 the applicant again asked the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice and the governor of Pula Prison to be transferred to Zadar Prison. 26. On 28 January 2011 the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that it was not possible to transfer him to any other prison because of the general problem of prison overcrowding. 27. On 2 April 2011 the applicant complained to the Ombudsman (Pučki pravobranitelj) about the conditions of his detention, and the Ombudsman requested that the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice inform him about the circumstances of the case. 28. On 26 June 2011 the Ombudsman expressed his concerns to the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice concerning the applicant’s transfer to Pula Prison from Zadar Prison, since the relevant information showed that Pula Prison was more overcrowded than Zadar Prison. On 24 August 2011 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that there was a problem of prison overcrowding and that nothing further could be done concerning his complaints. 29. In the meantime, on 4 July 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court about the conditions of his detention, and challenged the fairness of the criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 13 above). 30. On 25 August 2011 the applicant was transferred from Pula Prison to Zagreb Prison (Zatvor u Zagrebu), where he started to serve his prison sentence. 31. On 10 November 2011, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint that the criminal proceedings had been unfair (see paragraph 14 above) and declared the applicant’s complaint about the conditions of his detention in Pula Prison inadmissible on the grounds that he was no longer being held in Pula Prison.

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6. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in County Antrim. 7. On 6 January 1996 the applicant’s son, Mr James McDonnell, was remanded in custody to Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast. Since that prison had to close, all prisoners were to be transferred on 30 March 1996 to HMP Maghaberry. 8. On the morning of 30 March and prior to his transfer, Mr McDonnell was informed that his father had died suddenly during the night. Upon hearing the news, the applicant asked to be moved to a single cell. At 10.50 a.m. he was transferred to HMP Maghaberry. His cell was not ready on arrival so he waited in the recreation area. When a prisoner officer informed him that he would share a cell, Mr McDonnell said that he would wreck it. A principal officer was informed. 9. At 12.15 p.m. Mr McDonnell was informed his cell was ready and he said that he would hit the first prisoner who came into it. The principal officer was informed. 10. At 2.10 p.m. another prisoner, with two prison officers, arrived to share the cell. Mr McDonnell said that he wanted to be left alone. He left the cell and announced that he was going to the Punishment and Segregation Unit (“PSU”). There was then a scuffle between several prison officers and Mr McDonnell, which resulted in his being wrestled to the ground and physically restrained. He was brought to a standing position and, while still restrained, was taken to the PSU at approximately 2.20 p.m. A body search was carried out at the PSU with his consent. He was also examined by a medical officer, who noted that he had suffered bruising and grazing and was experiencing discomfort in his chest. The medical officer left at approximately 2.30 p.m. Statements later taken from prison officers and prisoners diverged as regards, inter alia, the circumstances of the incident, the level of restraint used and whether Mr McDonnell had been beaten. 11. At 3.45 p.m. on the same day Mr McDonnell was found unconscious in his cell in the PSU having suffered a heart attack. A number of unsuccessful attempts were made to resuscitate him. He was declared dead at 4.15 p.m. 12. On 30 March 1996 the first autopsy was conducted by Professor Crane, the State Pathologist for Northern Ireland. Professor Crane noted that Mr McDonnell had suffered a fracture to the hyoid bone in the neck, consistent with being grasped by a hand, and that it appeared that Mr McDonnell had suffered a heart attack some 12-24 hours prior to his death. He found that: “[the earlier heart attack] ... could ... have precipitated a fatal upset in the heart rhythm at any time ... [T]he possibility that the stress of the incident shortly before his death played some part in the fatal outcome cannot be completely excluded.” 13. Professor Crane’s report was sent to the Coroner in April 1997. (b) Professor Vanezis 14. A further autopsy was carried out on 2 April 1996 by Professor Vanezis. Professor Vanezis reported that Mr McDonnell’s thyroid cartilage was also fractured and that there was bruising to the area. He could not exclude that stress suffered while being restrained had contributed to the cause of death. 15. An initial copy of the report was provided to the Coroner in March 1997. A copy was sent by the Coroner to Professor Crane for consideration in April 1997. Having considered Professor Crane’s autopsy, Professor Vanezis produced, on 26 June 1997, a supplemental report confirming his own previous findings. (c) Dr Kirschner 16. The Northern Ireland Civil Liberties Council requested a report from Dr Kirschner of the International Forensic Programme, Chicago. Dr Kirschner considered the reports of Professors Crane and Vanezis as well as other material including statements from prisoners in the deceased’s cell block. Dr Kischner’s report of 7 September 1997 concluded: “[I]t is my opinion within a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty that the injuries that James McDonnell suffered approximately one hour prior to his death were a direct and proximate cause of his death. It is furthermore my opinion that the cause of death should be recorded as: Myocardial Ischaemia due to Multiple Blunt Trauma Injuries and Near-Asphyxiation.” 17. He was of the view that Mr McDonnell’s death should be classed as a homicide. 18. A copy of Dr Kirschner’s report was provided to the Coroner, together with a final copy of the report of Dr Vanezis, on 17 May 1999. In view of its controversial nature, the Coroner sent Dr Kirschner’s report to Professor Crane and to the police for their consideration. The police referred the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) and the DPP requested a further report from Professor Crane. The latter recommended that a second opinion on Mr McDonnell’s cardiology history be requested from Professor Knight. The Coroner requested a report from Professor Knight in June 1999. (d) Professor Knight 19. Professor Knight reviewed the above three reports as well as primary autopsy data. On 30 June 1999 he completed his report in which he agreed with the reports of Professor Crane and Vanezis. Professor Knight concluded that the immediate cause of death was a fatal heart attack, but he considered that the emotional and physical effects of the prior restraint could have been a contributory or precipitating factor. He considered the report of Dr Kirschner to be flawed in both fact and opinion. 20. A copy of Professor Knight’s report was provided to the Coroner in July 1999 and sent immediately to the police, the DPP, Professor Crane and the applicant’s solicitors. 21. Meanwhile, an investigation into Mr McDonnell’s death was commenced by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”). Twenty-one statements were taken from prisoners in March and May 1996. Eighteen prison officers were interviewed and statements were taken from eight of them in March 1996. Following the first autopsy, the eight officers were again interviewed under caution about, inter alia, the injuries noted on the deceased’s body. 22. On January 1997 a file was presented to the DPP. On 16 May 1997 the DPP gave a “no prosecution” direction. 23. The DPP reviewed his decision in 1999 on receipt of the report of Professor Knight (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above), but on 4 August 1999 gave a further “no prosecution” direction. 24. Following an inquiry from the applicant’s solicitor in May 2002, the DPP informed her by letter of 5 August 2002 of his decisions of 1997 and 1999. 25. On 8 November 2000 the applicant issued civil proceedings against the Prison Service of Northern Ireland. It appears that the writ has never been served. 26. The Police Service Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) replaced the RUC in 2001. In 2004 the Serious Crime Review Team reviewed the original investigation and concluded that extensive research into the case had not uncovered any new evidential material or investigative opportunities. 27. In 2001 the applicant made a complaint to the Police Ombudsman about the investigation into her son’s death. In February 2002 investigators from the Ombudsman’s office met with Professor Vanezis to discuss certain prisoners’ statements. On 2 May 2003 Professor Vanezis provided a further report to the Ombudsman confirming his view that Mr McDonnell had died from a heart attack but that stress relating to the restraint had contributed to his death. 28. The subsequent conclusions of the Ombudsman were as follows: “The Police Ombudsman has reviewed all the police documentation relating to the investigation into James McDonnell’s death. This includes the subsequent reviews undertaken by PSNI. The investigation into the death of James McDonnell was thorough and complete. The family of Mr McDonnell were not kept up-to-date with the investigation. This was not uncommon in 1996. However, with the advent of the emphasis on Family Liaison in any investigation into a sudden death, it is hoped that different standards would be applied today. Whilst the investigation was thorough and the DPP directed no prosecution against any of the prison officers involved in the restraint of James McDonnell prior to his death, some of the injuries suffered by James McDonnell have never been satisfactorily explained. This is particularly true of the injuries to Mr McDonnell’s throat. The police investigation was not able to properly deduce which of the prison guards, if any, may have inflicted the injuries, primarily the fracture of the hyoid bone. It is hoped that the inquest will allow the family of Mr McDonnell the opportunity to seek the answers to the questions that they have had since 1996.” 29. Meanwhile, following the decision of the DPP in 1997 not to bring any criminal prosecutions (see paragraph 22 above), the inquest was listed for a hearing on 2 February 1998. By letter dated 7 January 1998 the applicant’s solicitor sought an adjournment to await the outcome of pending judicial review proceedings concerning entitlement of family members of a deceased to legal aid at inquests (Sharon Lavery v. Secretary of State and Legal Aid Department). The Coroner adjourned the inquest until May 1999. 30. In October 1998 the Coroner wrote to the Court Service to inform them that inquests, including the inquest into the death of the applicant’s son, were delayed by reason of the pending judicial review proceedings. 31. On 16 March 1999 the High Court handed down its judgment in Sharon Lavery ([1999] NIQB; p. 6 and p. 1905), finding that there was no entitlement to legal aid at inquests. (b) May 1999 – February 2001 32. As noted above (see paragraph 18), in May 1999 the Coroner was provided with a copy of the report of Dr Kirschner. He adjourned the inquest to obtain another report from Professor Knight, which was completed in June 1999 (see paragraph 20 above). In July, the inquest was re-scheduled for November 1999. 33. In the meantime, in September 1999, the Crown Solicitor’s Office advised that it would apply to maintain the anonymity of the prison officer witnesses. The hearing date of November 1999 was vacated because of that application but also to facilitate the attendance of Dr Kirschner. 34. In 2000 the inquest was further adjourned to allow the applicant to seek disclosure on the basis of a new Home Office Circular (issued in April 1999). The applicant also indicated to the Coroner that she intended to issue a judicial review challenge in relation to the pre-inquest disclosure by the PSNI. In August 2000 the applicant informed the Coroner that she no longer intended to issue judicial review proceedings and wished a hearing date to be set. 35. In December 2000 the applicant informed the Coroner that her expert, Dr Kirschner, would not be available until March 2001. The inquest was accordingly listed to commence on 5 March 2001. (c) February 2001 – January 2002 36. In February 2001, with the applicant’s acquiescence, the inquest was again adjourned pending this Court’s judgment in Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (no. 24746/94, ECHR 2001‑III (extracts)). Judgment in the case was delivered on 4 May 2001. 37. Following delivery of the judgment, no inquests were listed from September 2001 to February 2002 pending the amendment of the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963 (“the 1963 Rules”). (d) January 2002 – March 2007 38. Between January 2002 and March 2007 inquests which gave rise to Article 2 issues were adjourned pending judicial review actions concerning the scope of the inquest (Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Amin ([2003] UKHL 51; and R (Middleton) ν. West Somerset Coroner ([2004] 2 A.C. 182)) and the application of Article 2 to deaths which pre-dated the Human Rights Act 2000 (In re McKerr ([2004] UKHL 12; and Jordan v. Lord Chancellor and Another and McCaughey v. Chief Constable of the Police Service Northern Ireland [2007] UKHL 14). 39. The latter judgments, delivered by the House of Lords on 11 March 2004 and 28 March 2007 respectively, confirmed that Article 2 did not apply to cases where the deaths in question pre-dated the Act. (e) March 2007 – April 2013 40. In August 2007 the Coroner wrote to the applicant informing her that nineteen inquests had been adjourned pending the outcome of proceedings before the House of Lords and were now ready to proceed. 41. A preliminary hearing took place on 2 April 2008. On that date, an inquest hearing date was fixed for October 2008. The Coroner subsequently sought copies of the interviews and statements of prison officers taken by the police and of the statements taken from certain prisoners. He gave directions on any anonymity claims that might be made on behalf of any of the witnesses. 42. On 16 May 2008 the Crown Solicitor’s Office confirmed that it acted for eight prison officers who were seeking anonymity and screening. A further preliminary hearing was listed for 10 October 2008 to address the matter. 43. On 10 October 2008 the Coroner was informed that individual threat assessments would have to be conducted in respect of each officer seeking anonymity and screening and no timescale for the completion of this process was available. 44. A preliminary hearing took place on 6 November 2008 at which the Coroner issued a ruling on applications for anonymity and directed that any applications for anonymity be filed and served by 1 December 2008. The inquest was provisionally listed to commence on 3 February 2009. 45. In December 2008 the Coroner was advised that it would take up to three months for the threat assessments to be completed. It was therefore necessary to postpone the February 2009 inquest start date. The applicant’s solicitor was notified by letter dated 15 December 2008. 46. In May 2009 the Coroner received the threat assessments in respect of the prison officers seeking anonymity. He was, at that time, involved in another complex inquest. 47. In October 2009 the applicant instructed new legal representation. The Coroner sought confirmation from the newly-appointed solicitors that legal funding was in place. The solicitors responded that they were in discussions concerning legal funding and would provide an update in due course. 48. On 24 February 2010 the applicant’s new solicitors made detailed status enquiries of the Coroner’s Office and emphasised that to date the applicant had received no disclosure. On 22 March 2010 the Coroner replied that he had received some documents from the PSNI. On the same date, he again wrote to the PSNI requesting that full disclosure with any proposed redactions be provided for his consideration by 14 May 2010. New risk assessments for the prison officers seeking anonymity were also requested. 49. No disclosure was made by the deadline set. Reminders were issued on 10 June, 26 June, 21 July and 12 August 2010. 50. The updated risk assessments were received by the Coroner on 21 July 2010. 51. A preliminary hearing was listed on 8 September 2010 in order for the Chief Constable of the PSNI to explain the delay in providing disclosure. The hearing was rescheduled for 8 October 2010 owing to the unavailability of counsel. 52. At the hearing on 8 October 2010, the anonymity of prison officer witnesses and PSNI disclosure were debated. The Coroner ordered the PSNI to make disclosure by 19 November 2010 and scheduled a hearing for 3 December 2010. Disclosure was not made as ordered and that hearing date was vacated. 53. On 23 March 2011 disclosure was received by the applicants from the PSNI. All prison officer details were removed from the statements and no initials were retained, so that it was impossible to understand which officer was referred to at any given point in the statements. The applicant requested initials (“ciphers”). The Coroner requested the PSNI to provide the disclosure again, with ciphers. By letter dated 28 April 2011 the Coroner confirmed to the applicant that the statements would be provided with ciphers and allowed twenty-one days from receipt of those statements with ciphers for the applicant to make submissions on anonymity and screening. 54. On 18 May 2011, and in light of this Court’s judgment in Šilih v. Slovenia ([GC], no. 71463/01, 9 April 2009, the Supreme Court overruled the judgments of the House of Lords concerning the applicability of Article 2 to pre-Human Rights Act deaths (see paragraphs 38-39 above) and accepted that such inquests should be compliant with Article 2 (McCaughey and Another, Re Application for Judicial Review [2011] UKSC 20). 55. Following reminders by the applicant to the Coroner in April, July, August and September 2011, on 6 September 2011 the statements with ciphers were provided to the applicant. 56. The applicant subsequently instructed a forensic pathologist, Dr Carey, to address the disputed issue of causation. Dr Carey requested access to primary data concerning the autopsy (post-mortem photographs, histology slides and the pathologist contemporary notes) and in April 2011 the applicant requested the Coroner to provide the material. The Coroner wrote to Professor Crane on 28 April 2011 asking that he make the material available to Dr Carey. In July 2011 Professor Crane replied querying the authority for the disclosure of his notes. By letter dated 1 September 2011 to the Coroner, the applicant contested Professor Crane’s refusal to provide access. Professor Crane subsequently agreed to provide the histological slides, and they were furnished in October 2011. In November 2011 the Coroner received Professor Crane’s notes and copies were provided to the applicant. 57. The Coroner received a copy of Dr Carey’s report in late November 2011. A preliminary hearing was listed on 10 January 2012. 58. At the hearing in January 2012, a revised timetable for the anonymity applications was put in place and the inquest was listed to commence on 26 November 2012, the first available date taking into account the Coroner’s existing commitments and the need for a suitable courtroom bearing in mind the estimated length of the inquest and its circumstances. A provisional witness list and timetable were circulated in February 2012. 59. In May 2012 Professor Crane provided his response to the report of Dr Carey. Additional comments from cardiac pathologist Dr Sheppard were circulated to the other legal representatives. The applicant sought disclosure of all correspondence between Professor Crane and Dr Sheppard. 60. An issue arose in May 2012 in respect of the threat assessments for the prison officers. After protracted correspondence, the issue was resolved by July 2012 and the threat assessment process commenced. By October 2012 some of the assessments remained outstanding. The Coroner decided that the inquest could not proceed in November 2012 and adjourned it until February 2013. 61. In December 2012 the applicant sought further disclosure of any other incidents which resulted in harm to a prisoner in which the prison officer witnesses had been involved, as well as details of any disciplinary proceedings against them. 62. The four pathology experts were not available in February 2013 and the Coroner was also unavailable as a result of illness. The Senior Coroner took over the case and listed the inquest to commence on 17 April 2013. 63. The correspondence between Professor Crane and Dr Sheppard was disclosed in March 2013. (f) April – May 2013 64. The inquest commenced before the Senior Coroner on 17 April 2013. At the start of the inquest, the Coroner made a decision to grant anonymity to the prisoner officer witnesses. 65. The inquest ended on 16 May 2013. The narrative of the jury’s verdict explained: “The Northern Ireland Prison Service has explained the majority of the injuries sustained by Mr McDonnell. However, it has not explained the injuries to Mr McDonnell’s neck and lumbar region. The Northern Ireland Prison Service failed to carry out best practice in regard to bereavement of a prisoner.” 66. The jury’s answers to the specific questions posed can be summarised as follows: (i) Mr McDonnell was subject to a control and restraint procedure and a relocation procedure on 30 March 1996 as a result of his violent behaviour. (ii) The use of the procedure was necessary but it was not carried out correctly. (iii) The use of the procedure was not carried out only in so far as necessary. (iv) The neck injuries recorded in Mr McDonnell’s post mortem appeared to have been sustained during the initial restraint when he was grabbed by the neck. (v) The factors contributing to Mr McDonnell suffering a fatal heart attack were: the initial restraint; neck compression; the control and restraint procedure as carried out in this instance; underlying heart conditions; and emotional stress. (vi) The Northern Ireland Prison Service has not explained how he sustained the injuries found in the post mortem. (vii) There were defects in the procedures used that caused or contributed to the death of Mr McDonnell. There were: excessive force; prison officers not being trained in the application of aspects of Prison Guidelines, such as discretion on releasing control and restraint, and failures in the duty of care towards prisoners. 67. At the conclusion of the case the Senior Coroner referred the case to the DPP pursuant to section 35(3) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002. The DPP was notified by letter dated 30 May 2013. 68. A decision by the DPP on whether to commence any criminal prosecutions is awaited. 69. The applicant commenced judicial review proceedings regarding the anonymity order made in respect of the prison officer witnesses at the inquest. She contended that this aspect of the inquest failed to comply with Article 2 of the Convention because it denied the inquest the requisite degree of transparency and accountability since the identities of those concerned were withheld from the next of kin and their conduct was not subject to public scrutiny. She did not seek the quashing of the jury’s verdict. 70. The judicial review hearing took place on 24 and 25 February and a decision was issued on 15 May 2014. The court rejected the applicant’s challenge. According to the latest information available to the Court, the applicant was considering whether to lodge an appeal against the decision.

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5. The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently detained at HM Prison Long Lartin, Evesham. 6. On 3 August 2007, the applicant stabbed a man at his home in Liverpool. The man died of his injuries. When the police arrived at the house, they found the applicant sitting in a chair, and he told them, “He’s my best friend and I’ve stabbed him”. The applicant was arrested and taken to the police station. When interviewed, he claimed that the victim had entered the house and attacked him, and that he was acting in self-defence. 7. The applicant was charged with murder and his trial began in the Crown Court at Liverpool before a judge and a jury. The applicant’s defence to the charge was one of self-defence. 8. On the first day of trial, a member of the jury informed the court that he was a retired police officer. He had been retired for many years and had not served in any of the units involved in the case. He did not recognise the names of any of the police officers in the case. The judge brought the matter to the attention of counsel and invited observations. The applicant’s counsel explained that he had not had the opportunity to speak to the applicant about the matter and continued: “...[B]ut can I say without having exercised that right that the advice which I will [be] giving him is that there is no objection on the face of it even for a serving police officer remaining on the jury in a case of this sort provided that the officer in question, or in this case the retired officer in question, has no knowledge of the case and the parties to the case or any of the police officers who may be concerned with it.” 9. He went on to refer to “obvious exceptions”, including where the police officer juror had some connection with the case or where there was a “significant challenge to police evidence as a necessary part of the conduct of the defence”, adding: “That does not apply in this case, the police evidence is, I will not say it is completely agreed but there is no significant challenge to the police evidence which would have any realistic impact on the jury’s verdict in this case.” 10. A short adjournment took place to allow the applicant’s counsel to investigate whether the retired officer had any connection or contact with the case. Following the adjournment, defence counsel confirmed that he had no representations to make. 11. On the second day of the trial, another member of the jury informed the court that he was a serving police officer and that he recognised a man sitting at the back of the court as a police officer. 12. Prosecuting counsel confirmed that the man in question was the officer in charge of the case, but explained that they did not intend to call him as a witness. They had made inquiries with the man, who had clarified that when he was an inspector at St Helen’s, a town near Liverpool, around four years earlier the police officer juror had been serving there as a constable. The man had not been the juror’s line manager. He suggested that inquiries ought to be made into the juror’s knowledge of the man, but suggested that it would be sufficient if the man were to remain outside the courtroom, as the rest of the jury did not know who he was and none of the jurors knew why he was there. 13. Defence counsel said that he wanted to know how much the juror knew about the man and about other officers involved in the case. The judge sought confirmation of the precise information required by the defence and proposed to prepare a list of questions for the juror on that basis, which he would share with counsel before they were put to the juror. Defence counsel indicated that his “provisional reaction” was that provided the answers to the questions were satisfactory there would be no problem. 14. The judge rose and returned to read his proposed questions to counsel and to the applicant. The questions were: - What is the extent of your knowledge of the police officer with the beard who you say you recognized sitting in court yesterday? - What were the circumstances in which you came to know him? - When and where prior to yesterday was your last contact with him? - What is your present rank? - Where are you currently based? - Please look at the list of police officers who will give evidence. Have you any knowledge of them? If so, what is the extent of this knowledge? 15. Defence counsel made no comment on the proposed questions. They were duly put to the police officer juror. Following a short adjournment, the judge set out the result of the investigation: “I say it in open court so there is no doubt about it. I understand that the juror in question knew the man with the beard, as I shall call him, at St Helen’s when the man with the beard was his inspector. This was a few years ago. He was able to give his name ... He has not, however, seen him since that inspector left St Helen’s, which he thinks was perhaps as long ago as four years. He makes clear that the inspector was his inspector for a few months but he did not see him socially or out of hours. The juror is currently a serving Police Constable at St Helen’s and he indicates he knows no-one on the list [of police officer witnesses]. Any observations?” 16. Defence counsel responded as follows: “No, my Lord. I am quite happy that the juror may continue to serve. I understand that he does not wish other jurors to be told that he is a police officer and that is understandable, his occupation is irrelevant to his jury serving and his participation in these proceedings.” 17. On 22 January 2008 the applicant was convicted of murder. On 24 January 2008 he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff of thirteen years. 18. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the presence of the serving police officer on his jury created a real possibility of actual or apparent bias which rendered his conviction unsafe. 19. On 28 November 2008 permission to appeal was refused on the papers. The judge considered that no fair-minded and informed observer with full knowledge of the relevant facts as disclosed in the discussions between counsel and the trial judge would conclude that there was a real possibility that the jury were biased. He further observed that the police evidence was not in dispute and that the applicant’s trial counsel, who was pre-eminently placed to assess the situation, had made no objection to either juror sitting on the jury after full inquiry had been concluded. 20. The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal before the full court. He argued that bias in his case arose from the following factors: that police witnesses and other witnesses closely connected to the police were cross-examined; that the juror was an officer in the same police force as the police witnesses and the officer in charge of the case, although was not based at the same police station; and that the juror had served under the officer in charge of the case some four years earlier. 21. On 8 June 2009, following an oral hearing, the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal. It noted the factors relied on by the applicant as suggesting bias, but considered that, against those factors, were the fact that the juror had no particular knowledge of the facts of the case; that he knew none of the police witnesses who were due to be called; and that he had had no contact with the officer in charge of the case for some four years. The court rejected the suggestion that the juror had worked out that the man at the back of the court was the officer in charge of the case, or indeed that he had any connection with the case. It concluded: “1.20 It is apparent that the mere fact that a juror is a serving policeman is not sufficient to give rise to a real risk of bias. There must be some other factor connecting him to the case in order to give rise to that risk. This was not a case in which the police evidence was in any sense hotly contested, despite the fact that some of the witnesses were cross-examined. In the circumstances, in our view, the suggestion that there was some additional connection between this juror and the office in charge of the case could be little more than speculation.”

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5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Amsterdam. 6. The applicant was suspected of membership of a crime ring organised around one H., a person widely known to have amassed criminal convictions for serious crimes; of complicity in extortion; and of possession of an illegal firearm. 7. On 30 January 2006 the applicant was arrested. On 2 February 2006 he was taken into initial detention on remand (bewaring) for fourteen days by order of an investigating judge of the Haarlem Regional Court (rechtbank). The order included the following grounds: “(post alia) Considering in addition that it appears that there is a serious reason of public safety requiring the immediate deprivation of liberty; Considering in this connection: that there is a suspicion of a [criminal] act which, according to the law, carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of twelve years or more and that act has caused serious upset to the legal order (een feit waarop naar de wettelijke omschrijving een gevangenisstraf van twaalf jaren of meer is gesteld en de rechtsorde ernstig door dat feit is geschokt); that there is a serious likelihood (dat er ernstig rekening mee moet worden gehouden) that the suspect will commit a crime (misdrijf) by which the health or safety of persons will be endangered, since the framework of the suspicion encompasses the display of aggressive and unrestrained behaviour by the suspect; that detention on remand is necessary in reason for discovering the truth otherwise than through statements of the suspect; ...” 8. On 14 February 2006 the applicant was taken into extended detention on remand (gevangenhouding) for thirty days by order of the Haarlem Regional Court following a hearing in camera. This decision stated the following grounds: “considering that the Regional Court finds, after examining the case, that the suspicion, indications and grounds which have led to the order for the suspect’s initial detention on remand still obtain; considering that the existence of these grounds is borne out by the conduct, facts and circumstances stated in the order for the suspect’s initial detention on remand, given on 2 February 2006, which the Regional Court adopts as its own; ...” 9. The Regional Court renewed its order for a further term of thirty days on 11 April 2006. The applicant appealed against this decision; his appeal was dismissed by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) on 17 May 2006. 10. The order for the applicant’s extended detention on remand was renewed periodically by the Regional Court until its suspension. 11. On 7 May 2007 the Haarlem Regional Court ordered the suspension (schorsing) of the applicant’s detention on remand with effect from noon the following day. The reason stated was the following: “The Regional Court is of the view that the serious reasons and grounds stated in the order for extended detention on remand (bevel tot gevangenhouding) still exist and that Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) is not yet applicable. Even so, the Regional Court considers it appropriate, in view of the circumstance that it has today ordered the suspension of the trial until a date next September, to decide as follows as to the execution of the detention on remand. The suspension of the trial is directly linked with the state of health of a co-suspect and the Regional Court’s decision in principle (uitgangspunt) to pursue the proceedings against all suspects simultaneously. That being so, and also in light of the length of the detention on remand until today, the Regional Court is led to suspend the detention on remand until the day on which the trial of the suspect will be pursued.” The co-suspect referred to was H., who needed time to recover from heart surgery which he had undergone in detention before his trial could resume. 12. The suspension of the applicant’s detention on remand was made subject to the following conditions: “1. that the suspect not seek to evade the execution of the detention on remand order if its suspension should be terminated; 2. that the suspect, should he be sentenced to a custodial sentence other than [in lieu of a fine or a community service order] for the criminal act for which the detention on remand was ordered, not seek to evade its execution; 8. that the suspect shall report in person twice a week (zich tweemaal per week dient te melden) at times and places indicated to him by the public prosecution service (openbaar ministerie).” 13. On 20 August 2007 the applicant submitted a request for his detention on remand to be lifted altogether (opheffing van het bevel tot voorlopige hechtenis). 14. On 22 August 2007 the Haarlem Regional Court gave a decision in the following terms: “This court’s decision of 7 May 2007 suspended the suspect’s pre-trial detention in connection with the special circumstances mentioned in that decision, which did not concern the suspect himself, which entailed the interruption of the trial for a considerable time. The Regional Court has allowed the interest of the suspect in awaiting the resumption of his trial in freedom to prevail over the prosecution interest in keeping the suspect in detention on remand on the grounds stated in the order for extended detention on remand only because of that special situation and only for as long as that situation might continue. As the suspect’s trial will resume before long and the said special situation will from then on no longer exist, there will, from then on, be no reason to allow the suspension of the suspect’s detention on remand to continue. The Regional Court takes the view that the serious reasons and grounds, with the exception of the ground related to the investigations, still exist and considers that Article 67a § 3 [of the Code of Criminal Procedure] is not yet applicable. The mere fact stated by the suspect’s counsel that since the suspect’s liberation there has been no large-scale public protest and that the suspect has complied unreservedly (onverkort) with the suspension conditions do not mean that there is no longer any ‘serious upset to the legal order’ within the meaning of Article 67a § 2 under 1 or the danger of an offence within the meaning of Article 67a § 2 under 2. Considering also the nature of the first-mentioned ground – briefly, an offence carrying a twelve-year sentence that has caused serious upset to the legal order –, the Regional Court does not consider the arguments submitted sufficient reason to suspend the detention on remand, as is requested in the alternative as a less intrusive way of using this means of coercion (minder bezwarende wijze van toepassing van dit dwangmiddel). ...” No appeal was possible against this decision. 15. The trial resumed on 25 September 2007. The applicant, through his counsel, made a request at the hearing for the detention on remand order to be lifted, or in the alternative, for the suspension to be continued. He argued that his release had not caused any public outcry. 16. According to the official record (proces-verbaal) of the hearing, the Regional Court gave a refusal, stated by its president in the following terms: “The Regional Court refers to its decision of 7 May last. At the time, the medical situation of the co-suspect H., the Regional Court’s desire to consider the cases together, and the fairly long duration of the detention on remand led to the decision to suspend the detention on remand until such time as the trial would resume. As soon as these reasons cease to apply the Regional Court must consider the situation afresh. This does not mean that the Regional Court will look back to see how well things have gone and what ripples your release has caused (hoeveel rumoer er over uw vrijlating is ontstaan), but that it will consider whether the serious reasons and grounds still exist. It takes the view that such is the case. As regards the alternative request, the Regional Court takes the view that the prosecution interest would not be served in sufficient measure if you could, within the framework of a suspension of your detention on remand, await the outcome of your criminal case in freedom. Your personal interest in awaiting the determination of your case in freedom does not outweigh the prosecution interest. Your detention on remand should therefore continue, given also that there is no question at the present time of applying Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The president stresses that the Regional Court will continue to consider ex officio whether it is necessary for the detention on remand to continue, and whether there may be grounds to order a variant as regards the modalities of its execution. The Regional Court dismisses both the principal and the alternative requests.” 17. The applicant was taken back into detention on remand on 27 September 2007. 18. On 15 November 2007 the applicant’s counsel submitted a further request for the lifting or, in the alternative, the suspension of the detention on remand order. This too was refused. 19. On 4 December 2007 the Regional Court lifted the applicant’s detention on remand. The decision was in the following terms: “That the Regional Court, sitting in camera, has come to take the view that serious reasons and grounds referred to in the order for extended detention on remand still exist, but that at this point Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure leads the Regional Court to take the appertaining decision.” 20. On 21 December 2007 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment. 21. The applicant appealed. On 3 July 2009 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment on technical grounds. Convicting the applicant afresh, it sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, six months of which was suspended. 22. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal on 12 October 2010.

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6. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in the Moscow Region. 7. The applicant came to Russia from Uzbekistan in 2010. In 2012 he lost his Uzbek passport. 8. On 20 January 2013 the Karshi Town Interior Department of Uzbekistan put the applicant’s name on the list of wanted individuals, on account of criminal charges brought against him for membership of a religious extremist organisation, attempted overthrow of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, and terrorism. 9. On 9 June 2013, at the request of the Uzbek authorities, the applicant’s name was added to the Russian federal list of wanted persons. 10. On 31 October 2013 the applicant was arrested in the Moscow Region, where he lived with his wife and two children. 11. On 2 November 2013 the Serpukhov Town prosecutor’s office noticed that the applicant was wanted by the Uzbek authorities and was therefore liable to extradition to Uzbekistan. At the same time, given that the applicant had violated immigration regulations in Russia, the prosecutor’s office ordered that the Serpukhov District Interior Department take measures to ensure his administrative removal to Uzbekistan. 12. On the same day the Serpukhov District Interior Department drew up a report on the commission of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code. 13. On 2 November 2013 the Serpukhov Town Court of the Moscow Region found that the applicant had infringed the immigration regulations and was therefore guilty of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code. The court ordered the applicant’s administrative removal to Uzbekistan and his detention pending such removal. The applicant was not assisted by counsel during the hearing before the Town Court. 14. On 12 November 2013 the applicant lodged an application for refugee status. He submitted that he was being persecuted in Uzbekistan for his religious beliefs and that he feared torture and ill-treatment in Uzbekistan in the criminal proceedings against him. 15. On 14 November 2013 counsel for the applicant appealed against the administrative removal order of 2 November 2013. He submitted, in particular, that the applicant had lodged an application for refugee status and could not therefore be removed to Uzbekistan as long as that application was pending. He further argued that the applicant would be exposed to a real risk of torture in Uzbekistan. To substantiate the risk of ill-treatment he relied on the Court’s case law and reports by United Nations institutions about widespread ill-treatment in detention facilities. 16. On 28 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the administrative removal order on appeal. In reply to the applicant’s argument about pending refugee status proceedings it noted that, pursuant to the Refugees Act, a person who had applied for refugee status could not ‒ indeed ‒ be returned to his country of origin against his will. However, in the present case the applicant had not applied for refugee status immediately after his arrival in Russia. Given that the application for refugee status had been lodged after the administrative removal order had been made, the pending refugee status proceedings could not prevent the applicant’s administrative removal. The applicant’s allegations about the risk of ill‑treatment or persecution for religious beliefs were hypothetical and unsubstantiated. 17. On 22 January 2014 the Moscow Region Department of the Federal Migration Service rejected the applicant’s application for refugee status. 18. On 21 February 2014 the applicant challenged the decision of 22 January 2014 before the Federal Migration Service. He has not yet received any reply. 19. On 6 August 2014 the applicant lodged an application for temporary asylum. It appears that the proceedings are pending. 20. The applicant is currently in detention awaiting administrative removal to Uzbekistan.

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4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Novoyavorivsk, Lviv Region. 5. In the late evening of 1 April 2006 the applicant’s husband and his friend (P.) were attacked in a street of Novoyavorivsk by a group of young men. The applicant’s husband sustained grievous head injuries, including fractures to his skull. His friend sustained bruises and abrasions to his face, a fractured nose, brain concussion and other less serious injuries. Following the incident the applicant’s husband was placed in hospital and remained there in a vegetative state. 6. On 2 and 3 April 2006 the police interviewed K., Dz. and Sh. who stated that they had beaten up the two men. 7. On 11 April 2006 the investigator of the Yavorivsk District Police Department of Lviv Region (“the District Police Department”) opened an investigation into disorderly conduct by a group under Article 296 § 2 of the Criminal Code. In the course of further questionings and confrontations, Dz., Sh., and K. gave details as to their scuffle with the two men. 8. On 28 April 2006 the investigator reclassified the case as individual disorderly conduct under Article 296 § 1 of the Criminal Code as only K. had behaved in a disorderly manner in respect of the applicant’s husband. On the same day K. was charged with individual disorderly conduct under Article 296 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 9. On 29 May 2006 the investigator additionally charged K. with the individual infliction of grievous bodily injury on the applicant’s husband under Article 121 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 10. On 30 May 2006 the investigator refused to open criminal proceedings under Article 121 of the Criminal Code against Dz. and Sh. noting that they had not inflicted any injuries on the applicant’s husband and that they had only been nearby when K. was beating the applicant’s husband. 11. On 5 June 2006 the applicant submitted a civil claim against K. for damages caused by the crime. The civil claim was joined to the criminal case. 12. On 12 June 2006 the Yavoriv District Court of Lviv Region (“the District Court”) committed K. for trial. 13. On 25 July 2006 the authorities instituted another set of criminal proceedings under Article 296 § 1 of the Criminal Code against Dz. for individual disorderly conduct during the incident on 1 April 2006 which resulted in injuries inflicted on P. (the applicant’s husband’s friend). 14. On 27 July 2006 the investigator refused to open criminal proceedings against Sh. for disorderly conduct as the latter had not done anything wrong during the incident on 1 April 2006. 15. On 31 July 2006 the applicant’s husband died as a result of the head injury sustained on 1 April 2006. 16. On 10 August 2006 the District Court committed Dz. for trial in respect of charges of individual disorderly conduct. 17. On 3 October 2006 the District Court consolidated the criminal cases against K. and Dz. in a single set of proceedings noting that the charges against the two defendants were inextricably linked to each other and the consolidated proceedings were necessary for the comprehensive and objective examination of the charges. 18. On 16 March 2007 the District Court remitted the case for additional investigation after finding that the facts suggested that the defendants should be charged with more serious offences. 19. On 26 April 2007 a forensic medical expert issued a report stating that the death of the applicant’s husband had been caused by an open head injury which was accompanied by skull fractures. 20. On 7 May 2007 the investigator reclassified the case. He charged K. with inflicting bodily injury and disorderly conduct, both as part of a group, as provided for in Articles 121 § 2 and 296 § 2 of the Criminal Code. Dz. was charged under Article 296 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 21. On 1 June 2007 the case was referred to the District Court for trial of K. and Dz. 22. On 23 June 2008 the District Court ordered the compulsory attendance of K., noting that he had earlier failed to appear without a valid reason. 23. On 3 July 2008 the District Court found that K. had failed to appear at court hearings without a valid reason and his whereabouts were unknown. The court therefore ordered a search for K. and issued an arrest warrant for him. 24. On 31 July 2008 K. was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. 25. On 23 December 2008 the District Court remitted the case for additional investigation after finding that the investigator had not clarified the role of the two defendants in the incident. Moreover, the refusal to open criminal proceedings against Sh. had been groundless. The District Court further released K. under a written obligation not to abscond. 26. On 3 April 2009 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 23 December 2008 and remitted the case to the District Court for trial. 27. On 16 June 2009 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 28. Between October 2009 and July 2011 the District Court scheduled a number of court hearings which, however, were adjourned for the reasons that K., lawyers, witnesses or victims failed to appear, or that the judge was ill or that it was necessary to arrange an audio recording of the hearing. 29. On 15 August 2011 the District Court found that it was necessary to carry out a reconstruction of the events and take other measures by the investigating authorities to verify and clarify the circumstances of the incident. 30. On 25 October 2011 the District Court resumed the proceedings after the investigatory measures had been completed. 31. On 26 December 2011 the District Court found that K. had failed to appear at a court hearing without a valid reason. The court ordered a search for K. and issued an arrest warrant against him. 32. On 26 March 2012 K. was arrested. 33. On 27 March 2012 the District Court placed K. in pre-trial detention. 34. On 29 March 2012 the District Court terminated the criminal proceedings against Dz. (who was charged with disorderly conduct under Article 296 § 2 of the Criminal Code) as time-barred. 35. On 23 May 2012 the District Court delivered a judgment in the criminal case against K. It established that K. had inflicted grievous bodily injuries on the applicant’s husband which caused the latter’s death. The court found K. guilty of crime provided for in Article 121 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The court also ordered K. to pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to the victims of the crime. The charges of disorderly conduct against K. were dropped as time-barred. 36. On the same day the District Court issued a separate ruling noting that there had been a number of shortcomings during the pre-trial investigation and requesting the Yavorivsk District Prosecutor and the head of the District Police Department to take relevant measures. The court considered that the investigation was not appropriate in the first days following the incident; it noted in particular that the police officers seized Sh.’s jacket with blood spots and then returned the jacket without examination of blood spots failing thereby to establish if Sh. had participated in the crime. 37. On 21 September 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court of 23 May 2012.

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4. The applicant was born in 1984. 5. On 15 October 2009 he was arrested by the Darnytskyy District Police Department of Kyiv on suspicion of having committed a robbery in aggravated circumstances. On the same day he was charged with that crime. 6. On 16 October 2009 the Darnytskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the Darnytskyy Court”) ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention for two months. 7. On 10 November 2009 the applicant was also charged with murder. 8. On 10 December 2009 the Darnytskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months, namely to 15 January 2010. 9. On 13 January 2010 the Darnytskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to four months, namely to 15 February 2010. 10. On 13 February 2010 the case was referred to the Kyiv Court of Appeal for consideration on the merits. 11. On 15 March 2010 the Kyiv Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing in the case and ordered, inter alia, that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant should be left unchanged. 12. On 14 April 2011 the Kyiv Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of robbery and murder. It convicted him to fourteen years’ imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his property. 13. On 13 September 2011 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh trial. 14. On 24 December 2013 the applicant was found guilty of robbery and murder and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The court also ordered the confiscation of the applicant’s property. 15. The applicant lodged an appeal. No further information was provided.

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5. The applicant was born in 1983. His present place of residence is unknown. 6. On 5 October 2005 the applicant was found guilty of fraud and sentenced to two years’ restriction of liberty. 7. In March 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against him on suspicion of robbery, theft and illegal drug dealing committed in 2005 and 2007. The applicant was detained as a suspect within this set of proceedings from 8 to 23 March 2007 and from 10 September 2007 to 21 October 2008. During the remaining period of the pre-trial investigation he was bound by an undertaking not to leave his town of residence. 8. On 21 October 2009 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the Shevchenkivskyy Court”) found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment, which also absorbed the outstanding part of the sentence of 5 October 2005 (see paragraph 6 above). 9. On 9 April 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 10. The case file contains no further information about the aforementioned proceedings. 11. On 3 July 2009 Mr B. lodged a complaint with the police to the effect that the applicant had robbed him of a mobile phone on 22 June 2009 (the applicant had then been at liberty subject to an undertaking not to leave his town of residence – see paragraph 7 above). 12. On 3 July 2009, at about 7 p.m., the applicant was summoned to the Shevchenkivskyy District Police Station no. 2 (ТВМ-2 Шевченківського РУ ГУМВС у м. Києві) by a telephone call. According to him, he could not refuse given that he was bound by the undertaking not to leave the town, which also implied his obligation to obey any police summonses. As the applicant further submitted, he was arrested in the police station upon his arrival there without any explanation. According to the report of the police officer involved, the latter had “invited [the applicant] to the police station on suspicion of having committed the criminal offence alleged by [Mr B.]”. 13. It appears that the applicant was held in the police station overnight (see, in particular, paragraph 27 below). The case file contains his written explanations to the police dated 3 July 2009 regarding the events of 22 June 2009. He admitted that he had met Mr B., but denied his involvement in the robbery. 14. On 4 July 2009 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of having robbed Mr B. 15. On the same day, at 2.15 p.m., the police issued a report, according to which the applicant had been apprehended at 2 p.m. on 4 July 2009 in the premises of the police station on suspicion of having committed a crime. The applicant signed the report with a comment that he had nothing to say. He also signed extracts from the Constitution and the legislation on pre-trial detention as regards his procedural rights, as well as a waiver of his right to legal assistance. 16. On 4 July 2009 the applicant was questioned as a suspect and denied that he was guilty. 17. On 7 July 2009 the investigator applied to the Shevchenkivskyy Court for an order remanding the applicant in custody pending trial, stating as reasons the applicant’s previous criminal record and the severity of the alleged offence, which was punishable with imprisonment for up to six years. The investigator considered that if the applicant remained at liberty, there was a risk that he would abscond or hinder the investigation. 18. On the same date, having upheld the investigator’s reasoning, the Shevchenkivskyy Court remanded the applicant in custody for two months. 19. On 31 August 2009 the court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months, having taken into account “the volume of investigative measures still to be undertaken”. 20. From 25 August to 22 September 2009 the applicant was held in the Kyiv City Centre of Forensic Psychiatric Expert Examinations with the aim of clarifying whether he could be held criminally liable. 21. On 19 October 2009 the Shevchenkivskyy Court opened the trial. It dismissed the applicant’s request for the custodial preventive measure to be replaced by an undertaking not to abscond. 22. On 26 July 2010 the court remitted the case for additional pre-trial investigation. 23. On 14 February 2011 the Shevchenkivskyy Court held a preliminary hearing. It upheld the custodial preventive measure in respect of the applicant. 24. On 6 March 2012 the court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 25. The Court has not been made aware of any further developments in these domestic proceedings. 26. The applicant alleged that, following his arrest on 3 July 2009, he had been “severely beaten” by the police. The applicant did not provide any factual details of his alleged ill-treatment or of any injuries sustained. 27. According to the applicant, on the morning on 4 July 2009 his mother had received a phone call from a person who had been detained in the same police station and released that morning. The applicant had asked him to pass a message to her stating that he was detained there and that he had been questioned and ill-treated by the police. 28. As further submitted by the applicant, his mother had contacted the police station in order to verify that information, but was told that her son was not there. She had therefore complained to the police and the prosecution authorities about his disappearance. 29. According to the Government, on 4 July 2009 the police had notified the applicant’s mother about his arrest and invited her to come to collect his belongings, which she did. She also signed a receipt to that effect. 30. On 8 July 2009 the applicant was taken to the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (the SIZO) (Київський слідчий ізолятор). His medical examination, which was carried out on the same day, did not reveal any injuries, and the applicant did not mention to the doctors that he had been ill-treated. His only complaint was about epigastric pain (see also paragraph 51 below). 31. On 13 July 2009 the applicant’s mother complained to the police and to the prosecution authorities about the alleged ill-treatment of her son in police custody. She also stated that he suffered from a number of contagious diseases and could not therefore be held in detention. 32. On 25 July 2009 the applicant underwent surgery for acute appendicitis and peritonitis. 33. On 28 July and 2 August 2009 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecution authorities that the need for surgery on her son had been the direct consequence of his alleged ill-treatment on 3 July 2009. 34. On 5 August 2009 the Investigative Unit of the Kyiv Main Police Department (СУ ГУМВС України в місті Києві) completed its internal inquiry into the matter. As noted in the inquiry report, on 4 July 2009 the applicant’s mother had signed a receipt confirming that she had collected her son’s belongings from the police station. She had therefore been aware of his arrest. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any coercion had been used on the applicant. Accordingly, his allegation of ill-treatment was found to be without basis. 35. On 16 August 2009 the SIZO doctors, acting on the instruction of the prosecution authorities, examined the applicant to establish if there were any traces of the alleged ill-treatment. None was discovered. 36. On 21 August 2009 the Shevchenkivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment considering it unfounded since there was no evidence of any criminal behaviour by the police in relation to him. 37. On 27 August, 5 and 21 October and 2 November 2009 the prosecutor sent letters to the applicant’s mother informing her of the aforementioned decision. According to the applicant, none of those letters reached his mother. 38. The applicant was detained in the SIZO from 8 July 2009 to 2 July 2012. 39. Without specifying in which cells he had been held and for how long, the applicant described his cells as severely overcrowded, poorly ventilated and damp. 40. According to the information provided by the Government, the applicant was held in the following cells: - cell no. 341, measuring 13.2 sq. m (shared by 6 detainees); - cell no. 14, measuring 31.6 sq. m (shared by 24 detainees); - cell no. 101, measuring 60.9 sq. m (shared by 38 detainees); - cell no. 260, measuring 21 sq. m (shared by 2 detainees); - cell no. 277, measuring 29.9 sq. m (shared by 5 detainees); - cell no. 270, measuring 27.6 sq. m (shared by 4 detainees); - cell no. 273, measuring 24.6 sq. m (shared by 4 detainees); - cell no. 33, measuring 51.8 sq. m (shared by 8 detainees); - cell no. 85, measuring 20.8 sq. m (shared by 10 detainees); - cell no. 331, measuring 12.7 sq. m (shared by 6 detainees); - cell no. 18, measuring 9.1 sq. m (shared by 4 detainees); - cell no. 142, measuring 9.4 sq. m (shared by 3 detainees); - cell no. 74, measuring 9.5 sq. m (shared by 4 detainees); and - cell no. 274, measuring 20.0 sq. m (shared by 4 detainees). 41. According to the Government, the conditions in those cells were adequate and they were equipped with the requisite furnishings and facilities. The windows and the ventilation system allowed fresh air to circulate and a satisfactory level of natural and artificial lighting was provided. 42. On 23 May 2011 the SIZO governor informed the prosecutor of the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office in charge of the supervision of lawfulness in prisons that during the period from 1 February to 1 April 2011 the applicant had changed cells five times. Specifically, on 1 February 2011 he was placed in cell no. 33, on 23 February 2011 in cell no. 101, on 5 March 2011 in cell no. 101 again (apparently after a stay in the medical unit), on 11 March 2011 in cell no. 260, and on 1 April 2011 in cell no. 33. The SIZO governor explained those transfers by the fact that the applicant had often been held in the SIZO medical unit, given his poor state of health. 43. On four occasions the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell for keeping prohibited items (in three cases a mobile telephone and in one case cash): on 14 July 2010, 22 October 2011, 12 December 2011 and 29 February 2012. On each occasion he was held in a disciplinary cell for one day, with the exception of 14 July 2010, when he was placed there for two days. In every case a medical specialist of the SIZO confirmed that the measure in question was compatible with the applicant’s state of health. 44. On 14 July 2011 the applicant’s mother complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office that on 8 July 2011 the SIZO administration had administered emetics to the applicant in order to establish whether any drugs were present in his body. She submitted that it had been an unjustified, humiliating and dangerous measure. 45. On 17 August 2011 the Kyiv Regional Office of the State Prison Department (Управління Державного департаменту України з питань виконання покарань в м. Києві та Київській області) informed the prosecution authorities, in response to the complaints by the applicant’s mother, that the applicant was under the close scrutiny of medical specialists on account of a number of illnesses and that his numerous medical examinations had not revealed any injuries. Furthermore, the applicant had never complained to any authorities or doctors of having been ill-treated during his detention. He had also given a written refusal to make any comment about his mother’s complaints. 46. On 25 October 2011 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the SIZO governor that her client had been unjustifiably incarcerated, and that on 13 and 19 October 2011 he had been beaten by persons wearing masks. 47. On 9 November 2011 the head of the SIZO medical unit replied that the applicant’s allegations were unfounded and that he had not made any complaints himself. 48. In 2004 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis for the first time. 49. In May 2007 he tested HIV-positive. In November 2007 his condition was assessed as clinical stage 3 HIV and AIDS. He was registered for monitoring in the AIDS Centre at the place of his residence. 50. The applicant also suffers from chronic viral hepatitis B and C. 51. On 8 July 2009, upon his arrival at the SIZO, the applicant underwent a medical examination and X-ray, which revealed post-tuberculosis residual lung changes. His height and weight were recorded as 180 cm and 74 kg respectively. The applicant complained of epigastric pain. He also informed the doctors of his past medical history of viral hepatitis B and C, and his HIV-positive status (see also paragraph 30 above). 52. On 15 July 2009 the applicant was examined by two tuberculosis specialists, who confirmed the diagnosis of post-tuberculosis residual changes in the right lung and recommended further medical supervision. 53. On 25 July 2009 the applicant was taken from the SIZO to the emergency hospital, where he underwent surgery in respect of acute appendicitis and peritonitis. The case file does not contain any information as to whether anything had led up to that emergency. Nor did the applicant submit any factual details in that regard, apart from his broadly-couched allegation, in reply to the Government’s observations, that the emergency had been a result of his ill-treatment (see paragraph 99 below). 54. According to the information provided by the Government, from 30 July to 6 November 2009 the applicant was given in-patient post-surgery medical treatment in the SIZO medical unit. The applicant contested this information as untruthful, referring to the fact that from 25 August to 22 September 2009 he had been undergoing forensic psychiatric expert examination in the Kyiv City Psychiatric Hospital (see also paragraph 20 above). The case file contains an extract from the applicant’s medical file held in the SIZO, according to which he received in-patient treatment in the SIZO medical unit from 30 July to 25 August 2009. 55. On 9 October 2009 the applicant was X-rayed. Following the discovery of a focal shadow on the right lung, it was recommended that he consult a specialist. 56. On 16 October 2009 a tuberculosis specialist examined the applicant and found that he had focal tuberculosis of the upper lobe of the right lung at an unclear stage of development. The doctor prescribed a trial chemotherapy regimen consisting of isoniazid, pyrazinamide, rifampicin and ethambutol. 57. On 13 November 2009 the applicant again underwent chest X-rays, which showed focal tuberculosis of the upper lobe of the right lung in the consolidation stage. The radiologist recommended that the applicant consult a tuberculosis specialist. 58. On 17 November 2009 the applicant was invited to undergo another X-ray, but he refused. 59. On 23 and 25 November and on 9 December 2009, at the applicant’s request, a dentist examined him. The diagnosis was chronic multiple complicated caries related to poor dental hygiene, as well as tongue candidiasis. The applicant was provided with some medication, ointment and vitamins, and had the decayed tooth roots removed. 60. On 9 December 2009 the applicant was also examined by a specialist in infectious diseases and underwent a CD4 test[1]. Its result was 618 cells/cu. mm. 61. On 1 April 2010 the applicant underwent X-rays, the findings of which were the same as on 13 November 2009. 62. On 6 June 2010 the applicant was X-rayed again, with no pathological indications having been revealed. 63. On 29 November 2010 the applicant was due to undergo X-rays, but was unable to because he was not feeling well. 64. On 23 December 2010 a radiologist recommended (it is not known in what circumstances) that the applicant consult a tuberculosis specialist. 65. On 18 March 2011 the applicant underwent further X-rays. He was diagnosed with pneumonia triggered by tuberculosis, post-tuberculosis residual changes in the form of focal consolidations in the lower lobe of the left lung, and bronchitis. The radiologist recommended that the applicant consult a tuberculosis specialist. 66. Although the applicant’s medical file shows that he underwent in-patient treatment for pneumonia in the SIZO medical unit from 11 to 30 March 2011, on 15 August 2012 the State Prison Department informed the Agent of the Government, who was collecting information for the purpose of preparing observations for submissions to the Court, that this information “had turned out to be unconfirmed”. 67. On 24 March 2011 the applicant again underwent a CD4 test. Its result was 898 cells/cu. mm. 68. On 11 April 2011 another such test was undertaken, which showed the CD4 count as 836 cells/cu. mm. 69. On 21 April 2011 the applicant underwent another X-ray, which revealed post-tuberculosis focal consolidations in the lower lobe of the right lung. It was recommended that the applicant consult a tuberculosis specialist. 70. Following a complaint from the applicant’s mother regarding the failure to administer antiretroviral therapy to her son, on 26 April 2011 the SIZO administration informed her that the applicant was undergoing treatment for tuberculosis and that a consultation by an infectious diseases specialist was needed to decide about antiretroviral therapy. 71. On 29 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist, who found that he had no active-phase tuberculosis and that his general state of health was good. 72. On 16 August 2011 the applicant’s X-rays showed that he had infiltrative tuberculosis of the upper lobe of the left lung in the disintegration stage. 73. On 21 August 2011 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist, who prescribed him seasonal relapse prevention therapy with two antibacterial drugs (ethambutol and rifampicin) for ninety days, starting on 10 October 2011 and also a special diet. According to the applicant, this prescription was not implemented in practice. 74. On 8 November 2011 the applicant complained of moderate general weakness and heaviness in the right hypochondrium and was examined again by the tuberculosis specialist. As a result, his ninety-day relapse prevention therapy was slightly modified. 75. On 22 November 2011 the tuberculosis specialist examined the applicant again, with no dynamics noted. The doctor recommended continuation of the treatment and a repeated CD4 test. It is not clear whether that test was carried out. 76. On 6 January 2012 the applicant underwent X-rays which showed that he had infiltrative tuberculosis of the upper lobe of the left lung in the disintegration stage. 77. On the same date the applicant was examined by two tuberculosis specialists, who diagnosed a recurrence of tuberculosis. They recommended a drug susceptibility test and prescribed isoniazid, rifampicin and ethambutol. 78. On 14 May 2012 the applicant had his chest X-rayed. There was a limited fibrosis in the right lung and a suspected ring-shaped shadow on the left lung. The applicant was diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis of the upper lobes of both lungs. 79. On 25 May 2012 he was examined by a tuberculosis specialist, who prescribed continuation of the treatment of 6 January 2012. 80. On 5 July 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Zhovtnevska prison no. 17 (Жовтневська виправна колонія № 17) in the Kharkiv region – where there was a hospital specialising in tuberculosis – for the purposes of serving his sentence. 81. According to the applicant, during his detention in the SIZO his weight dropped from 87 kg to 52 kg. He had previously indicated his height as 188 cm. The entry in his medical file in the Zhovtnevska prison upon his arrival there stated his height as 180 cm and his weight as still 74 kg (see also paragraph 51 above). 82. On an unspecified date following the applicant’s transfer to the Zhovtnevska prison (before 28 September 2012 – see paragraph 84 below) his drug susceptibility was tested. It revealed that the applicant was infected with strains of tuberculosis resistant to two of the first-line drugs with which he had been treated before. 83. On 7 September 2012 he was examined by an infectious diseases specialist, who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in the remission stage. 84. On 28 September 2012 the applicant was examined by the Head of the Phthisiology and Pneumonology Department of the Kharkiv Medical Academy of Post-Graduation Studies, who prescribed an individual scheme of chemotherapy for him, given his resistance to certain drugs. 85. On 30 September 2012 the applicant underwent a CD4 test. Its result was 469 cells/cu. mm. 86. On 5 October 2012 an infectious diseases doctor from the Kharkiv Regional AIDS Centre examined the applicant and diagnosed tuberculosis, oropharyngeal candidiasis and chronic viral hepatitis. 87. Also on 5 October 2012 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist from the Kharkiv Medical Academy, who reported positive developments as a result of the treatment and recommended its continuation. 88. According to the extract from the applicant’s medical file issued by the Zhovtnevska prison administration, the applicant was released from detention on 26 October 2012 on the ground of poor health. It was recommended that he register for monitoring in the local AIDS centre and that he continue his treatment for tuberculosis in the place of his residence. 89. None of the parties has submitted to the Court any details as to the circumstances of and the reasons for the applicant’s release. The applicant noted summarily that he “was transferred for treatment in [his] place of residence as his treatment [in detention] had not been successful.”

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5. The applicants are all Russian nationals. They were charged with different criminal offences and placed in detention. The applicants complain in particular that after their cases had been submitted to the trial court they were detained for approximately six months without a court order. The applicants’ individual circumstances are detailed below. 6. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Vsevolozhsk. 7. In 1998 criminal proceedings were instituted against him on suspicion of being a member of a large criminal group which had committed extortions by threats and other serious crimes. 8. On 7 December 1999 he was arrested by Czech police in Prague and on 18 February 2002 extradited to Russia where he was placed in detention. 9. On 1 March 2002 the Prosecutor of St Petersburg extended his detention up to four months, until 18 June 2002. The applicant did not appeal against this order. 10. On 10 June 2002 the Deputy Prosecutor General extended the applicant’s detention until 18 September 2002. 11. On 15 July 2002 the applicant’s counsel lodged an application for release with the Oktyabrskiy Federal Court claiming that the applicant should be released on the ground that the new Code of Criminal Procedure had entered into force on 1 July 2002, and that a person could now be detained only on the basis of a court order. 12. On 9 August 2002 the Oktyabrskiy Federal Court dismissed the application for release. This decision was quashed on 11 September 2002 by the St Petersburg City Court on the applicant’s appeal and the matter was sent back for reconsideration. On 4 October 2002 the Oktyabrskiy Federal Court referred the matter back to the City Court because the case had already been referred to it for trial. 13. On 19 September 2002 the applicant was served with a bill of indictment and on the same date the case was referred for trial to the St Petersburg City Court. 14. On 20 September and on 23 December 2002 the applicant applied to the St Petersburg City Court asking to be released on the grounds that his detention had ceased to be lawful after the expiration on 18 September 2002 of the last detention order. 15. On 13 March 2003 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court (“the Supreme Court”) about the St Petersburg City Court’s failure to examine his application for release of 23 December 2002. On 10 April 2003 the Supreme Court forwarded his complaint to the City Court. 16. The applicant’s detention was further extended by the St Petersburg City Court on 18 March, 18 June and 18 September 2003. Each time the City Court relied on the gravity of charges. All detention orders were appealed by the applicant. The detention orders of 18 March and 18 June 2003 were upheld by the Supreme Court on 18 September and on 8 October, respectively, whereas the detention order of 18 September 2003 was quashed on 3 December 2003. 17. On 8 December 2003 the applicant lodged an application for release with the St Petersburg City Court on the ground that since the extension order of 18 September 2003 had been quashed on appeal, he should be immediately released from detention. This application was never examined by the City Court. 18. On 16 December 2003 the St Petersburg City Court relying on the gravity of the charges extended the applicant’s detention for further three months, until 18 March 2004. 19. On 30 December 2003 the applicant appealed on the ground that the order had been unlawful since it was only based on the gravity of charges against him. Moreover, his detention had been extended despite the fact that the previous detention order had been quashed on appeal. 20. It appears that the applicant’s detention was further extended on 16 March 2004 and that the applicant appealed against that decision. On 29 March 2004 the St Petersburg City Court referred the case for additional investigation and confirmed that the applicant should remain in detention. 21. On 5 May 2004 the St Petersburg City Court referred the case for additional investigation. On the same date an investigator with the Prosecutor’s Office of St Petersburg ordered the applicant’s release on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 22. On 6 December 2007 the St Petersburg City Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him conditionally to five years’ imprisonment. 23. The applicants, Mr Ilya Aleksandrovich Stepanov (“the first applicant”), Mr Roman Sergeyevich Ponomarev (“the second applicant”) and Mr Aleksandr Anatolyevich Leontyev (“the third applicant”) were born in 1978, 1975 and 1964 respectively and live in Syasstroy, in the Leningrad region. 24. On 11 November 2004 the applicants were arrested on suspicion of theft. 25. On 13 November 2004 the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court of the Leningrad Region extended the applicants’ custody up to seventy-two hours. The applicants did not appeal this decision. 26. On 16 November 2004 the same court ordered the applicants’ pre-trial detention. No appeal was lodged against this order. 27. On 11 January 2005 the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court by three separate decisions extended the applicants’ detention until 12 February 2005. The Town Court held, in respect of the first and second applicants, that they “had committed the crime” while they had been under a written undertaking not to abscond. In respect of the third applicant, the Town Court held that he “had committed the crime” while he had been under a suspended sentence. The applicants appealed, notably on account of the wording used in these orders. 28. On 4 February 2005 the prosecuting authorities referred the criminal case against the applicants to the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court for trial. 29. On 9 February 2005 the Leningrad Regional Court upheld the detention orders of 11 January 2005. 30. On 14 February 2005 the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court remitted the criminal case against the applicants to the prosecuting authorities. The Town Court also held that the measure of restraint should remain unchanged without other details. 31. On 11 and 12 April 2005 the applicants’ detention was upheld by the Town Court with the same summary formula. Both decisions were appealed by the applicants and on 18 May 2005 both were upheld by the Leningrad Regional Court. 32. On 25 July 2005 the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court extended the applicants’ detention, indicating that this extension was necessary given that the six-month period of the applicants’ detention pending trial would expire on 4 August 2005. 33. On 21 October 2005 the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court acquitted the applicants of all charges and they were immediately released. On 14 December 2005 the Regional Court quashed this judgment. 34. On 28 April 2007 the Lodeynopolskiy Town Court found the applicants guilty of theft and sentenced them to different terms of imprisonment. On 6 June 2007 the Leningrad Regional Court upheld that judgment. 35. The applicant, Mr German Leonidovich Oynas was born in 1966 and lives in St Peterburg. 36. On 27 November 2003 the applicant was charged with causing grave bodily injury, an offence under Article 111 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 37. On 28 November 2003 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the applicant’s placement in detention. On 25 December 2003 this order was upheld by the St Petersburg City Court. 38. On 22 January 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 26 February 2004. The applicant appealed. On 26 February 2004 the St Petersburg City Court, in the applicant’s absence, upheld the extension order of 22 January 2004. 39. On 26 February 2004 the case was referred to the Vyborgskiy District Court for trial. 40. On 2 March 2004 the District Court, in the absence of the applicant, decided to set the case for trial without holding a preliminary hearing and held that the measure of restraint applied to the applicant should remain unchanged. The prosecutor and the applicant appealed. 41. On 29 April 2004 the St Petersburg City Court, in the applicant’s absence, quashed the decision of 2 March 2004 in so far as it had set the examination of the case without holding of a preliminary hearing and remitted the matter for fresh examination to the Vyborgskiy District Court. It also held that the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention was not within its competence. It further decided that the measure of restraint applied to the applicant should remain unchanged. 42. On 20 May 2004 the applicant lodged an application for release with the Vyborgskiy District Court. He complained that after 26 February 2004 he had been detained without any court order, that on 29 April 2004 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 2 March 2004 in his absence and, without giving any reasons, ordered not to change the measure of restraint. On 25 June 2004 this application was rejected by the District Court. 43. On 27 May 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court opened the preliminary hearing. The applicant applied for release. On the same date the court rejected the applicant’s motion for release having found that the applicant was charged with a serious offence, had been previously convicted and might interfere with the proceedings if released. The hearing was adjourned until 18 June 2004 and subsequently until 25 June 2004. 44. On 5 June 2004 the applicant appealed against the decision of 27 May 2004. 45. On 18 June 2004 the applicant’s counsel lodged an application for release with the Vyborgskiy District Court. On 25 June 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court dismissed it having found that the applicant was charged with a serious offence, had been previously convicted, and might interfere with proceedings if released 46. On 25 June 2004, after having held the preliminary hearing, the Vyborgskiy District Court, set the case for trial on 9 July 2004 and held that the measure of restraint should remain unchanged. 47. On 4 and 5 July 2004 the applicant appealed against the decisions of 25 June 2004. 48. On 9 July 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 26 November 2004, having found that the applicant was charged with a serious offence, he had been previously convicted and might interfere with proceedings if released. The applicant appealed. On 14 October 2004 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order of 9 July 2004. 49. On the same date the St Petersburg City Court held that it was impossible to examine the applicant’s appeals against the decisions of 27 May and 25 June 2004 by which his requests for release had been dismissed. 50. The applicant’s detention was further extended by the Vyborgskiy District Court on 23 November 2004, 25 February 2005, 23 May 2005 and on 15 July 2005. All these extension orders were based on the same grounds. Each time the applicant appealed. All these extension orders were upheld by the City Court. 51. On 4 October 2005 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. His conviction was upheld by the St Petersburg City Court on appeal on 31 January 2006. On 12 March 2007 the applicant was released for good behaviour. 52. On 4 August 2003 Mr Biryuchenko and on 16 September 2004 Mr Oynas complained to the Russian Constitutional Court about the de facto extension of their detention after their case files had been sent by the prosecution authorities to the respective trial courts. The Constitutional Court examined their complaints together with similar complaints lodged by other individuals. In a Ruling adopted on 22 March 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the challenged provisions of the new CCrP complied with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, their practical interpretation by the courts may have contradicted their constitutional meaning. In part 3.2 of the Ruling the Constitutional Court held: “The second part of Article 22 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation provides that ... the detention is permitted only on the basis of a court order ... . Consequently, if the term of detention, as defined in the court order, expires, the court shall decide on the extension of the detention, otherwise the accused person should be released ... These rules are common for all stages of criminal proceedings, and also cover the transition from one stage to another. ... The transition of the case to another stage does not automatically put an end to the preventive measure applied at previous stages. Therefore, when the case is transmitted by the prosecution to the trial court, the preventive measure applied at the pre-trial stage ... may continue to apply until the expiry of the term, for which it has been set in the respective court decision [imposing it] ... [Under Articles 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure] a judge, after having received the criminal case concerning a detained defendant, should, within fourteen days, set a hearing and establish ‘whether the preventive measure applied should be lifted or changed’. This wording implies that the decision to detain the accused or extend his detention, taken at the pre-trial stage, may stand after the completion of the pre-trial investigation and transmittal of the case to the court, only until the end of the term, for which the preventive measure has been set. The prosecution, in its turn, while approving the bill of indictment and transferring the case file to the court, should check whether the term of detention has expired and whether it is sufficient to allow the judge to take a decision [on further detention of the accused pending trial]. If by the moment of transferal of the case-file to the court this term has expired, or if it appears to be insufficient to allow the judge to take a decision [on detention], the prosecutor, pursuant to Articles 108 and 109 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, [should] request the court to extend the period of detention.” 53. On 1 August 2005 Mr Biryuchenko lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor’s office. He submitted that between 19 September 2002, which was after his case had been referred for trial to the City Court, and 18 March 2003, he had been detained unlawfully (see paragraphs 10-16 above). Subsequently, his detention had been extended six times: on 18 March, 18 June, 18 September and 16 December 2003, on 16 March and 29 March 2004. He pointed out that he had appealed against all the extension orders, but the appeal court had failed to take his arguments into account. Relying on the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 22 March 2005, the applicant argued that in his case the courts had wrongly interpreted Article 255 of the new CCrP and had taken an unlawful decision on 18 March 2003. All the subsequent detention orders had also been unlawful. He requested the Prosecutor to lodge a request for supervisory review with the Supreme Court and apply for quashing of the extension orders. 54. On 21 September 2005 the General Prosecutor’s Office replied that the ambiguity of Article 255 allowed the courts to detain the defendants during six months without taking any decision in this respect. Therefore, when extending the applicant’s detention and dismissing his applications for release, the courts of first and second instances had not found any violation of law. Furthermore, the applicant had been released on 5 May 2004. Therefore, his right to liberty had been reinstated long before the adoption of the ruling of 22 March 2005 by the Constitutional Court. For these reasons, there had been no grounds to apply for a supervisory review of detention orders.

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5. The applicants were born in 1977 and 2007 respectively and live in Svinaře. 6. The first applicant is the mother of the second applicant. During her pregnancy she had regular check-ups with a doctor and attended ante-natal classes at Hořovice Hospital. Prior to giving birth she had expressed, among other things, her wish to leave the maternity ward as soon as possible provided that there were no complications. 7. On 24 October 2007 the first applicant contacted a pediatrician, S., who agreed to take charge of her future child and to come and see them both at their home as soon as they were discharged from the maternity ward. She informed the first applicant that she would, however, be away the following weekend. The applicant then told her that she intended to leave the hospital “earlier”, without enlarging on that statement. S. subsequently stated that it had not been her understanding that the applicant wanted to leave the hospital a few hours after the birth. 8. The second applicant was born on Friday 26 October 2007 at Hořovice Hospital. It was a natural and spontaneous delivery with no complications. The applicants were found to have no health problems, the Apgar score for newborns (recording the pulse rate, respiration, complexion, muscular activity and reflex irritability) was the highest possible, according to the medical team’s assessment. In these circumstances, the first applicant decided to leave the hospital the same day, which she did at about noon despite meeting opposition from the medical team. 9. According to a statement issued by the hospital on 29 October 2007 following extensive media coverage of the case, the hospital staff had suggested that the applicants remain at the hospital for at least 48 hours and had warned the first applicant of the possible risks to the child’s health, but the first applicant had indicated that a pediatrician would be taking charge of the child. After the applicants had left, the hospital staff informed the police, which was standard practice in situations where a patient left hospital prematurely without the doctor’s consent and this could have repercussions on his or her health. The social welfare authority was not informed until after the pediatrician S. had contacted the hospital (see below). The hospital found it regrettable that the first applicant had not expressed her wish to leave the hospital only hours after the birth during the ante-natal classes. Had she done so, the staff would have recommended that she obtain a personal care plan for the newborn baby and secure written agreement from the pediatrician (who would thus have had proper advance notice), whereupon her decision would have been accepted. The first applicant had accepted, moreover, that the events in question might have arisen as a result of a misunderstanding regarding the care arrangements for her newborn baby. 10. According to the explanations given by the pediatrician S., on 26 October 2007 at about 2 p.m. she had been informed by the nurse from her surgery, who had received a call from the first applicant, that the latter had given birth that very morning and returned home. As it was an unusual situation, the pediatrician, who had been preparing to leave for the weekend and could not visit the applicants until Monday afternoon, informed the staff at Hořovice Hospital accordingly. D., the hospital doctor, decided to contact the social welfare authority, namely, the Černošice municipal office. In the meantime S. had informed the first applicant by telephone that she would be able to see her and her child until Monday afternoon, which the applicant had accepted. Shortly afterwards the pediatrician was contacted by a social worker. She told her about the situation and gave her the first applicant’s telephone number. 11. According to the note sent by the Černošice Municipal Office to the Beroun Municipal Office (hereafter “the social welfare authority”), on 26 October 2007 the first applicant had left the hospital at noon on that day without informing the doctors; she had not been living at the address she had given the hospital for three years and the village where she was staying and her telephone number had been provided by the pediatrician contacted by the Černošice authority. The social worker had succeeded in contacting the child’s father on that number. Although he had been informed that an interim measure under Article 76a of the Code of Civil Procedure might be applied, he had stated that the applicants would not return to the hospital and had refused to provide the family’s exact address. 12. At the request of the social welfare authority, Dr D. drew up a note observing that “given the short period of time since the birth, the health and potentially the actual life of the child [would] be at risk if he [were] deprived of hospital care”. 13. Also on 26 October 2007 the social welfare authority requested the Beroun District Court to apply an interim measure pursuant to Article 76a of the Code of Civil Procedure, with a view to entrusting the second applicant to the care of the gynaecology-obstetrics department of Hořovice Hospital. The above-mentioned notes drawn up by the Černošice Municipal Office and Dr D. were annexed to the request. 14. On the same day the court granted the request, reiterating the terms of the note drawn up by Dr D. The decision stated that any interim measure was served on the parties at the time of execution, which had to be immediate. 15. At 4.30 p.m. on 26 October 2007 a court bailiff and a social worker, accompanied by police officers, went to the applicants’ house. Although they explained to the child’s father that the first applicant could go to the hospital with the second applicant, he refused to take them to there of his own free will. An emergency medical team was therefore summoned. After examining the newborn baby, the doctor present observed that he had no health problems but agreed with the others that for the purposes of implementing the interim measure the mother and child would be taken back to the hospital in the ambulance. The father, police officers, social worker and court bailiff followed the ambulance. Once at the hospital, the second applicant was examined again and found not to have any health problems. 16. The applicants were made to remain at the hospital for two days and allege that no medical act was carried out during that time. According to the hospital report, the first applicant had refused neonatal screening and vaccination of the second applicant. At the express request of the first applicant, who accordingly signed the form refusing further medical treatment (negativní revers), the applicants were discharged from the hospital on 28 October 2007, approximately 50 hours after the birth. ...

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5. The applicant was born in 1948, and at the time of lodging the application lived in Milton, Ontario, Canada. 6. Malta has gone through various legislative regimes in order to regulate its housing situation. The first regime came about in 1931 and protected tenants from the termination of their leases. This was followed by the 1944 Rent Restriction (Dwelling Houses) Ordinance which, apart from regulating termination of the lease of dwelling houses, also controlled rents and the initial conditions of contracts. The Housing Act was then enacted in 1949, with the aim of providing a solution to homelessness caused by the Second World War. In 1959 the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta (hereinafter “the HD Ordinance”) was enacted, which provided incentives to encourage landlords to rent their property, and created a special class of dwelling houses free from rent control. 7. The applicant owns a property in Gozo (a maisonette measuring 105 square metres) which he inherited from his parents, his mother having passed away in 1984. 8. On 12 January 1960 the property was registered as a “decontrolled dwelling house” in accordance with Article 3 of the HD Ordinance. At the time, Article 5 (1) of the HD Ordinance provided that the provisions of the “Rent Ordinances” (the Reletting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance, Chapter 69 of the Laws of Malta and the Rent Restriction (Dwelling Houses) Ordinance, Chapter 116 of the Laws of Malta) were not applicable to dwelling houses decontrolled in accordance with Article 3 of the HD Ordinance. 9. In 1970 the applicant’s mother leased the premises to couple C., who are Maltese citizens (born in 1943 and 1950 respectively), for a rent of 35 Maltese Liri (MTL) (approximately 81.50 euros (EUR)) every six months, which was later decreased to the equivalent of EUR 75.70 every six months. At the time, the law permitted her to increase the rent, to refuse to renew the lease or to change its terms on renewal. 10. In 1979 the Maltese parliament enacted an amendment to the HD Ordinance, which provided that the rent restrictions set out in the Rent Ordinances would apply where tenants were Maltese citizens and occupied houses as ordinary residences. It further provided that landlords could not refuse to renew leases, raise their rent, or impose new conditions on renewal, except as provided for by law (see “Relevant domestic law” below). The applicant submitted that the contractual freedom of parties was greatly restricted as a result of the new provisions, in that his family could not charge a fair rent or recover possession of their property, despite the fact that his tenants owned substantial immovable property. 11. By a decision of the Rent Regulation Board (RRB) of 7 July 1998, the rent was further reduced to EUR 65.22 per year. The applicant did not appeal. 12. In 1995 new laws were enacted in respect of new leases which could again be free from rent control. They did not apply to the applicant’s case. 13. In 2009 and 2010 new concepts and provisions were introduced, aimed at gradually eliminating the restrictive regimes applicable to leases entered into before 1995. 14. Thus, while a rent of EUR 65.22 per year had been paid to the applicant since September 1998, a rent of EUR 185 had been paid from September 2010 onwards in view of the above-mentioned amendments. However, the applicant refused to accept any rent as from 2007 and it was duly deposited in court by the tenants by means of a schedule of deposit. 15. According to a court-appointed architect’s evaluation made in the context of constitutional proceedings instituted in 2005 (see paragraph 17 below), the property at that time had a rental value of EUR 2,912 per year. According to an architect’s report commissioned by the Government, the rental market value in 2013 was EUR 2,900 per year, and the sale value EUR 58,000. 16. To date, couple C still reside in the applicant’s property. It does not at present appear that they have any children formally residing with them. 17. In 2005 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining, inter alia, that the 1979 amendments (in particular Article 5 (2) and (3) of the HD Ordinance, which prohibited landlords from refusing to renew existing leases or from raising their rent) had breached his property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 18. On 4 June 2008 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction rejected his complaint. Basing its judgment on domestic case-law relating to the same subject matter, it considered that he remained the owner of the property at issue, which was being used as a dwelling house, that he could still evict the tenants if they failed to fulfil their obligations under the lease, and that although the amount of rent was low, the law provided for an increase in rent every fifteen years, amounting to double the actual rent. The interference with his rights was therefore proportionate given the needs of society. Moreover, his mother had not been forced to lease out the property. 19. The applicant appealed on 25 June 2008. 20. On 3 November 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as being lodged out of time, the statutory time-limit having expired on 16 June 2008. 21. On 29 April 2009 he lodged an application with the Court, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 22. By a decision of 10 November 2009 the Court, sitting as a Committee of three judges, declared the applicant’s application inadmissible. It found that he had lodged his appeal with the Constitutional Court out of time. The domestic remedies had therefore not been exhausted as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. 23. In 2010 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that the 1979 amendments, which prohibited landlords from refusing to renew existing leases or from raising their rent when the tenant was a Maltese citizen, had breached his property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. He submitted that the amendments introduced in 2009 had not improved his situation, even assuming they (in particular Article 1531C of the Civil Code) applied to the case in question, a matter which was unclear in the domestic context. With a new rent of EUR 185 per year (see Relevant domestic law below), he remained a victim of the alleged violation, not least because he was also prevented from refusing to renew the lease. He cited the then recent case of Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, 15 September 2009), in which the Court had found a violation in analogous circumstances. 24. By a decree of 30 April 2010 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction ruled that the defendant in the case should be the Attorney General of Malta, not the State of Malta as purported by the applicant. 25. On 15 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction, upholding the objection raised by the third party who joined in the suit (kjamat fil-kawża), rejected the applicant’s complaint on the basis that the matter had already become res judicata by virtue of the decision of 4 June 2008 (see paragraph 18 above). It noted that such a conclusion required three elements, namely the same parties (eaedem personae), the same object (eadem res) and the same cause of action (eadem causa petendi). Moreover, where the arguments raised were different, it had to be seen whether they could have been raised at the time of the principal judgment. In the present case, it considered that there had been no doubt that the requirement of eaedem personae had been met, despite the fact that the applicant had attempted to bring the present proceedings against the State and that the other proceedings had been against the Attorney General, as it was clear that the defendant in both cases was the Maltese Government. The element of eadem res had also been satisfied in so far as the present case concerned the same lease of the same property, with the same tenants and the same circumstances that had led the applicant to institute proceedings the first time round. Similarly, the element of eadem causa petendi had also been satisfied, since the applicant’s applications to the court were to a great extent the same, if not identical, despite the fact that he had made further arguments and submitted that his situation had remained unchanged notwithstanding the 2009 amendments to the Civil Code. The court considered that the changes to the application had not changed the nature of the action, namely a claim that the restrictions on the rent imposed by the law had been disproportionate. This matter had already been dealt with by the court in the first set of proceedings (no. 49/05), where it had decided that a fair balance had been struck by the authorities; it was not therefore open to the applicant to relitigate the matter. The court further held that even though the applicant had argued that despite the 2009 amendments (if they applied at all) he had remained a victim of the alleged violation, there was already a judgment in his respect stating that the law in so far as it applied to his case had not breached his rights, and the more recent amendments had not worsened his situation. Thus, the Civil Court (First Hall) held that there could not have been a breach of his rights even under the new law. Lastly, it concluded that any new arguments put forward by him should have been incorporated into the first set of proceedings. As to the Court’s recent case-law, it considered that the judgment cited did not entitle the applicant to ask for a fresh examination of his case. 26. By a judgment of 24 June 2011 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, considering the appeal to be frivolous and vexatious.

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6. The first applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Prague, the Czech Republic. The second applicant was born in 2005. She currently lives in Russia with O.H., her mother. 7. On 5 June 2003 the first applicant married a Russian national, O.H. The couple decided to settle in Prague. 8. On 28 January 2005 their daughter, the second applicant, was born. 9. In 2007 the first applicant and O.H. decided to separate. 10. On 1 November 2007 O.H. filed for divorce in the Czech Republic. Both O.H. and the first applicant sought custody of the child. 11. In April 2008 O.H., unbeknownst to the first applicant, obtained a one‑month Russian visa for the second applicant, and on 17 April 2008, together with the latter, left for Russia (Vologda Region). Upon the expiry of the visa on 12 May 2008 O.H. did not bring the second applicant back to the Czech Republic. Instead, on 20 May 2008 she obtained a temporary residence permit for the second applicant from the Russian Federal Migration Service, and on 27 May 2008, Russian citizenship for the latter. On an unspecified date O.H. and the second applicant left for St Petersburg. 12. On 7 July 2009 O.H. applied to the Federal Security Service Border Control (Пограничное управление Федеральной службы безопасности Российской Федерации по городу Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области) in order to restrict the second applicant’s travel outside Russia. 13. As of 10 July 2009 the second applicant’s travel abroad was restricted. 14. Since 29 May 2011 the first applicant has had no contact with the second applicant, because O.H. prevented him from either seeing the second applicant or communicating with her by telephone. The Russian authorities have been unable to establish O.H.’s and the second applicant’s whereabouts since then. 15. The interim decision of Prague 4 District Court of 30 April 2008 as amended by the interim decision of Prague Municipal Court of 21 July 2008 granted the first applicant temporary custody of the second applicant pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings. The Prague Municipal Court thereby obliged O.H. to hand the child over to the first applicant, not to leave the Czech Republic and not to remain outside the territory of the Czech Republic with the minor. The interim decision entered into force on 8 August 2008. 16. On 2 June 2011 Prague 4 District Court issued a final custody judgment by which custody of the second applicant was granted to the first applicant. O.H. was obliged to pay the first applicant 5,000 Czech korunas – about 200 euros (EUR) – monthly in alimony. The court held as follows: “The father loves [his daughter] very much; in the opinion of the experts he is better developed emotionally in comparison to the mother, is more capable of self-control and handling [stress] so as to not spoil the relationship between the mother and [the child] or otherwise turn [the child] against her mother. It was established that the interests of [the child] require that she be placed in her father’s care [as he] was established to be a more suitable caregiver; at the same time it was established that as a result of [the child’s] separation from her father the former’s psychological well-being [has been affected]. It was established that for the last three years the father, unlike the mother, has been cooperating with [the custody and guardianship authority], and the [guardian] had therefore had a real possibility to examine the father’s living conditions and his situation; ... it was established that he can provide [the child] with normal accommodation ... The father is financially stable, which enables him to provide [the child] with the material [items] and non-material values necessary for her health, mental, cultural and physical development. [The child] will soon go to primary school and the father, in view of his education and indisputable interest in [the child], is capable of providing her, along with the possibility of school education, with everything she needs. ... Despite the fact that the father was and is still being prevented from communicating with [the child], he [supports the child financially by giving money directly to the mother and making deposits into the child’s bank account], and in addition to alimony the father gives [the child] presents whenever he has the possibility to meet her. The mother, on the contrary, was characterised as unstable, authoritative, unfriendly to the father and inclined to impulsive aggression and rash behavior. While carrying out her parental duties she harms [the child], she has abused her parental authority since November 2007 at least ... Therefore, she acts both unlawfully and contrary to the interests of [the child] and the court’s decision. While exercising her parental authority the mother consciously and purposefully acts in total disregard of the recommendations of the experts and her lawful duties; she completely prevented communication between the father and [the child], at first without any reason. Subsequently, under an invented pretext, in April 2008 she took [the child], without the permission of the father, the court or [the custody and guardianship authority] abroad to the Russian Federation, where she has kept [the child] until now. At the same time the mother has not complied with the decision of the court pursuant to which she should have handed [the child] over to the father, to render to the father [the child’s] travelling passport and not to remain [with the child] outside the territory of the Czech Republic. [It was established that the decision in question] was served on [the mother] first of all through her representative in the Czech Republic, and thereafter to her personally in the course of the proceedings at the courts in St Petersburg and Moscow. Furthermore, the mother refuses to send an invitation for visiting Russia to the father, [who] has to go through demanding procedures to obtain Russian entry visas, and when the father succeeds in obtaining a visa and goes to Russia the mother often hides [the child] and refuses to communicate with the father[.] [S]he does not even allow the father to talk to [the child] on the telephone, and even if she lets them talk she purposefully manipulates the father’s and [the child’s] mindset according to the situation. Therefore, the court believes that the mother has, in disregard of the law of the Czech Republic, willfully interfered with [the child’s family life], her right to know her father and her right to be in her father’s custody. She has interfered with [the child’s] right to freedom of movement and to choose her place of residence, and her right to free entry to her homeland, the Czech Republic. Thereby the mother has breached the rights guaranteed by the State in the framework of Conventions on Human Rights, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The mother, unbeknownst to the father, the court or [the custody and guardianship authority] and without their consent in contravention of the legal order of the Czech Republic, applied to Russian administrative authorities to grant [the child], a national of the Czech Republic, Russian citizenship, on the basis of which in a record-breaking short term of five days the latter was granted Russian citizenship. ... Regarding the father’s claim for termination of the mother’s parental rights, the court has decided to dismiss it [since termination of parental rights is the most serious interference in relations between parents and children, when the violation of parents’ duties is so serious that the termination of parental rights is the only possible solution to protect the interests of the child]. The court has arrived at the conclusion that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in contradiction with the father’s own statement in his final speech that [the child] should have both parents. ...” 17. The case was examined in the absence of O.H. The District Court established that on 10 May 2011 consul T. of the Czech Consulate General informed O.H. by telephone about the venue and the time of the hearing, that is, 2 June 2011 at 1 p.m. in Prague 4 District Court, but O.H. did not say anything in reply and hung up. Nobody answered the phone when the consul tried to reach O.H. again. The telephone was subsequently switched off. The International Department for Civil Matters of the Czech Ministry of Justice did not receive confirmation from the Russian authorities on whether the request of October 2010 for the delivery of a court summons to O.H. had been complied with. The District Court therefore considered that O.H. had been duly notified and that she had failed to appear in court without valid reason. It therefore proceeded in her absence. 18. On 10 February 2012 that judgment became final. 19. The judgment remains unenforced to this day. 20. The first applicant challenged the decision of the Russian Federal Migration Service of 20 May 2008 granting the second applicant a temporary residence permit (see paragraph 11 above). 21. On 13 February 2009 Vologda Town Court dismissed the first applicant’s claims. The court held that the temporary residence permit had been granted to the second applicant in accordance with the procedure established by law, and that the relevant procedure did not require the applicant’s consent. 22. On 24 April 2009 Vologda Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. 23. The first applicant challenged the decision of the Russian Federal Migration Service of 27 May 2008 granting the second applicant Russian citizenship (see paragraph 11 above). 24. On 6 July 2009 Vologda Town Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. The court held that the granting of Russian citizenship to the second applicant had been carried out in compliance with the procedure provided for by the Russian law and did not require the consent of the first applicant as O.H., the second applicant’s mother, had Russian citizenship and the second applicant, having received a Russian temporary residence permit, was considered to be residing in Russia at the moment when the relevant decision had been taken by the competent authorities. The court held that the Russian Constitution allowed for dual citizenship, and that the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 6 June 1980 on prevention of dual citizenship, relied on by the first applicant, was no longer in force after 5 July 2006. The court further held that there was no evidence of criminally punishable acts in the actions of the Federal Migration Service. 25. The hearing of the case on 6 July 2009 took place in the absence of the first applicant. His request for adjournment of the hearing (due to his involvement in other court proceedings in St Petersburg) was dismissed. The first applicant was, however, represented by a lawyer. 26. On 9 October 2009 Vologda Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 27. On 12 March 2009 the first applicant applied to St Petersburg City Court seeking formal recognition of the interim measure of the Prague Municipal Court of 21 July 2008 granting him temporary custody of the second applicant pending the divorce proceedings (see paragraph 15 above). 28. By a final decision of 15 December 2009, however, the Supreme Court of Russia rejected the request. It held that the Treaty of 12 August 1982 between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance did not apply to interim measures. 29. As he had been prevented by O.H. from seeing the second applicant, on 20 April 2009 the first applicant brought proceedings before the Russian court seeking to have the terms of his contact with the second applicant in Russia fixed. 30. By a final decision of 18 May 2010 St Petersburg City Court discontinued the above proceedings. It found that according to the Treaty of 12 August 1982 between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance, litigation in the domestic courts of one High Contracting Party to the agreement had to be discontinued if the same litigation between the same litigants was pending before the domestic courts of the other High Contracting Party. 31. On 23 September 2010 the first applicant brought proceedings against O.H. seeking to cancel the restriction on the second applicant’s travel outside Russia (see paragraph 13 above). 32. By a final decision of 18 April 2011 St Petersburg City Court dismissed his claim. The court held that the essence of the first applicant’s complaint had been the fixing of the terms of his contact with the second applicant, which had been for the Czech courts to determine. The court held, therefore, that until the final judgment of the Czech courts the first applicant and O.H. were to decide on the issues in question by mutual agreement. The court further pointed out that the first applicant had the right to communicate with the second applicant on the territory of the Russian Federation and that O.H. had no right to prevent that. 33. On 29 June 2012 the first applicant applied to St Petersburg City Court for recognition and enforcement of the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011 (see paragraph 16 above). 34. On 9 October 2012 St Petersburg City Court, relying on Article 60 of the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance and Articles 409-12 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, refused the first applicant’s request, because O.H. had not been duly notified of the hearing of 2 June 2011 and had been deprived of the opportunity to take part in it. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “As it follows from the material of the case file [O.H.] did not participate in the proceedings before Prague 4 District Court resulting in a judgment the compulsory enforcement of which is sought by [the first applicant]. This circumstance is supported by the text of the judgment itself. As it follows from this document [O.H.] failed to appear [in court] for the hearing of the case [on 2 June 2011], although she had been informed orally about [the time and the place] of the hearing. The [Prague 4 District Court] found it established that [O.H.] had been informed about the hearing orally by a consul. At the same time it follows from [the applicant’s] application and the text of the above-mentioned judgment that in 2008 [O.H.] had left the territory of the Czech Republic with the child [and] resides on the territory of the Russian Federation. Taking into consideration [the fact] that at the time of delivery of the judgment O.H. has been residing on the territory of the Russian Federation, her notification should have been carried out in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, which provides that service of documents [must be] certified by a confirmation signed by the person on whom the document is served and officially sealed and signed by the competent authority responsible for the service with indication of the date of service, or by a confirmation issued by that competent authority with indication of the means, the place and the time of service. No such [confirmation] was provided by [the first applicant]. It follows from the contents of the above-mentioned judgment that a request for delivery of documents to [O.H.] was addressed to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and remained without reply. At the same time, according to Article 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation a request for compulsory enforcement of a foreign court judgment must be accompanied by a document showing that the party against whom the judgment was taken, and who did not participate in the proceedings, had been duly notified of the time and the place of the hearing. The same rule is contained in Article 55 of the Treaty. It follows from the contents of the above-mentioned legal provisions that notification of [O.H.] of the time and the place of the hearing should have been certified by [a] written confirmation, signed by [O.H.], [and] sealed by [the competent authority] which handed over the notification. No such documents were, however, provided by the [first applicant]. ... As noted above, the judgment of Prague 4 District Court indicates that [O.H.] was notified orally by a consul. ... The [first applicant’s] argument that [O.H.’s] notification by consul orally by telephone was in accordance with section 51 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Czech Republic does not amount to proof of [O.H.’s] proper notification ... The above-mentioned Treaty does not provide for the possibility of notification by a consul. Under Article 10 of the Treaty Contracting Parties are entitled to serve the documents through consular establishments to their citizens only. However, [since O.H.] is not a citizen of the Czech Republic, but only had a permit for permanent residence on the territory of the Czech Republic, the [court summons] was not served on her ... In view of the foregoing the court finds that [O.H.] was deprived of the possibility to take part in the proceedings as a result of a failure to duly notify her of the time and the place of the hearing ...” 35. The decision of 9 October 2012 was taken in the absence of O.H. Court summonses were repeatedly sent to O.H.’s place of residence in St Petersburg and to the address in Nyuksenitsa, Vologda Region, given to the court by the first applicant. However, the summonses returned unclaimed following the expiration of the storage time. Attempts were also made to notify O.H. through a local police inspector, without success. The court therefore considered that it had taken sufficient and exhaustive measures to notify O.H. and to ensure her presence at the hearing, that the latter had abused her right, and that it was possible to examine the first applicant’s request in her absence. 36. On 3 December 2012 St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment of 9 October 2012 on appeal. 37. On 16 September 2013 the first applicant’s “cassation appeal” lodged against the judgment of 9 October 2012 and the decision on appeal of 3 December 2012 was dismissed. 38. In February 2009 the first applicant applied to the guardianship and trusteeship body for St Petersburg Porokhovye municipal circuit (орган опеки и попечительства местной администрации внутригородского муниципального образования г. Санкт-Петербурга муниципальный округ Пороховые) to facilitate visits between him and the second applicant. 39. In March 2009 the first applicant renewed his application. 40. On 12 March and 29 September 2009 representatives of the guardianship and trusteeship body accompanied the first applicant to visit the child. 41. In the meantime, on 8 July 2009 the guardianship and trusteeship body examined O.H.’s living conditions in St Petersburg. It was established that the flat was in a very good condition, that all the furniture and household appliances were new, and that the girl had a separate room, which was spacious, tidy and cosy. 42. Between 2010 and July 2011 the first applicant did not apply to the guardianship and trusteeship body to organise visits between him and the second applicant. 43. In February 2012 the first applicant again applied to the guardianship and trusteeship body to organise his upcoming visit in March 2012. He relied on the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011. However, his request was refused in the absence of a judgment by the Russian court obliging the guardianship and trusteeship body to organise visits between the first applicant and the second applicant. 44. On over a dozen occasions the first applicant applied to the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg seeking for assistance in establishing contact with his daughter and visa support. 45. In response to the first applicant’s requests the Ombudsman tried to reconcile the first applicant and O.H. In particular, during his visit to Russia between 23 September and 4 October 2010 the first applicant stayed at O.H.’s apartment and was able to have contact with his daughter. However, the first applicant and O.H. later had a conflict. O.H. claimed that the first applicant had been cruel to the child and that she would interfere with contact between the first applicant and the child in the interests of the latter. The Ombudsman explained to O.H. the provisions of the Family Code concerning the right of the parent living apart from the child to have contact with the child. Nevertheless O.H. stated that she viewed the situation as a strictly private family matter. In her opinion the wide media coverage of the case initiated by the first applicant and the involvement of a number of official bodies went contrary to the principles of the inviolability of private and family life. She further submitted that the child did not want to communicate with the first applicant. Since May 2011 the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg has lost all contact with O.H. Information about the second applicant was put on the Ombudsman’s website (www.spbdeti.org) in the “missing child” section. 46. Concerning the issue of visa support to the first applicant, the Ombudsman applied to the representation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St Petersburg, which explained that the first applicant could apply to the health care and social welfare authorities for the invitation which was required in order to obtain a Russian visa. 47. In his letter of 23 August 2013 the first applicant expressed his gratitude to the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg for her active participation in protecting the second applicant’s rights. (b) In Vologda Region 48. On 24 October 2012 the first applicant lodged a request with the Ombudsman for Children in Vologda Region asking for assistance in establishing his communication with his daughter. 49. On 21 November 2012 the Ombudsman visited Nyuksenitsa, where O.H. was supposedly living. However, the information about O.H. and the second applicant’s whereabouts in Nyuksenitsa was not confirmed. The first applicant was informed accordingly. 50. On 7 December 2012 the first applicant applied to the Ombudsman for Children in Vologda Region asking for an inquiry into the activity of the commission for the affairs of minors in Nyuksenskiy municipal district to be carried out owing to what he saw as their negligent attitude in examining the issue of establishing his communication with his daughter. 51. On 29 December 2012 the first applicant was informed that his request was outside the Ombudsman’s competence and that he could apply to the prosecutor’s office or the court. 52. On 11 April 2013 the first applicant again applied to the Ombudsman for Children in Vologda Region asking for assistance in establishing his daughter’s whereabouts. 53. On 29 April 2013 the first applicant was informed that the child was not studying in any school in Nyuksenskiy municipal district and was not living there. (c) Ombudsman for Children under the President of the Federation of Russia 54. On 25 November 2009 and 29 July 2010 the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs applied to the Ombudsman for Children under the President of the Federation of Russia for assistance in the protection of the right of the second applicant to communicate with both parents. Since at the time O.H. lived in St Petersburg with the child, the applications were transmitted to the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg. 55. On 21 March 2011 and 28 November 2011 the Ombudsman for Children under the President had consultative meetings with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czech Republic in the Russian Federation and actively corresponded with the Czech Embassy on the issue. Regular contact was maintained with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the guardianship and trusteeship body for St Petersburg Porokhovye municipal circuit. 56. Meanwhile, on 25 July 2011 and 3 September 2012 the first applicant himself applied to the Ombudsman for Children under the President of the Federation of Russia. Regular contact was maintained with the first applicant by telephone and e-mail. 57. As a result of the work carried out by the Ombudsman for Children under the President and the ombudsmen for children in St Petersburg and Vologda Region, on 28 February 2013 a reply was given to the first applicant. He was informed about the legal means of protecting his right to communicate with his daughter which were applicable to his situation. In particular, he was told that he could bring a civil action before the Russian courts in order to determine his access rights (иск об определении порядка общения с дочерью). That recommendation was made with regard to the first applicant’s repeated assurances that he was not seeking compulsory enforcement of the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011 as he understood that after such a long – in comparison to the child’s life – passage of time, the enforcement of that judgment could be harmful to his daughter and would not be in her best interests. At the same time the first applicant repeatedly stated his wish to establish and maintain regular contact with his daughter and to receive information about her life. However, the first applicant did not follow the above recommendation. 58. On 2 November 2011 the first applicant reported O.H.’s refusal to allow him to communicate with his daughter, the second applicant, to the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Prosecutor’s Office of St Petersburg. 59. The local police inspector went to O.H.’s registered place of residence in St Petersburg and found that she was not living there. The neighbours had no information about O.H.’s whereabouts. A summons requesting O.H. to present herself at the local police station was returned unclaimed after the expiration of its storage time. 60. On 22 December 2011 the first applicant asked the police to search for O.H. in the absence of any information about her and the second applicant since 30 May 2011. The file was transferred to Krasnogvardeyskiy District investigations department (следственный отдел по Красногвардейскому главному следственному управлению Следственного комитета Российской Федерации по Санкт-Петербургу). 61. The investigator of Krasnogvardeyskiy District investigations department succeeded in reaching O.H.’s mother, G.K., on her mobile telephone. The latter submitted that she was in regular contact with O.H., but refused to divulge O.H.’s whereabouts. 62. On 11 January 2012 the investigator received a fax message from O.H. in which the latter confirmed that she was living at her registered place of residence with the second applicant, and that she refused all contact with the first applicant. 63. On the same day the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings into the disappearance of O.H. and the second applicant. 64. On 22 March 2012 the juvenile inspector of the local police went to the flat at O.H.’s registered address in St Petersburg, but nobody opened the door. O.H.’s neighbour, Mr Sh., said that O.H.’s flat had not been lived in since June 2011. 65. On 26 March 2012 the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Deputy Prosecutor set aside the decision of 11 January 2012 and returned the file to the investigator with instructions to carry out an additional check aimed at determining the whereabouts of O.H. and the second applicant. 66. On 3 April 2012 and 26 May 2013 the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings into O.H.’s and the second applicant’s disappearance. Those decisions were subsequently set aside by the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Deputy Prosecutor and additional checks were ordered. 67. The additional checks revealed that O.H. had not been receiving her correspondence. They also established that the second applicant had not been attending kindergarten since 6 June 2011, and that the last appointments she had attended at the health care facility had been on 22 June and 6 September 2011. 68. According to information provided by the Krasnogvardeyskiy District commission for the affairs of minors (комиссия по делам несовершеннолетних и защите их прав при администрации Красногвардейского района), since the end of May 2011 O.H. had been hiding the second applicant from her father, the first applicant; she had not been opening the door and had been ignoring summonses to appear in court. 69. The Krasnogvargeyskiy District Prosecutor’s Office examined the possibility of bringing administrative proceedings against O.H. under Article 5.35 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. However, the failure to establish O.H.’s whereabouts made it impossible to serve summonses on her, to obtain her explanations and to serve her with the record of administrative offence. 70. The prosecution authorities also conducted a check at O.H.’s presumed place of residence in Nyuksenitsa, Vologda Region. It was established that O.H. and the second applicant did not live there. 71. On 21 December 2012 Nyuksenskiy District Prosecutor questioned O.H.’s mother, G.K. The latter submitted that O.H. had lived and worked in Nyuksenitsa between June and August 2012, but that O.H.’s subsequent whereabouts were unknown to her. G.K. further submitted that the first applicant was not supporting O.H. financially, that he had arrived in Nyuksenitsa in summer 2012 and sent 4,000 Russian roubles (RUB) to O.H.’s place of residence in St Petersburg, although he had known that O.H. had been living and working in Nyuksenitsa at that time. 72. It was established that in 2012 the second applicant had been enrolled for external studies in the first grade of Kirovskiy District school no. 277 in St Petersburg under a distance learning programme. When O.H. had signed a contract with the school she had given a St Petersburg address. 73. On 31 January and 13 May 2013 the local police inspector again went to the above-mentioned address in St Petersburg, in vain. 74. In August 2013 O.H. logged onto the school educational website, which suggested that the child started the second grade programme. 75. To the present day the whereabouts of O.H. and the second applicant remain unknown. 76. On 30 December 2008 the Russian Ministry of Justice received from the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic court orders issued by Prague 4 District Court for a check of O.H.’s living conditions and certain other procedural actions to be carried out. 77. On 26 January and 27 January 2009 respectively, in accordance with the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance, the court orders were submitted to the North-Western Federal Circuit Department of the Ministry of Justice (Управление Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации по Северо-Западному федеральному округу). 78. On 16 March and 30 April 2009 reminders were sent to the North‑Western Federal Circuit Department of the Ministry of Justice. 79. According to that department, the execution of the orders had been complicated by the failure of the court to provide O.H.’s correct address. 80. On 31 July 2009 the Russian Ministry of Justice submitted to the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic the documents on execution of the orders of Prague 4 District Court. 81. On 29 October 2010 and 12 November 2010 the Russian Ministry of Justice received from the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic another order issued by Prague 4 District Court to take certain procedural steps in respect of O.H. and a request for service of court documents on O.H. 82. On 11 November and 23 November 2010 respectively the court order and request for service of documents were submitted to the North‑Western Federal Circuit Department. 83. On 12 May 2011 the Russian Ministry of Justice informed the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic that it was impossible to execute the orders of Prague 4 District Court. 84. Following receipt of a note from the Embassy of the Czech Republic forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, on 29 March 2012, the Russian Ministry of Justice submitted to the North-Western Federal Circuit Department a court order issued by Prague 4 District Court for service of court documents on O.H. 85. On 31 July 2012 the Russian Ministry of Justice submitted to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the documents attesting to the impossibility of executing that court order. 86. Following receipt of another note from the Embassy of the Czech Republic, on 22 November 2012 the Russian Ministry of Justice again submitted to the North-Western Federal Circuit Department a court order issued by Prague 4 District Court for service of court documents on O.H. 87. On 1 June 2012, the first day of acceptance by the Czech Republic of Russia’s accession to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, the first applicant filed a request under Article 21 of the Convention for securing the effective exercise of his “access rights” in respect of his daughter, the second applicant. 88. On 21 August 2012 the Office for the Legal Protection of Children (“the Czech Central Authority”) informed the Russian Ministry of Education and Science (“the Russian Central Authority”) that the first applicant had discovered the whereabouts of O.H. in Vologda Region. However, he had not seen his daughter. 89. As the Russian Central Authority had not replied to the above‑mentioned letters, on 1 October 2012 a reminder was sent to it. 90. On 1 November 2012, at the request of the Czech Central Authority, the Ambassador of the Czech Republic in Moscow sent a letter to the Russian Central Authority. 91. On 5 March 2013 the Russian Central Authority replied that it was not possible to establish O.H. and the second applicant’s place of residence. 92. In the meantime, on 12 December 2012 and 27 March 2013 the Czech Central Authority contacted the Russian Children’s Ombudsman about the same issue. The Czech Authority has not yet received a reply. 93. On 21 May and 6 September 2013 the Czech Central Authority sent further letters to the Russian Central Authority. No reply has been received. Another reminder was sent on 13 December 2013. 94. On 11 November 2013 the Czech Central Authority sent a letter to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private Law asking for help in securing effective cooperation between the Czech and Russian Central Authorities.

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5. The applicant was born in 1974 and is currently serving a prison sentence in medical penal institution LIU-58, Sverdlovsk Region. 6. On 23 April 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. He was taken to the police station, where he was allegedly ill-treated by police officers and confessed to murder. 7. On 24 April 2005 the applicant was subjected to a forensic medical examination, which recorded two bruises under his left and right eyes measuring 1 x 2 cm, an abrasion on the middle finger of the left hand measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm, and an abrasion on the back of the right forearm measuring 0.2 x 2 cm. The expert concluded that the bruises under the eyes could have been inflicted three to five days prior to the examination, and the abrasions of the upper limbs could have appeared one to two days prior to the examination. 8. On the same day the record of the applicant’s arrest was drawn up. The applicant was questioned as a suspect and, allegedly for fear of further beatings, confirmed his previous confession. He was placed in a temporary detention unit. The unit’s medical records show that the applicant had a bruise under his left eye when admitted. They further indicate that the applicant was otherwise in good health. 9. On 26 April 2005 the applicant complained of chest pain. An ambulance was called, and he was found to have a bruised breastbone. 10. On 29 April 2005 the applicant was allegedly beaten again by the police officers in an attempt to make him confirm his previous statements to the investigator. 11. On 5 May 2005 the applicant again complained of chest pain. He was taken to Ozersk Town Hospital. An X-ray examination showed a breastbone fracture. 12. On 6 May 2005 the applicant was transferred to remand prison IZ‑74/3, Chelyabinsk. The facility doctor who examined the applicant on admission entered the breastbone fracture diagnosis of 5 May 2005 in the applicant’s medical records. 13. On 10 November 2005 Ozersk Town Court, Chelyabinsk Region, convicted the applicant, under Article 111 § 4 of the Criminal Code, of intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm on V., causing his death by reckless conduct. The applicant was sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. The applicant was represented by a legal-aid lawyer at the trial. 14. The applicant appealed. He asked the appeal court to allow him to attend the appeal hearing in his case, and also expressed the wish to be represented by a lawyer. 15. On 27 April 2006 Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant was present at the appeal hearing. He was, however, unrepresented. 16. On 16 March 2011 the Presidium of Chelyabinsk Regional Court granted an application for supervisory review by the Chelyabinsk Region Prosecutor and quashed the appeal decision of 27 April 2006. The Presidium found that the applicant’s right to legal representation had been violated in the appeal hearing and remitted the case for a fresh examination before the appellate court. 17. On 21 April 2011 Chelyabinsk Regional Court held a new appeal hearing in the applicant’s criminal case, with the applicant taking part (by video link) and in the presence of his legal-aid lawyer. The Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal and reduced his sentence to ten years and six months’ imprisonment. 18. Meanwhile, in December 2005 the applicant complained of ill‑treatment to the Ozersk Town Prosecutor’s Office. 19. On 26 January 2006 investigator Ch. of the Prosecutor’s Office, relying on Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers complained against, for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. The investigator relied on statements by police officer P. denying that the applicant had been assaulted, extracts from the medical records of the temporary detention unit showing the entries of 24 April, 26 April and 5 May 2005, the applicant’s statements of 2 May 2005 in which he alleged that the bruises had been inflicted during a fight with some teenagers in April 2005, and references to the applicant’s failure to mention the alleged ill-treatment during the examination of the issue of his detention, when he was questioned as a suspect, or when charges were brought against him. 20. On 24 March 2006 the Ozersk Town Prosecutor quashed that decision and ordered an additional pre-investigation inquiry. 21. On 27 March, 17 April and 29 June 2006 and 21 June 2007 the investigator again refused to open a criminal case in connection with the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. However, on 13 April and 26 June 2006 and 9 June and 2 July 2007 respectively the supervising prosecutor quashed those decisions as unfounded and ordered additional pre‑investigation inquiries. 22. On 6 July 2007 chief investigator P. of the Ozersk Town Prosecutor’s Office refused for the sixth time to order the institution of criminal proceedings, and concluded that the applicant had sustained his injuries prior to his arrest. This decision was based on the following evidence: - the applicant’s explanations of June 2006 (see paragraph 23 below); - explanations by the chief of police Mo., police officers P. and Sh., and the deputy chief of police Yar., who denied having subjected the applicant to any violence; - explanations by prosecutor’s assistant B. and investigator Ma.; - explanations by officers of the temporary detention unit Kh., G. and Akh.; - extracts from the temporary detention unit’s logbooks, including its medical logbook; - the X-ray examinations logbook of Ozersk Town Hospital; - the report of the applicant’s forensic medical examination; - explanations by ambulance doctor S., who examined the applicant at the temporary detention unit on 26 April 2005, and by hospital doctor B., who examined the applicant at the hospital on 5 May 2005; - the applicant’s statements of 24 April-2 May 2005 taken from his criminal file, to the effect that he had received the injuries prior to the arrest during a fight with some teenagers and that he had no complaints against the police officers or the officers of the temporary detention unit in connection with those injuries; - explanations by forensic medical expert Mos.; - documents from the applicant’s criminal file, including the records of his questioning of 24 April, 29 April and 19 July 2005, in which the applicant submitted that he had attacked V. (the victim of the crime of which the applicant had been convicted) in self-defence; - the applicant’s statements made during the trial and his complaints to the prosecutor and the investigator to the effect that he had sustained his breastbone fracture as a result of acts of violence by V. 23. It followed from the applicant’s explanations, in particular, that in early April 2005 he had had a fight with some unidentified teenagers, as a result of which he had received a bruise under his left eye. On 21 April 2005 V. had kicked the applicant twice in the chest area and twice in the face, as a result of which he had had a bruise under his right eye and felt pain in his chest. On 23 April 2005 the applicant was arrested and taken to the police station, where one police officer hit him with something heavy on the nape of the neck and another kicked him in the chest area, as a result of which the applicant felt pain in his chest. On 24 April 2005 one of the police officers hit him on the head at least twice with a 1.5-litre plastic bottle filled with water, which did not result in any injuries. On 29 April 2005 in the investigations office of the temporary detention unit one of the police officers had knocked the applicant to the floor and kicked him at least three or four times on the left side and twice in the stomach and chest. These actions did not lead to any injuries. The applicant could not clarify whether his breastbone fracture had been the result of the actions of V. or of the police officers. 24. On 8 November 2007 the Ozersk Town Prosecutor found the decision of 6 July 2007 lawful and justified. 25. On 19 March 2008 Ozersk Town Court, Chelyabinsk Region, found the pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant’s allegations to be complete and unbiased, and the decisions of 6 July and 8 November 2007 lawful and justified. 26. On 24 June 2008 Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 March 2008 on appeal.

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5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Riga. 6. He was arrested in July 1995 and in May 1998 he was convicted and sentenced to capital punishment. In June 1999, following the amendments to the Criminal Law Code, the appellate court converted the sentence of capital punishment into fifteen years’ imprisonment. The applicant started serving his sentence in a closed-type prison under the strictest (“lower”) regime (zemākais soda izciešanas režīms) (see “Relevant domestic law” below). 7. On 27 March 2001 the applicant was transferred to the “medium” regime in a closed-type prison (vidējais soda izciešanas režīms). In accordance with domestic law, the applicant was entitled to a list of rights (see “Relevant domestic law” below). 8. On 27 July 2005, while the applicant was serving his sentence in Pārlielupe Prison, the prison’s administrative commission decided to apply a more stringent regime to him and to transfer him to a closed-type prison under the “lower” regime. Relying on that decision, on 16 August 2005 the governor of Pārlielupe Prison recommended transferring the applicant to Daugavpils Prison owing to the fact that Pārlielupe Prison did not have appropriate facilities for him to continue serving his sentence under a more stringent regime. 9. On 5 September 2005, on an appeal by the applicant, the decision of the administrative commission was revoked by a decision of the Jelgava Court, which on 6 September 2005 was forwarded to Pārlielupe Prison. At the same time, on 5 September 2005 the Prisons Administration approved the recommendation by Pārlielupe Prison to transfer the applicant to Daugavpils Prison (see paragraph 8 above) and on 6 September 2005 the governor of Pārlielupe Prison issued an order to that effect. 10. On 18 October 2005 the order was executed despite the fact that the initial decision of 27 July 2005 had been revoked, and the applicant – who in the meantime had been admitted to the prison hospital – was transferred to Daugavpils Prison. During his stay in that prison the applicant was able to enjoy only a limited number of rights normally applicable to prisoners under the “medium” regime. In particular, he could not exercise his right to leave his cell for more than one hour a day, or his right to unrestricted access to the medical unit, prison shop, canteen and library. 11. On 20 October 2005 the management of Daugavpils Prison informed the Prisons Administration that they could not provide the facilities required under the “medium” regime. 12. On 26 October 2005 the Prisons Administration adopted a decision to transfer the applicant to Jēkabpils Prison to serve his sentence under the “medium” regime. That decision was executed on 4 November 2005. 13. It appears from the file on the applicant’s case before the administrative courts that on 27 September 2005 he raised an objection with the Prisons Administration about his transfer to Daugavpils Prison under a more stringent regime, but that the Prisons Administration dismissed it on 13 October 2005, and also dismissed a further complaint on 21 April 2006. 14. According to the Government’s submissions, on 17 October 2005 the applicant sent a complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office, which forwarded it to the Specialised Multibranch Prosecutor’s Office. The latter then forwarded the complaint to the Prisons Administration. 15. On 20 December 2005 the Prisons Administration mentioned in a letter addressed to the applicant that his stay in Daugavpils Prison had been the result of the slow exchange of information between the courts, the prisons and the Prisons Administration. 16. On 26 October 2005 the applicant complained to the District Administrative Court that as a result of the unlawful activities of the Prisons Administration, he had been transferred to a prison in which he could not serve his sentence under the regime applicable to him. 17. Before initiating the administrative proceedings the District Administrative Court asked the applicant to pursue the appropriate out‑of‑court procedure by appealing against the negative decision of the Prisons Administration, which the applicant did in March 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). 18. After a series of procedural decisions, on 6 November 2007 the District Administrative Court found that the applicant’s transfer to Daugavpils Prison in order to serve his sentence under a stricter regime had been carried out without any lawful basis and awarded him 100 Latvian lati (LVL – 150 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Its finding was based on a comparison of the list of rights to which the applicant was entitled under the “medium” regime and the rights which he had actually enjoyed as a result of his unlawful transfer to more stringent prison conditions. The court also took into account the actions of the management of Daugavpils Prison and the duration of the applicant’s stay there. 19. The Regional Administrative Court partly upheld that decision, after analysing whether the applicant’s transfer to a more stringent regime amounted to a significant infringement of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention. The court established that in transferring him, the authorities had executed a decision which had been already revoked by the national courts, and that for a duration of eighteen days he had unlawfully been required to serve his sentence under a regime whereby he remained locked in a shared prison cell all day. According to the court, these conditions were aggravated by the fact that both the applicant and the authorities were aware that his transfer was unlawful. It held that he had suffered a serious infringement of his rights and accordingly awarded him LVL 300 (EUR 450) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 20. Following an appeal by the Prisons Administration, on 16 September 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court’s decision and discontinued the administrative proceedings owing to the fact that the examination of decisions taken in the course of the execution of prison sentences did not fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The Senate also referred to section 16 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, concerning the prosecuting authorities’ powers to initiate investigations into alleged violations of prisoners’ rights. In this connection the Senate mentioned that the applicant had lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office about his transfer. 21. On 14 July 2010 the applicant was released from prison after completing his sentence. 22. On 15 March 2013 the Prisons Administration destroyed the applicant’s file on account of the expiry of the statutory archiving period.

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4. The applicants were born in 1923, 1959 and 1963, respectively, and live in Casteltermini. 5. The applicants are the joint owners of a plot of land designated as agricultural land in Casteltermini. The land in issue was recorded in the land register as Folio no. 40, Parcel no. 185. 6. On 13 July 1989 the regional councillor for public works issued a decree authorising the Municipality to take possession, through an expedited procedure and on the basis of a public-interest declaration, of a portion of the applicants’ land in order to begin the construction of a road. 7. On 4 January 1991 the authorities took physical possession of the land. 8. By a writ served on 23 June 1998, the applicants brought an action for damages against the Casteltermini Municipality before the Agrigento District Court. They alleged that the occupation of the land was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without there having been a formal expropriation of the land and payment of compensation. They claimed a sum corresponding to the market value of the land and a further sum in damages for the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation. 9. On an unspecified date the court ordered an expert valuation of the land. In a report submitted on 17 September 2001 the expert concluded that the occupied land covered a surface area of 124.87 square metres and confirmed that it could be classified as building land. He further concluded that the market value of the land on the date the occupation became unlawful, which he identified as having occurred on 13 July 1994, corresponded to 6.20 euros (EUR) per square metre, for a total of EUR 773.88. 10. By a judgment delivered on 22 January 2003 and filed with the court registry on 23 January 2003, the Agrigento District Court declared that the possession of the land, which had been initially authorised, had become unlawful as of 4 June 1993. It found that the land had been irreversibly transformed by the public works. As a result, in accordance with the constructive-expropriation rule (occupazione acquisitiva or accessione invertita), the applicants had been deprived of their property, by virtue of its irreversible alteration, on the date on which the possession had ceased to be lawful. In the light of those considerations, the court concluded that the applicants were entitled to compensation in consideration for the loss of ownership caused by the unlawful occupation. 11. The court drew on the expert valuation to conclude that the land could be classified as agricultural land and that its market value on the date the occupation had become unlawful corresponded to EUR 773.88. However, in contrast with the expert’s finding, the court reiterated that the occupation had become unlawful as of 4 June 1993. 12. Therefore, the court held that the applicants were entitled to compensation in the sum of EUR 773.88, to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest. 13. The court further awarded the applicants EUR 37.43 as compensation for the damage occasioned by the unavailability of the land during the period from the beginning of the lawful occupation (13 July 1989) until the date of loss of ownership (4 June 1993). 14. The judgment became final in March 2004.

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4. The applicants were born in 1964, 1958, 1993, 1997, 1997, 2000, 1998, 1994, 1990 and 1989 respectively and live in Batman. 5. On 26 June 2005, the first two applicants’ son and the other applicants’ brother, A.O., aged fourteen at the time, went into Batman Stream to swim and subsequently drowned. 6. According to the applicants, the uncontrolled draining of sand from Batman Stream of Dicle River changed the stream’s ecological balance. Eventually, holes and vortexes which occurred as a result of uncontrolled sand drain allegedly contributed to A. O.’s drowning. 7. Criminal proceedings where initiated against the Beysan joint stock company (“the company”), which was conducting the sand mining business at the time of events, and the Batman Governor’s office which issued the necessary permits to run the sand mine. On 5 March 2005, the criminal proceedings before the Batman public prosecutor’s office concluded with a decision not to prosecute. On 12 March 2006, the first applicant appealed against the non-prosecution decision. However, on 19 March 2007 his appeal request was also rejected by the Batman Assize Court. 8. While the criminal proceedings were pending, the first applicant requested the determination of evidence from the Batman Magistrates’ Court into the incident which led to A.O.’s death. Two expert reports were issued following the scene investigation, conducted by the Batman Magistrates’ Court on 8 July 2005. According to the expert reports, it was stated that the uncontrolled sand draining from Batman Stream changed the natural flow of the water and caused artificial holes and vortexes which amounted to three meters in depth in some parts. Despite these dangers, there were no warning signs. 9. On 27 July 2005 the applicants being convinced that the failure of the authorities and the company to take necessary safety measures to protect A.O.’s right to life, applied to the civil court of first instance with a compensation request. They sought a total of 75,000 Turkish liras (TRY) (46,500 euros (EUR) at the time) in compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 10. The applicants also requested legal aid for the court fees. On 15 August 2005, the Batman Civil Court of First Instance ordered the Security Directorate in Batman to investigate the economical means of the applicants. According to the report submitted by the Security Directorate, it was revealed that the applicants were unemployed and lived on state benefits and help from their neighbours. Nevertheless, the trial court rejected the applicants’ legal aid request on the basis of Sıddık Onar, the father of the deceased’s, age and his ability to work. 11. On 1 December 2006 the trial court notified the applicants that they were required to pay a court fee of TRY 214.76 (approximately EUR 115) within ten days in order to continue the proceedings and that the proceedings would be discontinued if they failed to do so. 12. On 29 December 2006 the Batman Civil Court of First Instance decided to discontinue the proceedings as the applicants had not paid the court fees.

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5. The applicants are currently in detention. 6. On 7 May 2005 the victim, P.R., a registered alcoholic, was attacked in his flat. He suffered extensive injuries and spent a month in hospital. 7. He made a statement to the police on 3 June 2005. The statement bore a statement of truth which read: “This statement ... is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated anything in it which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.” 8. In his statement, he explained that on the day of the attack he had been at home in his flat and had drunk at least three litres of cider in the course of the day. At various times during the day he had been in the company of X., B. and M. At some point B. and M. had left his flat and had returned carrying a television and a hi-fi system, which they had placed in a bedroom. Later in the evening, X., B. and M. had left, although the victim explained, “I don’t know times and my memory is vague”. He then recalled answering a knock on the door, following which three men had entered the premises by force and attacked him. The victim said: “The bigger male out of the three started punching me to the face, followed by a man who was on crutches. I was getting punched by all of them and I eventually fell to the floor. I was dragged and pulled into the bedroom where they saw the television and hi-fi system. I remember them going mad punching me more and more to my body and face. I don’t remember much else.” 9. He described the features of the “bigger male” and the “male on crutches”, who he knew lived in the same block of flats. He said that the third male was called “Horncastle” and also described him. 10. The victim died on 23 July 2006 from an alcohol-related illness. 11. Mr Horncastle and Mr Blackmore were subsequently charged, together with another man, D., with causing P.R. grievous bodily harm with intent. 12. The prosecution case was that B. and M. had burgled another flat in the victim’s block of flats, and had taken the stolen property to the victim’s flat. B. and M. had pleaded guilty to that burglary. The prosecution alleged that the attack on the victim had occurred when Mr Horncastle and Mr Blackmore had gone with D., the owner of stolen property, to recover it. They claimed that Mr Blackmore was the “bigger male” and D. was the “male on crutches”. 13. The defence case was that although Mr Horncastle and Mr Blackmore had gone to the victim’s flat to help recover D.’s property, neither had been involved in the attack. 14. In a statement to the police, Mr Horncastle said that the victim had been very drunk, and that he (Mr Horncastle) had collected the television and returned it to D.’s flat. He had not seen the attack on the victim. 15. In his statement to the police, Mr Blackmore said that he had been drinking with D. and Mr Horncastle. They had gone back to D.’s flat at about 9 p.m. and discovered that it had been burgled. D. had asked if they would go with him and recover what had been stolen, as he had been told where it was. They had gone to the victim’s flat at about 10 p.m. The door had been opened by a man whom the others had pushed out of the way. They had seen the stolen property. He had picked up a DVD player and walked out, stepping over P.R., the victim, lying on the floor. Mr Blackmore said that he had had some specks of blood on his shoes, jeans and T-shirt which had come from the wall or a splatter when the victim had been hit. He had been aware that the victim was getting punched and had not wanted to have anything to do with it. He did not know what happened after that. He had put the DVD player in the lift and returned to the flat. At that point the victim was still lying on the floor and there was blood everywhere. He had not hit the victim. He had not expected them to do what they had done. 16. Another resident of the block of flats, J., made a statement to the police suggesting that M. might have been involved in the assault on the victim. That statement was disclosed to the defence. The defence was ultimately based on the assertion that M. was the perpetrator. 17. The prosecution applied to read the victim’s statement at trial, under section 116(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act” – see paragraphs 93-94 below). The application was opposed by the applicants under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE” – see paragraph 90 below) on the ground that it would be unfair to admit the statement which constituted the only admissible evidence of participation against them, as there could be no opportunity to challenge it and it was inherently unreliable. The applicants relied on the admission by the victim that he had drunk a quantity of alcohol; on his statement that “I don’t know times and my memory is vague”; and on the fact that the description given of the first male did not fit Mr Blackmore. 18. The judge ruled on 24 January 2007 that the statement should be admitted. He found that the condition in section 116(2)(a) was satisfied (namely, that the witness was dead); and that the fact that the statement was the principal evidence against the defendants did not make its admission unfair. He relied in particular on the fact that the defendants had all admitted being present in the victim’s flat together to recover D.’s property; that the defendants were going to call J. to give evidence that M. had been responsible for the attack; and that the jury could be given directions as to any difficulties faced by the defence on account of P.R.’s statement being read. 19. In March 2007 the trial commenced before a judge and a jury. D. subsequently pleaded guilty. The jury in the trial were later discharged for unrelated reasons and a retrial was ordered. A second trial commenced in June 2007, but the jury were again discharged following an issue in relation to the forensic evidence. A third trial commenced in November 2007. 20. The prosecution relied on other evidence, besides the statement of the victim. X., who had spent the day drinking with the victim, gave evidence to the effect that P.R. had been tipsy but not drunk on the afternoon of the attack. He also testified that he had subsequently visited the victim in hospital, where the victim had indicated that he had been attacked by three people but that he could not really remember who had attacked him. Two witnesses gave evidence that the victim had told them that D. and his friends had attacked him. There was also scientific evidence that the blood on the television matched that of the victim. Forensic evidence suggested that the assault had commenced at the front door and the hallway and then moved to the entrance of the bedroom. There was pooling of blood at the entrance to the bedroom, as if the source of the blood had lain there for some time. Blood on D.’s crutches matched the victim’s DNA profile. Evidence was also led to show that P.R. had shown no fear of M. when meeting him after the attack. 21. Mr Horncastle gave evidence in his defence. He said that he had been drinking all day with D. and Mr Blackmore. In the evening they had returned to D.’s flat and realised that it had been burgled. They had gone downstairs to another flat and he had followed D. inside. He had seen a man staggering in the hallway. D. had then pointed out the items that had been stolen. Mr Horncastle had picked up the television and returned to D.’s flat. He had not seen an assault and had not seen any blood. He, Mr Blackmore and D. had returned to the pub. 22. Mr Blackmore did not give evidence at trial. 23. P.R.’s neighbour, J., was called to give evidence for the defence. He testified that he had heard some shouting and banging on the night of the attack and had seen M. banging on doors. Later he had seen M. holding P.R. in a headlock; another person had been with him. He had closed the door but had heard a lot of shouting and noise for the next twenty minutes. His answers in cross-examination were not consistent with his previous statement to the police. 24. The judge, on Mr Blackmore’s application, admitted evidence of M.’s previous convictions as evidence of a propensity for violence. The judge refused to admit evidence of the previous convictions of Mr Horncastle and Mr Blackmore. 25. The judge made clear the importance of P.R.’s witness statement at the outset of his review of the evidence in the summing up to the jury, noting: “The prosecution case here depends, does it not, upon the evidence of [the victim].” 26. He explained to the jury that the victim’s evidence was not agreed, that the defence had not had the opportunity of testing it by cross‑examination and that it would carry less weight than evidence from a witness who had come to court and had testified. He set out examples of areas in the victim’s statement which had not been cross-examined. 27. Just over an hour after the jury had retired, they asked to see the victim’s statement; the judge told them that they could not see it but reminded them of its contents by reading it to them. 28. The jury subsequently returned unanimous guilty verdicts in respect of both Mr Horncastle and Mr Blackmore. 29. On 1 November 2007 at around 7 p.m. the victim, H.M., was at home alone in the house she shared with her partner, G.P., preparing to take a bath. Six men entered the house and stole various items, including jewellery. After threatening the victim with a knife, they kidnapped her by taking her away in the car they had come in. A black BMW X5 car owned by her partner was also taken at the same time. 30. The victim subsequently made a formal statement to the police, containing a statement of truth in the terms outlined above (see paragraph 7), giving an account of events on 1 November 2007. She stated that, as she had been about to bathe, two masked men had entered her bedroom; one had a knife. She had been ordered downstairs where there were four other men. They had asked where the jewellery, money and car keys were and she had told them about her partner’s safe in his wardrobe. Four of the men had then taken her to the car they had come in and had driven off. She assumed that the other two men had taken G.P.’s car. 31. The men in her car had then asked for G.P.’s telephone number, which she gave them, and they had telephoned him. She described the telephone conversations that followed and explained that the men had told her that they wanted one hundred thousand pounds before they would let her go. She had also been told that she should not go to the police because she would know what would happen to her if she did. She had been warned not to look at her captors, and had taken the threats to mean that they would kill her if she saw their faces. She said that she had been punched twice in the back of the head, which she understood to have been intended to show her that her kidnappers were serious about hurting her. She had heard her captors say that if they did not get money they would cut off her fingers and toes. One of the men had said something about putting her in a vice. She was eventually put in the boot of the car for a while before being dropped off unharmed. After unsuccessful attempts to telephone G.P. from various locations, she had eventually spoken to her father who had picked her up. She had arrived home shortly after 9 p.m. and the police had arrived around ten minutes later. In her statement, she did not identify any person as having participated in her kidnapping. 32. On 1 November 2007 G.P. made a short statement setting out his account of the ransom demands and how the kidnappers had threatened to cut off the victim’s fingers if he did not pay the ransom. 33. On 2 November 2007 Mr Graham was arrested in G.P.’s stolen car after having been seen on CCTV. A knife was found in the car. 34. On 3 November 2007 H.M. made a further police statement. She was shown the knife which had been recovered from the car in which Mr Graham had been arrested and asked if she had seen it before. She confirmed that it was the knife used to threaten her. 35. On 4 November 2007 a police officer visited G.P. and the victim, in the presence of the latter’s father, and told them “in no uncertain terms” that the men the police were seeking were dangerous and that it was not beyond them to use guns. He gave as an illustration the use of guns against a couple who had fled and had been murdered in the village to which they had been relocated. He spoke to them about moving. 36. On 22 November 2007 the victim and G.P made police statements to the effect that they wished to retract their previous statements and did not want the police to pursue a prosecution, as they were scared for the safety of their families. 37. Mr Marquis and Mr Graham were charged with kidnapping. The prosecution relied on other evidence, apart from the victim’s statement. 38. First, Mr Graham was seen with other masked men on the CCTV cameras entering the victim’s house on the evening of 1 November 2007. That evidence was not disputed at trial although when initially questioned Mr Graham had not accepted that he had been to the house or that the person shown on the CCTV was him. It was also not disputed that G.P.’s car had been taken from outside the house shortly thereafter. The telephone records proving that G.P. had subsequently been contacted on his telephone from the victim’s telephone and that a number of calls were made from Mr Marquis’ telephone to G.P. were undisputed. 39. There was evidence that Mr Marquis had spent the night of 1‑2 November 2007 at a hotel and that a woman of his acquaintance, K.H., had gone to the hotel to meet him that night. She gave evidence that she had been told to park her car between a red van and “my X5”. When she had gone to Mr Marquis’ room, she had been introduced to a man (whom Mr Marquis refused to identify). She had seen a pink telephone which was identical to the one owned by the victim. It was accepted that the telephone used to call G.P. that night was also used by Mr Marquis to contact K.H. between 31 October and 2 November 2007. A text to her from Mr Marquis at 1:35 a.m. on 2 November stated: “Hey don’t let no-one know where I am, you know. Remember I know your address and that. You should have just said you were going. I ain’t bothered, but if I get arrested, I know it’s you” 40. CCTV evidence showed Mr Graham at the wheel of G.P.’s car twice on 2 November 2007; on the second occasion the car had false registration plates. 41. There was also evidence that a man describing himself as John Graham had rented a room at the hotel where Mr Marquis had stayed on 1 November 2007 and had described himself as the driver of a black BMW X5. 42. Mr Graham’s defence was that there had been no kidnapping. He claimed that the victim and her partner had been involved in an attempted insurance fraud. Mr Marquis denied any involvement in any kidnapping that there may have been. 43. The victim and G.P. did not attend court on 4 April 2008 in compliance with a witness summons that had been issued for the trial. The victim was arrested on 7 April 2008 and brought to court. On giving an explanation to the judge that, although she was frightened, she would have attended court but had been told not to attend by Witness Support, she was bailed to appear on 9 May 2008. She was warned that if she did not attend a warrant for her arrest would be issued and she could be imprisoned for up to two years. The trial was fixed for 12 May 2008. G.P. later surrendered into custody and was also bailed to appear. 44. The victim made a further statement on 9 April 2008 which was video recorded. In it she said that she had made the retraction statement of 22 November 2007 because she was scared. She thought that those who had kidnapped her were dangerous and she was very frightened. She said: “Since I was kidnapped, I have found that the incident has altered my life. I am petrified. I find myself looking over my shoulder and wondering if the people responsible will come and get me. I feel like this because at the time they said to me, ‘You’d better not go to the police ‘cos you know what will happen if you do’. I perceived this as a direct threat against me and I just don’t know what they are capable of, considering that they forced their way into my house and kidnapped me. I perceive them as very dangerous people. As such I am terrified all of the time and find myself very tearful, and I am almost not sleeping at night.” 45. She added that the police had made her more frightened when they told her that she and G.P. had to move. She did not feel she could leave her house for fear of what might happen to her and her anxiety had been increased by the court case. 46. She confirmed that the police had explained the possibility of using special measures at trial. She said that her evidence would be “greatly enhanced” if she could speak from behind a screen in the court room. Finally, she said that she had not been subjected to any threats directly or indirectly from those responsible for kidnapping her, but that she still felt scared. 47. G.P. made a statement on video on 16 April 2008. In his statement he referred to the police visit in November 2008 and the advice to “leave town”, which he said had “really frightened” them. He said that he had tried to get in touch, through a friend, with a certain “Bijer” because another friend had recognised the number which had called him on the night of the kidnapping as that of “Bijer”. “Bijer” had rung him, but it was clear that this was not the person who had rung him on the telephone on 1 November 2007. “Bijer” had explained to him that he had sold the telephone the week before. G.P said that he was not scared to give evidence but just did not want to, in case there were reprisal attacks. 48. Neither the victim nor G.P. attended court on 9 May 2008. The victim’s father’s evidence to the trial judge was that she had packed her bags and fled the day before. 49. On 12 May 2008, the prosecution applied to read the statements of H.M. and G.P. under section 116(2)(e) of the 2003 Act on the grounds that they would not give evidence through fear (see paragraphs 93-94 below). The applicants argued that the statements could not be admitted as the fear did not fall within the meaning of the 2003 Act as it had not been generated by any action of theirs or their associates, but by what the police officer had said on 4 November 2007 (see paragraph 35 above). 50. On 13 May 2008 the trial judge handed down his ruling on the admission of the statements. He noted, in respect of H.M.’s video statement of 9 April: “I have seen a portion of that tape and it is perfectly clear to me the witness was petrified, genuinely really distressed, breaking down into tears.” 51. The judge heard evidence from the victim’s father and the police officer who had spoken to her on 4 November 2007. He observed that in her witness statement of 9 April, H.M. had explained that she was “more” scared as a consequence of the police advice, noting that this was “on top of her own fears”. He also observed that in her statement, H.M. had confirmed that the possibility of special measures at trial had been explained to her. He referred to the warning that he had given her as to the serious consequences if she failed to attend court (see paragraph 43 above). He concluded: “Having heard all the evidence, the only sensible conclusion is that she was and is so terrified of coming to court to give evidence, she would rather face arrest and imprisonment. I have no doubt she’s in fear of giving evidence.” 52. The judge noted that there was no qualification in section 116(2)(e) of the 2003 Act on how the fear had to have been generated. He accepted that H.M. qualified under the Act to have her statement read as a witness in fear, and stressed that there had been no bad faith by the police in respect of the advice that they had given. The judge found that it would not be unfair or unjust to admit the statement. 53. In the same ruling the judge declined to admit the evidence of G.P. as he was not satisfied that his non-attendance was due to fear. 54. On 15 May 2008 an application was made to the judge to admit G.P.’s statement made on 16 April 2008 in the interests of justice under section 114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act (see paragraph 92 below) so that it could be advanced as part of the defence case of Mr Marquis. It was submitted that Mr Marquis was put at a great disadvantage because the defence could not cross-examine G.P. in relation to the voice heard over the telephone on 1 November 2007. The judge refused the application on the basis that G.P. was not in fear and he was not prepared to go behind his ruling of 13 April 2008; and the evidence covered many matters which implicated the applicants and not just that part of it relating to the recognition of the voice over the telephone. 55. Mr Marquis and Mr Graham were tried at the Crown Court before a judge and a jury. 56. Oral evidence was heard from S., a friend of G.P., which the judge directed the jury to treat with caution. S. said he had been with G.P. on the night of the kidnapping when G.P. had received a telephone call. He had answered it and had looked distressed. S. had been able to hear some of the conversation, including a demand for money and a girl crying in the background. G.P. had told him that someone had taken his girlfriend and was demanding money. There had then been a couple more calls. G.P. had asked him to telephone the police which he had done. The tape of that call recorded the person calling the police as giving an account that three black males were demanding money while holding his girlfriend in the bathroom at her house. S. gave evidence that G.P. had also received further calls from another telephone. S. had recognised the telephone number and when he had put it into his own mobile telephone it had registered as belonging to Bijah (the abbreviation used by Mr Marquis for his first name). When S. denied that Bijah was the same person as Mr Marquis, the judge permitted him to be treated as a hostile witness and evidence was put to him to show he knew Mr Marquis. 57. A police officer gave evidence that he had called S.’s mobile telephone and had spoken to a man who had given his name as G.P. He had sounded agitated and was shouting that they had kidnapped her. He had then heard a mobile telephone ringing and had been told by G.P. that it was his girlfriend’s number. G.P. had asked him to listen. He had been able to hear some of the demands for money when the two telephones were held against one another. The telephone had rung again and he could hear a girl’s voice screaming that they had taken her. When the telephone had gone dead, G.P. had confirmed that it was his girlfriend and that he did not know where she was. He did not say where he was but said that he would be returning to their home shortly. Another call had then taken place during which money was demanded. 58. The victim’s father gave evidence that he had received a telephone call between 8.30 p.m. and 8.45 p.m. on 1 November 2007 from his daughter. She had told him that she had been kidnapped and needed to be picked up. She had sounded distressed. He had collected her and she had given him an account of what she said had happened. She had tried to contact her partner on the telephone, but had not answered. They had gone to her home to see if he was there. When they had arrived at the house, two of her friends were there and asked what had happened. She had given an account, tearful and shaken. The victim’s father had then searched the house but G.P. was not there. He had found lukewarm water in the bath and had telephoned the police. Before they came, the victim had given an account of what had happened which was consistent with the statement she subsequently gave to them. 59. Mr Marquis gave evidence at trial, denying any role in the kidnapping. He stated that his telephone had been used by him between 31 October and 2 November 2007 to contact K.H., but that he had lost it when he got into a car owned by some men on the afternoon of 1 November 2007 and did not get it back from them until he was at the hotel. The telephone had therefore not been in his possession when the calls had been made to G.P. He would not identify the men. When he had gone to the room at the hotel, the pink telephone was already there, but he had no idea how it had got there. 60. Mr Graham did not give evidence. He provided no evidence from any person which would have formed a basis for the case that the kidnapping was an attempted insurance fraud. It was nonetheless advanced as part of the defence case to the jury. 61. In his summing up, the trial judge directed the jury in relation to the way that they should treat H.M.’s statement and the disadvantages to the applicants of being unable to cross-examine her. 62. On 12 May 2008 Mr Marquis and Mr Graham were convicted of kidnapping. 63. Mr Horncastle and Mr Blackmore appealed against their convictions on the ground that the victim’s statement should not have been admitted as evidence. They submitted that the statement was the sole or decisive evidence against them. 64. Mr Marquis and Mr Graham appealed against their convictions on the grounds, inter alia, that the victim’s statement should not have been admitted because there was no evidence that the fear had been caused by the applicants, and the police had contributed hugely to the fear. It was also contended that her evidence was decisive in the case, as it was the only evidence that there had been a kidnapping. 65. On 22 May 2009, the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeals. 66. The court found that Article 6 § 3 (d) did not create any absolute right to have every witness examined and that the balance struck by the 2003 Act was legitimate and wholly consistent with the Convention. It noted, however, that there could be a very real disadvantage in admitting hearsay evidence and it needed cautious handling. Having regard to the safeguards contained in the 2003 Act, which were rigorously applied, it was of the view that there would be no violation of Article 6 if a conviction were based solely or to a decisive degree on hearsay evidence. Where the hearsay evidence was demonstrably reliable, or its reliability could properly be tested and assessed, the rights of the defence would be respected, there would be sufficient counterbalancing measures and the trial would be fair. The court considered that it was not appropriate that there should be a rule that counterbalancing measures could never be sufficient where the evidence was sole or decisive. 67. In terms of counterbalancing measures, the Court of Appeal considered that the power of a trial judge under section 125 of the 2003 Act to stop the case if the absent-witness evidence was unconvincing (see paragraph 98 below) provided for a “proportionate assessment of the reliability” of such evidence; and that it would not serve justice if that power were to be trammelled by a requirement that it be exercised in every case in which the evidence were the sole or decisive evidence. Sole or decisive absent-witness evidence could be wholly convincing and, equally, evidence which was neither sole nor decisive might have such a potential influence on the jury that the judge would be persuaded that a conviction was unsafe. Where there was a legitimate argument that the absent witness evidence was unconvincing and important to the case, the trial judge was required to make up his own mind as to whether a conviction would be safe. This involved assessing the reliability of the impugned evidence, its place in the evidence as a whole, the issues in the case as they had emerged, and all the other individual circumstances of the case. Finally, the other safeguards contained in the 2003 Act were rigorously applied and the difficulties faced by defendants when absent-witness evidence was admitted were well understood by the courts. 68. The Court of Appeal gave guidance as to when it would be appropriate to allow absent-witness evidence to be introduced because a witness was in fear. There was, in the case-law of this Court, no requirement that the fear had to be attributable to the defendant; the essential questions were whether there was a justifiable reason for the absence of the witness supported by evidence and whether the evidence was demonstrably reliable or its reliability could be properly tested and assessed. The Court of Appeal added: “87. It is, however, important that all possible efforts are made to get the witness to court. As is clear, the right to confrontation is a longstanding requirement of the common law and recognised in Article 6(3)(d). It is only to be departed from in the limited circumstances and under the conditions set out in the [2003 Act]. The witness must be given all possible support, but also made to understand the importance of the citizen’s duty, and indeed that the violent and intimidatory will only flourish the more if that duty is not done, whilst they will normally back down in the face of determination that it be performed. For this reason it is of especial importance that assurances are never given to potential witnesses that their evidence will be read. Unless the defendant consents, it is only the court applying the strict conditions of the [2003 Act] based on evidence that can admit such a statement. Any indication, let alone an assurance, can only give rise to an expectation that this will indeed happen, when if it does the impact of the evidence will be diminished and the disadvantage to the accused may result in it not being given at all. 88. ... In the case before us of Marquis and Graham ... the Judge found that the investigating police officer had significantly contributed to the fear of the witness by referring repeatedly to a notorious local example of witnesses being hunted down, although relocated, and killed. Although notorious, that incident was an extreme and very unusual case. The need for police officers to tender careful advice to potential witnesses in order to discharge their duty of care towards them should not lead to such frightening information being laboured out of defensiveness. Whilst the [2003 Act] requires fear to be construed broadly, it is not to be expected that fear based upon inappropriate assurances by police officers will result in the evidence being read and the case proceeding on the basis of it to the jury. If the evidence can really only be assessed by the jury by seeing the witness, as will often be the case, it may not be admitted. If it is admitted and central to the case, there is a significant possibility that at the end of the trial the Judge may have to rule under s.125 that a conviction relying upon it would be unsafe.” 69. Having considered the general principles, the court turned to examine the specific facts of the applicants’ cases. 70. The Court of Appeal reviewed the victim’s statement and the evidence presented to the trial court. It found that there was substantial evidence independent of the statement to prove that Mr Blackmore and Mr Horncastle had gone to the victim’s flat, that they had been present when the attack had taken place and that both had taken away items from the flat. It noted: “108. i) Blackmore and Horncastle both admitted they accompanied [D.] to flat 9 and were present when the door was opened. ii) Horncastle removed the TV on his own admission. The TV had [the victim’s] blood on it. It is an inescapable inference that Horncastle must have been present after sufficient violence had been inflicted on [the victim] for blood to have got onto the TV. His account that he saw no violence must have been untruthful. iii) Blackmore admitted taking the DVD and stepping over the prostrate body of [the victim]. He must have been present when the violence began and he returned to the flat to help with removing the TV, despite knowing that [the victim] had been attacked. iv) Neither appellant contended there was anyone else other than [D.] present at that time they first went to the flat or when the DVD or TV were removed. v) The scientific evidence pointed clearly to the attack having taken place at the entrance to the flat and at the door to the bedroom which was near the entrance. The attack must therefore have been visible to anyone who remained at the entrance. vi) It follows from the above that there was a significant amount of evidence which showed that the attack occurred in the presence of each of the appellants. vii) There was no evidence of motive for [M.] to have attacked [the victim]. On the contrary he was a friend of [the victim’s] and [the victim] had shown no fear when he saw him ... after he had been attacked.” 71. Despite the substantial amount of independent evidence, the Court of Appeal accepted that it was clear from the judge’s ruling on admissibility, from the way in which the case was summed up and from the question from the jury that the victim’s statement was to a decisive degree the basis on which the applicants were convicted. 72. However, it considered that the decisive nature of the evidence was only one of the factors which the court had to put into the balance in the various stages that it had to go through in applying the legislation. It observed that the judge’s decision on the admissibility of the evidence carefully applied the statutory tests under the 2003 Act; that the applicants had been provided with ample material to attack the victim’s credibility, including the notes of his treatment in hospital; that no application had been made under section 125 of the 2003 Act to stop the case; that the judge’s direction to the jury was very full and that he had drawn attention to the particular matters that put the defence at a disadvantage, in particular the inability to cross-examine the victim as to his memory, his alcoholism, his description of Mr Blackmore and other matters; and that there was no suggested reason why the victim should have provided an untruthful statement. 73. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the jury had been able to make a proper assessment of the reliability of the victim’s evidence contained in the statement. It further considered that the jury was right in placing reliance on the statement, as its convincing nature and reliability in important respects could be tested against other evidence, including the applicants’ own admissions; the visit of three persons to the victim’s flat and taking items away; the evidence of blood on the television removed by Mr Horncastle; Mr Blackmore’s evidence in relation to observing the victim on the floor and the blood in the flat; and the other independent evidence to which it had already referred . 74. The Court of Appeal accordingly concluded that the applicants were provided with sufficient counterbalancing measures to ensure respect for their fair trial rights. They had received considerable information about the victim and his time in hospital; they were able to draw to the jury’s attention all the arguments for treating the statement as unreliable; and they were able to put forward an alternative case that the assault was carried out by M. by calling independent evidence in support. 75. The Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence at trial and the judge’s decision to admit the victim’s statement. It also examined the directions given to the jury in relation to the way in which they should treat the statement and the disadvantages to the applicants in not being able to cross‑examine the victim, which it considered to be appropriate. 76. It found, having regard to its observations on the ambit of “fear” under the 2003 Act (see paragraph 68 above), that the judge was correct in his ruling as to the victim’s fear. 77. The court also took the view that there was sufficient material before the jury to enable them properly to assess the reliability of the victim’s statement. It explained: “140. ... We also consider that its convincing nature and reliability in important respects could be tested against other evidence including: i) that when the police visited the house, the bath had lukewarm water in it. ii) that a knife was recovered from the BMW in which Graham was arrested; she identified it as the one used on her. iii) that [G.P.] was phoned using her phone and an identical phone was seen in the bedroom at the Castle Marina Holiday Inn used by Marquis. In considering the overall fairness of the decision to admit the evidence of [the victim] and in looking at the safety of the conviction, we have taken into account the criticism of the judge’s refusal to admit the statement of [G.P.]. Marquis sought to admit only part of his evidence contained in the statements. The judge had concluded that [G.P.] was not in fear and could have attended. To have admitted the whole of the evidence in those circumstances would not have been in accordance with the statutory code and to have admitted part of it on Marquis’ application would have been to provide evidence that was misleading without the rest of the evidence.” 78. The Court of Appeal considered it clear that the convictions did not rest on the evidence of the victim to a decisive extent. It noted: “142. ... i) The main evidence against Graham was that there was clear CCTV evidence that Graham had been at the house at the time [the victim] said she was kidnapped; he admitted that, though in his interview he had not accepted that. He was arrested in [G.P.’s] stolen BMW X5. [The victim’s] statement did not identify him. ii) The main evidence against Marquis was that his phone was used to make the ransom demands heard by [S.] and [the police officer]. It was not disputed that a phone identical to one owned by [the victim] was seen by [K.H.] when she went to Marquis’ bedroom at the Marina Castle Holiday Inn. [The victim’s] statement did not identify him. iii) The only matter proved by [the victim’s] statement was that she had been kidnapped. There was, however, sufficient evidence of that from the other witnesses in the case, particularly her father. iv) There was no evidence to support the case advanced by Graham that the kidnapping was an attempted insurance fraud. v) Counsel for the Crown had submitted in his application to the judge to admit the statements of both [G.P.] and [the victim] that they were central to the case. However, the fact that this submission was made is an illustration of the difficulty ... of determining in advance whether the evidence is decisive. Self evidently the evidence of [G.P.] made no difference, as it was not admitted and in the result, for the reasons we have given, the evidence of [the victim] was not, in the event, decisive. vi) Thus, if contrary to the view we have expressed, a statement of a person kept away by fear could not be relied upon as evidence of a decisive extent in favour of a conviction, then as the conviction rests on other evidence, then that ground of appeal fails for that additional reason.” 79. The court concluded that the applicants’ defence rights were respected, the trial was fair and the convictions were safe. 80. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the decisions to admit the statements in their cases rendered their convictions unfair. They relied heavily on the judgment of the Fourth Section of this Court in Al‑Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009. 81. On 9 December 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals. Lord Phillips gave the judgment of the court, with which the other justices agreed. He identified the principal issue raised by the appeals as being whether a conviction based “solely or to a decisive extent” on the statement of a witness whom the defendant had had no chance of cross‑examining necessarily infringed his right to a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d). 82. Lord Phillips began with an analysis of the common law approach to a fair trial and the provisions of the 2003 Act. He set out the legal framework under section 116 of the 2003 allowing, exceptionally, the admission of hearsay evidence at criminal trials (see paragraphs 93-96 below), explaining “36. ... [T]he [Criminal Justice Act] 2003 contains a crafted code intended to ensure that evidence is admitted only when it is fair that it should be.” 83. He went on to detail the “special stipulations” set out in sections 124-126 of the 2003 Act which were applicable to all hearsay evidence and designed to ensure the fairness of the proceedings (see paragraphs 97-99 below). 84. He summarised the safeguards present at trial to protect against any potential for unfairness arising from the admission of hearsay evidence as follows: “38. ... i) The trial judge acts as gatekeeper and has a duty to prevent the jury from receiving evidence that will have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that it should not be received. ii) Hearsay evidence is only admissible in strictly defined circumstances. In essence the judge has to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution is not able to adduce the evidence by calling the witness. iii) Once the prosecution case is closed, the judge must withdraw the case from the jury if it is based wholly or partly on hearsay evidence and that evidence is so unconvincing that, considering its importance, the defendant’s conviction would be unsafe. iv) The judge has to direct the jury on the dangers of relying on hearsay evidence. v) The jury has to be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. vi) The defendant can apply for permission to appeal against his conviction, which will be granted where reasonable grounds for appeal are demonstrated. A failure to comply with the safeguards outlined above, and in particular the admission of hearsay evidence contrary to the rules on its admissibility, will constitute such grounds. Where the Court of Appeal finds that there has been such a failure, the appeal will be allowed unless the court is satisfied that, despite the shortcoming, the conviction is ‘safe’.” 85. Lord Phillips considered the approach to absent-witness evidence in other common law jurisdictions. He then examined criminal procedure in civil law jurisdictions and the case-law of this Court prior to the Chamber judgment in Al‑Khawaja and Tahery. He reviewed in some detail the origins and development of the “sole or decisive rule” in the Court’s case‑law. 86. He then turned to consider the Chamber’s judgment in Al‑Khawaja and Tahery, citing an extract of the judgment which explained that in the absence of special circumstances arising where the absent witness failed to give oral evidence as a result of fear induced by the defendant, it was doubtful whether any counterbalancing measures would be sufficient to justify the introduction in evidence of an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for conviction. He observed: “103. There are two points to be made about this passage. The first is that the Court appears to have accepted that the sole or decisive rule does not apply so as to preclude the reliance on the statement of a witness who refuses to testify because of fear induced by the defendant. The second is that the Court did not completely close the door to the possibility of ‘counterbalancing factors’ being sufficient to justify the introduction of a statement as sole or decisive evidence in other circumstances. The Court made it quite plain, however, that compliance with the statutory regime under which the statements in the two appeals had been admitted carried ‘limited weight’...” 87. However, having regard to the judgment of the Court of Appeal and to the development of the “sole or decisive rule” in cases largely relating to civil law jurisdictions, Lord Phillips concluded that the 2003 Act made the “sole or decisive” rule unnecessary in English criminal procedure. He considered that the safeguards it contained meant that if the 2003 Act were observed, there would be no breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) even if a conviction were based solely or to a decisive extent on absent witness-evidence. He therefore held: “108. In these circumstances I have decided that it would not be right for this court to hold that the sole or decisive test should have been applied rather than the provisions of the 2003 Act, interpreted in accordance with their natural meaning. I believe that those provisions strike the right balance between the imperative that a trial must be fair and the interests of victims in particular and society in general that a criminal should not be immune from conviction where a witness, who has given critical evidence in a statement that can be shown to be reliable, dies or cannot be called to give evidence for some other reason. In so concluding I have taken careful account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I hope that in due course the Strasbourg Court may also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or decisive test in this case.” 88. As to the applicants’ alternative arguments that, regardless of the application of the sole or decisive rule, the statements should not have been admitted, Lord Phillips relied on the findings of the Court of Appeal, which he said had given the arguments “careful consideration”. 89. In a separate concurring opinion, Lord Brown observed: “115. ... Obviously, the more crucial the evidence is to the proof of guilt, the more scrupulous must the Court be to ensure that it can be fairly adduced and is likely to be reliable. In this connection there can be no harm in using the concept of ‘sole or decisive’ so long as it is used broadly ... Understood and applied inflexibly, however, the concept would involve insoluble problems of detailed interpretation and application. 116. The better view may therefore be that no such absolute principle emerges from the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom ...”

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5. The applicant was born in 1964. When lodging his application, he was detained in Saarbrücken Prison. 6. In July 2007 the Zweibrücken Public Prosecutor’s Office was informed by a person, to whom they had guaranteed confidentiality and whose identity had remained unknown throughout the proceedings, that the applicant was selling large amounts of amphetamine. 7. The Trier police therefore mandated another police informer, S., who was equally guaranteed confidentiality by the Zweibrücken Public Prosecutor’s Office and was supervised by police officer K., to test the veracity of these allegations. S. visited the applicant in his motorbike shop on 18 July 2007 and pretended being interested in buying a motorbike. He visited the applicant in the shop for the second time on 14 August 2007. On that occasion, the applicant told S. that a former member of his motorbike club “Bandidos” had cheated the club and offered S. 1,000 euros (EUR) if he would beat up that person. When the applicant showed S., who had disclosed his acquaintance with arms, his firearms and asked S. whether he could supply him with weapons, S. asked the applicant whether he could sell him amphetamine. The applicant asked in reply how much S. would need and what price he would be ready to pay. S. offered to pay EUR 4,000 per kilogram of amphetamine of a good quality. The applicant agreed to the offer and handed over to S. a sample of amphetamine which he had stored in a drawer of his garage. On 24 August 2007 S. again visited the applicant and offered purchasing 500 grams of amphetamine from the applicant, in accordance with the instructions from his supervising police officer. The applicant agreed to sell that amount of drugs at a price of EUR 2,000. He had carried a loaded revolver during all of his meetings with S. and had threatened S. with the revolver once, accusing him of being a traitor. 8. On 27 August 2007 the Trier District Court authorised the participation of an undercover police officer, C., supervised by police officer L., in the operation. 9. On 28 August 2007 S. bought 500 grams of amphetamine for EUR 2,000 from the applicant, who carried a loaded revolver during the transactions, handed it over to C. who was awaiting him at a different place and brought the money supplied by C. to the applicant. 10. On 20 September 2007 S. again visited the applicant in his garage and told him that he would like to buy further drugs from him. The applicant thereupon asked S. whether he would need one kilogram or more. S. ordered 500 grams of amphetamine, in accordance with his instructions from police officer K., and announced that he would need higher amounts of drugs in the future. The applicant agreed to the proposals. 11. On 4 October 2007 S. again bought 500 grams of amphetamine for EUR 2,000 in the presence of C. from the applicant, who carried a loaded revolver during the transaction. As advised by police officer K., S. then asked the applicant to supply a larger amount of drugs. The applicant explained that he could supply as much as S. wanted, five or ten kilograms. S. thereupon ordered 6.5 kilograms of amphetamine for which he was to pay EUR 26,000. 12. On 16 October 2007 S. and C. bought the amount of amphetamine ordered from the applicant; the drugs were supplied by B. The applicant was arrested after having handed over the drugs to S. and while collecting the money from C. The police further seized 10 grams of amphetamine in the applicant’s flat and numerous guns in his garage. 13. B., having been informed of his right to remain silent, confirmed to the police after his arrest and subsequently before the investigating judge that he had participated in the drug transaction on 16 October 2007 and supplied the amphetamine seized on that day. 14. On 31 July 2008 the Trier Regional Court convicted the applicant of two counts of drug trafficking in not insignificant amounts while carrying a weapon and another count of drug trafficking in not insignificant amounts and sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment. 15. The Regional Court established the facts as summarized above (see paragraphs 6-13 above). It further took note of the fact that the applicant, a full member of the motorbike club “MC Bandidos Chapter Kaiserslautern”, had previously been convicted, in particular, by the Trier Regional Court of trafficking in drugs (amphetamine) on 9 February 1989 and sentenced to three years and ten months’ imprisonment. 16. The Regional Court observed that the applicant and his co-accused B. had not made any submissions on the drug charges during the trial hearing. Its findings of fact were based on the credible statements made by S. to his supervising police officer K. and, in respect of the last offence, on the confession made by co-accused B. during the investigation proceedings. 17. In the hearing, the Regional Court, having rejected the applicant’s objection to hearing police officer K. as a witness, had questioned K. as a witness giving hearsay evidence on the observations made by police informer S. It had not been possible to summon and question S. in person as the Rhineland-Palatinate Ministry for the Interior had issued a declaration dated 10 April 2008, supplemented on 21 July 2008 following the trial court’s proposal of alternative methods of questioning, blocking the disclosure of his identity (Sperrerklärung). These declarations, running to twelve and four pages respectively, had been read out in the hearing. 18. The Ministry had argued in these declarations that it was necessary to keep the identities of police informer S., and also of undercover police officer C., secret in order to protect their life and limb and that of their relatives. In the Ministry’s submission, there was a high risk that the applicant would organise a violent revenge against them. He was a member of the motorbike club “MC Bandidos, Chapter Kaiserslautern”, which was well-organised worldwide and known for violent, ruthless acts against persons considered as traitors. Members of the motorbike club were currently suspected of involvement in homicides. The applicant, on whose premises a considerable number of firearms had been found, had himself offered S. EUR 1,000 for assaulting a former member of the motorbike club who was suspected of having deceived the club in the course of business transactions. Further perpetrators who had been involved in the drug deal might equally possess firearms and had not been arrested yet. The disclosure of the identity of the police informer and of the well-trained undercover agent would further compromise the police’s ability to investigate serious crimes with their help or that of other informers in the future. 19. The Ministry further stated that there were no means other than the non-disclosure of their identity for the Land to protect the physical integrity of the police informer and of the undercover agent. In particular, keeping their names or places of residence secret or excluding the public and the applicant during their interrogation in court would be insufficient to protect them, owing to the presence of the applicant’s lawyers and possibly of contact persons of the applicant observing the court building at the day of the trial. The Ministry also rejected the Regional Court’s proposal to have S. questioned by a commissioned judge outside the main hearing as the applicant’s lawyers would be present during such a hearing and might pass on information to the applicant allowing the latter to detect S.’s identity. Likewise, a video conference including acoustic and optical shielding, as equally proposed by the Regional Court, could not exclude S.’s and C.’s identification by their figure, by their gestures and language used or by the disclosure of details permitting the detection of their identity in the course of questioning by the defence. 20. In the Regional Court’s view, the reasons given in the Ministry’s declarations for the non-disclosure of S.’s, and also C.’s, identities were neither arbitrary nor obviously unlawful. 21. The Regional Court noted that police officer K. had questioned S. on 26 October 2007 and had reported S.’s statements in the hearing. It had then given the defence the opportunity to put questions to S. in writing. On 25 June 2008 K. again questioned S., submitting to him the court’s questions and those of B.’s defence counsel, and again reported S.’s statements in court. Both police officer K.’s and S.’s detailed statements without contradictions were credible, having regard also to the fact that it had only hearsay evidence before it. The Regional Court noted, in particular, that the applicant had contested having carried a loaded revolver during the first two transactions, claiming that the object in his pocket had been a multi-tool. It found that S. had already mentioned on 26 October 2007 that the applicant had carried a weapon. When again being questioned by police officer K. on the court’s request on 25 June 2008, S. had given more details in respect of the revolver and had convincingly explained when and how he had seen that it had been loaded, which demonstrated the veracity of his statements. 22. The Regional Court found that the statements made by the police informer could be used as evidence. Under the well-established case-law of the Federal Court of Justice (the Regional Court referred to Federal Court of Justice, file no. 1 StR 221/99, judgment of 18 November 1999, BGHSt 45, pp. 321 ss., see paragraph 34 below), the use of police informers was permitted to combat serious crimes which were difficult to investigate, such as drug trafficking. It was not relevant in that context whether the applicant had been incited by a police informer to commit an offence as, in any event, this would not lead to an exclusion of evidence. In that event, the court would only have to state in the reasons of its judgment that there had been a breach of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and would have to mitigate the penalty as a result thereof. 23. The Regional Court considered that S.’s submissions had been supported by considerable further circumstantial evidence. In particular, the nature and amount of drugs trafficked was proven as S. had handed the drugs in question over to the police immediately after the respective transactions. Moreover, in respect of the last offence, the applicant and B. had been caught in the act and arrested at the scene of the crime. Furthermore, B. had initially confessed to the (third) offence in the investigation proceedings and his statements had been reported in the hearing by the police officer and the investigating judge who had questioned him at the time. 24. Finally, both B.’s confession and S.’s statements concerning the second offence had been confirmed by the submissions made by undercover police officer C. to police officer L. who supervised him. L. had testified as a witness giving hearsay evidence in the hearing, the court having dismissed the applicant’s objection to hearing him. The identity of C. had remained unknown as he had equally been covered by the Ministry’s declaration blocking a disclosure of his identity. The investigations by an undercover police officer had been lawful under Articles 110a and 110b § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 31-32 below), as they had been authorised by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the District Court and had been indispensable in order to further investigate suspicions of drug trafficking by the applicant. 25. When fixing the sentence, the Regional Court considered as aggravating factors the frequency of the offences as well as the applicant’s prior conviction for drug trafficking. It took into account as mitigating elements that the drug transactions had been under police surveillance from the outset and that the drugs could not, therefore, freely circulate on the market. Moreover, the applicant had trafficked in so-called soft drugs of average quality only. Furthermore, the applicant was disabled at a rate of 70 per cent and therefore particularly susceptible to suffer from detention. 26. In the Regional Court’s view the applicant had not, however, been unduly incited by police informer S. to commit the offences in question, within the meaning of the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice (the Regional Court again referred to the Federal Court of Justice’s judgment of 18 November 1999, cited above, BGHSt 45, pp. 321 ss.). The applicant had already been involved in drug trafficking and been predisposed to sell drugs prior to his meeting with the police informer. This was proven, in particular, by the fact that he had supplied S. with an amphetamine sample already when they discussed drug transactions for the first time. Moreover, he had indicated on that occasion that he could supply S. with larger amounts of drugs. The Regional Court found in that context that the price offered by S. to the applicant (EUR 4,000) was the average price for a kilogram of amphetamine of average quality in the region. Furthermore, the applicant had previously been convicted of drug trafficking. As his offences had not therefore been the result of unlawful police incitement, there was no ground for mitigating the sentence on that account. 27. On 1 August 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Federal Court of Justice. He claimed, in particular, that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention had been breached as he had been unable to cross-examine police informer S. and undercover agent C., on whose submissions his conviction had essentially been based. Moreover, S. had unduly incited him to sell drugs. The evidence obtained by the incitement should therefore have been excluded at his trial. 28. On 12 December 2008 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the Regional Court’s judgment as ill-founded. 29. On 19 January 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained, in particular, that the judgment of the Regional Court, confirmed by the Federal Court of Justice, had breached his right to a fair trial under the Basic Law. He had been unduly incited by the prosecution authorities to commit the offences he had later been found guilty of. Therefore, the evidence obtained by police incitement should have been excluded at his trial (he referred to the European Court of Human Right’s judgment in the case of Pyrgiotakis v. Greece, no. 15100/06, 21 February 2008 to support his view). Moreover, throughout the proceedings, he had not had an opportunity to question the police informer and the undercover police officer. 30. On 3 September 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 164/09). The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 10 September 2009.

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5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in the town of Krasnoobsk, the Novosibirsk Region. She had a daughter, Oksana Vladimirovna Belenko, born in 1983 but now deceased. 6. On 14 August 2003 Oksana Belenko complained of feeling ill. She was trembling, felt pain in her limbs, was having delusions and was behaving strangely. That evening her parents called an ambulance. The doctor of the ambulance team, having decided that she was suffering from hysterical neurosis, gave her some sedatives and painkillers. Her condition became worse, so the next morning she was taken to the town hospital, accompanied by her parents. In the town hospital she was examined by the chief psychiatrist, Rz., and a neuropathologist, Pn. The applicant’s daughter was behaving hysterically: she was laughing, shouting, trying to run around and threw a trolley over. As she was showing signs of a serious psychiatric disorder, later that day she was transferred to a psychiatric clinic. 7. It appears from her medical records that on admission to the clinic, the daughter did not react when spoken to, refused to submit to examination, and was moving her hands and legs around chaotically. The doctors at the clinic examined her and concluded that she was suffering from schizophrenia. No signs of any other illness or injury were evident at that time. Oksana Belenko was already in such a state that the clinical director decided to ask the District Court for authorisation for her continued confinement in the clinic. Her parents (her father and the applicant) did not object to the confinement. 8. According to the applicant, during the first few days in the psychiatric clinic her daughter was still able to recognise her relatives and had some understanding of the people and things around her. According to the official records, her condition was very serious and continued to deteriorate, and her understanding of the situation was seriously impaired. 9. On 16 and 17 August 2003 she was examined by the clinic’s doctors on duty, Kr. and Vas. She was administered Sibazon and Haloperidol injections. 10. On 18 August 2003 the applicant’s daughter was examined first by a psychiatrist on duty and then by a team of three doctors, including the acting chief doctor, Yar., and two other doctors, Lkh. and Olkh. She did not react to their questions, her eyes were motionless, she shouted out sporadically, and dropped herself onto the bed. The expert team considered that she needed further inpatient treatment. 11. On the same day the applicant asked the clinical director to release her daughter for further treatment at home. However, it was refused, the chief psychiatrist instead asking the court to issue a confinement order in respect of her. 12. On 20 August 2003 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Novosibirsk examined the clinical director’s request for Oksana Belenko’s further confinement to the psychiatric clinic. Neither the applicant nor her daughter participated in those proceedings. According to the applicant, she was not informed about the date or place of the hearing. The District Court authorised the further confinement. 13. The applicant continued to visit her daughter in the clinic almost every day. According to her, on one occasion her daughter was taken by the clinic staff to a meeting with her directly from the shower; her head was wet and, as a result, she caught a cold. The clinic staff also allegedly prevented her from visiting her daughter. 14. Oksana Belenko received treatment in the psychiatric clinic until 31 August 2003. It appears that her medical condition was very serious. Several examinations conducted within that period showed that she was suffering from a very rare disease, known as febrile expressionless schizophrenia of a pernicious nature. The illness is potentially fatal and has various symptoms, such as high fever, catalepsy (being stuck in rigid postures for hours), delusions, muteness, and excessive motor activity (constant movement). She was spending hours in her bed in a “foetal position”, with her hands and legs bent and pressed against her body. Treatment with psychotropic drugs only had a limited effect on her. In addition, because of her immobility and cataleptic postures she started developing decubitus ulcers (bedsores). According to the Government, between 18 and 31 August 2003 she was examined by doctors three times. 15. On 26 August 2003 the applicant wrote a letter to the psychiatric clinic asking for her daughter to be released, insisting that she would be better treated at home by a visiting doctor. However, given the daughter’s state of health and mind, the request was refused. 16. According to the applicant, during that period her daughter was being tied to her bed by the clinic staff. She and some of her relatives and friends saw ligature marks on her daughter’s hands and legs when they visited her in the clinic. The clinic staff, namely doctor L. and nurse B., denied tying her up. 17. On 31 August 2003 the applicant’s daughter had a high fever. She was examined by a doctor, who concluded that she had developed pneumonia, aggravated by a cardiac valve defect. The applicant informed the hospital that her daughter had congenital heart disease and that her skin had developed a bluish color, so the doctors of the psychiatric clinic called a cardiologist from the town hospital. After examining her, the cardiologist recommended her immediate transfer there, which was implemented the same day. 18. On 1 September 2003 the applicant’s daughter became worse and was transferred to the town hospital’s emergency unit. Doctor Pn. who examined her there discovered ligature marks on her body. On the same day the head of the hospital’s psychiatric department, Ls., made an entry in the daughter’s medical record which read “evidence of tying up on the shins and arms” (later reproduced in the expert report of 17 May 2005, see paragraph 32 below). 19. It appears that in so far as pneumonia was concerned, her treatment with antibacterial drugs had some positive effects. An X-ray examination was carried out on 15 September 2003 but did not reveal any characteristic signs of pneumonia in her lungs. 20. On 9 October 2003 the applicant’s daughter was transferred to the psychiatric department of the town hospital. It appears that as a result of the catalepsy, she had developed large purulent ulcers in the groin area. Two weeks later she was admitted to the surgical ward of the town hospital in connection with the ulcers and necrotic abscess. 21. At some point, the relatives lost confidence in the doctors’ ability to treat her properly. They thought that she was being neglected and even ill‑treated in the various hospitals, starting to suspect that she might also have been sexually abused there. The applicant made several written complaints to the regional authorities. 22. On an unspecified date the applicant’s daughter had a new episode of pneumonia, which the doctors related to the sepsis (inflammation) she had developed as a result of the purulent ulcers. She also developed tetraparesis (muscular weakness of all four limbs). 23. On 27 October 2003 a special panel was set up by the regional administration, which examined Oksana Belenko’s case. It concluded that the doctors’ actions had been adequate, that the worsening of her condition was due to external factors, and that the actions of the doctors did not present any danger to her life. 24. On 30 October 2003 the applicant’s daughter was admitted to the regional hospital. Her physical and mental health continued to deteriorate. According to the Government, while in the hospital she had continued to receive adequate medical care, such as treatment with fourth generation antibiotics. 25. On 4 November 2003 the applicant lodged a written criminal complaint regarding the allegedly inadequate treatment of her daughter. On 14 November 2003 the investigator refused to open an investigation in this connection. 26. On 7 December 2003 Oksana Belenko died. 27. On 8 December 2003 doctors examined her body. The doctors who carried out the post-mortem (вскрытие) concluded that she had died as a result of cerebral oedema, related to her psychiatric condition and aggravated by the pneumonia. The examination did not reveal any ligature marks. At the same time the doctors discovered that her left hip was dislocated, and that she had purulent necrotic wounds in the groin area and on her shins. 28. A few days after Oksana Belenko’s death, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint to have the doctors who had treated her daughter prosecuted. The inquiry was reopened. 29. On 31 December 2003 investigator O., following an additional inquiry, decided not to open a criminal investigation into her death. 30. On 4 February 2004 the Deputy Regional Prosecutor overruled the above decision and decided to open a criminal investigation, to be treated as a medical negligence case. The case was entrusted to investigator O. 31. On 20 May 2004 the Presidium of the Novosibirsk Regional Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court’s decision of 20 August 2003 (see paragraph 12 above). The Presidium held that Oksana Belenko’s relatives had not been duly informed of the hearing, and furthermore, that the District Court had not verified whether her condition had warranted her confinement. Since she had died by that time, it was decided that the proceedings should be discontinued. 32. On 17 May 2004 a group of doctors from the No. 6 Regional Psychiatric Hospital examined her case and concluded that it was impossible to discern a direct link between her mental condition and her death. In their report, they concluded that the death had actually been caused by a brain oedema and pulmonary valve insufficiency caused by pneumonia. The experts approved the diagnosis of the psychiatric clinic and hospitals and confirmed that the methods and medication used to treat her had been appropriate. 33. On 22 June 2004 the applicant was given victim status in the case (see paragraph 30 above). 34. On 11 October 2004 the Serbskiy Institute of Psychiatry conducted a second psychiatric expert examination of Oksana Belenko’s case. It concluded that the doctors had made the correct assessment of her condition, and had prescribed and administered her adequate treatment in a timely manner. 35. On 12 January 2005 a new forensic examination of the case concluded that she had died primarily as a result of the brain oedema caused by her psychiatric disorder. The expert team had at its disposal samples of tissue taken from her body during the post‑mortem examination and her medical records. The experts confirmed that the earlier diagnosis had been correct and that the treatment she had received had been adequate, excluding any possibility that she had died as result of inappropriate treatment. The report, in summarising the doctors’ earlier observations, noted that the examination of 1 September 2003 had revealed ligature marks on her shins and later mentioned marks on her arms. 36. Between 14 and 28 January 2005 a new forensic examination was carried out of the tissue taken from various parts of Oksana Belenko’s body. In addition, the investigator held a face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and doctors L., P., and Zh. Several of the psychiatric clinic staff were questioned, as were staff of the town and regional hospitals. 37. On 4 February 2005 the criminal investigation was closed, the investigator concluding that the applicant’s daughter had died of natural causes. 38. On 5 May 2005 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Novosibirsk Region ordered that the case be reopened and informed the investigator of the additional steps to be taken. 39. On 19 May 2005 the applicant requested the investigator in charge of the case to conduct an additional expert examination to establish the cause of her daughter’s death. In particular, the applicant alleged that her daughter had developed pneumonia because of the poor sanitary and hygienic conditions in the psychiatric clinic and the town hospital. In her opinion, her daughter had contracted the infection through her ulcers. In addition, the experts had failed to establish why her daughter had had ligature marks on her body. In the applicant’s opinion, the purulent wounds discovered on her daughter’s lower legs were not the “decubitus ulcers” caused by her immobility but rather a result of her being tied up in the psychiatric clinic. In addition, the expert reports did not establish the cause of her dislocated hip. The applicant invited the investigator to commission a new expert examination and put relevant questions to the experts. 40. On 12 June 2005 the investigator decided to close the case again. According to the report of that date, the ligature marks discovered on Oksana Belenko’s body during her examination on 1 September 2003 had been located around her shins. 41. On 11 July 2005 the case was reopened but then closed again on 14 July 2005. 42. On 25 January 2006 the case was reopened by the supervising prosecutor but then closed again on 26 February 2006. 43. The applicant contested the closure of the case in court. 44. On 20 March 2006 the supervising prosecutor ordered the case to be reopened and the investigator to carry out additional investigative measures, such as identifying and questioning other patients of the psychiatric clinic and establishing the cause of the ligature marks discovered on her body during the examination of 1 September 2003. 45. On 19 January 2007 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court noted that the case file contained conflicting expert opinions on the cause of Oksana Belenko’s death. Furthermore, the cause of the second episode of pneumonia and the purulent wounds on the lower legs had not been established. The court instructed the investigator to commission a new comprehensive forensic examination (комплексная судебно-медицинская экспертиза) to establish the cause of her death, and to carry out other investigative measures if necessary. 46. On 9 February 2007 the investigator commissioned the new comprehensive forensic examination, ordered by the court, into the cause of the death of the applicant’s daughter. He entrusted it to the No. 6 Regional Psychiatric Hospital. However, in 12 February 2007 the hospital refused to carry out the examination on the grounds that it had already prepared a similar report on the matter at an earlier date. 47. On 9 March 2007 the investigator closed the case again. 48. The applicant challenged that decision in court. On 26 June 2007 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court ordered the investigation to be continued. The court held, in particular, that the refusal of the No. 6 Regional Psychiatric Hospital to conduct a new expert examination did not prevent the investigator from seeking an expert opinion from another competent institution elsewhere. 49. On 13 August 2007 the court’s decision was upheld by the Novosibirsk Regional Court on appeal. 50. The criminal investigation was reopened but closed again on 5 September 2007. 51. In 2008 the applicant challenged the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings in court again. On 18 September of that year the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court examined the applicant’s complaint against the investigator’s decision of 5 September 2007 and ordered the case to be reopened. However, it appears from the documents submitted by the Government that this decision was not enforced and the case not reopened until 15 April 2011, as confirmed in a letter by the Zheleznodorozhniy District Prosecutor dated 19 April 2011. 52. On 15 April 2011 the District Prosecutor quashed the decision of 5 September 2007 and ordered the case to be reopened again. 53. On 20 April 2011 the investigator ordered another forensic examination of Oksana Belenko’s body to be commissioned and entrusted this task to the Krasnoyarsk Region Forensic Centre. However, on 22 April 2011 it refused to conduct the examination on the grounds that the investigator had failed to produce her medical records and the “tissue archive” (гистологический архив). 54. On 20 May 2011 the investigator decided to close the case again. The investigator reiterated the findings of the earlier expert examinations of the case and in particular the report of 12 January 2005 (see paragraph 35 above). Among other things, the investigator acknowledged that it proved impossible to find the medical records of the applicant’s daughter and the “tissue archive” and that, as a result, the experts were not in a position to conduct an additional forensic examination into the cause of her death. He further noted that: “... during the preliminary investigation it was established that ... [Oksana Belenko] had suffered from psychiatric disease in the form of schizophrenia, the febrile catatonic form. The reason for [her] death was [this disease]. From the medical examination report dated 12 January 2005 it follows that [her] death resulted from cerebral oedema, which itself had resulted from [the above-mentioned disease] ... It was noted on 1 September 2003 that on a few occasions [she] had been seen as carrying [marks on her arms], but from the statements of the questioned persons, it was impossible to establish with certainty any facts of the use of violence (tying up) in respect of [her] ... At the present time in this criminal case all of the indications of the Prosecutor’s office of the Novosibirsk Region were executed. The results of the conducted preliminary investigation demonstrated that no crime set out in Article 109 § 2 of the Criminal Code had taken place because [Oksana Belenko’s] death resulted from the cerebral oedema resulting from the psychiatric disease, that is from the natural factor, [her] treatment having been conducted in accordance with modern methods of treatment. It follows that the death of [Oxana Belenko] did not result from anyone’s unlawful actions.” 55. It does not appear that there have been any developments in the applicant’s case since the decision of 20 May 2011.

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5. The applicant, Mrs N.A., was born in 1986 and lives in Norway. 6. On 16 September 2009 the applicant and her former husband Mr U.A., a Pakistani national who was born in 1985, were indicted (I) under Article 229, third alternative, cf. Article 232 of the Penal Code (straffeloven), of having caused under particularly aggravating circumstances injury to the body and health of their daughter A entailing serious damage, or of having aided and abetted in this, by having exposed her at least on two occasions to violence causing the following damage: “- Two instances of fraction to her cranium; - bleeding under the hard membrane of the brain; - bleeding between the hard membrane of the brain and scull; - oedema changes in the brain; - bleedings in the retina in both eyes; - blue marks and miscolouring on the body; - elbow out of joint. The last-mentioned injury had been discovered in December 2007 and the remainder in January 2008. The injuries to her head had been life-threatening and had led to permanent brain injury. The violence had been caused by the child’s parents, Mr U.A. and Mrs N.A., directly by, amongst other things, blows and/or pushes against a hard surface and forceful shaking and/or by aiding and abetting the perpetration of the violence by not intervening and seeking to prevent the actions carried out against the child, in respect of whom both parents assumed the care.” They were also indicted (II) under Article 219 (2), cf. (1), of having seriously and repeatedly exerted violence or otherwise infringed or ill‑treated someone in their household – in an aggravated manner because the abuse had been carried out over a long period, had been committed against a defenseless person and had been unprovoked. During the period from 17 August 2005 until 26 January 2008, their son B had a number of times been exposed to violence resulting, inter alia, in the following injuries: “- A fracture in the upper arm caused by twisting; - blue nails on both of his big toes; - several wounds, scars and miscolouring to the body, including scars after scratching on the throat. The violence had been caused by the child’s parents, Mr U.A. and Mrs N.A., either directly and/or by aiding and abetting the perpetration of the violence by not intervening and seeking to prevent the actions carried out against the child, in respect of whom both parents assumed the care.” 7. On 13 January 2010 the Oslo City Court (tingrett) convicted the applicant and her former husband of the charges and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment of two years and a half and three years and a half, respectively. It was not in doubt that the two children had been subjected to gross ill-treatment by adults but concluded that it was not possible from the evidence taken from the defendants and witnesses in the case to identify one or more perpetrators. The statements given had been contradictory to such a degree that this could not be explained as being due to misunderstandings. Several of the statements ought to be considered as untrue leaving no possibility to distinguish between lies and truth on different points. On the other hand the City Court found it established that the damage to the children had mainly occurred while the children had been in the flat. It was further proven that the accused Mr U.A. had been present in the tiny flat occupied by the family while the ill-treatment occurred, as had also been the case of the applicant. The City Court also found it proven that each of the parents had aided and abetted in the commission of the violence by not having interfered or sought to prevent the acts of violence carried out against the children in regard to whom they had a duty of care. The parents were ordered to pay the children 300,000 and 100,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) (approximately 36,000 and 12,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 8. The applicant and her former husband appealed to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett), which, sitting with a jury, held a hearing for twelve days between 17 August and 3 September 2010). It took evidence from the defendants and eighteen witnesses and two court appointed experts. After the jury had answered all the questions put to it in the negative, the professional judges decided to accept the jury’s verdict of acquittal. 9. In the same judgment of 3 September 2010, the High Court (without the participation of any members of the jury) examined the children’s claims for compensation of non-pecuniary damage under section 3-5 (1) (a) of the Damage Compensation Act 1969. It held: “According to this provision a person who with intent or gross negligence has caused personal injury may be required to pay compensation to the victim. The High Court observes that such infringements as described in Article 219 of the Penal Code can constitute a ground for awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage under section 3-5(1)(b), cf. section 3-3, even if no damage has occurred in the sense of the Act. The assistance lawyer representing the children [‘bistandsadvokaten’] has argued on their behalf that Mr [U.A.] and Mrs [N.A.], with intent or gross negligence, have caused or aided and abetted [‘medvirket’] in causing serious injury to [A]’s head, her elbow getting out of joint and in seriously and repeatedly exposing [B] to violence. The victims’ claims for non-pecuniary damage has its basis in the same acts as those in respect of which Mr [U.A.] and Mrs [N.A.] has been acquitted in the criminal proceedings. The acquittal in the criminal proceedings does not hinder making an award of compensation for non‑pecuniary damage to the victims, since less stringent evidentiary requirements applies to the latter than to criminal punishment. When a judgment of acquittal has been given in the criminal case, the presumption of innocence in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention will set limits to what could constitute the basis for a decision on the civil claims. According to the European Court’s case-law, the national courts cannot justify their decision in a manner calling into doubt the acquitted person’s innocence for criminal law purposes (see the Norwegian Supreme Court’s case-law reports Norsk Retstidende – Rt. 2003 p. 1671). A condition for establishing liability to pay compensation is that it was clearly probable that the damage had been caused by intent or by gross negligence (Rt. 2003 p. 1671). Considering the evidence in the case as a whole, the High Court finds it clearly probable that Mr [U.A.] and Mrs [N.A.] have ill-treated their children or have aided and abetted in doing so by consent or by incitement to the acts, over a long period until 26 January 2008. The High Court further finds it clearly probable that the parents had inflicted or have aided and abetted in inflicting great injuries to A’s head and have inflicted or aided and abetted in inflicting injuries to B through repeated violence, including a fracture to his arm by twisting it. In its assessment of the evidence, the High Court emphasises that several of the injuries ascertained are not compatible with accidental occurrences but on the contrary show that they have been inflicted by strong violence. The High Court also points to the children’s later reactions, including that [B] was in 2008 diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. It further refers to witness statements from neighbours about noise in the form of screams of anxiety and painful cries from children in the apartment over a longer period. The High Court is of the view that the physical and psychological injuries sustained by the children are a direct consequence of the ill‑treatment to which they have been exposed. In the High Court’s view it was further foreseeable for Mr [U.A.] and Mrs [N.A.] that serious injuries, including serious brain damage, could occur in the case of such small children. Accordingly, the conditions for making an award of non-pecuniary damage have been fulfilled. The lawyer representing the children had filed a claim for compensation of non-pecuniary damage in an amount of up to NOK 300,000 in respect of [A] and up to NOK 100,000 in respect of [B]. An award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage is to be evaluated on the basis of a wide discretionary assessment of what would constitute a reasonable amount. Factors which are central in the assessment are the objective seriousness of the act, the extent to which the wrongdoer (‘skadevolder’) is to be blamed and the damaging effects. This case concerns injury on very small children, from they were babies until [A] was fourteen months old and [B] was two years and a half. The ill-treatment has occurred during a considerable part of the children’s lives until it was revealed. At present [B] apparently manage well physically and has no physical ailments. However, in 2008 he was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. [A] was in part paralysed on one side and her development is far behind compared to that of other children of her age. Her injuries can be said to be permanent. Compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of [A] is to be awarded in an amount of NOK 300,000 [approximately 40,000 euros (EUR)] and in respect of [B] in an amount of NOK 100,000 [approximately EUR 13,500]. The decision on the civil claims is based on the less stringent evidentiary requirements than those applicable to criminal punishment. Thus, the decision on the civil claim does not contradict [‘rokke ved’] the correctness of the acquittal.” 10. The applicant and her former husband appealed to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett), complaining inter alia of the High Court’s assessment of the evidence and that the reasoning for the award on compensation in this regard had failed to satisfy requirements of national law and entailed a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 11. On 4 November 2010 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) refused them leave to appeal, finding that such leave was warranted neither by the general importance of the case nor by other considerations.

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5. The applicant was born in 1957 and prior to his arrest lived in Ganja. 6. The applicant is a former head of the Ganja City Police Office and the Dashkasan District Police Office. On 11 January 2001 the Military Assize Court found him guilty of various crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 7. Council of Europe experts considered the applicant to have been a political prisoner. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated in its Resolution 1305 (2002) adopted on 26 September 2002 that it was profoundly disturbed by the fact that the applicant had neither been pardoned nor granted a retrial. 8. The applicant was dispensed from serving the remainder of his sentence by a presidential pardon decree of 20 March 2005. 9. According to the applicant, on 16 October 2005, when he was dining at his friend’s home in Baku, nine or ten plain-clothes police officers entered and arrested him. The applicant was taken to the Narimanov District Police Office, where a record on an administrative offence was drawn up by police officers. 10. On the same day the applicant was taken to the Narimanov District Court and appeared before a judge. The judge found the applicant guilty under Article 310.1 (obstructing the police) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention. The judge held that the police had arrested the applicant at around 7.30 p.m. on 16 October 2005 near the metro station Ganjlik in Baku, because he had failed to comply with a lawful request of the police to present his identity card. 11. On 21 October 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision. 12. By a letter of 29 October 2005, a certain R.M. informed the Ministry of National Security (“the MNS”) about the applicant’s unlawful activities, claiming that he had been conspiring to usurp State power by force. The author of the letter asked the MNS to carry out a search in the garden of the applicant’s house where the applicant had buried weapons in order to use them for the purposes of the said crimes. 13. On 30 October 2005, the police and officers of the MNS carried out a search of the applicant’s house and garden, situated in the village of Bayan in the Dashkasan region. According to the search record of 30 October 2005, some weapons and ammunitions, including different types of guns, an assault rifle, a pistol, cartridges and a grenade, were found buried in the garden. The search was carried out in the absence of the applicant, his lawyer or members of his family. The search record was signed by police officers, two attesting witnesses (hal şahidi) and two employees of the local executive authority. It appears from the case file that the search was carried out on the basis of a decision by the Ganja City Nizami District Court and was filmed. However, despite the Court’s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all documents and materials relating to the criminal proceedings, including a copy of the video recording of the search, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the video recording. 14. On 30 October 2005, while in administrative detention, the applicant was informed that he was being charged with the crimes of conspiring to organise mass disorder, illegal possession of weapons and conspiring to usurp State power by force under Articles 28 (preparation of a crime), 220 (mass disorder), 228 (illegal possession of weapons) and 278 (usurpation of state power by force) of the Criminal Code. 15. On 31 October 2005, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor’s request to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant, the Nasimi District Court ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of three months. 16. According to the applicant, during the night of 31 October to 1 November 2005 he was subjected to electric shocks twice in the temporary detention facility of the Organised Crime Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 17. It appears from the case file that on 22 November 2005 an expert examination was carried out in order to establish the ballistic, technical and chemical characteristics of the weapons and ammunition allegedly found on 30 October 2005. The Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the report of the expert examination of 22 November 2005. 18. On 27 January 2006 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 30 May 2006. 19. On 24 May 2006 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 30 October 2006. 20. On 4 July 2006 the investigator questioned R.M. as a witness. R.M. stated that he had known the applicant since 1992 when the latter was the head of the Dashkasan District Police Office. When they had resided in Turkey between June 1998 and January 2000 the applicant had informed him about his intention to organise a coup d’état in Azerbaijan. R.M. further stated that the applicant had also informed him at that time about weapons buried in the garden of his house situated in the Dashkasan region. He did not know how the applicant had obtained those weapons. 21. On 4 August 2006 the investigator questioned Z.M., a police officer, and E.A. and N.G., employees of the local executive authority, who had participated in the search. They stated that they had been present, together with two attesting witnesses, when the weapons buried in the garden had been found. 22. On 5 August 2006 the investigator questioned R., who had participated in the search as an attesting witness. He stated that he had seen the weapons which had been buried in the garden and had signed the search record. 23. By a decision of 11 August 2006, the investigator severed the original criminal case (no. 76586) and opened a new criminal case (no. 76811) against the applicant. In the context of the new criminal case, the applicant was charged only under Article 228.1 (illegal possession of weapons) of the Criminal Code. 24. On 14 August 2006 the investigator issued a final bill of indictment in criminal case no. 76811 under Article 228.2.2 (illegal possession of weapons committed repeatedly) of the Criminal Code and filed it with the Dashkasan District Court. It appears that the original criminal case (no. 76586), which still carried the charges against the applicant under Articles 28, 220.1 and 278 of the Criminal Code, was not sent for trial, but was not terminated either. 25. In their observations lodged with the Court, the Government submitted a copy of the record on the applicant’s familiarisation with the materials of the criminal case (“cinayət işinin materialları ilə tanış etmə protokolu”), dated August 2006 (the exact date of the record is illegible), which was signed by the investigator, the applicant and his lawyer. The relevant part of the record reads as follows: “[the applicant] I have become completely acquainted with the materials of the criminal case without any time restriction. As the criminal investigation was biased (qeyri-obyektiv) and ... [this part is illegible], we will raise our questions in the proceedings before the court. I have also become acquainted with the video recording.” 26. In the course of the proceedings before the Dashkasan District Court the applicant claimed his innocence, insisting that the criminal case against him had been fabricated and that the weapons in question did not belong to him. The court heard Z.M., a police officer, and E.A. and N.G., employees of the local executive authority, who reiterated the statements they had made during the investigation. The statements which R.M. and R. had made during the investigation were read out at the hearing. 27. On 7 September 2006 the Dashkasan District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 228.2.2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. The court held that the applicant’s guilt had been proven by the real evidence (different types of weapons) found during the search of his garden. The part of the judgment concerning the applicant’s conviction reads as follows: “Assessing all the evidence, the court considers that the statement of the accused, Efendiyev Natig Islam oglu [the applicant], made before the court, having a defensive character and being an attempt to escape responsibility, may not be accepted as evidence and that his statement was contradicted by the objective evidence examined by the court. The court considers that the investigation has correctly qualified the action of Efendiyev Natig Islam oglu under Article 228.2.2. of the Criminal Code and that he should be sentenced to a sanction within the framework of this article ...” The judgment made no mention of the reason for the absence of R.M. and R. from the hearing. In their observations submitted to the Court, the Government produced a copy of two telegrams, the texts of which were illegible. According to the Government, by those telegrams R.M. and R. had informed the first-instance court that they could not be present at the hearing for health reasons. 28. The applicant appealed against the judgment, claiming his innocence. He alleged that all the evidence had been fabricated and that the weapons found in his garden did not belong to him. In this connection, he submitted that the house had been uninhabited and the weapons found in his garden could easily have been planted there. He also noted that it had been impossible for him to have buried those weapons in the garden as he had been in prison until 20 March 2005 and following his release from prison he had been under strict police surveillance. He pointed out in this connection that the investigation and the first-instance court had failed to establish how he had obtained the weapons or when he had buried them in the garden. Moreover, when the weapons had been found they had been clean and there had been no trace of soil on them. The applicant further complained that the lower court had failed to show the video recording of the search. He also complained that despite his request, the first-instance court had not heard at the hearing one of his neighbours, N.M., who had been present during the entire search. Lastly, the applicant complained that, in spite of his explicit request, R.M., the person who had reported the existence of the weapons to the MNS, had never given evidence before the court. In this connection, he noted that there was a clear bias in R.M.’s statement against him, since according to the latter’s letter the MNS had already conducted a fruitless search of the garden in 1999. 29. On 20 November 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal’s judgment made no mention of the applicant’s request to show the video recording of the search. It also failed to reply to the question how the applicant had obtained the weapons and when he had buried them in the garden. Nor did the appellate court hear R.M., the police officers or the two attesting witnesses who had signed the search record. It did not provide any explanation as to the absence of R.M. However, the applicant’s neighbour did give evidence in the proceedings. The relevant part of the Court of Appeal’s judgment reads as follows: “The witness, Mammadova Najiba Isa gizi, heard at the Court of Appeal at the request of the defence, stated that ... her house was near Natig Efendiyev’s [the applicant] house. On the morning of 30 October 2005 when she went out she saw some people that she did not know next to the gate of Natig Efendiyev’s garden. As the gate was closed they asked her whether someone lived there. She told them that the house was uninhabited and then these persons entered the garden by breaking the lock of the gate. At that time there were about 15-16 persons in the garden; 3-4 of them were searching the surroundings of the house and the garden and some of the others were drawing up a record. She was in the vicinity of the latter. Later, those who were searching the garden shouted ‘we have found weapons’. She went with these people to the place where the weapons were found and they showed a blue plastic bag in which there were some weapons, saying that they had found them by digging the land. As the hole in which the weapons had allegedly been buried was smaller than the weapons, she remarked to the policemen that this hole was small and asked how these weapons could have been placed there. Moreover, the weapons and the blue plastic bag containing the weapons were clean. Then a record on the fact that the weapons had been found was drawn up. Her presence was not noted in the record. The witness N. Mammadova also stated that she had not seen that the persons who had searched Natig Efendiyev’s house had brought with them bags containing weapons and other belongings ... The panel of the court considers that the submissions of the witness, Mammadova Najiba Isa gizi, heard at the court at the request of the defendant, did not refute the fact that the weapons and other ammunition were found during the search in the garden of Natig Efendiyev’s house, situated in the village of Bayan ... The panel of the court finds that the Dashkasan District Court’s judgment in respect of Natig Efendiyev, which is lawful and justified, should be left unchanged and the defendant’s appeal should not be granted.” 30. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal reiterating his previous complaints. In particular, relying on Article 6 of the Convention he complained that the Court of Appeal had failed to hear evidence from R.M. at the hearing and to show the video recording of the search. He further complained that the search had not been carried out in accordance with the domestic law, since despite the fact that his neighbour had been present during the search, her presence had not been noted in the record. He also complained that the appellate court had not taken into consideration his neighbour’s statement that the weapons found in the garden were new and clean. 31. On 17 April 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The Supreme Court’s decision made no mention of the particular complaints raised by the applicant in his cassation appeal.

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5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Chişinău. 6. In April 2008 the applicant was arrested and placed in detention on suspicion of aggravated rape and ill-treatment of a young woman. 7. On 29 December 2009 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. 8. In the meantime, between 30 April 2008 and 6 September 2010 the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13 in Chisinau where, according to him, the conditions of detention were very poor. In particular, the applicant alleges that the cells were overcrowded and dirty, that the food was of very poor quality, and that he was not provided with appropriate medical care. 9. The relevant parts of the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment concerning his visit to Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (The United Nations Human Rights Council, document A/HRC/10/44/Add.3, 12 February 2009) read as follows: “B. Conditions in places of detention Institutions under the Ministry of Justice 30. Undoubtedly, progress has been achieved in improving conditions of detention. However, some of the institutions visited by the Special Rapporteur were heavily overcrowded. The authorities themselves pointed out that Institution No. 13 in Chişinău was severely overcrowded - on the day of the visit it held 931 persons with the official capacity being 600 (see also appendix). The Special Rapporteur was informed of Government plans to close down this institution. 31. Common problems at all pre- and post-trial prisons are the poor hygienic conditions, restricted access to health care and lack of medication as well as risk of contamination with tuberculosis and other diseases. Whereas the Special Rapporteur notes that the minimum norms regarding nutrition of detainees (Government Decision n. 609 of 29 May 2006) are checked on a daily basis and that, according to the financial plan of the Penitentiary Department, the food budget for 2008 had almost doubled in comparison to 2004 and is set to rise further, he also received consistent allegations regarding the poor quality and quantity of food ...” 10. In its report for 2009 (page 117 ­-“Conditions of detention”), the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (“the Human Rights Centre”, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found, inter alia, that: “Regarding personal hygiene, clothing and bedding, despite [the fact that] Government decision no. 609 (29 May 2006) concerning minimum daily food requirements and the issuing of items of personal hygiene provides for the issuing of soap to detainees for bathing and other sanitary-hygienic needs, this has remained unfulfilled during 2009.” 11. In its report for 2010 (page 142 et seq. - “Conditions of detention”) the Human Rights Centre found, inter alia, that: “Failure to adhere to the statutory cell size (4 square metres per person) in the living blocks of the institution has become an unpleasant problem which now affects the prison system across the entire country ... The same situation was confirmed during a visit to Chişinău Prison no. 13 in on 9 September 2010. In some cells the living space was not proportionate to the number of detainees. During the visit, eight detainees were being held in cell no. 38, which measured 24 square metres. This situation has been seen repeatedly during visits by the Centre’s staff to the Chişinău Pre-trial Detention Centre. Similar findings were made during visits to Rusca Prison no. 7 on 19 May 2010, where six detainees were being held in a cell measuring 15.5 square metres and to Cricova Prison no. 4, where (in living block no. 7) over twenty detainees were being held in a cell measuring 65 square metres. Overcrowding comes directly within the Ombudsman’s remit as part of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, which on many occasions has recognised overcrowding in the country’s prisons ... [T]he Prisons Department informed the Ombudsman that meat and fish products are provided [to detainees] whenever possible. At the same time, the authority stated that, owing to the difficult financial situation, during 2010 the detainees in Rezina Prison no. 17 received only 75% and 80% of their normal quotas of meat and fish products respectively. In this connection, the Minister of Justice provided information to the Ombudsman about the expenditure on prisoners’ food in 2010. The cost amounted to MDL 24.05 million, whereas the budgetary need for the same year was, according to the Ministry of Finance’s draft budget, MDL 29.05 million. The daily cost of feeding a detainee in 2010 was MDL 10.24, whilst the daily budgetary need was MDL 12.35. This statistic was often cited by prison authorities to justify why they were unable to provide detainees with meat and fish ... As regards sanitary conditions, lighting and ventilation problems continue to exist in the majority of living blocks in Moldovan prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prisons no. 1 and Rusca Prison no. 7. The Republic of Moldova inherited old gulag-type prisons in dilapidated buildings, corresponding to former Soviet standards. The prisons do not conform to current national and international standards; however, the budget constraints upon the State do not allow for their reconstruction or renovation. In the prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prison no. 1, detainees are held in large-capacity cells insufficiently equipped for their daily needs, namely areas for sleeping, for everyday living and for sanitary equipment. Detainees are held in extremely overcrowded, dark, damp and unventilated spaces full of cigarette smoke. In certain prisons the bunk beds essentially prevent daylight from reaching the living space.”

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5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently detained in Łódź Remand Centre. 6. On 25 September 2006 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered the applicant’s detention on remand for a period of three months. He was charged with a number of offences committed with an armed organised criminal group. 7. In its decision, the District Court relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. The court further emphasised the gravity of the offences in question, the applicant’s active role in the criminal group and the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on him after conviction. In the domestic court’s view the fact that the applicant was at the time detained pending other criminal proceedings against him did not guarantee the proper course of the proceedings since the applicant could had been released at any time from the pre-trial detention without the relevant authorities, responsible for the impugned proceedings, being notified. Moreover, the necessity to obtain further evidence justified remanding the applicant in custody. 8. The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 24 September 2006 was dismissed by the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 25 October 2006. The court emphasised that the applicant’s detention on remand was necessary even though at the relevant time he was in any event detained pending another set of criminal proceedings against him. 9. On 19 December 2006 and 26 June 2007 the Łódź Regional Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Subsequently, the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) extended the applicant’s detention on 19 September 2007, 19 December 2007, 28 March 2008, 18 June 2008, 22 October 2008 and on 23 December 2008. 10. On 18 March 2009 the State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy) lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Łódź Regional Court. The applicant was charged with several counts of extortion and robbery committed in an organised and armed criminal group and with participation in an organised and armed criminal group. The bill of indictment comprised 94 charges brought against 28 defendants. The prosecution authorities requested that 318 witnesses be heard before the court. 11. On 30 March 2009 the Łódź Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 December 2009. Subsequently, the same court ordered prolongation of his detention on 21 December 2009 (detention extended until 30 September 2010), on 22 September 2010 (detention extended until 31 March 2011) and on 23 March 2011 (detention extended until 30 September 2011). The applicant lodged a number of motions to be released as well as appeals against the decisions extending his pre-trial detention, all in vain. In their decisions the courts repeated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s detention. 12. On 3 April 2009 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against one of the decisions extending the applicant’s detention. The lawyer argued that the reasons for continued pre-trial detention ceased to exist since the applicant had started serving a seven years’ prison sentence imposed by the Łódź District Court in the case no. IV K 239/06. 13. Meanwhile, the court scheduled fifteen hearings for November and December 2009. Due to sick-leaves of the presiding judge and of some of the accused those hearings did not take place. 14. The trial was eventually opened on 18 January 2010. Subsequent scheduled hearings were adjourned due to absences of some of the co-accused and due to problems with sound system in the court room. 15. In May 2010 the Regional Court gave a severance order and decided to determine charges against two co-accused separately. 16. The bill of indictment was finally read out to the defendants at the hearing held on 27 May 2010. 17. At the hearing of 28 May 2010 the Regional Court started taking evidence from the accused. It subsequently held fourteen hearings until the end of 2010, during which some of the accused gave evidence. Five of the scheduled hearings were adjourned due to sick-leaves of the accused. One hearing was adjourned because of the motion for disqualification of the presiding judge lodged by one of the co-accused. 18. In 2011 the Regional Court continued taking evidence from the defendants. Of the twenty nine hearings scheduled for this year, eleven took place. The trial court adjourned fifteen hearings due to justified absences of the parties, three hearings were cancelled due to sick-leaves of the presiding judge and the lay judges. 19. Meanwhile, on 13 September 2011 the Łódź Regional Court lodged a motion with the Łódź Court of Appeal to extend the applicant’s pre-trial detention. On 28 September 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the lower court’s motion. Consequently, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was lifted on 30 September 2011. 20. The Regional Court scheduled twenty hearings for 2012, of which six hearings were eventually held. At the hearing of 16 April 2012 the trial court started taking evidence from wit nesses. Of the fourteen hearings cancelled this year, two were adjourned because of a sick-leave of the presiding judge, three because of absences of witnesses, and the remaining nine hearings – because of absences of the parties. 21. Until 30 July 2013 the Regional Court scheduled nine hearings for 2013, of which seven were adjourned due to justified absences of the defendants. 22. The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the first-instance court. 23. On 27 April 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Łódź Court of Appeal under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”). He sought a finding that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive and 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. 24. On 27 July 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court found that, considering the complexity of the case and the number of co-accused who had actively tried to obstruct the proceedings, the Łódź Regional Court had conducted the proceedings in a correct and timely manner. Consequently, the appellate court refused to award the applicant compensation.

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5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Łódź. 6. On 6 June 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of committing a number of offences in an armed organised criminal group. 7. On 15 June 2007 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody. The court relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. The risk of the applicant fleeing was also taken into account since he had spent almost a year in hiding after a ‘wanted’ notice (list gończy) had been issued against him. The court also referred to the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on the applicant after conviction. 8. The applicant’s detention on remand was extended by the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 4 September 2007, 18 December 2007 and 26 March 2008. Subsequently it was extended by the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 4 June 2008, 22 October 2008, 23 December 2008 and on 25 March 2009. The applicant’s appeals filed against some of the above decisions were dismissed by the Łódź Court of Appeal on 6 February 2008, 2 July 2008, 12 November 2008 and 22 April 2009. In their detention decisions the courts relied on the original grounds for the applicant’s arrest. They stressed, in particular, the danger of the applicant absconding referring to the fact that he had remained in hiding before his arrest. They further referred to the need to apprehend other members of the criminal group and to obtain additional evidence supporting the case against the applicant. In the courts’ view, the applicant, if released, would try to obstruct the proceedings by passing vital information about the preliminary proceedings onto the other members of the criminal group and by influencing witnesses. The courts concluded that in the context of the applicant’s case, which concerned organised crime, detention on remand was the only security measure to guarantee the proper conduct of the proceedings. 9. On an unspecified date in 2009 the charges against the applicant were severed to a separate set of the proceedings as he was to undergo a psychiatric examination. 10. On 16 June 2009 the Łódź Prosecutor of Appeal (Prokurator Prokuratury Apealacyjnej) lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Łódź Regional Court. The applicant was charged with several counts of robbery and drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group. 11. On 24 June 2009 the Łódź Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 December 2009. Subsequently, the same court ordered prolongation of his detention on 21 December 2009 (detention extended until 30 September 2010), on 22 September 2010 (detention extended until 31 March 2011) and on 23 March 2011 (detention extended until 30 September 2011). The applicant appealed against all of those decisions but to no avail. In their decisions the courts repeated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s detention. They also stressed the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on the applicant after conviction. 12. Meanwhile, on 28 July 2009, the Łódź Regional Court joined the applicant’s case with the case against the other members of the criminal group. The joined proceedings concerned altogether 29 defendants charged with 102 offences. The prosecution authorities requested that 318 witnesses be heard before the court. 13. The court scheduled fifteen hearings for November and December 2009. Due to sick-leaves of the presiding judge and of some of the accused those hearings did not take place. 14. The trial was eventually opened on 18 January 2010. Subsequent scheduled hearings were adjourned due to absences of some of the co‑accused and due to problems with sound system in the court room. 15. In May 2010 the Regional Court gave a severance order and decided to determine charges against two co-accused separately. 16. The bill of indictment was finally read out to the defendants at the hearing held on 27 May 2010. 17. At the hearing of 28 May 2010 the Regional Court started taking evidence from the accused. It subsequently held fourteen hearings until the end of 2010, during which some of the accused gave evidence. Five of the scheduled hearings were adjourned due to sick-leaves of the accused. In particular, the hearing scheduled for 16 August 2010 was cancelled because the applicant and another defendant in the case were feeling unwell. One hearing was adjourned because of the motion for disqualification of the judge lodged by one of the co-accused. 18. In 2011 the Regional Court continued taking evidence from the defendants. Of the twenty-nine hearings scheduled for this year, eleven took place. The trial court adjourned fifteen hearings due to justified absences of the parties, three hearings were cancelled due to sick-leaves of the presiding judge and the lay judges. 19. Meanwhile, the applicant’s detention on remand was lifted on an unspecified date in late August 2011. He continued to remain in custody as pre‑trial detention was imposed on him in a separate set of proceedings. 20. The Regional Court scheduled twenty hearings for 2012, of which six hearings were eventually held. At the hearing of 16 April 2012 the trial court started taking evidence from witnesses. Of the fourteen hearings cancelled this year, two were adjourned because of a sick‑leave of the presiding judge, three because of absences of witnesses, and the remaining nine hearings – because of absences of the parties. 21. Until 30 July 2013 the Regional Court scheduled nine hearings for 2013, of which seven were adjourned due to justified absences of the defendants. In particular, the hearing of 28 June 2013 was adjourned because of the absence of the applicant. 22. The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the first‑instance court. 23. On 25 February 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Łódź Court of Appeal under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”). He sought a finding that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive and 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. 24. On 11 May 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The appellate court found that, considering the complexity of the case and the number of co-accused, who actively tried to obstruct the proceedings, the first-instance court had conducted the proceedings in a correct and timely manner. Consequently, the court refused to award the applicant compensation.

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5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in London. 6. The applicant met V.T., a Lithuanian citizen, in the United Kingdom in 2005. They lived together in London. 7. On 18 September 2007 a son, A.M., was born to them. A.M. is a Lithuanian citizen. 8. In March 2008 V.T. went with the child to visit her family in Lithuania. After a month, the father went to Lithuania to fetch them. They all returned to the United Kingdom. In June the mother and their son went back to Lithuania for the summer. In July the mother wrote to the applicant stating that their relationship was over. She went to the United Kingdom shortly afterwards to collect their son’s belongings and returned to Lithuania, where she remained with the boy. On 17 July 2008 V.T. registered her and her son’s permanent residence at her parents’ address in Kuktiškės village, Utena district in Lithuania. 9. The applicant claimed that his son had been abducted and held in Lithuania without his consent. He initiated proceedings before the Vilnius Regional Court, asking that the child be returned to the United Kingdom, which was his son’s usual permanent place of residence. 10. By a decision of 6 March 2009, the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request. The applicant, V.T., two of her lawyers and representatives of the Lithuanian child care authorities were present at the hearing. The child care specialist asked the court to resolve the issue of the child’s return to his country of birth as it saw fit. This notwithstanding, the authorities observed that the child had good living conditions in Lithuania and was growing up in a secure environment among loving people. 11. The court acknowledged that since his birth the boy’s parents had taken care of him together and that consequently his permanent place of residence was the United Kingdom. Both of the parents had custody rights in respect of the boy. The Vilnius Regional Court also dismissed V.T.’s allegation that the applicant had agreed that the child could settle permanently in Lithuania. Moreover, V.T. had no legal basis on which to decide to change the child’s permanent place of residence on her own. Her refusal to return the child to the country of his birth after the holidays in summer 2008 could not be recognised as being justified. 12. The Vilnius Regional Court nevertheless ruled that the child should stay in Lithuania. In setting out its reasons, the court held that before arriving in Lithuania the child had lived in London for some seven months. It was therefore his mother, who did not go out to work, who had predominantly taken care of him during that time. Moreover, his living conditions in the United Kingdom were worse than those in Lithuania. In particular, the boy and his parents had lived in London in one small room, with construction work going on close by. By contrast, in Lithuania the child lived at V.T.’s parents’ house where, according to a child care representative, the boy felt happy and was spry, active, communicative and loved. The court also observed that the boy’s mother had taken care of him the entire time since birth, that they were very close and that the boy had never been left with a nanny or any other person. Furthermore, even though there was no evidence that the applicant had ever behaved improperly in front of the child, or that he had abused alcohol, used drugs or resorted to violence, the applicant had not demonstrated that he had the skills to take care of such a small child. Accordingly, the boy’s separation from the mother and transfer to the father would not be in the child’s interests. It followed that the child could be returned to the United Kingdom only with the mother. Given that the mother could not survive financially in London on her own and that the applicant refused to guarantee having enough money to maintain the child’s mother or to guarantee living conditions for her if she were to come back with the child to the United Kingdom, the applicant’s request that the child be returned to the United Kingdom had to be denied. 13. The applicant then started new court proceedings in the High Court of Justice in England and Wales (hereinafter – “the HCJ”). In summer 2009 that court appointed a guardian ad litem for A.M. 14. In January 2010 the boy’s guardian recommended that he remain in the care of his mother. The guardian also recommended to the HCJ that there be a period of contact between the father and his son, so that they could rebuild their relationship. During these proceedings, the applicant appeared in person, and V.T. gave evidence in person; she was also represented by her lawyers. 15. On 28 April 2010 the HCJ ruled that the child should permanently reside in Lithuania with his mother. The option for V.T. to come to the United Kingdom and take up a job there was not in the child’s best interests, given that the child would be placed in a nursery and would have two parents who were emotionally distant. Moreover, V.T. did not wish to live in England, even if she were to be supported by the applicant. Having acknowledged that the father had a genuine and serious interest in his son, the court held that the “central underlying problem” thus related to the promotion and preservation of a good relationship between the two of them. 16. The HCJ accepted that the applicant felt vulnerable in Lithuania but rejected his allegations about concerted attempts by the Lithuanian authorities to act against him. That notwithstanding, the HCJ also held: “99. (...) it seems to me that in Lithuania [the applicant] will have very real difficulties in engaging in the contact in an appropriate way because of the pressures he will have in Lithuania. (...) I see real advantage in the contact being here [in London] so that the child gets to know his father in the father’s own environment.” 17. The HCJ thus considered that the correct place for their contact would be England. Furthermore, the preferred timing was “clearly as soon as possible”. 18. Accordingly, the child’s mother was to come to the United Kingdom and spend up to six weeks there, during which time a regime of contact between the father and the child would take place. Afterwards the mother was free to return to Lithuania with the child and to live there permanently. The HCJ also “wished to make it abundantly clear” to both parents that “albeit the issues relating to the welfare of children could change with circumstances, it was going to take a very significant change for there to be any re-visiting of the overarching plan described above”. 19. Once the child had settled permanently in Lithuania, the applicant would have a right to ongoing contact: essentially, four times a year there would be seven to ten days’ residential contact between him and his son. The first two meetings would take place in the United Kingdom, once the mother had brought the child there. That was contingent upon the father paying a sum to fund the trip, namely 600 pounds sterling (GBP) for each visit. Thereafter the father would have the choice as to where this contact was to take place and he could travel to Lithuania, pick up the child and communicate with him in any location worldwide that he wished. 20. The applicant attended the court hearing. At the end thereof the judge informed the applicant that the judgment would be enforceable in Lithuania subject to applications being made there in respect of the contact order after the child had returned to live there permanently. 21. On 18 June 2010 the HCJ adopted a revised judgment and order, reiterating that the applicant and V.T. were not on good terms with each other and that it had thus had to take a difficult decision on 28 April 2010 when it ruled that the mother should have permission to take the child to live in Lithuania permanently. There was a risk, as portrayed by the applicant, that the applicant could be shut out of the child’s life by the mother’s family. However, in the meantime no significant or dramatic change of circumstances had occurred which would necessitate amending the custody decision. On this point the HCJ also expressed its confidence in the Lithuanian courts: “An additional point is that it seems to me that it is not open to me to proceed on the basis that the Lithuanian courts will do anything other than deal with this matter pursuant to [child’s] welfare principle. They are subject to Brussels II revised. Albeit I understand that the father was unhappy with the conclusions reached in the Lithuanian court, to my mind I cannot accept his submission that even if the mother and her family demonstrate the hostility he asserts, the Lithuanian court will join in and will not seek to promote the underlying theme of my judgments, namely, that there should be a contact between this father and son”. 22. As regards the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts for further examination of issues relating to parental responsibility and thus contact, the HCJ held: “(a) recognising and intending that, subject to Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, upon the Child, A.M., leaving the jurisdiction of England and Wales to live permanently in Lithuania pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Order, the courts of Lithuania will have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility, and thus contact ...” 23. The contact order established by the HCJ on 28 April and revised by it on 18 June 2010 set out three stages of contact: – the first stage covered the period from 19 June until 14 July 2010, when the mother was to bring the child to the United Kingdom for paternal contact, subject to and conditional upon the applicant paying the sum of GPB 3,000 to the mother of the child; – the second stage of the parental contact covered two periods of contact – 18-25 September and 11-18 December 2010 within the jurisdiction of England and Wales; two weeks before they were to take place, the applicant was to pay GBP 600 to the mother’s solicitors for the purpose of meeting the costs incurred by the mother when travelling with the child to the jurisdiction of England and Wales; – the third stage covered two periods of paternal contact from 19-28 March and 18-27 June 2011, when the applicant was to pick up his son at the Romanian Embassy in Vilnius and was allowed to choose any location worldwide to be with his son; as of July 2011, the applicant could take his son from Vilnius and travel with him worldwide four times a year, for ten days on each occasion. 24. Lastly, the applicant raised the argument that from a practical point of view it would be easier for him to travel with his son if the boy had a passport from the same country. The HCJ thus ordered that after 1 September 2010 V.T. would provide the Romanian and/or Moldovan authorities with relevant documents and information to enable the applicant to obtain Romanian and/or Moldovan passports and/or travel documents for the child. Should the mother fail to comply, the applicant could lodge a complaint with the HCJ, which retained jurisdiction on this sole issue of passports/travel documents. 25. The applicant sought leave to appeal against the HCJ judgment and order of 18 June 2010, but on 16 September 2010 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales refused his application. 26. The first stage of the contact order adopted by the HCJ was implemented. The applicant paid V.T. the sum of GPB 3,000 for the costs incurred by her when taking their son to the United Kingdom, and V.T. took the child to London for four weeks’ paternal contact, which should have lasted from 19 June until 14 July 2010. 27. During that visit, on 8 July 2010 the boy’s guardian ad litem informed the HCJ that she was concerned about the risk factors in relation to ensuring the boy’s safety and his return to his mother’s care in the light of their imminent return to Lithuania. The guardian noted that she had been made aware that the applicant had made an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the HCJ judgment and order of 18 June 2010. In the words of the boy’s guardian, the applicant had made abundantly clear his “obdurate attitude” to the judgment and order issued by the HCJ and his “steadfast view” that his son should live in the United Kingdom, irrespective of the child’s needs and best interests, which, as agreed by the HCJ court and the child care specialists, were best met on a day to day basis by his mother. The guardian also noted that the previous month the applicant had informed the United Kingdom authorities of his intention to leave the United Kingdom following the last session of his July 2010 contact period. Furthermore, the HCJ order of 18 June 2010 had allowed for the applicant to apply for a Romanian or Moldovan passport. In that connection, in June the applicant’s solicitor had urged V.T.’s solicitor to sign her son’s Romanian passport application form immediately. For the above reasons, the boy’s guardian ad litem had serious concerns that there was an increased risk of A.M. being abducted by his father. She thus recommended that the order of 18 June 2010 be varied and that the court suspend the last session of contact scheduled for 10 July to 13 July, allowing the boy and his mother to return to Lithuania before the expected time. 28. In addition to that, in an email of 9 July 2010 to the applicant from the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (hereinafter – “Cafcass”) of England, a Cafcass lawyer wrote: “Dear Mr Manic I understand you have been served with the passport and tipstaff orders. I am concerned to note that you initially informed the tipstaff you only had one passport but after further discussions handed over two passports. The tipstaff have also reported to us that you had several passport photos of A.M., again this is of concern. I realise you are not legally represented and I think it would be advisable for you to obtain legal advice before we next attend court. I can however impress upon you that if you breach the current orders and A.M. is not returned to his mother at the conclusion of contact then there will be very serious implications on your future contact with A.M. I therefore hope that you enjoy the following four days of contact and that you return him to his mother at the appropriate time and date.” 29. On 9 July 2010 the HCJ found the Cafcass communication ill-advised. The Moldovan and Romanian embassies were nonetheless ordered to advise V.T.’s solicitors if the applicant had made any application for travel documents in respect of the child and to refrain from issuing any such document. Having in the following days been informed by those two embassies that they had not been approached for a passport for the boy, the HCJ then ordered that V.T. make the boy available for the full visit in July. The boy’s mother afterwards took the boy to live with her in Lithuania. 30. On 16 September 2010 V.T.’s lawyer wrote to the applicant stating that V.T. was not proposing to bring their son to the United Kingdom so that the boy could see his father. V.T. believed that it would be too stressful for the boy and that the child was not ready to spend a week away from his mother. The applicant was also informed that jurisdiction over contact arrangements had now passed to the Lithuanian courts. V.T.’s lawyer also enclosed a cheque for GBP 600 by way of reimbursement of the sum the applicant had paid in relation to V.T.’s travel and accommodation expenses for the staying contact in September 2010. 31. On 7 October 2010 the applicant contacted the International Child Abduction Unit, the Central authority within the meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 in England, as regards the non-enforcement of the second stage of the HCJ mandate of 18 June 2010. The applicant noted that even though the GBP 600 for the September visit had been returned to him, he was ready to pay it again at any time should the contact go ahead. 32. On 18 October 2010 the aforementioned United Kingdom authority contacted the Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service in Lithuania (Valstybės vaiko teisių apsaugos ir įvaikinimo tarnyba, hereinafter – “the Service”) regarding the non-enforcement of the HCJ judgment and order. All the relevant documents ‒ including the HCJ contact order of 18 June 2010, the letter from V.T.’s solicitor (see paragraph 30 above) and the application form where the applicant stated that he was ready to pay GBP 600 so that a future visit would take place ‒ were transferred to the Lithuanian authority. 33. On 25 October 2010 the Service informed the International Child Abduction Unit in England that certificates issued in EU member states were directly enforceable in Lithuania, and they had therefore been submitted to a bailiff for execution (see paragraph 73 below). The Service also provided its counterpart in England with a list of the bailiffs acting in Utena region, where V.T. and the applicant’s son lived, and advised the applicant to contact one of the suggested bailiffs directly so that the HCJ order could be executed. The Service also noted that the procedural activity of the bailiff responsible for the enforcement of a foreign contact order was supervised by a regional court. 34. On 30 October 2010 the applicant contacted a bailiff working in Utena district of Lithuania. As is evidenced by the documents in the Court’s possession, between 30 October 2010 and 10 February 2011 the applicant wrote twenty six emails to the bailiff. The emails were written in English, with a Google translation into Lithuanian. In his very first email to the bailiff, the applicant noted that he had a certificate for a contact order under Article 41 of Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003. As explained in his emails of 2 and 4 November 2010, he attached the enforcement certificate, a letter to the Lithuanian Central authority, the letter from V.T.’s solicitors (see paragraph 30 above) and proof that he had paid 130 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 37 euros (EUR)) for the execution of the HCJ judgment in Lithuania, and promised to send other relevant information. The applicant also asked the bailiff to notify him if she was missing any documents and to inform him about the enforcement procedure. In his email of 2 November 2010 the applicant also indicated that, if it made it easier for the bailiff, she could reply to the applicant in Russian, a language he declared that he could understand. 35. In those emails to the bailiff, the applicant wrote, in particular, that he had sent the documents needed for the execution of the HCJ judgment by post (email of 5 November), and that Cafcass had assured him that the documents as posted by him to Lithuania were in order (email of 19 November, also attaching his email correspondence with Cafcass). It is apparent that the applicant and the bailiff spoke on the phone on 19 November, when the bailiff confirmed to the applicant that she had received the documents by DHL delivery the day before, but stated that the documents were not “original”. On 23 November the applicant again sent the documents to the bailiff via DHL post. He explained that the courts in England used black ink for the stamps but that, even so, the documents were marked as “original”. The same day the bailiff emailed the applicant saying that she needed the original paperwork, not photocopies. The applicant then asked the court in England to seal the HCJ order and posted the documents to the bailiff again. 36. By emails of 3 and 7 December the applicant asked the bailiff to inform him how the bailiff’s meeting with the child’s mother had gone, as regards the execution of the HCJ order, and mentioned that he was ready to make the payments according to the HJC order, so that the next visit [that of December 2010] would take place. By email of 9 December the applicant asked the bailiff to update him in writing about the steps she had taken to enforce the contact order. He mentioned that time was passing and this would cause damage to his relationship with his son. The applicant also asked the bailiff a number of times at what stage the enforcement procedure was (email of 13 December). In the applicant’s view, even though the bailiff’s assistant had told him over the phone that the matter had been passed over to the Lithuanian court, the applicant had received no explanation in writing as to which court that was and when the Lithuanian court decision was to be taken. The applicant wrote that “the blackout of information was leading me to believe that there was something wrong in the middle. I do not want to speculate and would be grateful if you wrote me a few lines to explain what is going on” (email of 15 December 2010). Later on, the applicant wrote that the bailiff’s “silence was agonising” (email of 5 January 2011). On 27 January the applicant reiterated his complaint that the bailiff had not informed him why the case was “dragged out”. He also asked the bailiff to provide him with answers in writing as well as with information about what he named “Complaints and Procedures”. Further, as is evident from the applicant’s emails of 1 and 7 February, the bailiff had told him over the phone that the Lithuanian court wanted the applicant to be present in the courtroom in Lithuania. He asked the bailiff what would be the reason for his appearance in court, but the bailiff did not respond. In an email of 8 February the applicant also wrote that, according to the bailiff, V.T. had not complied with the contact order because he had not paid her the GBP 600. The applicant explained however, that he had paid that sum, as mentioned in the letter of 16 September from 2010 V.T.’s lawyers, and asked the bailiff whether that evidence had been put before the Lithuanian court. Lastly, by an email of 10 February the applicant wrote that he could not understand the bailiff’s silence and why his emails went unanswered. He asked whether the bailiff had received instructions from her superiors or from Government agencies not to engage in any correspondence with him. 37. On 20 December 2010 the bailiff established that V.T. had not delivered the child for paternal contact which, in accordance with the order of the HCJ, was due to take place between 11 and 18 December 2010. For that reason, on 27 December 2010 the bailiff initiated court proceedings against V.T. concerning the non-enforcement of the United Kingdom court’s order. 38. On 26 January 2011 the Utena District Court sent to the applicant’s address in London a notification that court proceedings regarding non-execution of the HCJ judgment about his contact rights had been opened in Lithuania. The court wrote to the applicant that his “participation in the oral court hearing was not obligatory”. It was also explained to the applicant that he should nominate a representative in Lithuania on whom all the procedural documents could be served. Failing that, all procedural documents intended for the party residing abroad would remain in the case file and would be deemed to have been served. 39. In April 2011 the Lithuanian authorities granted the applicant legal aid for one year for the proceedings concerning non-execution of the HCJ order in Lithuania. On 22 April 2011 the State-appointed lawyer wrote to the applicant that she had become acquainted with the case regarding the non-execution of the HCJ judgment. She wrote that V.T. had not taken the son for the visit [of December 2010] because the applicant had not transferred GBP 600, and asked him to explain the situation and send her a copy of the document confirming the transfer of that sum. The same day the applicant wrote to the State-appointed lawyer stating that both the bailiff and the Utena District Court had the relevant documents. The applicant also attached to the letter some documents detailing the facts. He further attached the letter of 16 September 2010 (see paragraph 30 above) as proof that the child had not been taken to England in September, even though he had sent the money for that visit to materialise. Lastly, the applicant expressed his willingness to provide any other information, if needed. 40. On 27 April 2011 the Utena District Court dismissed the bailiff’s complaint. The applicant did not take part in that hearing, but had a State-appointed lawyer. As the court decision reads, “from V.T.’s explanations, information existing in the case-file, the explanations of the bailiff, and those of the [applicant’s] lawyer, it is clear that [V.T.] failed to execute the [HCJ] judgment, i.e. between 11 and 18 December 2010 she did not take the child A.M., born on 18 September 2007, for the contact visit with his father, because the father of the child had not paid GBP 600, and V.T. is unemployed and has no funds to take the child to England”. The Utena court also noted that by interim protective measures (laikinosios apsaugos priemonės) of 1 March 2011 imposed by the same court, the applicant was prohibited from removing the child from Lithuanian territory (see paragraphs 47-49 below). The decision stated that it could be appealed against within seven days. 41. On 2 May 2011 the Panevėžys State legal aid office informed the applicant by email about the court decision of 27 April 2011 and sent him its unofficial translation into English. Later that day the applicant emailed the State-appointed lawyer asking for an explanation as to what had happened in the courtroom on 27 April 2011. In an email of 2 May he asked that lawyer to appeal against the decision of 27 April, so that the seven days’ time-limit to appeal was not missed. On 16 May 2011 the lawyer acting under the legal aid scheme posted the decision of 27 April 2011 to the applicant. The Government stated that the applicant had not appealed against the 27 April 2011 decision. 42. According to the medical documents dated 19 July, 2 August and 30 September 2010, after the child’s and his mother’s visit to England for the contact visit, the boy returned very anxious, he could not sleep at night and he was afraid of people. The boy was also very active, irritable and required exceptional attention from his mother. As of 9 September 2010 the boy had been visiting a mental health centre. He had been diagnosed with emotional disorder, manifested as increased anxiety and frequent mood change. 43. On 13 December 2010 V.T. addressed to the Utena District Court a request that the child contact arrangements as set out in the HCJ judgment of 18 June 2010 be changed and that she be awarded child support and child support arrears (skola už vaiko išlaikymą) by the applicant. In support of her request, V.T. included the aforementioned medical records. 44. She submitted a modified claim on 9 February 2011. On that day she also applied to the court for interim protective measures to suspend execution of the contact order of the HCJ, and not to allow the applicant to be alone with his son. V.T. stated that the applicant had not paid the sum of money mentioned in the HCJ judgment and that the contact visits between him and the child had therefore not taken place. It was also her belief that the child did not recognise his father. Moreover, it was not in the child’s interests to communicate with the applicant in England, as the HCJ had ordered, because that environment was unfamiliar to the boy. She attached to her request what appears to be the Cafcass email of 9 July 2010 and the HCJ decision of the same day. V.T. insisted that the boy should never communicate with his father without her being present. 45. On 22 February 2011 the Utena District Court accepted for examination V.T.’s request for the change of parental contact. On the same day the court decided to examine V.T.’s request for interim protective measures on 1 March 2011, and not to inform the applicant about that oral hearing, without indicating in the text of the decision the reason why the applicant should not know about the hearing beforehand. The child care authority and V.T. were invited to attend the hearing. Moreover, the court deemed V.T.’s participation at the hearing to be obligatory. The court further held that, as the applicant resided in England and the question of interim protective measures had not yet been decided, for reasons of procedural economy any procedural decisions should be sent to the applicant only once the issue of interim protective measures had been examined. This procedural ruling was not appealable. 46. On 28 February 2011 V.T. submitted to the Utena District Court further written clarifications as to the necessity of interim protective measures. She claimed that the applicant might kidnap and not return their son should the boy be taken to England for a contact visit. She also stated that the applicant had also been prohibited from having contact with the boy for four days of the contact period in July 2010. It is apparent that V.T. relied on an email of 9 July 2010 from Cafcass to the applicant as evidence (see paragraph 28 above). V.T. also stated that after his last meeting with his father, the boy had been nervous and afraid of other people. 47. By a decision of 1 March 2011 the Utena District Court granted in part V.T.’s request for interim protective measures. At the hearing the child’s mother was present, as was a representative of the child care authorities, who observed that the applicant ought to retain the right to have contact with his son in Lithuania. The authority nevertheless took the view that the applicant should not be allowed to remove the child from Lithuania for fear that he might flee with his son. In Lithuania, the boy was spry and V.T. took good care of him. As the record of the hearing reads, V.T.’s request was essentially based on her fear that the applicant would not return the child to her if he was allowed to take his son from Lithuania. She also stated that after the staying visit of July 2010 the boy had been nervous and exhausted and would not leave her side. 48. The Utena District Court noted a conflict between the applicant and V.T. over the child’s contact arrangements. On the basis of the email from Cafcass dated 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 28 above), the Utena District Court found: “The documents submitted prove that the [applicant] was going to take the son away from the United Kingdom and prepared other personal documents for him for that purpose; during his contacts with the child, the latter’s personal documents were therefore taken from him and he was prohibited from removing the child from the jurisdiction of England and Wales. Taking this into account, there is a real risk that the execution of the [Lithuanian] court decision might become more complicated (if it were to become necessary to apply to a national court of a foreign State for acknowledgment and permission to execute a Lithuanian court decision, if one were to be made in V.T.’s favour) or even impossible (if, for example, the applicant were to conceal the child’s whereabouts or change them periodically). The risk that the execution of the court decision might become more complicated or even impossible constitutes a basis for ordering interim protective measures (...). It was also taken into account that the child’s domicile is in Lithuania, where he attends a kindergarten, and a sudden change in the environment might therefore have a negative impact on a child.” 49. The Utena District Court nevertheless acknowledged that a child whose parents were separated had the right to have constant and direct contact with both parents irrespective of their places of residence. It was also of paramount importance to avoid the alienation of the child from his father. Given that the applicant resided outside Lithuania and this could make it problematic for him to have contact with his son on certain days, the court determined that the applicant had the right to have contact with the child on any day on the premises of the Utena region child care authorities and in the presence of their representative. With prior notice, the applicant could see the child every day from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. V.T. was obliged to make the child available for the contact. 50. On 3 March 2011 the Utena District Court sent a notice to the applicant’s address in London about the pending civil case for maintenance of his son, the establishment of the new contact order and the applicant’s right to respond to V.T.’s claim. The court further reiterated the applicant’s duty to appoint a representative living in Lithuania, on whom all the procedural documents would be served by the court (Article 805 of the Code of Civil Procedure). On the same day V.T.’s lawyers informed the applicant by email about the district court’s decision to apply interim protective measures and sent him an electronic copy of that decision, in Lithuanian. It was explained to the applicant that the court decision would be translated and served on him as soon as possible by the Utena court itself or by post. The lawyer also explained to the applicant that by the decision of 1 March 2011 the Utena District Court had decided to apply interim protective measures and to prohibit the applicant from removing his son from the territory of Lithuania. The applicant was informed that the decision had entered into force on the day it was issued. The next day the applicant wrote an email to the Utena court acknowledging that he had received a court decision, but complaining that the content was in Lithuanian, and therefore he could not understand it. The decision of 1 March was translated into English and on 14 March 2011 the Utena court posted it to the applicant’s address in London. Because of technical problems, the decision was served on the applicant on 1 June 2011. The 1 March 2011 decision could be appealed against within seven days from the day it had been served. As established on 4 March 2014 by the Panevėžys Regional Court, the applicant did not appeal against the decision of 1 March 2011. 51. On 29 July 2011 the Utena District Court sent a written notice to the applicant informing him that on 29 September 2011 it was going to consider V.T.’s claim for changing the child contact arrangements and awarding the child support. The applicant was also informed that, in accordance with Article 805 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when a party living abroad does not designate any authorised person, all procedural documents intended for the party living abroad will remain in the case file and will be deemed to have been served. 52. The Utena District Court held the planned preparatory meeting on 29 September 2011, which the applicant did not attend. Nor did he take part in a subsequent hearing on 24 November 2011, even though he had been informed about it by that court. 53. At that subsequent hearing, about which the applicant was informed but which he did not attend, the Utena District Court asked the English judicial authorities to question the applicant as a witness so that it could be established what property he owned in England in connection with the claim for child support. Later on, the Utena District Court postponed hearings scheduled for 12 January and 23 February 2012 until such time as it had received, from the United Kingdom authorities, information about the property the applicant owned in England. 54. In December 2011, the applicant asked the Lithuanian child care authorities about the well-being of his son. In reply, the Lithuanian child care authorities described the child’s living conditions in Lithuania: he had a room of his own in V.T.’s parents’ house and V.T. paid for his kindergarten, food and clothes. In sum, the boy’s living conditions were good and the child care authority had no concerns about his well-being. 55. On 2 April 2012 the applicant gave evidence about his property in England. The Utena District Court received that evidence at the end of April. On 8 May 2012 the court scheduled a preliminary hearing in the civil case for maintenance and contact rights for 6 June 2012. The parties to the case, including the applicant, were informed about that future hearing. 56. On 26 June 2012 the Utena District Court adopted the decision regarding the maintenance of the applicant’s son and the order for the establishment of the contact between the applicant and the child. The court also noted that judicial documents had been served on the applicant, he had been granted the right to file a statement of defence with regard to the claim, and he had been informed about the preparatory hearing; moreover, he was obliged to submit details about his financial situation but he had neither filed any statement of defence, nor submitted the requisite details about his financial situation. Neither had the applicant expressed his opinion regarding V.T.’s claim in his written explanations. The court established that V.T. had taken all the measures necessary to satisfy her son’s interests so that he could grow up in a healthy environment. Having assessed the parties’ financial situations, the Utena District Court ordered the applicant to pay LTL 400 (EUR 115) per month in child support. 57. As to the child contact arrangements, the Utena District Court held: “The details of the case show that the child contact arrangements were established by the Order issued by the United Kingdom High Court of Justice, Family Division, on 18 June 2010 and under this Order the defendant was expected to have contact with his son on the following dates: from 18 September 2010 to 25 September 2010; from 11 December 2010 to 18 December 2010; from 19 March 2011 to 28 March 2011; from 18 June 2011 to 27 June 2011, and thereafter four times a year for a period of ten days each time. After the first two contact sessions the father was to have the right to choose any place in the world for all further contact sessions and to travel with his child without being accompanied by his mother. The [applicant] has not submitted any details proving that he had any contact with his child on the aforementioned dates or stating what the reasons were if he did not have such contact. [V.T.] stated that the last time the father saw his child was June 2010. The email submitted shows that no payment was received with regard to the contact that was due to occur on 11 December 2010 ... During the period of examination of the case, the [applicant] was allowed to contact his son in Lithuania in the presence of the representative of the Department for Protection of Children’s Rights ... According to the information provided by the representative of the Department for Protection of Children’s Rights ... no contact sessions between father and son took place during the period of application for interim protective measures lasting from 1 March 2011 to June 2012. As there is no evidence that there has been any contact between father and son since June 2010, there are no reasonable grounds to state that the [applicant] considers the meetings with his son significant and that there exists a close relationship between him and his son so it is indeed probable that the sudden departure of the child with his father and his removal from his habitual environment would not enhance the child’s sense of security or his emotional stability and might be harmful to him. Therefore the approach in this matter should be more cautious. The court agrees with the argument put forward by [V.T.] that the overriding interest regarding the child is to develop in a healthy, safe and quiet environment where he would not experience psychological tension, fear and perpetual conflict. It would appear from [V.T.’s] explanations and from email communications that there are reasonable grounds for stating that there is conflict in the relationship, personal discord, and an absence of tolerance between the parties, making communication between the respondent and his child complicated. However, according to medical documents submitted it cannot be unequivocally asserted that the child’s irritability is purely a consequence of the respondent’s contact sessions with the child. The medical reports state that the child is especially active and demanding of exceptional attention from his mother and that this condition was recorded on 30 August 2010 but ‒ as stated by [V.T.] ‒ the last time the [applicant] saw his child was June 2010. This condition could therefore be caused by strained relations between [V.T.] and [the applicant]. On the other hand, it should be noted that a child who is a minor cannot be a hostage of his parents’ conflict and the conflict relationship between the parties is not a circumstance justifying a need to restrict the [applicant’s] contacts with his child. During the proceedings it is permissible for a child to be questioned, unless this cannot be done due to his age or degree of maturity. A.M. was born on 18 September 2007, i.e. his age allows it to be concluded that he is not mature enough to express his ideas regarding the circumstances of the case, or to express his opinion, and he was therefore not questioned during the hearing. In circumstances such as these, the court determines the procedure for the father to have contact with the child by taking into consideration the child’s interests and by creating a possibility for the separated father to be involved in the child’s upbringing (...). At the same time, the period during which a close emotional bond between the [applicant] and the child might be restored should be established as lasting until the child is seven years old.” 58. Accordingly, for the first six months after the date when the Utena District Court decision came into effect, the applicant was to communicate with his son for no more than two hours per working day for ten days per month, in an environment to which the child was accustomed – at the child’s home or the child care authority’s premises, in the presence of his mother, a psychologist and a child care specialist. During the following six months the applicant could communicate with his son no more than four hours per day for twelve days per month, either in the child’s accustomed environment or in another place, in the presence of the child’s mother or without her, if she so agreed. Lastly, during the period starting from the thirteenth month and until his son’s seventh birthday, the applicant could see him on a daily basis for twelve days in March, June, September and December, in the child’s accustomed environment, as agreed by the applicant and V.T., but without her being present. The applicant also had the right to visit his son unimpeded whenever his child was sick. The parents were to ensure that the possibility existed for each of them to communicate with the child by telephone (or other electronic means) or some other form of communication. 59. The applicant acknowledges that he received the Utena District Court decision on 13 August 2012. 60. In response to the applicant’s request for information, on 28 August 2012 the Utena District Court sent the applicant a letter concerning his right to appeal against the decision of 26 June 2012 within thirty days. The court also informed the applicant about his right to restore a missed procedural time limit, if that time limit had been missed for serious reasons. The court further reiterated that the applicant had not appointed a representative living in Lithuania for dealing with contact rights and child maintenance, and on whom all the procedural documents would be served by the court. That being so, pursuant to Article 805 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all procedural documents addressed to a party residing abroad were left in the case file and were deemed to have been served. 61. On 13 February 2013 the applicant asked the Utena District Court to reopen the court proceedings. He argued that he had missed the statutory three-month time-limit for such reopening because he was a Romanian citizen residing in the United Kingdom and did not speak Lithuanian. 62. By a ruling of 14 June 2013 the Utena District Court refused the applicant’s request for reopening. The court first pointed out that a judge’s notice dated 3 March 2011 had explained the applicant’s duty to appoint a representative or an authorised person and the consequences of the failure to fulfil that duty (see paragraph 50 above). However, the applicant had not appointed any such representative. Furthermore, although the applicant acknowledged that he had been served with the 26 June 2012 decision (translated into English and containing the provisions as to how it could be appealed against) on 13 August 2012, he had not asked for a re-opening of the proceedings until 13 February 2013, that is nearly six months after receiving it. In reply to the applicant’s argument that he was a foreigner, the Lithuanian court noted that the applicant knew the rules regulating State-provided legal aid and could have asked for it in a timely fashion, because in earlier proceedings for non-enforcement of the HCJ contact order, he had been provided with State-provided legal aid by a decision dated 24 March 2011 (see paragraph 39 above). 63. On 4 March 2014 the Panevėžys Regional Court dismissed another request by the applicant to reopen the civil proceedings and to review the Utena District Court’s decision of 26 June 2012 concerning the contact order between the applicant and his son. The court reiterated that the applicant had not communicated directly with his son since June 2010. Similarly, there was no evidence of the applicant ever having visited his son either after the court decision of 1 March 2011 regarding interim protective measures or after the subsequent decision of 26 June 2012, both of which allowed the applicant to see his child for several hours each day. As to the applicant’s plea that the Lithuanian court order would cause him inconvenience – especially the necessity of travelling to Lithuania ‒ this did not mean that the contact as established by the Utena District Court on 26 June 2012 had established was negligible. According to the contact order, the applicant could see his son on workdays, ten to twelve days a month. Knowing about such a contact order, the applicant could plan his work and income accordingly. It was also significant that, according to the contact order issued by the HCJ on 18 June 2010, the child had to be collected from the Romanian embassy in Vilnius. Consequently, the applicant would in any case have to leave his place of residence and job in England and come to Lithuania. He would also inevitably have to invest time and money. Accordingly, taking into account the child’s interests – his age, state of health, need for mother’s attention, and the fact that the applicant had not directly communicated with his son since June 2010 ‒ the contact order as set by the Utena District Court on 26 June 2012 reasonably gave priority to the child’s interests whilst not neglecting the applicant’s right to be in contact with his son. 64. Lastly, the Panevėžys Regional Court noted that V.T. had moved to Lithuania in the summer of 2008. The child’s residence had been declared to be Lithuania in July 2008. V.T. had lodged the request that the child contact order be modified with the Utena City District Court when more than three months had passed after the move to Lithuania (see paragraphs 22 and 43 above). It followed that ‒ pursuant to Articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 ‒ in 2011 the United Kingdom courts were no longer able to consider decisions concerning the modification of contact orders, as those cases fell within the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State where the child was habitually resident, in this case Lithuania. 65. By a ruling of 12 May 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 66. On an unknown day, V.T. asked the Utena District Court to permanently restrict the applicant’s parental rights. She argued that the applicant did not communicate with his son. In turn, the applicant asked the Lithuanian court to suspend the proceedings until the Court had examined his application against Lithuania (no. 46600/11). On 10 June 2014 the Utena District Court suspended the proceedings in Lithuania until the applicant’s case is decided by the Court.

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5. The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently detained in Łódź Remand Centre. 6. On 25 September 2006 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) gave a decision, ordering the applicant’s detention on remand for a period of three months. He was charged with a number of offences committed in an armed organised criminal group. At that time the applicant was serving a prison sentence imposed in another criminal proceedings against him. The end of that prison sentence fell on 18 November 2007. In its decision, the District Court relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. The court further emphasised the gravity of the offences and the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on the applicant after conviction. According to the domestic court, the fact that the applicant was at the relevant time serving a prison sentence did not minimise the risk of him obstructing the proceedings. Additionally, the ongoing questioning of other members of the criminal group as well as the necessity to obtain other evidence justified remanding the applicant in custody. 7. On 19 December 2006 and 26 June 2007 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Subsequently, the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) extended the applicant’s detention on 19 September 2007, 19 December 2007, 28 March 2008, 18 June 2008, 22 October 2008 and on 23 December 2008. In their detention decisions the courts repeatedly relied on a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question and on the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on him. The courts considered that keeping the applicant in detention on remand was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. They emphasised the complex character of the case and the considerable number of co-accused involved who, if released, would had obstructed the proceedings. The courts noted that due to the nature of the organised criminal group, its methods of influencing and bringing pressure to bear on the other members of the group as well as witnesses, the authorities had had difficulties in collecting evidence and taking statements. 8. On 18 March 2009 the State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy) lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Łódź Regional Court. The applicant was charged with several counts of extortion and drug-trafficking committed in an organised and armed criminal group. The bill of indictment comprised 94 charges brought against 28 defendants. The prosecution authorities requested that 318 witnesses be heard before the court. 9. On 30 March 2009 the Łódź Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 December 2009. Subsequently, the same court ordered prolongation of his detention on 21 December 2009 (detention extended until 30 September 2010), on 22 September 2010 (detention extended until 31 March 2011) and on 23 March 2011 (detention extended until 30 September 2011). The applicant lodged a number of motions to be released as well as appeals against the decisions extending his pre-trial detention, all in vain. In their decisions the courts repeated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s detention. 10. Meanwhile, the court scheduled fifteen hearings for November and December 2009. Due to sick-leaves of the presiding judge and of some of the accused those hearings did not take place. 11. The trial was eventually opened on 18 January 2010. Subsequent scheduled hearings were adjourned due to absences of some of the co‑accused and problems with sound system in the court room. 12. In May 2010 the Regional Court gave a severance order and decided to determine charges against two co‑accused separately. 13. The bill of indictment was only finally read out to the defendants at the hearing held on 27 May 2010. 14. At the hearing of 28 May 2010 the Regional Court started taking evidence from the accused. It subsequently held fourteen hearings until the end of 2010, during which some of the accused gave evidence. Five of the scheduled hearings were adjourned due to sick-leaves of the accused. One hearing was adjourned because of the motion for disqualification of the presiding judge lodged by one of the co-accused. 15. In 2011 the Regional Court continued taking evidence from the defendants. Of the twenty nine hearings scheduled for this year, eleven took place. The trial court adjourned fifteen hearings due to justified absences of the parties, three hearings were cancelled due to sick-leaves of the presiding judge and the lay judges. 16. Meanwhile, on 17 August 2011 the Łódź Regional Court ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be lifted on condition that he paid the bail in the sum of 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) within the period of two weeks from the date of the decision. On the same date the applicant was released on bail and police supervision. He was also prohibited from leaving the country. 17. The Regional Court scheduled twenty hearings for 2012, of which six hearings were eventually held. At the hearing of 16 April 2012 the trial court started taking evidence from witnesses. Of the fourteen hearings cancelled this year, two were adjourned because of a sick-leave of a judge, three because of absences of witnesses, and the remaining nine hearings – because of absences of the parties. 18. Until 30 July 2013 the Regional Court scheduled nine hearings for 2013, of which seven were adjourned due to justified absences of the defendants. 19. The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending at first instance. 20. On 27 April 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Łódź Court of Appeal under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”). He sought a finding that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive and PLN 20,000 in compensation. 21. On 27 July 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court found that, considering the complexity of the case and the number of co-accused who had actively tried to obstruct the proceedings, the Łódź Regional Court had conducted the proceedings in a correct and timely manner. Consequently, the appellate court refused to award the applicant compensation.

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5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sopron. 6. From 1994 the applicant’s family operated a grocery with the personal involvement of the applicant. They sold, initially under the excise licence of the applicant’s mother, merchandise subject to excise tax, that is, alcohol and tobacco products. On average, the turnover of tobacco retail represented about one-third of the family’s business. The applicant himself obtained a shop-keeping licence in 1999 (see also paragraph 15 below). In 2001 he qualified as a trader and shop manager. In 2005, he was registered in his own right as a trader of excise goods. 7. On 11 September 2012 Parliament enacted Act no. CXXXIV of 2012 on the Repression of Smoking of the Youth and on Tobacco Retail. The Act was published on 24 September 2012. The Act was subsequently amended on several occasions, and the final version was enacted on 6 June 2013. It entered into force on 1 July 2013. 8. According to the Act, tobacco retail – previously exercised at about 42,000 retail points nationwide – was to become a State monopoly (exercised through a State-owned company, ND Nemzeti Dohány-kereskedelmi Nonprofit Zrt, “ND Zrt”), and tobacco retailers would become licensed through a concession tender, advertised on 15 December 2012, for up to five retail points per tenderer. In applying for the new concessions, tenderers were required to produce business plans reflecting, inter alia, the new governmental policy to limit to the utmost the access of minors to tobacco products, notably by prohibiting the entry of those less than 18 years of age into shops selling tobacco. Under the new licences, tobacco retail could take place only in shops with separate entrances, with dark shades in the shop windows preventing seeing through, and with only a limited selection of other goods on sale. The final time-limit for applying was 22 February 2013. Entities previously engaged in tobacco retail had no privileges in the tender. The decision about the tenders was to be taken by ND Zrt. In the tender, altogether some 6,800 licences were granted nationwide[1]. 9. The applicant applied for a concession on 4 February 2013, for the would-be licence to be used in the family enterprise. The application was signed by the applicant, and witnessed by his wife and their son. The applicant then amended the application according to the upcoming new rules, on 20 February 2013. According to the Government, the application was very succinct and in no way developed; in particular, it contained no appropriate business plan, which was part of the criteria for the tenders. The applicant submitted that no information was ever made available about the assessment of the tender. 10. On 23 April 2013 the applicant was informed that he had not obtained a tobacco retail concession. The decision contained no reasons or any indication of the applicant’s score on the 120-point tender adjudication score-sheet, and it was not subject to any legal remedy. The enterprise run by the applicant’s family was obliged to terminate the sale of tobacco products by the statutory deadline, that is, 14 July 2013. Tobacco wholesalers were under a legal obligation to re-buy any outstanding stocks from terminated retailers. The remaining sales activities of the applicant’s family enterprise were no longer profitable, entailing the winding-up of the business. 11. Under the law, no compensation is available for former holders of tobacco retail licences who, by not having been awarded a concession, lost part of their livelihood. The applicant submitted that this was the case of his family; and that he had, after losing the retail licence, considerable difficulties in supporting his family including a minor son. 12. The applicant further submitted that others in comparable situations – and in the case of those who had never been doing tobacco retail beforehand, in non-comparable situations – had been granted concessions, which difference in treatment could not be explained by any circumstance other than political adherence. In his view, this was corroborated by the fact that some successful tenderers had obtained more than one concession for multiple selling points. 13. On 14 January 2014 the Constitutional Court declared admissible a number of complaints relating to the same matter. In decision no. 3194/2014 (VII.14.) it dismissed these motions on the merits (see below in paragraph 16), noting in particular that the legislature had aimed to eliminate underage smoking and therefore restricted the accessibility of tobacco retail, measures reflecting Hungary’s obligations under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control as well as the findings of the Global Youth Tobacco Survey.

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5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Chişinău. At the time of the events he was an academic and member of the Moldovan Academy of Science. 6. On 21 July 2009 the applicant was arrested and charged with the offence of producing and putting into circulation counterfeit money. Since then he has remained remanded in custody pending criminal investigation and trial. The detention warrants were prolonged every month initially and every three months once the case had reached the Ialoveni District Court. Each time the reasons given for the detention were that the applicant had been accused of a serious offence punishable with imprisonment of up to fifteen years, that the criminal case was complex and that, if released, he might interfere with the investigation or collude with other co-accused, or abscond or reoffend. 7. The last two extensions of the applicant’s detention before the lodging of the present application took place on unspecified dates in May and August 2011. The applicant argued that there was no risk of his interfering with the investigation since all the witnesses and the parties to the proceedings had already been heard and all the evidence had been examined by the court. He also submitted that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or re-offend and agreed to be placed under house arrest if he could not be released. The applicant also argued that according to Article 186 § 8, once the case had been referred to a court, the detention could not last longer than six months, other than in exceptional cases. 8. The Ialoveni District Court dismissed the applicant’s arguments and, relying on the same grounds as before, extended his detention for a further three months. The court stated that the case was exceptional within the meaning of Article 186 § 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decisions of May and August 2011 contain similar wording. The applicant’s appeals against them were rejected by the Court of Appeal. 9. On 30 January 2012 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 April 2013 and the Court has not been informed about the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice.

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5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Riga. 6. The applicant was a professor and the head of the Department of Dermatological and Venereal Diseases of the Faculty of Medicine of Riga Stradiņa University (hereafter “the University”), which is a State university. The applicant had been elected to the position of head of department with effect until 13 April 2013. He was also an elected member of the constituent assembly of the University (Satversmes sapulce). 7. On 22 February 2010 the Council of the Faculty of Medicine decided to merge the Department of Dermatological and Venereal Diseases and the Department of Infectious Diseases. That decision was approved by the Senate of the University (Senāts) on the following day. It appears that as a result of the merger the position of head of department occupied by the applicant was abolished. Accordingly, on 24 February 2010 the applicant received a warning (brīdinājums) to that effect and was given the opportunity to agree to the changes in his contract with the University. He was also informed that if he refused, his employment relationship with the University would be terminated. 8. On 28 February 2010 the applicant sent various emails to the Rector of the University concerning the circumstances of the reorganisation and the abolition of his department. He criticised the decisions taken by the deputy dean, G.B. 9. On 3 March 2010 the applicant sent another email to the Rector of the University and to several other recipients, including the members of the Senate. The email criticised the lack of democracy and accountability in the leadership of the organisation, which, according to the applicant, stemmed from the fact that all the members of the Senate were also a part of the executive authority of the University and there was thus an inadequate system of checks and balances. He also drew the recipients’ attention to the alleged mismanagement of the University’s finances. In support of this allegation the applicant relied on the conclusions adopted by the State Audit Office (Valsts Kontrole) in December 2009. 10. The applicant further spoke in unfavourable terms about several representatives of the management of the University, stating, for example, that [Mr ...]. “pretends to be a God-fearing Catholic ... yet, as far as is known, has several children born out of wedlock”, that [Mr ...] “cannot decide a single question by himself, does not keep his word, is lying” and that [Mrs ...] “has called me and asked me to break the law in the interests of her protégés”. 11. Finally, the applicant came up with a proposal involving several amendments to the constitution of the University, such as changes in the election of the members of the Senate (an obligation to inform the constituent assembly of the candidate’s CV at least one week before the elections, the setting-up of an independent electoral commission); separation of powers between the University’s governing bodies (Senate members should not be part of the executive body of the University); and the granting of independence to the Senate (changing the remuneration system so that the Rector did not unilaterally fix the remuneration of members of the Senate). He asked the Rector to forward his proposals to the members of the constituent assembly and to send him the email addresses of those members or inform him where to find those contacts. 12. It appears that on 16 March 2010 the applicant expressed his disagreement with the reorganisation at the meeting of the Senate of the university which upheld the decision. 13. On 20 March 2010 the applicant sent an email to the Rector of the University. The subject-line of the email read “Settlement agreement”. The text of the email read as follows: “To the Rector of the University .... Confidential [1] Dear Rector, [2] In view of the situation which has evolved and the advice of my lawyers and supporters, I hereby propose the following settlement agreement. [3] It would entail: [4] Version 1 [5] You (the University) revoke all the orders and decisions of the Senate concerning the abolition/merger of the Department of Dermatological and Venereal Diseases. I for my part withdraw all my appeals, thereby restoring the situation as it was before the decision of the Senate of 23 February 2010. Meanwhile the three lecturers ... (all of them were recognised as plagiarists by a decision of the [Latvian association of doctors]) who expressed their intention to move to the Department of Infectious Diseases, are transferred to that Department. I have no objections if the specialist ... who, it is common knowledge, is the mother of ...’s daughter, is transferred to another post or fired. This month she did not spend a single day at work in the Department of Dermatological and Venereal Diseases (presumably she reports to ... or has been transferred to ... or another department, or maybe [she has] submitted her resignation, I don’t know). [6] Version 2. I, as a head of department elected until 2013, and after having received a certain amount of compensation on which we would agree (for example, LVL 100,000), as provided for by my agreement with the University, agree terms with you, the dispute is terminated and I leave the post. [7] Of course I understand that at the constituent assembly of the University you, as Rector, can secure a decision that is favourable to you. However by this means nothing would come to an end but would only start, as I reserve the right to appeal against all the decision [adopted by] the University in the administrative, district and regional courts, while of course making everything public beforehand and attracting the attention of society. [8] I do not believe that in an election year, taking into consideration the latest news (the conclusion adopted by the State Audit Office on the illegalities at the University, plagiarism on the part of lecturers and professors of the University etc.), you would want to have additional tasks and trouble (nodarbošanos un nepatikšanas). [9] I am sure that I don’t want this and I wish to be allowed to work in a creative manner with students in my field as before. In addition, I have much work to do organising two large European congresses in 2011 and 2012 in Riga, in both of which my participation as president has been confirmed. [10] Since I have also not received the list of members of the constituent assembly of the University (which was requested from you and the Senate in my letter of 3 March 2010!?, a fact which demonstrates the lack of democracy [at] the University), I will await a reply from you by Monday, 22 March 2010 at 11 a.m. If we are unable to reach agreement by signing a settlement agreement I will make all my current information public in the form of an open letter so that the members of the constituent assembly of the University also have at least one day before the meeting to think about their vote. Professor A. Rubins P.S. [contains a request concerning one of the applicant’s staff members who was on sick leave but at the same time attended meetings of the Senate]. 14. On 22 March 2010 the Rector replied to the applicant that he could not agree to any of the proposals. 15. The following day, 23 March 2010, at the meeting of the constituent assembly of the University, the applicant expressed his disagreement with the reorganisation and asked that the decision concerning the merger of faculties be annulled. His request was not upheld. On the same day the national news agency LETA published the applicant’s views about the alleged shortcomings in the management of the University. The criticisms referred to the conclusions of the State Audit Office. 16. On 25 and 31 March 2010 the Rector asked an ad hoc investigative committee and the ethics committee to review the applicant’s conduct. 17. On 6 May 2010 the applicant received a notice of termination of employment (uzteikums) from the University, in which he was informed that his employment contract with the University would be terminated ten days after receipt of the notice. The legal basis for the applicant’s dismissal was section 101(1)(1) and (3) of the Labour Law, and the applicant was deemed to have acted in contravention of several provisions of the University’s staff regulations (see Relevant domestic law part, paragraphs 30 and 34 below). The notice stated, inter alia, as follows: “The ground for dismissal is the email you sent to the Rector of [the University] on 20 [March] 2010, in which, while addressing the Rector concerning issues of interest to you, you included inappropriate demands, including elements of blackmail and undisguised threats. As a consequence your actions are considered as very grave infringements of basic ethical principles and standards of behaviour, and as absolutely contrary to good morals. The fact of sending such a letter, and its contents, are clearly contrary to good morals, all the more so taking into account the circumstances in which the letter was sent and your attitude.” 18. On 17 May 2010 the University dismissed the applicant from his post. Soon afterwards he took up a post in another university in Latvia. 19. The applicant submitted a claim to the Riga City Kurzeme District Court, asking the court to invalidate the notice of termination and to order his reinstatement and payment of the unpaid salary and benefits together with compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 20. In a judgment of 11 March 2011 the Kurzeme District Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It held that the fact that the applicant’s employer had been offended by his email was not a legitimate reason for his dismissal, since section 101 of the Labour Law did not include such a ground. The court considered that the allegation that the applicant’s email had contained elements of blackmail and threats was merely speculation on his employer’s behalf. It was additionally found that the applicant had not been given an adequate opportunity to respond to the allegations contained in the termination notice before that notice was sent to him. Accordingly the court annulled the termination notice and ordered the applicant’s reinstatement with back-payment of his salary. The applicant’s claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage was rejected as unsubstantiated. 21. Both the applicant and the University appealed. During the court hearing the applicant mentioned that he had requested that several illegalities be examined at the meeting of the constituent assembly of 23 March 2010. Counsel for the defendant stated that both the ad hoc investigative committees set up by the Rector had found that the content of the letter was to be perceived as blackmail and threats. He contended that the request to receive a certain amount in compensation and the deadline by which the reply had to be received all proved the breach of ethical norms. The defendant further alleged that several “defamatory facts about the University” had been published on 23 March by LETA, and considered that the above activities therefore confirmed the threats made in the applicant’s email. 22. On 18 January 2012 the Riga Regional Court quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim in full. The appeal court considered that in his email of 20 March 2010 the applicant had invited the Rector to carry out “unlawful actions”, namely to annul a decision of the Senate of the University (concerning the merger of two departments within the Faculty of Medicine). Such action was deemed to be “unlawful” because annulling decisions of the Senate of the University exceeded the Rector’s authority. The court also considered that the applicant had requested “unreasonably high compensation” for the termination of his employment. These two considerations led the appeal court to conclude that the applicant had failed to observe basic ethical principles such as honesty, collegiality and responsibility. 23. The conclusions of the appeal court echoed those reached by the University’s ethics committee and by two ad hoc investigative committees set up on 25 March and 6 April 2010. In particular, the court observed in point 10.1 that the committee had concluded that the infringements committed by the applicant were demonstrated by the fact that he had sent the email and had carried out “other activities after the Senate’s decision of 23 February 2010 ... including making unfounded statements, for example, about the abolition of the department, the circumstances of the reorganisation that had been directed against the applicant, and threats made by G.B. against the applicant. The email of 28 February 2010 ... comprises statements, for example, about ... private life and religious convictions”. 24. The court further noted that it was apparent from the materials in the case file that on 23 March 2010 the national news agency LETA had published the applicant’s views about events in the University, in which he had criticised the leadership of the University, stating that a group of twelve to fifteen persons had usurped all power and set up an authoritarian or even dictatorial regime. The court also referred to the content of the email the applicant had sent on 3 March 2010 (see paragraph 9 above) and came to the conclusion that he had contravened the obligation to treat the staff of the University with respect. 25. The court turned next to the question of “good morals” and, after finding that this term had no precise legal definition, proceeded to conclude that it consisted of three “basic ethical principles”: “the principle of integrity and righteousness”, “the principle of responsibility” and “the principle of loyalty”. It found that the applicant had acted in breach of these principles and that there was: “[11.2] ...no reason to conclude that the applicant had only intended to inform [the Rector] about [his plan] to exercise his democratic rights, [that is], to submit complaints to the courts and to publish information in the media, while respecting the interests of society. The content of the letter [of 20 March 2010] attests to [the applicant’s] wish to act for a selfish cause, namely to retain his position as a head of department, contrary to the Senate’s decision on reorganisation, or to receive substantial financial compensation, regardless of [the need to use] the budget of [the University] in an economical and reasonable way in compliance with the goals of the [University]. [The appeal court] finds that there is no evidence that prior to the letter of 20 March 2010 [the University] had obstructed the applicant’s democratic rights to inform society and the competent institutions about the alleged violations in the [University]. Taking into account the aforementioned finding, [that is], that the [applicant’s] aim in writing the letter of 20 March 2010 was selfish, the [appeal court] finds that the [applicant] sought to achieve a result beneficial to himself by trying to persuade [the Rector] to take unlawful steps. In view of the aforementioned considerations, this should be considered a threat.” 26. Turning to the applicant’s claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the appeal court cited section 9(1) of the Labour Law (see the Relevant domestic law part, paragraph 29 below) and disagreed that the applicant’s dismissal had created “unjustified consequences” (nepamatotas sekas) or caused non-pecuniary damage simply because the applicant had expressed legitimate concerns about the reorganisation of the University and about the way its financial resources were used. The court’s reasoning in that regard read as follows: “[The appeal court], on the basis of experience and logic, finds that a calm and positive atmosphere and a respectful attitude among colleagues best contribute to achieving constructive dialogue. Having analysed the above-mentioned evidence, the [appeal court] considers that nothing prevented the applicant from expressing his opinion in a manner compatible with ethics and the staff regulations”. 27. The applicant submitted an appeal on points of law, disputing, inter alia, the appeal court’s findings to the effect that, by sending one confidential letter to one recipient (namely the Rector of the University), in which he had raised points concerning the unjustified use of funds from the State budget, he had committed an infringement of work-related rules and ethics of such gravity as to justify his dismissal. The applicant also invoked in this connection that he had an obligation to inform the society about the unjustified use of funds, therefore the appellate court had erred in finding that the impugned email was unethical. The applicant’s appeal on points of law was rejected by the Senate of the Supreme Court in a preparatory meeting on 26 September 2012. 28. On 27 September 2010 the Rector of the University sought to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant for extortion. The criminal proceedings were instituted on 30 January 2012 on the basis of section 183 of the Criminal Law (extortion) and the applicant was ordered not to leave his permanent residence for more than twenty-four hours without the permission of the competent investigative authority. The criminal proceedings were discontinued on 9 February 2012 for lack of corpus delicti. The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings stated, inter alia, that according to the linguistic expert’s conclusions the impugned email contained clearly expressed demands to pay a certain amount of money as well as undisguised threats to disclose disreputable information about [the Rector] prior to the meeting of the Senate. It also noted that the email demonstrated the applicant’s wish to act selfishly, either in order to maintain his post or to receive a significant amount in compensation for the termination of his employment contract. However, as the Rector’s attitude demonstrated that the threats were not perceived as real, the court ruled that the criminal proceedings should be terminated and that the Rector had the right to institute defamation proceedings. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Relevant domestic law and practice 29. Section 9 of the Labour Law (a whistle-blowers’ protection clause) provides that an employee may not be punished or otherwise directly or indirectly subjected to unfavourable treatment, in the context of employment relations, for exercising his rights in a permissible manner [pieļaujamā veidā] or informing the competent authorities or officials about suspicions of criminal or administrative offences in his place of employment. If, in the event of a dispute, an employee reports such circumstances which could serve as a basis for unfavourable treatment by his or her employer, it is the employer’s duty to prove that the employee has not been punished or otherwise unfavourably affected, either directly or indirectly, for having exercised his or her rights in the context of employment relations in a permissible manner. 30. Section 101(1)(1) and (3) of the Labour Law authorises employers to dismiss an employee only on the basis of circumstances related to the employee’s conduct or his or her abilities, or in connection with the performance of economic, organisational, technological or similar functions within the company if (1) “the employee, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, has committed significant infringements of his or her employment contract or terms of employment” and (3) “the employee has fulfilled his or her duties in a manner that disregards good morals [labi tikumi] and such actions are not compatible with his or her continued employment.” 31. The same section further provides that if an employer intends to issue a notice of termination of an employment contract on the basis of, inter alia, the first paragraph, sub-paragraphs 1 and 3 of this section, the employer has a duty to request written explanations from the employee. When deciding on the possible termination of the employment contract the employer has a duty to evaluate the severity of the violation at issue and the circumstances in which it was committed, as well as the personal characteristics of the employee and his or her previous work record. 32. Point 3.2 of the constituent document of the University (Rīgas Stradiņa universitātes Satversme) provides that the Rector or the Senate may convene the constituent assembly of the University. The Rector, the Senate or the student self-government body may convene an extraordinary meeting of the constituent assembly. Pursuant to point 3.8 the Rector has a right of suspensive veto (atliekošā veto tiesības) over decisions adopted by the Senate. 33. Point 5.1 of the statue of the Senate (Senāta nolikums) provides that Senate meetings are convened, inter alia, at the initiative of the Rector. 34. The relevant provisions of the staff regulations in force at the University at the material time read as follows: 6.2.1. – employees have a responsibility to carry out work of good quality in accordance with their contract and job description, the constitution of the University, decisions of the Senate, internal regulations and orders and the external legislation of the Republic of Latvia. 35. According to the view of the Senate of the Supreme Court, published in a compilation of case-law on employment disputes, the final assessment of whether an infringement [of an employment contract or staff regulation] is grave lies with the domestic courts. Furthermore, the term “good morals” (section 101, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 3 of the Labour Law) is applicable not only to work carried out within the specified working hours but may also refer to employment-related functions performed outside regular working hours. Since the legislature failed to define the term “good morals”, this term has been acknowledged to be a general clause the content of which has to be defined by the courts’ case-law. According to present-day case-law and legal science, the term “good morals”, in addition to its social character, also has a legal dimension, that is, it encompasses not only generally accepted moral standards but also ethical principles and values enshrined, inter alia, in the Constitution. Thus, according to the Senate, the reference to the term “good morals” is a general clause the content of which has to be determined by those who apply the law.

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5. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows. 6. On 28 April 1995 the applicant company filed a civil suit against S.M. (“the debtor”) for the payment of debt. On 2 February 2005 the Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud) in Leskovac ordered the debtor to pay to the applicant 6,590 Serbian dinars (RSD), which was approximately 82 euros (EUR) at the time of the delivery of the judgment, plus statutory default interest on account of the debt and RSD 92,442 (approximately EUR 1,154) for the costs of the civil proceedings. By 15 September 2005 this judgment became both final and enforceable. 7. On 24 October 2005 the applicant company filed with the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Leskovac a request for the enforcement of the Commercial Court judgment by means of an inventory, valuation and sale of the debtor’s movable assets. On 26 October 2005 the Municipal Court issued an enforcement order. On 9 December 2005 the enforcement order was upheld on appeal. 8. On 16 March 2006 the bailiff made an inventory of certain movable assets found on the debtor. On 30 March 2006 the said property was seized. On 28 April 2006 the debtor sought return of the seized property, alleging that it belonged to a third person and offering other assets in its stead. On the same day the seized property was returned to the debtor, although no replacement assets were seized. 9. In the period from 20 July 2006 to 28 May 2007 the bailiff visited the debtor’s house and business premises six times, but no further attempts were ever made to make an inventory of her movable assets. 10. In the meantime, on 6 and 20 February, 2 October and 21 November 2006 the applicant company filed complaints about the delay in the enforcement proceedings with the Presidents of the Municipal, District and Supreme Courts, the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Board, the Supreme Council and the Ministry of Justice. On 25 October 2007 the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Board found that the impugned enforcement proceedings were excessively long and ordered their prompt completion. 11. On 15 November 2007 the applicant company filed a request for a change of means of enforcement in view of the failure of the authorities to enforce the judgment on the debtor’s movable assets. It proposed that the enforcement be carried out by means of seizure and sale of a family house registered in the name of the debtor’s husband. On 13 February 2008 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant company’s request and referred it to institute civil proceedings for determination of the debtor’s part in the family house in question. On 18 August 2008 this decision was upheld on appeal. 12. Since the applicant company’s request for a change of means of enforcement was rejected, the enforcement order of 26 October 2005 remained in force. No further steps were ever made to enforce that order.

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5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bucharest. 6. By orders of 5 and 8 March 2010 the National Anticorruption Department (“the N.A.D.”) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and three other co-accused, all of them border guard police officers, for bribe-taking and abetting bribe-taking. It held – on the basis of testimonial, documentary and surveillance evidence of phone conversations between one of the co-accused, his wife and a third party – that there was reasonable suspicion that on 6-7 September 2007 the applicant and his colleagues had asked seven Turkish nationals to pay them money in order to allow them to leave Romania. 7. On 8 March 2009 prosecutor G.B., who was attached to the N.A.D., authorised several police officers to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant’s name and the names of the three co‑accused. According to the order to appear produced by the N.A.D., the applicant’s presence was required in order for him to be heard as an accused (ȋnvinuit) in the criminal investigation instituted against him in 2008. No other reasons or considerations were stated on the order. 8. On 9 March 2010 two police officers went to the applicant’s workplace to enforce the warrant to appear. According to the report produced by the police officers and signed by the applicant, he was shown the warrant to appear and was informed that he would be taken to the N.A.D.’s premises. He was also informed that he could contact and retain the services of a legal representative of his own choosing. He refused to do so because he considered that he did not need one. The applicant and the escorting police officers left the applicant’s workplace at 8.40 a.m. 9. On the same date, at 12 noon, G.B. informed the applicant in the presence of a publicly appointed legal representative that a criminal investigation had been opened against him for bribe-taking. According to the documents submitted before the Court, and signed by the applicant and his legal representative, he had refused to retain a legal representative of his own choosing and had accepted assistance from a publicly appointed lawyer. According to the statement made before the prosecutor, he notified the authorities that he suffered from diabetes and that he needed his insulin treatment, which would have to be brought from his workplace. In addition, he requested the authorities to notify his wife in the event of his placement in police custody. He also stated that he reaffirmed the statement he had made previously concerning the events in connection with which he was being investigated. According to the record of the applicant’s statement, he was heard as an accused by the prosecutor at N.A.D.’s offices from 12 noon to 9.34 p.m. 10. On the same date, at 7.36 p.m., the applicant was informed that at 7.08 p.m. he had been charged with bribe-taking. According to the report produced by the authorities and signed by the applicant and his legal representative he refused to make any statement as a defendant (inculpat) and reaffirmed the statement he had made as an accused. 11. By an order dated 9 March 2010 the N.A.D. placed the applicant in police custody for twenty-four hours commencing at 9.15 p.m. for bribe‑taking. The arrest order was signed by both the applicant and his legal representative. It stated that on the basis of the available evidence there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant had accepted money from Turkish nationals for the purpose of allowing them to return to Turkey. It also stated that the offence in question was punishable by over four years’ imprisonment and his release would constitute a danger to public order, bearing in mind that he was a border guard officer and had committed the offence at his workplace. 12. On 10 March 2010, relying on testimonial, documentary and audio surveillance evidence, the N.A.D. asked the domestic courts to detain the applicant pending trial. 13. By an interlocutory judgment of 10 March 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the N.A.D.’s request and ordered the applicant’s release on condition that he remain in the country. It held that the available evidence was plagued by inconsistencies which should have been resolved by the investigating authorities. In addition, except for the seriousness of the offence, none of the other legal requirements for detaining the applicant pending trial had been met. In particular, there was no evidence in the file that he had attempted to abscond or to obstruct justice. Also, it had not been proven that his release would be a danger to public order, given that the events in question had occurred in 2007 and that the applicant was not responsible for the length of the criminal investigation. Consequently, it considered that the implementation of an alternative measure was more appropriate in his case. 14. On 8 April 2010 the Court of Cassation, sitting as a second instance court, dismissed as ill-founded an appeal by the N.A.D. against the interlocutory judgment of 10 March 2010. 15. By a judgment of 17 March 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of bribe-taking and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. 16. On 11 February 2013 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the judgment of 17 March 2011 and acquitted him. It also noted that he had been held in police custody for twenty-four hours from 9 to 10 March 2010. 17. On 21 April 2010 the applicant instituted criminal proceedings with no civil claims against the prosecutors investigating his case – in particular G.B. – for, inter alia, abuse of office by restricting certain rights, perjury, unlawful arrest and improper investigation, torture and unlawful perversion of justice (represiune nedreaptă). He argued that the prosecutor had obtained testimonial evidence against him in breach of domestic and international criminal procedure rules and had detained him for thirty-seven hours instead of the twenty-four allowed by law. In addition, there had been no reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence, nor had the other legally-required criteria for his detention been met. Also, he had been subjected to intense physical and psychological suffering because the order to appear issued by the prosecutor had been unjustified and devoid of grounds, in breach of Article 183 (2) of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure (“the C.C.P.”). Lastly, he had been refused a medical examination, medical treatment and food for the entire time he was under the authorities’ control, even though he had notified them of his medical condition. 18. On 10 May 2010 the applicant brought proceedings seeking to have prosecutor G.B. removed from the case on the grounds that he had instituted criminal proceedings against him in April 2010. 19. By a final order delivered on the same date, the hierarchically superior prosecutor attached to N.A.D., namely L.P., dismissed the applicant’s action of 10 May 2010 on the ground that there was no evidence in the file that G.B. had had a personal interest in the outcome of the case or that he had had a feud with one of the parties in the case. The fact that the applicant had instituted criminal proceedings against him was not an incompatibility ground provided for by law. 20. By a final order of 2 July 2010 the public prosecutor’s office attached to the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint of 21 April 2010 against the prosecutor G.B. on the grounds that the offences cited by the applicant were inexistent and that his claims amounted to a complaint against the acts and measures carried out by the prosecutor during the investigation stage of the criminal proceedings instituted against him. The purpose of a criminal complaint was not, however, to censor the acts and measures carried out by a prosecutor. The lawfulness of such measures could only be examined within the framework of a complaint lodged with the hierarchically superior prosecutor against the acts and measures carried out by the investigating prosecutor. The applicant appealed against the order before the domestic courts. 21. By interlocutory judgments of 16 November 2010 and 18 January 2011 the Court of Cassation ordered that the investigation file be attached to the court’s file and that G.B. be summoned before the court. According to the applicant, neither the investigation file nor G.B. was ever presented to the court. 22. By a final judgment of 12 April 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the order of 2 July 2010. It held that the applicant’s complaints concerned investigative acts carried out by G.B. During ongoing criminal proceedings, other legal remedies are available to the accused or the defendant(s) by virtue of the criminal procedure rules, and these could have been used here to express dissatisfaction in respect of the alleged breaches of the procedural rules and of their lawful rights. In this connection, the court identified several complaints the applicant could have lodged within the framework of the criminal proceedings instituted against him, namely a complaint against the prosecutor’s orders for preventive measures and based on Article 51 et seq., Article 64 § 2, Article 67 et seq., and Articles 140 § 2, 172 § 6, 275-278, 320 and 332 of the Romanian Criminal Procedure Code. In addition to the aforementioned legal remedies, the defendants had other lawful means of lodging complaints against the person investigating or supervising the investigation of their case. However, a criminal complaint lodged against the prosecutor who had carried out the investigation in criminal proceedings that were still pending was not one of the legal means the applicant could have used, as it opened up the possibility of having aspects of legality regarding the pending criminal trial examined outside the framework expressly provided by the Criminal Procedure Code and of examining aspects of the criminal proceedings instituted against him. Moreover, the procedure allowing the prosecutor’s orders to be challenged before domestic courts did not allow the court to substitute its judgment for that of the judicial organs charged with the examination of the pending criminal proceedings instituted against him. The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. 23. On 28 July 2011 the applicant brought proceedings against the Court of Cassation seeking an injunction to force that court to examine both the appeal on points of law lodged by him against the final judgment of 12 April 2011 and the unconstitutionality objections raised by him after the previously mentioned judgment was delivered. 24. On 12 September 2011, by a final judgment delivered in private, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the judgment of 12 April 2011 as inadmissible. It held that, following recent law reforms, judgments delivered by the domestic courts in proceedings challenging the legality of a prosecutor’s decision not to institute criminal proceedings were no longer appealable before two levels of jurisdiction. 25. By a judgment of 28 November 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s action of 28 July 2011. It held that ordering the Court of Cassation to examine his appeal on points of law would breach the principle of legal certainty. In addition, an unconstitutionality objection had been raised by the applicant after the proceedings had ended on 12 April 2011 and there was no legal framework that would allow the Court of Appeal to force another court to examine them. The applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of 28 November 2011 and according to him, the appeal was dismissed as ill-founded. 26. On 31 May 2010 the applicant brought criminal proceedings with no civil claims against the prosecutor L.P. for abuse of office against the public interest, incitement to the unlawful exercise of a profession and to perjury, incitement to unlawful perversion of justice, and incitement to the retention and destruction of documents. He claimed that, as G.B.’s hierarchically superior prosecutor, L.P. had approved the criminal-investigation measures undertaken by G.B., including the evidence dismissed and gathered by him, and had allowed G.B. to detain him and institute the criminal proceedings against him, even though he had been aware that he was innocent. 27. By a final order of 28 October 2010 the public prosecutor’s office attached to the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint against L.P. on the grounds that the offences cited by the applicant were non-existent. It held that the complaints lodged by the applicant against L.P. were related to those lodged by him against G.B. In the latter’s case the public prosecutor’s office had already discontinued the criminal investigation for similar reasons. The applicant appealed against the order before the domestic courts. 28. By a final judgment of 28 March 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the order of 28 October 2010. It held that L.P. had neither investigated the applicant’s case nor undertaken any acts or measures in this respect. He had merely approved the proposal submitted by G.B. before the domestic courts to detain the applicant pending trial. The fact that he had examined and dismissed the applicant’s complaints in respect of the legality of the criminal proceedings instituted against him did not engage his criminal liability. In the absence of evidence to suggest that the prosecutor had acted unlawfully or that he had breached his duties, the applicant’s arguments in support of his complaint could not be assessed within the framework of a criminal investigation. Most of the applicant’s complaints were in fact arguments in his defence based on challenges to the way the evidence had been produced, the measures undertaken and the procedural flaws. According to the relevant criminal procedure rules, such complaints could be raised by the applicant before the domestic courts examining his case but could not be interpreted as constituting the elements of an offence. The applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment. 29. On 21 November 2011, by a final judgment delivered in private, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the judgment of 28 March 2011 as inadmissible. It held that, following recent law reforms, judgments delivered by the domestic courts in proceedings challenging the legality of a prosecutor’s decision not to institute criminal proceedings were no longer appealable before two degrees of jurisdiction. 30. On 4 August 2011 the applicant brought criminal proceedings with no civil claims against prosecutors G.B. and L.P. for breach of the secrecy of his correspondence, amongst other things. He argued that the two prosecutors had unlawfully monitored his electronic mail correspondence during the spring of 2010 and in June 2010 had publicly presented the content of one of his electronic mails in court. 31. By a final judgment of 12 June 2012 the Court of Cassation dismissed the criminal proceedings with no civil claims that had been brought by the applicant against prosecutor G.B. for forgery and use of forged documents during the course of the criminal proceedings conducted by the said prosecutor against him. It held that the offences alleged by him were in fact allegations of breaches of procedural rules by the prosecutor investigating his case, which could have been examined by the appellate courts over the course of the criminal proceedings instituted against him, particularly since the proceedings in question were still pending before the domestic courts. 32. By a final order of 26 June 2012 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court of Cassation dismissed criminal proceedings that had been instituted by the applicant against prosecutors G.B. and L.P. on 4 August 2011 on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed. The applicant did not appeal against the order before the domestic courts. 33. By a final order of 12 September 2012, the public prosecutor’s office attached to the Court of Cassation dismissed criminal proceedings that had been instituted by the applicant against, inter alia, prosecutors G.B. and L.P. for slanderous denunciation, unlawful arrest and abusive investigation, and forgery on the grounds that, amongst other things, the available evidence did not suggest the existence of any offence committed by the aforementioned prosecutors. The applicant did not challenge the decision before the domestic courts. 34. According to the applicant’s medical papers he has been suffering from type-two diabetes since 1997 and has been treated with insulin since 2009. 35. On 9 March 2010 at 10.30 p.m., prior to being placed in a detention cell, the applicant was examined by the detention center’s medical nurse. According to the report produced on that day, the applicant’s general condition was relatively good. He informed the medical nurse that he required insulin treatment twice a day, in the morning and in the evening. He said that he had tested his own blood sugar level using his own tester at 9 p.m. and that his blood sugar level was high. 36. On 10 March 2010 the applicant was examined by a doctor specialising in diabetes and nutrition. According to the medical certificate produced on the same day, the applicant was following a programme of treatment involving two insulin injections per day, one in the morning and one in the evening. 37. Between 12 March 2010 and 16 May 2012 the applicant was examined by specialist doctors and was tested ten times. According to the medical certificates produced on those dates, he continued to receive two injections of insulin per day until November 2011, but the dosage was increased twice. In addition, doctors recommended that he take sick leave on six occasions. Furthermore, on 11 February 2011 it was recommended that he take his evening insulin dosage no earlier than 8 p.m. In November 2011 he was advised to administer three insulin injections per day. 38. In his initial submission to the Court on 22 June 2011 the applicant stated that on 9 March 2010 at about 7.30 a.m. the two police officers holding the warrant to appear had taken him to the N.A.D.’s office. At the N.A.D.’s office he had been left waiting in a room until 12 noon, when the police officers informed him that he needed to retain the services of a legal representative. Afterwards, he had again been left waiting for hours. 39. At about 7 p.m. a publicly appointed legal representative had arrived and the applicant had been questioned by prosecutor G.B. in her presence. He had been asked two short questions and afterwards he had once more been left waiting. 40. At about 9 p.m. prosecutor G.B. had informed the applicant that he had been placed in police custody for twenty-four hours. 41. At about 10 p.m. he had been handcuffed and taken to the detention center. At the detention center the police guards had taken away from him the syringe, the insulin and the device for measuring blood sugar levels he had had on him. The applicant had informed the police guards that he was suffering from diabetes and retinopathy and that he had not eaten the entire day. His request for a medical test to be carried out by a doctor had been dismissed and he had been visited by a nurse. 42. In his submission before the Court on 16 August 2012 the applicant stated that on 9 March 2010 after being taken to the N.A.D.’s office, he had been locked in a room and guarded by armed guards. Although he had informed the prosecutor investigating his case that he had been suffering from diabetes requiring insulin treatment and retinopathy, the latter had refused to allow him to eat for the purposes of being able to take his insulin treatment. 43. On the same date, according to the applicant, his two mobile phones had been confiscated by the police officers who accompanied him to the N.A.D.’s office without producing a report attesting to this confiscation measure. Also, he had been denied contact with his family and had not been allowed to retain the services of a legal representative of his own choosing. During his placement in police custody he had not been provided with food appropriate to his condition or with plates, glasses or cutlery to be able to eat the food. 44. On 11 April 2013 the N.A.D. informed the Government that as soon as the applicant had informed the prosecutor investigating his case that he suffered from diabetes and needed his insulin treatment ‒ which would have to be brought from his workplace ‒ steps had been taken to retrieve the applicant’s treatment from his workplace. Within thirty minutes the applicant had had access to his treatment kit and had been allowed to use it without any restriction. In addition, the police officer who had brought the treatment kit from the applicant’s workplace had also bought food for the applicant using his own money and had allowed him to eat. 45. On the same date the N.A.D. informed the Government that the applicant had been questioned by the prosecutor as an accused from 12 noon to 12.34 p.m. The fact that the record of the applicant’s statement mentioned 9.34 p.m. (21.34) as the time when the hearing had ended had been an error, given that the next procedural act carried out by the prosecutor had started at 12.45 p.m. In addition, the N.A.D. stated and provided evidence that for the rest of the time the prosecutor had not been hearing or carrying out procedural acts in relation to the applicant, but rather had been working on procedural acts and measures undertaken in relation to the three remaining co-accused and the available witnesses.

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