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4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Rome. 5. The applicant was the owner of a plot of land in Randazzo (Catania). The land in issue was recorded in the land register as Folio no. 57, Parcels no. 24, 28, 31, 32, 35 and 360. 6. By an order issued on 5 August 1981, the regional administrative authorities approved a land development plan for the construction of a road on the applicant’s land. 7. On 24 February 1984 the Mayor of Randazzo issued a decree authorising the Randazzo Municipality to take possession, through an expedited procedure and on the basis of a public-interest declaration, of a portion of the applicant’s land in order to begin the construction of the road. 8. On 2 April 1984 the authorities took physical possession of the land. 9. By a writ served on 26 July 1991, the applicant brought an action for damages against the Randazzo Municipality before the Catania District Court. They alleged that the occupation of the land was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without there having been a formal expropriation of the land and payment of compensation. They claimed a sum corresponding to the market value of the land and a further sum in damages for the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation. 10. On an unspecified date the court ordered an expert valuation of the land. In his report the expert concluded that the occupied land covered a surface area of 2,235 square metres and confirmed that it could be classified as agricultural land. He further concluded that the market value of the land on the date the occupation became unlawful, which was identified as having occurred on 2 April 1990, amounted to 9,000,000 Italian Lire (ITL). 11. By a judgment delivered on 26 May 1999 and filed with the court registry on 8 June 1999, the Catania District Court declared that the possession of the land, which had been initially authorised, had become unlawful as of 2 April 1990. It found that the land had been irreversibly transformed by the public works. As a result, in accordance with the constructive-expropriation rule (occupazione acquisitiva or accessione invertita), the applicant had been deprived of his property, by virtue of its irreversible alteration, on the date on which the possession had ceased to be lawful. In the light of those considerations, the court concluded that the applicant was entitled to compensation in consideration for the loss of ownership caused by the unlawful occupation. 12. The court drew on the expert valuation to conclude that the land could be classified as agricultural land and that its market value on the date the occupation had become unlawful in 1990 corresponded to ITL 9,000,000 (approximately EUR 4,600), to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest. The court further awarded the applicant ITL 2,339,600 (approximately EUR 1,200) as compensation for the damage occasioned by the unavailability of the land during the period from the beginning of the lawful occupation (24 February 1984) until the date of loss of ownership (13 July 1990), as well as ITL 5,150,000 (approximately EUR 2,700) as compensation for the decrease in the value of the adjoining land. 13. On 17 July 2000 the Municipality appealed against the judgment before the Catania Court of Appeal, primarily contesting the assessment of the property’s market value by the court-appointed expert and arguing that the District Court’s awards for damages ought to be reduced. 14. The applicant lodged a cross-appeal whereby he also challenged the court-appointed expert’s findings with regard to the calculation of the land’s market value and criticised the expert’s assessment methods which led, in his view, to an under-evaluation of the land. 15. By a judgment delivered on 30 July 2002 and filed with the court registry on 25 June 2003, the Court of Appeal reduced the amount to be awarded as compensation concerning the adjoining land that had not been subject to occupation but that had nonetheless been damaged to 4,950,000 ITL (approximately EUR 2,500). The court upheld the remainder of the Catania District Court’s judgment. It considered that the first instance court had awarded a sum equal to the property’s full market value. In the court’s view, the latter sum had been correctly determined by the court-appointed expert, who had taken into account the land’s actual characteristics and reached his conclusions by means of a standard methodology. 16. The judgment became final in September 2004.

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5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in the town of Kozelsk, the Kaluga region. 6. On 20 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of involvement in infliction of bodily injuries leading to death. 7. On 22 April 2003 the Kozelskiy district court of the Kaluga region (“the district court”) authorised the applicant’s continued detention with reference to the gravity of the charges against him and his previous conviction of theft. The court considered that if at large the applicant could obstruct the proceedings and continue his criminal activities. On 7 May 2003 the Kaluga regional court (“the regional court”) upheld the decision. 8. On 18 June 2003 the district court extended the applicant’s detention in view of the gravity of the charges, the fact that the applicant had a criminal record, was not employed and, if released, could reoffend or obstruct the criminal proceedings against him. The judge also noted that the materials adduced by the prosecution disclosed that there was a serious case against the applicant. The applicant did not appeal. 9. On 20 July 2003, upon completion of certain investigative measures, the prosecutor’s office decided to release the applicant from custody. 10. On 22 July 2003 the applicant was released under an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 11. On 19 May 2004 the district court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment. The period of detention from 20 April to 22 July 2003 was counted towards the sentence. The applicant was immediately taken into custody. 12. On 20 July 2004 the Kaluga regional court quashed the conviction on appeal and ordered a re-trial. It also held that the applicant should remain in custody; the court cited no legal ground for the preventive measure and set no time-limit. 13. On 8 October, 9 December 2004 and 20 January 2005 the district court repeatedly returned the case to the prosecutor, inter alia, in view of certain deficiencies in the bill of indictment. On all occasions the judge found that the applicant should remain in custody without citing any legal grounds for it. The decisions of 8 October 2004 and 20 January contained no reasons for extending the detention while that of 9 December 2004 dismissed the applicant’s request for release with a reference to the gravity of charges. The applicant did not appeal. 14. On 20 January 2005 the district court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 April 2005. It gave no reasons except for the fact that the trial was pending. 15. On 5 February 2005 the applicant pleaded guilty while being questioned in the presence of his lawyer and signed the record. Later he withdrew his plea. 16. On 7 April 2005 the district court convicted the applicant of inflicting bodily injuries leading to death. The defence and the prosecution lodged their respective appeals. 17. On 10 June 2005 the regional court sitting on appeal found that the first-instance court should have excluded testimonies given without counsel, quashed the judgment of 7 April 2005 and ordered a re-trial. The regional court also held without any reasons being given that the applicant should remain in custody, and extended the applicant’s detention until 1 August 2005. 18. In July 2005 counsel requested that the applicant be released pending the re-trial. On 25 July 2005 the district court rejected that request, inter alia, with reference to the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s previous conviction. The court extended his detention until 1 November 2005. The applicant appealed arguing that on 22 July 2003 he had already been released upon an undertaking not to leave his place of residence, which he had complied with. On 2 September 2005 the regional court upheld the order of 25 July 2005. 19. On 26 October 2005 the district court ordered the applicant’s release under an undertaking not to leave the place of his residence. The applicant was immediately released. 20. On 20 December 2005 the district court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The applicant was immediately taken into custody. 21. On 21 February 2006 the regional court upheld the judgment of 20 December 2005 thus making it final. 22. On 20 November 2008 the Zheleznodorozhny district court of Penza decided to apply to the applicant measures of compulsory psychiatric treatment. The applicant was then transferred to a psychiatric hospital in the town of Sychevka in the Smolensk region. 23. In the applicant’s initial submission, he submitted that he was kept in IZ-16/1 of Kazan between 15 July and 24 September 2008. During that period (except for two weeks) the applicant had no individual bed in the cell and had to sleep in shifts with two or three other inmates, which deprived him of an opportunity to have a sufficient time for sleep. 24. In his observations on the admissibility and merits of the application of 5 October 2009 the applicant clarified that he had stayed in the facility in question between 15 August and 24 October 2008. 25. The applicant was kept in IZ-16/1 during two periods of time: (a) between 15 August and 24 September 2008; and (b) between 22 and 24 October 2008. He was transferred there temporarily from the post‑conviction detention facility in which he had been serving his sentence so that he could undergo a psychiatric expert assessment. Between 24 September and 22 October 2008 the applicant stayed in a psychiatric hospital. 26. The applicant was kept in cells nos. 5 (from 15 until 17 August 2008), 6 (from 17 August until 19 September 2008), 11 (from 19 until 24 September 2008), and 46 (from 22 until 24 October 2008). 27. The cells presented the following characteristics: - cell no. 5: 20.06 square metres and five sleeping places; - cell no. 6: 16.2 square metres and four sleeping places; - cell no. 11: 20.98 square metres and five sleeping places; - cell no. 46: 12.4 square metres and three sleeping places. 28. The temperature in the cells was around +20 degrees Celsius. There was a ventilation system in each cell. There were windows that let in enough light. Lavatories were separated from the rest of the cells with partitions. 29. The Government, relying on the certificates issued by the prison governor on 12 May 2009, submitted that the number of inmates kept in each of the above cells had not exceeded the number of sleeping places and that, while in IZ-16/1, the applicant at all times had had an individual sleeping place; he had been provided with a set of bed linen. They also produced three statements by detainees kept in IZ-16/1 in cells nos. 6 and 11 from December 2008 and April 2009, respectively. Finally, they enclosed the applicant’s cell register and extracts from the prison population register of IZ-16/1 covering each day in the periods from 15 until 25 August 2008; from 27 August until 23 September 2008; and from 23 until 24 October 2008. The extracts showed that during the respective periods of the applicant’s stay cell no. 5 had housed four to five persons, cell no. 6 – two to four persons, cell no. 11 - five persons, and cell no. 46 – three persons.

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5. On 18 May 2002 Vitaliy Kholodkov, the applicants’ adult son, was found dead in his office with a gunshot wound to his head. Having examined the site and questioned potential witnesses, the Kuibyshevskiy District Police in Donetsk noted that some of his personal belongings, including two mobile telephones, were missing. 6. On the same date the Kuibyshevskiy District Prosecutor’s Office in Donetsk instituted criminal proceedings into the incident. 7. On 22 and 23 May 2002 the first and the second applicants respectively were admitted to the proceedings as injured parties. 8. On a number of occasions the applicants complained to various authorities that the investigation was ineffective. They maintained, in particular, that their son had been the victim of a contract killing and insisted that several persons, including A. S., his former business partner, could have ordered his murder. They also identified that their son’s missing mobile telephones had been appropriated by certain S.O. and V.R. They demanded that these persons be arrested and questioned as the potential contract killers. 9. On 20 December 2002 the District Prosecutor’s Office suspended the investigation referring to lack of any useful leads. 10. On 21 April 2003 this decision was quashed and the investigation was resumed. 11. On 4 August 2004 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office developed an action plan to verify the applicants’ allegations concerning deficiencies in the investigation. The parties did not provide any documents concerning the implementation of that action plan. 12. On 26 November 2004 an investigator with the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office suspended the proceedings referring to lack of any useful leads. 13. On 12 March 2005 this decision was quashed by the supervising prosecutor and the proceedings were resumed. 14. On 11 November 2005 V.R. (indicated by the applicants as a potential contract killer of their son) was placed on the wanted list as a potential suspect. 15. On 17 June 2008 the case was transferred to the Donetsk Regional Police Department for further investigation. 16. On 4 December 2008 the Donetsk Regional Police Department informed the first applicant, in response to his complaint concerning the protractions in the investigation, that they had identified a potential suspect. However, as his whereabouts were unknown, it was impossible to take any further actions in relation to the case. 17. On 25 February 2010 the General Prosecutor’s Office responded to the applicants’ complaint concerning ineffectiveness in the conduct of the investigation by mentioning that two officers from the Kuibyshevskiy District Police Department had been under disciplinary investigation on account of their purported failure to take necessary measures for the collection of evidence in the initial phase of the proceedings. 18. On 6 May 2010 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutors’ Office confirmed the above information. The parties did not inform the Court concerning the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings at issue. 19. In September 2011 the police arrested V.R. and a certain O.B., who confessed of having beaten Vitaliy Kholodkov in his office on 17 May 2002. O.B. also divulged that he had fired a gun while struggling with Vitaliy Kholodkov. 20. On 14 November 2011 the prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against A.S. (earlier indicated by the applicants as a potential organizer of Vitaliy Kholodkov’s killing) on suspicion of having contracted O.B. and V.R. to assault Vitaliy Kholodkov. 21. On 12 December 2011 A.S., O.B. and V.R. were committed to stand criminal trial before the Kuibyshevskiy District Court in Donetsk. 22. On 16 January 2013 the District Court convicted A.S. of having contracted O.B. and V.R. to assault Vitaliy Kholodkov. It also convicted O.B. of having assaulted and killed him and V.R. of having participated in the assault and having stolen the victim’s belongings. 23. On 23 April 2013 this judgment was quashed on appeal by the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal and the case was remitted for a retrial. 24. The parties have not informed the Court concerning further progress in the case.

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5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Baku. 6. He is a person with a Category 2 disability. 7. The applicant is an independent journalist and the chairman of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (“IRFS”), a non-governmental organisation specialising in the protection of journalists’ rights. He also worked as a reporter for the news agency Turan Information Agency. 8. On 14 June 2008 a group called the “Che Guevara Fan Club” held a gathering at a private café in Baku to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Che Guevara. The café in question was located in the basement of a building in the city centre and there were about twenty-five attendees in the gathering. The applicant, accompanied by two other colleagues (R.A. and M.H.) from the IRFS, attended this gathering. 9. The gathering began at noon and approximately thirty minutes later about thirty police officers entered the café. Some of them were in police uniform and others were in plain clothes. They suspended the gathering and announced that they were going to take the attendees to the police station. 10. The applicant identified himself, informing the police officers that he was a journalist and the chairman of the IRFS. He had with him his identity card and the card confirming that he was the chairman of the IRFS. The applicant also asked the police officers to identify themselves and to release his arrested colleagues. He further informed the Turan Information Agency by telephone about the police intervention. In response, one of the police officers, who was apparently in charge of the intervention, ordered other police officers to take the applicant to the police station. 11. According to the applicant, he was taken to a police car by four police officers, who used force against him. In particular, they punched and kicked him in the stomach. 12. In support of his version of events, the applicant relied on written eyewitness statements from R.A. and M.H., dated respectively 23 June 2008 and 24 June 2008, who confirmed that the applicant had informed the police officers that he was a journalist and the chairman of the IRFS before asking the police officers to release them. A police officer had then instructed other police officers to arrest the applicant and they had used force against him while taking him to a police car. 13. After his arrival at the police station, the applicant had been separated from the others who had been arrested and had been taken to the office of the Deputy Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, A.K. Four police officers had entered the room and had threatened the applicant in the presence of A.K. One of the police officers, O.A., had, according to the applicant, shouted at him and had taken out his gun. Hitting his gun on the table, he had shouted “I can eliminate you”, “I can arrest you”, “I can send you to jail”. Then he had pushed down the applicant’s head by pressing on the back of his neck so that his head hit the table. The applicant had warned the police officer that he was a person with a Category 2 disability and that his health was fragile. At that point O.A. had struck the applicant in the neck with his elbow; as a result, the applicant had lost consciousness. 14. In support of his version of events, the applicant relied on the above-mentioned written eyewitness statements from R.A. and M.H. In particular, R.A. submitted in his witness statement that, when he was in the corridor in the police station, the applicant was taken to the office of the Deputy Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. He had then heard someone who was shouting at the applicant saying “I can eliminate you”, “I can send you to jail”. 15. When the applicant regained consciousness, he had asked the police officers to call an ambulance because he did not feel well. They allegedly refused to do so, but had taken him out of the room. The applicant’s colleagues had seen him in the corridor and had asked other members of the IRFS to call an ambulance. They had also informed the media about the applicant’s ill-treatment by the police. 16. In the meantime, some journalists, human rights defenders and youth movement activists who had been informed of the arrest of the applicant and his colleagues had begun gathering in front of the police station. 17. At around 4 p.m. two police officers accompanied the applicant to the door leading out of the police station, but the applicant had been able to take only a few steps and had then again lost consciousness. In support of his version of events, the applicant relied on written eyewitness statements from I.A. (journalist), R.H. (civil society activist) and M.A. (director of the Turan Information Agency), who were at that time present in front of the police station. The witnesses stated that, when the applicant was taken out of the police station, he was unconscious and was taken by an ambulance, which was called by them, to hospital. 18. At 5.20 p.m. the applicant was admitted to hospital with the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury and contusion of the soft tissues around the nape of his neck. The applicant remained in the intensive care unit of the hospital for four days. He was released from hospital on 25 June 2008. 19. The events of 14 June 2008 attracted significant public and media interest both inside the country and internationally. In particular, a number of human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, expressed concern over the applicant’s arrest and ill-treatment by the police, asking the domestic authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the incident. 20. On 14 June 2008 the police intervened in the gathering in question on the basis of a complaint from people living in the neighbourhood of the café, who complained about noise and the behaviour of those attending. The applicant and other attendees who were unable to produce their identity cards were taken to the police station but were released once their identity had been established. During his stay at the police station the applicant was not ill-treated by the police. 21. A criminal inquiry was launched by Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 in connection with the information about the applicant’s admission to the Clinical Medical Centre with injuries. 22. On 15 June 2008 the applicant was questioned in hospital by an investigator from Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. The applicant described in detail the circumstances of his arrest and detention by the police on 14 June 2008. In particular, he stated that on 14 June 2008 he had attended the gathering commemorating the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Che Guevara, which had been interrupted by a police intervention. When he protested about the arrest of his journalist colleagues on the orders of the police officer who was apparently in charge of the intervention, four police officers forcibly took him to a police car. Following his arrival at Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, he was taken to the room of the Deputy Head of the police station. Other police officers were also in the room and one of them, who was wearing black sunglasses, began insulting him. He then began threatening him, took out his gun and shouted at him. The same police officer also struck him in the neck, as a result of which he lost consciousness. The police officers then took him out of the room. 23. While the criminal inquiry was still pending, on 17 June 2008 the spokesman for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, E.Z., in an interview with the Turan Information Agency, stated as follows concerning the applicant’s arrest and alleged ill-treatment by the police: “The statements made to the media by the chairman of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, Emin Huseynov, alleging that he was subjected to duress by the police are not true. Even the allegations published in the media are contradictory.” He further continued: “On 14 June a group of people held an unauthorised gathering at a café. The police requested the interruption of the unauthorised gathering. Twenty people were taken to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 in order to establish their identity and to conduct the relevant explanatory interviews (izahat işləri). They were all released following the explanatory interviews. At that time, Emin Huseynov said that he did not feel well. An ambulance was called immediately. It was established during the medical examination that his health problem was related to his previous diseases. It was established during the medical examination that E. Huseynov had lost consciousness because his blood pressure reached 190.” 24. According to the applicant, he was examined by a forensic expert in hospital on 18 June 2008. The forensic report dated 23 June 2008 provides that the examination began on 15 June 2008 and ended on 20 June 2008 without specifying the exact date of the applicant’s examination by the forensic expert in hospital. The forensic report of 23 June 2008 reads: “Questions addressed to the forensic expert: 1. What kind of injuries are there on E. Huseynov’s body? What are their degree of gravity and characteristics? In which order and with which instrument were they inflicted? Could these injuries be sustained as a result of a fall, a beating or were they inflicted by E. Huseynov himself? 2. Does the date of infliction of the injuries on the body of citizen E. Huseynov correspond to the date indicated in the descriptive part of the decision? Information about the case It appears from the decision that a report in connection with the information that citizen E. Huseynov, who resides in ..., has sustained injuries was assigned to me. E. Huseynov, who was questioned during the inquiry, stated that on 14 June 2008 a person that he did not know had struck him in the neck in Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. Citizen E. Huseynov attended the Clinical Medical Centre in connection with his injuries. The examination was carried out in the resuscitation and intensive care unit of the Clinical Medical Centre of the Baku City Main Health Department in the presence of the lawyer Rashid Hajili. According to the person examined, at approximately 12.30 p.m. – 1 p.m. on 14 June 2008 during an event dedicated to the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Che Guevara in café Alaturka, plain clothes persons took him and other attendees to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. He was struck in his head at that moment and later at the police station. He replies in detail and precisely to the questions about the incident and other questions. 2. No injuries or objective signs of injury were noticed on the hairy part of the head, the face and other parts of the body. It appears from medical record no. 5190 of the patient of the Clinical Medical Centre of the Baku City Main Health Department that at 5.20 p.m. on 14 June 2008 E. Huseynov, who is 29 years old, was admitted to the resuscitation and intensive care unit by a team from emergency unit no. 2 with the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury and contusion of the soft tissues around the nape of the neck (qapalı kəllə beyin travması, ənsə nahiyəsinin yumşaq toxumlarının əzilməsi). It was not possible for him to describe his complaints when he was admitted to hospital. According to those who brought him to hospital, the patient sustained the injury as a result of a beating. His general state was serious. The skin and mucous membrane were of ordinary color. The respiration was vesicular. The respiratory rate was 19 breaths per minute, the blood pressure was 190/120 mm Hg, the heart pulse was beating 120 per minute. The abdomen was not hard and there was no pain. Neurological status: his conscious awareness was impaired to the point of deafness. His reaction to bright light was positive, he turned away from it. His pupils and tendon reflexes were at equal distance from each side and they were alive. Meningitis symptoms and pathological reflexes were not observed. In the examination no injury was noticed on the skin. Diagnosis: neurological reaction (nevrotik reaksiya). At 5.25 p.m. on 14 June 2008 the patient, who was in a serious neurological state (nevrotik vəziyyət), was directly admitted from the admission unit to the resuscitation and intensive care unit. His conscious awareness was in soporous state. The tendon and corneal reflexes were alive. The skin and mucous membrane which may be observed by eye were pale. The blood pressure was 190/110 mm Hg, the heart pulse was beating 116 per minute. The respiration was normal and sufficient. The urination was normal. Hb-120 g/l, leucocytes 8,4-10 g/l. On 15 June 2008 there was no pathological change in side projected X-ray examinations of side and neck vertebras of the cranium. At 10 a.m. on 15 June 2008 the comment of the doctor on duty: the patient’s state was stable. He was conscious and replied to questions. His pupils were at equal distance from each side and corneal reflexes were alive. There were no meningitis elements. The skin and observable mucous membrane were pale ... (illegible), the heart pulse was beating 96 per minute, the blood pressure was 130/90 mm Hg ... (illegible), the respiratory rate was 20 breaths per minute ... (illegible). His tongue was wet, the abdomen was not hard, the urination was adequate. It was written in the summary of the cerebral computed tomography opinion dated 17 June 2008 that intraparenchymal traumatic pathological changes were not observed in E. Huseynov. In the computed tomography examination of 17 June 2008 pathological change in the neck area and traumatic change in the neck part of the vertebral column were not revealed. In the ultrasound examination of 17 June 2008 no liquid was revealed in the abdomen and there was no hematoma in the parenchymal organs. It was noted in the log dated 17 June 2008 that an examination was carried out by the doctors, the experts in neurotrauma, A.Y. and Q.I., the head of the resuscitation and intensive care unit, V.R., the experts in resuscitation, C.N. and F.T., and the following were noted: his general state was stable, he complained about headaches. The blood pressure was 120/70 mm Hg, the heart pulse was beating 88 per minute. Neurological status: he was conscious and adequately replied to questions. His pupils and tendon reflexes were at equal distance from each side and they were alive. No change was observed in the cranial-brain nerves. There were no meningitis symptoms. Taking into account the patient’s subjective complaints, it was desirable to subject him to a computed tomography examination. Bearing in mind the patient’s state, it was decided that the further examination and treatment of the patient be continued in the neurotrauma department. It appears from the subsequent log that the patient was examined jointly by the assistant professor M. and the head of the department. It was further indicated that E. Huseynov’s illness was related to extended osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, numerous disc protrusions in the back and neck areas (C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 3-4, L 5, S 1), chronic dyscirculatory encephalopathy and vestibulopathy. His treatment in connection with the above-mentioned diseases is ongoing. Clinical diagnosis: neurological reaction, vertebrogenic syndrome, C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7 intervertebral disc protrusions, paroxysmal vein distention. The forensic expert: C.A. Conclusion Relying on the forensic examination of E. Huseynov, born in 1979, and the content of the medical documents, I conclude as follows in reply to questions addressed in the decision: 2. E. Huseynov’s in-patient treatment was related to his previous diseases - extended osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, numerous disc protrusions in the back and neck areas (C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 3-4, L 5, S 1), chronic dyscirculatory encephalopathy and vestibulopathy.” 25. The applicant was not provided with a copy of the forensic report. 26. On 25 June 2008 Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 issued an explanation (arayış) concerning the police intervention of 14 June 2008. The relevant part of this document, signed by the Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, M.T., reads: “On the basis of the information that about fifty people had gathered at café “Alaturka” in the basement of building no. 6 at 28 May Street in Baku on 14 June 2008, at around 1 p.m. police officers from the Baku City Police Office took measures in order to identify the persons gathered in this place and to establish the purpose of the gathering, and twenty-two of them were taken to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. After these individuals had arrived at Police Station no. 22 at 1.55 p.m., they were registered in the “apprehended persons’ registration log” (gətirilmiş şəxslərin qeydiyyat kitabı) and were released at 4.30 p.m. At the police station, their identity was established and statements were taken from nine of them in order to establish the purpose of their gathering in that location. ... At the police station, their identity was established and they were released following a “prophylactic conversation” (profilaktik söhbət). It was also established that Huseynov Emin Rafik oglu, who presented a document stating that he was the chairman of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, was among the persons apprehended...” 27. By a decision of 27 June 2008, the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that there was no evidence that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police. The relevant part of the decision reads: “It was established during the examination of patients’ reception log in the Clinical Medical Centre that citizen E. Huseynov was admitted to the hospital with the diagnosis of neurological reaction at 5.20 p.m. on 14 June 2008. This was also noted in extract no. 5196, dated 20 June 2008, from the patient’s in-patient and out-patient medical record provided by the Clinical Medical Centre. In connection with the above-mentioned, the forensic report no. 143/TM of 23 June 2008, ordered on 15 June 2008, which was carried out by ... provides in reply to the questions addressed to the expert, on the basis of E. Huseynov’s forensic examination and the content of the medical documents, that no injuries or objective signs of injury (bruise, abrasion, wound, swelling, etc.) were noticed on the body of E. Huseynov and that E. Huseynov’s in-patient treatment was related to his previous diseases - extended osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, numerous disc protrusions in the back and neck areas (C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 3-4, L 5, S 1), chronic dyscirculatory encephalopathy and vestibulopathy. It appears from the evidence collected in connection with the fact that citizen Huseynov Emin Rafik oglu had sustained an injury and from the forensic report dated 23 June 2008 ... that there were no injuries or objective signs of injury on E. Huseynov’s body. As no criminal act has been established in this respect, it is appropriate to refuse to institute criminal proceedings.” 28. The applicant was not informed of the decision of 27 June 2008 concerning the investigator’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings. 29. On 16 March 2009 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Nasimi District Court. Relying on Articles 3, 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention, he complained that he had been ill-treated by the police during his arrest and whilst in police custody, and that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation in this respect. The applicant further complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty and that the police intervention of 14 June 2008 had been unlawful and had constituted an unjustified interference with his rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The applicant pointed out, in particular, that the investigator had questioned neither the police officers who had been involved in the ill-treatment nor the other witnesses. He also stated that he had not learned about the existence of the investigator’s decision of 27 June 2008 until 3 March 2009 and that he had never been provided with a copy of the forensic report. 30. On 31 March 2009 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding the investigator’s decision lawful. The court’s decision was silent as to the applicant’s particular complaints. The relevant part of the decision reads: “... It was established during the examination of patients’ reception log in the Clinical Medical Centre that citizen E. Huseynov was admitted to the hospital with the diagnosis of neurological reaction at 5.20 p.m. on 14 June 2008. This was also noted in extract no. 5196, dated 20 June 2008, from the patient’s in-patient and out-patient medical record provided by the Clinical Medical Centre. It appears from the forensic report ... that no injuries or objective signs of injury (bruise, abrasion, wound, swelling, etc.) were noticed on E. Huseynov’s body. It was noted that E. Huseynov’s in-patient treatment was related to the previous diseases ... that he had suffered. Therefore, the court considers that in carrying out a preliminary examination in compliance with Article 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for establishing whether there were sufficient basis to institute criminal proceedings the investigator took all the necessary steps and, as it was not established that there had been a criminal element in the examined fact, a justified and lawful decision on refusal to institute criminal proceedings was adopted.” 31. On 6 April 2009 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He also complained that the investigator had not arranged an identity parade including the police officer O.A. and neither had he questioned the police officers involved in his arrest and detention and, in particular, the Deputy Head of the Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 in whose room and whose presence he had been ill-treated. He had failed to obtain video recordings from security cameras situated in the police station in question. The applicant also disputed the conclusions of the forensic report, pointing out that he had not been provided with a copy of it. 32. On 27 April 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 33. In the meantime, the applicant also lodged a civil action against the Nasimi District Police Office, asking for compensation. Relying on Articles 3, 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention, he complained that he had been ill-treated by the police, that he had been arrested and taken to the police station unlawfully, and that the police intervention in the gathering had constituted an unlawful interference with his rights to freedom of expression and assembly. In support of his claim, the applicant relied on written eyewitness statements from R.A. and M.H., who stated that police officers had used force against the applicant during his arrest. They also stated that when the applicant was in the room of the Deputy Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, they had heard someone shouting at the applicant “I can eliminate you”, “I can send you to jail”. When the applicant had been taken out of the room, he did not feel well. 34. On 25 July 2008 the Nasimi District Court refused to admit his action, finding that it did not comply with the procedural requirements for lodging a complaint. 35. On 2 September 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 36. On 17 November 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the Baku Court of Appeal’s decision and remitted the case to the lower courts for a new examination. 37. On 17 June 2009 the Nasimi District Court, having examined the applicant’s action on the merits, decided to dismiss it. The court found that the applicant had been taken to the police station because he had not had his identity card on him. The court also held that the police intervention had been lawful, since the gathering at the café in the city centre disturbed other people present and consequently the police had intervened. As regards the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment, the court held that it had not been established that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police. The relevant part of the judgment reads: “It was established at the court hearing that an investigator from Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 had examined the fact that E. Huseynov had sustained injuries, that it had been decided to refuse to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of the collected materials because no criminal act had been established, and that this decision had not been challenged. Moreover, it was established at the court hearing on the basis of witness statements that the applicant had been taken to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 because he had not had his identity card on him, that he had been detained for a certain period of time, and that he had been then released following the establishment of his identity. It was also established at the court that E. Huseynov had been previously sustained brain injury and regularly underwent medical treatment in Azerbaijan and abroad for a long period of time. Unexpected health problems were previously observed in his case and the fact that he had felt unwell after having been brought to the police station was not related to any duress, but to his previous illness. Furthermore, it was not established at the court hearing that the applicant had sustained a bodily injury or subjected to physical violence, beaten or been under duress at the police station.” 38. On 3 August 2009 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 39. On 14 October 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 40. On 7 May 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments.

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5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Kriva Palanka. 6. On 24 April 2009 the applicant was operated on for stomach cancer and subsequently underwent chemotherapy. 7. On 29 October 2009 she had been feeling anxious and distressed, and her husband requested medical assistance from Kriva Palanka hospital (110 km from Skopje). Dr M., a general practitioner, gave an instruction that the applicant was to be transferred to a psychiatric clinic in Skopje. Dr C.T., a specialist in neuropsychiatry in Kriva Palanka hospital, also gave instructions for her to be transferred to that clinic with police assistance. 8. Still on 29 October, at around 5 pm., an ambulance arrived at the applicant’s house in the village of Uzem. Two police officers, who were later identified as M.N. and I.A. in the subsequent criminal proceedings, assisted with the applicant’s transfer to the Bardovci psychiatric hospital in Skopje, where she remained until 31 October 2009. 9. The relevant parts of a notice of her discharge, dated 2 November 2009 from Bardovci hospital provide as follows: “[This is the] first admission of (the applicant) to this hospital; it was carried out with the assistance of the police from Kriva Palanka. According to the limited information obtained from (the applicant’s) husband by telephone, (it is known) that since summer this year, when she was diagnosed with and treated for stomach cancer, (the applicant) had become ... melancholic, lethargic, and had threatened with committing suicide. When admitted, [the applicant] was malnourished, dehydrated, and had several haematomas of different sizes, most probably of recent date (најверојатно од понов датум) ... Concerning her psychological state she was depressed, anxious, tearful, and fixated on her poor state of health (cancer) ...she was burdened with depressive ideas and had a paranoid attitude towards her husband, which may be well-founded ... She is discharged without having been examined or treated, at her husband’s request.” 10. Following her discharge from the hospital in Skopje, the applicant was on the same day admitted to the Kriva Palanka hospital. A handwritten medical certificate was issued and entered in the hospital’s records under no. 2131. At the applicant’s request a transcript of this certificate was made by Dr G.S. The relevant parts of this certificate state that: “[According to the applicant] she was handcuffed by the police during her transfer to Bardovci psychiatric hospital, as instructed by a doctor. Objectively: haematoma measuring 2 x 6 cm on both forearms around the wrist joints; 3 hematomas measuring 1 x 2 cm on both lower legs. On the right hip, (a haematoma) measuring 1 x 2 cm. Regarding these injuries, [the applicant] says that they were inflicted by kicks and blows.” 11. Still on 31 October 2009 the applicant was also examined by Doctor M. (see paragraph 7 above). The relevant parts of the medical certificate issued on that date read as follows: “On 29 October 2009 at about 5 pm., on a request by (the applicant’s) husband and as suggested in (a neuropsychiatric opinion), the patient was transported to Skopje psychiatric clinic. The applicant states that she was abused during the transfer: she was hit and punched on the legs, [a third person] sat on her legs, and her hands were handcuffed behind her back. When she arrived she was treated violently by hospital staff. When examined ... [the following] is observed: [she] is upset; a haematoma and a scratch on the lower legs, thus 4-5 scratches on the right side measuring 1 x 2 cm; on the left side 4-5 (scratches) measuring 1 x 2 cm and 2 x 2 cm; haematomas and (two) scratches on the stomach measuring 3 x 1 cm; 5 scratches on the back measuring 5 x 6 cm; some small haematomas ... The patient has visible injuries caused by a trauma, namely hitting and punching. Opinion: light bodily injury.” 12. On 15 February 2010 Doctor M. issued a certificate that on 29 October 2009 the applicant had been examined and that an instruction had been given for her to be transferred to Skopje psychiatric clinic. 13. In support of the application before the Court, the applicant provided four photographs of her, showing the following injuries: five scratches on the lower and middle part of the back; two scratches and a haematoma on her stomach, and several haematomas on the lower legs. 14. On 21 November 2009 the police drew up an official note (службена белешка) regarding information obtained from Dr S.V. As indicated in the note, S.V. decided, “for the sake of truth”, to provide relevant information in reaction to a television interview broadcasted on 3 November 2009 in which the applicant had stated that she was ill-treated by police officers during her transfer to Bardovci hospital. During the interview she showed the injuries that she had allegedly sustained. The relevant parts of the note read as follows: “... I want to say that on 27 October 2009 at 9 pm., I was called, through the duty medical centre of Kriva Palanka hospital, to intervene in an urgent case reported by (the applicant’s) husband. I arrived at a pensioners’ home in Kriva Palanka, where (the applicant and her husband) were waiting. (The husband) told me that (the applicant) had injured herself, namely that she had hit her body and head against a wall and a bed; her face was covered with blood, and there was blood on the floor in front of the door. That suggested that she had had a nervous breakdown, for which I prescribed treatment. In my opinion and in view of the foregoing, it is most likely that the injuries she showed to the cameras were self-inflicted on the date indicated above, which was when I intervened.” 15. On 3 December 2009 L.S. provided information to the police in relation to media statements by the applicant and her husband that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police. L.S. stated that the applicant’s husband had beaten the applicant on three occasions (she did not specify the exact dates when the alleged beatings had happened, but she confirmed that it had been on “the nights of Thursday, Friday and Saturday”). She further stated: “During the Sunday night two women, most likely journalists, visited [the applicant’s husband]. On the Tuesday [the applicant’s husband] invited residents to watch on television ‘how do the police from Kriva Palanka work. I put them in a mould; I’ll take a lot of money from them’. I personally believe that [the applicant’s] injuries were inflicted by [her husband] who, while intoxicated, beats her up every day in front of their children.” 16. The note further indicated that four individuals (whose identity was specified), together with other residents in the building in which the applicant lived, could be interviewed regarding the case. 17. On 11 January 2010 the police informed the applicant’s husband that on 3 December 2009 L.S. had made a complaint against him, and that an official note had been drawn up. As stated in the letter, both the applicant’s husband and L.S. had been advised to stop arguing in future. The letter further indicated that L.S. had been warned that in the event of false reporting a misdemeanour complaint would be lodged against her. 18. In submissions of 27 January and 18 February 2010 the applicant brought criminal charges of medical malpractice against Dr C.T. alleging that he had instructed her to undergo a psychiatric examination without examining her, against V.S., a nurse who had accompanied the applicant during her transfer to Skopje (she had been sitting in the front passenger seat), and against M.N. and I.A., the police officers, for inflicting ill-treatment and mild bodily injury. She alleged that on 29 October 2009 she had been distressed. In the circumstances, her husband had gone to Kriva Palanka hospital, where Dr C.T. had decided that she be transferred to Skopje psychiatric clinic with assistance from the police. Doctor M. had also issued a recommendation in this respect (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant claimed, inter alia, that M.N. and I.A. had forcibly put her in the ambulance, stating that they had grabbed her arms and dragged her to the ambulance, ignoring her cries of pain from the surgery. After she had been put in the ambulance, she had been forcibly made to lie on a bed with her hands handcuffed behind her back. I.A. sat on her legs. They had gone, firstly, to Kriva Palanka hospital where Dr C.T. had given instructions, by telephone, to V.S. to administer an injection. The applicant alleged that on the way to Skopje she had been hit, punched and threatened by the police officers. As a result, she had “several injuries (haematomas) all over the body and limbs and five to seven marks on the back from the handcuffs, of which I have photographs”. In support of her complaint she attached medical certificates (see paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 above). 19. On 31 March 2010 the public prosecutor contacted the Ministry of the Interior with a request for further information regarding the incident. In reply, on 26 May 2010 the Sector for Internal Control and Professional Standards within the Ministry of the Interior submitted a “special report” regarding the case. It referred to statements (which it submitted in support) which Dr C.T., the applicant and her husband had given to the police between 13 and 15 April 2010. 20. Dr C.T. confirmed that on 29 October 2009 the applicant’s husband had told him that they lived in the pensioners’ home in Kriva Palanka; that the applicant’s mental health was poor; that she had arrived at their family house in the village of Uzem (see paragraph 8 above) without his consent; that she had broken a window to get in; that she had been aggressive and was capable of killing herself, their children or himself; that she had been uncooperative; and that she had refused to sleep or eat. 21. In the statement, the applicant’s husband confirmed that the applicant’s mental health had deteriorated since the stomach surgery, and that he had explained “her condition” to the doctors M. and C.T. during his visit of 29 October 2009. He also informed the police officers M.N. and I.A. about her state of health while he was in the ambulance with them on the way to their family house. When they got to the house he had asked the police officers to wait outside so that he could explain to the applicant that she was going to be taken to a psychiatric hospital. When the police officers had entered the house their children had started crying and putting their arms around the applicant. The police officers had forcibly separated the children from the applicant; they had grabbed her by the arms and dragged her (while she was on her knees) towards the door. After the situation had calmed down and in order not to harm the applicant, he had taken her by the legs, and he and the police officers had taken her to the front of the ambulance. Then the police officers had put her in the ambulance; they had handcuffed her hands behind her back and made her lie on a bed. To keep her still, I.A. had sat on her legs. The police officers had remained with the applicant in the rear of the ambulance, while V.S. had sat in the front passenger seat. While he had been occupied with the children in the house, the ambulance had left the scene. The next day he had found out that the applicant had been taken to Bardovci hospital; he went there, but no visits were allowed that day. 22. In depositions made on 15 April 2010 the applicant confirmed that on 29 October 2009 she had consented to be taken to Skopje psychiatric clinic; that the police officers had grabbed her hands and dragged her; that before she got into the ambulance M.N. had hit her on the back with a baton; and that her husband had helped M.N. and I.A. to bring her to the front of the ambulance. She also stated that no infusion or injection had been administered when they had stopped at Kriva Palanka hospital; that during the transfer to Skopje hospital (the ambulance had been driven at excessive speed) her hands had been handcuffed behind her back; that I.A. had been sitting on her legs and that she (I.A.) had hit her on the legs and head with a truncheon; that M.N. had grabbed her hair and had tightened up the handcuffs; that both M.N. and I.A. had punched her and hurt her legs. When she was admitted to Bardovci hospital she was bleeding and had bruises. 23. The “special report” of the Ministry further referred to statements given by doctors S.V. and L.S. (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). It also specified that the police officers concerned had denied that they had used any force against the applicant, and that the applicant had used offensive language against them and had been screaming loudly. The record also stated that V.S. (the nurse) and J.D. (the driver of the ambulance), had also denied that the police officers had used any force against the applicant. The report went on to state: “when (the police officers) arrived at (the applicant’s) house, they were warned by the (applicant’s) husband to be cautious because Marina had a knife with which she might assault them. For that reason, he proposed going into the house first to tell (the applicant) that she was going to be taken to Skopje for medical treatment. After five minutes, (the applicant’s husband) went out and called (the police officers) into the house. The police officers went in and told Marina that they would have to transfer her by ambulance to a health institution in Skopje. In response to that, Marina said to (her husband): do I deserve this from you, being taken for medical treatment; I do not belong there, you should go there because you are drunk every day and you constantly abuse and hit me and the children; I’m covered in bruises because of you ... Throughout the journey, (the applicant) used offensive language against the police officers and the nurse, she [the applicant] was very aggressive and angry, and she was screaming loudly and trying to hurt herself by hitting her head against the window of the ambulance. The police officers and the nurse had been forced during the entire transfer to hold her hands in order to prevent her from hurting herself or some of them”. 24. On 8 June 2010 the Kriva Palanka public prosecutor’s office, referring to the Ministry’s “special report” and the discharge notice from Bardovci hospital, rejected the applicant’s complaint against the accused (the decision noted that the nurse V.S. had died in the meantime), finding that the alleged offences were not subject to State prosecution. On 14 June 2010 the applicant, in the capacity of a subsidiary prosecutor, took over the prosecution and brought private charges before the Kriva Palanka Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) on the same charges as above (see paragraph 18 above). 25. On 6 October 2010 the trial court heard Dr C.T., M.N., I.A., the applicant, who was not legally represented, and her husband. According to the transcript of the court hearing, Dr C.T.’s statement was consistent with the statements he had made to the police (see paragraph 20 above). 26. The relevant parts of M.N.’s statement, as described in the court record, read as follows: “(the applicant’s husband) arrived at the police station and said in front of colleagues and himself (M.N.) that he had been afraid that something could happen to his children or (to the applicant), because, when she had gone to Uzem she had taken a knife and a telephone wire; they went by ambulance to Uzem ... [when they went into the house] (the applicant) became upset and grabbed one of the minor children in her arms; (the applicant’s) husband took the child away, and because she did not want to get into the vehicle he (M.N.) took her arms and her husband took her legs and they put her in the ambulance.” 27. I.A. confirmed M.N.’s statement, and stated that she had held the applicant down with her hands to prevent her from standing up. Both M.N. and I.A. denied that they had used force or handcuffs against the applicant. They also stated that a tranquilliser had been administered to the applicant before they had left for Skopje. 28. The applicant objected to the defendants’ statements. She further denied that her husband had helped the police officers to take her to the ambulance; on the other hand, she reiterated that the police officers had grabbed her and put her into the ambulance; that she had been handcuffed, and that M.N. had hit her with a truncheon; that I.A. had sat on her legs during the transfer; that I.A. had held her mouth closed to stop her talking, and had hit and punched her. 29. The applicant’s husband confirmed that he had requested that Dr C.T. give an instruction for the applicant to have treatment. When the applicant had refused to get into the ambulance the police officers had grabbed her by the arms and dragged her towards the ambulance. In order not to hurt her, he had grabbed the applicant by the legs and put her in the vehicle. M.N. had handcuffed the applicant. The applicant’s husband denied saying that the applicant had a knife and a wire. 30. On 6 October 2010 the trial court delivered a judgment acquitting C.T., M.N. and I.A. for lack of evidence. It also discontinued the proceedings against V.S. The trial court established that: “The accused doctor C.T. ... acted conscientiously and in accordance with his duty, and at the request of [the applicant’s] husband who had informed him about [the applicant’s] condition, he provided appropriate treatment; he drew up a report and instructed that she be transferred with police assistance to Skopje psychiatric clinic. [The applicant] was not examined by a specialist (не и бил извршен специјалистички преглед) because she was brought [to the hospital] outside working hours (and) [Dr C.T.] was far away from the office; after [V.S.] had told him by telephone about [the applicant’s] condition, he instructed that a tranquilliser injection be given and that [the applicant] be transported to Skopje. The accused M.N. and I.A., police officers in Kriva Palanka police station called to provide assistance during [the applicant’s] transfer by ambulance to Skopje psychiatric clinic, acted professionally and in accordance with the law and their powers; they did not use any physical force against the applicant and they did not inflict any injuries on her. The court established the above on the basis of evidence admitted at the trial, namely: oral evidence from the accused, who did not admit the alleged criminal offences, as well as the material evidence from the case file ... of the Kriva Palanka prosecutor’s office which ... [on the basis of the Ministry’s special report] rejected [the applicant’s] criminal complaint ... All these items of evidence are clear, undisputable, categorical, and inter-related; there is no reason for the court to question their reliability ... relying on [this evidence] the court delivers judgment, finding that [the evidence] does not prove that the accused committed the criminal offences with which they are charged. The court examined [the applicant’s] statement that ... the police officers had dragged her into the ambulance; that she had been handcuffed, and that M.N. had hit her with a truncheon ... that during the transfer she had been restrained with handcuffs; that police officer I.A. had been sitting on her legs and had closed her mouth to stop her talking; and (that I.A.) had hit and punched her ... The court examined the statement of [the applicant’s husband] that ... the police officers had grabbed [the applicant] by the arms and dragged her towards the ambulance, and in order not to hurt her, because she had recently had surgery, he had taken her legs and helped to put her in the ambulance; that police officer M.N. had put her head between her legs and had handcuffed her ... The court examined evidence submitted with the criminal complaints (medical reports described in paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 above), and photographs, but they did not contain anything that could lead to a different assessment of the facts from that established [by the court]. (This evidence) is medical evidence, on the basis of which the court established that there had been an instruction for the applicant to be treated at Skopje psychiatric clinic, and a medical certificate had been issued for the visible injuries that she had; that on 29 October 2009 she had been admitted to (Bardovci) hospital; that (at that time) she had been depressed and had a depressive and paranoid attitude towards her husband; that [she] had several haematomas of recent date ... four photographs showed bruises and scratches on her legs and body. It is undisputed that owing to [the applicant’s] condition she needed to be transferred for treatment with assistance from the police; this was also what her husband had asked for. She was admitted to an appropriate institution for treatment and was then discharged at the request of her husband; the injuries described in the medical certificate and visible in the photographs – a haematoma and scratches, which were noted in the discharge notice upon [the applicant’s] admission, were of recent date. However, this evidence cannot lead to a conclusion that [the injuries] were inflicted during the transfer, namely on the day when [the applicant] was transferred by ambulance with assistance from the police.” 31. The applicant appealed against the judgment and reiterated her argument that she had been ill-treated, and complained that Dr C.T. and M.N. had given false statements; that the trial court’s judgment had been delivered after the trial court had held only one hearing; and that her husband had not given oral evidence before the trial court. 32. On 15 December 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the facts established and the reasoning given by the trial court. The court reiterated that on the basis of a request by the applicant’s husband and in view of the applicant’s state of health Dr C.T. had correctly ordered urgent medical treatment with police assistance. The fact that the applicant had been hospitalised in Bardovci hospital instead of in Skopje psychiatric clinic, as instructed by Dr C.T., was irrelevant, as the medical care she had received was appropriate. The court confirmed that the police officers had acted in accordance with the law and their duties as police officers. 33. On 9 March 2011 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request for review of the legality of the judgments. 34. According to the applicant, she has never suffered from any mental disorder, nor was she receiving any medical treatment in that respect.

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5. The applicants are sisters who were born in 1987 and 1992 respectively and live in P. 6. In June 1997 the applicants, represented by their mother V.L., concluded a real estate agreement with B.P. in which they expressed their intention of buying a villa of 87 square metres and the adjacent courtyard of 624 square metres in V., a seaside neighbourhood of P. (hereinafter: the “house”). The agreement stated that the house was in poor condition as certain individuals had lived there for several years without any legal basis and had ruined the furniture and installations. 7. The agreement was formalised in a real estate purchase contract of 17 December 1997 by which the applicants acquired ownership of the house for an amount of 450,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 8. On 26 November 1999 the applicants registered their ownership of the house and the plot of land in the land register in equal shares. 9. On an unspecified date V.L. requested from the relevant Social Welfare Centre (hereinafter: the “Centre”) the authorisation to sell the house owned by the applicants, such authorisation being required under the relevant domestic law in cases where a parent wishes to dispose of a child’s property (see paragraph 39 below). 10. As a result of that request, on 10 April 2000 V.L. and her husband Z.L. (the father of the second applicant) were interviewed at the Centre. They stated that they had bought the house in 1997 for HRK 450,000 and that they had already spent approximately 80,000 Deutsche marks (DEM) renovating it. However, the house required some further investment for which they lacked the necessary means and thus they intended to sell it and to live with one of their parents. They further explained that they owned a retail business and that they had no problems with their children, who both had excellent marks at school. V.L. and Z.L. also promised that they would open a bank account on behalf of their children, into which they would deposit the money from the sale of the house. They pointed out that they had contacted a real estate agency, which was looking for a potential buyer. They also agreed that V.L. would conclude the sale contract once they had managed to find a buyer. 11. In February 2001 Z.L. was arrested and held in detention in connection with a suspected attempted murder and the unlawful possession of firearms. He was later indicted on the same charges in the P. County Court (Županijski sud u P.), which on 10 October 2001 found him guilty and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. During the criminal proceedings his defence lawyer was M.I, a lawyer practising in P. 12. On 15 October 2001 M.I. submitted a request to the Centre seeking authorisation for a real estate swap agreement between the applicants and a certain D.M., who was in fact M.I.’s mother-in-law. He provided powers of attorney signed by V.L., Z.L. and E.B. (the father of the first applicant) authorising him to obtain the Centre’s consent to a swap real estate agreement. 13. Together with his request, M.I. provided a draft swap agreement stipulating that D.M. would transfer to the applicants her four-room flat of 78.27 square metres, situated on the fourth floor of a residential building in P. (hereinafter: the “flat”), while the applicants would transfer their ownership of the house to D.M. The draft swap agreement also stated that the values of the properties to be exchanged were the same and that the parties waived their right to object that they had sustained damage as a result of giving the exchanged property away at below half of its real value. M.I. also submitted another document, a supplement to the swap agreement, in which the parties to that agreement acknowledged that V.L. and Z.L. had invested significant sums of money in the house and that, on the basis of the amounts shown on certain available invoices, D.M. would compensate them for those investments. 14. V.L. was invited to the Centre for an interview on 23 October 2001 in connection with M.I.’s request. She stated that her husband had meanwhile been imprisoned and that their retail business had started to go badly, leading her to close it in August 2001. She also explained that she was unemployed and that this situation had affected the applicants, who were no longer doing so well at school. She further stated that she had been obliged to borrow money to pay the bills for the house and that the overall situation had prompted her and Z.L. to exchange the house for a flat in P. with the additional obligation on the part of the flat-owner to pay them the difference in value between the two properties, amounting to some 100,000 DEM according to her estimate. Lastly, V.L. pointed out that E.B., the father of the first applicant, had given his consent to the swap agreement. She also undertook to register the ownership of the flat in the applicants’ names. 15. On 13 November 2001 the Centre gave its authorisation for the swap agreement, whereby the applicants would transfer their ownership of the house to D.M. while the latter would transfer her ownership of the flat and a garage to the applicants. The decision drafted by the Centre specified that V.L. was obliged to provide the Centre with a copy of the swap agreement. 16. In its statement of reasons behind the decision, the Centre pointed out that it had taken note of the powers of attorney provided to M.I. by the applicants’ parents, V.L.’s statement of 23 October 2001, birth certificates for the applicants and land registry certificates for the properties, and the draft swap agreement. It had also noted the fact that Z.L. had been convicted at first-instance of the offence of attempted murder and unlawful possession of firearms. Based on this information, the Centre concluded that the swap agreement was not contrary to the best interests of the applicants since their property rights would not be extinguished or reduced as they would become the owners of a flat which would provide fully suitable living accommodation. 17. On the same day, the Centre gave its authorisation for the supplementary document to the swap agreement by virtue of which D.M. would pay the applicants 5,000 DEM each on account of the difference in value between the exchanged properties. As a condition of this decision, V.L. was obliged to provide the Centre with a bank statement attesting that the payment had been made. In its statement of reasons, the Centre referred to a request made by V.L. for the conclusion of a supplement to the swap agreement and the statement she had given to the Centre. The Centre also found that this would not be contrary to the interests of the applicants. 18. The above two decisions issued by the Centre on 13 November 2001 were forwarded to the lawyer M.I. 19. On 16 December 2001 the applicants, represented by V.L., concluded the real estate swap agreement with D.M. before a Public Notary in P., and the applicants thereby transferred their ownership of the house to D.M. while the latter transferred her ownership of the flat and the garage to the applicants. The swap agreement contained a clause under which the parties agreed that there was no difference in the value of the exchanged properties, and that they had no further claims on that account. It also set down the value of the properties at some HRK 400,000. 20. Based on this contract, the applicants and D.M. duly registered their ownership of the properties with the land registry. 21. On 28 December 2001 lawyer M.I. submitted to the Centre a certificate from the land registry showing that the applicants had registered their ownership of the flat and bank statements showing that they had received the amount of 5,000 DEM each. 22. On 2 and 12 March 2002 the P. Tax Office (Ministarstvo financija, Porezna uprava) declared a tax obligation of HRK 20,000 for each of the parties ‒ based on the declared value of the transaction involved in the swap agreement ‒ which was divided by half in respect of the applicants, who were thus obliged to pay HRK 10,000 each. 23. On 17 November 2004 the applicants, represented by Z.L. as their legal guardian, brought an action against D.M.in the P. Municipal Court (Općinski sud u P.), asking the court to declare the swap agreement null and void (ništav). 24. During the proceedings the applicants argued that the swap agreement had effected the exchange of the ownership of the house ‒ which comprised two flats, each measuring 87 square metres, was only five minutes’ walk from the sea and was worth approximately 300,000 euros (EUR) ‒ for a flat and a garage worth in total no more than EUR 70,000. Given that at the time when the contract was concluded they were only fourteen and nine years old, the Centre should have defended their rights and should not have given its consent to a swap agreement of that kind. In this respect they pointed out that section 265 § 1 of the Family Act listed specific instances in which the property of a minor could be disposed of, and that no such instance had existed in their case. Moreover, the Centre had failed to carry out an on-site inspection or to commission an expert report which would have allowed it to estimate the value of the house and adopt a proper decision concerning the request for authorisation of the swap agreement. The applicants therefore considered that, by failing to take such vital measures, the Centre had allowed an unlawful and immoral property exchange to be executed. In their view, this had resulted in ab initio invalidity of the exchange. The applicants also pointed out that their legal guardian Z.L. had not been party to the discussions concerning the swap agreement. They therefore proposed that the trial court examine several witnesses, including the participants to the swap agreement, the employees of the Centre, the first applicant ‒ who was by that time already seventeen years old ‒ and several other witnesses who were aware of the circumstances of the case, and commission an expert report establishing the value of the properties. 25. On 1 March 2005 the P. Municipal Court dismissed the applicants’ request to take any of the proposed evidence on the grounds that the case could be decided on the basis of the documents from the case file. 26. On 15 April 2005 the P. Municipal Court dismissed the applicants’ civil action. It argued that it was not in a position to re-examine the Centre’s decision to authorise the swap agreement, since that was an administrative decision which could only have been challenged in administrative proceedings. Thus, given that such a decision existed, the P. Municipal Court could not find the swap agreement to be unlawful or contrary to the morals of society. It also pointed out that the swap agreement could possibly be only a voidable contract (pobojan) but no claim to that effect had been made by the applicants. 27. The applicants challenged that judgment by means of an appeal lodged before the P. County Court, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to examine any of their arguments and had thus erred in its decision concerning the validity of the swap agreement. 28. On 19 March 2007 the P. County Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court. 29. The applicants then lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 8 June 2007. The second applicant was represented by V.L., and the first applicant, having in the meantime reached the age of majority, was able to conduct the legal action herself. 30. In their appeal on points of law the applicants argued, inter alia, that the P. Municipal Court had failed to examine any of the relevant evidence and had incorrectly assessed the circumstances of the case. In particular, it had failed to take into account that the Centre had negligently allowed the swap agreement to be concluded without taking into account the value of the properties and the nature of their family circumstances at the time, namely the fact that Z.L. was in detention and that V.L. was known as a person with a problem of drug abuse. 31. On 19 December 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law as ill-founded and endorsed the decisions of the lower courts, which found that the civil courts were not in a position to re-examine the Centre’s final administrative decision allowing the conclusion of the swap agreement. Moreover, it did not appear to the Supreme Court that the Centre had failed in its protection of the best interests of the applicants. 32. The applicants then lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating their previous arguments before the lower courts. The second applicant was represented by V.L. 33. On 9 June 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicants’ constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 34. A report by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth (Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih) of 30 January 2014 submitted to the Court suggests that the Centre was not aware of V.L.’s drug abuse problem nor had it been alerted concerning M.I.’s conflict of interest. 35. According to a report by the Ministry of Health (Ministarstvo zdravlja) of 7 February 2014, V.L. started her drug addiction therapy on 12 December 2003 and terminated it in 2004. She then started again in 2007 and she was still undergoing therapy at the present time. 36. The information available from the e-land registry concerning property in Croatia shows that the house and the land on which it is located measure 225 square metres with an adjacent courtyard of 476 square metres, all of which is registered in the name of D.M. as owner.

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5. With the exception of the first applicant, a legal entity registered under Georgian law on 8 November 2010, the remaining fourteen applicants live in Tbilisi. Their dates of birth are indicated in the attached annex. 6. The first applicant, a Georgian non-governmental organisation set up to promote and protect the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Georgia, planned to organise a peaceful march on 17 May 2012 in the centre of the capital city to mark the International Day Against Homophobia. 7. In advance of the march, on 8 May 2012 the first applicant gave the Tbilisi City Hall and the Ministry of the Interior prior notice of its intention to hold a peaceful demonstration on the above-mentioned date. It informed the authorities of the planned route of the march, which would start from the grounds of the Tbilisi Concert Hall and proceed to Orbeliani Square, and the approximate number of participants. In addition, in the light of a foreseeable protest from those opposed to the LGBT community in Georgia, given the general background of hostility towards the sexual minorities, the applicant organisation specifically requested that the authorities provide sufficient protection from possible violence. 8. On 14 May 2012 the Tbilisi City Hall acknowledged receipt of the first applicant’s request and explained, in reply, the rights and responsibilities of demonstrators, as provided for by the relevant law. 9. On 15 May 2012 the applicant organisation was contacted by a senior officer of the Ministry of the Interior, who clarified the details of the planned march and confirmed to the organiser that police forces would be deployed to ensure that the procession took place peacefully. 10. The second to fourteenth applicants submitted written statements describing the exact circumstances surrounding the incident. At around 1 p.m. on 17 May 2012, members of the LGBT community, staff members of Identoba and other LGBT activists, including the thirteen above‑mentioned applicants – approximately thirty people in total (“the LGBT marchers”) – gathered in the grounds adjacent to the Tbilisi Concert Hall. They were holding banners with slogans such as “I am gay”, “I love my gay friend”, “Love is love” and “Get colourful”, as well as rainbow flags and umbrellas. A police patrol was present, as agreed, near the Tbilisi Concert Hall. 11. Shortly before the beginning of the demonstration, members of two religious groups, the Orthodox Parents’ Union and the Saint King Vakhtang Gorgasali’s Brotherhood, arrived in the Tbilisi Concert Hall area. Journalists were also present, recording interviews with the LGBT marchers. 12. Approximately 200 metres from the starting point of the march, members of the two above-mentioned religious groups (“the counter‑demonstrators”) stopped some of the LGBT marchers and started arguing with them. The counter-demonstrators claimed that nobody was entitled to hold a Gay Pride Parade or to promote “perversion”, as it was against moral values and Georgian traditions. In reply, the marchers tried calmly to explain that it was not a Gay Pride Parade but a public event dedicated to supporting the fight against homophobia, and continued to walk. 13. When the LGBT marchers reached Rustaveli Avenue, they were met there by a hundred or more counter-demonstrators, who were particularly aggressive and verbally offensive. The counter-demonstrators blocked the marchers’ way, made a human chain and encircled the marchers in such a way as to make it impossible for them to pass. The marchers were subjected to threats of physical assault and to insults, accused of being “sick” and “immoral” people and “perverts”. Further pejorative name-calling such as “fagots” and “sinners” was also repeated. At that moment, the police patrol cars which had been escorting the marchers from the Tbilisi City Hall suddenly distanced themselves from the scene. 14. The LGBT marchers, feeling threatened, immediately telephoned the police, alerting them to the danger and requesting the immediate dispatch of additional forces. While waiting for the arrival of the requested police support, the marchers noticed a few police officers present at the scene. However, when they approached them and asked for help, the officers replied that they were not part of the police patrol and it was not their duty to intervene. 15. The aggression towards the LGBT marchers continued to escalate and after approximately twenty to thirty minutes, the counter-demonstrators grabbed the banners from the hands of several activists and tore them apart. The counter-demonstrators then resorted to physical attack by pushing and punching the marchers in the front row. As a result of that assault, the sixth applicant (Mr G. Demetrashvili), who was in the front line of the march, was knocked down, beaten and kicked. Shortly afterwards, several police patrol cars arrived at the scene. Some of the law-enforcement officers intervened by stopping the beating of the sixth applicant. The police officers then separated the opposing parties by standing between them. At that time, the aggressive and agitated counter-demonstrators were still making particularly vitriolic threats, including that the marchers “should be burnt to death” and “crushed”. 16. The third applicant (Mr L. Berianidze), who was standing on the pavement with other LGBT marchers, asked the police to take more active measures to protect the demonstration. The police responded by forcing him into a patrol car and driving him to the Old Tbilisi Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, where he was detained for some twenty minutes. He was given no official explanation for his arrest at that time. However, as subsequently explained by the Government, the police had simply sought to distance him from the scene in order to protect him from the angry counter-demonstrators. 17. Three other employees of Identoba – the sixth, seventh and tenth applicants (Mr G. Demetrashvili, Ms G. Dzerkorashvili and Ms M Kalandadze) – were also arrested by the police when they moved from the pavement to the road. They were forced into police patrol cars and driven around the city for some twenty minutes before being returned to Rustaveli Avenue. As subsequently explained by the Government, the aim of the applicants’ short-term retention was twofold: to prevent them from committing an administrative offence – impeding road traffic – and to protect them from the counter-demonstrators’ assault. 18. Later on 17 May 2012, the third and sixth applicants (Mr L. Berianidze and Mr G. Demetrashvili) sought medical help for their injuries. The third applicant had a bruised left knee, grazes on his left palm and fingers, a haemorrhagic forearm and a haematoma on the right eyebrow. The sixth applicant had a closed head trauma, cerebral contusions, and bruises on the left side of his chest. Two days later, on 19 May 2012, the fourteenth applicant (Ms M. Tsutskiridze) also visited a doctor. She was diagnosed with a contusion of the left wrist. 19. The clashes between the marchers and counter-demonstrators were recorded by journalists present at the scene and broadcast in the evening of 17 May 2012 by a number of national television channels. The faces of the applicants who had been attacked and the assailing counter-demonstrators were clearly recognisable. 20. On 18 May 2012 members of the board of the applicant organisation filed several complaints with the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office concerning the violent acts committed during the march of 17 May 2012 by representatives of the two religious groups. The complaints were mostly based on the account of the circumstances as described in the thirteen individual applicants’ written statements (see paragraphs 10-19 above). 21. On 19 May 2012 a criminal investigation was launched into the infliction of light bodily harm on the fourteenth applicant (Ms M. Tsutskiridze) by unidentified persons. When questioned as a witness the same day, she stated that unidentified men had grabbed her poster and hit her with the handle of the poster. On 23 May 2012 the eighth applicant (Ms E. Glakhashvili) was also questioned about the fourteenth applicant’s injury to her hand. Subsequently, on 21 June 2012 a forensic medical examination was commissioned by the investigation, the results of which suggested that the bruising and excoriation the fourteenth applicant had sustained on her wrist represented light bodily injuries. The fourteenth applicant was not granted victim status within the framework of that criminal investigation at that time. 22. On 26 June 2012 the first applicant received a letter from the deputy director of the police patrol department of the Ministry of the Interior in response to the board members’ complaints of 18 May 2012. The response stated that, as there were no signs of illegality in the actions of the police during the demonstration, there was no need to launch an investigation against them for abuse of power. As to the counter-demonstrators’ actions, two of them had indeed been arrested for transgression under Article 166 of the Code of Administrative Offences – minor breach of public order – and fined 100 Georgian laris (some 45 euros (EUR)) each. 23. On 3 and 5 July 2012 the first applicant and thirteen individual applicants in the present case (from the second to the fourteenth) filed additional criminal complaints with the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Minister of the Interior. The applicants specifically requested that criminal investigations be launched on account of two factual situations: firstly, the verbal and physical attacks perpetrated against them by the counter-demonstrators with clear discriminatory intent; and, secondly, the acts and/or omissions of the police officers who had failed to protect them from the assaults. The applicants emphasised that criminal inquiries should be conducted with due regard to Article 53 of the Criminal Code, which provided that the existence of homophobic intent was an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a criminal offence. 24. The criminal complaints of the third, sixth, seventh and tenth applicants focussed on the attacks against them by the counter‑demonstrators and the lack of police protection. Those applicants did not request an inquiry into the alleged restriction of their liberty by the police during the incident of 17 May 2012 (Article 147 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 33 below). 25. By a letter of 17 July 2012, the Ministry of the Interior replied to the first applicant and the relevant thirteen individual applicants that during the incident of 17 May 2012 the police had called upon both the LGBT marchers and the counter-demonstrators to exercise their right to demonstrate in a peaceful manner. The Ministry’s letter then reiterated the information concerning the imposition of administrative sanctions on two of the counter-demonstrators (see paragraph 22 above). 26. On 24 October 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the alleged beating of the sixth applicant (Mr G. Demetrashvili) by unidentified persons on 17 May 2012. On the same day that applicant was interviewed as a witness. He stated that he had been encircled and insulted by five or six counter-demonstrators. The attackers then started kicking and hitting him. The ill-treatment lasted for a few minutes, until a police officer finally intervened and removed him from the scene. On 6 November 2012 a forensic medical expert issued an opinion confirming that the sixth applicant had sustained a contusion and closed head trauma. He was not granted victim status at that time. 27. In September 2014 the two counter-demonstrators who had previously been fined for administrative misconduct were examined as witnesses in relation to the beating of the sixth applicant. The latter, questioned again in September 2014 about the incident of 17 May 2012, stated that he could no longer remember certain circumstances due to the significant lapse of time. Nevertheless, he confirmed that he would still be able to recognise the faces of those individuals who had assaulted him. 28. According to the latest information available in the case file, the two criminal investigations opened on 19 May and 24 October 2012 into the light bodily injuries sustained by the sixth and fourteenth applicants are still pending, and the two applicants have never been granted victim status.

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4. The first applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Belfast. The second applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Lurgan. The third applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Craigavon. 5. On 14 March 2009 the first and third applicants were arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) on suspicion of involvement in the murder of a police officer on 9 March 2009. They were detained at Antrim police station on the same day. The first applicant was interviewed twice on 15 March 2009 and once on 16 March 2009; the third applicant was interviewed three times on 15 March 2009 and once on 16 March 2009. 6. On 16 March 2009 the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) made applications to the County Court under paragraph 29 of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act for warrants of further detention in respect of both applicants in order to carry out questioning and to conduct forensic examinations. The first applicant gave evidence on oath in the course of the hearing. Following the hearing, the County Court Judge granted warrants authorising a five-day extension of detention. 7. Each of the applicants was interviewed on twelve occasions in the following five days. 8. On 21 March 2009 the DPP made applications to the County Court under paragraph 36 of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act for seven-day extensions to the periods specified in the warrants for further detention. The extensions were sought in order to facilitate further questioning of the applicants once the results of additional forensic tests were obtained. At separate hearings on 22 March 2009 a police Superintendent gave evidence on oath as to the necessity of the extensions and arguments were heard on behalf of the first and third applicants. 9. Following the hearings Her Honour Judge Philpott QC delivered a written judgment in respect of the first applicant and an ex tempore decision in respect of the third applicant. She granted both applications, authorising the first applicant’s continued detention until 7.20 on 28 March 2009 and the third applicant’s continued detention until 5.52 on 28 March 2009. In her reasoning, Judge Philpott noted that the relevant forensic evidence was central to the investigation and that the investigation was being carried out diligently and expeditiously. 10. In the rulings Judge Philpott considered whether the 2000 Act or Article 5 of the Convention gave the court deciding whether or not to grant an extension of detention an express or implied power to examine the lawfulness of the arrest or to grant bail. She concluded that it did not as the 2000 Act only gave the judge the power to decide whether or not an extension of detention was necessary. Consequently, she had to confine herself to the issue of whether or not it was necessary to extend detention beyond forty-eight hours for investigative purposes and any issue as to the lawfulness of the arrest would have to be determined by the High Court in either Habeas Corpus or judicial review proceedings. 11. On 14 March 2009 the second applicant was arrested under section 41 of the 2000 Act on suspicion of involvement in the murder of two soldiers at Masserene Barracks, Antrim, on 7 March 2009. He was detained at Antrim Police Station on the same day. 12. On 15 March 2009 the DPP made an application to the County Court under paragraph 29 of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act for a warrant extending the second applicant’s detention as the results of a number of forensic tests were pending. 13. Following a hearing on 16 March 2009 a County Court Judge granted a warrant authorising a five-day extension to his detention. 14. The second applicant was interviewed on twelve occasions in the following five days. However, neither the interviews nor the results of the forensic tests provided any evidence linking the second applicant to the murders of the two soldiers. 15. On 21 March 2009 the DPP made an application to the County Court under paragraph 36 of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act for a seven-day extension to the period specified in the warrant for further detention. The extension was sought as the results of further forensic tests which had been sent for analysis to a laboratory in Great Britain were expected to become available within the following seven days and detention was considered necessary to ensure that further questioning could take place and, if there was sufficient evidence, charges could be brought. 16. On 21 March 2009 Judge Philpott granted the application, authorising the second applicant’s continued detention until 7.20 on 28 March 2009. 17. The applicants sought permission to apply for judicial review of Judge Philpott’s decisions of 21 and 22 March 2009 granting further extensions to the warrants authorising their detention. They submitted first, that Judge Philpott had been wrong to conclude that a court, in deciding whether or not to grant an extension of detention, was precluded from investigating the lawfulness of the arrest; secondly, that the judge had failed to address the question of whether the detention of the applicants was required while the results of the forensic examinations were expected; thirdly that the judge had failed to give reasons for her decision that detention was required; and finally, that Schedule 8 of the 2000 Act was incompatible with Article 5 of the Convention. 18. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted by the High Court of Northern Ireland on 24 March 2009 and the High Court heard the applications on 25 March 2009. 19. In respect of the applicants’ first submission, the High Court held that paragraphs 5 and 32 of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act had to be read in conformity with the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention as explained in the jurisprudence of the Court. Thus, the review of the lawfulness of the detention had to embrace an examination of the basis of the arrest, otherwise a person could be detained under the 2000 Act for up to twenty-eight days without there having been any judicial review of the lawfulness of the original arrest and that could not be Convention compliant. The High Court therefore found that Judge Philpott had been wrong to disavow any review of the lawfulness of the applicants’ arrest and, as a consequence, her decision to grant extensions had to be quashed. The court accepted, however, that a review of the lawfulness of the arrest need not involve a detailed analysis of the basis for the decision to arrest and should reflect the constraints that necessarily apply in many arrests for terrorist offences. 20. With regard to the applicants’ second and third submissions, the High Court found that although the judge had not focused directly on whether the applicants had to be detained rather than released pending the outcome of the remaining forensic examinations, she had not failed to have regard to the need for detention as the basis for the grant of the warrant. Moreover, although her reasons were pithily stated, they were sufficient to convey to the applicants the basis of her decision. 21. Consideration of the applicants’ fourth submission, namely the compatibility of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act with Article 5 of the Convention, was adjourned. In a judgment delivered on 24 February 2011, the High Court of Northern Ireland found no basis for the submission that Schedule 8 was incompatible with Article 5 of the Convention. In particular, the court held that although there was no doubt that the “competent legal authority” referred to in Article 5 § 1(c) was the authority having competence to deal with a criminal charge (the Magistrate in the United Kingdom), in Schiesser v. Switzerland, 4 December 1979, § 29, Series A no. 34 and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, ECHR 2006‑X the Court had made it clear that the function of “a judge or other officer” for the purposes of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention could be carried out by an officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and did not necessarily have to be a person with power to conduct the trial of any eventual criminal charge; that, although there was no express power to order release in the 2000 Act as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, such a power must be implied; that, as paragraph 32 of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act provided that there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the further detention of a person was necessary, it therefore contained a requirement of proportionality; that, there was no provision for conditional release on bail within the statutory scheme, an issue which did not arise in the present case but would need to be addressed in any future case in which it arose; that, although paragraph 33(3) of Schedule 8 enabled a judicial authority to exclude an applicant or anyone representing him from any part of the hearing and paragraph 34 permitted information to be withheld from the applicant or anyone representing him, there were a range of tools available to the court to preserve to the necessary extent an adversarial procedure and equality of arms; and, finally, that there was no authority which supported the applicants’ contention that Article 5 required that a detained person should be charged well before the expiry of the twenty‑eight day period contemplated in the 2000 Act. 22. On 4 April 2011 the High Court of Northern Ireland certified that it was satisfied that the decision given on 24 February 2011 involved the following points of law of general public importance: “(a) Whether paragraphs 29(3) and 36(3)(b) of Part III of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the Act”) permitting extended detention for more than four days are compatible with the Applicant’s rights under Article 5(1)(c), 5(2) and 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) (b) Whether the absence of a power to allow for conditional release on bail rendered the scheme for extending detention set out in Part III of Schedule 8 incompatible with Article 5 ECHR; and (c) Whether the procedure for granting an extension of detention, in circumstances where the suspect and legal representative have been excluded by the judge for a part of the hearing (as per Schedule 8, para 33(3)) and by reason of same information is made available to the judge but withheld from the suspect and his legal representative, (Schedule 8, para 34(1) and (2)(f) is incompatible with the request for an adversarial hearing as required by Article 5 in light of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (FC) & Anor [2010] 2 AC 269.” 23. However, the High Court refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 24. Permission to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 14 November 2011 on the basis that the applications did not raise an arguable point of law of general public importance. 25. The applicants were released without charge on 25 March 2009. The first and third applicants were not subsequently charged with any offence related to the murder of the police officer. 26. The second applicant was immediately re-arrested and interviewed over the following two days. On 27 March 2009 he was charged with the murder of the two soldiers, five attempted murders and possession of a firearm and ammunition. He was produced before a District Judge sitting at Larne Magistrates’ Court on 27 March 2009. His application for bail was refused. Following a hearing which took place on 6 and 23 November 2009, bail was refused by the High Court on the ground that there was a real risk of re-offending on account of his suspected involvement with a dissident republican organisation. The High Court again declined to grant bail on 8 October 2010. 27. On 7 November 2011 the second applicant stood trial before a judge sitting without a jury. On 20 January 2012 he was acquitted on all counts on the indictment.

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7. The first, second, third and fourth applicants were born in 1951, 1973, 1940 and 1978 respectively. The second and fourth applicants are the first applicant’s sons and the third applicant is his brother. The first, second and fourth applicants live in Moscow, the Russian Federation. 8. New political forces came to power in the Ajarian Autonomous Republic (“the AAR”) in May 2004, following the so-called “Rose Revolution” which occurred in the country in November 2003 (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, §§ 11-13, ECHR 2008). 9. On 25 August 2004 the first applicant, who had previously held the posts of Ajarian Deputy Minister of the Interior and President of the Audit Office, was charged, amongst other offences, with abuse of authority and extortion. 10. On 26 August 2004 the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the AAR initiated proceedings before the Ajarian Supreme Court to confiscate wrongfully and inexplicably acquired property from the applicants under Article 37 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Article 21 §§ 5 and 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“CAP”); the legislative provisions in question had been adopted on 13 February 2004. 11. The public prosecutor affirmed that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the salaries received by the first applicant in his capacity as Deputy Minister of the Interior between 1994 and 1997 and President of the Audit Office between November 1997 and May 2004 could not have sufficed to finance the acquisition of the property, which had occurred during the same time span, by himself, his sons and his brother. 12. The prosecutor attached to his brief numerous items of evidence (twenty-three documents) which showed that, on the one hand, the first applicant had earned 1,644 and 6,023 euros (EUR) respectively in official salaries when he had occupied the above-mentioned two posts in the Ajarian Government, whilst, on the other hand, the total value of the property that he and the other applicants had acquired corresponded to some EUR 450,000 (1,053,000 Georgian laris (GEL)). The latter figure was based on the expert opinions of two independent auditors who had conducted an assessment of the disputed property on 20 August 2004. 13. The public prosecutor therefore requested the Ajarian Supreme Court to rule that the items of property concerned, which are listed below, should be confiscated from the applicants and transferred to the State. 14. The first applicant’s property included: (a) a house located at 54 Mazniashvili Street, Batumi; (b) a house located at 13 Griboyedov Street, Batumi; (c) the first floor of a house located at 60 Gorgasali Street, Batumi; (d) a share in the capital of the Sanapiro Hotel, Kobuleti; (e) a Mercedes car; (f) a flat located at 1 Ninoshvili Street, Kobuleti. 15. The second applicant’s property included: (g) two guest houses located at 32 April 9th Street, Kobuleti. 16. The third applicant’s property included: (h) a house located at 245 Aghmashenebeli Street, Kobuleti. 17. The fourth applicant’s property included: (i) a flat located at 58b Gorgasali Street, Batumi; (j) a flat located at 4-6 Gudiashvili Street, Batumi; (k) a flat located at 20 H. Abashidze Street, Batumi; (l) a house located at 6 General A. Abashidze Close; (m) a house located at 186 Aghmashenebeli Street, Kobuleti. 18. On 30 August 2004 the Ajarian Supreme Court accepted the public prosecutor’s request for an examination on the merits. It transmitted the prosecutor’s brief together with all the supporting documents to the applicants, inviting them to submit their written replies and attend an oral hearing scheduled for 7 September 2004. 19. As attested by the relevant postal acknowledgements of receipt, the Ajarian Supreme Court’s subpoenas were duly served at all four applicants’ home addresses, but only the second applicant, represented by legal counsel, filed written comments on 6 September 2004. 20. The second applicant submitted that the property mentioned at (b) above in fact belonged to him and not to the first applicant. To prove it he produced a contract of sale dated 2 December 1997, between himself and a certain G.V., plus a document from the Land Registry. He stated that he had purchased the property for EUR 10,174. His father-in-law, with whom the second applicant and his wife lived after they married, had helped him purchase the property. He produced a certificate from the bank stating that his father-in-law had taken out the loan, as well as statements by different witnesses. 21. The second applicant further explained that the property mentioned at (f) above belonged to Mr N.U., who was neither a close relative nor in any way connected with the first applicant. It was therefore not subject to confiscation. 22. As to the property mentioned at (g) above, the second applicant alleged that the first applicant had had no part in purchasing or renovating it and that he, the second applicant, was the sole owner. He had bought the property from a lady for EUR 4,069 with the help of his godfather, V.M., who had allegedly lent him 50,000 United States dollars (USD) to renovate the site. 23. In sum, the second applicant requested that the properties mentioned at (b) and (f) and (g) above be removed from the confiscation list, and that due consideration be given to the evidence he had presented showing that the property concerned had not been wrongfully acquired. 24. As the first, third and fourth applicants failed to submit written arguments or appear before the Ajarian Supreme Court on 7 September 2004, the latter decided to postpone the hearing until 9 September 2004. The relevant subpoenas were again duly served at those applicants’ home addresses, but none of them appeared before the court, either in person or by designating an advocate, on the second occasion either. 25. The Ajarian Supreme Court opened a hearing on 9 September 2004 which the first, third and fourth applicants and their lawyers failed to attend, without giving reasons. It was attended by the second applicant’s lawyer, who additionally pleaded that the property mentioned at (d) above also belonged to him, but that he was giving it to the State as a gift. In response, the Ajarian Supreme Court changed the name of the defendant in that part of the case and named the second applicant as the owner of the property concerned. The second applicant further explained that in addition to the money his godfather had lent him, he had bought and renovated the property mentioned at (g) above with his salary as the director of a company in which he owned a quarter of the shares. According to the minutes of that company’s board meeting of 1 July 2004, the profit generated by its activities was EUR 17,987. 26. On 10 September 2004 the Ajarian Supreme Court gave judgment in the absence of the first, third and fourth applicants, who had been notified twice but had failed to appear without good reason (Article 26 § 1 (2) of the CAP). 27. Thus, the Ajarian Supreme Court ordered the confiscation of the property belonging to the first applicant listed under (a), (c) and (e), that belonging to the second applicant listed under (d) and (g), and that listed under (i) to (m) belonging to the fourth applicant. It considered in particular that the sums of EUR 1,644 and EUR 6,023 which the first applicant had earned as Deputy Minister of the Interior and President of the Audit Office respectively could not have sufficed to acquire the property in issue, and that the other applicants did not earn enough either. The salaries the first applicant earned were only enough to provide for the needs of a family of four. The court stated that the applicants, in particular the three who had failed to appear before the court, had failed to discharge their burden of proof by refuting the public prosecutor’s claim. 28. As regards the property mentioned at (g) above, the Ajarian Supreme Court concluded that the second applicant had failed to prove the lawful origins of the money he had used to acquire the property, which had been valued by independent auditors who had assessed both the plot of land and the four guest houses situated on it at no less than EUR 94,000. 29. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ajara considered it established that the property mentioned at (b) above belonged to the second applicant and that the property mentioned at (f) belonged to a third party. The prosecutor’s case concerning these two properties was thus dismissed: concerning the first property, the court accepted the second applicant’s arguments as to its lawful origins. 30. As regards the third applicant’s property mentioned at (h) above, it was established that this was a family home unrelated to the first applicant’s activities. However, as the property had been refurbished while the first applicant was in public office, making it worth EUR 24,418 according to an official valuation, the third applicant was ordered to pay the State compensation in the amount of EUR 10,174. 31. All four applicants, represented by legal counsel, as well as the public prosecutor, appealed against the first-instance court’s judgment of 10 September 2004. 32. The applicants requested that the confiscation proceedings be suspended pending the termination of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. They complained that the burden of proof had been shifted onto them in the confiscation proceedings. The first, third and fourth applicants also complained that they had not been given an opportunity to submit their arguments before the first-instance court. The first applicant additionally complained that he had been denied the right to be presumed innocent in the confiscation proceedings. 33. On 22 October 2004 the first applicant’s wife asserted before the Supreme Court of Georgia that she and her son, the fourth applicant, were the owners of the property mentioned at (m) above. She explained that she was a Russian national and had sold the family house in the Smolensk region, with her siblings’ consent, to buy the property in Kobuleti, where her Russian relatives would spend their summer holidays. 34. On 3 November 2004 a third party, Mr S. Tchitchinadze, applied to the Supreme Court of Georgia, stating that the decision of the Ajarian Supreme Court concerning the property mentioned at (a) above was unlawful because the property had previously belonged to him and was currently the subject of a dispute between himself and the first applicant. On 15 December 2004 Mr Tchitchinadze sent the Supreme Court of Georgia a decision of the Batumi City Court dated 14 November 2004 recognising him as the owner of the property in question. He requested that his property be removed from the confiscation list submitted by the public prosecutor (for more details, see Tchitchinadze v. Georgia, no. 18156/05, § 13, 27 May 2010). 35. At the hearing the four applicants’ legal counsel contended that the case concerning the first, third and fourth applicants should be remitted for fresh examination because the three men had not been able to participate in the proceedings at first instance. He further complained that the evidence presented by the second applicant had not been given due consideration. 36. On 17 January 2005 the Supreme Court of Georgia set aside the first-instance decision only in so far as it concerned the property mentioned at (a) above, the house located at 54 Mazniashvili Street in Batumi, acknowledging that the estate was the property of Mr S. Tchitchinadze (for further details see Tchitchinadze, cited above, §§ 16-17). For the remainder, it followed the reasoning of the Ajarian Supreme Court, namely that the first applicant’s income was not sufficient for him and his family members to have acquired the properties in issue, whilst the other applicants’ income was also insufficient. Concerning the arguments of the first applicant’s wife, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that the land register named only the fourth applicant as the owner of the property mentioned at (m) above. 37. On 6 December 2004 the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He argued that Article 37 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Article 21 §§ 5 and 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”), adopted on 13 February 2004, were contrary to the following constitutional provisions – Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), Article 21 (protection of property), Article 40 (presumption of innocence) and Article 42 §§ 2 and 5 (no criminal punishment without law and prohibition of retroactive application of criminal law) of the Constitution of Georgia. 38. In his constitutional complaint the first applicant mostly reiterated the arguments that he had previously submitted before the Supreme Court of Georgia. In particular, he complained that the confiscation of his property and that of his family members amounted to a criminal punishment being imposed on him in the absence of a final conviction establishing his guilt, and that he should not have been made to bear the burden of proving his innocence, that is, the lawfulness of the disputed property. He also complained that the confiscation of the property in such circumstances was in breach of his right to be presumed innocent of the corruption charges. The first applicant also stated that he and his family had acquired the property in question well before the amendments of 13 February 2004 were enacted and that, consequently, the retroactive extension of those provisions to their situation was unconstitutional. For those reasons, he argued that the confiscation procedure provided for by the impugned provisions of the CCP and CAP had been arbitrary and amounted to a violation of the constitutional guarantee of protection of his private property. 39. By a judgment of 13 July 2005 the Constitutional Court, after having heard the parties’ arguments and evidence from a number of legal experts and witnesses, dismissed the first applicant’s complaint as ill-founded on the basis of the following reasoning. 40. First, drawing an analogy with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Constitutional Court stated that the Georgian constitutional provision protecting the right to property (Article 21 of the Constitution) likewise did not exclude the possibility of deprivation of property if such a measure was lawful, pursued a public interest and satisfied the proportionality test. The court then went on to emphasise that only lawfully obtained property enjoyed full constitutional protection; in the first applicant’s case there had been a legitimate suspicion as to the lawful origins of the property, a suspicion which he and his family members had been unable to refute in the course of the relevant judicial proceedings. 41. The Constitutional Court further stated that the administrative confiscation proceedings provided for in Article 37 § 1 (1) of the CCP and Article 21 §§ 5 and 6 of the CAP, could in no way be equated with criminal proceedings, as no determination of a criminal charge was at stake; on the contrary, such proceedings were a classic example of a civil dispute between the State, represented by the public prosecutor, and private individuals. Given the “civil” nature of the proceedings in question, it was acceptable that the burden of proof in the proceedings should be shifted onto the respondent, the second applicant. Referring to its own comparative legal research and the Court’s judgments in the cases of Raimondo v. Italy (22 February 1994, §§ 16-20, Series A no. 281‑A) and AGOSI v. the United Kingdom (24 October 1986, §§ 33-42, Series A no. 108), the Constitutional Court added that such civil mechanisms, involving the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime or otherwise unlawfully obtained or unexplained property, were not unknown in a number of Western democracies, including Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 42. As to the issue of the alleged retroactivity of the application of the amendment of 13 February 2004 introducing the administrative confiscation procedure, and the second applicant’s presumption of innocence, the Constitutional Court ruled that since the proceedings in question had been “civil” and not “criminal”, the above-mentioned criminal-law guarantees could not apply. Furthermore, the amendment of 13 February 2004 had not introduced any new concept but rather had regulated anew, in a more efficient manner, the existing measures aimed at the prevention and eradication of corruption in the public service. In particular, the Constitutional Court referred to the 1997 Act on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in the Public Service, which had required all public officials not only to declare their own property and that of their family and close relatives, but also to show that the declared property had been acquired lawfully. 43. The Constitutional Court concluded that the amendments of 13 February 2004 undoubtedly served the public interest of intensifying the fight against corruption and that the test of proportionality had also been duly satisfied during the confiscation proceedings, which had been conducted fairly before the domestic courts. 44. On 17 October 1997 the Act on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in the Public Service, the first major piece of legislation in independent Georgia’s history setting out the principles and methods for preventing and eradicating corruption in the public service, was adopted by the Parliament of Georgia. 45. Section 1 of the Act proclaimed that its main objective was to prevent, uncover and put an end to instances of corruption, and to hold corrupt public officials liable. 46. Section 3 of the Act defined the notion of “corruption in the public service” as the use by a public official of his or her public post or of the influence associated with that post for the purposes of undue enrichment. The same provision defined the term of “a corruption offence” as an act which contained the elements of “corruption in the public service” and which could be subject to disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability. Section 4 explained what exactly should be understood by a public official’s “family members” and “close relatives”, a definition which included such categories as siblings, children and parents. 47. Chapter IV of the Act (sections 14 and 19) imposed upon public officials an obligation to declare their property each year (between 1 and 30 April). The declaration had to contain not only a list of the assets owned by the public official personally and by his or her “family members” and “close relatives”, and the property’s actual market value, but also information accounting for the origins of the property in question. The declarations submitted annually by public officials were public documents. 48. According to section 20(1) and (2) of the Act, a corruption offence or another breach of the requirements laid down by the Act gave rise to liability under the rules laid down for that specific purpose either by the criminal or the administrative legislation. If neither criminal nor administrative liability arose, disciplinary action, such as dismissal from the post, was to be taken. 49. On 13 February 2004 two major legislative amendments aimed at bolstering efforts to combat criminality, with a particular emphasis on economic offences and those committed in the public service, were adopted. One of those amendments introduced plea bargaining into the Code of Criminal Procedure (see Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, no. 9043/05, § 49, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), whilst the second one, which concerned both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Administrative Procedure, regulated the mechanism for the forfeiture of wrongfully acquired property. 50. As a result of that second amendment of 13 February 2004, Georgian law provided for two procedures for the forfeiture of property: “criminal confiscation” and “administrative confiscation”. Criminal confiscation was of a general nature and dealt with deprivation of the objects of an offence and the instrumentalities of and proceeds from crime, imposed as part of the sentencing proceedings following a final conviction establishing the person’s guilt. Meanwhile, the latter procedure, which was governed by Article 37 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Articles 21 §§ 4 to 11 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”), was specifically aimed at recovering wrongfully acquired property and unexplained wealth from a public official, as well as from the latter’s family members, close relatives and so-called “connected persons”, even without the prior criminal conviction of the official concerned. 51. Although a criminal conviction was not a necessary precondition, administrative confiscation could only be initiated if an official had first been charged with offences (including corruption) committed during his or her term in office against the interests of the public service, the enterprise or organisation concerned, or of one of the following offences: money laundering, extortion, misappropriation, embezzlement, tax evasion or violations of custom regulations, regardless of whether the official in question was still in office or not. 52. Thus, if the public official in question was accused of one or more of the above-mentioned offences, and the public prosecutor in charge of the investigation had a reasonable suspicion that the property in the possession of that public official and/or of his or her family members, close persons and “connected persons” might have been acquired wrongfully, the prosecutor could file “a civil action” (სარჩელი) with the court under Article 37 § 1 CCP, demanding the confiscation of the “ill-gotten” property and unexplained wealth. 53. Once a public prosecutor had filed a civil action for confiscation, which had to be substantiated with sufficient documentary evidence, the burden of proof would then shift onto the respondent. If the latter failed to refute the public prosecutor’s claim by producing documents proving that the property (or the financial resources for the purchase of the property) had been lawfully acquired or that taxes on the property had been duly paid, the court, after having ensured that the prosecutor’s claim was properly substantiated, would order the confiscation of the property in question (Article 21 § 6 of the CAP). 54. According to Article 21 § 8 of the CAP, the purpose of administrative confiscation was to restore the situation which had existed prior to acquisition of the impugned property by the public official through wrongful means. In particular, the property confiscated in those administrative proceedings was then to be restored to its legitimate owner(s), which could be a private individual or a legal entity, after the legal claims on the property of all other third parties had been satisfied. If the legitimate owner could not be determined during the confiscation proceedings, the property was forfeited in favour of the State (Article 21 § 8 (1) of the CAP). Value confiscation was also possible under Article 21 § 8 (3) of the CAP, which stated that if the property subject to forfeiture could not be transferred to the State in its original form, the respondent should pay monetary compensation corresponding to the value of the property. 55. The 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption was ratified and entered into force in respect of Georgia on 8 November 2008. 56. Articles 31 and 54 § 1 (c) of this Convention, which set forth the principle of universal recognition of confiscation of property linked to corruption, or proceeds of crime derived from corruption offences, read as follows: Article 31: Freezing, seizure and confiscation “1. Each State Party shall take, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of: (a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established in accordance with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; ... 4. If such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds. 5. If such proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds. 6. Income or other benefits derived from such proceeds of crime, from property into which such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which such proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds of crime. ... 8. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of such alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the fundamental principles of their domestic law and with the nature of judicial and other proceedings. 9. The provisions of this article shall not be so construed as to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. ...” Article 54. Mechanisms for recovery of property through international cooperation in confiscation “1. Each State Party, ... , shall, in accordance with its domestic law: ... (c) consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation of such property without a criminal conviction in cases in which the offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases.” 57. The relevant excerpts from the Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption further clarified a number of key legal notions relating to the confiscation of proceeds of crime related to corruption offences: “IV. What to consider as proceeds of crime for purposes of confiscation Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of article 31 outline the minimum scope of measures to implement the article. Paragraph 4 This refers to the situation in which proceeds have been transformed or converted into other property. In this case, States Parties are required to subject to confiscation the property transformed or converted, instead of the direct proceeds. Given that offenders will part as soon as they can with the primary proceeds of crime in order to obstruct investigative efforts to trace such property, the provision is of major relevance when applying an object-based model of confiscation, in order to avoid conflicts with potential bona fide third parties and facilitate investigative and prosecutorial activity. The provision reflects the same theory that lies behind a value-based model of confiscation: what matters is not to allow the offender to enrich him or herself by illegal means. The provision follows the so-called theory of “tainted property,” whereby, as tainted property is exchanged for “clean property”, the latter becomes tainted. While this may raise issues about receipt in good faith, countries have developed requirements, whereby legislation gives primacy to the irrevocability of the “taint” irrespective of the iterations of transfer, receipt and conversion. Paragraph 5 This refers to the situation where proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property from legitimate sources. States Parties are required to subject to confiscation any such property up to the assessed value of the proceeds. As stated above, both situations may pose a problem when the confiscation system operates under an object confiscation system, which requires a determination of property obtained through the offence. When operating a value confiscation system these situations do not pose any problem. Paragraph 6 This requires States Parties to subject to confiscation not only primary but also secondary proceeds of crime. Primary proceeds are those assets directly obtained through the commission of the offence – e.g., a bribe of $100,000. The secondary proceeds, by contrast, refer to benefits derived from the original proceeds, like bank interest or the amount increased as a consequence of investment. In this regard, the Convention requires States Parties to provide mandatory confiscation for both the primary and secondary proceeds. Though the definition of the proceeds of crime given in article 2 (g) includes property “obtained through a crime” and property “derived from a crime,” the paragraph explicitly refers to “[I]ncome or other benefits” derived from the proceeds of crime and applies to benefits coming from any of the situations referred into paragraphs 4 and 5 – property transformed or converted and intermingled property. In other words, any appreciation in value of the proceeds of crime, even when not attributable to any criminal activity must also be liable to confiscation. ... Paragraph 8 Paragraph 8 recommends that States Parties consider the possibility of shifting the burden of proof in regard to the origin of the alleged proceeds of crime. ... [I]n addition to the sui generis procedures that accept non-criminal standards of evidence after the conviction is reached, a number of jurisdictions have also adopted civil procedures of confiscation that operate in rem and are governed by a standard of the preponderance of evidence. VII. Protection of bona fide third parties Paragraph 9 requires States Parties not to construct any of the provisions of that article as to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. The Convention does not, however, specify to what extent third parties should be provided with effective legal remedies in order to preserve their rights. Thus, in implementing this provision, States Parties may wish to take into account that some jurisdictions have opted to establish a specific procedure for third parties claiming ownership over seized property, in which the prosecution evaluates whether the claimant(s): • Have acted with the purpose of concealing the predicate offence, or are implicated in any of the ancillary offences; • Have legal interest in the property; • Acted diligently according to the law and commercial practice; • If the property requires a public registration of the transaction or any administrative procedure, such information has conducted (e.g., real estate, or vehicles); • If the transaction was onerous, whether it followed real market values.” 58. The 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141), which entered into force in respect of Georgia on 1 September 2004, proclaimed that one of the “modern and effective methods” in the “fight against serious crime ... consists in depriving criminals of the proceeds from crime” (see the Preamble to the Convention). 59. The Convention called upon the Signatory Parties to “adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds” (see Article 2). At the same time, the term “confiscation” was defined as “a penalty or a measure, ordered by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or criminal offences resulting in the final deprivation of property” (see Article 1). 60. The Explanatory Report to the 1999 Convention further clarified the relevant legal terms: “15. ... The experts were also able to identify considerable differences in respect of the procedural organisation of the taking of decisions to confiscate (decisions taken by criminal courts, administrative courts, separate judicial authorities, in civil or criminal proceedings totally separate from those in which the guilt of the offender is determined (these proceedings are referred to in the text of the Convention as ‘proceedings for the purpose of confiscation’ and in the explanatory report sometimes as ‘in rem proceedings’). It was also possible to distinguish differences in respect of the procedural framework of such decisions (presumptions of illicitly acquired property, time-limits, etc.) ... 23. The committee discussed whether it was necessary to define ‘confiscation’ or ‘confiscation order’ under the Convention. ... The definition of ‘confiscation’ was drafted in order to make it clear that, on the one hand, the Convention only deals with criminal activities or acts connected therewith, such as acts related to civil in rem actions and, on the other hand, that differences in the organisation of the judicial systems and the rules of procedure do not exclude the application of the Convention. For instance, the fact that confiscation in some States is not considered as a penal sanction but as a security or other measure is irrelevant to the extent that the confiscation is related to criminal activity. It is also irrelevant that confiscation might sometimes be ordered by a judge who is, strictly speaking, not a criminal judge, as long as the decision was taken by a judge. The term ‘court’ has the same meaning as in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The experts agreed that purely administrative confiscation was not included in the scope of application of the Convention.” 2. The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism 61. In 2005 the Council of Europe adopted another, more comprehensive, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (ETS No. 198). It entered into force in respect of Georgia on 1 May 2014. 62. Articles 3 and 5 of the 2005 Convention, in so far as relevant, state as follows: Article 3 – Confiscation measures “4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to require that, in respect of a serious offence or offences as defined by national law, an offender demonstrates the origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of its domestic law.” Article 5 – Freezing, seizure and confiscation “Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the measures to freeze, seize and confiscate also encompass: (a) the property into which the proceeds have been transformed or converted; (b) property acquired from legitimate sources, if proceeds have been intermingled, in whole or in part, with such property, up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds; (c) income or other benefits derived from proceeds, from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled, up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds.” 63. The Explanatory Report to the Convention of 2005 reaffirmed that: “39. The definition of ‘confiscation’ was drafted in order to make it clear that, on the one hand, the 1990 Convention only deals with criminal activities or acts connected therewith, such as acts related to civil in rem actions and, on the other hand, that differences in the organisation of the judicial systems and the rules of procedure do not exclude the application of the 1990 Convention and this Convention. For instance, the fact that confiscation in some states is not considered as a penal sanction but as a security or other measure is irrelevant to the extent that the confiscation is related to criminal activity. It is also irrelevant that confiscation might sometimes be ordered by a judge who is, strictly speaking, not a criminal judge, as long as the decision was taken by a judge.” 64. The Explanatory Report further stated that: “71. Paragraph 4 of Article 3 requires Parties to provide the possibility for the burden of proof to be reversed regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation in serious offences. ... 76. This provision underlines in particular the need to apply such measures also to proceeds which have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources or which has been otherwise transformed or converted.” 65. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in July 1989 as an inter-governmental group by a Group of Seven (G-7) Summit in Paris. It has since been globally recognised as an authoritative body setting universal standards and developing policies for combating, amongst other, money laundering. In 2003 it issued a specific recommendation, which was endorsed by Georgia, calling for confiscation even in the absence of a prior criminal conviction (known as Recommendation no. 3): “Provisional measures and confiscation 3. ... Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law.” 66. In its First Evaluation Report on Georgia, which concerned a visit to the country by a team of examiners between 23 and 26 October 2000, MONEYVAL observed and recommended the following: “2. The main areas generating illegal proceeds and seriously jeopardising the economic development of Georgia are corruption, fraud and tax evasion as well as smuggling in goods. ... 6. The examiners consider that the seizure and confiscation regime should be reviewed and brought up to internationally accepted standards. ...In the view of the examiners, the confiscation procedure should conform to the requirements of the Strasbourg Convention – with the introduction of the possibility of confiscating instrumentalities and proceeds, and if they have been altered into another kind of property, the corresponding value may be confiscated.” 67. In the context of a second evaluation visit to Georgia by a MONEYVAL team of examiners, which took place between 21 and 23 May 2003, the Second Round Evaluation Report again criticised the domestic authorities for lacunae in the legal framework concerning the confiscation of proceeds of crime: “8. ... [V]alue confiscation was not regulated in Georgian legislation at the time of the on-site visit. Indeed, the absence of a real measure of confiscation was given as one of the prime reasons for the lack of money laundering investigations or prosecutions. There needs to be a completion of the legal framework to create an enabling legal structure to support confiscation in respect of all criminal proceeds (both direct and indirect), and equivalent value based confiscation should be introduced. It is advised that elements of practice which have proved of value elsewhere, including the reversal of the onus of proof regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds, should be considered in particular serious proceeds-generating offences.” 68. After its visit to Georgia between 23 and 29 April 2006, MONEYVAL made a number of positive comments in its Third Round Detailed Assessment Report about the administrative confiscation scheme introduced on 13 February 2004: “18. The Georgian legal framework covering ... confiscation has been significantly developed and now there is a basic legal structure in place for ... forfeiture of objects, instrumentalities and criminally acquired assets (proceeds). ... 19. There are also some innovative administrative forfeiture provisions in place in special cases involving public officials and organised crime groups – which incorporates elements of civil standard of proof, which are very welcome developments. ... 239. The procedure for confiscating from third parties property which has been transferred to defeat confiscation orders were first addressed by administrative provisions dealing with family members and close relatives of officials where officials are subject of prosecution. ... These provisions (and the associated changes to the burden of proof for forfeiture in these cases) are very welcome, and should cover many third parties into whose hands illegal assets fall in sensitive cases. 240. ... Clearly the new administrative provisions for confiscation in respect of cases being brought against officials have been successful. ...” 69. In its Second Evaluation Report on Georgia, adopted at its 31st Plenary Meeting held from 4 to 8 December 2006 in Strasbourg, GRECO observed and recommended the following: “31. In the past few years Georgia has adopted a vast array of new legislation, among other things on seizure and confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, including corruption and the laundering of these proceeds. The introduction of an administrative confiscation scheme in 2004, specifically directed at illegally acquired property and unexplained wealth of officials, gave law enforcement authorities an effective tool to deprive officials as well as their relatives and so-called connected persons, of the benefits of their crimes. Administrative confiscation requires no prior conviction, it explicitly allows for confiscation from third parties as well as of assets of equivalent value and requires a relatively low standard of proof, by providing that once the prosecutor has presented his/her claim to the court that the defendant’s property is illegal or cannot be explained the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that this property (or the financial resources required for acquiring the property) has been legally obtained. The GET [the Group’s Evaluation Team] was told that so far property with a value of more than €40 million had been reclaimed which illustrates the commitment of the Georgian authorities not to let officials benefit from crimes committed during their term in office. However, the GET also heard that there have been some concerns about the arbitrariness of the administrative confiscation regime, in that allegedly, only proponents of the previous administration were being targeted. There was also concern about the lack of transparency in the destination of confiscated property in that it was unclear to whom this property was being transferred (in case of existence of a legitimate owner of the property) or sold (in case of transfer to the State) and as to whether anyone other than the State stood to benefit from it. The Georgian authorities however informed the GET after the visit that the perceived lack of transparency in the destination of the confiscated property had been addressed, inter alia by abolishing the special state fund to which this property was allegedly transferred and that the value of the property confiscated was reflected in the State budget. Although the GET was not in a position to assess whether the aforementioned concerns are still prevalent, it considers that any doubt about the legitimate use of administrative confiscation must be avoided. The GET therefore observes that the Georgian authorities should ensure the utmost transparency in the use of administrative confiscation to avoid any impression that this mechanism is being misused.” 70. On 21 January 2004 the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies (“the ACN”) issued the following recommendation, referred to as “Recommendation no. 9”, to the Georgian authorities: “9. [to] consider amending the Criminal Code to ensure that the confiscation of proceeds applies mandatory to all corruption and corruption-related offences. Ensure that the confiscation regime allowed for confiscation of proceeds of corruption, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds or monetary sanctions of comparable effect, and that confiscation from third persons is possible. Review the provisional measures to make the procedure for identification and seizure of proceeds from corruption in the criminal investigation and prosecution phases efficient and operational. Explore the possibilities to check and, if necessary, to seize unexplained wealth.” 71. In June 2004 the ACN had already commended the Georgian authorities for having promptly undertaken a number of anti‑corruption measures, including on the legislative level. The relevant excerpt from the Addendum to the Summary Assessment and Recommendations, which was endorsed on 17 June 2004, reads as follows: “Despite a very short time since the January review, Georgian updated report informs of a number of important changes in the national legislation, some of which are related to the January recommendations. The main changes are summarised below: ... • Confiscation: adoption of legal provisions for the investigation of illegal or unjustified property, introduction of the institution of withdrawal of illegal property; • Efficiency of investigation and prosecution: introducing plea-bargaining in the criminal procedure; enhancing the possibilities to apply special investigative means in collection of evidence; • Confiscation of proceeds from crime: Georgia has adopted a new law, which provides legal basis for confiscation of unjustified property, and addresses January recommendation 9 concerning the confiscation of proceeds of corruption; additionally new measures are being introduced outside criminal process to enable confiscation of unexplained wealth (through the reversal of burden of proof) ...” 72. Subsequently, in its First Monitoring Report on Georgia, which was adopted on 13 June 2006, the ACN concluded that the authorities had largely complied with its previous Recommendation no. 9 (compare with paragraph 70 above): “The legislation of Georgia is compatible with the appropriate requirements of the international legislation, in particular with the relevant Council of Europe Convention, in providing for confiscation not only within a criminal procedure, but also through other means. Thus the Georgian Administrative Code empowers the prosecutor to claim the illegal property and unexplained wealth, the notion of which is described in the Law on Conflict of Interests. There are measures provided by the Criminal Procedure Code, such as the power to make civil claims in relation to the criminal offence. Georgia also supplied information regarding the application of these norms that substantiate the claims for effectiveness. It seems that the procedure for identification and seizure of proceeds of corruption exist and it is efficient and operational.” 73. In its Third Monitoring Report on Georgia, which was adopted on 25 September 2013, the ACN made the following observations concerning the results of the anti-corruption measures undertaken in the country: “Corruption in Georgia has been a significant obstacle to economic development since the country gained independence. Its pervasive nature and high visibility had seriously undermined the credibility of the government. However, the new Georgian government in 2004, which came to power after the ‘Rose Revolution’, committed to tackle corruption and achieved impressive results in eradicating administrative corruption. Georgia’s Transparency International Corruption Perception Index score increased from 1.8 in 2003 to 5.2 in 2012; Georgia is ranked 51st out of 174 countries (leader in the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia). This is by far the most significant increase for all Istanbul Action Plan countries. Georgia is now ranking higher than a number of EU member countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania). While all studies confirm that corruption has been widely eradicated from the citizens’ daily life, many civil society representatives and representatives of international organisations believed that high‑level corruption persisted. It is considered to be one of the reasons for the previous governing party’s loss at the October 2012 parliamentary elections. Progress in anti-corruption efforts has made the most significant impact on investment and business climate. In the latest World Bank’s Doing Business report (2013) Georgia moved up to 9th spot globally (from 112th in 2006) with the nearest country from the region being Armenia (32nd) and average regional rank of 73. Georgia was the top improving country since 2005 both in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia and globally with 35 institutional and regulatory reforms carried out.”

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5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bucharest. 6. In 1999 he purchased a house and the land on which it was built, located in Bucharest. The applicant’s parcel of land was adjacent to a parcel of land purchased by two other third parties in 1948. 7. On 13 November 2001 the applicant lodged a civil action against the two third parties, seeking to obtain the demarcation of the adjacent parcels of land and an order requiring the defendants to return to him an 11 sq. m parcel of land which was allegedly being illegally occupied by them. 8. In a judgment of 4 April 2002 the Bucharest District Court held that the defendants had been illegally occupying a parcel of 10.78 sq. m of the applicant’s land since 1965. It established the boundaries of the properties on the basis of a technical report prepared by an expert and ordered the defendants to return the land in question to the applicant. 9. The defendants lodged an appeal with the Bucharest County Court. The court ordered a new expert report. On 22 May 2003 the court dismissed the appeal as ill-founded endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court. 10. The defendants lodged an appeal on points of law on the ground that the courts had misinterpreted the facts and the applicable legal provisions. 11. In a final decision of 26 November 2003 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law, quashed the decisions of the first two courts and dismissed the applicant’s action. It held that both the applicant and the defendants had in their possession smaller areas of land than those mentioned in their respective contracts of acquisition, and invited the parties to reach a friendly settlement. It also held that the parties could bring a fresh action only if they could not reach an agreement.

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9. The applicant, Mr Lutpiddin Bakhritdinovich Mukhitdinov (a.k.a. Sattarov, see below), was born in 1967 in the Uzbek SSR of the USSR. He claims to have lived in Uzbekistan until 1992 when he left for Saudi Arabia. 10. Since 1997 the applicant has been living in Russia. In 2001, he acquired Russian nationality and changed his name to Sattarov. 11. On 7 May 2013 the Tyumen division of the Federal Migration Service determined that the applicant had obtained Russian nationality by fraud and cancelled his Russian passport. On 25 December 2013 the Tyumen Regional Court upheld, in the final instance, the decision of the Migration Service. 12. According to the letter from the police chief in Namangan, Uzbekistan, dated 8 April 2013, the applicant forfeited his Uzbek nationality because of his unaccounted absence from the country for more than five years. 13. On 7 May 1998 a criminal case was instituted against the applicant in Uzbekistan on the charge of illegal crossing of the Uzbek State border, an offence under Article 223 of the Uzbek Criminal Code. 14. On 15 December 2009 further charges were levelled against the applicant under Article 159 § 3 of the Uzbek Criminal Code (“Infringement of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan”) and Article 242 § 1 (“Organisation of a criminal enterprise”). The charges related to the applicant’s alleged participation in the religious terrorist organisation The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Wahhabii); he was suspected of meeting with its representatives during his stay in Saudi Arabia and of spreading the ideas of the organisation. 15. On 16 December 2009 the Namangan Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant. 16. On 30 June 2013 the applicant was arrested in Tyumen, Russia. 17. On 2 July 2013 the Kalininskiy District Court of Tyumen issued a detention order valid until 30 July 2013. On the latter date the District Court extended the authorised detention period until 30 December 2013. The extension was upheld by the Tyumen Regional Court on 15 August 2013. 18. On 11 December 2013 the Russian Prosecutor General approved the applicant’s extradition in relation to the offence of organising, and taking part in, the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist organisation (Article 244-2 § 1 of the Uzbek Criminal Code). It was noted that “the [applicant’s] extradition ... in relation to the extremist charges ... cannot be regarded as an obstacle for extradition since no procedural decision was taken in this respect by the competent Russian authorities” and further that the Uzbek authorities had provided “diplomatic assurances that [the applicant] ... would not be subject to torture, violence, other cruel or degrading treatment”. 19. On 26 December 2013 the District Court approved a further extension of the detention period until 30 March 2014. The applicant challenged the extension before the Regional Court, claiming that the maximum detention period in case of a medium-gravity offence, for which his extradition had been approved, was set by law at six months. By decision of 13 February 2014, the Regional Court quashed the extension order of 26 December 2013, finding that the District Court did not give any specific reasons for extending the applicant’s detention, and remitted the detention matter to the District Court. It directed that the applicant should remain in custody until 24 February 2014. 20. In the meantime, on 21 January 2014 the Tyumen Regional Court upheld the extradition order as being lawful and justified. The court noted that the Uzbekistan Prosecutor’s Office provided the appropriate assurances, that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no information capable of preventing the applicant’s extradition, that the Russian Federal Security Service had no information about the applicant’s persecution in Uzbekistan for political motives and that counsel’s allegations of a real risk of ill‑treatment or torture in Uzbekistan were “unsubstantiated” (голословные). 21. On 21 February 2014 the District Court issued a new extension order by which the applicant’s detention was extended until 30 March 2014. The applicant challenged it on the same grounds as before. On 11 March 2014 the Regional Court granted the applicant’s complaint and released him from custody, finding that by virtue of Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure his detention could not have been extended beyond the initial six‑month period. 22. On 19 March 2014 the Supreme Court rejected at final instance the applicant’s challenge to the decision on his extradition to Uzbekistan. It stated that the arguments about a real risk of torture and political persecution were “unconvincing”. 23. In the early morning of 22 July 2014 the applicant was taken away from his home by seven uniformed officers of the Federal Migration Service. The applicant’s lawyer arrived immediately on the scene and attempted to follow them but was stopped by the traffic police. 24. When the applicant’s wife and son arrived at the local office of the Migration Service later on that day, they were told that he had already been released. 25. On 27 July 2014 the applicant’s representative before the Court sent a faxed letter to the Federal Security Service, the Border Control and the Prosecutor General’s Office, asking them to stop the applicant’s unlawful transfer to Uzbekistan. She stated that she had information that the applicant was detained in a police ward in Tyumen and that he might be placed on the next flight to Tashkent. 26. Further to the Court’s request for factual information (see paragraph 7 above), on 7 August 2014 the Government replied that the applicant’s current whereabouts were not known, that he had not been detained or transferred outside of the Russian territory by State agents and there was no information about him crossing of the State border. 27. On 20 August 2014 the Tyumen Regional Prosecutor’s office advised the applicant’s representative as follows: “As regards [your] allegation about an unlawful arrest of Mr Mukhitdinov, I inform you that on 22 July 2014 the officers of the Tyumen regional branch of the Federal Migration Service conducted, in accordance with the approval plan on combating illegal migration, checks in the places where foreign nationals and stateless persons live, including the premises of a mosque at 9, Zhdanova street, Tyumen. Following the check, three persons, including Mr Mukhitdinov, were brought to the immigration control department. Upon identification, he was released. According to the information provided, Mr Mukhitdinov (Sattarov) was not arrested by the police on 22 July 2014 or any other date; the police has no information about his whereabouts.” 28. On 1 September 2014 the Tyumen Regional Prosecutor’s office additionally informed the counsel that on 25 August 2014 the Tyumen Regional Investigations Committee instituted a criminal case into the applicant’s disappearance.

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4. On 17 December 1999 the applicant brought a criminal complaint to the Zhovtnevyy District Police Office of Dnipropetrovsk (“the District Police”) that on 16 December 1999 Z. had beaten her on the street near his office and inside his office. 5. The District Police, having questioned Z., who had denied that he had beaten the applicant, refused to institute criminal investigation into the applicant’s criminal complaint on 22 December 1999. 6. On 18 January and 1 February 2000 the applicant renewed her criminal complaint. 7. On 22 March 2000 the District Police ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. The examination revealed that she suffered from head injury, concussion, haemorrhage in the right temporal area, post-traumatic right-side cocleite, haemorrhage on the left and right thighs and the right leg’s shin. The medical experts concluded that these injuries could have been inflicted on her by Z. on 16 December 1999. 8. On 5 April 2000 an investigator of the District Police instituted criminal investigation into the infliction of the bodily injuries on the applicant. 9. On 20, 24 and 29 April, 5 and 10 May 2000 respectively, the investigator questioned: i) Zub., Kyb. and Nos. who had been in Z.’s office on 16 December 1999; ii) St. and Krav. who had been near the office on that date. St. stated that he had seen Z. having beaten the applicant while Krav. stated that she had seen the applicant having been punched by an unknown man on 16 December 1999. 10. On 9 August 2000 the second medical examination of the applicant confirmed findings of the previous examination. 11. On 14 February 2001 the Dnipropetrovsk Prosecutor’s Office informed the District Police that the investigation into the applicant’s beating was ineffective and urged the police to accelerate it. 12. In 2001-2003 the District Police repeatedly questioned the applicant and persons whom it had already questioned earlier. During the same period of time it issued several decisions to suspend the investigation which were all quashed as being unfounded by the higher police department, prosecutors or by a court. 13. On 24 June 2003 the medical examination of the applicant ordered by the District Police revealed that she suffered from closed head injury, concussion, post-traumatic encephalopathy, hearing deterioration and circle vestibular disorder. According to the medical report, these health problems could have been caused by the beating on 16 December 1999. 14. On 17 August 2003 the District Police completed the pre-trial investigation and sent the case to the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk (“the District Court”) for trial. The pre-trial investigation included the examination of thirteen witnesses, four confrontations between the persons involved in the case, one examination of the crime scene and four reconstructions of events. 15. On 6 October 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim in the criminal proceedings seeking Z. to pay her UAH 5,000 (EUR 787) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 5,346.7 (EUR 842) to compensate her for pecuniary damage. 16. On 10 November 2003 the District Court found itself unable to rule on Z.’s guilt based on the material in the case-file and sent the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for additional investigation. The prosecutor referred the case to the District Police instructing it to carry out specified investigative measures. 17. On 11 December 2003 the applicant requested the District Police to order forensic medical examination of her health condition. On 16 December 2003 her request was granted. 18. On 26 December 2003 the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that police officer A. of the District Police had been disciplined for having committed a number of procedural violations while investigating her case. 19. On 10 January 2004 the medical examination of the applicant confirmed the conclusions of the previous examinations. 20. On 19 January 2004 the applicant requested another forensic medical examination but she was refused it. 21. On 10 March 2004 the State authorities issued Z. with a passport for travelling abroad. 22. On 9 April 2004 the District Police completed the pre-trial investigation and sent the case to the District Court for trial. 23. On 13 April 2004 the applicant requested the police to carry out additional investigative measures, but this request was refused on the ground that the measures in question had already been performed earlier. 24. On 11 May 2004 the District Court received the criminal case. On 17 May 2004 it decided that further investigation was needed and remitted the case to the District Police. 25. On 1 June 2004 Z. left the country to live on a permanent basis in Germany. 26. On 10 August 2004 investigator A. from the District Police established that Z. had absconded and placed him on a list of wanted persons. The proceedings were suspended until establishing Z.’s whereabouts. 27. On 29 December 2004 the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that Z. had been able to leave Ukraine because the District Police had failed to inform migration authorities that Z. was an accused in a criminal case. On 3 February 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against State employees who had unlawfully issued Z. with the passport for travelling abroad. 28. In 2005 Ukrainian authorities informed German authorities that Z. had left the country to live in Germany and requested that his whereabouts be established. 29. On 15 May 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Police Department informed the District Police that the investigation into the applicant’s beating was ineffective. The District Police was ordered to carry out a number of additional investigative actions. 30. In 2005-2008 the District Police questioned the applicant, St., Zub., Kyb., Nos. and Krav. and ordered forensic medical examination of the applicant which established that the injuries inflicted on 16 December 1999 led to her deafness. 31. On 17 January 2008 the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that Z.’s whereabouts had been known to the police since 2006, but due to negligence of the District Police his extradition had not been sought. 32. On 26 May 2008 the District Police terminated the criminal proceedings against Z. 33. On 24 June 2008 a prosecutor quashed the above decision as unfounded and sent the case back to the police. 34. On 21 August 2008 the District Police suspended the proceedings against Z. until “establishment of his whereabouts”. 35. On 29 October 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed that decision noting that the District Police had been aware of Z.’s place of residence, but for unknown reasons had not sought his extradition. 36. On an unspecified date the same office informed the applicant that a district court had ordered Z.’s detention pending trial and that his extradition had not yet been sought because Sh. and V., officers of the District Police, had failed to prepare documents necessary for extradition. 37. On 27 October 2009 the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine requested German authorities to extradite Z. 38. On 25 December 2009 forensic medical experts examined the applicant and established that due to the beating she lost 50 % of her working capacity. From December 1999 she had been periodically not fit for work and from 2004 onwards – permanently not fit for work. 39. On 22 June 2010 Z. was extradited to Ukraine. On 2 July 2010 he gave undertaking not to abscond. 40. On 21 January 2011 the pre-trial investigation into the applicant’s beating on 16 December 1999 was completed and the case was sent to the District Court for trial. 41. On 31 January 2011 the applicant modified her civil claim seeking to be paid UAH 400,000 (EUR 36,226) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 42. On 16 February 2011 the trial was postponed until 4 March 2011 because of the applicant’s request concerning recording of the hearings. 43. On 27 January, 6, 14, 23 February and 6 March 2012 the court adjourned the hearings due to the applicant’s absence. 44. On 4 April 2012 the applicant again modified her civil claim seeking to be paid UAH 550,000 (EUR 50,686) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 45. In a judgment of 14 May 2012 the District Court convicted Z. of having inflicted serious bodily injuries on the applicant and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. It also ordered Z. to pay the applicant UAH 50,000 (EUR 4,745) and UAH 5,346.7 (EUR 5,346) respectively, in compensation for non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage. 46. On 19 July 2012 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the first instance judgment and remitted the criminal case for additional investigation to the Prosecutor’s Office. The court noted, in particular, that the District Police had failed to assess all the relevant facts of the case and that the length of the pre-trial investigation was excessive. 47. On 7 November 2012 the Prosecutor’s Office noted that the District Police had committed serious violations of procedural law while investigating the applicant’s beating. The prosecutor ordered the head of the District Police to conduct an internal investigation into this matter and punish those who were responsible. 48. On 8 November 2012 the head of the District Police disciplinarily punished investigators Sh. and T. for the excessive length of the investigation and numerous procedural violations. 49. On 14 November 2012 the pre-trial investigation was again completed. 50. On 19 November 2012 the District Court received the criminal case against Z. for consideration on the merits. 51. On 12 December 2012 it terminated the criminal proceedings against Z. as time-barred. On 31 January 2013 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. 52. On 5 September 2013 the Higher Specialized Court quashed the lower court’s judgments and remitted the case to the District Court for a fresh consideration. It noted that the prosecution was not time-barred and the case had to be examined on its merits. 53. On 17 September 2013 the District Court received the criminal case. 54. On 17 October 2013 it discovered that Z. had absconded, placed him on the list of wanted persons and suspended the proceedings until establishing his whereabouts. 55. The proceedings have remained suspended.

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5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Ravne na Koroškem. 6. In 1993 his former employer, company Z. R., transferred him to another company. 7. On 20 April 1993 the applicant instituted proceedings against the company Z.R. before the Maribor Court of Associated Labour, complaining about his transfer. 8. On 28 June 1994 the Convention came into force in respect of Slovenia. 9. In September 1995 the applicant’s case was transferred to the Slovenj Gradec division of the Maribor Labour Court. 10. Between February 1996 and March 1997 the court held five hearings. 11. On 13 March 1997 the Maribor Labour Court established that the applicant’s transfer had never taken effect and that his employment with the defendant had continued. It ordered company Z.R. to re-employ the applicant and to pay him the salary due and the applicable benefits backdated to the day of his transfer. It dismissed the remainder of the claim. The applicant appealed. 12. In a decision of 16 April 1999 the Slovenian Pensions and Disability Insurance Institute recognised the applicant’s right to a pension as of 1 February 1999. His employment relationship with Z.R., which as of that date had still not re-employed him, hence terminated. 13. On 17 June 1999 the judgment of 13 March 1997 was upheld by the Higher Labour and Social Court and became final. 14. As Z.R. had not executed the court’s judgment, on 6 April 2000 the applicant instituted enforcement proceedings before the Slovenj Gradec Local Court. 15. On 12 July 2000 the court suspended the enforcement proceedings pending a final resolution of bankruptcy proceedings which had been instituted in the meantime against Z.R. (see below). 16. On 3 February 2005 the court decided to terminate the enforcement proceedings, since the applicant’s claims had been recognised in the bankruptcy proceedings. The decision became final on 22 February 2005. 17. On 5 July 2000 the Slovenj Gradec District Court decided to institute bankruptcy proceedings against the company Z.R. 18. On 31 August 2000 the applicant lodged a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, seeking 2,000,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT, approximately 8,346 euros (EUR)) payable under the judgment of 13 March 1997 (see paragraph 11 above). 19. On 11 October 2000 the court held the first main hearing in order to review the claims lodged by the creditors. It was decided that a committee of creditors would not be appointed. According to the applicant, both the receiver and the insolvency panel had assured him and his son, U.Z., who represented him, that they would inform them of any progress in the case, in particular of the scheduling of hearings concerning the distribution of the estate. On the same date the insolvency panel acknowledged part of the applicant’s claims and referred him to the contentious proceedings in respect of the remainder of the claims. The applicant appealed. 20. On 5 December 2000 the Maribor Higher Court upheld the applicant’s appeal and overturned the District Court’s decision by instructing the receiver to institute proceedings in respect of the disputed part of the applicant’s claim. 21. On 22 January 2000 the official receiver instituted proceedings before the Slovenj Gradec District Court, requesting it to declare that the disputed part of the applicant’s claim did not exist. 22. On 20 June 2001 the receiver reported to the insolvency panel that the conclusion of the proceedings was dependent on the conclusion of bankruptcy proceedings in respect T., a company that had been operated by Z.R. It was expected that a large proportion of T.’s property would be transferred back to Z.R., including a hotel and spa complex, R.V. The receiver estimated that until that had been done, the property available for sale would not even cover the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings. 23. On 8 April 2003 the receiver withdrew his claim against the applicant. 24. As a result, on 5 May 2004 the Slovenj Gradec District Court stayed the contentious proceedings. 25. On 1 February 2005 the receiver accepted the applicant’s claim in the full amount. 26. On 18 February 2005 the applicant demanded the payment of his claim. 27. In his regular reports to the insolvency panel submitted between 2004 and 2006, the receiver emphasised that the termination of the present proceedings was dependent on the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings in respect of company T., which in turn were dependent on the pending denationalisation proceedings in respect of the R.V. hotel complex. 28. In 2006 ownership of the hotel complex, R.V., was transferred to the company Z.R. According to the receiver’s reports, it could not be sold until the termination of the denationalisation proceedings. 29. On 24 October 2007 the denationalisation proceedings were finally resolved. 30. On 16 April 2008 the insolvency panel ordered the sale of the R.V. hotel complex. 31. At a public auction held on 18 May 2008, R.V. was sold for EUR 501,426. Reports on the sale were published online on the Bajta.si web portal, on a web portal for accountants, Racunovodja.si, on the Slovenian Press Agency website, and in the daily financial newspaper, Finance. 32. On 17 June 2008 the receiver submitted to the court a draft proposal on the main distribution of the estate. The receiver further proposed that the court issue a decision on the priority payment of the claim of the first creditor, F.F., concerning compensation for damage sustained at work, which had been recognised by a court decision. 33. On 19 June 2008 the Slovenj Gradec District Court issued a decision on the compensation to be paid to F.F. and posted it on the court’s notice board. 34. On 30 June 2008 the insolvency panel of the District Court endorsed a draft proposal on the distribution of the bankrupt company’s estate to the nineteen remaining creditors. It was proposed that each of them receive 2.85% of the claim acknowledged in the proceedings, which in the applicant’s case amounted to EUR 237,86. The court scheduled a further hearing for 10 September 2008 to confirm the distribution of the estate. 35. On the same day, 30 June 2008, the District Court published its decision and posted the notification of the hearing on the court’s notice board. It informed the creditors that they could lodge their objections in respect of the distribution proposal at the hearing itself or in writing before the hearing. 36. On 11 July 2008 the notification of the hearing, with its date and venue, was published in the Official Gazette. 37. On 10 September 2008 the District Court held the hearing on the distribution of the estate and confirmed the receiver’s distribution proposal. Its decision was posted on the court’s notice board on 11 September 2008 and could have been challenged within eight days. 38. As no appeal was lodged against the decision of 10 September 2008, it became final on 20 September 2008. 39. A few weeks later the applicant became aware that the decision on distribution had already been issued. On 24 November 2008 he sent a letter to the District Court, asking it to serve him with the decision of 10 September 2008 so that he could lodge an appeal against it. 40. In its reply of 27 November 2008 the District Court asked the applicant to specify whether it should consider his letter as an appeal against the aforementioned decision. 41. On the same day the court decided to terminate the proceedings. It ruled that since the applicant had refused to accept the sum awarded to him, it should be deposited with the court. 42. On 3 December 2008 the applicant amended his submission in accordance with the court’s inquiry of 27 November 2008, specifying that he was complaining against the decision of 10 September 2008 (see paragraph 37 above). 43. On 4 December 2008 the applicant appealed against the decision of 27 November to terminate the bankruptcy proceedings (see paragraph 41 above). He argued that he had not been properly informed about the hearing of 10 September 2008 on the distribution of the estate (see paragraph 37 above) and that it was unrealistic to expect him to follow for eight years the notices posted on the court’s board and to read all the Official Gazettes in order to be informed of the progress in the proceedings. Moreover, he maintained that he should have been awarded the full amount claimed in the bankruptcy proceedings, since, like all the other employees to whom the company owed salary arrears, he had been a priority creditor in those proceedings. 44. On 18 December 2008 the Slovenj Gradec District Court, considering the applicant’s submissions of 24 November and 3 December as an appeal against the decision of 10 September, rejected the appeal as being out of time. 45. On 29 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision. He argued that he had not been properly informed about the bankruptcy proceedings, that he should have been treated as a priority creditor, and that the bankruptcy court should have ruled ex officio on whether his claims had been ranked correctly and granted him the full amount claimed. 46. On 4 May 2009 the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 27 November 2008 (see paragraph 41 above), holding that he should have challenged the ranking of his claims at the hearing before the first-instance court. Relying on section 164 of the Compulsory Composition, Bankruptcy and Liquidation Act (see paragraph 51 below), it further concluded that the hearing on the distribution of the estate had been correctly scheduled. 47. On 22 June 2009 the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 18 December 2008. 48. On 17 July 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decisions of the Higher Court of 4 May and 22 June 2009, reiterating in substance his complaints before the lower courts. 49. On 4 December 2009 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint.

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5. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Veles. 6. The applicant was the owner of a plot of undeveloped land, the total surface area of which was 558 sq. m (“the land”). On 30 June 1987 the Council of the Municipality of Kavadarci (“the Municipality”) expropriated the land. As stated in the expropriation order, the expropriation was carried out for the benefit of the Municipality and in the interest of the then socially owned company K. (во корист на општина Кавадарци, а за потребите на ООЗТ „К.”) in order to construct a storehouse (стовариште). 7. On 25 July 1989 the Municipality requested, in non-contentious proceedings, that the Kavadarci Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”) determine the amount of compensation to be paid to the applicant. The request was submitted after the parties (the applicant and the Municipality) had failed to reach an agreement on the issue. 8. On 20 August 1997 the first-instance court ordered the State to pay the applicant the equivalent of 11,500 euros (EUR) in compensation for the land. On 23 April 1998 the Skopje Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case for fresh consideration because of substantial procedural flaws. 9. On 29 December 1999 the first-instance court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 8,000 in compensation for the expropriated land (558 sq. m). It ordered that the compensation was to be paid by a company, M.K., the successor to the company K., and by the State. The former was ordered to pay compensation for the part of the land it had used, and the latter to pay compensation for the remainder, which had been reserved for the construction of a public road. The court further dismissed the claim against the Municipality, finding that it had no requisite standing to be sued (недостаток на пасивна легитимација). On 20 April 2000 the Skopje Court of Appeal allowed the appeals lodged by the State and the company M.K. and remitted the case for renewed examination. It held that insolvency proceedings were pending against the company M.K. and that any claims should be established in those proceedings. It further found that the lower court had incorrectly established that the State should pay compensation. 10. On 11 December 2001 the first-instance court ordered that the Municipality was to pay compensation, which amount was set at approximately EUR 9,000, since the 1987 expropriation order had identified it as the beneficiary of the expropriation. It dismissed the claim as regards the State and the company M.K. for lack of requisite standing to be sued. On 27 February 2003 that judgment was quashed by the Skopje Court of Appeal, which held that, inter alia, the lower court had not identified the final beneficiary of the land. 11. On 27 May 2004 the first-instance court held that the company M.K.2000, the legal successor of the company M.K., and the Public Road Fund (Фонд за магистрални и регионални патишта Скопје), should pay compensation in an amount equivalent to approximately EUR 8,650, which corresponded to the market value of the land. It dismissed the claim as regards the State and the Municipality for lack of requisite standing to be sued in the proceedings. It further held that each party to the proceedings should pay their own costs. 12. On 16 November 2005 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment, with the exception of the costs, which matter was remitted for fresh consideration. 13. On 10 February 2006 the first-instance court ordered the company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund to pay the trial costs incurred by the applicant. 14. On 25 April 2007 the Supreme Court accepted a legality review request (барање за заштита на законитоста) in which the public prosecutor complained about the lower courts’ judgments. The Supreme Court overturned the first- and second-instance courts’ judgments and dismissed the order for compensation to be paid to the applicant. The court held that the company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund could not be held responsible for the payment of any compensation for the land expropriated in the interest of the company K., which had ceased to exist. The land had been State-owned developed land. The company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund did not therefore have the requisite standing to be sued in the proceedings. 15. On 2 July 2007 the applicant lodged a request with the first-instance court against the Municipality, seeking determination of the amount of compensation for the land. 16. On 11 September 2007 the first-instance court held that the Municipality should pay compensation to the applicant for 558 sq.m of land in the amount equivalent to approximately EUR 8,650. 17. On 17 October 2007 the Municipality appealed against the first-instance court’s decision. The applicant lodged observations in reply claiming that the compensation had been correctly set and that the Municipality’s appeal should be dismissed. 18. On 25 January 2008 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the Municipality’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s decision. On 31 March 2009 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the Municipality’s appeal on points of law.

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4. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Krasnyy Liman. He had a son, V., who lived in Severodonetsk, Lugansk Region. 5. On the evening of 11 August 2002, V. was sitting in the courtyard of the apartment block in which he lived. At about 7.45 p.m. a man approached V., shot him in the head, and ran away. Several people witnessed the incident. V. died an hour later in hospital. 6. On the same date the police instituted a criminal investigation into the murder and questioned the eyewitnesses, who stated that the killer had been 25-30 years old and around 175-180 centimetres tall. He had been wearing sunglasses, dark jeans, a red T-shirt and a cap. 7. On the same date the police examined the crime scene, found the bullet and sent it for forensic examination, and collected fingerprints and biological material. 8. On 12 August 2002 the police searched V.’s apartment and questioned his wife, T. She did not know who might have wanted to kill V. or for what reason. He never spoke to her about his business or other activities. 9. On the same date the forensic experts established that V. had been shot with a TT pistol. 10. On 13 August 2002 the police questioned K.Y., who had previously stolen money from V., and established that he had an alibi for the period of time when V. had been murdered. His fingerprints did not match those found on the crime scene. The police thus concluded that K.Y. was not involved in the murder. 11. On the same date the police questioned employees of the bar owned by V., who stated that on 10 August 2002 P. – a member of the criminal gang led by a certain Bo. – had been looking for the applicant’s son. P. was 25-30 years old and 180 centimetres tall. 12. The Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office established that P. had been wanted by the police since 1999 as they suspected that he had killed a certain L. with a TT pistol on Bo.’s instructions. The Office concluded that P. might have been involved in V.’s murder and declared P. and Bo. wanted. 13. On 14 August 2002 the police recognised T. as an injured party to the proceedings. The next day, it identified the telephone numbers from which V. had received calls on the day of his death and proceeded to identify the names and whereabouts of the people who had called him. 14. On 16 August 2002, V.’s business partner K. was questioned. He stated that Bo. had threatened V. with violence. On the same date a list of Bo.’s acquaintances was drawn up which included P. (see paragraph 11 above), Lu., Kl., Lit., Kr. and R. 15. In August 2002 the police established that there was no match between the fingerprints of Kl., Lit., Kr. and P. and those found on and near the crime scene. The police searched Lit.’s home and seized his clothes. The clothes were later destroyed, not being needed as evidence. 16. On 23 and 26 August 2002 the police searched the apartments of V.’s acquaintances, but found no evidence that they might have been involved in his murder. 17. On 27 August 2002 K. was questioned again. He said that a certain Vo. and Bu. both worked for Bo. After V.’s murder, Bo. had called K. and had threatened that he would be “broken”. 18. The police searched Vo.’s home, but found no evidence of his involvement in V.’s killing. 19. On 5 September 2002 the police showed the eyewitnesses several persons suspected of the murder, including Vo. The witnesses did not recognise the man who had shot V. amongst them. 20. By 2 October 2002 the police had identified and questioned everyone who had called V. on 10 and 11 August 2002. There was no evidence that any of them had been involved in the murder. 21. Later in October 2002, the police found the TT pistol with which V. had been killed in the possession of a certain Sh. The latter explained that he had bought the gun in September 2002 from A., a boy aged under 18. 22. The police questioned A., who stated that he had found the gun and some sunglasses on 12 August 2002 near garages in Lisichansk Town. He had subsequently sold the gun to Sh. 23. The police questioned the owners of the garages and individuals living near the garages. None of them had seen who had left the gun near the garages. There was no evidence that the boy, Sh., or the garage owners had known Bo. or V. or had had a motive for killing V. 24. On 22 October 2002 the police questioned Lit., who said that he knew nothing about the murder. 25. During November 2002 the police continued questioning V.’s acquaintances and checking whether their biological material and fingerprints matched those found at the crime scene. 26. On 14 November 2002 the police collected blood and saliva from Lu. and a certain Buk., whom the eyewitnesses had seen near the crime-scene on 11 August 2002. They also questioned Lu., who stated that on 11 August 2002 he had been in hospital, where many people had seen him. Lu. did not know anything about the murder. 27. The forensic medical examination established that both Lu. and Buk. might have smoked one of the cigarettes found near the crime scene. 28. On 22 November 2002 the police organised an identity parade and showed Sh. to the eyewitnesses of the murder. However, they did not identify him as the man who had shot V. 29. On 25 February 2003 the police suspended the investigation on the grounds that it had proved impossible to establish who had committed the murder. 30. On 5 August 2003 the investigation was resumed but suspended again on 8 August 2003. 31. On 27 October 2003 the Lugansk Regional Prosecutor quashed the decision to suspend the investigation, observing that it was necessary to carry out “additional investigative measures”. However, he did not specify what those measures were. The case was sent to the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office for further investigation. 32. On 27 November 2003 the police arrested Bo. within the framework of the investigation into the murder of L. (see paragraph 12 above). In December 2003 it questioned Bo. in connection with the death of V. He stated that V. had been his friend, and he had known nothing about his killing. 33. In 2004 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office examined a number of witnesses who had been questioned earlier and collected information about people who had stayed in hotels in Severodonetsk on 11 and 12 August 2002. 34. On 29 September 2004 the prosecutors prepared a plan of additional investigative measures to be carried out. In particular, they suspected that V. had been involved in illegal metal trafficking and proposed finding his partners in that business. It was also planned to question Ly. with whom the applicant’s son had had “tense relations”, and to find and question Lu., Li. and R. 35. On an unspecified date the prosecutors questioned Ly. and K. and found no evidence that they had been involved in V.’s murder. K. and several other of V.’s acquaintances who were questioned by the police denied that the applicant’s son had been involved in any illegal business, including metal trafficking. 36. On 25 May 2005 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office suspended the investigation, stating that despite all the measures taken it had proved impossible to find V.’s killer. 37. On 2 August 2005 the police arrested P. within the framework of investigation into the death of L. (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). 38. On 12 August 2005 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office resumed the investigation into the death of V. because it was planned to question P., Li., R. and Bu. 39. On 2 September 2005 the police compared P.’s fingerprints to those collected at the crime scene and found that they did not match. 40. On 15 October 2005 it showed P.’s photo to the eyewitnesses of V.’s killing. They were unable to say whether it was P. who had shot V. because the murder had occurred a long time before. 41. The Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office informed the police that since July 2005 a certain F. had been wanted for killing H. with a TT pistol in the Lugansk Region. The prosecutors instructed the police to check whether F. could have been involved in V.’s murder. The police informed the prosecutors that it would look into F.’s involvement in the killing after establishing his whereabouts. 42. On 27 October 2005 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office instructed the Lisichansk Prosecutors’ Office to find and question Kl., R., Kr., and Li. 43. On 3 November 2005 the Severodonetsk Police questioned P., who stated that he had been living in Moldova in 2000-2003 and had not been involved in V.’s murder. 44. On 13 November 2005 the Lisichansk Police stated that R. and Li. had not been found at their permanent places of residence. 45. In November 2005 the Lisichansk Police questioned Kl., who stated that he did not know V. or anything about his murder. He had heard about Bo., but had not known him personally. 46. On 15 November 2005 the Lisichansk Police informed the Severodonetsk Police that it could not question Li. and R. because their whereabouts were unknown. Kr. could not be questioned because he was in prison. No further steps were taken to find and question Li., R., and Kr. 47. On 22 December 2005 the police questioned Bo., who said that V. had been his friend and denied that he was involved in the murder. 48. On 8 August 2006 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office suspended the investigation but resumed it on 19 July 2007 and transferred the case to the Severodonetsk Police. 49. On 21 August 2007 the Lugansk Regional Police Directorate noted that not all the necessary measures had been taken in order to investigate V.’s murder and ordered that the investigation be accelerated. The Severodonetsk Police were ordered to: i) show photos of F. to the eyewitnesses; ii) search the homes of R., Lu. and Li.; iii) investigate whether Sh. might have been involved in V.’s murder; iv) continue to search for persons who might have been involved in the murder. 50. On 2 June 2008 the Severodonetsk Police suspended the investigation, stating that it had proved impossible to find V.’s killer. On 1 September 2008 the proceedings were resumed but were suspended once again on 30 September 2008. 51. On 29 May 2009 the Lugansk Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 30 September 2008, stating that not all the necessary measures had been taken in order to investigate the murder. The case was submitted to the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office for further investigation. 52. On 10 September 2009 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office suspended the investigation stating that it had proved impossible to identify the killer. 53. On 27 January 2010 the higher prosecutors quashed that decision, and ordered the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office to carry out further investigative measures. 54. On 11 February 2010 the Severodonetsk Prosecutors’ Office gave instructions to find and question V.’s parents and wife. 55. On 3 March 2010 the police questioned the applicant, who stated that he did not know who had killed his son. 56. On 15 March 2010 the prosecutors suspended the investigation, stating that it had proved impossible to find the killer of the applicant’s son. The applicant was informed on 23 March 2010. 57. On unspecified dates the applicant asked the authorities to inform him about the progress of the investigation. He received the following replies. 58. On 9 December 2002 the Severodonetsk Prosecutor’s Office informed him that the police had found and examined the crime weapon and were looking for Bo.’s acquaintances. On 26 December 2003 the prosecutors informed the applicant that the police had questioned Bo. in connection with V.’s murder. On 25 February 2005 the prosecutors informed the applicant that they were looking for Bo.’s acquaintances.

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5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Jesenice. 6. On 15 April 1998 the Kranj District Court instituted insolvency proceedings against the company S., at that time the applicant’s employer. 7. On 29 April 1998 the receiver in insolvency issued a decision on the termination of the applicant’s employment contract with the company S. 8. On an unknown date, the applicant lodged his claim for a redundancy payment in the insolvency proceedings. Since the receiver disputed the claim, the Kranj District Court on 11 September 1998 referred the applicant to labour proceedings. 9. On 22 December 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Kranj Divison of the Labour and Social Court. 10. In the same period about 150 claims similar to that of the applicant were lodged before the same court. 11. In 1999 the Kranj Labour and Social Court issued decisions in four cases similar to the applicant’s, dismissing the claims. It held that the workers who had lost their jobs owing to the employer’s insolvency before section 19 of the 1999 Act Amending the Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Slovenia Act (“the 1999 Act”) became effective were not entitled to a redundancy payment. Section 19 explicitly foresaw a right to a redundancy payment for workers who were let go after a company had become insolvent. 12. In 2000 several applications for a constitutional review of section 19 of the 1999 Act were lodged with the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of non-retroactive application of that provision. 13. On 5 October 2001, following the negative decisions issued in the four cases (see paragraph 11 above), the trade union which was also representing the applicant requested the court to postpone hearings scheduled in other cases. The union wanted to first check whether the other workers wanted to withdraw their claims in order to avoid the costs of the proceedings. 14. No formal decision on adjourning or staying the proceedings was issued by the court. 15. On 10 April 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the motions for review of the constitutionality of section 19 of the 1999 Act. It held that they were unfounded, since they were based on the false premises that the right to a redundancy payment for workers laid off because of their employer’s insolvency was introduced only by section 19, and that moreover it did not apply retroactively. Referring to its own decisions issued in 1994, 1995 and 2000, it stressed that this right had already been foreseen by the general labour legislation in force prior to the adoption of the 1999 Act. It explained that the purpose of Section 19 was solely to explicitly clarify that also workers who lost their jobs because of the insolvency of their employers were entitled to redundancy payments. Such clarification was needed because of the conflicting case-law of the lower courts. In this respect the Constitutional Court emphasised that while it could not interfere with the correct interpretation of legal norms by the lower courts, the latter could not apply an interpretation which would be unconstitutional, arbitrary, or clearly wrong. 16. On 14 July 2003, the parties settled with the company S., which acknowledged the applicant’s claim. 17. On 13 July 2006 the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for damage sustained because of the length of the labour proceedings. 18. On 27 September 2007 the Ljubljana Local Court dismissed his claim. It held that Section 25 of the 2006 Act on Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”) was not applicable, since that provision only applied to cases where an individual had already lodged an application on account of length of proceedings before an international court. Applying the general rules of the 2001 Code of Obligations on pecuniary damages, it further concluded that since the case had been settled the applicant had failed to prove that he had incurred any damage. In any case, there was also no causal link between the conduct of the court and the damage allegedly sustained. The applicant appealed. 19. On 9 January 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case back to the first-instance court. 20. On 8 May 2008 the Ljubljana Local Court, in a renewed set of proceedings, again dismissed the applicant’s claim. It concluded that he had failed to prove either any damage on account of delays in the proceedings or any causal link. The applicant appealed. 21. On 5 November 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 22. On 27 May 2010 the Constitutional Court granted the applicant’s constitutional appeal by referring to its decision of 18 March 2010 (see paragraph 29 below) and remitted the case to the higher court. 23. On 15 September 2010 the Ljubljana Higher Court remitted the case back to the first-instance court. 24. On 25 October 2010 the Ljubljana Local Court, applying by analogy, in accordance with the instructions of the Constitutional Court, the provisions of the 2006 Act, dismissed the applicant’s claim. Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it held that it had been reasonable to suspend the examination of the applicant’s claim pending the outcome of some similar cases and of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 15 above). It held that it could not identify any unreasonable delays in these similar cases, which took five years at three levels of jurisdiction, of which three years were before the Constitutional Court. The applicant appealed. 25. On 13 April 2011 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law and a constitutional appeal. 26. On 14 July 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 27. On 8 May 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal.

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4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Budapest. 5. The applicant’s employment was terminated unlawfully according to the judgment of the Budapest Labour Court dated 24 August 2004. 6. Relying on this decision, on 19 October 2004 the applicant lodged a claim for unpaid wages and other claims against his former employer. 7. The Pest County Labour Court rejected the claim on 5 May 2006. 8. On appeal, the second-instance court quashed the judgment and transferred the case to the competent Budapest Regional Court on 24 January 2007. 9. In the resumed proceedings, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim on 28 November 2008. 10. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld in essence the first‑instance decision on 14 September 2010. 11. The applicant lodged a petition for review. On 11 July 2011 the Supreme Court reversed the previous decision and awarded the applicant 2,053,440 Hungarian forints in salary arrears.

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5. The applicant was born in Ukraine in 1987 and arrived in Slovenia in 2000 with her sister and mother, who had married a Slovenian. 6. Between July and December 2001, at the age of 14, she was allegedly repeatedly sexually assaulted by a family friend, X, 55 years old at the time, who together with his wife often took care of her and helped her in preparations for beauty contests. 7. In July 2002 the applicant told her mother about the alleged sexual assaults by X, but was unwilling to talk about them with anyone else. 8. On 15 July 2002 a priest gave a statement to the Maribor police, in which he said that the applicant’s mother had told him about her concern that the applicant had been raped by X. 9. On 16 July 2002 the applicant’s mother lodged a criminal complaint against X, in which she alleged that X had forced the applicant to engage in sexual intercourse with him on several occasions. 10. On 17 July 2002 the applicant was questioned by Maribor police officers and described how X had forced her to engage in various sexual activities. As regards the time frame of the assaults, the applicant stated that X had first attempted to kiss her before July 2001, when she had started modelling for fashion shows. She proceeded to give an account of a number of occasions when X had sexually assaulted her. On one occasion X had lain on top of her while she was sleeping at his house and had attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, spreading her legs with one hand and putting his other hand over her mouth to prevent her from screaming, but he was interrupted by his younger son coming up the stairs. On another occasion, when they were at a swimming pool, he had groped her in the water. On yet another occasion X had allegedly taken the applicant to an abandoned workshop owned by his family and performed oral sex on her. Moreover, according to the applicant, X had forced her to perform oral sex on him at least three times, once at his home, once at his company’s garage, and the third time in his van, which he had parked in woods near the town. On that last occasion the applicant had allegedly tried to escape; however, being unfamiliar with the surroundings, she had come back to the van. The applicant stated that X had on several occasions attempted to have intercourse with her, but that she had not been certain whether he had managed to achieve penetration. She further stated that she had tried to defend herself by crying and pushing X away, but without success. 11. The applicant was also examined by an expert in gynaecology, who found that her hymen was intact. Moreover, in the course of July and August 2002 the police questioned X, who denied any sexual relations with the applicant, and three other people. 12. Following a series of unsuccessful attempts to obtain specific information from the police as regards the progress of the investigation, the applicant’s mother complained to the Maribor District State Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the State Prosecutor’s Office”). 13. On 27 June 2003 the State Prosecutor’s Office sent a letter to the Maribor police, urgently requesting a copy of the criminal complaint lodged against X. 14. On 18 August 2003 the police sent a report to the State Prosecutor’s Office stating that the applicant had failed to provide a detailed account of her allegations or to indicate the locations where the alleged rapes had taken place. The police noted that the applicant had given the impression of being under severe psychological stress and in fear of her mother’s reaction. They concluded that it was impossible to confirm her allegation of rape, and equally impossible to establish the reasons for her serious emotional distress. 15. On 28 August 2003 the State Prosecutor’s Office lodged a request for a judicial investigation in respect of X based on charges of sexual assault on a minor below the age of fifteen. The request alleged that X had forced the applicant to engage in oral sex and had had sexual intercourse with her on at least three occasions, despite her refusal and attempted resistance. 16. On 7 January 2005 X was summoned to appear before the investigating judge of the Maribor District Court. He refused to give an oral statement. On 10 March 2005 X, represented by a lawyer, submitted a written statement in which he denied the charges. He also submitted a medical report which indicated that his left arm had been disabled since birth. 17. On 26 May 2005 the investigating judge issued a decision to open a criminal investigation in respect of X. An appeal by X against this decision was rejected by the pre-trial panel of the Maribor District Court. 18. On 17 October 2005 the applicant was examined as a witness before the Ljubljana District Court, which had been asked to carry out the witness examination because the applicant lived in the area. The examination resumed on 8 November 2005. Neither X nor his counsel was informed of this examination. The applicant testified in detail as to when, where and how the alleged offences had taken place. She first described the assault which had occurred in X’s house, while she had been sleeping there, reiterating that X had been disturbed by his son. According to the applicant’s statement, the second assault had occurred when, instead of driving the applicant home, X had parked in the woods and started to kiss her forcefully. X had then undressed the applicant, parted her legs with one hand and held her wrists with the other and again attempted to have intercourse with her, but there had been no penetration. The applicant further recounted that X had on another occasion taken her to the family’s abandoned workshop and had performed oral sex on her. She stated that she had attempted to free herself of his grip, but that X had again pinned her wrists down and also slapped her across the face. Again, vaginal intercourse had been attempted but had not actually occurred. X had ordered her not to talk to anyone about this, or he would have her and her family deported from Slovenia. The applicant added that she remembered these three occasions well and the events had occurred just as she described them, and that there had been a number of other similar incidents between July and December 2001. 19. On 13 and 20 December 2005 X’s wife and another witness were examined by the investigating judge of the Maribor District Court. 20. On 13 January 2006 the Koper District Court, at the request of the Maribor District Court, examined witness D., who testified that the applicant had told her of the alleged rape. 21. On 14 April 2006 the investigating judge examined witness H., who was an employee of the company owned by X and his wife. H. testified that she had not seen X behaving improperly towards the applicant on the company’s premises. 22. On 16 May 2006 the investigating judge appointed an expert in gynaecology, B., in order to establish the probability that the applicant had engaged in sexual intercourse in the period between July and December 2001. The latter carried out a consultation with the applicant, who refused a clinical examination. She told B., among other things, that despite the attempts made by X there had been no actual sexual penetration. During the consultation, B. confronted the applicant with an orthopaedics report stating that X could not have used his left arm in the ways described by her, to which the applicant answered that she had seen X use it to lift heavy items. B. also presented the applicant with the police report stating that she had not been able to give a detailed account of the sexual assaults and specific locations, and asked her why she had not defended herself against X, for instance by scratching or biting. The applicant replied that she had not defended herself and had been unable to do so. On 19 June 2006 the expert prepared his report, which was based on the evidence in the file, including a gynaecological report from 2002 which showed that the applicant’s hymen was intact at that time, and the conversation with the applicant. He found that there was nothing to indicate with certainty that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with X at the material time. In addition to his medical opinion, the expert commented that there were certain inconsistencies in the applicant’s account of the events in issue. It can be seen from the report that neither of the alleged inconsistencies was related to any medical issue. 23. On 20 June 2006 the investigating judge appointed an expert in clinical psychology, R. The latter, after holding a consultation with the applicant, submitted her report on 4 July 2006, and concluded as follows: “Since 2001 Y. has shown all the symptoms of a victim of sexual and other kinds of abuse (emotional, behavioural and physical symptoms) ... In addition to the emotional consequences, the girl shows very typical behavioural patterns relating to the abuse experienced by her, and also some physical symptoms (disturbed sleep, nightmares, collapsing). The symptoms are indicated in the report ... The gravity of the consequences – physical and sexual in particular – is difficult to assess at the present time. But, like the short-term ones, the long-term consequences can be predicted. Their real extent will become apparent at key stages of the girl’s life and in stressful situations ... Because of these effects, which are most serious in her psychological sphere ... it is of very marginal importance whether during the perpetrator’s violent behaviour the child victim experienced hymen defloration or not ... Sexual behavioural patterns can only be assessed properly by an expert in clinical psychology ...” 24. On 15 September 2006 the Maribor district prosecutor’s office indicted X for sexual assault of a child below the age of fifteen under Article 183 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. An objection by X to the indictment was rejected by the pre-trial panel of the Maribor District Court on 20 October 2006. 25. The Maribor District Court scheduled a hearing for 27 June 2007. However, the hearing was adjourned at X’s request on the basis of a document which showed that he was now on sick leave for several weeks. 26. A hearing was then scheduled for 3 October 2007, but adjourned at X’s counsel’s request. The next hearing was to be held on 12 November 2007. However, owing to the absence of a jury member, the hearing was adjourned. Subsequently, X informed the court that he was about to go on a business trip, for which reason the next hearing was postponed until 16 January 2008. 27. On 16 January 2008 X failed to appear before the court. On 17 January 2008 he submitted a sick-leave certificate. 28. On 25 January 2008 X’s counsel informed the court that X had revoked his power of attorney and that he would be represented by another lawyer, M., from then on. However, the court received no new power of attorney authorising M. to act as X’s counsel. Since X was accused of a criminal offence requiring mandatory representation, on 28 January 2008 the court appointed M. as counsel for X . 29. On 14 March 2008 the court held a hearing, from which the public was excluded on the grounds of protection of privacy and public morals. The court heard evidence from X. At the hearing the applicant’s counsel sought to have M., X’s counsel, disqualified on the ground that in 2001 the applicant and her mother had sought advice from him on the matters in issue. Furthermore, the applicant’s mother had been intimately involved with him. M. denied that he had ever seen the applicant or her mother and said that he only knew that the lawyer at whose firm he had been working at that time had represented the applicant’s mother’s estranged husband in divorce proceedings. The panel dismissed the application, ruling that no statutory grounds existed for disqualifying M. as counsel. 30. On 14 March 2008 X submitted written pleadings, claiming that he would have been unable to use physical force on the applicant, as his left arm had been seriously disabled since birth and was 15 cm shorter than his right arm. X alleged that he had practically no use of his disabled arm. Moreover, he asserted that he and his family had been helping the applicant and her sister to integrate into their new community and learn Slovene, while their mother had been busying herself with her private activities. According to X, the charges of sexual assault were prompted by the applicant’s mother, who wished to extort money from him. 31. On 14 April 2008 the court held a second hearing in the case. X was questioned by the State prosecutor, mostly about the use of his left arm, and in this connection conceded that, although he usually drove automatic cars, he did occasionally drive a smaller manual transmission car. However, when asked whether he had ever driven a truck, X replied that this had no bearing on the case, acknowledging nevertheless that he had a licence to drive all categories of road vehicles. Then the applicant was summoned to testify, the court granting her request for X to be absent from the hearing room. While recounting the instances of sexual abuse by X, the applicant cried repeatedly and the hearing was adjourned for a few minutes on that account. X’s counsel M. then questioned the applicant, asking her how tall she had been and how much she had weighed at the material time. The applicant became very agitated and asked M. why, having been the first to hear her story, he was asking those questions and was now acting as X’s counsel. M. commented that this was part of the tactics. The hearing was then adjourned owing to the applicant’s distress. 32. On 9 May 2008 the court held a third hearing. The questioning of the applicant continued in the absence of X. When asked how she felt about the situation with hindsight, she cried and said that no one had helped her and that the proceedings had been dragging on for several years, during which she had had to keep reliving the trauma. 33. On 27 August 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal under the Protection of the Right to a Hearing without Undue Delay Act of 2006 (hereinafter “the 2006 Act”) with a view to accelerating the proceedings. 34. On 26 September 2008 the court held a fourth hearing, from which the public was excluded, at which X personally asked the applicant over a hundred questions, starting with a comment in the form of a question “Is it true that you have told and showed me that you could cry on cue and then everybody would believe you?” It does not appear from the record of the hearing that the applicant made any reply. X then asked the applicant a series of questions aimed at proving that they had seen each other mainly at gatherings of their families or when the applicant, in need of transport or other assistance, had actively sought his company. Among the questions asked by X were the following: “Is it true that I could not have abused you on the evening of the event as you stated on 14 April?”, “Is it true that if I had wished to satisfy my sexual needs, I would have called you at least once?”; “Why did you call me in September and ask me to take you out of town if I had already raped you five times before that date?”, “Why were you calling me, because I certainly never called you?”, or “Is it true that you specifically asked that we drive out of town alone, because you wished to talk to me and to celebrate your success at a beauty pageant?” The applicant insisted that she had not called X, nor had she initiated any outings with him, but that he had called her. X also asked the applicant whether she had told him that, once she had a boyfriend, she would always be on top, as she wanted to be the mistress. 35. Moreover, X claimed that the charges of rape were fabrications by the applicant’s mother. Hence, he asked the applicant numerous questions about her mother, including about her knowledge of Slovene, her work, and her personal relationships. Further, X confronted the applicant with the medical report which indicated that his left arm was seriously disabled. The applicant insisted that she had seen X using his left arm in his daily life, including driving cars, lifting and carrying his children and their school bags, and carrying boxes and bottles. Throughout the questioning, X disputed the accuracy and credibility of the applicant’s answers, extensively commenting on the circumstances described by her and rejecting her version of events. He continued to do so even after the presiding judge explained to him that he would have the opportunity to make his comments after the applicant’s questioning. 36. During the cross-examination, X repeated a number of questions and was eventually warned against doing this by the presiding judge. Moreover, the presiding judge ruled out of order seven questions that she perceived had no bearing on the case in issue. 37. On three occasions, when the applicant became agitated and started crying, the court ordered a short recess. After one of these recesses X asked the applicant whether she would feel better if they all went to dinner, just as they used to, and maybe then she would not cry so much. 38. At one point the applicant requested the court to adjourn the hearing as the questions were too stressful for her. However, after being told by X that the next hearing could not be held until after 19 November 2008 when he would be back from a business trip, the applicant said, while crying, that he should continue with his questioning as she wanted to get it over with. Eventually, after four hours of cross-examination of the applicant, the presiding judge adjourned the hearing until 13 October 2008. 39. X’s wife, mother-in-law and an employee of his company were examined at the next hearing, all three of them asserting that X had very little use of his left arm and certainly could not lift any burdens. 40. On 24 November 2008 a sixth hearing was held. The questioning of the applicant by X took an hour and a half. When questioned by X’s counsel M., the applicant again asserted that she had told him the whole story a long time ago. M. denied this, stating that if he had been informed he would have advised the applicant to go to hospital and to the police. Once the applicant’s questioning was over, her mother was questioned, mostly about her private relationships. 41. At the end of the hearing X’s counsel M. confirmed that he had encountered the applicant’s mother when he was working at a law firm with a lawyer who had represented her in certain court proceedings. He also stated that he would inform the court within three days as to whether he would request leave to withdraw from representing X in the proceedings in issue. On 25 November 2008 M. requested leave from the court to withdraw from the case, as he had been personally affected by certain statements made by the applicant’s mother. 42. At a hearing of 15 December 2008 the court dismissed the request by X’s counsel M., finding that there were no statutory grounds disqualifying him from representing M. The gynaecologist, B., was examined as a witness. He acknowledged that in order to clarify the circumstances he had also addressed certain issues in his report that had not been part of the investigating judge’s request. Moreover, he reiterated that the applicant’s hymen had been intact at the material time. 43. On 22 January 2009 the court held an eighth hearing in the case and examined the expert in clinical psychology, R., who again stated that sexual abuse which had happened long ago could not be proved by any material evidence, and that only the psychological consequences could be assessed. She further reiterated that the applicant displayed clear symptoms of sexual abuse. 44. On 20 February 2009 the court appointed T., another expert in gynaecology, to give an opinion on whether the applicant could have had sexual intercourse at the material time, given the results of her medical examination (see paragraph 11 above). On 10 March 2009 the expert submitted his report, which stated that those results were not inconsistent with the applicant’s account of the events in issue. 45. On 16 March 2009 the court held a hearing at which it appointed N., an expert in orthopaedics, to prepare an opinion as to whether, in view of his disabled left arm, X could have performed the acts described by the applicant. 46. On 5 May 2009 N. submitted his report, in which he found that X’s left arm was severely disabled, and that for those reasons some of the events could not have happened in the way described by the applicant. 47. On 8 June 2009 the court held a hearing at which N. was questioned. Further to questions put by the applicant’s counsel, N. explained that he had based his opinion on the documents in X’s medical file, the X-rays brought to him by X, and an examination of X. 48. A hearing was held on 9 July 2009. The applicant requested that N. be questioned further. 49. On 29 September 2009 the court held the twelfth and last hearing in the case. At the hearing the applicant and the State Prosecutor questioned N., who stated, inter alia, that X could only use his left arm to assist the right arm in carrying out specific tasks, and that he had practically no strength in his left arm. In the expert’s opinion, X would not have been able to spread the applicant’s legs with his left arm, and neither would he have been able to take off his trousers as alleged by her. After being asked by the prosecutor whether his assessment was based on the assumption that the applicant had used all her strength to resist X, N. stated: “I did not base my conclusion on that assumption, as I did not know whether she had resisted or whether she had willingly submitted.” After being asked whether the applicant, who was 14 years old at the time, could have resisted X, who had allegedly been lying on top of her, he said he believed so. N. also testified that although X had more than ordinary strength in his right arm, he could not have assaulted the applicant in the way she alleged. 50. After the examination of N., the applicant, who had sought and obtained an opinion from another orthopaedist outside the court proceedings which indicated that X might still have limited use of his left arm, asked for another orthopaedics expert to be appointed, on the grounds that there was doubt about N.’s conclusions. This request was rejected by the court as unnecessary, as was the applicant’s request for the court also to call as witnesses her sister and her mother’s former husband, who had allegedly seen X rowing with both arms. A request by the prosecutor for the applicant to be examined again was also rejected. 51. At the end of the hearing the court pronounced judgment, acquitting X of all charges. In view of this verdict, the court recommended that the applicant pursue her claim for damages, which she had submitted in the course of the proceedings, before the civil court. 52. On 15 December 2009 the applicant lodged a new supervisory appeal under the 2006 Act. On 22 December 2009 she received a reply from the court informing her that the reasoning of the judgment had been sent to her that day. 53. In the written grounds the court explained that the expert orthopaedics report contested X’s ability to carry out certain acts described by the applicant, for which he would have had to use both arms. As explained by the expert, X was not capable of even moving his left hand in a position which would have allowed him to take his trousers off or spread the applicant’s legs. According to the court, the fact that some of the applicant’s allegations were disproved by the expert raised some doubts as to her entire version of the events. On the basis of the principle that any reasonable doubt should benefit the accused (in dubio pro reo), the court had acquitted X. As regards the report by the expert in psychology R., which found that the applicant had suffered sexual abuse, the court noted that it could not ignore the judgment delivered in another set of proceedings concerning the applicant’s mother’s estranged husband, in which the competent court had accepted that he had engaged in sexual activity in front of the applicant and her sister and had also behaved inappropriately towards the applicant. 54. On 30 December 2009 the State Prosecutor lodged an appeal, in which she criticised the court for not considering the fact that owing to his age, gender and body mass X was much stronger than the applicant, and was also in a position of power on account of his economic and social status. Moreover, she pointed out that X had operated manual transmission vehicles, which required him to use both his arms. The prosecutor further argued that the criminal offence in question did not require the sexual act to have been committed by force; it was sufficient that the applicant opposed it. She also stressed that the proceedings had already been pending for eight years, which had aggravated the trauma suffered by the applicant. 55. The appeal was dismissed by the Maribor Higher Court on 26 May 2010, which found that the reasoning of the first-instance court’s judgment was clear and precise regarding the doubt that X had committed the alleged criminal acts. 56. The applicant subsequently asked the Supreme State Prosecutor to lodge a request for the protection of legality (an extraordinary remedy). On 28 July 2010 the Supreme State Prosecutor informed the applicant that the aforementioned request could only concern points of law and not the facts, which the applicant had called into question. 57. On 11 February 2011 the applicant and the Government reached an out-of-court settlement under the 2006 Act in the amount of 1,080 euros (EUR), covering all pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred by the applicant as a result of a violation of her right to a trial without undue delay in the criminal proceedings in issue. The applicant also received EUR 129.60 in respect of the costs incurred in the proceedings. 58. Article 183 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code regulating the criminal offence of sexual assault on a person younger than 15 years, as in force at the material time, reads as follows: “(1) A person who engages in sexual intercourse or any other sexual act with a person of the opposite or same sex who is not yet fifteen years old, and where the maturity of the perpetrator and that of the victim are obviously disproportionate, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to eight years. (2) A person who commits the above act against a person who is not yet ten years old, or against a vulnerable person who is not yet fifteen years old, or by using force or threat to life or limb, shall be punished with imprisonment of three years or more ...” 59. Section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as in force at the material time, provides that the police, having concluded the preliminary investigation of an alleged criminal offence, will draw up a criminal complaint based on the information collected and send it to the State Prosecutor’s Office. However, even if the information gathered does not appear to provide any grounds for such a criminal complaint to be made, the police must submit a report on their actions to the State Prosecutor. 60. As regards the protection of under-age victims of criminal offences of a sexual nature during judicial investigations, the Criminal Procedure Act includes a number of provisions aimed at protecting under-age victims of or witnesses to criminal proceedings. In proceedings regarding criminal offences against sexual integrity, minors must, from the initiation of the criminal proceedings onwards, have counsel to protect their rights. Under-age victims who have no lawyer are assigned one by the trial court. Moreover, the defendant cannot be present during the examination of witnesses below the age of 15 years who claim to be victims of criminal offences against sexual integrity. In this regard, section 240 of the Act provides that minors, especially those who have been affected by the criminal offence, should be examined with consideration for their age, to avoid any harmful effects on their mental state. 61. In order to ensure the smooth running of a judicial investigation, the parties and the victim may, under section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1994, complain to the president of the court charged with the investigation about any delays or other irregularities. Upon the examination of the complaint, the president is required to inform the complainant of any steps taken in this regard. 62. As to the time frame for scheduling a criminal trial, section 286(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the presiding judge shall schedule a first hearing within two months of receipt of an indictment. If he fails to do so, he must inform the president of the court accordingly, and the latter is required to take the necessary steps to schedule a hearing. 63. As regards the conduct of the hearing, section 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the public may be excluded from the hearing if so required, for example for the protection of the personal or family life of the defendant or the victim. In accordance with section 299 of the Act, the presiding judge conducts the hearing, grants the parties the right to address the court, and questions the defendant, witnesses and experts. Moreover, it is the presiding judge’s duty to ensure that the case is presented fully and clearly, that the truth is established, and that any obstacles protracting the proceedings are eliminated. 64. The defendant may be temporarily removed from the courtroom if a witness refuses to testify in his presence. The witness’s statement is then read to him and he is entitled to put questions to him or her. Nonetheless, pursuant to section 334(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act the presiding judge will prohibit any questions that have already been asked, that bear no relation to the case, or that in themselves suggest how they should be answered. 65. Article 148 of the Code of Obligations regulating the liability of legal persons for damage inflicted by one of their subsidiary bodies, which also applies to the determination of the State’s liability for damages, provides that a legal person is liable for damage inflicted on a third party by one of its subsidiary bodies in the exercise of its functions or in connection therewith. In order for a claimant to be awarded compensation for damage inflicted by the State, he or she is required to prove all four elements of the State’s liability, that is, unlawfulness of the State’s action, existence of damage, causal link, and negligence or fault on the part of the State. 66. By virtue of Article 179 of the Code of Obligations, which constitutes the statutory basis for awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage, such compensation may be awarded in the event of the infringement of a person’s personality rights, as well as for physical distress, mental distress suffered due to the reduction of life activities, disfigurement, defamation, death of a close relative, or fear, provided that the circumstances of the case, and in particular the level and duration of the distress and fear caused thereby, justify an award. 67. According to the decision of the Supreme Court no. II Ips 305/2009, an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage is strictly limited to the categories of damage specified in the Code of Obligations, adhering to the principle of numerus clausus. The Supreme Court thus decided that non-pecuniary damage resulting from excessive length of proceedings could not be classified among the categories of damage recognised by the Code of Obligations, as the right to trial within a reasonable time could not be interpreted as a personality right. 68. Under section 1 of the 2006 Act, any party to court proceedings – including a victim of a criminal offence – is guaranteed the right to have his or her rights decided upon by the court without undue delay. 69. The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985 provides that victims of crime should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity (Annex, Article 4). Moreover, the responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by, inter alia, taking measures to minimise inconvenience to victims, protecting their privacy when necessary, and ensuring that they and their families and witnesses on their behalf are protected from intimidation and retaliation (Annex, Article 6 (d)). 70. Victims of criminal offences further enjoy protection under the legislation of the European Union. In 2001, a Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/JHA) was adopted with a view to introducing minimum standards on the rights and protection of victims of crime. Article 2 of the Framework Decision requires the Member States to ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role in its criminal legal system and that they are treated with due respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings. Moreover, Article 3 provides that victims must be afforded the possibility to be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence; however, appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that they are questioned by the authorities only in so far as necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings. Article 8 requires the Member States to provide a number of measures aimed at protecting the victims’ safety and privacy in the criminal proceedings. Among others, measures must be taken to ensure that contact between victims and offenders within courts premises may be avoided, unless such is required in the interests of the criminal proceedings. Also, the Member States must ensure that, where there is a need to protect victims – particularly those most vulnerable – from the effects of giving evidence in open court, they may be entitled to testify in a manner which enables this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate means compatible with its basic legal principles. 71. Moreover, the EU Member States’ ambition to reinforce the rights of the victims of crime led to the adoption, on 25 October 2012, of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (2012/29/EU) establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. The relevant part of the Directive, which is to be implemented into the national laws of the EU Member States by 16 November 2015, provides as follows: Recital 19 “A person should be considered to be a victim regardless of whether an offender is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between them ...” Article 20 – Right to protection of victims during criminal investigations “Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that during criminal investigations: (a) interviews of victims are conducted without unjustified delay after the complaint with regard to a criminal offence has been made to the competent authority; (b) the number of interviews of victims is kept to a minimum and interviews are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal investigation; ... (d) medical examinations are kept to a minimum and are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal proceedings.” Article 22 – Individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection needs “1. Member States shall ensure that victims receive a timely and individual assessment, in accordance with national procedures, to identify specific protection needs and to determine whether and to what extent they would benefit from special measures in the course of criminal proceedings, as provided for under Articles 23 and 24, due to their particular vulnerability to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation. 2. The individual assessment shall, in particular, take into account: (a) the personal characteristics of the victim; (b) the type or nature of the crime; and (c) the circumstances of the crime. 3. In the context of the individual assessment, particular attention shall be paid to victims who have suffered considerable harm due to the severity of the crime; victims who have suffered a crime committed with a bias or discriminatory motive which could, in particular, be related to their personal characteristics; victims whose relationship to and dependence on the offender make them particularly vulnerable. In this regard, victims of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, gender-based violence, violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation or hate crime, and victims with disabilities shall be duly considered. ...” Article 23 – Right to protection of victims with specific protection needs during criminal proceedings “1. Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that victims with specific protection needs who benefit from special measures identified as a result of an individual assessment provided for in Article 22(1), may benefit from the measures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. A special measure envisaged following the individual assessment shall not be made available if operational or practical constraints make this impossible, or where there is a an urgent need to interview the victim and failure to do so could harm the victim or another person or could prejudice the course of the proceedings. 2. The following measures shall be available during criminal investigations to victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1): ... (b) interviews with the victim being carried out by or through professionals trained for that purpose; ... 3. The following measures shall be available for victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1) during court proceedings: (a) measures to avoid visual contact between victims and offenders including during the giving of evidence, by appropriate means including the use of communication technology; (b) measures to ensure that the victim may be heard in the courtroom without being present, in particular through the use of appropriate communication technology; (c) measures to avoid unnecessary questioning concerning the victim’s private life not related to the criminal offence; and (d) measures allowing a hearing to take place without the presence of the public.” 72. On 5 May 2011 the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which entered into force on 1 August 2014. The Convention was signed by Slovenia on 8 September 2011, but has not yet been ratified. The relevant part of the Convention provides as follows: Article 49 – General obligations “1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings. 2. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in conformity with the fundamental principles of human rights and having regard to the gendered understanding of violence, to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with this Convention.” Article 54 – Investigations and evidence “Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that, in any civil or criminal proceedings, evidence relating to the sexual history and conduct of the victim shall be permitted only when it is relevant and necessary.” Article 56 – Measures of protection “1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and judicial proceedings, in particular by: (a) providing for their protection, as well as that of their families and witnesses, from intimidation, retaliation and repeat victimisation; (b) ensuring that victims are informed, at least in cases where the victims and the family might be in danger, when the perpetrator escapes or is released temporarily or definitively; (c) informing them, under the conditions provided for by internal law, of their rights and the services at their disposal and the follow‐up given to their complaint, the charges, the general progress of the investigation or proceedings, and their role therein, as well as the outcome of their case; (d) enabling victims, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of internal law, to be heard, to supply evidence and have their views, needs and concerns presented, directly or through an intermediary, and considered; (e) providing victims with appropriate support services so that their rights and interests are duly presented and taken into account; (f) ensuring that measures may be adopted to protect the privacy and the image of the victim; (g) ensuring that contact between victims and perpetrators within court and law enforcement agency premises is avoided where possible; (h) providing victims with independent and competent interpreters when victims are parties to proceedings or when they are supplying evidence; (i) enabling victims to testify, according to the rules provided by their internal law, in the courtroom without being present or at least without the presence of the alleged perpetrator, notably through the use of appropriate communication technologies, where available. 2. A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child.”

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6. The applicant was born in 1962 and habitually resides in Krivoj Rog (Ukraine). 7. From 25 June 2002 until 19 September 2013 the applicant was continuously deprived of his liberty in Slovakia, mainly within the scope of detention pending trial on various charges pursued against him, partly in parallel and partly consecutively. His overall deprivation of liberty included the following periods. 8. From 25 June 2002 until 19 May 2005 he was remanded pending trial on several charges, which included what would later be classified as the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group (see paragraphs 11 and 35 below). On the latter date the prosecution on that charge was removed to be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings. 9. The applicant’s pre-trial detention in the subsequent period would later be set off against a four-year prison sentence imposed on him for the offence of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity. He was released from detention in connection with that offence on 13 July 2010. 10. Immediately after his release from the last-mentioned detention, the applicant’s liberty was again restricted and it later resulted in his being remanded pending trial on the charge of murder, of which he was ultimately acquitted on 27 July 2011. In consequence, he was released from detention on that very day. 11. Following his release on 27 July 2011, the applicant was immediately re-arrested on the same day, and later remanded pending trial on the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group (see paragraphs 8 above and 35 below). This term of detention ended with the applicant’s release on 22 February 2012. 12. Upon his release on 22 February 2012, the applicant was immediately re-arrested on the same day, and was later remanded pending trial on another charge of murder. This term of detention ended with the applicant’s release on 17 September 2013. 13. Upon his last-mentioned release, the applicant was immediately transferred to the detention centre for foreigners (záchytný tábor) in Medveďov, where he was detained until his expulsion to Ukraine on 19 September 2013. 14. The applicant’s prosecution on the first charge of murder (see paragraph 10 above) commenced in 2007 while he was still deprived of his liberty within the scope of detention pending trial on the charge of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity (see paragraph 9 above). 15. On 6 June 2010 an investigator informed the public prosecution service (“PPS”) that if the applicant’s conviction and sentence for attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity were to be upheld on appeal ‒ an appeal which was about to be heard ‒ the applicant would be eligible for release because the four-year term of his sentence would soon be fully covered by the term of his detention. It would therefore be advisable to consider lodging an application for the applicant to be detained pending trial on the murder charge, which the PPS subsequently did. 16. Immediately after the applicant’s release from detention in connection with the charge of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity, on 13 July 2010, he was taken to the Border and Foreigners Police Department in Bratislava, where a decision was taken ordering his administrative expulsion, a ban from re-entering Slovakia for five years, and detention pending the enforcement of the expulsion order (zaistenie). The applicant was then taken to the detention centre in Medveďov to await implementation of the expulsion order. 17. In the course of the murder trial, a public session (verejné zasadnutie) was scheduled to take place before the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) on 23 July 2010 with a view to examining questions concerning the detention of the applicant. However, in view of the circumstances described in the foregoing paragraph, on 15 July 2010 the public session was cancelled and the applicant was summoned for questioning the following day. 18. On the morning of 16 July 2010 the applicant was seized in the detention centre in Medveďov by police officers who then brought him to the District Court for the questioning that had been ordered. 19. Later in the day of 16 July 2010, the applicant was brought before a Chamber of the District Court for the questioning, immediately after which the District Court ordered a private session (neverejné zasadnutie) with a view to making a decision concerning the applicant’s detention. 20. Following the private session of 16 July 2010, on the same day, the District Court remanded the applicant in detention pending trial on the murder charge. 21. Immediately following the pronouncement of the detention order, on 16 July 2010, which was a Friday, the applicant stated on the record that he wished to lodge an interlocutory appeal and that he would submit the reasons for his appeal upon receiving the written version of the detention order with reasons. The appeal and its reasons were to be submitted to the court of appeal via the first-instance court, that is to say the District Court. 22. On 19 July 2010, which was a Monday, the applicant submitted the reasons for his appeal in writing in the Russian language, stating that he would submit further reasons when the written version of the remand order was served on him. It appears that the applicant’s submission of 19 July 2010 was received at the District Court on 21 July 2010. 23. On the last-mentioned date, that is to say on 21 July 2010, the written version of the detention order was served on the applicant in the Slovak language and, on the same day, the District Court transmitted the case file to the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) for determination of the applicant’s interlocutory appeal. 24. On 26 July 2010, which again was a Monday, the applicant sent a further written submission in the Russian language, adding reasons to his appeal. It appears that this submission was received at the District Court on 28 July 2010. 25. However, on that day, that is to say on 28 July 2010, the Regional Court determined the applicant’s interlocutory appeal by dismissing it as unfounded. The Regional Court observed at the outset that the applicant had not submitted any reasons for his appeal either orally or in writing. 26. On 25 August 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). Relying inter alia on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, he contended that (i) his arrest and bringing before the District Court had been unlawful; (ii) the remand decision had been arbitrary; and (iii) the Regional Court had failed to take account of the reasons for his interlocutory appeal submitted on 19 and 26 July 2010. 27. On 7 December 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It acknowledged that any tribunal ruling on matters concerning detention on remand was under a duty to examine carefully all submissions made by the person remanded, but pointed out that the applicant’s submissions of 19 and 26 July 2010 had not been available to the Regional Court when it examined his interlocutory appeal. In addition, matters concerning detention on remand generally require swift determination and courts of appeal were obliged to determine interlocutory appeals in such matters within five working days of the date when the appeal was referred to them for determination. Furthermore, in contrast to case no. II. ÚS 108/08 (see paragraph 50 below), the applicant had been heard at first instance. And lastly, he had been represented by a lawyer, but the latter had taken no steps to ensure the effective assertion of his rights. Thus, in the circumstances, the decision to dismiss the applicant’s interlocutory appeal without examining the reasons for it could not be considered arbitrary. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 3 February 2011. 28. At around 3.20 p.m. on 27 July 2011, following his acquittal of the first murder charge and release from detention in connection therewith earlier that day, the applicant was re-arrested. At 5 p.m. that day he was served with a document dated 18 June 2003 charging him with the offence of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above). 29. On 28 July 2011 the PPS applied for an order for the applicant’s detention pending trial, referring to charges of (i) 14 December 2001 for fraud; (ii) 8 June 2002 for legalising the proceeds of criminal activities; (iii) 18 June 2003 for conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group; and (iv) 3 July 2003 on another count of legalising the proceeds of a criminal activity. 30. On 29 July 2011 a pre-trial judge at the Specialised Criminal Court (Špecializovaný trestný súd) remanded the applicant pending trial. As regards the specific trial in question, he identified it by reference to the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Law no. 140/1961 Coll., as amended). The judge observed that the applicant was a non-national and that, prior to his initial arrest, for more than a year he had not been living at his registered permanent residence, but rather at his girlfriend’s address. However, he had not been registered as living there. Furthermore, the applicant had often been travelling abroad. Accordingly, the judge held that there was no guarantee that, if left at liberty, the applicant would actually continue to live at his girlfriend’s, as he had submitted he would do. The judge also observed that the charges brought against the applicant in the other trials concerned various offences allegedly committed at various times and that even the bringing of these charges had not prevented him from allegedly committing the murder of which he stood accused in one of those trials. In addition, the applicant had already been convicted with final effect of attempting to legalise the proceeds of a criminal activity (see paragraph 9 above). Therefore, his declaration that he had sufficient means to live on was not a sufficient guarantee that he would not continue offending. The judge concluded that there was a need to detain the applicant under Article 71 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 301/2005 Coll., as amended) in order to prevent his fleeing and continuing to engage in criminal activities. 31. The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal (i) arguing that his arrest had been unlawful because he had not been informed of the reasons for it; (ii) contesting the charge and the reasons for detaining him; (iii) complaining that he had already been deprived of liberty for more than 9 years; and (iv) complaining that his case demonstrated a pattern of arbitrarily remanding and re-remanding him consecutively on various charges. 32. On 8 August 2011 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal, finding that all formal and substantive requirements for detaining the applicant had been met and that all the applicable time-limits had been observed. 33. On 19 September 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court. Relying mainly on Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, he complained that, on his arrest, he had not been informed of the reasons for it; that the courts had ignored his argument concerning the unlawfulness of his arrest; that his detention was in general arbitrary; and, more concretely, that his case demonstrated a pattern of arbitrarily remanding and re‑remanding him consecutively on various charges. On the last-mentioned count, he contended in particular that (i) he had been facing the charges pursued against him in the present trial for eight years; (ii) he had been constantly detained for all those eight years; (iii) throughout that period the authorities had had a sufficient time to pursue the case against him properly; (iv) his previous accumulated detention had to be seen as one matter; and (v) there were no adequate grounds for its continuation. 34. On 18 October 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It held at the outset that it had no jurisdiction to examine any alleged violations in so far as they concerned the first-instance court because, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, such examination lay within the jurisdiction of the court of appeal. The Constitutional Court found that the report concerning the applicant’s arrest contained references to the charges on which he had been arrested and had been signed by the applicant. There could therefore be no doubt as to his having been informed of the reasons for his arrest. Similarly, it was apparent from the Supreme Court’s decision that it had taken note of the applicant’s arguments regarding the lawfulness of his arrest. The fact that the Supreme Court had not given a specific answer on that point was not contrary to the applicant’s rights because it had examined the arguments by implication when dealing with the overall lawfulness of the applicant’s detention. As to the remainder of the applicant’s complaint, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the applicant’s detention had by then lasted more than nine years in total. However, in terms of the Constitutional Court’s decision, it was necessary to take into account the fact that the contested decision was neither a decision to dismiss his request for release nor a decision to extend his detention. Having taken into account the nature of the contested decision and the reasons behind it, and considering the length of the applicant’s detention in concreto in the case at hand ‒ that is to say only since 27 July 2011 ‒ the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that, at the given time, the length of the applicant’s detention had not yet reached a point of being unconstitutional. The decision was served on the applicant on 22 November 2011. 35. The applicant’s release on 22 February 2012 (see paragraph 10 above) had been ordered by the Supreme Court on that very day. In its decision, it observed that at the initial stage of the proceedings (see paragraph 8 above), the applicant had been prosecuted for and detained pending trial on various charges, which had then been removed to be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings on 19 May 2005 and that, in the subsequent period, he had been remanded pending trial partly on the same charges. In this connection, it referred in the following terms to the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) in unrelated case no. II. US 55/98: “... the removal of one of several prosecuted offences to a separate set of proceedings is not, as such, contrary to the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty of the person facing the charges. Such a course of action on the part of the prosecuting authorities would, however, conflict [with those constitutional guarantees] ... if there were no well-founded reasons for it or if it manifestly served to obtain an extension of the detention beyond the statutory timescale of its duration, or if it otherwise entailed as a consequence the arbitrary keeping of a person in detention.” 36. As regards the present case, the Supreme Court went on to observe: “In the case at hand it is not disputed that there are well-founded reasons for continuing the detention of [the applicant] .... However, on the other hand, it must be observed that in the given case doubts may not be completely dispelled that the keeping of the applicant ... in detention for ten years might appear to be an arbitrary and above all self-serving deprivation of liberty in order to obtain his conviction for serious offences, especially since he has been portrayed as the leader of an illegal mafia-type grouping. Thus, if the duration of the above-mentioned [initial] detention is added to the period of the applicant’s detention after 27 July 201[1] (almost seven months), it becomes apparent that the maximum permissible duration of his detention for [two of the charges] has already been exceeded. At the same time, it must be observed that [the applicant] is being prosecuted for four offences which may not be detached from one another because it is one criminal matter for which he is detained.” 37. The Supreme Court went on to observe that the applicant’s detention after 27 July 2011 resulted from his prosecution for the same offences “for which he had already been detained from 25 July 2002 at least until 19 May 2005, when that matter had been removed to be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings. Within that period and in that matter, [the applicant] was detained for two years and 329 days ... [He] is at present detained in the same matter, which is still at pre-trial stage, (the [statutory maximum duration]) of such detention having been significantly exceeded. However, at the same time, the [statutory maximum duration] of the whole detention has also been exceeded.” 38. Moreover, in the closing part of its decision, the Supreme Court observed that: “The status of the examined matter is even more complicated, however: after the removal to a separate set of proceedings of a part of [the charges against the applicant], no decision has been identified as having regulated the scope of the applicant’s detention. From later decisions it may be understood that the applicant’s detention was linked to his prosecution for the offence classified as murder, which had earlier been a part of the previously joined proceedings. This status must be accepted as reality; if the detention of [the applicant] were linked to his prosecution for the offences which now form the subject-matter of the present proceedings, the maximum duration of [his detention] would have run out substantially earlier.” 39. In a judgment of 19 April 2011 (case no. II. US 93/11), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the “speediness” requirement under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the procedure for the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the first murder trial. However, his just satisfaction claim was rejected on the ground that he had failed to substantiate it. 40. On 22 August 2012 (case no. I. US 281/2012), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s Article 5 rights in the context of the dismissal of his request for release from detention pending trial on the charge of conceiving, setting up and supporting a criminal and terrorist group. The grounds were essentially the same as those established by the Supreme Court in its decision of 22 February 2012 (see paragraphs 35 et seq. above). 41. In a judgment of 5 June 2013 (case no. I. US 47/2013), the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s Article 5 rights in the context of the dismissal of his request for release from detention pending trial on the second murder charge (see paragraph 12 above). It observed that he had been remanded in detention pending trial on that charge as well as on the previous charge immediately after having been released from the previous detention, which had amounted to a recurring pattern. It was noteworthy that the alleged murder had taken place in 1999, although the applicant had not been charged with it until 2012, despite having been detained as early as 2002. The applicant had been prosecuted for various offences both in parallel and consecutively. The respective statutory provisions concerning the maximum duration of detention could not be interpreted as authorising detention pending trial for the maximum period in relation to each individual charge. Otherwise, as had occurred in the applicant’s case, a person could be detained for the maximum permissible period repeatedly for consecutively levelled charges ad infinitum, which was not justified by any public interest. The Constitutional Court nevertheless dismissed the applicant’s just satisfaction claim considering that, “in view of the circumstances of the case”, an award was “neither expedient nor appropriate” (účelné ani vhodné). The written version of the Constitutional Court’s judgment was served on the Trnava Regional Court on 11 September 2013. It was against that court that the complaint was directed and, following the Constitutional Court’s judgment, it eventually ordered the applicant’s release on 17 September 2013 (see paragraph 12 above). 42. The Constitutional Court also found a violation of the applicant’s Article 5 rights in the context of his detention pending trial on the second murder charge ‒ not only on the same grounds as those mentioned above but also on others ‒ in three further judgments of 6 and 7 March 2014 (case nos. IV. US 494/13, IV. US 495/13 and IV. US 561/13). However, noting that the applicant had been released in the meantime, it also cited and endorsed its previous position that it was “neither expedient nor appropriate” to award him any just satisfaction.

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6. The applicants were born in 1923, 1948, 1957 and 1924 respectively. The fourth applicant lives in the village of Rogachevo, the second applicant lives in the village of Obrochishte and the third applicant lives in Varna. The first applicant also lived in Rogachevo. 7. A predecessor of the applicants had owned agricultural land in the village of Kranevo, which had been collectivised after 1945. 8. Following the adoption of the Agricultural Land Act (“the ALA”, see paragraph 16 below) in 1991, the fourth applicant, on behalf of his predecessors’ heirs, sought the restitution of land totalling 15,000 square metres. In a decision of 19 June 1995, the Balchik agricultural land commission partially allowed the request, refusing to restore the heirs’ rights to 9,210 square metres of land which had been either taken for urban development or transferred to third parties. 9. Upon an appeal lodged by the fourth applicant, in a final judgment of 7 December 1995 the Balchik District Court quashed the relevant part of the land commission’s decision of 19 June 1995. It noted, in particular, that the public works for which parts of the land at issue had been taken had not been completed, and that in so far as other parts of the land had been transferred to third parties, there was no bar to restitution as the third parties had not carried out any construction work. On that basis the District Court recognised the heirs as the “owners” of all of the land claimed by them. 10. In execution of the above judgment, on 19 February 1996 the land commission issued another decision, restoring to the heirs, inter alia, in its “actual boundaries”, a plot of 1,180 square metres described as “plot no. 891, district 23, under the cadastral plan of Kranevo of 1950”. On 29 July 1996 the heirs obtained a plan of that plot. After agreeing as to the partition of the restituted land, the plot at issue was allocated to the fourth applicant and his sister (who after her death in 2004 was succeeded by the remaining applicants, namely her husband and her sons). On 30 September 1996 the fourth applicant and his sister obtained a notarial deed. 11. However, the plot was in actual fact held by several private persons, having been transferred in 1972 by the agricultural co-operative of the time to the predecessors of a certain Ms D.S. in exchange for another plot. In 1996 Ms D.S. had sold a share of the plot to a certain Ms E.H. and Mr N.R. 12. On 28 March 1997 the fourth applicant and his sister brought a rei vindicatio action against Ms D.S., Ms E.H. and Mr N.R., claiming that the 1972 transfer of the property and the subsequent sale could not have prejudiced their own rights. 13. The action was examined by three levels of jurisdiction and disallowed in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 1 June 2005. The domestic courts took note of the Balchik District Court’s final judgment of 7 December 1995, but found that they were competent to exercise an “indirect judicial review” (косвен контрол) of it. The courts found further that the documents describing the plot, namely the Balchik land commission’s decision of 19 February 1996 and the notarial deed of 30 September 1996, referred to “plot no. 891, district 23 under the cadastral plan of Kranevo of 1950”. However, there existed no cadastral plan dating from 1950 and the current plans, the last of which dated from 1984, did not show a plot bearing that number. The Balchik District Court and the land commission had thus restored the claimants’ rights to “a non-existent plot under a non-existent plan”. 14. In addition, the domestic courts found that the defendants had validly obtained title to their plot pursuant to the 1972 exchange and the 1996 contract of sale. Accordingly, they were entitled to hold the land as its owners. 15. Following the above developments, the applicants have not sought to obtain compensation in lieu of restitution in kind, a possibility provided for under the relevant provisions of the ALA.

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6. The applicants were born in 1962, 1967, 1989, 1996, 1998, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947, 1949, 1955, 1957 and 1960 respectively, and live in Larnaca, Nicosia and Famagusta. The first and second applicants are husband and wife. The third, fourth and fifth applicants are their children. The sixth to thirteenth applicants are the five brothers and three sisters of the first applicant. 7. On 1 December 2000 a Turkish Cypriot named Ömer Gazi Tekoğul was arrested by the police of the Republic of Cyprus in possession of two kilograms of heroin. His arrest brought protests from the authorities of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), who alleged that he had been unlawfully arrested in the buffer zone controlled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (“the UNFICYP”), where neither the Greek Cypriot nor the Turkish Cypriot side was allowed to exercise authority. There were reports that Mr Tekoğul’s vehicle had allegedly been found abandoned by the Turkish Cypriot authorities inside the United Nations (“UN”) buffer zone, with its engine running and headlights on. The Republic of Cyprus authorities maintained that the arrest had been effected within their jurisdiction just outside the buffer zone. 8. On 8 December 2000 Mr Tekoğul was charged with drug possession and smuggling, and was remanded in custody by the Larnaca District Court in the Republic of Cyprus. 9. According to a report of the UN Secretary General dated 30 May 2001 on the UN operation in Cyprus, UNFICYP’s own investigation into the incident had not yielded sufficient evidence to confirm or refute either version of the events regarding the arrest of Mr Tekoğul[1]. 10. In the meantime, on 20 March 2001 Mr Tekoğul was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment by the Larnaca Assize Court on various drug‑related charges, but was subsequently pardoned by President Clerides and released on 28 September 2001. 11. The first applicant is a building contractor. At the time of the events giving rise to this application, he owned a construction company, Panicos Tsiakkourmas and Company Ltd., which employed workers from both sides of the island. 12. Like many other Greek Cypriot contractors employing Turkish Cypriot workers, the first applicant picked up his Turkish Cypriot workers each morning from a café (“Rabiye’s café”) located in the Sovereign Base Area (“SBA”) of Dhekelia[2] in the vicinity of the Pergamos checkpoint, where people crossed from the “TRNC” to the SBA. The first applicant would collect his Turkish Cypriot workers from the café every weekday morning at approximately 5.45 to 6 a.m. and would drive them to work. At the end of the working day, he would drop them off at the same location. 13. The events that took place on the morning of 13 December 2000, which resulted in the first applicant’s detention by the “TRNC” authorities, are disputed between the parties. They will therefore be presented separately. 14. At approximately 5.30 a.m. on 13 December 2000 the first applicant left his house in the village of Livadhia in Larnaca to collect his Turkish Cypriot workers from Rabiye’s café in his red Chevrolet double-cabin pickup, as he did every workday. Since it had rained heavily the night before, parts of the road were flooded, which forced him to drive slowly. The heavy rain had stopped by the morning, but it was still drizzling when he left the house. 15. On the main road from Pyla to Pergamos leading to Rabiye’s café, the first applicant noticed five to six metres ahead of him a white Isuzu pickup with the registration number UJ 100, which he recognised as belonging to a fellow Greek Cypriot contractor (V.Z.). As he was driving slowly behind that vehicle in the left-hand lane[3], the first applicant noticed further down the road another car, a red Renault, which had pulled up on the left side of the road just before the ex‑Pergamos camp[4] junction, approximately 500 metres before Rabiye’s café. The bonnet of the red car was open and two men in civilian clothes were checking the engine. 16. The white pickup driving in front of the first applicant slowed down as it approached the red Renault and the driver rolled down his window to talk to the two men. While one of the men continued to check the car’s engine, the other one waved the driver of the white pickup to move along. 17. As the first applicant approached the stationary red Renault, another car, a white Renault which he had not previously noticed, emerged from the junction on the left-hand side and started heading towards him at full speed. The first applicant swerved his car to the right to prevent a collision and then applied the brakes. The white Renault also stopped right in front of his car and four men in civilian clothes leapt out. The first applicant then noticed that the white Isuzu pickup travelling ahead of him had also stopped, probably to check what was happening behind. In a matter of seconds, one of the men who had leapt out of the white Renault opened his driver’s door, shouted some words in Turkish and put a gun to his forehead, while another tried to pull him out of the car. When the first applicant resisted, holding tight to his unfastened seat belt, the man holding the gun hit him on the head above the left ear with the handle of his gun, which caused him to fall down on the road into a puddle of rainwater measuring 20 to 25 cm, in a semi-conscious state as a result of the force of the blow. The men kicked and punched him on the ground, and twisted and bit his hands to force him to let go of the seat belt, while the first applicant called for help. After receiving some forceful kicks below the pelvis and to the ribs, which were so strong that he thought his ribs were broken, he let go of the belt and rolled on the ground. The four men then picked him up by the arms and legs and dragged him to the white Renault, which was a left-hand drive car. The first applicant estimated that the whole ordeal, which had started at approximately 5.45 a.m., had lasted less than three minutes, and it had been witnessed by the driver of the white Isuzu pickup travelling ahead of him. 18. Once inside the car, with both his arms twisted behind his back, the first applicant received another strong kick from the man who was holding him by the right arm. The man holding the pistol sat in the front passenger seat and continued to point the pistol at him. They then started driving towards the Pergamos checkpoint. When the first applicant noticed that the right passenger door of the car was not fully closed, he started pushing the man to his right with his shoulder so that they would fall out of the car. As they were passing Rabiye’s café, the first applicant saw a group of people standing outside and called out for help from the slightly open door, but he could not manage to attract their attention. 19. When the car reached the Pergamos checkpoint, the first applicant noticed that the barrier, which was normally down, had been lifted so that they were able to drive straight through to the “TRNC” without slowing down. After driving in the occupied area for a while, the man sitting to the first applicant’s left placed a rope around his neck and tied his hands behind his back with the ends of the same rope, which prevented him from moving. When the applicant asked whether they were going to kill him, the same man answered yes and then the man sitting in the front passenger seat punched him in the face, which damaged his teeth and caused his mouth to bleed. 20. The first applicant could not understand the conversation in the car, which was in Turkish, except for the word “police”, which was uttered frequently. Since he had lived in the occupied area until he was twelve years old, he recognised that he was being driven towards Famagusta. Once they reached the Famagusta industrial area, the car stopped, and the man sitting in the front passenger seat took off his sock and taped it around the first applicant’s eyes, and then taped his mouth. A couple of minutes later, the first applicant heard another car drive up to them. He was quickly transferred to the other car, with his hands still tied behind his back with the rope that ran around his neck. After driving for another five to seven minutes the second car stopped and he was taken out of the car. He was subsequently taken into a building and put in a room on his own, where he waited for quite some time with his eyes and mouth taped, and his hands tied behind his back. 21. After a while, someone untied the rope around the first applicant’s hands and neck, but left his hands cuffed behind his back, and removed the tape from his mouth. He was then asked personal questions regarding himself and his family, including whether he had any relatives working in the police force or the army. No one explained to him where he was or why he was being held. The person who spoke to him alternated between broken Greek and English. His captors then made him sit in front of an electric heater so that he might dry, as his clothes were all wet from falling into the puddle of water outside his car during the struggle prior to his abduction. 22. When his captors eventually removed the sock from his eyes, the first applicant noticed that he was in an office, and the time was 11.55 a.m. Three men in civilian clothes, whom he had not seen before but later discovered to be Sub‑inspector Ü.Ö. and police sergeants R.Ö. and H.M., were standing in front of him. When he asked them in Greek why he had been seized, one of them replied in broken Greek that he had been arrested for drug possession. They then gave him a fresh set of clothes and shoes and asked him to change out of his wet clothes. The first applicant suspected that he was in a police station, but his captors continued to conceal his whereabouts and the identity of the three persons interrogating him. 23. After changing into new clothes, the first applicant was led out of the building by the three men. In the reception area of the building, he saw police officers in uniform, which reinforced his assumption that he had been taken to a police station. He was subsequently taken to a hospital in Nicosia by two of his interrogators. 24. The first applicant was first examined by a doctor at the hospital in the presence of the two men who had taken him there. As the doctor did not speak English or Greek, they relied on the officers’ interpretation to communicate. The first applicant explained to the doctor that he was diabetic and asked the doctor to check his blood sugar levels. Tests showed that his blood sugar level had increased considerably, so the doctor prescribed him an anti‑diabetic drug. The first applicant also tried to tell the doctor that he was suffering from pain in his pelvis and ribs, and in particular that the pain in the ribs was making it difficult to breathe, but the doctor paid no attention to his grievances and merely registered the swelling in his head and some redness on his chest and back, without examining the injuries in his mouth or lower body. 25. The first applicant was subsequently referred to a radiologist, who X‑rayed his chest and head. He was also examined by a specialist in pulmonary diseases. He was then taken for a drug test. When the first applicant refused to take the drug test and requested to see UN doctors instead, one of the men escorting him punched him in the stomach. It is not clear whether a drug test was subsequently performed on the first applicant. 26. Following the examinations at the hospital, which lasted about two hours, the first applicant was taken to another building, where he was again placed in an office. In that office, the men handling him showed him a black plastic bag with Turkish writing on it, and told him that the bag contained the drugs recovered from him. However, after some discussion among themselves, one of them went out of the room and came back with another black plastic bag, which bore no writing, and placed the drugs allegedly recovered from him in the new bag. They then placed the bag in a plastic container and sealed it before his eyes. 27. At approximately 5.30 p.m., the first applicant was taken to yet another small office in a nearby building. There were six men in the office, including the two who had been escorting him and two interpreters. The men were speaking to each other in Turkish, without translating for him, and drinking tea; the first applicant did not understand where he had been taken. One of the interpreters then told him in broken Greek that he was before a judge, who had charged him with possession of drugs, and that he would be placed in custody for eight days. For the brief period he was in that room, the first applicant was not given the opportunity to respond, apart from stating that he had no involvement with drugs, or to ask questions; he was not informed of his rights, nor was he asked whether he wanted the assistance of a lawyer. 28. The first applicant was subsequently taken to the Atatürk Square police station (referred to as the “Saray police station”) in Nicosia and placed in a very small cell, measuring approximately 1.80 by 1.20 metres, where he stayed for the next eight days. The cell was very cold, damp and mouldy in parts, because there was no glass in the small window. Despite the cold, he was given only one filthy blanket to keep warm. There were, moreover, no shower facilities in the police station. As for the toilets, they were very dirty; no soap or toilet paper was provided and the toilet did not flush. The first applicant had to call an officer each time he needed to use the toilet, and on many occasions he was not let out of his cell to go to the toilet, despite his need to urinate frequently on account of his diabetes. He solved the problem by urinating in a plastic bottle inside his cell. The first applicant further stated that he had not been given any food at the Saray police station and that he had had to purchase food from the canteen with his own money. 29. The first applicant claimed that the next day, a Turkish Cypriot detainee at the Saray police station approached him and told him in Greek that the police had asked him to confess to being the person who would pick up the drugs that the first applicant had intended to hide in the “TRNC”, but that he had refused to collaborate with the police. 30. At 3 p.m. on 14 December 2000 the first applicant was visited by a UN inspector and a doctor. The inspector issued an incident report following the visit, the relevant parts of which read as follows: “During the visit the prisoner, who is a diabetic, stated that he had no complaints in relation to how he had been treated by the TCPE [Turkish Cypriot Police Element] but that he had been assaulted i.e. punched and kicked by six civilians and had been threatened with a gun by them a short time before his arrest by the TCPE. He stated that his arrest had occurred in the Dekelia [sic.] area. Since his arrest he had been taken to the Hospital by the TCPE where he was administered some drugs for his diabetes. He requested the UN to secure his own clothes for him, to deliver his Diabetes Monitoring Kit to him and also to arrange a visit for his wife. He further stated that he did not do anything and that he was kidnapped at Dekelia. He was in a distressed state. He consented to a medical examination by the UN doctor who found a number of tender areas with no bruising.” 31. On 15 December 2000 the first applicant was visited at the Saray police station by a Turkish Cypriot lawyer, Mr M. Aziz, who was appointed by his family to represent him. The meeting was monitored by a number of police officers. On 16 December 2000 another Turkish Cypriot lawyer, Mr G. Menteş, visited him and they met, once again, in the presence of police officers. The first applicant claimed that all his subsequent meetings with his lawyers at the Saray police station had been held in the presence of police officers or other prison authorities. 32. The Government’s version of the events is based on the incident reports prepared by Sub-inspector Ü.Ö., who allegedly led the operation for the first applicant’s arrest. 33. According to Sub-inspector Ü.Ö.’s report, on 12 December 2000 he received a tip-off call from a police informant, informing him that a Greek Cypriot named “Panayotis” would enter the “TRNC” through the SBA of Dhekelia the next morning with narcotics, which he would hide in a pre‑designated spot just outside the Turkish cemetery to the west of the Pergamos checkpoint, to be picked up by a contact from the “TRNC”. 34. At approximately 4.45 a.m. on 13 December 2000 Sub-inspector Ü.Ö., accompanied by police sergeants R.Ö. and H.M., took their positions in the vicinity of the drop-off point to wait in ambush. At around 6.05 a.m., before daybreak, they saw someone approaching on foot from the direction of the SBA, approximately seventy metres to the west of the Pergamos checkpoint. It was believed that this person, who was later identified as the first applicant, had crossed the ditch which ran along the boundary between the “TRNC” and the SBA and which was filled with rainwater at the relevant time, and then jumped over the wire fence between boundary stones nos. 96 and 97, where parts of the fence had shrunk. As the first applicant was walking towards an olive tree in the designated area, Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. came out of his hiding place and ordered him to stop, in Turkish. Upon hearing that order, the first applicant started to run back towards the SBA; however, the two police sergeants caught up with him and seized him after a struggle, during which the applicant fell to the ground. The sub-inspector then grabbed the package that the first applicant was holding in his hands, which was wrapped in a black plastic bag. In the meantime, Sergeant H.M. informed the first applicant in Greek that they were police officers and told him that he had entered “TRNC” territory without permission. He also asked the first applicant to identify himself and to explain what he was carrying in the plastic bag. The first applicant gave his name and stated that he was innocent. The police officers then handcuffed him and placed him in the police car. Once inside the car, the police officers opened the plastic bag and found two plates of cannabis resin wrapped in a white cloth and a Greek newspaper. Sergeant H.M. informed the applicant once again, in Greek, that he had entered “TRNC” territory without permission and that he had in his possession prohibited drugs. 35. At approximately 6.50 a.m. the first applicant was taken to the Famagusta (Gazimağusa) police headquarters for an identity check, where he was also questioned about where he had obtained the drugs and to whom he was taking them in the “TRNC”. The first applicant remained silent in response to those questions. 36. At approximately 8.30 a.m. Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. and Sergeant H.M. went to the narcotics bureau of the Nicosia (Lefkoşa) police headquarters to inform their superiors of the first applicant’s arrest, while the first applicant stayed at the Famagusta police headquarters under the supervision of Sergeant R.Ö.. After going to the narcotics bureau, Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. and Sergeant H.M. went back to the scene of the incident, where Sub‑inspector Ü.Ö. sketched a map of the area and another sergeant took photographs. Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. also took a soil sample from the area for forensic analysis. 37. At approximately 11.30 a.m. Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. and Sergeant H.M. went back to the Famagusta police headquarters, and took the first applicant’s clothes and shoes as evidence. 38. At approximately 12.50 p.m. the first applicant was taken to the Dr Burhan Nalbantoğlu State Hospital (“the Nicosia State Hospital”) for a general medical examination. After the examination, he was taken to the narcotics bureau of the Nicosia police headquarters, where the material which was obtained from him earlier and which was believed to be cannabis resin was sealed in his presence, to be dispatched to the laboratory for further examination. The first applicant’s shoes, together with the soil sample collected from the area where he was believed to have crossed into the “TRNC”, were also sealed before his eyes for forensic analysis. 39. Later the same evening, the first applicant was brought before the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court, where the presiding judge ordered his remand in custody for eight days to facilitate the police investigation. The hearing was held in the judge’s office and the applicant was assisted by two interpreters. 40. According to the detailed incident report prepared by Sub-inspector Ü.Ö., on the night of 13 December 2000 various measures were taken in the area where the first applicant had been arrested to catch the person who was supposed to pick up the drugs, but no one showed up. 41. The analysis report of 18 December 2000 drawn up by the Ministry of Health and Environment of the “TRNC” confirmed that the substance allegedly seized from the first applicant was cannabis resin, in the amount of 1.1 kilograms. 42. According to the report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the “TRNC” dated 2 January 2001, various different kinds of soil were found under the first applicant’s shoes, while the muddy specimen found on the heel appeared to be the most recent. The amount of soil extracted from the heel was not found to be sufficient for a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, the limited examinations conducted revealed that the sample obtained from the shoes resembled the sample obtained from the scene of the incident, without, however, being identical. The report indicated that variations in soil properties could be due to the depth from which the soil sample had been obtained, or whether it had been obtained from a fertilised part of the land or not. 43. On 21 December 2000 Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. informed the first applicant of the charges against him, which were the possession of 1.1 kilograms of cannabis resin and its unlawful import into the “TRNC”. The first applicant, who was provided with an interpreter, used his right to remain silent, merely stating that his lawyer would defend him. However, he refused to sign a written statement to that effect. 44. Later the same day, the first applicant was brought before the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court for a bail hearing, where he was represented by two lawyers, Mr M. Aziz, a local lawyer practising in “TRNC”, and Mr P. Brogan, who practised at the English Bar. He was also assisted by an interpreter. At the hearing, the prosecution requested the court to order the first applicant’s detention until the trial in view of the risk of his absconding, and called Sub‑inspector Ü.Ö. as a witness. 45. The first applicant’s counsel pleaded in favour of his release, and also argued that he had not been arrested in “TRNC” territory as alleged, but had been abducted from SBA territory by unknown persons and then taken to the “TRNC” after being badly beaten. The assault had left injuries on his body, as documented in various medical reports. The first applicant did not make any additional comments on his alleged ill-treatment, but merely stated that he would appear for trial if he were released on bail. 46. Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. denied the allegation that the first applicant had been assaulted and stated that the injuries observed on his body might have been caused as a result of the resistance he had shown to his arrest. 47. At the end of the hearing, the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court refused the first applicant’s bail request on the weight of the arguments presented by the prosecution and ordered his pre-trial detention for a period not exceeding three months. The District Court indicated in this connection that it had not found the first applicant’s statement that he would appear for trial if released on bail to be credible and reliable, but it did not comment on his counsel’s allegations of ill-treatment. The first applicant was transferred to the Nicosia Central Prison after the hearing. 48. It appears that on 30 January 2001 the first applicant appeared before the court for another bail hearing. The Court has not been provided with the minutes of that hearing, but it appears that the hearing was adjourned until 8 February 2001 on account of the first applicant’s deteriorating health, and that he was transferred to hospital for treatment for high blood sugar levels (see paragraphs 106-109 below for further details). 49. On 6 February 2001 the charges against the first applicant were lodged with the Famagusta District Court. 50. On 8 February 2001 the Famagusta District Court convened for a preliminary inquiry in the case, which lasted until 15 February 2001, during which period the District Court sat for six full days. The first applicant was present throughout the hearings and was represented by both his lawyers. He was also assisted by interpreters. 51. During the preliminary inquiry the prosecution called five witnesses: the three police officers who had allegedly arrested the first applicant, namely Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. and police sergeants H.M. and R.Ö.; another police officer who had interpreted the formal charges against the first applicant; and the forensic chemist who had analysed the drugs allegedly seized from him. The first applicant, on the other hand, called one witness, Mr J.C., the UN Liaison Officer in Cyprus at the material time. 52. The Famagusta District Court first heard the prosecution witnesses, who gave testimonies consistent with the incident reports and presented evidence against the first applicant, including a sketched map indicating where the applicant had crossed into the “TRNC” and where he had been captured, photographs of the relevant areas taken a few hours after the arrest, the drugs allegedly recovered from the applicant, and the clothes and shoes he had been wearing on the relevant day, which were soiled with mud on account of the struggle on the ground, as well as copies of the medical reports drawn up following his arrest. 53. The prosecution witnesses were subsequently cross-examined by the defence counsel, who challenged the veracity and credibility of their testimonies in the light of the first applicant’s account of events, according to which he had been kidnapped from his car in SBA territory and had then been handed over to the “TRNC” police. The defence counsel accordingly asked detailed questions about the tip-off call which Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. had allegedly received the day before the first applicant’s arrest and the identity of the police informant; the planning of the ambush and the weather conditions on the relevant morning; the route that the first applicant had followed to reach the “TRNC”; the exact point from which he had allegedly crossed into “TRNC” territory; and the paperwork undertaken by the police subsequent to the first applicant’s arrest. The responses received appeared to be consistent with the earlier testimonies and did not reveal new evidence, apart from some factual details, such as the height of the border fence, which, according to the prosecution witnesses, was approximately 110 centimetres at the point of crossing but yielded when pressed, details of the conversation with the police informant, and the notes taken by the arresting officers in their police notebooks prior to and after the operation. 54. Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. was asked why he had not submitted the package of drugs allegedly recovered from the first applicant for a fingerprint examination, to which he responded that he had seen no need for such an examination as he had taken the package directly from the applicant’s hands himself. He further maintained that no examination had been made of the footprints identified on the terrain, as the first applicant had apparently slipped and had not left very clear marks. 55. Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. was also asked whether he had recorded the tip-off he had received from his informant. He responded that he had recorded both the tip-off call and the subsequent operation conducted on the morning of 13 December 2000 for the first applicant’s arrest in his police notebook, which had been submitted to the court as evidence. 56. On the last day of the preliminary inquiry the defence counsel called Mr J.C. as the defence’s sole witness. Mr J.C. stated that he had been appointed by the UNFICYP as a Civil Affairs Police Liaison Officer. His duty was to liaise between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot sides on policing and humanitarian issues. He explained that on 3 December 2000 his contact person on the Turkish side on humanitarian issues, Mr M.İ., who was the head of the Directorate on Consular Affairs and Minorities Issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the “TRNC”, had called him for a meeting. During the meeting, Mr M.İ. had told Mr J.C. that he wanted to protest, through the UN, about the recent arrest of Ömer Gazi Tekoğul by the Greek Cypriot police in the UN buffer zone. Mr M.İ. had allegedly told him that if Ömer Gazi Tekoğul was not released before noon on 4 December 2000, Greek Cypriots from Pyla, a mixed village located in the UN buffer zone, would start disappearing. M.İ. had added that if the Greek Cypriot police had adopted a new policy of kidnapping suspects from the buffer zone, the Turkish Cypriot police would respond in the same manner. 57. In response to the objections of the prosecution regarding the admissibility of Mr J.C.’s testimony as evidence, the Famagusta District Court held that it would accept Mr J.C.’s testimony not as evidence as to the truth of the statement allegedly made by Mr M.İ., which would be against the rule on hearsay evidence, but only as evidence of the fact that a meeting had taken place between Mr M.İ. and Mr J.C. 58. On the basis of the testimonies and other evidence presented before it, on 15 February 2001 the Famagusta District Court decided that there were sufficient grounds to commit the first applicant for trial before the Famagusta Assize Court. It also prolonged the first applicant’s pre-trial detention. 59. The first applicant claimed that during the preliminary inquiry, he had seen one of his abductors amongst the audience, but that the latter had managed to leave the court room before he had had the chance to point him out to his lawyer. 60. The first applicant’s trial commenced in the Famagusta Assize Court on 23 February 2001. He attended all of the hearings together with his two lawyers. He was also provided with an interpreter. 61. In addition to the five witnesses who had testified at the preliminary inquiry, the prosecution called as witnesses a forensic police officer, a “TRNC” military officer stationed in Pergamos, the three doctors who had examined the first applicant on 13 December 2000 and the agricultural engineer who had analysed the soil obtained from the first applicant’s shoes. The evidence provided by the prosecution witnesses, including during cross‑examination, was, in general, consistent with the previous testimonies and official reports. 62. During his cross-examination Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. was asked a number of questions regarding the identity of his informant, which he refused to answer. However, he gave detailed information about the telephone conversation he had had with the informant, and also about his “exploratory visit” to the estimated drug drop-off point in the evening of 12 December 2000 together with the informant. Sub‑inspector Ü.Ö. also stated that he had informed his supervisor about the information he had received from his informant prior to the operation conducted on 13 December 2000, while keeping the identity of the informant secret. However, he had not alerted the local police and military officers in Pergamos in order to protect the secrecy of the operation. In response to a question as to why no one had been left at the drop-off point following the first applicant’s arrest to capture the latter’s contact person in the “TRNC”, Sub-inspector Ü.Ö. stated that he had suspected his informant to be that contact person and that, in any event, a unit had been stationed at the drop‑off point on the night of 13 December 2000 to catch any suspects. 63. During his cross-examination Dr E.A., who had conducted the initial medical examination of the first applicant after his arrest, was asked to provide details of the findings of his medical report (see paragraph 24 above). Accordingly, he indicated that on the relevant morning he had observed a swelling with a diameter of 4 centimetres on the left side of the first applicant’s head, as well as redness measuring 0.5 cm by 4-5 cm behind the right ear, redness measuring 8-10 cm across the chest, and two areas of redness measuring 3-5 cm by 3-4 cm on the back, all of which appeared to have been sustained only hours before the examination. He stated that the swelling observed above the first applicant’s left ear could have been caused by blunt-force trauma or by the impact of falling on a stone or similar hard object. He also confirmed that the examination had been conducted in the presence of two persons in civilian clothes, whom he had perceived to be police officers and who had also acted as interpreters between the first applicant and himself. He added that although he had raised the question specifically, the first applicant had not expressed any complaints of bodily injury, apart from stating that he was diabetic. The police, on the other hand, had explained that there had been a scuffle during his arrest. 64. Dr İ.A., who had examined the first applicant after Dr E.A. for any pulmonary problems, stated that the first applicant had presented symptoms of bronchitis. He had therefore prescribed medicine to him for that purpose but had not noted any other injuries or marks on his face or torso. He also indicated that the examination had been conducted in the presence of another person in civilian clothes, whom he assumed to be a police officer. 65. Dr H.K., a general surgeon, stated before the court that he had also examined the first applicant on the relevant day in response to his complaints of abdominal pain, but had not identified any causes for such pain. In response to a question from the first applicant’s lawyer, he stated that a blow to the abdomen could cause pain in that area. He added that if the blow was strong, it would also leave a mark, but he had not noted any such marks on the first applicant’s abdomen. 66. On 23 March 2001, after the close of the case for the prosecution, the first applicant was called to make his defence statement. His sworn testimony was largely in line with the account of events he subsequently submitted to the Strasbourg Court, including the detailed allegations of his abduction and ill‑treatment. However, he did not claim before the trial court that his abduction had been witnessed by the driver of a certain white Isuzu pickup. 67. Following the first applicant’s statement and cross‑examination, the defence called seventeen witnesses to testify in support of its case, including a number of SBA police officers. The pertinent witness statements are summarised below. (a) Statement of Mr G.H. (Greek Cypriot builder) 68. Mr G.H. stated that he had left his house in Larnaca to go to work at approximately at 5.30 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000. While on his way to Pergamos to pick up his Turkish Cypriot workers, he had overtaken the first applicant’s car, which was heading in the same direction. When asked whether he had actually seen the applicant in the car, G.H. answered in the negative and indicated that he had only identified the car from its number plate. Moreover, he had been unable to tell whether there had been only one person or more in the car. G.H. claimed that as he had approached Pergamos, he had noticed a stationary white car on the left-hand side of the road, with its bonnet open and a man examining its engine. Shortly afterwards, he had noticed a red car with a number plate starting with a “Z”, parked to the right of the white car. He had driven past those cars without stopping, but while driving by, he had heard a man shouting. He had assumed that it was the driver of the white car calling for help with his car. He had arrived at Rabiye’s café where his workers were waiting for him at approximately 5.45 a.m., had a coffee and then left with his workers. As he was driving past the spot where he had seen the two Renault cars previously, he had noticed the first applicant’s car parked oddly, almost in the middle of the road and facing towards the roadside, with its driver’s door open, its engine running and its headlights on. The two other cars, on the other hand, had gone. (b) Statement of Mr A.G. (Greek Cypriot builder) 69. On the morning of 13 December 2000, as he was driving to Pergamos to pick up his Turkish Cypriot workers from Rabiye’s café, Mr A.G. had noticed a red car with a red “Z” number plate parked on the left side of the road just before the junction leading to the ex-Pergamos camp. It had looked like the police cars that were used by the “TRNC” police in Pyla. The red car was facing Pergamos with its bonnet open, and there were two men standing in front of it. He had then noticed, on the opposite side of the road by the cypress trees, a white car, which had flashed its headlights at him. He had driven past both cars without stopping and arrived at Rabiye’s café at approximately 5.40 to 5.45 a.m. He had left the café at approximately 6 a.m. and while driving past the place where he had previously seen the two cars, he had noticed that those cars had gone but this time the first applicant’s car was parked on the right side of the road, facing the wrong direction, with its engine running, and its headlights and wipers on. The driver’s door was also open. (c) Statement of Mr N.M. (Greek Cypriot builder) 70. Mr N.M. left his house at approximately 5.30 a.m. on 13 December 2000 to pick up his Turkish Cypriot workers at their designated café by the Pergamos checkpoint. A red double-cabin pickup, which he later learned belonged to the first applicant, was driving approximately seventy metres ahead of him in the same direction. When he saw that part of the road was flooded, N.M. first turned his car around to return home, as he thought the weather would not be suitable for construction work that day, but then changed his mind and resumed his journey to Pergamos. On reaching the junction leading to the ex-Pergamos camp sometime between 5.40 and 5.50 a.m., he noticed the first applicant’s car parked in the right-hand lane of the road, facing slightly to the right. He also saw someone getting out of that car and walking towards the fields on the right. There was no one else in the car, but the engine was running. The driver’s door and both rear passenger doors were open. He also noticed three or four other people approximately twenty metres further down in the fields to the right, but did not see any other cars in the vicinity. He then heard someone yelling “Let me go!” in Greek from the direction of the fields, but was too scared to get out of the car to see what was going on, and drove back home. (d) Statement of Mr Yiannis Tsiakkourmas (the eighth applicant, who is also the first applicant’s brother and a builder) 71. While driving towards Pergamos to pick up his Turkish Cypriot workers at approximately 6.05 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000, Mr Yiannis Tsiakkourmas saw his brother’s car parked just before the junction leading to the ex-Pergamos camp. He noticed that the engine was running and the wipers were on, the driver’s door was open, but his brother was not around. His phone and bag were, however, in the car. He drove to Rabiye’s café to ask about his brother, and when he found no further information he took two of his Turkish Cypriot workers with him and drove back to the place where he had found the first applicant’s car. He then went to the SBA police to report his brother missing. Upon returning to the place of the incident, and prior to the arrival of any SBA police officers, he asked one of his Turkish Cypriot workers to move the car to avoid causing any accidents. The car was accordingly parked in a safer spot on the left side of the main road. (e) Statement of Mr S.E. (Greek Cypriot builder) 72. On the morning of 13 December 2000, while driving to Pergamos to pick up his Turkish Cypriot workers, Mr S.E. saw a red Chevrolet double‑cabin pickup, which he later learned was the first applicant’s car, parked in the right-hand lane of the road approximately 500 metres from Rabiye’s café, slightly facing the left-hand side of the road and with the driver’s door open. When he reached the café, one of the first applicant’s Turkish Cypriot workers approached him and said that his boss had still not arrived. S.E. let the worker call the first applicant from his mobile phone, but the first applicant did not answer. S.E. then left the café with his workers. As he was driving past the first applicant’s car again, he saw three or four people standing by it, including the first applicant’s brother, Yiannis Tsiakkourmas. 73. Three other Greek Cypriot builders, Mr H.Z., Mr A.S. and Mr M.T., also gave similar accounts to that of S.E. regarding the location of the first applicant’s car. (f) Statement of Detective Sergeant P.P. (SBA police officer) 74. Detective Sergeant P.P., a Greek Cypriot, was the chief investigating officer appointed by the SBA police to investigate the first applicant’s alleged abduction. He stated that at approximately 6.30 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000, he had seen Yiannis Tsiakkourmas at the SBA police station, reporting his brother missing. When he went to the scene of the incident at around 7 a.m., he found the first applicant’s red Chevrolet pickup, which had already been moved from its original position, at the ex‑Pergamos camp junction, on the left-hand side of the main road from Pyla to Pergamos. He noticed that the car key was still in the ignition, and there was a handbag and a mobile phone inside the car. He and a couple of other officers searched the vicinity for signs of the applicant, with the help of a sniffer dog, but found no clues to indicate his whereabouts. He claimed that in some parts of the fields by the side of the main road, the mud was 30 to 40 centimetres deep, which made walking in the fields very hard. He then instructed Sergeant N. to go to the Pergamos checkpoint to enquire whether the first applicant had been detained by the “TRNC” police that morning. The answer was negative. 75. Detective Sergeant P.P. presented to the trial court a map he had sketched on 3 January 2001, covering the area between boundary stones nos. 96 and 97 where the first applicant was alleged to have crossed into the “TRNC”, as well as some photographs that the SBA police had taken in the area. The sketched map indicated a stream, with a barbed-wire fence to its north, marking the boundary between the SBA and the “TRNC”. About fifteen metres from the barbed wire was an olive tree in an uncultivated field, which was the alleged drop-off point for the drugs the first applicant was accused of smuggling. According to the map, the barbed-wire fence in the relevant area was 120 to 140 cm high on average, but P.P. acknowledged that the fence had deformed and sunk in certain parts, which was also evident in some of the photographs. Moreover, there was a small hole measuring 6 by 20 cm at the bottom of the fence adjoining the field. According to P.P., the approximate depth of the stream on the relevant date was two and a half to three metres. 76. In the cross-examination, the prosecution argued that the exact location where the first applicant had been captured, including the deformed wire fences where he had crossed into the “TRNC”, had intentionally not been photographed by the SBA police, so the photographs submitted to the trial court as evidence were irrelevant and misleading. Moreover, the wire fence on the SBA-“TRNC” border was not barbed throughout, contrary to P.P.’s suggestion. The prosecution claimed that the investigation conducted by the SBA police had lacked independence and impartiality. (g) Statement of Mr N.P. (SBA police officer) 77. Mr N.P., a Greek Cypriot superintendent in the SBA police service, testified that at approximately 1.30 a.m. on 13 December 2000 he had received a call at the police station stating that some of the roads in the SBA of Dhekelia had been flooded because of the heavy rain that night. He therefore left the police station to check the roads and instruct the rerouting of certain roads as necessary. At approximately 5 a.m. he drove past the area where the first applicant’s vehicle was later found abandoned. Although the heavy rain had stopped by that time, it was still drizzling and the road in the relevant area was covered with three to five inches of water. By 6 a.m. the rain had stopped completely. 78. When shown the photographs which the “TRNC” police had allegedly taken in the area later that morning, Mr N.P. said that the ground looked too dry, so those photographs could not have been taken on 13 December 2000. (h) Statement of Sergeant A.E.N. (SBA police officer) 79. Sergeant A.E.N. was a Turkish Cypriot working in the SBA police force. At approximately 6.25 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000, he crossed from the “TRNC” to the SBA through the Pergamos checkpoint to report to his work station. As he was approaching the ex-Pergamos camp junction on the main road from Pergamos to Pyla, he noticed a stationary car further down his lane, facing his direction. Since the headlights of the car were bothering his eyes, he flashed his lights, but there was no reaction. As he approached, he saw that the stationary car was a red pickup and the driver’s door was open. When A.E.N. pulled up by the red car to see what was going on, he noticed that the car’s engine was also running, although there was no one inside it. Once he reached the police station he reported what he had seen and was accordingly instructed to go back to the place of the incident for further investigation. When A.E.N. went back at approximately 7.10 a.m., he found that Yiannis Tsiakkourmas and two Turkish Cypriot workers had moved the red pickup and had parked it about 25 metres down the road leading to the ex-Pergamos camp. (i) Statement of Mr D.J.W. (dog trainer) 80. Mr D.J.W. was a search-dog trainer in the British armed forces. At approximately 8.15 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000 he was deployed to track the first applicant’s whereabouts with his dog. When he arrived there were six SBA police officers at the scene of the incident. He first explained to the trial court how the tracking process worked in general and stated that the dog could only track one person at a time, and would follow the freshest track in the area. On that morning, they had started the search at the place where the first applicant’s car was first found. They had covered the 400-metre perimeter, but had not been able to find any tracks. Since the recent rainfall had made the ground wet, it would not have been possible to walk on the grass by the asphalt road without leaving footprints, but they had found no such marks, which meant that the first applicant had not left the area on foot. (j) Statement of Mr J.C. (UN Liaison Officer) 81. The defence lastly called Mr J.C. as a witness, to testify on his exchange with Mr M.İ., an officer of the “TRNC” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The trial court, however, ruled that Mr J.C. could not testify on the content of Mr M.İ.’s statements in view of the rules on hearsay evidence. (k) Other witnesses 82. At the hearing held on 10 April 2001, the first applicant’s lawyer, Mr P. Brogan, told the trial court that while the defence had a number of Turkish Cypriot witnesses who wished to testify in favour of the defence, mainly to confirm the sighting of the abandoned vehicle, it had not been possible to secure their attendance as those witnesses were being intimidated by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. According to submissions made by the applicants, the President of the Court responded in a hostile manner and requested proof of service of witness summonses on the relevant Turkish Cypriot persons, but the exchange between the President and the defence counsel was not included in the minutes of the hearing. 83. At the hearing held on 11 April 2001, the first applicant’s other lawyer, Mr M. Aziz, informed the trial court that the defence still had eight more witnesses to call. However, since they had not managed to duly serve those witnesses with official summonses, and most of them had no further information to share with the court than that already presented, they had decided to relinquish their right to call those witnesses and to close the defence case. The President of the Court asked in return why the said witnesses had not been served with a “short summons” to secure their attendance and stated that the court was very sensitive to this issue in view of Mr P. Brogan’s allegations of witness intimidation made at the previous hearing. Mr M. Aziz stated in response that he had no information as to the factual basis of Mr P. Brogan’s allegations of intimidation and that he did not mean to blame any State officials for the non-attendance of the Turkish Cypriot witnesses. 84. On 26 April 2001 the Famagusta Assize Court delivered its judgment against the first applicant, which reads as follows: “The legislation, the testimonies and the evidence presented have been assessed [by the court] comprehensively. [The court] has carefully observed the prosecution witnesses, as well as the defendant and his witnesses during their depositions. While there are some small discrepancies between the testimonies of ... prosecution witnesses, their statements were mainly found to be credible, accurate and reliable. On the other hand, [the court] has not found the testimonies of the defendant and his witnesses to be credible, accurate and reliable. Moreover, we decided that these testimonies were not likely to be true, on the basis of the principle of “balance of probabilities”. Since all witness testimonies and the evidence presented to the court are in the case file, we find it unnecessary to cite them one by one in our judgment. We believe that on the basis of the testimonies and evidence they presented, the prosecution have proven, beyond reasonable doubt, both charges against the defendant. Consequently, the defendant is found guilty of both charges brought against him.” 85. The first applicant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment on the first count, with no sentence on the second count. The Famagusta Assize Court, however, ruled that he be released from prison in view of the time he had already spent on remand. 86. The medical examinations conducted on 13 December 2000 in the aftermath of the first applicant’s arrest have been outlined in paragraphs 63 ‑ 65 above. According to the information and documents provided by the parties, he underwent further medical examinations throughout his detention in the “TRNC”, the details of which are as follows. 87. The day after his arrest, on 14 December, the first applicant was examined by a UNFICYP medical officer, Dr S.T., at his request. It appears that a “TRNC” official in civilian clothes supervised the examination and took notes. 88. According to the information in the case file, the first applicant told Dr S.T. that he had been punched and kicked at the time of his arrest and that he felt acute pain in his ribs and pelvis. The first applicant claimed before the Court that he had been prevented from saying more as the “TRNC” official supervising the examination had told him to keep quiet. 89. When conducting a physical examination, the doctor noted a slight swelling above the first applicant’s left ear; a graze behind the right ear and the right side of the back; and tender areas on the right side of the chest and the left side of the back, behind the neck, and around the tail bone and the right hip. No handcuff marks were noted on his wrists. 90. It appears from Dr S.T.’s notes that the first applicant indicated that he had been treated well after being handed over to the uniformed police on 13 December 2000, and that he was being given his diabetes medication. Dr S.T. noted that the applicant’s diabetes was the type that could usually be controlled by diet (type-2 diabetes) and further remarked that arrangements had been made for a blood glucose monitoring kit to enable him to monitor his diabetes. There were, however, no remarks regarding the first applicant’s intimidation by the “TRNC” official supervising the examination. 91. On 28 December 2000 Dr S.T. made an unannounced visit to the central prison to check on the first applicant. During the visit he also performed a blood sugar test. In a report he issued the next day, Dr S.T. indicated that although the applicant’s blood sugar level was somewhat high (“197 g/dL”), it was still within the normal range for him – he had informed the doctor that his levels were usually around “200g/dL”. The doctor also noted that the applicant’s request for a special diet for his diabetes was being met by the prison authorities. In conclusion, Dr S.T. was satisfied that the applicant was receiving adequate treatment for his diabetes and was being allowed to monitor his blood sugar levels. 92. Dr S.T. visited the first applicant again on 19 and 23 January 2001, together with a Turkish Cypriot doctor, H.S., to check his physical state and blood sugar levels. In his report dated 23 January 2001, Dr S.T. made the following remarks: “In my opinion a good standard of medical care is being given. However, because of Mr. Tsiakkourmas’ mental state and the stress he is under, his diabetic control is poor. There is also a question as to whether or not he is complying fully with his treatment.” 93. Dr S.T. also visited the first applicant on 16 February and 9 April 2001 for routine medical checks and noted that he was in reasonable health. In his latter report dated 9 April 2001, Dr S.T. also stated that the first applicant had made no complaints of ill-treatment by the prison staff. 94. On 8 January 2001 the first applicant was examined by Dr G.P., a Hungarian specialist in internal medicine and endocrinology practising in Limassol, in relation to his diabetes. The doctor noted that his blood sugar level was “340 mg/dL” and that he had lost a considerable amount of weight since his imprisonment. He then concluded his report as follows: “The obvious weight loss and marked hyperglycaemia without any other signs of concomitant disease can only be explained by a rapid metabolic deterioration that followed his imprisonment. The initial and ongoing stress situation, the involuntary immobilisation of a formerly physically active person in association with marked depression are factors which increase both hyperglycaemia and insulin resistance in the diabetic person and lead to catabolism. The present treatment is obviously insufficient to prevent further worsening. If his immediate return to his normal environment and daily activities is not achievable at present, I suggest this: 5. Blood glucose testing three times daily If these measures do not improve his diabetes control significantly in few days’ time or signs of further deterioration are detected, the commencement of insulin treatment and/or hospitalisation should be considered. His physical state should also be followed up to decide if medical treatment is necessary.” 95. On 15 January 2001 Dr G.P. saw the first applicant once again at the Nicosia State Hospital, together with Dr H.S. and a UNFICYP medical officer, R.K. Dr G.P. noted his findings as follows: “The patient was in a very bad mood ... and he mentioned that he didn’t want to comply with further medical assistance from whatever side. ... [He said that] he took this tablet [Amaryl] only once daily and didn’t take the other tablet [Glucophage] recommended during my first visit. His physical examination was carried out by Dr H.S. in our presence.... His blood sugar was 349 mg/dL.... I advised an abdominal ultrasound examination which was carried out without delay by the X-ray department in our presence. Multiple small stones were found in both kidneys without any other pathological findings. After these I tried to convince him to comply with our medical recommendations ... The main problem now seems to be the lack of compliance with the medical recommendations. His parodontitis [sic.] and the presence of small renal stones are also warning signs that his diabetic control must be improved otherwise a progressing inflammation in the mouth and a urine infection can worsen his diabetes with severe acute consequences. To avoid this, a proper compliance with the medical recommendations seems to be absolutely important. In this situation a psychiatric exploration is also necessary, carried out by a doctor who speaks Greek as a mother tongue ... This exploration may help break his present denial of medical care and provide further opinion [on] how to proceed with his medication.” Dr G.P.’s findings coincided with the separate report prepared by the Turkish Cypriot doctor, H.S. 96. On 25 January Dr G.P. saw the first applicant for the third time and noted his findings as follows: “... He complained of regular gastric pain ... He confirmed that he was taking the anti-diabetic drug according to the last recommendation. ... I took his blood sugar, which was 199 mg/dL in the fasting state this time. We recommended hospitalisation for a better blood sugar stabilisation and follow‑up. The idea was rejected by Dr H.S. who suggested a more frequent blood sugar monitoring to show if his blood sugar levels can be diminished, if required, with an elevated anti-diabetic dose without bringing him out of the prison. On my fears that the patient may have a stress mediated gastric ulceration that can progress into perforation or bleeding he promised to arrange a gastroscopy on 30 or 31st January next week.” 97. On 15 March 2001 Dr G.P. examined the first applicant for the fourth and the last time, in the presence of Dr H.S. and a UNFICYP medical officer, and made the following notes: “... He has not performed a blood sugar test since weeks but in general he felt somatically fit. Sometimes he does not take the Amaryl tablet in the evening when he ‘feels alright’. ... I took his blood sugar, which was 191 mg/dL ... non-fasting. There was an agreement among all three doctors present that it was time to carry out new laboratory and ECG tests. However, the patient denied all these and allowed only the aforementioned blood sugar test ... His explanation was that he felt helplessness, nobody wanted to help him to take him out of prison, he didn’t even ask for my visit or for any other medical help in the future. He also said that he would stop tablet taking on Monday and would start a hunger strike. I tried to explain to him that in his health situation this would be really dangerous, could lead to sudden worsening of his status. I could not convince him to abandon this idea, that he should comply with the medical suggestions to remain fit ... His anger and negativistic attitude to health care can be signs of deepening depression.” 98. On 12 January 2001 the first applicant was examined by another UNFICYP medical officer, Dr R.K., who made the following findings after his visit: “Mr. Tsiakkourmas ... suffers from diabetes type II for about four years. The patient was found in a good physical condition but seemed to be depressive ... His blood sugar level [was] 220 mg/dL ... The drugs recently prescribed by Dr G.P. are available at prison, but he refuses to take any other drugs than prescribed by his ‘own doctor’. There is also the possibility to monitor the bodyweight and to check the blood sugar level three times a day, as recommended, but the patient refuses this as well, because he wants to avoid to be pricked too often and in his opinion doing this every two or three days seem to be sufficient. The perfect therapy plan developed by Dr G.P. is not accepted by the patient! ... His blood sugar level is too high and has to be properly adjusted, but there is no acute danger to his life. The main problem at this moment seems to be the fact that he refuses any other medication prescribed or monitoring recommended than from his own doctor.” 99. Dr R.K. issued the following “inter-office memorandum” on 16 January 2001 in relation to the first applicant’s health situation: “1. Dr. H.S., the [Turkish Cypriot] responsible doctor at Nicosia General Hospital North, is an endocrinologist and seems to be very competent and cooperative. All necessary drugs and means to carry out recommended tests (blood sugar level, blood pressure, weight etc.) and supportive measures (physical exercise, diet etc.) are available at the hospital as well as at the prison. 2. The main problem at this moment is the patient’s unwillingness to follow the therapy plan for understandable reasons (lack of trust of foreign doctors, depressive situation ...). ...” 100. After his visit on 25 January 2001 Dr R.K. noted that the first applicant had still not been taking the recommended medication regularly. 101. According to the documents submitted by the respondent Government, the first applicant was also regularly examined by Turkish Cypriot doctors. 102. On 3 and 8 January 2001 a Turkish Cypriot doctor, whose name cannot be discerned from the reports, examined the first applicant and measured his blood sugar levels. He also prescribed medication for his diabetes, including 1mg of Amaryl. 103. On 15 January 2001 Dr H.S. examined the first applicant in the presence of Dr G.P., Dr M.K. and a UN officer at the Nicosia State Hospital and noted the following in his report: “Tsiakkourmas suffers from type-2 diabetes and takes Amaryl (1mg), twice a day. While his diabetes was controlled through diet previously, currently he is hyperglycaemic. It was noticed during the examination that Tsiakkourmas was stressed and depressed ... The right lumbar region was sensitive to percussion and there was pain upon deep palpation at the right hypochondriac region ... The results of the examination of the extremities were normal. His blood sugar level was 347 mg/dl ... Based on these results, his gallbladder and kidneys were examined in ultrasound. His gallbladder was empty and no stones were noted; there were stones in both kidneys. Liver, spleen, urinary bladder and prostate were normal.” Based on his findings, Dr H.S. recommended that the first applicant continue with his medication and special diet, exercise daily, measure his glucose levels regularly and be brought to the hospital for examination by him twice a week. He also recommended the first applicant’s referral to a psychiatrist. 104. It appears that Dr H.S. continued to examine the first applicant regularly throughout his detention. In his report dated 22 January 2001, he noted that the first applicant had refused to be examined and had stated that he had not been taking his medication. 105. On 25 January 2001 the first applicant was examined by a Turkish Cypriot psychiatrist, Dr İ.T., with the assistance of an interpreter. The doctor noted no pathologies, apart from the applicant’s distress. She stated in her report that she had offered to prescribe the first applicant a tranquiliser, but he had rejected it. 106. On 30 January 2001 the first applicant was admitted to the Nicosia State Hospital for closer monitoring of his health. He was kept there until 5 February 2001. 107. After visiting the first applicant at the hospital on 1 February 2001, Dr R.K. noted his improved physical condition. According to his report dated 6 February 2001, the first applicant’s state of health continued to improve after his discharge from the hospital. Similarly, when he visited the first applicant on 20 and 28 February 2001 and 27 March 2001, Dr R.K. found him in a “sufficient health condition”, although his psychological state appeared to have deteriorated. Dr R.K. stressed to the first applicant that if he had any health problems, he should approach the prison authorities and ask to be seen by a doctor. 108. Following his discharge from the hospital the first applicant was also visited twice by Dr S.T. for routine medical checks (on 16 February and 9 April 2001). Dr S.T. noted that he was in reasonable health and also stated that he had made no complaints of ill-treatment by the prison staff. 109. On 18 April 2001 the first applicant was examined by another UNFICYP medical officer, Dr J.G., who also found him to be in a very satisfactory state of health. Dr J.G. indicated that the first applicant continued to take the prescribed anti-diabetic drugs regularly, and that he had been receiving the proper diet. He also noted that the first applicant had been performing physical exercises and was allowed to get books and newspapers. 110. The first applicant submitted a medical report dated 11 May 2001 issued by his dentist. The report stated that he was suffering from serious problems with his upper anterior teeth, including abscessed gums, and had a scar on his lower lip, which was consistent with a powerful blow to the face. 111. The first applicant also submitted other medical certificates that he had obtained from various doctors approximately six months after his release from prison, including one from his own doctor. According to those reports, while the first applicant’s diabetes appeared to be under control by that time, he continued to suffer psychologically. 112. It appears from the information in the case file that the first applicant was allowed to receive visitors twice a week during his detention on remand, including from his friends, and was granted one hour for each visit. His allegation that he was not given permission to make telephone calls was denied by the Government. 113. Following special permission sought by the second applicant (the first applicant’s wife), the first applicant was authorised to receive visits from his family on 15 April 2001, Easter Sunday, although it was not an ordinary visit day. 114. The parties disagreed as to whether the family visits in the Nicosia Central Prison were monitored. The applicants claimed that a prison officer had stood guard in or by the visit room during most visits, whereas the Government maintained that the applicants had been able to meet and communicate out of the sight of the authorities. 115. The parties submitted photographs and sketched maps of the scene of the incident and its vicinity, as well as various documents concerning the events and evidence that unfolded following the detention of the first applicant by “TRNC” authorities. Those documents, in so far as they are relevant, are summarised below. 116. The Government submitted four pages from the police notebook of Sub-inspector Ü.Ö., including two handwritten entries. 117. The first of those entries, which was made at 6.30 p.m. on 12 December 2000, read as follows: “According to the information I received, at approximately 5.30 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000 a Greek Cypriot will enter the TRNC via Pergamos to hide illicit drugs in the empty lot located by the border crossing, to be picked up by his accomplice on this side. The superintendent put me in charge of taking the necessary precautions in the area. I informed sergeants R.Ö. and H.M..” 118. The second entry was made at 7.10 a.m. on 13 December 2000, after the arrest of the first applicant, and described the circumstances in which the latter had been captured with drugs as follows: “At 6.05 a.m. we captured a Greek Cypriot coming from the SBA on the lot by the cemetery located next to the Pergamos Gate, together with sergeants R.Ö. and H.M.. I took the bag he was carrying. Upon checking the bag, I found what I believed to be two plates of cannabis resin wrapped in newspaper. The defendant was informed by sergeant H.M., who acted as the interpreter, that he was being arrested for having made an unauthorised entry into the TRNC and possessing illicit drugs. The defendant said “I am innocent”. I learned from Sergeant H.M. that the person’s name was “Banayodis Giryagu” [sic.]. We transferred Banayodis Giryagu to the Gazimağusa Security Directorate. At 6.45 a.m. I interrogated [him] with the help of sergeant H.M. [to find out] where he had found the drugs in his possession and who he was taking them to. I could not get any responses. I left the detainee in Gazimağusa under the control of sergeant R.Ö.. I am now leaving for Lefkoşa together with the evidence.” 119. After being informed about the discovery of the first applicant’s car in SBA territory, in a seemingly abandoned state with his briefcase and mobile phone left inside the car, the SBA police[5] promptly started an investigation into his whereabouts. The forensic examinations conducted in and around the car, including with the help of a sniffer dog, did not yield any results. The police and the military in the “TRNC” initially denied any knowledge of the first applicant; it was not until 10.25 a.m. that the “TRNC” authorities informed the SBA police that the first applicant was in their custody, having been found in possession of drugs in “TRNC” territory. 120. On the basis of the information received from the “TRNC” authorities, the SBA police searched the first applicant’s car for traces of drugs and fingerprints. It appears that they found no traces of drugs, and no further information was provided regarding fingerprints. Over the next couple of months, they also interviewed some 104 people in an attempt to shed light on the events of 13 December 2000. Amongst the interviewees were the first applicant’s Turkish Cypriot workers, his fellow Greek Cypriot contractors, including those who later testified before the Famagusta Assize Court, members of the SBA police force, and the residents of the houses in the area where the first applicant’s car had been found and where he had allegedly crossed into the “TRNC”. 121. A number of interviewees attested to having seen the first applicant’s car on the morning of 13 December 2000 parked in an odd manner on the main road from Pyla to Pergamos, albeit with some inconsistencies as to its position and state, such as whether and which doors of the car were open, which way it was facing and whether the engine was running. Some others who had taken the same road around the relevant time stated that they had not noticed anything out of the ordinary or seen the first applicant’s car. A number of persons approached for statements, including some Turkish Cypriots, refrained from giving statements altogether because they were afraid to talk for political reasons. 122. Of the 104 people interviewed, only two, G.H. and A.G., who also subsequently testified before the Famagusta Assize Court, had seen the Renault cars that had allegedly been used for the first applicant’s abduction. Although A.G. stated before the Assize Court that he had seen two Renault cars, one white and one red (see above paragraph 69), he had not mentioned anything about a white car in his earlier statement to the SBA given on 19 December 2000. Moreover, the sketched plan attached to G.H.’s statement, indicating the respective positions of the red and the white Renault cars and the car of the first applicant, did not fully correspond to the statements given by the other witnesses and the first applicant himself, nor did it match his subsequent statement before the Assize Court, particularly as to where the red Renault car had been parked vis-à-vis the white one. 123. Amongst all those interviewed, only one person – a Greek Cypriot builder, Mr N.M., who also subsequently appeared before the Famagusta Assize Court as a witness – claimed to have witnessed anything suggesting an abduction on the relevant morning. In his statement to the SBA police on 18 January 2001, N.M. said that at approximately 5.50 a.m. on the morning of 13 December 2000, he had seen a red double-cabin pickup parked on the main Pyla-Pergamos road, with no other cars around it, and a man running from that car towards the field on the right side of the road. There were three or four other men in the field, who were pulling someone by the hands and arms towards the east side of the field, and he heard that man yelling “Let me go!”. 124. On 16 December 2000 the SBA police interviewed Mr V.Z., the owner of the white Isuzu pickup with registration number UJ 100, which the first applicant claimed had been travelling in front of him towards Pergamos on the relevant morning. V.Z. stated that on the morning of 13 December 2000, his car had been driven by a Turkish Cypriot worker of his, whose name he did not reveal for safety reasons (but who will be referred to as “X” hereinafter). According to what V.Z. had heard from X, as he was driving from Pergamos to Pyla on the morning of 13 December 2000, X had noticed two civilian cars, one red and the other white, blocking the way of a double‑cabin pickup that had been coming from the direction of Pyla (that is, the opposite direction to him). As he approached, he saw three or four persons running from one of the vehicles towards the pickup and by the time he was driving past those vehicles, they were pulling the driver out of the pickup, while three or four other people were sitting inside the other vehicle. V.Z. stated that X had not seen anything more because he had driven past without stopping. Allegedly, a couple of days after the incident the first applicant’s nephew, Kyriacos Tsiakkourmas (who himself is an applicant before the Court), and an SBA police officer managed to track down X. Yet, apart from their allegations, there is no evidence in the case file to demonstrate that any contact was actually made with X or that X confirmed V.Z.’s testimony. 125. As for the interviews conducted with the residents of the area, it appears from their testimonies that none of them had seen anyone around on the morning of 13 December 2000. They had certainly not seen anything suggesting an arrest or abduction on the road. Some of them confirmed that the depth of the stream by the border fences, which the first applicant had allegedly crossed to enter the “TRNC”, had been around eighty centimetres to one metre on the morning in question. It further appears from the documents submitted by the applicants that after finishing the interviews with the residents of the area around the Pergamos Gate, an SBA officer set off to walk from the point of the alleged crossing into the “TRNC” to the point of the alleged abduction in order to measure the time it would have taken the first applicant to walk that distance. According to the officer’s notes, the relevant path could be covered in ten minutes at a normal pace. 126. The applicants also submitted various SBA police reports regarding the investigation conducted into the first applicant’s alleged abduction. The report dated 15 December 2000 stated the following: “On 14.12.00 Panicos’ [the first applicant’s] wife, accompanied by a Turkish Advocate, visited him in custody in the Controlled Area of Northern Cyprus. It has been confirmed by both parties that Panicos alleges that at the location of his abandoned vehicle he saw a vehicle with the bonnet open and two men with their attention fixed on the engine compartment. He stopped to offer assistance, and at this point he was bundled into their vehicle and driven from the SBA into the controlled site via Pergamos gate. This was against his will. He was then driven around for approximately one hour, given a parcel and pushed out of the vehicle at an unknown location. Approximately five minutes passed and then a Turkish Cypriot Police car arrived. He went to them for assistance and was arrested for allegedly being in possession of a parcel of controlled drugs”. 127. In another report prepared on 16 December 2000, SBA sergeant P.P. noted that the first applicant’s nephew, Kyriacos Tsiakkourmas, had given him some information that he had received from his uncle’s Turkish Cypriot lawyer regarding the alleged abduction. The relevant parts of the report read as follows: “Panicos also told his solicitor that following his abduction he was taken to a place where there were airplanes. During the journey the persons who abducted him were beating him up. On arriving at the aeroplane place (suspected to be Erdjian Airport [sic.]) the persons who abducted him dragged him out of the vehicle, threw a bag to him and left. Following that Turkish Police arrived at the said place and arrested him.” 128. In a report prepared on 5 January 2001, SBA sergeant P.P. noted that the “Political Section” of the TRNC Police Plain Clothes Unit used two unmarked civilian vehicles, a red Renault and a white Renault, to patrol the area of Pyla and Pergamos. In his opinion, those vehicles had also been used for the abduction of the first applicant. 129. In their report issued on 23 January 2001, the SBA police made the following conclusions: “Turkish Cypriot Police Officers maintain that they arrested Tsiakkourmas inside the Turkish Controlled Area about 70 yards west of Pergamos Gate. If this account is accepted then Tsiakkourmas must have abandoned his vehicle, engine running, lights on and driver’s door open, almost in the middle of what was then a fairly busy road. He must have left his briefcase and mobile telephone and (carrying a large quantity of cannabis) walked 500 metres across a muddy field, climbed a 1.5 metre high fence and crossed a 4 metre wide ditch. An SBA Police Officer will state that there was water to a depth of one metre in the ditch that morning. He thereafter must have tried to hide the cannabis under a 1 metre high olive tree (the only one in the area described by the Turkish Police). (This in an area with which Tsiakkourmas would be unlikely to be familiar – inside the Turkish Controlled Area). All of this he must have accomplished knowing that his employees were waiting for him at 0545 hrs, as they had been doing for the past ten years, at the Pergamos Check Point. ... Notwithstanding the fact that it is often much more difficult to prove innocence rather than guilt it is submitted that, in spite of the statements of the Turkish Cypriot Police to the contrary, all other available evidence indicates that Panicos Tsiakkourmas was taken from his vehicle at the locus where that vehicle was abandoned – well within the Eastern Sovereign Base Areas. Other than the statements of the Turkish Cypriot Police Officers there is absolutely no evidence – forensic or historical – to indicate that Tsiakkourmas had – or ever has had – illegal drugs in his motor vehicle or in his possession.” 130. Some members of the SBA police also appeared before the Famagusta Assize Court as defence witnesses. Their statements have been noted above (paragraphs 74-79 above). In a separate affidavit he sent to the Court, SBA sergeant P.P. stated that various Turkish Cypriot witnesses who had wished to testify before the Assize Court for the defence had been intimidated by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Sergeant P.P. claimed that some of those witnesses had personally told him that they had been questioned and threatened by the Turkish Cypriot police. The Court notes that it cannot be inferred from the case-file that these allegations were brought to the attention of the Assize Court. 131. On 24 January 2001 the SBA police conducted a reconstruction of the first applicant’s alleged abduction on the basis of the evidence available to them. The reconstruction was also recorded on video. It appears that a number of “TRNC” police officers also watched the reconstruction. 132. The SBA police were not permitted to interview the applicant during his detention in the “TRNC”. However, following his release they took a statement from him, which was consistent with his account of the events submitted to the Court. They also showed him the video of the reconstruction exercise. According to the records of the SBA police, the first applicant recognised two of the bystanders in the reconstruction video as his abductors. Upon investigation, it was established that one of the persons recognised by the applicant was police officer E. of the Famagusta Intelligence Service and the second one was police officer Ü., who worked at the Pergamos police station. Arrest warrants were subsequently issued against those persons on 7 June 2001 on suspicion of the offence of abduction. There is no further information in the case file on this matter, nor is it clear whether this information was shared with the Turkish Cypriot authorities. 133. There is no information in the case file to suggest that the Government of the United Kingdom lodged any protests with the Turkish Government in relation to the alleged abduction of the first applicant from SBA territory. 134. On 7 July 2001 the applicant’s Turkish Cypriot lawyer, Mr M. Aziz, gave the following information to Mr Rauf Denktaş, the President of the “TRNC” at the material time, regarding the allegations of witness intimidation during the trial of the first applicant before the Famagusta Assize Court: “At the close of the case by the Prosecution, the defense summoned 17 witnesses. The names of all the Greek, English and Turkish witnesses that were summoned were given to me by P. Brogan, the co-defense lawyer, after consultation with the British Sovereign Bases Police. However, due to reasons out of my knowledge, the names of some additional witnesses were withheld from me. An attempt was made to call these witnesses at the last minute. The names of these witnesses were given to me at the last minute. I issued the necessary summonses through the Registrar’s Office of the Famagusta District Court. All the witnesses listed in the attached paper were issued with summons [17 witnesses in total] and these were brought to the Court to testify. Although the 3-4 witnesses whose names were given to me late were issued with summonses, these could not be served by the Court bailiff in time. On the last day of the trial, I gave the Court the information I got from the English lawyer that these 3-4 witnesses had actually wanted to come to the Court but had been threatened or hindered. The Court asked me whether [they] had been summoned, in which case the court could order their presence. I told the Court that the summonses had not been served yet. As there was no service of the summons, the judge, under the Criminal Procedure Law and the related Regulation, could not order the arrest of these witnesses. As a result, the defense closed its case (without calling these additional witnesses) after calling 17 witnesses listed in the attached paper. The reason a proper service of the summonses could not be done was the concealment of the names of these witnesses even from me till the last minute, and our attempt to summon them without applying for a short service order from the Court. As a defense lawyer, as well as not personally having seen the witnesses, I got to know about their identities just before the issuing of the summons, the day before in the afternoon, and issuing a summons the same day, I sent it by hand to the British Sovereign Bases Police. It is not again in my knowledge whether these witnesses were personally served with these summonses. We produced no evidence that they had been duly served. For this reason, the claims that the witnesses for defense had been prevented or threatened are not in my knowledge. Nothing was done to put such an allegation before the Court in the form of evidence.” 135. On 17 July 2001 that letter was conveyed by Mr Rauf Denktaş to Mr Edward Clay, the British High Commissioner to Cyprus at the relevant time. 136. On 8 January 2001 Mr Rauf Denktaş sent the following letter to the UN Secretary General regarding the alleged abductions of the first applicant and of Mr Tekoğul. “I understand that letters of protest about the arrest by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus police of one Panicos Tsakourmas [sic], aged 39, while in possession of drugs is being circulated in all directions by the Greek Cypriot leadership. It is alleged that the said Tsakourmas was abducted by Turkish Cypriots in retaliation to “the arrest” by the Greek Cypriot police of Turkish Cypriot Ömer Gazi Tekoğul at Pyla, a mixed village. Both Tsakourmas and the Turkish Cypriot Ömer Gazi Tekoğul, aged 42, are in custody pending their trial in respective courts, one in the Greek side and the other before the Assize Court to be held in February in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Both sides allege that they were kidnapped by the police of the other side. Naturally, it is the relevant courts which will have to decide these issues. The allegation that Tsakourmas was arrested in retaliation to the unlawful arrest of Tekoğul is strenuously denied by the three policemen involved. But the case of Tekoğul is a clear case of abduction by Greek Cypriot policemen who, concealing their identity, pretended to be a good friend of Tekoğul until the day he was abducted by them. ... On 1 December 2000, at about 2040 hours [Tekoğul] had started his car, parked outside a Turkish coffee shop in Pyla, in order to go home when the two Greek Cypriot “friends” approached his car and beckoned him to enter their car for a chat. As soon as Tekoğul entered their car, he was hit on the head, and driven away in the direction of Larnaca. Shortly, four other Greek Cypriot policemen joined them and Tekoğul was taken into custody while his car, outside the coffee shop in Pyla, continued to run. Some hours later, the family was informed by neighbours about the car and Tekoğul’s father took it away. In the mixed village of Pyla, under United Nations control, the rule is that if anyone is arrested by either side, the United Nations should immediately be informed. This was not done in the case of Tekoğul. The family was informed about the said “arrest” 12 hours after the abduction. Tekoğul’s Greek Cypriot advocate Andreas Constantinou made this statement to the Cyprus Mail, on 28 December 2000. ‘I believe the police lied in their statements and I told the Attorney-General this when they said Tekoğul was arrested in the free areas, if they arrested him in free areas why didn’t police show us the car?’ All in all it is clear that Tekoğul was abducted in line with the well-known, and long practiced Greek Cypriot policy of harassing Turkish Cypriots. Abduction of well‑known or popular Turkish Cypriots had stopped for some time, but it appears that the practice is coming back unless United Nations authorities in Pyla take stern steps in this matter. In view of growing publicity about the Tsakourmas’ case I thought I should give this information to you for a fair appraisal of the situation.” 137. A report prepared by the SBA police on 17 December 2000 noted the following: “On 17/12/2000 at 1220 hrs, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf DENKTAŞH [sic.] visited Pyla village... ... He was then interviewed by the Media. Amongst others he stated about TSIAKKOURMAS case: - He only knows that the arrest was affected within TCAs [Turkish Cypriot Administration]. - The arrest of TSIAKKOURMAS cannot be characterised that it occurred in retaliation to the arrest of the T/Cypriot, because everybody knows that he is employing about 15 Turkish Cypriot workers. - No negotiations are taking place for an exchange between the two prisoners. The matters are in the hands of the Courts.” 138. According to another report of the SBA police dated 12 January 2001, Mr Rauf Denktaş had allegedly said in a meeting with Sir David Hannay, Britain’s Special Envoy to Cyprus at the time, that he would be prepared to release the first applicant on bail if Ömer Gazi Tekoğul were also granted bail, because both suspects were suffering from health problems. 139. The applicants submitted as evidence an affidavit made by Mr J.C. before a notary public in Dublin, Ireland, on 10 December 2001. The relevant parts of his affidavit read as follows: “On the morning of Sunday 3.12.2000 at approximately 9.30 a.m., I received a telephone call whilst in my apartment within the UN compound in the UN Headquarters in Nicosia. The telephone call ... was from Mr M.İ. Mr M.İ. wanted to meet the Chief of Mission of UNFICYP. He did not tell me the reason ... I was unable to contact the Chief of Mission. Mr M.İ. then wished to speak to the Special Adviser to the Chief of Mission who was also Head of the Civil Affairs Branch. I failed to make contact with the Special Adviser and informed him accordingly. He was very agitated and I agreed to meet him to discuss what he described was a serious matter ... Mr M.İ. was very agitated and very concerned about the arrest of Ömer Gazi Tekoğul who, he alleged, was arrested in the UN buffer zone in the Pyla area. Ömer Gazi Tekoğul is a Turkish Cypriot, who was arrested by the Police of the Republic of Cyprus on the night of Friday 1.12.2000 being found in possession of a substantial amount of the illegal drug heroin. ... he [Mr M.İ.] told me to take down a protest about Ömer Gazi Tekoğul’s arrest. As he spoke, I noted his protest in my notebook. ... I then read out to Mr M.İ. the protest that he made in the format that I would present it which was as follows: “PROTEST On 3/12/2000, 1100 hrs north Ledra Checkpoint, Nicosia, Mr M.İ. made the following protest to Insp. J.C., CAPLO, UNFICYP for the information of the Greek Cypriot Government and UNFICYP. I strongly protest the fact that the Greek Cypriot police kidnapped a Turkish Cypriot ÖMER GAZI TEKOĞUL in Pyla village within the UN controlled buffer zone on Friday night 01/12/00. I further state that if ÖMER GAZI TEKOĞUL is not released before 1200hrs (noon) on Monday 04/12/00 Greek Cypriots living in the Pyla area will disappear. If the Greek Cypriot police are engaging in a new policy of kidnapping suspects from the UN controlled buffer zone Turkish Cypriot police will respond in a similar manner.” Mr M.İ. approved the format. ... I exhibit as Exhibit A to this affidavit page 53 of my notebook in which I recorded the protest as made by Mr M.İ.”

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5. The applicant, Ms Erla Hlynsdóttir, is an Icelandic national who was born in 1978 and lives in Reykjavík. She is a journalist, working for the newspaper DV. 6. In May 2007 the Director of Public Prosecutions issued an indictment against two individuals for importing cocaine into Iceland. The cocaine had been hidden in a Mercedes Benz vehicle, where it had been discovered by customs officers. The police had removed the cocaine and put another substance in its place. One of the accused, Mr A, had collected the car from customs and had paid customs duties for it. He and the other accused had driven the vehicle to a garage, where the substance had been removed. 7. The newspaper DV published an article on 5 July 2007 on the ongoing criminal proceedings against Mr A and his co-accused before the Reykjavík District Court. A picture of Mr A was published on the front page of the newspaper showing him walking into the courtroom. There was a large headline under the photograph which read “Scared cocaine smugglers” and underneath that it was written that both the accused were afraid of retaliation by their accomplices and had therefore refused to identify them. Mr A´s name also appeared on the front page, with a report that he and his co-accused could expect prison sentences of seven to eight years and three to four years respectively for removing the substance. 8. The article itself was reproduced on page 2 of the newspaper and the applicant was identified as its author. Next to the article appeared another photograph of Mr A, again using his name. The article stated that Mr A had been afraid to reveal the identity of the man he claimed had actually been behind the importation, and that he feared for his family’s and his own safety. The article contained the following passage: “The Director of Public Prosecutions is requesting a punishment of seven to eight years´ imprisonment in respect of [Mr A], who has been indicted for importing nearly 3.8 kilograms of cocaine, intended for sale, together with an unknown accomplice. A punishment of three to four years is requested in respect of [Mr B], who is also charged in the case with removing the alleged drug from the vehicle, in cooperation with [Mr A],”. 9. In the next paragraph it was stated: “The cocaine was hidden in a vehicle which [Mr A] imported into the country and took possession of in February 2007, believing that the cocaine was still in the vehicle, but the police had already confiscated the cocaine and replaced it with a decoy drug.” This sentence was a verbatim rendering of a part of the description of the facts contained in the indictment, without explicit reference being made to that document. 10. By a judgment of 12 July 2007 the District Court acquitted both Mr A and his co-accused of all charges, and on 29 May 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. 11. On 21 October 2008 Mr A lodged defamation proceedings before the Reykjavík District Court against the applicant and Mr S.M.E., who was the editor of DV at the time. In his writ he requested that the headline (“Scared cocaine smugglers”) which had appeared on the front page of the newspaper published by DV on 5 July 2007 and the passage quoted in paragraph 9 above be declared null and void. In addition, Mr A requested that the respondents jointly and severally be ordered to pay him 2,500,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ISK 500,000 to cover the costs of publishing the judgment in the case in three newspapers. 12. Mr A argued that the responsibility for the statements lay with the applicant as the author of the article, in accordance with section 15 (2) of the Printing Act no. 57/1956. No one had been identified as the author of the front-page headline, and therefore the publisher or editor was responsible for it (see section 15 (3) of the same Act, at paragraph 23 below). 13. By a judgment of 26 June 2009 the District Court found for the applicant and the editor. In its reasoning it referred to the right to freedom of expression and protection of private life, as guaranteed by the Icelandic Constitution. It further stated: “When there is an overlap of the defendant’s aforementioned interest in the enjoyment of freedom of expression and the plaintiff’s interest in the enjoyment of respect for his private life, it must be examined whether the publication of the material, for which the defendants are responsible, can be considered to have taken place in the context of a general public debate and therefore to be of interest to the public. The disputed comments appeared in newspaper coverage of public criminal proceedings in which the plaintiff had been accused of a serious crime. The proceedings were open to the public and to those who wanted to observe, in accordance with the usual practice, and the defendants’ account is in accordance with what was revealed at the proceedings. News reporting of criminal cases being tried before the domestic courts must be considered normal and part of a journalist’s work. It cannot be a requirement that news reporting must await the outcome of a trial before publication. It makes no difference that the plaintiff was later acquitted of the charges. It must therefore be held that the published material, at the time it was published, was relevant to the public and was newsworthy. Although the headline on the front page is sensationalist, it has to be kept in mind that it refers to what was revealed during the testimony of the plaintiff in the criminal case, namely that he did not want to reveal the name of the person on whose behalf he was acting in respect of the charge of importing the drugs, as he feared for his own and his family’s safety. In view of all this, the statements are not considered to have been insulting or hurtful to the plaintiff, as defined in Article 234 of the Penal Code, or to contain an insinuation, as in Article 235 of the same Code. Moreover, they will not be deemed to entail an illegal injury to his character and honour ...” Mr A appealed against the District Court’s judgment to the Supreme Court. 14. By a judgment of 11 March 2010, the Supreme Court overturned the District Court judgment. It declared null and void the words “cocaine smugglers” on the front page and the statement “... believing that the cocaine was still in the vehicle” and ordered the applicant and the editor jointly and severally to pay the appellant ISK 100,000 (approximately 575 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, plus interest, and ISK 50,000 for the costs of publishing the judgment. Its judgment contained the following reasons: “When the statements at issue in the present case appeared in DV on 5 July 2007, the criminal proceedings against the appellant and another man were pending before the District Court. This was clearly stated in the article, in which the substance of the charges against them was reproduced, along with a few essential points from the prosecution’s evidence and the statements which they had given at the hearing. It is not argued that the narrative was in any way incorrect, with the exception of those statements which are at issue in this case. The material published concerned a serious criminal case, which was being tried at a public hearing. It was therefore not subject to any limitations under Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no. 19/1991, in force at the time, which would have prevented the media from utilising its freedom [of expression] under Article 73 of the Constitution, to report on the case, including freedom to identify the accused. However, in that discussion special weight ought to be attached to the fact that it is the role of the courts, not the media, to determine whether an accused person is guilty of an offence. ... The appellant was acquitted of the ... criminal charges by a judgment of the District Court exactly one week after the publication of the statements in DV, and that conclusion was unaltered after the adoption of the Supreme Court judgment of 29 May 2008. By virtue of that conclusion the courts had rejected the accusation that the appellant and the co-accused in this case had been guilty of being ‘cocaine smugglers’, and also that the appellant in February 2007 had taken possession of the aforementioned vehicle ‘believing that the cocaine was still in the vehicle’. However, these two assertions were made in the statements which the appellant seeks to have declared null and void, without any reservation being made with reference to the fact that the assertions were based on an indictment which was contested in court. Bearing in mind the outcome of the criminal proceedings that had been instituted by that indictment, the statements in question contained an insinuation against the appellant, and there is no ground for rejecting his request for them to be declared null and void. As regards the other statements which the appellant claims should be declared null and void, it must be held that the word ‘scared’ in the headline on the front page contained a value judgment, and was also supported by comments made by the appellant and the co-accused during the criminal proceedings. The narrative in the article inside the newspaper, stating that the cocaine had been hidden in the vehicle which the appellant had imported into the country and had taken possession of in February 2007, after the police had confiscated the drugs and replaced them with another substance, was merely a description of facts that were later substantiated during the criminal proceedings. There are therefore no grounds for declaring the statements relating to this matter null and void. The statements which are declared null and void were published in an article, of which [the applicant] was named as the author, except for one word [kókaínsmyglarar] in the headline on the front page. She is liable to pay compensation for them, as provided for in section 15(2) of the Printing Act. On the other hand, since the author of the front-page headline was not identified, liability to pay compensation for that statement falls on the defendant [Mr S.M.E.] as the editor of the newspaper, under section 15 (3) of the same Act. The statement in the front-page headline and those in the article on page two were linked to such a degree [voru þau tengsl] that the defendants must be ordered jointly to pay compensation for them. It is considered that since, in the present case, declaring the statements null and void alone rectifies the appellant’s position to a great extent, compensation in the amount of ISK 100,000 is appropriate, with default interest, as further specified in the operative part of the present judgment. With reference to Article 241 § 2 of the Penal Code, the defendants must also be ordered to pay ISK 50,000 to the appellant to cover the costs of publication of the outcome of this case; he has not claimed interest on that amount.” 15. After his acquittal, Mr A initiated proceedings before the domestic courts, seeking compensation from the Icelandic State for unlawful detention during the above-mentioned criminal investigation, but to no avail. The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 16 June 2010, found the detention to have been justified even though he was later acquitted. 16. In April 2009, Mr A was again arrested for involvement in importing drugs into Iceland, and in December 2009 he was sentenced by a final judgment to ten years´ imprisonment for his part in the crime.

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5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Thessaloniki. 6. On 15 September 1986 he was admitted to the Corps Officers’ Military Academy (medical section). He was paid a salary and was granted welfare benefits. He pursued academic studies free of charge at the University of Thessaloniki’s Faculty of Medicine, taking the six-year degree course for medical professionals in the national health system. 7. On 3 June 1993, on completion of his studies, he was appointed to the rank of second lieutenant in the army medical corps. 8. In accordance with Article 64 § 1 of Legislative Decree no. 1400/1973 on the status of officers of the armed forces, as applicable at the material time, the applicant had undertaken to serve in the armed forces for a period corresponding to three times the duration of his studies at the military academy – that is, eighteen years. The relevant provision was later amended by section 1 of Law no. 3257/2004 and the period in question was reduced to twice the duration of his studies – that is, twelve years. 9. On 18 January 1996 the Army General Staff organised a competitive examination for the recruitment of medical specialists. Officers in the medical corps, such as the applicant, were invited to apply in order to acquire a specialist qualification. The applicant was attached to the 424 General Military Hospital in Thessaloniki, where he worked as an intern from 26 July 1996 to 30 July 1997. Subsequently, from 30 July 1997 to 27 July 2001, he occupied a paid supernumerary position (by virtue of section 8 of Law no. 123/1975) at the Papanikolaou General Regional Hospital in Thessaloniki as a junior doctor specialising in anaesthesiology. 10. After completing his specialist training, which lasted approximately five years – during which time he was paid his salary as an army officer – the applicant gave an undertaking, in accordance with Article 64 § 7 of Legislative Decree no. 1400/1973, to serve in the army for a further five years. He provided a sworn declaration to that effect as required by Article 67 § 10 of the Legislative Decree. 11. The applicant served in the armed forces until 22 January 2006, when he resigned at the age of 37 as an anaesthetist with the rank of colonel. 12. By a notice of 12 September 2006 the Army General Staff informed the applicant that, pursuant to Article 64 of Decree no. 1400/1973, he was required either to serve in the armed forces for a further nine years, four months and twelve days or to pay the State a fee calculated on the basis of the period remaining to be served. 13. In a decision of 26 May 2007 the accounts department of the Army General Staff assessed the amount of the fee at 106,960 euros (EUR). The decision stated that the applicant could apply to the Court of Audit for judicial review, but that the application would not have suspensive effect as far as the payment procedure was concerned. 14. On 25 June 2007 the applicant applied to the Fifth Division of the Court of Audit for judicial review of the notice of 12 September 2006. He argued that Article 64 of Decree no. 1400/1973 was in breach of Article 22 § 4 of the Constitution (prohibition of all forms of compulsory labour) and Article 4 § 2 of the Convention, read separately and in conjunction with Article 14. On 27 June 2007 the applicant also applied for a stay of execution of the decision of 26 May 2007. 15. On 5 July 2007 a division president of the Court of Audit made an interim order staying the execution of the decision of 26 May 2007. On 29 October 2007 the Fifth Division of the Court of Audit confirmed the stay of execution sought by the applicant. 16. In judgment no. 175/2009 of 13 February 2009 the Fifth Division of the Court of Audit dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review as ill-founded. It held in particular that the fee to be paid by the applicant did not constitute a menace of a penalty, did not infringe the proportionality principle, had been calculated objectively and was designed to ensure that the State was refunded the expenses it had incurred in training regular members of the armed forces, who were also paid a salary throughout their basic and specialist training. 17. On 3 March 2009 the applicant appealed on points of law to the plenary Court of Audit. On 4 March 2009 he applied to the same court for a stay of execution of the decision of 26 May 2007. 18. On 17 March 2009 the president of the plenary Court of Audit made an interim order staying the execution of the decision in question. On 18 March and 9 April 2009, while those proceedings were ongoing, the Thessaloniki Tax Office ordered the applicant to pay the sum of EUR 106,960, plus EUR 2,139.20 in stamp duty and EUR 427.84 to the agricultural insurance fund. 19. On 21 October 2009 the plenary Court of Audit confirmed the stay of execution sought by the applicant. 20. On 10 May 2010 the Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance informed the applicant that because the amount assessed in the decision of 26 May 2007 had not been paid by the end of the previous year, interest of EUR 13,143.24 had been charged for late payment. It also informed him that if he paid the outstanding amount by 31 May 2010, he would be entitled to an 80% discount on the interest. 21. On 26 May 2010 the applicant deposited the sum of EUR 112,155.69 at the Thessaloniki Tax Office. 22. In judgment no. 3230/2011 of 7 December 2011 (served on the applicant on 10 February 2012) the plenary Court of Audit partly allowed the appeal on points of law. 23. It found that the failure to include a period of five years – which had been essential for the applicant to complete his specialist training – as part of his total length of service was in breach of the proportionality principle enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution. 24. It held that the period during which a medical officer worked towards obtaining a specialist qualification formed part of the officer’s actual military service. Accordingly, it quashed the Fifth Division’s decision as regards the finding that the applicant’s period of specialist training constituted years of study that should not be included in the calculation of his overall period of compulsory service. 25. It dismissed as ill-founded the ground of appeal alleging a violation of the Convention, reasoning as follows: “Paragraph 7 of Article 64 of the Decree ... is compatible with the provisions of the Constitution, the Social Charter and the Convention, in view of the fact that during the period of five years the medical officer serves the armed forces that have trained him or her, and it achieves the aim pursued, namely providing supervisory personnel for the armed forces, without the officer being required to work. As to the fee to be calculated in accordance with paragraph 16 of the same Article, this is a means of offsetting the expenditure incurred by the State in training officers and on no account constitutes a penalty.” 26. The plenary Court of Audit remitted the case to a different bench of the Fifth Division. The only question referred was that of the reassessment of the fee by counting the applicant’s five years of specialist training as part of his overall length of service. 27. In judgment no. 4909/2013 of 12 December 2013 (served on the applicant on 10 January 2014) the Fifth Division of the Court of Audit varied the decision of 26 May 2007 issued by the accounts department of the Army General Staff by reducing the amount payable by the applicant to EUR 49,978.33. 28. In particular, the Court of Audit held firstly that the decision of 26 May 2007 was lawful in that the applicant had left the army before completion of the period of eighteen years’ compulsory service. However, it found that the length of his remaining period of compulsory service was not nine years, four months and twelve days, as the Army General Staff had calculated, but four years, four months and ten days. It pointed out that the period already served by the applicant should have included his specialist training, which had begun on 26 July 1996 and ended on 27 July 2001, since, as judgment no. 3230/2011 had made clear, the period of specialist training was to be counted as part of the actual service performed. 29. On 13 March 2014 the State reimbursed the applicant the sum of EUR 59,749.61, corresponding to the difference between the payment he had already made and the amount determined in judgment no. 4909/2013. 30. According to information supplied by the Government, the applicant is now working in a large private hospital in Thessaloniki. ...

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5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Korolivka, in the Kyiv Region. 6. On 12 July 2010 the Bila Tserkva Town Court (“the Bila Tserkva Court”) found the applicant guilty of inflicting grievous bodily injuries on a certain Mr N. on 12 May 2006. Although this type of crime was punishable with five to eight years’ imprisonment, the court considered it possible to apply a more lenient sanction to the applicant. It had regard, in particular, to the fact that he had pleaded guilty and had shown remorse. Accordingly, the Bila Tserkva Court sentenced the applicant to four years and seven months’ imprisonment. It also decided to include in the served part of the applicant’s sentence the period from 20 October 2005 to 3 May 2006 (six months and fourteen days), during which he had been detained in the context of another criminal case. Lastly, in fixing the applicant’s sentence the court had regard to the fact that he “had spent more than four years in [pre-trial] detention facilities in which the detention conditions were considerably harsher than in a post-conviction prison, and the previous judgments in respect of him had been quashed”. No further information is available regarding the earlier detention of the applicant, the other criminal cases involving him, or the judgments that had been quashed. 7. In the operative part of its judgment, the Bila Tserkva Court also ruled that the applicant should remain in a pre-trial detention centre (“SIZO”) as a preventive measure until the judgment became final. It further noted that the judgment was amenable to appeal within fifteen days of the date of its delivery. 8. On 15 July 2010 the term of the applicant’s sentence expired, and he asked the SIZO administration to release him. His request was rejected. On the same day the SIZO administration, however, applied to the Bila Tserkva Court for permission to release the applicant subject to an undertaking not to abscond, given that he had served his prison sentence in full. No reply was received. 9. On 19 July 2010 the applicant’s lawyer applied once again to the SIZO administration for the applicant’s immediate release. He submitted, in particular, that there were no grounds for his client’s continued detention. A copy of that letter was also sent to the Kyiv Region Prosecutor’s Office. 10. On 27 July 2010 the fifteen-day time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 12 July 2010 expired and, in the absence of an appeal, it became final. 11. On the same day the SIZO administration wrote to the applicant’s lawyer stating that it could not release the applicant until either the preventive measure in respect of him was changed or the judgment became final. It was noted in the letter that, in any event, it was for the Bila Tserkva Court to authorise the applicant’s release. 12. On 29 July 2010 the SIZO received the court’s order to enforce the final judgment and the applicant was released. 13. On 5 August 2010 the State Prisons Department wrote to the applicant’s lawyer in reply to his complaints regarding the delayed release of the applicant, stating that there had been no violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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10. The applicants, who are all French nationals, are Mr Pierre Lambert and his wife Mrs Viviane Lambert, who were born in 1929 and 1945 respectively and live in Reims, Mr David Philippon, who was born in 1971 and lives in Mourmelon, and Mrs Anne Tuarze, who was born in 1978 and lives in Milizac. They are the parents, a half-brother and a sister respectively of Vincent Lambert, who was born on 20 September 1976. 11. Vincent Lambert sustained serious head injuries in a road-traffic accident on 29 September 2008, which left him tetraplegic and in a state of complete dependency. According to the expert medical report ordered by the Conseil d’État on 14 February 2014, he is in a chronic vegetative state (see paragraph 40 below). 12. From September 2008 to March 2009 he was hospitalised in the resuscitation wing, and subsequently the neurology ward, of Châlons‑en‑Champagne Hospital. From March to June 2009 he was cared for in the heliotherapy centre in Berck‑sur‑Mer, before being moved on 23 June 2009 to the unit in Reims University Hospital providing follow-up and rehabilitative care to patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state, where he remains to date. The unit accommodates eight patients. Vincent Lambert receives artificial nutrition and hydration which is administered enterally, that is, via a gastric tube. 13. In July 2011 Vincent Lambert was assessed by a specialised unit of Liège University Hospital, the Coma Science Group, which concluded that he was in a chronic neuro-vegetative state characterised as “minimally conscious plus”. In line with the recommendations of the Coma Science Group he received daily sessions of physiotherapy from September 2011 to the end of October 2012, which yielded no results. He also received eighty-seven speech and language therapy sessions between March and September 2012, in an unsuccessful attempt to establish a code of communication. Attempts were also made to sit the patient in a wheelchair. 14. As Vincent Lambert’s carers had observed increasing signs in 2012 of what they believed to be resistance on his part to daily care, the medical team initiated in early 2013 the collective procedure provided for by the Law of 22 April 2005 on patients’ rights and end-of-life issues (the so-called “Leonetti Act” – see paragraph 54 below). Rachel Lambert, the patient’s wife, was involved in the procedure. 15. The procedure resulted in a decision by Dr Kariger, the doctor in charge of Vincent Lambert and head of the department in which he is hospitalised, to withdraw the patient’s nutrition and reduce his hydration. The decision was put into effect on 10 April 2013. 16. On 9 May 2013 the applicants applied to the urgent-applications judge of the Châlons‑en‑Champagne Administrative Court on the basis of Article L. 521-2 of the Administrative Courts Code (urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom (référé liberté)), seeking an injunction ordering the hospital, subject to a coercive fine, to resume feeding and hydrating Vincent Lambert normally and to provide him with whatever care his condition required. 17. In an order dated 11 May 2013, the urgent-applications judge granted their requests. The judge held that, since no advance directives had been drawn up by Vincent Lambert, and in the absence of a person of trust within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Public Health Code, the collective procedure should be continued with his family, despite the fact that the latter was divided as to what should become of the patient. The judge noted that, while Vincent Lambert’s wife had been involved in the procedure, it was clear from examination of the case that his parents had not been informed that it had been applied, and that the decision to withdraw nutrition and limit hydration, the nature of and reasons for which had not been disclosed to them, had not respected their wishes. 18. The judge held accordingly that these procedural shortcomings amounted to a serious and manifestly unlawful breach of a fundamental freedom, namely the right to respect for life, and ordered the hospital to resume feeding and hydrating Vincent Lambert normally and to provide him with whatever care his condition required. 19. In September 2013 a fresh collective procedure was initiated. Dr Kariger consulted six doctors, including three from outside the hospital (a neurologist, a cardiologist and an anaesthetist with experience in palliative medicine) chosen by Vincent Lambert’s parents, his wife and the medical team respectively. He also had regard to a written contribution from a doctor in charge of a specialised extended-care facility within a nursing home. 20. Dr Kariger also convened two meetings with the family, on 27 September and 16 November 2013, which were attended by Vincent Lambert’s wife and parents and his eight siblings. Rachel Lambert and six of the eight brothers and sisters spoke in favour of discontinuing artificial nutrition and hydration, while the applicants were in favour of continuing it. 21. On 9 December 2013 Dr Kariger called a meeting of all the doctors and almost all the members of the care team. Following that meeting Dr Kariger and five of the six doctors consulted stated that they were in favour of withdrawing treatment. 22. On completion of the consultation procedure Dr Kariger announced on 11 January 2014 his intention to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration on 13 January, subject to an application to the administrative court. His decision, comprising a reasoned thirteen-page report, a seven‑page summary of which was read out to the family, observed in particular that Vincent Lambert’s condition was characterised by irreversible brain damage and that the treatment appeared to be futile and disproportionate and to have no other effect than to sustain life artificially. According to the report, the doctor had no doubt that Vincent Lambert had not wished, before his accident, to live under such conditions. Dr Kariger concluded that prolonging the patient’s life by continuing his artificial nutrition and hydration amounted to unreasonable obstinacy. 23. On 13 January 2014 the applicants made a further urgent application to the Châlons‑en‑Champagne Administrative Court for protection of a fundamental freedom under Article L. 521-2 of the Administrative Courts Code, seeking an injunction prohibiting the hospital and the doctor concerned from withdrawing Vincent Lambert’s nutrition and hydration, and an order for his immediate transfer to a specialised extended-care facility in Oberhausbergen run by the association Amréso‑Bethel (see paragraph 8 above). Rachel Lambert and François Lambert, Vincent Lambert’s nephew, intervened in the proceedings as third parties. 24. The Administrative Court, sitting as a full court of nine judges, held a hearing on 15 January 2014. In a judgment of 16 January 2014, it suspended the implementation of Dr Kariger’s decision of 11 January 2014. 25. The Administrative Court began by observing that Article 2 of the Convention did not prevent States from making provisions for individuals to object to potentially life-prolonging treatment, or for a doctor in charge of a patient who was unable to express his or her wishes and whose treatment the doctor considered, after implementing a series of safeguards, to amount to unreasonable obstinacy, to withdraw that treatment, subject to supervision by the Medical Council, the hospital’s ethics committee, where applicable, and the administrative and criminal courts. 26. The Administrative Court went on to find that it was clear from the relevant provisions of the Public Health Code, as amended following the Leonetti Act and as elucidated by the parliamentary proceedings, that artificial enteral nutrition and hydration – which were subject, like medication, to the distribution monopoly held by pharmacies, were designed to supply specific nutrients to patients with impaired functions and which required recourse to invasive techniques to administer them – constituted a form of treatment. 27. Observing that Dr Kariger’s decision had been based on the wish apparently expressed by Vincent Lambert not to be kept alive in a highly dependent state, and that the latter had not drawn up any advance directives or designated a person of trust, the Administrative Court found that the views he had confided to his wife and one of his brothers had been those of a healthy individual who had not been faced with the immediate consequences of his wishes, and had not constituted the formal manifestation of an express wish, irrespective of his professional experience with patients in a similar situation. The court further found that the fact that Vincent Lambert had had a conflictual relationship with his parents, since he did not share their moral values and religious commitment, did not mean that he could be considered to have expressed a clear wish to refuse all forms of treatment, and added that no unequivocal conclusion as to his desire or otherwise to be kept alive could be drawn from his apparent resistance to the care provided. The Administrative Court held that Dr Kariger had incorrectly assessed Vincent Lambert’s wishes. 28. The Administrative Court also noted that, according to the report drawn up in 2011 by Liège University Hospital (see paragraph 13 above), Vincent Lambert was in a minimally conscious state, implying the continuing presence of emotional perception and the existence of possible responses to his surroundings. Accordingly, the administering of artificial nutrition and hydration was not aimed at keeping him alive artificially. Lastly, the court considered that, as long as the treatment did not cause any stress or suffering, it could not be characterised as futile or disproportionate. It therefore held that Dr Kariger’s decision had constituted a serious and manifestly unlawful breach of Vincent Lambert’s right to life. It issued an order suspending the implementation of the decision while rejecting the request for the patient to be transferred to the specialised extended-care facility in Oberhausbergen. 29. In three applications lodged on 31 January 2014, Rachel Lambert, François Lambert and Reims University Hospital appealed against that judgment to the urgent-applications judge of the Conseil d’État. The applicants lodged a cross-appeal, requesting Vincent Lambert’s immediate transfer to the specialised extended-care facility. The National Union of Associations of Head Injury and Brain Damage Victims’ Families (UNAFTC, see paragraph 8 above) sought leave to intervene as a third party. 30. At the hearing on the urgent application held on 6 February 2014, the President of the Judicial Division of the Conseil d’État decided to refer the case to the full court, sitting as a seventeen-member Judicial Assembly. 31. The hearing before the full court took place on 13 February 2014. In his submissions to the Conseil d’État, the public rapporteur cited, inter alia, the remarks made by the Minister of Health to the members of the Senate examining the bill known as the “Leonetti Bill”: “While the act of withdrawing treatment ... results in death, the intention behind the act [is not to kill; it is] to allow death to resume its natural course and to relieve suffering. This is particularly important for care staff, whose role is not to take life.” 32. The Conseil d’État delivered its ruling on 14 February 2014. After joining the applications and granting UNAFTC leave to intervene, the Conseil d’État defined in the following terms the role of the urgent‑applications judge called upon to rule on the basis of Article L. 521‑2 of the Administrative Courts Code. “Under [Article L. 521-2], the urgent-applications judge of the administrative court, when hearing an application of this kind justified by particular urgency, may order any measures necessary to safeguard a fundamental freedom allegedly breached in a serious and manifestly unlawful manner by an administrative authority. These legislative provisions confer on the urgent-applications judge, who normally decides alone and who orders measures of an interim nature in accordance with Article L. 511-1 of the Administrative Courts Code, the power to order, without delay and on the basis of a ‘plain and obvious’ test, the necessary measures to protect fundamental freedoms. However, the urgent-applications judge must exercise his or her powers in a particular way when hearing an application under Article L. 521-2 ... concerning a decision taken by a doctor on the basis of the Public Health Code which would result in treatment being discontinued or withheld on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy and the implementation of which would cause irreversible damage to life. In such circumstances the judge, sitting where applicable as a member of a bench of judges, must take the necessary protective measures to prevent the decision in question from being implemented where it may not be covered by one of the situations provided for by law, while striking a balance between the fundamental freedoms in issue, namely the right to respect for life and the patient’s right to consent to medical treatment and not to undergo treatment that is the result of unreasonable obstinacy. In such a case, the urgent‑applications judge or the bench to which he or she has referred the case may, as appropriate, after temporarily suspending the implementation of the measure and before ruling on the application, order an expert medical report and, under Article R. 625-3 of the Administrative Courts Code, seek the opinion of any person whose expertise or knowledge are apt to usefully inform the court’s decision.” 33. The Conseil d’État found that it was clear from the very wording of the relevant provisions of the Public Health Code (Articles L. 1110‑5, L. 1111‑4 and R. 4127‑37) and from the parliamentary proceedings that the provisions in question were general in scope and applied to Vincent Lambert just as they did to all users of the health service. The Conseil d’État stated as follows. “It is clear from these provisions that each individual must receive the care most appropriate to his or her condition and that the preventive or exploratory acts carried out and the care administered must not subject the patient to disproportionate risks in relation to the anticipated benefits. Such acts must not be continued with unreasonable obstinacy and may be discontinued or withheld where they appear to be futile or disproportionate or to have no other effect than to sustain life artificially, whether or not the patient is in an end-of-life situation. Where the patient is unable to express his or her wishes, any decision to limit or withdraw treatment on the ground that continuing it would amount to unreasonable obstinacy may not be taken by the doctor, where such a measure is liable to endanger the life of the patient, without the collective procedure defined in the Code of Medical Ethics and the rules on consultation laid down in the Public Health Code having been followed. If the doctor takes such a decision he or she must in any event preserve the patient’s dignity and dispense palliative care. Furthermore, it is clear from the provisions of Articles L. 1110-5 and L. 1111-4 of the Public Health Code, as elucidated by the parliamentary proceedings prior to the passing of the Law of 22 April 2005, that the legislature intended to include among the forms of treatment that may be limited or withdrawn on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy all acts which seek to maintain the patient’s vital functions artificially. Artificial nutrition and hydration fall into this category of acts and may accordingly be withdrawn where continuing them would amount to unreasonable obstinacy.” 34. The Conseil d’État went on to find that its task was to satisfy itself, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that the statutory conditions governing any decision to withdraw treatment whose continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy had been met. To that end it needed to have the fullest information possible at its disposal, in particular concerning Vincent Lambert’s state of health. Accordingly, it considered it necessary before ruling on the application to order an expert medical report to be prepared by practitioners with recognised expertise in neuroscience. The experts – acting on an independent and collective basis, after examining the patient, meeting the medical team and the care staff and familiarising themselves with the patient’s entire medical file – were to give their opinion on Vincent Lambert’s current condition and provide the Conseil d’État with all relevant information as to the prospect of any change. 35. The Conseil d’État decided to entrust the expert report to a panel of three doctors appointed by the President of the Judicial Division on proposals from the President of the National Medical Academy, the Chair of the National Ethics Advisory Committee and the President of the National Medical Council respectively. The remit of the panel of experts, which was to report within two months of its formation, read as follows. “(i) To describe Mr. Lambert’s current clinical condition and how it has changed since the review carried out in July 2011 by the Coma Science Group of Liège University Hospital; (ii) To express an opinion as to whether the patient’s brain damage is irreversible and as to the clinical prognosis; (iii) To determine whether the patient is capable of communicating, by whatever means, with those around him; (iv) To assess whether there are any signs to suggest at the present time that Mr Lambert reacts to the care being dispensed to him and, if so, whether those reactions can be interpreted as a rejection of that care, as suffering, as a desire for the life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or, on the contrary, as a desire for the treatment to be continued.” 36. The Conseil d’État also considered it necessary, in view of the scale and the difficulty of the scientific, ethical and deontological issues raised by the case and in accordance with Article R. 625-3 of the Administrative Courts Code, to request the National Medical Academy, the National Ethics Advisory Committee and the National Medical Council, together with Mr Jean Leonetti, the rapporteur for the Law of 22 April 2005, to submit general written observations by the end of April 2014 designed to clarify for it the application of the concepts of unreasonable obstinacy and sustaining life artificially for the purposes of Article L. 1110-5, with particular regard to individuals who, like Vincent Lambert, were in a minimally conscious state. 37. Lastly, the Conseil d’État rejected the applicants’ request for Vincent Lambert to be transferred to a specialised extended-care facility (see paragraph 29 above). 38. The experts examined Vincent Lambert on nine occasions. They familiarised themselves with the entire medical file, and in particular the report of the Coma Science Group in Liège (see paragraph 13 above), the treatment file and the administrative file, and had access to all the imaging tests. They also consulted all the items in the judicial case file of relevance for their expert report. In addition, between 24 March and 23 April 2014, they met all the parties (the family, the medical and care team, the medical consultants and representatives of UNAFTC and the hospital) and carried out a series of tests on Vincent Lambert. 39. On 5 May 2014 the experts sent their preliminary report to the parties for comments. Their final report, submitted on 26 May 2014, provided the following replies to the questions asked by the Conseil d’État. (a) Vincent Lambert’s clinical condition and how it had changed 40. The experts found that Vincent Lambert’s clinical condition corresponded to a vegetative state, with no signs indicating a minimally conscious state. Furthermore, they stressed that he had difficulty swallowing and had seriously impaired motor functions of all four limbs, with significant retraction of the tendons. They noted that his state of consciousness had deteriorated since the assessment carried out in Liège in 2011. (b) Irreversible nature of the brain damage and clinical prognosis 41. The experts pointed out that the two main factors to be taken into account in assessing whether or not brain damage was irreversible were, firstly, the length of time since the accident which had caused the damage and, secondly, the nature of the damage. In the present case they noted that five and a half years had passed since the initial head injury and that the imaging tests showed severe cerebral atrophy testifying to permanent neuron loss, near-total destruction of strategic regions such as both parts of the thalamus and the upper part of the brain stem, and serious damage to the communication pathways in the brain. They concluded that the brain damage was irreversible. They added that the lengthy period of progression, the patient’s clinical deterioration since July 2011, his current vegetative state, the destructive nature and extent of the brain damage and the results of the functional tests, coupled with the severity of the motor impairment of all four limbs, pointed to a poor clinical prognosis. (c) Vincent Lambert’s capacity to communicate with those around him 42. In the light of the tests carried out, and particularly in view of the fact that the course of speech and language therapy carried out in 2012 had not succeeded in establishing a code of communication, the experts concluded that Vincent Lambert was not capable of establishing functional communication with those around him. (d) Existence of signs suggesting that Vincent Lambert reacted to the care provided, and interpretation of those signs 43. The experts observed that Vincent Lambert reacted to the care provided and to painful stimuli, but concluded that these were non‑conscious responses. In their view, it was not possible to interpret them as conscious awareness of suffering or as the expression of any intent or wish with regard to the withdrawal or continuation of treatment. 44. On 22 and 29 April and 5 May 2014 the Conseil d’État received the general observations of the National Medical Council, Mr Jean Leonetti, rapporteur for the Law of 22 April 2005, the National Medical Academy and the National Ethics Advisory Committee. The National Medical Council made clear in particular that, in using the expression “no other effect than to sustain life artificially” in Article L. 1110‑5 of the Public Health Code, the legislature had sought to address the situation of patients who not only were being kept alive solely by the use of methods and techniques replacing key vital functions, but also, and above all, whose cognitive and relational functions were profoundly and irreversibly impaired. It emphasised the importance of the notion of temporality, stressing that where a pathological condition had become chronic, resulting in the person’s physiological deterioration and the loss of his or her cognitive and relational faculties, obstinacy in administering treatment could be regarded as unreasonable if no signs of improvement were apparent. Mr Leonetti stressed that the Law of 22 April 2005 was applicable to patients who had brain damage and thus suffered from a serious condition which, in the advanced stages, was incurable, but who were not necessarily “at the end of life”. Accordingly, the legislature had referred in its title to “patients’ rights and end‑of‑life issues” rather than “patients’ rights in end‑of‑life situations”. He outlined the criteria for unreasonable obstinacy and the factors used to assess it and stated that the reference to treatment having “no other effect than to sustain life artificially”, which was stricter than the wording originally envisaged (namely, treatment “which prolongs life artificially”) was more restrictive and referred to artificially sustaining life “in the purely biological sense, in circumstances where, firstly, the patient has major irreversible brain damage and, secondly, his or her condition offers no prospect of a return to awareness of self or relationships with others”. He pointed out that the Law of 22 April 2005 gave the doctor sole responsibility for the decision to withdraw treatment and that it had been decided not to pass that responsibility on to the family, in order to avoid any feelings of guilt and to ensure that the person who took the decision was identified. The National Medical Academy reiterated the fundamental prohibition barring doctors from deliberately taking another’s life, which formed the basis for the relationship of trust between doctor and patient. The Academy reiterated its long-standing position according to which the Leonetti Act was applicable not only to the various “end-of-life” situations, but also to situations raising the very difficult ethical issue of the “ending of life” in the case of patients in “survival” mode, in a minimally conscious or chronic vegetative state. The National Ethics Advisory Committee conducted an in‑depth analysis of the difficulties surrounding the notions of unreasonable obstinacy, treatment and sustaining life artificially, summarised the medical data concerning minimally conscious states, and addressed the ethical issues arising out of such situations. It recommended, in particular, a process of reflection aimed at ensuring that the collective discussions led to a genuine collective decision-making process and that, where no consensus could be reached, there was a possibility of mediation. 45. A hearing took place on 20 June 2014 before the Conseil d’État. In his submissions the public rapporteur stressed, in particular, the following: “... [T]he legislature did not wish to impose on those in the caring professions the burden of bridging the gap which exists between allowing death to take its course when it can no longer be prevented and actively causing death by administering a lethal substance. By discontinuing treatment, a doctor is not taking the patient’s life, but is resolving to withdraw when there is nothing more to be done.” The Conseil d’État delivered its judgment on 24 June 2014. After granting leave to Marie‑Geneviève Lambert, Vincent Lambert’s half-sister, to intervene as a third party, and reiterating the relevant provisions of domestic law as commented on and elucidated in the general observations received, the Conseil d’État examined in turn the applicants’ arguments based on the Convention and on domestic law. 46. On the first point the Conseil d’État reiterated that, where the urgent‑applications judge was called on to hear an application under Article L. 521-2 of the Administrative Courts Code (urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom) concerning a decision taken by a doctor under the Public Health Code which would result in treatment being discontinued or withheld on the ground of unreasonable obstinacy, and implementation of that decision would cause irreversible damage to life, the judge was required to examine any claim that the provisions in question were incompatible with the Convention (see paragraph 32 above). 47. In the case before it the Conseil d’État replied in the following terms to the arguments based on Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention. “Firstly, the disputed provisions of the Public Health Code defined a legal framework reaffirming the right of all persons to receive the most appropriate care, the right to respect for their wish to refuse any treatment and the right not to undergo medical treatment resulting from unreasonable obstinacy. Those provisions do not allow a doctor to take a life-threatening decision to limit or withdraw the treatment of a person incapable of expressing his or her wishes, except on the dual, strict condition that continuation of that treatment would amount to unreasonable obstinacy and that the requisite safeguards are observed, namely that account is taken of any wishes expressed by the patient and that at least one other doctor and the care team are consulted, as well as the person of trust, the family or another person close to the patient. Any such decision by a doctor is open to appeal before the courts in order to review compliance with the conditions laid down by law. Hence the disputed provisions of the Public Health Code, taken together, in view of their purpose and the conditions attaching to their implementation, cannot be said to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention ..., or with those of Article 8 ...” The Conseil d’État also rejected the applicants’ arguments based on Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, finding that the role entrusted to the doctor under the provisions of the Public Health Code was not incompatible with the duty of impartiality flowing from Article 6, and that Article 7, which applied to criminal convictions, was not relevant to the case before it. 48. Regarding the application of the relevant provisions of the Public Health Code, the Conseil d’État held as follows. “Although artificial nutrition and hydration are among the forms of treatment which may be withdrawn in cases where their continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy, the sole fact that a person is in an irreversible state of unconsciousness or, a fortiori, has lost his or her autonomy irreversibly and is thus dependent on such a form of nutrition and hydration, does not by itself amount to a situation in which the continuation of treatment would appear unjustified on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy. In assessing whether the conditions for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration are met in the case of a patient with severe brain damage, however caused, who is in a vegetative or minimally conscious state and is thus unable to express his or her wishes, and who depends on such nutrition and hydration as a means of life support, the doctor in charge of the patient must base his or her decision on a range of medical and non-medical factors whose relative weight cannot be determined in advance but will depend on the circumstances of each patient, so that the doctor must assess each situation on its own merits. In addition to the medical factors – which must cover a sufficiently long period, be assessed collectively and relate in particular to the patient’s current condition, the change in that condition since the accident or illness occurred, his or her degree of suffering and the clinical prognosis – the doctor must attach particular importance to any wishes the patient may have expressed previously, whatever their form or tenor. In that regard, where such wishes remain unknown, they cannot be assumed to consist in a refusal by the patient to be kept alive in the current conditions. The doctor must also take into account the views of the person of trust, where the patient has designated such a person, of the members of the patient’s family or, failing this, of another person close to the patient, while seeking to establish a consensus. In assessing the patient’s particular situation, the doctor must be guided primarily by a concern to act with maximum beneficence towards the patient...” 49. The Conseil d’État went on to find that it was its task, in the light of all the circumstances of the case and the evidence produced in the course of the adversarial proceedings before it, in particular the expert medical report, to ascertain whether the decision taken by Dr Kariger on 11 January 2014 had complied with the statutory conditions imposed on any decision to withdraw treatment whose continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy. 50. In that connection the Conseil d’État ruled as follows. “Firstly, it is clear from the examination of the case that the collective procedure conducted by Dr Kariger ..., prior to the taking of the decision of 11 January 2014, was carried out in accordance with the requirements of Article R. 4127-37 of the Public Health Code and involved the consultation of six doctors, although that Article simply requires that the opinion of one doctor and, where appropriate, of a second be sought. Dr Kariger was not legally bound to allow the meeting of 9 December 2013 to be attended by a second doctor designated by Mr Lambert’s parents in addition to the one they had already designated. Nor does it appear from the examination of the case that some members of the care team were deliberately excluded from that meeting. Furthermore, Dr Kariger was entitled to speak with Mr François Lambert, the patient’s nephew. The fact that Dr Kariger opposed a request for him to withdraw from Mr Lambert’s case and for the patient to be transferred to another establishment, and the fact that he expressed his views publicly, do not amount, having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, to a failure to comply with the obligations implicit in the principle of impartiality, which Dr Kariger respected. Accordingly, contrary to what was argued before the Châlons-en-Champagne Administrative Court, the procedure preceding the adoption of the decision of 11 January 2014 was not tainted by any irregularity. Secondly, the experts’ findings indicate that ‘Mr Lambert’s current clinical condition corresponds to a vegetative state’, with ‘swallowing difficulties, severe motor impairment of all four limbs, some signs of dysfunction of the brainstem’ and ‘continued ability to breathe unaided’. The results of the tests carried out from 7 to 11 April 2014 to assess the patient’s brain structure and function ... were found to be consistent with such a vegetative state. The experts found that the clinical progression, characterised by the disappearance of the fluctuations in Mr Lambert’s state of consciousness recorded during the assessment carried out in July 2011 by the Coma Science Group at Liège University Hospital and by the failure of the active therapies recommended at the time of that assessment, were suggestive of ‘a deterioration in the [patient’s] state of consciousness since that time’. Furthermore, according to the findings set out in the experts’ report, the exploratory tests which were carried out revealed serious and extensive brain damage, as evidenced in particular by ‘severe impairment of the structure and metabolism of the sub-cortical regions of crucial importance for cognitive function’ and ‘major structural dysfunction of the communication pathways between the regions of the brain involved in consciousness’. The severity of the cerebral atrophy and of the damage observed, coupled with the five-and-a-half-year period that had elapsed since the initial accident, led the experts to conclude that the brain damage was irreversible. Furthermore, the experts concluded that ‘the lengthy period of progression, the patient’s clinical deterioration since 2011, his current vegetative state, the destructive nature and the extent of the brain damage, the results of the functional tests and the severity of the motor impairment of all four limbs’ pointed to a ‘poor clinical prognosis’. Lastly, while noting that Mr Lambert was capable of reacting to the care administered and to certain stimuli, the experts indicated that the characteristics of those reactions suggested that they were non-conscious responses. The experts did not consider it possible to interpret these behavioural reactions as evidence of ‘conscious awareness of suffering’ or as the expression of any intent or wish with regard to the withdrawal or continuation of the treatment keeping the patient alive. These findings, which the experts reached unanimously following a collective assessment in the course of which the patient was examined on nine separate occasions, thorough cerebral tests were performed, meetings were held with the medical team and care staff involved and the entire file was examined, confirm the conclusions drawn by Dr Kariger as to the irreversible nature of the damage and Mr Lambert’s clinical prognosis. The exchanges which took place in the adversarial proceedings before the Conseil d’État subsequent to submission of the experts’ report do nothing to invalidate the experts’ conclusions. While it can be seen from the experts’ report, as just indicated, that Mr Lambert’s reactions to care are not capable of interpretation and thus cannot be regarded as expressing a wish as to the withdrawal of treatment, Dr Kariger in fact indicated in the impugned decision that the behaviour concerned was open to various interpretations, all of which needed to be treated with great caution, and did not include this aspect in the reasons for his decision. Thirdly, the provisions of the Public Health Code allow account to be taken of a patient’s wishes expressed in a form other than advance directives. It is apparent from the examination of the case, and in particular from the testimony of Mrs Rachel Lambert, that she and her husband, both nurses, had often discussed their respective professional experiences in dealing with patients under resuscitation and those with multiple disabilities, and that Mr Lambert had on several such occasions clearly voiced the wish not to be kept alive artificially if he were to find himself in a highly dependent state. The tenor of those remarks, reported by Mrs Rachel Lambert in precise detail and with the corresponding dates, was confirmed by one of Mr Lambert’s brothers. While these remarks were not made in the presence of Mr Lambert’s parents, the latter did not claim that their son could not have made them or that he would have expressed wishes to the contrary, and several of Mr Lambert’s siblings stated that the remarks concerned were in keeping with their brother’s personality, past experience and personal opinions. Accordingly, in stating among the reasons for the decision at issue his certainty that Mr Lambert did not wish, before his accident, to live under such conditions, Dr Kariger cannot be regarded as having incorrectly interpreted the wishes expressed by the patient before his accident. Fourthly, the doctor in charge of the patient is required, under the provisions of the Public Health Code, to obtain the views of the patient’s family before taking any decision to withdraw treatment. Dr Kariger complied with this requirement in consulting Mr Lambert’s wife, parents and siblings in the course of the two meetings referred to earlier. While Mr Lambert’s parents and some of his brothers and sisters opposed the discontinuing of treatment, Mr Lambert’s wife and his other siblings stated their support for the proposal to withdraw treatment. Dr Kariger took these different opinions into account. In the circumstances of the case, he concluded that the fact that the members of the family were not unanimous as to what decision should be taken did not constitute an impediment to his decision. It follows from all the above considerations that the various conditions imposed by the law before any decision can be taken by the doctor in charge of the patient to withdraw treatment which has no effect other than to sustain life artificially, and whose continuation would thus amount to unreasonable obstinacy, may be regarded, in the case of Mr Vincent Lambert and in the light of the adversarial proceedings before the Conseil d’État, as having been met. Accordingly, the decision taken by Dr Kariger on 11 January 2014 to withdraw the artificial nutrition and hydration of Mr Vincent Lambert cannot be held to be unlawful.” 51. Accordingly, the Conseil d’État set aside the Administrative Court’s judgment and dismissed the applicants’ claims.

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5. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Las Vegas, United States of America. 6. Her mother owned a plot of agricultural land of 1,000 square metres which was expropriated in 1952. Subsequently the plot was included in the urban territory of the Bankya district of Sofia. 7. The applicant is her mother’s sole heir. 8. In 1992, following the adoption of the Agricultural Land Act, the applicant requested that her property rights to the plot be restored. In a decision of 7 September 1994 the Bankya land commission held that, since the plot had become part of the urban territory, the procedure could only continue after the presentation of a plan of the plot and a certificate, showing whether any part of the plot had been constructed upon (see paragraph 23 below). 9. In a letter dated 19 June 2000, in response to an inquiry of the applicant as to the status of her request for restitution, the Bankya land commission stated once again that it needed a plan and a certificate. 10. On an unspecified date after that the applicant requested the Bankya district mayor to issue these documents, to allow her to pursue the restitution procedure. 11. During the years which followed the Bankya district authorities instructed the applicant to submit various documents, allegedly necessary for the preparation of the plan and the certificate, which she did. Nevertheless, the documents sought by the applicant were not issued. 12. On 27 February 2007 the applicant applied for judicial review of the mayor’s tacit refusal to issue the documents at issue. 13. Initially, the Sofia Administrative Court dismissed the application as inadmissible. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 19 May 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed that decision and ordered the lower court to examine the merits of the application. It commented as follows on the applicant’s situation: “It can only be concluded on the basis of the case file that in the course of many years the municipal bodies were unlawfully refusing to provide [the applicant] with a plan of the plot and a certificate, and were instead flooding her with correspondence, expressing in different letters some kind of views as to what documents she needed to present and informing her that different procedures on which her request depended were under way. ...” 14. After a fresh examination of the case, in a judgment of 9 January 2009 the Sofia Administrative Court quashed the mayor’s refusal, finding that the mayor enjoyed no discretion as to whether to issue the documents sought by the applicant, and ordered him to issue these documents within one month. It noted that the plan of the plot and the certificate were mandatory for the Agriculture and Forestry Department (the former land commission) to be able to resume the restitution procedure, and pointed out that the mayor’s unlawful refusal to issue them affected the applicant’s right to restitution. 15. The above judgment was not appealed against and became final. 16. On 5 March 2009 the Bankya district mayor once again instructed the applicant to submit additional documents so that a plan of the plot and a certificate could be issued. The applicant challenged these instructions as irrelevant and impossible to observe. Nevertheless, in a decision of 24 February 2010 the mayor refused to issue a certificate and a plan because the instructions had not been complied with. 17. The applicant applied once again for judicial review. In a decision of 25 June 2010 the Sofia Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review as inadmissible, considering that the case concerned the enforcement of its judgment of 9 January 2009. However, upon an appeal by the applicant, on 23 September 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed that decision, finding that the fresh refusal by the mayor to issue the documents sought was subject to separate judicial review. 18. In a new judgment of 27 June 2011 the Sofia Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review. 19. Upon an appeal by the applicant, in a final judgment of 8 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court set the above judgment aside, pronounced the mayor’s refusal null and void, remitted the case to him, and ordered him to issue the documents sought by the applicant. It pointed out that the mayor had already been obliged to issue the documents in question on the strength of the judgment of 9 January 2009. It noted further that the certificate and the plan of the plot were prerequisites for the resumption of the stayed restitution procedure. 20. Following the above judgment, between October 2012 and January 2013 the Bankya district administration sent three letters to the Sofia municipal administration requesting information about the plot’s current status in the land register, but, according to the applicant, made no further efforts to obtain the information thus requested, and at the end of 2013 the information was obtained by the applicant’s lawyer. 21. On 18 August 2014, upon a request by the applicant, a judge from the Supreme Administrative Court imposed a fine of 1,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) on the Bankya district mayor for his failure to comply with the judgment of 8 May 2012 (Article 304 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, see paragraph 25 below). The judge noted that there was no indication that the documents sought by the applicant had been issued, and also that the mayor had provided no explanation for his failure to take that action. On 30 October 2014 the judge’s decision was upheld by a three‑member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court.

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5. The applicant company was established in 1995 and has its registered office in Prešov. 6. In 2004 the applicant company bought real property registered on ownership certificate no. 5604 for the cadastral area of Južné mesto in the city of Košice. The seller was a State-owned enterprise (“the seller”) acting through a receiver in insolvency. 7. Prior to the sale, in a decision (uznesenie) of 8 April 1998, the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) acting as an insolvency court had consented to the property being sold directly as opposed to through a public auction. 8. By way of an order (opatrenie) of 9 July 2004 the insolvency court approved the sale of the property to the applicant company because it had fulfilled the conditions for the sale as set out in the decision of 8 April 1998. It observed that the proposed price was adequate in view of all the circumstances, including the fact that there were municipal and other roads situated on the land in question. 9. The order of 9 July 2004 was not amenable to appeal. It became final and binding on the same day as it was issued. 10. On 28 July 2004 the sale was registered in the land registry. The title to the property was thereby effectively transferred to the applicant company. 11. The seller was subsequently dissolved and struck out of the companies register, whereby it ceased legally to exist. 12. On 22 April 2008 the City of Košice (“the claimant”) brought an action against the applicant company seeking a ruling that it was the owner of the property. The claimant argued in principle that, by mistake, the property had not been registered as its own; that accordingly it did not belong to the seller; and that – consequently – the sale had been void. 13. The action was examined and dismissed on 27 February 2009 by the Košice I District Court (Okresný súd) and, following an appeal lodged by the claimant, on 8 October 2009 by the Regional Court. The District Court held a hearing and took complex documentary evidence and oral submissions from the parties. Both courts unanimously concluded that there was a non-rebuttable legal presumption, under Article 19 § 2 of the Insolvency Code (Law no. 328/1991 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time), that the property belonged to the insolvency estate and could be lawfully sold to third parties unless its exclusion from the estate had been claimed by way of a special action (vylučovacia žaloba), which had not happened in the present case. The applicant company had acquired the property in good faith and the present action could not be used to contest that. 14. The dismissal of the action became final and binding on 7 January 2010. 15. On 13 December 2010 the claimant filed a petition with the Office of the Prosecutor General (“the PG”) requesting the latter to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the above-mentioned judgments by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie – “extraordinary appeal”). 16. Having decided to accede to the request and acting through his First Deputy, on 5 January 2011 the PG challenged the contested judgments in the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd). He argued that the courts had erred in applying the said legal presumption which, in his view, only applied if the party concerned had been invited by the insolvency court to seek the exclusion of the property in question from the insolvency estate by the special action mentioned above and if that party had failed to act on the invitation. This had however not been the case in the present situation. Moreover, the PG argued that both the seller’s receiver in insolvency and the insolvency court should have flagged up and treated the property as contentious, especially in view of the fact that there were public roads on it. 17. The applicant and the claimant were both given an opportunity to comment. 18. On 30 April 2012 the Supreme Court quashed the challenged judgments and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a new determination. It referred to a precedent of 11 September 2009 in case no. 5Cdo 194/08, which had been published in the “Collection of Standpoints of the Supreme Court” in 2010 (issue 3/2010, item 25), according to which there were conditions attached to the legal presumption applied by the lower courts. The present case fell within one of the exceptions. In particular, the Supreme Court concurred with the PG’s argument that the presumption only applied on condition that the party concerned had been invited but had failed to seek to have the disputed items excluded from the insolvency estate. However, according to the Supreme Court, there was an exception to that condition, in that the latter would only apply if there were circumstances casting doubt on whether the disputed items rightfully fell within the insolvency estate. The Supreme Court found that, on the facts of the present case, the claimant had not been invited to seek to have the plots in question excluded from the estate. Moreover, there were reasons to doubt whether the seller had actually been the owner of those plots and whether the property had belonged to the seller’s insolvency estate. As the receiver and the insolvency court had failed to flag up the property as being contentious, the presumption was not applicable and the sale contract was void. Moreover, in the Supreme Court’s assessment, in view of the circumstances, the applicant company could not be considered as having been the bona fide purchaser of the property. The contested judgments were therefore wrong in law and had to be quashed. 19. Since then the case has been pending at the first instance. 20. On 3 August 2012 the applicant company lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). The applicant company relied, inter alia, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and challenged the Supreme Court’s decision. In particular, it contended that the Supreme Court had wrongfully re‑examined the lawfulness of the insolvency court’s order of 9 July 2004, which was impermissible outside the framework of the insolvency proceedings. In any event, an extraordinary review of that order was also impermissible on account of the expiry of the applicable time-limits. In addition, the re-examination of that order was impermissible because it was in breach of the principle of res judicata. Lastly, the applicant company disagreed with the Supreme Court’s findings on the merits. 21. On 11 October 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It found no constitutionally relevant arbitrariness, unfairness or irregularity in the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning or in the underlying procedure. It added that, in so far as the applicant company could be understood as wishing to rely on the principle of res judicata with regard to the original insolvency proceedings, this principle did not apply in the present case because the insolvency proceedings had concerned the seller and not the claimant. Any rulings made in the insolvency proceedings therefore did not restrict the claimant from pursuing its own claims in the action at the origin of the present case. The Constitutional Court’s decision became final and binding on 2 November 2012.

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4. As respondent party, the applicant was involved in a case of property litigation as of 6 March 1996. 5. Due to pending proceedings before the construction authorities, the Pest Central District Court suspended the procedure. Subsequently, a first hearing was held in 1999. 6. The court separated the proceedings from further claims on 2 December 2004. 7. On 27 June 2006 the court rejected the counterclaim of the applicant. 8. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court quashed this decision on 27 March 2007. It remitted this part of the action to the first-instance court. 9. In the resumed proceedings the first-instance court partly found for the applicant on 27 January 2010. 10. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld this judgment on 1 January 2010. 11. The applicant lodged a petition for review; and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on 9 November 2011. The decision was served on the applicant on 1 March 2012.

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5. The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in the village of Ribaritsa. 6. Her father, of whom she is the sole heir, owned agricultural land in the area surrounding the village which was incorporated into an agricultural cooperative at the beginning of the 1950s. 7. In 1991, following the adoption of the Agricultural Land Act (“the ALA”, see paragraph 17 below), the applicant applied for the land’s restitution. 8. By a decision dated 10 March 1999 the land commission dealing with the case refused to restore her rights to two plots of 900 and 2,000 square metres respectively, noting that sheep pens had been built on them by the agricultural cooperative. It held that the applicant was entitled to compensation in lieu of restitution. 9. The above decision was served on the applicant in 2004, whereupon she applied for a judicial review. 10. In a judgment of 8 September 2005 the Teteven District Court quashed the decision of 10 March 1999, finding, on the basis of an expert report, that there were no buildings on the plots at issue, only assorted construction materials. Accordingly, there was no obstacle to the plots’ restitution in kind. In addition, the Agriculture and Forestry Department – the successor body of the land commission – had argued in the proceedings that the land had been sold by the agricultural cooperative to a third party. According to the District Court, this circumstance, apart from being unsubstantiated, could not bar restitution in kind either, because any dispute as to the land’s ownership would fall to be examined by the civil courts after completion of the restitution procedure. 11. On the basis of the above, the District Court held that the applicant was entitled to the restitution in kind of the two plots of land. 12. No appeal was lodged against the above judgment and it entered into force on 26 September 2005. 13. On 20 February 2006 the Agriculture and Forestry Department took another decision on the same matter, refusing the restitution in kind of two plots of land, one of 2,127 square metres and the other of 454 square metres, apparently identical to the plots discussed above. The Department noted that in 1995 the two plots had been sold by the agricultural cooperative to a third party, and that an agricultural building and a metal shelter had been erected on the plot of 2,127 square metres. It held once again that the applicant was entitled to compensation in lieu of restitution. 14. The applicant applied for a judicial review of that decision. In a final judgment of 4 October 2006 the Lovech Regional Court found the decision null and void since it contradicted the judgment of 8 September 2005. 15. The applicant submits that following the Lovech Regional Court’s judgment she paid numerous visits to the Agriculture and Forestry Department to request compliance with the judgment of 8 September 2005. In July 2007 she wrote to the Department’s superior body, the Lovech Regional Directorate of Agriculture and Forests, requesting its intervention. 16. In 18 October 2006 the Agriculture and Forestry Department adopted a new decision on the matter. Noting that the applicant’s right to restitution had been recognised by virtue of the judgments of 8 September 2005 and 4 October 2006, it restored her rights to three plots, measuring 2,127, 319 and 454 square metres respectively, which were apparently identical to the plots discussed above. The decision identified the plots measuring 2,127 and 454 square metres with their borders and specifications under the cadastral plan, but not the plot of 319 square metres. The decision, a copy of which was submitted by the Government, bears no mention of having been received by the applicant.

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5. The applicant company was established in 1993 and has its registered office in Opava (the Czech Republic). 6. The present application concerns claims against a Slovak gas company (“the defendant”) dating back to 1998 when the defendant was still a State‑owned enterprise and when its director and statutory representative was Mr J.D. It came to light subsequently that, at the time, Mr J.D. had issued a number of promissory notes (vlastná zmenka) in the name of the defendant for large amounts of money (see Michaela Huserová, Administrator in Bankruptcy of Union banka, a.s. in liquidation and Stroden Management Limited v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 760/04, 9 November 2010). 7. Prior to becoming the statutory representative of the defendant, Mr J.D. had served a term as Minister of Industry and two terms as Minister of the Economy. In 1999 he was murdered in circumstances that are yet to be clarified. 8. The promissory notes have always been contested by the defendant. Nevertheless, they have been negotiated among many parties and have given rise to a deal of litigation, including the proceedings in the present case. They have also attracted extensive media attention. 9. In 2001, the defendant was transformed into a joint‑stock company. It then underwent privatisation and 49% of its shares were sold to private foreign investors. 10. The contract for the privatisation of the defendant contains a clause pursuant to which the State agreed to indemnify the investors for any loss they might incur on account of the promissory notes signed by Mr J.D. 11. Of relevance for the present application is the fact that at the time, 51 % of the defendant’s shares were held by the State, while the remaining 49 % were held by a private party. At present, the defendant is wholly owned by the State. 12. On 23 December 2005 the applicant company instituted proceedings against the defendant before the Bratislava V District Court (Okresný súd). Then and at all stages of the proceedings, it was represented by a lawyer. The applicant company relied on a promissory note for the payment of the equivalent of some 11,350,000 euros (EUR) signed by Mr J.D. in the name of the defendant on 29 September 1998. The date of issue indicated on the promissory note was 1 October 1998. On the basis of that note and four endorsements on it, the applicant company claimed to be the holder of the note and sought a judicial order for the defendant to pay the above-mentioned amount with interest and some additional associated amounts. 13. On 17 February 2006, in summary proceedings, the District Court issued a payment order (zmenkový platobný rozkaz) for the amounts claimed. The defendant protested (námietky) and appealed (odvolanie), but the order was upheld in ordinary proceedings by, respectively, the District Court on 21 May 2007 and the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) on 28 April 2009. 14. Both the District Court and the Regional Court held hearings at which the legal representatives of the parties and two witnesses were heard and documentary evidence as adduced by the parties was examined. 15. The courts concluded that the promissory note had been validly issued in the name of the defendant by Mr J.D.; that, at the time of issue, the note had been incomplete as it had had no maturity date; and that its maturity date, 1 November 2005, had been added to it later. The courts dismissed the defendant’s claims that the note had been issued for payment “at sight”, that it had accordingly been intended to be presented for payment within a year of its date of issue (section 34 of the Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques Act (Law no. 191/1950 Coll. – Zákon zmenkový a šekový) – “the Act”); and that, in the absence of such presentation, it had been statute-barred three years after its maturity date (section 70 of the Act). The courts rather considered the note to be a blank promissory note, in which case the missing maturity date would be added later under an agreement entered into for that purpose, as envisaged by section 10 of the Act. Under that provision, in the circumstances, the only argument that the defendant could raise against the applicant company was that it had acquired the note in bad faith or that, in acquiring it, the applicant company had been guilty of gross negligence. As regards the adding of the maturity date to the promissory note, the courts heard as a witness one of the previous holders of the note – A., who at the same time was an executive of another of the note’s previous holders. He submitted before the court that he had had an oral understanding with Mr J.D. about adding the maturity date to the note and that the date had accordingly been added to the note by another previous holder of the note. The courts further noted that the contract under which the applicant company had acquired the promissory note contained a declaration by the previous holder that it had already acquired the note with the maturity date, and that the maturity date had been added to the note in compliance with the arrangements previously made. In the courts’ assessment, the applicant company had acted in reliance on those assurances and it was up to the defendant to disprove them, which it had failed to do. It had equally failed to establish the other defences it had sought to rely on. 16. As no ordinary appeal lay against the appeal court’s judgment, following its service on the parties, the matter was resolved with the force of a final and binding decision (právoplatnosť) on 8 June 2009. 17. On 5 June 2009 the defendant filed a petition with the Office of the Prosecutor General (“the PG”) requesting the latter to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the above-mentioned judgments by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie – “extraordinary appeal”). 18. The PG decided to accede to the request and on 10 June 2009 he challenged the contested judgments in the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd). The PG relied on Article 243h § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended – “the CCP”) (see paragraph 49 below), which provides that reasons for an extraordinary appeal may be submitted within sixty days of the introduction of the extraordinary appeal if there is the risk of considerable economic damage or other irreparable consequences. In that respect, the PG argued that the contested judgments were directly enforceable and that the volume of the case file was extensive. The reasons for appealing would therefore be submitted later. 19. At the same time, the PG requested that the enforceability of the contested judgments be suspended. Pursuant to Article 234ha of the CCP (see paragraph 50 below), by virtue of this request, the enforceability was immediately and automatically suspended, pending the Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss the request or, in the absence of such a decision, pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Supreme Court on the extraordinary appeal. In support of his request, the PG submitted that the defendant, in which the State was a major shareholder, had been ordered to pay a large sum of money. If that sum were to be paid and if the Supreme Court were to allow the extraordinary appeal, it would give rise to a claim for repayment of unjustified enrichment in an equally significant amount. Such a claim would not be secured and its settlement would be uncertain and risky. 20. In the absence of a decision on the part of the Supreme Court to dismiss the PG’s request, the enforceability of the payment order in the applicant company’s favour remained suspended until the PG’s extraordinary appeal had been decided on its merits (see below). 21. Meanwhile, on 23 July 2009, the PG had submitted the reasons for his appeal. 22. The main argument was that the courts had erred in the application of the law (especially section 10 of the Act) to the facts that were decisive for assessing whether the applicant company had acted with gross negligence in acquiring the promissory note, in particular in relation to adding the maturity date. In the PG’s view, it had been grossly negligent of the applicant company to have contented itself with the declarations of the seller as to the existence of and compliance with the arrangements for adding the maturity date to the note (see paragraph 15 above in fine) without pursuing any proper enquiries. This was all the more so as it was generally known that the defendant had contested the notorious “promissory notes of Mr J.D.”, and that in view of the sum of money concerned the note in the present case was clearly outwith the ordinary course of business. Moreover, it was obvious how little the applicant company had paid to acquire the promissory note and the payment conditions were peculiar. On the latter points, the PG submitted that the price payable for the promissory note by the applicant company was no more than 50 % of its nominal value and that 98.8 % of that price was payable only on collection of payment under the note. Those and other elements indicated that the transactions in respect of the note had been speculative in nature. In the PG’s view, in those circumstances, the applicant company had been grossly negligent; the defendant was entitled to claim that there had been no valid arrangement for adding the maturity date to the promissory note; and it was up to the applicant company to show that such an arrangement had existed and had been complied with, failing which the note was payable “at sight,” and any claims based on it were statute-barred. In the PG’s submission, requiring the defendant to show that no arrangement for adding the maturity date to the note had existed would amount to a probatio diabolica because the non-existence of a fact was not capable of being proven. 23. On 4 September 2009 the applicant company submitted its observations in reply to the extraordinary appeal and to the defendant’s petition for that remedy. It disputed the PG’s arguments and submitted, inter alia, that the burden of proof in respect of the allegedly unlawful alteration of the note after its issuance rested solely with the defendant. The applicant company had been under no duty to enquire into the existence of and compliance with any arrangement for adding the maturity date to the note. In that respect, it emphasised that in judicial proceedings concerning promissory notes, the burden of proof in principle always rested with the issuer, and only with the issuer. 24. On 12 May 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting in chambers, allowed the appeal, quashed the contested judgments and remitted the matter to the District Court for a new determination. It did so having in principle accepted the line of argument advanced by the PG and having noted, in particular, that the testimony of A. as regards the alleged understanding with Mr J.D. about the adding of the maturity date to the note had been contradicted by other evidence and was as such implausible. 25. The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicant company’s lawyer on 7 July 2010. As a result, the case was remitted to the first instance. The further course of the proceedings before the ordinary courts is described in paragraphs 31 et seq. below. 26. On 6 September 2010 the applicant company challenged the Supreme Court’s judgment of 12 May 2010 in the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). The applicant company relied, inter alia, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, invoking its rights to a fair trial, in particular access to a court, equality of arms, protection of property, as well as the principles of legal certainty and rule of law. The applicant company argued that there was a systemic problem as the principle of the parties’ procedural equality had been breached by the mere existence of the extraordinary appeal proceedings. The dispute over the promissory note was of a commercial and as such private-law nature. Any room for interference by the State with judicial proceedings and final and binding decisions in such a dispute was therefore particularly narrow. The position in the present case was aggravated by the fact that the PG’s extraordinary appeal favoured the defendant, an entity in which the State had a majority interest. In addition, the applicant company contested the application of the existing rules in its specific case, since the PG had interfered by extraordinary means with a final and binding judgment in the State’s favour. The applicant company pointed out the particular circumstances of the case, including the fact that the two lower levels of jurisdiction had determined the matter unanimously, that they had already dealt with the arguments that were subsequently reiterated by the PG, and that the re‑assessment of the case had involved not only questions of law, but also questions of fact. In conclusion, the interference with the final and binding judgment in favour of the applicant company had been without any acceptable justification. Furthermore, the applicant company noted that the Government of the Slovak Republic had previously publically declared that what had been termed “[Mr J.D.]’s promissory notes” would never be honoured. In view of that declaration as well as the Government’s contractual obligation to indemnify investors in the defendant for any losses that they might incur on account of the promissory notes signed by Mr J.D (see paragraph 10 above), the extraordinary appeal had not served any greater good as envisaged by the applicable statute, but had rather served the Government’s political and economic interests. As the Supreme Court had not clearly distanced itself from those considerations, it could not be regarded as independent and impartial. Lastly, as the quashed judgments had been final and binding, they had constituted possessions and their quashing was an interference with those possessions, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 27. On 11 November 2010 the applicant company added further reasons to its constitutional complaint, relying on the Report on the Independence of the Judicial System adopted by the Venice Commission at its 82nd plenary session on 12 and 13 March 2010, with particular reference to the revision of judges’ decisions outside the appeals procedures (see paragraphs 58 et seq. below). In addition, the applicant company pointed out the circumstances of the adoption of the amendment (Law no. 484/2008 Coll.) to the CCP allowing the reasons for extraordinary appeals to be added at a later date, and for such appeals to have “automatic suspensive effect”. In particular, the amendment had been adopted with retroactive effect and with the aim of reversing the outcome of a specific, albeit unrelated, dispute. 28. On 26 April 2011 the Supreme Court, as the defendant to the complaint, submitted its observations in reply and, on 12 January 2012, the applicant company submitted a rejoinder. 29. On 19 January 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It observed that the statutory framework for the examination of individual complaints did not allow it to examine the compliance of statutes with the Constitution and international instruments as such. It could therefore only review the application of the existing statutory rules in the applicant company’s individual case. It also observed that the statutory provisions on extraordinary appeals were an integral part of the legal system of Slovakia and that there was a presumption of their constitutionality. It further noted that the PG had no power to lodge such an appeal of his or her own motion, but could only do so following the filing of a petition by those concerned, on grounds strictly defined by the CCP and within the time-limit prescribed by it. In the present case, the PG’s extraordinary appeal had been prompted by a petition by the defendant and it had relied on appropriate grounds. In that regard, the Constitutional Court noted that the extraordinary appeal was concerned with the distribution of the burden of proof, which was a preliminary but crucial matter in the case at hand. On the facts, it was determinative for its outcome in that, in the event of a failure to establish the given elements of the case, the party upon which the burden of proof rested would automatically lose it. The Constitutional Court also noted the Supreme Court’s finding that the rigidity of the lower courts’ interpretation of the statutory premise that the burden of proof in this type of case rested on the issuer of the promissory note had been arbitrary and one-sided, and that its effects had suppressed the object and purpose of the CCP and the Act. Thus, in the Constitutional Court’s assessment, the extraordinary appeal had not been motivated merely by a differing legal view but rather by an error of procedure. It thus satisfied the requirements of the Convention for an acceptable interference with an adjudicated matter. As to the merits of the case, the Constitutional Court noted that it was not a court of further appeal against decisions of the ordinary courts. It found the reasoning of the Supreme Court congruous and convincing, and found no constitutionally relevant unfairness, arbitrariness or irregularity in the proceedings. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court drew a distinction between the PG, who had lodged the extraordinary appeal, and the Supreme Court, which had decided on it, finding no grounds to doubt the Supreme Court’s independence and impartiality. In any event, it had been open to the applicant company to challenge any of the Supreme Court’s judges involved in the case for bias, which it had not done. As to equality of arms, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant company had had – and had amply used – the opportunity to present its views as regards the extraordinary appeal, and found that the applicable guarantees had been respected. As regards the applicant company’s property claim, the Constitutional Court reiterated its established case-law, pursuant to which a general court could not bear “secondary liability” for a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of a substantive nature unless there had been a constitutionally relevant violation of the rules of procedure. However, no such procedural issue had been established. 30. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant company’s lawyer on 16 February 2012. It was not amenable to appeal. 31. Following the quashing of the judgments of 21 May 2007 and 28 April 2009 by the Supreme Court on 12 May 2012, the case was remitted to the District Court for re‑examination in the light of the principles set out by the Supreme Court. 32. The action was thus re-examined and again dismissed at first instance by the District Court on 29 October 2012 and, following an appeal lodged by the applicant company, by the Regional Court on 19 September 2013. 33. The District Court held a hearing and new evidence was taken. Having examined the evidence and in view of the legal opinions expressed by the Supreme Court, the court concluded that the applicant company had been mala fides in acquiring the promissory note, and that it had failed to show that the note had been issued as a blanket note or that any arrangement had been made for adding a maturity date to it. Thus, the note had been payable “at sight” and any claims based on it were statute-barred. 34. Following service of the written version of the Regional Court’s judgment on the parties, the dismissal of the action became final and binding on 23 October 2013. 35. In another case the applicant company sued the same defendant for payment under another promissory note, also issued by Mr J.D. on behalf of the defendant on 1 October 1998. The note was for the same amount as in the present case and the relevant circumstances were similar. 36. Following the applicant company’s action, a payment order was issued on 6 March 2006. However, it was then quashed on 21 May 2007 following a protest by the defendant. The latter decision was upheld on 29 January 2008 following an appeal lodged by the applicant company. 37. The applicant company subsequently twice petitioned the PG to challenge by way of an extraordinary appeal the judgments quashing the payment order and dismissing its appeal. Among other things, it referred to the PG’s extraordinary appeal of 10 June 2006 in the present case (see paragraphs 18 et seq. above) and submitted that the judgments mentioned in the preceding paragraphs contained the same structural and technical flaws, save for the outcome, which that time had been to the applicant company’s disadvantage. 38. In a letter of 5 October 2010 the PG informed the applicant company that its repeated petition had ultimately been dismissed.

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5. The applicant company was established in 1995 and has its registered office in Bratislava. 6. On 17 March 1995 the applicant company concluded a contract with Slovak Radio (Slovenský rozhlas), Slovakia’s national public-service radio broadcaster, a publicly funded institution with its own legal personality, the status of which is regulated by law (at that time Law no. 619/2003 Coll., as amended, presently Law no. 532/2010 Coll., as amended). 7. Under the contract, in return for a fee, the applicant company agreed to act as exclusive agent for Slovak Radio as the principal (“the principal”) for the sale of broadcasting time for the purposes of advertising. 8. The venture worked well and the contract was amended several times. The amended contract was valid until 31 December 2007. 9. However, in 2004 the relationship between the applicant company and the principal began to sour because the principal was not content with the amount of business acquired by the applicant company in 2003. 10. The principal had accordingly issued the applicant company with a bill for the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit from such business. 11. As the applicant company did not pay the bill, the principal served the applicant company with a notice of termination of the contract, considering the applicant company’s failure to pay the bill to be a fundamental breach of the contract. 12. The notice period expired on 30 September 2005, following which the principal arranged for the sale of its broadcasting time by other means. 13. On 20 October 2005 the applicant company challenged the validity of the principal’s notice of termination of the contract in court, but later withdrew the action. 14. The principal, for its part, sued the applicant company for payment of the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit. No information has been made available about the current state and outcome of those proceedings. 15. On 5 December 2006 the applicant company demanded that the principal pay it the equivalent of some 693,000 euros (EUR), according to the exchange rate applicable at that time, by way of indemnity for termination of the contract. With reference to the contract, the amount of the indemnity had been calculated as the applicant company’s average yearly commission for the preceding five years, taking into account both financial and non-financial transactions between the principal and third parties, the latter being referred to as barter transactions. 16. As the principal did not satisfy the applicant company’s claim, on 1 June 2006 the applicant company sued it for the above-mentioned amount and late-payment interest. 17. On 29 March 2007 a copy of the action was served on the principal for observations. Hearings were scheduled for 13 and 27 April and 14 May 2007, in the course of which the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) examined complex documentary evidence and heard the statutory representative of the applicant company and four witnesses. 18. However, the principal submitted no written observations and appeared at none of the hearings. The circumstances of its absence were disputed (see below). 19. On 14 May 2007 the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) granted the action in full. It observed that despite having been represented by a lawyer, the principal had failed to submit any observations or to present a good excuse for its failure to appear at any of the hearings. It therefore proceeded to examine the case under Article 101 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended – “the CCP”), which in the event of a party’s unjustified failure to cooperate, allows for the examination of the case on the basis of the elements available. As a preliminary issue, the District Court examined the question of validity of the notice of termination of the contract issued by the principal. It observed that the notice had not been contested and concluded that it was valid. There were no reasons disqualifying the applicant company from being eligible for the indemnity, and the barter transactions had rightly been taken into account in its calculation. 20. The principal appealed (odvolanie) to the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd). In terms of form, it contested the first-instance judgment in its entirety. Nevertheless, in terms of substance, it acknowledged the existence of the legal basis of the applicant company’s entitlement to indemnity, disputing solely its scope, in so far as the barter transactions were concerned. Without those transactions, the acknowledged amount of the indemnity was equivalent to some EUR 526,000, according to the exchange rate applicable at that time. In support of its challenge to the claim exceeding that amount, the principal pointed out that, in the proceedings in its action for payment of the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant company had lodged a counter-claim for compensation for the barter transactions. The principal also contended that the decision to determine the action in its absence had been arbitrary. 21. Having examined the appeal, the Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment on 28 November 2007. It considered that, except for the part related to the barter transactions, the applicant company’s claim had been acknowledged by the principal. As to those transactions, it observed that the applicant company had offset a claim for compensation for them against the claims asserted by the principal in its above-mentioned action. The claim for compensation for those transactions was however a different matter from a claim for indemnity for the termination of the contract, which was asserted in the present proceedings, and which the Regional Court found to be well‑founded. Lastly, as regards the principal’s absence from the first-instance proceedings, the Regional Court observed (i) that the principal had requested the adjournment of the hearing of 13 April 2007; (ii) that the summons for the hearing of 27 April 2007 had not been deliverable to the principal’s lawyer prior to that hearing; and (iii) that on 11 May 2007 the principal’s new lawyer had requested that the hearing of 15 May 2007 be adjourned so as to allow him to study the case file, although the summons for that hearing had already been served on the principal on 3 May 2007 at the latest. In those circumstances, the District Court’s assessment that the principal had been “absolutely passive” in the proceedings was right and the examination of the case in the principal’s absence had been justified. 22. As no ordinary appeal lay against the Regional Court’s judgment, following its service on the parties, the matter was resolved with the force of a final and binding decision (právoplatnosť) on 9 January 2008. On the expiry of a period of grace for voluntary payment, the judgment became enforceable (vykonateľnosť) on 12 January 2008. 23. On 10 March 2008 the principal challenged the Regional Court’s judgment by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). Asserting its rights of access to a court and to a fair hearing, it contended that the impugned judgment was grossly arbitrary and contrary to European Union law. In the latter respect, the Regional Court had arbitrarily refused to ask the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. 24. On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) declared the complaint inadmissible. It held that an unjustified refusal to ask for a preliminary ruling may in certain circumstances give rise to a ground for appealing on points of law (dovolanie) under Article 237 (g) of the CCP. As that remedy had not been exhausted, the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the complaint. 25. On 25 April 2008 the principal filed a petition with the Office of the Prosecutor General (“the PG”) requesting the latter to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the above-mentioned judgments by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie – “extraordinary appeal”). 26. The PG decided to accede to the request and on 23 October 2008 challenged the contested judgments in the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd). He argued primarily that the courts had erred in finding the notice of termination of the contract valid because it had not been disputed by the parties. This was a point of law and it could not have been resolved simply with reference to the lack of disagreement of the parties over it. The courts therefore should have examined that question independently and properly. As for the substance, in his view, had the notice been invalid, there would have been no reason for an indemnity. On the other hand, had the notice been valid, the indemnity could have been refused, because it had been based on a breach of contract by the applicant company. Moreover, the PG pointed out that the contract had neither provided for nor excluded compensation for barter transactions. In such circumstances, the contract should have been interpreted in terms of the parties’ subsequent practice, which had not involved the payment of compensation for such transactions. They should accordingly not have been taken into account for the purpose of calculation of the indemnity. 27. Simultaneously, the PG applied for a ruling to suspend the enforceability of the impugned judgments pending the outcome of the extraordinary appeal. The Supreme Court acceded to that request on 8 December 2008. 28. Meanwhile, on 26 November 2008, the applicant company had submitted observations in reply; it submitted further observations on 3 February and 3 September 2009. The latter observations were not submitted until after the Supreme Court had determined the extraordinary appeal (see paragraph 30 below), as the applicant company did not know of its decision at the time. 29. In its observations, the applicant company raised numerous arguments, including the following. There was no justification for protecting the principal’s rights by way of an extraordinary appeal because it had failed to protect its own rights with due diligence in the lower courts and because, even at the cassation level, it had left the protection of its rights to the public authorities. In that regard, it had been open to the principal to assert its rights before the Supreme Court directly by way of an appeal on points of law. It had not done so simply in order to avoid incurring court fees for such an appeal. Moreover, under Article 243e § 1 of the CCP, the availability of an indirect remedy, an extraordinary appeal (on points of law), was excluded by the availability of a direct remedy, an (ordinary) appeal on points of law. At the appellate level, the only point in dispute had been the part of the applicant company’s claim concerning the barter transactions. The PG’s challenge to the ordinary courts’ findings as regards the validity of the notice to terminate the contract therefore exceeded the grounds of the principal’s petition for an extraordinary appeal. Indeed, it was contrary to it because the principal had not challenged the notice but rather had relied on it. In any event, the PG’s challenge was ill-founded because there was no correlation between the validity of the notice and the fact that it had been based on the applicant company’s refusal to pay the bill submitted by the principal. Lastly, with reference to Convention case-law, the applicant company submitted that the extraordinary appeal as a remedy against a final and binding judgment in its favour was incompatible with the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. 30. On 12 August 2009, sitting in chambers, the Supreme Court allowed the extraordinary appeal. It quashed the judgments of both the District Court and the Regional Court and remitted the matter to the former for a new examination. It concluded that the courts had erred in that, firstly, they had omitted to examine the validity of the contract itself and secondly, depending on the outcome of that examination, they had failed properly to examine the validity of the notice. In view of those errors it had not been possible to deal in concreto with the questions of the basis and scope of the applicant company’s claim. 31. The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicant company’s lawyer on 22 September 2009. As a result, the case was remitted to the first instance, where it has been pending ever since. 32. On 20 November 2009 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, contesting the Supreme Court’s decision of 12 August 2009. It relied on its rights to access to a court, equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, legal certainty and a fair hearing. The applicant company argued that the admissibility requirements for the extraordinary appeal had not been met, and that the extraordinary appeal had not only been belated but had exceeded the scope of the principal’s petition. In addition, by the mere fact of admitting the extraordinary appeal, the Supreme Court had set at naught the entire preceding judicial process, in violation of the principle of legal certainty. The applicant company further argued that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision, a brand new hearing of the case had been called for, even though no procedural irregularities of the previous hearing had been established. In addition, the contested decision was biased in favour of the principal and was not amenable to review on account of lack of reasoning. The applicant company also contended that the Supreme Court had completely ignored its observations in reply to the extraordinary appeal. Lastly, the applicant company complained that it had been denied access to the Supreme Court’s case file in the extraordinary appeal. 33. On 25 November 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant company’s complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill‑founded. In so far as the applicant company had sought to contest the extraordinary appeal in principle, the Constitutional Court observed that the statutory framework for examination of individual complaints did not allow it to examine the compliance of statutes with the Constitution and international instruments as such. To the extent that the applicant company might be understood as wishing to object to any action on the part of the PG, no such objection could be considered because the applicant company had only identified the Supreme Court as the defendant of its complaint. As for the remainder of the complaint, which concerned the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant company had failed to show any constitutionally relevant arbitrariness in the interpretation and application of the relevant rules. As regards the applicant company’s argument that the extraordinary appeal had been lodged belatedly, it was based on the premise that the principal had appealed against the first-instance judgment only in so far as it concerned the barter transactions. That premise was however mistaken because the principal had defined the target of its appeal as the first‑instance judgment as a whole (see paragraph 20 above). As to the Supreme Court’s failure to give a specific answer to the applicant company’s arguments, the Constitutional Court considered that the right to an answer to submitted arguments was related not to a person but to substance. The Supreme Court had thus been under a duty not to reply to the arguments submitted by the applicant company as such, but rather to address the relevant aspects of the case. On the latter point, the applicant company had failed to show that any of the relevant aspects of the case had gone unanswered. Lastly, the Constitutional Court accepted that it had been a mistake to deny the applicant company access to the Supreme Court’s case file. However, it held that that had no constitutional significance because, in view of the character of the extraordinary appeal proceedings, access to the case file or the lack of it would have had no impact on the outcome of the proceedings. 34. A copy of the Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant company on 21 January 2011.

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5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sumgayit. 6. The applicant nominated himself to stand as an independent candidate in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 and applied for registration as a candidate in the single-mandate Sumgayit-Absheron Electoral Constituency No. 44. 7. As the Electoral Code required that each nomination as a candidate for parliamentary elections be supported by a minimum of 450 voters, on 6 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Constituency Electoral Commission (“the ConEC”) twelve signature sheets containing 600 voter signatures collected in support of his candidacy. 8. Before the ConEC’s decision on the question of the applicant’s registration as a candidate, the accuracy of the signature sheets and other registration documents submitted by the applicant were to be first examined by a special working group (işçi qrupu) established by the ConEC. 9. On 11 October 2010, the applicant was invited to the ConEC. He was informed that the validity of supporting signatures submitted by him had already been examined by the ConEC working group and that, based on the results of that examination, the ConEC had held a hearing on whether to register him as a candidate. According to the applicant, he orally protested to the fact that he had not been informed of the time of the examination by the working group of his signature sheets and that the ConEC had taken a decision without his participation. 10. On 12 October 2010 the applicant was informed that by a decision of 11 October 2010 the ConEC had refused the applicant’s request for registration as a candidate. The ConEC found that, according to the opinion of the working group, a number of submitted supporting signatures were invalid, and that the number of the remaining valid signatures was below 450. According to the ConEC decision, the working group had relied on opinions of two of its experts. In particular, expert M.M. found that 172 signatures were not authentic, because they had been executed repeatedly by the same persons who had already signed the signature sheets. Expert A.V. found that a total of 243 signatures were invalid. No more detail was given in the ConEC decision as for the reasons for the invalidation of those signatures. 11. The applicant was provided with a copy of the ConEC decision on 12 October 2010. However, the relevant expert opinions were not made available to him until a further written request by the applicant to this effect. 12. According to the applicant, the expert opinion by M.M. was undated, while the expert opinion by A.V. was dated 11 October 2010. No copies of those expert opinions were submitted to the Court either by the applicant or the Government. However, it can be discerned from other documents in the case file that, according to those expert opinions, the following grounds were given for invalidation of some of the signatures: (a) 86 groups of signatures, consisting of a total of 258 signatures, had been “probably (ehtimal ki) executed by the same person in each group”; for these reasons, 86 of those signatures were deemed valid, while the remaining 172 were considered invalid; (b) eight signatures were found to be invalid because the information on voters’ addresses was incomplete (only the city of residence was mentioned); and (c) 60 signatures were considered invalid because the information on the relevant voters’ addresses omitted the city of residence (all those voters lived in Sumgayit). 13. On 14 October 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (“the CEC”) against the ConEC decision to refuse registration. He complained, inter alia, of the following: (a) contrary to the requirements of Article 59.3 of the Electoral Code, the applicant had not been invited to participate in the process of examination of the signature sheets by the ConEC working group and, thus, deprived of the right to give necessary explanations to the experts; (b) contrary to the requirements of Article 59.13 of the Electoral Code, he had not been provided with a copy of the record on the results of the examination of the signature sheets at least twenty-four hours prior to the ConEC meeting on the applicant’s registration; (c) the applicant’s presence at the ConEC meeting of 11 October 2010 had not been ensured; and (d) the findings of the ConEC working group that such a large number of signatures were invalid were factually wrong, arbitrary and unjustifiably formalistic. In particular, the finding that 172 signatures were “executed by the same person” was accepted as an established fact merely on the basis of an indication of such probability by the expert, in the absence of any further factual verification. Furthermore, invalidation of the remaining signatures owing to incomplete information on the voters’ addresses had been wrong, because such information was not “incorrect” within the meaning of Article 59.7.1 of the Electoral Code (on which the ConEC had relied), but simply incomplete and could, therefore, be rectified if the applicant had been given an opportunity to do so as required by the Electoral Code. In the applicant’s view, taking into account the territorial location of the constituency, it should have been clear to the ConEC that the relevant voters resided in Sumgayit, even though they had not mentioned the city of residence on the signature sheets. 14. Enclosed with his complaint to the CEC, the applicant submitted written statements by ninety-one voters, whose signatures had been declared invalid, affirming the authenticity of their signatures. He also submitted photocopies of ID cards of several voters in order to clarify the situation with their residence addresses. However, according to the applicant, those documents were not taken into consideration by the CEC. 15. The CEC conducted another examination of the signature sheets by members of its own working group. The applicant was not invited to participate in this process. According to the working group’s minutes of 15 October 2010 and two expert opinions, a total of 178 signatures were considered to be invalid. In particular, expert A.A. found that three signatures were invalid because they belonged to persons with no right to vote (minors under eighteen years of age) and that three other signatures had been executed by persons whose identification document number was stated incorrectly. Expert U.A. found that “45 groups of signatures, consisting of a total of 217 signatures, had been probably executed by the same person in each group” (“217 ədəd imza 45 qrup olmaqla öz aralarında ehtimal ki, eyni şəxs tərəfindən icra olunmuşdur”). This meant that one signature in each such group should be considered valid (a total of 45), while the remainder should be considered invalid (a total of 172). 16. The applicant was not invited to the CEC meeting dealing with his complaint against the ConEC decision of 11 October 2010. 17. By a decision of 17 October 2010 the CEC dismissed the applicant’s complaint and upheld the ConEC decision of 11 October 2010. It found that, based on the findings of the CEC’s own working group, 178 out of 600 signatures submitted by the applicant were invalid and that the remaining number of 422 valid signatures was below the minimum required by law. 18. The applicant was given copies of the CEC decision and the relevant working group documents on 18 October 2010. 19. On 20 October 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the CEC decision with the Baku Court of Appeal. He reiterated his complaints made before the CEC concerning the ConEC decision and procedures. Moreover, he raised, inter alia, the following complaints: (a) contrary to the requirements of the electoral law, the CEC failed to notify him of its meetings and to ensure his presence during the examination of the signature sheets and the examination of his complaint; (b) the relevant CEC documents had been made available to him in a belated manner, which was contrary to the requirements of the electoral law and had deprived him of the opportunity to challenge the decisions of the CEC and its working group more effectively; (c) both electoral commissions’ decisions were based on expert opinions that contained nothing more than conjecture and speculation (that the signatures were “probably” (“ehtimal ki”) falsified), instead of properly established facts; (d) the CEC had ignored the written statements by ninety-one voters confirming the authenticity of their invalidated signatures and had failed to take them into account; and (e) the CEC had failed to provide any reasoning and had not addressed any of the applicant’s arguments in its decision. 20. By a judgment of 23 October 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In its judgment, the court took note of the ConEC and CEC decisions, proceeded to cite a number of provisions of the Electoral Code and the Code of Civil Procedure without explaining their relevance to the facts of the case at hand, did not address any of the applicant’s arguments, and dismissed his appeal as “unsubstantiated” without providing reasons for reaching such a conclusion. 21. On 30 October 2010 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating his previous complaints and arguing that the Baku Court of Appeal had not carried out a fair examination of the case and had delivered an unreasoned judgment. 22. On 2 November 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated, without examining his arguments in detail and finding no grounds for doubting the findings of the electoral commissions and the Court of Appeal.

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5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Vienna. 6. On 3 October 2000 the applicant was stopped by the police at 11.05 p.m. while driving his car on a public road. He was ordered to undergo a breathalyser test. After nine attempts to measure the amount of alcohol, among which only one was valid, the test was discontinued. The applicant’s conduct was considered to amount to a refusal to undergo the breathalyser test and his driving licence was temporarily withdrawn. Two different sets of proceedings were initiated against the applicant. 7. On 15 December 2000 the Melk District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft, DAA) issued a decision to withdraw the applicant’s driving licence for a period of four months as a preventive measure to secure road safety. The DAA observed that, according to the case-law of the Administrative Court, it amounted to a refusal to undergo a breathalyser test if the person who had been ordered to undergo the test had made four invalid attempts out of five. According to the statements of police officers W. and R. and the paper print outs of the test results, the applicant had been allowed to make much more attempts, namely nine and only one had produced a valid result. When the applicant had claimed that the breathalyser had been defective, police officer R had made himself two attempts using the same mouthpiece as the applicant and both attempts had produced valid results. The DAA also noted that technical tests of the breathalyser had been carried out on 15 May 2000 and on 9 November 2000 and each time the breathalyser had been found fully functioning. On the basis of this evidence it was safe to conclude that the applicant had refused to undergo the breathalyser test. The DAA also ordered that an appeal had no suspensive effect because it was necessary to avoid the risk that a person lacking trustworthiness for road traffic might drive. Moreover the applicant was ordered to follow driver improvement training before his driving licence would be returned. 8. The applicant appealed and argued that the DAA should have obtained the report of a technical expert on the functioning of the breathlyser as only such an expert could clarify whether the machine was working properly. 9. On 19 December 2005 the Lower Austria Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. He found that according to the paper print out of the breathalyser test the applicant had made nine attempts of which only one had been valid whereas during the other attempts the applicant had not blown sufficient air into the mouth-piece. Thereupon two attempts with the same mouth-piece as used by the applicant had been made by police officer R., which both produced valid results. Thus, there were no indications that the breathalyser did not function properly or that it had not been handled correctly by the police officers who had been specially trained for this task. In such circumstances a request for obtaining a report by a technical expert, without giving clear indications in what the malfunctioning of the breathalyser might have consisted, amounted to an inadmissible request for evidence (Erkundungsbeweis). The Regional Governor concluded that refusing to undergo a breathalyser test was as serious as driving under the influence of alcohol because it prevented the authorities from verifying whether a person was actually drunk. The additional measure imposed on the applicant was therefore justified in order to improve his attitude. 10. On 8 February 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court and requested an oral hearing. In his complaint he argued that the Lower Austria Regional Government had not been competent to decide on his case as he resided in Vienna. He further complained about the authority’s assessment of evidence, as the statements of the police officers who had ordered him to undergo the breathalyser test were contradictory and stated that they should be questioned on the precise circumstances in which breathalyser test had been carried out. Lastly he complained that the authority had wrongly applied the law because it should not have refused to obtain the opinion of a technical expert on the functioning of the breathalyser. 11. On 27 September 2007 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that on the basis of the evidence before them the authorities had arrived at the conclusion that the applicant had refused to undergo the breathalyser test. The applicant had failed to raise any substantial arguments against these findings and had not shown that the assessment of the evidence carried out by the authorities was contradictory or implausible. In accordance with Section 39 § 2 of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz) the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request for a hearing as it found that an oral hearing was not likely to contribute to the clarification of the case. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 25 October 2007. 12. On 20 April 2001 the DAA issued a penal order (Straferkenntnis) and imposed a fine for refusal to take the breathalyser test. 13. On 30 April 2001 the applicant appealed. 14. On 30 September 2005 the Lower Austria Independent Administrative Panel found that, since no decision had been taken within the prescribed time limit of 15 months after the lodging of the appeal, the fine imposed by the DAA had expired ipso iure.

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4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Sevastopol. 5. On 20 June 2003 Ivan Mashchenko, the applicant’s husband, was reported by an ambulance team to have died in a garage cooperative complex. The same day the police examined the site and ordered a forensic examination of the body. 6. On 23 June 2003 the applicant received a medical certificate indicating that her husband had died of a head injury. 7. On 30 June 2003 the Gagarinskiy District Prosecutors’ Office in Sevastopol concluded that Mr Mashchenko’s death had resulted from a head injury caused by an accidental fall and there were no grounds for instituting criminal proceedings. They referred, primarily, to the statements by D., who had submitted that his friend Mr Mashchenko had accidentally fallen on his back in D.’s presence, after both of them had consumed some alcohol in the garage. An ambulance had been called, but Mr Mashchenko died before it had arrived. The investigation also referred to the statements by K., the garage complex guardian, who had submitted that he had called the ambulance, after having been informed by G., the garage complex electrician, that Mr Mashchenko had been lying on the floor and in need of assistance. 8. In September 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of 30 June 2003 in the Gagarinskiy District Court of Sevastopol. She noted, in particular, that she had only been apprised of the above decision on 3 September 2003 and had not been provided with a copy of it; that the authorities had neither questioned her as part of their inquiry, nor informed her of the progress in the proceedings. Likewise, they had not studied her husband’s medical file and had examined the location where the death had occurred in a perfunctory manner. 9. In the meantime, on 31 July 2003, following the completion of all laboratory tests, a forensic expert concluded that Ivan Mashchenko had in fact died of a heart attack, while his head injury could be classified as a minor one. 10. On 26 February 2004 the court revoked the disputed decision of 30 June 2003, having concluded that the inquiry had been perfunctory. It referred to the discrepancies between the death certificate and the expert conclusion concerning the cause of Mr Mashchenko’s death; found that the investigation had failed to question all pertinent witnesses, including the ambulance staff, who had been first to certify Mr Mashchenko’s death, and noted that there had been unreconciled factual discrepancies between the accounts of the incident provided by the main witnesses D. and G. 11. On 30 April 2004 the District Prosecutor’s Office took a fresh decision not to institute criminal proceedings. 12. On 5 July 2004 this decision was revoked by the District Court, which found that its instructions had not been fulfilled in good faith. 13. Between 2004 and 2011 nine more decisions not to institute criminal proceedings were taken (on 5 January and 8 August 2005, 16 August 2006, 14 May and 8 June 2007, 14 March, 13 June and 24 October 2008 and 11 May 2010). All of them were subsequently revoked either by the Sevastopol City Prosecutor’s Office or by the District Court (on 1 August 2005, 24 May 2006, 10 April, 31 May and 22 November 2007, 6 May and 3 September 2008, 28 April 2010 and 25 March 2011 respectively) with reference to insufficiency of the measures taken and failure of the inquiring officers to fulfil the earlier instructions given to them. At various times these instructions concerned, in particular, the need to question additional witnesses, including the owners of the neighboring garage boxes and members of the ambulance team, reconcile factual discrepancies between the accounts of D., K., G. and some other witnesses as well as the discrepancies between the medical documents concerning the cause of Mr Mashchenko’s death. The inquiring officers were likewise instructed to explore the applicant’s allegations that her husband might have been hit by a vehicle or by a third party, in particular, a certain N.Z., owner of one of the garage boxes, with whom he had presumably had conflicts. 14. On 2 June 2011 the District Prosecutor’s Office took a fresh decision not to institute criminal proceedings, finding that, regard being had to the evidence collected, in particular, the statements by D., G., K. and other witnesses and the expert conclusion that Mr Mashchenko had died of a heart attack, there had been no grounds to suspect any criminal wrongdoing. 15. On 6 September 2011 the District Court revoked this decision, having found that its earlier instructions, as well as those of the City Prosecutor’s Office, had not been fully complied with. In particular, no meaningful action had been taken to identify N.Z., to summon some of the members of the ambulance team for questioning and to reconcile factual discrepancies between various witness testimonies. 16. On 10 February 2012 the District Prosecutor’s Office took a fresh decision not to institute proceedings. It noted, in particular, that it was no longer possible to question D., the principal witness, as he had died; that, according to Dr. S. of the ambulance team and officer P., who had participated in the initial on-site examination, neither of them had approached or examined the body so closely as to confirm or deny that there had been blood around it or other injuries potentially inflicted by third parties. Z., the medical expert, who had initially examined the body on site, and Sh., another ambulance team member, could not be questioned as they had moved out of Sevastopol and could not be located. B., another member of the ambulance team, reported that she could not recall the details of the incident. Notwithstanding impossibility to re-examine certain sources of evidence and to reconcile minor factual discrepancies, there was no reason to doubt the principal conclusion that there had been no crime committed against Mr Mashchenko, who had died of a sudden heart attack. Inter alia, according to the statements by the president of the garage cooperative complex, there had been no garage box owner called N.Z. and Mr Mashchenko had in any event not been in conflict with anyone. There was no other evidence whatsoever in support of the applicant’s unsubstantiated hypothesis concerning a car accident or an assault. 17. According to the applicant, she learned of this decision and obtained its copy only on receipt of the Government’s observations in the present case. She also submitted that throughout the course of the proceedings the District Prosecutor’s Office had routinely failed to update her on the progress of the case, apprise her of the decisions taken, provide her with copies thereof, and respond to her inquiries in a coherent and meaningful way.

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6. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Čavle. 7. On 28 February 1997 the applicant’s father, G.B., applied to the Rijeka Office of the Department for Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members (Odjel hrvatskih branitelja i članova njihovih obitelji Primorsko-goranske županije, područna jedinica Rijeka; hereinafter “the Rijeka Office”) for recognition of the status of a disabled war veteran, on the grounds that he had contracted tuberculosis and developed psychosis during his military service in 1995. 8. On 19 December 1997 G.B. died and the applicant took over the proceedings as his heir. 9. On 24 September 1998 the Rijeka Office dismissed the application. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “The case file was resubmitted to the Medical Committee, which established the following: - G.B ... served in the Homeland War ... from 9 October 1991 to 15 July 1992, from 15 July to 3 November 1992 and from 9 June to 19 July 1995; - during military service he contracted tuberculosis; - his mental health issues had been recognised much earlier; - the Medical Committee is of the opinion that his tuberculosis and psychosis have not been caused by his military service.” 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. On 24 February 1999 the Ministry in charge of the Homeland War Veterans affairs (Ministarstvo hrvatskih branitelja iz Domovinskog rata; later Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti; hereinafter: the “Ministry”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal holding that the proceedings should have been terminated as G.B. had meanwhile died. 11. The applicant challenged that decision before the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). 12. On 19 July 2000 the Administrative Court accepted the applicant’s administrative action, quashed the decision of the Ministry and remitted the case. 13. On 21 June 2001 the Ministry allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the decision of the Rijeka Office (see paragraph 9 above) but declared G.B.’s application inadmissible. It held that such application could only be lodged after a claimant had been discharged from the army, which was not the case in G.B.’s case. 14. The applicant lodged an administrative action against that decision. On 26 January 2006 the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Ministry and remitted the case. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “The administrative bodies’ decisions ... were rendered while the [old] Act on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members (Official Gazette nos. 108/96 and 23/01) was still in force. In the meantime, since the action was lodged and before this judgment was rendered, a new Act on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members entered into force and was published in Official Gazette no. 174 of 10 December 2004. Pursuant to section 158(2) of that Act, which entered into force on 1 January 2005, the proceedings instituted while the old legislation was still in force and in which the final decision has not yet been rendered should be decided under the new Act if more favourable for the Croatian Homeland War veteran. In the present case, on 1 January 2005, the date the Act on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members entered into force, the disputed decision of the defendant body was not final. The court therefore finds that the defendant body must decide the application in accordance with section 158(2) ... It is a specific legislative provision which requires the impugned decision to be quashed ... The defendant body shall decide, in the light of the provisions of the Act that govern the conditions and methods of recognition of disabled Croatian Homeland War veteran status, if more favourable for the claimant.” 15. On 20 May 2006 the Ministry allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the decision of the Rijeka Office (see paragraph 9 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “This Ministry has reconsidered the case and found that the appeal is well-founded, albeit for different reasons. Section 14 of the by-law on the Procedure before the Medical Committee for the Determination of Rights under the Act on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members provides that the First-Instance Medical Committee shall issue its opinion after examining the person [concerned] and the relevant medical and other documentation ... As [G.B.] was not examined in person before the First-Instance Medical Committee and cannot be examined, the first-instance body shall, in the fresh set of proceedings, terminate the proceedings relying on section 54 of the Administrative Procedure Act.” 16. On 12 September 2006 the social services department of the Primorsko-Goranska County Office of State Administration (Ured državne uprave u Primorsko-goranskoj županiji, Služba za društvene djelatnosti; hereinafter “the County Office”), which meanwhile became competent to examine the case, terminated the proceedings concerning G.B.’s recognition as a disabled war veteran on the grounds that due to his death, certain relevant facts could no longer be established. 17. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 21 April 2007 the Ministry allowed the applicant’s appeal and reversed the decision of the County Office. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “III: The deceased G.B ... is hereby recognised as a fourth category disabled Homeland War [veteran], with 80% damage to his body ... on the grounds that he contracted tuberculosis while defending the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. 2. Supplementary benefit ... IV. The application for recognition of Homeland War [veteran] status on the grounds of psychosis is hereby denied. ... The case file was submitted to the competent Second-Instance Medical Committee on appeal which, in its opinion ... of 1 March 2007 established 80% permanent damage to the body ...” 18. This decision was served on the applicant in June 2007. 19. On 30 September 2011 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), in a single-judge formation, found a violation of the applicant’s right to a trial within reasonable time concerning the proceedings before the administrative authorities and the Administrative Court and awarded her compensation in the amount of 10,500 Croatian kunas (HRK). The applicant did not lodge further appeal against this decision before a panel of judges of the Supreme Court. 20. On 2 July 2007 the applicant applied before the County Office for recognition as the family member of a fallen war veteran and family disability benefit. 21. On 4 July 2007 the County Office declared the applicant’s application inadmissible as lodged out of time. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “Upon examining the case file it was established that the claimant lodged her application after the time-limit [set forth in] section 124 of the Act [on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Veterans and their Family Members] had expired. Section 124(2) of the Act [stipulates that] where a Homeland War veteran has, before the entry into force of the Act, died of illness directly caused by his defence of the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, applications for recognition of status and ... disability benefit must be lodged within 12 months of the date of entry into force of the Act. The Act entered into force on 1 January 2005, which means that the deadline for lodging the application expired on 31 December 2005.” 22. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 20 December 2007 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance administrative body. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “Upon appeal, and after examining the case file, it was established that the [first-instance] decision is valid and had a basis in law. That is to say, after examining the evidence in the case file, it was established that the claimant lodged her application ... on 2 July 2007, arguing that her father died from TB, and from the death certificate it is clear that he died on 19 December 1997. ... section 124(2) of the Act stipulates that where a Homeland War veteran has, before the entry into force of the Act, died of illness directly caused by his defence of the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, applications for recognition of status and for disability benefit must be lodged within 12 months of the date of entry into force of the Act (that is to say, on 31 December 2005 at latest). As the claimant lodged her request on 2 July 2007, that is to say after the (preclusive) statutory time-limit, which cannot be prolonged upon a party’s request or of [the administrative body’s] own motion, and the appeal reasons do not influence the reasoning in this case, the appeal is hereby dismissed.” 23. The applicant challenged that decision before the Administrative Court, arguing that the decisions of the administrative bodies had been unfair and overly formalistic, effectively depriving her of her right to disability benefit. Specifically, she argued that the final decision on her father’s status had only been rendered on 21 April 2007 and had been served on her on 15 June 2007. In her view, she was only able to lodge her request after 15 June 2007, as an earlier request would have been premature and ill-founded. 24. On 17 June 2009 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action, endorsing the reasoning of the administrative bodies. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “... the claimant lodged her application ... on 2 July 2007. Section 124(2) of the ... Act stipulates that where a Homeland War veteran has, before the entry into force of the Act, died of illness directly caused by his defence of the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, applications for recognition of status and for disability benefit must be lodged within 12 months of the date of entry into force of the Act. As the Act entered into force on 1 January 2005 the application could have been lodged by 31 December 2005. It was not disputed that the claimant lodged her application on 2 July 2007, that is to say after the expiry of the time-limit stipulated in section 124(2) of the Act, and therefore this Court finds that the decision of the defendant body was well-founded. The claimant’s allegations in her administrative action are therefore ill-founded and irrelevant. In addition, it is noted that the claimant took over proceedings from her late father ... However, they were separate proceedings establishing the claimant’s late father’s status as a disabled Homeland War veteran, and not the proceedings establishing the status of a family member of a fallen Homeland War veteran and the right to family disability benefit ...” 25. The applicant further lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against that judgment. She reiterated her arguments from the administrative action, adding that the domestic authorities had spent ten years trying to establish her late father’s status, which could have only been used as the legal basis for her request after 15 June 2007. She also argued that her status was de facto recognised when she had been allowed to take over the proceedings after her late father, and that she was only lacking a declaratory recognition of her factual status. 26. On 3 December 2009 the Constitutional Court, endorsing the reasoning of the Administrative Court, declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. This decision was served on the applicant on 12 January 2010.

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5. The applicant, Mr Yuriy Vitaliyovych Lutsenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1964. 6. The applicant was the Minister of the Interior. He occupied this post from 2005 to 2006 and from 18 December 2007 to 11 March 2010. Since 27 August 2014 he has been the leader of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko party. 7. On 2 November 2010 the General Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the GPO”) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and another individual, Mr P., on suspicion of abuse of office under Article 191 § 3 of the Criminal Code. On 5 November 2010 the applicant was formally charged. On the same day he gave a written obligation not to abscond. 8. On 11 December 2010 the GPO instituted another criminal case against the applicant for exceeding his official powers under Article 365 § 3 of the Criminal Code, on the ground that he had arranged for the allocation of a one-room apartment to his driver, Mr P. 9. The two criminal cases were joined together. 10. On 13 December 2010 the GPO completed the investigation in the case and formally charged the applicant with both offences, having reclassified his actions specified in the first charge under Article 191 § 5 of the Criminal Code (misappropriation, embezzlement, and conversion of property by malfeasance). 11. On 26 December 2010 the applicant was arrested and detained in the Security Service Detention Centre (Слідчий Ізолятор Служби Безпеки України). 12. On 27 December 2010 the Pechersk District Court (Печерський районний суд) (hereinafter “the Pechersk Court”) ordered that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant be changed from a written obligation not to abscond to remand in custody. 13. On 28 December 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 13 (Київський Слідчий Ізолятор №13) (hereinafter “the SIZO”). 14. On 17 May 2011 the GPO submitted the applicant’s criminal case to the Pechersk Court which, on 27 February 2012, rendered a judgment sentencing the applicant to four years’ imprisonment. The case received extensive attention in both national and international media which were present at court hearings. Photographs depicting the applicant behind metal bars were published soon after the court hearings. 15. On 7 March 2012 the applicant appealed, seeking the quashing of the first-instance judgment on the ground of lack of guilt. 16. On 16 May 2012 the Kyiv Court of Appeal (Апеляційний суд міста Києва) upheld the judgment of the Pechersk Court. 17. On 31 August 2012 the applicant was transferred to Mena colony in Chernihiv Region to serve his prison sentence. 18. In a judgment of 3 April 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for civil and criminal cases (Вищий спеціалізований суд України з розгляду цивільних і кримінальних справ) upheld the applicant’s prison sentence slightly reducing the amount of compensation that he had to pay. 19. On 7 April 2013 the former President of Ukraine issued a decree of pardon in respect of a number of individuals, including the applicant, who was released the same day. 20. Prior to his arrest the applicant was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus type 2 and chronic gastritis and pancreatitis. 21. Upon his admission to the SIZO on 28 December 2010, the applicant was examined by the head of the medical unit and a duty doctor. He underwent clinical, laboratory and X-ray examinations. On the basis of those examinations and the applicant’s anamnesis, he was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension and it was recommended that his arterial pressure be constantly monitored. According to the applicant, the prison doctors did not pay attention to his chronic diseases which were mentioned in the medical report submitted to the Pechersk District Court and indicated orally by him on a number of occasions. 22. According to the Government, during the period from December 2010 to April 2011 the applicant was under constant supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit who visited him on 29, 30 and 31 December 2010, 1-9, 17 and 24 January, 10, 18 and 25 February, 1, 10 and 20 March and on 1 April 2011. During this period, no complaints were received from him and his state of health remained satisfactory. Doctors regularly measured his blood pressure and pulse rate and carried out his general examination. The applicant denied that he had not complained about problems connected with his state of health. According to him, during the three first months of his detention, he lost more than 20 kilograms, his low-grade fever and spastic stomach pain was constant. 23. Following the applicant’s complaints about the deterioration of his health, on 24 February 2011, a private medical laboratory took blood samples from him for analysis. Inflammation was diagnosed as a result. The doctor who arrived at that conclusion presumed that it was probably a mixed viral and bacterial infection. A provisional diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis was also made. For more specific diagnoses, further specialist examinations were required. 24. On 9 March 2011 the applicant was diagnosed with arthritis by SIZO doctors. 25. On 15 March 2011 a new blood analysis showed some negative changes in the applicant’s immune system. His requests for examination by the cardiologist/rheumatologist who issued the above conclusion were without success. 26. According to the Government, on 6 and 13 April 2011 the applicant was examined by the head of the SIZO medical unit. He complained of pain in the joints. He was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension and generalised osteoarthritis, and blood pressure monitoring was recommended. 27. On 21 April 2011 the applicant went on hunger strike in protest at his continued pre-trial detention. 28. According to the Government, between 22 April and 10 May 2011 the applicant was under daily supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit. From time to time he complained of dizziness and general weakness. His state of health remained satisfactory during this period. 29. On 29 April 2011 the SIZO administration placed him in a solitary-confinement cell and demonstrated forced-feeding facilities (such as handcuffs, a mouth widener and a rubber tube). Those were apparently never applied to him. 30. According to the Government, on the same day, the applicant was examined by the head of the SIZO medical unit. He complained of heart pain, which he said was worse when he made turning movements. The applicant was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension, generalised osteoarthritis, and myositis of the left major pectoral muscle. At the same time, he informed the doctor that he had eaten no food for several days and had only had tea without sugar and coffee with sugar. An analysis of the applicant’s urine was carried out. There was a one-plus reaction for acetone. General monitoring of the applicant’s state of health, of the acetone level in his urine, and of his blood pressure was recommended. On 1 May 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from the State Prison Service of Ukraine (Державна пенітенціарна служба України) (hereinafter “the SPS”). He was prescribed an “anti-starvation food mixture” (semolina or oatmeal, butter, sugar, milk, eggs, boiled meat, salt, and ascorbic acid, with a total caloric content of 1,638.5 kcal) and the following medication: NaCL solution, vitamins Bl and B6, and Riboxin solution. On the same date a general blood analysis, a blood sugar-level test and a urine acetone test were carried out for the applicant - (a “three-plus” reaction was obtained). On the same date the applicant consumed 500 ml of “anti-starvation food mixture”. On 2 May 2011 the SPS medical panel found his general state of health stable and held that positive progress was being made in overcoming dizziness and general weakness. A urine test for acetone was carried out for the applicant (a “three-plus” reaction was obtained). On 3 May 2011, upon another examination by the SPS medical panel, a urine acetone test was carried out for the applicant. A “three-plus” reaction was obtained. On the same date the applicant consumed 400 ml of “anti-starvation food mixture”. It was recommended that he undergo further biochemical and general blood tests, a general urine analysis, a blood-sugar-level test and a urine acetone test, and also ultrasonic examinations of his abdominal cavity and kidneys. Injections of Reosorbilact solution and of glucose in solution were given to the applicant. On 4 May 2011 the SPS medical panel saw the applicant again. He was found to have moderate diffuse changes in the liver, chronic cholecystitis and chronic pancreatitis. On the same date the applicant consumed 500 ml of “anti-starvation food mixture”. Injections of Reosorbilact solution and of glucose in solution were given to the applicant. 31. On 5 May 2011 the applicant’s wife asked the SIZO administration to carry out medical examinations of her husband in her presence. By that time, the applicant had lost about fourteen kilograms in weight. On the same day, according to the Government, the applicant was examined by the SPS medical panel. A general blood test, a blood-sugar-level test and a test of the urine for acetone were carried out at the Dila Laboratory. The test results were low-grade positive. The applicant was diagnosed with chronic cholecystitis and chronic pancreatitis. It was also found that the applicant’s state of health reflected his starvation. On the same date, the applicant refused to eat food or to undergo fluid-maintenance therapy to restore the balance of water, protein, and electrolytes in the body. 32. On 6 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO medical unit. According to the Government, he was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. He was diagnosed with hypertension of the 1st degree, cardiac insufficiency, type 2 diabetes mellitus in a mild form at the compensation stage, chronic cholecystitis in unstable remission, chronic pancreatitis in unstable remission, osteoarthritis without exacerbation, disseminated osteochondrosis of the spine, and thoracic kyphosis. It was recommended that the applicant: (1) undergo an exercise electrocardiography (ECG) test and ultrasonic examination of the heart in order to exclude ischaemic heart disease; (2) take antihypertensive medication (Prestarium Combi) when the blood pressure was higher than 140/90 mm Hg; take Metoprolol in order to stop the tachycardia which occurred when the pulse rate was higher than 100 beats per minute. The applicant received this medical treatment in full. 33. According to the Government, on 7 May 2011 he was once again examined by the SPS medical panel. A check test of the urine for acetone was carried out (a “two-plus” reaction was obtained) and a general urine test was also done for the applicant. The panel confirmed the previous diagnosis. The applicant refused to consume any of the “anti-starvation food mixture” or to undergo fluid maintenance therapy. On 8 May 2011 he was examined by a panel of doctors from Kyiv-based medical institutions of the Ministry of Health. The previous diagnosis was confirmed and it was additionally found that the applicant had chronic gastritis in unstable remission. The panel noted that the applicant’s hunger strike was significantly affecting his general state of health. Electrocardiography and echocardiography tests were carried out for the applicant. The urinary reaction for acetone was one-plus. The applicant was refusing to consume the “anti-starvation food mixture”. He was subjected to fluid-maintenance therapy with Aminoven. It was also recommended that the applicant broaden the variety of foods he ate, limiting the consumption of easily digestible carbohydrates (sugar, honey, and sweets); consistently take graduated physical activity; take Duphalac or Guttalax (to normalise bowel function) and probiotics (Lacium or Symbiter). On 9 and 10 May 2011 the applicant was examined by the SPS medical panel. The urinary reaction for acetone was low-grade positive. He refused to consume “anti-starvation food mixture”. He was subjected to fluid-maintenance therapy with a physiological solution, vitamins Bl, B6, C, Riboxin, and Reosorbilact. 34. According to the applicant, before 10 May 2011 his medical monitoring had been limited to measuring his blood pressure and weighing him, along with a superficial examination by the SIZO doctor. 35. On 10 May 2011 he was taken to the Kyiv Clinical Emergency Hospital (Міська клінічна лікарня швидкої медичної допомоги) (hereinafter “the Emergency Hospital”). On the following day, the management of the hospital informed the investigator that the applicant was suffering from chronic pancreatitis in the aggravated stage, chronic gastroduodenitis, cardial-type neurocirculatory dystonia, and type 2 diabetes. His condition was evaluated as moderately serious. 36. On 18 May 2011 the deputy medical director of the Emergency Hospital gave additional details to the applicant’s wife as regards his health. In addition to the aforementioned diagnoses, he noted the following illnesses: chronic cholecystitis, gall bladder polyposis, autoimmune thyroiditis, euthyroidism, seborrheic dermatitis, myopia, osteochondrosis, chronic sinusitis, right-ear deafness, duodenal ulcer, gastric erosion and duodenogastric reflux. 37. On 23 May 2011 the applicant ended his hunger strike. 38. According to the Government, on 24 May 2011 he was examined by doctors of the SIZO medical unit. On the same date he ate gruel. He was also subjected to fluid-maintenance treatment with Aminoven and Pariet. Generally, although he continued to complain of general weakness, his condition improved considerably once he had ended the hunger strike. The SIZO doctors saw the applicant also on the next day. They concluded that the applicant was suffering from the following illnesses: exacerbated chronic pancreatitis, chronic cholecystitis, gall-bladder polyposis, chronic duodenal ulcer, autoimmune thyroiditis, euthyroidism, type 2 diabetes mellitus, cardial-type neurocirculatory dystonia of medium severity, seborrheic dermatitis, cervical osteochondrosis, toxic-dyscirculatory encephalopathy of endogenic origin (degree I-II), duodenal ulcer, papillomatous gastropathy, and gastric erosions. On the same date the applicant ate gruel and drank water and carrot juice. The applicant underwent fluid-maintenance treatment and anti-ulcer treatment. On 26 and 27 May 2011 the doctors of the SIZO medical unit confirmed the previous diagnosis. The applicant received fluid-maintenance and anti-ulcer treatment and underwent a urine test (which indicated no acetone), a blood test for sugar, and biochemical analysis of the blood. A consultation with a gastroenterologist was also scheduled for the applicant. On 28 May 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. As a result of the examination, the panel found the applicant’s general state of health to be satisfactory. The applicant was diagnosed with the following conditions: peptic duodenal ulcer, post gastrointestinal haemorrhage condition, erosive gastritis, and mild post haemorrhagic anemia. It was recommended that he receive anti-ulcer treatment as an in-patient basis at a gastroenterology clinic. If it was impossible to arrange in-patient treatment for him, he would have to continue to take Pariet; again undergo a fibrogastroscopy with biopsy, a general blood test, electrolytes (potassium, phosphorus, fecal occult blood test) and eat five small meals a day, sticking to a diet with a high protein content. 39. According to the applicant, on 28 May 2011 he was examined in the SIZO and diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in the progressing phase, gastrointestinal bleeding, erosive gastritis, and toxic-metabolic encephalopathy. Moreover, all his previously diagnosed diseases were confirmed. 40. According to the Government, on 29 May 2011 he was examined by SIZO doctors, who confirmed the previous diagnoses. He continued to receive the anti-ulcer treatment and multiple small-portion meals. 41. On 30 May 2011 the applicant underwent a urine acetone test, which revealed no acetone, a blood test for sugar, and a general blood test. The examination results confirmed the previous diagnoses. 42. On 31 May and 1 June 2011 he was examined by SIZO doctors who confirmed the previous diagnoses. Analyses of his blood and urine were carried out. He continued to receive the anti-ulcer treatment and appropriate diet. 43. On 8 June 2011 the governor of the SIZO informed the President of the Pecherskyy Court of some further diagnoses regarding the applicant’s health, established during his examination of 28 May 2011, and sought leave for him to be examined in the Emergency Hospital. According to the Government, the letter was sent to the court only on 9 June 2011. 44. In his reply of 14 June 2011 the judge of the Pechersk Court stated that the court did not object to the applicant’s being examined in a civilian hospital. A copy of this letter was sent to the Convoy Service of the Ministry of the Interior with a request for escorted transport for the applicant. 45. On 23 June 2011 the Convoy Service replied that the applicant’s medical care was the responsibility of the SIZO administration. 46. On 24 June 2011 the applicant’s wife and his legal representative made a new request to the court that he be hospitalised. They alleged that the applicant had constant stomach pain and had lost more weight, 24 kg in total. On 29 June 2011 the judge replied that the court had no objection. 47. According to the Government, from 2 June to 2 July 2011 the applicant was examined daily by SIZO doctors. In line with the instructions given following the previous examination by the medical panel, the applicant had regular clinical, biochemical, and general blood tests and urine analyses (these took place on 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, and 30 June 2011). The applicant was receiving anti-ulcer treatment, the recommended diet, and the prescribed outpatient treatment. During this period, the above-mentioned diagnoses remained valid. Furthermore, on 24 June 2011 the doctors found that his peptic duodenal ulcer had begun to cicatrise, which indicated a gradual improvement in his state of health. 48. According to the Government, the court gave its permission for the applicant’s examination at the Emergency Hospital on 14 July 2011. 49. On 15 July 2011 the applicant was examined at the Emergency Hospital. Fibrogastroscopy and ultrasonic scans were performed for the applicant. The examination revealed that he had esophageal varicose veins with 1st degree dilatation, moderate portal hypertensive gastropathy, chronic cholecystitis, gall-bladder polyposis, chronic pancreatitis, and urolithic diathesis. It was recommended that the applicant undergo a biochemical blood test, a general blood test, analyses for hepatitis B, C, and D antibody titers, abdominal ultrasonic scanning with Doppler sonography. According to the applicant, he did not receive any of the prescribed medicines. 50. On 21 July 2011, blood samples were taken from the applicant in the presence of his lawyer for complex liver function tests (hepatitis B, C, and D). At the applicant’s request, in order to ensure an objective analysis, the samples were sent to two laboratories: Eurolab and Synevo. 51. On 22 July 2011 the applicant underwent abdominal ultrasonic scanning with Doppler sonography at the Emergency Hospital. On the basis of the examination, the following diagnosis was made: signs of diffuse damage to the liver in a chronic hepatosis pattern, portal hypertension of the P’ degree, splenomegaly of the lst degree, and chronic cholecystitis. In pursuance of the recommendation, the applicant was tested for hepatitis B, C, and D markers, and liver function tests were done. 52. On 23 July 2011 the applicant was prescribed the following medication: Ursofalk, Essentiale Forte, Primer, Chophytol, and Duspatalin. 53. According to the Government, from 2 to 30 August 2011 the applicant was under daily supervision by SIZO doctors. His state of health remained unchanged. He continued complaining of discomfort in the upper abdomen. He received the medical treatment prescribed for him earlier. 54. On 30 August 2011 two senior civilian doctors examined the applicant in the SIZO. They diagnosed cirrhosis of the liver supposedly triggered by the earlier hunger strike. Furthermore, two internal haemorrhages were noted. It was recommended that the applicant undergo a more thorough examination in a specialist civilian hospital. In the meantime, he needed to get proper nutrition. 55. According to the Government, on 2 September 2011, following a court decision, the SIZO was visited by a panel of doctors (gastroenterologists, an endoscopist, and an ultra-sonographer). The applicant refused to be medically examined, to have blood samples taken, or to undergo ultrasonic examinations and fibrogastroduodenoscopy, which had been recommended by the medical panel. 56. On 6 September 2011 a commission of the Ministry of Health examined the applicant in the SIZO. It recommended that he undergo examination with special equipment so that specific diagnoses could be made. 57. On 7 and 8 September 2011 blood samples and faeces were taken from the applicant for laboratory tests. 58. On 13 September 2011 the applicant’s wife again requested the Pechersk Court to allow her husband to be hospitalised and given proper treatment. 59. On 15 September 2011 the applicant was hospitalised and examined in the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre, which diagnosed the initial signs of portal hypertension, as well as signs of chronic cholecystitis, angiomyolipoma of the right kidney, and parenchymatous cyst of the left kidney. On the same date the applicant underwent an abdominal ultrasonic scan, which discovered signs of gall-bladder polyps and pancreatic diffuse changes, and confirmed the aforementioned kidney pathologies. 60. On 20 September 2011 the applicant underwent a colonoscopy which showed sigmoid colon diverticulitis. On the same day a newly appointed commission of the Ministry of Health examined him and diagnosed fatty liver disease. Dietetic therapy, mineral-vitamin complex, proton pump blockers and hepato-protectors were prescribed. 61. According to the Government, on 22 September 2011 the applicant consulted a haematologist. In view of a decreased number of white blood cells (leukocytes) and thrombocytes in his blood, it was recommended that he again undergo a general blood test at two independent laboratories, to be identified by the Ministry of Health. Once the results of those examinations were known it was recommended that the applicant again consult a haematologist. 62. On 23 September 2011 the applicant’s blood samples were sent to the laboratory for a general blood test. On 26 September 2011, following the haematologist’s recommendation, a blood sample was sent to the Sinevo laboratory for a coagulation profile test. 63. On 28 September 2011 the applicant again consulted the haematologist. The results of the previous examinations led the doctor to find that he had no blood system disorders. 64. On 24 October 2011 the applicant completed the course of medical treatment prescribed by the panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions on 20 September 2011. 65. On 29 September 2011 it was proposed that he undergo a liver biopsy, which he declined. According to him, the biopsy is a surgical intervention, after which the patient should stay in the medical institution under medical supervision for a period the doctor considers necessary to monitor any post-operative complications. However, the applicant was not provided with guarantees that the medical care would be adequate and that he would stay in the hospital after the biopsy. He considered that removing him immediately to the SIZO would hurt his state of health. Besides, the applicant feared that proper medical care would not be provided to him in the SIZO if there were complications after the biopsy. He referred in this connection to his previous experience. 66. On 4 October 2011 the applicant’s relatives brought him the proton pump blockers and hepato-protectors which had been prescribed by the Ministry of Health commission specialists as early as 20 September 2011. 67. According to the Government, on 2 November 2011 the applicant was examined by SIZO doctors. When examined, he complained of general weakness, dragging pain in the right hypochondrium, and discomfort in the upper abdomen and in the intestine area. He was diagnosed with fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, erosive haemorrhagic helicobacter-associated gastritis, and diverticular disease of the sigmoid colon. As the applicant had completed the prescribed course of outpatient treatment, it was proposed that he undergo laboratory and instrumental tests. The applicant submitted a written statement refusing to undergo fibrogastroduodenoscopy and rectosigmoidoscopy. 68. On 3 November 2011 blood samples were taken from the applicant for laboratory examination at the Kyiv diagnostic centre. In particular, he underwent clinical, general, and biochemical blood tests and a coagulation profile test. 69. On 5 November 2011, upon a court decision, the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. He was diagnosed with the following conditions: fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter associated gastritis, and diverticular disease of the sigmoid colon. It was recommended that the applicant undergo an abdominal ultrasound scan, a faecal occult blood test, and a faecal analysis for helminth eggs and protozoa, consult a urologist, receive diet-based treatment, take a mineral-vitamin complex, and continue to take proton-pump inhibitors. 70. On 8 November 2011 the applicant underwent abdominal ultrasonic scanning at the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre. He was diagnosed with gall bladder polyp signs, moderate pancreatic changes, angiomyolipomas of the right kidney, and small cysts of the left renal sinus. However, he refused to consult a urologist. 71. On 9 November 2011 he received a parcel with the necessary medication. 72. According to the Government, during November 2011 the applicant’s state of health remained satisfactory. From time to time he complained of general weakness, discomfort in the large intestine area, and pain in the right hypochondrium. During that period, he was examined daily by doctors of the SIZO medical unit, and regularly provided with the prescribed medical treatment. The diagnosis remained unchanged. However, the applicant continued to complain of periodic discomfort in the large intestine area. He received the medical treatment prescribed by the panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions on 5 November 2011. 73. On 14 December 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. The results of the earlier examinations led the doctors to diagnose the applicant with the following conditions: fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticular disease of sigmoid colon, but no signs of blood disorder were found. The doctors recommended that the applicant undergo some additional examinations: electrocardiography, irrigoscopy, and an analysis of faeces for dysbiosis, to determine pancreatic (faecal) elastase, and a faecal occult blood test. Also, the applicant was prescribed the following medical treatment: diet-based treatment; Spasmomen or Meteospasmyl; Posterisan suppositories; Kreon; Validolum, to stop pain in the stomach; Chophytol, to continue to take from 19 December 2011. However, on 19 December the applicant on his own initiative refused to start the medical treatment prescribed. 74. In early January 2012 the applicant complained to the SIZO administration of stomach and intestinal pains. 75. On 5 and 14 January 2012 he underwent various laboratory tests in respect of his chronic gastrointestinal diseases, and on 11 January 2012 an ultrasonic examination of his abdominal cavity was conducted. 76. On 19 January 2012, during a court hearing, the applicant complained that he did not feel well. An ambulance was therefore called. The doctor diagnosed exacerbation of chronic pancreatitis and administered some medication to the applicant. The applicant’s overall state of health was assessed as satisfactory. 77. On 20 January 2012 the applicant was examined by a panel of medical specialists delegated by the Ministry of Health which established the following diagnoses: fatty liver disease (steatosis), signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticulosis of sigmoid colon. While the commission acknowledged a deterioration of the applicant’s health due to “nutrition-regime disturbance and psycho-emotional overload”, it found his health generally satisfactory and not warranting in-patient treatment in a specialist civilian hospital. The physicians recommended normalisation of the nutrition regime and reduction of the psycho-emotional pressure. They also prescribed some medication. 78. On 23 January 2012 the Ministry of Health delegated another panel, of three gastroenterologists, to examine the applicant in the SIZO. The doctors found him to be in a generally satisfactory state of health, and concluded that he did not require hospitalisation. They also specified the medication to be administered to the applicant, and repeated the earlier recommendation regarding his nutritional needs. 79. On 24 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. They noted that his state of health had improved. The applicant was diagnosed with fatty liver disease (steatosis), signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticulosis of sigmoid colon. It was advised that he receive rational nutrition diet, continue to take Duspatalin and take Kreon, Valeriana extract, and suppositories with belladonna. The applicant received that medication in full. 80. On 6 April 2012 he was transferred from the SIZO to the Emergency Hospital for further examination. 81. According to the applicant, despite numerous check-ups, there was no proper medical treatment or medicine available to him in the SIZO. He received proper medical treatment in the Emergency Hospital on 10 May 2011 and 6 April 2012, but was discharged from the hospital on 23 May 2011 and 20 April 2012 respectively, upon an arbitrary decision by the Prison Service authorities, rather than upon a decision of the doctors treating him at the hospital. He was provided with medication which was incompatible with his general state of health, and although they treated his immediate health problem they contributed to the deterioration of his general state of health. 82. Upon his admission to the SIZO, the applicant was placed in cell no. 158, measuring 8.58 square metres. He shared the cell with one or two other inmates. According to him, the cell had poor ventilation and lacked personal hygiene facilities. Its walls had mould traces. Furthermore, there was no access to drinking water. Except for period from 28 April to 8 May 2011 (see paragraph 110 below), he shared this cell with two other detainees. 83. According to the Government, the cell had a proper ventilation system and natural lighting. The applicant had had daily exercise in the fresh air, except on days when lengthy court hearings were held. He was permitted to receive drinking water from relatives. He was allowed to take a shower once or twice a week. 84. From 8 to 10 May 2011, the applicant was held in cell no. 257 in the SIZO medical unit, which measured 23.21 square metres. 85. From 10 to 23 May 2011 he was a patient in the Emergency Hospital. 86. On 23 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 260, measuring 22.32 square metres, in the SIZO medical unit, which he shared with another person. He remained there until 1 July 2011. 87. On 1 July 2011 he was transferred to cell no. 158, which he shared with another inmate. 88. On 27 March 2012 he was moved to cell no. 136. 89. On 6 April 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Emergency Hospital. He returned to cell no. 136 on 20 April 2012. 90. From the documents provided by the Government, in particular the minutes of the hearings held before the Pechersk Court (see annex), it appears that between 23 May 2011 and 16 February 2012 the court held seventy-nine hearings at which the applicant was present. At the hearing of 27 February 2012, it pronounced the judgment convicting the applicant. During thirty-five hearings, the court did not withdraw for deliberation on intermediate procedural issues but at least one break was announced, during twelve hearings the court both withdrew to deliberate and announced at least one break, and eleven hearings were interrupted by deliberations on intermediate procedural issue of the court but otherwise were carried out without a proper break. On 14 and 19 July, 22 August and 29 September 2011, 17, 27 and 31 January, 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 14 and 15 February 2012 the court announced breaks for lunch. However, on 14 July 2011 the applicant had been removed from the courtroom for the rest of the hearing because of his improper behavior before the lunch break was announced. Moreover, eighteen hearings were carried out without any deliberation and the court did not announce any break. In particular, on 12 October 2011 the hearing lasted two hours and 51 minutes, on 18 October 2011 it took three hours and 36 minutes, and on 16 and 21 November 2011 the hearings lasted almost three hours. 91. The applicant continued his hunger strike up to 23 May 2011. He was informed beforehand that the preliminary hearing would be held on that day. According to him, he was woken up at 4.30 a.m. to be taken to the court building for a hearing which started at about 11 a.m. He had to wait in a small convoy room of about 1.5 square metres. Overall, for about twelve to fourteen hours, he was allegedly held without food and drinking water, in poorly ventilated premises. On the same day, he terminated the hunger strike, which had lasted for about a month. 92. According to the Government, this information was incorrect. The applicant left the hospital at 7 a.m., reaching the court-house at 7.20 a.m. At 10.30 a.m. he was transferred to the courtroom. 93. According to the applicant, he was brought to the court hearing with an open bleeding stomach ulcer, although this condition required immediate hospitalisation. After the eight-hour hearing he was driven to the SIZO. He was transferred to the medical unit of the SIZO only after he had lost consciousness. Despite this, no treatment was recommended for him. Late at night the applicant’s state of health suddenly worsened. 94. According to the Government, as long as the applicant was in hospital, his health was under constant supervision by medical specialists there. In the event that his state of health did not permit him to take part in a hearing, this would be notified by the medical staff and the applicant would not then have been convoyed to the court hearing. 95. According to the applicant, he suffered from the absence of drinking water and nutrition, as well as the lack of rest, during the later court hearings too, while being kept in a metal cage in the courtroom. 96. On 20 January 2012 the applicant, in his request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was subsequently not granted, maintained that on 17 and 18 January 2012 the Pechersk Court had held the hearings daily despite his complaints of deteriorating health and acute pain in his stomach. According to him, the hearings had lasted from 9 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. usually with one thirty-minute break. On 19 January 2012 the court hearing had lasted from 9 a.m. until 11:30 p.m. The applicant stated that after having left the SIZO, he had not been provided with any food or water until his return. Moreover, on 19 January 2012 the court called the ambulance for him four times. 97. According to the information submitted by the Government, on the days of the hearings detainees received food packs from the prison authorities: the applicant refused these in writing on 1 December 2011 and 11, 19 and 20 January 2012, noting that he had his own food supply. 98. The Government submitted tables of the schedule of the hearing days (see annex) containing the information about the time when the applicant was put in the car and reached the courtroom, when the hearings started and were closed and the time when the applicant was put in the car and arrived back in the SIZO. They also submitted the minutes of the court hearings held before the Pechersk Court.

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4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in St Petersburg. 5. In 1995, a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of fraud and bribery. On 31 August 1995 the investigators searched the applicant’s home and office. They removed some items and money. 6. On 10 March 1998 the applicant sued the Prosecutor’s Office for the return of his possessions. On 27 May 1998 the proceedings were adjourned pending the outcome of the criminal case. 7. By decisions of 29 November 2000 and 23 January 2001, the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg established that the searches of 31 August 1995 had been unlawful. 8. In July 2002 the civil proceedings were resumed. 9. On 4 February 2004 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued. Prosecutors returned a part of the applicant’s possessions but the rest of them had already been disposed of. 10. In its judgment of 8 February 2005, the Court found that the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant did not satisfy the “reasonable time” requirement (see Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 136, 8 February 2005). 11. On 9 March 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court partly upheld the applicant’s claims. On 18 May 2005 the St Petersburg City Court remitted the case to the first instance for a fresh examination. 12. On 13 February 2007 the applicant submitted an amended statement of claims. In particular, he asked the court to award him damages in respect of the loss of value and profit, and, finally, costs and expenses. 13. By a final judgment of 3 October 2007, the St Petersburg City Court awarded the applicant damages and costs and expenses in the amounts claimed but dismissed his claim for the loss of profit. The City Court acknowledged that the investigative authorities had illegally removed, and subsequently disposed of, the applicant’s property. 14. The judgment was enforced in January 2008.

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4. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Innsbruck. 5. The applicant was the manager of Alpenland Holland B.V., a company registered in the Netherlands dealing with artwork. 6. On 11 May 1994 the Innsbruck Tax Authority first informed the Innsbruck Public Prosecutor of the suspicion of tax fraud by the applicant in connection with the sale of several pieces of artwork by Alpenland Holland B.V. 7. On 16 May 1994 the Innsbruck Regional Court issued an order for the applicant’s home to be searched. The search was conducted on 30 May 1994, which is also the date when the applicant was first notified of the investigations against him. 8. On 26 February 1997 the Innsbruck Tax Authority submitted its final report to the Innsbruck Public Prosecutor. 9. On 8 June 1998 the Innsbruck Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant concerning the suspicion of tax fraud during the years 1989, 1990 and 1992, alleging that the applicant had evaded taxes amounting to 6.87 million. Austrian Schilling (equivalent to approximately 500,000 euros (EUR)). 10. The Innsbruck Regional Court held oral hearings on 19 November 1998, 14 January 1999 and 5 October 2000. On the latter date it acquitted the applicant of the charges. On 22 November 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment upon a plea of nullity by the Innsbruck Tax Authority and referred the case back to the first instance for a re-trial. 11. After having held oral hearings on 5 June 2002, 9 September 2002 and 14 October 2002, the Innsbruck Regional Court convicted the applicant of tax fraud and sentenced him to a fine of EUR 120,000, EUR 40,000 of which was suspended on probation. The judgment was served on 16 November 2002. The applicant lodged a plea of nullity. 12. On 11 September 2003 the Supreme Court again quashed the judgment and referred the case back to the first instance. 13. In March 2003 the Innsbruck Regional Court commissioned an expert to determine the assessment base for the calculation of the taxes. 14. On 18 and 19 November 2004 and on 23 December 2004 further oral hearings were held. The Innsbruck Regional Court remarked in a note to the file dated 14 February 2005, quoting the case Hennig v. Austria (no. 41444/98, 2 October 2003), that the length of the proceedings was already considerable, and admitted that this was attributable to the court system. 15. In March 2004 the expert opinion was delivered. During the oral hearing of 18 May 2006 the Innsbruck Regional Court requested the expert to supplement his report, as it had turned out to be incomplete and did not answer the most relevant questions. A revised expert opinion was received in March 2007. 16. During the oral hearing on 29 May 2009, at which the applicant was heard, the Innsbruck Public Prosecutor withdrew the indictment because the statutory time-limit for the prosecution of the offence had expired. Consequently, the Innsbruck Regional Court acquitted the applicant of the charges (judgment delivered orally on 29 May 2009, served on the applicant’s counsel on 25 February 2010). The written judgment contained, inter alia, the following wording: “The above-mentioned sales transactions solely aimed at the commission of tax fraud in Austria. No levies were paid in the Netherlands in connection with the sale of the paintings. The profits made constitute income deriving from a business according to Section 23 of the Income Tax Act [Einkommenssteuergesetz], which from an economic point of view are attributable to the applicant according to Section 21 of the Federal Tax Rules [Bundesabgabenordnung]. Taking into account the expenses incurred, tax loads and therefore tax evasion amounting to ATS 975,122.09 (EUR 70,864.89) turnover tax, ATS 4,104,950.75 (EUR 298,318.40) income tax and ATS 1,495,319.40 (EUR 108,669.09) business tax arose. The accused was determined to effect these transactions in order to mask his tax liability in Austria and thereby commit tax fraud. ... From a legal point of view, it follows from the facts that the accused was to be acquitted even though the elements of the offence were fulfilled, as the Public Prosecutor withdrew the indictment ...” 17. Following the Court’s notification of the present application to the Government, the latter informed the Court that, on 18 September 2014, the Procurator General’s Office had lodged a plea of nullity for the preservation of the law regarding the judgment of the Innsbruck Regional Court of 29 May 2009. 18. On 6 November 2014 the Supreme Court held that the judgment in question had violated the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, namely the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, on the grounds that the Innsbruck Regional Court had stated in its reasoning that it considered the applicant to be guilty, even though it acquitted him.

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4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Bataysk, Rostov Region. 5. In 1987 the applicant took part in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result the applicant suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. 6. In 1993 due to that fact he was granted status of a disabled person and awarded a monthly compensation, to be adjusted once a year in line with the minimum subsistence amount (величина прожиточного минимума). 7. In 2002 the applicant brought proceedings against the Bataysk Social Security Office (Отдел социальной защиты населения г. Батайска) seeking indexation of the compensation amount and payment of the respective arrears for the previous years. 8. On 21 January 2003 the Bataysk Town Court rendered a judgment ordering the increase of the monthly allowances due to the applicant in line with the increase of the minimal subsistence amount in the Rostov Region. In re-calculating the amount of the applicant’s allowances the court applied the multiplier of 1.92 based on the data provided by the regional committee on statistics. As a result, the monthly allowance increased up to 4,800 Russian roubles (RUB), and monthly food allowance increased up to RUB 576. The court ordered the defendant to pay the applicant the recalculated amount as from 1 January 2002 less the sums already paid. On 16 April 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Rostov Regional Court and entered into force. 9. On an unspecified date the Bataysk Social Security Office appealed to the Rostov Regional Court by way of supervisory review seeking to quash the judgment of 21 January 2003. On 30 June 2003 the judge-rapporteur refused to initiate the supervisory review proceedings. 10. On an unspecified date the Bataysk Social Security Office lodged a new supervisory review complaint, now with the President of the Rostov Regional Court. The President granted the application. On 24 October 2003 the case was transferred to the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court for the examination on the merits. 11. On 4 December 2003 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment of 21 January 2003 stating that the first instance court’s calculation of the compensation amount had not been supported by evidence and that the first instance court had misinterpreted the domestic law. The case was remitted to the Bataysk Town Court for a fresh examination. 12. On 25 December 2003 the Bataysk Town Court reduced the multiplier to 1.25, recalculated the compensation amount and reduced it to RUB 3,125. In this set of proceedings the applicant amended his claims and dropped the food allowance claim. The applicant did not appeal against this judgment. 13. On 20 January 2010 the Bataysk Town Court had awarded the applicant pecuniary damages in the amount of RUB 76,061.40 for the period from 1 July 2000 to 4 December 2007, which were paid to the applicant in July 2010. There is no information as to the grounds for the claim of the damages. Nor related documents were provided.

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4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Volgograd. 5. On 15 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of large-scale fraud. 6. On 28 September 2001 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody. 7. On 2 October 2001 and 22 July 2002 charges were brought against the applicant. 8. On 7 August 2002 the criminal case was submitted to the Tsentralniy District Court of Volgograd (“the District Court”) for trial. 9. On 8 October 2002 the first hearing was held. It was presided over by judge A. 10. On 26 November 2002 the applicant was released from custody. 11. On 30 December 2002 the case was transferred to judge G. and, pursuant to Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Immutability of court composition), the trial was restarted. 12. Between March and June 2003 and between June 2004 and January 2005 the hearings were adjourned on seven occasions: on five occasions due to the non-attendance of the accused, their representatives and the witnesses, and on two occasions, from 19 May to 11 July 2003 and from 10 December 2004 to 17 January 2005, following requests from the applicant for more time to study the case file. 13. In the meantime, on 19 January 2003, an unrelated criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of storing firearms and narcotic drugs. He was again remanded in custody on 20 January 2003. On 19 June 2003 the District Court convicted the applicant of storing firearms and narcotic drugs and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. 14. On 28 March 2005 judge G. went on maternity leave, and on 26 April 2005 the initial case was transferred to judge S. The trial was restarted. 15. Between May and November 2005 the hearings were adjourned on two occasions due to the non-attendance of the participants in the trial. 16. On 16 December 2005 judge S. resigned, and on 14 February 2006 the case was transferred to judge M. The trial was again restarted. 17. Between March and June 2006 the hearings were adjourned on three occasions due to the non-attendance of the participants in the trial. 18. On 19 July 2006 judge M. resigned and the case was transferred to judge Mar. The trial was restarted for the fourth time. 19. Between November 2006 and June 2008 the hearings were adjourned on five occasions due to the non-attendance of the participants in the trial. 20. On 6 August 2008 the District Court of Volgograd found the applicant guilty of complicity in large-scale fraud and sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment. The final sentence under both verdicts was set at nine years’ imprisonment. 21. On 1 December 2009 Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 22. The applicant was detained in Volgograd remand prison IZ-34/1 from 10 October 2001 to 26 November 2002, from 20 January 2003 to 19 August 2003, from 23 September 2003 to 17 May 2005[1], from 12 July 2005 to 29 April 2008 and from 16 May 2008 to 6 September 2008. He submitted that the cells had been severely overcrowded and in a poor sanitary condition. 23. The cell where the applicant was held most recently, measuring approximately thirty square metres and equipped with eighteen bunk beds, accommodated between twenty and thirty inmates at any given time. The inmates were obliged to take turns to sleep. 24. The toilet in the corner of the cell (a hole in the floor measuring about 15-20 cm in diameter), elevated above the floor by 0.4 metres and separated by a 0.6 metre partition, offered no privacy. It had no flushing system. 25. The cell was not equipped with a washstand. Instead, the inmates had to use the water running from a tap over the toilet. 26. The dining table was situated a metre away from the toilet. It could seat about ten inmates. The rest of the inmates had to eat sitting on the concrete floor. 27. The food was of low quality. The drinking-water tanks were placed on the floor. 28. The cell was lit around the clock by two 100-watt filament lamps. It was poorly ventilated. The air was thick with the stench of tobacco, laundry and the toilet. 29. The cell was infested with insects and rodents. 30. The applicant was allowed to take a five-minute shower once a week. 31. The exercise yards were unequipped and too small to accommodate all the detainees properly. 32. The applicant twice contracted tuberculosis while being detained in Volgograd IZ-34/1. His eyesight deteriorated. 33. The applicant’s attempts to challenge the conditions of his detention before various domestic authorities yielded no result. 34. The applicant was transported from the remand prison to the courthouse and back more than a hundred times between 2001 and 2008. Prisoners were transported between the remand prison and the courthouse in a prison van – a metal freight vehicle comprising three compartments: two designed for twenty inmates and the third one for single occupancy. The van had no windows and offered no access to natural light or air. It had no artificial lighting or ventilation either. There were no seat belts or other safety equipment to prevent inmates from falling and hitting themselves against the walls. It was stiflingly hot in the van in the summer and freezing cold in the winter. 35. There were four cells in the holding area of the District Court where the applicant was taken. Each cell measured about three square metres and accommodated five to six inmates. The cells were equipped with one bench each, which could seat only three inmates. Those suffering from hepatitis, tuberculosis, HIV and other diseases were placed together with the rest of the inmates. On each occasion the applicant spent as long as seven or eight hours in such conditions.

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10. The applicant company is a public limited liability company (aktsiaselts), registered in Estonia. 11. The applicant company is the owner of Delfi, an Internet news portal that published up to 330 news articles a day at the time of the lodging of the application. Delfi is one of the largest news portals on the Internet in Estonia. It publishes news in Estonian and Russian in Estonia, and also operates in Latvia and Lithuania. 12. At the material time, at the end of the body of the news articles there were the words “add your comment” and fields for comments, the commenter’s name and his or her e-mail address (optional). Below these fields there were buttons labelled “publish the comment” and “read comments”. The part for reading comments left by others was a separate area which could be accessed by clicking on the “read comments” button. The comments were uploaded automatically and were, as such, not edited or moderated by the applicant company. The articles received about 10,000 readers’ comments daily, the majority posted under pseudonyms. 13. Nevertheless, there was a system of notice-and-take-down in place: any reader could mark a comment as leim (Estonian for an insulting or mocking message or a message inciting hatred on the Internet) and the comment was removed expeditiously. Furthermore, comments that included certain stems of obscene words were automatically deleted. In addition, a victim of a defamatory comment could directly notify the applicant company, in which case the comment was removed immediately. 14. The applicant company had made efforts to advise users that the comments did not reflect its own opinion and that the authors of comments were responsible for their content. On Delfi’s website there were Rules on posting comments which included the following. “The Delfi message board is a technical medium allowing users to publish comments. Delfi does not edit the comments. An author of a comment is liable for his or her comment. It is worth noting that there have been cases in the Estonian courts where authors have been punished for the contents of a comment ... Delfi prohibits comments whose content does not comply with good practice. These are comments that – contain threats; – contain insults; – incite hostility and violence; – incite illegal activities ... – contain off-topic links, spam or advertisements; – are without substance and/or off topic; – contain obscene expressions and vulgarities ... Delfi reserves the right to remove such comments and restrict their authors’ access to the writing of comments ...” The functioning of the notice-and-take-down system was also explained in the Rules on posting comments. 15. The Government submitted that in Estonia Delfi had a notorious history of publishing defamatory and degrading comments. Thus, on 22 September 2005 the weekly newspaper Eesti Ekspress had published an open letter from its editorial board to the Minister of Justice, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Chancellor of Justice in which concern was expressed about the incessant taunting of people on public websites in Estonia. Delfi was named as a source of brutal and arrogant mockery. The addressees of the public letter responded to it in the 29 September 2005 edition of Eesti Ekspress. The Minister of Justice emphasised that the insulted persons had the right to defend their honour and reputation in court by bringing a suit against Delfi and claiming damages. The Chief Public Prosecutor referred to the legal grounds which made threats, incitement to social hatred, and sexual abuse of minors punishable under criminal law, and noted that liability for defamation and insults was dealt with under civil procedure. The Chancellor of Justice referred to the legal provisions designed to ensure freedom of expression as well as the protection of everyone’s honour and good name, including sections 1043 and 1046 of the Obligations Act (Võlaõigusseadus). 16. On 24 January 2006 the applicant company published an article on the Delfi portal under the heading “SLK Destroyed Planned Ice Road”. Ice roads are public roads over the frozen sea which are open between the Estonian mainland and some islands in winter. The abbreviation “SLK” stands for AS Saaremaa Laevakompanii (Saaremaa Shipping Company, a public limited liability company). SLK provides a public ferry transport service between the mainland and certain islands. At the material time, L. was a member of the supervisory board of SLK and the company’s sole or majority shareholder. 17. On 24 and 25 January 2006 the article attracted 185 comments. About twenty of them contained personal threats and offensive language directed at L. 18. On 9 March 2006 L.’s lawyers requested the applicant company to remove the offensive comments and claimed 500,000 Estonian kroons (EEK) (approximately 32,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The request concerned the following twenty comments. “1. (1) there are currents in [V]äinameri (2) open water is closer to the places you referred to, and the ice is thinner. Proposal – let’s do the same as in 1905, let’s go to [K]uressaare with sticks and put [L.] and [Le.] in a bag 2. bloody shitheads... they’re loaded anyway thanks to that monopoly and State subsidies and have now started to worry that cars may drive to the islands for a couple of days without anything filling their purses. burn in your own ship, sick Jew! 7. What are you whining for, knock this bastard down once and for all[.] In future the other ones ... will know what they risk, even they will only have one little life. 8. ... is goddamn right. Lynching, to warn the other [islanders] and would-be men. Then nothing like that will be done again! In any event, [L.] very much deserves that, doesn’t he. 10. If there was an ice road, [one] could easily save 500 for a full car, fckng [L.] pay for that economy, why does it take 3 [hours] for your ferries if they are such good icebreakers, go and break ice in Pärnu port ... instead, fcking monkey, I will cross [the strait] anyway and if I drown, it’s your fault 14. The people will chatter for a couple of days on the Internet, but the crooks (and also those who are backed and whom we ourselves have elected to represent us) pocket the money and pay no attention to this flaming – no one gives a shit about this. Once [M.] and other big crooks also used to boss around, but their greed struck back (RIP). Will also strike back for these crooks sooner or later. As they sow, so shall they reap, but they should nevertheless be contained (by lynching as the State is powerless towards them – it is really them who govern the State), because they only live for today. Tomorrow, the flood. 15. this [V.] will one day get hit with a cake by me. damn, as soon as you put a cauldron on the fire and there is smoke rising from the chimney of the sauna, the crows from Saaremaa are there – thinking that ... a pig is going to be slaughtered. no way 17. Estonian State, led by scum [and] financed by scum, of course does not prevent or punish antisocial acts by scum. But well, every [L.] has his Michaelmas ... and this cannot at all be compared to a ram’s Michaelmas.[1] Actually feel sorry for [L.] – he’s a human, after all... :D :D :D 18. ... if after such acts [L.] should all of a sudden happen to be on sick leave and also next time the ice road is destroyed ... will he [then] dare to act like a pig for the third time? :) 19. fucking bastard, that [L.]... could have gone home with my baby soon ... anyway his company cannot guarantee a normal ferry service and the prices are such that ... real creep ... a question arises whose pockets and mouths he has filled up with money so that he’s acting like a pig from year to year 20. you can’t make bread from shit; and paper and internet can stand everything; and just for my own fun (really the State and [L.] do not care about the people’s opinion) ... just for fun, with no greed for money – I pee into [L.’s] ear and then I also shit onto his head. :)” 19. On the same day, that is about six weeks after their publication, the offensive comments were removed by the applicant company. 20. On 23 March 2006 the applicant company responded to the request from L.’s lawyers. It informed L. that the comments had been removed under the notice-and-take-down obligation, and refused the claim for damages. 21. On 13 April 2006 L. brought a civil suit in the Harju County Court against the applicant company. 22. At the hearing of 28 May 2007, the representatives of the applicant company submitted, inter alia, that in cases like that concerning the “Bronze Night” (disturbances of public order related to the relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument in April 2007) Delfi had removed between 5,000 and 10,000 comments per day, on its own initiative. 23. By a judgment of 25 June 2007, L.’s claim was dismissed. The County Court found that the applicant company’s liability was excluded under the Information Society Services Act (Infoühiskonna teenuse seadus), which was based on Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce). The court considered that the comments section on the applicant company’s news portal was to be distinguished from its journalistic section. The administration of the former by the applicant company was essentially of a mechanical and passive nature. The applicant company could not be considered the publisher of the comments, nor did it have any obligation to monitor them. 24. On 22 October 2007 the Tallinn Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by L. It considered that the County Court had erred in finding that the applicant company’s liability was excluded under the Information Society Services Act. The County Court’s judgment was quashed and the case was referred back to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. 25. On 21 January 2008 the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal by the applicant company. 26. On 27 June 2008 the Harju County Court, having re-examined the case, found for L. In accordance with the Court of Appeal’s instructions, it relied on the Obligations Act and deemed the Information Society Services Act inapplicable. It observed that the applicant company had indicated on its website that comments were not edited, that the posting of comments that were contrary to good practice was prohibited, and that the applicant company reserved the right to remove such comments. A system was put in place whereby users could notify the applicant company of any inappropriate comments. However, the County Court considered that this was insufficient and did not allow adequate protection for the personality rights of others. The court found that the applicant company itself was to be considered the publisher of the comments, and it could not avoid responsibility by publishing a disclaimer stating that it was not liable for the content of the comments. 27. The County Court found that the news article itself published on the Delfi news portal was a balanced one. A number of comments, however, were vulgar in form; they were humiliating and defamatory, and impaired L.’s honour, dignity and reputation. The comments went beyond justified criticism and amounted to simple insults. The court concluded that freedom of expression did not extend to protection of the comments concerned and that L.’s personality rights had been violated. L. was awarded EEK 5,000 (EUR 320) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 28. On 16 December 2008 the Tallinn Court of Appeal upheld the County Court’s judgment. It emphasised that the applicant company had not been required to exercise prior control over comments posted on its news portal. However, having chosen not to do so, it should have created some other effective system which would have ensured rapid removal of unlawful comments. The Court of Appeal considered that the measures taken by the applicant company were insufficient and that it was contrary to the principle of good faith to place the burden of monitoring the comments on their potential victims. 29. The Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company’s argument that its liability was excluded under the Information Society Services Act. It noted that the applicant company was not a technical intermediary in respect of the comments, and that its activity was not of a merely technical, automatic and passive nature; instead, it invited users to post comments. Thus, the applicant company was a provider of content services rather than of technical services. 30. On 10 June 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant company. It upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment in substance, but partly modified its reasoning. 31. The Supreme Court held as follows. “10. The Chamber finds that the allegations set out in the appeal do not serve as a basis for reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The conclusion reached in the Court of Appeal’s judgment is correct, but the legal reasoning of the judgment must be amended and supplemented on the basis of Article 692 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. The parties do not dispute the following circumstances: (a) on 24 January 2006 the defendant’s Internet portal ‘Delfi’ published an article entitled ‘SLK Destroyed Planned Ice Road’; (b) the defendant provided visitors to the Internet portal with the opportunity to comment on articles; (c) of the comments published [avaldatud[2]] on the aforementioned article, twenty contain content which is derogatory towards the plaintiff [L.]; (d) the defendant removed the derogatory comments after the plaintiff’s letter of 9 March 2006. 12. The legal dispute between the parties relates to whether the defendant as an entrepreneur is the publisher within the meaning of the Obligations Act, whether what was published (the content of comments) is unlawful, and whether the defendant is liable for the publication of comments with unlawful content. 13. The Chamber agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the defendant does not fall within the circumstances precluding liability as specified in section 10 of the ISSA [Information Society Services Act]. According to section 2(6) of the Technical Regulations and Standards Act, an information society service is a service specified in section 2(1) of the ISSA. According to this provision, ‘information society services’ are services provided in the form of economic or professional activities at the direct request of a recipient of the services, without the parties being simultaneously present at the same location, and such services involve the processing, storage or transmission of data by electronic means intended for the digital processing and storage of data. Hence, important conditions for the provision of information society services are that the services are provided without the physical presence of the parties, the data are transmitted by electronic means, and the service is provided for a fee on the basis of a request by the user of the service. Sections 8 to 11 of the ISSA establish the liability of providers of different information society services. Section 10 of the ISSA states that where a service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of the contents of the information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of any facts or circumstances indicating any illegal activity or information; (b) the provider, upon having knowledge or becoming aware of the aforementioned facts, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Hence, the provision in question is applied in the event that the service provided consists in storing data on [the service provider’s] server and enabling users to have access to these data. Subject to the conditions specified in section 10 of the ISSA, the provider of such a service is exempted from liability for the content of information stored by it, because the provider of the service merely fulfils the role of an intermediary within the meaning of the provision referred to, and does not initiate or modify the information. Since the Information Society Services Act is based on Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), the principles and objectives of that Directive must also be taken into account in the interpretation of the provisions of the Act in question. Articles 12 to 15 of the Directive, which form the basis for sections 8 to 11 of the ISSA, are complemented by Recital 42 of the preamble to the Directive, according to which the exemptions from liability established in Articles 12 to 15 cover only cases where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored. Hence, the providers of so-called ‘content services’ who have control over the content of the information stored cannot rely on the exemptions specified in Articles 12 to 15 of the Directive. The Chamber shares the opinion of the Court of Appeal that the activities of the defendant in publishing the comments are not merely of a technical, automatic and passive nature. The objective of the defendant is not merely the provision of an intermediary service. The defendant has integrated the comments section into its news portal, inviting visitors to the website to complement the news with their own judgments [hinnangud] and opinions (comments). In the comments section, the defendant actively calls for comments on the news items appearing on the portal. The number of visits to the defendant’s portal depends on the number of comments; the revenue earned from advertisements published on the portal, in turn, depends on the [number of visits]. Thus, the defendant has an economic interest in the posting of comments. The fact that the defendant is not the author of the comments does not mean that the defendant has no control over the comments section. The defendant sets out the rules for the comments section and makes changes to it (removes a comment) if those rules are breached. By contrast, a user of the defendant’s service cannot change or delete a comment he or she has posted. He or she can only report an inappropriate comment. Thus, the defendant can determine which of the comments added will be published and which will not be published. The fact that the defendant does not make use of this possibility does not lead to the conclusion that the publishing of comments is not under the defendant’s control. The Chamber agrees with the opinion of the Court of Appeal that the defendant, which governs the information stored in the comments section, provides a content service, for which reason the circumstances precluding liability, as specified in section 10 of the ISSA, do not apply in the present case. 14. It is not disputed that the defendant is the publisher of an article entitled ‘SLK Destroyed Planned Ice Road’, published on the Delfi Internet portal on 24 January 2006. The County Court also found that the defendant must be regarded as the publisher of the comments. The Court of Appeal, agreeing with that opinion, noted that the fact that the defendant relied on a violation of its right to freedom of expression showed that it considered itself – and not the authors of the comments – to be the publisher of the comments. In the opinion of the Chamber, in the present case both the defendant and the authors of the comments are the publishers of the comments within the meaning of the Obligations Act. The plaintiff has the right to choose against whom to bring the suit. The suit has only been brought against the defendant [Delfi]. The Chamber has explained the definitions of “disclosure” and “discloser” in paragraph 24 of its judgment of 21 December 2005 in civil case no. 3-2-1-95-05, finding that for the purposes of section 1047 of the Obligations Act, disclosure [avaldamine] means communication of information to third parties and the discloser is a person who communicates the information to third parties. In addition, the Chamber explained that in the case of publication [avaldamine] of information in the media, the discloser/publisher [avaldaja] can be a media company as well as the person who transmitted the information to the media publication. Publishing of news and comments on an Internet portal is also a journalistic activity [ajakirjanduslik tegevus]. At the same time, because of the nature of Internet media [internetiajakirjandus], it cannot reasonably be required of a portal operator to edit comments before publishing them in the same manner as applies for a printed media publication [trükiajakirjanduse väljaanne]. While the publisher [(väljaandja) of a printed media publication] is, through editing, the initiator of the publication of a comment, on the Internet portal the initiator of publication is the author of the comment, who makes it accessible to the general public through the portal. Therefore, the portal operator is not the person to whom information is disclosed. Because of [their] economic interest in the publication of comments, both a publisher [väljaandja] of printed media and an Internet portal operator are publishers/disclosers [avaldajad] as entrepreneurs. In cases concerning a value judgment [väärtushinnang] that prejudices and denigrates a person’s honour and good name, in determining the definition of publication/disclosure and publisher/discloser it is irrelevant whether the value judgment is derived from the published/disclosed information or is derogatory because of its substantive meaning ... Hence, publication/disclosure is communication to third parties of a value judgment on a person (section 1046(1) of the Obligations Act) and/or of information which allows a value judgment to be made, and a publisher/discloser is a person who communicates such judgments [hinnangud] and information to third parties. In the present case the comments have been made accessible to an unlimited number of persons (the general public). 15. In reply to the allegations in the defendant’s appeal to the effect that the Court of Appeal wrongly applied Article 45 of the Constitution since, in justifying the interference with freedom of expression, it relied on the principle of good faith, and not the law, and that the removal of a comment from the portal is an interference with the freedom of expression of the person posting the comment, the Chamber explains the following. The exercise of any fundamental right is restricted by Article 19 § 2 of the Constitution, which provides that everyone must honour and consider the rights and freedoms of others, and must observe the law in exercising his or her rights and freedoms and in fulfilling his or her duties. The first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution provides for everyone’s right to freedom of expression, that is, the right to disseminate information of any content in any manner. That right is restricted by the prohibition on injuring a person’s honour and good name, as laid down in the Constitution (Article 17). The Chamber is of the opinion that in handling the conflict between freedom of expression on the one hand, and honour and good name on the other, regard must be had to the fact that Article 17 of the Constitution, which is formulated as a prohibition, does not completely preclude any interference with a person’s honour and good name, but only prohibits defamation thereof (section 1046 of the Obligations Act). In other words, disregarding the aforementioned prohibition would not be in conformity with the Constitution (Article 11 of the Constitution). The second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution includes the possibility of restricting the freedom of expression by law in order to protect a person’s honour and good name. In the interests of the protection of a person’s honour and good name, the following provisions of the Obligations Act may be regarded as restricting the freedom of expression: sections 1045(1)(4), 1046(1), 1047(1), (2) and (4), 1055(1) and (2), and 134(2). The County Court found that injuring the plaintiff’s honour was not justified and was therefore unlawful; as there was no discussion of the [news] topic in the comments, the plaintiff was simply insulted in order to degrade him. The Court of Appeal also agreed with that opinion. The Chamber finds that if section 1046 of the Obligations Act is interpreted in conformity with the Constitution, injuring a person’s honour is unlawful. The legal assessment by the courts of the twenty comments of a derogatory nature is substantiated. The courts have correctly found that those comments are defamatory since they are of a vulgar nature, degrade human dignity and contain threats. The Chamber does not agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeal that the removal of comments of an unlawful nature interfering with the personality rights of the plaintiff is not an interference with the freedom of expression of the authors of the comments. The Chamber considers that the application of any measure restricting a fundamental right in any manner may be regarded as an interference with the exercise of that fundamental right. Interference by an Internet portal operator with the freedom of expression of persons posting comments is, however, justified by the obligation of the portal operator-entrepreneur to respect the honour and good name of third parties, as arising from the Constitution (Article 17) and the law (section 1046 of the Obligations Act), and to avoid causing them harm (section 1045(1)(4) of the Obligations Act). 16. According to the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the contents of the comments were unlawful; they were linguistically inappropriate. Value judgments ... are inappropriate if it is obvious to a sensible reader that their meaning is vulgar and intended to degrade human dignity and ridicule a person. The comments did not contain any information which would have required excessive verification on the initiative of the portal operator. Hence, the defendant’s allegation that it was not and should not have been aware of the unlawfulness of the comments is groundless. On account of the obligation arising from law to avoid causing harm, the defendant should have prevented the publication of comments with clearly unlawful content. The defendant did not do so. In accordance with section 1047(3) of the Obligations Act, the disclosure of information or other matters is not deemed to be unlawful if the person who discloses the information or other matters or the person to whom such matters are disclosed has a legitimate interest in the disclosure, and if the person who discloses the information has verified the information or other matters with a thoroughness which corresponds to the gravity of the potential violation. The publication of linguistically inappropriate value judgments injuring another person’s honour cannot be justified by relying on the circumstances specified in section 1047(3) of the Obligations Act: such judgments are not derived from any information disclosed but are created and published for the purpose of damaging the honour and good name of the party concerned. Hence, the publication of comments of a clearly unlawful nature was also unlawful. After the disclosure, the defendant failed to remove the comments – the unlawful content of which it should have been aware of – from the portal on its own initiative. In such circumstances, the courts have reasonably found that the defendant’s inactivity is unlawful. The defendant is liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff, since the courts have established that the defendant has not proved the absence of culpability [süü] (section 1050(1) of the Obligations Act).” 32. On 1 October 2009 Delfi announced on its Internet portal that persons who had posted offensive comments were not allowed to post a new comment until they had read and accepted the Rules on posting comments. Furthermore, it was announced that Delfi had set up a team of moderators who carried out follow-up moderation of comments posted on the portal. First of all, the moderators reviewed all user notices of inappropriate comments. The compliance of comments with the Rules on posting comments was monitored as well. According to the information published, the number of comments posted by Delfi’s readers in August 2009 had been 190,000. Delfi’s moderators had removed 15,000 comments (about 8%), mainly consisting of spam or irrelevant comments. The percentage of defamatory comments had been less than 0.5% of the total number of comments.

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12. At the time of the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was an autonomous region (oblast) of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Azerbaijan SSR”). Situated within the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, it covered 4,388 sq. km. There was at the time no common border between Nagorno-Karabakh (known as Artsakh by its Armenian name) and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Armenian SSR”), which were separated by Azerbaijani territory, the district of Lachin being the shortest distance between them, including a strip of land often referred to as the “Lachin corridor”, less than 10 km wide. 13. According to the USSR census of 1989, the NKAO had a population of 189,000, consisting of 77% ethnic Armenians and 22% ethnic Azeris, with Russian and Kurdish minorities. The district of Lachin had a different demographic, the vast majority of its population of some 60,000 being Kurds and Azeris. Only 5-6% were Armenians. 14. In early 1988 demonstrations were held in Stepanakert, the regional capital of the NKAO, as well as in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, to demand the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia. On 20 February the Soviet of the NKAO made a request to the Supreme Soviets of the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR that the NKAO be allowed to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. The request was rejected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 23 March. In June it was also rejected by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, whereas its counterpart in Armenia voted in favour of unification. 15. Throughout 1988 the demonstrations calling for unification continued. The district of Lachin was subjected to roadblocks and attacks. The clashes led to many casualties, and refugees, numbering in the hundreds of thousands on both sides, flowed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a consequence, on 12 January 1989 the USSR government placed the NKAO under Moscow’s direct rule. However, on 28 November, control of the region was returned to Azerbaijan. A few days later, on 1 December, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno‑Karabakh Regional Council adopted a Joint Resolution on the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. As a result of this Resolution, a joint budget for the two entities was established in January 1990 and a decision was taken to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian elections, which were to take place in the spring of that year. 16. In early 1990, following an escalation of the conflict, Soviet troops arrived in Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh and the latter was placed under a state of emergency. Violent clashes between Armenians and Azeris continued, however, with the occasional intervention by Soviet forces. 17. On 30 August 1991 Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union. This was subsequently formalised by the adoption of the Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 18 October. On 2 September the Soviet of the NKAO announced the establishment of the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” (the “NKR”), consisting of the territory of the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan, and declared that it was no longer under Azerbaijani jurisdiction. On 26 November the Azerbaijani Parliament abolished the autonomy previously enjoyed by Nagorno-Karabakh. In a referendum organised in Nagorno-Karabakh on 10 December, 99.9% of those participating voted in favour of secession. However, the Azeri population boycotted the referendum. In the same month, the Soviet Union was dissolved and Soviet troops began to withdraw from the region. Military control of Nagorno‑Karabakh was rapidly being handed over to the Karabakh Armenians. On 6 January 1992 the “NKR”, having regard to the results of the referendum, reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan. 18. In early 1992 the conflict gradually escalated into a full-scale war. The ethnic Armenians conquered several Azeri villages, resulting in at least several hundred deaths and the departure of the population. 19. The district of Lachin, in particular the town of Lachin, was attacked many times. The applicants claimed that the attacks were made by troops of both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. The Government maintained, however, that Armenia did not participate in the events, but that military action was carried out by the defence forces of Nagorno-Karabakh and volunteer groups. For almost eight months in 1991, the roads to Lachin were under the control of forces of Armenian ethnicity who manned and controlled checkpoints. The town of Lachin became completely isolated. In mid-May 1992 Lachin was subjected to aerial bombardment, during which many houses were destroyed. 20. On 17 May 1992 realising that troops were advancing rapidly towards Lachin, villagers fled. The following day the town of Lachin was captured by forces of Armenian ethnicity. It appears that the town was looted and burnt in the days following the takeover. According to information obtained by the Government from the authorities of the “NKR”, the city of Lachin and the surrounding villages of Aghbulag, Chirag and Chiragli were completely destroyed during the military conflict. 21. In July 1992 the Armenian Parliament decreed that it would not sign any international agreement stipulating that Nagorno-Karabakh remain a part of Azerbaijan. 22. According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report (“Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, December 1994), the capture of the district of Lachin resulted in approximately 30,000 Azeri displaced persons, many of them of Kurdish descent. 23. Following the capture of Lachin, ethnic Armenian forces continued to conquer four more Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (Kelbajar, Jebrayil, Gubadly and Zangilan) and substantial parts of two others (Agdam and Fizuli). 24. On 5 May 1994 a ceasefire agreement, known as the Bishkek Protocol (“the Ceasefire Agreement”), was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and the “NKR” following Russian mediation. It came into force on 12 May. 25. According to the above-mentioned HRW report, between 1988 and 1994 an estimated 750,000 to 800,000 Azeris were forced out of Nagorno‑Karabakh, Armenia and the seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. According to information from the Armenian authorities, 335,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and 78,000 internally displaced persons (from regions in Armenia bordering Azerbaijan) have been registered. 26. According to the Government, the “NKR” controls 4,061 sq. km of the former NKAO. While it is debated how much of the two partly conquered districts is occupied by the “NKR”, it appears that the occupied territory of the seven surrounding districts in total amounts to some 7,500 sq. km. 27. Estimates of today’s population of Nagorno-Karabakh vary between 120,000 and 145,000 people, 95% of whom are of Armenian ethnicity. Virtually no Azerbaijanis remain. The district of Lachin has a population of between 5,000 and 10,000 Armenians. 28. No political settlement of the conflict has so far been reached. The self-proclaimed independence of the “NKR” has not been recognised by any State or international organisation. Recurring breaches of the Ceasefire Agreement along the borders have led to the loss of many lives and the rhetoric of officials remains hostile. Moreover, according to international reports, tension has heightened in recent years and military expenditure in Armenia and Azerbaijan has increased significantly. 29. Several proposals for a peaceful solution of the conflict have failed. Negotiations have been carried out under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its so-called Minsk Group. In Madrid in November 2007, the Group’s three Co-Chairs – France, Russia and the United States of America – presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan a set of Basic Principles for a settlement. The Basic Principles, which have since been updated, call, inter alia, for the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; a future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding referendum; the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. The idea is that the endorsement of these principles by Armenia and Azerbaijan would enable the drafting of a comprehensive and detailed settlement. Following intensive shuttle diplomacy by Minsk Group diplomats and a number of meetings between the Presidents of the two countries in 2009, the process lost momentum in 2010. So far the parties to the conflict have not signed a formal agreement on the Basic Principles. 30. On 24 March 2011 the Minsk Group presented a “Report of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ Field Assessment Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh”, the Executive Summary of which reads as follows. “The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs conducted a Field Assessment Mission to the seven occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) from October 7-12, 2010, to assess the overall situation there, including humanitarian and other aspects. The Co-Chairs were joined by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and his team, which provided logistical support, and by two experts from the UNHCR and one member of the 2005 OSCE Fact-Finding Mission. This was the first mission by the international community to the territories since 2005, and the first visit by UN personnel in 18 years. In travelling more than 1,000 kilometers throughout the territories, the Co-Chairs saw stark evidence of the disastrous consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the failure to reach a peaceful settlement. Towns and villages that existed before the conflict are abandoned and almost entirely in ruins. While no reliable figures exist, the overall population is roughly estimated as 14,000 persons, living in small settlements and in the towns of Lachin and Kelbajar. The Co-Chairs assess that there has been no significant growth in the population since 2005. The settlers, for the most part ethnic Armenians who were relocated to the territories from elsewhere in Azerbaijan, live in precarious conditions, with poor infrastructure, little economic activity, and limited access to public services. Many lack identity documents. For administrative purposes, the seven territories, the former NK Oblast, and other areas have been incorporated into eight new districts. The harsh reality of the situation in the territories has reinforced the view of the Co‑Chairs that the status quo is unacceptable, and that only a peaceful, negotiated settlement can bring the prospect of a better, more certain future to the people who used to live in the territories and those who live there now. The Co-Chairs urge the leaders of all the parties to avoid any activities in the territories and other disputed areas that would prejudice a final settlement or change the character of these areas. They also recommend that measures be taken to preserve cemeteries and places of worship in the territories and to clarify the status of settlers who lack identity documents. The Co-Chairs intend to undertake further missions to other areas affected by the NK conflict, and to include in such missions experts from relevant international agencies that would be involved in implementing a peace settlement.” 31. On 18 June 2013 the Presidents of the Co-Chair countries of the Minsk Group issued a Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. “We, the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries – France, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America – remain committed to helping the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reach a lasting and peaceful settlement. We express our deep regret that, rather than trying to find a solution based upon mutual interests, the parties have continued to seek one-sided advantage in the negotiation process. We continue to firmly believe that the elements outlined in the statements of our countries over the last four years must be the foundation of any fair and lasting settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These elements should be seen as an integrated whole, as any attempt to select some elements over others would make it impossible to achieve a balanced solution. We reiterate that only a negotiated settlement can lead to peace, stability, and reconciliation, opening opportunities for regional development and cooperation. The use of military force that has already created the current situation of confrontation and instability will not resolve the conflict. A renewal of hostilities would be disastrous for the population of the region, resulting in loss of life, more destruction, additional refugees, and enormous financial costs. We strongly urge the leaders of all the sides to recommit to the Helsinki principles, particularly those relating to the non-use of force or the threat of force, territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. We also appeal to them to refrain from any actions or rhetoric that could raise tension in the region and lead to escalation of the conflict. The leaders should prepare their people for peace, not war. Our countries stand ready to assist the sides, but the responsibility for putting an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains with them. We strongly believe that further delay in reaching a balanced agreement on the framework for a comprehensive peace is unacceptable, and urge the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to focus with renewed energy on the issues that remain unresolved.” 32. The applicants have stated that they are Azerbaijani Kurds who lived in the district of Lachin, where their ancestors had lived for hundreds of years. On 17 May 1992 they were forced to flee from the district to Baku. They have since been unable to return to their homes and properties because of Armenian occupation. 33. Mr Elkhan Chiragov was born in 1950. He lived in the district of Lachin. In the original application, it was mentioned that he lived in the village of Chirag, but in the reply to the Government’s observations it was stated that his correct home village was Chiragli, where he worked as a teacher for fifteen years. He claimed that his possessions included a large furnished house of 250 sq. m, 55 beehives, 80 head of small livestock and nine head of big livestock, and five handmade carpets. 34. On 27 February 2007, together with the applicants’ reply to the Government’s observations, he submitted an official certificate (“technical passport”) dated 19 July 1985, according to which a two-storey, twelve-bedroom dwelling house with a total area of 408 sq. m (living area of 300 sq. m and subsidiary area of 108 sq. m) and a storehouse of 60 sq. m, situated on a plot of land of 1,200 sq. m, had been registered in his name. 35. He also presented a statement by three former neighbours, who affirmed that he owned a two-storey, sixteen-room dwelling house of 260 sq. m and a car, as well as a statement by A. Jafarov and A. Halilov, representatives of the Lachin City Executive Power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who stated that Mr Elkhan Chiragov used to live in Chiragli. 36. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant submitted, inter alia, a marriage certificate according to which he was born in Chiragli and married there in 1978, birth certificates for his son and daughter, both born in Chiragli in 1979 and 1990 respectively, as well as a letter dating from 1979 and a 1992 employment book issued by the Lachin District Educational Department, showing that he had worked as a teacher in Chiragli. 37. Mr Adishirin Chiragov was born in 1947. He lived in the district of Lachin. In the original application, it was mentioned that he lived in the village of Chirag, but in the reply to the Government’s observations it was stated that his correct home village was Chiragli, where he had worked as a teacher for twenty years. He claimed that his possessions included a large furnished house of 145 sq. m, a new “Niva” car, 65 head of small livestock and 11 head of big livestock, and six handmade carpets. 38. On 27 February 2007 he submitted a technical passport dated 22 April 1986, according to which a two-storey, eight-bedroom dwelling house with a total area of 230.4 sq. m (living area of 193.2 sq. m and subsidiary area of 37.2 sq. m) and a storehouse of 90 sq. m, situated on a plot of land of 1,200 sq. m, had been registered in his name. 39. He also presented a statement by three former neighbours, who affirmed that he owned a two-storey dwelling house with eight rooms, as well as a statement by A. Jafarov and A. Halilov, representatives of the Lachin City Executive Power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who stated that Mr Adishirin Chiragov used to live in Chiragli. 40. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant submitted, inter alia, a marriage certificate according to which he was born in Chiragli and married there in 1975, birth certificates for his son and two daughters, all born in Chiragli in 1977, 1975 and 1982 respectively, as well as a USSR passport issued in 1981, indicating Chiragli as his place of birth and containing a 1992 registration stamp designating Chiragli as his place of residence. 41. Mr Ramiz Gebrayilov was born in Chiragli in 1960. In 1988 he graduated with a degree in engineering from the Baku Polytechnical Institute. In 1983, while still studying in Baku, he visited the town of Lachin and was given a 5,000 sq. m plot of land by the State. He claimed that he had built a six-bedroom house with a garage on it and lived there with his wife and children until he was forced to leave in 1992. There were also some cattle sheds. He also owned a car repair business called “Auto Service”, a shop and a café, which were situated on a further 5,000 sq. m of land that he owned. In addition, he had 12 cows, 70 lambs and 150 sheep. 42. Mr Gebrayilov had been unable to return to Lachin since his departure in 1992. In 2001 Armenian friends of his went to Lachin and videotaped the condition of the houses in the town. According to the applicant, he could see from the video that his house had been burnt down. He had also been informed by people who left Lachin after him that his house had been burnt down by Armenian forces a few days after he had left Lachin. 43. On 27 February 2007 Mr Gebrayilov submitted a technical passport dated 15 August 1986, according to which a two-storey, eight-bedroom dwelling house with a total area of 203.2 sq. m (living area of 171.2 sq. m and subsidiary of area 32 sq. m), situated on a plot of land of 480 sq. m, had been registered in his name. 44. He also presented a statement by three former neighbours, who affirmed that he owned a two-storey house with eight rooms, as well as a statement by V. Maharramov, representative of the Lachin City Executive Power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who stated that Mr Gebrayilov used to live in his personal house in Lachin. 45. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant submitted, inter alia, a birth certificate and a marriage certificate according to which he was born in Chiragli and married there in 1982, birth certificates for his daughter and two sons, all born in Lachin in 1982, 1986 and 1988 respectively, as well as an army book issued in 1979. 46. Mr Akif Hasanof was born in 1959 in the village of Aghbulag in the district of Lachin. He worked there as a teacher for twenty years. He claimed that his possessions included a large furnished house of 165 sq. m, a new “Niva” car, 100 head of small livestock and 16 head of big livestock, and 20 handmade carpets. 47. On 27 February 2007 he submitted a technical passport dated 13 September 1985, according to which a two-storey, nine-bedroom dwelling house with a total area of 448.4 sq. m (living area of 223.2 sq. m and subsidiary area of 225.2 sq. m) and a storehouse of 75 sq. m, situated on a plot of land of 1,600 sq. m, had been registered in his name. 48. He also presented a statement by three former neighbours, who affirmed that he owned a two-storey, nine-room dwelling house as well as a stall for livestock and subsidiary buildings, as well as a statement by V. Maharramov, representative of the Lachin City Executive Power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who stated that Mr Hasanof used to live in his personal house in Aghbulag. 49. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant submitted a birth certificate, a USSR passport issued in 1976 and an employment book issued by the Lachin District Educational Department, indicating that he was born in Aghbulag and had worked as a teacher and school director in that village between 1981 and 1988. 50. Mr Fekhreddin Pashayev was born in 1956 in the village of Kamalli in the district of Lachin. After graduating with a degree in engineering from the Baku Polytechnical Institute in 1984, he returned to the town of Lachin where he was employed as an engineer and, from 1986, as chief engineer at the Ministry of Transport. He claimed that he owned and lived in a two‑storey, three-bedroom house in Lachin which he had built himself. The house was situated at no. 50, 28 Aprel Kucesi, Lachin Seheri, Lachin Rayonu. Mr Pashayev submitted that the current market value of the house would be 50,000 United States dollars (USD). He also owned the land around his house and had a share (about 10 ha) in a collective farm in Kamalli. Furthermore, he owned some land through “collective ownership”. 51. On 27 February 2007 he submitted a technical passport dated August 1990, according to which a two-storey dwelling house with a total area of 133.2 sq. m (living area of 51.6 sq. m and subsidiary area of 81.6 sq. m), situated on a plot of land of 469.3 sq. m, had been registered in his name. 52. He also presented a statement by three former neighbours, who affirmed that he owned a two-storey, four-room dwelling house, as well as a statement by V. Maharramov, representative of the Lachin City Executive Power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who stated that Mr Pashayev used to live in his own house at 28 Aprel Kucesi, Lachin. 53. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant submitted, inter alia, a marriage certificate according to which he was born in Kamalli and married there in 1985, birth certificates for his two daughters, born in Kamalli in 1987 and in Lachin in 1991 respectively, a birth certificate for his son, registered as having been born in Kamalli in 1993, as well as an army book issued in 1978 and an employment book dating from 2000. He explained that, while his son had in fact been born in Baku, it was normal under the USSR propiska system to record a child as having been born at the parents’ registered place of residence. 54. Mr Qaraca Gabrayilov was born in the town of Lachin in 1940 and died on 19 June 2005. On 6 April 2005, at the time of submitting the present application, he stated that, when he was forced to leave on 17 May 1992, he had been living at holding no. 580, N. Narimanov Street, flat 128a in the town of Lachin, a property he owned and which included a two-storey residential family house built in 1976 with a surface of 187.1 sq. m and a yard area of 453.6 sq. m. He also claimed that he owned a further site of 300 sq. m on that street. Annexed to the application was a technical passport dated August 1985, according to which a two-storey house with a yard, of the mentioned sizes, had been registered in his name. 55. On 27 February 2007, however, the applicant’s representatives submitted that he had been living at 41 H. Abdullayev Street in Lachin. Nevertheless, he owned the two properties on N. Narimanov Street. Attached to these submissions were a statement by three former neighbours and a statement by V. Maharramov, representative of the Lachin City Executive Power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who stated that Mr Gabrayilov used to live in his own house at H. Abdullayev Street, Lachin. Attached were also a decision of 29 January 1974 by the Lachin District Soviet of People’s Deputies to allocate the above-mentioned plot of 300 sq. m to the applicant, and several invoices for animal feed, building materials and building subsidies allegedly used during the construction of his properties. 56. On 21 November 2007 Mr Sagatel Gabrayilov, the son of the applicant, stated that the family did used to live at N. Narimanov Street but that, on an unspecified date, the name and numbering of the street had been changed, their address thereafter being H. Abdullayev Street. Thus, the two addresses mentioned above referred to the same property. 57. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant’s representatives submitted, inter alia, a birth certificate and a marriage certificate according to which he was born in Chiragli and married there in 1965, a birth certificate for his son, born in Alkhasli village in the district of Lachin in 1970, as well as an army book issued in 1963. 58. The applicants and the Government as well as the third-party intervener, the Azerbaijani Government, submitted extensive documentation and statements on the issue of whether Armenia exercises authority in or control over the “NKR” and the surrounding territories. The information thus received is summarised below, in so far as considered relevant by the Court. 59. In 1993 the United Nations Security Council adopted the following four Resolutions relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Resolution 822 (1993), 30 April 1993, S/RES/822 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, ... 1. Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan, ...” Resolution 853 (1993), 29 July 1993, S/RES/853 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Expressing its serious concern at the deterioration of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic and at the tensions between them, ... Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the seizure of the district of Agdam in the Azerbaijani Republic, ... 3. Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces involved from the district of Agdam and other recently occupied districts of the Azerbaijani Republic; ... 9. Urges the Government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with its resolution 822 (1993) and the present resolution, and the acceptance by this party of the proposals of the Minsk Group of the [OSCE]; ...” Resolution 874 (1993), 14 October 1993, S/RES/874 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region, ... 5. Calls for the immediate implementation of the reciprocal and urgent steps provided for in the [OSCE] Minsk Group’s ‘Adjusted timetable’, including the withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and the removal of all obstacles to communication and transportation; ...” Resolution 884 (1993), 12 November 1993, S/RES/884 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities as [a] consequence of the violations of the cease-fire and excesses in the use of force in response to those violations, in particular the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz in the Azerbaijani Republic, ... 2. Calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), and to ensure that the forces involved are not provided with the means to extend their military campaign further; ... 4. Demands from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed hostilities and hostile acts, the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, and the withdrawal of occupying forces from the other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic in accordance with the ‘Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)’ ... as amended by the [OSCE] Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993; ...” 60. The above-mentioned HRW report of December 1994 (see paragraph 22) contains accounts of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While stating that “[a] Karabakh Armenian military offensive in May/June 1992 captured a large part of Lachin province”, it goes on to summarise the events in 1993 and 1994 as follows: “... Karabakh Armenian troops – often with the support of forces from the Republic of Armenia – captured the remaining Azerbaijani provinces surrounding [Nagorno-] Karabakh and forced out the Azeri civilian population: the rest of Lachin province, and Kelbajar, Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrayil, Qubatli, and Zangelan provinces.” The HRW report presents several pieces of information which point to an involvement of the Armenian army in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories (see Chapter VII. The Republic of Armenia as a Party to the Conflict). Allegedly, Armenia had even sent members of its police force to perform police duties in the occupied territories. HRW spent two days in April 1994 interviewing Armenian uniformed soldiers on the streets of Yerevan. 30% of them were draftees in the Armenian army who had either fought in Karabakh, had orders to go to Karabakh or had ostensibly volunteered for service there. Moreover, on a single day in April 1994 HRW researchers had counted five buses holding an estimated 300 soldiers of the Armenian army entering Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Other western journalists had reported to HRW researchers that they had seen eight more buses full of Armenian army soldiers heading for Azerbaijani territory from Armenia. According to HRW, as a matter of law, Armenian army troop involvement in Azerbaijan made Armenia a party to the conflict and made the war an international armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 61. Several proposals for a solution to the conflict have been presented within the Minsk Group. A “package deal” proposal of July 1997 set out, under the heading “Agreement I – The end of armed hostilities”, a two‑stage process of the withdrawal of armed forces. The second stage included the provision that “[t]he armed forces of Armenia [would] be withdrawn to within the borders of the Republic of Armenia”. The “step-by-step” approach presented in December 1997 also contained a two-stage withdrawal process and stipulated, as part of the second phase, that “[a]ll Armenian forces located outside the borders of the Republic of Armenia [would] be withdrawn to locations within those borders”. Substantially the same wording was used in the “common state deal” proposal of November 1998. While these documents were discussed in Minsk Group negotiations, none of them led to an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 62. The applicants referred to statements by various political leaders and observers. For instance, Mr Robert Kocharyan, then Prime Minister of the “NKR”, stated in an interview with the Armenian newspaper Golos Armenii in February 1994, that Armenia supplied anti-aircraft weapons to Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, Mr Vazgen Manukyan, Armenian Minister of Defence from 1992 to 1993, admitted in an interview with British journalist and writer, Thomas de Waal, in October 2000 that the public declarations stating that the Armenian army had not taken any part in the war had been purely for foreign consumption:[1] “You can be sure that whatever we said politically, the Karabakh Armenians and the Armenian army were united in military actions. It was not important for me if someone was a Karabakhi or an Armenian.” 63. The annual report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “The Military Balance”, for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 assessed that, of the 18,000 troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, 8,000 were personnel from Armenia. The 2013 report stated, inter alia, that “since 1994, Armenia has controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh, and also seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan, often called the ‘occupied territories’”.[2] 64. Mr David Atkinson, rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), stated in November 2004 in his second report to the Political Affairs Committee on “The Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference” concerning Nagorno-Karabakh (Doc. 10364, 29 November 2004) as follows. “According to the information given to me, Armenians from Armenia had participated in the armed fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region besides local Armenians from within Azerbaijan. Today, Armenia has soldiers stationed in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the surrounding districts, people in the region have passports of Armenia, and the Armenian government transfers large budgetary resources to this area.” Based on this report, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted on 25 January 2005 Resolution 1416 (2005) on the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference in which it noted, inter alia, as follows. “1. The Parliamentary Assembly regrets that, more than a decade after the armed hostilities started, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains unsolved. Hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced and live in miserable conditions. Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces, and separatist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 2. The Assembly expresses its concern that the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly reaffirms that independence and secession of a regional territory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful process based on the democratic support of the inhabitants of such territory and not in the wake of an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state. The Assembly reiterates that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and reaffirms the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity.” 65. In its report “Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground” of 14 September 2005, the International Crisis Group (ICG) stated the following regarding the armed forces in the “NKR” (pp. 9-10). “[Nagorno-Karabakh] may be the world’s most militarized society. The highly trained and equipped Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army is primarily a ground force, for which Armenia provides much of the backbone. A Nagorno-Karabakh official told Crisis Group it has some 20,000 soldiers, while an independent expert [U.S. military analyst Richard Giragosian, July 2005] estimated 18,500. An additional 20,000 to 30,000 reservists allegedly could be mobilised. Based on its population, Nagorno‑Karabakh cannot sustain such a large force without relying on substantial numbers of outsiders. According to an independent assessment [by Mr Giragosian], there are 8,500 Karabakh Armenians in the army and 10,000 from Armenia. ... Nevertheless, many conscripts and contracted soldiers from Armenia continue to serve in [Nagorno-Karabakh]. The (de facto) minister of defence admits his forces have 40 per cent military contract personnel, including citizens of Armenia. He claims that no Armenian citizens are unwillingly conscripted and says 500,000 Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh descent live in Armenia, some of whom serve in the Nagorno‑Karabakh forces. Former conscripts from Yerevan and other towns in Armenia have told Crisis Group they were seemingly arbitrarily sent to Nagorno‑Karabakh and the occupied districts immediately after presenting themselves to the recruitment bureau. They deny that they ever volunteered to go to Nagorno‑Karabakh or the adjacent occupied territory. They were not paid a bonus for serving outside Armenia, and they performed military service in Nagorno-Karabakh uniform, under Nagorno-Karabakh military command. Young Armenian recruits’ opposition to serving in Nagorno-Karabakh has increased, which may help explain an apparent decrease in the numbers being sent to [Nagorno-Karabakh]. There is a high degree of integration between the forces of Armenia and Nagorno‑Karabakh. Senior Armenian authorities admit they give substantial equipment and weaponry. Nagorno-Karabakh authorities also acknowledge that Armenian officers assist with training and in providing specialised skills. However, Armenia insists that none of its army units are in Nagorno-Karabakh or the occupied territories around it.” The Government objected to the report of the ICG, which organisation had no office in Armenia or the “NKR”. Furthermore, the statement on the number of Armenian servicemen in the “NKR” derived from an email with Mr Giragosian, who had been contacted by the Government and had given the following declaration: “When I expressed this opinion I didn’t mean that the people serving in the Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces are soldiers. I meant that approximately that number of volunteers are involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces from Armenia and other States according to my calculations. As for the number I mentioned, I can’t insist that it’s correct as it is confidential information and nobody has the exact number. The reasoning behind my opinion was that I believe that many Armenians from different parts of the world participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh self-defence forces.” 66. On 19 April 2007 the Austrian newspaper Der Standard published an interview with the then Armenian Foreign Minister, Mr Vartan Oskanian. On the subject of the disputed territories, Mr Oskanian reportedly referred to them as “the territories, which are now controlled by Armenia”. A few days later the Armenian Embassy in Austria issued a press release stating that Mr Oskanian had been misinterpreted and that the correct expression was “the territories, which are now controlled by Armenians”. 67. On 14 March 2008 the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (A/RES/62/243). Recalling the 1993 Security Council Resolutions (see paragraph 59 above), it contains the following passages. “The General Assembly, ... 2. Demands the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan; 3. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the population expelled from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan to return to their homes, and stresses the necessity of creating appropriate conditions for this return, including the comprehensive rehabilitation of the conflict-affected territories;” 68. In an interview with Armenia Today, published on 29 October 2008, Mr Jirayr Sefilyan, a Lebanese-born Armenian military commander and political figure who was involved in the capture of the town of Shusha/Shushi in early May 1992, and later continued to serve in the armed forces of both the “NKR” and Armenia, reportedly made the following statement: “We must turn the page of history, as starting from 1991 we have considered Karabakh as an independent State and declared that they should conduct negotiations. Who are we kidding? The whole world knows that the army of the NKR is a part of the Armenian armed forces, that the budget of the NKR is financed from the budget of Armenia, and that the political leaders of the NKR are appointed from Yerevan. It is time to consider Karabakh as a part of Armenia, one of its regions. In the negotiation process the territory of Karabakh should be considered as a territory of Armenia and no territorial cession must be made.” 69. In Resolution 2009/2216(INI) of 20 May 2010 on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus, the European Parliament expressed, inter alia, the following: “The European Parliament, ... 8. is seriously concerned that hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno‑Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return, property rights and the right to personal security; calls on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognise these rights, the need for their prompt realisation and for a prompt solution to this problem that respects the principles of international law; demands, in this regard, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, accompanied by deployment of international forces to be organised with respect of the UN Charter in order to provide the necessary security guarantees in a period of transition, which will ensure the security of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and allow the displaced persons to return to their homes and further conflicts caused by homelessness to be prevented; calls on the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities and leaders of relevant communities to demonstrate their commitment to the creation of peaceful inter-ethnic relations through practical preparations for the return of displaced persons; considers that the situation of the IDPs and refugees should be dealt with according to international standards, including with regard to the recent PACE Recommendation 1877(2009), ‘Europe’s forgotten people: protecting the human rights of long-term displaced persons’.” 70. On 18 April 2012 the European Parliament passed Resolution 2011/2315(INI) containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the EU-Armenia Association Agreement which, inter alia, noted that “deeply concerning reports exist of illegal activities exercised by Armenian troops on the occupied Azerbaijani territories, namely regular military manoeuvres, renewal of military hardware and personnel and the deepening of defensive echelons”. The European Parliament recommended that negotiations on the EU-Armenia Association Agreement be linked to commitments regarding “the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and their return to Azerbaijani control” and “call[ed] on Armenia to stop sending regular army conscripts to serve in Nagorno‑Karabakh”. 71. The applicants submitted that, on various occasions in 2012 and 2013, the Armenian President, Minister of Defence and high-ranking military staff visited the disputed territories to inspect troops, attend military exercises and hold meetings with military and other officials in the “NKR”. In July 2013 Armenia’s top army generals and other military officials, including the Armenian Minister of Defence and the commanders of the armed forces of the “NKR”, held a meeting in Nagorno-Karabakh, focusing on efforts to strengthen the Armenian military. 72. On 15 January 2013 the Armenian President, Mr Serzh Sargsyan held a meeting with the leaders of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of the Armenian Ministry of Defence. The speech he gave at the meeting was published the same day on the official website of the President of the Republic of Armenia. It contained, inter alia, the following statements. “It happened that from the first years of independence, the Army has been playing a special role in our society. It was the war, whose spirit was felt all over Armenia – in some places more than in the others. In those days, every family had a close or a distant relative in the Armenian Army; and the Army was in everyone’s heart. That feeling became stronger when our Army attained victory which was so important, which was vital. ... The ultimate goal of our foreign policy is the final legal formulation of the victory achieved in the aggressive war unleashed by Azerbaijan against Artsakh. The Republic of Nagorno Karabakh must be recognized by the international community since there is no logical explanation as to why the people, who have exercised their legal right for self-determination and later protected it in the uneven war, should ever be part of Azerbaijan. Why the destiny of these people should be defined by the illegal decision once made by Stalin? ... Armenia and Artsakh do not want war; however everyone must know that we will give a fitting rebuff to any challenge. The people of Artsakh will never face the danger of physical extermination again. The Republic of Armenia will guarantee against that. ... Security of Artsakh is not a matter of prestige for us; it is a matter of life and death in the most direct sense of these words. The entire world must know and realize that we, the power structures of Armenia and Artsakh stand against the army which pays wages to the murderers, if that horde can be called army in the first place.” 73. In an opinion drawn up at the request of the Government, Dr Hari Bucur-Marcu, a military expert of Romanian nationality, stated that he had found nothing in the Armenian military policy that envisaged any form of control over “NKR” forces or any indication on the ground that Armenian forces were present or active in the “NKR”. He further concluded that there was no evidence that Armenia exercised any control or authority over the “NKR” or its defence force, or that Armenian forces exercised any control over the government or governance of the “NKR”. The Government stated that Dr Bucur-Marcu had been given the opportunity to interview senior military officers in Armenia and access their records. Furthermore, by arrangement with the “NKR” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had been able to travel there and talk to military and political officials, as well as examine documents. 74. On 25 June 1994 an Agreement on Military Cooperation between the Governments of the Republic of Armenia and the “Republic of Nagorno‑Karabakh” (“the 1994 Military Agreement”) was concluded. It provides, inter alia, the following: “The Government of the Republic of Armenia and the Government of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (‘the Parties’), having regard to mutual interest in the field of military cooperation, to the need to develop bilateral relationships and mutual trust through cooperation between the armed forces of the States of the Parties, seeking to strengthen the military and military-technical cooperation, agreed on the following: ... Article 3 Both Parties shall engage in the military cooperation in the following areas: 6. cultural and sports activities and tourism. The Parties shall agree in writing whether they wish to cooperate in other areas. Article 4 The Parties shall cooperate through: 1. visits and working meetings at the level of Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of General Staff or other representatives authorised by the Ministers of Defence; 8. creation of conditions for the mutual use of elements of infrastructure of the armed forces of the Parties within the framework of this Agreement; 9. education of highly qualified military and technical staff and specialists. Within the framework of cooperation under this Agreement, the Parties shall agree that conscripts from Armenia and the NKR have the right to serve their fixed-term military service in Nagorno‑Karabakh and Armenia respectively. In such cases, the conscripts concerned shall be considered exempt from the fixed-term military service in the territory of that State the person shall be considered exempt from the fixed-term military service in the country of their citizenship. Article 5 Within the framework of this Agreement, the Parties shall also agree that 1. should an Armenian citizen serving fixed-term military service in the NKR commit a military crime, the criminal prosecution and trial against him or her shall be conducted on Armenian territory by Armenian authorities in accordance with the procedure established under Armenian legislation; 2. should a citizen of the NKR serving fixed-term military service in Armenia commit a military crime, the criminal prosecution and trial against him or her shall be conducted on the territory of the NKR by the authorities of the NKR in accordance with the procedure established under NKR legislation. Within the framework of this Agreement the Parties will provide mutual technical support with regard to armament and recovery and maintenance of military equipment. Concluding agreements with those performing activities on armament and recovery and maintenance of military equipment, as well as ensuring the living conditions of the representatives of manufacturing enterprises in the territory of the States of the Parties shall be carried out by the Ministry of Defence of the client State. Other forms of cooperation shall be conducted upon mutual written agreement. ...” 75. The Government asserted that the Armenian conscripts who, pursuant to Article 4 of the Agreement, performed their service in the “NKR” were mainly in the lower ranks and comprised no more than 5% (up to 1,500 persons) of the “NKR” defence force. However, the Government did not rule out the possibility that some Armenian nationals may have served in the “NKR” defence force on a contractual and voluntary basis. Among those serving in the “NKR” defence force, side by side with inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, were also volunteers of Armenian origin from various countries where there is an Armenian diaspora. Allegedly, the Armenian soldiers serving in the “NKR” were under the direct command of the “NKR” defence force, which was the only armed force operational in the “NKR”. The Government maintained that the Armenian conscripts serving in the “NKR” under the Agreement did so of their own accord (see, however, the ICG report, paragraph 65 above). The Government further stated that the Armenian army and the “NKR” defence force cooperate in a defence alliance on matters such as intelligence sharing, visits of senior officers, seminars, joint military exercises, parade inspections and the like. 76. On 11 October 2007 the Court issued a partial decision as to the admissibility of Zalyan, Sargsyan and Serobyan v. Armenia ((dec.), nos. 36894/04 and 3521/07, 11 October 2007), which concerns the alleged ill‑treatment and unlawful detention of three military servicemen. The facts of the case reveal that the applicants had been drafted into the Armenian army in May 2003 and had been assigned to military unit no. 33651, stationed near the village of Mataghis in the Martakert region of the “NKR”. Two servicemen of the same military unit were found dead in January 2004. A criminal investigation into their murders ensued and the applicants were questioned for a number of days in April 2004 in Nagorno-Karabakh – first at their military unit, then at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office and finally at the Stepanakert Military Police Department – before being transported to Yerevan for further proceedings. The officers conducting the questioning of the applicants in Nagorno-Karabakh included two investigators of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia, an investigator of the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office and an Armenian military police officer. A chief of battalion of the military unit was also present at the first questioning. The applicants were subsequently charged with murder and the criminal trial against them commenced in November 2004 at the Syunik Regional Court’s seat in Stepanakert. The applicants were present at the trial. On 18 May 2005 the court found the applicants guilty of murder and sentenced them to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 77. Similarly, as reported by the human rights organisation Forum 18, as well as HRW, Mr Armen Grigoryan, an Armenian citizen and conscientious objector, was taken from a military recruitment office in Yerevan in June 2004 and transferred to a military unit based in Nagorno-Karabakh. Having fled the unit, Mr Grigoryan was arrested and eventually found guilty of having refused military service by a court sitting in Stepanakert on 9 June 2005 and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. 78. Several prominent Armenian politicians have held, at different times, high positions in both Armenia and the “NKR”, or have had close ties to Nagorno-Karabakh. The first Armenian President, Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was a member of the Armenian “Karabakh Committee” which, in the late 1980s, led the movement for unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. In April 1998 he was succeeded as Armenian President by Mr Robert Kocharyan, who had previously served as Prime Minister of the “NKR” from August 1992 to December 1994, as President of the “NKR” from December 1994 to March 1997 and as Armenian Prime Minister from March 1997 to April 1998. In April 2008 Mr Serzh Sargsyan became the third Armenian President. In August 1993 he had been appointed Armenian Minister of Defence after serving from 1989 to 1993 as Chairman of the “Self-Defense Forces Committee of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh”. Furthermore, in 2007 Mr Seyran Ohanyan switched from being the Minister of Defence of the “NKR” to becoming the Commander-in-Chief of the Armenian armed forces. In April 2008 he was appointed Armenian Minister of Defence. 79. The applicants claimed that Armenian law applies in the “NKR”. However, according to the Government, between January 1992 and August 2006 the “NKR” adopted 609 different laws, one of the first being the Law on the basis of the State independence of the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh”. Article 2 of this Law provides that the “NKR decides independently all issues concerning the Republic’s political, economic, social and cultural, construction, administrative and territorial division policies”. Furthermore, in January 1992 bodies of executive and judicial power were created, including the Council of Ministers (its government), the Supreme Court and first-instance courts of the “NKR”, as well as the “NKR” prosecutor’s office. The “NKR” also has its own President, Parliament and police force, as well as local self-government bodies, including administrations governing the territories surrounding the “NKR”, whose representatives are appointed by “NKR” authorities. It also holds its own presidential and parliamentary elections. While several laws have been adopted from Armenian legislation, the Government maintained that they did not apply automatically, that is, by decisions of Armenian courts, but were independently interpreted and applied by “NKR” courts, whether in the district of Lachin or elsewhere. 80. In its 2005 report (see paragraph 65 above,), the ICG stated the following (pp. 12-13). “The economy of Nagorno-Karabakh was previously integrated into [that of] Soviet Azerbaijan but was largely destroyed by the war. Today it is closely tied to Armenia and highly dependent on its financial inputs. All transactions are done via Armenia, and products produced in Nagorno-Karabakh often are labelled ‘made in Armenia’ for export. Yerevan provides half the budget. ... Nagorno-Karabakh is highly dependent on external financial support, primarily from Armenia but also from the U.S. and the world-wide diaspora. It cannot collect sufficient revenue to meet its budgetary needs, and in absolute terms is receiving increasing external support. The 2005 budget totalled 24.18 billion drams (some $53.73 million). Locally collected revenues are expected to total 6.46 billion drams (about $14.35 million), 26.7 per cent of expenditures. Since 1993 Nagorno-Karabakh has benefited from an Armenian ‘inter-state loan’. According to the Armenian prime minister, this will be 13 billion drams ($28.88 million) in 2005, a significant increase from 2002 when it was 9 billion drams ($16.07 million). However, Nagorno-Karabakh’s (de facto) prime minister argues that part of this loan – 4.259 billion drams (about $9.46 million) – is in fact Armenia’s repayment of VAT, customs and excise duties that Armenia levies on goods that pass through its territory, destined for Nagorno-Karabakh. The remainder of the loan has a ten-year repayment period at nominal interest. Though Armenia has provided such loans since 1993, nothing has been repaid. According to the Armenian prime minister, Stepanakert ‘is not yet in a position to repay ... . In the coming years we will need to continue providing this loan to help them continue building their infrastructure ... we do not envision that they will be able to go ahead on their own anytime soon’. The U.S. is the only other state that provides direct governmental assistance. In 1998 Congress for the first time designated Nagorno-Karabakh a recipient of humanitarian aid distinct from Azerbaijan. The U.S. money is administered by its Agency for International Development (USAID), which has distributed it to such NGOs as the Fund for Armenian Relief, Save the Children, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Through September 2004, the U.S. had pledged $23,274,992 to Nagorno‑Karabakh and had spent $17,831,608. Armenian lobby groups have been influential in making these allocations possible.” The ICG further stated that the Armenian “inter-state loan” had accounted for 67.3% of the “NKR” budget in 2001 (according to the “Statistical Yearbook of Nagorno-Karabakh”) and 56.9% in 2004 (according to an ICG communication with the NK National Statistical Service Director). 81. The loan provided by Armenia to the “NKR” for the years 2004 and 2005 amounted to USD 51 million. USD 40 million went to rebuilding educational institutions and USD 11 million to help the families of soldiers killed in action. 82. The Hayastan All-Armenian Fund (“the Fund”) was founded by an Armenian presidential decree on 3 March 1992. According to its official website, its mission is the following: “[T]o unite Armenians in Armenia and overseas to overcome the country’s difficulties and to help establish sustainable development in Armenia and Artsakh. In addition to [the] problems associated with the break-up of the Soviet Union, the government had to find solutions to the aftermath of the 1988 Spitak earthquake, an economic blockade and the rehabilitation of areas that had suffered from the Artsakh conflict.” The Fund’s 2012 annual report includes messages from Mr Serzh Sargsyan, Armenian President, and Mr Bako Sahakyan, “President of the Republic of Artsakh”, which, inter alia, contain the following statements. Mr Sargsyan: “The Hayastan All-Armenian Fund is an embodiment of the unity between Armenia, Artsakh and the diaspora. As such, the fund is consistently, resolutely, and before our very eyes transforming our pan-national inner strength into tangible power.” Mr Sahakyan: “The year 2012 was a jubilee year for the Armenian people. As a nation, we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the founding of the NKR Defense Army and the liberation of Shushi, a magnificent victory which was made possible by the united efforts and indestructible will of the entire Armenian people, the selfless bravery and daring of its valiant sons and daughters.” The Fund has twenty-five affiliates in twenty-two different countries. Its resources come from individual donations, mainly from members of the Armenian diaspora. It now raises about USD 21 million annually. The Board of Trustees is the Fund’s supreme governing body. Under the Fund’s Charter, the Armenian President is ex officio the President of the Board of Trustees. The Board, which during its existence has had between twenty-two and thirty-seven members, includes many prominent individuals and representatives of political, non-governmental, religious and humanitarian institutions from Armenia and the diaspora. In 2013 the Board, in addition to the Armenian President, Mr Sargsyan, comprised the former Armenian President, Mr Kocharyan; the Armenian Prime Minister, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Diaspora; the President, former President and Prime Minister of the “NKR”; the Chairmen of the Armenian Constitutional Court, National Assembly and Central Bank; four Armenian religious leaders; three representatives of Armenian political parties; a representative of the Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen (Employers) of Armenia; and representatives of four non-governmental organisations incorporated in the United States of America and Canada. The remainder of the thirty-seven person Board was made up of thirteen individuals from the Armenian diaspora. The composition of the Board has been similar since the Fund’s creation. The Fund has financed and overseen numerous projects since its establishment, including the construction and renovation of roads, housing, schools, hospitals, as well as water and gas networks. In the mid to late 1990s it constructed the highway linking the town of Goris in Armenia with Lachin and with Shusha/Shushi and Stepanakert in Nagorno‑Karabakh. In 2001 it financed the construction of the north-south highway in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the Fund’s 2005 annual report, it had paid approximately USD 11 million during the year for various projects, of which about USD 6.1 million had gone to projects in Nagorno‑Karabakh. According to figures provided by the Government, the not fully complete expenditure for 2012 amounted to USD 10.7 million in Nagorno-Karabakh and USD 3.1 million in Armenia. Also according to Government figures, in 1995-2012 the fund allocated about USD 111 million in total – or about USD 6 million annually – to projects in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1992-2012 it allocated USD 115 million to projects in Armenia. 83. The applicants and the Azerbaijani Government claimed that residents of the “NKR” and the surrounding territories are routinely issued with Armenian passports. In its 2005 report (see paragraph 65 above), the ICG stated that “Armenia has given a majority of the inhabitants its passports for travel abroad” (at p. 5). The Azerbaijani Government also pointed to the possibility for residents of the mentioned territories to acquire Armenian citizenship. They referred to section 13 (“Citizenship by Naturalisation”) of the Law of the Republic of Armenia on citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, which provides as follows. “Any person who is eighteen or older and capable of working that is not an RA citizen may apply for RA citizenship, if he/she: (1) has been lawfully residing on the territory of the Republic of Armenia for the preceding three years; (2) is proficient in the Armenian language; and (3) is familiar with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. A person who is not an RA citizen may be granted RA citizenship without being subject to the conditions set forth in subsections (1) and (2) of the first part of this section, if he/she: (1) marries a citizen of the Republic of Armenia or has a child who holds RA citizenship; (2) has parents or at least one parent that had held RA citizenship in the past or was born on the territory of the Republic of Armenia and had applied for RA citizenship within three years of attaining the age of 18; (3) is Armenian by origin (is of Armenian ancestry); or (4) has renounced RA citizenship of his/her own accord after 1 January 1995.” The respondent Government, for their part, stated that both Armenia and the “NKR” have provisions for dual citizenship. Moreover, in accordance with an Agreement of 24 February 1999 with the “NKR” on the organisation of the passport system, Armenia issues passports to residents of the “NKR” in certain circumstances. Article 1 of the Agreement reads as follows. “The Parties agree that their citizens have the right to free movement and residence on the territory of each of the Parties. Within the scope of this Agreement, until the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised, the citizens of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh wishing to leave the territory of either the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh or the Republic of Armenia may apply for and obtain an Armenian passport. The Parties agree that, within the scope of this Article, the obtaining of an Armenian passport by citizens of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh does not confer on them Armenian citizenship. Those passports may only be used for travel outside the territories of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh by citizens of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, and cannot be used as an identification document for internal use in the Republic of Nagorno‑Karabakh or in the Republic of Armenia.” Regulations on the application of this Agreement were also issued in 1999 and provide that an Armenian passport shall be issued to an “NKR” resident only in exceptional cases where the purpose for going abroad is medical, educational or concerns another personal matter. The Government asserted that fewer than 1,000 persons had been issued with a passport under the 1999 Agreement. 84. The applicants and the Azerbaijani Government stated that the Armenian dram was the main currency in the “NKR”, whereas the respondent Government maintained that the currencies accepted there also included euros, United States dollars, pounds sterling and even Australian dollars. 85. The Azerbaijani Government pointed out that the National Atlas of Armenia, published in 2007 by the State Committee of the Real Estate Cadastre, adjunct to the Armenian Government, and thus allegedly an official publication, consistently incorporated the “NKR” and the surrounding occupied territories within the boundaries of the Republic of Armenia on various types of maps. 86. The applicants and the Azerbaijani Government submitted that the Armenian Government has a policy of encouraging settlers to move to the “NKR” from Armenia and, more recently, Syria. In February 2005 the “Report of the OSCE Fact‑Finding Mission (FFM) to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)” was published. The mandate of the FFM was to determine whether settlements existed in the territories; military structures and personnel as well as political considerations were strictly outside that mandate. In regard to settlements in the district of Lachin, the Report concluded: “Generally, the pattern of settlers’ origins in Lachin is the same as in the other territories. Thus, the overwhelming majority has come to Lachin from various parts of Azerbaijan, mostly after years of living in temporary shelters in Armenia. A comparatively small minority are Armenians from Armenia, including earthquake victims. They heard about Lachin as a settlement options [sic] by word-of-mouth, through the media or from NGOs in Armenia and NK. There was no evidence of non‑voluntary resettlement or systematic recruitment.” The Report further stated. “The direct involvement of NK in Lachin District is uncontested. Nagorno‑Karabakh provides the Lachin budget and openly acknowledges direct responsibility for the district. Lachin residents take part both in local and NK elections. While the links between Nagorno Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia remain outside the purview of this report, the FFM found no evidence of direct involvement of the government of Armenia in Lachin settlement. However, the FFM did interview certain Lachin residents who had Armenian passports and claimed to take part in Armenian elections.” 87. Prior to their accession to the Council of Europe, Armenia and Azerbaijan gave undertakings to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly committing themselves to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (see Parliamentary Assembly Opinions 221 (2000) and 222 (2000) and Committee of Ministers Resolutions Res(2000)13 and Res(2000)14). The relevant paragraphs of Parliamentary Assembly Opinion 221 (2000) on Armenia’s application for membership of the Council of Europe read as follows. “10. The Assembly takes note of the letter from the President of Armenia in which he undertakes to respect the cease-fire agreement until a final solution is found to the conflict [in Nagorno-Karabakh] and to continue the efforts to reach a peaceful negotiated settlement on the basis of compromises acceptable to all parties concerned. ... 13. The Parliamentary Assembly takes note of the letters from the President of Armenia, the speaker of the parliament, the Prime Minister and the chairmen of the political parties represented in the parliament, and notes that Armenia undertakes to honour the following commitments: ... 13.2 the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: a. to pursue efforts to settle this conflict by peaceful means only; b. to use its considerable influence over the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to foster a solution to the conflict; c. to settle international and domestic disputes by peaceful means and according to the principles of international law (an obligation incumbent on all Council of Europe member states), resolutely rejecting any threatened use of force against its neighbours; ...” Resolution Res(2000)13 of the Committee of Ministers on the Invitation to Armenia to become a member of the Council of Europe referred to the commitments entered into by Armenia, as set out in Opinion 221 (2000), and the assurances for their fulfilment given by the Armenian government.

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5. Mr Benieamin Manole, the first applicant, was born in 1956 and lives in Priponesti, Galaţi county. 6. By decision of 15 January 2006 the first applicant, a farmer, and forty-eight other persons meeting in constituent assembly decided to form a trade union entitled “Agricultural trade union Romanian Farmers Direct”. The first applicant was elected President of the new trade union. 7. On 23 January 2006 the first applicant applied to the Tecuci District Court seeking the registration of the trade union which he represented, with a view to conferring legal personality on it. He enclosed with his request the statutes of the trade union and the relevant authority form presented to him by the Constituent Assembly, as notarised on 27 January 2006. 8. According to those statutes, the applicant trade union’s main purpose was to defend the interests of its members, that is to say farmers and persons providing services for farmers, including transport facilities. The first applicant described that purpose as follows: “The Romanian Farmers Direct trade union emerged from the desire to help Romanian farmers move on from subsistence farming to agriculture as practised in the European Union, where the production of rural farms is directed towards the market rather than self-sufficiency, as is currently the case in our country, [in order to] provide farmers with a decent standard of living. Our trade union has set itself the aim of organising local centres (three or four adjacent municipalities) in all the counties of Romania with a view to providing legal information, accountancy advice and judicial assistance to individual farmers .... We believe that it would be advantageous if as many farmers as possible could come together to think and act in unison in order to ensure the success of our agricultural activities ....” 9. By judgment of 27 January 2006 the district court, sitting in single-judge formation (Judge N.M.), declared the request for registration of the trade union inadmissible on the grounds that only employees (persoanele încadrate în muncă) and civil servants could set up trade unions. 10. On appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant trade union, represented by the first applicant, that judgment was quashed by decision of Galaţi County Court on 21 March 2006. That court held that the action had been wrongly declared inadmissible and that the district court should have examined the merits of the case. 11. By judgment of 12 April 2006 the Tecuci District Court, sitting in the same single-judge formation, rejected the request as ill-founded on the grounds that under Law No. 54/2003 on trade unions (Legea sindicatelor), farmers could not set up trade unions but could only join pre-existing unions. 12. The applicant trade union lodged an appeal on points of law, submitting, first of all, that the court which had tried the case after invalidation had been the same which had delivered the invalidated judgment of 27 January 2006, and secondly, that Article 40 of the Constitution guaranteeing trade union rights had been infringed. 13. By decision of 30 May 2006 the county court accepted the applicant trade union’s appeal on points of law insofar as it concerned the make-up of the first-instance trial court, and, assessing the merits of the case, rejected the trade union’s application for the registration of the trade union. In doing so the court observed that only employees holding a contract of employment and civil servants could set up trade unions, to the exclusion of farmers and other self-employed persons, who could only join pre-existing trade unions. 14. By a handwritten authority form dated 12 November 2006, the first applicant, acting in his own name and on behalf of the applicant trade union – in his capacity as the latter’s representative – appointed Mrs G. Perin counsel to represent them before the Court. That authority was signed by both the first applicant and Mrs G. Perin. The authority may be translated as follows: “I, the undersigned Manole Benieamin, born on 18 March 1956 in the municipality of ..., in my capacity as President of the farmers’ trade union ‘Romanian Farmers Direct’ and as legal representative of that trade union, appoint as counsel to defend our case before the European Court of Human Rights Ms Giulia Perin, a lawyer practising in Padua, Italy.” II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ... 22. The relevant provisions of the (Revised) European Social Charter, the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and derived European law are expounded in the judgments in the cases of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (no . 2330/09, §§ 58-60) and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey ([GC], no 34503/97, §§ 45-47, ECHR 2008). 2. International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards (a) ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), and supervision of its application 23. The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, which was adopted in 1948 and ratified by Romania on 28 May 1957, are set out in the judgments in the cases of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (cited above, § 56) and Danilenkov and Others v. Russia (no. 67336/01, § 105, ECHR 2009 (extracts)). 24. The relevant parts of the observations of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), adopted in 2012 and published in 2013, concerning the application by Romania of Convention No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise read as follows: “The Committee notes, however, that certain issues previously raised are still pending after the adoption of the Social Dialogue Act .... The Committee also notes a number of additional discrepancies between the provisions of the Social Dialogue Act and the Convention in terms of scope of application (such as self-employed, apprentices, dismissed or retired workers), eligibility conditions for trade union officials, restriction of trade union activities ... etc. In this respect, the Committee notes that the Government has recently benefitted from ILO technical assistance seeking to ensure the conformity with the Convention of a draft Emergency Ordinance which substantially amends the Social Dialogue Act. The Committee trusts that the Government will take due account of its comments in the context of this legislative review and that the new legislation will be in full conformity with the Convention. The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report any developments in this respect.” 25. The relevant parts of the global report entitled “Freedom of association in practice: Lessons learned. Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” read as follows: “82. The ILO supervisory bodies have consistently emphasized that all workers, without any distinction, and irrespective of their employment status, including self-employed workers, managerial employees and workers in cooperatives, should enjoy the right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing, like all other workers. This is all the more important in the case of vulnerable categories of workers for whom the exercise of the right to organize is a way of breaking out of marginalization and poverty. ... Agriculture and rural employment 158. Nearly half the world’s workforce is found in rural areas, which remain the largest source of employment in Africa and most of Asia. Nevertheless, in many countries agricultural and rural workers are still denied the right to organize and bargain collectively. This is despite the fact that the need to protect the rights of those working in agriculture was recognized as early as 1921, when the ILO’s member States adopted the Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (No. 11), according to which agricultural workers should have the same ‘rights of association and combination’ as industrial workers. This Convention has been ratified by 122 member States. 159. At the same time, the practical difficulties of putting into effect the rights to organize and bargain collectively in the sector cannot be minimized. The agricultural sector, and rural employment in general, have distinctive features. In general, agriculture is a sector in which small enterprises with relatively few employees predominate and self-employment is widespread. Much of the wage employment is temporary or seasonal, and farms are spread over wide geographical areas. These factors are a challenge to trade union organization. The number of agricultural trade union members is usually relatively small compared to the total number of workers in the sector. ... 160. In addition to practical difficulties facing agricultural workers who wish to organize, there is also evidence of government interference which restricts the exercise of this basic right. The most common legal obstacle in the sector remains the full or partial exclusion of agricultural workers from legislation guaranteeing the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. ...” (b) ILO Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (No. 11) 26. The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 11 on the right of association (agriculture), adopted in 1923 and ratified by Romania on 28 May 1930, read as follows: Article 1 “Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to secure to all those engaged in agriculture the same rights of association and combination as to industrial workers, and to repeal any statutory or other provisions restricting such rights in the case of those engaged in agriculture.” (c) ILO Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention (No. 141) and the relevant recommendations 27. The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 141 on Rural Workers’ Organisations and their role in economic and social development, which was adopted in 1975 and has not been ratified by Romania, read as follows: Article 2 “1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term rural workers means any person engaged in agriculture, handicrafts or a related occupation in a rural area, whether as a wage earner or, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, as a self-employed person such as a tenant, sharecropper or small owner-occupier. 2. This Convention applies only to those tenants, sharecroppers or small owner-occupiers who derive their main income from agriculture, who work the land themselves, with the help only of their family or with the help of occasional outside labour and who do not - (a) permanently employ workers; or (b) employ a substantial number of seasonal workers; or (c) have any land cultivated by sharecroppers or tenants.” Article 3 “1. All categories of rural workers, whether they are wage earners or self-employed, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations, of their own choosing without previous authorisation. 2. The principles of freedom of association shall be fully respected; rural workers’ organisations shall be independent and voluntary in character and shall remain free from all interference, coercion or repression. 3. The acquisition of legal personality by organisations of rural workers shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this Article. 4. In exercising the rights provided for in this Article rural workers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land. 5. The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Article.” 28. ILO Convention No. 141 has been ratified by 40 States, including nineteen member States of the Council of Europe (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 29. The relevant provisions of Recommendation No. 149 concerning rural workers’ organisations and their role in economic and social development, adopted by the ILO in 1975, read as follows: II. Role of Organisations of Rural Workers “4. It should be an objective of national policy concerning rural development to facilitate the establishment and growth, on a voluntary basis, of strong and independent organisations of rural workers as an effective means of ensuring the participation of rural workers, without discrimination ... in economic and social development and in the benefits resulting therefrom. 5. Such organisations should, as appropriate, be able to-- (a) represent, further and defend the interests of rural workers, for instance by undertaking negotiations and consultations at all levels on behalf of such workers collectively; (b) represent rural workers in connection with the formulation, implementation and evaluation of programmes of rural development and at all stages and levels of national planning; ... (f) contribute to the improvement of the conditions of work and life of rural workers, including occupational safety and health; ... III. Means of Encouraging the Growth of Organisations of Rural Workers 6. In order to enable organisations of rural workers to play their role in economic and social development, member States should adopt and carry out a policy of active encouragement to these organisations, particularly with a view to - (a) eliminating obstacles to their establishment, their growth and the pursuit of their lawful activities, as well as such legislative and administrative discrimination against rural workers’ organisations and their members as may exist; ... 7. (1) The principles of freedom of association should be fully respected; rural workers’ organisations should be independent and voluntary in character and should remain free from all interference, coercion or repression. ... 8. (1) Member States should ensure that national laws or regulations do not, given the special circumstances of the rural sector, inhibit the establishment and growth of rural workers’ organisations. ...”

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5. Mr Hatip Dicle and Mr Selim Sadak were born in 1955 and 1954 and live in Diyarbakir and Şırnak, respectively. 6. Mr Hatip Dicle and Mr Selim Sadak, who were MPs in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and members of the DEP political party (Democracy Party), which has since been dissolved by the Constitutional Court, were arrested on 2 March 1994 and 1 July 1994 respectively. 7. On 8 December 1994 they were sentenced by the Ankara State Security Court to fifteen years’ imprisonment for belonging to an illegal organisation, pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Penal Code. 8. By judgment of 26 October 1995 the Court of Cassation upheld that judicial decision. 9. On 17 July 2001, adjudicating on an application lodged by the applicants and two other persons, the European Court of Human Rights found, in its judgment in the case of Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 1) (nos. 29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96, ECHR 2001‑VIII), a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of independence and impartiality of the State Security Court, as well as a violation of Article 6 § 3 (a), (b) and (d) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 on the grounds that the applicants had not received timely information on the reclassification of the charges against them and had been unable to question the prosecution witnesses or to have them questioned. 10. On 9 December 2004, at the 906th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies at the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers adopted a Final Resolution (ResDH(2004)86) on the judgment of the Court in the case of Sadak and Others, cited above. The relevant passages of that Resolution read as follows: “The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’), Having regard to the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sadak and others case delivered on 17 July 2001 and transmitted the same day to the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 of the Convention; Recalling that the case originated in several applications (nos. 29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96) against Turkey, lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 17 January 1996 under former Article 25 of the Convention by Mr Selim Sadak, Ms Leyla Zana, Mr Hatip Dicle and Mr Orhan Doğan, four Turkish nationals, and that the Commission declared admissible the complaints relating to the lack of fairness of the criminal proceedings conducted against them, to the lack of independence and impartiality of the State Security Court which convicted them, in 1994, to 15 years’ imprisonment for belonging to an armed organisation, as well as to the discriminatory violation of their right of freedom of expression and freedom of association; Whereas in its judgment of 17 July 2001 the Court unanimously: - held that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court; - held that there had been a violation of Article 6, paragraphs 3 (a), (b) and (d), of the Convention, taken together with paragraph 1, on account of the fact that the applicants were not notified in good time that the charges against them had been altered and that they were unable to examine or have examined the witnesses against them; - held that it was not necessary to examine the other complaints under Article 6 of the Convention; - held that it was not necessary to examine the complaints under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention; - held that the government of the respondent state was to pay, within three months, USD 25 000 to each of the four applicants in respect of all heads of damage taken together; USD 10 000 to all the applicants together in respect of costs and expenses, and that simple interest at an annual rate of 6% would be payable on those sums from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement; - dismissed the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction; Having regard to the Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers concerning the application of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention; Having invited the Government of the respondent state to inform it of the measures which had been taken in consequence of the judgment of 17 July 2001, having regard to Turkey’s obligation under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention to abide by it; Whereas during the examination of the case by the Committee of Ministers, the government of the respondent state gave the Committee information about the measures taken in order to erase the consequences for the applicants of the violations found by the Court and to prevent new violations of the same kind as those found in the present judgment; this information appears in the appendix to this resolution; Having satisfied itself that, on 16 October 2001, within the time-limit set, the government of the respondent state paid the applicants the sums provided for in the judgment of 17 July 2001; Recalling, as far as individual measures are concerned, Interim Resolution ResDH(2002)59 of 30 April 2002 in which the Committee requested the reopening of the criminal proceedings against the applicants or the adoption of other ad hoc measures to erase the consequences of their unfair conviction, as well as Interim Resolution ResDH(2004)31 of 6 April 2004 by which the Committee, stressing the importance of the presumption of innocence, requested that the applicants be released pending the outcome of their new trial in the absence of any compelling reasons justifying their continued detention; Having noted with satisfaction that, on 14 July 2004, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 21 April 2004 of the Ankara State Security Court confirming the applicants’ previous conviction, that, since June 2004, the applicants are no longer in detention following the suspension of the execution of their sentence, that restrictions on their travel abroad were removed on 16 September 2004, that the applicants are no longer deemed to be convicted and that a new trial is currently pending before the Ankara 11th Criminal Court; Considering that, since the violation found by the European Court concerned the fairness of the incriminated proceedings and not their outcome, it is not necessary to await the outcome of the new trial; Declares, after having examined the information supplied by the Government of Turkey, that it has exercised its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention in this case.” 11. Meanwhile, on 3 February 2003, Act No. 4793 reforming a number of previous Acts came into force. It added to Article 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) a new paragraph 6 providing for the reopening of criminal proceedings following a finding of a violation by the European Court of Human Rights. 12. On 4 February 2003 the applicants requested the reopening of proceedings on the basis of the judgment delivered by the Court in their case. 13. On 21 April 2004, having ordered the reopening of the proceedings against the applicants pursuant to Article 327 § 6 CPP, the Ankara State Security Court reiterated its judgment of 8 December 1994. In the grounds for the judgment it mainly used the words “accused (convicted)” with reference to the applicants. Occasionally it used the words “convicted (accused)” with reference to Mr Selim Sadak and the word “convicted” with reference to Mr Hatip Dicle. 14. On 8 June 2004 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the 21 April 2004 judgment of the State Security Court. In that appeal they requested their release under Article 38 of the Constitution, relying on their right to the presumption of innocence. They argued that under Article 338 CPP the acceptance of the reopening of proceedings had invalidated the finality of their first conviction. They pointed out that in the event of an application for reopening of proceedings the law was silent on the issue of the execution of the initial sentence and on the conduct of the future proceedings. The applicants submitted that the absence of provisions in that regard did not mean that there was a legal vacuum provided that any proceedings reopened returned to the trial phase. They added that persons being retried no longer had the status of convicted persons, which meant that the restriction on their liberty could no longer be considered as being in “execution” of the sentence initially imposed on them. Consequently, they concluded that the reopening of the proceedings had given them prisoner status, and that they had therefore lost their “convict” status. 15. Subsequently the applicants submitted another brief memorial to the Court of Cassation, arguing, in particular, that by referring to them as “convicted persons” the State Security Court had flouted their right to the presumption of innocence. Indeed, they took the view that since proceedings had been reopened their conviction was no longer res judicata and therefore that they should no longer have been considered as convicted persons and their right to the presumption of innocence should have been respected, pursuant to Article 38 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 16. On 9 June 2004 the Court of Cassation ordered the applicants’ release. 17. By judgment du 13 July 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 21 April 2004, stating that the violations found by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 17 July 2001 had not been remedied. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows: “III. The procedural phase following the reopening of the proceedings It is accepted, in both legal practice and legal theory, that where an application for a reopening of proceedings pursuant to the ... Code of Criminal Procedure is accepted, the investigation which must be conducted [after the reopening of proceedings] is independent and distinct from the previous investigation, and the decision to reopen the proceedings provides the basis for that fresh investigation. As stated in the judgment of the Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation of 5. 11. 1990 (E. 8/220 and K. 258), the hearings to be organised [in the framework of the new trial] are not the continuation of those held previously, and all the procedural rules must be applied to those hearings as if the case were being tried for the first time. The assessment of new evidence, of the nature of the offence and of the sentencing in the framework of the hearings to be held when the proceedings are reopened must be conducted quite independently and separately from the assessment during the initial proceedings, and new pieces of evidence ... may be gathered and examined. IV. Conclusion ... 2 – The proceedings as reopened under the relevant decision is completely independent from the previous proceedings; in accordance with that principle, all the legal rules of procedure must be applied to the new hearings, the indictment must be read out, the reclassification of charges must be notified and fresh interrogations must be conducted ...” 18. The State Security Courts having in the meantime been abolished under Act No. 5190, the Court of Cassation referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court (“the Assize Court”). 19. On 1 June 2005 the new Turkish Penal Code came into force. The offence of belonging to an armed band formerly set out in Article 168 is now governed by Article 314 of the new Penal Code. 20. On 9 March 2007, having taken note, in particular, of the Court of Cassation’s argument that the procedure for reopening the trial was completely independent from the initial one, the Assize Court upheld the conviction of 8 December 1994. It nevertheless reduced the applicants’ sentence to a prison term of seven years and six months pursuant to Article 314 § 2 of the Penal Code. In the reasoning of its decision the court used the words “accused (convicted person)” with reference to the applicants. 21. On 27 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld that judgment. 22. Meanwhile, on 19 May 2007, the Higher Electoral Council had issued a decision setting out the conditions to be met by candidates – including independent candidates with no party political affiliation – standing for the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007. The relevant part of that decision read as follows: “1. ... After serving final sentences ... [the candidate] must, pursuant to section 13/A of the Law on the register of police records, provide, for each conviction, a document certifying that he has recovered his civil rights and that the conviction has become res judicata. ... 3. Pursuant to the Penal Code ... save in cases of negligence, persons who have been sentenced to a prison term of twelve months or more or who have been convicted of an offence, pursuant to section 11 (f) of Act No. 2839 on the election of members of parliament and whose prison sentence has become res judicata, must provide a document certifying that they have, or are deemed to have, served their sentence.” 23. On 10 May 2007, Mr Hatip Dicle applied to the Ankara Assize Court for a document establishing that he had indeed served his full prison term. 24. In its 15 May 2007 decision the Assize Court held as follows: “In applying to the convicted person the provisions of Act No. 5237 on the entry into force of [the Penal Code] of 1 June 2005, it was decided to sentence Mehmet Hatip Dicle to a prison term of seven years and six months, to apply section 53 of Act No. 5237 and to deduct from that sentence the period which he had served in detention. The State Prosecutor has filed an appeal on points of law against that judgment, but the latter has not yet become final. The convicted person Mehmet Hatip Dicle, whose sentence was commuted to seven years and six months pursuant to the provisions [of the Penal Code], was remanded in custody from 2 March 1994 to 17 March 1994, and imprisoned from 17 March 1994 to 9 June 2004 as a detainee and then as a convicted person. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the final sentence to be imposed on Mehmet Hatip Dicle for belonging to an illegal armed organisation is a prison term of fifteen years ... In order to serve that sentence, he was held in prison for the aforementioned periods. Pursuant to the provisions of the Penal Code [in respect of the applicant], this court delivered judgment on 9 March 2007 (E. 2004/343 and K. 2007/67) reducing the fifteen-year prison sentence to a term of seven years and six months. Since that judgment is not yet final it has not become res judicata. Consequently, it is impossible to indicate the date on which the sentence was completed. However, [it may be said that] the sentence served by the convicted person up to the date of his release corresponds to a sentence of seven years and six months... On those grounds: This court cannot lawfully adjudicate on the application lodged by the convicted person Mehmet Hatip Dicle for a document certifying that he has served the full sentence imposed on him, firstly because the decision to reduce his sentence to seven years and six months has not yet become final, and secondly because the [initial] judgment sentencing him to a fifteen-year term did become res judicata and he was released on account of the stay of execution of that sentence.” 25. On 1 and 4 June 2007 Mr Hatip Dicle and Mr Selim Sadak submitted their names as independent candidates for the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 in the constituencies of Diyarbakır and Şırnak respectively. They provided, inter alia, copies of their police records mentioning their 8 December 1994 conviction by the State Security Court and the decision given by the Assize Court on 15 May 2007. 26. By decision of 9 June 2007 the Higher Electoral Council rejected the applicants’ candidacies on the grounds that their criminal convictions had rendered them ineligible.

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14. At the time of the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was an autonomous region (oblast) of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Azerbaijan SSR”). Situated within the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, it covered 4,388 sq. km. There was at the time no common border between Nagorno-Karabakh (known as Artsakh by its Armenian name) and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Armenian SSR”), which were separated by Azerbaijani territory, the district of Lachin being the shortest distance between them, including a strip of land often referred to as the “Lachin corridor”, less than 10 km wide. 15. According to the census of the USSR of 1989, the NKAO had a population of approximately 189,000, consisting of 77% ethnic Armenians and 22% ethnic Azeris, with Russian and Kurdish minorities. 16. In early 1988 demonstrations were held in Stepanakert, the regional capital of the NKAO, as well as in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, to demand the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia. On 20 February the Soviet of the NKAO appealed to the Supreme Soviets of the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR that the NKAO be allowed to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. The request was rejected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 23 March. In June it was also rejected by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, whereas its counterpart in Armenia voted in favour of unification. 17. Throughout 1988 the demonstrations calling for unification continued. The district of Lachin was subjected to roadblocks and attacks. The clashes led to many casualties, and refugees, numbering in the hundreds of thousands on both sides, flowed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a consequence, on 12 January 1989 the USSR government placed the NKAO under Moscow’s direct rule. However, on 28 November, control of the region was returned to Azerbaijan. A few days later, on 1 December, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno‑Karabakh regional council adopted a Joint Resolution on the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. 18. In early 1990, following an escalation of the conflict, Soviet troops arrived in Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh and the latter was placed under a state of emergency. Violent clashes between Armenians and Azeris continued, however, with the occasional intervention by Soviet forces. 19. On 30 August 1991 Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union. This was subsequently formalised by the adoption of the Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 18 October 1991. On 2 September the Soviet of the NKAO announced the establishment of the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” (the “NKR”), consisting of the territory of the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of the Azerbaijan SSR, and declared that it was no longer under Azerbaijani jurisdiction. On 26 November 1991 the Azerbaijani Parliament abolished the autonomy previously enjoyed by Nagorno-Karabakh. In a referendum organised in Nagorno-Karabakh on 10 December 1991, 99.9% of those participating voted in favour of secession. However, the Azeri population boycotted the referendum. In the same month, the Soviet Union was dissolved and Soviet troops began to withdraw from the region. Military control of Nagorno‑Karabakh was rapidly being handed over to the Karabakh Armenians. On 6 January 1992 the “NKR”, having regard to the results of the referendum, reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan. 20. In early 1992 the conflict gradually escalated into a full-scale war. By the end of 1993, ethnic Armenian forces had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO as well as seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions (Lachin, Kelbajar, Jebrayil, Gubadly and Zangilan, and substantial parts of Agdam and Fizuli). 21. On 5 May 1994 a ceasefire agreement, known as the Bishkek Protocol (“the Ceasefire Agreement”) was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and the “NKR” following Russian mediation. It came into force on 12 May 1994. 22. According to a Human Rights Watch report (“Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, December 1994), between 1988 and 1994 an estimated 750,000 to 800,000 Azeris were forced out of Nagorno‑Karabakh, Armenia and the seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. According to information from the Armenian authorities, 335,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and 78,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs – from regions in Armenia bordering Azerbaijan) have been registered. 23. According to the Armenian Government, the “NKR” controls 4,061 sq. km of the former NKAO. While it is debated how much of the two partly conquered districts is occupied by the “NKR”, it appears that the occupied territory of the seven surrounding districts in total amounts to 7,500 sq. km. 24. Estimates of today’s population of Nagorno-Karabakh vary between 120,000 and 145,000 people, 95% of whom are of Armenian ethnicity. Virtually no Azerbaijanis remain. 25. No political settlement of the conflict has so far been reached. The self-proclaimed independence of the “NKR” has not been recognised by any State or international organisation. Recurring breaches of the Ceasefire Agreement along the borders have led to the loss of many lives and the rhetoric of officials remains hostile. Moreover, according to international reports, tension has heightened in recent years and military expenditure in Armenia and Azerbaijan has increased significantly. 26. Several proposals for a peaceful solution of the conflict have failed. Negotiations have been carried out under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its so-called Minsk Group. In Madrid in November 2007, the Group’s three Co-Chairs – France, Russia and the United States of America – presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan a set of Basic Principles for a settlement. The Basic Principles, which have since been updated, call, inter alia, for the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; a future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding referendum; the right of all IDPs and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. The idea is that the endorsement of these principles by Armenia and Azerbaijan would enable the drafting of a comprehensive and detailed settlement. Following intensive shuttle diplomacy by Minsk Group diplomats and a number of meetings between the Presidents of the two countries in 2009, the process lost momentum in 2010. So far the parties to the conflict have not signed a formal agreement on the Basic Principles. 27. On 24 March 2011 the Minsk Group presented a “Report of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ Field Assessment Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh”, the Executive Summary of which reads as follows. “The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs conducted a Field Assessment Mission to the seven occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) from October 7-12, 2010, to assess the overall situation there, including humanitarian and other aspects. The Co-Chairs were joined by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and his team, which provided logistical support, and by two experts from the UNHCR and one member of the 2005 OSCE Fact-Finding Mission. This was the first mission by the international community to the territories since 2005, and the first visit by UN personnel in 18 years. In traveling more than 1,000 kilometers throughout the territories, the Co-Chairs saw stark evidence of the disastrous consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the failure to reach a peaceful settlement. Towns and villages that existed before the conflict are abandoned and almost entirely in ruins. While no reliable figures exist, the overall population is roughly estimated as 14,000 persons, living in small settlements and in the towns of Lachin and Kelbajar. The Co-Chairs assess that there has been no significant growth in the population since 2005. The settlers, for the most part ethnic Armenians who were relocated to the territories from elsewhere in Azerbaijan, live in precarious conditions, with poor infrastructure, little economic activity, and limited access to public services. Many lack identity documents. For administrative purposes, the seven territories, the former NK Oblast, and other areas have been incorporated into eight new districts. The harsh reality of the situation in the territories has reinforced the view of the Co‑Chairs that the status quo is unacceptable, and that only a peaceful, negotiated settlement can bring the prospect of a better, more certain future to the people who used to live in the territories and those who live there now. The Co-Chairs urge the leaders of all the parties to avoid any activities in the territories and other disputed areas that would prejudice a final settlement or change the character of these areas. They also recommend that measures be taken to preserve cemeteries and places of worship in the territories and to clarify the status of settlers who lack identity documents. The Co-Chairs intend to undertake further missions to other areas affected by the NK conflict, and to include in such missions experts from relevant international agencies that would be involved in implementing a peace settlement.” 28. On 18 June 2013 the Presidents of the Co-Chair countries of the Minsk Group issued a Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. “We, the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries – France, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America – remain committed to helping the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reach a lasting and peaceful settlement. We express our deep regret that, rather than trying to find a solution based upon mutual interests, the parties have continued to seek one-sided advantage in the negotiation process. We continue to firmly believe that the elements outlined in the statements of our countries over the last four years must be the foundation of any fair and lasting settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These elements should be seen as an integrated whole, as any attempt to select some elements over others would make it impossible to achieve a balanced solution. We reiterate that only a negotiated settlement can lead to peace, stability, and reconciliation, opening opportunities for regional development and cooperation. The use of military force that has already created the current situation of confrontation and instability will not resolve the conflict. A renewal of hostilities would be disastrous for the population of the region, resulting in loss of life, more destruction, additional refugees, and enormous financial costs. We strongly urge the leaders of all the sides to recommit to the Helsinki principles, particularly those relating to the non-use of force or the threat of force, territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. We also appeal to them to refrain from any actions or rhetoric that could raise tension in the region and lead to escalation of the conflict. The leaders should prepare their people for peace, not war. Our countries stand ready to assist the sides, but the responsibility for putting an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains with them. We strongly believe that further delay in reaching a balanced agreement on the framework for a comprehensive peace is unacceptable, and urge the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to focus with renewed energy on the issues that remain unresolved.” 29. The applicant, an ethnic Armenian, states that he and his family used to live in the village of Gulistan in the Shahumyan district of the Azerbaijan SSR. He claims to have had a house and outhouses there. 30. Geographically, Shahumyan shared a border with the NKAO and was situated to the north of it. The region did not form part of the NKAO, but was later claimed by the “NKR” as part of its territory (see paragraph 19 above). According to the applicant, 82% of the population of Shahumyan was ethnically Armenian prior to the conflict. 31. In February 1991 Shahumyan was abolished as a separate administrative region and was formally incorporated into the present-day Goranboy region of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 32. In April and May 1991 the USSR internal forces and the special‑purpose militia units (“the OMON”) of the Azerbaijan SSR launched a military operation with the stated purpose of “passport checking” and disarming local Armenian militants in the region. However, according to various sources, the government forces, using the official purpose of the operation as a pretext, expelled the Armenian population from a number of villages in the Shahumyan region, thus forcing them to leave their homes and flee to Nagorno‑Karabakh or Armenia. The expulsions were accompanied by arrests and violence towards the civilian population. In 1992, when the conflict escalated into a full-scale war, the Shahumyan region came under attack by the Azerbaijani forces. 33. The parties’ positions differ in respect of the applicant’s residence and possessions in Gulistan. (a) The applicant 34. The applicant maintained that he had lived in Gulistan for most of his life until his forced displacement in 1992. In support of this claim he submitted a copy of his former Soviet passport issued in 1979, from which it can be seen that the applicant was born in Gulistan. He also submitted his marriage certificate, which shows that he and his wife, who was also born in Gulistan, got married there in 1955. In addition, the applicant asserted that, having grown up in Gulistan, he left for some years to complete his military service and to work in the town of Sumgait. A few years after his wedding, he returned to Gulistan where he lived until June 1992. 35. The applicant submitted a copy of an official certificate (“technical passport”) when he lodged the application. According to that document, dated 20 May 1991, a two-storey house in Gulistan and outhouses of a total area of 167 sq. m and 2,160 sq. m of land were registered in the applicant’s name. Furthermore, he submitted a detailed plan of the main house. 36. According to the technical passport, of the 167 sq. m on which the house stood, 76 sq. m were occupied by the main house and 91 sq. m by various outhouses, including a cowshed. Of the 2,160 sq. m of land, 1,500 were a fruit and vegetable garden. The document also contains information of a technical nature (for instance, the building materials used) concerning the main house and the outhouses. 37. The applicant explained that he had obtained the land by permission of the village council to divide his father’s plot of land between him and his brother. The decision was recorded in the village council’s register. With the help of relatives and friends, he and his wife built their house on that plot of land between 1962 and 1963. Their four children grew up in the house and he and his wife continued to live there until they had to flee in June 1992. Furthermore, the applicant explained that he had been a secondary school teacher in Gulistan and had earned his living partly from his salary and partly from farming and stockbreeding on his land, while his wife had been working at the village’s collective farm from the 1970s. 38. In addition to the technical passport and the plan of the house mentioned above, the applicant submitted photos of the house and written statements dating from August 2010 by two former officials of the village council, Ms Khachatryan and Mr Meghryan. The former states that she was the secretary of the village council from 1952 to 1976. She confirms that the village council allowed the applicant to divide his father’s plot of land between himself and his brother. Both Ms Khachatryan and Mr Meghryan, who states that he was a member of the Board of the village council for some years in the 1970s, claim that entries regarding the allotment of land to villagers were made in the registration book of the village council. A number of further written statements from May 2010 by family members (including the applicant’s wife, two of their children and his son-in-law), former neighbours and friends from Gulistan provide a description of Gulistan and confirm that the applicant was a secondary school teacher and had a plot of land and a two-storey house in the village. They also confirm that a number of outhouses and a fruit and vegetable garden belonged to the applicant’s house, where he and his family lived until June 1992. 39. The applicant described that the Shahumyan region was subjected to a blockade by the Azerbaijani government in the early 1990s. In 1992 the armed forces started attacking the region. In June 1992 Gulistan came under direct attack by Azerbaijani forces. From 12 to 13 June 1992 the village was heavily bombed. The population of the village, including the applicant and his family members, fled in fear for their lives. The above-mentioned statements by a number of witnesses also provide a description of the blockade of the Shahumyan region during the conflict, of the attack on the village and the flight of its inhabitants. 40. The applicant and his family fled to Armenia. Subsequently, the applicant and his wife lived as refugees in Yerevan. In 2002 the applicant obtained Armenian citizenship. He was seriously ill from 2004 and died on 13 April 2009 in Yerevan. (b) The Government 41. The Government submitted that it could not be verified whether the applicant had actually lived in Gulistan and had any possessions there. For the period from 1988 to the present date, the relevant departments of the Goranboy region did not possess any documentation concerning the plot of land, house or other buildings allegedly owned by the applicant. Moreover, certain archives of the former Shahumyan region, including the Civil Registry Office and the Passport Office, had been destroyed during the hostilities. No documents relating to the applicant are available in the Goranboy regional archives today. 42. In support of their position, the Government submitted a number of documents, namely: a statement, dated 22 July 2007, by Colonel Maharramov, Head of the Goranboy Regional Police Department, confirming that the archives of the Civil Registry Office and of the Passport Office of the former Shahumyan Region had been destroyed during the conflict; a letter from the State Registry Service for Immovable Property of 31 July 2007 according to which the relevant Regional Department’s Archives did not contain any document concerning the applicant’s alleged property rights; a statement dated 5 March 2012 by Mr Mammadov, Chairman of the State Land and Mapping Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, according to whom only the Executive Committee of the Soviet of People’s Deputies of Districts and Cities had been empowered to allocate land under the Land Code of the Azerbaijan SSR. 43. The parties’ positions also differ in respect of the current situation obtaining in Gulistan. The Armenian Government, as a third-party intervener, also made submissions on the issue. 44. Regarding the situation in Gulistan, the applicant asserted that Azerbaijan had control over the village and, in particular, that they had positions in the village itself and on its outskirts. In his view, there was nothing to prove that Gulistan was on the Line of Contact (LoC) between Azerbaijani and “NKR” forces as claimed by the Government. 45. In the proceedings prior to the admissibility decision, the applicant submitted a written statement from an anonymous senior officer of the “NKR” armed forces dated 11 August 2010, according to whom Gulistan was under the de facto control of Azerbaijani military forces (see paragraphs 51 and 58 below). Moreover, the applicant asserted that fellow villagers had tried to return to Gulistan on several occasions but had been unable to enter the village as they would have risked being shot at by Azerbaijani forces. (b) The Government 46. The Government accepted throughout the proceedings that Gulistan was located on the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan. 47. In their submissions prior to the admissibility decision, the Government asserted that Gulistan was physically on the LoC between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces, which had been established by the Ceasefire Agreement. The village was deserted and the LoC was maintained by the stationing of armed forces on either side and by the extensive use of landmines. It was thus impossible for the Government to exercise any control over the area or to have any access to it. 48. In their submissions after the admissibility decision, the Government stated that they did not exercise sufficient control over the village. Referring to the statements of a number of military officers who had served in the Goranboy region and had made statements on the situation in Gulistan (see paragraph 62 below), they submitted in particular that the village, situated in a V-shaped valley on the northern bank of the River Inzachay, was on the LoC, meaning that it was surrounded by armed forces of Azerbaijan on one side (in the north and east) and of Armenia on the other side (in the south and west). Armenian forces held strategically advantageous positions on a steep, forested slope south of the river, while Azerbaijani positions on the north bank of the river were situated in lower, relatively open territory. The Government asserted that, as a matter of fact, Gulistan was not under the effective control of either side. It was a contested area and constituted a dangerous environment. The village and its surroundings were mined. Violations of the Ceasefire Agreement occurred frequently. There were no safe buildings in the area as the village had been destroyed and deserted. 49. In their pleadings at the hearing of 5 February 2014, the Government emphasised that Gulistan was exposed to fire from Armenian military positions situated across the river on a steep slope. In addition, they referred to the AAAS report (see paragraphs 74-75 below), noting that it confirmed, apart from the fact that Gulistan was on Azerbaijani territory, that the area around Gulistan was mountainous and was the object of sustained military activity and that the village had been destroyed. They maintained that the area was mined and inaccessible to any civilian. (c) The Armenian Government, third-party intervener 50. The Armenian Government maintained throughout the proceedings that the respondent Government had full, effective control over Gulistan. 51. At the hearing of 15 September 2010, they had contested the Government’s assertion that Gulistan was on the LoC. Referring to the written statement of 11 August 2010 by an anonymous senior officer of the “NKR” armed forces serving near Gulistan which had been submitted by the applicant, the Agent of the Armenian Government had declared that he had been personally present when the statement had been made and confirmed its correctness. On the basis of this statement, the Armenian Government asserted that, in the area in issue, the dividing line between the “NKR” and Azerbaijani armed forces was a gorge through which the River Indzachay flowed. Gulistan was situated north of the riverside and was under the control of Azerbaijani armed forces who had military positions in the village itself and on its outskirts, while “NKR” forces were stationed on the other side of the gorge. They also referred to the DVD containing footage of the village submitted to the Court by the applicant in 2008 (see paragraph 56 below) claiming that the person who can be seen walking between the houses was an Azerbaijani soldier. The Armenian Government maintained that it was impossible for “NKR” forces or any Armenians to have access to the village. 52. In their submissions following the admissibility decision, the Armenian Government disclosed the identity of the senior “NKR” officer at the Court’s request. The officer in question is Colonel Manukyan of the “NKR” Defence Army. Moreover, the Armenian Government submitted that their Agent, Mr Kostanyan, had obtained permission from the “NKR” authorities and therefore visited the territory near Gulistan in May 2012. He had obtained DVD material and recorded interviews with three “NKR” officers describing the situation on the ground in and near Gulistan (see paragraph 71 below). The Armenian Government also replied to the Court’s question concerning their assertion made at the hearing of 15 September 2010 that the man walking between the ruins on the DVD submitted by the applicant in 2008 was an Azerbaijani soldier: while stating that they were not in a position to comment on that man’s identity, they referred to statements of the “NKR” military officers according to whom there were Azerbaijani military positions in Gulistan, while there was no presence of civilians. 53. At the hearing of 5 February 2014, the Armenian Government repeated their description of the situation pertaining in Gulistan. Moreover, they asserted that Azerbaijani military presence in the area had also been confirmed by the AAAS report. 54. The parties have submitted extensive documentary material in support of their respective positions. The following paragraphs contain a short description of the main items of evidence. (a) The applicant (i) Map of Gulistan 55. A map of Gulistan and its surroundings: It appears to be a copy of an official map with names in Azeri, showing the entire village on the north bank of a river (Indzachay). The alleged positions of the Azerbaijani forces are indicated as follows: one is in the middle of the village, a few more are on its northern edge, others are also spread out on the north bank of the river but are further away, most of them apparently on the heights around the village. (ii) DVDs 56. A DVD, submitted with the applicant’s observations of 21 February 2008, containing footage of Gulistan and its surroundings. The village is situated on a hillside. Many of the houses are in ruins, while a few still have intact roofs. Smoke is rising from some chimneys. At one point a man walking between the ruins appears. On a hillside situated some distance from the village, constructions are to be seen which appear to be firing positions. (iii) Statements by “NKR” officials and by former villagers of Gulistan 57. A letter by the Minister of Defence of the “NKR” of 14 February 2008 describing the situation on the ground in Gulistan and claiming in particular that the Azerbaijani armed forces had several posts and shooting points right in the village. 58. A statement dated 11 August 2010 by a senior officer of the “NKR” forces serving in a military position near the village of Gulistan since 2005 (see the summary of the statement at paragraph 51 above). The statement was accompanied by a hand-drawn map of Gulistan and its surroundings and a number of photos showing the area. The officer, who had initially remained anonymous, is Colonel Manukyan from the “NKR” Defence Army. A statement by Mr Aloyan, assistant to the representative of the applicant, who recorded the statement by the “NKR” officer on the spot, namely at the military unit near Gulistan, confirming the contents of the officer’s statement and that the photos had been taken from the “NKR” military position. A statement by Mr Kostanyan, Agent of the Armenian Government, in whose presence the senior “NKR” officer made his statement at his military unit close to Gulistan. 59. Statements dated March 2012 from three former villagers of Gulistan who claimed that they had unsuccessfully tried to return to Gulistan between 2002 and 2004. They claim to have approached the area on the “NKR” side of the ceasefire line; two of them state that they were able to look down on the village from the height of Napat, but were prohibited from moving any further by the “NKR” soldiers accompanying them due to the risk of sniper fire from the opposing forces. One of them states that, with the aid of binoculars, he was able to see a number of entrenchments in the village and a soldier standing there. (b) The Government (i) Maps 60. A map of Gulistan and its surroundings. The map shows the entire village on the north bank of the River Indzachay, the Azerbaijani military positions are also on the north bank of the river mostly on the heights around the village. The “NKR” positions are on the south bank of the river, the closest being right opposite the village. A map of Nagorno Karabakh submitted by the Armenian Government in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia ([GC], no. 13216/05, ECHR 2015). The map shows Gulistan on the very border of the “NKR” to the north of a river. A map of Azerbaijan published in 2006 by the State Land and Cartography Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The map shows Gulistan on the very border of the area occupied by the “NKR”. On the map the occupied areas are shaded and surrounded by a red line; Gulistan is on that red line but outside the shaded area, to the north of a river. (ii) DVDs 61. Two DVDs containing footage of Gulistan and its surroundings, submitted in September 2008 and July 2012, respectively. The first shows the village in a hilly landscape, with most houses in ruins, plus some buildings on the crest of a hill which appear to be firing positions. The second again shows the village (houses in ruins and destroyed farming machinery) and the surrounding landscape and is accompanied by a text explaining in particular that there is no habitation in the village, that the Armenian positions are on a forested slope and control the village with large-calibre guns, while Azerbaijani positions are at a distance of some 2.5 km and can only visually control the village. (iii) Statements by Azerbaijani military officers, officials and villagers from neighbouring villages 62. Statements made in March 2012 by six Azerbaijani army officers: Colonel Babayev, who served in a military unit in the Goranboy region from 1994 to 1997, and Lieutenant colonels Abdulov, Mammadov, Ahmadov, Abbasov and Huseynov, who served in military units in the Goranboy region for various periods between 1999 and 2009 and describe the situation on the ground in Gulistan as follows. – Gulistan is on the north bank of the River Indzachay. – Azerbaijani military positions are on the north bank of the river in the east and north-east of the Gulistan settlement, situated in the lowlands, at distances between 1 and 3 km from the destroyed village. – Armenian military positions are on the south bank of the river in the west and south-west of the Gulistan settlement, situated on strategically better upland positions (steep slopes covered with forest). The estimates given by the officers in respect of the distance at which the nearest Armenian positions are located vary between 200 and 300 m and 1 km. – Ceasefire violations by the Armenian forces are frequent. – They contest the Armenian Government’s assertion that some of the houses in the village have been repaired and are being used as military positions by the Azerbaijani forces. – The Azerbaijani positions and the village itself are within shooting range of the Armenian positions (fire with large-calibre machine guns); military staff can therefore not move freely in the area but only on designated routes. – There are no civilians in the village. – Most of the buildings (some 100 houses) in the village were destroyed during the hostilities. As the village has been deserted since 1992, houses have decayed, roofs have collapsed and trees are now growing inside the destroyed buildings. There are currently no habitable buildings left; after the hostilities, Armenian forces mined the territory of the settlement, these mines are sometimes triggered by animals. – Lieutenant colonel Abdulov claims to have observed movements of Armenian military in the ruins in the south part of the Gulistan settlement and Lieutenant colonel Mammadov claims to have seen Armenian military servants moving from their positions towards the river. Lieutenant colonels Abbasov and Huseynov state that they observed Armenian military forces destroying buildings and using the material for their fortifications. 63. Information from the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence covering the period from 2003 to 2010 on ceasefire violations indicating an increase from 2008 (twenty in 2008, thirty-five in 2009 and fifty-two in 2010) and on casualties in the area of Gulistan as a result of mine explosions (five soldiers killed on 5 August 2003) or violations of the ceasefire (one soldier killed on 25 February 2005). 64. A letter by the Director of the National Agency for Mine Action dated 12 July 2010 stating that the village of Gulistan in the Goranboy region was “defined as a territory with an extensive mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination”. 65. Statements made in March 2012 by eight villagers living in neighbouring settlements, the village of Meshali and the town of Yukhari Aghjakand. They describe Gulistan as being deserted and state that the surroundings are mined and regularly come under fire from the Armenian positions. (iv) Press releases 66. Two press releases from October 2006 from an Armenian source relating to an OSCE mission monitoring the border line between Nagorno‑Karabakh and Azerbaijan near Gulistan. 67. Numerous press releases from the Azeri Press Agency issued between June 2010 and May 2012 mentioning ceasefire violations in various areas including the area of Gulistan. The text most frequently used by these press releases reads as follows: “Armenian armed forces fired on the opposite Azerbaijani Armed Forces from posts near Gulistan village” or “... from posts in the nameless upland near Gulistan” or “enemy units fired on the positions of Azerbaijani armed forces from the posts ... near Gulistan in Azerbaijan’s Goranboy region”. One of these press releases, dated 3 March 2012, reports that “Azerbaijani lieutenant Gurban Huseynov has struck a mine in Gulistan on the frontline of the Goranboy region. Consequently, he lost his leg”. 68. A statement by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines dated 20 September 2013 expressing concern about the increased placement of anti-personnel landmines by the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities along the Armenian-Azerbaijani LoC east and north of the disputed territory. (c) The Armenian Government, third-party intervener (i) Map 69. A map of Gulistan and its surroundings, which shows the entire village on the north bank of the River Idzachay. The Azerbaijani positions are also on the north bank of the river and very close to the village (to the east and west of it and on its northern edge), while the “NKR” positions are on the south bank of the river, the closest being just opposite the village. (ii) DVDs 70. A DVD, submitted in July 2012, containing footage of Gulistan and its surroundings and interviews taken on the spot by Agent of the Armenian Government, Mr Kostanyan, with three “NKR” army officers serving in the military unit near Gulistan (for their contents see paragraph 71 below). It shows the village, with most houses in ruins, and the landscape around it. Towards the end of the video, a herd of sheep and some people can be seen moving behind the destroyed village. (iii) Statements by “NKR” military officers 71. Transcripts of the interviews recorded in May 2012 with Unit Commander Sevoyan, Sergeant Petrosyan and Officer Vardanyan, serving in the “NKR” military unit located near Gulistan. They describe the situation on the ground as follows. – The Azerbaijani military forces have positions in the village and sometimes perform combat duties there, but their permanent location point is in the rear. – There are no civilians in the village. – There are no mines in the village itself but the area surrounding it has been mined by the Azerbaijani forces (they have noticed that from time to time animals trigger a mine). – Sometimes there are ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani side; if they are negligent they risk being shot at from the Azerbaijani positions. – Several times, former villagers of Gulistan came to the area wishing to visit their village. Due to dangers from snipers and combat weapons’ fire from the Azerbaijani side, they did not allow them to approach the village. 72. On 12 September 2013 the Court requested that the AAAS, in the framework of its “Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Programme”, provide a report on the following issues: the location of military positions, such as trenches and fortifications in and around the village of Gulistan, for the period between the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Azerbaijan (15 April 2002) and the present, and on the state of destruction of buildings in the village and of its cemeteries at the time of the Convention’s entry into force in respect of Azerbaijan. 73. The AAAS submitted its report to the Court in November 2013. On the basis of the interpretation of high‑resolution satellite images from 2005, 2009 and 2012 obtained from public sources, the report provides the following information. 74. In respect of military structures it notes that there are trenches and revetments in the village and adjacent to it in the 2005 and 2009 images, a build-up having taken place in the intervening period, while after 2009 trenches seem to have fallen into disuse, as is shown by the fading visual signature of these trenches in the 2012 image. In the area surrounding Gulistan, military activity was apparent. Military build-up between 2005 and 2009, concerning trenches, revetments, military buildings, vehicles and vehicle tracks was followed by continued military development in the region between 2009 and 2012, but of a different type, in that trenches and revetments fell into disuse, while military buildings and vehicle presence continued to increase. 75. In respect of the destruction of buildings, the report indicates that most of the approximately 250 houses in the village are destroyed, the term “destroyed” meaning that they are no longer intact. The report notes that building degradation and vegetation overgrowth obscured building footprints and made structure counts difficult. While in 2005 some thirty-three buildings remained intact, there were only seventeen in 2009 and thirteen in 2012 left. For most of the destroyed buildings, outer and interior walls have been preserved while roofs have collapsed. While the state of the buildings suggests fire as a possible cause of destruction, the report emphasises that the cause of destruction could not be determined via satellite imagery, and, in particular, it was not always possible to state whether or not buildings had been destroyed deliberately. No cemeteries were identifiable on the satellite imagery. The report suggests that this might be due to vegetation overgrowth. 76. Prior to their accession to the Council of Europe, Armenia and Azerbaijan gave undertakings to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly committing themselves to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (see Parliamentary Assembly Opinions 221 (2000) and 222 (2000) and Committee of Ministers Resolutions Res(2000)13 and Res(2000)14). The relevant paragraphs of Parliamentary Assembly Opinion 222 (2000) on Azerbaijan’s application for membership of the Council of Europe read as follows. “11. The Assembly takes note of the letter from the President of Azerbaijan reiterating his country’s commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict and stressing that Azerbaijan’s accession to the Council of Europe would be a major contribution to the negotiations process and stability in the region. ... 14. The Parliamentary Assembly takes note of the letters from the President of Azerbaijan, the speaker of the parliament, the Prime Minister and the chairmen of the political parties represented in Parliament, and notes that Azerbaijan undertakes to honour the following commitments: ... 14.2. as regards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: a. to continue efforts to settle the conflict by peaceful means only; b. to settle international and domestic disputes by peaceful means and according to the principles of international law (an obligation incumbent on all Council of Europe member states) resolutely rejecting any threatened use of force against its neighbours;” Resolution Res(2000)14 by the Committee of Ministers on the Invitation to Azerbaijan to become a member of the Council of Europe refers to the commitments entered into by Azerbaijan, as set out in Opinion 222 (2000), and the assurances for their fulfilment given by the Azerbaijani Government.

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5. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Oryahovo. 6. On 13 June 2002 he, his son and his brother were attacked by a group of men and beaten with bats and metal rods. The applicant was left unconscious with a traumatic brain injury and broken skull and a dislocated finger. Both injuries, necessitating his hospitalisation for several days, were classed as intermediate bodily harm under Bulgarian law. 7. On the same day the police opened criminal investigation and carried out an inspection of the scene of the attack. In the next few days they interviewed the applicant and the other victims, as well as witnesses including suspected participants in the incident. 8. The applicant, his son, and his brother explained that the family had made a living out of collecting snails and had been in a dispute with K.K., who had been buying them. On 13 June 2002 the applicant and the other victims were in his son’s car, looking for K.K. to discuss the situation. They found him, accompanied by about fifteen other men in four cars. The men were carrying metal rods and bats. The applicant, who was the first to approach them, was hit by K.K. in the face. The others then proceeded to hit him until he fell to the ground. His brother was also attacked, receiving several blows and a broken arm. His son remained in the car and managed to lock the doors, but the car was heavily damaged. The attack took place at a bus station in front of onlookers. 9. A man named T.K. said that in the days preceding the attack, members of the applicant’s family had been threatening K.K. On 13 June 2002 he heard K.K. call friends he did not know. After gathering, the group left in their cars to look for the applicant and his family. When they found them, K.K. had a short exchange with the applicant and the two groups then started to fight. K.K.’s friends were carrying bats. T.K. stated that he had not participated in the fight, and had attempted to pull K.K. away. He had not seen who had started it. 10. When interviewed as a suspect on 14 June 2002, K.K. refused to explain what had happened. 11. On 14 June 2002 the police investigator appointed an expert with the task of making an assessment of the injuries sustained by the applicant. The parties did not provide the Court with a copy of that report. 12. On 24 and 25 July 2002 the investigator in charge of the case requested information from the police on any links the parties might have had with criminal groups, on T.K. and K.K., and on several other suspected participants in the attack. The information provided showed, in particular, that T.K. had various previous convictions. 13. The parties did not inform the Court of any other investigative actions taken at that stage. 14. In a decision of 2 December 2002 a prosecutor from the Oryahovo regional prosecutor’s office stayed the criminal proceedings, reasoning that some of the perpetrators of the attack had not been identified. That decision was quashed on an unspecified date by the Oryahovo District Court. It appears that K.K. was charged after this date for his participation. 15. On 21 March 2003 the prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against K.K., considering that the charges against him had not been proven. Once again this decision was quashed by the Oryahovo District Court. 16. On 31 October 2005 the prosecutor once again stayed the criminal proceedings on the grounds that the perpetrators had not been identified. Following an appeal by the applicant, that decision was quashed on 4 March 2006 by the Oryahovo District Court. It was noted, in particular, that in a letter dated 19 April 2004, not presented to the Court, the Vratsa regional prosecutor’s office had acknowledged that the investigator had not done what had been necessary to find the perpetrators, and that no action in that regard had subsequently been taken. Accordingly, there were no grounds to stay the proceedings. 17. On 9 June 2006 the investigator once again interviewed the applicant and his son. The applicant gave the names of four of the attackers, including K.K. and T.K. His son stated that one of them had had a tattoo on his right arm. 18. The parties did not inform the Court of any other action taken between then and 18 February 2009, when the case was sent by the investigator to the prosecutor with a proposal to indict K.K. and T.K. On 2 December 2009 the Oryahovo district prosecutor’s office indicted the two men, having separated the material concerning the remaining attackers, who had not been identified, into a new case file. 19. On 20 April 2012 the Oryahovo District Court convicted the two accused of causing bodily harm to the applicant, and ordered them to pay 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The parties did not provide a copy of that judgment’s reasoning. 20. Following an appeal, the District Court’s judgment was quashed on 9 October 2012 by the Vratsa Regional Court, which remitted the case to the prosecution. It considered that the proceedings had been flawed by a number of procedural breaches at the pre-trial and trial stages. In particular, the prosecutor had failed to accurately describe in the indictment the relevant factual circumstances and roles played by each of the accused, seeing that there had been other unidentified participants in the attack. In addition, the District Court had not examined some discrepancies in the evidence collected, and its reasoning had not been thorough and consistent. 21. Following the judgment above, the Oryahovo district prosecutor’s office reintegrated the material concerning the unidentified attackers into the original case file. Considering that the case could only properly be examined once all of the perpetrators had been identified and accused, in a decision of 3 December 2012 the prosecutor in charge once again ordered a stay of the criminal proceedings. He instructed the head of the local police directorate to continue the search for the remaining perpetrators. 22. The applicant appealed against this decision, but it was upheld on 18 December 2012 by the Oryahovo District Court. 23. Following inquiries by the prosecution, in letters of 8 April and 25 June 2013 and 24 March 2014 the local police directorate stated that none of the persons searched for had been identified.

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7. The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Varna. The second applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Sokobanja. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9. The applicant ran a transport business as a sole proprietor (samostalni preduzetnik) from 1979 to 1995. 10. In 1990 and 1991 the applicant provided transport services to the Pocerski Metković local community (Mesna zajednica Pocerski Metković) in Šabac. According to the contract, the local community which had engaged his services had levied what were known as self-imposed local taxes (“SILT”; samodoprinosi). 11. On an unspecified date in 1994 the applicant, together with two other traders, brought an action against the local community requesting payment for services provided. The applicant’s business ceased to exist in 1995 and the applicant, as its sole proprietor and manager, took over the outstanding claim as its successor. 12. The local community was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General (javni pravobranilac) of the Šabac Municipality, the latter being the founder of the Pocerski Metković local community. 13. On 11 May 2001 the Valjevo Commercial Court ordered the local community to pay the applicant 24,400 Serbian dinars (RSD) with interest. The court also ordered the local community to pay all the claimants jointly the amount of RSD 54,520 for the costs of the civil proceedings. On an unspecified date soon after, the judgment of 11 May 2001 became final and enforceable. 14. On 29 April 2003 the applicant applied to the Valjevo Commercial Court for enforcement of the said judgment, and proposed that this be carried out by bank transfer. 15. On 6 October 2003 the Valjevo Commercial Court ordered the enforcement, also awarding the applicant RSD 4,664 for the costs of the enforcement proceedings. Thereafter, the said court transmitted this enforcement order to the competent department of the Central Bank in Kragujevac (Narodna banka Srbije). 16. On 9 June 2006 and 8 October 2007 the applicant enquired about the enforcement. He was informed that the debtor’s bank account had been frozen since 13 November 2003 and that he had been registered as the second-class priority creditor. 17. According to the Government, on 19 December 2003 the Commercial Court archived the enforcement case as terminated. The applicant, however, had apparently not received any decision to this effect, nor did the Government submit that such a decision had been adopted. 18. Pursuant to the rules of court, the enforcement court was obliged to keep the case file for five years from the date on which the enforcement proceedings had been terminated. After the enforcement court’s proposal of 4 August 2010 for elimination of worthless registration material and archival holdings, the next day the Inter-Municipal Historical Archive in Valjevo destroyed the applicant’s case file in accordance with the Law on Cultural Goods (published in Official Gazette of the RS, no. 71/94). According to the relevant court’s statement, no minutes of the destruction or the record of any documents had been made. 19. The judgment of 11 May 2001 remains unenforced. 20. The applicant ran an installation business “Instalaterska radnja Sokosat” as a sole proprietor. The business entered into a contract with the Sokobanja local community (Mesna zajednica Sokobanja), regarding the maintenance of the cable-satellite transmission system on the territory of that local community. 21. As the local community failed to pay for the services provided, the business brought an enforcement action before the Zaječar Commercial Court. On 9 October 2002 that court ordered direct enforcement of the outstanding invoices (izvršenje na osnovu verodostojne isprave). 22. On 9 December 2002, following an appeal by the local community, the court suspended the enforcement order and referred the case to civil proceedings. 23. The local community was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General of the Sokobanja Municipality, the latter being the founder of the Sokobanja local community. 24. On 17 April 2003 the Zaječar Commercial Court partly upheld the enforcement order, and ordered the local community to pay the business (i) the amounts of RSD 342,098.80 of debt and RSD 18,672 for the costs incurred within the enforcement proceedings, (ii) interest on the two above amounts, (iii) interest on a number of other amounts that would appear to have been previously paid but with no interest calculated, and (iv) RSD 36,172 for the costs of the civil proceedings. 25. On 25 December 2003 the High Commercial Court partly upheld the judgment of 17 April 2003, while ordering the Commercial Court to re-examine the costs of the civil proceedings. 26. On 2 February 2004, with a revision on 25 March 2004, the Zaječar Commercial Court ordered the local community to pay RSD 67,750 on account of the costs of the civil proceedings. 27. On 27 May and 2 June 2004 respectively the Zaječar Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the judgment of 17 April 2003 and of the decisions of 2 February and 25 March 2004 (domestic enforcement cases nos. I 306/04 and I 348/04) by debtor account transfer (plenidbom novčanih sredstava i prenosom na žiro-račun poverioca). The applicant was also awarded the amounts of RSD 20,574 and RSD 8,275 for the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 28. On 31 January 2005 the applicant informed the Niš Commercial Court that the Sokobanja Municipality had been failing to transfer funds from its account to the debtor’s or the applicant’s bank accounts, and that the local community had been running its activities through the municipal bank account or a special account for collection of self-imposed local taxes in order to deceive the creditor. As there were practically no funds in the debtor’s account, the applicant requested the court to change the means of enforcement by auctioning off the debtor’s specified movable assets, in particular the cable-satellite transmission system. 29. On 10 February 2005, the Niš Commercial Court (i) joined the two above-mentioned set of enforcement proceedings; (ii) repealed the enforcement order by bank account transfer; (iii) declined jurisdiction in respect of auction of the assets and transferred the case to the Sokobanja Municipal Court; and (iv) refused the applicant’s request for adoption of an interim measure in this respect. 30. On 9 May 2005, having established that the debtor was the owner of the cable-satellite transmission system, the Sokobanja Municipal Court ordered enforcement by assessment and auction. On 30 May 2005 the court revised the order, correctly increasing the debts. 31. On 13 March 2007 the Municipal Court suspended the enforcement proceedings (obustavio izvršenje) which had been instituted on the basis of the above-mentioned orders of May 2005. The court clarified that the expert engaged by the court could not establish the exact ratio of ownership between the debtor and the current distributor in respect of the cable-satellite transmission system, and stated that the citizens’ interest should not be compromised by selling it, as they had financed the development of the system. The court lastly instructed the applicant to initiate a new set of proceedings to determine the debtor’s exact ownership in respect of the system, as well as other movable and non-movable assets, and to settle the applicant’s claim in that direction. On 12 June 2007 the panel of the same court summarily upheld that decision. 32. On 29 November 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for protection of legality as unavailable in the present case. 33. The applicant did not initiate a new set of civil proceedings as instructed. 34. The judgment of 17 April 2003 and the decisions of 2 February and 25 March 2005 remain unenforced to date. 35. Upon the request of the respondent’s State Agent before the Court, the President of the Administrative Court provided it with a succinct summary and her interpretation of the relevant domestic law. The president stated that neither the financial duties and liabilities of the local communities, nor the broader liability of the municipalities or the State for the local communities’ debts, were subject to regulation by it. The president also observed that the subject matter of the unenforced contracts in both the above cases was within the competences of the local communities in question (letter of 9 August 2011, Su I-1 212/11).

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6. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Nalchik. She is the mother of the late Ms Madina Eneyeva, who was born in 1972 and died in 2007. 7. On 26 May 2007 Ms Eneyeva was at a local market together with Mr A, her brother-in-law. One of the stall-holders, Ms G.Zh., suspected that Ms Eneyeva was planning to steal a skirt from her market stall. The two women started a fight and exchanged a few blows. The police arrived and arrested the applicant’s daughter on suspicion of theft. Ms Eneyeva and Mr A. were both put into a police vehicle. 8. The parties have presented different accounts of the subsequent events. 9. According to Mr A., after Ms Eneyeva had been put into the police vehicle, an unknown police officer with the rank of lieutenant approached the vehicle, kicked Ms Eneyeva fifteen times on her legs and then left. Once at the police station, Mr A. was released. According to the applicant, upon arrival at the police station, her daughter was taken to the interrogation room situated on the second floor (in Russian referred to as the “third floor”) of the police station and was beaten by the police officers until she fainted. While Ms Eneyeva was unconscious, unspecified police officers threw her out of the window. 10. In the Government’s submission, it was alleged that during the drive to the police station Ms Eneyeva had unsuccessfully tried to escape from the police vehicle. Upon arrival at the police station, she had been escorted to the office of Lieutenant A.Zh. She had refused to answer his questions and had asked for permission to use a lavatory. Since there were no female police officers in sight, A.Zh. escorted her to the lavatory on the second floor of the police station himself and waited for her in the corridor outside the locked door. Being unguarded, Ms Eneyeva jumped out of the window in an attempt to escape from police custody. 11. Ms Eneyeva was then taken to hospital by ambulance. She underwent urgent surgery. At 10.45 p.m. on 26 May 2007 Ms Eneyeva died of complex internal injuries to her head, body and extremities. 12. The applicant then sought an investigation into her daughter’s suspicious death and ill-treatment. According to the applicant, her daughter had no suicidal tendencies; she had three young children and a good home in recently obtained social housing. 13. On 26 May 2007 the prosecutor’s office of Nalchik (“the town prosecutor’s office”) were notified that Ms Eneyeva had jumped out of the window of the police station and then died. 14. On an unspecified date the town prosecutor’s office opened pre‑investigative inquiry no. 663-07 into the circumstances of Ms Eneyeva’s death. 15. On 28 May 2007 a forensic expert issued a post-mortem report, according to which ‒ apart from various injuries ‒ Ms Eneyeva had bruises and scratches on her legs, those injuries being unrelated to the fall. 16. On 4 June 2007 the deputy town prosecutor received and examined the applicant’s complaint, in which she alleged that her daughter had been thrown out of the window by the police officers. He stated that the investigator in charge of pre-investigative inquiry no. 663-07 had not yet carried out all requisite investigative measures, in particular, that he had not questioned a number of persons: the police officers who had arrived at the market once Ms G.Zh. had reported the theft, those who had arrested Ms Eneyeva, the ambulance crew members and Mr A. Nonetheless, the deputy town prosecutor concluded that “there is nothing to suggest that Ms Eneyeva’s death on 26 May 2007 in Nalchik was a violent one, as suggested in the complaint; moreover, there is no proof that the police officers of Nalchik were implicated in her death ...” and decided to dismiss the applicant’s complaint. 17. After a pre-investigation inquiry, on 5 June 2007 an investigator from the Nalchik prosecutor’s office concluded that the applicant’s daughter “had made another attempt” to escape from the police station, and refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to Ms Eneyeva’s death. 18. The above decision was later quashed by the Nalchik prosecutor who considered that it was established that the applicant had sustained injuries at the hands of an unspecified police officer. 19. On 17 June 2007 the investigator again refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s daughter’s death. The decision was quashed by the deputy town prosecutor on 20 June 2007. 20. On 7 July 2007 the investigator from the Nalchik prosecutor’s office refused to institute a criminal case to investigate the circumstances of Ms Eneyeva’s death. 21. On 27 July 2007 the Kabardino-Balkariya prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 7 July 2007 refusing to open an investigation into Ms Eneyeva’s death. However, no further investigation into the circumstances of the death appears to have taken place and no further decision regarding this appears to have been taken after 27 July 2007. On 11 August 2007, however, Lieutenant A.Zh. was subjected to disciplinary measures for failure to comply with the procedure concerning escorting detainees. 22. For reasons unknown, on 27 July 2007, while quashing the refusal to investigate the death of Ms Eneyeva, the Kabardino-Balkariya prosecutor’s office opened criminal proceedings in case no. 25/35-07 to investigate an alleged abuse of powers by an unidentified police officer who had hit Ms Eneyeva on her legs inside the police vehicle at the market on 26 May 2007. They referred to the medical expert report (see paragraph 15 above) according to which there had been bruises on Ms Eneyeva’s legs which had not been caused by the fall out of the window. The authorities relied on Article 286 of the Russian Criminal Code (“abuse of power by a public official”). The circumstances of Ms Eneyeva’s death lay outside the scope of the investigation in question. 23. On 13 September 2007 the applicant was granted victim status in case no. 25/35-07. 24. On 22 October 2007 a forensic expert carried out another examination of Ms Eneyeva’s body to establish the origin of the scratches and bruises on the legs and concluded that the injuries in question had been inflicted by blunt objects. 25. On 27 October 2007 the investigation into the abuse of power was stayed for failure to identify those responsible. On 19 November 2007 the investigation was resumed and eventually stayed again on 28 February 2008. 26. In view of the authorities’ failure to institute a criminal investigation into Ms Eneyeva’s death, the applicant brought court actions on 31 January 2008 and on 26 February 2008. Eventually, on 23 June 2008 the Nalchik Town Court held in favour of the applicant, finding that the investigator’s failure to investigate had been unlawful. 27. On 8 April 2009 the applicant again complained about the investigator’s lack of action. On 14 May 2009 the Nalchik Town Court granted the applicant’s claim and held that the investigator’s continued failure to comply with the judgment of 23 June 2008 was unlawful. 28. On 23 March 2010 the deputy prosecutor of Nalchik quashed the ruling of 28 February 2008 staying the investigation (see paragraph 25 above). 29. Accordingly, on 31 March 2010 the investigation was again resumed. 30. On 11 April 2010 Mr K., a police officer on duty on 26 May 2007, was questioned as a witness. No essential information was obtained as a result of the interview. 31. In April 2010 the investigators tried to find eye-witnesses who had seen Ms Eneyeva at the market on 26 May 2007, but in vain. Also in April 2010 the certificate of death of Mr A. was included in the case file. 32. On 15 April 2010 the investigators decided to carry out a forensic medical examination of the injuries found on Ms Eneyeva’s body by a group of experts on the basis of the documents in the case file. However, no information on the results of the examination had been made available by 29 January 2015. 33. On 25 April 2010 Mr Ch., a police officer on duty on 26 May 2007, was questioned as a witness. He did not provide any relevant information. 34. On 8 May 2010 two shop assistants were questioned as witnesses and submitted that they had not seen the police using any force on Ms Eneyeva. 35. On 8 May 2010 the investigation was suspended owing to failure to find those responsible. 36. On 28 August 2010 the investigation was resumed. 37. On 22 September 2010 the investigators questioned Ms B. as a witness. Ms B. was the wife of Mr O., a forensic expert who had examined Ms Eneyeva’s dead body in 2007. Ms B. stated that her husband had left for Moscow for a lengthy period of time. 38. On 30 September 2010 the investigation was again suspended. 39. On 21 January 2015 the investigation was resumed. An internal inquiry was instituted by the Investigative Committee of Russia regarding poor supervision of the investigation of case no. 25-35/07. The investigation appears to be still pending. 40. The applicant stated that after 23 March 2010 she had not received any update on the progress of the investigation from the domestic authorities.

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5. The applicants are a married couple. They were born in 1976 and 1988 respectively. The first applicant is serving a sentence of imprisonment in Kholodnogirska penitentiary no. 18. The second applicant lives in Kharkiv. 6. At the time of the events the applicants lived in a two-room apartment together with Ms S., the second applicant’s mother. 7. Ms S. had a pending judicial dispute with a certain Mr L. regarding the inheritance of a house. The applicants, being interested in improving their living conditions, provided her with various support in those proceedings. 8. In April 2008 the first applicant visited Mr L. with a view to dissuading him from pursuing the mentioned dispute. 9. On 27 June 2008 Mr L. was found dead in his house. His throat was cut and there were multiple stabs and cuts on his body. One of the windows was broken, and there was a hoe lying nearby on the floor. 10. On the same day a criminal investigation was opened into the murder. 11. At about 10 p.m. on that same day the applicants came home where several police officers were waiting for them. The applicants were taken to the Kharkiv Frunzenskyy District Police Department (Фрунзенський районний відділ Харківського міського управління Головного управління внутрішніх справ МВС України в Харківській області). According to the applicants, this was done under the pretext that they needed to be questioned in respect of the first applicant’s debt vis-à-vis some third persons. As submitted by the Government, the police apprehended the applicants on suspicion of the murder of Mr L. 12. The applicants were questioned regarding their whereabouts and actions on 26 and 27 June 2008. They stated that they had been together shopping, going to the cinema, having meals and so on. 13. Both applicants were held in the police station during the night on 27-28 June 2008. They stated in their submissions to the Court that they had not been subjected to any ill-treatment at that stage. 14. On 28 June 2008 the first applicant underwent a forensic medical examination. According to its report, which was completed on 1 July 2008, the examination revealed multiple bruises and sores on virtually all the body of the first applicant. They included about thirty multidirectional sores on his back and about the same number of sores on his hips, buttocks and knees. The expert gave the following possible dates of the injuries: a bruise on the left shoulder and a sore on the torso – between 22 and 24 June 2008; bruises on the right part of the torso – between 25 and 27 June 2008; sores on the torso, the back and the legs – between 25 and 27 June 2008. Those sores were assessed as having possibly originated from the impact of some protruded blunt objects, such as glass fragments. 15. According to the first applicant, he sustained the injuries discovered on 28 June 2008, having accidentally fallen a day before. 16. The first applicant submitted the following account of the subsequent events. After the aforementioned examination, he was taken to the criminal investigation department, where one of the officers suggested that he should confess to the murder of Mr L. As the first applicant refused to do so, some officers brought in a dirty mattress and a gas mask. They put wet cloths around his wrists and handcuffed him. One of the officers punched him in the solar plexus and pushed him on the mattress. The others twisted his arms behind his back and made him split his legs while beating him to his torso and genitals. The gas mask was then put on the first applicant’s face and the vent was blocked. He fainted several times and was made regain consciousness with cold water. The gas mask was repeatedly put on his face, and he was made inhale cigarette smoke. At the same time, his genitals were being twisted. The first applicant’s ill-treatment continued as described above in several rounds. The officers threated him that they would bring his wife and do the same with her in front of him. He then signed a confession to the murder of Mr L. He had, however, to adjust it many times as dictated by the police. The first applicant was made memorise his confession. 17. The Government maintained that the first applicant had not been subjected to any ill-treatment. 18. According to the detention logbook of the police station, the first applicant was detained at 8.15 p.m. on 28 June 2008 as a criminal suspect. 19. On the same date, 28 June 2008, the investigator appointed a lawyer, Mr M., for the first applicant. He maintained his initial confession during his questioning in the presence of the lawyer. According to the first applicant, he did so fearing further ill-treatment and not having the possibility to talk with the lawyer in private prior to the questioning. 20. As regards the second applicant, in the morning on 28 June 2008 she was taken from the police station to her home, where a search was conducted. The police allegedly threatened her that if she did not testify against her husband, they would accuse her of a drug-related offence having previously planted drugs in her apartment. 21. Thereafter the second applicant was taken back to the police station, where she made a statement, allegedly under coercion, that her husband had admitted to her having murdered Mr L. More specifically, the second applicant submitted that three police officers had hit her several times on the head and had pulled her by the hair. 22. On 30 June 2008 a reconstruction of the crime was conducted in the presence of the first applicant’s lawyer, during which the first applicant confessed again to the incriminated crime. About forty minutes later he, however, retracted his confession as made under duress and complained of his ill-treatment by the police. According to the first applicant, he did so after his first confidential conversation with his lawyer, which had taken place only after the aforementioned event. His lawyer subsequently stated that he had had his first confidential meeting with the first applicant prior to the latter’s questioning on 28 June 2008 (see paragraph 65 below). 23. On 1 July 2008 the investigator submitted for approval to the Frunzenskyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor’s Office”) an application for the first applicant’s pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. The prosecutor decided to question the first applicant himself before taking a decision. He saw that the first applicant had multiple injuries and concluded that his confession had been extracted by force. Furthermore, the prosecutor noted a number of discrepancies between the confessions of the first applicant and the autopsy report in respect of the victim. The second applicant was questioned too. She submitted that she had incriminated her husband under duress. 24. As a result, the prosecutor refused to approve the investigator’s application, quashed the latter’s decision on bringing the charges against the first applicant and released him. The prosecutor also directed his subordinates to question both applicants about their ill-treatment in police custody and to duly report their submissions. 25. While the applicants were making written statements in the office of the deputy prosecutor, at about 10.30 p.m., four officers of the Frunzenskyy District Police Department, namely, the first deputy head of the department (перший заступник начальника райвідділу) Mr K. (see also paragraphs 68 and 83 below for additional information about this police officer), the head of the criminal investigation department (начальник сектору карного розшуку) Mr Pap., his deputy (заступник начальника карного розшуку) Mr Par., and the chief of the investigation unit (начальник слідчого відділу) Mr M., broke in. Disregarding the objections of the deputy prosecutor and constraining him by force, they took the applicants out. There were more police officers waiting in the corridor. 26. The applicants were handcuffed and taken to the Frunzenskyy Police Department, located near the prosecutor’s office. On the way, one of the officers allegedly hit the first applicant in the right hip. 27. The first applicant was taken to an office on the ground floor where he was made sit quiet with one of the police officers. The office was locked from inside, and the light was switched off. About an hour later, he was taken to another office where the bars on the window could be removed. He was made write a note that he had left the police station at 10.30 p.m. The first applicant was then taken outside through the window behind the building of the police station. The police officers placed him a car, parked that car in a nearby yard and waited there till 3 or 4 a.m. It is not known what happened thereafter. It appears that the first applicant remained detained (see, in particular, paragraph 31 below). 28. After the police had taken the applicants from the prosecutor’s office, at 11.15 p.m. the deputy prosecutor visited the Frunzenskyy Police Department. According to the visitors’ logbook, the applicants had entered the building at 10.30 p.m. and had been remaining there. Having searched the premises, the prosecution officials found the second applicant in tears in one of the offices. The first applicant could not be found. Police officer K. submitted to the prosecutor a note on behalf of the first applicant, but without his signature, that he had left the police department at 10.30 p.m. The prosecution officers went to the applicants’ home, but the first applicant was not there. 29. On 30 June 2008 the first applicant complained to the prosecution authorities that he had been ill-treated by the police (see also paragraph 22 above). It appears that the second applicant raised a similar complaint too. 30. On 2 July 2008 the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against the police officers K., Pap. and Par. under Article 365 § 2 of the Criminal Code (exceeding power by engaging in the violent or degrading treatment of a victim) in respect of the events of the evening of 1 July and the night from 1 to 2 July 2008. 31. On the same date the applicants were assigned victim status and questioned. Also on that day the first applicant underwent a forensic medical examination, after which he was released. 32. On 4 July 2008 a report of the first applicant’s examination was delivered. It documented multiple bruises on his shoulders, torso, back, chest, arms, hips, thighs and legs. Their colouring varied from yellowish to violet and purple. The first applicant also had crust-covered sores and bruises on both wrists. The expert concluded that most of the injuries had originated from the impact of blunt objects between 23 and 27 June 2008. One bruise on the first applicant’s back below the left shoulder blade was assessed as sustained between 30 June and 1 July 2008. Lastly, according to the report, some sores on the right forearm, the left elbow and the right ankle had been inflicted on the first applicant on 1 July 2008. 33. On 2 July 2008 the second applicant underwent a medical examination too, which did not reveal any injuries. According to the second applicant, she complained to the expert that she had headaches and was advised to apply for help to a hospital. 34. On 5 July 2008 she was examined by a neurosurgeon in the local hospital who reported that she had bruises of the head soft tissues. 35. On 8 and 9 July 2008 the applicants were questioned in respect of their alleged ill-treatment by the police. They recognised the officers K., Pap. and Par. at the photos shown to them. 36. On 11 and 14 July 2008 a reconstruction of the events of 28 June and 1-2 July 2008 was conducted with the applicants’ participation. 37. On an unspecified date the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor’s Office directed the management of the police department to establish the whereabouts of the officers K., Pap. and Par., who had not complied with the prosecutor’s summonses. 38. On 18 July 2008 the Chief of the Frunzenskyy Police Department wrote to the prosecutor that all those three officers were on sick leave and that their whereabouts were being established. 39. On 21 August 2008 the police officers K., Pap. and Par. were questioned in respect of the alleged ill-treatment of the applicants. K. and Pap. refused making any statements. It is not known what Par. stated. 40. On 2 September 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation in respect of the aforementioned police officers, having concluded that the wrongdoings imputed to them were to be qualified as interference with the activity of a law-enforcement official (the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor) rather than exceeding power by engaging in the violent or degrading treatment of a victim. Accordingly, a different criminal case was opened, with a new charge. 41. On an unspecified date in October 2008 K., Pap. and Par. were questioned again. They denied any ill-treatment of the applicants. As to their behaviour on 1 July 2008, they submitted that they had believed that the applicants had posed a danger to the deputy prosecutor. 42. On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor, who had been involved in the events of 1 July 2008, gave detailed statements regarding those events, when questioned as a witness in the framework of the criminal investigation against the police officers. 43. Between 19 and 23 December 2008 the first applicant underwent a forensic medical examination with a view to establishing the origin of his injuries documented earlier. 44. On 23 December 2008 the examination report was completed. It reiterated the findings of the first applicant’s examinations of 28 June and 2 July 2008 (see paragraphs 14, 31 and 32 above). Furthermore, it noted that the sores on the first applicant’s wrists could have been caused by his handcuffing. The report stated that the findings of the earlier examinations did not contradict the other materials in the case file. 45. On 30 December 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office terminated the criminal investigation into the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment, for the lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. The prosecutor noted a contradiction in the first applicant’s submissions, according to which his only injury as of 28 June 2008 had been a bruise on his right hip from an accidental falling the day earlier, and the forensic medical examination report of 28 June 2008, which had established many others injuries. The expert who had examined the first applicant on 2 July and 23 December 2008, had stated during his questioning by the prosecutor that the injuries sustained by the first applicant after 28 June 2008, were located in the body parts accessible for self-infliction, apart from the bruise below the left shoulder blade. It appeared impossible to establish the origin of that bruise. The expert had also noted that no injuries on the first applicant’s genitals had been revealed. Overall, the prosecutor concluded that those few injuries which were dated later than 28 June 2008 “could have been sustained [by the first applicant] in circumstances unrelated to any use of force by the police against him”. It was also noted in the ruling that the first applicant had never raised any complaints before the medical personnel of the detention facility. Lastly, as regards the allegations of the second applicant that she had been ill-treated by the police, the prosecutor noted that her medical examination of 2 July 2008 had not revealed any injuries. In sum, the ill-treatment allegations of both applicants were found to be without basis. 46. On 9 October 2009 the Kharkiv Chervonozavodskyy District Court (“the Chervonozavodskyy Court”) quashed the above decision and directed the prosecution authorities to carry out an additional investigation. It noted, in particular, that the contradictions between the first applicant’s submissions that he had had no injuries as of 28 June 2008 and the forensic medical examination report of that date, according to which he had had numerous injuries, had to be clarified. 47. On 27 May 2010 a reconstruction of the events of 28 June and 1‑2 July 2008 was conducted with the participation of the first applicant. He maintained the allegations of his ill-treatment by the police. 48. On 27 and 28 May 2010 a forensic medical expert examined the available documents in respect of the first applicant with a view to clarifying the origin of his injuries. The case file does not contain a copy of the respective report. It appears that, according to the expert’s conclusions, only some of the first applicant’s injuries could have originated in the circumstances as described by him. 49. On 31 May 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office once again terminated the investigation initiated on 2 July 2008 for the lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers concerned. The prosecutor noted that, even though the first applicant had sustained some injuries while in detention, the exact time and circumstances of their infliction remained unknown. Furthermore, the location of some of the injuries allowed to presume that they could have been self-inflicted. The prosecutor also noted that the first applicant had not “personalised” his injuries: in other words, that he had not specified who exactly of the police officers had inflicted each specific injury on him. The investigator had also questioned the forensic expert who had conducted the examination of the first applicant on 28 June 2008 who had confirmed her findings. 50. On the same date, 31 May 2010, the Regional Prosecutor’s Office delivered two additional rulings refusing to open a criminal case following the complaints of ill-treatment by each of the applicants. 51. On 29 November 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a court of first instance in the first applicant’s trial, ordered the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the first applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment by the police. It noted that, according to the first applicant, the presence of his fingerprint on the hoe seized at the crime scene was explained by the fact that the police officers had put that hoe in his hands by force during his ill-treatment. 52. On 28 December 2010, 25 April and 5 May 2011 the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor’s Office, to which the investigation was re-assigned, refused to open a criminal case against the police, having mainly relied on the respective rulings of 31 May 2010 (see paragraphs 49 and 50 above). All those decisions were, however, quashed as premature. 53. On 18 May 2012 the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor’s Office again refused to open a criminal case against the police officers allegedly involved in the applicants’ ill-treatment. 54. On 11 June 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant by an expert panel with a view to clarifying his injuries and the possible circumstances of their infliction. The investigator noted that similar examinations, which had been carried out earlier, were inconsistent in their conclusions. 55. On 12 July 2012 a panel of experts issued a forensic medical examination report, in which they stated, in particular, that the first applicant might have sustained all the injuries (with the exception of two bruises and one sore) at the time and under the circumstances as indicated by him during the reconstruction of the events conducted on 27 May 2010 (see paragraph 47 above). 56. On 6 August 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, which was apparently investigating the matter in parallel, refused to open a criminal case against the police officers too. On the same day it terminated, on similar grounds as earlier, the criminal investigation initiated on 2 July 2008. On 5 September 2012 the Chervonozavodskyy Court quashed both aforementioned rulings as based on an incomplete and one-sided investigation. 57. On 8 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 58. On 22 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office refused to open a criminal case against the police officers in respect of the second applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. On the same date it discontinued the criminal investigation against the police officers in respect of the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, which had been launched on 2 July 2008 (see paragraph 30 above). 59. The first applicant unsuccessfully challenged the aforementioned decision before the domestic courts. 60. On 11 November 2008 the first applicant was committed for trial. 61. On 18 May 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Kharkiv Court”), sitting as a court of first instance, remitted the case for additional investigation. It noted, in particular, that the first applicant’s initial confession could not be relied on because he had later retracted it as obtained under duress and given that his ill-treatment complaint had not been duly investigated. The court also indicated a number of contradictions between the first applicant’s confessions and the case-file materials. 62. On an unspecified date the additional investigation was completed and the case was referred to the trial court again. 63. On 26 January 2011 the Kharkiv Court found the first applicant guilty of murder for profit and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. It relied, in particular, on the first applicant’s initial confessions, which he had later retracted. Furthermore, the court referred to certain material evidence inculpating the first applicant (such as the hoe with his fingerprint found at the scene of the crime, and his shorts with a blood stain possibly originating from the victim). His allegations that he had been ill-treated and that the evidence against him had been fabricated were dismissed as unsubstantiated. 64. On 20 September 2011 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court quashed the above judgment mainly on the ground that Article 3 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law required a proper investigation of the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, which had not been done. The Higher Court also remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 65. On 4 July 2012 the Kharkiv Court once again found the first applicant guilty of murder for profit and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. The court relied, inter alia, on his confessions made on 28 June 2008 and further reiterated on 30 June 2008 in the presence of his lawyer (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above). It was noted in the judgment that the first applicant’s lawyer, who had represented him on the aforementioned dates, had been questioned and had stated that he had had a confidential conversation with the first applicant prior to the first questioning and that there had been no violations of the criminal procedure. 66. As regards the first applicant’s allegation that he had been ill-treated on 28 June 2008, the court noted that the prosecution authorities had thoroughly investigated the matter and had decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers concerned. The Kharkiv Court referred in this connection to the prosecutor’s decision of 18 May 2012 (see paragraph 53 above). At the same time, having regard to the ill-treatment allegation on the part of the second applicant, which was still under investigation, the Kharkiv Court decided not to rely on her statements incriminating the first applicant, which she had made during the pre-trial investigation. 67. In so far as the first applicant complained of his kidnapping by the police from the prosecutor’s office on 1 July 2008, the trial court noted that the investigation was ongoing and that it was not necessary to wait for its outcome for the pronouncement of the judgment. 68. The first applicant challenged the judgment on points of law. He submitted, in particular, that that there was no solid evidence proving his guilt and that the trial court had wrongly relied on his self-incriminating statements obtained under duress, without any adequate investigation of his ill-treatment complaint. He referred in this connection to the Court’s judgment in the case of Savin v. Ukraine (no. 34725/08, 16 February 2012), which concerned that applicant’s torture by K., the same police officer who was involved in the alleged ill-treatment of the applicants in the present case. 69. On 22 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court and its reasoning.

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5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lived in Nakhchivan at the time of the events. 6. The applicant was an independent journalist and worked as a reporter of the Yeni Musavat newspaper in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (“the NAR”). 7. The applicant was the author of two critical articles about the economic and political situation in the NAR published in the Yeni Musavat newspaper in August and September 2007. The articles, entitled “Food has become considerably more expensive in Nakhchivan (owing to Vasif Talibov’s “care”)” (“Naxçıvanda ərzaq xeyli bahalaşıb (Vasif Talıbovun “qayğısı” sayəsində)”) and “Vasif Talibov rebuilds his native village” (“Vasif Talıbov doğulduğu kəndi söküb yenidən tikdirir”), related in particular to the activities of the Speaker of the Parliament of the NAR, Vasif Talibov, who is also “the supreme official of the NAR” (“Naxçıvan Muxtar Respublikasının ali vəzifəli şəxsi”) under its Constitution of 29 December 1998. 8. On 17 September 2007 the applicant also met a reporter from Radio Liberty and helped him to prepare a report about the economic and political situation in Nakhchivan. 9. At around 2 p.m. on 22 September 2007, when the applicant was in a café in the village of Jalilkand in the Sharur District, the head (M.M.) of the district department of the MNS approached him. M.M. accused the applicant of publishing defamatory articles about the NAR, and ordered four men in uniform to arrest him. 10. The applicant was taken to the premises of the MNS in Sharur by car. His mobile phone was taken away while he was being transported there. When they arrived at the MNS building M.M. told him to stop spreading misinformation about the NAR. He further ordered agents of the MNS to explain to the applicant “the meaning of his activity as a reporter” and left the room. 11. Five men then began to torture the applicant. They hit him repeatedly with truncheons, kicked him and punched him in the head. Approximately an hour later, M.M. returned and asked the applicant whether he had “grown wise”. M.M. further ordered five men to make the applicant “understand his mistakes”. The applicant was then subjected to further ill-treatment. 12. The applicant was subsequently taken to the office of M.M. who demanded that he become a member of the ruling political party (YAP - Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası) and to write defamatory articles about opposition leaders. The applicant refused to do so. 13. The applicant was released at 2 a.m. on 23 September 2007; his mobile phone was returned to him. Before his release, M.M. told him that if he did not “grow wise”, he would be brought back to the MNS. 14. Following his release, the applicant immediately informed the Yeni Musavat newspaper of his arrest. According to the applicant, his relatives also took photographs of the injuries on his body. However, he was unable to see a doctor immediately, because it was night. 15. The Government submitted that on 22 September 2007 the applicant was not arrested, detained or ill-treated, by agents of the MNS. 16. In the morning of 23 September 2007, while the applicant was about to go and see a doctor, he was arrested by the police and taken to the Sharur District Police Office. 17. The head of the Sharur District Police Office, M.H., shouted at the applicant, demanding to know why he had informed the press of his arrest. 18. On the same day the applicant was taken to the Sharur District Court, which sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention for obstructing the police. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at the hearing. Two police officers testified against him. The applicant was not provided with a copy of the court decision. 19. At the request of the applicant, after the court hearing he was taken to the Sharur Central Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor who observed numerous bruises on his body. However, he was not provided with any medical record. 20. At around 2.30 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was approached by the police in the centre of the Jalilkand village, because he was using loud and abusive language in public. As the applicant did not comply with the police request to stop his unlawful action, an administrative offence report was drawn up and he was taken to the police station. It appears from the report that the applicant refused to sign it. The relevant part of the report of 23 September 2007 provides as follows: “On 23 September 2007 H. Mehdiyev did not comply with the lawful request of the police, and continued to shout and use insulting language in the centre of the Jalilkand village.” 21. On the same day the Sharur District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 310.1 (obstructing the police) of the Code of Administrative Offences, and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention. It was specified in the decision that it could be appealed against within ten days of its receipt. The relevant part of the decision of 23 September 2007 provides as follows: “Assessing the evidence at its disposal, the court concludes that the fact that Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu [the applicant] committed the above-mentioned administrative offence is proved by his confession and the statements of witnesses heard in connection with the case. The court qualifies the administrative offence committed by Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Therefore, he must be found guilty under this article and must be punished.” 22. The Government produced a receipt confirming that the applicant had received a copy of the court decision at 5.30 p.m. on 23 September 2007. The receipt was dated 23 September 2007 and signed by the applicant. 23. At around 7 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was taken to detention facility no. 8 to serve his sentence. 24. During his detention the applicant was deprived of food and water. He was not provided with any bedding and was forced to spend nights outside on a concrete walkway. The applicants’ hands were handcuffed at all times and due to the detention facility’s proximity to the River Aras, he suffered badly from mosquito bites. 25. At midnight on 25 September 2007, the Minister of National Security of the NAR arrived at the detention facility with two other men. They appeared to be drunk. The Minister insulted the applicant and then all of them beat him. 26. The Government submitted that there was no detention facility no. 8 in the NAR and the applicant was detained in the temporary detention facility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the NAR. 27. The applicant was detained alone in a cell which was 2.8 metres high, 5.2 m long, and 2.2 m wide. The cell was adequately lit and ventilated. The applicant was provided with a separate bed and bedding, as well as with other necessities. In support of their account of the conditions, the Government produced photographs of the detention facility in question and the cell in which the applicant was held. 28. The Government also produced a medical record dated 16 December 2013 from the doctor on duty at the detention facility at the time. According to the medical record, at 7.45 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was examined by the doctor and “no pathology was revealed” (heç bir patalogiya aşkar edilmədi). The medical record of 16 December 2013 provides as follows: “Examination by the doctor on duty: At 7.45 p.m. on 23 September 2007 Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu accompanied by two police officers came to the admission department for examination. During the examination of the citizen, no pathology was revealed. The blood pressure was 120/85 mm Hg. Practically healthy (praktiki sağlam). The doctor on duty: I.M.” 29. Following the applicant’s administrative detention, various Azerbaijani and international human rights organisations asked the Azerbaijani authorities for the applicant’s release. In particular, on 26 September 2007 Reporters Without Borders submitted a request to the Azerbaijani authorities to stop the applicant’s harassment because of his journalistic activities and to order his release. In respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by agents of the MNS on 22 September 2007, the request reads: “The day before his arrest, Mehdiyev was forced into a car by national security ministry agents and held all day in a ministry building where, according to Reporters Without Borders’ sources, he was beaten because of his reports about gas and electricity problems in the region.” On 27 September 2007 the Committee to Protect Journalists also called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to stop the applicant’s harassment because of his journalistic activities and to carry out a thorough investigation in this respect. The applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment by agents of the MNS on 22 September 2007 and his administrative detention were also covered by the Azerbaijani media. 30. On 27 September 2007 the applicant was released from administrative detention. No official reason was given for his early release from detention. 31. According to the applicant, after his release from detention, he was treated in the Nakhchivan Republic Hospital, however all the medical institutions refused to give him an official medical certificate. The doctor who examined the applicant told him that his seventh rib was broken. In support of his claim, the applicant relied on a medical record dated 1 October 2007 in which the doctor indicated that an X-ray examination of the applicant’s seventh rib had been carried out, without providing further information. Although the name of the doctor appeared on the medical record, it was not signed or stamped and there was no information about the medical establishment in which the examination was carried out. The medical record of 1 October 2007 provides as follows: “Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu; born in 1961 in Jalilkand; X-ray examination of the ribcage and the seventh left side rib in the back armpit (sol yeddinci qabırğasının arxa qoltuqaltı).” 32. Relying on Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the Convention, on 3 October 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office asking for the institution of a criminal investigation. He submitted the same factual information as what he submitted to the Court (see paragraphs 9-14 above) i.e. that at around 2 p.m. on 22 September 2007 he had been arrested, at the request of the head (M.M.) of the district department of the MNS, in a café in the village of Jalilkand in the Sharur District by agents of the MNS, and had been taken to the premises of the MNS in Sharur. Once there M.M. demanded that he stop spreading misinformation about the NAR. He further ordered the agents of the MNS to explain to the applicant “the meaning of his activity as a reporter” and left the room. Five men then began to torture him. They hit him repeatedly with truncheons, kicked him and punched him in the head. Approximately an hour later, M.M. returned and asked him whether he had “grown wise”. M.M. further ordered the five men to make him “understand his mistakes”. He was then subjected to further ill-treatment and was only released at around 2 a.m. on 23 September 2007. Before his release, M.M. told him that, if he did not “grow wise”, he would be brought back to the MNS. 33. The applicant sent his complaint by recorded delivery and it appears from the postal document submitted to the Court that the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office received it on 4 October 2007. 34. The applicant did not receive any reply to his complaint. 35. On 19 October 2007 the applicant lodged the same complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ombudsman. The applicant produced postal documents confirming that the letters had been sent to the above-mentioned authorities. 36. By a letter of 25 October 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant that it had forwarded his complaint to the Prosecutor of the NAR for examination. 37. On 7 November 2007 the applicant re-submitted the same complaint to the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office by recorded delivery. The applicant produced a postal document confirming the receipt of his letter by the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office. 38. By a letter of 23 November 2007, the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the applicant that it had forwarded his complaint to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the NAR for examination. 39. No action was taken in respect of the applicant’s above-mentioned complaints. 40. On 9 February 2008 the applicant lodged an action with the Sharur District Court in accordance with the procedure established by Articles 449‑451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning appeals against actions and decisions taken by the prosecuting authorities. Relying on Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the Convention, he reiterated his previous complaints and asked the court to declare unlawful the prosecuting authorities’ failure to examine his complaint. 41. The applicant did not receive any reply from the Sharur District Court. 42. On 17 March 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court of the NAR, reiterating his previous complaints. He further complained that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint concerning the prosecuting authorities’ inaction. 43. In the meantime, the applicant sent the same complaint to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, complaining that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint. By a letter of 1 April 2008 the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court for examination. 44. By a letter of 29 April 2008, the Supreme Court of the NAR informed the applicant that his complaint could not be examined by it because, as an appellate court, it examined appeals only against first‑instance courts’ decisions. 45. On 28 July 2008 the applicant made representations to the Judicial Legal Council, stating that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint. 46. By a letter of 5 August 2008, the Judicial Legal Council forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court, asking the court to examine the complaint and to take necessary measures. The Judicial Legal Council further asked the Sharur District Court to inform the applicant about the result of the examination. 47. On 8 January 2009 the applicant applied again to the Judicial Legal Council, arguing that, despite its letter of 5 August 2008 sent to the Sharur District Court, he had not been informed of any decision taken by the Sharur District Court. 48. By a letter of 14 January 2009, the Judicial Legal Council forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court. The Judicial Legal Council’s letter of 14 January 2009 was identical in wording to its letter of 5 August 2008. 49. On 18 June 2009 and on 6 January 2010 the applicant sent further letters to the Sharur District Court, reiterating his previous complaints. 50. The applicant did not receive any response from the Sharur District Court.

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5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Miass, Chelyabinsk Region. 6. The applicant is a mentally disabled person. On 19 September 2003 the applicant was arrested on a suspicion of having committed a murder. On the same day the applicant’s mother informed the investigator that the applicant suffered from a mental disease. 7. In the period from 19 September until 25 October 2003 during the questionings conducted in the presence of counsel the applicant confessed, and furthermore confessed to murders of another five persons. 8. On 20 September 2003 the Kopeysk Town Court of the Chelyabinsk Region remanded the applicant in custody upon the investigator’s request. 9. On 14 November 2003 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk extended the applicant’s detention. It was subsequently extended on 18 February, 23 April and 17 September 2004 on the grounds that he was suspected of an especially serious criminal offence, might abscond, reoffend, interfere with the witnesses or obstruct the investigation in some other way. On 17 September 2004 the applicant detention was extended until 25 November 2004. 10. On 4 March 2004 the investigator ordered a psychiatric expert examination of the applicant. 11. On 16 July 2004 the commission of experts concluded that at the time of examination the applicant was in an acute phase of the disease and was not able to account for his actions. It was therefore impossible to determine the applicant’s state of mind at the time of the offences. The experts stated that the applicant posed a danger to society and needed a compulsory treatment at a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision. 12. On 22 October 2004 the applicant’s case was sent by the investigator to the court. 13. On 11 November 2004 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court held a preliminary hearing and extended the applicant’s detention. 14. The court hearings in the applicant’s case started on 17 November 2004. 15. On 11 February 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court ordered compulsory treatment of the applicant in a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision until the improvement of his condition subsequently followed by the expert examination. The court also stated that until his placement to the hospital the preventive measure should remain unchanged. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The court has no reason to doubt the conclusions of the medical experts [of 16 July 2004]. Taking into account the mental state of Y. and the nature of committed acts posing a danger to society and the need for compulsory treatment in a specialized psychiatric hospital with intensive supervision, the court considers that in accordance with Articles 97, 99(1) (g), 101 (4) of the Criminal Code he should be placed in this kind of hospital for compulsory treatment. However the question of releasing him from execution of sentence or criminal responsibility cannot be currently resolved, as it was not possible to resolve the question of sanity of Y. in relation to the alleged acts due to a temporary disorder, namely the depressive episode of severe degree. In these circumstances Y. should be placed in the mental hospital until the improvement of his condition ... The preventive measure should remain unchanged until his placement in the mental hospital.” 16. The applicant’s counsel appealed. In particular she argued that the applicant should be released, as the compulsory treatment of the applicant in a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision would worsen his state of health. He should be treated in a mental hospital of a general type, noting that more than seven months had passed since the last medical examination. 17. On 15 April 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 July 2005 on the grounds that he was suspected of an especially serious criminal offence and the consideration of his case on the merits was still pending. 18. On 12 May 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the decision of 11 February 2005 and remitted the case for fresh examination to the first instance court. The Supreme Court noted that the first instance court had wrongly applied the provisions of the Code of the Criminal Procedure on compulsory medical treatment of offenders who had committed a crime in the state of insanity to the applicant’s case since his state of mind at the time of the commission of the crimes had not yet been established. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “Having examined the materials of the case, grounds of appeal statements ... the court finds that the decision should be quashed due to the violation of rules of criminal procedure. The present criminal case was transmitted to the Regional Court with a view of application of the compulsory measures of a medical nature. The court considered this case according to the Articles 441-442 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... and found that Y. having a mental disease, currently in acute state, committed the acts ... and placed him in a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision for compulsory treatment until the improvement of his condition subsequently followed by the expert examination. However according to the Article 443 (1) of the Criminal Code [Code of Criminal Procedure] the measures indicated in Article 99 of the Criminal Code could be applied only in respect of the person who has committed an act, prohibited by the criminal law, in the state of insanity, or to a person who became mentally ill after committing the crime, which makes it impossible to sentence him or to execute it. Only in such circumstances is it possible to consider the case according to these rules ... provided by Articles 440-443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It follows from the materials of the case, in particular from the results of the expert examination, that Y. does not fall into any of these categories of persons as until improvement of his acute condition it is not possible to establish whether he committed an act, prohibited by the criminal law, in the state of insanity, or has plunged into a state of mental disorder after committing the crime, which makes it impossible to sentence him or to execute the sentence. Nevertheless the court accepted this case and considered it according to Articles 440-443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the same time the court in its decision notes that Y. committed the act, prohibited by the criminal law ... However as it mentioned before it does not follow from the expert report that he was in a state of insanity ... At the same time it follows from the experts report ... that Y. suffers from the acute state of the disease and is in need of the treatment in a psychiatric institution. According to Article 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when it is established that a person to whom detention on remand has been applied as a preventive measure suffers from a mental illness, a court, upon a prosecutor’s request and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the of Code of Criminal Procedure, shall take a decision authorising a transfer of that person to a psychiatric hospital ... The preventive measure shall remain unchanged.” 19. On 23 June 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court scheduled another hearing of the applicant’s case for 7 July 2005. 20. On 7 July 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court returned the case to the prosecutor in order to cure the violations of certain procedural rules. The court also extended the applicant’s detention on remand. The decision remained silent as to the grounds on which such conclusions were based and also as to the period of such authorised detention or the date of its next review. The applicant appealed. In particular he indicated that the period of his detention had expired. 21. On 21 July 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 October 2005 on the grounds that he was suspected of an especially serious criminal offence. 22. On 26 September 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Referring to the gravity of the charges, it noted that there were no reasons which would make it necessary to cancel or change that preventive measure. 23. On 10 October 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 January 2006 on the grounds that he was suspected of an especially serious criminal offence and the consideration of his case on the merits was still pending. 24. On 25 October 2005 the investigator suspended the criminal investigation until the improvement of the applicant’s condition. The deputy prosecutor of the Chelyabinsk Region asked the court to transfer the applicant to a psychiatric institution, relying on Article 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. On the same date the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, relying on Article 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered the applicant’s transfer to a psychiatric institution until the improvement of his condition. The court noted that since it did not deal with the issue of compulsory medical treatment of the applicant it was not authorized at that stage to determine the type of the institution the applicant had to be transferred to. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “It follows from the medical expert’s report that Y. suffers from the acute state of the disease. Currently he is not able to understand the factual character of his actions and control them. Taking into account his current mental state it is not possible to establish his mental state at the material time in respect of the acts he is accused of. Taking into account his current mental state, the presence of the mood disorders, the hallucinatory experiences, the lack of criticism towards his own mental state, Y. represents a danger to society and is in need of the treatment in a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision until the improvement of his condition. According to Article 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court can transfer a person who is detained on remand to an inpatient psychiatric institution when it is established that the person suffers from a psychiatric illness. Taking into account the circumstances of the case the court takes the decision about the transfer of Y. to the mental hospital. However the court does not deal with the issue of compulsory medical treatment of the applicant; thus it is not authorised at that stage to determine the type of the institution the applicant had to be transferred to ... ... Decides to transfer the applicant to a psychiatric institution ...” 26. The applicant’s counsel appealed. She argued, in particular, that she had not been notified of the hearing and the applicant was not in the acute state of the disease anymore. 27. On 17 November 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision on the applicant’s transfer. 28. The administration of the remand prison IZ-74/3 of Chelyabinsk asked the court to determine the type of psychiatric institution the applicant had to be transferred to. 29. On 13 January 2006 the applicant was transferred to the Smolensk psychiatric hospital of a specialized type with intensified supervision. 30. On 17 January 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk taking into account the results of the expert examination of 16 July 2004 decided that the applicant had to be transferred to a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “... Taking into account the medical expert’s report of 16.07.2004 ... the court considers it necessary to transfer Y. to a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision until the improvement of his condition ...” 31. On 2 February 2006 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 17 January 2006. 32. On 22 March 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk upheld the investigator’s decision of 25 October 2005 to suspend the proceedings. The applicant appealed. 33. On 9 June 2006 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 22 March 2006. 34. On 22 September 2006 the medical commission of the Smolensk psychiatric hospital concluded that the applicant’s condition had improved so that he could be transferred back to the judicial and investigation authorities. 35. On 17 November 2006 the Sychevskiy District Court of the Smolensk Region passed the decision to stop the compulsory medical treatment of the applicant. 36. On 28 December 2006 the investigation was resumed and the applicant signed an undertaking not to leave the town and was released. 37. On 10 January 2007 the prosecutor decided to conduct an outpatient psychiatric expert examination of the applicant. The applicant failed to appear and his representative requested an inpatient examination. 38. On 7 March 2007 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk ordered the applicant’s inpatient psychiatric expert examination. 39. On 19 April 2007 the commission of experts delivered the results of the examination. The commission of experts concluded that at the time of the crimes the applicant was in a state of insanity. The experts stated that the applicant posed a danger to society and needed a compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision. 40. On 25 July 2007 the applicant’s case was sent to the court. 41. By decision of 21 August 2007 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court scheduled the hearing of the applicant’s case for 22 August 2007. 42. On 22 August 2007 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court ordered the applicant’s detention for three months with reference to the expert’s report of 19 April 2007 and to the fact that he was suspected of an especially serious criminal offence. 43. On an unspecified date the applicant’s counsel lodged a request for conducting an additional psychiatric expert examination of the applicant. On 22 August 2007 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court granted the request of the lawyer. 44. On 17 November 2007 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until the end of consideration of the case by the trial court. It referred to the seriousness of the charges against him and the fact that he had changed his place of residence without due notification of the investigation authorities. On 14 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 17 November 2007. 45. On 6 December 2007 the commission of experts delivered the results of the psychiatric examination, which confirmed the conclusions reached in the report of 19 April 2007 and the applicant’s inability to take part in the court’s hearings. 46. On 18 February 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court decided to return the case to the prosecutor to correct the inaccuracy in the description of the facts of the case. On the same day the court also extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 22 May 2008. 47. On 12 May 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court scheduled the hearing of the applicant’s case for 23 May 2008 and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 22 August 2008. 48. On 20 August 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 22 November 2008. It referred again to the fact that he had changed his place of residence without due notification of the investigation authorities. 49. On 11 September 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court found it established that the applicant had sexually assaulted and murdered six women and stole the belongings of one of them. Since the applicant had committed the crimes in the state of insanity, the court relieved him of criminal responsibility and ordered his compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution of a specialized type with intensified supervision. The applicant appealed. 50. On 25 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 11 September 2008.

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5. The applicants were born in 1960, 1979 and 1987 respectively and live in Petrinja. 6. The documents submitted by the parties reveal the following facts. 7. On 9 August 1991 the Sisak Police lodged a criminal complaint with the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office against a person or persons unknown, alleging that at about 11 p.m. on 4 August 1991 V.B., who was driving a coach, had been stopped by a road patrol; he had allegedly not complied with the orders given and had been beaten up. He had been taken to the Sisak Hospital where he died soon afterwards. The autopsy was carried out on 5 August 1991. V.B. was the applicants’ respective husband and father. 8. On 9 August 1991 the Sisak Police interviewed Vl.P., who told them that on 4 August 1991 he had been in a bar in Odra when V.H. and M.S., both dressed in Croatian Army uniforms and armed with automatic guns, asked him to drive a coach to Sisak. They had kept the driver, V.B., with them. Vl.P. had complied with the order and two other Croatian soldiers, I.C. and M.B., had accompanied him in the coach while Mi.T., another Croatian soldier, followed them in a vehicle. There had been about ten passengers on the coach. When he subsequently returned to Odra, V.B. was no longer there. 9. In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the “UNTAES”). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 10. V.H. died in 1997. 11. The documents submitted by the parties do not indicate that any steps were taken between 9 August 1991 and 22 October 2002. 12. M.B. (see paragraphs 13, 15, 22, 25 and 26 below) died on 25 June 2002. 13. Between 22 October 2002 and 4 March 2003 the Sisak Police interviewed ten former Croatian soldiers who had been stationed in the Sisak area. D.M., interviewed on 19 February 2003, said that in 1991 he had worked in the Sisak Police. One night he and two of his colleagues, H. and K., had been instructed by Croatian soldiers to go to the Odra Community Centre (Društveni dom Odra), where they had arrested one person. On their arrival, V.H., one of the soldiers who was personally known to D.M., told him that the arrested person could not walk. There had been about twenty men in camouflage uniforms. He had recognised M.B., who was commander of the unit. The arrested man, named [V.]B., had been put into the back of the vehicle. He had been covered in blood, was unconscious and could hardly breathe. They had taken [V.]B. to the police station in Sisak and then to a hospital. 14. D.K., interviewed on 20 February 2003, said that he knew who had beaten up V.B. and that he had told an inspector everything at the material time, and would not reveal the identity of the perpetrators to the police. He described in detail the events of 4 August 1991 with regard to the killing of V.B. and said that it had occurred in the Odra Community Centre where a Croatian Army unit had been stationed. He had been upstairs and heard some noise downstairs. He had gone down to see what was happening, and had seen V.B. lying in blood and surrounded by some soldiers. 15. Several of the soldiers interviewed identified M.B. as the commander of the unit which was stationed in the Odra Community Centre. 16. On 20 February 2003 the Sisak Police also interviewed M.S., who denied any involvement in the abduction and killing of V.B. 17. On 26 February 2003 the Sisak Police again interviewed Vl.P. He stated that he had joined the Croatian Army during the summer of 1991, probably in June, and had been with a unit that was stationed in the Odra Community Centre. The commander of that unit was D.K. On the night when V.B. had been stopped at the checkpoint in Odra, Vl.P. had been in a bar at a crossroads. There had been a lot of people in the bar, but he could not remember any of them. At one point someone had approached him and told him that he must drive a coach back to Sisak because the driver had been apprehended. When he exited the bar he had seen a coach parked on the street and V.B. standing next to it. He had not seen that V.B. had been physically ill-treated. He did not remember who had been there. 18. On 1 October 2003 the Sisak Police compiled a report on the investigation into the killing of V.B. in which the documents from the case-file were listed and described. 19. On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney’s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney’s Offices, which were required to examine all of the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to initiate criminal proceedings. 20. On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney’s Office issued an instruction for implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to the County State Attorney’s Offices, in which they stated that an inspection of their work had indicated two main problems: possible partiality of the persons involved in the pending proceedings as regards the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators; and the problem of trials in absentia. The instructions favoured impartial investigations of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and stressed the duties of those working for the State Attorney in that respect. 21. In January 2009 the Sisak Police interviewed six former policemen or Croatian soldiers who had been stationed in the Sisak area in 1991. S.Š., interviewed on 28 January 2009, said that he had been one of the soldiers in the Croatian Army unit stationed in the Odra Community Centre in 1991 when V.B. had been killed. He had not personally witnessed the event, but had later heard that M.S. and V.H. had taken V.B. from a coach and beaten him, and that J.B. (who died in 2002) had also been present. 22. When interviewed by the Sisak Police on 29 January 2009, D.M. (see paragraph 12 above) reiterated that he had been a policeman between 1981 and 1998, when he had retired. As regards the killing of V.B., one night in August 1991 he had been ordered to go to Odra together with two other officers, H. and K. They had parked a police wagon in front of the Odra Community Centre and he, D.M., had stayed in the vehicle, while H. and K. had entered the building. A certain N.H. had approached him and they had spoken for few moments. He had heard some noise from inside the Odra Community Centre. A member of the special police, M.B., had approached him and told him to park the police wagon at the entrance of the Odra Community Centre. H. and K. had got into the vehicle, saying that “these people are not normal”. A person had been pushed into the back of the police wagon. He had not seen who had done it, but supposed that they had been the members of the special police whose commander had been M.B. When they had arrived in Sisak, the police officers had opened the wagon and D.M. had seen V.B. covered in blood and breathing with difficulty. They had then driven him to the emergency ward. 23. Vl.P. died on 8 February 2009. 24. N.H. died on 13 September 2009. 25. On 13 December 2010 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office asked the Sisačko-moslavača Police Department to collect the relevant information regarding various cases concerning war crimes committed by unknown perpetrators. With regard to the killing of V.B., they asked the police to interview D.B., who had been the duty officer of the Sisak Police between 10 p.m. on 4 August 1991 and 6 a.m. on 5 August 1991, and who had allegedly informed his superiors about the arrest of V.B. He was to be asked in particular which of his superiors he had informed, what had been ordered by the superiors, which operative officer had been in charge and why M.B. and the person called D.[V.H.] – who had been identified by witness D.K. as possible direct perpetrators – had not been interviewed. 26. On 28 December 2010 the Sisačko-moslavača Police Department submitted a report to the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office. The relevant part concerning the killing of V.B. reads: “... a report on the interview with D.B., who was the duty officer of the Sisak Police between 10 p.m. on 4 August 1991 and 6 a.m. on 5 August 1991 is enclosed. In the register of operative duty it is stated that on that day police officers M., K., H., S. and Nj. were in charge of the inquiry into the case of V.B. A criminal complaint against an unknown perpetrator was lodged by officer R.Š. She was interviewed on 5 August 1991 by officer Z.S. who carried out interviews in connection with the B. case. It has not been established why M.B. and the person called D.[V.H.] have not been interviewed.” 27. On 20 June 2011 the Sisak County Police lodged a criminal complaint against Đ.B., V.M and D.B. on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. This included the killing of the applicants’ relative. On the same day Đ.B., Head of the Sisak Police Department in 1991 and 1992, V.M., police commander at the border territory of Sisak and Banovina in 1991 and 1992 and Deputy of Sisak Police Department, and D.B., a member of the “Wolves” Unit of the Croatian Army, were arrested. 28. On an unspecified date the investigation was opened and on 13 July 2011 Đ.B. died. 29. On 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office lodged an indictment against V.M. and D.B. at the Osijek County Court, alleging that they had been in command of the unit whose unknown members committed a number of crimes against the civilian population between July 1991 and June 1992, including the killings of the applicants’ relative. They were charged with war crimes against the civilian population. 30. On 9 December 2013 a first-instance judgment was delivered. V.M. was found guilty of war crimes against the civilian population in that he, in his capacity as “the commander of police forces in the broader area of Sisak and Banovina” and “Deputy Head of the Sisak Police”, had allowed the killings of persons of Serbian origin and had failed to undertake adequate measures to prevent such killings. The relevant part of the judgment concerning the applicants’ close relative: “on 4 August 1991 in Odra Sisačka [the police] unlawfully arrested and took from a ‘Slavijatrans’ coach its driver, V.B., who was then brutally beaten by several unidentified members of the reserve police, stationed in Odra, under the command of M.B., and who died of the injuries thus sustained the same evening in the Sisak Hospital.” 31. On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of V.M. and increased his sentence to ten years’ imprisonment. 32. On 15 February 2005 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Petrinja Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their close relative. The claim was dismissed on 6 April 2005 and was upheld on appeal by the Sisak County Court and the Supreme Court on 11 September 2008 and 19 May 2010 respectively. The national courts found that the claim had been submitted after the statutory limitation period had expired. 33. A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants was dismissed on 18 May 2011. 34. Following the criminal conviction of V.M., the applicants sought the reopening of these proceedings in the Petrinja Municipal Court. Their request is now pending.

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6. The first applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Helsinki. The applicant company has its seat in Helsinki. 7. The first applicant is a journalist for a weekly magazine, Seura, which is published by the applicant company. 8. On 16 March 1998 and 19 November 2001 respectively the Finnish national public service broadcasting company broadcast two TV documentaries in its MOT series which concerned mould-infested houses and the protection of forests. They were made by several reporters, including Mr M.B. who was the complainant at the origin of criminal proceedings that were subsequently brought against the first applicant (“the complainant”) (see paragraph 12 below). 9. On 18, 19 and 23 March 2002 the first applicant criticised on two separate internet discussion sites, namely on the “Ylevi” site maintained by the Green League (Vihreä liitto, Gröna förbundet) and the “Journalism” site maintained by Tampere University, the manner in which these two documentaries had been made. He wrote, inter alia, that: “[The complainant] is a fanatic warrior of the faith for whom facts are just in the way. He has indisputably been caught at cold, intentional lying.” “[The complainant] in fact claimed that the house was healthy but that one cheating company doing mould inspections had managed to find some insignificant mould spots because of which a completely unnecessary court case was initiated. ... Contrary to [the complainant’s] assurances, N.N.’s former house was rotten. ... [The complainant] must have known that. He is thus lying cold-bloodedly and intentionally. ... He thus knew that [the expert] lied but he let it happen.” 10. On 31 May 2002 the first applicant published a four-page article in Seura magazine, which is one of the biggest nationwide family magazines in Finland, on similar lines. The article had been approved by a lawyer before publication. The article included passages such as: “[The complainant] claimed that over 10% of the Finnish forest area was already protected and that conservationists demanded that an additional 10-15% of the forest area in Southern Finland should be preserved. These figures are fabricated.... S.S. thus said in [the documentary] the complete opposite of what her research showed and what was stated in her grant application. When I interviewed [the complainant], he admitted that he had known about the grant and the 1993 research. Still he accepted S.S.’s clearly groundless testimony in the documentary.” 11. On 5 July 2002 Seura magazine published a two-page reply in which the reporters who had made the documentaries in question replied to the first applicant’s criticism. In response to this reply, the magazine published a page-long counter-reply by the first applicant. 12. On 21 September 2002 the complainant reported the matter to the police, asking them to investigate whether the first applicant was guilty of defamation when he called him a liar in his writings. By letter dated 16 October 2002 the complainant presented his claim for damages against the applicants. 13. On 15 and 17 November 2002 the applicant company and the first applicant submitted their replies to the police. On 5 December 2002 the first applicant was questioned by the police for the first time. 14. On 23 April 2004 the public prosecutor pressed charges in the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) against the first applicant for defamation. The complainant concurred with the charges brought by the public prosecutor. The compensation claim presented by him previously on 16 October 2002 was joined to the criminal charges. The applicants claimed that the Espoo District Court was not the appropriate court because the forum norms had changed in January 2004. 15. On 8 June 2005 the Espoo District Court found in an interlocutory decision that it was a competent court to decide the case. Even though the article in question had been written and the decision on its publication had been taken in Helsinki, the magazine had been printed and the consequences of the article had arisen in Espoo. As the internet articles concerned the same matter, the court was competent to examine them too. 16. On 26 January 2007 the Espoo District Court dismissed all charges against the first applicant and the compensation claim directed against the applicants. It found first of all that all the articles should be considered as one matter because they concerned the same topic, irrespective of whether they had been published on internet or in the magazine. Both the first applicant and the complainant had had grounds for their views and they had not said anything that was clearly untrue. The documentaries made by the complainant had provoked public discussion, but they had also provoked harsh criticism on account of the manner in which they were presented. Therefore the threshold for acceptable criticism of the complainant and of his documentaries was higher than usual. As there had been insinuations in the documentaries that some of the expert opinions had been false, the first applicant was allowed to use similar wording vis-à-vis the complainant. 17. By letter dated 26 February 2007 the complainant appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten). The Appeal Court held oral hearings on 16 and 17 October and on 27 October 2008. 18. On 30 January 2009 the Appeal Court convicted the first applicant of defamation and sentenced him to 40 day-fines, totalling 240 euros (EUR). He was ordered to pay EUR 2,000 plus interest in damages to the complainant. The applicant company was ordered, together with the first applicant, to pay EUR 4,000 plus interest in damages to the complainant as well as his costs and expenses of EUR 25,500, plus interest, in total. The court found first of all that the Espoo District Court had been the competent court in the matter. As to the merits, the Appeal Court mentioned Article 10 of the Convention and the principles expressed therein as well as adverting to the Court’s case-law and legal literature on Article 10. With reference to the Court’s case-law, it recalled that even if everyone was guaranteed freedom of expression, it was not permitted to defame others or to disseminate false information on anybody. In this respect a journalist had the same responsibility as others. The Appeal Court then found that it had not been proved that the complainant had disseminated wrong information in the documentaries in the manner recounted by the first applicant, except for the misleading information given in the context of the reportage on mould-infested houses which the complainant had failed to rectify. It appeared also from the witness statements that different statistical information existed as far as the conserved forest area in Finland was concerned, such that it could not be said that the figures given by the complainant had been fabricated. The first applicant had thus imparted false information on the complainant and these accusations had been serious. The first applicant had not therefore had strong reasons or probable cause to hold his own accusations to be true. The fact that freedom of expression was guaranteed under Article 12 of the Constitution as well as under Article 10 of the Convention together with the fact that the complainant was also a journalist and that the first applicant had been able to give grounds for his own opinion in the media, did not entitle the first applicant to impart the above-mentioned false information. Nor did the first applicant have the right to call the complainant a liar. On these grounds the first applicant was found guilty of defamation. 19. By letter dated 31 March 2009 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), claiming that all facts had been correct in the article published in Seura magazine. Moreover, during the oral hearing in the Appeal Court, the applicants had not been allowed to put questions to the opposing party’s witnesses, whereas the opposing party had been able to question their witnesses. Also the evidence provided by the applicants had not been adequately taken into account by the Appeal Court and the proceedings had taken place in the wrong forum. 20. On 11 December 2009 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal.

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5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Gherla. 6. On 29 March 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to commit crimes and blackmail, and was placed in the Cluj County Police detention centre. On 28 July 2009 he was transferred to Gherla Maximum Security Prison (“Gherla Prison”) where he remained until 2 February 2011, when his pre-trial detention was replaced by the courts with a prohibition on leaving the town. 7. The applicant alleged that for a period of four months, between 29 March and 28 July 2009, he was held in the Cluj County Police detention centre in a 4 sq. m underground cell with three other prisoners. The cell had no window or ventilation and the walls were covered in mould. He had no free access to water and the cell was extremely unhygienic. He further alleged that access to the toilet was given in accordance with a daily programme which in his opinion amounted to psychological torture. 8. In Gherla Prison the applicant was detained in severely overcrowded cells. He submitted that for a certain period he shared a 38 sq. m cell with twenty-six other prisoners. The cell also lacked ventilation because the window was covered with two rows of metal bars and additional metallic netting. 9. The applicant supported his allegations with statements from Mr S.O.A., who was held in a neighbouring cell in the Cluj County Police facility, and from Mr F.F., who was also held at the Cluj County Police centre at the same time as the applicant, and who afterwards shared a cell with him in Gherla Prison. They confirmed entirely the applicant’s allegations. 10. In the Cluj County Police detention centre the applicant shared a cell of 4.14 sq. m with another prisoner (thus 2.07 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). The cell was not provided with any sanitary facilities such as a toilet, sink or shower. However, the centre had two common bathrooms where the prisoners had access to the toilet on request and to the showers twice a week. The cell had no window to the outside, but ventilation was ensured by a window located above the door and protected with bars and metallic netting. 11. In Gherla Prison the applicant was initially held in quarantine for three days in a 35 sq. m cell which he shared with fourteen other prisoners also in pre-trial detention (thus 2.33 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). The cell had seven rows of bunk beds. 12. Between 31 July and 19 August 2009, still in quarantine, the applicant shared a cell of 43.25 sq. m with twenty-five other prisoners (thus 1.66 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). This cell had eight rows of bunk beds. 13. On 19 August 2009 the applicant was transferred for six days to a cell measuring 16.38 sq. m together with five other prisoners (thus 2.73 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). The cell had three rows of bunk beds. 14. Between 24 August and 9 November 2009 the applicant was held in a cell of 15.96 sq. m with four other prisoners (thus 3.19 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). The cell had three rows of bunk beds. On 9 November 2009 the applicant was moved from this cell at his own request. Between 9 November 2009 and 22 September 2010 he was placed in a cell which measured 51.52 sq. m and accommodated fifteen prisoners (thus 3.43 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). The cell had nine rows of bunk beds. 15. Between 22 and 29 September 2010 the applicant shared a cell measuring 46 sq. m with twenty-two other prisoners (thus 2 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). The cell had nine rows of bunk beds. 16. From 29 September 2010 until his release on 2 February 2011 the applicant shared a cell of 15.96 sq. m with four other prisoners (thus 3.19 sq. m of personal space for each inmate). 17. The cells the applicant was held in were all provided with several tables and a window of 2 m x 1.40 m which ensured natural light and ventilation. 18. On 22 April and 24 July 2010 the applicant requested to be allowed conjugal visits from his wife. His requests were refused by the prison authorities, with the reasoning that no right to such visits was provided for prisoners in pre-trial detention. 19. The applicant complained about these two refusals before the post sentencing judge in Gherla Prison. He relied on Article 82 of Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of sentences, which provided that prisoners on remand should benefit from the same rights as convicted prisoners. On 10 June 2010 the judge rejected the applicant’s complaint, holding that in accordance with Article 44 letters a) and b) of the Regulation for the enforcement of Law no. 275/2006 the applicant, being a prisoner on remand, did not have the right to conjugal visits. 20. The applicant complained against this decision before the Gherla District Court. He underlined that the refusal of conjugal visits amounted to discrimination in breach of the Romanian Constitution and the case-law of the Court. On 26 July 2010 the Gherla District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint with final effect, holding that the decision taken by the judge responsible for the execution of sentences on 10 June 2010 was correctly based on Law no. 275/2006, which provided for the right to conjugal visits only for convicted prisoners. The district court finally held that the contested decision was also in accordance with the Court’s case-law, which stated that restrictions on conjugal visits were not, as such, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. 21. According to the regulations in force at the relevant time the applicant had the right to a maximum of seventy-two visits throughout his entire detention period of one year and ten months. He was visited by his wife sixty-seven times. The remaining visits were by his father and sister. All the visits took place in an area designated for visits, separated by a glass wall and speaking to each other by telephone, under the visual surveillance of prison guards.

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9. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Diyarbakır. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a member of the DTP (Party for a Democratic Society), a pro-Kurdish political party whose dissolution was ordered by the Constitutional Court in 2009, and a member of the Parliament of Turkey. The applicant is currently the co-chair of the HDP (People’s Democratic Party). 10. In 11 October 2007 an article entitled “Turk, here is your enemy” (Türk, işte karşında düşmanın) was published in a Bolu local newspaper, the Bolu Express. The article in question was also published on the newspaper’s website. In it, the author, Mr I.E., made the following statements: “TURK, HERE IS YOUR ENEMY Here are some newspaper titles from the last few days: - A landmine exploded in Diyarbakır. One non-commissioned officer was martyred and three privates were injured. - Twelve village guards were killed while returning to their village in Beytüşşebap. - Attack on a military unit with a rocket-propelled grenade in the Başkale district of Van. A soldier was martyred. - A landmine exploded in the region of Namaz mountain, in Şırnak. A specialist sergeant was martyred. - Ambush in the region of Gabar mountain, in Şırnak. 13 soldiers were martyred. These are news articles which we have come across by chance over the last week or ten days. I would not be surprised if, after research, we found other similar news stories. For almost 25 years, you have deceived us with statements such as ‘they will be avenged’, ‘we are more determined than ever’ or ‘we will eradicate it’. We have had enough of your lies and fairy tales. Civilians and the military, are you fooling children? Or are you mocking the nation? Can there be a State or an army which cannot defeat three to five thousand ‘looters’? Shame on you, since you cannot defeat them. If you are a State, be a State. If you are the Legislature, act as one. If you are the Government, govern. If you are the Judiciary, do what you have to do. It is enough. This has been the last straw! We went crazy when we heard that thirteen soldiers from the Bolu Commando Brigade had been killed last Sunday. How can one preserve one’s sanity? While the instigators of the terrorists who kill our soldiers, policemen, civilians and our protectors without hesitation are under the roof of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, While there are DTP mayors and provincial and district administrators who call these terrorist murderers ‘my brothers/my sisters’ and who wash the carcasses of terrorists who die like dogs, Is it right to chase those who are in the mountains? Are the hit men the real murderers? Do you know who the real murderers are? The real murderers are those who use yellow, green and red, the colours of the PKK[1], in their political party’s flag. They are those who back the bullets of the members of the PKK, murdering bastards, and who call them their brothers and sisters. The real murderers are those who instigate murder. They are: the President of the DTP (Party for a Democratic Society) A.T; the DTP’s Members of Parliament, namely A.A.A., B.Y., M.N.K., A.B., Selahattin Demirtaş, G.K., A.T., P.B., S.T., E.A., S.S., M.N.Y., O.Ö., İ.B., S.B., H.K., Ş.H., F.K., Ö.Ü.; the members of the DTP’s executive council ... and all DTP mayors and presidents of DTP provincial and district branches. Great Turkish Nation, here is your enemy. These persons will be the target of ‘civilian patriots’ as the enemies of Turks, if they do not state that the PKK is a separatist terrorist organisation and that its members are traitors. Instead of chasing the terrorists in the mountains, a few microbes should be ‘wiped out’ and the question should be put to them – ‘one from us, five from you: do you still wish to continue?’ Of course, there will be patriots who will be able to do this. This is society’s intense desire. It is now the majority’s wish that for every security officer who is killed, one of these people should share the same fate. It is time to cut out those organs which suffer from necrosis. ... May God rest the souls of our martyrs and give patience to their families. We sincerely share their pain. We also offer our condolences to the Bolu Commando Brigade. Tomorrow is the sacred Eid. Could you celebrate if you were the parents or siblings of one of the thirteen brave soldiers who lost their lives for their country in the region of Gabar mountain, in Şırnak? Think about it. May your Eid be blessed although it is sad and painful.” 11. On 2 November 2007 the applicant’s lawyer filed a petition with the Bolu public prosecutor’s office, requesting that a criminal investigation be initiated and that Mr I.E. be punished for incitement to commit a crime and incitement to disrespect the law, and for insulting his client. The lawyer also noted that Mr I.E. had committed these offences through the press. In his petition, the applicant’s lawyer stressed that two recent murders (those of Andrea Santoro, a Catholic priest, and Hrant Dink, the editor-in-chief of AGOS, a bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper published in Istanbul) had been committed subsequent to publication of articles on the Internet. He stated that the content of the article openly incited society to kill the persons listed in it, including the applicant, and that by using the expression “murderer” in respect of the applicant, the author had insulted him. 12. On an unspecified date Mr I.E. sent a petition to the Bolu public prosecutor containing his defence submissions. He maintained at the outset that he had defended the Turkish Republic and the Turkish military forces throughout his life. He further contended that, had he committed an offence in his article as alleged by the complainant, then he had committed it under severe provocation. He submitted that the complainant had never condemned the PKK’s activities and that he had referred to PKK members as “brothers and sisters”. Mr I.E. noted that he had been demonstrating solidarity with the families of the martyrs killed by the terrorists and that, were his solidarity to be regarded as an offence, then as a Turkish nationalist he was proud of committing the offence in question. He also claimed that he had criticised the DTP’s ideology and activities in his article and had intended to inform society. He contended that a case had been brought before the Constitutional Court for the DTP’s dissolution, and that the content of his article had been similar to the indictment brought by the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation in that case. He had not used the word “Kurdish” in his article, since he accepted all citizens of Turkey as Turkish. Until the complainant stated “How happy is he who says ‘I am a Turk’”, he would struggle against him. He also maintained that in view of the hundreds of cases brought against DTP members on charges of separatism, aiding and abetting the PKK and hostility towards the State, the complainant had been shameless in daring to file a complaint against him. He further noted that he had targeted those who were terrorists, that is, PKK members, and if the complainant considered himself the subject of the article, then he (Mr I.E.) had been right to identify him as a target. Mr I.E. maintained that nobody had been hurt as a result of his article, but that many people had died as a result of terrorism. At the end of his submissions, he again noted that the applicant had been unable to say “How happy is he who says ‘I am a Turk’” and that, therefore, the applicant’s Turkishness was open to doubt. 13. On 7 December 2007 the Bolu public prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against Mr I.E. In his decision, the public prosecutor stated that the article had been drafted as a reaction to the PKK, an organisation recognised internationally as a terrorist organisation, which had carried out acts of terrorism and killed both civilians and soldiers. According to the public prosecutor, after listing the killings committed by the PKK, the author had stated his opinion as to why society and the State should act together against the killings committed by the PKK and had articulated public reaction and anger in the face of those killings. The author had even criticised the State’s activities in relation to acts of terrorism. The Bolu public prosecutor held that Mr I.E. had severely criticised the DTP, which had not condemned the PKK’s illegal activities and which was considered to have failed to act side by side with society and the State. The public prosecutor considered that the article expressed the author’s opinions and offered a number of proposals with a view to eradicating the terrorist organisation in issue. 14. The Bolu public prosecutor further noted that the PKK’s supporters had described the organisation’s so-called political aims in the press and elsewhere, although its activities had created great anger and hatred in society. The public prosecutor maintained that articles had also appeared in the press expressing society’s anger and hatred. In spite of all these publications, there had been no armed conflict between different ethnic groups in Turkey, due to the culture of tolerance, respect and understanding which existed in the country. The Bolu public prosecutor stated that in the light of the aforementioned sociological and political background in Turkey, the article should be considered as using freedom to disseminate information, to criticise and to comment within the context of freedom of the media, given that it contained somewhat exaggerated criticism of a political party, its members and activities. 15. In his decision, the public prosecutor considered that the case was comparable to another case. According to the judgment in that case, which contained a reference to the Court’s judgment in Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (26 April 1995, Series A no. 313), in cases concerning defamation, if a factual basis existed, then certain expressions could not be regarded as extreme. Considering that freedom of the media included the expression of social reactions and opinions using strong language, and referring to the above-mentioned domestic judgment, the public prosecutor concluded that there was no reason to bring a case against Mr I.E. 16. On 30 July 2008 the applicant’s lawyer objected to the decision of 7 December 2007. In his pleadings, the lawyer reiterated the arguments contained in the submissions of 2 November 2007. He further maintained that the content of Mr I.E.’s article had been alarming and that the DTP members who were named in the article had been marked as targets on account of their adherence to a political opinion. He also noted that the applicant had not been alone in being affected by the article’s content; it posed a further threat to society as a whole. Lastly, the applicant’s lawyer contended that the public prosecutor’s finding that there had been a factual basis for the author’s expressions in the article demonstrated that he had taken the applicant’s political identity into account in issuing his decision. 17. On 21 August 2008 the Düzce Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s objection, holding that the decision of 7 December 2007 had been correct. On 18 September 2008 this decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer. 18. In October 2008 a number of news reports were published in the national press and on the Internet, according to which Mr Mehmet Ali Şahin, Minister of Justice at the relevant time, had set out his position with regard to the investigation into Mr I.E. Mr Şahin stated that, in his view, the content of the article in issue should not have been protected within the scope of the right to freedom of thought and expression. The Ministry of Justice would therefore apply to the Court of Cassation and request that the decision of 21 August 2008 be quashed. 19. On 15 October 2008, through the public prosecutor’s office at the Court of Cassation, the Ministry of Justice applied to the Court of Cassation. 20. On 30 September 2009 the Court of Cassation issued its decision on the Ministry’s request. It noted that the applicant had lodged his objection to the decision of 7 December 2007 outside the relevant time-limit and that the Düzce Assize Court had incorrectly examined the decision on the merits. Considering that the Düzce Assize Court’s decision had nevertheless brought about the correct result, namely dismissal of the objection, the Court of Cassation dismissed the Ministry’s request.

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5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Bratislava. 6. On 9 May 2007 the applicant lodged an action with the Bratislava V District Court (Okresný súd) seeking a ruling declaring that a meeting of flat owners in a block of flats held on 24 April 2007 was contrary to the law, and that the decisions adopted at that meeting were void. The defendant of the action was an entity with legal personality referred to as a community of owners of residential and non-residential premises in the given building (“the defendant”). Such entities are officially registered with the local District Authority (obvodný úrad). The defendant was so registered with the District Authority in Bratislava. 7. On 2 January 2008 a submission was made to the District Court by a lawyer indicating that he was acting on behalf of the defendant and informing the court that on 14 December 2007 the defendant had ceased legally to exist. In that connection he submitted a letter from the District Authority which indicated that the defendant had been struck out of the relevant register on that date, the context being that the administration of the building was no longer the responsibility of the defendant and that that responsibility had been transferred to a specialised agency. 8. On 24 January 2008 the applicant requested that a hearing scheduled before the District Court for 28 January 2008 be postponed sine die. She submitted that she had just learned of the striking out of the defendant by consulting the relevant register, and that she would make a further submission once she had analysed the situation, for which she needed time. The hearing scheduled for 28 January 2008 was accordingly adjourned. 9. On 3 March 2008 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, on the grounds that the defendant had ceased to exist and had no legal successor. In particular, the District Court held that neither the individual owners of the flats in the building nor the newly contracted administration agency could be considered as having succeeded to the defendant’s position in the proceedings. 10. On 20 March 2008 the applicant appealed (odvolanie), raising two principal arguments. First, she submitted that the administration agency was the successor to the original defendant, and that consequently the proceedings should have continued against it. Second, even assuming that the first contention was not correct, the court should not have terminated the proceedings but should rather have stayed them pending the outcome of another set of proceedings before the same District Court, in which a decision was being contested which had been taken at another meeting of the flat owners on 11 September 2007, to the effect that the defendant should be wound up (zrušenie). If that other set of proceedings ended with a ruling declaring the winding up of the original defendant void, its striking out of the given register would lose basis and the proceedings could continue against that defendant. More details about those other proceedings are set out below (see paragraphs 18 et seq.). 11. On 30 May 2008 the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the first-instance decision, noting that the defendant had been struck out of the relevant register and had thereby lost capacity to be a party to the proceedings, in which situation there was no alternative to a discontinuance of the proceedings. The relevant legal provisions were referred to, but no reasons were offered for the latter conclusion. 12. On 7 July 2008 the applicant appealed on points of law (dovolanie), relying on Article 237 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended) (“the CCP”), under which such an appeal was admissible if the courts had prevented a party to the proceedings from pursuing a case before them. In particular, she argued that the Regional Court had provided neither any factual nor legal grounds for its conclusion, as a result of which it was not amenable to review. In addition, she pursued and further developed the same line of argument as in her appeal. 13. On 7 May 2009 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible, holding that the shortcomings alleged by the applicant did not fall within the purview of Article 237 (f) of the CCP. This applied specifically to the alleged deficiency in the Regional Court’s reasoning and the alleged errors of fact and law in the lower courts’ decisions. In addition, in so far as the applicant had contested an error of procedure in that the courts had failed to stay the proceedings rather than to terminate them, the Supreme Court held that staying the proceedings was an option and not a duty of the court concerned, and that the fact that the present proceedings had not been stayed did not make out the admissibility ground cited by the applicant. As the appeal was not admissible, the Supreme Court did not examine the merits of the case. 14. On 17 August 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). She directed the complaint against all three levels of the ordinary courts and pursued and further developed in principle the arguments described above. She considered that the discontinuance of the proceedings had been unlawful, submitted that it had been a mistake of the ordinary courts not to have examined the merits of her claim, and argued that this had amounted to a breach of her rights of access to court and to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 15. On 16 December 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It considered it separately with reference to the individual levels of ordinary jurisdiction involved. As regards the alleged shortcomings in the proceedings leading to the Regional Court’s decision of 30 May 2008, it held that the applicant had failed to submit her complaint within the statutory time-limit of two months. As regards the Supreme Court, it observed that the central argument in the applicant’s appeal on points of law was the alleged error of law. In that regard, it went on to hold, inter alia, that: “The Supreme Court ... rightfully emphasised ... that, as there were no grounds on which the applicant’s appeal on points of law would be admissible, it was not possible for it to review the merits of the Regional Court’s decision. The Supreme Court did not exclude in a binding manner that the decision of the Regional Court was the result of a wrongful legal assessment of the matter, nor did it exclude the possibility of there having been another error in the proceedings before it which had resulted in a wrongful decision on the merits.” 16. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court found that, as regards the admissibility of the applicant’s appeal, the Supreme Court had given relevant reasons for its decision and that that decision was not arbitrary. In particular, it also noted that, should the other set of proceedings end with a ruling declaring the winding up of the defendant void, this would create for the applicant the opportunity to seek reopening of the proceedings in her case. Future examination of that case on the merits thus could not be completely excluded. However, at the same time, the Constitutional Court noted that even if the winding up of the defendant were to be declared void, this would not automatically mean that the defendant would legally come into existence once more. The coming into being of a legal entity such as the defendant required incorporation, which in turn necessitated a decision of the District Authority, and could not result directly from a judicial decision. 17. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 5 February 2010. 18. On 26 September 2007 an individual brought proceedings against the above-mentioned defendant as well as the above-mentioned newly appointed management agency, seeking a ruling declaring void a decision to wind up the defendant taken at a meeting of flat owners in the block held on 11 September 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). 19. After the first dismissal of the action was quashed following the claimant’s appeal, the action was again dismissed by the District Court on 4 April 2012 and, following the claimant’s appeal, by the Regional Court on 19 March 2014. 20. On 14 July 2014 the claimant challenged the judgments last mentioned by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court. The complaint appears to be still pending.

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5. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Bucharest. 6. On 23 August 1996 the Sibiu Police Department remanded the applicant in custody for twenty-four hours on suspicion of intellectual forgery (fals intelectual) and use of forged documents (uz de fals). 7. By an order of 24 August 1996 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office detained the applicant for five days pending trial on account of the seriousness of the offences and the need to protect public order. 8. By an order of 28 August 1996 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention by twenty-five days on account of the seriousness of the offences, the need to protect public order, and the need to prevent him from destroying evidence. 9. The applicant challenged the order before the domestic courts and requested to be released under judicial supervision. 10. By a final interlocutory judgment of 18 October 1996 the Alba Iulia Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s challenge. It held that the applicant’s arrest had been lawful; however there was no lawful reason concerning the applicant that would prevent the court from releasing him under judicial supervision. 11. On 2 September 1997 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant and other co-accused for bribery, influence peddling, complicity in fraud, intellectual forgery, and use of forged documents, and referred the case to the Sibiu County Court. 12. On 17 April 1997, 15 May, 2 July and 17 September 1998 the Sibiu County Court heard the applicant, his co-accused and the witnesses in the case. In addition it allowed the applicant’s and his co-accuseds’ request for documentary evidence, and ordered an expert financial report to be produced in the case. The applicant submitted that he did not agree that a financial expert report should be produced in the case, and refused to submit observations on the report’s objectives following the court’s request. 13. On 15 October 1999 the applicant informed the Sibiu County Court that he had no objections in respect of the financial expert report. 14. On 22 May 2000 the applicant’s chosen legal representative submitted oral observations to the court in respect of the merits of the case. 15. On 15 June 2000 the Sibiu County Court acquitted the applicant on the basis of documentary, testimonial and expert evidence in addition to the applicant’s statements, on the ground that no unlawful act had been committed. 16. The Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the judgment. 17. On 5 December 2000 the Alba Iulia Court of Appeal allowed the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office’s appeal on the merits, quashed the judgment of 15 June 2000, convicted the applicant of bribery, trafficking influence, complicity in fraud, and forgery of privately signed documents (fals ȋn ȋnscrisuri sub semnătură privată) which following changes to the relevant domestic legislation had absorbed the offences of intellectual forgery (fals intelectual) and use of forged documents (uz de fals), and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. 18. The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. 19. On 1 March 2002 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, quashed the judgments of 15 June and 5 December 2000, and referred the case back to the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office for the entire criminal investigation of the case to be carried out again. The court held that the prosecutor’s office had failed to observe the lawful requirements for investigating the case, had established the facts of the case superficially, and had breached procedural rules which affected the very existence of the criminal investigation and the lawfulness of the referral of the case to the court. It noted that the investigation had been carried out mainly by the police, and not by the prosecutor as required by the applicable rules of criminal procedure; the prosecutor’s office had failed to produce all the relevant evidence in the case concerning the existence of the offences and of the defendants’ guilt, and had not clarified the contradictions in the available evidence, in particular between the expert opinions produced in respect of the case. The domestic courts which had examined the case had also been unable to clarify the existence or inexistence of the alleged damage caused by the defendants, or to quantify it. 20. On 16 October 2002 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office referred the applicant’s case to the National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office. It held that given the applicant’s status and the nature of some of the offences the National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office was competent to carry out the criminal investigation in respect of the case. 21. From 27 November 2002 to 13 January 2003 the prosecutor attached to the National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office heard the applicant and his co-accuseds in respect of all the charges brought against them. In addition, the prosecutor also heard two witnesses in respect of the circumstances of the case. 22. On 30 June 2003 the National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings opened against the applicant for bribery and influence peddling on the ground that no unlawful act had been committed. The prosecutor’s office relied on testimonial evidence, including statements by the applicant produced both before the courts and before the prosecutor’s office after the case had been referred back there by the courts. In addition, it referred the case to the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office in order to carry out the criminal investigation opened against the applicant for complicity in fraud and forgery of privately signed documents, on the ground that it was not competent to carry out the investigation in respect of those offences. 23. On 31 July 2003 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation initiated against the applicant. It held on the basis of the documentary, testimonial and expert evidence available in the file that although the applicant’s criminal liability was undeniable, the criminal action initiated against him was time-barred. 24. The applicant challenged that decision, and on the basis of Article 13 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure requested that the authorities continue the criminal investigation initiated against him to enable his innocence to be established. 25. On 11 November 2003 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office allowed the applicant’s challenge and reopened the criminal investigation against the applicant. 26. On 12 November 2003 the prosecutor attached to the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office heard the applicant. On the same date the applicant stated that he did not have any more evidence to request, and that the evidence already produced fully proved his innocence. In addition, he asked the authorities to examine the circumstances of his case by relying on the evidence produced at the pre-trial and trial stages of the proceedings. 27. On 14 November 2003 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation initiated against the applicant. It held on the basis of the testimonial, documentary and expert evidence available in the file, as well as the applicant’s own statements, that although the applicant’s unlawful acts had been proven, the criminal action initiated against him was time-barred. 28. The applicant appealed against the order before the Sibiu County Court. He argued that the prosecutor’s office’s order was unlawful, because the criminal investigation against the applicant had been carried out by the same prosecutor who had previously confirmed the applicant’s indictment. In addition, he denied committing the impugned offences. 29. On 31 May 2004 the Sibiu County Court held that it was not competent ratione materiae to examine the applicant’s action, and referred the case to the Sibiu District Court. 30. On 14 July 2004 the Sibiu District Court allowed the applicant’s action, quashed the prosecutor’s office’s order of 14 November 2003, and referred the case back to the prosecutor’s office for the criminal investigation against the applicant to be reopened. It held that the criminal investigation against the applicant had been carried out by the same prosecutor who had previously confirmed the applicant’s indictment. In addition, by declining to examine the remaining arguments raised by the applicant, it had instructed the prosecutor’s office to assess if the applicant’s complaint concerning the merits of the case was founded. Lastly, it instructed the prosecutor’s office to clearly determine the extent of the applicant’s involvement in committing the impugned offences and also whether he had been indicted for the same unlawful acts of which he had been informed. 31. The applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment, without providing any arguments. 32. On 18 October 2004 the Sibiu County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as ill-founded, and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The court noted that the applicant had submitted the grounds for his appeal on points of law after the debates on the merits of the case had been closed. 33. On 21 March 2005 the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation initiated against the applicant. It held on the basis of the documentary, testimonial and expert evidence available in the file produced both during the previous investigation and during the trials that, although the applicant was guilty of the impugned offences, the criminal proceedings initiated against him were time-barred. In addition, it described the applicant’s involvement in committing the unlawful acts and noted that after its reopening the criminal investigation against the applicant had been carried out by a different prosecutor from the one who had confirmed his indictment. Furthermore, the applicant had been indicted for the same unlawful acts of which he had been informed. In this connection, the prosecutor’s office noted that some of the offences had been examined by the prosecutor’s order of 30 June 2003. Also, following some amendments to the relevant legislation, the domestic legal practice had changed: the offences of intellectual forgery and use of forged documents had been absorbed by the offence of forgery of privately signed documents. 34. The applicant appealed against the decision before the Sibiu District Court by relying on Article 2781 § 8 (c) of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure. He argued that the domestic court should quash the prosecutor’s decision, retain the case for examination, and acquit him. In addition, he contended that the prosecutor’s order had been unlawful because it concerned acts with which the criminal investigation was not concerned, and was in any case not supported by the evidence available to the file. Also, without providing any grounds the investigating authorities had ceased to accuse him of intellectual forgery or use of forged documents. Furthermore, the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office did not follow the mandatory instructions received from the court. There was no evidence in the file that he had been an accomplice to an offence. Lastly, he had disagreed with being charged with forgery of privately signed documents; he had argued that the parties had not been allowed to submit observations in respect of the requalification carried out. 35. On 18 January 2006 the applicant and his chosen legal representative informed the Sibiu District Court that he did not have other requests in respect of the judicial investigation of the case. They further argued, among other things, that although in July 2004 the Sibiu District Court had ordered the prosecutor’s office to reopen the criminal proceedings against him and had given the investigating authorities several instructions, none of those instructions had been followed. In particular, no evidence was adduced, and they were not called to take part in the production of evidence. Also, the investigating authorities did not clarify any of the issues identified by the court. Consequently, they requested that on the basis of Article 2781 § 8 (c) the court should quash the prosecutor’s order and, given that the production of other evidence was not necessary, acquit the applicant in respect of the merits of the case. 36. By a judgment of 2 February 2006 the Sibiu District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the prosecutor’s decision, relying on the available evidence. It held that the investigating authorities had not ceased to accuse him of intellectual forgery or use of forged documents, but had re‑qualified those offences as forgery of privately signed documents. Also, the Sibiu Prosecutor’s Office had observed the mandatory instructions received from the court. In particular, the criminal investigation had been carried out by a different prosecutor from the one who had indicted the applicant, the prosecutor had explained in detail how the applicant had helped and contributed to the commission of the offences, and had verified that the acts for which the criminal investigation had been opened were identical to those indicated by the prosecutor’s order. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s order had clearly described in detail, by relying on evidence, why the applicant had been an accomplice to an offence. Lastly, the applicant’s own statements amounted to an acknowledgment that he had forged privately signed documents. 37. The applicant appealed against the judgment on points of law. He argued that the domestic court should quash the prosecutor’s decision, retain the case for examination, and on the basis of the same evidence available in the file acquit him of fraud and forgery of privately signed documents. He further contended that the evidence in the file and the examination carried out by the prosecutor’s office did not prove that he had committed the offences. Also, the parties had not been allowed to submit observations following the requalification of two of the offences he had been charged with to forgery of privately signed documents. 38. By a final judgment of 30 March 2007 the Bacău County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and acknowledged the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s order of 21 May 2005 and of the first‑instance court’s judgment. It so held on the basis of the available documentary, testimonial and expert evidence produced both during the criminal investigation and before the domestic courts that the applicant had committed the offences of complicity in fraud and forgery of privately signed documents. In addition, the prosecutor’s office had examined the applicant’s guilt on the merits, and had established that the acts had existed and therefore the criminal proceedings against the applicant could not have been discontinued on the ground that no unlawful act had been committed. Therefore, the prosecutor’s office had correctly held that the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been time-barred. 39. In a letter of 28 February 2008 the applicant informed the Court that the criminal proceedings initiated against him had destroyed his reputation, and that a virulent press campaign had been initiated against him and his company at the time of his arrest. The applicant submitted three articles published in local and national newspapers between June 1997 and March 1998 describing the events which led to the charges being brought against him and a chronological narration of the criminal proceedings initiated against him.

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4. The applicant initiated a payment warrant procedure for repayment of debts on 21 July 1997 which, by the protest of the debtor, developed into court proceedings. 5. The procedure was suspended on 16 April 1999 due to other pending court proceedings, which ended in July 2003. 6. Subsequently, after several hearings, the first-instance court partly found for the applicant on 21 December 2003. 7. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court quashed the decision and remitted the case on 10 March 2005. 8. In the resumed proceedings, after the transfer of the case from one court to another for reasons of jurisdiction, the Budapest IV/XV District Court partly found for the applicant on 23 November 2007. 9. On appeal, the second-instance court found for the applicant on 25 September 2008. 10. In review proceedings, the Supreme Court upheld this decision on 14 May 2009. Its ruling was served on the applicant on 27 August 2009.

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4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Bitlis. 5. On 10 November 2000 the applicant and his two brothers, E.B. and B.B., went to Darkolink hill[1] in Güroymak, Bitlis, with their two oxen to collect leaves and twigs. The sledge pulled by the oxen detonated a landmine and the animals died on the spot as a result of the explosion that ensued. The applicant and his brother E.B., both injured, were promptly taken to a health care centre in Güroymak by the gendarmerie, who were stationed at the Cevizyatağı gendarmerie station located approximately 500 metres from the scene of the incident. They were subsequently transferred to the Tatvan Military Hospital for further medical intervention. 6. According to a medical report prepared by the Gölcük State Hospital on 28 March 2001, both of the applicant’s legs were amputated below the knee as a result of the serious injuries he had sustained. It appears, however, that his brother E.B. was only slightly injured. 7. On 12 March 2002 he was declared disabled by a medical panel of the Van State Hospital, which established that his working capacity had been reduced by 80 %. 8. Shortly after the incident, the gendarmes drafted an incident report and made a sketch map of the scene of the incident. The incident report indicated that the explosion had taken place on Darkolink hill located 500 metres from the Cevizyatağı Gendarmerie Station, in an area which had previously been regularly used by the gendarmerie for exploration and surveillance purposes. The gendarmes who drafted the report were of the opinion that the landmine had been planted by members of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an illegal organisation) after nightfall, when the area was not under surveillance, with the intention of targeting the security forces. There was no further information in the report as to when the landmine might have been planted. 9. The gendarmes also took witness statements from the applicant’s brothers and five village guards between 10 and 15 November 2000. 10. In his statement to the gendarmerie the applicant’s injured brother E.B. stated that they regularly used the site of explosion to collect leaves and that he did not want to bring any complaints in connection with the incident. 11. The applicant’s other brother B.B., who was apparently a village guard, gave an account of the events in his statement to the gendarmerie. He submitted that the hill where the explosion took place had been used in the past by security officers from the Cevizyatağı gendarmerie station, as well as by village guards, for surveillance purposes. It was very likely that the area had been mined by the PKK to strike at the gendarmerie forces and the guards whilst on surveillance duty. 12. The other five witnesses, all village guards, confirmed that the hill in question had served as a surveillance and exploration area in the past for both security forces and village guards. According to one of the witnesses, the PKK terrorists must have realised the purpose for which this hill was used and mined the area to harm them. 13. In his statement taken by the gendarmes on 15 November 2000, the applicant said that he regularly went to the hill in question to collect leaves, but he did not know that the area was mined. He also told the gendarmes that he did not wish to lodge any complaints in relation to the incident. 14. On 16 November 2000 the commander of the mine-sweeping unit issued a report, where he stated that the pieces collected at the scene of the incident were parts of mortar ammunition, which was used by the PKK to make “homemade” mines (yapma mayın). 15. On an unspecified date the Güroymak public prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation of its own motion into the circumstances of the incident. On 8 January 2001 the public prosecutor issued a permanent search warrant valid for twenty years from the date of the incident. The search warrant instructed the security forces to carry out a rigorous investigation into the identification of the perpetrator(s) and to report to the public prosecutor’s office every three months. 16. On 14 November 2007 the Van public prosecutor’s office instructed the Güroymak public prosecutor’s office to continue the investigation until the statutory time-limit expired, and to report to it every three months. 17. On 4 August 2003 the applicant filed an action for compensation against the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior before the Güroymak Civil Court of First Instance for the alleged pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage he had sustained on account of the explosion of the landmine, including the loss of his oxen. 18. On 11 February 2004 the Güroymak Civil Court of First Instance issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the action in question fell under the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The first‑instance court held that the criminal investigation conducted by the public prosecutor had not yielded sufficient information to determine whether the landmine that had injured the applicant had been laid by security forces or terrorists. However, even in the latter case, the State could be held responsible for the damage sustained on account of the “social risk” doctrine, which was a no-fault based principle adopted by the administrative courts on the basis of the reasoning that the burden of the damage caused in the fight against terrorism should be shared by society as a whole in accordance with the principles of “justice” and “the social State”. 19. On 3 November 2004 the applicant brought a new action for compensation against the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, this time before the Van Administrative Court. 20. On 16 December 2004 the administrative court requested the applicant, via a letter, to deposit postal costs in the amount of 50,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL[2]) (approximately 26 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) within thirty days of the service of the letter. The letter was served on the applicant on 27 December 2004. Upon the applicant’s failure to make the payment, the administrative court repeated its request on 4 March 2005, and warned the applicant that the proceedings would be discontinued in the event of failure to make the requested payment within thirty days of service of the second letter. This second payment request was received by the applicant on 17 March 2005. 21. On 28 April 2005 the Van Administrative Court discontinued the compensation proceedings on procedural grounds, on account of the applicant’s failure to pay the postal costs despite two warnings that had been sent in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577) (davanın açlmamış sayılması kararı). The Van Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 11 May 2005. 22. The applicant did not appeal against the decision of the Van Administrative Court. However, on 13 May 2005 he filed a petition with that court, arguing that he had made the requested payment on 15 April 2005. 23. On 28 November 2006 the applicant filed a new action against the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior before the Van Administrative Court, requesting compensation in relation to the same incident. 24. In a decision dated 23 February 2007 the administrative court held that it had already delivered a decision on 28 April 2005 on the applicant’s compensation claim against the same parties in relation to the same incident, and the relevant decision had become final by reason of the applicant’s failure to appeal. In view of the “final decision” concerning the dispute in question, the new compensation claim filed by the applicant could not be examined on the merits. The Van Administrative Court accordingly decided to dismiss the action. 25. On 25 July 2007 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Van Administrative Court. He argued mainly that contrary to the finding of that court, its earlier decision of 28 April 2005 did not constitute a “final decision” on the merits of the case, as it had been dismissed on purely procedural grounds. He further stated that he had not appealed against the relevant decision at the time to avoid loss of time. 26. On 6 September 2007 the Van Administrative Court requested the applicant to pay court fees of TRY 53.90, within fifteen days of the service of the request. 27. On 24 September 2007 the applicant made the requested payment, approximately two months after lodging the appeal. 28. On 30 September 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal request. Although it accepted the applicant’s argument that the Van Administrative Court’s earlier decision could not be considered to be a “final decision” on the merits of the dispute, it nevertheless found that the applicant had failed to lodge his compensation claim within the relevant statutory time-limit. 29. On 29 January 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s rectification request.

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6. The first applicant, Mr Juozas Sidabras, was born in 1951 and lives in Kaunas. 7. He graduated from the Lithuanian Physical Culture Institute (currently the Lithuanian Sports University), qualifying as a sports instructor. 8. From 1975 to 1986 he was employed by the Lithuanian branch of the USSR State Security Committee (the KGB). After Lithuania declared independence in 1990, he found employment as a tax inspector. 9. On 31 May 1999 the Lithuanian authorities concluded that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions of Article 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 64 below). As a result, on 2 June 1999 he was dismissed by the tax authorities. 10. The first applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities, claiming that his dismissal under the KGB Act, and the ensuing inability to find employment, were unlawful. The domestic courts dismissed his claims (see Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, §§ 14-16, ECHR 2004‑VIII). 11. On 29 November 1999 the first applicant submitted an application to the Court, alleging that he had lost his job and that his employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application of the KGB Act, in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 12. By a judgment of 27 July 2004 in the case of Sidabras and Džiautas (cited above), the Court found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. It concluded that the ban on the first applicant seeking employment in various branches of the private sector, in application of Article 2 of the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate measure, despite the legitimacy of the aims pursued (see § 61 of the judgment). The Court ordered the State to pay the first applicant 7,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs. 13. By a letter of 2 November 2004 the Court informed the Lithuanian Government that, as no request had been made under Article 43 of the Convention for the above-mentioned cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber, the judgment of 27 July 2004 had become final on 27 October 2004, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. 14. In 2005 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe discussed the question of whether the Court’s judgments in the cases of Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (cited above) and Rainys and Gasparavičius v. Lithuania (nos. 70665/01 and 74345/01, 7 April 2005) had been executed. As regards individual measures, the Government informed the Committee of Ministers that the sum awarded to the first applicant had been paid to him. As regards general measures, the Lithuanian Parliament was preparing amendments to the KGB Act, which would be adopted in the near future. Moreover, in order to prevent similar violations of the Convention, the Lithuanian courts and other institutions had been informed about the Court’s judgment and provided with a translation (see also paragraphs 61-63 below). 15. On 8 December 2006 the first applicant started domestic court proceedings against the State of Lithuania, seeking 257,154 Lithuanian litai (LTL) in pecuniary damages, which he counted as ten years of his tax inspector’s salary, and LTL 500,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which he claimed to have suffered because of the continuing violation of his right to respect for his private life under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The first applicant noted that since 1999 he had been unemployed and registered at the Šiauliai Employment Office (Šiaulių darbo birža), a State institution that provides assistance for job seekers. He argued that, even though he had not been in the service of the KGB for more than twenty years, owing to the restrictions imposed by the KGB Act he had been unable to gain employment in certain branches of the private sector as of 1999. 16. The first applicant also maintained that the Republic of Lithuania had disregarded its obligations under international treaties and the Convention. Without referring to specific judgments of the Court, he considered that the common principles developed by the Court required that Lithuania execute the Court’s judgment in his case without undue delay. It was his view that the Court’s judgment in his case obliged Lithuania to amend the KGB Act. However, the Lithuanian Parliament had ignored the Court’s judgment and had been stalling any amendment of the KGB Act, which the Court had found to be incompatible with the Convention. He concluded that since 27 October 2004, when the Court’s judgment in his case had become final, the Republic of Lithuania had continued to violate his employment rights. 17. On 21 February 2007 at the request of the first applicant, the Šiauliai Employment Office issued him with a document to the effect that he had been registered as a job seeker since 14 June 1999, and that between August 2004 and April 2006 he had been turned down a number of times for jobs proposed to him, “for justified reasons”. As it transpires from other documents presented to the Court, those justified reasons included: a lack of professional qualification or work experience for the posts of business manager at a factory producing television sets and at other local companies; another candidate had been chosen for the post of supervisor at a waste management facility; and a lack of English language skills for a job as a hotel manager. Without further explanation, it was also briefly noted in the document of 21 February 2007 that the first applicant “had not been employed because of applicable restrictions (he could not take up jobs which required him to manage people, pedagogical jobs or work in the security sector) (bedarbis neįdarbintas dėl taikomų apribojimų: negali dirbti vadovaujantį, pedagoginį darbą, apsaugoje)”. 18. On 13 March 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It observed that the Strasbourg Court had awarded him compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he had sustained before the Court had adopted its judgment on 27 July 2004. The first-instance court then turned to the first applicant’s claim about the continued discrimination against him after the Court’s judgment. On this point, it observed that the Šiauliai Employment Office’s document of 21 February 2007 stated that he “had not been employed because of applicable restrictions”. Without elaborating any further on the facts, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court merely observed that that particular document and other materials of the case file did not prove that the first applicant’s right to choose a particular private sector job had been infringed because Article 2 of the KGB Act had not been amended after the Court’s judgment. Accordingly, his claim for damages for the period after the Court’s judgment was dismissed. 19. On 23 March 2007 the first applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. In addition to his previous arguments he further maintained that after the re-establishment of Lithuania’s independence, he had fully cooperated with the Lithuanian authorities and helped to disclose the identities of former KGB officers before they infiltrated the Lithuanian authorities. However, notwithstanding his loyalty to the independent Lithuania and the Court’s judgment in his favour, he had been banned from legal, pedagogical or other jobs because the KGB Act had remained in force. He had been unemployed since June 1999 and thus could not take care of his family. As it appears from his appeal on points of law, the first applicant did not mention any particular instance when he had been refused a job because of his status. Yet he reiterated his point of view that the principles of the Court required that States execute the Court’s judgments without undue delay and within the shortest time possible. 20. On 14 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decision. It observed that the Convention formed an integral part of the Lithuanian legal system and that individuals could directly rely on its provisions before the national courts. Moreover, in the event of a conflict between the legal norms of the Convention and national laws, the Convention was to be given priority. The Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the lower court’s reasoning that the first applicant’s request for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained before 27 July 2004 (the date of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in his case) had to be dismissed because an award had already been made by the Court and the applicant had been paid the sum of EUR 7,000. 21. Regarding the first applicant’s claim in respect of the damage allegedly suffered since then, on the basis of the Court’s judgment in Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy ([GC] nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000‑VIII), the Supreme Administrative Court noted that States undertook to take general and, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible its effects. The States were free to choose how to correct the breach of individual applicants’ Convention rights, provided that the means chosen were compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment. Restitutio in integrum was an important aspect of remedying the violation. 22. That being so, even though the legislator had an obligation to ensure legal certainty and to reconcile domestic law with the norms of the Convention, legislative amendment was not the only way to implement the Court’s judgment. The fact that the KGB Act had not been amended had not in itself breached the first applicant’s rights. A person’s rights could also be secured by administrative decisions and domestic court practices. Both the KGB Act and the Strasbourg Court’s judgment were in force in Lithuania. For the Supreme Administrative Court, in the event of a conflict between them, priority was to be given to the Court’s judgment. Consequently, even though the KGB Act was still in force, a refusal to employ the first applicant in the private sector based on the restrictions contained in the KGB Act would be unlawful. Accordingly, the protection of a person’s rights through the direct application of the Court’s judgment and before any legislative amendments had been adopted was to be considered proper execution of the Court’s judgment. 23. Regarding the facts of the case, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the first applicant had attempted to obtain employment in the private sector. It observed that on 21 February 2007 the Šiauliai Employment Office had issued him with a document certifying that he had been registered as a job seeker since 14 June 1999 and had not been employed because of the restrictions applied to him (see paragraph 17 above). The appellate court noted that in response to its request to explain the reasons for the first applicant’s unemployment in more detail, on 28 December 2007 the Šiauliai Employment Office had provided the appellate court with another document stating that on 14 June 1999 an individual plan for the first applicant’s employment had been prepared with a view to employing him as a lawyer (in-house lawyer; juriskonsultas), because he had more than ten years’ work experience in different companies and institutions in the city of Šiauliai. From 1999 to 2004, more than thirty posts for in-house lawyers had been created in Šiauliai, for which a university degree in law was required and the salary was just higher than minimal salary. The advertisements for those posts had been shown to the first applicant, but he had not been given any of those jobs because the employers considered that he lacked the relevant qualifications. The Šiauliai Employment Office could therefore no longer offer the first applicant other in-house lawyer posts. To increase his chances of finding a job, at the end of 2003 the first applicant had attended computer literacy courses and courses for professional training in the field of administrative work. In 2004 a new individual plan had been compiled together with the first applicant, so that, because he so wished, he could obtain the job of business manager (komercijos vadybininkas). The Šiauliai Employment Office then named six companies which refused the first applicant the job of business manager, administrator and sales manager because other candidates had been chosen or because he lacked knowledge of the English language. 24. The Supreme Administrative Court observed that those two documents were contradictory. The court deemed it proper to rely on the report of 28 December 2007 as it was more recent and, in the court’s opinion, more comprehensive and explanatory. It concluded that the restrictions which the KGB Act imposed on a person’s ability to find employment in certain areas of the private sector had not been applied to the first applicant. The existence of the KGB Act, as such, had not violated his rights and did not entitle him to compensation. The Supreme Administrative Court determined that there was no proof that, after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004, the first applicant had been prevented from obtaining a private sector job because of the restrictions related to the KGB Act. Furthermore, he had not provided any particular information as to who had refused to employ him on the basis of those restrictions and when. It followed that the first applicant had not managed to secure a job because of the local labour-market situation. Moreover, there was no information that he had attempted to find a job in another manner, that is to say not only relying on the assistance of the Šiauliai Employment Office, but had been refused a job because of the legislative restrictions. To give rise to a violation of the Convention, a breach of a person’s rights had to be real, and not hypothetical. Given that there was no proof that after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004 the first applicant could not obtain a job because the KGB Act remained unchanged, and having concluded that his right to work in the private sector could no longer be restricted because of the direct applicability of the Convention, the first applicant’s claim for damages had to be dismissed. 25. On 18 April 2008, four days after the Supreme Administrative Court’s final decision in his case, the Šiauliai Employment Office suggested that the first applicant contact two specific private companies for a post as a business manager. On 6 May 2008 the first applicant came back to the Šiauliai Employment Office and stated that he had not taken the business manager’s job in one of those companies because he did not like the conditions offered. He planned to take part in the interview for the business manager’s job in the other company. Later in 2008 the first applicant was refused positions of business manager, insurance consultant and other jobs a number of times because he lacked foreign language skills, qualifications, or the relevant work experience. As it transpires from the documents in the Court’s possession, he turned other jobs down simply because he deemed that the salary offered was too low or the work place too far away. On 23 December 2008 the first applicant was appointed as a carer for his mother (paskirtas motinos rūpintoju). The Šiauliai Employment Office therefore discontinued its assistance to him. 26. The second applicant, Mr Kęstutis Džiautas, was born in 1962 and lives in Vilnius. 27. On an unspecified date in the 1980s, he graduated from Vilnius University as a lawyer. From 11 February 1991 he worked as a prosecutor. 28. On 26 May 1999 the Lithuanian authorities concluded that, from 1985 to 1991, the second applicant had been an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB and that he was therefore subject to the restrictions provided for by Article 2 of the KGB Act. As a result, on 31 May 1999 he was dismissed from his job as prosecutor. 29. The second applicant brought an administrative action against the authorities, claiming that his dismissal under the KGB Act, which made it impossible for him to find employment, was unlawful. The domestic courts dismissed his claims (see Sidabras and Džiautas, cited above, §§ 20-23). 30. On 5 July 2000 the second applicant lodged an application with the Court. Like the first applicant, he alleged that Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention had been violated. 31. By a judgment of 27 July 2004 in Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (cited above), the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention and awarded the second applicant EUR 7,000 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs. 32. On 5 January 2005 the second applicant wrote to the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Lithuanian Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice to enquire whether the State intended to amend the KGB Act and, if so, when. At the same time, he acknowledged that the Lithuanian authorities had already paid him a sum of money awarded to him by the Court. 33. On 11 January 2005 the Government Agent before the Court informed the second applicant that the Ministry of Justice was working on amendments to the KGB Act. On 26 February 2005 the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Seimas informed the second applicant that the Seimas had set up a working group that was also drafting legislative amendments. 34. According to the Government, as of 29 March 2006 the second applicant was registered in the list of trainee lawyers (advokato padėjėjas), which is a precondition to becoming a lawyer. The Government also noted that the second applicant had submitted his traineeship report on 14 May 2009 and was going to take the Bar exam. 35. On 20 October 2006 the second applicant sued the Republic of Lithuania for non-pecuniary damage. He claimed to have lost LTL 100,000 as a result of the State’s failure, since 27 July 2004 (the date of the Court’s judgment in his case), to amend the KGB Act. This in turn had restricted his prospects of finding employment in certain private sector areas. He argued that the common principles governing the execution of the Court’s judgments required the State to execute the judgment without undue delay. 36. On 12 February 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s claim. It noted that the judgment in the Sidabras and Džiautas case did not oblige the State to amend the KGB Act within a specific time-frame and that the Seimas was in the process of discussing the relevant legislative amendments. During the court hearing the second applicant submitted that he had contacted an insurance company and a commercial bank in order to check what the reaction of potential employers would be. He maintained that those employers had replied that they would be unable to employ him because to do so would breach the KGB Act. The first-instance court, however, noted that the second applicant had not provided any evidence to prove that he had actually applied for and been refused any particular job in the private sector. Accordingly, the court had no basis on which to hold that the second applicant had in reality addressed those two employers and that they had refused to hire him. 37. The second applicant appealed. He pointed out in particular that he had not attempted to obtain employment in the private sector so as not to harm the employers, who would have faced administrative liability if they had employed him. That was the reason why he had no proof of having actually attempted to obtain a job barred to him by the KGB Act. 38. On 18 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s appeal. Its reasoning was similar to that of its decision of 14 April 2008 in the first applicant’s case (see paragraphs 20-22 above). It observed that the second applicant had based his claims for damages on the alleged non-execution of the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004. However, referring to the cases of Scozzari and Giunta (cited above, § 249) and Vermeire v. Belgium (29 November 1991, § 26, Series A no. 214-C), it observed that under Article 46 of the Convention, Contracting States were free to choose the appropriate individual and general measures to discharge their legal obligation to execute the Court’s decisions, albeit monitored by the Committee of Ministers. Moreover, given the abstract nature of the Convention norms, the domestic courts should follow the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence in order better to comprehend their content. 39. As to the facts of the second applicant’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court observed that, because the Court’s judgment in Sidabras and Džiautas prevailed over the KGB Act, the restrictions on working in certain private sector areas could no longer be imposed on the second applicant. Thus, even though the KGB Act had not been amended, a refusal to employ him on the basis of the restrictions provided for in the KGB Act would be in violation of the Convention and consequently unlawful. It was also the court’s view that protecting a person’s rights by direct application of the Court’s judgments rather than by legislative amendments was an appropriate way to execute those judgments. It followed that, because of the direct applicability of the Convention and the Court’s judgments, the State had not failed to act, the latter being a precondition for the State’s civil liability. 40. As to the second applicant, he had failed to prove that, after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004, he had attempted to obtain employment in the private sector and had been refused owing to the restrictions of the KGB Act. The Supreme Administrative Court stressed that “the mere existence of contradictions and ambiguities in the legal system did not in itself provide grounds for a violation of a person’s rights and did not harm that person”. Similarly, a mere hypothetical violation and a person’s idea that his rights had been breached, without any tangible facts, were not sufficient. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore dismissed the second applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 41. The third applicant, Mr Raimundas Rainys, was born in 1949 and lives in Vilnius. 42. From 1975 to October 1991 he was an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB. Thereafter he found employment as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company, Omnitel. 43. On 17 February 2000 the State Security Department informed Omnitel that the third applicant had been a KGB officer and was therefore subject to the restrictions provided for by Article 2 of the KGB Act. As a result, on 23 February 2000 Omnitel dismissed the third applicant from his job. 44. After unsuccessful litigation before the Lithuanian courts for reinstatement in his job and for unpaid salary (see Rainys and Gasparavičius, cited above, §§ 11-13), the third applicant lodged an application with the Court, alleging that he had lost his job and that his employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application to him of the KGB Act, in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 45. In its judgment in the case of Rainys and Gasparavičius (cited above, § 36) the Court held that the third applicant’s inability to pursue his former profession as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company, and his continuing inability to find private-sector employment because of his “former permanent KGB employee” status under the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, despite the legitimacy of the aims pursued. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 46. By a letter of 15 July 2005, the Court informed the Lithuanian Government that, as no request had been made under Article 43 of the Convention for the above-mentioned cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber, the judgment of 7 April 2005 had become final on 7 July 2005, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. 47. On 25 July 2005 the third applicant requested that the Supreme Administrative Court reopen the proceedings in his earlier case for unlawful actions and reinstatement in his job at Omnitel, on the basis of Article 153 § 2 (1) of the Law on Administrative Court Proceedings (see paragraph 65 below). 48. On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the proceedings in the domestic courts related to the dismissal of the third applicant from his position as a lawyer with a telecommunications company. It observed that the Court’s judgment gave reason to doubt the lawfulness of those domestic decisions. It therefore decided to reopen the proceedings which the third applicant had previously instituted against the State Security Department and his previous employer, the private telecommunications company, Omnitel. For reasons of jurisdiction, the case was subsequently remitted to the Vilnius Regional Court, a court of general jurisdiction, for a fresh examination. 49. On 10 July 2007 the Vilnius Regional Court acknowledged that the third applicant had been dismissed from his previous job at Omnitel unlawfully. As to the question of his reinstatement, the court relied on Article 297 § 4 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 67 below) and noted that more than seven years had elapsed since the telecommunications company had dismissed the third applicant from his job. During that time the third applicant had worked in companies specialising in other fields, such as railways and television. Moreover, the activities of the telecommunications company had also evolved. In the court’s view, because he lacked appropriate qualifications and foreign language skills, after such a long time the third applicant would no longer be competent to work as a lawyer in that company. The court also noted that at that time the third applicant was working in another company, without specifying what that company was, and therefore had a source of income. The Regional Court also noted the continuing conflict between the third applicant and the company, which could be another reason not to reinstate him to his former job at Omnitel. Lastly, the court observed that the KGB Act was still in force. In the court’s view, should the third applicant be reinstated, the question of his dismissal could arise de novo, or his employer would face the risk of administrative penalties. In the light of those circumstances, the court dismissed the third applicant’s claim for reinstatement. 50. The court then turned to the issue of compensation for lost earnings for the period of 23 February 2000 to 23 March 2007, indicated by the third applicant, for which he requested the sum of LTL 136,464. However, it was to be noted that the Court had already awarded him more than LTL 120,000 for both past and future pecuniary loss. Moreover, after his dismissal from Omnitel, the third applicant had worked in different jobs and had received more than LTL 90,000 in salary. Under Lithuanian law, an employee could be awarded no more than three years’ unpaid salary. In the third applicant’s case the salary in Omnitel would amount to LTL 145,440 (LTL 4,040 a month for thirty-six months). Accordingly, the two sums he had already received (LTL 120,000 and LTL 90,000) amounted to more than the award requested. Lastly, the third applicant had acknowledged that since his dismissal from Omnitel, he had continued to receive a pension from another State for his work in the KGB, ranging from LTL 500 to 800 a month. It followed that the claim for pecuniary damage had to be dismissed. 51. Both the third applicant and Omnitel appealed. At the hearing, the third applicant asked to be paid LTL 167,534 for lost earnings as compensation for the fact that he had still not been reinstated with Omnitel. 52. On 11 February 2008 the Court of Appeal rejected both appeals. It upheld the lower court’s conclusion that the third applicant had been dismissed from his previous job unlawfully. Moreover, the circumstances mentioned in Article 297 § 4 of the Labour Code existed. Accordingly, the third applicant could not be reinstated in his former job with Omnitel. The court added that “the laws that provide for the prohibition on former [USSR] KGB employees from working in the telecommunications sector are still in force, so that if the [third] applicant were reinstated in his previous job, certain problems might arise”. Additionally, the applicant was working in another company and receiving a pension for his previous work with the KGB. He therefore had a source of income. The Court of Appeal also endorsed the lower court’s view that the third applicant had been compensated by the Strasbourg Court for the pecuniary damage he had suffered as a consequence of his unlawful dismissal. The sum he now asked for – LTL 167,534 – was lower than the awards of LTL 90,000 and 120,000 he had already received. 53. The third applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his claim for reinstatement and for compensation for lost earnings. He argued that Article 42 § 1 of the Law on the Employment Contract was an imperative legal norm and meant that once the court found that an employee had been dismissed unlawfully, that employee was to be reinstated in his or her previous job. It followed that the argument of the Court of Appeal that “if the [third] applicant were reinstated to his previous job certain problems might arise” was arbitrary. 54. Omnitel argued that in 2000 it had dismissed the third applicant from his job merely following the letter of the KGB Act. Article 1876 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided that an employer could be fined LTL 3,000 to 5,000 should he not comply with the KGB Act. This was all the more likely to happen since the Constitutional Court had recognised Article 2 of the KGB Act as constitutional in its ruling of 4 March 1999, that is before the third applicant was dismissed. Even though the Court had found a violation in the third applicant’s case, the KGB Act was still in force, and therefore the third applicant’s reinstatement was barred. Furthermore, in the judgment of 17 March 2005 the Court had not ordered Lithuania to amend the KGB Act. Nor had the Court ordered the Lithuanian courts to have the third applicant reinstated in his previous job. In his written reply to this last argument, the third applicant observed that the Republic of Lithuania, by not appealing against the Court’s judgment to the Grand Chamber, had shown its agreement with the interpretation and application of the Convention in the Rainys and Gasparavičius judgment. He therefore insisted that the Court’s judgment was sufficient legal basis for him to be reinstated in his former job at the private telecommunications company, Omnitel, notwithstanding the fact that Article 2 of the KGB Act had not been amended. 55. Lastly, Omnitel maintained that the lower courts had been correct in referring to other circumstances why the third applicant could not be reinstated on the basis of Article 297 § 4 of the Law on the Employment Contract, namely, for economic, technological and organisational reasons, and the fact that it could lead to unfavourable conditions for him (see paragraph 49 above). 56. On 20 June 2008 the Supreme Court held: “The European Convention on Human Rights is an international agreement, ratified by the Seimas. It is therefore an integral part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania... The European Court of Human Rights was established to guarantee the observance of the rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In ratifying the Convention, the Republic of Lithuania took an undertaking to execute the Court’s final judgments in every case in which it is a party. The Convention norms must be implemented in reality (Konvencijos normos turi būti realiai įgyvendinamos). The State itself establishes the manner in which it will ensure implementation of the Convention norms. One such method is the reopening of proceedings, provided for in Article 366 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Namely, a case which had been terminated by a final court decision may be reopened if the Court finds that the Lithuanian courts’ decisions are in conflict (prieštarauja) with the Convention or its Protocols, to which Lithuania is a party.” 57. As to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court noted that the third applicant had worked as a lawyer at Omnitel and had been dismissed on 23 February 2000 because of the restrictions provided for in Article 2 of the KGB Act. As the Constitutional Court had held on 4 March 1999, those restrictions were compatible with the Constitution. 58. The Supreme Court nevertheless observed that on 7 April 2005 the Court had found that the third applicant had lost his job as a lawyer in the private telecommunications company on the basis of the application of the KGB Act which the Court had found to be discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. The Court had also held that the third applicant’s inability to pursue his former profession and his continuing inability to find private sector employment because of his “former KGB officer” status under the Act constituted a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims sought (paragraphs 36 and 45 of the Court’s judgment). The Supreme Court then held: “Accordingly, even though the KGB Act, which was the basis for dismissing the third applicant from his job, is in force and even acknowledged as being in conformity with the Lithuanian Constitution, the dismissal from his job on the basis of that Act in essence had been recognised as unlawful by the Court’s judgment, that is to say a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, had been found. This circumstance is not to be questioned when resolving the dispute in the domestic court. Despite the fact that there was no fault in the actions of [the State Security Department or Omnitel], which were implementing the obligations stemming from the KGB Act, the undertaking to implement the provisions of the Convention constituted a legal ground for the courts of the first and appellate instances to conclude that the applicant’s dismissal was unlawful. It must be emphasised that the ground for such a decision is not the provisions of the Law on the Employment Contract or the Labour Code, which regulate the issue of reinstatement, but the provisions of the Convention and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. At the same time it must be emphasised that, while the KGB Act, the compatibility of which with the Constitution had already been verified (kurio konstitucingumas jau buvo patikrintas) is still in force, the question of reinstating the third applicant to his job may not be resolved favourably. In the circumstances of this case the recognition of the fact that he had been dismissed from his job unlawfully is sufficient satisfaction for him (atleidimo iš darbo pripažinimas neteisėtu šios bylos aplinkybių kontekste yra ieškovui pakankama satisfakcija).” 59. The Supreme Court noted that the third applicant had been awarded compensation by the Court for actual and future pecuniary damage. Given that he had been awarded EUR 35,000 [approximately LTL 120,000], the third applicant had already been fully compensated for the disproportionate and discriminatory measure – dismissal from his job at Omnitel. For the court of cassation, “there was no legal ground for repeatedly awarding compensation for the violation, which the Court had not found to be of a continuous nature (pakartotinai priteisti žalos atlygimą už pažeidimą, kurio tęstinumo Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas savo sprendime nekonstatavo, nėra teisinio pagrindo)”. 60. The Supreme Court thus fully upheld the lower court’s decisions. It also observed that “in the context of the [third applicant’s] case, other arguments by the parties in the appeals on points of law had no legal relevance for the lawfulness of the lower courts’ decisions”. 61. On 9 February 2005 a working group of the Seimas was set up to prepare amendments to a number of laws, including Article 2 of the KGB Act. According to the documents submitted to the Court by the Government, as of January 2005, the Lithuanian Government submitted a number of reports to the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Council of Europe, explaining individual and general measures regarding execution of the Court’s judgments in the applicants’ cases. They noted, firstly, that the compensation awarded by the Court had been paid to the applicants. The Government also noted that the Court’s judgments and their translations into Lithuanian had been disseminated to the Lithuanian courts. 62. The Government considered that appropriate execution of the Court’s judgments required setting up legal regulation giving access to employment in the private sector for the former KGB employees, which was in compliance with the Convention requirements. In that connection they indicated that amendments to Article 2 of the KGB Act had been registered in the Seimas and had been presented to its plenary on 14 June 2005. They expected that the law would be amended at the beginning of the Seimas’ autumn session of 2005. The Government also considered that the draft law amending Article 2 of the KGB Act would guarantee the balance between the aims sought and interference with the right to respect for private life. The legislative amendments would also provide appropriate safeguards for avoiding discrimination as well as adequate judicial supervision of the employment restrictions imposed by the KGB Act. In February 2007 the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that the amendments to the KGB Act had been presented to the Seimas on 16 January 2007. However, voting in Parliament had failed because the necessary quorum had not been reached. They reiterated their previous statement about the importance of having the KGB Act amended and expected that the relevant amendments would be adopted in the spring of 2008. In October 2007 the Government wrote to the Department for the Execution of Judgments that a draft new law, amending the KGB Act in its entirety (not only its Article 2), was included in the Seimas’ working programme for the autumn session. In September 2008 the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that the KGB Act had still not been amended and, to their regret, would most likely not be amended until the Seimas’ elections in October 2008. However, a number of specific laws, for example, those regulating the professions of lawyers, bailiffs and notaries, had been amended, so that they no longer banned former KGB employees from taking up those professions. The Government also suggested that the judgments of the Court were directly applicable in the Lithuanian legal system. Therefore, the fact that the KGB Act had not been rectified had no legal consequences for former KGB employees as regards their opportunities to obtain employment in the private sector. By a letter of 22 January 2009, the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that as of 1 January of that year, even formal restrictions enshrined in the KGB Act had ceased to be valid. 63. The KGB Act was never amended and is still a valid law.

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6. The applicant was born in 1957 and at the time of the events she lived in Baku. 7. On 7 April 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 178 (fraud) of the Criminal Code against the applicant. 8. On 20 August 2009 the criminal proceedings under Article 178 of the Criminal Code were terminated owing to the impossibility of determining the applicant’s whereabouts. 9. On 24 August 2009 the applicant was invited to the Sabail District Police Office as a witness in connection with the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. After her arrival at the police office she had a conversation with the investigator which lasted approximately one hour. The applicant was then taken by three police officers to a drug rehabilitation centre, where it was established that she was a drug user. 10. The applicant was then returned to the police office and she was subjected to a body search in the presence of two attesting witnesses (hal şahidi) and three police officers. During the search, narcotic substances were found on her person. 11. At 10.10 p.m. on 24 August 2009 the investigator drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest (tutma protokolu). It appears from the record that the applicant was arrested under Article 234.1 of the Criminal Code on suspicion of illegal possession of narcotic substances in an amount exceeding that necessary for personal use, without intention to sell. 12. On 26 August 2009 the applicant was charged with the criminal offence of possession of narcotic substances in an amount exceeding that necessary for personal use, without intention to sell, as provided in Article 234.1 of the Criminal Code. On the same day the prosecutor requested the judge to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (həbs qətimkan tədbiri) in respect of the applicant. 13. On 26 August 2009 the Sabail District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor’s request for the preventive measure of remand in custody to be applied, ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of two months. The judge substantiated the necessity of this measure by the gravity of the applicant’s alleged criminal acts and the possibility of her absconding from and obstructing the investigation. 14. The applicant did not appeal against the Sabail District Court’s decision of 26 August 2009. 15. On 21 September 2009 the investigator in charge of the case decided to reinstitute criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 178 (fraud) of the Criminal Code. 16. On 26 September 2009 the investigator decided to join the two criminal proceedings against the applicant under Articles 178 and 234 of the Criminal Code in the same criminal proceedings. 17. On 22 October 2009 the Sabail District Court extended the applicant’s remand in custody by one month, until 24 November 2009. The judge reasoned the need for this extension by citing the possibility that she would abscond from or obstruct the investigation. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “Taking into account the facts that the detention period of the accused Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi will end on 24 October 2009 and that, if released, there are sufficient grounds [to believe that she might] abscond from the investigation and the court, obstruct the normal functioning of the investigation, or prevent the clarification of important facts relating to the criminal inquiry by illegally influencing individuals taking part in the criminal proceedings, I consider it necessary to extend her pre-trial detention for a period of one month, namely until 24 November 2009.” 18. The applicant appealed against this decision, alleging that there was no need for an extension of her pre-trial detention and that during the two previous months no investigative steps had been taken by the investigator. 19. On 2 November 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal, finding that the detention order was justified. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The first-instance court, taking into account the facts that a certain period of time is needed to complete the investigation, and that there are sufficient grounds [to believe that], if released, the accused O. Isayeva might abscond from the investigation and the court, obstruct the normal functioning of the investigation, or prevent the clarification of important facts relating to the criminal inquiry by illegally influencing individuals taking part in the criminal proceedings, took a decision, in line with the law, ordering the extension of her pre-trial detention for a period of one month, namely until 24 November 2009. Therefore, the appellate court considers that as there were no grounds to quash this decision of the first-instance court, the appeal should be dismissed and the decision should be left unchanged.” 20. On 24 November 2009 the prosecutor filed an indictment with the Assize Court. 21. On 10 December 2009 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. At that hearing, the court decided, inter alia, that the preventive measure of remand in custody should be left “unchanged”. 22. On 25 May 2010 the Assize Court convicted the applicant of fraud and illegal possession of narcotic substances and sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed against this judgment. 23. At the preliminary examination of the case before the Baku Court of Appeal, the applicant complained that her defence rights had been violated during the investigation, asking the appellate court to quash the Assize Court’s judgment and to remit the case to the first-instance court for a new examination. 24. On 15 July 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing in which it decided to dismiss the applicant’s request. The applicant appealed against this decision. 25. On 1 September 2010 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal, finding that her defence rights had been violated at the investigation stage of the proceedings, and quashed the appellate court’s decision of 15 July 2010. In particular, the Supreme Court found that the investigator had failed to inform the applicant, in a language she understood, of the accusations against her, that the applicant had not been given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence, and that the investigator had failed to examine witnesses on behalf of the applicant. On the same day the Supreme Court delivered a special ruling (xüsusi qərardad) informing the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the unlawful actions of the investigator in charge of the case. 26. On 2 November 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal quashed the Assize Court’s judgment of 25 May 2010 and the Assize Court’s decision of 10 December 2009. The appellate court decided to remit the case to the preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings before the first-instance court. 27. On 14 December 2010 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. At that hearing the court decided to remit the case to the prosecution authorities for a new investigation, finding that the applicant’s defence rights had been violated during the investigation. The court also decided that the applicant’s remand in custody should be extended for a period of one month, until 14 January 2011. 28. Relying on a request from the Sabail District Prosecutor for an extension of the period of the applicant’s detention, on 11 January 2011 the Sabail District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 29 January 2011. The judge gave as reasons for this measure the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the applicant’s alleged criminal acts, as well as the facts of the case. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “Bearing in mind the characteristics of the criminal acts attributed to Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi, the fact that these criminal acts are qualified as serious crimes, the conditions of their commission and the particular facts of the case, I consider that in the present case the defence of public interest should prevail over respect for her right to liberty... It should be taken into consideration that by its decision of 14 December 2010 the Assize Court determined the pre-trial detention period of Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi until 14 January 2011. However, as indicated in the provisions of that court decision, a certain period of time was required for completion of the investigation, the accused and her lawyer should be familiarised with the case file, and any possible requests should be examined. 29. The applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that the first‑instance court had failed to justify the extension of her detention. 30. On 19 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Sabail District Court’s decision of 11 January 2011. As regards the justification, the wording of the appellate court’s decision was similar to that of the first‑instance court’s decision. 31. On 25 January 2011 the Sabail District Court examined the prosecutor’s request for the extension of the applicant’s detention period. At the hearing, the applicant’s lawyer asked the judge to dismiss the prosecutor’s request. He submitted that the applicant had a permanent place of residence, that there was no risk of her absconding, and that she had been unlawfully detained for more than one year and six months. On the same day the judge extended the applicant’s remand in custody by one month, until 29 February 2011. He substantiated the necessity of the extension of the applicant’s detention as follows: “While examining the [the prosecutor’s] request and the materials of the case file, I consider that a decision ordering the extension of the detention period of the accused Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi until 29 February 2011 should be taken because the accused Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi does not have a permanent place of residence, her detention period will end on 29 January 2011 and the criminal investigation cannot be completed by that date, and, if released, there are sufficient grounds to believe that she might abscond from the investigation.” 32. The applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating her previous complaints. 33. On 4 February 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court’s decision ordering the applicant’s detention for a period of one month, holding that this period should be calculated until 28 February and not until 29 February 2011. 34. On 23 February 2011 the Sabail District Court again decided to extend the applicant’s detention, until 15 March 2011. The judge justified the need for the extension of the applicant’s detention as follows: “Taking into account that the investigation was not completed, that the grounds for the accused’s detention have not changed, that she does not have a permanent place of residence in Baku, that the police office is considered to be her place of residence and for this reason she might abscond from the investigation if released, as well as the seriousness of the offences attributed to her and the volume and complexity of the case, I consider that the request should be granted in part and the extension of the detention for a period of fifteen days should be considered lawful, reasonable and fair.” 35. The applicant appealed against this decision, arguing that the first‑instance court had failed to justify her continued detention. 36. On 3 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s extension order. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “Therefore, bearing in mind that the investigation of the case was at the final stage, that the grounds for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody have not changed, that she was accused of a serious crime, that she does not have a permanent place of residence and there is a likelihood of her absconding from the investigation, as well as the seriousness of the offence attributed to her, the panel of the court concludes that the first-instance court has been correct in extending the detention period of the accused Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi.” 37. On 10 March 2011 the Sabail District Court decided to extend the applicant’s detention until 28 March 2011. The court gave as the reason for its decision that it needed more time to complete the investigation. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “As all the investigative actions have now been completed, it was necessary to announce the end of the investigation to the accused and the victims. However, because of the workload of some of the participants in the criminal proceedings, it was not possible to carry out investigative actions with the accused. As the participation of all the parties is now possible, the investigation of the case should be completed, the accused and the victims should be informed of the end of the investigation and they should be familiarised with the numerous pieces of evidence in the criminal case, all of which needed a certain period of time.” 38. On 17 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court’s extension order. 39. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant lodged a request with the Sabail District Court asking the court to replace her remand in custody with the preventive measure of house arrest. She claimed, in particular, that her detention had not been justified and that there was no evidence that she might abscond from the investigation if placed under house arrest. The applicant further submitted that her sister’s flat was the place where she would live if placed under house arrest. 40. On 10 March 2011 the Sabail District Court dismissed the request. The judge substantiated the decision as follows: “Bearing in mind the characteristics, the seriousness of the offence and the danger to the public of the criminal act attributed to the accused Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi, the need to prevent Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi from committing unlawful acts, her personality, the facts that there are sufficient grounds [to believe that], if released she might abscond from the investigation and prevent the establishment of the truth on the case; also, she has been charged with an offence punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment ... I decide that the request ... for replacement of the remand in custody of the accused Isayeva Ofeliya Alik gizi with the preventive measure of house arrest should not be granted.” 41. On 17 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the first-instance court had been correct in refusing to replace her detention with the preventive measure of house arrest. 42. On an unspecified date, the prosecutor asked the court to extend the applicant’s detention until 12 April 2011. The prosecutor gave as the reason for the need to extend the detention the attitude of the applicant’s lawyer, who had refused to familiarise himself with the material in the case file until 28 March 2011 because it was a public holiday. 43. On 28 March 2011 the Sabail District Court examined the prosecutor’s request. At the court hearing, the applicant’s lawyer submitted that he was not obliged to familiarise himself with the case file on public holidays, and that his failure to do so could not constitute a ground for extension of the applicant’s detention. On the same day, relying on the prosecutor’s request, the court decided to extend the applicant’s detention on remand for a period of ten days, namely until 7 April 2011. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “As the [the prosecutor’s] present request was justified solely on the basis of the lawyer’s failure to familiarise himself with the material in the case file and the lawyer stated that he would begin to familiarise himself with the case file from 28 March 2011 ... the extension of the detention for a period of ten days should be considered appropriate.” 44. On 5 April 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s extension order. 45. On 9 April 2011 the Baku City Deputy Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Baku Assize Court. 46. On 4 May 2011 the Baku Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. At that hearing, the court decided, inter alia, that the preventive measure of remand in custody should be left “unchanged”. 47. On 28 September 2011 the applicant lodged a request with the Baku Assize Court, asking the court to replace her remand in custody with the preventive measure of house arrest. She claimed, in particular, that there was no evidence that she might abscond from the court, and stated that if placed under house arrest she would live in her sister’s flat. 48. On the same day the Baku Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s request. The relevant part of the Baku Assize Court’s decision of 28 September 2011 reads as follows: “After having examined the request in question and having heard the participants in the proceedings, the court, taking into account the characteristics of the criminal acts attributed to the accused and the danger they present to the public, considers that there is no need to replace the preventive measure of remand in custody applied in respect of the accused with another preventive measure; for this reason, the request should be dismissed.” 49. On 30 May 2012 the Baku Assize Court convicted the applicant of fraud and illegal possession of narcotic substances and sentenced her to nine years’ imprisonment. 50. The applicant appealed against the judgment of 30 May 2012. 51. On 5 August 2012, while her appeal was pending before the Baku Court of Appeal, the applicant died in prison. 52. Following the applicant’s death, her sister, Ms Sevil Rzayeva, lodged a request with the Baku Court of Appeal, as the applicant’s legal heir, asking the court not to terminate the criminal proceedings. 53. On 13 August 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal decided to continue the examination of the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 30 May 2012. The Court has not been informed of the outcome. 54. By two powers of attorney, dated 9 August 2012 and 8 July 2014, Ms Sevil Rzayeva gave the right to the applicant’s representative to represent her before the courts at all levels of jurisdiction. In particular, the power of attorney of 8 July 2014 provided that the applicant’s representative was entitled to represent Ms Sevil Rzayeva in all the legal proceedings, including the proceedings before the Court.

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5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Grozny. She is the mother of Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov, who was born in 1982. 6. At the material time the applicant and her family, including Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov, lived in Vedeno, Chechnya. Checkpoints were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement which was situated at high altitude. Since January 2002 Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov worked as a policeman at the Argun district department of the interior (“the Argun ROVD”) providing security in the building of the Vedeno district department of the State Pension Fund (the Pension Fund). The applicant’s husband was the head of the Pension Fund. 7. According to the applicant, on an unspecified date in September 2002 Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov was abducted by a group of servicemen from the ‘Vostok’ battalion of the Russian federal forces which was staffed by ethnic Chechens under the command of Mr Sulim Yamadayev. The applicant’s son was apprehended on the suspicion of membership in illegal armed groups and released on the following day upon payment of ransom. 8. On or around 7 or 8 January 2004 a group of men in camouflage uniforms had arrived at the Pension Fund’s building and asked the on-duty colleagues of Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov, Mr A.M. and Mr. D. Kh., to show them their identity documents saying that they were from the Yamadayev’s battalion and were checking the posts. The men were looking for Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov. 9. At about 7.30 a.m. on 13 January 2004 a grey UAZ vehicle with three Chechen armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at the Pension Fund. The men asked the on-duty servicemen Mr A.M. and Mr. D. Kh. at what time employees of the fund came to work. When the on-duty officers asked them to show their identity documents, the men refused and said that they were checking the posts. 10. On 13 January 2004 Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov was at work at the Pension Fund. He was supposed to be on the overnight duty until the morning of 14 January 2004. At about 5 p.m. he went home to have dinner. At about 6 p.m. he left home with his service gun to return to work and disappeared on the way to the Pension Fund. 11. In the morning of 14 January 2004 the applicant’s husband went to work and found out that his son was missing. He immediately started searching for him. At about 1 p.m. the applicant was informed by the head of the Vedeno district administration Mr Pashayev that Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov had allegedly been detained at the Vedeno military commander’s office where he had been taken in the evening of 13 January 2004 for an identity check. 12. On or around 20 January 2004 the applicant and her husband went to Gudermes, Chechnya, to visit the head of the ‘Vostok’ battalion, Mr Sulim Yamadayev. The latter promised to assist them in the search for their son in exchange for 10,000 American dollars (USD). The applicant explained to him that they did not have the required amount. 13. In February 2004 unidentified officers from the Vedeno ROVD who were working there on mission from the Perm Region in Russia provided the applicant with information about her son’s abduction. According to the officers, on 13 January 2004 servicemen from ‘Vostok’ battalion in an UAZ minivan (‘tabletka’) had allegedly arrested Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov on the street and taken him to the military commander’s office where he had been detained between 13 and 16 January 2004. Two officers from the criminal search division of the Vedeno ROVD, Mr V.St. and Mr P.K., had allegedly participated in the arrest. 14. At some point in the spring of 2004 an unidentified serviceman from ‘Vostok’ battalion visited the applicant’s fellow villager Ms R.V. and told her that he had been detained in a basement in Gudermes together with Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov who had been arrested on 13 January 2004 on the way to work by servicemen of the ‘Vostok’ battalion. 15. There has been no news of Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov ever since. 16. The Government submitted a copy of “the entire contents of criminal case-file no. 43018” into the abduction Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov on 114 pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows. 17. On 15 January 2004 the applicant complained about her son’s disappearance to the Vedeno department of the interior (the Vedeno ROVD) stating that her son “left for work but never arrived there”. 18. On 15 February 2004 the Vedeno ROVD refused to initiate a criminal investigation into the alleged abduction. 19. On 27 April 2004 the supervising prosecutor from the Vedeno district prosecutor’s office overruled the decision of 15 February 2004 as unlawful and ordered that the district prosecutor’s office initiate an investigation into the events under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). The criminal case file was given the number 43018. On the same day the applicant was informed thereof. 20. On 28 May 2004 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned (see paragraph 33 below). 21. On 27 June 2004 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 22. On 22 August 2005 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unlawful and premature and ordered that it be resumed and a number of investigative steps taken. In particular, he pointed out that the investigators had not taken such basic steps as questioning of a number of witnesses including relatives and neighbours of the disappeared, crime scene examination, and forwarding information requests to various law enforcement agencies concerning Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s possible arrest by their agents. 23. On 22 September 2005 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 24. On 27 November 2006 the supervising prosecutor again overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unlawful and ordered that it be resumed and a number of investigative steps taken. 25. On 6 December 2006 the investigators forwarded information requests to various law enforcement agencies asking for information on possible whereabouts of Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov and that of his service gun. No replies in the positive were received. 26. On 27 December 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed thereof. 27. On 14 January 2010 the applicant requested that the investigators provided her with an update on the progress of the proceedings, allowed to access the case file and resumed the investigation. 28. On 16 January 2010 the investigators replied that it was impossible to resume the suspended investigation as all possible investigative steps had been already taken. 29. On 1 December 2011 the investigation was again resumed. The criminal proceedings are still pending. 30. On 15 January 2004 the police questioned the applicant who stated that in the evening of 13 January 2004 her son had gone to work and disappeared. 31. On 5 February 2004 the police investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour Ms Z.G. who stated that she had learnt of Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s disappearance from her neighbours. 32. On 27 February 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s supervisor, Mr R.N., who stated, among other things, that about a week prior to Mr Saydulkhanov’s disappearance five or six men in camouflage uniforms had arrived at the Pension Fund in a light UAZ minivan. They had checked officer V.D.’s identity documents introducing themselves as belonging to “Djamaat “and acting under the command of Yamadayev. According to the witness, they could have been from the first military regiment stationed in the village of Oktyabrskaya. Then, the witness and his colleagues had understood that the men had been looking for Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov. In the afternoon of 13 January 2004 these men had arrived again and asked for water. Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov who had been standing at the entrance had gone to fetch it, but when he had returned those men had already left. In the witness’ opinion, it was possible that Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov had been kidnapped for ransom since his father was the head of the Pension Fund and dealt with large sums of money. The witness further stated that he had conducted his own investigation and found out that the military servicemen who had manned the checkpoint next to the exit from Shali, a settlement situated in about thirty kilometres from Vedeno, had stopped UAZ minivan ‘tabletka’ on the night of the abduction; inside the vehicle a man had been lying on the floor. To the question as for the man’s identity, the men in the vehicle had replied that it was a bandit caught in Vedeno. One of the servicemen at the checkpoint, being from Vedeno, wanted to check who this person was, but the men had told him that the bandit was not originally from Vedeno, that he had only been caught there and that his surname had been Dzhabrailov. 33. On 28 May 2004 the investigators questioned the applicant who stated that on 13 January 2004 her son, Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov, had gone to work. However, the next day her husband had found out that Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov had not been at work that night. She had learnt from unspecified local residents that her son had been abducted by servicemen from ‘Vostok’ battalion. She pointed out that in January 2004 she had been told by an unidentified serviceman from the rifle regiment (стрелковая рота) that her son had been detained by a group of servicemen under the command of Yamadayev and some FSB officers and that the abductors would release Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov in exchange for USD 10,000 and that if she were to complain of the abduction, they would kill her and her family members. In March 2004 an unidentified serviceman of Chechen ethnic origin had told her on the street that when the ransom would be ready she would need to pass it on through him. The applicant further stated that when she had been interviewed by the police investigator in January 2004 about the circumstances of the disappearance, she had not mentioned the ransom and even requested that officer that the police would not open a criminal case into the matter as she had been afraid of her safety. 34. On 3 June 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s colleague, Mr V.D., who stated that on 13 January 2004 he had been on duty with Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov. At about 5 p.m. in the afternoon Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov had gone home for dinner but had not returned. The next morning Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s father had come to search for his son and he had learnt from him that Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov had eaten at home and had then left for work. Two days later the witness had learnt that Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov had allegedly been abducted. 35. On 29, 30 and 31 August 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s colleagues Mr M.S., Mr M.Kh. and Ms Kh.D. all of whom stated that they had learnt of his abduction from their colleagues. 36. On the same dates, 29, 30 and 31 August 2005, the investigators also questioned other colleagues of Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov, Mr D. Kh., Mr A.M. and again Mr R.N. All of them stated that they had learnt of his abduction from their colleagues. The witnesses further added that prior to the events, in the morning of 13 January 2004, at about 7.30 a.m. right before they were to pass on the duty to Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov and Mr V.D., a grey UAZ minivan with blackened windows and without official registration numbers had pulled over at the Pension Fund’s building. Three armed men without masks, in camouflage uniforms of ‘NATO’ type, had gotten out and asked them in Chechen at what time the employees of the Pension Fund arrived at work. In reply the witnesses asked for the men’s identity documents. The latter had refused to show the documents, said that they were just “checking the posts” and then they had driven away. In addition, Mr D.Kh. stated that a few days prior to the abduction, he had learnt from a fellow villager, that armed men in camouflage uniforms had arrived at the building of the Vedeno military commissioner’s office and asked who guarded the Pension Fund’s building and what had been the regular security routes of that building’s security guards. 37. On 5 December 2006 the investigators again questioned the applicant who reiterated her previous statement (see paragraph 33 above). 38. On 6 December 2006 the investigators again questioned Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s supervisor Mr R.N. who stated that he had no new information to add to his previous statements (see paragraphs 32 and 36 above) other than that one of the men he had mentioned in his previous statements concerning the events surrounding Mr Muslim Saydulkhanov’s disappearance had been called Alikhan and that this person had subsequently moved from Chechnya to the Astrakhan Region in Russia.

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5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 6. On 17 January 2005 the applicant was detained on suspicion of having committed a robbery. 7. By decision of 11 March 2005 the court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 22 March 2005. According to the applicant, his pre‑trial detention continued on 23 March 2005 since the investigator sent his criminal case to the court with a one day delay. 8. On 25 April 2005 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to nine years of imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 9. By decision of 22 July 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the judgment with certain modifications. 10. The applicant subsequently lodged a request with a court to initiate supervisory review proceedings in his case. On an unspecified date the applicant’s request was granted. 11. On 22 November 2006 the Presidium of Chelyabinsk Regional Court amended the judgment and reduced the applicant’s sentence to eight years and six months of imprisonment. 12. During the trial the applicant was transported to the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk to take part in the examination of his criminal case. 13. While waiting for hearings in the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk the applicant was put in a convoy cell, a barred room measuring approximately 4 sq. metres with one bench. According to the applicant, he was usually kept in the convoy cell with six other accused. On 29 June 2005 as many as nine accused were kept in the convoy cell. The cell did not have a toilet and the detainees were taken to the toilet on the wardens’ orders. Though the accused leaving for a court were provided with a packed lunch, no hot meal or hot water was distributed. The accused were not allowed to smoke. 14. The applicant did not provide any detailed information as to how many times and how long he had been detained in the convoy cell. 15. He stated that the average time spent in the convoy cell by an accused was 4-5 hours a day. 16. On 30 June and 18 July 2005 the applicant complained to the court and the Head of the Court’s Convoy Service about the conditions of detention in the convoy cell. 17. By letter of 28 July 2005 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk replied to the applicant’s complaint. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows: “... on 29 June 2005 twenty accused were brought to the court’s convoy cells, the cells were filled up to the limit because according to the Order no. 41 ... the following categories of individuals should be detained separately: men and women, minors and adults, individuals with previous criminal record and first time accused, suspects and convicted, suspects and accused in one case. According to the Federal Law ... smoking is prohibited in all premises of the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, including the convoy cell.” 18. By letter of 9 August 2005 the Head of the Court’s Convoy Service replied to the applicant’s complaint. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows: “On 29 June 2005 the convoy staff was obliged to seat the accused brought to the court according to the rules in force, thus 9 individuals were put together in one of the convoy cells. According to the Federal Law ... smoking is prohibited in all premises of the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, including the convoy cell.” 19. On 25 July 2005 the applicant asked the prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the wardens of the courthouse. The prosecutor ignored the applicant’s motion and the applicant challenged his inaction in court. By decision of 18 October 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint in the final instance. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The court’s conclusion that there are no grounds to record the applicant’s complaint under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and to adopt a procedural decision under Article 145 of CCP correlates with the factual circumstances of the case. It follows from the applicant’s statement of appeal ... that he complained of the conditions of the detention in the convoy cell of the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, namely the smoking ban and the overcrowding of the cells. The complaint does not contain any information on committed crimes and does not require institution of criminal proceedings. These circumstances were established during the court hearing and confirmed by the record of the hearing. For the reasons mentioned above the court of first instance reasonably dismissed the applicant’s complaint.” 20. The Government submitted that the courthouse convoy premises measuring 50 sq. metres in total had four cells, 4 sq. metres each. They had adequate ventilation and lighting, the entrance was secured by metal grill doors. Each cell was equipped with one bench. The cells did not have sanitary facilities, but the convoy premises had two lavatories. The applicant had access to the toilet at any time upon request. The Government provided undated photographs and a plan of the convoy premises. 21. Relying on a certificate issued by the director of facility IZ-74/1 on 21 October 2009, the Government claimed that the applicant was brought to the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk seven times: on 11 March, 7, 19, 22 and 25 April, 29 June and 31 August 2005. 22. The Government submitted that the documents confirming the number of detainees in the convoy cells and their time of arrival and departure were destroyed on 16 January 2009 due to expiry of the time‑limit for their storage. 23. With reference to the applicable regulations, the Government submitted that on the dates of the applicant’s transfers to the District Court the applicant had received a dry ration (bread, tinned meat or fish, tea, salt, sugar and disposable tableware before 2 August 2005, and instant first and second course, sugar, tea, disposable tableware from 2 August 2005). The Government provided a copy of the invoice dated 15 June 2006 confirming the purchase of a water boiler by the District Court. 24. The Government acknowledged that on 29 June 2005 the convoy premises were crowded to the limit. According to the statement by the Deputy Head of the Convoy Service dated August 2005, there were twenty detainees in four cells in the convoy premises. The statement does not provide exact numbers for each cell.

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5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently being detained in Giurgiu Prison. He is married and has four children. His wife resides in Turkey together with their children. 6. On 28 June 2005 the Bucharest County Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment. The Bucharest County Court also decided that the applicant would be deported to Turkey at the end of his prison term. 7. In his letters to the Court, which he began sending on 15 July 2008, the applicant complained of the inhuman conditions in which he was being detained, first in Rahova Prison and then in Giurgiu Prison. He described a severe lack of hygiene in both prisons, with insufficient cleaning and personal hygiene products being provided by the prison authorities. He alleged that he could not sleep at night because of bed bugs. He also complained that the food was not adapted to his diabetes. 8. The applicant further alleged that throughout his detention in both prisons he had not been included in any educational activities and had not been allowed to do any work. He had thus been unable to integrate, to be re-educated or to have the term of his prison sentence reduced. 9. In 2008 the applicant was diagnosed with type II diabetes and a sleep disorder. 10. In Rahova Prison the applicant was detained in cells measuring 21 sq. m, which he shared with seven other prisoners (2.62 sq. m of personal space). The cells contained eight beds, a window measuring 1.2 by 1.2 m and their own bathroom with a shower, a sink and a toilet. Cold water was always available and hot water was available twice per week. Heating was provided during the winter up to a maximum temperature of 18oC. 11. The Government submitted that, whenever the presence of bugs was noticed, disinfection operations took place without delay. They submitted documents showing that disinfection had been performed two or three times per year in 2005, 2007 and 2008 in the cells occupied by the applicant in Rahova Prison. 12. The food provided to the applicant was adequate and adapted to his diabetes by substituting pork with beef. 13. The applicant participated in educational and recreational activities whenever necessary. The Government further indicated that the applicant’s reduced participation in the above-mentioned activities was due to his state of health. (b) Giurgiu Prison 14. The Government submitted that on 17 January 2009 the applicant had been transferred to Giurgiu Prison where he was currently being held in a cell measuring 21.47 sq. m together with five other prisoners (3.57 sq. m of personal space). The cell contained six beds, three bedside tables, one bench, one table and a box for shoes. It had a window measuring 1.5 by 1.8 m and a bathroom with a shower, a sink and a toilet. During the winter, a temperature of 19oC was ensured in all the cells. Hot water was provided twice per week. 15. With respect to the prisoners’ personal hygiene, once per month the prison administration provided each prisoner with two bars of soap, one tube of toothpaste, one tooth brush, one tube of shaving cream, one razor, and toilet paper. Concerning the hygiene in the cell, the Government submitted that prisoners were responsible for cleaning the cells and were provided with cleaning products by the prison administration. Regular disinfection was conducted once every three months. 16. The applicant received a menu adapted for his diabetes, which included 125 grams of meat per day. 17. With respect to activities in Giurgiu Prison, the Government submitted that in December 2011 the applicant had watched a folk music concert and in December 2012 he had taken part in a discussion on religious themes conducted by the orthodox priest. Also, once in 2013 and once in 2014 the applicant had taken part in a quiz on Romanian history. 18. In 2007 the applicant lodged a request with the Romanian Ministry of Justice based on the provisions of the Convention between Romania and Turkey on the transfer of convicted persons, seeking to serve the rest of his sentence in a Turkish prison. According to the applicant, he wanted the transfer in order to be closer to his family, who lived in a Turkish village in humble conditions and did not have the means to travel to Romania. 19. The Romanian Ministry of Justice acted on the applicant’s request and initiated the transfer proceedings. As a result, on 5 June 2007 the Ankara District Court acknowledged the judgment of the Romanian court which had convicted the applicant and decided that the rest of the applicant’s sentence should be served in Turkey. 20. On 4 February 2008 the applicant’s transfer request was brought before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The applicant claimed before the court that such a transfer would be in accordance with the convention signed between Romania and Turkey and would allow him to see his children and to receive visits from his family, who would provide him with adequate food and treatment for his diabetes. 21. In a judgment of 4 April 2008 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s transfer request, on the ground that Turkey had less severe legal provisions on conditional release, which might lead to the applicant’s release in a shorter period of time. The punitive and educational purpose of his sentence would thus fail to be achieved. 22. On 15 December 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected with the same reasoning a new transfer request lodged by the applicant.

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5. The applicant was born in 1986 and is currently in detention at HMP Risley. 6. On 17 April 2007, after pleading guilty to counts of rape, indecent assault and robbery, the applicant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence for the public protection (“IPP”). The minimum term that the applicant had to serve before being eligible for release (the “tariff”) was set at 4 years 273 days. His tariff was due to expire on 16 January 2012. 7. On 16 October 2007 the applicant completed alcohol in cell work and on 31 October 2007 he completed an alcohol awareness course. 8. In March 2008 the applicant was transferred to HMP Wayland. From 30 May 2008 to 2 July 2008 he participated in the Enhanced Thinking Skills (“ETS”) course. 9. In November 2008 the applicant completed the Living with Loss course. 10. On 16 July 2009 the applicant completed the Core Sex Offenders Treatment Programme (“SOTP”). In a post-programme progress review dated 30 November 2009, further work to reduce his risk of reoffending was identified, namely full engagement in the Structured Assessment of Risk and Need (“SARN”) process and full engagement in further assessments for sexual offending programmes. 11. A SARN Report dated 8 April 2010 prepared by a forensic psychologist in training noted that the applicant was assessed at a high statistic and high dynamic risk of sexual reoffending. It recommended personality and psychiatric assessments followed by completion of the extended Sex Offenders Treatment Programme (“ESOTP”) in order to reduce his risk. It concluded that the risk presented by the applicant was not low enough for him to be transferred to open conditions. The applicant was placed on a waiting list for the ESOTP. 12. On 20 May 2010 the applicant was informed by the Parole Board that it had not directed his release on licence or transfer to open conditions as some risk factors were outstanding. It noted that the Secretary of State had identified the need for sex offending and alcohol awareness work to reduce the level of risk. The applicant’s next parole process was to commence in May 2011, with an oral hearing in November 2011. 13. On 13 September 2010 the applicant made a formal application to HMP Bure, where he was then detained, to ask whether it intended to run the ESOTP. He was advised in reply that the prison planned to run the ESOTP in around April 2011. The applicant was not selected to participate in the course. 14. On 13 July 2011 the applicant completed a further alcohol awareness course. 15. On 26 September 2011 the Parole Board decided, on the papers, not to direct the applicant’s release. It noted that the applicant had completed an accredited alcohol course, the ETS course and the SOTP and that he hoped to complete the Thinking Skills Programme (“TSP”) and ESOTP in the near future. It concluded: “You have been consistently well motivated to engage with all work identified as necessary for you. This is to your credit, as is your calm and personable approach. You have made some progress in that you now talk more openly and in more depth about your sexual offences. This has enabled you to work constructively with programme facilitators, and has provided a foundation on which to build in the ESOTP. You are motivated to complete that programme, and it is only available in the closed estate – any move to open conditions would therefore be premature. Release is, at present, out of the question. There is some lack of clarity around some of the risk factors in your case, and you yourself recognise that there is more to be done in terms of addressing risk ...” 16. In November 2011 the applicant completed the TSP. 17. By letter dated 1 December 2011, the applicant was informed that the Secretary of State had considered the Parole Board recommendation and agreed that the applicant was not suitable for release or transfer to open prison conditions. The next review period was set at twenty months, allowing eight months for completion of TSP, six months for completion of ESOTP and six months for production of a further SARN report. The review would therefore commence in October 2012 with a view to completion by July 2013. 18. In a Sentence Planning and Review Report dated 5 December 2011, it was recognised that ESOTP was a course that the applicant should concentrate on as part of his sentence plan. The report observed that the applicant’s need to improve his use of alternative styles of thinking had been addressed through his attendance at the TSP. The report further noted: “Alcohol was an area that was problematic before his incarceration ... He has completed an accredited alcohol course (TADS) and continues to work with CARATS to address this issue. Mr Alexander has completed TSP and reports following completion were positive ... His sentence plan also recommends that he is assessed for the Extended SOTP. I understand from the programmes department that due to lack of resources this remains an objective. However, I am confident that subject to local prioritization strategy this should be completed in 2013.” 19. The applicant’s tariff expired on 16 January 2012. 20. On 27 April 2012 the Prison Service notified the applicant’s solicitors that the applicant was listed on their database “as a priority for assessment” prior to the next ESOTP scheduled to commence in August 2012. The applicant was not selected to participate in the course. 21. On 24 May 2012 the applicant completed a “Change is Possible” group work session. On an unknown date, he attended a brick-laying course. 22. On 12 October 2012 the applicant made a formal application to HMP Bure to ask for an assurance that he would have a place on the next ESOTP. He was advised in reply that no such assurance could be given but that he was a “high priority”. 23. On 28 November 2012 the Prison Service advised the applicant’s solicitors that he would continue to be considered for the next group to participate in the ESOTP, in line with the prioritisation strategy. 24. On 18 December 2012 the applicant’s Parole Assessment Report commented on the work done to date and noted: “Unfortunately, Mr Alexander has yet to get a place on the [ESOTP] and it is hoped that he will in March 2013.” 25. In its recommendation, the report stated: “It is hoped that [the applicant] will be able to participate in the ESOTP (6 months in duration) that is scheduled for March 2013. Until that programme is completed and a further SARN written to identify whether further intervention is required to manage risk, there can be no change to his current assessments and there is no support for a move to less secure conditions at this time ...” 26. On 12 February 2013 the Parole Board decided on the papers not to direct the applicant’s release, deeming him still a risk to the public until he completed the ESOTP. Its report stated: “Through no fault of your own, you have been unable to complete ESOTP but it is anticipated that you will have the opportunity to do so in 2013.” 27. On 13 February 2013 the applicant was informed by HMP Bure programmes team that his placement onto the ESOTP expected to run in June 2013 would depend on the assessment process, which was ongoing, and on his level of priority. 28. On 11 March 2013 the applicant’s solicitors advised him that HMP Bure had informed them that the applicant would be assessed for a place on the ESOTP to commence in May 2013. 29. On 13 March 2013 the applicant was informed that the Parole Board decision of February 2013 was final and that the next review would commence in October 2013, with a view to a hearing in May 2014. 30. On 2 April 2013 the applicant was assessed as being suitable for the ESOTP. 31. On 10 April 2013 the applicant’s solicitors advised him that they had been informed by HMP Bure that he was a “relatively high priority” to complete the next ESOTP running at HMP Bure in May/June 2013. 32. In June 2013 the applicant was transferred to HMP Whatton. In February 2014 he underwent further assessments for the ESOTP in order for prison staff to decide whether he could access the ESOTP at another prison or whether he should undertake the course at HMP Whatton. 33. On an unknown date in autumn 2014 the applicant commenced the ESOTP at HMP Risley. He was due to complete the course in March 2015.

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5. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Sant’Angelo In Campo (Lucca). 6. In 2001 the applicant was practising law. In September 2001 he sent a letter to the Italian National Legal Service Commission (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura – the “CSM”) in which he complained about the conduct of a judge, X, at the Lucca District Court. He subsequently transmitted the content of that letter by means of a “circular letter” to a number of judges of the same court, but without expressly referring to X by name. 7. The relevant parts of that circular letter read as follows: “Before you receive any incorrect or untrue information, before the corporatist spirit prevails over a correct interpretation of the reasons that drove me to write to the CSM, to the Ministry of Justice, to the National Council of Notaries and to the National Bar Council, about the conduct of two judges of the Lucca District Court in the context of a judicial partition procedure to which my clients were parties, and before any of my colleagues come to apologise, on my behalf, for my initiative, perhaps making out that I am insane or irresponsible, my intention is to clarify and tell you the reasons which led me to do so. An appeal on points of law is pending against a judgment of the Lucca District Court in which that court, ruling against the claims by a female partner and deciding on the related issue of the partition of an inheritance, asked the investigating judge to proceed with the sale of a flat, which was the sole item of property to be divided between the heirs, and which was occupied by the partner and her daughter, an heir, born to the cohabiting couple. Since the judgment of the Lucca District Court was not final, it was not possible to proceed with the sale or to initiate the procedure relating thereto, since this was prohibited expressly by Article 791 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The other heir, however, applied for ... the sale, and the investigating judge, in spite of our repeated requests for suspension of the sale, which were all rejected, brought about, after two auctions without a buyer, the conveyance of the property to a third party at the third auction. Here are the specific reasons for which all our requests were rejected: ... In spite of this, I would like to point out at the outset that I do not feel any animosity towards the judiciary and judges in general, and that I consider, by contrast, that the role played by judges is crucial and irreplaceable for civil society. There are and have been judges who carry out and have carried out their duties with great dignity and decorum [decoro], and who deserve my admiration and the admiration of all those who have worked in the field of justice. None of us can forget Y, who died, one can say, on the ‘battlefield’. I still remember that, in the courtroom, he was the one, out of all his colleagues, who, even in his state of extreme and obvious suffering, took the greatest number cases for adjudication, and he carried on doing this until the bitter end. I confess that if I had been able to spare him the effort, in view of his condition, I would willingly have taken over his workload. But there are other equally deserving judges who work, even during their holidays, going to the office, talking to lawyers, and with whom we can have a form of collaboration and dialogue – and to them I also express my esteem and admiration. I am well aware that justice is done by men and precisely for that reason decisions may be erroneous and incomplete. I still prefer, however, a human justice to one that is automated. But what I refuse to accept is the idea that, when the rights of the individual and the dignity of those whose task it is to defend him or her are at stake, those rights could be decided upon in a partial manner, perhaps with a display of arrogance, or that a ruling could be given with total indifference and lack of commitment. I personally believe strongly in the autonomy of the judiciary and I feel that without respect for the autonomy of the person whose task it is to decide, it would be impossible to have dispassionate and fair judgments. Autonomy, however, cannot be turned into an absolute discretionary power because that would be bordering on or tantamount to arbitrariness. I have pointed out how I see the meaning of justice and reiterate that I think very highly of the duties exercised by judges, and that my full admiration goes to those who act with dedication, commitment and decorum [decoro]. I am even envious of judges, because they probably have more time to study and to dwell on issues, and also to attend to other cultural and social interests, than lawyers who, by the nature and specificity of their work, do not always manage to do things or to do things well. I often take home things to read and to study and I end up, mid-evening, nodding off over a book after a busy day, running from one office to another in the morning, and answering the phone or receiving clients in the afternoon. I also understand that the judiciary is burdened with work and with problems, that the staffing is insufficient and the workload huge – and for that reason it is true that protests [esposti] do not help to get the work done more easily, and that more collaboration and dialogue would be better than protests. There are limits, however, that in my view should not be passed and, after thinking about this for quite some time, I decided to submit this particular protest [the letter to the CSM]. I will now quote the last part of my protest in which I dwell on the meaning of the lawyer’s profession and ask whether it is legitimate that any decision or conduct should always be accepted: ‘This lawyer would point out as follows: It is regrettable to direct this letter against individuals who, even [if they have] different duties, are considered by this lawyer to be “colleagues”, as practitioners in law usually call each other. He considers, however, that he is obliged to do so in response to a lack of commitment and total indifference towards the legitimate demands of the citizen in whose name justice is done, with a belief in impunity, as the position is one of “power”, even though it should be seen as the discharge of a “duty”, and “last but not least”, a lack of respect for the dignity and responsibility of this lawyer’s profession. This lawyer has practised law in courts at three levels of jurisdiction, has borne very high costs on behalf of his clients – to the point where, if one were to apply the professional rate, one would exceed the amount of the claim – has sought, in three statements of claim filed in the Florence Court of Appeal, a stay of execution under Article 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but his requests were all rejected by reasoning that leaves much to be desired – but that is not the subject of this protest –has accumulated a formidable pile of documents of all descriptions, and has seen the attachment of funds in respect of his own claim go up in smoke. In the time it has taken to work on these cases, he could probably have dealt with fifteen ordinary cases of average complexity. If work – any type of work, provided it is lawful – has its own protection and its own dignity, then the judge too (more than any person, as a result of his function and role) cannot but allow himself not to respect for the work of others, including that of the lawyer. As a legal practitioner, this lawyer has a duty to provide some certainty to his client, who is the citizen in whose name justice is done (judgments are headed “In the name of the Italian People”). What certainty can the lawyer provide if each judge, instead of applying the law, gives his preferred interpretation and does not even explain his interpretation of the laws in question? It should be noted that the system of appeals and claims is no guarantee for the citizen. Judges are only human and can make mistakes (errare humanum est), but they cannot and must not wilfully make mistakes, by malicious intent, serious misconduct or negligence, and the citizen must have his or her claims upheld, provided they are well founded, from the earliest stage. There are a large number of cases; this can be explained by the fact that if many decisions had been taken correctly from the outset, one could have avoided the proliferation of cases, procedures and claims, as can be seen here; and not forgetting the many cases where the citizen, disappointed and bemused to receive abnormal decisions, having lost all confidence in the justice system, decides not to appeal. This entails a justified loss of confidence in the courts and an increase in workload and expense for the State, because of the extra work for other judges, registries and bailiffs. And what justification and explanation could be given by the lawyer to this client, to whom he had predicted a certain result, with all due caution, only to present a decision by the judge that is diametrically opposed to that which he predicted?? If that is the result of an error, or a lack of knowledge or commitment or analysis on the part of the lawyer, he should take responsibility for it; but when this depends on the judge, it is damaging to the lawyer because the client will necessarily have a negative opinion of the lawyer’s work. Are clients and citizens capable of understanding whether it is the lawyer or the judge who has made a mistake and to what extent?? If the lawyer does not obtain appropriate results with legal argument, what other means are available?? What must the lawyer do to obtain something to which he is professionally entitled?? ... Or should the lawyer not make life difficult for himself and carry on regardless, tending to his garden [il suo orticello], while protecting his head from any tiles that might fall off the roof – because on the one hand he is not protected and on the other he is at the mercy of another person’s discretionary power?? ... Without any regard for his own professional dignity?? ... When this letter reaches you I will be undergoing a medical operation. I am sorry that, for the time being, I cannot provide any further clarification or explanations to those who may wish them. I am however ready, if necessary, to answer for my conduct and to provide any clarification that may be requested of me after my operation, when I am in a better state of health again.’” 8. Finding that certain expressions used in the circular letter had impugned his reputation, X filed a criminal complaint for defamation against the applicant. 9. As X was a judge in Lucca, the file was transferred, under Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the judicial authorities of Genoa. 10. On 13 February 2003 the Genoa public prosecutor requested that the applicant be committed to stand trial before the court of that city. 11. X joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. 12. According to the charge, in the circular letter the applicant had expressed admissible (lecite) criticism in so far as he spoke about interpreting and performing the work of a judge, but had then overstepped the limits to his freedom of expression by writing the following sentences in particular: (a) “Autonomy ... cannot be turned into an absolute discretionary power because that would be bordering on or tantamount to arbitrariness”. (b) “... in a partial manner, perhaps with a display of arrogance, or ... a ruling ... given with total indifference and lack of commitment”. (c) “... the judge ... cannot allow himself not to respect the work of others, including that of the lawyer”. (d) “Judges are only human and can make mistakes ... but they cannot and must not wilfully make mistakes, by malicious intent, serious misconduct or negligence”. 13. At the hearing of 4 March 2004 the representative of the public prosecutor’s office stated that the applicant also had to be charged with proffering insults, given that it transpired from X’s statement that he had been one of the recipients of the circular letter. 14. In a judgment of 3 February 2005, deposited in the court’s registry on 11 February 2005, the Genoa District Court convicted the applicant of defamation and proffering insults and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment and to the reimbursement of X’s court costs (amounting to 2,000 euros (EUR)) with reparation for the damage sustained by X. The amount of that damage was to be fixed in separate civil proceedings; the court nevertheless awarded X an advance payment (provisionale) of EUR 15,000. 15. The District Court observed that it was not in dispute that the applicant had written the circular letter and had asked his secretary to send copies to the judges in the civil divisions of the Lucca District Court. During the proceedings, the applicant had filed pleadings and had made spontaneous statements. His arguments in defence had not, however, made it possible to disregard the offensive nature of the expressions used in the circular letter, exacerbated by the fact that he was a lawyer. In his letter, the applicant had stated that he had the greatest respect for the judiciary and for judges who carried out their duties with “dedication, commitment and decorum”. But he was clearly not talking here about X, who had been accused by the applicant of being arrogant and indifferent, of believing that he was immune because he held a position of power, and of having committed wilful mistakes, by malicious intent, serious misconduct or negligence. Those accusations could be explained not by X’s inaction in the handling of a case, but by the decisions taken by X in a case where the applicant’s requests had been rejected. Instead of reiterating his legal arguments, the applicant had overstepped the limits of his right to criticism, alleging that X had erred “wilfully”, thus seriously impugning the honour of the judge in question. 16. According to the District Court, the subject of the accusations contained in the circular letter could only have been X, as shown by similar letters, which expressly referred to that judge, addressed by the applicant and his clients to the CSM, the Ministry of Justice, the National Council of Notaries and the National Bar Council. 17. The applicant’s defence (esimente) of provocation (Article 599 of the Criminal Code) was not accepted. Even supposing that the decisions of X could be regarded as “unfair acts”, the circular letter, sent about four months after those decisions, did not constitute an immediate reaction to them. 18. The applicant lodged an appeal. 19. He alleged, among other things, that the offences he was said to have committed were punishable merely by a fine, that the sentence imposed on him had been disproportionate and that the advance he had to pay was excessive. Moreover, in his complaint X had not mentioned that he himself had been a recipient of the circular letter, thus ruling out the charge of proffering insults. The applicant also argued that it could not be seen from the text of the letter that the criticism was directed at X and that this document, when assessed as a whole, was merely a manifestation of his frustrations about the shortcomings of the justice system in general. 20. Lastly, in the alternative, he took the view that his defence of provocation was valid. He argued that, in the proceedings for the partition of an inheritance, X had on a number of occasions rejected his requests for the suspension of a sale by auction of the flat in question, and that X’s decisions had subsequently been overturned by another judge. 21. At the hearing of 12 March 2007, the applicant stated that it had not been his intention to offend X personally and he produced documents as evidence of his ill-health. 22. In a judgment of the same day, deposited in the court’s registry on 2 April 2007, the Genoa Court of Appeal ruled that no prosecution could be brought on a charge of proffering insults, as there had been no criminal complaint on that ground, and reduced the sentence for the offence of defamation to a fine of EUR 400. It stated that this sentence was fully remitted (condonata), and ordered the applicant to make reparation for the damage sustained by X, which it assessed at EUR 15,000, and to reimburse X’s court costs in the appeal proceedings (EUR 2,000). 23. The Court of Appeal observed that, in the first part of his circular letter, the applicant had recounted the tribulations of the partition proceedings in which X had taken the impugned decisions. He had added that he regretted having to make complaints about certain individuals (X and another judge) whom, even though they had different duties from his own, he regarded as “colleagues”. In addition, the judges of the Lucca District Court, giving testimony in the first-instance proceedings, had had no difficulty in identifying X as the addressee of the criticisms in the circular letter. In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument that the letter was merely a manifestation of his discontent about the justice system in general could not be accepted. 24. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the decisions taken by X in the context of the inheritance partition proceedings could, at most, be regarded as “erroneous” but not as “unfair”. The court also pointed out that one of the questions at the heart of the dispute (the existence of inheritance rights in favour of the partner) had been settled by the Court of Cassation differently from the applicant’s proposed solution. The National Bar Council had in fact noted that the applicant’s letters could have been seen as a means of pressure against the judges concerned. 25. According to the Court of Appeal, the applicant had not expressly challenged the part of the first-instance judgment considering that the expressions contained in the circular letter had overstepped the limits of the right to criticise. 26. The applicant, who had no criminal record, had to be allowed the benefit of mitigating circumstances, and under Article 52 of Legislative Decree no. 274 of 2000 (see paragraph 32 below), the penalty for defamation was now a mere fine (and not a custodial sentence). 27. The Court of Appeal observed that the distribution of a letter such as that sent by the applicant, within a small court, could not but impugn the dignity of the judge against whom it was directed and his image as an independent judge. The expressions used by the applicant, outside any procedural act, sought to call into question the professional conduct of X, who was portrayed, within a restricted community, as a partial and soft judge. In the light of those considerations, the Court of Appeal, ruling on an equitable basis, awarded the civil party EUR 15,000 in non-pecuniary damage. 28. The applicant appealed on points of law. 29. He reiterated his grievances and, referring to a particular passage in his grounds of appeal, stated that the Court of Appeal had made a mistake in asserting that the defendant had failed to challenge the finding about the offensive nature of the expressions contained in the circular letter. In any event, the judge had been required, at all stages of the proceedings, to verify of his own motion whether or not the criminal charge in question was made out. 30. In a judgment of 12 November 2008, deposited in the court’s registry on 17 December 2008, the Court of Cassation, finding that the Court of Appeal had given logical and correct reasoning in respect of all the contentious points, dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law.

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5. The applicant is a Syrian national of Kurdish origin. He was born in 1988 and currently lives in Geneva. On an unknown date he entered Swizerland from Italy, where he had arrived also on an unknown date. On 18 February 2013 he sought asylum in Switzerland. 6. On 8 May 2013 the Federal Office of Migration (the “FOM”) rejected the applicant’s asylum request on the basis of the fact that his fingerprints had already been registered in EURODAC, in Greece, on 16 August 2012, and in Italy, on 21 January 2013. Furthermore, the Italian authorities had accepted the Swiss authorities’ request of 17 April 2013 to take the applicant back into their territory by virtue of Article 10 § 1 of Regulation no. 343/2003/EC (the “Dublin Regulation”). The FOM further ruled that the applicant’s two sisters, who were living in Switzerland respectively since 2006 and January 2012, did not fall under the category of “family members” as provided in Article 2 (i) of the Dublin Regulation. Regarding the back problems alleged by the applicant, it considered that Italy was obliged to grant him access to medical treatment and that nothing indicated that those health problems impeded the transfer of the applicant to Italy. 7. The applicant appealed against the FOM’s decision to the Federal Administrative Court (the “FAC”). He maintained that he had fled his home country Syria because he had been persecuted, detained and tortured there. As established by medical certificates, he had been diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder, for which he was receiving medical treatment. He was also receiving medical treatment for his back problems. He claimed that the FOM’s decision was in breach of Article 10 § 1 of the Dublin Regulation because Greece was the first member State he had entered less than twelve months before. Thus it was the Greek authorities which were theoretically responsible for examining his asylum request. It could not, however, be derived from the fact that he could not be returned to Greece as established in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC] no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011) that Switzerland could return him to Italy. Therefore, the Swiss authorities’ request for his return to Italy was in breach of the law because they had known that the Italian authorities were not competent in that matter, and Italy had erroneously accepted the request. According to the applicant, the FOM’s decision also violated Article 15 § 2 of the Dublin Regulation which provided that persons who were dependent on relatives who were residing in a member State should be kept together with them. In this regard he established that two of his older sisters were legally residing in Switzerland with their families. He claimed that owing to the presence of his sisters he had regained a certain emotional stability in his life. His expulsion to Italy, where he had no family member to care for him, would therefore aggravate his mental health problems in such a way that he would be at risk of irreparable harm contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. 8. On 13 June 2013 the FAC dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It ruled that according to the Dublin Regulation the applicant had to return to Italy, whose authorities had, prior to accepting the Swiss request for return, been informed by Switzerland that the applicant had first entered the “Dublin area” in Greece. Furthermore, the FAC considered that in view of the dates of arrival in the respective countries it could not be excluded that on leaving Greece the applicant had left the “Dublin area” before entering Italy. Furthermore, it established that the applicant was not so severely ill that he was dependent on the assistance of his sisters. Therefore, Article 15 § 2 of the Dublin Regulation was not applicable in his case and neither was Article 8 of the Convention. Moreover, the FAC held that with regard to the asylum procedure and the availability of medical treatment for asylum seekers it had not been established that there were structural deficiencies in the Italian reception system and that Italy failed to respect its international obligations in respect of asylum seekers and refugees. Therefore, nothing indicated that the applicant would suffer treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of expulsion to Italy. Finally, the FAC stated that it was up to the Swiss authorities to inform their Italian counterparts about the applicant’s health problems when they were executing the expulsion. 9. Before this Court the applicant produced in particular a medical report dated 6 June 2013 establishing that, as a result of trauma allegedly suffered in detention in Syria, he had back problems and showed severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. As a result, the applicant was put on a course of twice monthly psychotherapy sessions with a general practitioner and was prescribeda daily dose of Sertraline, an anti-depressant, as well as sleeping pills (Zolpidem) and pain-killers for his back (Tilur). The report also stated that in the absence of medical treatment the applicant’s health status would deteriorate quickly and put him at a high risk of alcohol or drug abuse as well as suicide. The risk of suicide would be greater should the applicant be returned to his country of origin. Moreover, according to the report, the involvment of the applicant’s sisters was “an absolute necessity” (absolument nécessaire) for him to gain some emotional stability in order to overcome the multiple traumas suffered. Upon the recommendation of his doctor, the applicant was allocated an individual apartment unit for asylum seekers. The applicant also submitted his sisters’ declarations, according to which he was virtually spending the whole time with their families, he was in great emotional need, could not be left alone and spent only the nights alone in his apartment. They added that they were willing and able to provide him with emotional support so that he could recover from his trauma.

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5. The applicant was born in 1980 and is currently detained at HM Prison Frankland. 6. In August 2006 the applicant was arrested, along with others, in the context of a large-scale counter-terrorism operation. It was alleged that he had conspired to construct and simultaneously explode improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”) on transatlantic passenger aircraft in flight, using suicide bombers. 7. A first trial of eight defendants, including the applicant, on charges of conspiracy to murder (Count 1) and conspiracy to endanger the safety of an aircraft (Count 2) began in the Crown Court on 4 April 2008. The prosecution case in respect of the conspiracy to murder charge was that the means by which it was to be effected was by way of detonation of IEDs on board aircraft in mid-flight. 8. After the close of the prosecution case, the indictment was amended to add a further count (Count 1A) which alleged a conspiracy to murder but did not specify the means by which the murder would be carried out. The count was added at the request of the prosecution to cover the possibility that the jury was satisfied that a defendant had agreed to murder but was not aware of the means settled upon to bring the conspiracy to fruition. Count 1 was amended to make clear that it was concerned with a conspiracy to murder specifically by way of detonation of IEDs on aircraft mid-flight. 9. On 8 September 2008 the applicant was convicted of Count 1A but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count 1. The jury was also unable to reach verdicts on some or all counts in relation to six other defendants. The eighth defendant was acquitted of all charges. 10. An exchange followed between judge and prosecuting counsel and the judge ordered the prosecution to indicate by 26 September 2008 whether a retrial would be sought. 11. The announcement of the verdict was widely covered in the press and the media. The reports included references to material which was never put before the jury (see paragraphs 19-26 below). The media also attacked the jury’s failure to return a guilty verdict on Count 1. 12. On 10 September 2008 lawyers for one of the defendants wrote to the Attorney General seeking, inter alia, details of what steps had been taken to ensure the integrity of post-verdict/pre-retrial decision reporting and to prevent the reporting of inadmissible and prejudicial materials. 13. On the same day, the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) announced its intention to seek a retrial of the applicant and the other defendants. Communicating this decision to the media, it added: “The CPS would like to remind media organisations of the need to take great care in reporting the events surrounding this alleged plot. These remain allegations only and, if retrials take place, the defendants have the right to a fair trial. It is extremely important that there should be responsible media reporting which does not prejudice the due process of law.” 14. On 11 September 2008 every national newspaper reported that the applicants were to face a retrial. General reporting about the case nevertheless continued until around 14 September 2008. 15. The Attorney General replied to the defendant’s lawyers’ letter on 25 September confirming that the observations had been noted and were receiving consideration. (b) The application for a stay of proceedings 16. The applicant subsequently applied for a stay of proceedings (i.e. an order effectively terminating his prosecution in respect of Count 1). One of the grounds for the application was that a fair trial was no longer possible as a result of alleged prejudicial publicity which had occurred following the conclusion of the first trial. 17. On 18 December 2008 Mr Justice Henriques refused the request for a stay. He summarised the defence case as follows: “It is the defence case ... that the coverage was manipulated and orchestrated by State sources, either intelligence services, police anti-terrorist branches or government officials. It is asserted that there was a widespread press briefing exercise designed and intended to inform the media of non-evidential material for publication post-verdict, the effect of which was to vilify the defendants in the eyes of the public by supplying the media in confidence with significant undisclosed background material. The State, it is said, failed to take any steps either to notify the court of the confidential press briefings, thus preventing appropriate orders from being made to prevent prejudicial publicity resulting from its own briefings. This was, it is said, a deliberate attempt to manipulate the court’s process on any retrial by seeking to ensure that the world at large was prejudiced against the defendants by an unprecedented volume of St ate-sourced media coverage ...” 18. He considered it implicit in the submissions that the applicant’s argument was that no retrial jury exposed to this volume of publicity could try the case as an unbiased, independent and impartial tribunal. 19. Henriques J summarised the seven examples of inadmissible material which had been published by the press to which the defence had referred by way of illustrative examples. He stressed that this was “by no means the totality of the information complained of”. 20. The first example concerned disclosure of evidence not adduced at trial as to the applicant being in telephone contact with the leader of the 21 July 2005 failed bombings of the London transport system. The statement appeared in almost every national paper and on national media. It was attributed to different sources in different publications, including, inter alia, senior detectives, police, “records show” and counter-terrorism officials. 21. The second example concerned disclosure of evidence not adduced at trial as to deeper links between some of the applicants and others convicted of terrorist offences. This included evidence that the applicant had taken trips to Pakistan at the same time as those responsible for the explosions on the London transport system on 7 July 2005 and the failed 21 July bombing attempt and had been in regular telephone contact with the ringleader of the latter attack. The story was published in virtually every national newspaper and was broadcast on national media. It was attributed to, variously, detectives, intelligence officials, counter‑terrorism sources, investigators and trial officials. 22. The third example concerned disclosure of evidence not adduced at trial as to the defendants’ acquaintance and contact with a certain Rashid Rauf in Pakistan, who had allegedly put them in touch with Al-Qaeda’s leadership. This had been published in almost every national newspaper and broadcast on national media. Some of the attributed sources included the Pakistani Interior Minister, British officials, intelligence services, internal US intelligence documents, security sources and named senior officials in the United Kingdom and the United States. 23. The fourth example concerned assertions which were not the subject of evidence or disclosure at trial that the plot might have been overseen by Abu Ubaydah Al Masri, the former head of Al-Qaeda’s external operations, who had allegedly overseen the July 2005 London bombing plots. The information was carried by several newspapers and was attributed, inter alia, to the police, counter-terrorism officials, intelligence agencies and senior British and American officials. 24. The fifth example concerned assertions which were not the subject of evidence or disclosure at trial that the alleged plot was disrupted following interception of a text message encouraging the conspirators to act. There was also reference to telephone calls and text messages between the UK and Pakistan and a specific incriminating text sent to the applicant. These were published in some national newspapers and broadcast on television, with the attributed source being a British Government source. 25. The sixth example concerned assertions which were not the subject of evidence or disclosure at trial that the telephones of unspecified defendants were being intercepted by the police and that interception had revealed that a dummy run was being planned. Several newspapers and media sources carried the story, with the source being variously named as the police, counter-terrorism police and the head of Counter-Terrorism Command. 26. The seventh example concerned assertions that the United States Government had pressed Pakistan into making arrests before all the legal evidence had been gathered. The information was reported in several newspapers and by several broadcasters. A terrestrial television channel carried the express statement that the British State authorities had reason to delay the effecting of arrests owing to known intelligence that the conspirators would perform additional incriminating acts in furtherance of the airline conspiracy. The source was said to be the head of Counter‑Terrorism Command, US sources, senior British police and counter-terrorism sources, and the former shadow Minister for Homeland Security in the United Kingdom. 27. Henriques J set out the events immediately following the handing down of the verdicts and continued: “It is simply not possible in this judgment to recite each and every objectionable word published by the media ... Whilst it will be convenient to cite in due course some of the worst examples, I readily accept that the multiplicity and breadth of reporting must be considered in order to gauge the potential effect upon any juror who will have been exposed to these or any significant number of these many reports ... I have read everything to which my attention has been drawn.” 28. He noted that there was an “avalanche of objectionable material” in prominent position in both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. There was news coverage across all television and radio channels. There was, and continued to be at the time of Henriques J’s ruling, vast Internet coverage which could be accessed with ease. The very essence of the large majority of the material asserted that all of the defendants were guilty of the conspiracy to blow up aircraft. Henriques J categorised the offending material as follows: “(i) the defendants have strong links with several prominent Al Qaeda terrorists, including Rashid Rauf, 7/7 bombers and 21/7 bombers, of which the jury were not informed; (ii) but for the premature arrest in Pakistan of Rashid Rauf, for which the Americans are to blame, more evidence would have become available to the prosecution; (iii) the activities of the defendants were being monitored by phone taps and other forms of interception and a dummy run was anticipated which might be used to carry out a real attack; (iv) the investigation had prevented unspeakable carnage and loss of countless lives; (v) the jury were incompetent, the evidence was very strong and the jury’s verdict was astonishing; (vi) the trial judge mishandled the trial and in particular permitted a two-week break during the jury retirement, the jury returning for only five days at the commencement of their deliberations before then going on holiday.” 29. On the subject of pre-verdict briefing, Henriques J said: “... [I]t is common practice for there to be pre-verdict briefings in high profile cases. There are any number of matters in which the public have an interest. There is frequently a public debate concerning topics raised by the case. Instant reporting is demanded by the public at large. They are entitled to it. It is their right. Before there can be immediate post-verdict reporting, there must be pre-verdict briefing.” 30. Turning to the first of the specific complaints made by the defence, the judge noted that prosecution counsel had conceded that there had been some “significant disclosure of non-evidential material by the Executive” but had “vehemently objected” to any suggestion that there had been secret briefings. The judge did not accept that secret Executive press briefings had taken place. He referred to material published in particular in the United States and concluded that there were a “multiplicity of avenues” through which journalists could have gained information other than through secret briefings. He explained: “... I regard the submission that the Executive quite deliberately briefed the press during the trial with a view to disadvantaging the defendants in any retrial that might possibly take place as fanciful ... The plot alleged requires not only foresight of a retrial during the trial itself; it requires foresight that the press will breach the embargoes that they have signed not to disclose such material until conclusion of the proceedings.” 31. As to the second allegation, that the State “perpetrated a gross manipulation and abuse of the court process by failing to restrain publicity resulting from its own briefings, the judge found again that there was absolutely no evidence that any individual had been party to such a plot. He described as a “most extravagant allegation” and rejected it “with certainty”. 32. On the third question whether the defendants could receive a fair trial, having regard to the publicity, the judge noted that the publicity was worldwide, often repeated and reported by every branch of the media, including the Internet and associated blogs. It had run in the main from 8 September to 14 September 2008, and much of the reporting remained available on the Internet. He reviewed in some detail the major publications of 9 September as well as a few of the worst other examples. As to the law on adverse publicity, the judge explained: “As to the legal principles relevant to a defendant receiving a fair trial, I have reminded myself of Montgomery v HM Advocate [see paragraph 60 below], and in the context of this case reminded myself that the only issue to be addressed is the right of a defendant to a fair trial and no assessment of the weight to be given to the public interest comes into the exercise. The fact that the allegations here are of the gravest nature is wholly irrelevant. The defendants must receive a fair trial, however grave the allegations and however far-reaching the consequences may be of staying this trial.” 33. The judge considered a number of domestic judgments concerning the impact of prejudicial publicity before or during trial. He continued: “I have concluded that a fair trial is in this case possible for all defendants on this indictment and propose to ensure that each of them does receive a fair trial. In reaching that conclusion I have brought the experience of many years in the criminal courts to this decision. I trust juries and have every confidence that they do indeed have regard to the directions given by judges. ... I trust a jury in this building to decide whether they can be sure on the evidence presented to them that there was indeed a plan to blow up aircraft. I cannot accept the proposition that an English jury may convict because of something they may remember having read many months earlier. I do believe that juries pay attention and act upon the directions we give them. I will give them at the outset of the trial a most careful direction tailored particularly to this case and I shall canvass the direction with counsel before I deliver it. If necessary, I will repeat it from time to time. I have no fears that the jury will be influenced by those earlier press reports. They know that none of us can believe everything that we read in the press ... I believe that sufficient time will have passed by February 16th of next year, over five months since the publicity ... There have been other terrorist trials in the meantime occupying crime correspondents and their readers. I am sure that the facts will have receded and faded, as will any possible prejudice.” 34. The judge further pointed out that all defendants had admitted conspiracy to commit public nuisance by making martyrdom videos and that the first three defendants had admitted conspiring to cause explosions. These convictions would be put before the jury in the retrial and, the judge said, in the face of these admissions links to other terrorists, if remembered by jury members, became “rather less significant”. In any event, in his experience, the impact of pre-trial publicity and prejudicial media coverage was minimal even in high-profile cases. He cited examples of cases where offensive pre-trial publicity had taken place but the defendants had subsequently been acquitted. He concluded that he had absolutely no doubt that juries took their responsibilities most seriously and decided cases on the evidence presented to them in court. He fixed the retrial to commence on 16 February 2009. (c) The retrial proceedings 35. The retrial of seven defendants, including the applicant, on Count 1 and four defendants on Count 1A duly commenced on 16 February 2009 but was twice aborted in the early stages. On 2 March 2009 a further jury was selected and sworn. During jury selection that day, the judge directed the potential jury members as follows: “It is, of course, of critical importance that we are able to select a jury which is completely unbiased and a jury which is prepared to give its time to a very important case indeed. You will appreciate the gravity of the allegation, a plan to blow up a number of aircraft effectively simultaneously. It is a hugely important task, quite possibly the most important task required or asked of any of you; hugely important public service. Of course not all of you will be in a position to serve and for those who do undertake the task, it will necessarily involve a degree of self-sacrifice.” 36. He specifically asked them whether there was any reason arising from their beliefs, occupation or any other matter that might inhibit their ability to return an impartial verdict in this trial or whether they or any relative or close friend, held views of such strength that they might materially influence their consideration of the case. 37. On the matter of the adverse publicity prior to the retrial, he said the following: “Next: as a result of publicity given to this case and to these allegations, do any of you hold any pre-conceived views of guilt or innocence incompatible with an unbiased discharge of your duties as a juror? No. Thank you. Next: are you, or is any member of your immediate family or any close friend, or have you, or any member of your immediate family or any close friend, been employed by any media agency involved in the investigation and/or reporting of this case? Come forward, sir.” 38. He further asked the potential jury members questions concerning two recent broadcasts which had discussed the case: “Two broadcasts. One broadcast: did any of you watch this programme on BBC television, it was two weeks ago, that is not yesterday, not the Sunday before that but the Sunday before that, in other words 15 days ago, at 10 o’clock in the morning, BBC1, there was a programme broadcast called The Big Questions? The host was Nicky Campbell and there were a panel of three or four experts, if I can call them that, one of whom certainly was a rabbi, when there was a discussion which touched upon the plot to blow up airliners and terrorism and the facts giving rise to this case were to some extent touched upon. Did anybody, 10 o’clock in the morning, watch that programme? Could you come forward, please, sir. Then exactly two weeks ago today, 10.00 pm on a Monday evening, Radio 4, there was broadcast a programme, The World Tonight, in which the alleged plot to blow up airliners was discussed. Did anybody listen to that radio programme on Radio 4? No. Next – sorry, come forward, please. Thank you. I told you that this case started some two weeks ago and on all the major television programmes publicity was given to it. Did any of you, as a result of seeing that publicity, carry out any internet research; in other words, have any of you carried out internet research in the last two weeks into the alleged airline plot? No. Thank you very much.” 39. Finally, the jury having been selected, the judge directed the jury as follows: “Can I please give you some additional instructions? There may now be a temptation, knowing that you are going to serve upon this case, to try to find out a little bit more about it and if any of you are addicts of the internet or the web, there may be a temptation to go on to it and read about it and see about it. Please do not do that. There was an element of inaccurate and unsatisfactory reporting at the time this matter first came to light. The allegations were not accurately reported in every instance and it is critically important that you decide the case upon the evidence that you hear in court and nowhere else. We tell jurors in all criminal cases not to carry out any research of their own. In a typical pub fight case we tell jurors not to go and have a look at the pub, not to turn themselves into sleuths because what is critical is you decide the case only upon what you hear in court. The defendants are entitled to know the basis and the exact basis upon which they are being tried. So, accordingly, please do not, either before the case starts tomorrow or indeed at any stage, carry out any internet research or indeed any research of any kind. I will also give you further instructions not to read any newspapers or listen to any television reports. The reason for that is sometimes they are inaccurate, sometimes they are speculative and they are always partial reporting. The only way you can hear and receive all the evidence is by being here in court, listening to it. That is where you receive the information. The other danger is when you go back tonight you will say, ‘I’ve been selected for a jury’ and those with whom you live or those you meet tonight may say to you, ‘I know all about that case. I have read about it in the newspapers.’ Please do not discuss the case with anybody. It will be quite wrong for anybody to tell you what they think about the case and it might affect your judgment in the long run. You have been selected to try a terrorist case, tell them, because that is what the allegation is here, one of terrorism, and leave it at that. There is no purpose at all in discussing the facts of the case with anybody and, indeed, it would be absolutely wrong and a contempt of court if you were to do so. I have explained the real reason for not doing so is the person you were discussing it with might be playing a part in deciding the case and you and only the 12 of you must do that, nobody else must play any part in doing so. There are other instructions which I will give you tomorrow after the case has started, but for the time being that suffices.” 40. The trial commenced with the prosecution’s opening speech on 3 March 2009. At the end of the first day, the trial judge gave the jury the following instructions: “I am obliged to give you certain instructions. Some of them you are familiar with because I said a few things to you yesterday. I remind you, please, do not carry out any research of any kind into this case, either over the internet or in any other way at all. That includes not visiting any site referred to in the case. All your information must come to you in this court. Please ignore any newspaper reports, if there are any, into this case and please disregard any broadcast of any kind that you may hear. It is vital that you do not discuss the case with anybody for reasons which I gave you yesterday. Other people will express views which might in due course affect your judgment. The decision must be the decision of the 12 of you and nobody else.” 41. The judge reminded the jury intermittently throughout the trial that they were not permitted to discuss the case with family or friends or to carry out Internet research. On 30 June 2009, the first day of the parties’ closing speeches, he said: “We have embarked now upon a new phase of this case and now is as good a time as any to remind you of what I said earlier in the case about avoiding information which may in some way touch upon terrorism or even this case. I remind you again, please: do not carry out any internet research. Do not read any books. Do, please, switch channels if a television programme comes on which is obviously about terrorism or some related topic. Please avoid all newspaper articles and the like which deal with terrorism. The reason for that is to allow you to approach the facts of this case and when you come to reach your several decisions with a clear mind, unaffected by anything outside of this case, anything originating outside this courtroom. You decide this case on the information that you have received within this court and nothing else.” 42. Again during his summing-up, the trial judge reminded the jury that they should not discuss the case with anyone outside the jury. Once the jury had retired to consider its verdict, he reminded them at the close of each day that they should not discuss the case outside the jury room. 43. On 7 September 2009 the applicant was convicted on Count 1. Of the other six defendants tried on Count 1, two were convicted, three were acquitted and the jury were unable to reach a verdict in respect of one. Of the four defendants tried on Count 1A, one was convicted and the jury were unable to reach a verdict in respect of the other three. 44. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of forty years. 45. The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction. The Court of Appeal granted leave on several grounds, including the question whether the retrial was fair having regard to the media publicity after the first trial. 46. On 19 May 2011 the appeal against conviction was dismissed. 47. The court noted the high media interest in the first trial and the simultaneous reporting of the trial proceedings, including the verdicts. It observed that in the circumstances it was impossible to have imposed restrictions on the verdicts as no-one had applied to the trial judge to ask for this to be done before the verdicts were taken. Even if such an application had been made and granted, given the worldwide interest in the case the Court of Appeal considered it difficult to see how publication of the verdicts could have been prevented in jurisdictions outside the trial court’s jurisdiction. 48. Responding to the submission on behalf of the applicant that jurors at his retrial could no longer be relied upon to follow the trial judge’s directions, the court said: “92. To the extent that there remains the risk that, despite what jurors are told by a judge, an individual juror might look up matters on the internet, any attempt by an individual juror to use what was found to influence the views of the other jurors is, in our judgement, bound to fail. For what was found on the internet to have any influence on the verdict of a jury, it would require other members of the jury to disobey their oath. In our judgement, ... the trial process in this trial was capable of coping with the adverse publicity. There was, it must be emphasised, no evidence at all to suggest that any juror had sought information on the internet.” 49. The Court of Appeal emphasised that allegations that the publicity and disclosure of certain facts by State authorities had been deliberate were not pursued on appeal. It noted that embargoed police or prosecution service briefings were commonplace in major trials and that no challenge was made to the propriety of the press briefings. It also reviewed the actions of the prosecution and the Attorney General. The court then turned to consider in detail the ruling of Henriques J of 8 December 2008 and expressed itself to be “entirely satisfied” that he had not only applied the correct principles but had come to a conclusion that was open to him, namely that a fair-minded observer would consider that a jury, properly directed, could fairly try the applicant. It explained: “104. Not only do we consider that conclusion open to him but we also consider that that conclusion was correct. We accept ... that trying the case elsewhere was not an option; asking potential jurors about their knowledge of the case again was not an option. However, we do consider that, given the trial process and the months that had elapsed before the second trial, the informed observer would be satisfied that a jury would consider fairly and impartially the evidence and would have no regard to the publicity to which we have referred.” 50. The court added: “105. We have also taken into account the fact that, unlike the decisions in Abu Hamza and Montgomery v HM & Another [2003] 1 AC 641 [see paragraphs 60-61 below], this was not a case concerned with pre-trial publicity but with publicity following a conviction. The fact that it was a trial following a conviction on one count in our view is an important factor that may be viewed as more significant than pre-trial publicity. However, looking at the matter overall, we consider that the trial process could ensure a fair trial and a fair-minded observer would think that as well.” 51. On 16 November 2011 the Court of Appeal declined to certify that the applicant’s case raised a point of law of public importance.

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7. The applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Cracow. 8. On 7 May 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed three armed robberies and one attempted armed robbery with the use of a machete on 4 May 2012. He was initially detained in a police establishment for children (policyjna izba dziecka) in Cracow. 9. On 7 May 2012 the Cracow-Krowodrze District Court (Family and Juvenile Section) instituted inquiry (postępowanie wyjaśniające) with a view to determining whether the applicant had committed the offences at issue. 10. On the same day the Cracow-Krowodrze District Court decided to place the applicant in a shelter for juveniles (schronisko dla nieletnich) for a period of three months. It found that, in view of the available evidence, there existed a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed three armed robberies and one attempted armed robbery and some other offences. The court also noted that the applicant was lacking in moral character and that the nature of the offences with which he had been charged militated in favour of placing him in a correctional facility (zakład poprawczy). It also noted that there was a risk that he might go into hiding or put pressure on witnesses. 11. The applicant appealed. He argued, inter alia, that there had been no risk of fleeing or interfering with witnesses. He also objected to his placement in the shelter on the grounds that he had a history of mental difficulties and had been schooled in a specialised institution. 12. On 10 July 2012 the Cracow Regional Court upheld the decision of the lower court. It had regard to the gravity of the offences which the applicant had allegedly committed and the fact that they could not be treated as an isolated incident. The court also noted that in the past a family court had handed down a warning and that on 29 May 2012 he had been put under the supervision of a court guardian. In view of those circumstances, it was considered likely that the applicant would be placed in a correctional facility. His placement in the shelter was further justified by the fact that he had threatened one of the victims of the robbery. Responding to the arguments related to the applicant’s mental health, the court noted that the placement in the shelter, in addition to the applicant’s isolation, placed him under educational supervision which could not be seen as incompatible with his well-being. 13. On 27 July 2012 the Cracow‑Krowodrze District Court ordered that the applicant’s case should be examined in correctional proceedings (postępowanie poprawcze). 14. On 9 August 2012 the applicant’s counsel requested the Cracow‑Krowodrze District Court to order the applicant’s immediate release. He submitted that the three-month period for which the measure was applied had expired on 7 August 2012 and that no decision on prolongation of the measure had been given. He argued that in accordance with section 27 §§ 4 and 5 of the Juvenile Act the decision on prolongation of the placement in a shelter for juveniles could be taken only by a court after summonses had been sent to the parties and counsel. The applicant’s counsel obtained information from the court’s registry that in practice such decisions were not given, and that it sufficed for the court to issue an order for the case to be examined in correctional proceedings. The applicant’s counsel objected to such a practice and considered it to be unlawful. 15. On 9 August 2012 the Cracow-Krowodrze District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for release. It provided the following reasons: “The juvenile Maksymilian Grabowski is accused of having committed criminal acts with the use of a dangerous object. These circumstances exclude the possibility of altering the security measure in respect of the juvenile. At present the state of health of the juvenile is normal. In the absence of reasons justifying the quashing of the security measure in respect of the juvenile, it has been decided as above in accordance with sections 20 and 27 of the Juvenile Act”. 16. On 9 August 2012 the applicant’s counsel wrote to the director of the Gacki Shelter for Juveniles urging him to release the applicant. 17. By a letter of 16 August 2012 the Cracow-Krowodrze District Court informed the applicant’s counsel that after the court had ordered the examination of the case in the correctional proceedings on 27 July 2012, it did not prolong the applicant’s placement in the shelter for juveniles pursuant to section 27 § 3 of the Juvenile Act. 18. The Cracow-Krowodrze District Court held hearings in the applicant’s case on 21 November 2012 and 9 January 2013. On the latter date the court delivered a judgment and held that the applicant had committed the offences which had been imputed to him. The court ordered the applicant’s placement in correctional facility but suspended the application of this measure for a two-year probationary period. It further ruled to place the applicant under the supervision of a court guardian during the probationary period. 19. Having regard to the judgment, on 9 January 2013 the Cracow‑Krowodrze District Court quashed the applicant’s placement in a shelter for juveniles. The applicant was released on the same day. 20. The judgment of 9 January 2013 was not appealed against and became final on 14 February 2013.

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9. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 10. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently serving a life sentence in the town of Solikamsk, Perm Region. 11. On 21 November 1994 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of banditry, robbery and aggravated murder. 12. Between 21 November 1994, the date of his arrest, and the summer period of 1995 the applicant was held in various remand prisons in Ekaterinburg, Perm, Izhevsk and the Perm Region. 13. On 13 October 1995 the Perm Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. The judgment became final on 6 June 1996. 14. From the summer of 1995 to the autumn of 1999 the applicant was held in remand prison no. 1 in Perm. Following his conviction he was held in a special cell for prisoners awaiting the implementation of their death sentence. 15. On 19 May 1999 the President of Russia commuted the applicant’s death sentence to life imprisonment. 16. On 8 October 1999 the applicant was transferred to a special-regime correctional colony for life prisoners in the Perm Region, and on 11 October 1999 he began serving the first ten years of his sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of Article 127 § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. The applicant fell within the exception from the general rule of that legal provision, in that the first ten years of his sentence were calculated from the date of his placement in the special-regime correctional colony, rather than from the date of his initial arrest in 1994. The exception applied only to those prisoners whose conduct during their detention on remand had been in breach of the rules (see paragraph 52 below). The applicant later unsuccessfully challenged this rule before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 30 below). 17. For the next ten years the applicant was held under a strict regime of imprisonment, governed by Article 125 § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 29 below). 18. On 11 October 2009, on expiry of the first ten years of his sentence, the applicant’s prison regime was changed from a strict regime to an ordinary regime, governed by Article 125 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 50 below). 19. At the time of his arrest on 21 November 1994 the applicant was married to S. and had a three-year-old son. His remaining family consisted of his parents, O. and A., his brother Se. and his grandmother M. According to the applicant, his extended family numbered seventeen people in total, and after his arrest he wished to maintain contact with all of them. 20. From 21 November 1994 to 8 October 1999 the applicant was not allowed to see his family at all, with the exception of one visit by his wife in the week following the first-instance judgment in the criminal case against him in October 1995. 21. In 1996, following the first-instance judgment in his criminal case, the applicant’s wife divorced him, on her initiative. 22. The applicant submitted that he had been allowed to start corresponding with the outside world following the entry into force of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences in January 1997. He then re‑established contact with all of his family members and his former wife. 23. During this period the applicant was allowed to have one short-term visit from his relatives every six months. The visits lasted no longer than four hours. During the meetings the applicant communicated with his visitors via a glass partition or through metal bars, under conditions which allowed no physical contact. A warden listened in to the conversations with his visitors. 24. The applicant used his right to short-term visits as frequently as possible, and received visits from his mother, his father and his brother. His friends also tried to visit the applicant, but this was not authorised by the prison administration. Long-term family visits during the first ten years of his sentence were not allowed. 25. According to the applicant, due to the severity of the restrictions on his contacts with the outside world he lost contact with some of his family members and with his own son, whom he had not seen for the past fifteen years. The applicant’s son refuses to see the applicant, but has agreed to help him financially. 26. After the applicant’s change of regime on 11 October 2009, he became entitled to long-term family visits in addition to short-term visits. The applicant availed himself of each subsequent opportunity to have a long-term visit, and saw his family members once every six months: once in 2009, twice in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. On each of these occasions the visit was for the authorised maximum duration of three days, except for one visit in the spring of 2013. This visit was interrupted at the initiative of the applicant and his mother, who had to catch her train and leave earlier. The applicant’s brother also attended these visits. The visits lasted no more than seventy-two hours and his privacy was respected throughout. The applicant’s father participated in the short-term visits until 2007, but could not come for the long-term visits which started in 2009 on account of his health. 27. The Government submitted that, in total, the applicant had fourteen short-term visits and nine long-term visits during his detention in the special-regime correction colony. None of the applicant’s respective requests for a visit was refused. 28. On 24 August 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court of Russia, challenging the constitutionality of the ten‑year ban on long-term family visits for convicts sentenced to life imprisonment as contained in Article 125 § 4 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. He alleged, in particular, that the provision in question had been discriminatory and breached his right to respect for private and family life. 29. The Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint concerning Articles 125 § 3 and 127 § 3 inadmissible, having ruled as follows: “... Nor do the provisions of Article 125 § 3 and Article 127 § 3 of the Code on the Execution of Criminal Sentences breach [the applicant’s] constitutional rights. Article 55 § 3 of the Constitution ... allows for the possibility of restricting human and civil rights by federal law, as a means of protecting the basis of the constitutional regime, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of others, [and] securing the defence of the country and State security. Such restrictions may be linked, in particular, with the application of criminal sanctions against offenders, in the form of imprisonment and other measures related to punishment. ... Article 71 (o) of the Constitution empowers the federal legislature to provide for restrictive measures of this type in relation to convicted persons on whom a sentence has been imposed, which, as follows from Article 43 § 1 of the Criminal Code... consist, by their very nature, in deprivation or restriction of the convict’s rights and freedoms, as provided by law. At the same time, both the legislature, in establishing liability for a crime, and the law-enforcement agencies, in deciding on its application to an offender, are required to take into account the nature of the crime, the danger posed by it to the values defended by the Constitution and the criminal law, its seriousness, its causes and other circumstances in which the crime was committed, and also information about the offender, provided that regulation by those institutions, and their application, correspond to the constitutional principles of legal liability and guarantees to the individual in his or her public relations with the State. As the Constitutional Court noted in [its previous case-law ...], the legislative regulation of criminal liability and punishment without taking into account the offender’s personality and other objective and reasonable circumstances which facilitate an appropriate assessment of the social danger posed by the criminal act itself and by the offender, and the application of identical sanctions for crimes that pose varying degrees of social danger, without taking into account the offender’s degree of participation in the crime, his or her conduct subsequent to the crime and in serving a sentence where that has already been imposed, and other [relevant] factors, would both be contrary to the constitutional prohibition on discrimination and the principles of fairness and humanism expressed in the Constitution. In setting out criminal sanctions with a range of restrictions, corresponding to the gravity of the crime committed by the convict and the sentence imposed, and also in determining the manner in which that sentence is to be served, the legislature must proceed on the basis that convicts enjoy, as a whole, the same rights and freedoms as other citizens, with the exceptions determined by their individual personalities and the offences committed by them. The conditions for serving sentences, as laid down both in Articles 125 and 127 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences and in a range of other provisions of that Code, are intended to tailor sentences to individual offenders and differentiate sanctions and their application, and to create the preconditions for achieving the aims of punishment, which, as stated in Article 43 § 2 of the Criminal Code, are the restoration of justice, reform of the offender and the prevention of new crimes ...” 30. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, this time challenging Article 127 § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, in so far as this provision distinguished between two categories of detainees serving their sentence in special-regime colonies on the basis of whether or not they had previously breached prison rules while in their detention on remand and had been punished by solitary confinement. For those who had not previously breached prison rules and had not been punished by solitary confinement, the initial ten-year period of the strict-regime conditions started running from the date of their initial arrest and detention. For those who had previously breached prison rules and been punished by solitary confinement, the ten-year period under strict‑regime conditions began from the date of their arrival in a special‑regime correctional colony. The applicant argued that this provision was unconstitutional and discriminatory. On 21 December 2006 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s second complaint against the above-mentioned provision inadmissible, ruling as follows: “... the [above-mentioned] provision does not violate the rights of [the applicant]. Article 55 § 3 of the Constitution allows for the possibility of restricting human and civil rights by federal law as a means of protecting the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of others, [and] ensuring the defence of the country and State security. Such restrictions may be linked to the application of criminal sanctions against offenders in the form of coercion by the State, the distinctive feature of which is that, throughout its execution, certain of the offender’s his rights and freedoms are withdrawn and specific obligations are imposed. At the same time, the restrictions imposed on a convicted person’s rights and freedoms shall correspond to the crime committed and to his or her personality. This requirement is also compulsory in respect of cases where [the authorities have punished] persons who breached the legally established regime in the course of the criminal proceedings or [already] while serving their sentence. The provision of Article 127 § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences [in so far as it includes the contested rules] is intended to tailor sentences to individual offenders and to differentiate the conditions for serving sentences, and to create the preconditions for achieving the aims of punishment, which, as stated in Article 43 § 2 of the Criminal Code, are the restoration of justice, reform of the offender and the prevention of new crimes. If, in the applicant’s opinion, his rights were violated by the relevant actions or decisions of the law-enforcement bodies when imposing a sanction in the form of a placement in a solitary confinement, during his transfer from a remand prison to a correctional colony or in calculating the term of his detention under the strict regime, he is entitled to appeal against them in court ...” 31. The applicant made attempts to bring civil claims against the prosecutor’s office and the lawyer who defended him in the course of the criminal proceedings. The applicant challenged in court the prosecutor’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings and the Ombudsman’s failure to act on his complaints. He also lodged a number of complaints with the Constitutional Court. All of these proceedings proved unsuccessful.

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5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Strumica, where he works as a surgeon at Strumica Hospital (“the hospital”). 6. On 8 June 1997 the applicant treated Z.R.’s broken and injured arm. In the days that followed Z.R. complained of pain in the arm. The applicant, together with two other doctors and other hospital staff, applied various treatments and referred Z.R. to the children’s clinic in Skopje. 7. On 11 June 1997 Z.R. was admitted to the children’s clinic in Skopje. It was discovered that he had a serious bacterial infection; consequently, his right hand was amputated on 19 June 1997. 8. On 25 September 1997, an investigating judge of Strumica Court of First Instance (“the trial court”), on a request by the public prosecutor, opened an investigation against the applicant. On 19 April 2000 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicant for aggravated medical malpractice (тешки дела против здравјето на луѓето). 9. On 10 July 2001 and 13 December 2004 the trial court acquitted the applicant (се ослободува од обвинение). Those judgments were quashed by the Štip Court of Appeal (“the appellate court”) on 30 January 2002 and 9 March 2005 respectively. The appellate court on both occasions observed, inter alia, that the degree of the applicant’s guilt and consequently, the proper qualification of the criminal offence, had not been correctly established in the proceedings before the trial court. It further ordered that the experts’ opinions be supplemented. 10. On 13 September 2006 the trial court again acquitted the applicant, finding no grounds that a criminal offence had been intentionally committed. 11. On 13 December 2006 the appellate court, of its own motion, at a session in the presence of both parties, re-qualified the charges and dismissed them (се одбива обвинението) as time-barred. It found that despite its instructions given in the earlier remittal orders, the degree of the applicant’s guilt was not correctly established in the proceedings before the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the applicant’s actions could have been negligent rather than intentional and therefore the criminal prosecution had become time-barred. 12. On 21 March 2007 the Supreme Court accepted the public prosecutor’s request for the protection of legality, and remitted the case to the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court, having re-qualified the charges, established the facts anew without holding a hearing (претрес). 13. On 8 October 2007 the appellate court held a hearing in the presence of both parties and again dismissed the charges as time-barred. 14. The applicant and the public prosecutor both lodged appeals before the Supreme Court. The applicant also submitted observations in reply to the public prosecutor’s appeal. 15. On 26 March 2008 the Supreme Court held a session (седница) in the presence of the public prosecutor. After hearing the public prosecutor’s oral pleadings, in which she sought a dismissal of the applicant’s appeal and for the prosecutor’s appeal to be allowed, relying as well on the parties’ written submissions, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, allowed the public prosecutor’s appeal, and reversed the appellate court’s judgment. The Supreme Court accepted the trial court’s findings of facts and law, namely that the imputed offence should be qualified as intentional aggravated medical malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the applicant was guilty, and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. The applicant’s representative was served with the Supreme Court’s judgment on 19 June 2008, and the applicant himself on 11 July 2008. 16. On 1 April 2009 the applicant started serving the prison term. On 6 October 2009 the trial court replaced the prison sentence with a conditional discharge. This decision became final on 14 October 2009.

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6. The applicants, Mr V.M. and Mrs G.S.M., and four of their children were born in 1981, 1977, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011 respectively and live in Serbia. Their eldest daughter, who was also an applicant, was born in 2001 and subsequently died on 18 December 2011 after the application had been lodged. 7. The applicants are of Roma origin and were born in Serbia, where they spent the greater part of their lives. They explained that they decided to leave their country for Kosovo because of the discrimination and ill‑treatment they had suffered on account of their origin in every sphere: access to the employment market, medical care, schooling difficulties and so forth. 8. The eldest daughter of the first two applicants had been physically and mentally disabled since birth and had suffered from epilepsy. 9. After failing to obtain a more secure situation for themselves in Kosovo, in March 2010 the applicants travelled to France, where they lodged an application for asylum. Their application was rejected by a final decision on 4 June 2010. 10. The applicants stated that in the meantime they had returned to Kosovo, and then to Serbia, in May 2010 owing to the precariousness of their situation in France and their inability to provide for their essential needs. 11. In March 2011, as their situation had not changed, the applicants decided to go to Belgium, where they lodged an asylum application on 1 April 2011. 12. During their interview with the “Dublin” department of the Aliens Office on 4 April 2011 the applicants gave an account of their movements to date and expressed their fears in the event of a return to Serbia. The first applicant stated that he had chosen to seek asylum in Belgium because he had been told that he could obtain better treatment for his disabled daughter there. He said that he was suffering from psychological problems. The second applicant said that Belgium had been the choice of the smuggler. When asked about her health, she replied that she was six months’ pregnant. She also mentioned their eldest daughter’s health problems. 13. The applicants maintained that they had explained the reasons why they refused to return to France, where they had been living in extremely precarious conditions. They submitted that they had not been asked to provide any evidence of having left the territory of the Member States of the European Union (“EU”) or regarding the family members’ state of health. 14. On 12 April 2011 the Belgian authorities sent France requests to take the applicants back on the grounds that the latter had been unable to prove that they had left the territory of the Member States of the EU for Serbia since their stay in France. 15. On 22 April 2011, relying on Article 16(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third‑country national (“the Dublin II Regulation”), France refused to take charge of the applicants on the grounds that the couple were considered to have disappeared since May 2010 because they had not collected the notice of final refusal of their asylum application dated 4 June 2010 and this corroborated their statements to the Aliens Office according to which they had left the Schengen Area in 2010 and re-entered it in March 2011, thus leaving for a period of more than three months. 16. On 2 May 2011 the Belgian authorities asked the French authorities to reconsider their position given that there was no conclusive evidence that the family had left the territory of the Member States for more than three months since their stay in France and the applicants were clearly aware of the rejection of their asylum application in France. 17. On 6 May 2011 France accepted the request to take the family back pursuant to Article 16(1)(e) of the Dublin II Regulation. 18. On 17 May 2011 the Aliens Office issued decisions refusing the applicants leave to remain and ordering them to leave the country for France on the grounds that under Article 16(1)(e) of the Dublin II Regulation Belgium was not responsible for examining the asylum application and that France had agreed to take charge of the family. The decisions indicated among other things that the family, who were originally from Kosovo, “had not furnished evidence of their stay” in Kosovo after staying in France nor any certificates regarding any medical treatment or care in respect of the pregnancy, or concerning the child or the father. Considering that France was a country which respected human rights, had democratic institutions, had ratified the Convention and the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, and was bound to implement the directives of the European Union on asylum and that if a return were to raise a problem under Article 3 of the Convention, the family could always lodge an application with the Court for interim measures, the Aliens Office considered that the Belgian authorities did not have to use the sovereignty clause provided for in Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation. 19. Accordingly, the applicants were ordered to leave the country within seven days and to report to the French authorities at the border crossing. On the same day the applicants were issued with laissez-passer. 20. On 19 May 2011 the applicants, through their legal representative, contacted the Aliens Office for the purposes of providing it with evidence that they had left the territory of the European Union for more than three months (gynaecologist’s certificates, the second applicant’s health card and proof of enrolment at school of one of their children). 21. On 25 May 2011 execution of the orders to leave the country were extended until 25 September 2011 on account of the fact that the second applicant was soon due to give birth. 22. On 16 June 2011 the applicants lodged an application with the Aliens Appeals Board for the decisions refusing them residence permits and ordering them to leave the country to be set aside and for a stay of execution. They argued that the decisions, with the reasons given therein, had not provided them with the examination required by Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 336, ECHR 2011) of their fears regarding a return to Serbia and of their health problems. Firstly, the reasoning was erroneous and incomplete (error as to their nationality, identifying them as Kosovars instead of Serbs, failure to mention their return to Serbia and their Roma origin). Secondly, they could not be blamed for having failed to provide, during their Dublin interview, documents certifying their health problems and their movements to date or for not having substantiated their fears regarding a transfer to France. Like all Dublin asylum-seekers at that time, when they had attended those interviews they had not been assisted by a lawyer or informed of the documents that they should bring and no document had been requested of them. As they had expressed their fears, the Belgian authorities should have asked the appropriate questions and requested the relevant documents in order to ensure that their return did not infringe their fundamental rights. The applicants also argued that France should not have been determined as the State responsible for examining their asylum applications. Under Article 16(3) of the Dublin II Regulation, the obligations regarding the determination of the State responsible ceased where the third-country national had left the territory of the Member States for at least three months. That was precisely the position the applicants had been in on account of their return to Serbia from May 2010 to March 2011 as certified by the documents subsequently sent to the Aliens Office (see paragraph 20 above). Lastly, they submitted that the Belgian authorities should have used the sovereignty clause or the humanitarian clause both on account of their special vulnerability and of the notoriously difficult situation of the Roma minority in Serbia and of the conditions for the reception of asylum-seekers in France. 23. The hearing before the Aliens Appeals Board took place on 26 August 2011. 24. On 23 September 2011 the applicants unsuccessfully sought a further extension of the order to leave the country pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board. 25. On 27 September 2011 the applicants lodged an application with the Court for interim measures suspending their transfer to France pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board. 26. On 28 September 2011 the Court refused to indicate an interim measure. 27. In a judgment of 29 November 2011 the Aliens Appeals Board ruled on the application to have the decisions refusing residence permits and ordering the applicants to leave the country set aside and for a stay of execution. 28. The Aliens Appeals Board dismissed the ground of appeal regarding the conditions of reception in France and based on the risk alleged by the applicants of being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. It found as follows: “... the Board cannot but observe that the applicants have failed to show that they encountered difficulties in their dealings with the French authorities regarding access to health care for their child or their conditions of reception as asylum-seekers. They have not adduced so much as a shred of evidence regarding the circumstances of the ill-treatment they have allegedly suffered and have merely asserted in their application, without substantiating this with the slightest evidence that could corroborate the facts, “that they found themselves in an extremely precarious situation at the time of lodging their application for asylum and that their only refuge was a night hostel that they had to leave the next morning”. Moreover, although their daughter’s disability had been specified in the “Dublin form”, the parties have not made any allegation whatsoever before the Aliens Appeals Board of encountering particular difficulties in the reception of asylum-seekers as organised by the relevant French authorities.” 29. The Aliens Appeals Board also criticised the applicants for failing to produce in full the NGO reports that they had cited in support of their application, which had prevented it from checking whether the extracts produced did actually concern France. 30. The Aliens Appeals Board set the decisions aside, however, on the ground that the Aliens Office had not established the legal basis on which it considered that France was the State responsible for examining the applicants’ asylum application. 31. On 23 December 2011 the Belgian State lodged an appeal on points of law with the Conseil d’État against the Aliens Appeals Board’s judgment. It disputed the Aliens Appeals Board’s analysis of the applicable legal basis. 32. In an order of 12 January 2012 the Conseil d’État declared the appeal admissible. In a judgment of 28 February 2013 it rejected it for lack of current interest on the grounds that the operative provisions of the Aliens Appeals Board’s judgment were no longer a source of complaint for the applicants because they had returned to Serbia and had left the territory of the Member States for more than three months with the result that Belgium was relieved of any obligation in the process of determining which Member State was responsible for their asylum application. 33. In the meantime, on 22 September 2011, the applicants had lodged an application for leave to remain on medical grounds under section 9ter of the Aliens (Entry, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion) Act of 15 December 1980 (“the Aliens Act”) on behalf of their eldest daughter. They referred to the extreme precariousness of their position and the discrimination they had suffered as Roms in Serbia and Kosovo. Citing several international reports in support of their submissions, they argued that for that reason they had no guarantee that they would be able to obtain the necessary treatment for their daughter’s health condition. They sought temporary leave to remain pending the outcome of the asylum proceedings they had instituted in Belgium. 34. On 30 September 2011 the Aliens Office declared their application inadmissible on the grounds that the medical certificate of 26 June 2011 (see paragraph 38 below), produced in support of their application to have their residence status regularised, certified the existence of a medical problem and stipulated the treatment considered necessary but, contrary to the requirements of section 9ter § 3, 3o of the Aliens Act, did not specify the degree of seriousness of the condition. 35. The applicants indicated in their observations in reply that they had learnt of the existence of that decision during the proceedings before the Court. 36. On 1 April 2011 the Federal agency for the reception of asylum-seekers (“Fedasil”) assigned the applicants a reception facility as their mandatory place of registration, namely, Morlanwez asylum-seekers’ reception centre. 37. The social worker from the centre took down the following account by the applicants of the conditions of their reception in France: “The family decided to leave France because they had no means of subsistence. They were living in a night shelter which they had to leave in the day. They and the children were out on the streets from 7 a.m. They had to use a pushchair as a wheelchair for S., who is disabled. They had no information of any kind apart from the status of asylum-seeker which had been given to them on their arrival. No doctor, no social worker, no lawyer, no interpreter. They had absolutely no means of communication. They had no idea what they should do or what to expect. S. was not receiving any medical treatment of any kind. When her health deteriorated and she had to be taken to hospital, it was the mother’s sister who drove her to the emergency ward at the hospital and acted as interpreter. Once at the hospital the little girl had [epileptic] fits and her hair fell out. That was what decided the family to return to Serbia”. 38. The eldest daughter was examined on 26 June 2011 by a neuro‑psychiatrist at Jolimont-Lobbes Hospital and a medical certificate was drawn up on that day certifying the child’s disabilities. 39. In that certificate, which was sent to the Aliens Office on 1 July 2011, the doctor noted that the child had “cerebral palsy with epilepsy”, suffered from “severe axial and peripheral hypotonia”, that she could not sit up unassisted and soiled her underwear, that she could not talk and appeared not to understand others. He also noted that the child was taking medicines and that she required physiotherapy and appropriate equipment (orthopaedic braces, seat-brace). Those medical findings were confirmed by a neurological examination carried out on 1 July 2011. 40. The eldest daughter was admitted to hospital on 7 and 8 July 2011 for her epileptic fits and a neurological report drawn up. 41. After the second applicant gave birth on 26 July 2011 the family were assigned a new reception centre on 5 August 2011 in an open centre suitable for families, in Saint-Trond in the province of Limbourg. 42. On 26 September 2011, when the order extending execution of the order to leave the country expired, and as they could no longer benefit from material assistance for refugees, the applicants were removed from the Saint-Trond reception centre. 43. The applicants travelled to Brussels, where voluntary associations indicated a public square in the municipality of Schaerbeek, in the centre of the Brussels-Capital administrative district, where other homeless Roma families were also staying. They stayed there from 27 September to 5 October 2011. 44. On 29 September 2011, through their legal representative, the applicants asked the French-speaking community’s General Delegate to the Rights of the Child to intervene urgently with the national authorities responsible for the reception of asylum-seekers. 45. On the same day the General Delegate sent a letter to the Director-General of Fedasil requesting that accommodation be found urgently. 46. A signed statement by the General Delegate dated 2 October 2011 indicated that he also contacted the municipality of Schaerbeek in an attempt to find urgent accommodation for the family. According to the General Delegate, the municipal authorities stated that they did not have power to make a decision and that it was for the federal authorities to decide, and Fedasil declared that it did not have power on account of the decision taken by the Aliens Office regarding France’s responsibility for processing the asylum request (see paragraph 18 above). Fedasil also stated that the application to the Aliens Appeals Board (see paragraph 22 above) was not of suspensive effect, which was why the reception centre had applied the rules terminating the right to material assistance. 47. On 5 October 2011, following the intervention of the General Delegate, the Secretary of State’s office for Asylum and Migration, Social Integration and the Fight against Poverty instructed Fedasil to designate a reception centre as a matter of urgency. 48. After spending two days at the transit centre of the Woluwe‑Saint‑Pierre municipality, also in the Brussels-Capital administrative district, on 7 October 2011 the applicants were assigned a new reception centre as a mandatory place of registration: the Bovigny reception centre for asylum-seekers in the province of Luxembourg approximately 160 km from Brussels. 49. The Government maintained that the applicants had failed to register at the centre. The applicants, for their part, stated that they had gone there by train and a special bus but had been sent back to Brussels to Fedasil’s Dispatching Department on the grounds that their “annex 26quater [order to leave the country] was invalid.” 50. When they got back to Brussels on 7 October 2011 the applicants got off the train at the Brussels Gare du Nord, where they remained without any means of subsistence and with no accommodation despite the very cold weather for nearly three more weeks until their return to Serbia was organised via a charitable organisation as part of the Fedasil return programme. The applicants left Belgium for Serbia on 25 October 2011. 51. In the meantime, on 12 October 2011, the applicants’ mandatory place of residence had been changed to code 207 “no-show” (see paragraph 81 below) and on 25 November 2011 the applicants’ names were deleted from the waiting register. 52. After their return to Serbia their eldest daughter’s health deteriorated, forcing the applicants to leave the room they had rented on account of the insalubrious conditions. They went to stay with a relative in Novi-Sad and then to the suburbs in Belgrade. 53. The applicants’ eldest daughter was admitted to hospital on 4 December 2011 suffering from a lung infection. She died on 18 December 2011. 54. In a letter to their lawyer of 21 November 2012 the applicants stated that they had been attacked by Serbs on a number of occasions: among other incidents, some men had driven by in a car and broken the windows of their home by throwing stones, and had uttered threats, complaining of their links with the “Belgians” and ordering them to leave Serbia. The first applicant had attempted to defend himself and been beaten up twice by his attackers.

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5. The applicant was born in 1979. 6. On 3 January 2003 the applicant started serving a sentence in the Pravieniškės Prison after his conviction for rape and theft. 7. In subsequent separate proceedings the applicant and his three accomplices were found guilty of murder and robbery committed as part of an organised group in 2000. A final decision in that case was adopted in 2013 by the Supreme Court. The applicant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. That sentence was added to the applicant’s prior conviction, and a final sentence of thirteen years’ imprisonment was imposed. 8. On 25 May 2003 the applicant was found beaten up and unconscious in the Pravieniškės Prison after being attacked by other prisoners. A pre-trial investigation into the incident was opened the same day by the Pravieniškės Prison authorities, who informed the Kaišiadorys prosecutor about it. Immediately after the event an investigator of the prison inspected the area where it had taken place. 9. The same day the applicant was taken injured and unconscious to the Prison Department’s Hospital (Laisvės atėmimo vietų ligoninė) and then to the Emergency Hospital of Vilnius University (Vilniaus greitosios pagalbos universitetinė ligoninė), where he underwent an operation. Five days later he was transferred back to the Prison Department’s Hospital. 10. On 26 May 2003 the investigators ordered that the applicant be examined by a forensic medical expert. According to the medical record, the applicant had sustained beatings (muštinė žaizda) to the head and haematoma. 11. On 5 June 2003 the applicant’s mother wrote to the State authorities that she had learned about the incident only a week later, when she wanted to visit her son in the Pravieniškės Prison. She alleged that the prison was dangerous and demanded that those responsible for the assault on her son be found and punished. 12. By a letter of 13 June 2003 the Kaišiadorys prosecutor informed the applicant’s mother that a pre-trial investigation into the assault on her son had been opened on the day of the incident. She was also informed that a medical examination had been ordered to establish the severity of the injury. 13. On 1 July 2003 the Pravieniškės Prison investigator wrote to the Kaunas police that the applicant’s mother was avoiding coming to the prison and testifying and he therefore requested the police to question her as a witness; it was indispensable to ask her whether her son had ever told her about having disagreements with other prisoners or whether he had received threats. The police were also asked to employ operational measures to identify suspects and determine the circumstances surrounding the severe bodily injury (sunkus sveikatos sutrikdymas) of the applicant. 14. On 10 July 2003 the applicant was granted victim status by the investigators. It was explained to him that in that status he could submit requests or lodge complaints, under Article 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 43 below). On 10 July and 18 August 2003 the applicant was questioned about the incident. However, he stated that, given his state of health, he did not remember how he had been attacked and injured. 15. According to a medical certificate of 28 August 2003, a severe fracture of the skull had occurred as a result of what the doctors described as two blows to the applicant’s head. He had been unconscious for some time just after the assault, and then neurosurgery had been carried out. The doctors concluded that the applicant had sustained a serious head injury and would need a long period of rehabilitation. In August 2003 the applicant was declared Category II disabled, and in March 2004 he was declared Category III disabled (a less severe level of disability). As the applicant’s state of health improved, in February 2008 he was declared able to work at ninety percent. 16. On 28 August 2003 the applicant was discharged from the Prison Department’s Hospital and returned to the Pravieniškės Prison for outpatient health care. Afterwards, on different dates, the applicant spent time in Lukiškės Remand Prison, Pravieniškės Prison and the Prison Department’s Hospital. 17. On 10 September 2003 the applicant testified that on the day of the incident he was taking exercise when another prisoner approached him and asked him to go to the living quarters of the Pravieniškės Prison Wing no. 5. They went to a place where there were other prisoners, among whom the applicant noticed a person he had known earlier from the time outside the prison. That person was holding a knife, and hit (smogė) the applicant on the head. The applicant described him as a tall, well-built man of 40-45, who had previously been convicted of murder. The applicant was confident that he could recognise his attacker. On 25 September 2003 the applicant identified from photographs of forty three persons a suspect who appeared to be a certain E.J. 18. A report of 11 November 2003 from the Pravieniškės Prison showed that E.J. had a conviction for robbery under Article 272 of the Criminal Code, and had been sentenced to three years of imprisonment. According to that report, E.J. had left Pravieniškės Prison on 5 September 2002 for Lukiškės Remand Prison and had come back to the Pravieniškės Prison on 29 May 2003, which was four days after the incident. An extract from E.J.’s personal file indicates that E.J. arrived at Lukiškės Remand Prison on 5 September 2002 and left that prison on 29 May 2003. 19. On 19 December 2003 the Pravieniškės Prison authorities concluded, on the basis of the 11 November 2003 report, that on the day of the incident E.J. was not being held in the Pravieniškės Prison but was in Lukiškės Remand Prison in Vilnius. 20. According to the Pravieniškės Prison’s internal investigation report of 19 December 2003, the authorities questioned twenty eight witnesses, including prisoners, operational investigation measures were ordered, medical examinations were carried out and photographs of possible suspects were shown to the applicant and witnesses. 21. By a letter of 25 February 2004 to the Kaunas police, the Pravieniškės Prison authorities reiterated their request that suspects be identified. The letter also mentioned that, according to the medical report, the applicant had sustained two blows to the head with blunt objects (sužalojimai padaryti veikiant bukais daiktais – dviem smūgiais). The prison authorities also observed that the applicant’s testimony lacked consistency (apklausiamas keičia parodymus) and that he claimed not to remember the circumstances of the incident. 22. On 26 March 2004 the Kaunas police informed the Pravieniškės Prison investigators that no reliable information enabling identification of the perpetrators of the assault on the applicant had been established. 23. On 10 May and 13 July 2005 the Pravieniškės Prison authorities requested the Kaišiadorys prosecutor and the Kaunas and Plungė police authorities to order additional operational measures, inter alia, to question three witnesses – inmates of the Pravieniškės Prison at the time when the applicant was injured. The last letter ended with a request for the criminal police “to identify persons who had committed the impugned crime and to find the crime weapon” (nustatyti asmenis, padariusius minėtą nusikaltimą ir surasti nusikaltimo padarymo įrankius). 24. On 15 July 2005 the prosecutor ordered the Kaunas police to carry out the aforementioned actions. The prosecutor also informed the applicant’s mother that the criminal investigation file had been examined by a prosecutor. Twelve days later, the Plungė police authorities sent the report of questioning to the Pravieniškės Prison investigators. 25. Considering that the process of investigation was not producing any results, in February 2007 the applicant’s mother objected to the way the investigation in the case was being conducted and asked the prosecutors to find her son’s attackers. 26. By a letter of 27 April 2007 the prosecutor dismissed the complaint by the applicant’s mother that the criminal investigation was not effective. According to the prosecutor, even though a number of investigative actions had been carried out, it was not possible to identify the persons who had injured the applicant. It was explained to the applicant’s mother that, if she disagreed with the prosecutor’s conclusion, she could appeal to a court. 27. On 7 August 2008 the Kaišiadorys district prosecutor refused to comply with a request by the applicant’s mother to start an investigation into whether the Pravieniškės Prison authorities had failed to act and to protect her son’s safety and health in prison. In the decision, the prosecutor wrote: “The [applicant’s mother] cites matters which are relevant to the criminal case concerning the injury to M. Kardišauskas. A pre-trial investigation into this incident is already pending. In the event that a failure of the officers to perform their official duties is established, the question of their criminal responsibility will be decided subsequently. The question of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage [caused to the applicant] will also be decided within the current pre-trial investigation, once a person or persons who have committed the crime, that is, injured M. Kardišauskas, are identified. If then, due to his state of health or for other reasons, M. Kardišauskas is unable to submit a civil claim on his own account, the prosecutors will have to submit such a claim, as prescribed by Article 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” The decision stated that it could be appealed against within fourteen days to the pre-trial investigating judge of the Kaišiadorys district court. 28. According to a report by the Pravieniškės Prison authorities of 28 December 2007, even though prisoners who had served in that prison as of 2003 had been questioned about the attack on the applicant, no relevant information had been obtained. 29. On 19 April 2010 the prosecutor informed the applicant’s mother that no suspect had been identified during the investigation. 30. The pre-trial investigation was still pending on 7 June 2012, as was later observed by the Supreme Administrative Court in the administrative case for damages (see paragraphs 33-40 below). 31. In reply to a request for information by the applicant’s mother, on 9 January 2013 the prosecutor wrote to her that the pre-trial investigation was still pending, no suspect had been identified and no procedural decision had been taken in the criminal case. 32. In their observations of 4 November 2013 on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government stated that the criminal investigation remained open until new circumstances came to light. On 20 January 2014 the Court received observations from the applicant, in which he noted that the criminal investigation was still continuing. 33. In April 2010 the applicant was granted State-guaranteed legal aid and on 18 October 2010 he instituted proceedings against the State. 34. Firstly, the applicant claimed damage to his health resulting from the failure of the prison authorities to protect him from ill-treatment. To this claim the Pravieniškės Prison administration responded that the applicant had never indicated that he was in danger in prison. 35. Secondly, in the rectified complaint of 29 November 2010 the applicant criticized the authorities for not having established who his assailant was. On 3 February 2011, when addressing the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court in writing, the applicant further argued that the authorities had failed to act diligently and to take all necessary measures so that the crime was solved quickly. 36. During those proceedings the applicant contended that the introduction of his civil claim for damages in respect of the injury had been delayed for objective reasons, namely the state of his health, his continuing stay in prison, the failure of the investigating authorities to indicate suspects and to inform the applicant in a timely fashion of the possibility of submitting such a claim and of his right to legal aid. 37. On 23 March 2011 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The court established that the applicant had been injured on 25 May 2003, and the statutory time-limit to lodge a claim for damages caused by health impairment was three years. The applicant had lodged his claim only on 18 October 2010, that is, more than seven years after the injury had been sustained. 38. The applicant appealed. On 14 November 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court remitted the case to the first-instance court to verify whether part of the applicant’s claim that the pre-trial investigation had not been effective was also time-barred. 39. On 14 February 2012 Kaunas Regional Administrative Court refused to examine the applicant’s claim for damage caused to his health on the ground of prescription. The court established that as early as 2004 the applicant’s health had improved; he had been released from hospital and had returned to prison. The applicant had relatives to assist him in making use of his rights, and he could also have asked for free legal aid in a timely fashion. Lastly, it was only the applicant’s own unfounded belief that a court action for damages against the Pravieniškės Prison was not possible before the person who had attacked him was identified. 40. By a final decision of 7 June 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the claim due to the expiry of the three-year prescription period applicable to claims relating to damage to health. The court rejected the applicant’s arguments that he had been misled by the prosecutors investigating the incident, who had convinced him that he would be able to lodge a civil claim for damages only after the person responsible for his injury was identified. The applicant’s contention that his health had prevented him from submitting the claim in time was likewise dismissed. The Supreme Administrative Court also observed that the applicant could have appealed against the investigating officers’ or prosecutor’s actions, if he considered them improper. However, the applicant had not made use of any of his rights under Article 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The pre-trial investigation was not yet over.

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5. The applicants were born in 1969 and 1965 respectively and live in Chişinău. 6. The applicant was a police officer from 1991 to 2012, when he retired. 7. On 27 February 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal delivered a judgment obliging the Chișinău municipality to provide him and his family with social housing. The court concluded that the applicant had been entitled to social housing under Article 35 (1) of the Law on Police Forces. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice on 11 June 2008 and became final on the same day. Enforcement proceedings were instituted on 10 April 2008. 8. Between 2008 and 2012 he lodged numerous complaints about the failure to enforce the judgment in his favour to no avail. The judgment of 27 February 2008 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal has not been enforced to date. 9. The applicant was a police officer from 1988 to 2005, when he retired. 10. On 6 May 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal delivered a judgment obliging the Chișinău municipality to provide him and his family with social housing. The court noted that the applicant had retired from the police force in 2005 and concluded that he had been entitled to social housing under Article 35 (1) of the Law on Police Forces. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice on 23 July 2008 and became final on the same day. 11. Enforcement proceedings were instituted on 16 June 2008. The judgment of 6 May 2008 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal has not been enforced to date.

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5. In implementation of the Court’s judgment in the case of Kudła v. Poland given on 26 October 2000 (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000-IX) Poland enacted the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”) (see also paragraphs 75-83 below). Subsequently, following the introduction of the Law of 20 February 2009 on amendments to the law on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o zmianie ustawy o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2009 Amendment”) the name of the 2004 Act was altered to the Law on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki (see also paragraphs 84-89 below). 6. The Court has previously considered the remedies introduced by the 2004 Act under Article 35 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention in three leading cases and concluded that they were “effective” for the purposes of those provisions (see Charzyński v. Poland no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 36-43 ECHR 2005-V; Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII; and Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 68-73, ECHR 2005‑V (extracts). In consequence, in 2005 over 600 Polish cases involving complaints of excessive length of proceedings, which were at that time pending before the Court, were rejected by committees of three judges under former Article 28 of the Convention on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 7. However, since then every year at least 100 prima facie well-founded applications concerning complaints of breaches of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time have been lodged with the Court by persons who have exhausted the remedies under the 2004 Act. As in the present three cases the facts of which are described below, and in 591 cases to be communicated listed in the annex to this judgment (see also paragraphs 209‑212 below), the applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the unreasonable length of civil or criminal proceedings and under Article 13 of the domestic courts’ refusal to grant them sufficient just satisfaction for a breach of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time. As regards their grievances under Article 13, all the applicants in essence maintained that the Polish courts dealing with their complaints under the 2004 Act had failed to comply with the principles established by the Court with respect to the “reasonable-time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 and the criteria for “appropriate and sufficient redress” to be afforded at domestic level for a breach of that requirement (for the relevant criteria, see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 195-216 and 272, ECHR 2006‑V). 8. Between 30 October 1998, when the Court gave its judgment in the case of Styranowski and for the first time found a violation of Article 6 § 1 by Poland on account of the excessive length of proceedings (see Styranowski v. Poland, 30 October 1998, §§ 57-58 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII), and 31 December 2014 the Court has delivered further 419 judgments where the same breach was found. It is to be noted that 280 of those judgments were given in 2005-2011, after the entry into force of the 2004 Act. In addition, between 2005 and 2011 the Court struck out of its list of cases 358 applications where the parties had either concluded a friendly-settlement agreement or where the Court accepted the Government’s unilateral declaration acknowledging a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13. 9. Pending the outcome of the pilot-judgment procedure in the present case and having regard to the aim of that procedure, which is to facilitate the most speedy and effective resolution of a dysfunction at domestic level through general measures whereby the State provides a global solution for all the persons actually affected and prevents similar repetitive violations in the future (see Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement) [GC], no. 31443/96, § 35, ECHR 2005‑IX and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, §§ 234 and 236, ECHR 2006‑VIII), at the end of 2012 the Court put on hold Polish applications alleging exclusively excessive length of judicial proceedings. Since then, the Government have been notified only of cases granted priority or cases involving mostly other substantiated complaints, where the length of proceedings has represented merely a secondary or peripheral issue. Subsequent developments of the caseload have demonstrated the growth in the number of new applications to the Court under this head. In 2013-14 256 prima facie well-founded cases were lodged, of which 144 were registered as ready for decision in 2014. 10. As of the date of adoption of this judgment, 650 cases involving mainly, or at least partly, complaints about the length of civil (157 cases) and criminal (493 cases) proceedings are pending before the Court, of which 33 have been communicated to the Polish Government and the remainder earmarked for communication and examination under Article 28 § 1 (b) of the Convention. 11. In total, 537 Polish cases are currently pending execution before the Committee of Ministers. As of the date of adoption of the judgment, the above number included 393 cases involving a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They are divided into three groups concerning, respectively, criminal proceedings (68 cases), civil proceedings (240 cases) and administrative proceedings (85 cases). 12. The Committee of Ministers classified the Polish length‑of‑proceedings cases as suitable for the enhanced supervision procedure. That procedure was introduced by the Committee of Ministers on 1 January 2011, as part of the implementation of the Interlaken Plan. Indicators for cases to be examined under that procedure are as follows: judgments requiring urgent individual measures; pilot judgments; judgments disclosing major structural and/or complex problems as identified by the Court and/or the Committee of Ministers and Inter-State cases. 13. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Warszawa. 14. On 18 September 2002 the applicant, who was a policeman, was arrested on suspicion of participating in an organised criminal group and corruption. On 20 September 2002 he was charged with those offences and remanded in custody. 15. On 5 December 2002 the prosecutor signed a bill of indictment against the applicant and fifteen co-accused. The applicant was indicted on charges of participating in an organised criminal group, abuse of power and corruption. 16. On an unspecified date in December 2002 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) lodged the bill of indictment with the Warsaw-City District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 17. On 14 May 2003 the court issued a severance order, deciding that the accused policemen be tried separately; however, no trial date was scheduled. 18. On 30 May 2003 the applicant was released. 19. On 20 November 2003 the court ordered that the accused policemen’s case be joined with another case. No trial date was scheduled. 20. On 24 May 2005 the Warsaw-City District Court decided that it did not have competence to deal with the case and referred it to the Warsaw‑Mokotów District Court. The decision became final on 28 July 2005 but the case-file was not transferred to that court until 18 November 2005. 21. The proceedings before the Warsaw Mokotów District Court started on 21 September 2006. One of the reasons for the delay was that, on 10 July 2006, the court had found that the accused had not yet been served with a copy of the bill of indictment, which should normally have taken place at the initial stage of the judicial proceedings. Up to the end of 2006 the court held fourteen hearings. In the first half of 2007 eight hearings took place. 22. On 19 July 2007 the Warsaw Mokotów District Court held that as a result of amendments to the criminal law that had meanwhile entered into force, it no longer had competence to deal with the case and referred it to the Warsaw Regional Court. The parties appealed. 23. On 15 November 2007 the District Court found that the appeals were well-founded and quashed its decision on referral. The case-file, which had meanwhile been transferred to the Regional Court, was returned in June 2008. 24. The trial before the District Court restarted in June 2008. However, as so much time had elapsed, it had to be conducted from the beginning. In 2008 the court held eleven hearings, in 2009 ten hearings and in 2010 seven hearings. 25. On 21 July 2010 the Warsaw Mokotów District Court acquitted the applicant. 26. On 16 April 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint under the 2004 Act (hereafter also referred to as “length complaint”) with the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) He sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 5,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation. On 1 June 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court held that the length of the proceedings had been excessive from 17 September 2004 to 18 November 2005 (see also paragraph 20 above) and awarded the applicant PLN 2,000 (approximately EUR 500) in compensation. In its assessment of the length of the proceedings, the court took into account only the period starting from 17 September 2004, i.e. the date on which the 2004 Act entered into force. As regards the period after 18 November 2005, the Regional Court found that, despite the fact that “in the first half of 2006, at the stage of preparation for the trial and during the initial hearings the court’s actions [had been] somewhat chaotic and the court had not avoided certain shortcomings”, the proceedings had been conducted with due diligence. In consequence, the court refused to grant the applicant the full sum sought, holding that he had not demonstrated that he had sustained damage in that amount. 27. In the absence of domestic remedies, the Court’s award, determined with reference to the criteria set in its case-law, in particular the length of the period under consideration (see paragraphs 126-128 and 132 below) and sums usually granted in similar Polish cases would amount to PLN 38,000. The applicant was awarded approximately 5.5% of that sum. On the date of the national court’s decision on the applicant’s complaint, namely 1 June 2010 (see paragraph 26 above) a domestic award, determined with reference to the Court’s awards in similar cases and the Scordino (no.1) criteria (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, §§ 195-216 and 272) should have reached at least PLN 13,200 in order for the applicant to lose his victim status. 28. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Łódź. 29. On 8 September 1998 the applicant lodged an application for the securing of evidence with the Łódź District Court. Pursuant to Article 310 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such an application can be lodged by a prospective party before the initiation of a civil action if there is a fear that the taking of specific evidence will be impossible or too difficult, or if there is a need to establish the state of affairs. The applicant, who intended to bring a civil claim against his landlord for damages resulting from defective performance of a lease contract, asked the court to obtain an expert report determining the state and value of outlays that he had made on the commercial premises that he had rented. The report was submitted to the court on 20 November 1998. A copy thereof was served on the applicant on 8 December 1998. 30. On 4 March 1999 the applicant lodged an action for damages with the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). He also asked the court to secure his claim. An order securing the claim by means of a mortgage on the defendant’s property was given on 17 May 1999. 31. The first hearing was held on 20 September 1999. The next hearing took place on 9 November 2000. In the meantime, the court dealt with some procedural matters involved in the defendant’s interlocutory appeal against the order securing the claim, which was accompanied by his various other requests, such as applications for exemption from court fees or for retrospective leave to appeal out of time. 32. Overall, from 4 March 1999, namely the date on which the claim was lodged, to 6 November 2001 the Regional Court held six hearings and heard evidence from the parties and nine witnesses. The hearings were held on 20 September 1999, 9 November 2000, 17 May, 4 September, 4 October and 6 November 2001. 33. On 30 November 2001 the court gave judgment and rejected the applicant’s claim in its entirety. The applicant appealed on 24 January 2002. 34. On 4 September 2002 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 35. The re-trial started on 28 November 2002. From that date to 16 May 2005 the Regional Court scheduled four hearings, which were held on 3 February and 3 April 2003, 31 March 2004 and 16 May 2005. It heard evidence from a witness, an expert and the parties. The applicant modified his claim on 16 May 2005. 36. In the meantime, on 31 March 2004 the court had decided to take evidence from an expert in construction. The expert submitted his report on 13 September 2004. 37. On 2 June 2005 the Łódź Regional Court gave its second judgment, partly allowing the applicant’s claim. 38. The judgment was partly quashed on the defendant’s appeal and the case was remitted by the Łódź Court of Appeal on 28 March 2006. On 17 May 2006 the case-file was returned to the Regional Court. 39. On 25 May 2006 the Regional Court ordered the parties to apply for the taking of further evidence that they wished to submit, on pain of rejecting any such subsequent requests. On 13 June 2006 the applicant asked the court to take evidence from one witness and from himself as a party. On 19 June 2006 the defendant asked the court to obtain evidence from two experts. 40. The re-trial started on 20 September 2006. From that date to 19 March 2010 the court scheduled five hearings, which were held on 17 November 2006, 18 July 2007, 5 September 2008, 1 April 2009 and 19 March 2010. It heard evidence from two witnesses, three experts and the parties 41. In the meantime, on 29 December 2006, the court had ordered that evidence from an expert in construction be obtained. It fixed a thirty-day time-limit for submission of his report. The expert submitted the report on 19 March 2007. The defendant asked the court to take evidence from another expert. 42. At the hearing held on 18 July 2007 the parties stated that they would attempt to settle the case. On 12 and 13 September 2007 respectively they informed the court that their negotiations had failed. 43. On 8 November 2007 the court ordered that evidence from three experts – in construction, accountancy and air-conditioning and ventilation – be obtained. The construction expert submitted his report on 7 January 2008, the expert-accountant submitted his report on 22 October 2008 and the air‑conditioning expert submitted his report on 2 November 2009. The intervals between those dates were caused by the fact that the court waited until each expert had finished his work before sending the materials in the case-file to the following expert. Also, the expert in air-conditioning on several occasions asked the court to extend the time-limits set for submission of his report, which he justified by the volume of his work on other reports, long holidays and difficulties in obtaining a document or in setting a date for an on-site inspection of the premises. The court granted all his requests. 44. On 16 April 2010 the Łódź Regional Court delivered its third judgment, rejecting the applicant’s claim in its entirety. The applicant appealed on 6 August 2010. 45. On 5 November 2010 the Łódź Court of Appeal heard the appeal. On 19 November 2010 it partly allowed the applicant’s appeal, altered the contested judgment and granted the applicant’s claim up to the amount of PLN 56,770, with statutory interest. 46. On 4 May 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint under the 2004 Act with the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). He sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and PLN 10,000 Polish zlotys in compensation. 47. On 2 June 2010 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court concluded that, given the complexity of the case and the need to obtain evidence from experts in three different fields, the proceedings had been conducted in a correct and timely manner. In its assessment of the length of the proceedings, the court took into account only the period after 28 March 2006, namely the date on which the Court of Appeal had partly quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 2 June 2005 (see also paragraph 38 above). 48. In the absence of domestic remedies, the Court’s award, determined with reference to the criteria set in its case-law, in particular the length of the period under consideration, (see paragraphs 126-128 and 144 below) and sums usually granted in similar Polish cases would amount to PLN 36,400. On the date of the national court’s decision on the applicant’s complaint, i.e. 2 June 2010 (see paragraph 47 above) a domestic award, determined with reference to the Court’s awards in similar cases and the Scordino (no.1) criteria (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, §§ 195-216 and 272) should have reached at least PLN 11,000 in order for the applicant to lose his victim status. 49. The applicant was born in 1955. She lives in Poznań. 50. In 1999 the applicant lodged a civil action for payment and accounting (pozew o złożenie rachunku z zarządu i zapłatę) against a certain A.T. with the Gdynia District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). The action concerned property which had been inherited by the applicant. 51. On 15 December 1999 A.T. and four other persons applied to the Gdynia District Court for adverse possession (zasiedzenie) of the property in question. The applicant was not notified of the proceedings. 52. On an unspecified date the Gdynia District Court informed the applicant that the proceedings for payment and accounting initiated by her had been stayed pending the outcome of the case concerning adverse possession. 53. On 12 April 2000 the applicant informed the District Court that she wished to join the proceedings. 54. From 15 December 1999 to 19 April 2006 the court heard evidence from four witnesses and two participants in the proceedings. It also ordered that a press announcement be published to all unknown heirs or heirs whose whereabouts were unknown of one of the late predecessors in title to the property. 55. On 19 April 2006 the Gdynia District Court decided that A.T. and four other persons had acquired a half share in the property by adverse possession. 56. The applicant appealed on an unspecified date in April or May 2006. 57. On 18 October 2007 the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case, holding that the District Court had failed to make the necessary findings of fact and to determine the merits of the case. Also, the proceedings had been flawed by procedural shortcomings, such as the court’s failure to serve copies of the 1999 application for adverse possession on all the interested parties‑including the applicant. During the appellate proceedings the court re-opened the case after the hearing and three times adjourned delivery of its decision. 58. On 2 January 2008 the Gdynia District Court asked the Gdańsk Regional Court to transfer the case to the Poznań District Court. On 31 March 2008 the Regional Court refused that request. 59. On 20 September 2008 the applicant was served with a copy of the 1999 application for adverse possession. The document was incomplete, as some pages and appendices were missing. The court informed the applicant that she was entitled to submit a response to the application. 60. On 3 March 2009 the court summoned a certain M.T. to join the proceedings. 61. During the hearing held on 24 April 2009 the court found that the proceedings also concerned the interests of the second husband of one of the petitioners and ordered that the petitioners produce his heirs’ personal details and addresses and serve them with a copy of the application for adverse possession. The parties were informed that the next hearing would not take place before August 2009 because of the judge rapporteur’s planned holidays. 62. On 6 July 2009 the Gdynia District Court summoned a certain J.M.P. to join the proceedings. 63. On 21 September 2009 the proceedings were suspended as the petitioners had failed to produce an extra copy of the 1999 application for adverse possession, which had to be served on J.M.P. 64. On 25 October 2010 the applicant applied for discontinuation of the proceedings. 65. On 4 November 2010 the Gdynia District Court resumed the proceedings and scheduled a hearing for 17 December 2010. 66. Between December 2010 and December 2011 the District Court scheduled four hearings and summoned further persons to join the proceedings. A hearing scheduled for 8 February 2011 had been cancelled because the case-file had meanwhile been transmitted to the Gdańsk Regional Court together with a complaint lodged by the applicant under the 2004 Act, alleging that the length of the proceedings had been excessive (see paragraphs 72-73 below). 67. On 21 February 2012 the District Court gave the second decision on the merits. The applicant appealed on 1 April 2012. 68. On 14 November 2012 the Mayor of the City of Gdynia applied to the Regional Court to be summoned as a party to the proceedings. It was submitted that the District Court had erroneously summoned the Gdańsk First Tax Chamber as the State Treasury’s representative and party in the proceedings. Subsequently, on an unknown date, the Regional Court summoned the Mayor of the City of Gdynia to join the proceedings as a party. 69. On 28 November 2012 the Mayor filed an appeal against the decision of 21 February 2012, invoking the nullity of the entire proceedings on the grounds that it had been impossible to defend his rights. The appellate hearing, which was scheduled for 19 December 2012, was cancelled. 70. On 10 April 2013 the Regional Court held a hearing. The case was closed and the court announced that the judgment would be delivered on 24 April 2013. However, on that date the court reopened the case and fixed a fresh date for a hearing for 4 June 2013. 71. On 4 June 2013 the Court of Appeal again heard the appeals lodged by the applicant and the Mayor of the City of Gdynia. On 18 June 2013 the court gave judgment. It partly amended the first‑instance decision and dismissed the remainder of the appeals. 72. On 15 December 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gdańsk Regional Court under the 2004 Act. She sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and PLN 20,000 Polish in compensation. 73. On 31 January 2011 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. In its assessment of the length of the proceedings, the court did not to take into account the period before 17 September 2004, namely the date on which the 2004 Act had entered into force, holding that the 2004 Act applied only to the excessive length of proceedings occurring on the date of its entry into force. As regards the subsequent period, it held that the proceedings could not be said to have been excessively long, given that it had been necessary to secure the participation and representation of all the interested parties in the proceedings. 74. In the absence of domestic remedies, the Court’s award, determined with reference to the criteria set in its case-law, in particular the length of the period under consideration (see paragraphs 126-128 and 154 below) and sums usually granted in similar Polish cases, would amount to PLN 42,000. On the date of the national court’s decision on the applicant’s complaint, namely 31 January 2011 (see paragraph 73 above), a domestic award, determined with reference to the Court’s awards in similar cases and the Scordino (no.1) criteria (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, §§ 195-216 and 272) should have reached at least PLN 11,000 in order for the applicant to lose her victim status.

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6. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Armavir. She is disabled and is confined to a wheelchair. She depends on her disability pension as a means of subsistence. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings against her neighbour, M., seeking to have dismantled a construction that the latter had built in 1987 inside the entrance of their multi-flat house for the purpose of insulating the building. In its place the applicant sought to install a wooden ramp for her wheelchair in order to facilitate her access to her flat, situated on the ground floor. 8. It appears that during the court proceedings the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, modified her claim and asked for the construction in question not to be dismantled but to be allocated to her so that she could install a wooden ramp in its place. 9. On 26 July 2007 the Armavir Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate with any proof, such as an expert opinion, that it was necessary and possible to dismantle the construction and that it was technically possible to install a wooden ramp in its place. 10. On 1 August 2007 the applicant, still not represented, lodged an appeal. 11. On 13 September 2007 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim on appeal. The court found that the applicant’s request to have the construction allocated to her was ill-founded since the construction had not been built by her and, moreover, belonged to the owner of the underlying plot of land. The court further referred to an opinion issued on 16 January 2007 by the Armavir Municipality, according to which it was technically preferable to build a wooden ramp from the balcony side of the applicant’s flat rather than from the building’s main entrance. 12. On 7 November 2007 the applicant, still unrepresented, lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation. 13. By a letter of 12 November 2007 the Chief Registrar of the Court of Cassation returned the applicant’s appeal, informing her that the appeal had not been admitted for examination as it had not been lodged by an advocate licensed to act before the Court of Cassation, pursuant to Article 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CCP).

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7. In or before the year 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted in Italy against named individuals (not including the applicants) who were charged, inter alia, of conspiracy, money laundering, abuse of a position of influence in financial trading, embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud. In particular it was suspected that Mr EMP organised, financed and managed, directly or indirectly a network of companies situated in various states (San Marino, Italy, Malta, Portugal (Madeira) and Vanuatu) which were all traceable to one source namely, San Marino Investimenti S.A. (hereinafter “S.M.I.”). According to the applicants, Mr EMP owned S.M.I.’s entire capital stock which was instrumental to the accomplishment of a series of investment and fiduciary operations (operazioni fiduciarie) the aim of which was to allow a number of Italian clients to launder money coming from illicit sources (by impeding the identification of the real source of the money entrusted to it by means of a double system of fiduciary mandates (mandati fiduciari)). The group of co-accused were suspected of having, through such network, abusively supplied investment services contrary to the legal requirements as provided in the relevant Italian law (Testo Unico Della Finanza) and of having abusively carried out financial activities without being in possession of the necessary economic and financial requisites and the relevant registration as required by Italian law (Testo Unico Bancario). 8. In the context of these proceedings, by means of a letter rogatory received by the San Marino judicial authorities on 8 May 2009, the Public Prosecutor’s office (of the Rome Tribunal) asked the San Marino authorities for assistance in obtaining documentation and carrying out searches in various banks, fiduciary institutes and trust companies (banche, fiduciare e societa’ trust) in San Marino, in accordance with Article 29 of the Bilateral Convention on Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Italy and San Marino of 1939. 9. By a decision of 27 November 2009 (hereinafter also referred to as the exequatur decision), the ordinary first-instance tribunal (Commissario della Legge, hereinafter the Commissario), accepted the request in conjunction with the crimes of conspiracy, money laundering, aggravated fraud and embezzlement with the aim of fraud, considering that the relevant requirements for the execution of the request were fulfilled. In particular the Commissario considered that those crimes were also punishable under San Marino law. It therefore ordered, inter alia, an investigation in respect of all banks, fiduciary institutes and trust companies in San Marino. The purpose was to acquire information and banking documents (inter alia, copies of statements showing transactions and movements, cheques, fiduciary dispositions (disposizioni fiduciarie) and emails) related to a number of named current accounts in specified institutes as well as any other current account which could be traced back (riferibile) to S.M.I, held by all banks and fiduciary institutes in San Marino, which were directly or indirectly involved with the company or physical persons mentioned in this decision. In reaching that decision the Commissario bore in mind the relevant articles of the Bilateral Convention on Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Italy and San Marino of 1939, law no. 104/2009, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and San Marino’s commitment to international organs such as the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) as well as Article 36 of law no. 165/05 which provides that banking secrecy cannot be held against the criminal justice authorities and Article 13 of law no. 104/2009 according to which the act of acquiring copies of documentation amounts to seizure. It gave further details as to the search and seizure operation, inter alia, that copies should be made of the documentation, that in the event that the investigation was successful the directors of the credit institute were to submit the relevant documents within twenty days to the Agency for financial investigations, who in turn would immediately transfer it, indicating the names of those involved (directly or indirectly), to enable notification. It further ordered that where data was held on electronic storage devices (supporti informatici), the collection of data from these devices should be supervised by appointed experts; and that clone copies were to be made of these storage devices, as well as back-up copies. Any means of information technology seized had to be sealed and kept in custody in appropriate places, and the removal of such seals had to be notified to the interested persons to enable them (or their lawyers) to be present. It ordered the judicial police to serve the decision upon the directors of all the banks and trust companies, to the legal representatives of the physical persons, to the directly interested persons, and to persons who were in possession, under whatever title, of the those places. It also warned that documentation obtained and forwarded could not to be used for purposes other than those linked to the criminal proceedings mentioned in the decree accepting the request made in the letter rogatory, unless the court decided otherwise following a further assessment. 10. By a note of 26 April 2010 the Commissario ordered that Italian citizens who had entered into fiduciary agreements (aperto posizioni fiduciarie) with S.M.I. (1452 in all) should be notified of the decision. It was noted that any information referring to the said citizens and transmitted to the judicial authority of the requesting state could not be used for the purposes other than the prosecution of the criminal offences mentioned in the exequatur decision (non potra essere utilizzata per fini diversi dal perseguimento degli illeciti penali di cui alle norme di legge indicate nel provvedimento di amissione della rogatoria), unless the court decided otherwise following a new assessment. 11. Following the investigation and implementation of the exequatur decision, in consequence of the last-mentioned order of the Commissario, the applicants were served with the relevant notification (M.N. on 24 January 2011, S.G. on 16 June 2011 and C.R. and I.R. on 4 February 2011). 12. On an unspecified date the applicants lodged a complaint (Article 30 of law no. 104/2009) before the judge of criminal appeals (Giudice delle Appellazioni Penali) against the Commissario’s decision concerning the seizure of documents related to them on the basis that they were not persons charged with the criminal offences at issue. They alleged a violation of the principles contained in the San Marino Declaration on Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles (hereinafter “the declaration”). In particular they contended that the principle that crimes had to be punishable under the law of the requested state had not been respected, that there had been a violation of both Italian and San Marino law, and they noted the absence of the fumus delicti and of any link between the crimes at issue and the position of the applicants. Moreover, given that many such complaints by persons in similar situations had already been declared inadmissible by the domestic courts for lack of standing - them not being the persons charged and therefore not the direct victims of the seizure - the applicants further complained that Article 30 (3) of law no. 104/2009 was not compatible with the principles laid down in the Declaration, in so far as it had been interpreted as not protecting or recognising the right to lodge a complaint by anyone who was subject to coercive measures of seizure of documents (related to their interests) as a result of an exequatur decision. 13. By decisions of 25 February 2011 in respect of S.G., C.R. and I.R., and of 30 June 2011 in respect of M.N., the judge of criminal appeals declared the complaints inadmissible. The court noted that the applicants had been served with a notice of the exequatur order and had exhausted pleas available in law in that respect (hanno esperito le impugnazioni previste dalla legge). It further noted that an exequatur decision may only be challenged by a person who is involved in the investigation being carried out by the requested authority, or by a third party who is not investigated but who has been subjected to the measure. A person, who, in consequence of the investigation, is involved in any way with the activity undertaken, may not be considered as an interested person since any breach of the rights or interests of such persons, resulting from the execution of the exequatur decision, must be raised in the ambit of the Italian jurisdictions. The court considered that as established by domestic case-law it was only after the finding of admissibility of the application that a judge had to set a time-limit for submissions. For the purposes of admissibility one had to verify, amongst other things, the juridical interest of the appellant. Moreover, any constitutional complaints could give rise to an assessment of such question by the competent court (Collegio Garante), following a referral, only if the original proceedings were properly instituted, and not where, because of a lack of juridical interest of the appellant, the application was inadmissible. In the present case the appellants were not interested parties in relation to the exequatur decision, but may only have an eventual interest in the effects of such execution, and thus they did not have juridical interest to challenge the said decision. 14. In relation to the complaint of incompatibility with the Declaration, the court of criminal appeals only pronounced itself on the request made by C.R.: on 29 April 2011 it declared the complaint inadmissible as on that date no proceedings appeared to be pending. 15. The applicants appealed to the third instance criminal judge (Terza Istanza Penale) reiterating their complaints and invoking the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In particular they noted that the Commissario’s exequatur decision had ordered the seizure of documents related to them, despite them not being linked to any of the activities mentioned in that decision or them having ever had relations with the Italian companies. Moreover, the seized documents were irrelevant for the purposes of ascertaining the existence of the crimes attributed to the accused, thus, the only purpose behind the seizure was to name the Italians who had had dealings with S.M.I. irrespective of any involvement they had had with the facts object of the letter rogatory. They further challenged the appeal decisions in so far as they were issued in breach of the rights of the defence, in particular as they were not allowed to present submissions as provided for in law, neither in respect of the challenge nor in respect of the constitutional complaint. Furthermore, the decisions had lacked reasons and made no reference to the actual position of the applicants and a lack of reasoning in respect of the rejection of the constitutional complaint was particularly detrimental as it did not allow a proper examination of the matter by the third-instance judge. 16. By decisions of 29 July 2011 filed in the registry on the same day and served on 3 August 2011 in respect of S.G., I.R and C.R., and of 27 October 2011 filed in the registry on the same day and served on 10 November 2011 in respect of M.N., the third-instance criminal judge confirmed the appeal decision in that the appellants lacked juridical interest. In consequence the appeal was inadmissible and in any event there appeared to be no violation of law tainting the impugned decision. The question of constitutional legitimacy of law no. 104/2009 was also rejected on the same ground as that put forward by the appeal court. 17. In the meantime, the applicants (except for M.N.) had lodged an objection requesting the revocation of the exequatur decision in their respect, on the basis that the documents related to them were of no relevance to the investigation. 18. By a decision of 7 September 2011, served on their lawyer on an unspecified date, the Commissario held that the objection was to be discontinued (non luogo a procedere) in view of the findings of the third-instance criminal judge. The Commissario noted that the authorities were not limited to carrying out the actions requested by the letters rogatory only in respect of persons formally charged, but could also extend such acts to third persons who were not so charged. 19. The applicants lodged a further objection requesting the Commissario to restrict the use of the seized documents. By decisions filed in the relevant registry on 19 September 2011 the Commissario held that its exequatur decision of 27 November 2009 had already applied such a limitation, indeed that decision had clearly stated that such documentation was not to be used for purposes other than those linked to the criminal proceedings mentioned in the letters rogatory, unless the court decided otherwise following a further assessment.

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5. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Narva. 6. On 17 September 2012 the applicant, in misdemeanour proceedings, was fined 80 euros (EUR) by a police officer of the East Prefecture of the Police and Border Guard Board for a breach of public order (breaking a glass panel of a bus shelter). 7. The applicant contested this decision before the Viru County Court. He argued that he had not committed the act in question and challenged the assessment of witness statements. He complained about the failure of the police to present him to a witness for identification. Lastly, he complained that the police had not indicated in its decision the specific provisions of the local rules on public order which he had allegedly breached. 8. The County Court sent summons to the applicant for a hearing scheduled for 21 March 2013 at 12.30 p.m. It was noted in the summons that the applicant’s participation in the hearing was mandatory. Furthermore, it was noted, with reference to Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure (Väärteomenetluse seadustik), that if a complainant failed to appear at the hearing, although he had been notified of the obligation to participate, and the hearing was not adjourned, the court would refuse to examine the complaint. The applicant’s counsel, a representative of the police prefecture and witnesses were also summoned. 9. The summons sent to the applicant’s address, which he had used throughout the proceedings and which had been indicated in his complaint, could not be served on him personally as he was not present on 4 February 2013 when the court’s security officer attempted to serve the summons. His mother refused to accept the summons and said that the applicant was living abroad. The applicant’s counsel received the summons on 8 February 2013. The witnesses also received the summons in the beginning of February. 10. On 20 March 2013 the County Court issued a ruling by which the applicant’s complaint was admitted for the proceedings. According to the ruling the hearing was scheduled for 21 March 2013 at 12.30 p.m. and the names of persons to be summoned to the hearing were set out. 11. On 21 March 2013 the County Court held its hearing. The applicant did not appear. His counsel asked the court to examine the matter without the applicant’s presence as the applicant was abroad and it was not known when he would return to Estonia. According to the applicant’s father, who was in the courtroom as a spectator, the applicant was not to return to Estonia within the next five years. The County Court refused to examine the applicant’s complaint. It delivered its decision in writing on 2 April 2013. 12. According to the County Court’s decision, the applicant had failed to inform the authorities of his new address. However, as the applicant’s father was aware of the time of the court hearing and of the applicant’s intention not to return to Estonia within the next five years, the court concluded that the applicant’s parents were communicating both with the applicant and his counsel. Thus, the applicant must have been aware of the court hearing and summons sent to him. 13. The County Court found that in view of the substance of the misdemeanour case and the court’s duty to hear a misdemeanour matter in its entirety, regardless of the limits of the complaint filed, and to verify the factual and legal circumstances on the basis of which the body conducting the extra-judicial proceedings (that is, the police) had made its decision, it was not possible to examine the case without the applicant’s participation. It noted that one of the complaints made by the applicant had been that the body conducting the extra-judicial proceedings had not presented the applicant for identification to the witness. Thus, interviewing of the applicant and presenting him for recognition to the witness were important steps for the adjudication of the matter which could not be accomplished without the applicant’s participation. The court considered that adjourning the hearing would serve no purpose since the applicant was not to return to Estonia within a month – the time-limit for which a hearing could be adjourned under the law of procedure. Moreover, the applicant’s counsel had not requested an adjournment but examination of the complaint without the applicant’s presence. However, for the above reasons the court did not consider it possible to examine the case without the applicant. Relying on Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure – which provided that if a complainant failed to appear at the hearing although he had been notified of the obligation to participate in the court hearing – the County Court refused to examine the complaint. 14. The applicant’s counsel appealed, relying, inter alia, on Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention according to which a person had the right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. The receipt of the summons was not disputed. 15. On 23 May 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of the first-instance court. It noted that under Article 126 § 1 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure the court could decide on a discretionary basis whether a complainant’s participation in the court hearing was necessary and, if needed, oblige the person in question to appear. In the case at hand the County Court had given reasons as to why the applicant’s participation was required and it was not possible to examine the case in his absence. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the applicant had challenged in his complaint to the County Court the failure of the police to present him to witnesses for identification. It was, however, unclear, how the County Court could have eliminated this deficiency in the applicant’s absence. 16. No appeal lay against the Court of Appeal’s ruling.

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5. The applicants are HIV-positive, with a minimum degree of disability of 67%. They are, or were, detained in Aghios Pavlos Hospital (psychiatric section) at Korydallos Prison. 6. Andreas Martzaklis: imprisoned on 7 May 2011 and detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Athens Criminal Court, a decision given by the Indictments Division of the Khalkida Criminal Court in 2010 ordering the execution of a sentence passed by the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal which had been stayed, and a judgment delivered by the Athens Court of Appeal sentencing him to four years’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 8 May 2013 but rearrested the same day and placed in preventive detention. 7. Christos Sarris: provisionally detained from 5 December 2011 to 14 December 2012, and detained by judgment of 14 December 2012 sentencing him to 6 years’ imprisonment and then by judgment of 19 March 2014 sentencing him to 6 years and 4 months’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 9 May 2014 pursuant to section 19 of Act No. 4242/2014. 8. Christos Efstathiou: imprisoned on 14 February 2011. Detained pursuant to a decision given by the Indictments Division of the Khalkida Criminal Court on 22 December 2008, ordering the execution of the remainder of a sentence with suspensive effect, and pursuant to a judgment delivered by Athens Criminal Court, which merged the sentences into a total of 25 months. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 26 June 2014 pursuant to Article 105 of the Criminal Code. 9. Efthymios Karatzoglou: imprisoned on 18 July 2011. Detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Piraeus Criminal Court of Appel on 12 April 2013 sentencing him to two years and eight months’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 15 May 2013 pursuant to section 1 of Act No. 4043/2012. 10. Achilleas Papadiotis: imprisoned on 17 February 2011. Detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal on 10 June 2013 sentencing him to 10 years and 4 months’ imprisonment (starting date for serving the sentence: 8 December 2012). Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Transferred to Patras Prison on 6 October 2014. 11. Dimitrios Nikolopoulos: imprisoned on 20 August 2012 and detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal on 9 February 2012 sentencing him to 10 years’ imprisonment, and a judgment delivered by the Athens Criminal Court on 1 December 2010 sentencing him to three months’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Placed in Aghios Pavlos Hospital. 12. Spyridon Petrenitis: detained since 18 April 2012 pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Larissa Court of Appeal on 1 April 2013 sentencing him to two years’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 23 May 2013 under section 1 of Act No. 4043/2012. 13. Chrysafis Chatzikos: imprisoned on 13 July 2012 and detained ever since under the following decisions: 17 March 2010 judgment of the Athens Criminal Court sentencing him to ten months imprisonment; 23 February 2012 judgment of the Athens Criminal Court sentencing him to seven months’ imprisonment; 24 February 2012 judgment of the Athens Criminal Court sentencing him to ten months’ imprisonment; 8 June 2012 decision of the Indictments Division of the Chios Criminal Court ordering the execution of the remainder of a sentence with suspensive effect which had been passed by the Athens Criminal Court on 31 August 2011; and 5 April 2013 judgment of the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal sentencing him to 18 years’ imprisonment (in provisional detention from 16 August 2012 to 5 April 2013). 14. Christos Dorizas: imprisoned on 21 September 2012 and detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Piraeus Criminal Court of Appeal on 11 November 2011, sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment, followed by a judgment delivered by the same court on 14 December 2012 sentencing him to fifteen months’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court and constantly since then. 15. Panagiotis Kormalis: imprisoned on 25 July 2012 and detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Crete Criminal Court of Appeal on 10 June 2013 sentencing him to five years and three months’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 17 March 2014 under section 19 of Act No. 4242/2014. His release warrant mentioned that he had contracted AIDS. 16. Aimilianos Chamitoglou: imprisoned on 5 April 2012 and detained: first of all, under a provisional detention order of 1 October 2013 (on charges of armed robbery); and secondly, pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Athens Court of Appeal on 25 February 2014 sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment (beginning on 27 March 2012). On 10 February 2014 the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal acquitted him of the armed robbery charge. Released on licence on 17 March 2014 under section 19 of Act No. 4242/2014. 17. Antonios Poulopoulos: imprisoned on 19 August 2011 and detained pursuant to a judgment delivered by the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal on 20 June 2012 sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 13 September 2013 under Article 105 of the Penal Code. 18. Nikolaos Drosakis: imprisoned on 24 April 2012. Detained pursuant to a decision given by the Indictments Division of the Nafplio Criminal Court on 17 October 2012, and to the judgments of the Nafplio Criminal Court of Appeal and the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal of February and 24 April 2013 respectively, sentencing him to various prison terms. Detained as a convicted prisoner at the time of the application to the Court. Released on licence on 26 March 2014 under section 1 of Act No. 4043/2012. Has since returned to prison. 19. According to the information supplied by the applicants who had been convicted under court judgments, which information was not disputed by the Government, the courts had not granted suspensive effect to their appeals (see Article 497 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 20. In a petition transmitted on 5 October 2012 under Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the supervising public prosecutor responsible for Korydallos Prison, forty-five HIV-positive persons detained in the Aghios Pavlos Hospital, including the applicants, complained of their conditions of detention on the second floor of that hospital. They drew attention to the overcrowded premises, the uncontrolled admission of new patients, and the fact that they were held with other detainees suffering from cancer, asthma, hepatitis, venereal diseases, bronchitis, scabies, psoriasis and even tuberculosis, which diseases necessitated confinement to individual cells because several of them were transmissible. A small quantity of cream had been distributed to some of the HIV-positive detainees who were also affected with scabies. They had been advised to change their sheets and underwear every day and to wash them at high temperatures, even though the washing machine was out of order. When they had gone to fetch their medication the nurses had told them not to touch the bars through which they handed over the medicines in order to prevent the risk of infection. The administrative and medical staff had not given the detainees any official information in order to minimise the seriousness of the epidemic. 21. On 12 October 2012 the supervising public prosecutor had informed the detainees that “only 15 persons” were suffering from scabies. Relying on Article 6 of the Prison Code the HIV-positive detainees, including the applicants, had also complained to the Prison Hospital Board, but had received no reply. 22. A delegation of HIV-positive detainees had been received by the supervising public prosecutor to draw attention to the constantly increasing numbers of persons detained in the Aghios Pavlos Hospital and the intolerable conditions of detention. 23. The applicants submitted that the cells were so overcrowded that the personal space available for each detainee was less than 2 m², including beds and sanitary facilities. 24. The bathrooms fell short of minimum hygiene standards and cleaning in the premises was left to the discretion of the few HIV-positive persons in receipt of an allowance enabling them to purchase cleaning products. 25. The food was so poor in nutritional value that HIV-positive detainees risked developing AIDS owing to physical debilitation. 26. The premises were under-heated, and detainees were exposed to low temperatures, particularly at night. 27. Nor had the problem of smoking been resolved. Several detainees smoked in the communal areas, the cells and the dormitories, and the non-smokers, especially those with respiratory problems, became passive smokers. 28. The hospital staff did not include any infectious disease specialists, which placed HIV-positive detainees at risk because they were diagnosed by non-specialists. 29. During the distribution of medicines the nurse, wearing gloves, left the boxes on the floor outside the cell bars, and the HIV-positive persons had to stretch through the bars to retrieve them, avoiding touching the others, as recommended by the nurse. 30. The applicants also complained about the fact that diagnoses were conducted automatically and that the doctors always prescribed the same medicines without individually examining each patient. Any requisite transfers to outside hospitals were always carried out after long delays. Distribution of medication prescribed for some of the applicants was often interrupted without explanation for periods of between one week and one month. Other applicants had not yet begun their treatment, which delay the doctors explained by claiming that “the limit [regarding the presence of the virus in the blood] necessitating the initiation of treatment has increased”. 31. The applicants also complained of a lack of access to the outside world, news programmes and even use of the telephone, and the fact that the detainees were not held separately from the convicted prisoners. 32. Lastly, the applicants stated that a video on conditions of detention had been leaked in November 2014 and had induced the prosecutor with the Court of Cassation to order an inquiry, which was currently under way. ...

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5. The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Lepoglava. 6. On 23 October 2008 I.P., a well-known Croatian journalist, and his business associate N.F. were killed by the explosion of an improvised device placed under I.P.’s car, which was parked in front of his publishing company. The explosion also caused injuries to two employees of the publishing company and considerable material damage on the surrounding buildings and nearby parked cars. 7. On 23 October 2009 the State Attorney’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: the “State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office”) indicted several persons in the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) on charges of conspiracy to kill I.P. and for putting that into action. The applicant was indicted for having participated in the group by aiding and abetting the direct perpetrators. 8. On 3 November 2010 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to sixteen years’ imprisonment. 9. The applicant’s conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 8 February 2012. 10. Following the attack against I.P. and his publishing company, the intelligence available to the police showed that the applicant and several other persons could be implicated in the events and it was therefore decided to arrest them. 11. The Police Director (Glavni Ravnatelj Policije) issued an oral order that the arrests be carried out by an antiterrorist team of the Special Police Forces (Specijalna policija, Antiteroristička jedinica Lučko; hereinafter: the “ATJ”). 12. On 29 October 2008, at around 6.05 p.m., the ATJ stormed into the applicant’s flat, where he was at the moment together with his sister and grandmother. 13. According to the applicant, immediately after breaking into the flat, the AJT officers threw him on the floor and started punching him over the head and body. 14. According to the Government, an ATJ team of six officers broke into the applicant’s flat and ordered him to lie down. As he started resisting, the police officers applied the throwing technique of “foot sweep”, which made the applicant to lose his balance and while falling on the ground he hit the table with his head. He was immediately offered medical assistance but he refused. 15. A report available to the Court signed by the Commander-in-chief of the Special Police Forces (Zapovjednik Specijalne Policije) of 30 October 2008, which is essentially a verbatim of a report of one of the arresting ATJ officers (see paragraph 36 below), in its relevant part concerning the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, reads: “... the intervention with a view to arrest [the applicant] started by the ATJ officers forceful breaking the front doors using the [battering ram]. Inside the flat they found the suspect and an older woman to whom they issued several orders: “Police, lie down on the floor”. As the suspect resisted, two officers approached him and grabbed him by the arms but he continued to resist. [The officers] then applied the technique of foot sweep and pulled him to the ground. As he was still trying to set himself free he was handcuffed. While he was falling on the ground he hit the table with his face ... Afterwards ... [the officers] offered to the suspect medical assistance but he refused it saying that he felt good.” 16. According to the applicant, following his arrest he was blindfolded and taken to a remote place by a river, where he was again beaten up and his head was immersed in the water, forcing him to confess to the murders of I.P. and N.F. and some other crimes. The police officers also continued to beat him up while taking him to the police station. 17. According to the Government, following the applicant’s arrest he was taken to the parking area of the police station used by the Organised Crime Unit of the Zagreb Police Department (Policijska uprava zagrebačka, Sektor kriminalističke policije, Odjel organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: the “police”) where he was kept in the minivan of the ATJ in the period between 6.45 and 8.30 p.m., awaiting other suspects to be arrested and brought to the police station. 18. The available report of the arresting ATJ officer (see paragraph 36 below) in this respect indicates that the applicant was brought to the parking area of the police station at 7.00 p.m. where he was kept in the minivan of the ATJ until 7.40 p.m. and then surrendered to the police inspectors. 19. Once when he was brought to the police station on 29 October 2008 at around 8.30 p.m. the applicant was placed in a room under the control of two police inspectors M.A. and M.M. 20. According to reports of these two police inspectors dated 18 April and 14 May 2012 respectively, the applicant was for a while guarded by an ATJ officer but then, at unspecified time, they requested that officer to leave the room. The police inspectors also submitted that the applicant had been handcuffed when he was brought to the police station and then, at unspecified time but sometimes soon after his arrival, the handcuffs were taken off. They also acknowledged that they had seen visible injuries on the applicant’s head and nose for which he had been allegedly offered medical assistance but he had refused it. The emergency had been called in only after the order of their superiors. 21. The emergency service came to the police station on the same day at 10.55 p.m. The relevant record of the applicant’s examination, in so far as legible, reads: “Brought to the police station. Visible open injury above the left eye; 1,5 centimetre long. Contusion and haematoma of the nose with the possible fracture. Regular general status. The patient refuses to go to the hospital and further treatment.” 22. The applicant stayed in the police station until 30 October 2008 at 8.30 p.m. During that period he was taken to searches of his house and car and he was questioned by the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. in the presence of a lawyer and a Deputy at the State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office. 23. According to the applicant, throughout his stay in the police station he was tightly constrained, beaten and threatened that he should make no problems concerning his injuries. 24. According to the Government, during his stay in the police station the applicant was kept in one of the offices ordinarily used by the police officers. Apart from several minutes upon his arrival to the police station, the applicant was not handcuffed. He also had access to the toilet and drinking water. He was obliged to sit on a chair as there were no beds but it was impossible to take him to the detention unit as the investigative actions were still ongoing. In any case, he had an opportunity to ask for a rest and food but he did not make any such request. 25. On 30 October 2008, at around 8.30 p.m., the applicant was taken to the Police Detention and Escort Unit (Jedinica za zadržavanje i prepratu; hereinafter: “JZP”) for a rest. A report accompanying his transfer, signed by the Chief of the police and dated 30 October 2008 indicated, inter alia, that he had no visible injuries. 26. A report signed by the on-duty officer at JZP, dated 30 October 2008, indicated that the applicant was admitted to the detention unit with visible injuries of his face. 27. According to the applicant, during his stay in JZP he was offered a sandwich but he could not eat due to a strong jaw pain. 28. According to the Government, during his stay in JZP the applicant was placed in a room which was equipped with beds and sanitary facility. The room was appropriately heated and ventilated and had access to natural and artificial light. The hygiene and sanitary conditions were good and the applicant was provided with food and water. 29. On 31 October 2008 at 9.15 a.m. the police took the applicant from JZP to participate in a further search of his premises. 30. On the same day, at around 6.45 p.m., the applicant was brought for questioning before an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court. He decided to remain silent concerning the charges held against him, but with regard to his injuries the applicant stressed: “The only thing I would point out is that before I was taken in [to the police station] I fell in my flat and according to the findings of the doctors who were called in to the police station, I sustained a nose fracture, most probably with dislocation. I refused the medical assistance in order to get out from the police station as soon as possible.” 31. The investigating judge put no additional questions concerning this matter nor did he take any further actions in that respect. 32. Following the applicant’s questioning, an investigation into the explosion was opened in respect of him and several other persons. At the same time, an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court ordered his pre-trial detention. 33. On 3 November 2008 the applicant was examined in Zagreb Prison Hospital (Zatvorska bolnica u Zagrebu) and several medical records were drafted. 34. One medical record available to the Court indicates that the applicant sustained his injuries after a fall on 30 October 2008, whereas two other medical reports refer to several blows on the applicant’s head and nose. 35. Based on his medical examination in Zagreb Prison Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with contusions of head, nose and shoulder and a nose fracture without dislocation, as well as a distortion of a metal implant in his hand related to an old injury. His general medical condition at the time was regular and he had a smaller hematoma on the left side of his head and nose and smaller hematomas below both eyes. He also had a smaller hematoma on the left shoulder and a visible dislocation of the metal implant in his hand but without a fresh fracture. In July 2009 the applicant again saw a doctor who indicated testicular problems. 36. On 29 October 2008 one of the arresting ATJ officers reported on the applicant’s arrest to the Commander of the ATJ. In his report, he indicated that the ATJ had been requested to arrest the applicant in connection with a suspicion of double murder. The report also provides the details of the arrest already observed above (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above). 37. On 30 October 2008 the Commander of the ATJ requested the Commander-in-chief of the Special Police Forces to assess the lawfulness of the ATJ’s actions; and the latter forwarded that request to the Police Director. 38. On the same day the Police Director assessed the reports concerning the ATJ actions by indicating the following: “This is to inform you that I find the use of force, namely the physical force and the measures of restraint, used by the ATJ team on 29 October 2008 during the arrest of Amir Mafalani ... lawful within the meaning of sections 54, 55 and 57 of the Police Act and sections 30, 31, 32 and 35 of the By-law on the police conduct.” 39. In October 2011 the applicant, through lawyers, requested Zagreb Prison Hospital and the emergency services to provide him the relevant medical records concerning the injuries he had sustained during his arrest on 29 October 2008. He also requested the police to provide him the relevant documents related to his arrest. 40. On 2 November 2011 the police replied that all relevant reports were confidential and could not be disclosed. This reply was forwarded for information to the State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office. 41. On 11 November 2011, after receiving the reply, the applicant complained to the State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office asking why an effective investigation, within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, had not been conducted. 42. The State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office replied on 16 November 2011, indicating that the applicant should consult the relevant domestic law on the use of police force and that, in case of any complaint to that effect, he could always lodge a criminal complaint with the competent State Attorney’s Office. 43. In the meantime, the applicant obtained the requested medical records. 44. On 15 February 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) against unidentified perpetrators alleging ill-treatment during his arrest and stay in the police station. 45. On 20 February 2012 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office informed the applicant that his criminal complaint had been forwarded to the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) for further examination. 46. On 3 March 2014 the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed. It relied on a written report of the Police Director and written reports of the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. It also observed the applicant’s medical documentation and search and seizure records as well as the interrogation records in the criminal proceedings against him. 47. On 31 January 2012 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu) against the State claiming damages in connection with his alleged ill-treatment by the police during his arrest and stay in the police station. 48. The Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office, representing the State, challenged the applicant’s civil action on the grounds that the police had acted in accordance with the law and that their use of force had been caused by the applicant’s conduct. 49. During the proceedings, the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard the applicant and several witnesses, including the applicant’s sister and grandmother, one of the applicant’s co-suspects and the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. , as well as the Police Director. 50. The applicant’s grandmother testified that she had seen the police officers immediately attacking and hitting the applicant as they had entered the flat, and his sister confirmed that she had heard him screaming and had also seen him being dragged around by the police. 51. The applicant’s co-suspect in his testimony submitted that he had seen the applicant seriously injured in the police station, while the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. denied any ill-treatment, as did the Police Director who also stated that the police had monopoly of the use of force. 52. In his statement of 14 January 2015 the applicant contended that during his arrest he had been severely beaten by the ATJ officers all over his head and body. Afterwards he had been taken near a river and again beaten, subjected to mock execution and immersed in the water. When he was finally brought to the police station, the uniformed police officers continued to beat him with the acquiescence of the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. He was also tightly constrained to a chair and at one point, while he was dragged from one office to another, he felt strong pain in his shoulder. Later on, during his transfer to the investigating judge, two uniformed police officers who escorted him said that he should say nothing about the ill-treatment and that he would soon go home. In the ensuing period, he started feeling various health problems related to the ill-treatment and has been seeing doctors regularly. 53. The civil proceedings are still pending.

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6. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in St. Gallenkappel, Switzerland. 7. Since 2004, the applicant and F.H. have been involved in legal disputes against each other concerning the property rights in 75% of the bearer shares in both the EMK stock corporation and the EMK Engineering stock corporation, companies resident and registered in Liechtenstein which trade in building units. 8. By an immediately enforceable interim injunction dated 28 December 2009, taken in accordance with Article 276 § 1 of the Act on Enforcement and Injunction Proceedings (see paragraph 36 below), the Regional Court granted F.H.’s request to prohibit the Real Property and Commercial Registry to register certain changes concerning the EMK Engineering stock corporation which had been decided in the corporation’s extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of 23 July 2004 (file no. 02.CG.2007.83). It thereby confirmed its provisional order of 21 March 2007 to that effect. The Regional Court notably prohibited registering the decisions taken in that meeting that F.H. had been voted out of his office as a representative and member of the corporation’s supervisory board with power to represent the corporation and that the applicant had been elected managing director of the corporation with power to represent the corporation alone. 9. On 25 March 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision on the applicant’s request and the case was remitted to the Regional Court for a further investigation of the facts. 10. On 30 July 2010 the Regional Court issued a fresh identical interim injunction. It stated that the interim order served to secure F.H.’s claim in the main proceedings for a declaration that the decisions taken in the EMK Engineering stock corporation’s extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of 23 July 2004 were null and void and for a prohibition of the entry of those decisions in the real property and commercial register. 11. The Regional Court confirmed that the applicant had not obtained property of 75% of the bearer shares in the EMK Engineering stock corporation and had not therefore validly represented 75% of the shares in the corporation’s extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. The decisions taken in that meeting were thus unlawful. It further found that interim injunctions under Article 276 § 1 of the Act on Enforcement and Injunction Proceedings could also be taken in order to secure claims for a declaration (Feststellungsansprüche) if such a measure was necessary to preserve the status quo of either an object or a legal relationship. For such interim orders the restriction that interim injunctions should not anticipate the outcome of the main proceedings did not apply. In the present case, it was necessary to maintain the status quo in the commercial register in order to prevent F.H. from suffering irreversible damage. F.H. could suffer such damage if the changes in question were made in the real property and commercial register as dispositions could then be taken for the stock corporation without his participation. 12. On 23 September 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the order of 30 July 2010. 13. On 22 October 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court against the Court of Appeal’s decision dated 23 September 2010. 14. On 7 November 2011 the Constitutional Court informed the applicant that judges B., Bu., S., V. and W. would deliberate on his complaint in private on 28 November 2011. 15. By submissions dated 18 November 2011, which were received at the court on 21 November 2011, the applicant, who was not represented by counsel at that stage of the proceedings, lodged motions for bias against all five judges called upon to decide on his complaint and against the secretary in charge (Schriftführerin), V. 16. The applicant argued, in particular, that the Constitutional Court had to his disadvantage not quashed previous decisions of the lower courts in related proceedings. Moreover, he complained that it had taken the Constitutional Court more than one year to assign the judges who were to decide on his complaint despite the importance of the proceedings for him and that the court discriminated against German nationals. 17. Furthermore, in the applicant’s submission, judges B., V. and W. and secretary V. had failed to take measures to remedy the disadvantages resulting from the fact that the commercial register did not reflect his rights concerning the EMK Engineering stock corporation and had arbitrarily disregarded his rights under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention in previous related proceedings. 18. The applicant further submitted that, for different reasons, the five judges of the Constitutional Court individually were not impartial. As regards the court’s president, judge B., the applicant complained that the latter had not granted his constitutional complaint suspensory effect and had refused to order interim measures in related proceedings. Furthermore, judge B. was a member of different committees and commissions of which judges of the Supreme Court, which had given a decision contested by him in the main proceedings, and judge H., who was a judge at the Constitutional Court and F.H.’s brother, were equally members. 19. In the applicant’s submission, judge Bu., for his part, was biased because he worked for the Government in that he drew up expert reports on constitutional questions and taught at seminars organised by the Government. He further worked with judge H. on a regular basis. 20. The applicant further stressed that judge S. was a member of the supervisory board of a state-owned company and was therefore not independent and impartial. 21. Judge V., for his part, had been a professor at the Liechtenstein University and was, therefore, not independent as he had worked for the Government and as judges had short terms of office. Moreover, he was biased as he was a good friend of judge H., F.H.’s brother. 22. Finally, judge W., in his law firm, was the partner of a lawyer against whom the applicant had brought proceedings concerning an inheritance. Another lawyer of that law firm had already represented the EMK Engineering stock corporation. Moreover, judge W. had previously worked as a lawyer in judge H.’s law firm. 23. Three of the judges of the Constitutional Court made statements on the applicant’s motions for bias. Judge Bu. stated that he had not drawn up any expert reports for the Government since his appointment as a judge. Judge S. submitted that he did not draw considerable income from his work as a member of the supervisory board of a state-owned stock corporation. Judge W. explained that he did not have any knowledge of whether his partner in the law firm, who was currently absent, was involved in unrelated legal proceedings with the applicant. His work for judge H. dated back ten years and he had been working as a self-employed counsel for some nine years already since then. 24. On 28 November 2011 the Constitutional Court, composed of judges B., Bu., S., V. and W., dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias against them (file no. StGH 2010/141). 25. The Constitutional Court stated that, in accordance with the principle that, if possible, a motion for bias should not be decided upon by the challenged judge, the challenged judges, respectively, had not participated in the deliberations and the decision on the respective motion for bias against them, which had been decided upon by the four remaining judges. 26. The Constitutional Court considered that the fact alone that judges B., V. and W. had already taken part in decisions finding against the applicant in related proceedings did not suffice to substantiate that there were objectively justified doubts as to their impartiality. Likewise, the fact that the judges were elected for a period of five years did not compromise their impartiality. 27. The independence of the judges of the Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the executive was guaranteed by the Constitution. The applicant further had not substantiated that the executive had influenced the judges of the Constitutional Court in the present proceedings in any way. The fact that some of the judges had previously worked for the executive did not suggest that the executive had influenced the present proceedings. 28. Finally, the fact that the challenged judges worked together with F.H.’s brother, the vice-president of the Constitutional Court, on a regular basis and were friends of the latter did not objectively cast doubts on their impartiality in the circumstances of the present case. In a small country like Liechtenstein, excessively strict standards in this respect would disproportionately obstruct the administration of justice. 29. The decision was served on the applicant on 19 December 2011. 30. On 19 December 2011 the Constitutional Court, composed of judges B., Bu., V., S. and W., allowed the applicant’s constitutional complaint in so far as he had complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the proceedings and dismissed the remainder of his complaint (file no. StGH 2010/141). The applicant complained about that judgment in a new, separate application (no. 67213/12) to the Court.

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5. The applicant, Mr Boutros Yaacoub El Khoury was born in 1977. At the time of lodging his applications he was detained in Berlin’s Moabit prison. 6. On 2 August 2005 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of two counts of drug trafficking. The arrest warrant specified that the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences resulted from statements made by one of his co‑suspects, the separately prosecuted A.K. The District Court further found that there was a risk that the applicant, who did not have a permanent residence in Germany and in the past had been travelling between Brazil and Europe, would abscond. A partly suspended prison sentence had previously been imposed on him in Germany. Moreover, two additional arrest warrants were pending against him in Germany, one relating to a further offence of drug trafficking and the other, dated 1 July 2004, concerning forgery of identification papers. 7. On 16 August 2006 the applicant was detained in Portugal pending his extradition to Germany (Auslieferungshaft) as a consequence of the arrest warrants dated 1 July 2004 and 2 August 2005. On 8 September 2006 he was extradited to Germany where he was remanded in custody in Berlin Moabit prison. His detention on remand (Untersuchungshaft) was subject to reinforced security conditions. He was kept separate from other prisoners in an isolated cell (isolierter Einzelhaftraum) and was excluded from most group prison events. Contacts with visitors were limited and subject to close supervision. 8. On 18 September 2006 the Berlin Prosecutor’s Office charged the applicant with having used a forged passport when entering German territory on one occasion in 2003. By a further bill of indictment dated 20 October 2006, he was charged with two counts of drug trafficking, committed jointly with several co-accused, among them G., U. and A.K. He was further accused of having incited G. to import drugs illicitly. 9. In their description of the facts underlying the drugs-related offences allegedly committed by the applicant, the prosecution authorities mainly relied on statements made by A.K. in the course of separate criminal proceedings jointly conducted against A.K. and U. before the Berlin Regional Court on suspicion of organised drug trafficking. The bill of indictment further specified that the applicant was suffering from a congenital heart defect and as a consequence was not to be subjected to long-lasting situations of physical and mental stress. 10. On 13 December 2006 the Berlin Regional Court admitted both indictments and opened the trial against the applicant. The trial started on 20 February 2007. The applicant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. 11. By a judgment of the Berlin Regional Court dated 28 February 2007 in the proceedings separately conducted against A.K., the latter was convicted of several counts of drug trafficking and illicit importation of drugs and sentenced to a cumulative prison sentence of five years and three months. A.K. appealed against the judgment on points of law. 12. On 20 September 2007 and 30 October 2007 the applicant applied for the arrest warrants dated 1 July 2004 and 2 August 2005 to be set aside. By decisions of 20 September 2007 and 19 November 2007 respectively the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s motions. 13. By a decision of 17 December 2007 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the risk of absconding prevailed because a final expulsion order against the applicant was in force and he had used various aliases. It stressed that the applicant’s continued detention on remand was still proportionate. The trial court had complied with its obligation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously. Any circumstances that had limited the court’s ability to accelerate the proceedings had their origin outside the latter’s sphere of responsibility. Since the first trial day on 20 February 2007, hearings had been held on 37 days. Delays in the proceedings were the result of comprehensive applications for the taking of evidence by the defence in August and September 2007, in particular of a voluminous motion regarding the applicant’s alibi submitted on 2 August 2007. Moreover, the applicant had been unavailable to attend trial on a number of days due to his participation in separately conducted court proceedings. The Court of Appeal further noted that the fact that one of the judges sitting in the applicant’s case had been seconded to another court since 15 October 2007 had reduced the frequency with which hearings could be held. 14. On 3 March 2008 the applicant again requested that the arrest warrants be set aside. 15. By a decision of 7 March 2008 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be continued. In the Regional Court’s view any possible delays in the proceedings were the result of the defence’s continuing voluminous applications for the taking of evidence. 16. Following the applicant’s appeal against this decision on 29 April 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal lifted the arrest warrant dated 1 July 2004 but rejected the remainder of the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the risk of absconding was still high with regard to the fact that the applicant’s companion had been sentenced to four years in prison, the execution of which had been suspended on the condition that she reported to the police and did not leave the country (Haftverschonung). 17. The Court of Appeal further held that while the sentence to be expected for the offence of forgery underlying the arrest warrant of 1 July 2004 did not justify its further execution, the applicant’s continued detention on remand on the basis of the arrest warrant dated 2 August 2005 was, for the time being, still proportionate. The Court of Appeal noted in this context that in the period since 20 February 2007 hearings had been held in the instant case on 56 days with an average duration of three hours, amounting to an average of less than one hearing day per week. Gaps in the hearing schedule from 23 April to 7 May 2007, in the period from 12 July until 3 September 2007 and from 22 December 2007 to 6 January 2008, were due to the judges’ absence on leave, while in May 2007 counsel for the defence had been on leave. The Court of Appeal further took into account that on several occasions the Regional Court had dispensed with the reading out of whole documents (so-called “self-reading procedure” – Selbstleseverfahren) to speed up the proceedings. 18. On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 29 April 2008 and applied for his immediate release. 19. On 2 June 2008, following a plea bargain between the prosecution and the defence, the proceedings against G. were severed from the applicant’s trial. 20. On 4 June 2008 the applicant, whose heart condition had deteriorated in the course of his detention and who had previously been treated in the prison hospital, underwent heart surgery. 21. By a decision of 11 June 2008 (file no. 2 BvR 1062/08) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 29 May 2008, without providing reasons. It further held that, as a consequence, there was no need to decide on the applicant’s request for interim measures. 22. In the proceedings against A.K., the Federal Court of Justice on 10 July 2008 dismissed A.K.’s appeal on points of law against his conviction by judgment of the Berlin Regional Court dated 28 February 2007. 23. On 4 August 2008 the applicant submitted a further request to set aside the arrest warrant dated 2 August 2005. He argued that the continued execution of the arrest warrant was disproportionate. 24. By a decision of 15 August 2008 the Berlin Regional Court held that the applicant’s detention was still proportionate. 25. On 6 October 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, in which the applicant’s counsel had stated that the applicant’s ability to stand trial was not reduced due to his prior heart surgery. The Court of Appeal found that the strong suspicion of the applicant having engaged in drug trafficking, as well as the risk of his absconding, persisted. With reference to the findings in its decision of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeal further held that the conduct of the proceedings since May 2008 did not change its assessment that his continuing detention on remand was still proportionate. The low frequency with which hearings had been scheduled and the interruption of the trial from 6 to 21 May 2008 and 17 July to 6 August 2008 had not been imputable to the domestic courts. 26. On 2 November 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Berlin Court of Appeal’s decision alleging, inter alia, that the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct the proceedings expeditiously despite his continued detention on remand violated his rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. By a decision of 26 November 2008 (file no. 2 BvR 2241/08) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons. 27. By decisions of the Berlin Court of Appeal of 9 March 2009 and the Berlin Regional Court of 20 April 2009 the reinforced security conditions accompanying the applicant’s detention on remand were set aside for the most part. 28. On 20 April 2009 the Berlin Regional Court, following a further request by the applicant to lift the arrest warrant, again ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be continued. The applicant appealed against the decision. 29. On 22 May 2009 the Berlin Court of Appeal, referring to the reasoning in its previous decisions, rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the conduct of the proceedings since its last decision of 6 October 2008 had again been determined by continual applications for the taking of evidence filed by the defence as well as requests for the suspension of the proceedings and motions for bias against the court. All such requests had been dealt with by the Regional Court in due course and any resulting delays in the proceedings, like the time lapse between hearings from 13 December 2008 to 4 January 2009 and 5 May 2009 to 1 June 2009, did not fall within the trial court’s sphere of responsibility. 30. By a decision of 27 July 2009 (file no. 2 BvR 1320/09) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s related constitutional complaint of 18 June 2009. 31. On 16 September 2009 the Berlin Regional Court pronounced its judgment in the applicant’s trial after having held hearings on a total of 101 days, with an average duration of not more than three hours each, in which it had heard at least twenty witnesses and one expert. 32. By its judgment of 16 September 2009 the Berlin Regional Court convicted the applicant of two counts of drug trafficking as well as falsification of documents and imposed a cumulative prison sentence (Gesamtfreiheitsstrafe) of six years. In the determination of the applicant’s sentence, the Regional Court had regard to the particular strain to which the applicant had been subject as a result of the long duration of the proceedings as well as of his detention on remand. It emphasised that the latter had lasted around three years, calculated from the date of the applicant’s extradition from Portugal until the pronouncement of the judgment and had been particularly burdensome due to, inter alia, the reinforced security conditions imposed on the applicant and his heart operation in 2008. 33. As regards the offence of falsification of documents, the Regional Court established that on 2 November 2003 the applicant had entered German territory using a forged Greek passport. 34. Concerning the drugs-related offences the Regional Court observed that, during the period at issue, the applicant had engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in cooperation with G. and U. In the afternoon of 7 February 2004, the applicant, according to a plan previously agreed with U., had taken over 3 kg of a cocaine mixture as well as 100 kg of hashish from G. in Berlin with a view to reselling the drugs for a profit. The Regional Court also found it established that on an unspecified date in the period between 25 February and 10 March 2004 the applicant had acquired between 95 and 100 g of a cocaine mixture from A.K. for the purpose of reselling it to a customer for a profit. 35. While the applicant confessed to having used a forged passport on the occasion of his entry into Germany on 2 November 2003, he denied any involvement in drug trafficking. The Regional Court based its finding of facts in this regard on the witness statements made by A.K., whom it considered to be the central witness against the applicant and the only direct witness of the facts underlying the actual crimes. A.K. had secretly observed how G. had handed the drugs over to the applicant on 7 February 2004. On the occasion of a meeting between A.K. and the applicant several weeks after the incident, the applicant had confessed to A.K. that G. had imported the drugs on the applicant’s behalf according to a plan previously set up with U. 36. Within the period from 6 March 2007 to 15 January 2009, A.K. testified on several occasions as a witness at the applicant’s trial. He answered questions from the trial court and the prosecution throughout the proceedings. At the beginning of the proceedings he furthermore offered to consider answering questions formulated by counsel and put to him by the Regional Court, but refused to answer direct questions from the applicant or the defence, relying on his right to remain silent in order not to incriminate himself by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 49 below). Following his last hearing on 15 January 2009, the witness travelled to Lebanon and subsequent attempts by the Regional Court to summon him to appear at trial were to no avail. By a decision of 31 July 2009 the court held that it would be impossible to have the witness examined in the foreseeable future since the latter was prevented from leaving Lebanon pursuant to a decision by a Lebanese religious court, the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry and the German Embassy in Beirut. Pointing to the court’s obligation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously in view of the applicant’s continuing detention on remand, and having regard to the fact that the witness had repeatedly been heard at trial, the Regional Court was of the opinion that his absence did not justify a further delay in the proceedings. 37. The court also heard representatives of the police and public prosecution authorities who had been involved in A.K.’s examination at the pre-trial stage as well as the acting judges and public prosecutors in the criminal proceedings conducted in respect of A.K. and in respect of further separately prosecuted co-accused. In addition, at a request by the defence, all available protocols of statements made by A.K. at the various stages of the proceedings were read out at trial with the consent of all parties. 38. The Regional Court specified in its judgment that A.K’s testimony had only been marginally supplemented and confirmed by the remaining available evidence which had provided information with respect to the motivation underlying the offence, the time when it had been committed and the quality of the drugs at issue. The court emphasised that in view of the decisive nature of A.K.’s statements for the applicant’s conviction and the fact that he had refused to answer any questions from the defence, it had assessed particularly carefully and critically whether the witness had been reliable. This had also been necessary taking into account that A.K. was living in Lebanon, had testified at the applicant’s trial with a view to obtaining a reduction of the expected sentence in his own proceedings on charges of drug trafficking and had repeatedly been found guilty of drug trafficking. 39. The court nevertheless concluded that A.K. had been a credible witness. His witness statements made at trial had been coherent and consistent with submissions previously made before the investigative authorities at the pre-trial stage. His decision to contribute to the clarification of the facts underlying the charges against the applicant as well as other accused persons involved in organised drug trafficking had been motivated by his wish to cut his link to the drug-dealer scene and start a new life. In the Regional Court’s opinion there was no evidence that he had wrongly incriminated the applicant. 40. The Regional Court further found that the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention to examine or have examined witnesses against him had been respected in the instant case. A.K.’s refusal to answer questions from the defence did not require the court to exclude his statements as evidence in the trial nor did such behaviour put the witness’s credibility into question. Even following termination of the criminal proceedings against A.K. by final decision of the Federal Court of Justice dated 10 July 2008, the witness could still rely on his right not to testify, by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since there remained a risk that he would incriminate himself with respect to offences that were closely linked to the one of which he had been convicted. Several investigations previously conducted against A.K. in this respect had been discontinued by the prosecution authorities and could be resumed in the future. The court emphasised in this connection that it had done everything in its power to enable an examination of A.K. by the defence. Despite A.K.’s refusal to answer questions from the defence or the applicant, in the beginning he had offered to consider answering the applicant’s questions put to him in writing. The applicant’s counsel declined this offer. As a consequence the court had granted the applicant’s counsel’s request to examine A.K., which he accordingly did. Any attempts in this respect had, however, been to no avail. Therefore the court itself had questioned A.K. on subjects that had appeared to be of importance for the defence and he had answered all questions. Subsequently, upon the court’s proposal the applicant had submitted further subjects of interest in a list. On these matters the court then put questions to A.K. in a later hearing. In addition, in the last part of the trial, A.K. had answered a number of questions that had been proposed by the defence and had been put to him by the court with identical wording. At his counsel’s recommendation he had then decided to refrain from participating in any such indirect questioning. 41. In his appeal on points of law of 15 April 2010 against the Regional Court’s judgment the applicant complained, inter alia, that neither he nor his counsel had had an opportunity to examine A.K., the main witness against him, at any stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, A.K.’s testimony had not been corroborated by further significant evidence as regards the actual commission of the crime by the applicant. The applicant also argued that, after A.K.’s conviction in the criminal proceedings conducted against him had become final on 10 July 2008, the latter could no longer rely on a right to remain silent by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the applicant’s proceedings. The Regional Court had nevertheless not compelled him to answer questions by the defence at that stage of the proceedings and had consequently not done everything in its power to enable an examination of the witness by the defence, in breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. 42. By written submissions to the Federal Court of Justice dated 31 August 2010, the Federal Public Prosecutor moved that the applicant’s appeal on points of law be dismissed. He argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had not had an opportunity to examine A.K. at any stage of the proceedings, these had as a whole been fair. 43. In his reply to the Federal Prosecutor’s submissions, the applicant also claimed that his trial had been unreasonably long. He argued that during 135 weeks or 31 months of trial, hearings had been held on 101 days, which amounted to an average of 0.75 days per week or 3.25 days per month and had on average lasted less than three hours each. 44. By a decision of 6 December 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as manifestly ill-founded. 45. By written submissions dated 20 October 2010 to the Federal Court of Justice the applicant complained of a violation of his right to be heard. 46. On 17 January 2011 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint. 47. On 13 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained of a violation of his right to a fair trial because he had not been able to question witness A.K. at any stage of the proceedings and of the length of his detention on remand and the length of the proceedings. 48. By a decision of 18 January 2012 (file no. 2 BvR 447/11) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons.

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4. The first applicant was born in 1953 and the second applicant was born on 1957. They live in Izhevsk. 5. In 1986 the first applicant was called up to take part in the emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result, he suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. In October 1996 experts established a causal link between the applicant’s disability and his involvement in the Chernobyl events. 6. Under domestic law the first applicant is entitled to monthly payments in compensation for health damage. He brought court proceedings against local authorities claiming adjustment of the monthly payments in line with the increase of a statutory minimum wage for the period between October 1996 and April 2000. 7. On 3 May 2000 the Oktryabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk of the Udmurtia Republic allowed his claim in part and ordered the Pensions and Social Allowances Department of the Oktyabrskiy District of Izhevsk and the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Republic of Udmurtia to pay the applicant a lump sum of 9,823.37 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the debt accrued as a result of previous underpayment. The court ordered that the award be paid at the expense of the federal budget. On 15 May 2000 the judgment became final and entered into force. 8. On 13 June 2000 the bailiffs’ office opened the enforcement proceedings. On 10 December 2003 those proceedings were discontinued on account of the respondent authority’s lack of funds. 9. On 24 May 2004 the amount awarded was paid to the first applicant in full. 10. Being a victim of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the first applicant is entitled to additional housing. As he was not offered any, he brought an action against the local authorities claiming to provide him with housing. 11. On 15 November 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk found for the first applicant and ordered the Ministry of Architecture, Construction and Housing Policy of the Republic of Udmurtia to grant him a separate room which should meet sanitary and technical requirements and be well-equipped in accordance with the set standards. 12. The judgment was not appealed against and entered into force ten days later. 13. The Ministry of Construction of the Republic of Udmurtia did not execute the judgment due to lack of available housing. 14. On 31 January 2005 the respondent authority informed the first applicant that as of 15 December 2004 the competence to distribute the social housing to the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster had been transferred to the Ministry for Disaster Relief of the Republic of Udmurtia, and since that date the Ministry of Construction had accordingly been unable to execute the judgment in his favour. 15. On 20 April 2005 the first applicant filed a claim to alter the mode of enforcement of the judgment of 15 November 2004 from in-kind provision of the room to monetary compensation for its acquisition. His claim was granted by the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk on 11 May 2005 and he was awarded RUB 230,000 to be paid by the Ministry for Disaster Relief of the Republic of Udmurtia at the expense of the federal budget. 16. On 27 July 2006 the Federal Treasury Department at the Ministry of Finance informed the applicant that the debtor had not enforced the judgment and proposed to bring actions against the Ministry for Disaster Relief of the Russian Federation. 17. Since 25 April 2007 the State compensations for acquisition of housing to the victims of the Chernobyl disaster are provided only in form of housing certificates. 18. On 29 August 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk ordered indexation of the awarded amount to RUB 547,400. That decision entered into force on 9 September 2008. 19. The award granted by the judgment of 15 November 2004 as amended by the indexation order of 29 August 2008 has not been paid to date.

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5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Telki. 6. Between 25 February 2002 and 18 May 2005, litigation was in progress between the applicant and his former employer. The latter was eventually obliged to re-employ the applicant. 7. The applicant did not accept the position that was offered to him in pursuit of the re-employment order. New litigation started on 5 January 2006. 8. On 18 November 2008 the Budapest Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s action. 9. On appeal, on 9 July 2010 the Budapest Regional Court reversed this decision and found for the applicant. 10. The respondent pursued a petition for review before the Kúria. On 29 February 2012 this court reversed the appeal judgment and found for the respondent.

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4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Kryvyy Rig. Before his arrest he was rector of a State-owned university. 5. On 23 September 2009 the applicant was medically examined. An endocrinologist noted that he had type-2 diabetes and prescribed insulin injections. The endocrinologist advised that commencement and adjustment of the insulin treatment should take place on an in-patient basis in a local hospital. 6. On 29 September 2009 an investigator from the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office arrested the applicant on suspicion of having received bribes in his capacity as university rector. He was detained in the temporary detention facility of Kryvyy Rig (“the ITT”). 7. On 2 October 2009 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kryvyy Rig (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention for three months, stating, without referring to any concrete facts, that he might abscond, hinder the investigation or continue his criminal activities. The court also noted that there was evidence in support of the prosecutors’ suspicion that the applicant had received bribes. 8. On 5 October 2009 the applicant was transported to the Kryvyy Rig remand centre (“the SIZO”). 9. On 7 October 2009 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the above decision. The court noted, without providing further details, that the case file contained evidence that the applicant had attempted to hinder the investigation, and medical documents indicating that he was physically fit for detention. No further information about the said evidence and documents was made available to the Court. 10. On 18 November 2009 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention to 29 January 2010, relying on the same grounds as in its previous decision. 11. On 25 November 2009 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. Referring to unspecified medical documents, it again noted that the applicant was physically fit for detention. 12. On 29 January 2010 the investigation in the applicant’s case was completed and the case was referred to the District Court for trial. 13. In a preliminary hearing on 9 March 2010, the District Court ruled that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant had to be maintained as there were no reasons to change it. The court did not fix the length of the applicant’s detention. 14. In a judgment of 23 May 2011, the District Court sentenced the applicant to five years and two months’ imprisonment for bribery. On 5 October 2011 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal modified that judgment and sentenced the applicant to five years’ suspended imprisonment with a probationary period of three years. On the same date the applicant was released from the SIZO. The judgment became final. 15. In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant took part in fifty court hearings and in a number of investigative actions. 16. In a written request for release, the applicant stated that his state of health was incompatible with detention and that, as he no longer held the post of rector, he could not hinder the investigation. On 31 May 2010 he submitted his request to the SIZO administration asking them to send it to the District Court for examination. On 2 June 2010 the SIZO administration duly forwarded the request. On 7 June 2010 the District Court rejected the request, holding that if he were freed, the applicant could influence witnesses. It continued: “... In so far as the applicant’s health is concerned, it appears from the medical certificates provided by the SIZO and municipal hospital no. 8 that the applicant is being provided with medical treatment. Therefore, the court finds no reason to change the applicant’s preventive measure.” 17. The court did not refer to any concrete facts supporting its finding that the applicant could influence witnesses. Nor did it examine the adequacy of the medical treatment provided to him. No details of the “medical certificates” to which the District Court referred were made available to the Court. 18. On an unspecified date, the applicant wrote another request for release against an undertaking not to abscond. He argued that during his detention his state of health had deteriorated as a result of the inadequate medical treatment provided to him in the SIZO. He also argued that the conditions of his transportation to court hearings had been inappropriate given his state of health. In particular, due to the insufficient ventilation in the van transporting him, his blood pressure had risen and he had had difficulty breathing. It remains unknown when this request was submitted to the District Court. 19. On 17 June 2010 the District Court examined and rejected the applicant’s request, stating: “... the applicant could influence witnesses and thus hinder the investigation ... Where necessary the applicant has received medical aid in the SIZO.” 20. On 6 August 2010, 21 and 22 February 2011, the applicant submitted further requests for release, either against an undertaking not to abscond or on bail. Relying on the findings of forensic medical examinations carried out on 12 November 2010 and 28 January 2011 (see paragraphs 62-66 below), he argued that the treatment provided to him during his detention had not been adequate and that he needed in-patient treatment in a specialist medical institution. That kind of treatment could not be provided to him in the SIZO. 21. On 28 March 2011 the District Court rejected those requests. The court based its decision on the findings of the forensic examination of 28 January 2011, noting that the applicant’s diseases were of a chronic nature and could last for a long time. The court also stated: “If necessary the applicant can be transported to court hearings in an ambulance accompanied by a doctor”. ... “From the medical certificates issued by the SIZO and the certificate issued by hospital no. 9 on 25 March 2011, it follows that when necessary the applicant receives medical aid in the SIZO and in municipal hospitals. The applicant may influence witnesses”. No details of the “medical certificates” to which the District Court referred were made available to the Court. 22. On 7 April 2011 the applicant submitted another request for release, advancing the same arguments as in his requests of 6 August 2010, 21 and 22 February 2011. 23. On 28 April 2011 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request, essentially relying on the same grounds as in its decision of 28 March 2011. 24. On 9 March and 7 June 2010 the District Court examined the applicant’s complaint that his detention from 29 January to 9 March 2010 had been unlawful and rejected it as unsubstantiated. The court found that, although that period of detention had not been covered by any court decision, the detention had been justified because the applicant had been awaiting committal for trial. 25. On 5 October 2009 the doctor who had examined the applicant upon his arrival at the SIZO decided, in view of the applicant’s abnormally high blood pressure, to place him in the cardiology department of a municipal hospital. On the same date the applicant was taken to municipal hospital no. 3, which had cardiology and endocrinology departments. 26. The applicant was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, stenocardia, hypertensive diseases (stage II), chronic cholecystitis (remission stage) and pancreatitis (remission stage), type-2 subcompensated diabetes of medium severity, kidney cyst, prostate adenoma, and chronic pielonefritis (remission stage). 27. The applicant was discharged from the hospital on 27 October 2009. He was recommended constant monitoring by a doctor and prescribed various medications, including an oral medication to lower his sugar level (Gliclazide). 28. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO medical unit, which was tasked with providing primary medical aid to SIZO detainees and did not have the equipment and staff to provide specialist medical treatment and assistance. The unit’s medical staff included two nurses, two feldshers (paramedics), a doctor, a psychologist and a gynaecologist. 29. On 11 February and 9 March 2010 the SIZO medical unit informed the applicant’s lawyer that, according to the results of medical tests, the applicant’s diabetes and kidney pathology warranted in-patient examination in a specialist medical institution. However, no further steps were undertaken in this respect. 30. On 24 March 2010 an endocrinologist from hospital no. 3 studied the results of the applicant’s sugar-level tests and recommended that he start insulin injections on 9 April 2010. 31. On 1 and 6 April 2010 the applicant was transported to municipal hospitals nos. 3 and 8 respectively, where he was examined by surgeons. On the latter date the applicant was diagnosed with chronic pancreatitis. After the examinations, which lasted for several hours, the applicant returned to the SIZO. 32. On 9 April 2010 an endocrinologist from hospital no. 3 confirmed the insulin prescription and recommended regular sugar-level tests. From that date onwards the applicant received insulin injections and did not raise any objection in that respect. He bought the insulin in the SIZO pharmacy, while the insulin syringes were sent to him by his relatives. 33. In a letter of 15 April 2010 addressed to the applicant’s lawyer, the SIZO medical unit stated that the applicant’s condition during his detention was of medium severity and unstable. 34. On 13 May 2010 the applicant complained to the SIZO medical staff of a sudden deterioration in his health. The medical staff noted that his pancreatitis had worsened and that there had been a significant rise in his sugar level. They called an ambulance to take him to hospital no. 8, which, however, did not have specialist endocrinology or cardiology departments. The applicant was placed in the intensive-care department, underwent a number of medical tests and was examined by an urologist, a neuropathologist, a cardiologist and an endocrinologist. He received treatment in connection with his diabetes and pancreatitis. The doctors established that his state of health had deteriorated since October 2009 and his general condition was serious. 35. On 21 May 2010 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and transported back to the SIZO medical unit. 36. In the applicant’s discharge note the hospital doctors recommended that he be monitored by an endocrinologist and that his sugar level be regularly measured. His diabetes treatment was modified and he was prescribed a special diet – so-called “fractional nutrition”. 37. On three occasions between 27 May and 8 June 2010 a SIZO doctor raised the dose of insulin administered to the applicant. According to the Government, the dosage was raised on the advice of an endocrinologist. The applicant disagreed. 38. On 2 June 2010 the SIZO medical unit informed the applicant’s lawyer that it did not have sufficient equipment and staff to provide the applicant with adequate insulin treatment, which could only be administered on an in-patient basis in a specialist medical institution. 39. On the same date the head of the SIZO medical unit informed the judge dealing with the applicant’s criminal case that it was impossible to provide the applicant with adequate medical treatment in the SIZO. He noted that the applicant’s condition warranted comprehensive in-patient treatment in an outside medical institution and asked the judge to consider changing the applicant’s preventive measure. He also noted that further modification of the insulin dosage in the SIZO “without the endocrinologist’s supervision might lead to undesired results”. The judge did not react to that information. 40. On 16 June and 2 July 2010 the applicant requested that the Court, under the Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, oblige Ukraine to transfer him to a specialist hospital, where he could receive adequate medical care. He alleged that as a consequence of that request, the SIZO medical staff stopped registering his complaints and providing him with any medical assistance. The Government contested the applicant’s allegation. On 30 July 2010 the Court refused the applicant’s request. 41. On 13 July 2010 an endocrinologist examined the applicant in the SIZO, confirmed his previous diagnosis and adjusted his treatment. 42. On 20 July 2010 the applicant was examined by an urologist and an oculist in hospital no. 8. He underwent a kidney ultrasonic examination and was diagnosed with retinal angiopathy. On the same date he returned to the SIZO. 43. On 28 January 2011 the applicant was examined in the SIZO medical unit by an endocrinologist, a cardiologist and a urologist from municipal hospitals. 44. On 30 January 2011 the SIZO administration requested hospital no. 8 to assess whether the applicant needed in-patient treatment. The hospital did not reply, and the SIZO administration did not follow up on the request. 45. From 1 March 2011 onwards the SIZO medical unit had no doctors among its staff. 46. On 16 March 2011, following a new request submitted by the applicant under Rule 39, the Court decided that the Government should “ensure that the applicant received treatment in the specialised institutions referred to in the report of 28 January 2011” (see paragraphs 63-66 below). On 17 March 2011 the Court informed the Government of its decision. 47. On 18 March 2011 the applicant was taken by ambulance to hospital no. 8, where he remained until 19 March 2011. The Government submitted that the applicant’s hospitalisation had been based on the Court’s decision of 16 March 2011. The applicant challenged that statement and submitted that he had been hospitalised solely because of a sudden deterioration in his health, which the SIZO staff had been unable to deal with. 48. On 19 March 2011 the applicant was transferred to the cardiology department of hospital no. 9, which had an endocrinologist on its staff. 49. During his stay at the hospitals, the applicant was advised to undergo a coronography (heart examination) as soon as possible. 50. On 26 March 2011 the applicant was discharged, the hospital doctors having noted an improvement in his state of health. He returned to the SIZO medical unit. 51. The SIZO administration proposed that the applicant undergo the coronography at any of the hospitals in Kryvyy Rig and receive treatment for diabetes in the endocrinology department of hospital no. 3 in Kryvyy Rig. The applicant refused, maintaining that he did not trust the Kryvyy Rig doctors. He would only agree to be taken to the Strazhesko Cardiology Institute in Kyiv. 52. On 8 April 2011 the applicant was examined in the SIZO by an endocrinologist from hospital no. 3 and his treatment for diabetes was modified. 53. On 15 April 2011 the governor of the SIZO informed the judge dealing with the criminal case against the applicant that the latter’s condition was of medium severity and unstable. He asked the judge to consider changing the applicant’s preventive measure, in particular, in view of his age and state of health. The judge did not react to that request. 54. On 19 April 2011 the SIZO administration asked the judge to allow the applicant to be moved to the Strazhesko Cardiology Institute in Kyiv. On 6 June 2011 the judge granted the request. 55. In the meantime, on 21 April 2011, the applicant was urgently taken to the endocrinology department of hospital no. 8 because of a sudden deterioration in his health. He remained in the hospital until 27 April 2011 and received treatment for diabetes. 56. On 10 July 2011 the applicant was transported to Kyiv by train. 57. Between 11 and 22 July 2011 the doctors of the Strazhesko Cardiology Institute in Kyiv examined the applicant and prescribed non-urgent heart surgery. In addition to the diseases previously noted by other doctors, the applicant was diagnosed with poliposis of the stomach and sigmoid colon, stomach polipantruma, repeated Q-wave infarction of the posterior wall of the left ventricular valve of the heart, atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries, mitral valve regurgitation, tricuspid valve regurgitation, atrioventricular valve regurgitation and atherosclerotic cerebrovascular insufficiency. 58. On 30 July 2011 the applicant returned to the Kryvyy Rig SIZO medical unit. 59. While the applicant remained in detention, his wife and lawyer submitted several requests to the authorities seeking his move to a specialist hospital instead of the SIZO. The SIZO administration replied that the applicant was receiving adequate treatment in the SIZO and occasionally in municipal hospitals, and that his health condition did not require specialist in-patient treatment in an outside medical institution. 60. The applicant lodged a number of complaints with the prosecutors stating that he had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detention. The prosecutors rejected his complaints as unsubstantiated. The applicant did not challenge the prosecutors’ decisions before the courts. 61. According to the applicant, he was handcuffed to his bed at all times during his stays in municipal hospitals. He did not raise any complaint in this connection before the national authorities and did not provide any evidence in that regard. The Government denied that the applicant had been handcuffed. 62. On 12 November 2010, following a request from the applicant’s lawyer and having studied the applicant’s medical records provided by the latter, a committee of medical experts from the Central Bureau for Forensic Examinations based in Kyiv drew up a report on the applicant’s state of health. It found that as a result of the inadequate medical treatment provided to him during his pre-trial detention, his condition had deteriorated. It stated, in particular, that the applicant’s hypertension had been exacerbated and the type-2 diabetes had reached the stage of decompensation. The experts noted that the gravity of the applicant’s condition warranted in-patient treatment in specialist endocrinology and cardiology hospitals, such as the Strazhesko Cardiology Institute in Kyiv. The experts also expressed the opinion that the applicant risked developing a brain haemorrhage and aortic dissection if he was not provided with appropriate treatment. It was recommended that he be transported in an ambulance accompanied by a doctor. 63. On 23 November 2010 the District Court, following a prosecutor’s request, ordered a committee of medical experts from the Dnipropetrovsk Bureau for Forensic Examinations to assess whether the applicant was physically fit for transportation and participation in court hearings. 64. The medical experts decided that, in view of the instability of the applicant’s condition, it was not necessary to examine him in person. They assessed the applicant’s condition on the basis of his medical file provided by the SIZO. In their report of 28 January 2011 the experts concluded that the applicant’s condition was grave, highly unstable and unpredictable, he was prone to sudden deterioration in his health, which could be fatal if it occurred during transportation in a vehicle without appropriate medical equipment. The applicant’s transportation was thus found to be “undesirable”. However, if it was strictly necessary for the court to contact the applicant, the experts recommended transporting him in a special cardiac ambulance accompanied by a doctor. 65. The experts found that the applicant’s condition had deteriorated while in detention as a result of the inadequate and incomprehensive medical treatment provided to him during that period. If not provided with appropriate in-patient treatment at a specialist medical institution – the experts referred to the Strazhesko Cardiology Institute as an example of such an institution – the applicant risked developing potentially fatal complications, such as cardiac arrest, brain haemorrhage or aortic dissection. 66. The report of 28 January 2011 contains the statement that “... the applicant’s diseases are of a chronic nature, and may last for a lengthy period of time”. 67. On 8 June 2011, following a request from the applicant’s wife, a committee of medical experts from the Central Bureau for Forensic Examinations studied the applicant’s medical records and found that since 12 November 2010 his health had deteriorated and that his condition warranted comprehensive in-patient treatment in a specialist hospital, in particular the Strazhesko Cardiology Institute. Without such treatment the applicant risked developing life-threatening conditions such as a brain haemorrhage and aortic dissection. The experts mentioned that, in view of the instability of the applicant’s condition, his transportation would be potentially fatal. The applicant’s short-term hospitalisations had not constituted appropriate in-patient treatment in the applicant’s case because they had been aimed only at stabilising sudden deteriorations in his condition and had not formed part of a comprehensive treatment. 68. The results of the above forensic examinations were submitted to the District Court. 69. The applicant claimed that on 29 June 2010 his wife had asked the SIZO administration to send her his medical records. The SIZO administration had not responded to her request. The Government stated that the SIZO administration had not received such a request. A copy of the request which the applicant submitted to the Court bears no evidence that it was received by the SIZO. 70. On 4 and 11 August and 22 November 2010, 10 and 31 March 2011 respectively, the applicant’s wife submitted further requests to the SIZO administration asking them to send her the applicant’s medical records. The SIZO sent her the records on 18 August and 29 November 2010, 29 March and 6 April 2011, respectively. 71. On 31 March 2011, following a request from the applicant’s lawyer, hospital no. 9 provided the lawyer with a copy of the applicant’s medical records. According to the applicant, all the medical records provided to his wife and lawyer were incomplete and contained false information. 72. According to the applicant, the window in his cell in the SIZO “had no glass in it”, which resulted in “dampness and air temperature fluctuations”. The food provided by the SIZO was of poor quality. The applicant did not provide further details in that regard. 73. The special diet (“fractional nutrition”) prescribed to the applicant was not available in the SIZO and was provided to him by his relatives two or three times a week. 74. On 26 August 2011 the Government examined the two cells in which the applicant had been held in the SIZO. They submitted that the windows in the cells were double glazed and measured 110 by 130 cm. The temperature in the cells was 20C and the humidity was 56%. The Government acknowledged that the SIZO had not provided the “fractional nutrition” to the applicant. According to them, he had received it from his relatives and had been able to follow the prescribed diet. 75. From 29 September to 5 October 2009 and from 9 March 2010 to 1 February 2011 – on twenty-six occasions in total – the applicant was transported in a van used for the transportation of healthy detainees. Between 5 October 2009 and 9 March 2010 he was once transported in a police car. 76. Between 18 April 2011 and 22 September 2011 the applicant was transported in an ambulance accompanied by a doctor (nineteen times in total). The exact duration of the trips remains unknown; the applicant stated that sometimes his transportation had lasted for up to three hours. 77. The above-mentioned van had metal walls and one small window. According to the applicant, it was not sufficiently ventilated and had no heating system, so it was too cold in winter and too hot in summer. It does not appear from the applicant’s submissions that he was transported with other inmates. The Government argued that the van had had sufficient ventilation and the conditions of the applicant’s transportation had been adequate. 78. The applicant submitted that the train carriage in which he had been transported to Kyiv had not been fit for transportation of a person in his condition. The Government maintained that the conditions in the train carriage were adequate. The parties did not provide any further details in this regard. 79. On 5 July 2011 the prosecutor rejected the applicant’s complaint concerning the inappropriate conditions of his transportation in the train. The applicant did not challenge that decision before the courts.

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5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Chernigiv. Since childhood the applicant has suffered from the second-highest officially recognised degree of disability. In particular, the applicant’s walking ability is impaired – he can only walk with the aid of crutches. Since August 1977 the applicant has worked as a senior researcher at the Chernigiv Institute of Agricultural Microbiology. 6. The applicant was married to O.M., with whom he had a daughter – A.M. – who was born on 5 May 2002. They lived together as a family in the applicant’s flat in Chernigiv. Y.L. – another daughter of O.M.’s – who was born on 30 April 1994, and M.M., the applicant’s mother, also lived in the same flat. 7. In October 2005 O.M. moved to live at her mother’s flat in Chernigiv, as O.M. was suffering from cancer and required external assistance, taking with her A.M., who was then three years old. 8. On 3 April 2006 a lawyer acting on behalf of O.M. lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court in Chernigiv against the applicant, seeking maintenance payments. In particular, in the claim it was stated that O.M. and the applicant “had not lived as a married couple” since August 2005, that the applicant “had left the family”, that he was not participating in the upbringing of A.M. and was not contributing to it financially. 9. The applicant submitted his observations on the claim, in which he stated that it had been O.M. who “had left the family” to live at her mother’s flat and that O.M. had taken A.M. with her. The applicant asserted that he was contributing money towards his daughter’s upbringing and that whenever his daughter had been unwell she had stayed at his home in order to protect O.M. against possible infection, most recently from 31 March to 5 April 2006. The applicant further contended that O.M. was in a poor state of health and taking opioids constantly, and that the claim had been instigated by her relatives, in particular by V.K., O.M.’s mother. The applicant asked the court to order A.M. to return to live at his flat as long as O.M. remained in a poor medical condition. 10. On 16 May 2006 the Desnyanskyy District Court allowed O.M.’s claim, finding that she and A.M. were living separately from the applicant and that he was not contributing money towards the child’s upbringing. The applicant did not appeal against that judgment, stating that he had only learnt of it after some delay. 11. On 16 June 2006 O.M. died. V.K. took A.M. away from Chernigiv without informing the applicant of the latter’s whereabouts. 12. The applicant stated that he had lodged a number of complaints and requests with the police, prosecutors, local child-care authorities and non-governmental organisations seeking assistance in his daughter’s return. In particular, he submitted a copy of his complaint of 19 September 2006 addressed to the police and to the Municipal Centre of Social Services for Family, Children and Youth (Міський центр соціальних служб для сім’ї, дітей та молоді, “the Municipal Family Welfare Centre”) in Chernigiv. 13. In a letter dated 16 October 2006, the Municipal Family Welfare Centre informed the applicant that his request of 19 September 2006 for his daughter’s return had been examined. The applicant was also informed by V.K.’s neighbours that she had left Chernigiv for Andriyivka, a village in the Chernigiv oblast (about 25 km away from Chernigiv), and had taken A.M. with her. The local authorities in Andriyivka were thus asked to assist the applicant in his request for the return of his daughter. The Chernigiv Municipal Family Welfare Centre also informed the applicant that he should raise the issue of establishing his daughter’s place of residence before the courts. 14. In October 2006 the police informed the applicant that there were no grounds for opening a criminal case on the basis of his complaint and that he should pursue it directly before the courts in the framework of a private action. 15. On 11 December 2006 V.K. lodged a request with the Desnyanskyy District Council in Chernigiv asking that she be appointed as A.M.’s tutor, stating that A.M. had been living with her since O.M.’s death, that the applicant suffered from the second-highest officially recognised degree of disability, and that she was not receiving any help from him. 16. The applicant was not informed about V.K.’s request. 17. On 22 December 2006, in response to V.K.’s request, the Desnyanskyy District Council adopted a decision appointing her as tutor of A.M. on the grounds that “the child’s mother had died [and] her father, who suffered from the second [highest officially recognised] degree of disability, could not take care of [the child’s] upbringing because of his state of health” (“the tutelage decision”). The decision noted that A.M. was living with V.K. at the latter’s place of residence. 18. By a letter dated 24 February 2007, the Desnyanskyy District Council informed the applicant about the tutelage decision. 19. On 31 December 2006 A.M. broke her hip after falling from a cupboard in V.K.’s flat. According to the applicant, this had happened because V.K. had left his daughter without supervision for a long period of time. 20. In February 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking his daughter’s return. On 8 May 2007 the claim was left undecided as the applicant had failed to appear before the court. According to the applicant, it was his lawyer who had failed to attend the court hearing. 21. In September 2007 the applicant lodged a new claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking his daughter’s immediate return pursuant to Article 162 of the Family Code. The applicant argued that after his wife’s death, V.K. had retained his daughter unlawfully and without his consent. He also stated that V.K. had hindered his contact with A.M. The applicant invoked Articles 151, 153, 154 and 163 of the Family Code and Article 23 of the Civil Code. 22. V.K. disputed the applicant’s claim, arguing that she was A.M.’s tutor and that her granddaughter was therefore living lawfully at her home. V.K. stated that in October 2005 O.M. and A.M. had come to live in her flat as O.M. had required assistance for health reasons. After the latter’s death, A.M. had remained with V.K. 23. V.K. also lodged a counterclaim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of allegedly false information the applicant had submitted to the courts. In her counterclaim, V.K. stated that after the death of O.M. the applicant had, “periodically”, made phone calls asking her to return A.M. to him. V.K. alleged that he had verbally abused her, but provided no further details. 24. The representatives of the tutelage service (орган опіки та піклування) within the Desnyanskyy District Council submitted that the tutelage decision had been taken because the applicant – due to his disability – had not been able to take care of the child’s upbringing, that the living conditions at the child’s place of residence had been inspected and that the interests of the child had been taken into account. 25. During a court hearing on 19 December 2007 the applicant stated that he wished his claim to be amended to include a request for cancellation of the tutelage decision. The judge invited the applicant to submit an amended claim in writing. 26. At a hearing on 8 February 2008 the applicant submitted to the court his amended claim challenging the lawfulness of the tutelage decision and asking the court to order the Desnyanskyy District Council to adopt immediate measures to bring about his daughter’s return. The applicant argued that the contested decision had been taken without his consent and that he had not been informed that the matter had been considered. Referring to the incident on 31 December 2006 as a result of which A.M. had been injured (see paragraph 19 above), the applicant argued that his daughter’s life and health were at risk while she was staying with V.K. The applicant relied inter alia on Articles 152, 153, 157, 160 and 163 of the Family Code, Articles 58, 79, 1167 and 1168 of the Civil Code, and Articles 3 and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of Children of 1989. 27. The judge sitting in the case refused to include the amended claim in the case file on the grounds that the “amended” claim was in fact a new claim. The judge noted that its inclusion in the case would require the participation of new parties and would complicate consideration of the original claim. 28. At the hearing on 8 February 2008 the court delivered a judgment rejecting the applicant’s original claim. The court found that the applicant had been informed of the tutelage decision before he had lodged his claim with the court and as he had not challenged that decision, A.M. was staying with V.K. lawfully. 29. By the same judgment, the court also rejected V.K.’s counterclaim as unsubstantiated. 30. The applicant appealed, stating that the first-instance court’s refusal to consider his amended claim was groundless and that the judgment was not in accordance with the relevant law. The applicant also stated that the court had not allowed him to question the witnesses who had appeared before the court, but provided no details in that regard. 31. On 10 April 2008 the Chernigiv Oblast Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. It noted that A.M. had been living “permanently” at V.K.’s place of residence since October 2005 and that, by the judgment of 16 May 2006, the Desnyanskyy District Court had ordered the applicant to pay maintenance to O.M. in respect of A.M.’s upbringing (see paragraph 10 above). The Court of Appeal held that there were no grounds for returning A.M. to the applicant pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the Family Code, given that the tutelage decision was in force, that A.M. was staying lawfully with V.K., and that the latter was opposed to the child’s returning to living with the applicant because she believed that it would be contrary to the child’s interests. 32. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had not produced evidence showing that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to live with the applicant or that it was contrary to her interests to live with her tutor. 33. The Court of Appeal refused to deal with the arguments brought by the applicant on the basis of his amended claim, since it had not been examined by the court of first instance. In that context the Court of Appeal held that the first-instance court’s decision not to include the amended claim was in compliance with Article 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 34. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He argued that, in dealing with his case, the courts had not acted in accordance with the proper procedure. In particular, the applicant alleged that the courts had unlawfully refused to consider his amended claim, that they had refused to summon witnesses on his behalf without stating the reasons why, that they had not considered the applicant’s request for the inclusion of important documentary evidence, and that they had systematically restricted his procedural rights, in particular the right to study the case file and to put questions to those taking part in the proceedings. 35. The applicant also argued that the courts’ decisions had not been in accordance with the law. 36. In his cassation appeal the applicant further alleged that V.K. had systematically hindered his access to the child. 37. By a decision of 9 September 2008, the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal as unsubstantiated, finding that the arguments contained in it did not constitute a basis for concluding that the judgments of the lower courts were wrong or unlawful. No further reasons were given by the Supreme Court. 38. According to the applicant, some of the court hearings had been held in the absence of his representative, who was unable to attend for health reasons. He provided no further details in that regard. 39. On 1 April 2008 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking cancellation of the tutelage decision. The claim was based on the same arguments as those supporting the original and amended claims lodged by the applicant in the course of the first set of proceedings (see paragraphs 21 and 26 above). 40. On 18 August 2008 the Desnyanskyy District Court, relying on paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, Articles 243-244 of the Family Code and Section 2.2 of the Regulations on Tutelage and Guardianship of 1999, found against the applicant. 41. The court noted that (i) the applicant had not produced any evidence showing that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to live with the applicant or that it would be contrary to her interests to live with her tutor; (ii) the tutelage service within the Desnyanskyy District Council had not had any concerns about the fulfilment by V.K. of her duties as a tutor; (iii) A.M. had lived at her grandmother’s home for three years before the decision in the case had been taken; (iv) during that period the applicant had not enquired about his child’s situation, had not used any means to communicate with her, and had not visited the child either at her place of residence or at the nursery which she had been attending; and (v) the applicant had participated in his daughter’s upbringing only by making maintenance payments. The court held that the contested decision had been adopted in accordance with the law and that A.M.’s interests had been duly taken into account. 42. The applicant appealed, stating that the first-instance court had not taken into consideration his submissions that (i) V.K. had unlawfully retained his daughter before the tutelage decision had been adopted; (ii) V.K. had been hindering his communication with the child; (iii) there were witnesses alleging that V.K. had been abusing alcohol and “misbehaving”; (iv) V.K. had been responsible for the incident on 31 December 2006 (see paragraph 19 above); and (v) in addition to paying maintenance, the applicant had been sending money and parcels to A.M. by post, as he had not had the opportunity to deliver them in person. Moreover, V.K. had allegedly refused to let him into her house when he had come to see his daughter and had not answered his phone calls. 43. The applicant also alleged that the first-instance court had refused to question witnesses on his behalf and that he had not been allowed to put questions to the witnesses who had been questioned by the court. The applicant did not provide further details in respect of those allegations. 44. On 4 November 2008 the Chernigiv Oblast Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, finding that (i) A.M. had been living with V.K. at her home since October 2005; (ii) A.M. had been under the medical supervision of the clinic in that location since birth; (iii) after O.M.’s death the applicant had not taken charge of the child’s upbringing; (iv) the applicant had not challenged the lawfulness of his daughter’s living with the grandmother prior to the adoption of the tutelage decision; (v) the applicant suffered from the second-highest degree of disability; and (vi) due to his “impaired moving capacity” the applicant had been sleeping in his office overnight on workdays (from Monday to Friday), returning home only for weekends. Relying on those grounds, the Court of Appeal held that the tutelage decision safeguarded the interests of the child, was in accordance with the law, and did not violate the applicant’s rights to educate and support his child. 45. The Court of Appeal also held that the applicant’s allegations that the retention of his daughter by V.K. had been unlawful, that his communication with A.M. had been hindered and that V.K. had failed to fulfil her duties as a tutor were not supported by evidence and had been disproved by the information submitted by the Desnyanskyy District Council. 46. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He argued that, in violation of the proper procedure, the first-instance and appeal courts (i) had refused the applicant’s requests to have certain audio recordings examined in court and to check the reliability of the documents provided by the Desnyanskyy District Council; (ii) had not included the documentary evidence on which the applicant had relied; (iii) had not allowed the applicant to put questions to witnesses – in particular Y.L. – or to express his views regarding the way the hearings had been held; and (iv) had not observed the relevant regulations when accepting medical information (which he did not further specify). The applicant also stated that the courts had not taken into account his arguments that he had been unable to take care of A.M. because V.K. had hindered his communication with the child. In particular, she had allegedly “hidden” A.M. from the applicant, had not opened the door of her house when the applicant had tried to visit, and had otherwise blocked any opportunity for the applicant to see A.M. The applicant also argued that the courts had not applied the law pertinent to the case. 47. On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal, finding that it contained no arguments requiring examination of the case material or demonstrating that the lower courts had violated procedural or substantive law. 48. According to the applicant, V.K. had continued to hinder his communication with A.M. and he had not been able to participate in his daughter’s upbringing. In particular, on occasions when the applicant had come to visit his daughter, V.K. had not opened the door of her house. She had also refused to allow the applicant to take A.M. for medical examination. 49. The applicant alleged that, despite his repeated requests for assistance in obtaining access to his daughter to enforce his parental rights, the authorities had been reluctant to help him. The applicant submitted copies of letters from the Desnyanskyy District Council and the Andriyivka Council stating inter alia that the living conditions of A.M. were satisfactory and that she was doing well at school. However, the applicant had not contacted the school administration to learn about the child’s everyday life and progress. In a letter dated 6 July 2009, the Desnyanskyy District Council stated that it would no longer deal with further similar requests from the applicant. 50. The applicant also argued that he could provide adequate living conditions for his daughter, being a physiologist with a teaching qualification; he had sufficient income and owned a flat. The applicant also stated that he had been a tutor to Y. L. 51. According to the applicant, his daughter’s living conditions at V.K.’s place of residence were worse than the conditions at his home, V.K.’s house in Andriyivka having no sanitary facilities or no natural gas supply. The applicant explained that the school which his daughter attended was about to be closed on the grounds of having too few pupils. The school was two kilometres away from V.K.’s house, whereas the applicant’s house was only about two hundred metres from a school.

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5. The applicant was born in 1950 and currently lives in Traun. 6. On 21 January 2005 the Linz Regional Court convicted the applicant of having deliberately caused severe bodily harm and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The court found that the applicant had beaten his 80‑year-old mother by kicking and punching her face, head and thorax, which resulted in a severe and lasting infirmity. The applicant had been convicted on seven previous occasions, four of which involved similar offences of violence. Relying on a report by a psychiatric expert, the court found that even though the applicant was responsible for his acts, he was suffering from a grave mental disorder, was dangerous to the public and was likely to re-offend. For these reasons, the court ordered the applicant’s detention in an institution for mentally ill offenders in accordance with section 21 § 2 of the Criminal Code, in addition to the term of imprisonment. Given the time the applicant had served in detention on remand, the Court stated that the applicant’s detention pursuant to the prison sentence was likely to end on 7 May 2010. 7. On 7 June 2005 the Linz Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against his sentence. On the same day the applicant was placed in Garsten detention centre, an institution for mentally ill offenders. 8. On 31 March 2006, in a first set of proceedings in which the applicant requested his conditional release from the institution, the Steyr Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) ordered that the applicant remain in the institution. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision on 9 May 2006. 9. On 10 January 2007 the applicant applied for the lifting of the order to detain him at Garsten detention centre (under section 21 § 2 of the Criminal Code) in order to serve his sentence in an ordinary prison. 10. On 12 January 2007 the Regional Court asked the Garsten prison administration and its psychiatric and psychological service to transmit further information on the applicant, which it received on 9 March 2007. On 12 March 2007 it ordered a fresh psychiatric expert report and instructed the expert to submit the report before 11 June 2007. 11. On 23 June 2007 the applicant filed an application with the Court of Appeal for the setting of a time-limit (Fristsetzungsantrag) under section 91 of the Court Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz) for the Regional Court to decide on his application, as the last determination of the continuing need to detain him had taken place on 9 May 2006, and he had not yet received a decision concerning his application of 10 January 2007. 12. On an unspecified date, the applicant was transferred to a psychiatric institution in Vienna. It appears, however, that this transfer was only temporary, and on an unspecified date, the applicant was transferred back to Garsten detention centre. 13. After having been urged by the Regional Court to deliver her report, the expert replied on 3 July 2007 that she would submit it as soon as possible. She did so on 10 July 2007 and explained that the applicant had meanwhile been transferred to an institution in Vienna, for which reason she had not been able to examine him earlier. She found that the applicant, even though he had started to respond positively to his therapy, was still suffering from a serious mental disorder and that there was still the risk that the applicant would commit dangerous acts of violence. 14. On 30 July 2007 the Court of Appeal granted the applicant’s application under section 91 of the Court Act and ordered the Regional Court to take a decision by 3 August 2007 at the latest. It held that in the light of the chronology of events in this case, the Regional Court had not fulfilled its duty to take a decision within a reasonable amount of time. 15. On 31 July 2007, after having held an oral hearing with the applicant present, the Regional Court ordered the continuation of his detention in an institution for mentally ill offenders. On the basis of the expert opinion obtained, the court found that the applicant was still dangerous and likely to re-offend. It dismissed the applicant’s request for the hearing of two prison officers as witnesses, since these persons could not make a relevant assessment in this respect and that therefore the applicant’s request lacked a relevant issue on which evidence should be taken (relevantes Beweisthema). 16. On 16 August 2007 the applicant appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal maintaining his view that the placement in a psychiatric institution was no longer justified. He maintained, furthermore, that the length of the proceedings for the determination of this issue was in breach of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 17. On 10 September 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On the basis of the evidence obtained, the expert report of a psychiatrist, reports by the head of Garsten detention centre and its psychiatric and psychological service, it found that despite progress in the applicant’s therapy he still suffered from a grave mental disorder and was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. The Court of Appeal also considered that the Regional Court had correctly dismissed the applicant’s request for the taking of further evidence. As to the applicant’s argument that the proceedings related to his request had lasted an unreasonably long time, the Court of Appeal found that, according to the relevant case‑law, the condition under section 25 § 3 of the Penal Code for annual review of the further necessity of detention in an institution was complied with if such a review had been started by the competent court within the one-year period, whereas it was not necessary that the decision following the review be taken within that time-limit. 18. On 28 February 2008 the applicant again applied for the order for psychiatric detention to be lifted, and to be transferred to an ordinary prison. After a further application by the applicant under section 91 of the Court Act, the application was finally examined on 10 September 2009, when the Regional Court ordered the termination of the applicant’s psychiatric detention, suspended the remaining seven months of his prison sentence and released him subject to a number of conditions.

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5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ulan-Ude. 6. In 2007 the applicant’s wife, N., gave birth to a daughter, A. 7. In 2010 the applicant and N. divorced. 8. On 18 January 2011 the Oktyabrskiy District childcare and guardianship authority (“the childcare authority”) determined that A. would reside with the applicant during even weeks and with her mother, N., during odd weeks. In January, June, July and August, A. was to live with the applicant for one week of his choice per month. 9. On 22 March 2011 the applicant discovered several bruises on A.’s body. Suspecting that she had been beaten and sexually abused by N.’s new partner, he refused to return A. to N. 10. During the following year, A. lived with the applicant and her paternal grandmother. On several occasions the applicant allowed N. to visit A. in his presence. 11. On 25 March 2011 the applicant complained to the police and to the Oktyabrskiy District investigation committee that his daughter had been beaten and sexually abused by N.’s partner. The investigation committee opened a pre-investigation inquiry. 12. The applicant and N. both applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ulan-Ude for a residence order in respect of A. 13. On 25 April 2011 A. was questioned by an investigator in the presence of a psychologist as part of the pre-investigation inquiry. A. stated that she wanted to live with the applicant because he was nice, whereas her mother and her mother’s new partner had treated her badly. She was again questioned by the investigator in the presence of a psychologist on 27 June and 3 August 2011, and confirmed her previous statements. 14. On 19 May 2011 the Oktyabrskiy District Court granted N.’s application for a residence order and refused the applicant’s similar application. The court found that both parents had taken an equal share in A.’s upbringing. They both had sufficient financial means and their standard of living was equally satisfactory. However, taking into account A.’s gender and age, it was preferable for her to be brought up by her mother. A child under the age of twelve could be separated from the mother only in exceptional circumstances. No such circumstances had been established in the present case. N. was employed and had sufficient income. There was no evidence of negligence or mistreatment on her part. A.’s bruises could have been sustained as a result of a fall or in the course of a game, and were insufficient to prove mistreatment. A criminal inquiry into the allegations of mistreatment was still pending. The court-appointed expert psychologist’s finding that A. was emotionally closer to her father and paternal grandmother than to her mother could not be taken into account in the absence of established evidence of mistreatment by the mother. The court concluded that it was therefore in A.’s best interests to live with her mother. 15. On 20 May 2011 the childcare authority noted that A. wished to live with her father. An inspection of the applicant’s flat had revealed that he had created all the appropriate conditions for A.’s normal development. The childcare authority therefore found that A. should reside with the applicant. 16. On 22 June 2011 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya upheld the judgment of 19 May 2011 on appeal. It found that the Oktyabrskiy District Court had failed to consider the childcare authority’s findings and opinion and had therefore committed a serious breach of the procedure prescribed by law. However, given that the childcare authority’s opinion was advisory rather than binding on the court, the failure to consider that opinion did not warrant reconsideration of the judgment, which was correct in substance. 17. On 30 June 2011 the Oktyabrskiy District investigation committee opened criminal proceedings into the alleged mistreatment and sexual abuse of A. 18. As the applicant continued to retain A., N. applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for an injunction requiring the applicant to return A. to her. 19. On 29 November 2011 the Oktyabrskiy District Court allowed N.’s application. It found that the applicant had refused to comply with the judgment of 19 May 2011, upheld on appeal. It ordered that, in compliance with that judgment, the applicant should return A. to N. On 30 January 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya upheld that judgment on appeal. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a second time to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for a residence order in respect of A. At the same time he applied for a restriction of N.’s parental authority over A. 21. On 23 January 2012 the Oktyabrskiy District Court dismissed the application and confirmed its previous order to the effect that A. should live with her mother, citing the same reasons as in the judgment of 19 May 2011. The court found no reason to restrict N.’s parental authority over A. On 2 April 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya upheld that judgment on appeal. 22. On 13 March 2012 N. kidnapped A. from the applicant. She has since prevented the applicant from seeing his daughter. 23. On 20 March 2012 A. was again questioned by the investigator in the presence of a psychologist. She said that she liked living with her mother and that her mother was treating her well. 24. On 23 April 2012 A. was examined by a panel of psychologists appointed by the investigator as part of the criminal proceedings. They found that A. was not suffering from any learning difficulties or disorders. However, owing to her age, level of development and susceptibility to external influence, she was unable to give reliable evidence about her relationships with her mother, her father or her mother’s new partner. 25. On 30 April 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District investigation committee discontinued the criminal proceedings, finding that there was no evidence of mistreatment or sexual abuse and that the bruises could have been caused by a fall. According to the experts, A.’s statements that her mother’s partner had treated her badly were unreliable. The witnesses had been unable to provide any information confirming the applicant’s allegations of child abuse. 26. The applicant applied for a third time to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for a residence order in respect of A. He also asked that N. be deprived of parental authority over A. 27. While those proceedings were pending, N. lodged an application with the Oktyabrskiy District Court, contesting the applicant’s paternity of A. She requested that his name be deleted from A.’s birth certificate and that A.’s family name and patronymic be changed. 28. On 23 July 2012 a DNA paternity test established that the applicant was not A.’s biological father. 29. On 18 September 2012 the Oktyabrskiy District Court allowed N.’s claims. It found that the applicant was not A.’s biological father and terminated his parental status in respect of her. It ordered that the applicant’s name be deleted from A.’s birth certificate and that A.’s family name and patronymic be changed to a family name and a patronymic not connected with the applicant. On 19 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya upheld that judgment on appeal. 30. On 16 January 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant’s application for a residence order and an order to deprive N. of parental authority over A. The court reasoned that as the applicant was not A.’s biological father, he had no standing under domestic law to lodge civil actions concerning parental authority over A. or A.’s residence arrangements. The applicant was absent from the hearing because he was ill. 31. On 27 February 2013 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya upheld that decision on appeal. According to the applicant, he had not been informed of the date of the hearing. Nor was he informed about the appeal decision until 12 March 2013. 32. On 31 May 2013 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Buryatiya refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant to the presidium of that court for examination, finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. It noted, in particular, that there was proof in the case file that a letter had been sent to the applicant on 7 February 2013 informing him of the date of the appeal hearing. Information regarding the hearing date had also been published on the court’s official website. The applicant had therefore been duly informed of the date of the appeal hearing.

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4. The applicants, two brothers, were born in 1982 and 1974 respectively and live in Tautii Magheraus. 5. According to the first applicant, in the summer of 2004 he was contacted on several occasions by an undercover police agent who wanted to buy ecstasy from him, brought into the country from the Netherlands. According to the prosecutor’s report, the police gained knowledge of the first applicant’s alleged involvement in drug trafficking at the beginning of September 2004. 6. It was established by the prosecutor and domestic courts that some time in September the first applicant brought a batch of drugs into the country and sold ten tablets to the undercover agent on 26 October 2004 and 115 tablets on 29 October 2004. According to the transcripts of the conversations intercepted between the first applicant and the police agent, on 28 October the latter called the first applicant, asked him if he had “any left” and at the applicant’s confirmation that some 150 remained, the undercover agent calculated their price at 1,000 euros, and advised the applicant on where and how to meet the next day for him to buy them all. 7. On 29 October 2004 the police intercepted a conversation between the undercover agent and the first applicant when they met for the drug transaction. The police agent told the applicant that the day before he had been offered a batch of “1,000 pieces” (1,000 de bucăţi) which would be available the next week, and that he would not want to miss such an opportunity. The applicant offered to bring the same amount for him. The police agent agreed, and asked how much more he could bring. They settled for 5,000 pieces. The undercover agent warned the first applicant repeatedly during their conversation that if he did not receive his supply from the applicant he would go to the other provider. During the conversation it appeared that the applicant had meanwhile sold some twenty more tablets. The first applicant called someone on his mobile phone and discussed in English getting 5,000 or 10,000 tablets. He then reported to the agent that he could get him some stronger tablets, and described the sensations he had had when he had used them himself. The agent proposed the place and arrangements for their next transaction. 8. The new transaction was postponed for various reasons and was finally planned to take place on 23 December 2004 in Baia Mare. That day the first applicant informed his brother for the first time that he had brought drugs into the country and about the deal. After having initially refused and argued extensively about it with his brother, the second applicant agreed to help, in order to save the family from potential retaliation by the Dutch seller. That evening he took the drugs to an agreed location while the first applicant negotiated the terms of the transaction with the undercover agent. 9. The first applicant and the undercover agent then joined the second applicant; the agent was offered an ecstasy tablet for testing and then left with the first applicant in order to set out the details of the transaction. The second applicant was to wait at the same location for the buyer to return with the money to pay for the drugs. Meanwhile, the second applicant saw police agents approaching in a taxi. He threw the bag containing the drugs into a nearby bush and phoned his brother to warn him. The first applicant told the undercover agent that the transaction was cancelled. 10. Police agents apprehended the two applicants and later recovered a bag containing 4,409 ecstasy tablets from the bushes. 11. The applicants were taken to the police station for further questioning. After consultation with their counsel they refused to make any statements. They were arrested. 12. On 25 October 2004 the organised crime and terrorism division of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Cluj Court of Appeal (“the prosecutor”) identified the first applicant as being apparently involved with trafficking in drugs and drug consumption, the merchandise being brought from the Netherlands. 13. On 26 October 2004 the prosecutor authorised the use of an undercover police agent to infiltrate the applicants’ circle in order to obtain information and evidence about the drug trafficking. It also authorised the undercover agent to purchase 150 ecstasy tablets. After each transaction the undercover agent wrote a report on the meeting with the first applicant. The prosecutor noted as follows: “there are strong indications that the crime of drug trafficking has occurred/is about to occur ... as Ciprian Vlăduț Pop bought in 2004 high-risk drugs from the Netherlands, namely ecstasy tablets (MDMA), which he is selling in Baia Mare and Cluj-Napoca.” 14. On 29 October 2004 the prosecutor started criminal prosecutions against the first applicant on suspicion that he had both consumed and sold drugs. On 23 December 2004 the prosecution was extended to the second applicant. 15. On 27 October and 11 and 18 November 2004 the Cluj County Court authorised for a period of thirty days, at the prosecutor’s request, the tapping of the first applicant’s telephone and that of the undercover police agent. On 24 November and 22 December the authorisation was extended by thirty days on each occasion. Some 100 CDs were recorded in the process. 16. The prosecutor asked for the tablets purchased by the undercover agent to be tested by the police laboratory for physical and chemical analysis (“the police laboratory”). On 28 October, 2 November, and 27 December 2004 the police laboratory submitted its reports on the three batches of tablets, concluding that they contained methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). The tablets remaining after the laboratory test were sealed and stored in a special police depository. The applicants and two taxi drivers who transported the police agents to the crime scene were interviewed by the prosecutor. 17. On 11 January and 10 March 2005 the first applicant stated that he had visited the Netherlands in the summer of 2004 and met P., who had afterwards visited Romania and spent a few weeks at the applicant’s home. P. found out that ecstasy sold very well in Romania, and offered to obtain some for the first applicant. The applicant brought a first batch of 250 tablets and sold some of them to the undercover police agent; the remaining tablets he either consumed himself or gave away to others. During the night of 22/23 December 2004 the applicant returned from the Netherlands with a batch of 5,000 ecstasy tablets from P. He contacted several individuals to offer to sell them tablets, but the undercover police agent offered to buy them all. 18. The second applicant gave statements on 11 January 2005. He declared that before 23 December 2004 he had not known of any dealings in drugs that his brother might have had, that during the night of 22/23 December he had returned with his brother from the Netherlands but had not been aware until later that day that his brother, who had crossed the border on his own on foot, had brought drugs into the country. He further explained that he had agreed to help his brother because he feared his brother was in danger of being attacked and killed by the drug dealers, given the large amount of money involved in the transaction. He further explained that it was morally impossible for him, at the time of the crime, to denounce his brother to the authorities. He also explained that he had never taken drugs himself. 19. On 2 March 2005 the prosecutor presented the transcripts of some of the recorded conversations, along with forty CDs, to the Maramureş County Court. He sought confirmation from the court that the evidence produced before it was relevant to the case (procedure under Articles 913 and 915 of the CCP). The hearing took place on 9 March 2005. Defence counsel asked for an adjournment to allow her to study the evidence and form an opinion on the relevance of the CDs. She also expressed the wish to examine the remaining recordings which had not been produced before the court by the prosecutor. The court dismissed the requests and accepted the evidence in the file, as proposed by the prosecutor. It agreed with the prosecutor’s opinion and ruled that the remaining CDs were not relevant to the case. 20. On 10 March 2005 the applicants, in the presence of their counsel, acquainted themselves with the prosecution file. 21. On 15 March 2005 the prosecutor committed the applicants to trial for trafficking in drugs, under Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (“Law no. 143/2000”). The prosecutor noted that the first applicant was also a drug user, whereas his brother, the second applicant, was not and had had no knowledge of his brother’s dealing before 23 December 2004. The prosecutor also noted that the first applicant had a prior conviction for theft and breach of firearms regulations (nerespectarea regimului armelor). 22. The case was heard by the Maramureş County Court. The applicants’ detention pending trial was extended at regular intervals by the court. 23. On 5 April 2005 the applicants gave statements before the court, reiterating their declarations from the prosecution phase. It appears that at that time the first applicant was suffering from withdrawal symptoms and was under sedatives prescribed by the prison doctors to alleviate his symptoms. 24. The applicants’ counsel asked for an expert evaluation of the tablets to establish whether they contained MDMA or a lighter drug. Relying on the principle of equality of arms, defence counsel requested that the expert examination be performed by experts from the Ministry of Justice and not by experts from the Forensic Institute, as the latter institution was attached to the police. The prosecutor advised that the Police Forensic Institute was normally responsible for such analyses. On 11 July 2005 the Ministry of Justice informed the court that it would not be possible for their experts to perform the requested tests. 25. The second applicant also asked the court to hear evidence from the undercover police agent. His request remained unanswered. 26. On 26 July 2005 the first applicant, who was suffering from withdrawal symptoms, became ill in the court building and had to be taken to hospital. Defence counsel asked for a medical assessment of his client. Despite repeated requests by the court, the prison authorities later failed to take the first applicant to hospital so he could receive the expert examination ordered by the court. 27. On 10 August 2005, at the court’s request, the Police Forensic Institute re-examined the drugs and in a comprehensive report confirmed that the tablets contained MDMA. 28. On 8 November 2005 the court heard pleadings from counsel for the prosecution and the defence. The applicants did not deny the substance of the charges. The first applicant admitted that the police operation respected the domestic legislation, but doubted its morality; in particular, he argued that if it had not been for the undercover police agent’s insistence he would not have bought ecstasy in the first place. In his view the undercover police agent asked on purpose for a high-risk drug to attract a heavier penalty for the applicants, whereas if he had requested a milder drug the sentencing would have been consequently lighter. The prosecutor replied that as it was known that the first applicant had brought ecstasy into the country in the summer of 2004, the undercover agent had done no more than follow that lead; it would have made no sense for him to ask for another drug so long as there was no indication that the applicant had dealt in any other type of drugs. The second applicant pointed out that he had only been informed about the drug dealing on the very day when the last transaction had taken place, and that by telephoning his brother that day he had in fact prevented the crime from being committed. 29. The County Court rendered its judgment on 25 November 2005, based on the evidence in the file, namely the police reports from the undercover operation, witness statements (the two taxi drivers who had brought the police officers to the scene of the transaction and who had seen the applicants handcuffed and the police retrieving the bag containing the drugs from the bushes), the transcripts of the intercepted telephone calls and the expert reports concerning the content of the tablets. It reiterated the history as it had been established in the bill of indictment, and concluded that the applicants were guilty of the offences they had been accused of. The court gave no further answers to the arguments raised by the defence. It convicted both applicants and sentenced the first applicant to seven years and six months’ imprisonment and the second applicant to three years and six months’ imprisonment. 30. The applicants reiterated their complaints concerning breach of the principle of equality of arms, in that the tablets had been analysed in police laboratories and not by an independent expert. Finally they renewed their request to have all the transcripts of the intercepted conversations produced before the court, and complained that they could not have access to them as the remaining recordings had been destroyed. Before the court, they also argued that the unlawfully obtained evidence should be removed from the file and reiterated that the police operation had started only from a suspicion that the first applicant was a drug user. Throughout the proceedings, the second applicant made repeated requests to be allowed to study his file, but received no answer from the court. 31. On 5 October 2006 the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute examined the first applicant and his medical record. On 19 January 2007 it rendered its medical report, which was examined at the court hearing held on 31 January 2007. The experts concluded that the applicant’s drug addiction could be treated in the prison hospitals and that the medication he had received so far had been adequate; as he was not experiencing withdrawal symptoms, he did not need to be placed in a special drug withdrawal programme; they also considered that his medical condition was compatible with detention. 32. The Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal delivered its decision on 7 February 2007. Concerning the defence’s arguments about lack of access to the transcripts of the intercepted telephone calls the court reiterated that on 9 March 2005 it had decided which transcripts were useful to the case. The court dismissed their complaints concerning the secret police operation; in doing so, it relied on the report drafted by the undercover agent and by the prosecutor, and observed that the applicants’ own statements to the police and before the courts corroborated those reports. The court of appeal substantially maintained the conclusions of the first‑instance court. 33. The applicants appealed on points of law and reiterated their main defence arguments. However, their appeal was dismissed in a final decision rendered on 29 March 2007 by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 34. The second applicant described his detention as follows. He was arrested on 23 December 2004 and remained imprisoned until 1 May 2007. He spent the first three months of detention in police detention facilities, the following eight to nine months in Baia Mare Prison, then thirteen months in Gherla Prison; he spent the remaining time in Jilava Prison. 35. He had to share cells with smokers, although he was a non-smoker himself. He repeatedly asked the prison administration to place him in a cell with non-smokers. No such arrangements could be made for him, as the pre‑trial detention facilities were already overcrowded and there were no places available in the non‑smoking cells; according to the applicant, in Baia Mare Prison the ratio was of thirty-nine bunk beds, placed on three levels, for sixty inmates. When in Baia Mare Prison the applicant went on hunger strike from 13 to 16 April 2007 because he was placed in smoking cells despite being a non-smoker; he ended his protest when a non‑smoking cell became available after refurbishment. 36. When he was detained in Gherla Prison, he complained about being placed with smokers and about overcrowding in prison, notably that he did not have 4 sq. m of personal living space in the cell. On 5 February 2007 his complaint was dismissed by the judge delegated by the court to supervise the observance of the prisoners’ rights, under Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of sentences (“the post-sentencing judge”). The post-sentencing judge noted that there was no obligation in Romanian law to place a detainee in a non-smoking cell or to provide him with a certain amount of living space. According to the applicant, the cells were all dirty and infested with bugs. 37. According to information provided by the prison service, during his detention the applicant occupied altogether eleven cells in three prisons (Baia Mare, Gherla, and Jilava), sharing with between five and forty-three others; his personal living space was on average 1.91 sq. m at all times. In addition he spent three days in a cell alone in Baia Mare when he was on hunger strike, and two days alone in Gherla Prison infirmary; on those two occasions his living space was 16 sq. m. 38. The second applicant also described an episode where he was hit by a prison guard; he explained that he had got scared and become agitated because he had seen his brother suffering from withdrawal and was sure that his brother was about to die without anybody willing to come to his rescue. He pressed charges against the guard, and on 31 March 2006 the prosecutor decided not to prosecute. 39. He tried on two occasions to commit suicide by hanging himself (13 September 2005 and 2 December 2005). As a consequence of his attempted suicide of 2 December 2005, the second applicant was handcuffed to his bed for a month, according to his statements. The prison service explained that on 2 December 2005 he had been handcuffed to his bed as a means of preventing him from repeating his suicide attempt; he had been kept thus handcuffed while he remained “agitated and psychologically vulnerable”. On 2 December 2005 he was seen by the prison doctor, who noted his agitation, lack of cooperation and headache, and concluded that he could be treated in the medical infirmary. He was not known to have a mental disorder, and no recurrence of the suicidal behaviour was recorded while he was in detention. 40. On 9 March 2006 the second applicant complained before the Cluj Court of Appeal, within the appeal proceedings on the merits of the accusations against him, about the conditions of his detention, in particular the fact that he shared a large dormitory with smokers. He requested to be medically examined in order to demonstrate the negative consequences of the passive smoking on his health. He also complained of lingering pain in his right leg on which he had fallen from a three-metre height on 2 December 2005, when he had tried to hang himself from a suspended bar; he had sought medical examination, which he alleged had been refused by the prison doctors until 23 December 2005. The applicant made full statements about his attempted suicide on 2 December 2005, and described how he had been handcuffed to his bed and left without medical care. He received no answer to these complaints.

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5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Fălticeni. 6. On 31 July 2008, the applicant was driving to Galați accompanied by C.P. in a car registered in the United States of America. At about 7 p.m. they visited a mutual friend, O.C. Shortly thereafter, all three of them returned to his car, which was parked near O.C.’s home. They found it surrounded by three police cars, approximately ten police officers and dozens of curious civilians. 7. The applicant overheard one of the police officers informing his colleagues that they had found out the car registered in America had been involved in that accident in which some pedestrians had been injured. He informed the police officers that he was the owner of the car and denied that he had been involved in an accident. 8. The police officers immediately proceeded to detain the applicant aggressively, without checking his identity papers. Police officer G.S. twisted the applicant’s arm behind his back and hit him in the legs. The blow was so powerful that the applicant had to grab one of the police car’s wing mirrors and window in order to avoid falling down. At the same time he was hit on the head and his mouth was covered because he was shouting for, amongst other things, his identity documents, which were in his car. Police officer I.V.V. also punched the applicant repeatedly. 9. Once he was in the police car, the applicant was handcuffed with his hands behind his back and two police officers, who remained unidentified, continued to hit him. He lost his dentures and eventually fainted. Police officer R.P. travelled in a separate car and police officer M.G. drove the police car in which the applicant was detained. Consequently, the applicant concluded that those two officers could not have hit him. 10. At the police station police officer C.M. removed the handcuffs from the applicant. 11. On 31 July 2008, the applicant was caught speeding and refused to stop his car at a police officer’s request. When the police eventually found his car parked in an area surrounded by blocks of flats, the applicant and his friends became very agitated and the applicant refused to show his identity papers to the police officers. He claimed that he was immune to prosecution because he was an American citizen. 12. The police officers lawfully took the applicant to the police station in order to establish his identity and to fine him for speeding. According to eyewitness statements, the police officers handcuffed the applicant in a stern, but not abusive manner. They confirmed that the applicant and his friends had been verbally abusive towards the police officers. 13. On 1 August 2008, following a request by the applicant, the Galați Forensic Medical Service produced an expert report concluding that the applicant had suffered traumatic lesions which could have been sustained on 31 July 2008. It also concluded that he had suffered an injury to the lower lip and damage to the dental prosthesis next to his upper-right canine as a result of his being struck with a solid object, possibly on the chin. In addition, the skin on the bridge of his nose and the left side of his neck had been scratched by a hard and sharp nail-like object. The bruises located on his left shoulder and below his left clavicle had resulted from being struck with a solid object. The bruise on the inside of his right arm had resulted from finger compression. Also his left forearm and the back of his left hand had been scratched with or by solid sharp objects. The report concluded that the contusion of his thorax together with the bruise below his left clavicle would require, in the absence of any complications, four to five days of medical care in order to heal. The rest of the lesions would require one to two days of medical care to heal and he might have to have the prosthesis next to his upper-right canine repaired. 14. The forensic report stated that on 31 July 2008 the emergency unit of the Galați County Hospital had diagnosed the applicant with cranio-cerebral and thorax trauma, as well as a severe thorax contusion. The thorax X-ray that had been produced on the same date did not show any broken ribs or post-traumatic lung damage. Also the dental emergency unit attached to the same hospital had diagnosed the applicant with a contusion in the chin area as a result of a blow which had damaged the dental work on his upper-right canine. It stated that the repairs to his upper-right canine could require the destruction of his fixed maxillary prosthesis. 15. On 14 August 2008 the applicant underwent an encephalography at the Baia Mare County Hospital. He was advised to rest for ten days on account of anxiety. 16. At the applicant’s request, on 18 August 2008 the Suceava Forensic Medical Service produced a forensic expert report. The report stated that according to a dental specialist, the dental-alveolar lesions suffered by the applicant as a result of the assault of 31 July 2008 would require twenty‑eight to thirty days of medical care to heal and repair. 17. The forensic report further stated that according to the medical documents presented by the applicant, he had been prescribed treatment with pain killers for five days for his dental-alveolar lesions. In addition, his fixed maxillary prosthesis needed to be repaired as a result of the damage caused to his upper-right canine; the report estimated that the repairs would take thirty days. 18. On 4 August 2008 the applicant brought criminal proceedings against the police officers who had been involved in the incident of 31 July 2008 for violent behaviour. In addition, he requested that those responsible for the impugned events be brought to justice. He claimed that on 31 July 2008 he had been ill-treated by police officers and had suffered physical injuries, including damage to his dental prosthesis. 19. On 11 August 2008 O.C. and A.C., friends of the applicant and C.P., submitted two statements before the Galați Police Department. O.C. stated that when the applicant had returned to his car, police officers had already been waiting for him, claiming that the car had been involved in an accident, even though there had been no visible damage to the car. Although the applicant had attempted to present his identity papers to the police, they had abusively and violently grabbed him and handcuffed him. Subsequently, the applicant had been thrown into a police car and hit until he fainted. When O.C. had attempted to find out what police station the applicant was being taken to, one of the officers had elbowed him in the chest. 20. A.C. stated that on arrival at the police station she had noticed a smell of alcohol on the breath of one of the prosecution witnesses. The witness had been collected by the police officers from the terrace of a restaurant located near the scene of the incident. He had been insulting the applicant on account of his American citizenship. He had admitted that he had been drinking and when he had started becoming aggressive, one of the officers had asked him to leave the room. 21. On 14 August 2008 the investigating authorities heard D.Z. as a witness. He stated that he had seen the applicant park his car at the scene of the incident and run together with C.P. through the blocks of flats. The police had arrived shortly afterwards and waited for the applicant to return. When the applicant had returned the officers had asked him politely to identify himself. The applicant had refused vehemently to identify himself and claimed that the police officers could not touch him because he was an American citizen. As the police officers had been unable to reason with him, they had been forced to immobilise him in order to place him in the police car, which the applicant had almost wrecked. At the same time the applicant had continued to verbally offend the officers and him. He had seen the applicant being placed in the police car; the applicant had not been beaten by the police officers. Moreover, the applicant had not been abused, either physically or verbally, by the police officers at the police station. 22. On 20 August 2008 the investigating authorities heard M.M. and I.P. as witnesses. They both stated that they had seen police officers speak to the applicant and attempt politely to identify him. The applicant had refused to give his identity by shouting that he was an American citizen. The police officers had made several more attempts to politely reason with the applicant and once that had failed they had proceeded to immobilise him and to place him in a police car. Once inside the police car, the applicant had started shouting again, at which point several other bystanders, including M.M., had started to remonstrate with him. Consequently, C.P. had started insulting them. The witnesses further stated that they had not seen the police officers hit the applicant. 23. On an unspecified date C.P. stated before the investigating authorities that on 31 July 2008 when the applicant had been driving to Galați, she had noticed a police car on the road and had seen a police officer make a signal. However, it had not been the correct signal for a motorist to stop. The applicant had not stopped the car but had continued to drive. When they had arrived in Galați she had seen another police car, but the police had not signaled the applicant to stop. 24. On 3 February 2009 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Galați District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings brought by the applicant against the police officers, on the grounds that the police officers had not committed the offences of which they had been accused or that the alleged offences were not provided for by criminal law. It held, on the basis of the police officers’ statements corroborated by the statements of M.M., I.P. and D.Z. that the applicant had repeatedly refused to show the police officers his identity papers, despite warnings that he would be taken to a police station if he failed to provide proof of his identity. The police officers had attempted to take the applicant to the police station, but he had resisted. Consequently, the officers had immobilised him. When they had attempted to place him in the police car, he had continued to resist, physically struggling and being verbally aggressive towards them. The prosecutor’s office further held that the time required for medical care could not be confused with the time required for full recovery. In this connection, it noted that in the applicant’s case the reconstruction work that was needed on his upper teeth would take thirty days. Consequently, the thirty days referred to by the forensic expert report of 18 August 2008 could not be understood to mean days of medical care within the meaning of the law. Lastly, the use of force by the police officers had not been disproportionate and had been aimed solely at immobilising him. 25. The applicant challenged the decision before the superior prosecutor attached to the Galați District Court. He argued that the witnesses who had been heard had committed perjury, probably because they had been influenced by the police. 26. By a final decision of 19 March 2009 the superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s challenge. He held, amongst other things, based on the eyewitness statements, that the police officers’ actions had been in response to the applicant’s aggressive and offensive behaviour. Consequently, the police officers had not overstepped their bounds. Also, the number of days of medical care required by the applicant, according to the forensic expert report produced on 18 August 2008, concerned the period required for the reconstruction of his upper dental prosthesis and not the time it would take for the dental-alveolar lesions to heal. 27. The applicant appealed against the decision before the domestic courts. He argued that the authorities had failed to investigate how the injuries attested by the forensic expert reports had been caused. 28. By a judgment of 16 October 2009 the Galați District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 3 February 2009. It noted, amongst other things, that according to the forensic expert report of 1 October 2008, the applicant had suffered injuries which required, depending on their severity, one to five days of medical care. In addition, according to the criminal investigation carried out in respect of the case, the police officers who had been involved in the events of 31 July 2008 were R.P., I.V.V., M.G., G.S., C.M. and T.R. as well as two Police Academy students, I.M. and A.I. According to the statements of C.M. and T.R., the applicant had been caught speeding. He had ignored T.R.’s signals to stop and had continued to drive. Consequently, C.M. and T.R. had asked their colleagues to locate and stop the applicant’s car. I.M. had made a second attempt to stop the applicant, but he had ignored the police sirens and the signals to stop. The police officers had searched for the applicant’s car and had eventually found it parked near O.C.’s home. According to the statements of R.P., M.G., I.V.V. and G.S., when the applicant returned to his car he refused the police officers’ request to show his identity papers on the grounds that he was an American citizen and was not subject to Romanian law. Even though he was informed that he had broken the law, he continued to refuse to show his identity papers to the police or to accompany them to the police station. 29. The court also noted that M.G. and R.P. stated that G.S. and I.V.V. had had to handcuff the applicant and force him into the police car, because he had refused to climb into the car and had resisted by grabbing the car door and wing mirror. G.S. and I.V.V. stated that after the applicant had been immobilised and forced into the police vehicle, during the drive to the police station he had continued to bang his head against the windows of the police car. At the police station C.M. had fined the applicant for the offence and prepared a police report, which had eventually been signed by the applicant. C.M. stated that from the time the applicant had arrived at the police station, he had had no further contact with the other police officers and had shown no signs of violence. 30. The court further noted that according to C.P.’s statement, she had seen the applicant being handcuffed and how several police officers had tried to place him in the police car, even though he had wanted to prove to them that he was an American citizen. She had not been allowed to travel with the applicant to the police station and when she had arrived there his clothes had been dirty and he had blood stains on his face. According to O.C., the applicant had been handcuffed prior to being placed in the police car and had not been asked to identify himself or told why was he being taken to a police station. O.C. had seen the applicant resisting getting into the police car, but the police officers had used force. He also contradicted the applicant’s statement that after leaving the police station they had gone to the Galați County Hospital. 31. The court also noted that D.Z. had seen the whole incident and had stated that the applicant had refused to identify himself because he was an American citizen and together with C.P. he had insulted the police officers and the other witnesses. Also the applicant had been forcefully placed in the police car because he had been behaving aggressively and had been grabbing the car door and wing mirror. D.Z.’s statement concerning the applicant’s behaviour had also been confirmed by witnesses I.P. and M.M. 32. The court held that according to the available evidence, in particular the witness statements of D.Z., G.S. and I.V.V., the applicant had had to be handcuffed because he had been behaving aggressively both prior to and after being placed in the police car as well as during the drive to the police station. The court noted that the applicant had claimed that the injuries he had suffered at the hands of the police had amounted to ill-treatment in breach of the guarantees set out in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the European Court of Human Rights had been reluctant to sanction the behaviour of State agents if they had used force in order to counteract the aggressive behaviour of an arrested person. The applicant’s refusal to show the police officers his identity papers and his aggressive conduct on account of his foreign nationality had not been justified given that he had been informed that he had committed an offence and had a duty to observe the laws of the State. Consequently, the force used by the State agents did not appear excessive. 33. The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. He argued that the prosecutor’s office attached to the Galați District Court had not been competent ratione materiae to carry out the criminal investigation in his case. The investigation had been superficial because not all the police officers involved in the events had been identified and because the police officers who had informed their colleagues that the applicant’s car had been involved in a car accident had not been heard. The authorities had refused to allow him to identify the individuals against whom the criminal proceedings had been brought, and witnesses C.M. and A.I. had committed perjury. At the time of the incident he had been denied the right to contact the American Embassy or a lawyer. The statements of witnesses C.P. and O.C. had been incomplete, and the first-instance court had ignored the fact that the authorities had failed to investigate how the injuries attested by the forensic expert reports had been caused. 34. By a final judgment of 18 February 2010 the Galați District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the prosecutor’s office attached to the Galați District Court had been competent ratione materiae to carry out the criminal investigation in the case. Also the investigation had not been superficial and the authorities had identified and heard the four police officers who had handcuffed the applicant and had driven him to the police station. Other police officers had been heard, including the two Police Academy students as well as relevant eyewitnesses who were not police officers. 35. The court also held that the investigation had focused on all the applicant’s allegations and the authorities had heard the defence witnesses requested by him, namely C.P. and O.C. The fact that the authorities had not adduced all the data considered relevant by the applicant was not unlawful, considering that a preliminary investigation could be limited in respect of both quality and quantity by its lawful purpose. Moreover, the applicant’s allegation that some of the witnesses had committed perjury had been refuted by the corroboration of their statements by other evidence. The prosecutor’s office solution remained valid given that most of the witnesses had confirmed that the applicant had refused to go to the police station and had behaved aggressively, both verbally and physically, and that none of the witnesses had confirmed that he had been hit before being placed in the police car. Consequently, the measures taken against him had not been excessive or unjustified and had met the requirements of section 31 of Law no. 218/2002 on the organisation and operation of the Romanian police force. 36. The court further held that the fact that the statements of the applicant’s friends had contradicted those of the remaining witnesses was a consequence of their friendly relations with the applicant. 37. The court considered that the authorities had correctly interpreted the available medical documents. The scratches on the left side of the applicant’s neck, on his left forearm and the back of his left hand, as well as the bruises on his left shoulder, below his left clavicle and on the inside of his right arm had been inflicted by the police officers when they had handcuffed him and placed him in the police car. Their actions had been proportionate given his strong opposition. It was clear that handcuffing and the operation of placing a person in a police vehicle, if that person physically resisted the measure, would cause injuries. The superficial nature of the injuries and the areas of the body where the bruises and scratches had been sustained merely confirmed the proportional nature of the police officers’ actions. It was clear that the applicant had exaggerated the nature of his injuries in his complaint against the officers, given that there was no evidence in the file suggesting that he had been repeatedly kicked. It appeared that the internal lip injury and the dental damage suffered by the applicant had been caused by an impact to the chin, possibly when he had been resisting his handcuffing and placement in the car. The police officers could not be considered guilty as long as the applicant had continued to behave violently in the police vehicle. He had not suffered any external lesions in the chin area which could have been caused by an impact with a solid object. 38. On 31 July 2008 the applicant was fined for speeding and for failure to stop when signaled to do so by a police officer. 39. By a final judgment of 3 May 2010 the Galați County Court dismissed on the merits the applicant’s action seeking the annulment of the speeding fine imposed on 31 July 2008 and of the suspension of his driving licence.

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5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant is an opposition politician and, since 2001, the chairman of the reformist wing of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party. 7. On 10 September 1994 the applicant was arrested during a demonstration organised by the Popular Front Party and taken to the Baku City Chief Police Department where a hand grenade was allegedly found in the pocket of his suit’s jacket. According to the applicant, the suit had been acquired immediately before the demonstration and he had not had time to remove the manufacturer’s stitches sealing the pockets and, therefore, would not have been physically able to put anything inside the pockets. 8. On the same day, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 220 (illegal possession of weapons) of the 1960 Criminal Code (in force until 1 September 2000, when it was replaced by the new Criminal Code). 9. Until 13 September 1994, the applicant was detained as a suspect. On 13 September 1994 he was formally charged under Article 220 § 1 of the 1960 Criminal Code by the investigator of the Baku City Chief Police Department. On the same day, the investigator ordered his detention on remand pending trial. 10. By a decision of the investigator of 23 September 1994 the applicant was released from detention. 11. By a decision of the investigator of the Nasimi District Prosecutor’s Office of 11 December 1995, the investigation in the framework of the criminal proceedings against the applicant was suspended on the ground that “the perpetrator of the criminal offence [had] not been identified”. The applicant was not informed about the decision to suspend the investigation at that time. 12. In the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections, the applicant was elected and re-elected to the National Assembly for two consecutive terms and served as a parliament member until 2005. In the elections of 6 November 2005, according to the official election results published by the Central Electoral Commission, he was again re-elected to the National Assembly, however on 1 December 2005 the Constitutional Court annulled the election results in the applicant’s constituency in an arbitrary manner, depriving the applicant of his parliamentary seat (see, for more details, Kerimli and Alibeyli v. Azerbaijan, nos. 18475/06 and 22444/06, 10 January 2012). 13. The applicant held a diplomatic passport issued in 1998, which expired in 2003. On 15 July 2003 he was issued a new diplomatic passport valid until 31 December 2005. 14. In addition, the applicant held a regular passport issued in 2001, which expired on an unspecified date in June 2006 (according to the applicant) or on 24 July 2006 (according to the Government). 15. In June 2006 the applicant applied to the Passport Registration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the PRD”) for a new regular passport. However, according to the applicant, his application was rejected in an informal manner. The applicant was informed that the PRD had no information of the outcome of the criminal proceedings instituted in 1994. He was told that, as the PRD could not issue passports to persons against whom criminal proceedings were pending, the applicant had to provide a statement from the relevant prosecuting authorities confirming that the criminal proceedings had been discontinued. 16. Following an inquiry with the Baku City Chief Police Department, the applicant discovered that the criminal proceedings instituted in 1994 had been transferred to the Nasimi District Prosecutor’s Office and suspended on 11 December 1995, but had never been discontinued. 17. Subsequently, the applicant complained about the authorities’ failure to discontinue the proceedings and his resulting inability to receive a passport to the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, the Nasimi District Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but to no avail. 18. In September 2006 the applicant lodged a civil action against the PRD and the Nasimi District Prosecutor’s Office, asking the court to order the PRD to issue him a passport and to order the prosecutor’s office to “remove the restriction on his freedom of movement” by discontinuing the criminal proceedings instituted in 1994. He noted that, the limitation period for prosecution in respect of the criminal offence under Article 220 of the 1960 Criminal Code was five years from the date of the alleged criminal offence, while under the 2000 Criminal Code it was seven years in respect of the equivalent criminal offence. He therefore argued that the proceedings should have been discontinued years earlier owing to the expiry of the prescription period. 19. On 2 November 2006 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. It noted that the Nasimi District Prosecutor’s Office had responded to the applicant’s requests by advising him to apply to the PRD and that the applicant had been unable to demonstrate that the PRD had breached his rights. 20. On 14 March 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s judgment on the same grounds, and also added that the applicant had failed to appeal against the decision of 11 December 1995 to suspend the investigation under the relevant procedure of judicial supervision. 21. On 15 February 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and terminated the civil proceedings. It noted that the complaints raised by the applicant, and more specifically his complaint concerning the prosecution authorities’ failure to discontinue the criminal proceedings, were subject to examination under the criminal procedure and not in the civil proceedings under the rules of civil procedure. The applicant was advised to lodge a complaint against the prosecuting authorities’ actions under the relevant procedure of judicial supervision envisaged by the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”). 22. In May 2008 the applicant lodged such a complaint under the procedure of judicial supervision provided by Article 449 of the CCrP, asking the court to discontinue the criminal proceedings instituted in 1994 owing to the expiry of the prescription period. 23. On 26 May 2008 the Nasimi District Court dismissed this complaint, noting that, while the CCrP provided for a right to complain against a prosecuting authority’s decision to discontinue the proceedings, the same Code did not provide for a right to complain against the prosecuting authority’s failure to take a decision to discontinue the proceedings. Therefore, the court could not order the Nasimi District Prosecutor’s Office to discontinue the proceedings. Furthermore, the court noted that it had no competence under the CCrP to discontinue the proceedings itself. 24. On 22 July 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Nasimi District Court. No further appeal lay against the Baku Court of Appeal’s decision.

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5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Cheboksary. 6. In 2001 the applicant obtained an award of remuneration arrears in the proceedings against a private company that went under insolvency administration. On 15 May 2003 the applicant sued the insolvency manager of the company seeking the recovery of the remuneration awarded to him by the court. 7. On 30 November 2004 the Novocheboksarskiy Town Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. 8. On 12 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya upheld the judgment of 30 November 2004. 9. On 3 July 2004 the applicant lodged a claim with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya against the Novocheboksarskiy Town Court seeking recovery of non‑pecuniary damages for excessively long examination of his claim against the insolvency manager. 10. On 8 July 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya returned the applicant’s claim on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to examine it. The court directed the applicant to lodge the claim with a district court. The applicant appealed. 11. On 17 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia amended the decision of 8 July 2004 and dismissed the applicant’s claim without consideration on the merits on the ground that it could not be examined in the course of civil proceedings. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “... According to Article 16 of the Federal Law “On the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation” a judge could only be held responsible for actions committed in the course of administration of justice if he or she had been convicted of abuse of powers ... Since the issue of holding a judge responsible for an opinion expressed or a decision taken while administering justice could only be resolved in the course of the procedure established by law, the disputes of such kind could not be examined by courts in the course of civil proceedings. With regard to the issue of compensation for damages caused by unlawful actions ... of a judge in cases when the judge’s fault had been established in the course of other type of proceedings than criminal, the issues of the basis for and the procedure of compensation by the state of the damage caused by unlawful actions ... which manifested themselves, among other things, in the breach of [the requirement of] the reasonable length of court proceedings ... are at present not determined by law [as well as] the courts’ jurisdiction in such cases.” 12. In the meantime on an unspecified date the applicant lodged with the Leninskiy District Court of Cheboksary, as advised by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya (see paragraph 10 above), a claim against the Treasury of the Russian Federation and the Novocheboksarskiy Town Court seeking non‑pecuniary damages for the excessive length of the civil proceedings in his case. 13. On 15 July 2004 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim without examination on the merits. The court noted that the procedure for challenging the actions of a judge required a special legal framework which had not yet been set up. The applicant appealed. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “... Taking into account the nature of the judiciary and the constitutional immunity of the judge, the procedure of appeal against the judge’s acts not resulting in the decision on the merits of a case required an adoption of special legislation. Currently there is no legislative framework in this respect ...” 14. On 23 August 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It stated that procedural rules for resolution of the issue raised by the applicant had not yet been established. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “... Taking into account the material law providing responsibility of the judges and judiciary, disputes arising from the applicant’s claim could be resolved only in the course of the civil proceedings established by law. On the date of adoption of the decision disputed by the applicant, the legislator did not provide any legal framework for such cases ...”

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5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently detained at Sátoraljaújhely Prison. 6. On 19 October 2001 he started to serve a prison sentence at Szeged Prison, where he remained until 30 January 2006. According to the applicant, he spent 63 months with eleven other inmates in three different cells (nos. 356, 358 and 215) measuring 27 square metres each, including sanitary facilities. The cells were equipped only with one tap and a toilet, separated from the living area only by a curtain. The dining table was fixed to the floor just a metre away from the toilet. The applicant had a daily one‑hour‑long outdoor activity. The yards were closed premises measuring 40 by 20 metres, about 100-150 persons being taken to the yard at a time. The applicant was also entitled to thirty minutes’ exercise in the gym three times a week. He attended secondary school classes three times a week, six hours on each occasion. 7. On 30 January 2006 the applicant was transferred to Budapest Prison Unit “B”, where his cells (nos. 316, 130, 325, 211, and 206) measured 27 square metres and were occupied by him and seven other men (that is, 3.4 square metres gross living space per inmate). The cells had no ventilation system and were infested with parasites. Detainees were permitted to take a shower once a week, according to the applicant, in unhygienic conditions and for no longer than 1-2 minutes. The applicant was entitled to a daily walk of about one hour in the prison yard measuring 20 by 20 metres. He indicated, however, that he was not able to go outdoors during the period between 20 June 2009 and 12 May 2010 on those days when he was employed as a librarian. 8. Between 12 May 2010 and 27 May 2011 the applicant continued to serve his sentence in Unit “A” of Budapest Prison. He was kept in five cells described as follows: cell nos. 8, 9 and 141 (8 square metres, three inmates), and cell nos. 3 and 252 (6.5 square metres, two inmates). Only a curtain was used as a partition between the toilet and the living area. Throughout his detention the applicant had no out-of-cell activities other than a daily one-hour walk in the yard of the prison facility, gym exercise twice a week for about 50 minutes each time and a weekly visit to the library for about 15 minutes. The inmates were allowed one shower per week. The shower room was equipped with four shower heads. There were about 25 inmates taken to have a shower at the same time, making it impossible to move around because of the sheer number of prisoners. 9. On 27 May 2011 the applicant was transferred back to Unit “B” of Budapest Prison, where he spent two years in five different cells. The size of those cells was 27 square metres. The occupancy rate varied between 8 persons (that is, 3.38 square metres gross living space per inmate) and 10 persons (that is 2.7 square metres gross living space per inmate). 10. Since 16 June 2013 the applicant has been detained at Sátoraljaújhely Prison with three other inmates in a cell measuring 8 square metres.

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5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Split. 6. On 5 June 1992 the Customs Office Sežana in customs offence proceedings seized a large amount of gold belonging to the applicant and his car. 7. On 5 July 1996 the customs offence proceedings were discontinued and the seized property was returned to the applicant on 12 September 1997. 8. On 17 November 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State claiming pecuniary losses sustained due to the seizure with the Koper District Court. 9. On 19 March 1999 the applicant requested the court to expedite the proceedings. 10. On 1 April 1999 the Koper District Court issued its decision dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. 11. On 7 March 2000 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the appeal. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 12. On 30 August 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. 13. On 8 April 2004 the Constitutional Court quashed the decisions of the lower instances in the part concerning pecuniary damages in respect of the car and remitted that part of the case back to the first instance court. 14. On 1 September 2004 the Koper District Court held the first main hearing after the remittal. At the hearing the applicant’s representative informed the court of his intention to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights and requested the district court to postpone the hearing until the Court would decide on his application. The district court followed the applicant’s representative’s motion and adjourned the proceedings. 15. In August 2006 the Koper District Court scheduled a hearing for 27 September 2006. After the applicant’s representative had received the summons to the hearing, he requested the hearing to be postponed since the Court had not yet decided on his application. The district court dismissed the applicant’s motion. 16. At the hearing held on 27 September 2006 the applicant again requested that the hearing be postponed pending the outcome of his application with the Court. The district court dismissed the request. Since the applicant modified his claim at the hearing and submitted further evidence the court adjourned the hearing in order to enable the defendant to respond to the modification and the new evidence. 17. On 3 November 2006 the court held a further hearing and issued its decision. Both parties appealed. 18. On 18 September 2007 the Koper Higher Court granted the appeals and remitted the case back to the first instance. 19. On 12 February 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal with the Koper District Court due to the length of the proceedings. 20. On the same day, 12 February 2008, the Koper District Court held a hearing and issued its decision. The applicant appealed. 21. On 26 February 2008 the Koper District Court dismissed the applicant’s supervisory appeal as unfounded, since in the meantime the court had issued its decision in the case and therefore no acceleratory measures could be taken by the court. 22. On 18 June 2008 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the appeal. After several unsuccessful attempts of service the decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 10 December 2008. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 23. On 17 September 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 24. On 14 December 2009 the applicant lodged an application for settlement with a view to reaching an agreement on just satisfaction on account of the delays in the civil proceedings with the State Attorney’s Office. 25. On 6 January 2009 the State Attorney’s Office dismissed the applicant’s claim due to the fact that his supervisory appeal had been dismissed and the applicant should have therefore also lodged a motion for a deadline. 26. On 29 April 2010 the applicant, relying on the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”), lodged a claim with the Koper Local Court seeking compensation in the amount of 5,800 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage incurred as a result of the length of the civil proceedings. 27. On 13 February 2012 the Koper Local Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that the applicant should have lodged a motion for a deadline after his supervisory appeal had been rejected. 28. On an unknown date the applicant appealed. In his appeal he stressed that he had no reason to lodge a motion for a deadline since the court had in the meantime issued its decision and his motion for a deadline would in any case be rejected for lack of legal interest. 29. On 17 January 2013 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that it was irrelevant whether the applicant had any prospects of succeeding with the motion for a deadline, as the 2006 Act did not require that a party would succeed with the legal remedy but solely that he or she had lodged it. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 12 February 2013.

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5. The first applicant was born in 1979, while the second and third applicants were born in 1984 and 1983, respectively. They all habitually reside in Pružina. 6. Since 2007 the applicants have been facing multiple charges mainly concerning alleged violent offences, against a background of organised crime. In the context of their prosecution on these charges, they were arrested, remanded, released, and re-arrested and re-remanded several times. 7. A part of the present application directly relates to three of their unsuccessful requests for release from detention following their arrest on 1 April 2010 on a charge of perjury. These requests and the underlying procedures are described in chronological order in sections B. to D. below. 8. The applicants’ term of detention following the arrest of 1 April 2010 ended with their release on 1 April 2011, subsequent to which, on the same day, they were again arrested and later remanded in detention pending trial on a charge of extortion. The remainder of the application directly concerns their interlocutory appeal against the remand order following that arrest and, together with the underlying procedure, it is described below in section E. 9. On 2 May 2010 the first applicant made a submission requesting release. It was received at the Považská Bystrica District Court on 11 May 2010 and the applicant amended it by means of a further submission, which reached the District Court on 19 May 2010. 10. On 21 May 2010 the District Court heard the first applicant. In the course of the questioning he challenged the judge in charge of the case on grounds of bias, alleging that there had been an arbitrary interference with the organisation of the workload at the District Court, as a result of which the case had not been assigned to the lawful judge. 11. At the conclusion of the questioning on the same day, that is to say on 21 May 2010, the District Court dismissed the challenge. Immediately afterwards the first applicant used his right to state on the record that he wished to appeal against the decision on his challenge and he submitted his grounds for appeal on 24 May 2010. That appeal was dismissed by the Trenčín Regional Court on 10 June 2010, the decision being served on the first applicant on 21 June 2010. 12. The first applicant’s request for release was then dismissed by the District Court on 25 June 2010 and, following his interlocutory appeal, by the Regional Court on 20 July 2010, the latter decision being served on the applicant on 26 July 2010. 13. On 27 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the examination of his request for release had not been speedy, that its dismissal had been arbitrary, and that it had not been determined by the lawful judge. 14. On 4 October 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. As for the length of the proceedings in the first applicant’s request for release, the Constitutional Court recapitulated the course of those proceedings and found that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded as regards both the part of the proceedings that took place before the District Court and the part that took place before the Regional Court. The remaining complaints were partly out of time and partly manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the first applicant on 23 November 2011. 15. On 10 May 2010 the second applicant and the third applicant also requested release and offered to pledge under Article 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that, if released, they would live in accordance with the law. Their request was filed with the Považská Bystrica District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) which was responsible for dealing with it in the first instance. 16. Finding no reasons for acceding to it, on 17 May 2010 the PPS transmitted the request to the District Court for a judicial determination. The case file was received at the District Court on 21 May 2010. Having established that the case file was incomplete, the District Court asked the PPS for a complete version of it on 27 May 2010, which was submitted to the District Court on 2 June 2010. Meanwhile, on 27 May 2010, the applicants waived their right to be heard in person by the District Court. 17. The request was dismissed by the District Court on 3 June 2010 and, following the applicants’ interlocutory appeal of 16 June 2010, by the Regional Court on 15 July 2010. The former decision was served on the applicants and two of their three lawyers on 9 June 2010. On 8 July 2010, by means of telephone inquiry in response to the impossibly of having it served on the third lawyer, the District Court established that the third lawyer had stopped representing the applicants, explaining the failure to inform the court accordingly by the fact that he had been on holiday. The latter decision was served on the applicants and on the lawyer of one of them on 2 August 2010. It was served on the other applicant’s lawyer on 9 August 2010. 18. On 30 September 2010 the second applicant and the third applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, directing it against the District Court and the Regional Court, and alleging a violation of their rights under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention (and their constitutional equivalents) to a speedy review of the lawfulness of their detention by an impartial tribunal established by law and to release pending trial. 19. On 9 November 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. As for the length of the proceedings in the applicants’ request for release, the Constitutional Court recapitulated the course of those proceedings and observed that some delays had been caused by the failure of the authorities to submit a complete case file to the District Court and by the above‑mentioned failure of one of the applicants’ representatives to inform the court of the termination of his mandate, which had resulted in repeated and eventually futile attempts to serve the written copy of the District Court’s decision on him. The Constitutional Court concluded that neither before the District Court nor the Regional Court had the length of proceedings been incompatible with the speediness requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The remaining complaints were inadmissible partly because they were a res iudicata by virtue of a previous decision of the Constitutional Court and partly because they were manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the second applicant and the third applicant on 19 December 2011. 20. On 22 December 2010 the applicants lodged a fresh request for release. In response, the District Court informed them in a letter of 3 January 2011 that – without the submission of new relevant information – under the applicable statute a new request for release could be lodged at the earliest thirty days after the final determination of the previous request. As the applicants’ request of 22 December 2010 contained no such new information in relation to their previous request – which had only been dismissed with final effect on 16 December 2010 – it could not be entertained. 21. The first applicant amended his request by means of a further submission received at the District Court on 20 January 2011 while the second applicant and the third applicant did so by a submission received on 31 January 2011. 22. The request was dismissed by the District Court on 7 February 2011 and, following the applicants’ interlocutory appeal, by the Regional Court on 23 February 2011, the latter decision being served on the applicants on 2 March 2011. 23. On 31 March 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging inter alia a violation of their rights under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. 24. On 14 June 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It recapitulated the course of those proceedings and observed that – since the applicants’ request contained no new relevant information in relation to their previous request – the courts were prevented by law from examining it. The periods under consideration had therefore not commenced on 22 December 2010, as claimed by the applicants, but only on 20 and 31 January 2011, when they had amended the original request. From that perspective, the length of the impugned proceedings was acceptable. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicants on 18 August 2011. 25. Following their arrest on 1 April 2011 (see paragraph 8 above), the applicants were remanded in detention pending trial on a charge of extortion by the District Court’s order of 4 April 2011. 26. On 14 April 2011 the applicants challenged the detention order by means of an interlocutory appeal, which the Regional Court dismissed on 21 April 2011, its decision being served on the applicants on 19 May 2011. 27. On 15 June 2011 the applicants challenged these decisions before the Constitutional Court, alleging inter alia a violation of their rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention, including the right to a speedy review of the lawfulness of their detention upon their interlocutory appeal against the detention order of 4 April 2011. 28. On 13 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicants on 16 January 2012. 29. Meanwhile, on 27 September 2011, the applicants were indicted to stand trial on the charge in question and, on 15 November 2011, they were released from detention. The proceedings on the merits appear to be still pending.

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4. On 9 August 1995 the Shijak Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited title to a plot of land measuring 1,020 sq. m of which 747 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot of land measuring 272 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided for by law. 5. The Commission decision remains unenforced. 6. On 8 February 1995 the Shkodër Commission recognised the applicant’s and other heirs’ inherited title to a two-storey building and to a plot of land surrounding the building measuring 500 sq. m. Since the plot of land measuring 500 sq. m was occupied, the applicant and the heirs would be compensated in one of the ways provided for by law. It was also decided that the building should be restored to them. 7. The applicant claimed that in 1995 and 1997 he instituted two legal actions against a third party for the vacation and restoration of his property. However, he decided to discontinue those actions, having regard to pending judicial proceedings in other cities. It would appear that the third party has built unauthorised constructions on the applicant’s plot of land. 8. The Commission decision remains unenforced. 9. On 12 May 1994 the Shijak Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited title to a plot of land measuring 5,527 sq. m of which 5,000 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot of land measuring 527 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided for by law. 10. The Commission decision remains unenforced. 11. On 13 August 2007 the Durrës Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited title to a plot of land measuring 65,000 sq. m of which 60,000 sq. m were restored to them. Since the remaining land measuring 5,000 sq. m consisted of arable land, roads and channels (“e llojit arë, rrugë e kanale”) was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided for by law. 12. The Commission decision remains unenforced.

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5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lived prior to his arrest and conviction in the Perm region. He is currently serving a prison sentence in a correctional colony in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous region. 6. On 20 February 2005 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of triple murder and attempted murder. 7. On 21 February 2005 Chusovskiy District Court of the Perm Region ordered that he be placed in detention. The applicant remained in a temporary detention facility in the town of Chusovo until his conviction in June 2005. 8. On 21 June 2005 the Perm Regional Court found the applicant guilty of triple murder and attempted murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 9. The applicant was represented by state-appointed counsel at the investigation stage and before the first-instance court. 10. On 29 June 2005 the applicant appealed against his conviction to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”). 11. On 14 November 2005, while he was detained in Moscow remand prison no. 2, the applicant asked the Supreme Court to appoint legal counsel to defend him during the appeal proceedings. He also asked to meet counsel prior to the appeal hearing in order to prepare his defence. His request of 14 November 2005 was registered in the register of outgoing correspondence of the remand prison. According to the Government, the applicant’s request never reached the Supreme Court and has therefore not been examined. 12. On 18 November 2005 the Supreme Court examined the applicant’s appeal. The applicant was not assisted by legal counsel at the appeal hearing. The Government acknowledged that the appeal court had not taken measures to ensure that the applicant be provided with free legal assistance for the appeal hearing. The Supreme Court heard the applicant and the prosecutor and modified the legal classification of the applicant’s action. However, that modification had no impact on the applicant’s sentence.

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5. The applicants were born in 1983, 1985, 1937 and 1947 respectively and live in Villepinte, apart from the second applicant, who lives in Drancy. The second, third and fourth applicants are the first applicant’s brother, mother and father, respectively. 6. During the afternoon of 30 November 2004 the first applicant, who was smoking a cigarette in the Mitry-Villeparisis railway station, was identity-checked by officers of the General Security Service (“SUGE”) of the French National Railway Company (“SNCF”). 7. Just before 8 p.m. on the same day two police officers from the Mitry Mory police station, S.D. and S.G., were called out to that railway station after a report that an individual had been throwing stones at the trains. Arriving at the railway station, they saw a man who did not correspond to the description provided, who appeared to be drunk, and who reacted aggressively when approached. They called for reinforcements just as five SUGE officers arrived on the scene. The individual in question, who was later identified as the first applicant, ran off towards an underground passageway. 8. The SUGE officers, who included L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B., stopped and questioned the first applicant. The latter put up no resistance to his arrest. The SUGE officers then took him outside the main entrance to the railway station had placed him against a wall. 9. The statements given by witnesses to that scène diverge concerning the subsequent events (see paragraphs 15 to 18, 20 and 34 to 44 below). 10. The first applicant was forced to the ground by the SUGE officers, who handcuffed him behind his back, before frisking him. He was then placed in a police vehicle parked nearby. The operation ended at 7.59 p.m. 11. During his transport to and arrival at the police station, the first applicant complained of nausea, and had to be helped out of the vehicle by the police officers. The latter mentioned that he was bleeding profusely from the chin. 12. Having arrived in the police cells, the first applicant lost consciousness and went into a coma. A doctor present in the police station administered first aid, before the arrival of the fire brigade ambulance at 8.14 p.m. and then the emergency medical services (SMUR) at 8.45 p.m. He was then transferred to the Lagny-sur-Marne hospital, and later, to the Beaujon hospital in Clichy. 13. The first applicant was remanded in custody at 8.15 p.m. on charges of insulting members of the police force and deliberate violence against a public-service employee, although the measure could not be notified to him owing to his state of alcoholic intoxication, according to the police report. The police custody was terminated at 10.10 p.m. on the instructions of the State Prosecutor. 14. The duty officer at the Meaux public prosecutor’s office was advised of the case at 8.40 p.m. He ordered the opening of a flagrante delicto procedure on charges of deliberate violence against persons performing public duties, assigning the task to the Versailles Regional Police Department (“DRPJ”). 15. The police and SUGE officers who had been involved or present during the first applicant’s arrest were questioned. Their versions contradicted each other: the SNCF employees spoke of a model arrest, whereas some of the police officers described it as “robust”. Among the latter, N.T., D.F. and R.D. pointed out that they had seen a SUGE officer, identified as Y.F., kneeing the first applicant in the face while he was being held on the ground by two other officers. They added that, noticing that Y.F. was about to knee him again, police sergeant A.H. had restrained him by the leg and said “that’ll do”. 16. A.H. did not mention that fact during his first questioning. He was interviewed again, and he explained that when he had arrived at the railway station on the evening in question he had noted the presence of five SUGE officers surrounding the first applicant, who was waving his arms. One of them had attempted to take the latter by the arms, but he had brushed him off. The officer identified as Y.F. had replied “don’t you hit me”, and had become “annoyed” with the first applicant. With the help of three colleagues he had brought him to the ground. Given the applicant’s refusal to allow himself to be handcuffed, he had struck him on the head with his left knee. A.H. said that he had then approached the scene. Seeing Y.F. moving his left leg back to knee him again, he had prevented him from doing so. When asked why he had not mentioned these facts in his first witness statement, the police officer stated that he had “thought that it was for the person concerned to shoulder his responsibilities”. 17. N.T. submitted that before being brought to the ground the first applicant had not been violent, but when an SUGE officer had touched him he had tried to remove his hand. One of the SUGE team had then, unsuccessfully, attempted to punch him in the face. 18. Some of the police and SUGE officers mentioned that the first applicant had had a cut on his chin before his arrest. 19. On 2 December 2004 L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B. were remanded in custody. 20. On 3 December 2004 the scene was reconstructed in the presence of two members of the prosecutor’s office and the five SUGE officers and the six police officers who had been involved in the arrest. The SUGE officers said that the arrest had been effected without any particular difficulties, the first applicant having been handcuffed on the floor, emphasising that he had displayed no injuries on being handed over to the police officers. The latter presented a different version of events, explaining how the applicant had been kneed in the head. 21. Dr M.K., who had operated on the first applicant at the Beaujon hospital, told the investigators that the injuries noted might have been compatible with one very violent blow, such as a hard slap, a kick or a knee strike, a blow from a medium-weight blunt instrument, or even a heavy fall. He did not consider the injury compatible with a truncheon blow. 22. At the Lagny-sur-Marne hospital, a brain scan showed an acute subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere. Blood tests showed alcohol levels of 1.51 grams per litre of blood and the presence of active cannabinoids (THC), pointing to exposure to cannabis between 2 and 24 hours before the testing. 23. The first applicant was admitted to the Beaujon hospital on 1 December 2004 and immediately taken to the operating theatre, where he underwent emergency surgical evacuation of his haematoma. A control scan carried out the same day showed a residual subdural haematoma. 24. On 1 December 2004 a forensic doctor was called upon to examine the first applicant, and noted that he was in a stage-3 coma on the Glasgow Coma Scale (on which stage 0 corresponds to death and stage 15 to a wakeful state). The doctor described a temporo-parietal fracture on the left-hand side, a closed 3.4 centimetre-long wound on the left side of the chin, two haematomas on the left tibia and a scratch on the left cheek. He also mentioned a subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere which was extended and compressive and had been the reason for the applicant’s emergency transfer to hospital. 25. A second scan carried out on 3 December 2004 showed an odontoid fracture associated with a fracture of the lateral mass of vertebra C2. 26. On 15 and 28 December 2004 the first applicant underwent further operations. 27. From 14 February to 12 December 2005 he was hospitalised at the Bouffémont Functional Rehabilitation Centre. 28. The discharge assessment drawn up by the said Centre mentioned a large number of neurological after-effects, including the partial loss of active motor skills in all four limbs, and serious cognitive and behavioural disorders (disinhibition, maladjustment, inability to concentrate, temporal disorientation, demotivation and loss of initiative, and passive opposition). 29. On 12 December 2005, since his condition had not improved, the first applicant was transferred to another rehabilitation centre. On 26 June 2008 the first applicant’s residual rate of permanent partial disability (IPP) was estimated at 95 %, given his lack of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life. He was confined to a wheelchair and was unable to engage in any autonomous occupational activity. 30. On 3 December 2004 the Meaux Public Prosecutor requested the instigation of a judicial investigation against L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B. on charges of intentional violence having caused over eight days’ total unfitness for work (ITT), aggravated by the following three circumstances: the violence had been jointly, by persons performing public duties, in a place used for acceding to public transport. 31. On the same day the three persons targeted by the request for an investigation were formally charged. L.P. and O.D.B. were placed under judicial supervision, while Y.F. was placed in preventive detention until 28 July 2005, when he would be released under judicial supervision. 32. The applicants, assisted by counsel, applied to join the proceedings as civil parties. 33. On 8 December 2006, in view of the evolution of the first applicant’s state of health, the State Prosecutor requested further investigations, reclassifying the charges as intentional acts of violence have caused a permanent disability. The three SUGE officers were formally charged on this new basis. 34. A large number of witnesses were heard by the investigators on letters rogatory, and some of them were directly questioned by the investigating judge. 35. Three train passengers present at the material time stated that they had not seen the first applicant being struck. 36. Two individuals who had been with the applicant on the day in question, S.M. and S.Gh., were also questioned. S.M. explained that during the afternoon he and the first applicant had drunk alcohol and had been fined for smoking in the railway station. They had then reasoned with a person who had been on the railway tracks throwing stones at the trains. S.M. pointed out that the first applicant had a swollen lip and small scars on his face, around the chin. While they had been together the first applicant had neither fallen nor bumped his head. 37. S.Gh. told the investigators that the first applicant had been “shoved” by one of the officers involved, who had forced him face-down on to the ground, without his head actually touching the floor. She added that when he had been on the ground an SUGE officer had kicked him, with medium force, on the head or his upper body, although she was unable to say whether the kick had landed on his head. She further stated that when the first applicant refused to get into the vehicle, one of the staff involved had hit him lightly on the back of the head or upper body with a black objet, possible a truncheon, but that the blow had not been violent. The investigating judge summoned S.Gh. four times to appear before him, but she did not attend. Moreover, having subsequently mentioned the violent acts during a TV interview, she had explained that “she had been all over the place”, that she had been “taken by surprise” and that she “had overdone it a bit in front of the TV cameras”. 38. Furthermore, on 9 May 2006 an SNCF employee informed the investigators that he had been confided in by a dog-handler, claiming that he had been talking to some of the first applicant’s friends and had discovered that he had been fighting on the afternoon in question and that someone had smashed a bottle over his head. The employee explained that she had not spoken up earlier because her information was only second-hand. Furthermore, she had not considered the dog-handler particularly reliable, as he had previously given her information which she knew to be false. However, this witness statement could not be compared with other evidence or corroborated by the witness as he had died since the material time. On 26 May 2006 the police had telephoned the six dog-handlers who could have made the statements in question. The only one who had worked in the company in question at the material time had stated that he had not heard about the case and had never spoken to any friends of the victim, with whom he was not acquainted. 39. S.D. and S.G., the two police officers who had first arrived on the scene, gave statements. One said that the arrest had been carried out “robustly” and that the first applicant’s head had possibly hit the ground, as he had “fallen with his whole weight, all at once”, and the other stated that the applicant had fallen “to the ground heavily, face down”, with his head hitting the floor. The latter added, before the investigating judge, that he was virtually sure that the applicant’s head had hit the ground, even though his view was partially blocked by a vehicle. He further added that he had not seen the person being kneed. 40. The four police officers sent as reinforcements, D.F., N.T. R.D. and A.H., stated that they had witnessed a kneeing incident. R.D. affirmed that when the first applicant had been brought to the ground there had been a loud “bump”. A.H. went back on the statements made during the flagrante delicto procedure, informing the investigating judge that he did not know whether the applicant’s head had “bumped on the ground”. 41. The two SUGE officers who had been present but had not taken part in the operation explained that there had been no violence, and one of them suggested that if there had been any blows they must have been delivered in the police car or the police station. 42. As regards the persons formally charged, O.D.B. stated that no blows had been delivered. He said that the episode during which the first applicant had been brought to the ground had been a “textbook example”, explaining that there had been no violence, and that the person had just been placed on the ground. He was sure that his head had not hit the ground. He added that Y.F. had not kneed the first applicant, explaining to the investigating judge that in his view things had gone badly in the police station and the police officers were trying to “shift the blame on to them”. He added that the wound to the first applicant’s chin after his arrival in the detention area bore no comparison to the scratch which they had noted earlier on. He considered that his colleague had used the level of force strictly necessary to bring the arrestee to the ground. 43. L.P. affirmed that while the first applicant had still been standing, he had deliberately punched Y.F. on the arm. The latter had then seized him by the sleeve to knock him off balance. The applicant had ended up on his knees, and had been laid out on his side and then on his stomach. O.D.B. and he had held him by the ankles while Y.F. was handcuffing him. L.P. stated that the first applicant had been brought to the ground quite normally and that he had neither fallen to the ground nor been struck. He justified the use of that technique by the fact that the arrestee had been struggling and making incoherent statements. He added that he had had traces of blood around his nose, something which he had already noticed when fining him during the afternoon. He told the investigating judge that the first applicant’s head could not have hit the ground, after having stated while in custody that he had not been able to see his head when the person had been brought to the ground. 44. Finally, Y.F., a former trainer in the field of operational techniques, confirmed that he had fined the first applicant during the afternoon, without any further incidents occurring, even though the latter had already been consuming alcohol. He described the applicant’s annoyance and disgraceful language when they had met up again later. He complained that he had been punched deliberately and violently on his right forearm. He had pulled at the first applicant’s sleeve to bring him to his knees, and had then forced him to the ground with L.P.’s help, laying him on his right side and then turning him on to his stomach. He had personally handcuffed the arrestee by placing his knees on his body, his left knee on the back and his right knee on the posterior. His colleagues had been holding the arrestee’s legs. He specified that the latter had been “brought to the ground” and not “pushed to the ground”. The applicant’s head had not collided with anything and he had not been struck in any way, in the knowledge that he had had a slight cut on his chin and dried blood around his nose. Y.F. said that something must have happened at the police station or during his time in the police vehicle, because the injury to the chin which had been visible during the arrest had nothing in common with the wound which he had displayed at the police station; that wound had been four centimetres deep and bleeding, leaving a pool of blood. If the SUGE officers had noted such a wound on handing him over to the police, they would have immediately called an ambulance. 45. Y.F.’s administrative file showed that he had repeatedly complained of abuse and threats. 46. Consultation of the SNCF operational handbooks had shown that the head was singled out as a part of the body which should never be struck. 47. No images of the handcuffing episode could be obtained from the CCTV footage at the railway station. On the other hand, the footage did show the identity check carried out in the afternoon and the attempts by the first applicant to calm down an individual standing on the railway tracks. 48. On 29 December 2004 the investigating judge commissioned an expert report on the matter from Dr T., a forensic doctor, and Professor L, a brain surgeon. They submitted their report on 25 April 2005. 49. The reports concluded that the first applicant had had a subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere which had caused brain damage. 50. In view of the nature and consequences of that haematoma, the experts considered that the length of time required to constitute it had probably been less than thirty minutes from the time of the head injury, and could not have been less than fifteen minutes. Having regard to the timescale of the events and the witness statements, the experts stated that the shock could not have occurred during the few minutes’ drive from the railway station to the police station, or on arrival at the latter. On the other hand, they found that the injuries could have been caused by the applicant being pushed to the ground, being kneed or falling full length during his arrest. Alcohol or drug consumption could not have had any direct and/or definite influence on the traumatic brain injury. b) Expert report of 24 January 2006 51. Dr G., a neurologist, and Ms D., a neuropsychologist, examined the first applicant on 3 January 2006. They submitted their report on 24 January 2006. 52. They noted a deficiency of all four limbs and a serious deterioration of the cognitive and mental functions. They concluded that the neurological condition was directly responsible for the first applicant’s state of total dependency, and considered that it was too soon to determine the chances of consolidation but that the situation was unlikely to change greatly. c) Expert report of 19 October 2006 53. On 26 June 2006 Dr G. and Dr S. examined the first applicant. In their report of 19 October 2006 they noted that he could neither stand nor walk, that he was completely dependent as regards everyday activities and should be placed under guardianship. His total unfitness for work was still being assessed. 54. They mentioned that the injuries observed could only have been the result of violent trauma, and that if they had been caused by being pushed to the ground, he must have been pushed extremely violently. The hyperextension of the cervical rachis and the fracture of the C2 vertebra could have been caused by a violent blow from a knee, but not the haemorrhagic lesions or the left temporal contusion, the latter having been caused either by direct blows to the skull or by the head violently hitting the ground. They confirmed that alcohol or drug consumption could not have been factors in the injuries, although they explained that the state of intoxication could have diminished the person’s reactivity in attempting to limit the consequences of falling. 55. The experts considered that the timescale of the events as reported pointed to the conditions surrounding the arrest in the railway station as having very probably, indeed certainly, been the cause of the traumatic cranio-cerebral and rachidial lesions. They pointed out that they had no information at their disposal to rule out the possibility that the first applicant had sustained other violent attacks while in the police vehicle or at the police station, but added that if such violence had indeed occurred, it was conceivable that it had caused injuries. Nevertheless, the lapse of time between the arrest and the arrival at the police station had been so short that that hypothesis was “improbable”. 56. They further explained that the bleeding in the chin area could not have been caused by the subdural haematoma, but might have resulted from the person having been violently pushed to the ground or having received any other type of blow. 57. The experts concluded that the first applicant suffered from an infirmity which would leave him with permanent motor, cognitive and mental after-effects. d) Expert report of 9 March 2009 and reconstruction of 23 November 2007 58. On 6 September and 30 November 2007 the investigating judge appointed four experts, Dr G., Dr S. and Dr L., and also M.F., an expert in “martial arts, combat and self-defence sports and the ballistics of body movements and blows”, to assist in the reconstruction of events and conduct a fresh medical examination of the first applicant. They were also mandated to determine whether the first applicant’s statement as recorded on 22 November 2007 could be deemed reliable. 59. The reconstruction took place on 23 November 2007. Police officers S.D. and S.G. confirmed that when they had first encountered the first applicant he had been acting rather nervously, seemed to have consumed alcohol, displayed an injury on his chin, and was red in the face. The SUGE officers who had met S.D. and S.G. had informed them that they had already fined the applicant that afternoon. SUGE officer C.A. explained that since the police officers had informed them that they had been insulted the decision had been taken to arrest the person concerned and the SUGE officers had asked him to come with them. C.A. had put him in an armlock. For his part, Y.F. stated that he had seized his left sleeve. 60. According to the SUGE officers, they had taken the first applicant outside the railway station, and there had been some hesitation when S.D. had told them that this was not the man who had been throwing stones at the trains. O.D.B. pointed out that Y.F. had then released him and stepped back. Y.F. explained that the first applicant had then turned angrily to face him and punched him on the forearm. He had seized the applicant by the collar, forced him to his knees and placed him on his right side. He had then placed him face down on the ground and put his hands behind his back in order to handcuff him. After frisking him, he had taken the first applicant by the right arm, and the latter had stood up otherwise unaided. 61. A.H. confirmed that the applicant had made a gesture towards Y.F.’s arm, and Y.F. had warned him: “don’t you touch me”. However, he explained that because he was resisting handcuffing, Y.F. had struck him with his left knee. 62. One of the other police officers, D.F., confirmed that he had seen the person being struck by Y.F.s left knee, while R.D. mentioned a blow from the right knee. N.T. confirmed the action described by A.H., although he was not sure which leg had been used. 63. The police officers added that the first applicant had been placed in the police vehicle and that when they had almost reached the police station he had said that he was going to vomit. They pointed out that the man had been very calm, but when he was about to leave the vehicle he said that he would need help because his knee hurt. D.G. had helped him out of the car, holding one of his legs. That was when the applicant’s head had slid along the head-rest and hit the car doorframe. D.G., seeing that he had fainted, had asked a colleague to help him. Outside the vehicle the first applicant had vomited liquids and remained inert, mumbling rather than speaking. He had then been dragged into the sobering-up area. 64. The experts submitted their report on 9 March 2009. They observed that in Y.F.’s version of events there had been no mention of blows or of the first applicant’s head hitting the ground. They also noted that in A.H.’s version, the blow was described as incapable of having had a major impact. They found that during the manoeuvre to bring the first applicant to the ground, he had been in a position to break his fall and, possibly, if he had been kneed, to protect himself. Moreover, they stated that if the kneeing incident was taken on board, the time which had elapsed between the latter and the arrival at the police station, when the first symptoms of the brain damage became evident, would have been between 2 minutes and 10 seconds and 3 minutes and 30 seconds. They concluded that in view of the minimum period of evolution (the “response time”) between the traumatic injury and the first symptoms, that is to say between fifteen and twenty minutes, the kneeing could not be deemed to have caused the brain injury. 65. The experts considered that the various statements by the persons charged and the witnesses, as well as the reconstructions of the different versions, were “completely incompatible with the forensic medical findings as regards the nature and/or seriousness of the injuries described in the various hospital and forensic reports”, such injuries being “necessarily the outcome of violent traumatic injuries”. 66. They pointed out that the observations made during the reconstruction meant that it was unlikely, or even impossible, that the fracture had occurred during the events that had taken place at the railway station or the police station, explaining that such a fracture usually caused serious neck pain and stiffness in the cervical rachis, which had not been noted by the victim, the witnesses or the participants. 67. As regards the hypothesis mentioned during the investigation to the effect that the first applicant might have been hit by a bottle during a fight that had taken place during the afternoon of 30 November 2004, the experts pointed out that they had not received any evidence to support that affirmation, but that a blow with a bottle could have caused an internal contusion which would not have produced any external symptoms on the scalp but would have caused a subdural haematoma such as that discovered on the first applicant’s admission to hospital. The first manifestations felt by the first applicant on his way to the police station had most likely stemmed from just such a traumatic injury. The manifestations in question had therefore reflected the brain’s intolerance of the mounting pressure exerted by the subdural haematoma, which had been tolerated for a few hours and had then decompensated during the transfer to the police station. 68. The experts emphasised that the lapse of time between the applicant’s arrest by the SUGE brigade and the emergence of the traumatic brain injuries had been too short to conclude that the actions carried out and the blows struck by members of that brigade might have caused the brain damage. Furthermore, the actions of the SUGE officers, as studied in detail on the day of the reconstruction, could not have explained the intracranial lesions. 69. As regards the first applicant’s condition, the experts considered that his residual rate of permanent partial disability (IPP) could be estimated at 95 %, given his lack of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life and his inability to engage in any autonomous occupational activity. His suffering and disfigurement were estimated at 6/7, and his loss of amenity and professional damage were declared absolute, total and definitive. 70. The experts observed that the first applicant had said that he had been “attacked”. They added, however, that any memory on the applicant’s part had necessarily been “reconstructed”, either through unintentional, spontaneous fabrication or by repeating something overheard from people around him and possibly deformed by himself. He could certainly have had no direct memories of the events. 71. The National Security Ethics Committee, which had been contacted by two members of parliament concerning the circumstances of the first applicant’s arrest, assessed the procedural documents and interviewed the SUGE officers, apart from the persons formally charged, and also the police officers. It adopted an opinion on 19 December 2005. 72. It first of all noted that when the applicant had been arrested in the underground carpark of the railway station he had not been accused of an offence, as the police officers had acknowledged that his profile did not match that of the person sought. It added that the two police officers who had initially been involved had pointed out that they had not wanted to arrest the first applicant, but simply to check his identity, while the head of the SUGE team had stated that he had stopped the applicant for questioning because he had thought that the police officers had been insulted and he had considered them as victims. The committee noted that the head of team had admitted that “it was a bit topsy-turvy”, and that on leaving the railway station he had been unable to understand why the officers had not handcuffed the man and taken him to the police station. 73. The committee observed that the arrest had been carried out in a confused and confusing manner. The SUGE officers had explained that they had decided to handcuff the first applicant because he had insulted them and had struck Y.F. on the forearm. 74. The committee noted that A.H. had partly confirmed that version, and pointed out that there had been a kind of confused “stand-off” between the SUGE and the police officers outside the railway station. A.H. had noted that the first applicant had been insulting the SUGE officers, that he had lunged at one of them, hitting him on the arm or the shoulder, and that the officer in question had said “Don’t you touch me!”. After the applicant had been handcuffed, A.H. had decided to apprehend him on charges of violence against persons performing public duties, which violent acts he considered to have been committed in his presence. 75. The committee observed that S.G., who had taken the first applicant to the police station, had stated that he did not know the reason for the arrest. 76. The committee noted that even supposing that the head injury might have been caused by one of the SUGE officers, the police officers whom it had interviewed had provided no further information such as to establish its origin or the time of its causation. The only conclusions to be drawn from their statements were that the arrest had been violent, because the first applicant had initially resisted handcuffing. 77. The committee observed that the police and SUGE involvement in the case had been extremely confused. It stated that the police sergeant, who had been assisted by five police officers, ought to have taken control of the situation as soon as he arrived on the scene. He should have intervened between the SUGE officers and the first applicant, immediately placing the latter under his protection, and have asked the SUGE officers why he had been stopped and questioned, with a view to deciding on the appropriate action to take. The committee noted that instead of shouldering that responsibility, the police officers had passively looked on as the SUGE officers used force which the former’s mere presence had rendered illegitimate. 78. The committee considered that the lawfulness of the apprehension had been highly questionable. Indeed, the first two police officers arriving on the scene had taken the view that the apprehension had not been justified by the first applicant’s attitude outside the railway station. Interrogation of the various parties involved had not made clear whether a serious act of violence had been committed against Y.F. or whether the first applicant had merely pushed him away. The committee noted that the incident appeared in fact to have amounted to a mere scuffle to which Y.F. had reacted impulsively. 79. It further noted that the SUGE officers had imposed the decision to apprehend the first applicant on the police officers, who were not in control of the situation. The latter had merely passively accepted the applicant’s handover in order to transport him to the police station. That confusion explained why the injury could not be imputed with any certainty to either of the services in question. The committee further stated that even supposing that the injury had been caused by the SUGE officers during the handcuffing operation, at a time when the first applicant should have been under police protection, it was surprising, at the very least, that none of the police officers present had been able to identify the act of violence which had occasioned the injury. 80. In the committee’s view, the injury under the applicant’s chin raised issues. Even supposing that it had already been there prior to the apprehension and that the wound had reopened, as the police officers affirmed, it pointed at the very least to a very rough mode of transport of an injured person. Lastly, the committee pointed out that it was not its task to issue an opinion on the origin of the head injury or to attribute it to either of the services. It added that the possibility of a joint police/SUGE operation required the respective competences to be strictly defined. It should be reiterated that the arrival of the police removes the SUGE mandate, immediately placing the operation under the sole authority of the most senior police officer present. Moreover, SUGE officers should also be aware of the conditions for the lawfulness of in flagrante apprehensions and should in fact, like police personnel, undergo compulsory conflict management training. 81. Lastly, the committee decided to transmit its opinion to the public prosecutor for assessment of the expediency of prosecuting those concerned on charges of failure to assist a person in danger. 82. On 15 February 2010 the investigating judge of the Meaux Regional Court issued a discontinuance order. 83. She considered that the serious brain damage suffered by the first applicant had originated in events preceding his questioning by the SUGE officers and his transport to the police station by the police officers. She observed that the investigation had failed to establish the precise circumstances under which the events had occurred and to identify the perpetrator. No further investigation had been possible because all the witnesses identified had been heard and the first applicant was no longer capable of providing further information on the series of events of which he had been the victim. 84. The investigating judge added that the circumstance surrounding the apprehension had been caused by the first applicant’s insulting and violent behaviour. No proof had been provided of illegitimate violence, since it had transpired from the proceedings and the witness statements that the applicant’s head had not hit the ground, and that even supposing that Y.F. had kneed him, such acts did not fall within the category of deliberate violence. The judge stated that the investigation had shown that, owing to the position in which Y.F. had been standing, the intensity of his action had necessarily been limited, forming part of an operational technique. 85. The applicants, all of whom had joined the proceedings as civil parties, appealed against the discontinuance decision, seeking: - its annulment pursuant to Articles 184 and 802 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the grounds that it was identically worded to the public prosecutor’s final submissions; - the appointment of a panel of experts mandated to produce a fresh report under the supervision of a member of the Investigations Division, and; - in the alternative, the committal of the defendants for trial by the criminal court for the acts of violence perpetrated against the first applicant. 86. By judgment of 3 September 2010 the Investigations Division of the Paris Court of Appeal dismissed all those requests. It held that the civil parties had sustained no damage as a result of the grounds of nullity on which they had relied, since they could have adduced their claims in adversarial proceedings before it; it also pointed out that the entire proceedings had been submitted to it and that it was empowered to deal with all aspects of the case. As regards the request for a new expert report, the Investigations Division noted that the first expert report had been drawn up by a panel of four experts with complementary specialities, who had all attended the extremely long and detailed reconstruction organised by the investigating judge, during which they had seen all those involved in the impugned events repeat several times the gestures which they had described, covering all the different versions presented. It held that another expert opinion, for which all this input could not be replicated, would be of no real value for establishing the truth, and that it was neither necessary nor practicable to repeat such a complex reconstruction, which had at no stage been criticised by the various parties involved in the proceedings. The Division added that in medical terms, the civil parties had provided no scientific evidence capable of contradicting the conclusions of the panel of experts, merely affirming that the extremely serious injuries sustained by the first applicant must have originated in the manner of his arrest. 87. As regards the violence in question, the Investigations Division noted that the first applicant had suddenly lost his temper and struck Y.F. violently on the arm, which had been a deliberate, aggressive act. They therefore considered that the SUGE officers’ intervention to neutralise him had been amply justified, subject to the operation having taken place under appropriate conditions. It nevertheless noted that the operation seemed to have been more “robust” than the SUGE officers had admitted, the latter having spoken of a “textbook” operation, which evoked a theoretical ideal and seemed “too perfect”. Furthermore, the other parties involved had described a swifter series of events than the “takedown” in three separate stages described by Y.F. As regards the possibility that the first applicant had been kneed in the head, the Investigations Department noted divergences in the various witness statements, and concluded that some uncertainty remained as regards both whether such a blow from the knee had actually been administered and whether it had been intentional. 88. Finally, as regards the causal link between the arrest and the first applicant’s injuries, the Investigations Division noted the general consensus that the applicant had been “in good shape” on being installed in the police vehicle after his handcuffing, and that neither his position in the vehicle nor the speed of transport had suggested that he had been the target of any violence at this stage of events. Referring to the reconstruction, the Investigations Division considered that by reprising all the descriptions of the actions by all those involved and taking on board the hypotheses least favourable to the SUGE officers in question, the experts had been able to ascertain that the arrestee’s head had not hit the ground in any of the reconstructed actions, that the blow from the knee, if such a blow had ever actually occurred, would have affected the right craniofacial region, that if it had been struck as described it could only have had a minor impact and that the actions carried out could not explain the intracranial lesions noted, especially the cranial fracture on the left side of the head. The Court of Appeal further observed that the experts’ findings had been very clear, considering it highly unlikely, or indeed impossible, that the fracture had been caused during the incidents at the railway station or at the police station. 89. The Division pointed out that the experts had extensively justified their change of mind on the basis of factors which they had noted from the reconstructions of all the different versions, which they had attended, and that the medical evidence gathered would appear to support the existence of a previous traumatic injury which had taken some time to manifest. Lastly, it noted that the previous findings concerning the first applicant’s physical state during the afternoon had lent credence to that eventuality. Furthermore, the time taken for the symptoms to appear would have been incompatible per se with the short lapse of time between the arrest and the first symptoms, too soon after the operation to have been caused by it. 90. The Investigations Division concluded that the investigation had failed to gather sufficient evidence that a criminal offence had been committed. 91. On 27 September 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law. It held that the applicants could not complain about the reasons given for the discontinuance decision because, owing to the devolutive effect of the appeal, the Investigations Division had substituted its own reasoning for the original one. Moreover, it considered that that Division had analysed all the facts criticised in the complaint, answered all the main points set out in the civil parties’ memorial and determined, on the basis of sufficient and non-contradictory grounds, that there was insufficient evidence that any individuals had committed the offence of collective assault having caused a permanent disability or any other offence. 92. In observations received by the registry of the Bobigny Compensation Board for Crime Victims (“CIVI”) on 16 March 2012, the Guarantee Fund against acts of terrorism and other criminal offences requested the reimbursement of provisional awards made to the first applicant to a total of 490,000 euros (EUR), under three CIVI decisions of 30 October 2006, 5 July 2007 and 8 December 2009. ...

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5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Budapest. 6. On 28 June 2011 the applicant, a retired army general, was apprehended on charges of spying. On 1 July 2011 the court placed him under house arrest. Upon the prosecution’s appeal, his pre-trial detention was ordered on 14 July 2011 for fear of absconding. He was detained at Budapest Penitentiary’s Maglódi Facility. He submitted that while he had been in detention, the prison staff had very often switched on the light in his cell disturbing his night rest. The applicant’s requests for release were to no avail, although he demonstrated that he could have absconded during the house arrest but had not. In the face of his arguments that he had no criminal history, was nearly 60 years old with a settled background and family situation, the court insisted on the argument that, because of his connections abroad, there was a risk that he might nevertheless abscond. 7. On 30 September 2011 the investigation was terminated and the case file presented to the applicant and his lawyer. 8. On 11 November 2011 the Military Bench of the Budapest Court of Appeal quashed a previous detention order of the Military Bench of the Budapest High Court and remitted the case to it. In the applicant’s view, this was procedurally incorrect, since the Court of Appeal should have decided on the merits, rather than remitting the case. 9. The applicant was in pre-trial detention until 6 April 2012. After that date, he was under house arrest again until 13 March 2013. Subsequently, he was released but restricted to the village of Szada. 10. The applicant unsuccessfully filed requests for release on 27 July and 30 September 2011. Moreover, on 14 November 2011, 9 January and 7 November 2012 and 1 March 2013 he unsuccessfully appealed against the court decisions prolonging the pre-trial detention or house arrest. 11. According to the applicant – a submission uncontested by the Government – the orders prolonging the coercive measures reiterated, in a rather stereotypical manner, the risk of his absconding, although without specifying any particular risk other than his foreign connections. Moreover, whenever prolongation motions or requests for release were decided on in oral proceedings, the prosecution’s motions were communicated to the defence only at the hearing, not before. Whenever the decisions prolonging the coercive measure were adopted without a court session, that is, in written proceedings, the prosecutorial motions had not been served to the defence at all. 12. On 5 July 2013 the applicant was convicted of spying and sentenced to two years and 10 months’ imprisonment. The procedure appears to be still pending.

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9. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that following the events in Qamishli in March 2004 (see paragraph 242 above; paragraph 3.13 of the United Kingdom Border Agency’s Country of Origin Information Report on Syria) he had participated in demonstrations that took place at his university. He was arrested in July the same year by the civil police and was detained for four days. During this period he was ill-treated and his health was adversely affected by the physical violence he was subjected to. The applicant was arrested again in March 2005 for three days and once again subjected to physical violence. Following his release, he was not able to find any employment as his police file remained open. He also submitted that he had not served compulsory military service. 10. The applicant left Syria on 10 February 2006 and entered Cyprus illegally on 5 March 2006 after travelling from Turkey. He submitted that he secured a visa for Turkey after bribing officials. 12. The Asylum Service discontinued the examination of his application and closed his file on 29 August 2007 by virtue of section 16A (1) (a) of the Refugee Law of 2000-2004 (as amended up to 2004; Law no. 6(I)/2000; see paragraphs 236 below and M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872/10, § 74, ECHR 2013 (extracts)) as the applicant had not complied with the obligation deriving from section 8 of that Law, according to which, in the event of a change of address, the applicant had to inform the Asylum Service either directly or through the local Aliens and Immigration Police Department, within three days (see paragraph 236 below). According to the note in his file the applicant had not attended the interview arranged for 6 July 2007. In the note it is stated that a letter had been sent to him on 7 June 2007 by the Asylum Service requesting him to attend the interview. The applicant, however, had not received this letter as he had changed address in the meantime without notifying the authorities. Furthermore, it had not been possible to make telephone contact with him as he had given a wrong number. 13. The applicant did not lodge an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees (hereafter “the Reviewing Authority”). 14. The applicant submitted that he never received a letter asking him to attend an interview nor had he received notification of the decision of the Asylum Service to close his file so as to be able to appeal against it. 16. The applicant left Syria on 25 September 2008 and entered Cyprus illegally on 12 November 2008 after travelling from Turkey. 17. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that he had left Syria because he had been harassed and ill-treated by the Syria Security Police due to his origin and his connections to the Yekiti party. He stated that he had left Syria illegally. 18. The applicant applied for asylum in Cyprus on 13 November 2008. In his application for asylum, the applicant claimed that he had left Syria for two reasons. First of all, he had been beaten up by members of the Security Forces as he had complained about having to repair their cars at his car repair garage without payment. Secondly, his business had suffered setbacks by rising oil prices. He stated that he had left Syria legally. 19. The Asylum Service held an interview with him on 15 May 2009. In his interview the applicant claimed that he had been arrested and beaten up by the Security Forces on a number of occasions in connection with their demands to have their cars repaired for free and that the Head of the Security Forces had threatened to imprison him for a very long period. He also claimed that after he had left Syria he had found out that the Security Forces as well as the Syrian authorities were looking for him on the pretext that he had participated in the Qamishli events in 2004. He therefore faced imprisonment if he returned to Syria. 20. His application was dismissed on 29 May 2009 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (as amended up to 2007), and the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter “the 1951 Geneva Convention”) in that he had not shown that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion or a well-founded fear of serious and unjustified harm for other reasons. The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. The Asylum Service noted that there had been significant discrepancies and inaccuracies in his account of the facts on which his allegations of persecution were based. It held that the applicant’s allegations had been unfounded and had not been credible. 21. On 9 July 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority against the Asylum Service’s decision. 22. In the copies of the records of the Civil Registry and Migration Department it was noted on 3 March 2010 that in accordance with instructions given by Minister of the Interior on 9 February 2010, if the applicant was traced, the possibility of granting him a special residence permit should be examined before deporting him. Deportation should take place only if the applicant was involved in illegal activities. 24. The Reviewing Authority pointed to contradictions in the applicant’s claims and held, having regard to all the information and evidence available, that they were unsubstantiated. It noted that the applicant had given two different reasons for which the Head of Security Forces had allegedly threated him with imprisonment. Furthermore, although he initially claimed that the Security forces and the authorities were falsely accusing him of participating in the Qamishli events, he then stated that he had actually participated but was not able to give accurate information concerning these events. Furthermore, the events complained of had happened in 2004 whereas he had left Syria legally in 2008 and he did not allege that during this period he was persecuted by the authorities because of his alleged participation. He was also able to leave Syria legally. The Reviewing Authority further stressed that his claims concerning ill-treatment were incoherent and that the applicant had not been able to describe in any detail the treatment he had been allegedly subjected to. Lastly, in reply to the applicant’s claims before it that he had been subjected to persecution because of his Kurdish origin, the Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had not applied for asylum on this basis. In any event, it stressed that there was no indication that he had been subjected to any kind of discrimination on the ground of his origin. 25. The Reviewing Authority concluded by observing that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 26. The applicant submitted that he did not receive the decision of the Reviewing Authority but had only heard that his asylum file had been closed. He was therefore not able to appeal. 27. The Government submitted that a letter was sent on 10 May 2010 by double registered mail (registered mail with proof of delivery) to the address given by the applicant. The letter had been returned. They provided a copy of the receipt on which it was noted “insufficient address.” 29. In his application form to the Court the applicant submitted that he had converted to Christianity. In 2003 he was detained by the Syrian police and was accused of organising a church congregation (organising people for church). During his detention, which lasted two days, he was tortured by police officers. He did not confess that he had changed religion but told them that he had been going to church to give music lessons. He was arrested again on 12 March 2004 and detained for five days during which he was subjected to torture. After he was released he was told that he would be contacted again. For this reason he started travelling around Syria but never staying in places where too many Kurds lived. 30. The applicant left Syria on an unspecified date in 2005. Although he had left legally, he had bribed a police officer at the border to let him go through. The applicant entered Cyprus illegally after travelling from Turkey. 32. Following an interview on an unspecified date, his application was dismissed on 16 August 2008 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2005 (as amended up to 2005; see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service held that the applicant’s claims and his alleged fear of persecution on return to Syria were not credible. It noted in this respect that the applicant had been able to obtain a passport lawfully and to leave Syria, that there had been discrepancies between his asylum application and his interview, concerning the grounds for which he had alleged left Syria, and that the applicant lacked basic knowledge of the Christian religion. 33. On 12 September 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority against the Asylum Service’s decision. 36. The Reviewing Authority, referring to the Asylum Service’s decision, held that there had been discrepancies in the applicant’s account of the facts and reasons for his departure from Syria which undermined his credibility. The Reviewing Authority noted, inter alia, that although the applicant had claimed that he had left Syria because he had been persecuted by the Security Forces he had been able to obtain a passport lawfully and to leave the country. The applicant had also stated in his interview that he had not faced any difficulties going through passport control as he did not have any problems with the Syrian authorities. Moreover, although the applicant alleged that he had been persecuted and harassed for participating in Kurdish festivities, when requested he did not give any details concerning the alleged persecution. To the extent that the applicant claimed that he had been detained twice following the Qamishli events, the Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had been released without conditions and had never been charged with any offence. Lastly, the applicant in his interview had claimed that he had converted to Christianity while in Syria in 2002 and that he had left Syria for this reason. He had not, however, mentioned this in his application form on which it was stated that he was a Muslim. In any event, the applicant lacked basic knowledge of the Christian religion and had not been baptised. 37. The Reviewing Authority concluded that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 38. On 25 April 2007 the applicant was put on a stop-list but it was noted that he was not to be deported until further instructions were received from the Ministry of Interior. 39. The applicant did not lodge a recourse against the Reviewing Authority’s decision. He submitted that this was because of the costs of such proceedings and also due to the fact that he was subsequently given a temporary residence permit by the authorities (see paragraph 40 below). 40. On 6 July 2007, the Minister of Interior, following a meeting with the Cyprus-Kurdish Friendship Association on 5 July 2007, decided to grant the applicant a temporary residence permit for one year on the condition that he found a local employer who had authorisation to employ third country nationals. The applicant submitted that he was not able to find such an employer and that the Labour Office was not willing to approve a contract with other employers. 42. The Government submitted a copy of a letter dated 11 March 2009 which the Civil Registry and Migration Department had addressed to the applicant, informing him that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority, his application of 17 October 2006 for a residence permit (see paragraph 34 above) had been rejected and that he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 43. In the copies of the records of the Civil Registry and Migration Department it was noted on 3 March 2010 that in accordance with instructions given by the Minister of the Interior on 9 February 2010, if the applicant was traced, the possibility of granting him a special residence permit should be examined before deporting him. Deportation should take place only if the applicant was involved in illegal activities. 45. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that he was a musician and as he was stateless he was unable to get a licence in Syria in order to practise his profession. Furthermore, a decree by the Governor of Al-Hasakah province in 1988 reportedly prohibited the singing of non-Arabic songs at wedding or festivals (Order No. 1865/sad/24; Human Rights Watch, Syria: The Silenced Kurds, 1 October 1996, E804, page 28). The applicant feared that he would be subjected to arbitrary detention and possibly torture because he was singing Kurdish songs. 46. For this reason he left Syria illegally on 20 January 2007 and entered Cyprus illegally on 28 January 2007 after travelling from Turkey. 48. The Asylum Service held an interview with him on 9 March 2009. In his interview the applicant alleged, firstly, that his human rights had been violated as he was an Ajanib Kurd; in particular, his rights to education, work and property. Secondly, the applicant stated that he did not want his children to be Ajanib. Thirdly, he claimed that he would be imprisoned if he returned to Syria, as he had left the country illegally. He, however, stated that he had never been arrested and detained, harassed or persecuted by the Syrian authorities. 49. His application was dismissed on 17 March 2009 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (see paragraph 20 above). In particular, the Asylum Service held that the mere fact that the applicant was an Ajanib Kurd from the Al-Hasakah area did not mean that the applicant was in danger of persecution. In particular, the Asylum Service held that the applicant could not claim to be in danger of persecution and entitled to refugee status simply by reason of being an Ajanib Kurd from the Al-Hasakah area. Furthermore, it considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if he returned to Syria. 50. On 30 March 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority against the Asylum Service’s decision. 51. It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that, on 25 August 2009, the applicant was put on the authorities’ “stop list”. 52. On 31 December 2009 the Reviewing Authority upheld the Asylum Service’s decision and dismissed the appeal. 53. The Reviewing Authority stressed, inter alia, that Ajanib Kurds were not persecuted on the basis of their ethnicity when they were not involved in anti-regime activities. The applicant had neither alleged that he had been harassed by the Syrian authorities nor that he had been persecuted by them. Furthermore, the Reviewing Authority observed that unless a person was an opponent of the regime, there was no real risk that leaving Syria illegally would result in persecution on their return. It also noted that according to its own research, Ajanib Kurds were entitled to, among other things, work in the public and private sector, receive an education and register their property. Furthermore, the applicant had given a document which belonged to his father and on which his personal details and family situation were registered such as births, death and divorce. The applicant could thus register his children under his name. Lastly, the applicant’s claim that he could not work as a musician did not constitute persecution or discrimination. 54. The Reviewing Authority concluded by observing that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 55. The applicant submitted that he did not lodge a recourse against this decision as he could not afford to do so. 56. The applicant submitted an attestation from the “Civata Demokratik a Kurd” (“CDK”) in Cyprus dated 26 March 2009 stating that he was a compatriot and participated in the movement of the Kurdish peoples for national and human rights and that he was also a member of the party in Cyprus. It stated that, as many other Kurds and being a stateless Kurd, the applicant was deprived of his rights and had no identity card. He was therefore not able to obtain a licence to work as a musician and that if he was returned to Syria he would be subjected to long term imprisonment, torture and ill treatment. 58. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that he was a member of the Yekiti party in Syria and that he was involved in the Qamishli events. Following these events he was too scared to return to his village which had been closed for three months. During that period many people from his village were arrested and tortured by the authorities. Some disappeared. He decided to leave Syria as he was a stateless Kurd and given his political involvement in the Yekiti party and the Qamishli events. 59. The applicant left Syria illegally on 30 November 2006 and entered Cyprus illegally on 1 December 2006 after travelling from Turkey. 61. The Asylum Service, however, discontinued the examination of his application and closed his file on 6 September 2007 by virtue of sections 8 and 16A (1) (a) of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 as the applicant had not informed the Asylum Service or the local Aliens and Immigration Police Branch of his change of address (see paragraph 236 below). It was noted in the file that the Asylum Service had received a letter dated 19 March 2007 from the Nicosia District Immigration Office informing them that the applicant had not showed up at their offices within reasonable time and remained illegally in Cyprus. On 26 March 2007 he was put on the authorities’ “stop-list” as a wanted person. Subsequently, by letter dated 4 July 2007 the applicant was asked to attend an interview at the Asylum Service on 22 August 2007. The applicant did not show up and the authorities had not been able to locate him. The letter was returned by the postal service with a note that the applicant had moved. It had not been possible to make telephone contact as he had given a wrong number. 62. On 10 June 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority which was dismissed on 3 September 2008. The Reviewing Authority observed that the appeal concerned the applicant’s asylum claim and its substance and not the decision of the Asylum Service to close the file. As the substance of his claim had not been examined his appeal should have been directed against the decision to discontinue the examination of his application and not the merits of his case. 63. The applicant submitted that the Asylum Service had never called on him to attend an interview and that he had informed the Immigration Police about his change of address. He had only found out later from his lawyer that his file had been closed because he had not attended the interview. (He submitted an affidavit to this effect dated 24 November 2009 he made at the Paphos District Court.) 65. In his application form to the Court the applicant claimed that on 8 March 2005, some police officials approached him while he was working in his field. A fight ensued when the officers wanted to take his fingerprints and he resisted. He beat up one of the officers and managed to escape. He went into hiding as the Syrian police were looking for him. 66. He then left Syria on 25 August 2005 and entered Cyprus illegally on 29 August 2005 after travelling from Turkey. 69. His application was dismissed on 10 July 2008 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 and the 1951 Geneva Convention (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It observed in this respect that it transpired during the interview that the applicant had left Syria for financial reasons. Furthermore, to the extent that the applicant alleged that if returned to Syria he would be arrested, convicted and sentenced to long-term imprisonment because he had lodged an asylum application, this was unfounded. On the basis of the information before it, the Syrian authorities did not persecute persons just because they had applied for asylum. 70. On 25 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority against the Asylum Service’s decision. 72. The Reviewing Authority observed that in his application form the applicant claimed that he had left Syria because of fear following the Qamishli events. In his interview with the Asylum Service, however, he claimed that he had left Syria for financial reasons and that although he had taken part in the Qamishli events and had been arrested, arrests had been a general phenomenon and this had not been the reason he had left Syria. In his appeal he stated that he had left for financial and political reasons. He had not however, substantiated that he would be subjected to prosecution on political grounds. The applicant was not involved in any political parties and did not carry out any anti-regime activities. Lastly, it found that the applicant’s allegation that he ran the risk of being imprisoned if returned to Syria because the authorities knew he had sought asylum was also unfounded as, on the basis of the information before it, the Syrian authorities did not persecute failed asylum seekers upon their return unless they were opponents of the regime. 73. The applicant submitted that he did not lodge a recourse against this decision as he could not afford to do so. 74. The Government submitted a copy of a letter dated 5 May 2009 which the Civil Registry and Migration Department had addressed to the applicant, informing him that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority and the expiry of his temporary residence permit, he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 78. In his application form to the Court the applicant claims that on 20 March 2005, while he was serving in the Syrian army, he was arrested and taken into detention by the Syrian authorities along with other Kurds because of Nowruz (the Iranian New Year, Nowruz or Newroz marks the first day of spring or Equinox and the beginning of the year in the Persian calendar). He was tortured for ten days along with his co-detainees. They were put into a car tyre and were subjected to bastinado. They were accused of conspiring against the State. Military proceedings were brought against him but after completion of his military service the charges were dropped. During this time the military police collected information on him and his friends and he was entered on a database as a dangerous individual. He was arrested again on 21 March 2006 because he attended the Nowruz celebrations and was a member of Yekiti party. He was detained for a week and was released after bribing the District Officer. He was then re-arrested on 15 August 2006 at his house after attending a Yekiti party meeting. He was released after bribing the same official. He then decided to leave Syria and managed to obtain a Turkish visa after bribing a Syrian security official working at the Turkish embassy. 80. He applied for asylum on 25 August 2006. He claimed that he had left Syria because as a Kurd he had been subjected to discrimination. Kurds were persecuted and did not enjoy any rights. He had therefore left for fear of his life. 81. The Asylum Service held an interview with him on 27 February 2009. The applicant claimed, inter alia, that he was a follower/supporter of the Yekiti Party, he had left Syria due to the injustice that Kurds suffered, and in particular, although he had a passport he had no other rights and he could not buy a house or land or work. He claimed that he was known to the Syrian authorities and he had been taken at the police station and beaten up on several occasions. He had been arrested and detained on a number of occasions. In particular, in 2005 he had been arrested and detained for four or five days for participating in the Nowruz festivities. He had been arrested on another occasion for problems he had in the army. In May 2006 he was detained for a week and in August 2006 for four days. The latter two times he had been released after paying a sum of money. He also stated that he was not wanted by the authorities and no other member of his family had ever been arrested. He claimed that he feared arrest if returned to Syria. 82. Subsequently, the Asylum Service called the applicant for a second interview and asked him to provide any documents he had concerning his application. The second interview was held on 10 April 2009. In this the applicant claimed, inter alia, that certain members of his family worked and that although the job market was not good, he would be able to work if he managed to find something. The applicant stated that he had been arrested on 20/21 March 2005 when he was in the army following a dispute with another soldier on 21 March 2006 for participating in the Nowruz festivities, and on 25 May 2006 and 2 August 2008 when demonstrations took place even though he was not involved. He was not, however, wanted by the authorities nor did he have any problems by reason of the fact that he was a follower of the Yekiti party. 83. His application was dismissed on 13 May 2009 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It therefore held that his asylum application had not been substantiated. In particular, the Asylum Service pointed out that during his interview he had claimed that he had left Syria for two reasons: because of his Kurdish origin he could not work and buy a house or land and secondly due to his arrests by the Syrian authorities. With regard to the first claim, they noted that he had not substantiated that he had been subjected to any form of discrimination due to his origin. As regards the arrests the applicant’s allegations remained unfounded as he had not given any specific answers to questions that had been put to him. Furthermore, during the interview the Asylum Service had spotted a number of significant untruths/falsehoods concerning his claim. 86. The Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had not been subjected to persecution and had claimed that he was not wanted by the Syrian authorities. In its decision it observed that the applicant’s claims had not been credible and had been vague and unsubstantiated. Although he claimed that he could not buy a house or land, he then stated that his parents owned a house which they lived in. Further, although he initially claimed that he could not work due to the fact that he was Kurdish he then stated that his family worked and he also was able to. The information he gave concerning his arrest and reasons was equally general and vague. He was not in a position to give specific replies to questions given concerning these matters. The Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had not been able to reply satisfactorily and with precision to certain questions and give information concerning his claims. 87. In conclusion, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 88. The applicant submitted that he did not lodge a recourse against this decision as he could not afford to do so and at that time no legal aid was granted in such cases. 90. In his application form to the Court the applicant claimed that he and his family are members of the Azadi Kurdish party in Syria which was banned by the authorities. In early September 2006 the applicant was driving his motorbike in his village carrying Azadi party papers. The civil police in Aleppo ordered him to stop but he fled as he was scared that they would find the papers. The police pursued him but he managed to escape. The next day the police went to his house. The same day he got a visa on his passport. 93. The Asylum Service, however, discontinued the examination of his application and closed his file on 3 April 2009 by virtue of section 16A (1) (c) of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (see paragraph 236 below) as the applicant had not come to the interview which had been fixed for 27 March 2009 despite having received the letter requesting him to attend. It was noted in the file that the letter had been sent to him by double registered mail and there was indication he had received it. It was also noted that the applicant, on 19 March 2009, had confirmed on the telephone after receiving a call by the Asylum Service that he would come to the interview. Despite this he had not shown up. Lastly, there was no indication that the applicant had departed from the country. 95. The applicant submitted that he never received a letter asking him to attend an interview and that he had not received notification of the decision of the Asylum Service to close his file. He was subsequently informed of the closure of his file but he did not appeal against the decision as he did not know the procedure to follow and the steps to take so he could appeal against it. He was also scared to approach the authorities. 96. In the copies of the records of the Civil Registry and Migration Department it was noted on 3 March 2010 that in accordance with the instructions of the Minister of the Interior given on 9 February 2010, if the applicant was traced, the possibility of granting him a special residence permit should be examined before deporting him. Deportation should take place only if the applicant was involved in illegal activities. 99. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that on 13 March 2004 he participated in a demonstration in his village concerning the Qamishli uprising. He had a camera and was taking photographs of the event when the civil police arrested him. He was blindfolded, placed in a police vehicle and transferred to the central detention centre of the village. There he was continuously tortured and ill-treated for one month. After his release, he was obliged to report to the police every two days. On 2 January 2005, nine months after his release, the applicant decided to leave Syria as he was no longer able to handle the feeling of insecurity. He applied to get a passport from the authorities but this was refused. He succeeded in getting one after bribing officials. 103. His application was dismissed on 8 July 2008 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It noted that no form of discrimination or persecution transpired from the applicant’s claims. There had been discrepancies between his application and the allegations made during his interview, which undermined his credibility. It held that the applicant’s claims and his alleged fear of persecution on return to Syria were not credible. 106. The Reviewing Authority noted that there were serious discrepancies between what he stated in his asylum application form and during his interview. For example, in his application he stated that he had left Syria because he was Kurdish and he had problems with the Syrian authorities. During the interview he had alleged that he had not left Syria for political reasons but because his family had reached an agreement with another family to marry against his wishes. The applicant had also claimed that he had to move about in the country in order to avoid being caught by the authorities but then stated that he did not face any serious problems. Further, he initially claimed during the interview that even though he had signed his application form he did not know the contents as this had been filled in by another person. He subsequently, stated, however, that the contents were of a political nature and that he had told the person filling in the form to write whatever he wanted. This undermined the applicant’s credibility. 107. The Reviewing Authority concluded that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. The letter of notification addressed to the applicant by the Reviewing Authority dated 29 September 2008 stated that its decision was subject to adjudication before the Supreme Court within seventy-five days from the date he was informed of the decision. 108. The applicant submitted that he did not lodge a recourse against the Reviewing Authority’s decision as he did not know he had the right to do so. 109. The Government submitted a copy of a letter dated 24 March 2009 which the Civil Registry and Migration Department had addressed to the applicant, informing him that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority as well as the expiry of his temporary residence permit, he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 112. In his application form to the Court the applicant claimed that on 20 March 2007 he lit a fire with some friends to celebrate Nowruz. When the police came he managed to flee but his friends were arrested. He later found out from his family that the police were looking for him. He left Syria on 29 September 2007 through the border with Turkey after the taxi driver bribed the officials. 114. He applied for asylum on 7 November 2007. He claimed that he had left Syria because he had participated in a demonstration concerning Kurdish rights and that for this reason he was sought after by the Syrian authorities. 115. The Asylum Service held an interview with him on 4 November 2008. The applicant claimed, that following the demonstration the authorities had asked certain of the persons that had been arrested information about him. He had left Syria for this reason. He also claimed that if he returned to Syria he might not be allowed entry or he ran the risk of being arrested. Furthermore, he stated that he had never been detained, harassed or persecuted by the Syrian authorities and that he or his family did not belong to any, inter alia, political, religious or military group/organisation. 116. His application was dismissed on 23 April 2009 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 and the 1951 Geneva Convention (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It observed that the applicant’s allegations were general and vague. In particular, it noted that the applicant had failed to give any information/details about the demonstration he had allegedly participated in despite being asked during the interview. It concluded that his allegations had been unfounded and had not been credible. 119. The Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had admitted that he had not been subjected to any harassment or persecution. His allegations concerning his fears of arrest were vague and general. He was not in a position to specify when and which demonstration he had taken part despite being asked specific questions on this during the interview. Furthermore, he had been able to leave the country legally without any problems. There was no indication that the Syrian authorities were searching for him. 120. In conclusion, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 121. The applicant submitted that he did not lodge a recourse against this decision as he was advised by a lawyer that it would be a waste of time and effort as the Supreme Court dismissed all such cases. 123. In his application form to the Court the applicant claimed that when he was in the Syrian army he was detained for forty days on the basis of his ethnic identity. During that period he was subjected to ill-treatment such as standing still under the sun for long periods. There were also other Kurds detained with the applicant and they were all told that this was a preparation for what was going to happen to all the Kurds in the future. The applicant was also involved in cultural (folklore) activities of the Yekiti party. Participation in cultural groups such as dance, drama or folkloric groups that wear Kurdish traditional dress and participate in funerals or other social rites was considered by the authorities to be political and thus repressed. The Syrian government and authorities tended to politicise ordinary people who participated in these activities and therefore they ran a risk of being criminalised and exposed to persecution by the authorities. 128. His application was dismissed on 8 August 2008 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 and the 1951 Geneva Convention (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It noted that the applicant, during the interview, had claimed that he had left Syria due to a long standing property dispute between his family and another family. Although the Asylum Service did not question the credibility of his allegations concerning the existence of this dispute as such it did not find the applicant’s claims as to his involvement in this dispute credible and that his departure from Syria was justified on this ground. The statements made in his interview were contradictory and he had stated that his life was not in danger. Eventually, the applicant had admitted that he had left Syria for financial reasons and faced no danger if he returned. 131. The Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant’s account of facts concerning the alleged family dispute were contradictory. Furthermore, in his asylum application form he had stated that he his life was not in danger and that he had left Syria lawfully and for financial reasons. It had also become clear during the interview that the applicant had not left Syria for the reasons he had initially claimed but for financial reasons; he could not find work with an adequate salary. He was therefore using the asylum procedure to extend his stay in Cyprus. New claims put forward by the applicant in his appeal that he was wanted by the Syrian authorities because he had taken part in the Nowruz celebrations and that had been detained for three months had not been substantiated and had not been raised by the applicant in his asylum application form or his interview with the Asylum Service. Lastly, the applicant had admitted that his life would not be in danger if he returned nor would he be punished. 132. In conclusion, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 134. The Government submitted a copy of a letter dated 30 July 2009 which the Civil Registry and Migration Department had addressed to the applicant, informing him that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority, he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 136. In his application form to the Court the applicant claimed that on 20 March 2006 he and his mother lit a small fire to celebrate Nowruz. They also had the Kurdistan flag on their roof. The police raided their house during which they hit the applicant’s mother. She fell and had a minor head injury. They arrested the applicant and put him in detention. There were no formal legal proceedings and the applicant was released after his family bribed the police. In 2007 he was arrested once again but was released with the help of his family who bribed the officers. He managed to obtain a passport through bribery and left Syria on 15 July 2007. 140. His application was dismissed on 10 February 2009 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 and the 1951 Geneva Convention (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It noted that the applicant, during the interview, had claimed that he had left Syria because he had been persecuted by the Syrian authorities for being a member of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party, an illegal organisation). It held that the applicant’s claims were not credible as he had not been able to reply satisfactorily to basic questions concerning the party. He was not therefore able to establish that his was a member of the party and therefore substantiate that this was the ground for which he was allegedly persecuted. 143. The Reviewing Authority in its decision observed that the applicant’s claims had not been credible and had been unsubstantiated. It noted that although the applicant claimed that he had been persecuted for being a member of the PKK and participating in activities and had fled for this reason, he was not able to give any information about the party. For example, he did not know who was the leader of the PKK, he was not able to draw the flag or to explain what the initials meant. Furthermore, he had a passport and had left the country legally without any problems. 144. In conclusion, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 146. By a letter dated 26 January 2010 the Civil Registry and Migration Department asked the applicant, following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority, to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 149. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that he was a member of the banned Azadi Kurdish party. On 7 August 2003 he completed his military service and then went back to his village where he discovered that the Syrian authorities had changed the name of his village into an Arabic one. Along with four other persons they rewrote the original name over the Arabic one on the road signs. After this, the intelligence service detained two of his friends. The applicant and the others fled to Aleppo. From the two persons arrested, the one disappeared in the hands of the authorities and the second one was released after spending two years in detention and after disclosing the identities of the ones who managed to escape. After getting help from members of the Azadi party, the applicant managed to get a passport. 150. The applicant left Syria on 23 September 2003 and came to Cyprus on 27 September 2003 with a tourist visa after travelling from Lebanon. 151. He applied for asylum on 23 September 2004, about a year later. In his form he claimed that he had left Syria because of the inhuman treatment Kurds were subjected to and their difficult living conditions. 152. The Asylum Service held an interview with him on 20 May 2008. During this he stated that he had left Syria because the Kurds had no rights and that a photograph had been taken of him during a demonstration of the Azadi party. He stated that he feared arrest and imprisonment upon his retrun. 153. His application was dismissed on 30 May 2008 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service found that the asylum application had not been substantiated. It noted that there had been discrepancies in his account of the facts which undermined his credibility in so far as he claimed that he had taken part in a demonstration during which his photo had been taken by the Syrian authorities. Further, it considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. 156. The Reviewing Authority in its decision observed that the applicant in his application had claimed that he had left Syria because of the conditions of living and human rights violations of Kurds. In his interview he also claimed that he had left as the authorities had taken a photo of him during a demonstration of the Azadi party in 2001 and if he returned he would be imprisoned as this is normally the case. The applicant was not able to give a more specific time frame for the demonstration The Reviewing Authority noted that the applicant had not had any problems with the authorities following that demonstration. At the same time he had claimed that he worked on and off in Lebanon for a period of two years and occasionally returned to Syria without any problems. He alleged that only on one occasion did the authorities force him and some friends to break up a meeting for Nowruz. The applicant’s account of facts and claims were full of discrepancies and unsubstantiated, undermining his credibility. 157. In conclusion, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 158. The applicant submitted that he did not lodge a recourse against this decision as he was advised by a lawyer that it would be a waste of time and effort as the Supreme Court dismissed all such cases. 159. It appears that the applicant’s wife also applied for asylum. Her application was rejected on 24 July 2008 and her appeal on 25 September 2008. She was then asked, in a letter dated 23 June 2009 sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department, to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 162. In his application form to the Court the applicant stated that on 12 March 2004 during the events at the football match in Qamishli, he got scared and left the town. He went to his home village, Amer Capi, where he stayed for seven months. When the situation improved he returned to Qamishli. On 1 June 2005 the civil police killed a prominent Kurdish religious leader. During the demonstration at the mosque the police officers took pictures of the demonstrators and two days later went to the applicant’s house searching for him. On 14 June 2005 the applicant left Syria. He travelled from Qamishli to Aleppo and then obtained a visa after bribing someone to issue a visa for Turkey. 166. His application was dismissed on 23 October 2008 on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 and the 1951 Geneva Convention (see paragraph 20 above). The Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility of the applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. It noted that the applicant, during the interview, had claimed that he had left Syria because he was wanted by the Syrian authorities for participating in an illegal demonstration. His allegations, however, were unfounded and not credible, as during the interview his account of facts was full of discrepancies, contradictions and untruths. Furthermore, there were discrepancies between his written application form and the allegations made during the interview. In particular, the grounds he gave in his interview for leaving Syria where not the same as those he had given in his application. This undermined his overall credibility. 167. The applicant claims that he was not informed of the decision and in August 2009 he asked a non-governmental organisation to follow up his case. It was then that he discovered that his application had been dismissed. 168. In the meantime it appears that his temporary residence permit granted to him on the ground that he was an asylum seeker expired. 170. On 3 March 2010 his appeal was dismissed under Section 28 F (2) of the Refugee Law 2000-2009 (as amended up to 2009) on the ground that it had been filed out of time. The Reviewing Authority observed that the letter informing the applicant of the dismissal of his asylum application dated 23 October 2008 was served through a private messenger and that the delivery slip was signed by his fellow lodger. It noted that on 10 August 2009 a letter had been sent by a non-governmental organisation requesting information about the stage of proceedings of the applicant’s application. A letter was sent dated 17 August 2009 informing the NGO that the applicant’s claim had been examined, the decision had been sent to the applicant by registered post and according to the file it had been received. The appeal deadline was twenty days from the date the applicant was notified of the decision on the basis of section 28 F (2) of the Refugee Law (see paragraph 237 below). The appeal was filed on 9 December 2009, more than thirteen months following the date he had been notified of the decision. 171. The Government submitted that a letter was sent on 19 March 2010 informing him of this decision by double registered mail to the address given by the applicant. The letter had been returned. They provided a copy of the receipt on which it was noted “unclaimed”. 173. The Government submitted a copy of a letter dated 27 May 2010 which the Civil Registry and Migration Department had addressed to the applicant, informing him that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 174. On 17 May 2010 the Yekiti Party and other Kurds from Syria organised a demonstration in Nicosia, near the Representation of the European Commission, the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and the Government Printing Office. They were protesting against the restrictive policies of the Cypriot Asylum Service in granting international protection. About 150 Kurds from Syria, including the applicants, remained in the area around the clock, having set up about eighty tents on the pavement. According to the Government, the encampment conditions were unsanitary and protesters were obstructing road and pedestrian traffic. The encampment had become a hazard to public health and created a public nuisance. The protesters performed their daily chores on the pavement, including cooking and washing in unsanitary conditions. The sewage pits had overflown, causing a nuisance and offensive odours. The public lavatories were dirty and the rubbish bins of the Government buildings were being used and, as a result, were continuously overflowing. Furthermore, the protesters were unlawfully obtaining electricity from the Printing Office. Members of the public who lived or worked in the area had complained to the authorities. The Government submitted that efforts had been made by the authorities to persuade the protesters to leave, but to no avail. As a result, the authorities had decided to take action to remove the protesters from the area. 175. On 28 May 2010 instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers in the normal way. According to the Government these instructions superseded the ones given by the Minister of the Interior on 9 February 2010 (see paragraphs 22, 43 and 96 above). 176. On 31 May 2010 the Minister requested the Chief of Police, among others, to take action in order to implement his instructions. Further, he endorsed suggestions made by the competent authorities that deportation and detention orders be issued against Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers who had passports and did not have Ajanib or Maktoumeen status and that the police execute the orders starting with the ones issued against the leaders of the protesters. The police were also directed to take into account the policy guidelines and to use discreet methods of arrest. 177. According to the Government, letters were sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to a number of failed Syrian-Kurdish asylum-seekers informing them that they had to make arrangements to leave Cyprus in view of their asylum applications being turned down (see M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872/10, § 32, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). The letter sent to H.Sw. was dated 27 May 2010, in thirteen cases, including those of H.S., A.T., M.S, A. Hu, H.H. and M.Y the letters were dated 1 June 2010, in respect of AM, the letter was dated 9 June 2010 and in respect of M.K., the letter was dated 28 June 2010. Another letter was dated 16 June 2010 (the asylum procedures having been completed in early 2008) and one letter was dated 5 February 2011 in a case where the asylum procedure had been completed on 22 April 2010 and the person in question had voluntarily agreed and did return to Syria on 24 September 2010. Letters had been sent out to the remaining applicants much earlier (see paragraphs 42, 74, 109 and 134 above). 178. From documents submitted by the Government it appears that from 31 May until 7 June 2010 the authorities kept the area under surveillance and kept a record of the protesters’ daily activities and of all comings and goings. In the relevant records it is noted that invariably, between 1.30 a.m. and 5.30 a.m., things were, in general, quiet, and everyone was sleeping apart from those keeping guard. During the above-mentioned period a large-scale operation was organised by the Police Emergency Response Unit, “ERU” (“ΜΜΑΔ”), and a number of other authorities, including the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, for the removal of the protesters and their transfer to the ERU headquarters for the purpose of ascertaining their status on a case-by-case basis. 179. In the meantime, between 28 May 2010 and 2 June 2010 orders for the detention and deportation of forty-five failed asylum seekers were issued following background checks. These included applicants A.T., F.T. and H.H. in respect of whom the orders were issued on 2 June 2010 pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of that Law. Letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, containing a short paragraph with information as to the immigration status of each person. This information included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service, the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority, where lodged, and the date some of those concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). The letters recommended the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The Government submitted copies of two such letters with information concerning thirteen people. 180. The letter that included information on F.T. and another four of the persons detained stated that they all appeared to lead the political group, YEKITI, which was active in Cyprus and that they organised demonstrations complaining about their rights in Cyprus. It was considered that if the opportunity was given to them to organise themselves they could constitute a future threat to the security of Cyprus. 181. On 2 June 2010, letters were also prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing those concerned of the decision to detain and deport them. These included applicants A.T.., F.T. and H.H. The Government submitted that, at the time, the authorities did not know whether the individuals concerned by the decisions were among the protesters. 182. The removal operation was carried out on 11 June 2010, between approximately 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. with the participation of about 250 officers from the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, the ERU, the Nicosia District Police Division, the Traffic Division, the Fire Service and the Office for Combating Discrimination of the Cyprus Police Headquarters. The protesters, including the applicants, were led to buses, apparently without any reaction or resistance on their part. At 3.22 a.m. the mini buses carrying the male protesters left. The women, children and babies followed at 3.35 a.m. A total of 149 people were located at the place of protest and were transferred to the ERU headquarters: eighty-seven men, twenty-two women and forty children. Upon arrival, registration took place and the status of each person was examined using computers which had been specially installed the day before. The Government submitted that during this period the protesters had not been handcuffed or put in cells but had been assembled in rooms and given food and drink. It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that by 6.40 a.m. the identification of approximately half of the group had been completed and that the whole operation had ended by 4.30 p.m. The applicants do not contest the Government’s account. 183. It was ascertained that seventy-six of the adults, along with their thirty children, were in the Republic unlawfully. Their asylum applications had either been dismissed or their files closed for failure to attend interviews. Those who had appealed to the Reviewing Authority had had their appeals dismissed. Some final decisions dated back to 2006. A number of people had also been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. Deportation orders had already been issued for twenty-three of them (see paragraph 34 above). 184. The authorities deported twenty-two people on the same day at around 6.30 p.m. (nineteen adults and three children). Forty-four people (forty-two men and two women), including the applicants, were arrested. Applicants A.T., F.T.. and H.H were detained under the deportation and detention orders that had been issued on 2 June 2010 (see paragraph 181 above). The remaining applicants were charged with the criminal offence of unlawful stay in the Republic under section 19(2) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see M.A., cited above, § 65). The applicants, along with the other detainees, were transferred to various detention centres in Cyprus. H.S., A.T., F.T., and M.S. were placed in the Limassol Police Station Detention Facility; A.M. in the Larnaca Police Station Detention facility; M.J. and H.Sw. in the Paphos Police station Detention facility; A.Hu., H.H., A.Ab., I.K. and M.Y. in the immigration detention facilities in the Nicosia Central Prisons (Block 10); M.K. in the Paralimni Police Station Detention facility and H.M. in the Xilofagou Police Station Facility. All those detained who were found to be legally resident in the Republic returned to their homes. Further, on humanitarian grounds, thirteen women whose husbands were detained pending deportation and who had a total of twenty-seven children between them were not arrested themselves. This included M.Y’s wife (see paragraphs 159-160 above). 185. According to the Government, the applicants and their co-detainees were informed orally that they had been arrested and detained on the basis that they had been staying in the Republic unlawfully and were thus “prohibited immigrants” (see M.A., cited above, § 62). They were also informed of their rights pursuant to the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained Law 2005 (Law no. 163(I)/of 2005) (see M.A., cited above, § 93) and, in particular, of their right to contact by phone, in person and in private, a lawyer of their own choice. The applicants submitted that they had not been informed of the reasons for their arrest and detention on that date. 186. On the same day letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, recommending the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The letters contained a short paragraph in respect of each person with information as to his or her immigration status. This included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service and the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority where lodged. Some letters also referred to the date the asylum application had been lodged and the date some of the individuals concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. The Government submitted copies of letters concerning thirty-seven people (most of these letters referred to groups of people). 187. Deportation and detention orders were also issued in Greek on the same day in respect of the remaining fifty-three people detained (see paragraph 183 above), including the remaining eleven applicants (see paragraph 179 above), pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of that Law. These were couched in identical terms. The order issued in respect of A.Ab. also referred to 6(1)(l) of the Law. In respect of one more person the order mentioned sections 6(1)(i) (see M.A., cited above, § 41). 188. Subsequently, on the same date, letters were prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing all the detainees individually, including the remaining applicants (see paragraph 187 above), of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted thirty-seven copies of these letters, including those addressed to the applicants, the text of which was virtually identical, a standard template having been used. The text of the letter reads as follows: “You are hereby informed that you are an illegal immigrant by virtue of paragraph (k). section 1, Article 6 of the Aliens and Immigration law, Chapter 105, as amended until 2009, because you of illegal entry [sic] Consequently your temporary residence permit/migration permit has been revoked and I have proceeded with the issue of deportation orders and detention orders dated 11th June 2010 against you. You have the right to be represented before me, or before any other Authority of the Republic and express possible objections against your deportation and seek the services of an interpreter.” 189. The only differences was that some letters referred to illegal stay rather than illegal entry and that the letters issued earlier referred to 2 June 2010 as the date of issuance of the deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 181 above). 190. On the copy of the letters to the applicants provided by the Government, there is a handwritten signed note by a police officer stating that the letters were served on the applicants on 18 June 2010 but that they refused to receive and sign for them. The other letters had a similar note or stamp on them with the same date, stating that the person concerned had refused to sign for and/or receive the letter. In a letter dated 7 September 2010 the Government stated that the applicants had been served on 18 June 2010. In their subsequent observations the Government submitted, however, that this was the second attempt to serve the letters, the first attempt having been made on 11 June 2010, that is, the day of the arrest. 191. The applicants submitted that they had never refused to receive any kind of information in writing. They claimed that it had only been on 14 June 2010 that they had been informed orally that they would be deported to Syria on the same day but that the deportation and detention orders were not served on them on that date or subsequently. They submitted that they had eventually been informed by their lawyer, following the receipt of information submitted by the Government to the Court in the context of the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that deportation and detention orders had been issued against them. 192. From the documents submitted by the Government, it appears that at least another fourteen of the detainees were to be deported on 14 June 2010 (this figure is stated in documents submitted by the Government with no further details). 193. On Saturday, 12 June 2010, the applicants, along with twenty-nine other persons of Kurdish origin, submitted a Rule 39 request in order to prevent their imminent deportation to Syria. 194. On 14 June 2010 the President of the First Section decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the respondent Government that the detainees should not be deported to Syria until the Court had had the opportunity to receive and examine all the documents pertaining to their claim. The parties were requested under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court to submit information and documents concerning the asylum applications and the deportation. 195. On 21 September 2010 the President of the First Section reconsidered the application of Rule 39 in the light of information provided by the parties. He decided to lift Rule 39 in thirty-nine applications, including the present ones. He decided to maintain the interim measure in respect of five applications (for further details see M.A., cited above, § 58). Rule 39 was subsequently lifted with regard to three of the applications. 196. Following this decision the applicants who were not covered by Rule 39 were deported to Syria on various dates (see section D below). 198. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from the Kurdish Organization for the Defence of Human Rights and Public Freedoms in Syria (“DAD”) that the applicant had been arrested and detained in Adra prison in Damascus. 199. By a letter dated 24 July 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant was living in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq. 201. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that the applicant had been arrested and detained in Adra prison in Damascus. 204. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that the applicant upon his arrival in Syria had been requested by the authorities to present himself to the civil police on two different occasions. He had then been arrested in November 2010 and detained in Damascus on unknown grounds. 205. By a letter dated 5 December 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that on 2 March 2011 the applicant had been sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Following his release from prison he left Syria and went to Austria. 207. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that upon his return to Syria the applicant had been arrested and detained in Adra prison in Damascus. 208. By a letter dated 5 December 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that on 2 March 2011 the applicant had been sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Following his release from prison he left Syria and went to Northern Iraq. 210. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that upon his return to Syria the applicant had been arrested and detained in Adra prison in Damascus for two months. 211. By a letter dated 5 December 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant, following his release from prison, had left Syria and gone to Northern Iraq. 213. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that the applicant had been arrested upon his arrival at Damasucs airport. 214. By a letter dated 24 July 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had been detained in Damascus for two days during which he had been interrogated and had revealed that he had sought asylum in Cyprus. He was then taken by the police to Al-Hasakah where he was detained by the civil police for fifteen days. He was detained in a cell measuring 1.6 square meters and he was subjected to torture and ill-treatment. In particular, he was beaten on various parts of his body with wooden sticks. During his detention he was interrogated in relation to his affiliation to political parties. Subsequently he was transferred to Al-Hasakah Central Prison where he was detained for about a month and eight days. After that he was brought before a court in Qamishli without having been informed of the charges brought against him. He was questioned as to his affiliation to political parties. He was then taken back to Al-Hasakah Central Prison. He was subsequently transferred to the Devik Central Prison in his hometown where he was detained for a night and the next day he was taken to court again. He was released after his family bribed officials and he immediately went into hiding. He hid in friends’ and relatives houses and subsequently in a bakery in Damascus, until he could find a way to leave from Syria again. While in Damascus, his cousin informed him that he had received a letter requesting the applicant to present himself at the Aleppo Police. He was told by members of his family that he was still wanted from the military and civil police. After a failed attempt to leave Syria he managed to leave through Northern Iraq. He returned to Cyprus after travelling from Turkey and was in the process of submitting a new asylum application. The applicant stated that he was still wanted by the military police in Syria and that his family was still trying to find out the reason why he was a wanted person. 216. By a letter dated 5 December 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had been arrested and detained upon his arrival in Syria and that on 2 March 2011 he had been sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Following his release, the applicant left Syria and went to Greece. 218. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that the applicant upon his arrival in Syria had his passport retained by the authorities and had been asked to show up for checks at the civil police on different occasions. His passport was eventually returned to him. 220. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had agreed to return voluntarily to Syria on 24 September 2010. 223. By a letter dated 4 July 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had been arrested a week after he returned to Syria and was still detained in Aleppo prison. He had been accused of acting against the Syrian Government while he was in Cyprus and had been sentenced to imprisonment for one year and eight months. She stated in the letter that it was expected that he would be released soon. 225. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from the DAD that when the applicant, upon his arrival in Syria, had his passport retained by the authorities and was asked to present himself to the political police on different occasions. After bribing the authorities 1000 United States dollars (USD) he was given back his passport. They authorities put a written warning in his passport that he was forbidden to travel to Greece. 228. By a letter dated 12 December 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had to serve compulsory military service once he returned to Syria. He fled, however, to Northern Iraq, before completing it. 229. The applicant returned to Syria voluntarily on 1 October 2010. No information has been given as to whether the applicant’s wife and child were eventually deported with him as planned by the authorities. 230. By a letter dated 5 December 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that according to information she had received from members of the Kurdish community in Cyprus the applicant was living in Aleppo in Syria. 231. The applicant was deported on 14 December 2010. No information has been given as to whether the applicant’s wife and child were also deported. 232. By a letter dated 27 December 2010 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant’s representative informed the Court that she had received information from DAD that the applicant upon his arrival in Syria had been arrested and detained in Adra prison in Damascus. 233. By a letter dated 24 July 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had been detained for six months, during which he had been ill-treated. After his release he remained in Syria.

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