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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:49:36.954000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:22:19.740000Z" | Malicious File | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.
Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)
While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1204.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002"
},
{
"description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2017, July 12). PSA: Don't Open SPAM Containing Password Protected Word Docs. Retrieved January 5, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Password Protected Word Docs",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/psa-dont-open-spam-containing-password-protected-word-docs/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:34:32.435000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:38:31.983000Z" | Identify Business Tempo | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1591.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003"
},
{
"description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:40:47.488000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:32:10.810000Z" | Hardware | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1592.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:01.759000Z" | "2023-05-31T12:33:20.915000Z" | Taint Shared Content |
Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.
A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)
Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1080",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080"
},
{
"description": "Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Retwin Directory Share Pivot",
"url": "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.
Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-12-28T21:59:02.181000Z" | "2024-04-19T04:27:51.388000Z" | Trust Modification | Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.
Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain)
An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1484.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"
},
{
"description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain",
"url": "https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD Federation",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods",
"url": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365"
},
{
"description": "Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023",
"url": "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection"
},
{
"description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML",
"url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name"</code>, or <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"SaaS"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-16T15:45:17.032000Z" | "2023-12-26T20:58:19.356000Z" | Symmetric Cryptography | Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1573.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:07:55.393000Z" | "2024-01-11T23:47:44.655000Z" | Local Account | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code> on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: id man page)(Citation: groups man page) On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1087.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001"
},
{
"description": "MacKenzie, D. and Robbins, A. (n.d.). id(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "id man page",
"url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/id"
},
{
"description": "MacKenzie, D. and Youngman, J. (n.d.). groups(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "groups man page",
"url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/groups"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as <code>net.exe</code> and <code>net1.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:18:35.535000Z" | "2021-10-16T17:15:12.169000Z" | Social Media Accounts | Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona.
A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1586.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001"
},
{
"description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AnonHBGary",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/"
},
{
"description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014",
"url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation"
},
{
"description": "Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage",
"url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-06-23T20:00:27.600000Z" | "2021-08-31T14:51:47.352000Z" | Safe Mode Boot | Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)
Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Safe Mode",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234"
},
{
"description": "Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019",
"url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft bcdedit 2021",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit"
},
{
"description": "Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016",
"url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise"
},
{
"description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020",
"url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware"
},
{
"description": "Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new ‘Windows Safe Mode’ encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BleepingComputer REvil 2021",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/"
},
{
"description": "Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August 30, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Bootcfg",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a <code>\*</code> in front of the "Startup" value name: <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\["\*Startup"="{Path}"]</code> or by adding a key to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal</code>.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as <code>bcdedit.exe</code> and <code>bootcfg.exe</code>.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-20T00:06:56.180000Z" | "2020-10-22T16:35:53.806000Z" | TFTP Boot | Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.
Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1542.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-17T19:13:50.402000Z" | "2024-04-11T19:25:51.394000Z" | Windows Service | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API.
Adversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)
Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002).
To make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e., [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)), for example by using the `sc sdset` command to set service permissions via the Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from the view of standard service enumeration methods such as `Get-Service`, `sc query`, and `services.exe`.(Citation: SANS 1)(Citation: SANS 2) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1543.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003"
},
{
"description": "Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection"
},
{
"description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Joshua Wright. (2020, October 13). Retrieved March 22, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS 1",
"url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/"
},
{
"description": "Joshua Wright. (2020, October 14). Retrieved March 22, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS 2",
"url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/defense-spotlight-finding-hidden-windows-services/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Services",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft 4697 APR 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697"
},
{
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 AcidBox June 2020",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts.
Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software.
Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:11:16.560000Z" | "2020-03-27T16:10:37.183000Z" | Fast Flux DNS | Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)
The simplest, "single-flux" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)
In contrast, the "double-flux" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1568.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001"
},
{
"description": "Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MehtaFastFluxPt1",
"url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref"
},
{
"description": "Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MehtaFastFluxPt2",
"url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref"
},
{
"description": "Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fast Flux - Welivesecurity",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-06T20:57:37.959000Z" | "2024-04-19T12:49:40.919000Z" | System Checks | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment.
Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Once executed, malware may also use [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.
Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output.
Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1497.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/"
},
{
"description": "Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "McAfee Virtual Jan 2017",
"url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/"
},
{
"description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-12-03T14:25:00.538000Z" | "2022-03-24T17:33:03.443000Z" | Cron | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:15:06.561000Z" | "2023-04-07T17:16:47.754000Z" | Domain Groups | Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Commands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1069.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-15T02:59:38.628000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:16:32.119000Z" | Vulnerabilities | Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database)
An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "National Vulnerability Database",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T19:15:44.182000Z" | "2024-04-15T23:51:25.037000Z" | Spearphishing Link | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.
Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)
Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)
Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured through “consent phishing” into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)
Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1566.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
"url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016"
},
{
"description": "Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Jenko Hwong. (2021, August 10). New Phishing Attacks Exploiting OAuth Authorization Flows (Part 1). Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021",
"url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/new-phishing-attacks-exploiting-oauth-authorization-flows-part-1"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, June 14). Microsoft delivers comprehensive solution to battle rise in consent phishing emails. Retrieved December 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse"
},
{
"description": "Optiv. (2021, August 17). Microsoft 365 OAuth Device Code Flow and Phishing. Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021",
"url": "https://www.optiv.com/insights/source-zero/blog/microsoft-365-oauth-device-code-flow-and-phishing"
},
{
"description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2021, June 3). OAuth’S Device Code Flow Abused in Phishing Attacks. Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/oauths-device-code-flow-abused-in-phishing-attacks"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 2.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-28T17:11:54.034000Z" | "2020-03-29T21:23:51.886000Z" | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the <code>/var/log/</code> directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)
* <code>/var/log/messages:</code>: General and system-related messages
* <code>/var/log/secure</code> or <code>/var/log/auth.log</code>: Authentication logs
* <code>/var/log/utmp</code> or <code>/var/log/wtmp</code>: Login records
* <code>/var/log/kern.log</code>: Kernel logs
* <code>/var/log/cron.log</code>: Crond logs
* <code>/var/log/maillog</code>: Mail server logs
* <code>/var/log/httpd/</code>: Web server access and error logs
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002"
},
{
"description": "Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Logs",
"url": "https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T15:37:27.052000Z" | "2022-03-25T18:11:13.604000Z" | Application or System Exploitation | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.
Adversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1499.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004"
},
{
"description": "Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sucuri BIND9 August 2015",
"url": "https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044000Z" | "2021-10-15T20:18:31.112000Z" | Office Application Startup | Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.
A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137"
},
{
"description": "SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost Ruler GitHub",
"url": "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler"
},
{
"description": "Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet O365 Outlook Rules",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/"
},
{
"description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746"
},
{
"description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page",
"url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943"
},
{
"description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
},
{
"description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
"url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.
Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page)
Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T19:09:48.811000Z" | "2022-03-11T18:47:52.603000Z" | InstallUtil | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code>.
InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN InstallUtil",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Installutil",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:09:50.723000Z" | "2024-04-19T13:26:16.082000Z" | Spearphishing Link | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)
Adversaries may also embed “tracking pixels”, "web bugs", or "web beacons" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citation: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP)
Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: Mr. D0x BitB 2022)
Adversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Human Factor)
Adversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor.
From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1598.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
"url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMictro Phishing",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html"
},
{
"description": "IAPP. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "IAPP",
"url": "https://iapp.org/resources/article/web-beacon/"
},
{
"description": "Jonathan Greig. (2023, August 16). Phishing campaign used QR codes to target large energy company. Retrieved November 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "QR-campaign-energy-firm",
"url": "https://therecord.media/phishing-campaign-used-qr-codes-to-target-energy-firm"
},
{
"description": "Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PCMag FakeLogin",
"url": "https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "mr.d0x. (2022, March 15). Browser In The Browser (BITB) Attack. Retrieved March 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mr. D0x BitB 2022",
"url": "https://mrd0x.com/browser-in-the-browser-phishing-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse"
},
{
"description": "NIST Information Technology Laboratory. (n.d.). web bug. Retrieved March 22, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NIST Web Bug",
"url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/web_bug"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). The Human Factor 2023: Analyzing the cyber attack chain. Retrieved July 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint Human Factor",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/threat-reports/pfpt-us-tr-human-factor-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ryte Wiki. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Ryte Wiki",
"url": "https://en.ryte.com/wiki/Tracking_Pixel"
},
{
"description": "Tim Bedard and Tyler Johnson. (2023, October 4). QR Code Scams & Phishing. Retrieved November 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "qr-phish-agriculture",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/email-and-cloud-threats/cybersecurity-stop-month-qr-code-phishing"
},
{
"description": "ZScaler. (2020, February 11). Fake Sites Stealing Steam Credentials. Retrieved March 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ZScaler BitB 2020",
"url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/fake-sites-stealing-steam-credentials"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:27:15.774000Z" | "2023-08-11T20:24:03.069000Z" | SSH | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1021.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004"
},
{
"description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
"url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"'</code> can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command <code>log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"'</code> can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in <code>/var/log/auth.log</code> or <code>/var/log/secure</code> depending on the distro you are using. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-19T16:59:45.362000Z" | "2024-03-29T18:29:06.873000Z" | Additional Cloud Roles | An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker)
(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)
This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.
For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the <code>CreatePolicyVersion</code> API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the <code>AttachUserPolicy</code> API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)
In some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or modify a victim-owned account.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1098.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003"
},
{
"description": " Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Expel AWS Attacker",
"url": "https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/"
},
{
"description": "Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft O365 Admin Roles",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS IAM Policies and Permissions",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud IAM Policies",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies"
},
{
"description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024",
"url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019",
"url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"IaaS",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Azure AD"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-05T13:24:49.780000Z" | "2023-10-04T14:16:17.655000Z" | Print Processors | Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, during boot.(Citation: Microsoft Intro Print Processors)
Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> API call with an account that has <code>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</code> enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> Registry key that points to the DLL.
For the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code> API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)
The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved October 5, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, June 26). Introduction to print processors. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Intro Print Processors",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-print-processors"
},
{
"description": "Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET PipeMon May 2020",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process API calls to <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> and <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code>. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> or <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> as they pertain to print processor installations.
Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T19:05:18.137000Z" | "2024-01-31T14:09:27.066000Z" | Spearphishing Attachment | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1566.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
"url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.
Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.
Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2f41939b-54c3-41d6-8f8b-35f1ec18ed97 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-29T18:30:12.244000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:26:49.584000Z" | Stripped Payloads | Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols are often created by an operating system’s `linker` when executable payloads are compiled. Reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads.(Citation: Mandiant golang stripped binaries explanation)(Citation: intezer stripped binaries elf files 2018)
Adversaries may use stripped payloads in order to make malware analysis more difficult. For example, compilers and other tools may provide features to remove or obfuscate strings and symbols. Adversaries have also used stripped payload formats, such as run-only AppleScripts, a compiled and stripped version of [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), to evade detection and analysis. The lack of human-readable information may directly hinder detection and analysis of payloads.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/008"
},
{
"description": "Ignacio Sanmillan. (2018, February 7). Executable and Linkable Format 101. Part 2: Symbols. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "intezer stripped binaries elf files 2018",
"url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/executable-linkable-format-101-part-2-symbols/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/"
},
{
"description": "STEPHEN ECKELS. (2022, February 28). Ready, Set, Go — Golang Internals and Symbol Recovery. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant golang stripped binaries explanation",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/golang-internals-symbol-recovery"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-12T14:09:53.107000Z" | "2021-07-26T22:51:20.448000Z" | Component Object Model | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1559.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001"
},
{
"description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft COM",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018",
"url": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)
Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T18:11:08.357000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:51:58.945000Z" | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.
There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)
Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.
Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)
If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001"
},
{
"description": "CrowdStrike, Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, December 30). Retrieved October 19, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Adversaries Hijack DLLs",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/"
},
{
"description": "Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Hijacking July 2010",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html"
},
{
"description": "Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye fxsst June 2011",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Manifests",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365"
},
{
"description": "Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html"
},
{
"description": "OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OWASP Binary Planting",
"url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:27.985000Z" | "2024-01-02T13:35:57.680000Z" | Automated Collection | Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.
In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023)
This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.
This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identify resources in cloud environments. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1119",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Why Are You Texting Me? UNC3944 Leverages SMS Phishing Campaigns for SIM Swapping, Ransomware, Extortion, and Notoriety. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3944-sms-phishing-sim-swapping-ransomware"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"SaaS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:25.967000Z" | "2023-04-14T21:51:47.277000Z" | Clipboard Data | Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
For example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using <code>clip.exe</code> or <code>Get-Clipboard</code>.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard)(Citation: clip_win_server)(Citation: CISA_AA21_200B) Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g., [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002)).(Citation: mining_ruby_reversinglabs)
macOS and Linux also have commands, such as <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1115",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2021, August 20). Alert (AA21-200B) Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations: Observed TTPs. Retrieved June 21, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA_AA21_200B",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-200b"
},
{
"description": "Maljic, T. (2020, April 16). Mining for malicious Ruby gems. Retrieved October 15, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mining_ruby_reversinglabs",
"url": "https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/mining-for-malicious-ruby-gems"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft, JasonGerend, et al. (2023, February 3). clip. Retrieved June 21, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "clip_win_server",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN Clipboard",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012"
},
{
"description": "rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Operating with EmPyre",
"url": "https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:46:24.434000Z" | "2024-04-10T16:41:01.496000Z" | Proc Filesystem | Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.(Citation: Picus Labs Proc cump 2022)(Citation: baeldung Linux proc map 2022)
When executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as <code>grep -E "^[0-9a-f-]* r" /proc/"$pid"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1</code>, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes.(Citation: atomic-red proc file system) When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process’s memory.(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)(Citation: Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook)
If running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the `/maps` & `/mem` locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007"
},
{
"description": "Atomic Red Team. (2023, November). T1003.007 - OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "atomic-red proc file system",
"url": "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md"
},
{
"description": "baeldung. (2022, April 8). Understanding the Linux /proc/id/maps File. Retrieved March 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "baeldung Linux proc map 2022",
"url": "https://www.baeldung.com/linux/proc-id-maps"
},
{
"description": "Carlos Polop. (2023, March 5). Linux Privilege Escalation. Retrieved March 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook",
"url": "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#proc-usdpid-maps-and-proc-usdpid-mem"
},
{
"description": "Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017",
"url": "https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin"
},
{
"description": "Huseyin Can YUCEEL & Picus Labs. (2022, March 22). Retrieved March 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Picus Labs Proc cump 2022",
"url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-mitre-attck-t1003-os-credential-dumping-technique-and-its-adversary-use"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/PID/maps`, where the `PID` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:49:05.467000Z" | "2021-04-15T02:49:14.664000Z" | Botnet | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005"
},
{
"description": "Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Norton Botnet",
"url": "https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html"
},
{
"description": "Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Imperva DDoS for Hire",
"url": "https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs-Anna",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs-Bazaar",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs-Booter",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-01-22T16:08:40.629000Z" | "2022-03-25T13:18:55.310000Z" | Password Managers | Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)
Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1555.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005"
},
{
"description": "ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ise Password Manager February 2019",
"url": "https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/"
},
{
"description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019",
"url": "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github KeeThief",
"url": "https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVD CVE-2019-3610",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610"
},
{
"description": "Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cyberreason Anchor December 2019",
"url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers.
Consider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-05T16:16:08.471000Z" | "2022-10-21T19:30:58.414000Z" | Gatekeeper Bypass | Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )
Based on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called `com.apple.quarantine` (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:
1. Checks extended attribute – Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
2. Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.
3. Code Signing – Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.
4. Notarization - Using the `api.apple-cloudkit.com` API, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an “unauthorized app” and the security policy will be modified.
Adversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211)), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)
Applications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1553.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001"
},
{
"description": "Brandon Dalton. (2022, August 9). A bundle of nerves: Tweaking macOS security controls to thwart application bundle manipulation. Retrieved September 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/"
},
{
"description": "Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021",
"url": "https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/"
},
{
"description": "Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OceanLotus for OS X",
"url": "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update"
},
{
"description": "hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag",
"url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/"
},
{
"description": "How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization ",
"url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as <code>xattr</code>. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag when performing updates.
Review <code>false</code> values under the <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code> entry in an application's <code>Info.plist</code> file (required by every application). <code>false</code> under <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code> indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code> entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag.
QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> attribute, located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2</code>. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-17T20:33:20.127000Z" | "2023-04-15T00:21:55.791000Z" | Drive-by Target | Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).
Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including:
* Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts
* Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets
* Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))
In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1608.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gallagher 2015",
"url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/"
},
{
"description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:21.315000Z" | "2023-04-03T18:55:18.326000Z" | System Service Discovery | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code>systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>.
Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:41.399000Z" | "2024-04-19T12:32:44.370000Z" | Network Sniffing | Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005) activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.
In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)
On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `monitor capture`.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1040",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Traffic Mirroring",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 17). Configure and Capture Embedded Packet on Software. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "capture_embedded_packet_on_software",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ios-nx-os-software/ios-embedded-packet-capture/116045-productconfig-epc-00.html"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP Packet Mirroring",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring"
},
{
"description": "Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass — Part 1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure Virtual Network TAP",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network",
"IaaS"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-05T16:27:37.784000Z" | "2022-09-22T19:13:52.548000Z" | Code Signing | Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001), this activity will result in a valid signature.
Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)(Citation: EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning)
Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1553.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002"
},
{
"description": "Howard Oakley. (2020, November 16). Checks on executable code in Catalina and Big Sur: a first draft. Retrieved September 21, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning",
"url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/11/16/checks-on-executable-code-in-catalina-and-big-sur-a-first-draft/"
},
{
"description": "Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist Digital Certificates",
"url": "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/"
},
{
"description": "Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Digital Certificates",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-08-30T18:07:27.741000Z" | "2023-09-29T16:11:43.530000Z" | Data from Cloud Storage | Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.
In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009). In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., [Data from Information Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213)).
Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019) There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.
This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017)(Citation: Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021)
Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1530",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Amazon S3 Security, 2019",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/"
},
{
"description": "Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide"
},
{
"description": "Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices"
},
{
"description": "HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017",
"url": "https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/"
},
{
"description": "Justin Schoenfeld, Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Transferring leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved July 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/"
},
{
"description": "Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Office 365"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T14:30:05.252000Z" | "2022-03-25T19:24:18.545000Z" | Runtime Data Manipulation | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1565.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38"
},
{
"description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T12:58:40.678000Z" | "2023-07-28T18:29:56.525000Z" | Credentials in Registry | Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)
* Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>
* Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code> | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002"
},
{
"description": "netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pentestlab Stored Credentials",
"url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044000Z" | "2023-09-29T19:44:43.870000Z" | Network Share Discovery | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, the <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points used for smb services. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1135",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Shared Folder",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Shared Resource",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 3.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:28.471000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:41.575000Z" | Peripheral Device Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1120",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120"
},
{
"description": "Shahriar Shovon. (2018, March). List USB Devices Linux. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Peripheral Discovery Linux",
"url": "https://linuxhint.com/list-usb-devices-linux/"
},
{
"description": "SS64. (n.d.). system_profiler. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Peripheral Discovery macOS",
"url": "https://ss64.com/osx/system_profiler.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--34a80bc4-80f2-46e6-94ff-f3265a4b657c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-09-27T19:49:40.815000Z" | "2023-10-03T04:06:42.256000Z" | Break Process Trees | An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection software leverages the “parent-child" relationship for detection, breaking this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts and programs.(Citation: 3OHA double-fork 2022)
On Linux systems, adversaries may execute a series of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute their payload without any arguments, call the `fork()` API call twice, then have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent process that is immediately adopted by the `init` system process (PID 1), which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from its previous process tree.
Another example is using the “daemon” syscall to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/009"
},
{
"description": "Juan Tapiador. (2022, April 11). UNIX daemonization and the double fork. Retrieved September 29, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "3OHA double-fork 2022",
"url": "https://0xjet.github.io/3OHA/2022/04/11/post.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, May 19). Rise in XorDdos: A deeper look at the stealthy DDoS malware targeting Linux devices. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/19/rise-in-xorddos-a-deeper-look-at-the-stealthy-ddos-malware-targeting-linux-devices/"
},
{
"description": "The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sandfly BPFDoor 2022",
"url": "https://sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:49:03.815000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:33:02.476000Z" | Network Topology | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:41:08.652000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:07:08.549000Z" | Code Signing Certificates | Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1587.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T19:17:41.767000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:27:04.900000Z" | Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018)
Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1222.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110"
},
{
"description": "M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DACL May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces"
},
{
"description": "Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014",
"url": "https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-07T19:52:52.801000Z" | "2021-08-16T21:26:09.296000Z" | Add-ins | Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)
Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Office Add-ins",
"url": "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460"
},
{
"description": "Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins",
"url": "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Mail CDS 2018",
"url": "https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019",
"url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-12-12T15:08:20.972000Z" | "2021-10-18T17:05:44.321000Z" | Transport Agent | Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks.
Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1505.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help"
},
{
"description": "Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET LightNeuron May 2019",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:04.307000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:40.871000Z" | System Information Discovery | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</code> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. <code>show version</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1082",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Instances Resource",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Virutal Machine API",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX.FairyTale",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Network"
] | 2.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:56.776000Z" | "2024-01-17T22:52:23.454000Z" | Application Layer Protocol | Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1071",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--356662f7-e315-4759-86c9-6214e2a50ff8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-28T15:36:34.141000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:44:25.342000Z" | AppDomainManager | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking how the .NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution of .NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code.(Citation: Microsoft App Domains)
Known as "AppDomainManager injection," adversaries may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies. For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration files (`.config`) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.(Citation: PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject)(Citation: PwC Yellow Liderc)(Citation: Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014"
},
{
"description": "Administrator. (2020, May 26). APPDOMAINMANAGER INJECTION AND DETECTION. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject",
"url": "https://pentestlaboratories.com/2020/05/26/appdomainmanager-injection-and-detection/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 15). Application domains. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft App Domains",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/app-domains/application-domains"
},
{
"description": "PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PwC Yellow Liderc",
"url": "https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html"
},
{
"description": "Spagnola, N. (2023, May 5). AppDomain Manager Injection: New Techniques For Red Teams. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/05/appdomain-manager-injection-new-techniques-for-red-teams/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T21:14:58.206000Z" | "2021-03-08T10:33:02.019000Z" | Remote Data Staging | Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1074.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--35d30338-5bfa-41b0-a170-ec06dfd75f64 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-07-14T14:01:50.806000Z" | "2023-10-16T17:51:35.865000Z" | Additional Container Cluster Roles | An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes account.(Citation: Kubernetes RBAC)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023) Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account additional permissions.(Citation: Kuberentes ABAC)
This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised.
Note that where container orchestration systems are deployed in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based role-based access control (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition to local permission assignments.(Citation: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM)(Citation: AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Service Accounts) In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction with [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1098.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/006"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). IAM roles for service accounts. Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Create IAM policies. Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/iam"
},
{
"description": "Kuberenets. (n.d.). Using ABAC Authorization. Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kuberentes ABAC",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/abac/"
},
{
"description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Role Based Access Control Good Practices. Retrieved March 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes RBAC",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/"
},
{
"description": "Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023",
"url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Azure. (2023, April 28). Access and identity options for Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS). Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Service Accounts",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/concepts-identity"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:46.977000Z" | "2024-03-01T15:29:46.832000Z" | Scheduled Task/Job | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053"
},
{
"description": "Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ProofPoint Serpent",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Task Scheduler Security",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers"
] | 2.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:38:49.266000Z" | "2022-04-19T17:33:16.346000Z" | Msiexec | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007"
},
{
"description": "Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Msiexec",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft msiexec",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:47:59.457000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:34:22.917000Z" | Network Trust Dependencies | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003"
},
{
"description": "García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pentesting AD Forests",
"url": "https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T20:08:03.691000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:41.052000Z" | Reflection Amplification | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.
Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1498.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002"
},
{
"description": "Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017",
"url": "https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/"
},
{
"description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018",
"url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018",
"url": "https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:05:45.829000Z" | "2021-04-20T20:11:55.147000Z" | Password Filter DLL | Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated.
Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.
Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002"
},
{
"description": "Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013",
"url": "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html"
},
{
"description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013",
"url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-03-28T15:34:44.590000Z" | "2022-04-18T20:22:44.971000Z" | Terminal Services DLL | Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)
[Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a "generic" process (ex: <code>svchost.exe</code>) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named <code>ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The <code>termsrv.dll</code> file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\System32\`, is the default <code>ServiceDll</code> value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\`.
Adversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal <code>termsrv.dll</code> functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the <code>termsrv.dll</code> file or modifying the <code>ServiceDll</code> value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1505.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005"
},
{
"description": "James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "James TermServ DLL",
"url": "https://twitter.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, February 17). Windows System Services Fundamentals. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft System Services Fundamentals",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/12229.windows-system-services-fundamentals.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 23). About Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Remote Desktop Services",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/about-terminal-services"
},
{
"description": "Stas'M Corp. (2014, October 22). RDP Wrapper Library by Stas'M. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RDPWrap Github",
"url": "https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap"
},
{
"description": "Windows OS Hub. (2021, November 10). How to Allow Multiple RDP Sessions in Windows 10 and 11?. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows OS Hub RDP",
"url": "http://woshub.com/how-to-allow-multiple-rdp-sessions-in-windows-10/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for changes to Registry keys associated with <code>ServiceDll</code> and other subkey values under <code>HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\</code>.
Monitor unexpected changes and/or interactions with <code>termsrv.dll</code>, which is typically stored in <code>%SystemRoot%\System32\</code>.
Monitor commands as well as processes and arguments for potential adversary actions to modify Registry values (ex: <code>reg.exe</code>) or modify/replace the legitimate <code>termsrv.dll</code>.
Monitor module loads by the Terminal Services process (ex: <code>svchost.exe -k termsvcs</code>) for unexpected DLLs (the default is <code>%SystemRoot%\System32\termsrv.dll</code>, though an adversary could also use [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005) on a malicious payload). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T14:07:54.329000Z" | "2024-03-01T19:06:05.126000Z" | AppleScript | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Scripts can be run from the command-line via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e "script here"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code>#!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)
AppleScripts do not need to call <code>osascript</code> to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s <code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascript</code> command line utility.
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple AppleScript",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelOne AppleScript",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/"
},
{
"description": "Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Macro Malware Targets Macs",
"url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for execution of AppleScript through <code>osascript</code> and usage of the <code>NSAppleScript</code> and <code>OSAScript</code> APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465000Z" | "2024-04-18T23:22:37.874000Z" | Browser Extensions | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In macOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however <code>.mobileconfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)
There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1176",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176"
},
{
"description": "Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chrome Extension Crypto Miner",
"url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/"
},
{
"description": "Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "xorrior chrome extensions macOS",
"url": "https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/"
},
{
"description": "Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chrome Extensions Definition",
"url": "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions"
},
{
"description": "De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ICEBRG Chrome Extensions",
"url": "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
},
{
"description": "Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers",
"url": "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chrome Extension C2 Malware",
"url": "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). \"Catch-All\" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Catch All Chrome Extension",
"url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)"
},
{
"description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds",
"url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2020, December 10). Widespread malware campaign seeks to silently inject ads into search results, affects multiple browsers. Retrieved February 26, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Browser Adrozek",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/"
},
{
"description": "Raggi, Michael. Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2021, February 25). TA413 Leverages New FriarFox Browser Extension to Target the Gmail Accounts of Global Tibetan Organizations. Retrieved February 26, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Browers FriarFox",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta413-leverages-new-friarfox-browser-extension-target-gmail-accounts-global"
},
{
"description": "Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stantinko Botnet",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Browser Extension",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.
Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.
On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as <code>profiles install -type=configuration</code>. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a <code>plist</code> file in the <code>/Library/Managed Preferences/username/</code> directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T15:31:43.613000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:43.164000Z" | Service Exhaustion Flood | Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.
One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)
Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1499.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002"
},
{
"description": "ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arbor SSLDoS April 2012",
"url": "https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare HTTPflood",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018",
"url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.
In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:28:40.064000Z" | "2022-04-28T16:05:10.755000Z" | Compromise Hardware Supply Chain | Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1195.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:17.472000Z" | "2023-10-13T16:01:07.538000Z" | Native API | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.
Native API functions (such as <code>NtCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks.(Citation: Redops Syscalls) Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1106",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MACOS Cocoa",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Core Services",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS Foundation",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation"
},
{
"description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OutFlank System Calls",
"url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/"
},
{
"description": "Feichter, D. (2023, June 30). Direct Syscalls vs Indirect Syscalls. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Redops Syscalls",
"url": "https://redops.at/en/blog/direct-syscalls-vs-indirect-syscalls"
},
{
"description": "Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GNU Fork",
"url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html"
},
{
"description": "Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CyberBit System Calls",
"url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/"
},
{
"description": "glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GLIBC",
"url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/"
},
{
"description": "Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LIBC",
"url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html"
},
{
"description": "Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Kernel API",
"url": "https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html"
},
{
"description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MDSec System Calls",
"url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft CreateProcess",
"url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Win32",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft NET",
"url": "https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework"
},
{
"description": "The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NT API Windows",
"url": "https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.
Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3975dbb5-0e1e-4f5b-bae1-cf2ab84b46dc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-06-15T18:00:04.219000Z" | "2023-09-08T18:05:28.311000Z" | Clear Network Connection History and Configurations | Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133). Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.
Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under (Citation: Microsoft RDP Removal):
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers</code>
Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as <code>C:\Users\\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp</code> and `C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal
Server Client\Cache\`.(Citation: Moran RDPieces) Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in `/Library/Logs` and/or `/var/log/`).(Citation: Apple Culprit Access)(Citation: FreeDesktop Journal)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004) or tampering to enable [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090). Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/007"
},
{
"description": "freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd-journald.service. Retrieved June 15, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FreeDesktop Journal",
"url": "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-journald.service.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 24). How to remove entries from the Remote Desktop Connection Computer box. Retrieved June 15, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft RDP Removal",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer"
},
{
"description": "Moran, B. (2020, November 18). Putting Together the RDPieces. Retrieved October 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Moran RDPieces",
"url": "https://www.osdfcon.org/presentations/2020/Brian-Moran_Putting-Together-the-RDPieces.pdf"
},
{
"description": "rjben. (2012, May 30). How do you find the culprit when unauthorized access to a computer is a problem?. Retrieved August 3, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Culprit Access",
"url": "https://discussions.apple.com/thread/3991574"
},
{
"description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
"url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-08-24T13:43:00.028000Z" | "2021-06-07T19:23:33.039000Z" | AS-REP Roasting | Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)
Preauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)
For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) attacks similarly to [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003) and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)
An account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)
Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1558.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004"
},
{
"description": "HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/"
},
{
"description": "Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019",
"url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"
},
{
"description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014",
"url": "https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
},
{
"description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:55:17.771000Z" | "2021-10-17T15:59:02.770000Z" | Virtual Private Server | Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)
Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003"
},
{
"description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig",
"url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
},
{
"description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation"
},
{
"description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
"url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3a32740a-11b0-4bcf-b0a9-3abd0f6d3cd5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-29T18:07:04.743000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:58:48.119000Z" | AutoHotKey & AutoIT | Adversaries may execute commands and perform malicious tasks using AutoIT and AutoHotKey automation scripts. AutoIT and AutoHotkey (AHK) are scripting languages that enable users to automate Windows tasks. These automation scripts can be used to perform a wide variety of actions, such as clicking on buttons, entering text, and opening and closing programs.(Citation: AutoIT)(Citation: AutoHotKey)
Adversaries may use AHK (`.ahk`) and AutoIT (`.au3`) scripts to execute malicious code on a victim's system. For example, adversaries have used for AHK to execute payloads and other modular malware such as keyloggers. Adversaries have also used custom AHK files containing embedded malware as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payloads.(Citation: Splunk DarkGate)
These scripts may also be compiled into self-contained executable payloads (`.exe`).(Citation: AutoIT)(Citation: AutoHotKey) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/010"
},
{
"description": "AutoHotkey Foundation LLC. (n.d.). Using the Program. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AutoHotKey",
"url": "https://www.autohotkey.com/docs/v1/Program.htm"
},
{
"description": "AutoIT. (n.d.). Running Scripts. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AutoIT",
"url": "https://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/docs/intro/running.htm"
},
{
"description": "Splunk Threat Research Team. (2024, January 17). Enter The Gates: An Analysis of the DarkGate AutoIt Loader. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Splunk DarkGate",
"url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/enter-the-gates-an-analysis-of-the-darkgate-autoit-loader.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T19:03:48.310000Z" | "2020-10-21T22:36:22.369000Z" | Reduce Key Space | Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.
Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1600.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-31T12:32:08.228000Z" | "2024-02-14T20:07:44.756000Z" | Clear Command History | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.
Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>history -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to clear command history data (<code>clear logging</code> and/or <code>clear history</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code> module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003"
},
{
"description": "jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos PowerShell command audit",
"url": "https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft PowerShell Command History",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
},
{
"description": "Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics",
"url": "https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file can be an indicator of suspicious activity.
Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> and use of the <code>Clear-History</code> command. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-05-05T05:06:38.938000Z" | Indirect Command Execution | Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)
Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1202",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202"
},
{
"description": "Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017",
"url": "https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120"
},
{
"description": "Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RSA Forfiles Aug 2017",
"url": "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe"
},
{
"description": "vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017",
"url": "https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:08.977000Z" | "2023-10-17T20:42:21.453000Z" | Replication Through Removable Media | Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.
Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1091",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091"
},
{
"description": "Lucian Constantin. (2014, January 23). Windows malware tries to infect Android devices connected to PCs. Retrieved May 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows Malware Infecting Android",
"url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/2486903/windows-malware-tries-to-infect-android-devices-connected-to-pcs.html"
},
{
"description": "Zack Whittaker. (2019, August 12). This hacker’s iPhone charging cable can hijack your computer. Retrieved May 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "iPhone Charging Cable Hack",
"url": "https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/12/iphone-charging-cable-hack-computer-def-con/"
},
{
"description": "Zhaohui Wang & Angelos Stavrou. (n.d.). Exploiting Smart-Phone USB Connectivity For Fun And Profit. Retrieved May 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Exploiting Smartphone USB ",
"url": "https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.226.3427&rep=rep1&type=pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:20.537000Z" | "2023-04-12T23:54:39.466000Z" | Data from Local System | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). show running-config - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "show_run_config_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_protocols_through_showmon.html#wp2760878733"
},
{
"description": "Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to collect files such as configuration files with built-in features native to the network device platform.(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands that view configuration files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044000Z" | "2023-08-14T19:28:18.334000Z" | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
One such example is the use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.(Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.(Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1140",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity PowerDuke November 2016",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
},
{
"description": "Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/"
},
{
"description": "Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016",
"url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160).
Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-07T20:00:25.560000Z" | "2021-10-15T20:18:30.700000Z" | Outlook Rules | Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005"
},
{
"description": "Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SilentBreak Outlook Rules",
"url": "https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/"
},
{
"description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
},
{
"description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules",
"url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/"
},
{
"description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
"url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T20:22:13.470000Z" | "2023-10-20T16:43:53.391000Z" | Impair Defenses | Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.
Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Emotet shutdown)
Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562"
},
{
"description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, November 8). Emotet Strikes Again – LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved March 6, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Emotet shutdown",
"url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.
Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-05-27T14:30:01.904000Z" | "2022-10-21T14:21:57.991000Z" | Cloud Accounts | Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)
A variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1586.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003"
},
{
"description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud",
"url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:20:53.104000Z" | "2023-04-11T01:07:48.218000Z" | Email Accounts | Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).
A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.
Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1586.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002"
},
{
"description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AnonHBGary",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-17T20:09:13.222000Z" | "2023-04-11T23:22:49.534000Z" | Upload Malware | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1608.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/"
},
{
"description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2024-02-26T14:23:37.009000Z" | Supply Chain Compromise | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
* Manipulation of development tools
* Manipulation of a development environment
* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
* Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1195",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195"
},
{
"description": "Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Avast CCleaner3 2018",
"url": "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities"
},
{
"description": "Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Command Five SK 2011",
"url": "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf"
},
{
"description": "IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "IBM Storwize",
"url": "https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E"
},
{
"description": "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Schneider Electric USB Malware",
"url": "https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/"
},
{
"description": "Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trendmicro NPM Compromise",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets"
},
{
"description": "Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Dofoil 2018",
"url": "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2023-11-28T21:27:35.373000Z" | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).
If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.
Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)
For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1190",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190"
},
{
"description": "Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CWE top 25",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html"
},
{
"description": "CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/"
},
{
"description": "Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wired Russia Cyberwar",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/"
},
{
"description": "Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVD CVE-2016-6662",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVD CVE-2014-7169",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OWASP Top 10",
"url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Network",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers"
] | 2.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:12:46.830000Z" | "2024-03-01T16:58:02.395000Z" | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1558",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558"
},
{
"description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection",
"url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"
},
{
"description": "Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kekeo",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo"
},
{
"description": "Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f"
},
{
"description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
"url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
},
{
"description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019",
"url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS kerberos framework MIT",
"url": "http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html"
},
{
"description": "Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MIT ccache",
"url": "https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket",
"url": "https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Klist",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist"
},
{
"description": "Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=227"
},
{
"description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix",
"url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Kerberos Tickets",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)
Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally.
Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.
Monitor for unusual processes accessing <code>secrets.ldb</code> and <code>.secrets.mkey</code> located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/</code>. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:48:28.456000Z" | "2024-02-26T14:19:09.417000Z" | Credentials from Password Stores | Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1555",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555"
},
{
"description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "F-Secure The Dukes",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"IaaS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T12:51:45.570000Z" | "2023-09-05T15:00:36.471000Z" | Exfiltration Over Web Service | Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1567",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2024-04-12T23:52:30.489000Z" | Remote Access Software | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)
Remote access software may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.
Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Installation of many remote access software may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).(Citation: Google Chrome Remote Desktop)(Citation: Chrome Remote Desktop) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1219",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219"
},
{
"description": "CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report",
"url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf"
},
{
"description": "CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrySyS Blog TeamSpy",
"url": "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Chrome Remote Desktop",
"url": "https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/1649523"
},
{
"description": "Huntress. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chrome Remote Desktop",
"url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708"
},
{
"description": "Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Living off the Land",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.
[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 2.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-09-30T17:09:31.878000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:55:55.068000Z" | Domains | Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.
Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)
Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)
Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)
Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "URI Unique",
"url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF"
},
{
"description": "Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PaypalScam",
"url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA MSS Sep 2020",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a"
},
{
"description": "Fehrman, B. (2017, April 13). How to Bypass Web-Proxy Filtering. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "bypass_webproxy_filtering",
"url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/bypass-web-proxy-filtering/"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT28",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Krebs, B. (2018, November 13). That Domain You Forgot to Renew? Yeah, it’s Now Stealing Credit Cards. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Domain_Steal_CC",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/that-domain-you-forgot-to-renew-yeah-its-now-stealing-credit-cards/"
},
{
"description": "Malhotra, A., McKay, K. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal . Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "tt_obliqueRAT",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html"
},
{
"description": "Malhotra, A., Thattil, J. et al. (2022, March 29). Transparent Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware to target Indian government officials . Retrieved September 6, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "tt_httrack_fake_domains",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "MDSec Research. (2017, July). Categorisation is not a Security Boundary. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Categorisation_not_boundary",
"url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/07/categorisation-is-not-a-security-boundary/"
},
{
"description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "URI",
"url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits"
},
{
"description": "Mudge, R. (2017, February 6). High-reputation Redirectors and Domain Fronting. Retrieved July 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Redirectors_Domain_Fronting",
"url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/high-reputation-redirectors-and-domain-fronting/"
},
{
"description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "URI Use",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "iOS URL Scheme",
"url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html"
},
{
"description": "RISKIQ. (2017, December 20). Mining Insights: Infrastructure Analysis of Lazarus Group Cyber Attacks on the Cryptocurrency Industry. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "lazgroup_idn_phishing",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171223000420/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/"
},
{
"description": "RISKIQ. (2022, March 15). RiskIQ Threat Intelligence Roundup: Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Global Malware Infrastructure. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "httrack_unhcr",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220527112908/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/ukraine-malware-infrastructure/"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T21:08:52.529000Z" | "2020-03-29T18:27:30.891000Z" | Archive via Library | An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.
Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1560.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002"
},
{
"description": "mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PyPI RAR",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/"
},
{
"description": "D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "libzip",
"url": "https://libzip.org/"
},
{
"description": "madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Zlib Github",
"url": "https://github.com/madler/zlib"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia File Header Signatures",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:28:32.166000Z" | "2021-10-18T12:22:50.800000Z" | Thread Execution Hijacking | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:38.511000Z" | "2024-03-08T17:00:59.133000Z" | Masquerading | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update",
"url": "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457"
},
{
"description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)
Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Containers"
] | 1.7 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:56:24.231000Z" | "2020-11-10T18:29:31.094000Z" | Application Shimming | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
* <code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb</code> and
* <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</code>
Custom databases are stored in:
* <code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code> and
* <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom</code>
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).
Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Application Shimming",
"url": "http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Black Hat 2015 App Shim",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):
* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags
* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases
* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations
* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory
* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)
Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T12:47:23.631000Z" | "2024-04-15T21:33:12.892000Z" | Unsecured Credentials | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552"
},
{
"description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix",
"url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.
Monitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior.
Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T19:46:27.750000Z" | "2024-04-12T02:49:39.980000Z" | Port Monitors | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham)
Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. The Registry key contains entries for the following:
* Local Port
* Standard TCP/IP Port
* USB Monitor
* WSD Port
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010"
},
{
"description": "Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bloxham",
"url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AddMonitor",
"url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process API calls to <code>AddMonitor</code>.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
Monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>, paying particular attention to changes in the "Driver" subkey. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--438c967d-3996-4870-bfc2-3954752a1927 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-07-08T21:04:03.739000Z" | "2023-04-12T20:56:32.743000Z" | Clear Mailbox Data | Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests.
Adversaries may manipulate emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534), [Email Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114), [Mail Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003) for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). For example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the <code>ExchangePowerShell</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module, including <code>Remove-MailboxExportRequest</code> to remove evidence of mailbox exports.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: ExchangePowerShell Module) On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command line utility called <code>mail</code> or use [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to interact with APIs on macOS.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: mailx man page)
Adversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails being detected by security products.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/008"
},
{
"description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/"
},
{
"description": "Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017",
"url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Michael Kerrisk. (2021, August 27). mailx(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 10, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mailx man page",
"url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/mailx.1p.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 25). ExchangePowerShell. Retrieved June 10, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ExchangePowerShell Module",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/?view=exchange-ps#mailboxes"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-10T16:01:15.995000Z" | "2022-04-20T16:42:05.094000Z" | Login Hook | Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file and can be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev)
Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file, using the <code>LoginHook</code> or <code>LogoutHook</code> key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter)
**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Customizing Login and Logout. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Login Scripts Apple Dev",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). LoginWindowScripts. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wardle Persistence Chapter",
"url": "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "S1 macOs Persistence",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--43c9bc06-715b-42db-972f-52d25c09a20c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-09-01T21:03:13.406000Z" | "2023-10-01T02:28:45.147000Z" | Content Injection | Adversaries may gain access and continuously communicate with victims by injecting malicious content into systems through online network traffic. Rather than luring victims to malicious payloads hosted on a compromised website (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004) followed by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)), adversaries may initially access victims through compromised data-transfer channels where they can manipulate traffic and/or inject their own content. These compromised online network channels may also be used to deliver additional payloads (i.e., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and other data to already compromised systems.(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)
Adversaries may inject content to victim systems in various ways, including:
* From the middle, where the adversary is in-between legitimate online client-server communications (**Note:** this is similar but distinct from [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557), which describes AiTM activity solely within an enterprise environment) (Citation: Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM)
* From the side, where malicious content is injected and races to the client as a fake response to requests of a legitimate online server (Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)
Content injection is often the result of compromised upstream communication channels, for example at the level of an internet service provider (ISP) as is the case with "lawful interception."(Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)(Citation: EFF China GitHub Attack) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1659",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659"
},
{
"description": "Budington, B. (2015, April 2). China Uses Unencrypted Websites to Hijack Browsers in GitHub Attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "EFF China GitHub Attack",
"url": "https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/china-uses-unencrypted-websites-to-hijack-browsers-in-github-attack"
},
{
"description": "Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 1, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET MoustachedBouncer",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moustachedbouncer-espionage-against-foreign-diplomats-in-belarus/"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky IT Encyclopedia. (n.d.). Man-in-the-middle attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM",
"url": "https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/man-in-the-middle-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Starikova, A. (2023, February 14). Man-on-the-side – peculiar attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky ManOnTheSide",
"url": "https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-on-the-side/27854/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:47.843000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:45.488000Z" | Process Injection | Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific.
More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055"
},
{
"description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GNU Acct",
"url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RHEL auditd",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing"
},
{
"description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics",
"url": null
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
},
{
"description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits",
"url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, <code>QueueUserAPC</code>/<code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--43f2776f-b4bd-4118-94b8-fee47e69676d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-07-20T15:30:55.763000Z" | "2023-10-12T05:22:59.079000Z" | Exfiltration Over Webhook | Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server.(Citation: RedHat Webhooks) Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello.(Citation: Discord Intro to Webhooks) When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application.
Adversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated [Automated Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020) of emails, chat messages, and other data.(Citation: Push Security SaaS Attacks Repository Webhooks) Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it.(Citation: Microsoft SQL Server)
Access to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.(Citation: CyberArk Labs Discord)(Citation: Talos Discord Webhook Abuse)(Citation: Checkmarx Webhooks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1567.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/004"
},
{
"description": " Jossef Harush Kadouri. (2022, March 7). Webhook Party — Malicious packages caught exfiltrating data via legit webhook services. Retrieved July 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Checkmarx Webhooks",
"url": "https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/webhook-party-malicious-packages-caught-exfiltrating-data-via-legit-webhook-services-6e046b07d191"
},
{
"description": "CyberArk Labs. (2023, April 13). The (Not so) Secret War on Discord. Retrieved July 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CyberArk Labs Discord",
"url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-not-so-secret-war-on-discord"
},
{
"description": "D. (n.d.). Intro to Webhooks. Retrieved July 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Discord Intro to Webhooks",
"url": "https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/articles/228383668-Intro-to-Webhooks"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 3). Defending new vectors: Threat actors attempt SQL Server to cloud lateral movement. Retrieved October 3, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SQL Server",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2023/10/03/defending-new-vectors-threat-actors-attempt-sql-server-to-cloud-lateral-movement/"
},
{
"description": "Nick Biasini, Edmund Brumaghin, Chris Neal, and Paul Eubanks. (2021, April 7). https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/. Retrieved July 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Discord Webhook Abuse",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/"
},
{
"description": "Push Security. (2023, July 31). Webhooks. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Push Security SaaS Attacks Repository Webhooks",
"url": "https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/webhooks/description.md"
},
{
"description": "RedHat. (2022, June 1). What is a webhook?. Retrieved July 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RedHat Webhooks",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/automation/what-is-a-webhook"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"SaaS",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-10-19T23:08:40.603000Z" | Traffic Signaling | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1205",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205"
},
{
"description": "Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/"
},
{
"description": "AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AMD Magic Packet",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant - Synful Knock",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
},
{
"description": "Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hartrell cd00r 2002",
"url": "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitLab WakeOnLAN",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.4 |