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int64 0
522k
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stringclasses 631
values | commit_id
stringlengths 7
40
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stringclasses 630
values | commit_url
stringlengths 4
164
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stringlengths 0
11.5k
| target
int64 0
1
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stringlengths 5
484k
| func_hash
float64 1,559,120,642,045,605,000,000,000B
340,279,892,905,069,500,000,000,000,000B
| file_name
stringlengths 4
45
| file_hash
float64 25,942,829,220,065,710,000,000,000B
340,272,304,251,680,200,000,000,000,000B
⌀ | cwe
sequencelengths 0
1
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stringlengths 4
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stringlengths 0
2.3k
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stringlengths 37
49
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
7,897 | Chrome | 87e204e0aaf7445afbd0d50af6849d857517ae70 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87e204e0aaf7445afbd0d50af6849d857517ae70 | None | 1 | PerformanceNavigationTiming::PerformanceNavigationTiming(
LocalFrame* frame,
ResourceTimingInfo* info,
TimeTicks time_origin,
const WebVector<WebServerTimingInfo>& server_timing)
: PerformanceResourceTiming(info ? info->InitialURL().GetString() : "",
"navigation",
time_origin,
server_timing),
ContextClient(frame),
resource_timing_info_(info) {
DCHECK(frame);
DCHECK(info);
}
| 278,483,109,287,912,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2018-6134 | Information leak in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to bypass no-referrer policy via a crafted HTML page. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6134 |
7,899 | Chrome | 67d9b414fa64448abc398ae9fc57c3ddf5de5998 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/67d9b414fa64448abc398ae9fc57c3ddf5de5998 | None | 1 | scoped_refptr<Image> CSSPaintValue::GetImage(
const ImageResourceObserver& client,
const Document& document,
const ComputedStyle&,
const FloatSize& target_size) {
if (!generator_) {
generator_ = CSSPaintImageGenerator::Create(
GetName(), document, paint_image_generator_observer_);
}
if (!ParseInputArguments(document))
return nullptr;
return generator_->Paint(client, RoundedIntSize(target_size),
parsed_input_arguments_);
}
| 134,061,584,196,077,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2018-6137 | CSS Paint API in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6137 |
7,907 | Chrome | 46f5cfb6414c04b65cba4ec59ca992f338934fc9 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/46f5cfb6414c04b65cba4ec59ca992f338934fc9 | None | 1 | bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseVideoCaptureApiForDevToolsSnapshots)) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
}
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 228,237,655,791,597,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-6139 | Insufficient target checks on the chrome.debugger API in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6139 |
7,924 | Chrome | 1f35b6980f600ec93e167118c21959d5cbd7c5c4 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1f35b6980f600ec93e167118c21959d5cbd7c5c4 | None | 1 | void CredentialManagerImpl::OnProvisionalSaveComplete() {
DCHECK(form_manager_);
DCHECK(client_->IsSavingAndFillingEnabledForCurrentPage());
const autofill::PasswordForm& form = form_manager_->pending_credentials();
if (form_manager_->IsPendingCredentialsPublicSuffixMatch()) {
form_manager_->Save();
return;
}
if (!form.federation_origin.unique()) {
for (auto* match : form_manager_->form_fetcher()->GetFederatedMatches()) {
if (match->username_value == form.username_value &&
match->federation_origin.IsSameOriginWith(form.federation_origin)) {
form_manager_->Update(*match);
return;
}
}
} else if (!form_manager_->IsNewLogin()) {
form_manager_->Update(*form_manager_->preferred_match());
return;
}
client_->PromptUserToSaveOrUpdatePassword(std::move(form_manager_), false);
}
| 23,707,503,991,766,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-6143 | Insufficient validation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6143 |
7,927 | Chrome | 7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6 | None | 1 | ExtensionNavigationThrottle::WillStartOrRedirectRequest() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
content::WebContents* web_contents = navigation_handle()->GetWebContents();
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
const GURL& url = navigation_handle()->GetURL();
bool url_has_extension_scheme = url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme);
url::Origin target_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
const Extension* target_extension = nullptr;
if (url_has_extension_scheme) {
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
} else if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme) {
DCHECK(url.SchemeIsFileSystem() || url.SchemeIsBlob());
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(target_origin.host());
} else {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
if (!target_extension) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
if (target_extension->is_hosted_app()) {
base::StringPiece resource_root_relative_path =
url.path_piece().empty() ? base::StringPiece()
: url.path_piece().substr(1);
if (!IconsInfo::GetIcons(target_extension)
.ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
}
if (navigation_handle()->IsInMainFrame()) {
bool current_frame_is_extension_process =
!!registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (!url_has_extension_scheme && !current_frame_is_extension_process) {
if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme &&
navigation_handle()->GetSuggestedFilename().has_value()) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
bool has_webview_permission =
target_extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
APIPermission::kWebView);
if (!has_webview_permission)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
}
guest_view::GuestViewBase* guest =
guest_view::GuestViewBase::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (url_has_extension_scheme && guest) {
const std::string& owner_extension_id = guest->owner_host();
const Extension* owner_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(owner_extension_id);
std::string partition_domain;
std::string partition_id;
bool in_memory = false;
bool is_guest = WebViewGuest::GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL(),
&partition_domain, &partition_id, &in_memory);
bool allowed = true;
url_request_util::AllowCrossRendererResourceLoadHelper(
is_guest, target_extension, owner_extension, partition_id, url.path(),
navigation_handle()->GetPageTransition(), &allowed);
if (!allowed)
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
content::RenderFrameHost* parent = navigation_handle()->GetParentFrame();
bool external_ancestor = false;
for (auto* ancestor = parent; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->GetParent()) {
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedOrigin() == target_origin)
continue;
if (url::Origin::Create(ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL()) == target_origin)
continue;
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL().SchemeIs(
content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
continue;
external_ancestor = true;
break;
}
if (external_ancestor) {
if (!url_has_extension_scheme)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
if (!WebAccessibleResourcesInfo::IsResourceWebAccessible(target_extension,
url.path()))
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
if (target_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
const Extension* parent_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
parent->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (parent_extension && parent_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
| 332,886,639,999,288,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-6121 | Insufficient validation of input in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.170 allowed a remote attacker to perform privilege escalation via a crafted HTML page. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6121 |
7,938 | Chrome | 75b803b1c81ed9fa5513cbff550232b4fb915e7b | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75b803b1c81ed9fa5513cbff550232b4fb915e7b | None | 1 | v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value;
if (!GetPrivate(global, kModulesField, &modules_value) ||
modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
| 271,380,316,653,586,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-1672 | The ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner function in extensions/renderer/module_system.cc in the extension bindings in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 mishandles properties, which allows remote attackers to conduct bindings-interception attacks and bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1672 |
7,952 | Chrome | 5289a5d4c98681e9a0f2d28da0c7aa35e282db57 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5289a5d4c98681e9a0f2d28da0c7aa35e282db57 | None | 1 | void ServiceWorkerContainer::registerServiceWorkerImpl(ExecutionContext* executionContext, const KURL& rawScriptURL, const KURL& scope, PassOwnPtr<RegistrationCallbacks> callbacks)
{
if (!m_provider) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeState, "Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The document is in an invalid state."));
return;
}
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> documentOrigin = executionContext->getSecurityOrigin();
String errorMessage;
if (!executionContext->isSecureContext(errorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, errorMessage));
return;
}
KURL pageURL = KURL(KURL(), documentOrigin->toString());
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(pageURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL scriptURL = rawScriptURL;
scriptURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(scriptURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> scriptOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(scriptURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scriptURL ('" + scriptOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(scriptURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the script ('" + scriptURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
KURL patternURL = scope;
patternURL.removeFragmentIdentifier();
if (!documentOrigin->canRequest(patternURL)) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> patternOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(patternURL);
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The origin of the provided scope ('" + patternOrigin->toString() + "') does not match the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "').")));
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(patternURL.protocol())) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeSecurity, String("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: The URL protocol of the scope ('" + patternURL.getString() + "') is not supported.")));
return;
}
WebString webErrorMessage;
if (!m_provider->validateScopeAndScriptURL(patternURL, scriptURL, &webErrorMessage)) {
callbacks->onError(WebServiceWorkerError(WebServiceWorkerError::ErrorTypeType, WebString::fromUTF8("Failed to register a ServiceWorker: " + webErrorMessage.utf8())));
return;
}
m_provider->registerServiceWorker(patternURL, scriptURL, callbacks.leakPtr());
}
| 8,127,412,112,075,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-1682 | The ServiceWorkerContainer::registerServiceWorkerImpl function in WebKit/Source/modules/serviceworkers/ServiceWorkerContainer.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, allows remote attackers to bypass the Content Security Policy (CSP) protection mechanism via a ServiceWorker registration. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1682 |
7,979 | Chrome | 96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | None | 1 | xsltStylePreCompute(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
/*
* URGENT TODO: Normally inst->psvi Should never be reserved here,
* BUT: since if we include the same stylesheet from
* multiple imports, then the stylesheet will be parsed
* again. We simply must not try to compute the stylesheet again.
* TODO: Get to the point where we don't need to query the
* namespace- and local-name of the node, but can evaluate this
* using cctxt->style->inode->category;
*/
if ((inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(inst->psvi != NULL))
return;
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(inst)) {
xsltStylePreCompPtr cur;
if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "apply-templates")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltApplyTemplatesComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "with-param")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "apply-templates",
BAD_CAST "call-template");
xsltWithParamComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "value-of")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltValueOfComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "copy")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCopyComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "copy-of")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCopyOfComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "if")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltIfComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "when")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "choose", NULL);
xsltWhenComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "choose")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltChooseComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "for-each")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltForEachComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "apply-imports")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltApplyImportsComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "attribute")) {
xmlNodePtr parent = inst->parent;
if ((parent == NULL) || (parent->ns == NULL) ||
((parent->ns != inst->ns) &&
(!xmlStrEqual(parent->ns->href, inst->ns->href))) ||
(!xmlStrEqual(parent->name, BAD_CAST "attribute-set"))) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
}
xsltAttributeComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "element")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltElementComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "text")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltTextComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "sort")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "apply-templates",
BAD_CAST "for-each");
xsltSortComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "comment")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCommentComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "number")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltNumberComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "processing-instruction")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltProcessingInstructionComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "call-template")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltCallTemplateComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "param")) {
if (xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 0) == 0)
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltParamComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "variable")) {
if (xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 0) == 0)
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
xsltVariableComp(style, inst);
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "otherwise")) {
xsltCheckParentElement(style, inst, BAD_CAST "choose", NULL);
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "template")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "output")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "preserve-space")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "strip-space")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if ((IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "stylesheet")) ||
(IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "transform"))) {
xmlNodePtr parent = inst->parent;
if ((parent == NULL) || (parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"element %s only allowed only as root element\n",
inst->name);
style->errors++;
}
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "key")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "message")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "attribute-set")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "namespace-alias")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "include")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "import")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "decimal-format")) {
xsltCheckTopLevelElement(style, inst, 1);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "fallback")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
return;
} else if (IS_XSLT_NAME(inst, "document")) {
xsltCheckInstructionElement(style, inst);
inst->psvi = (void *) xsltDocumentComp(style, inst,
(xsltTransformFunction) xsltDocumentElem);
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsltStylePreCompute: unknown xsl:%s\n", inst->name);
if (style != NULL) style->warnings++;
}
cur = (xsltStylePreCompPtr) inst->psvi;
/*
* A ns-list is build for every XSLT item in the
* node-tree. This is needed for XPath expressions.
*/
if (cur != NULL) {
int i = 0;
cur->nsList = xmlGetNsList(inst->doc, inst);
if (cur->nsList != NULL) {
while (cur->nsList[i] != NULL)
i++;
}
cur->nsNr = i;
}
} else {
inst->psvi =
(void *) xsltPreComputeExtModuleElement(style, inst);
/*
* Unknown element, maybe registered at the context
* level. Mark it for later recognition.
*/
if (inst->psvi == NULL)
inst->psvi = (void *) xsltExtMarker;
}
}
| 311,436,744,199,642,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | preproc.c | 28,898,988,182,186,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-1683 | numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1683 |
7,993 | Chrome | e3e16497d0d5639fb3257305ea369ba4ab8ba210 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3e16497d0d5639fb3257305ea369ba4ab8ba210 | None | 1 | void InputConnectionImpl::CommitText(const base::string16& text,
int new_cursor_pos) {
StartStateUpdateTimer();
std::string error;
if (!ime_engine_->ClearComposition(input_context_id_, &error))
LOG(ERROR) << "ClearComposition failed: error=\"" << error << "\"";
if (IsControlChar(text)) {
SendControlKeyEvent(text);
return;
}
if (!ime_engine_->CommitText(input_context_id_,
base::UTF16ToUTF8(text).c_str(), &error))
LOG(ERROR) << "CommitText failed: error=\"" << error << "\"";
}
| 305,688,989,729,893,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-1686 | The CPDF_DIBSource::CreateDecoder function in core/fpdfapi/fpdf_render/fpdf_render_loadimage.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles decoder-initialization failure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PDF document. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1686 |
8,000 | Android | e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20 | None | 1 | status_t Parcel::appendFrom(const Parcel *parcel, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
status_t err;
const uint8_t *data = parcel->mData;
const binder_size_t *objects = parcel->mObjects;
size_t size = parcel->mObjectsSize;
int startPos = mDataPos;
int firstIndex = -1, lastIndex = -2;
if (len == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if ((offset > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (len > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (offset + len > parcel->mDataSize)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
for (int i = 0; i < (int) size; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i];
if ((off >= offset) && (off < offset + len)) {
if (firstIndex == -1) {
firstIndex = i;
}
lastIndex = i;
}
}
int numObjects = lastIndex - firstIndex + 1;
if ((mDataSize+len) > mDataCapacity) {
err = growData(len);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return err;
}
}
memcpy(mData + mDataPos, data + offset, len);
mDataPos += len;
mDataSize += len;
err = NO_ERROR;
if (numObjects > 0) {
if (mObjectsCapacity < mObjectsSize + numObjects) {
int newSize = ((mObjectsSize + numObjects)*3)/2;
binder_size_t *objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, newSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects == (binder_size_t*)0) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mObjects = objects;
mObjectsCapacity = newSize;
}
int idx = mObjectsSize;
for (int i = firstIndex; i <= lastIndex; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i] - offset + startPos;
mObjects[idx++] = off;
mObjectsSize++;
flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData + off);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
flat->handle = dup(flat->handle);
flat->cookie = 1;
mHasFds = mFdsKnown = true;
if (!mAllowFds) {
err = FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
}
}
}
return err;
}
| 51,133,333,841,899,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2015-3845 | The Parcel::appendFrom function in libs/binder/Parcel.cpp in Binder in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M does not consider parcel boundaries during identification of binder objects in an append operation, which allows attackers to obtain a different application's privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 17312693. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3845 |
8,014 | Android | e999f077f6ef59d20282f1e04786816a31fb8be6 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/sonivox/+/e999f077f6ef59d20282f1e04786816a31fb8be6 | None | 1 | static EAS_RESULT Parse_wave (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, EAS_U16 waveIndex)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 size;
EAS_I32 endChunk;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 wsmpPos = 0;
EAS_I32 fmtPos = 0;
EAS_I32 dataPos = 0;
EAS_I32 dataSize = 0;
S_WSMP_DATA *p;
void *pSample;
S_WSMP_DATA wsmp;
/* seek to start of chunk */
chunkPos = pos + 12;
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get the chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* make sure it is a wave chunk */
if (temp != CHUNK_WAVE)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Offset in ptbl does not point to wave chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* read to end of chunk */
pos = chunkPos;
endChunk = pos + size;
while (pos < endChunk)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_WSMP:
wsmpPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_FMT:
fmtPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_DATA:
dataPos = chunkPos + 8;
dataSize = size;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (dataSize > MAX_DLS_WAVE_SIZE)
{
return EAS_ERROR_SOUND_LIBRARY;
}
/* for first pass, use temporary variable */
if (pDLSData->pDLS == NULL)
p = &wsmp;
else
p = &pDLSData->wsmpData[waveIndex];
/* set the defaults */
p->fineTune = 0;
p->unityNote = 60;
p->gain = 0;
p->loopStart = 0;
p->loopLength = 0;
/* must have a fmt chunk */
if (!fmtPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS wave chunk has no fmt chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a data chunk */
if (!dataPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS wave chunk has no data chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* parse the wsmp chunk */
if (wsmpPos)
{
if ((result = Parse_wsmp(pDLSData, wsmpPos, p)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
/* parse the fmt chunk */
if ((result = Parse_fmt(pDLSData, fmtPos, p)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* calculate the size of the wavetable needed. We need only half
* the memory for 16-bit samples when in 8-bit mode, and we need
* double the memory for 8-bit samples in 16-bit mode. For
* unlooped samples, we may use ADPCM. If so, we need only 1/4
* the memory.
*
* We also need to add one for looped samples to allow for
* the first sample to be copied to the end of the loop.
*/
/* use ADPCM encode for unlooped 16-bit samples if ADPCM is enabled */
/*lint -e{506} -e{774} groundwork for future version to support 8 & 16 bit */
if (bitDepth == 8)
{
if (p->bitsPerSample == 8)
size = dataSize;
else
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
size = dataSize >> 1;
if (p->loopLength)
size++;
}
else
{
if (p->bitsPerSample == 16)
size = dataSize;
else
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
size = dataSize << 1;
if (p->loopLength)
size += 2;
}
/* for first pass, add size to wave pool size and return */
if (pDLSData->pDLS == NULL)
{
pDLSData->wavePoolSize += (EAS_U32) size;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
/* allocate memory and read in the sample data */
pSample = pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSamples + pDLSData->wavePoolOffset;
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleOffsets[waveIndex] = pDLSData->wavePoolOffset;
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleLen[waveIndex] = (EAS_U32) size;
pDLSData->wavePoolOffset += (EAS_U32) size;
if (pDLSData->wavePoolOffset > pDLSData->wavePoolSize)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Wave pool exceeded allocation\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_SOUND_LIBRARY;
}
if ((result = Parse_data(pDLSData, dataPos, dataSize, p, pSample)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
| 21,319,537,981,250,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-3836 | The Parse_wave function in arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_mdls.c in the Sonivox DLS-to-EAS converter in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not reject a negative value for a certain size field, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer overflow) via crafted XMF data, aka internal bug 21132860. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3836 |
8,019 | Android | c82e31a7039a03dca7b37c65b7890ba5c1e18ced | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c82e31a7039a03dca7b37c65b7890ba5c1e18ced | None | 1 | status_t BnHDCP::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case HDCP_SET_OBSERVER:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
sp<IHDCPObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IHDCPObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(setObserver(observer));
return OK;
}
case HDCP_INIT_ASYNC:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
const char *host = data.readCString();
unsigned port = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(initAsync(host, port));
return OK;
}
case HDCP_SHUTDOWN_ASYNC:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(shutdownAsync());
return OK;
}
case HDCP_GET_CAPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(getCaps());
return OK;
}
case HDCP_ENCRYPT:
{
size_t size = data.readInt32();
void *inData = malloc(2 * size);
void *outData = (uint8_t *)inData + size;
data.read(inData, size);
uint32_t streamCTR = data.readInt32();
uint64_t inputCTR;
status_t err = encrypt(inData, size, streamCTR, &inputCTR, outData);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt64(inputCTR);
reply->write(outData, size);
}
free(inData);
inData = outData = NULL;
return OK;
}
case HDCP_ENCRYPT_NATIVE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IHDCP, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
size_t offset = data.readInt32();
size_t size = data.readInt32();
uint32_t streamCTR = data.readInt32();
void *outData = malloc(size);
uint64_t inputCTR;
status_t err = encryptNative(graphicBuffer, offset, size,
streamCTR, &inputCTR, outData);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt64(inputCTR);
reply->write(outData, size);
}
free(outData);
outData = NULL;
return OK;
}
case HDCP_DECRYPT:
{
size_t size = data.readInt32();
void *inData = malloc(2 * size);
void *outData = (uint8_t *)inData + size;
data.read(inData, size);
uint32_t streamCTR = data.readInt32();
uint64_t inputCTR = data.readInt64();
status_t err = decrypt(inData, size, streamCTR, inputCTR, outData);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->write(outData, size);
}
free(inData);
inData = outData = NULL;
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
| 100,821,162,213,020,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-3834 | Multiple integer overflows in the BnHDCP::onTransact function in media/libmedia/IHDCP.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application that uses HDCP encryption, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow, aka internal bug 20222489. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3834 |
8,023 | Android | 51504928746edff6c94a1c498cf99c0a83bedaed | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/51504928746edff6c94a1c498cf99c0a83bedaed | None | 1 | virtual ssize_t readAt(off64_t offset, void *buffer, size_t size) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(
IMediaHTTPConnection::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt64(offset);
data.writeInt32(size);
status_t err = remote()->transact(READ_AT, data, &reply);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("remote readAt failed");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
int32_t exceptionCode = reply.readExceptionCode();
if (exceptionCode) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
int32_t len = reply.readInt32();
if (len > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, mMemory->pointer(), len);
}
return len;
}
| 23,993,132,887,243,497,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2015-3831 | Buffer overflow in the readAt function in BpMediaHTTPConnection in media/libmedia/IMediaHTTPConnection.cpp in the mediaserver service in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 19400722. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3831 |
8,024 | Android | 2674a7218eaa3c87f2ee26d26da5b9170e10f859 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/2674a7218eaa3c87f2ee26d26da5b9170e10f859 | None | 1 | status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
| 27,595,787,619,421,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-3829 | Off-by-one error in the MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) via crafted MPEG-4 covr atoms with a size equal to SIZE_MAX, aka internal bug 20923261. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3829 |
8,025 | Android | f4f7e0c102819f039ebb1972b3dba1d3186bc1d1 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f4f7e0c102819f039ebb1972b3dba1d3186bc1d1 | None | 1 | status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
| 273,114,330,204,908,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2015-3828 | The MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not enforce a minimum size for UTF-16 strings containing a Byte Order Mark (BOM), which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer underflow and memory corruption) via crafted 3GPP metadata, aka internal bug 20923261, a related issue to CVE-2015-3826. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3828 |
8,026 | Android | f4a88c8ed4f8186b3d6e2852993e063fc33ff231 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f4a88c8ed4f8186b3d6e2852993e063fc33ff231 | None | 1 | status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
| 221,766,710,213,051,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2015-3827 | The MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not validate the relationship between chunk sizes and skip sizes, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer underflow and memory corruption) via crafted MPEG-4 covr atoms, aka internal bug 20923261. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3827 |
8,027 | Android | 463a6f807e187828442949d1924e143cf07778c6 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/463a6f807e187828442949d1924e143cf07778c6 | None | 1 | status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
| 134,531,541,806,590,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2015-3824 | The MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not properly restrict size addition, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) via a crafted MPEG-4 tx3g atom, aka internal bug 20923261. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3824 |
8,028 | Android | 5e751957ba692658b7f67eb03ae5ddb2cd3d970c | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/5e751957ba692658b7f67eb03ae5ddb2cd3d970c | None | 1 | status_t ESDS::parseESDescriptor(size_t offset, size_t size) {
if (size < 3) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 2; // skip ES_ID
size -= 2;
unsigned streamDependenceFlag = mData[offset] & 0x80;
unsigned URL_Flag = mData[offset] & 0x40;
unsigned OCRstreamFlag = mData[offset] & 0x20;
++offset;
--size;
if (streamDependenceFlag) {
offset += 2;
size -= 2;
}
if (URL_Flag) {
if (offset >= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
unsigned URLlength = mData[offset];
offset += URLlength + 1;
size -= URLlength + 1;
}
if (OCRstreamFlag) {
offset += 2;
size -= 2;
if ((offset >= size || mData[offset] != kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor)
&& offset - 2 < size
&& mData[offset - 2] == kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor) {
offset -= 2;
size += 2;
ALOGW("Found malformed 'esds' atom, ignoring missing OCR_ES_Id.");
}
}
if (offset >= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t tag;
size_t sub_offset, sub_size;
status_t err = skipDescriptorHeader(
offset, size, &tag, &sub_offset, &sub_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (tag != kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseDecoderConfigDescriptor(sub_offset, sub_size);
return err;
}
| 251,778,599,478,684,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-1539 | Multiple integer underflows in the ESDS::parseESDescriptor function in ESDS.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted ESDS atoms, aka internal bug 20139950, a related issue to CVE-2015-4493. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1539 |
8,029 | Android | d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb | None | 1 | static jobject Bitmap_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jobject parcel) {
if (parcel == NULL) {
SkDebugf("-------- unparcel parcel is NULL\n");
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
const bool isMutable = p->readInt32() != 0;
const SkColorType colorType = (SkColorType)p->readInt32();
const SkAlphaType alphaType = (SkAlphaType)p->readInt32();
const int width = p->readInt32();
const int height = p->readInt32();
const int rowBytes = p->readInt32();
const int density = p->readInt32();
if (kN32_SkColorType != colorType &&
kRGB_565_SkColorType != colorType &&
kARGB_4444_SkColorType != colorType &&
kIndex_8_SkColorType != colorType &&
kAlpha_8_SkColorType != colorType) {
SkDebugf("Bitmap_createFromParcel unknown colortype: %d\n", colorType);
return NULL;
}
SkBitmap* bitmap = new SkBitmap;
bitmap->setInfo(SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, colorType, alphaType), rowBytes);
SkColorTable* ctable = NULL;
if (colorType == kIndex_8_SkColorType) {
int count = p->readInt32();
if (count > 0) {
size_t size = count * sizeof(SkPMColor);
const SkPMColor* src = (const SkPMColor*)p->readInplace(size);
ctable = new SkColorTable(src, count);
}
}
jbyteArray buffer = GraphicsJNI::allocateJavaPixelRef(env, bitmap, ctable);
if (NULL == buffer) {
SkSafeUnref(ctable);
delete bitmap;
return NULL;
}
SkSafeUnref(ctable);
size_t size = bitmap->getSize();
android::Parcel::ReadableBlob blob;
android::status_t status = p->readBlob(size, &blob);
if (status) {
doThrowRE(env, "Could not read bitmap from parcel blob.");
delete bitmap;
return NULL;
}
bitmap->lockPixels();
memcpy(bitmap->getPixels(), blob.data(), size);
bitmap->unlockPixels();
blob.release();
return GraphicsJNI::createBitmap(env, bitmap, buffer, getPremulBitmapCreateFlags(isMutable),
NULL, NULL, density);
}
| 104,165,536,811,189,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-1536 | Integer overflow in the Bitmap_createFromParcel function in core/jni/android/graphics/Bitmap.cpp in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to cause a denial of service (system_server crash) or obtain sensitive system_server memory-content information via a crafted application that leverages improper unmarshalling of bitmaps, aka internal bug 19666945. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1536 |
8,030 | Android | 7dcd0ec9c91688cfa3f679804ba6e132f9811254 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/7dcd0ec9c91688cfa3f679804ba6e132f9811254 | None | 1 | native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) err = BAD_VALUE;
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
| 182,889,183,101,894,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2015-1528 | Integer overflow in the native_handle_create function in libcutils/native_handle.c in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M allows attackers to obtain a different application's privileges or cause a denial of service (Binder heap memory corruption) via a crafted application, aka internal bug 19334482. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1528 |
8,034 | Android | 89c03b3b9ff74a507a8b8334c50b08b334483556 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/89c03b3b9ff74a507a8b8334c50b08b334483556 | None | 1 | status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
| 115,645,474,102,852,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-6722 | An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-31091777. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6722 |
8,037 | Android | fdb1b40e7bb147c07bda988c9501ad223795d12d | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/fdb1b40e7bb147c07bda988c9501ad223795d12d | None | 1 | int vp9_alloc_context_buffers(VP9_COMMON *cm, int width, int height) {
int new_mi_size;
vp9_set_mb_mi(cm, width, height);
new_mi_size = cm->mi_stride * calc_mi_size(cm->mi_rows);
if (cm->mi_alloc_size < new_mi_size) {
cm->free_mi(cm);
if (cm->alloc_mi(cm, new_mi_size))
goto fail;
}
if (cm->seg_map_alloc_size < cm->mi_rows * cm->mi_cols) {
free_seg_map(cm);
if (alloc_seg_map(cm, cm->mi_rows * cm->mi_cols))
goto fail;
}
if (cm->above_context_alloc_cols < cm->mi_cols) {
vpx_free(cm->above_context);
cm->above_context = (ENTROPY_CONTEXT *)vpx_calloc(
2 * mi_cols_aligned_to_sb(cm->mi_cols) * MAX_MB_PLANE,
sizeof(*cm->above_context));
if (!cm->above_context) goto fail;
vpx_free(cm->above_seg_context);
cm->above_seg_context = (PARTITION_CONTEXT *)vpx_calloc(
mi_cols_aligned_to_sb(cm->mi_cols), sizeof(*cm->above_seg_context));
if (!cm->above_seg_context) goto fail;
cm->above_context_alloc_cols = cm->mi_cols;
}
return 0;
fail:
vp9_free_context_buffers(cm);
return 1;
}
| 3,857,975,046,340,091,300,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-6712 | A remote denial of service vulnerability in libvpx in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-11-01 could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Android ID: A-30593752. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6712 |
8,040 | Android | 3b1c9f692c4d4b7a683c2b358fc89e831a641b88 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3b1c9f692c4d4b7a683c2b358fc89e831a641b88 | None | 1 | status_t MediaHTTP::connect(
const char *uri,
const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers,
off64_t /* offset */) {
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
return mInitCheck;
}
KeyedVector<String8, String8> extHeaders;
if (headers != NULL) {
extHeaders = *headers;
}
if (extHeaders.indexOfKey(String8("User-Agent")) < 0) {
extHeaders.add(String8("User-Agent"), String8(MakeUserAgent().c_str()));
}
bool success = mHTTPConnection->connect(uri, &extHeaders);
mLastHeaders = extHeaders;
mLastURI = uri;
mCachedSizeValid = false;
if (success) {
AString sanitized = uriDebugString(uri);
mName = String8::format("MediaHTTP(%s)", sanitized.c_str());
}
return success ? OK : UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
| 46,246,661,838,968,125,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-6699 | A remote code execution vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Android ID: A-31373622. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6699 |
8,041 | Android | c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c894aa36be535886a8e5ff02cdbcd07dd24618f6 | None | 1 | status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
if (cmdCode == EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM &&
(*replySize < sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
((effect_param_t *)pCmdData)->psize > *replySize - sizeof(effect_param_t))) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29251553");
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
| 186,065,196,266,317,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-3924 | services/audioflinger/Effects.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 does not validate EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM and EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM_DEFERRED commands, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30204301. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3924 |
8,052 | Android | 0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0c3b93c8c2027e74af642967eee5c142c8fd185d | None | 1 | status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setNextPlayer(const sp<IMediaPlayer>& player) {
ALOGV("setNextPlayer");
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
sp<Client> c = static_cast<Client*>(player.get());
mNextClient = c;
if (c != NULL) {
if (mAudioOutput != NULL) {
mAudioOutput->setNextOutput(c->mAudioOutput);
} else if ((mPlayer != NULL) && !mPlayer->hardwareOutput()) {
ALOGE("no current audio output");
}
if ((mPlayer != NULL) && (mNextClient->getPlayer() != NULL)) {
mPlayer->setNextPlayer(mNextClient->getPlayer());
}
}
return OK;
}
| 6,735,926,774,297,518,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-3913 | media/libmediaplayerservice/MediaPlayerService.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 does not validate a certain static_cast operation, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30204103. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3913 |
8,057 | Android | 047eec456943dc082e33220d28abb7df4e089f69 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/047eec456943dc082e33220d28abb7df4e089f69 | None | 1 | static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (uid >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
| 333,350,833,508,657,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-3900 | cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c in ServiceManager in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 does not properly restrict service registration, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29431260. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3900 |
8,058 | Android | 97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64 | None | 1 | status_t OMXCodec::allocateBuffersOnPort(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (mNativeWindow != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
return allocateOutputBuffersFromNativeWindow();
}
if ((mFlags & kEnableGrallocUsageProtected) && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
ALOGE("protected output buffers must be stent to an ANativeWindow");
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
status_t err = OK;
if ((mFlags & kStoreMetaDataInVideoBuffers)
&& portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
err = mOMX->storeMetaDataInBuffers(mNode, kPortIndexInput, OMX_TRUE);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("Storing meta data in video buffers is not supported");
return err;
}
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGV("allocating %u buffers of size %u on %s port",
def.nBufferCountActual, def.nBufferSize,
portIndex == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
if (def.nBufferSize != 0 && def.nBufferCountActual > SIZE_MAX / def.nBufferSize) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
size_t totalSize = def.nBufferCountActual * def.nBufferSize;
mDealer[portIndex] = new MemoryDealer(totalSize, "OMXCodec");
for (OMX_U32 i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
sp<IMemory> mem = mDealer[portIndex]->allocate(def.nBufferSize);
CHECK(mem.get() != NULL);
BufferInfo info;
info.mData = NULL;
info.mSize = def.nBufferSize;
IOMX::buffer_id buffer;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput
&& ((mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnInputPorts)
|| (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers))) {
if (mOMXLivesLocally) {
mem.clear();
err = mOMX->allocateBuffer(
mNode, portIndex, def.nBufferSize, &buffer,
&info.mData);
} else {
err = mOMX->allocateBufferWithBackup(
mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
} else if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput
&& (mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts)) {
if (mOMXLivesLocally) {
mem.clear();
err = mOMX->allocateBuffer(
mNode, portIndex, def.nBufferSize, &buffer,
&info.mData);
} else {
err = mOMX->allocateBufferWithBackup(
mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
} else {
err = mOMX->useBuffer(mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("allocate_buffer_with_backup failed");
return err;
}
if (mem != NULL) {
info.mData = mem->pointer();
}
info.mBuffer = buffer;
info.mStatus = OWNED_BY_US;
info.mMem = mem;
info.mMediaBuffer = NULL;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF((mOMXLivesLocally
&& (mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts)
&& (mQuirks & kDefersOutputBufferAllocation)),
"allocateBuffersOnPort cannot defer buffer allocation");
info.mMediaBuffer = new MediaBuffer(info.mData, info.mSize);
info.mMediaBuffer->setObserver(this);
}
mPortBuffers[portIndex].push(info);
CODEC_LOGV("allocated buffer %u on %s port", buffer,
portIndex == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
sp<MetaData> meta = mSource->getFormat();
int32_t delay = 0;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, &delay)) {
delay = 0;
}
int32_t padding = 0;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, &padding)) {
padding = 0;
}
int32_t numchannels = 0;
if (delay + padding) {
if (mOutputFormat->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numchannels)) {
size_t frameSize = numchannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mSkipCutBuffer != NULL) {
size_t prevbuffersize = mSkipCutBuffer->size();
if (prevbuffersize != 0) {
ALOGW("Replacing SkipCutBuffer holding %zu bytes", prevbuffersize);
}
}
mSkipCutBuffer = new SkipCutBuffer(delay * frameSize, padding * frameSize);
}
}
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput && (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers)) {
Vector<MediaBuffer *> buffers;
for (size_t i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
const BufferInfo &info = mPortBuffers[kPortIndexInput].itemAt(i);
MediaBuffer *mbuf = new MediaBuffer(info.mData, info.mSize);
buffers.push(mbuf);
}
status_t err = mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
if (err != OK) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
buffers.editItemAt(i)->release();
}
buffers.clear();
CODEC_LOGE(
"Codec requested to use secure input buffers but "
"upstream source didn't support that.");
return err;
}
}
return OK;
}
| 147,675,475,152,290,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-3899 | OMXCodec.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 does not validate a certain pointer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29421811. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3899 |
8,059 | Android | 014b01706cc64dc9c2ad94a96f62e07c058d0b5d | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/014b01706cc64dc9c2ad94a96f62e07c058d0b5d | None | 1 | void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
| 48,596,368,302,748,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-3890 | The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3890 |
8,063 | Android | 4974dcbd0289a2530df2ee2a25b5f92775df80da | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/4974dcbd0289a2530df2ee2a25b5f92775df80da | None | 1 | static vpx_codec_err_t decoder_peek_si_internal(const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si,
int *is_intra_only,
vpx_decrypt_cb decrypt_cb,
void *decrypt_state) {
int intra_only_flag = 0;
uint8_t clear_buffer[9];
if (data + data_sz <= data)
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
si->is_kf = 0;
si->w = si->h = 0;
if (decrypt_cb) {
data_sz = VPXMIN(sizeof(clear_buffer), data_sz);
decrypt_cb(decrypt_state, data, clear_buffer, data_sz);
data = clear_buffer;
}
{
int show_frame;
int error_resilient;
struct vpx_read_bit_buffer rb = { data, data + data_sz, 0, NULL, NULL };
const int frame_marker = vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 2);
const BITSTREAM_PROFILE profile = vp9_read_profile(&rb);
if (frame_marker != VP9_FRAME_MARKER)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile >= MAX_PROFILES)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if ((profile >= 2 && data_sz <= 1) || data_sz < 1)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb)) { // show an existing frame
vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 3); // Frame buffer to show.
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
if (data_sz <= 8)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
si->is_kf = !vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
show_frame = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
error_resilient = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
if (si->is_kf) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
} else {
intra_only_flag = show_frame ? 0 : vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
rb.bit_offset += error_resilient ? 0 : 2; // reset_frame_context
if (intra_only_flag) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile > PROFILE_0) {
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
rb.bit_offset += REF_FRAMES; // refresh_frame_flags
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
}
}
}
if (is_intra_only != NULL)
*is_intra_only = intra_only_flag;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
| 37,903,833,722,496,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-3881 | The decoder_peek_si_internal function in vp9/vp9_dx_iface.c in libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read, and device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 30013856. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3881 |
8,066 | Android | cadfb7a3c96d4fef06656cf37143e1b3e62cae86 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/sonivox/+/cadfb7a3c96d4fef06656cf37143e1b3e62cae86 | None | 1 | EAS_RESULT DLSParser (EAS_HW_DATA_HANDLE hwInstData, EAS_FILE_HANDLE fileHandle, EAS_I32 offset, EAS_DLSLIB_HANDLE *ppDLS)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA dls;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 pos;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 size;
EAS_I32 instSize;
EAS_I32 rgnPoolSize;
EAS_I32 artPoolSize;
EAS_I32 waveLenSize;
EAS_I32 endDLS;
EAS_I32 wvplPos;
EAS_I32 wvplSize;
EAS_I32 linsPos;
EAS_I32 linsSize;
EAS_I32 ptblPos;
EAS_I32 ptblSize;
void *p;
/* zero counts and pointers */
EAS_HWMemSet(&dls, 0, sizeof(dls));
/* save file handle and hwInstData to save copying pointers around */
dls.hwInstData = hwInstData;
dls.fileHandle = fileHandle;
/* NULL return value in case of error */
*ppDLS = NULL;
/* seek to start of DLS and read in RIFF tag and set processor endian flag */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(dls.hwInstData, dls.fileHandle, offset)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWReadFile(dls.hwInstData, dls.fileHandle, &temp, sizeof(temp), &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* check for processor endian-ness */
dls.bigEndian = (temp == CHUNK_RIFF);
/* first chunk should be DLS */
pos = offset;
if ((result = NextChunk(&dls, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (temp != CHUNK_DLS)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "Expected DLS chunk, got %08lx\n", temp); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* no instrument or wavepool chunks */
linsSize = wvplSize = ptblSize = linsPos = wvplPos = ptblPos = 0;
/* scan the chunks in the DLS list */
endDLS = offset + size;
pos = offset + 12;
while (pos < endDLS)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the next chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(&dls, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_CDL:
if ((result = Parse_cdl(&dls, size, &temp)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (!temp)
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
break;
case CHUNK_LINS:
linsPos = chunkPos + 12;
linsSize = size - 4;
break;
case CHUNK_WVPL:
wvplPos = chunkPos + 12;
wvplSize = size - 4;
break;
case CHUNK_PTBL:
ptblPos = chunkPos + 8;
ptblSize = size - 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* must have a lins chunk */
if (linsSize == 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No lins chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a wvpl chunk */
if (wvplSize == 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No wvpl chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a ptbl chunk */
if ((ptblSize == 0) || (ptblSize > DLS_MAX_WAVE_COUNT * sizeof(POOLCUE) + sizeof(POOLTABLE)))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "No ptbl chunk found"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* pre-parse the wave pool chunk */
if ((result = Parse_ptbl(&dls, ptblPos, wvplPos, wvplSize)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* limit check */
if ((dls.waveCount == 0) || (dls.waveCount > DLS_MAX_WAVE_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #waves [%u]\n", dls.waveCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* allocate memory for wsmp data */
dls.wsmpData = EAS_HWMalloc(dls.hwInstData, (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_WSMP_DATA) * dls.waveCount));
if (dls.wsmpData == NULL)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "EAS_HWMalloc for wsmp data failed\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
EAS_HWMemSet(dls.wsmpData, 0, (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_WSMP_DATA) * dls.waveCount));
/* pre-parse the lins chunk */
result = Parse_lins(&dls, linsPos, linsSize);
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
{
/* limit check */
if ((dls.regionCount == 0) || (dls.regionCount > DLS_MAX_REGION_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #regions [%u]\n", dls.regionCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* limit check */
if ((dls.artCount == 0) || (dls.artCount > DLS_MAX_ART_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #articulations [%u]\n", dls.regionCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* limit check */
if ((dls.instCount == 0) || (dls.instCount > DLS_MAX_INST_COUNT))
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS file contains invalid #instruments [%u]\n", dls.instCount); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* Allocate memory for the converted DLS data */
/* calculate size of instrument data */
instSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_PROGRAM) * dls.instCount);
/* calculate size of region pool */
rgnPoolSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_DLS_REGION) * dls.regionCount);
/* calculate size of articulation pool, add one for default articulation */
dls.artCount++;
artPoolSize = (EAS_I32) (sizeof(S_DLS_ARTICULATION) * dls.artCount);
/* calculate size of wave length and offset arrays */
waveLenSize = (EAS_I32) (dls.waveCount * sizeof(EAS_U32));
/* calculate final memory size */
size = (EAS_I32) sizeof(S_EAS) + instSize + rgnPoolSize + artPoolSize + (2 * waveLenSize) + (EAS_I32) dls.wavePoolSize;
if (size <= 0) {
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* allocate the main EAS chunk */
dls.pDLS = EAS_HWMalloc(dls.hwInstData, size);
if (dls.pDLS == NULL)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "EAS_HWMalloc failed for DLS memory allocation size %ld\n", size); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
EAS_HWMemSet(dls.pDLS, 0, size);
dls.pDLS->refCount = 1;
p = PtrOfs(dls.pDLS, sizeof(S_EAS));
/* setup pointer to programs */
dls.pDLS->numDLSPrograms = (EAS_U16) dls.instCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSPrograms = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, instSize);
/* setup pointer to regions */
dls.pDLS->pDLSRegions = p;
dls.pDLS->numDLSRegions = (EAS_U16) dls.regionCount;
p = PtrOfs(p, rgnPoolSize);
/* setup pointer to articulations */
dls.pDLS->numDLSArticulations = (EAS_U16) dls.artCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSArticulations = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, artPoolSize);
/* setup pointer to wave length table */
dls.pDLS->numDLSSamples = (EAS_U16) dls.waveCount;
dls.pDLS->pDLSSampleLen = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, waveLenSize);
/* setup pointer to wave offsets table */
dls.pDLS->pDLSSampleOffsets = p;
p = PtrOfs(p, waveLenSize);
/* setup pointer to wave pool */
dls.pDLS->pDLSSamples = p;
/* clear filter flag */
dls.filterUsed = EAS_FALSE;
/* parse the wave pool and load samples */
result = Parse_ptbl(&dls, ptblPos, wvplPos, wvplSize);
}
/* create the default articulation */
Convert_art(&dls, &defaultArt, 0);
dls.artCount = 1;
/* parse the lins chunk and load instruments */
dls.regionCount = dls.instCount = 0;
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
result = Parse_lins(&dls, linsPos, linsSize);
/* clean up any temporary objects that were allocated */
if (dls.wsmpData)
EAS_HWFree(dls.hwInstData, dls.wsmpData);
/* if successful, return a pointer to the EAS collection */
if (result == EAS_SUCCESS)
{
*ppDLS = dls.pDLS;
#ifdef _DEBUG_DLS
DumpDLS(dls.pDLS);
#endif
}
/* something went wrong, deallocate the EAS collection */
else
DLSCleanup(dls.hwInstData, dls.pDLS);
return result;
}
| 129,549,297,689,813,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-3879 | arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_mdls.c in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference, and device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29770686. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3879 |
8,067 | Android | 7109ce3f8f90a28ca9f0ee6e14f6ac5e414c62cf | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libavc/+/7109ce3f8f90a28ca9f0ee6e14f6ac5e414c62cf | None | 1 | WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
{
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
if(ret != 0)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
| 176,342,596,394,453,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-284"
] | CVE-2016-3878 | decoder/ih264d_api.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles the case of decoding zero MBs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29493002. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3878 |
8,068 | Android | 9f9ba255a0c59544f3555c9c45512c3a2fac5fad | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/9f9ba255a0c59544f3555c9c45512c3a2fac5fad | None | 1 | bool SoftVPX::outputBufferSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader) {
uint32_t width = outputBufferWidth();
uint32_t height = outputBufferHeight();
uint64_t nFilledLen = width;
nFilledLen *= height;
if (nFilledLen > UINT32_MAX / 3) {
ALOGE("b/29421675, nFilledLen overflow %llu w %u h %u", nFilledLen, width, height);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29421675");
return false;
} else if (outHeader->nAllocLen < outHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("b/27597103, buffer too small");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27597103");
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 66,696,249,750,732,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-3872 | Buffer overflow in codecs/on2/dec/SoftVPX.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29421675. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3872 |
8,069 | Android | c2639afac631f5c1ffddf70ee8a6fe943d0bedf9 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c2639afac631f5c1ffddf70ee8a6fe943d0bedf9 | None | 1 | void SoftMP3::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0 && inHeader->nFilledLen) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
mConfig->pInputBuffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
mConfig->pInputBuffer = NULL;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = 0;
}
mConfig->inputBufferMaxLength = 0;
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = 0;
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
if ((int32)outHeader->nAllocLen < mConfig->outputFrameSize) {
ALOGE("input buffer too small: got %u, expected %u",
outHeader->nAllocLen, mConfig->outputFrameSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793371");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
mConfig->pOutputBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer);
ERROR_CODE decoderErr;
if ((decoderErr = pvmp3_framedecoder(mConfig, mDecoderBuf))
!= NO_DECODING_ERROR) {
ALOGV("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
if (decoderErr != NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR
&& decoderErr != SIDE_INFO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (mConfig->outputFrameSize == 0) {
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
}
if (decoderErr == NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR && mSawInputEos) {
if (!mIsFirst) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
memset(outHeader->pBuffer, 0, outHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
} else {
ALOGV_IF(mIsFirst, "insufficient data for first frame, sending silence");
memset(outHeader->pBuffer,
0,
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader) {
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
}
} else if (mConfig->samplingRate != mSamplingRate
|| mConfig->num_channels != mNumChannels) {
mSamplingRate = mConfig->samplingRate;
mNumChannels = mConfig->num_channels;
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mIsFirst) {
mIsFirst = false;
outHeader->nOffset =
kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFilledLen =
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t) - outHeader->nOffset;
} else if (!mSignalledOutputEos) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs + (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mSamplingRate;
if (inHeader) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength);
inHeader->nOffset += mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
mNumFramesOutput += mConfig->outputFrameSize / mNumChannels;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 154,590,744,829,326,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-3871 | Multiple buffer overflows in codecs/mp3dec/SoftMP3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29422022. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3871 |
8,070 | Android | 1e9801783770917728b7edbdeff3d0ec09c621ac | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1e9801783770917728b7edbdeff3d0ec09c621ac | None | 1 | void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onPortEnable(OMX_U32 portIndex, bool enable) {
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK_EQ((int)port->mTransition, (int)PortInfo::NONE);
CHECK(port->mDef.bEnabled == !enable);
if (!enable) {
port->mDef.bEnabled = OMX_FALSE;
port->mTransition = PortInfo::DISABLING;
for (size_t i = 0; i < port->mBuffers.size(); ++i) {
BufferInfo *buffer = &port->mBuffers.editItemAt(i);
if (buffer->mOwnedByUs) {
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mDef.eDir == OMX_DirInput) {
notifyEmptyBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
} else {
CHECK_EQ(port->mDef.eDir, OMX_DirOutput);
notifyFillBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
}
}
}
port->mQueue.clear();
} else {
port->mTransition = PortInfo::ENABLING;
}
checkTransitions();
}
| 11,372,754,031,162,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-3870 | omx/SimpleSoftOMXComponent.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 does not prevent input-port changes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29421804. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3870 |
8,144 | Android | a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/net/wifi/+/a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399 | None | 1 | static byte parseHexByte(const char * &str) {
byte b = parseHexChar(str[0]);
if (str[1] == ':' || str[1] == '\0') {
str += 2;
return b;
} else {
b = b << 4 | parseHexChar(str[1]);
str += 3;
return b;
}
}
| 286,529,297,307,740,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-3837 | service/jni/com_android_server_wifi_WifiNative.cpp in Wi-Fi in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application that provides a MAC address with too few characters, aka internal bug 28164077. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3837 |
8,156 | Android | 8e438e153f661e9df8db0ac41d587e940352df06 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/8e438e153f661e9df8db0ac41d587e940352df06 | None | 1 | void SoftAAC2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
UCHAR* inBuffer[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS];
UINT inBufferLength[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS] = {0};
UINT bytesValid[FILEREAD_MAX_LAYERS] = {0};
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || mEndOfInput) && !outQueue.empty()) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
INT_PCM tmpOutBuffer[2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT];
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
mEndOfInput = (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) != 0;
if (mInputBufferCount == 0 && !(inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
ALOGE("first buffer should have OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG set");
inHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
}
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) != 0) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
inBuffer[0] = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inBufferLength[0] = inHeader->nFilledLen;
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr =
aacDecoder_ConfigRaw(mAACDecoder,
inBuffer,
inBufferLength);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_ConfigRaw decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
mInputBufferCount++;
mOutputBufferCount++; // fake increase of outputBufferCount to keep the counters aligned
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
configureDownmix();
if (mStreamInfo->sampleRate && mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
ALOGI("Initially configuring decoder: %d Hz, %d channels",
mStreamInfo->sampleRate,
mStreamInfo->numChannels);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
}
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
continue;
}
if (mIsADTS) {
size_t adtsHeaderSize = 0;
const uint8_t *adtsHeader = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
bool signalError = false;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < 7) {
ALOGE("Audio data too short to contain even the ADTS header. "
"Got %d bytes.", inHeader->nFilledLen);
hexdump(adtsHeader, inHeader->nFilledLen);
signalError = true;
} else {
bool protectionAbsent = (adtsHeader[1] & 1);
unsigned aac_frame_length =
((adtsHeader[3] & 3) << 11)
| (adtsHeader[4] << 3)
| (adtsHeader[5] >> 5);
if (inHeader->nFilledLen < aac_frame_length) {
ALOGE("Not enough audio data for the complete frame. "
"Got %d bytes, frame size according to the ADTS "
"header is %u bytes.",
inHeader->nFilledLen, aac_frame_length);
hexdump(adtsHeader, inHeader->nFilledLen);
signalError = true;
} else {
adtsHeaderSize = (protectionAbsent ? 7 : 9);
inBuffer[0] = (UCHAR *)adtsHeader + adtsHeaderSize;
inBufferLength[0] = aac_frame_length - adtsHeaderSize;
inHeader->nOffset += adtsHeaderSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= adtsHeaderSize;
}
}
if (signalError) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt, ERROR_MALFORMED, NULL);
return;
}
mBufferSizes.add(inBufferLength[0]);
if (mLastInHeader != inHeader) {
mBufferTimestamps.add(inHeader->nTimeStamp);
mLastInHeader = inHeader;
} else {
int64_t currentTime = mBufferTimestamps.top();
currentTime += mStreamInfo->aacSamplesPerFrame *
1000000ll / mStreamInfo->aacSampleRate;
mBufferTimestamps.add(currentTime);
}
} else {
inBuffer[0] = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
inBufferLength[0] = inHeader->nFilledLen;
mLastInHeader = inHeader;
mBufferTimestamps.add(inHeader->nTimeStamp);
mBufferSizes.add(inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
bytesValid[0] = inBufferLength[0];
INT prevSampleRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
INT prevNumChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
aacDecoder_Fill(mAACDecoder,
inBuffer,
inBufferLength,
bytesValid);
mDrcWrap.submitStreamData(mStreamInfo);
mDrcWrap.update();
UINT inBufferUsedLength = inBufferLength[0] - bytesValid[0];
inHeader->nFilledLen -= inBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nOffset += inBufferUsedLength;
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr;
int numLoops = 0;
do {
if (outputDelayRingBufferSpaceLeft() <
(mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
ALOGV("skipping decode: not enough space left in ringbuffer");
break;
}
int numConsumed = mStreamInfo->numTotalBytes;
decoderErr = aacDecoder_DecodeFrame(mAACDecoder,
tmpOutBuffer,
2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT,
0 /* flags */);
numConsumed = mStreamInfo->numTotalBytes - numConsumed;
numLoops++;
if (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_NOT_ENOUGH_BITS) {
break;
}
mDecodedSizes.add(numConsumed);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_DecodeFrame decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
}
if (bytesValid[0] != 0) {
ALOGE("bytesValid[0] != 0 should never happen");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
size_t numOutBytes =
mStreamInfo->frameSize * sizeof(int16_t) * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_OK) {
if (!outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer,
mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
} else {
ALOGW("AAC decoder returned error 0x%4.4x, substituting silence", decoderErr);
memset(tmpOutBuffer, 0, numOutBytes); // TODO: check for overflow
if (!outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer,
mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels)) {
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
if (inHeader) {
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
}
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_TPDEC_CLEAR_BUFFER, 1);
mBufferSizes.pop();
int n = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < numLoops; i++) {
n += mDecodedSizes.itemAt(mDecodedSizes.size() - numLoops + i);
}
mBufferSizes.add(n);
}
/*
* AAC+/eAAC+ streams can be signalled in two ways: either explicitly
* or implicitly, according to MPEG4 spec. AAC+/eAAC+ is a dual
* rate system and the sampling rate in the final output is actually
* doubled compared with the core AAC decoder sampling rate.
*
* Explicit signalling is done by explicitly defining SBR audio object
* type in the bitstream. Implicit signalling is done by embedding
* SBR content in AAC extension payload specific to SBR, and hence
* requires an AAC decoder to perform pre-checks on actual audio frames.
*
* Thus, we could not say for sure whether a stream is
* AAC+/eAAC+ until the first data frame is decoded.
*/
if (mInputBufferCount <= 2 || mOutputBufferCount > 1) { // TODO: <= 1
if (mStreamInfo->sampleRate != prevSampleRate ||
mStreamInfo->numChannels != prevNumChannels) {
ALOGI("Reconfiguring decoder: %d->%d Hz, %d->%d channels",
prevSampleRate, mStreamInfo->sampleRate,
prevNumChannels, mStreamInfo->numChannels);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
if (inHeader && inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
mInputBufferCount++;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
} else if (!mStreamInfo->sampleRate || !mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
ALOGW("Invalid AAC stream");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
return;
}
if (inHeader && inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
mInputBufferCount++;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
mLastInHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else {
ALOGV("inHeader->nFilledLen = %d", inHeader ? inHeader->nFilledLen : 0);
}
} while (decoderErr == AAC_DEC_OK);
}
int32_t outputDelay = mStreamInfo->outputDelay * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (!mEndOfInput && mOutputDelayCompensated < outputDelay) {
int32_t toCompensate = outputDelay - mOutputDelayCompensated;
int32_t discard = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
if (discard > toCompensate) {
discard = toCompensate;
}
int32_t discarded = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(0, discard);
mOutputDelayCompensated += discarded;
continue;
}
if (mEndOfInput) {
while (mOutputDelayCompensated > 0) {
INT_PCM tmpOutBuffer[2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT];
mDrcWrap.submitStreamData(mStreamInfo);
mDrcWrap.update();
AAC_DECODER_ERROR decoderErr =
aacDecoder_DecodeFrame(mAACDecoder,
tmpOutBuffer,
2048 * MAX_CHANNEL_COUNT,
AACDEC_FLUSH);
if (decoderErr != AAC_DEC_OK) {
ALOGW("aacDecoder_DecodeFrame decoderErr = 0x%4.4x", decoderErr);
}
int32_t tmpOutBufferSamples = mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
if (tmpOutBufferSamples > mOutputDelayCompensated) {
tmpOutBufferSamples = mOutputDelayCompensated;
}
outputDelayRingBufferPutSamples(tmpOutBuffer, tmpOutBufferSamples);
mOutputDelayCompensated -= tmpOutBufferSamples;
}
}
while (!outQueue.empty()
&& outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable()
>= mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (outHeader->nOffset != 0) {
ALOGE("outHeader->nOffset != 0 is not handled");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
INT_PCM *outBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<INT_PCM *>(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset);
int samplesize = mStreamInfo->numChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (outHeader->nOffset
+ mStreamInfo->frameSize * samplesize
> outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("buffer overflow");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
int available = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
int numSamples = outHeader->nAllocLen / sizeof(int16_t);
if (numSamples > available) {
numSamples = available;
}
int64_t currentTime = 0;
if (available) {
int numFrames = numSamples / (mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels);
numSamples = numFrames * (mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels);
ALOGV("%d samples available (%d), or %d frames",
numSamples, available, numFrames);
int64_t *nextTimeStamp = &mBufferTimestamps.editItemAt(0);
currentTime = *nextTimeStamp;
int32_t *currentBufLeft = &mBufferSizes.editItemAt(0);
for (int i = 0; i < numFrames; i++) {
int32_t decodedSize = mDecodedSizes.itemAt(0);
mDecodedSizes.removeAt(0);
ALOGV("decoded %d of %d", decodedSize, *currentBufLeft);
if (*currentBufLeft > decodedSize) {
*currentBufLeft -= decodedSize;
*nextTimeStamp += mStreamInfo->aacSamplesPerFrame *
1000000ll / mStreamInfo->aacSampleRate;
ALOGV("adjusted nextTimeStamp/size to %lld/%d",
(long long) *nextTimeStamp, *currentBufLeft);
} else {
if (mBufferTimestamps.size() > 0) {
mBufferTimestamps.removeAt(0);
nextTimeStamp = &mBufferTimestamps.editItemAt(0);
mBufferSizes.removeAt(0);
currentBufLeft = &mBufferSizes.editItemAt(0);
ALOGV("moved to next time/size: %lld/%d",
(long long) *nextTimeStamp, *currentBufLeft);
}
numFrames = i + 1;
numSamples = numFrames * mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
break;
}
}
ALOGV("getting %d from ringbuffer", numSamples);
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(outBuffer, numSamples);
if (ns != numSamples) {
ALOGE("not a complete frame of samples available");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = numSamples * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mEndOfInput && !outQueue.empty() && outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable() == 0) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mEndOfOutput = true;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = currentTime;
mOutputBufferCount++;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
ALOGV("out timestamp %lld / %d", outHeader->nTimeStamp, outHeader->nFilledLen);
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
if (mEndOfInput) {
int ringBufAvail = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable();
if (!outQueue.empty()
&& ringBufAvail < mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
if (!mEndOfOutput) {
mEndOfOutput = true;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
INT_PCM *outBuffer = reinterpret_cast<INT_PCM *>(outHeader->pBuffer
+ outHeader->nOffset);
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(outBuffer, ringBufAvail);
if (ns < 0) {
ns = 0;
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = ns;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mBufferTimestamps.itemAt(0);
mBufferTimestamps.clear();
mBufferSizes.clear();
mDecodedSizes.clear();
mOutputBufferCount++;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
break; // if outQueue not empty but no more output
}
}
}
}
| 260,137,757,108,904,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3830 | codecs/aacdec/SoftAAC2.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via crafted ADTS data, aka internal bug 29153599. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3830 |
8,159 | Android | 7554755536019e439433c515eeb44e701fb3bfb2 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libavc/+/7554755536019e439433c515eeb44e701fb3bfb2 | None | 1 | WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
{
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
if(ret != 0)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
| 337,237,439,284,486,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-172"
] | CVE-2016-3828 | decoder/ih264d_api.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles invalid PPS and SPS NAL units, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28835995. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3828 |
8,160 | Android | a4567c66f4764442c6cb7b5c1858810194480fb5 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/a4567c66f4764442c6cb7b5c1858810194480fb5 | None | 1 | void SoftHEVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL && (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
if (!setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx)) {
ALOGE("Decoder arg setup failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
ALOGV("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
| 169,293,408,990,322,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-172"
] | CVE-2016-3827 | codecs/hevcdec/SoftHEVC.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 6.0.1 before 2016-08-01 mishandles decoder errors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28816956. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3827 |
8,161 | Android | 9cd8c3289c91254b3955bd7347cf605d6fa032c6 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/9cd8c3289c91254b3955bd7347cf605d6fa032c6 | None | 1 | status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::command(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
ALOGVV("command(), cmdCode: %d, mEffectInterface: %p", cmdCode, mEffectInterface);
if (mState == DESTROYED || mEffectInterface == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return mStatus;
}
status_t status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
cmdCode,
cmdSize,
pCmdData,
replySize,
pReplyData);
if (cmdCode != EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM && status == NO_ERROR) {
uint32_t size = (replySize == NULL) ? 0 : *replySize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < mHandles.size(); i++) {
EffectHandle *h = mHandles[i];
if (h != NULL && !h->destroyed_l()) {
h->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, size, pReplyData);
}
}
}
return status;
}
| 128,598,111,816,536,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3826 | services/audioflinger/Effects.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the reply size for an AudioFlinger effect command, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29251553. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3826 |
8,178 | Android | bae671597d47b9e5955c4cb742e468cebfd7ca6b | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/jhead/+/bae671597d47b9e5955c4cb742e468cebfd7ca6b | None | 1 | static void ProcessExifDir(unsigned char * DirStart, unsigned char * OffsetBase,
unsigned ExifLength, int NestingLevel)
{
int de;
int a;
int NumDirEntries;
unsigned ThumbnailOffset = 0;
unsigned ThumbnailSize = 0;
char IndentString[25];
printf("ProcessExifDir");
if (NestingLevel > 4){
ErrNonfatal("Maximum directory nesting exceeded (corrupt exif header)", 0,0);
return;
}
memset(IndentString, ' ', 25);
IndentString[NestingLevel * 4] = '\0';
NumDirEntries = Get16u(DirStart);
#define DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(Start, Entry) (Start+2+12*(Entry))
{
unsigned char * DirEnd;
DirEnd = DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, NumDirEntries);
if (DirEnd+4 > (OffsetBase+ExifLength)){
if (DirEnd+2 == OffsetBase+ExifLength || DirEnd == OffsetBase+ExifLength){
}else{
ErrNonfatal("Illegally sized exif subdirectory (%d entries)",NumDirEntries,0);
return;
}
}
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Directory\n",(int)(DirStart-OffsetBase), (int)(DirEnd+4-OffsetBase));
}
}
if (ShowTags){
printf("(dir has %d entries)\n",NumDirEntries);
}
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++){
int Tag, Format, Components;
unsigned char * ValuePtr;
int ByteCount;
unsigned char * DirEntry;
DirEntry = DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, de);
Tag = Get16u(DirEntry);
Format = Get16u(DirEntry+2);
Components = Get32u(DirEntry+4);
if ((Format-1) >= NUM_FORMATS) {
ErrNonfatal("Illegal number format %d for tag %04x", Format, Tag);
continue;
}
if ((unsigned)Components > 0x10000){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal number of components %d for tag %04x", Components, Tag);
continue;
}
ByteCount = Components * BytesPerFormat[Format];
if (ByteCount > 4){
unsigned OffsetVal;
OffsetVal = Get32u(DirEntry+8);
if (OffsetVal+ByteCount > ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal value pointer for tag %04x", Tag,0);
continue;
}
ValuePtr = OffsetBase+OffsetVal;
if (OffsetVal > ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset){
ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset = OffsetVal;
}
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Data for tag %04x\n",OffsetVal, OffsetVal+ByteCount, Tag);
}
}else{
ValuePtr = DirEntry+8;
}
if (Tag == TAG_MAKER_NOTE){
if (ShowTags){
printf("%s Maker note: ",IndentString);
}
ProcessMakerNote(ValuePtr, ByteCount, OffsetBase, ExifLength);
continue;
}
if (ShowTags){
for (a=0;;a++){
if (a >= (int)TAG_TABLE_SIZE){
printf("%s", IndentString);
printf(" Unknown Tag %04x Value = ", Tag);
break;
}
if (TagTable[a].Tag == Tag){
printf("%s", IndentString);
printf(" %s = ",TagTable[a].Desc);
break;
}
}
switch(Format){
case FMT_BYTE:
if(ByteCount>1){
printf("%.*ls\n", ByteCount/2, (wchar_t *)ValuePtr);
}else{
PrintFormatNumber(ValuePtr, Format, ByteCount);
printf("\n");
}
break;
case FMT_UNDEFINED:
case FMT_STRING:
{
printf("\"%s\"", ValuePtr);
}
break;
default:
PrintFormatNumber(ValuePtr, Format, ByteCount);
printf("\n");
}
}
switch(Tag){
case TAG_MAKE:
strncpy(ImageInfo.CameraMake, (char *)ValuePtr, ByteCount < 31 ? ByteCount : 31);
break;
case TAG_MODEL:
strncpy(ImageInfo.CameraModel, (char *)ValuePtr, ByteCount < 39 ? ByteCount : 39);
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTime, (char *)ValuePtr, sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTime));
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME_ORIG:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeOrig, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeOrig));
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME_DIG:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeDig, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeDig));
break;
case TAG_DATETIME_DIGITIZED:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.DigitizedTime, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.DigitizedTime));
if (ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags >= MAX_DATE_COPIES){
ErrNonfatal("More than %d date fields! This is nuts", MAX_DATE_COPIES, 0);
break;
}
ImageInfo.DateTimeOffsets[ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags++] =
(char *)ValuePtr - (char *)OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_DATETIME_ORIGINAL:
strncpy(ImageInfo.DateTime, (char *)ValuePtr, 19);
case TAG_DATETIME:
if (!isdigit(ImageInfo.DateTime[0])){
strncpy(ImageInfo.DateTime, (char *)ValuePtr, 19);
}
if (ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags >= MAX_DATE_COPIES){
ErrNonfatal("More than %d date fields! This is nuts", MAX_DATE_COPIES, 0);
break;
}
ImageInfo.DateTimeOffsets[ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags++] =
(char *)ValuePtr - (char *)OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_WINXP_COMMENT:
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){ // We already have a jpeg comment.
if (ShowTags) printf("Windows XP commend and other comment in header\n");
break; // Already have a windows comment, skip this one.
}
if (ByteCount > 1){
if (ByteCount > MAX_COMMENT_SIZE) ByteCount = MAX_COMMENT_SIZE;
memcpy(ImageInfo.Comments, ValuePtr, ByteCount);
ImageInfo.CommentWidchars = ByteCount/2;
}
break;
case TAG_USERCOMMENT:
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){ // We already have a jpeg comment.
if (ShowTags) printf("Multiple comments in exif header\n");
break; // Already have a windows comment, skip this one.
}
for (a=ByteCount;;){
a--;
if ((ValuePtr)[a] == ' '){
(ValuePtr)[a] = '\0';
}else{
break;
}
if (a == 0) break;
}
{
int msiz = ExifLength - (ValuePtr-OffsetBase);
if (msiz > ByteCount) msiz = ByteCount;
if (msiz > MAX_COMMENT_SIZE - 1) msiz = MAX_COMMENT_SIZE - 1;
if (msiz > 5 && memcmp(ValuePtr, "ASCII", 5) == 0) {
for (a = 5; a < 10 && a < msiz; a++) {
int c = (ValuePtr)[a];
if (c != '\0' && c != ' ') {
strncpy(ImageInfo.Comments,
(char *)ValuePtr + a, msiz - a);
break;
}
}
} else {
strncpy(ImageInfo.Comments, (char *)ValuePtr, msiz);
}
}
break;
case TAG_FNUMBER:
ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_APERTURE:
case TAG_MAXAPERTURE:
if (ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber == 0){
ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber
= (float)exp(ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)*log(2)*0.5);
}
break;
case TAG_FOCALLENGTH:
ImageInfo.FocalLength.num = Get32u(ValuePtr);
ImageInfo.FocalLength.denom = Get32u(4+(char *)ValuePtr);
break;
case TAG_SUBJECT_DISTANCE:
ImageInfo.Distance = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURETIME:
ImageInfo.ExposureTime = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_SHUTTERSPEED:
if (ImageInfo.ExposureTime == 0){
ImageInfo.ExposureTime
= (float)(1/exp(ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)*log(2)));
}
break;
case TAG_FLASH:
ImageInfo.FlashUsed=(int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_ORIENTATION:
if (NumOrientations >= 2){
ErrNonfatal("More than two orientation tags!",0,0);
break;
}
OrientationPtr[NumOrientations] = ValuePtr;
OrientationNumFormat[NumOrientations] = Format;
if (NumOrientations == 0){
ImageInfo.Orientation = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
}
if (ImageInfo.Orientation < 0 || ImageInfo.Orientation > 8){
ErrNonfatal("Undefined rotation value %d", ImageInfo.Orientation, 0);
ImageInfo.Orientation = 0;
}
NumOrientations += 1;
break;
case TAG_EXIF_IMAGELENGTH:
case TAG_EXIF_IMAGEWIDTH:
a = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
if (ExifImageWidth < a) ExifImageWidth = a;
break;
case TAG_FOCAL_PLANE_XRES:
FocalplaneXRes = ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_FOCAL_PLANE_UNITS:
switch((int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)){
case 1: FocalplaneUnits = 25.4; break; // inch
case 2:
FocalplaneUnits = 25.4;
break;
case 3: FocalplaneUnits = 10; break; // centimeter
case 4: FocalplaneUnits = 1; break; // millimeter
case 5: FocalplaneUnits = .001; break; // micrometer
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_BIAS:
ImageInfo.ExposureBias = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_WHITEBALANCE:
ImageInfo.Whitebalance = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_LIGHT_SOURCE:
ImageInfo.LightSource = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_METERING_MODE:
ImageInfo.MeteringMode = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_PROGRAM:
ImageInfo.ExposureProgram = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_INDEX:
if (ImageInfo.ISOequivalent == 0){
ImageInfo.ISOequivalent = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_MODE:
ImageInfo.ExposureMode = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_ISO_EQUIVALENT:
ImageInfo.ISOequivalent = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_DIGITALZOOMRATIO:
ImageInfo.DigitalZoomRatio = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_THUMBNAIL_OFFSET:
ThumbnailOffset = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
DirWithThumbnailPtrs = DirStart;
break;
case TAG_THUMBNAIL_LENGTH:
ThumbnailSize = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
ImageInfo.ThumbnailSizeOffset = ValuePtr-OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_EXIF_OFFSET:
if (ShowTags) printf("%s Exif Dir:",IndentString);
case TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET:
if (Tag == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET && ShowTags) printf("%s Interop Dir:",IndentString);
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Get32u(ValuePtr);
if (SubdirStart < OffsetBase || SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal exif or interop ofset directory link",0,0);
}else{
ProcessExifDir(SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, NestingLevel+1);
}
continue;
}
break;
case TAG_GPSINFO:
if (ShowTags) printf("%s GPS info dir:",IndentString);
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Get32u(ValuePtr);
if (SubdirStart < OffsetBase || SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal GPS directory link",0,0);
}else{
ProcessGpsInfo(SubdirStart, ByteCount, OffsetBase, ExifLength);
}
continue;
}
break;
case TAG_FOCALLENGTH_35MM:
ImageInfo.FocalLength35mmEquiv = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_DISTANCE_RANGE:
ImageInfo.DistanceRange = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
}
}
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
unsigned Offset;
if (DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, NumDirEntries) + 4 <= OffsetBase+ExifLength){
printf("DirStart %p offset from dirstart %d", DirStart, 2+12*NumDirEntries);
Offset = Get32u(DirStart+2+12*NumDirEntries);
if (Offset){
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Offset;
if (SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength || SubdirStart < OffsetBase){
printf("SubdirStart %p OffsetBase %p ExifLength %d Offset %d",
SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, Offset);
if (SubdirStart > OffsetBase && SubdirStart < OffsetBase+ExifLength+20){
if (ShowTags) printf("Thumbnail removed with Jhead 1.3 or earlier\n");
}else{
ErrNonfatal("Illegal subdirectory link",0,0);
}
}else{
if (SubdirStart <= OffsetBase+ExifLength){
if (ShowTags) printf("%s Continued directory ",IndentString);
ProcessExifDir(SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, NestingLevel+1);
}
}
if (Offset > ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset){
ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset = Offset;
}
}
}else{
}
}
if (ThumbnailOffset){
ImageInfo.ThumbnailAtEnd = FALSE;
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Thumbnail\n",ThumbnailOffset, ThumbnailOffset+ThumbnailSize);
}
if (ThumbnailOffset <= ExifLength){
if (ThumbnailSize > ExifLength-ThumbnailOffset){
ThumbnailSize = ExifLength-ThumbnailOffset;
if (ShowTags) printf("Thumbnail incorrectly placed in header\n");
}
ImageInfo.ThumbnailOffset = ThumbnailOffset;
ImageInfo.ThumbnailSize = ThumbnailSize;
if (ShowTags){
printf("Thumbnail size: %d bytes\n",ThumbnailSize);
}
}
}
printf("returning from ProcessExifDir");
}
| 131,638,438,977,564,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-3822 | exif.c in Matthias Wandel jhead 2.87, as used in libjhead in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access) via crafted EXIF data, aka internal bug 28868315. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3822 |
8,188 | Android | 590d1729883f700ab905cdc9ad850f3ddd7e1f56 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/590d1729883f700ab905cdc9ad850f3ddd7e1f56 | None | 1 | u32 h264bsdInitDpb(
dpbStorage_t *dpb,
u32 picSizeInMbs,
u32 dpbSize,
u32 maxRefFrames,
u32 maxFrameNum,
u32 noReordering)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i;
/* Code */
ASSERT(picSizeInMbs);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= MAX_NUM_REF_PICS);
ASSERT(maxRefFrames <= dpbSize);
ASSERT(maxFrameNum);
ASSERT(dpbSize);
dpb->maxLongTermFrameIdx = NO_LONG_TERM_FRAME_INDICES;
dpb->maxRefFrames = MAX(maxRefFrames, 1);
if (noReordering)
dpb->dpbSize = dpb->maxRefFrames;
else
dpb->dpbSize = dpbSize;
dpb->maxFrameNum = maxFrameNum;
dpb->noReordering = noReordering;
dpb->fullness = 0;
dpb->numRefFrames = 0;
dpb->prevRefFrameNum = 0;
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t);
if (dpb->buffer == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->buffer, 0,
(MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1)*sizeof(dpbPicture_t));
for (i = 0; i < dpb->dpbSize + 1; i++)
{
/* Allocate needed amount of memory, which is:
* image size + 32 + 15, where 32 cames from the fact that in ARM OpenMax
* DL implementation Functions may read beyond the end of an array,
* by a maximum of 32 bytes. And +15 cames for the need to align memory
* to 16-byte boundary */
ALLOCATE(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, (picSizeInMbs*384 + 32+15), u8);
if (dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
dpb->buffer[i].data = ALIGN(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData, 16);
}
ALLOCATE(dpb->list, MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1, dpbPicture_t*);
ALLOCATE(dpb->outBuf, dpb->dpbSize+1, dpbOutPicture_t);
if (dpb->list == NULL || dpb->outBuf == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(dpb->list, 0,
((MAX_NUM_REF_IDX_L0_ACTIVE + 1) * sizeof(dpbPicture_t*)) );
dpb->numOut = dpb->outIndex = 0;
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
| 223,946,036,477,816,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-3819 | Integer overflow in codecs/on2/h264dec/source/h264bsd_dpb.c in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28533562. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3819 |
8,191 | Android | d1c775d1d8d2ed117d1e026719b7f9f089716597 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libmpeg2/+/d1c775d1d8d2ed117d1e026719b7f9f089716597 | None | 1 | INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
}
return;
}
| 248,363,492,286,330,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-3765 | decoder/impeg2d_bitstream.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28168413. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3765 |
8,192 | Android | daef4327fe0c75b0a90bb8627458feec7a301e1f | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/daef4327fe0c75b0a90bb8627458feec7a301e1f | None | 1 | sp<IMemory> MetadataRetrieverClient::getFrameAtTime(int64_t timeUs, int option)
{
ALOGV("getFrameAtTime: time(%lld us) option(%d)", timeUs, option);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
Mutex::Autolock glock(sLock);
mThumbnail.clear();
if (mRetriever == NULL) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frame = mRetriever->getFrameAtTime(timeUs, option);
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to capture a video frame");
return NULL;
}
size_t size = sizeof(VideoFrame) + frame->mSize;
sp<MemoryHeapBase> heap = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, "MetadataRetrieverClient");
if (heap == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to create MemoryDealer");
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
mThumbnail = new MemoryBase(heap, 0, size);
if (mThumbnail == NULL) {
ALOGE("not enough memory for VideoFrame size=%u", size);
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frameCopy = static_cast<VideoFrame *>(mThumbnail->pointer());
frameCopy->mWidth = frame->mWidth;
frameCopy->mHeight = frame->mHeight;
frameCopy->mDisplayWidth = frame->mDisplayWidth;
frameCopy->mDisplayHeight = frame->mDisplayHeight;
frameCopy->mSize = frame->mSize;
frameCopy->mRotationAngle = frame->mRotationAngle;
ALOGV("rotation: %d", frameCopy->mRotationAngle);
frameCopy->mData = (uint8_t *)frameCopy + sizeof(VideoFrame);
memcpy(frameCopy->mData, frame->mData, frame->mSize);
delete frame; // Fix memory leakage
return mThumbnail;
}
| 47,687,956,695,025,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3764 | media/libmediaplayerservice/MetadataRetrieverClient.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive pointer information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28377502. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3764 |
8,200 | Android | 338aeaf28e9981c15d0673b18487dba61eb5447c | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/dalvik/+/338aeaf28e9981c15d0673b18487dba61eb5447c | None | 1 | char* dexOptGenerateCacheFileName(const char* fileName, const char* subFileName)
{
char nameBuf[512];
char absoluteFile[sizeof(nameBuf)];
const size_t kBufLen = sizeof(nameBuf) - 1;
const char* dataRoot;
char* cp;
/*
* Get the absolute path of the Jar or DEX file.
*/
absoluteFile[0] = '\0';
if (fileName[0] != '/') {
/*
* Generate the absolute path. This doesn't do everything it
* should, e.g. if filename is "./out/whatever" it doesn't crunch
* the leading "./" out, but it'll do.
*/
if (getcwd(absoluteFile, kBufLen) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Can't get CWD while opening jar file");
return NULL;
}
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen);
}
strncat(absoluteFile, fileName, kBufLen);
/*
* Append the name of the Jar file entry, if any. This is not currently
* required, but will be if we start putting more than one DEX file
* in a Jar.
*/
if (subFileName != NULL) {
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen);
strncat(absoluteFile, subFileName, kBufLen);
}
/* Turn the path into a flat filename by replacing
* any slashes after the first one with '@' characters.
*/
cp = absoluteFile + 1;
while (*cp != '\0') {
if (*cp == '/') {
*cp = '@';
}
cp++;
}
/* Build the name of the cache directory.
*/
dataRoot = getenv("ANDROID_DATA");
if (dataRoot == NULL)
dataRoot = "/data";
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName, kInstructionSet);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
/* Tack on the file name for the actual cache file path.
*/
strncat(nameBuf, absoluteFile, kBufLen);
ALOGV("Cache file for '%s' '%s' is '%s'", fileName, subFileName, nameBuf);
return strdup(nameBuf);
}
| 93,130,013,348,756,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-3758 | Multiple buffer overflows in libdex/OptInvocation.cpp in DexClassLoader in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that provides a long filename, aka internal bug 27840771. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3758 |
8,201 | Android | ae18eb014609948a40e22192b87b10efc680daa7 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ae18eb014609948a40e22192b87b10efc680daa7 | None | 1 | static void print_maps(struct pid_info_t* info)
{
FILE *maps;
size_t offset;
char device[10];
long int inode;
char file[PATH_MAX];
strlcat(info->path, "maps", sizeof(info->path));
maps = fopen(info->path, "r");
if (!maps)
goto out;
while (fscanf(maps, "%*x-%*x %*s %zx %s %ld %s\n", &offset, device, &inode,
file) == 4) {
if (inode == 0 || !strcmp(device, "00:00"))
continue;
printf("%-9s %5d %10s %4s %9s %18s %9zd %10ld %s\n",
info->cmdline, info->pid, info->user, "mem",
"???", device, offset, inode, file);
}
fclose(maps);
out:
info->path[info->parent_length] = '\0';
}
| 177,103,654,200,417,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3757 | The print_maps function in toolbox/lsof.c in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows user-assisted attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that attempts to list a long name of a memory-mapped file, aka internal bug 28175237. NOTE: print_maps is not related to the Vic Abell lsof product. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3757 |
8,202 | Android | 659030a2e80c38fb8da0a4eb68695349eec6778b | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/tremolo/+/659030a2e80c38fb8da0a4eb68695349eec6778b | None | 1 | int res_inverse(vorbis_dsp_state *vd,vorbis_info_residue *info,
ogg_int32_t **in,int *nonzero,int ch){
int i,j,k,s,used=0;
codec_setup_info *ci=(codec_setup_info *)vd->vi->codec_setup;
codebook *phrasebook=ci->book_param+info->groupbook;
int samples_per_partition=info->grouping;
int partitions_per_word=phrasebook->dim;
int pcmend=ci->blocksizes[vd->W];
if(info->type<2){
int max=pcmend>>1;
int end=(info->end<max?info->end:max);
int n=end-info->begin;
if(n>0){
int partvals=n/samples_per_partition;
int partwords=(partvals+partitions_per_word-1)/partitions_per_word;
for(i=0;i<ch;i++)
if(nonzero[i])
in[used++]=in[i];
ch=used;
if(used){
char **partword=(char **)alloca(ch*sizeof(*partword));
for(j=0;j<ch;j++)
partword[j]=(char *)alloca(partwords*partitions_per_word*
sizeof(*partword[j]));
for(s=0;s<info->stages;s++){
for(i=0;i<partvals;){
if(s==0){
/* fetch the partition word for each channel */
partword[0][i+partitions_per_word-1]=1;
for(k=partitions_per_word-2;k>=0;k--)
partword[0][i+k]=partword[0][i+k+1]*info->partitions;
for(j=1;j<ch;j++)
for(k=partitions_per_word-1;k>=0;k--)
partword[j][i+k]=partword[j-1][i+k];
for(j=0;j<ch;j++){
int temp=vorbis_book_decode(phrasebook,&vd->opb);
if(temp==-1)goto eopbreak;
/* this can be done quickly in assembly due to the quotient
always being at most six bits */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word;k++){
ogg_uint32_t div=partword[j][i+k];
partword[j][i+k]=temp/div;
temp-=partword[j][i+k]*div;
}
}
}
/* now we decode residual values for the partitions */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word && i<partvals;k++,i++)
for(j=0;j<ch;j++){
long offset=info->begin+i*samples_per_partition;
if(info->stagemasks[(int)partword[j][i]]&(1<<s)){
codebook *stagebook=ci->book_param+
info->stagebooks[(partword[j][i]<<3)+s];
if(info->type){
if(vorbis_book_decodev_add(stagebook,in[j]+offset,&vd->opb,
samples_per_partition,-8)==-1)
goto eopbreak;
}else{
if(vorbis_book_decodevs_add(stagebook,in[j]+offset,&vd->opb,
samples_per_partition,-8)==-1)
goto eopbreak;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}else{
int max=(pcmend*ch)>>1;
int end=(info->end<max?info->end:max);
int n=end-info->begin;
if(n>0){
int partvals=n/samples_per_partition;
int partwords=(partvals+partitions_per_word-1)/partitions_per_word;
char *partword=
(char *)alloca(partwords*partitions_per_word*sizeof(*partword));
int beginoff=info->begin/ch;
for(i=0;i<ch;i++)if(nonzero[i])break;
if(i==ch)return(0); /* no nonzero vectors */
samples_per_partition/=ch;
for(s=0;s<info->stages;s++){
for(i=0;i<partvals;){
if(s==0){
int temp;
partword[i+partitions_per_word-1]=1;
for(k=partitions_per_word-2;k>=0;k--)
partword[i+k]=partword[i+k+1]*info->partitions;
/* fetch the partition word */
temp=vorbis_book_decode(phrasebook,&vd->opb);
if(temp==-1)goto eopbreak;
/* this can be done quickly in assembly due to the quotient
always being at most six bits */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word;k++){
ogg_uint32_t div=partword[i+k];
partword[i+k]=temp/div;
temp-=partword[i+k]*div;
}
}
/* now we decode residual values for the partitions */
for(k=0;k<partitions_per_word && i<partvals;k++,i++)
if(info->stagemasks[(int)partword[i]]&(1<<s)){
codebook *stagebook=ci->book_param+
info->stagebooks[(partword[i]<<3)+s];
if(vorbis_book_decodevv_add(stagebook,in,
i*samples_per_partition+beginoff,ch,
&vd->opb,
samples_per_partition,-8)==-1)
goto eopbreak;
}
}
}
}
}
eopbreak:
return 0;
}
| 183,647,412,667,613,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3756 | Tremolo/res012.c in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate the number of partitions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28556125. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3756 |
8,204 | Android | d4841f1161bdb5e13cb19e81af42437a634dd6ef | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libavc/+/d4841f1161bdb5e13cb19e81af42437a634dd6ef | None | 1 | WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 272,222,286,368,369,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3755 | decoder/ih264d_parse_pslice.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not properly select concealment frames, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28470138. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3755 |
8,205 | Android | 6fdee2a83432b3b150d6a34f231c4e2f7353c01e | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/6fdee2a83432b3b150d6a34f231c4e2f7353c01e | None | 1 | int main(int argc __unused, char** argv)
{
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
bool doLog = (property_get("ro.test_harness", value, "0") > 0) && (atoi(value) == 1);
pid_t childPid;
if (doLog && (childPid = fork()) != 0) {
strcpy(argv[0], "media.log");
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
MediaLogService::instantiate();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
for (;;) {
siginfo_t info;
int ret = waitid(P_PID, childPid, &info, WEXITED | WSTOPPED | WCONTINUED);
if (ret == EINTR) {
continue;
}
if (ret < 0) {
break;
}
char buffer[32];
const char *code;
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
code = "CLD_EXITED";
break;
case CLD_KILLED:
code = "CLD_KILLED";
break;
case CLD_DUMPED:
code = "CLD_DUMPED";
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
code = "CLD_STOPPED";
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
code = "CLD_TRAPPED";
break;
case CLD_CONTINUED:
code = "CLD_CONTINUED";
break;
default:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "unknown (%d)", info.si_code);
code = buffer;
break;
}
struct rusage usage;
getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &usage);
ALOG(LOG_ERROR, "media.log", "pid %d status %d code %s user %ld.%03lds sys %ld.%03lds",
info.si_pid, info.si_status, code,
usage.ru_utime.tv_sec, usage.ru_utime.tv_usec / 1000,
usage.ru_stime.tv_sec, usage.ru_stime.tv_usec / 1000);
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.log"));
if (binder != 0) {
Vector<String16> args;
binder->dump(-1, args);
}
switch (info.si_code) {
case CLD_EXITED:
case CLD_KILLED:
case CLD_DUMPED: {
ALOG(LOG_INFO, "media.log", "exiting");
_exit(0);
}
default:
break;
}
}
} else {
if (doLog) {
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // if parent media.log dies before me, kill me also
setpgid(0, 0); // but if I die first, don't kill my parent
}
InitializeIcuOrDie();
sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
ALOGI("ServiceManager: %p", sm.get());
AudioFlinger::instantiate();
MediaPlayerService::instantiate();
ResourceManagerService::instantiate();
CameraService::instantiate();
AudioPolicyService::instantiate();
SoundTriggerHwService::instantiate();
RadioService::instantiate();
registerExtensions();
ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool();
}
}
| 153,447,124,376,763,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2016-3754 | mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not limit process-memory usage, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28615448. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3754 |
8,361 | Android | 54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8 | None | 1 | native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
if (!h) {
return 0;
}
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) err = BAD_VALUE;
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
| 49,962,414,184,976,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3750 | libs/binder/Parcel.cpp in the Parcels Framework APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate the return value of the dup system call, which allows attackers to bypass an isolation protection mechanism via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28395952. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3750 |
8,374 | Android | 514139f4b40cbb035bb92f3e24d5a389d75db9e6 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/514139f4b40cbb035bb92f3e24d5a389d75db9e6 | None | 1 | static BT_HDR *create_pbuf(UINT16 len, UINT8 *data)
{
BT_HDR* p_buf = GKI_getbuf((UINT16) (len + BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET + sizeof(BT_HDR)));
if (p_buf) {
UINT8* pbuf_data;
p_buf->len = len;
p_buf->offset = BTA_HH_MIN_OFFSET;
pbuf_data = (UINT8*) (p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
memcpy(pbuf_data, data, len);
}
return p_buf;
}
| 30,281,110,686,918,547,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-3744 | Buffer overflow in the create_pbuf function in btif/src/btif_hh.c in Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows remote attackers to gain privileges via a crafted pairing operation, aka internal bug 27930580. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3744 |
8,375 | Android | ecf6c7ce6d5a22d52160698aab44fc234c63291a | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libavc/+/ecf6c7ce6d5a22d52160698aab44fc234c63291a | None | 1 | void ih264d_init_decoder(void * ps_dec_params)
{
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_dec_params;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc, *ps_cur_poc;
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ih264d_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
ps_dec->init_done = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 1;
ps_dec->u2_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd = 0;
ps_dec->u1_separate_parse = DEFAULT_SEPARATE_PARSE;
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_type = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics = 0;
ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
memset(ps_dec->ps_pps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_pic_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS));
memset(ps_dec->ps_sps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_seq_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAMS));
/* Initialization of function pointers ih264d_deblock_picture function*/
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[0] = ih264d_deblock_picture_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[1] = ih264d_deblock_picture_mbaff;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
ps_dec->u4_num_fld_in_frm = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
/* Initialize the sei validity u4_flag with zero indiacting sei is not valid*/
ps_dec->ps_sei->u1_is_valid = 0;
/* decParams Initializations */
ps_dec->ps_cur_pps = NULL;
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps = NULL;
ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 1;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width = 0;
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS; //REJECT_PB_PICS;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_cur_frm = INIT_FRAME;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = 0xFF;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/* POC initializations */
ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_top_field_order_count = ps_cur_poc->i4_top_field_order_count =
0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count =
ps_cur_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp = 4;
/* Field PIC initializations */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
/* Set the cropping parameters as zero */
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv = 0;
/* The Initial Frame Rate Info is not Present */
ps_dec->i4_vui_frame_rate = -1;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 0;
ps_dec->u1_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* Set the default frame seek mask mode */
ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask = SKIP_NONE;
/********************************************************/
/* Initialize CAVLC residual decoding function pointers */
/********************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[0] = ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_1;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_2to10;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_11to16;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[0] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n0to7;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[1] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n8;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[0] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_none_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_left_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_top_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[3] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_both_available;
/***************************************************************************/
/* Initialize Bs calculation function pointers for P and B, 16x16/non16x16 */
/***************************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[0] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_frm;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[1] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_fld;
/* Initialize Reference Pic Buffers */
ih264d_init_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.cabac_table = gau4_ih264d_cabac_table;
ps_dec->pu1_left_mv_ctxt_inc = ps_dec->u1_left_mv_ctxt_inc_arr[0];
ps_dec->pi1_left_ref_idx_ctxt_inc =
&ps_dec->i1_left_ref_idx_ctx_inc_arr[0][0];
ps_dec->pu1_left_yuv_dc_csbp = &ps_dec->u1_yuv_dc_csbp_topmb;
/* ! */
/* Initializing flush frame u4_flag */
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 0;
{
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
}
memset(ps_dec->disp_bufs, 0, (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(disp_buf_t));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
ih264d_init_arch(ps_dec);
ih264d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
ps_dec->init_done = 1;
}
| 158,351,370,982,025,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-3743 | decoder/ih264d_api.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not initialize certain data structures, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 27907656. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3743 |
8,383 | Android | 60547808ca4e9cfac50028c00c58a6ceb2319301 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/60547808ca4e9cfac50028c00c58a6ceb2319301 | None | 1 | u32 h264bsdActivateParamSets(storage_t *pStorage, u32 ppsId, u32 isIdr)
{
/* Variables */
u32 tmp;
u32 flag;
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
ASSERT(ppsId < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS);
/* check that pps and corresponding sps exist */
if ( (pStorage->pps[ppsId] == NULL) ||
(pStorage->sps[pStorage->pps[ppsId]->seqParameterSetId] == NULL) )
{
return(HANTRO_NOK);
}
/* check that pps parameters do not violate picture size constraints */
tmp = CheckPps(pStorage->pps[ppsId],
pStorage->sps[pStorage->pps[ppsId]->seqParameterSetId]);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
return(tmp);
/* first activation part1 */
if (pStorage->activePpsId == MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS)
{
pStorage->activePpsId = ppsId;
pStorage->activePps = pStorage->pps[ppsId];
pStorage->activeSpsId = pStorage->activePps->seqParameterSetId;
pStorage->activeSps = pStorage->sps[pStorage->activeSpsId];
pStorage->picSizeInMbs =
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs *
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->width = pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->height = pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
/* first activation part2 */
else if (pStorage->pendingActivation)
{
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_FALSE;
FREE(pStorage->mb);
FREE(pStorage->sliceGroupMap);
ALLOCATE(pStorage->mb, pStorage->picSizeInMbs, mbStorage_t);
ALLOCATE(pStorage->sliceGroupMap, pStorage->picSizeInMbs, u32);
if (pStorage->mb == NULL || pStorage->sliceGroupMap == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(pStorage->mb, 0,
pStorage->picSizeInMbs * sizeof(mbStorage_t));
h264bsdInitMbNeighbours(pStorage->mb,
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs,
pStorage->picSizeInMbs);
/* dpb output reordering disabled if
* 1) application set noReordering flag
* 2) POC type equal to 2
* 3) num_reorder_frames in vui equal to 0 */
if ( pStorage->noReordering ||
pStorage->activeSps->picOrderCntType == 2 ||
(pStorage->activeSps->vuiParametersPresentFlag &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->bitstreamRestrictionFlag &&
!pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->numReorderFrames) )
flag = HANTRO_TRUE;
else
flag = HANTRO_FALSE;
tmp = h264bsdResetDpb(pStorage->dpb,
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs *
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs,
pStorage->activeSps->maxDpbSize,
pStorage->activeSps->numRefFrames,
pStorage->activeSps->maxFrameNum,
flag);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
return(tmp);
}
else if (ppsId != pStorage->activePpsId)
{
/* sequence parameter set shall not change but before an IDR picture */
if (pStorage->pps[ppsId]->seqParameterSetId != pStorage->activeSpsId)
{
DEBUG(("SEQ PARAM SET CHANGING...\n"));
if (isIdr)
{
pStorage->activePpsId = ppsId;
pStorage->activePps = pStorage->pps[ppsId];
pStorage->activeSpsId = pStorage->activePps->seqParameterSetId;
pStorage->activeSps = pStorage->sps[pStorage->activeSpsId];
pStorage->picSizeInMbs =
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs *
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->width = pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->height =
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
else
{
DEBUG(("TRYING TO CHANGE SPS IN NON-IDR SLICE\n"));
return(HANTRO_NOK);
}
}
else
{
pStorage->activePpsId = ppsId;
pStorage->activePps = pStorage->pps[ppsId];
}
}
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
| 227,750,239,788,619,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2507 | Integer overflow in codecs/on2/h264dec/source/h264bsd_storage.c in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28532266. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2507 |
8,384 | Android | 4f236c532039a61f0cf681d2e3c6e022911bbb5c | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/4f236c532039a61f0cf681d2e3c6e022911bbb5c | None | 1 | bool ATSParser::PSISection::isCRCOkay() const {
if (!isComplete()) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* data = mBuffer->data();
if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return true;
}
unsigned sectionLength = U16_AT(data + 1) & 0xfff;
ALOGV("sectionLength %u, skip %u", sectionLength, mSkipBytes);
sectionLength -= mSkipBytes;
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sectionLength + 4 /* crc */; i++) {
uint8_t b = data[i];
int index = ((crc >> 24) ^ (b & 0xff)) & 0xff;
crc = CRC_TABLE[index] ^ (crc << 8);
}
ALOGV("crc: %08x\n", crc);
return (crc == 0);
}
| 180,480,682,085,530,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2505 | mpeg2ts/ATSParser.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate a certain section length, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28333006. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2505 |
8,385 | Android | dd3546765710ce8dd49eb23901d90345dec8282f | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/dd3546765710ce8dd49eb23901d90345dec8282f | None | 1 | AudioSource::AudioSource(
audio_source_t inputSource, const String16 &opPackageName,
uint32_t sampleRate, uint32_t channelCount, uint32_t outSampleRate)
: mStarted(false),
mSampleRate(sampleRate),
mOutSampleRate(outSampleRate > 0 ? outSampleRate : sampleRate),
mPrevSampleTimeUs(0),
mFirstSampleTimeUs(-1ll),
mNumFramesReceived(0),
mNumClientOwnedBuffers(0) {
ALOGV("sampleRate: %u, outSampleRate: %u, channelCount: %u",
sampleRate, outSampleRate, channelCount);
CHECK(channelCount == 1 || channelCount == 2);
CHECK(sampleRate > 0);
size_t minFrameCount;
status_t status = AudioRecord::getMinFrameCount(&minFrameCount,
sampleRate,
AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount));
if (status == OK) {
uint32_t frameCount = kMaxBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t) / channelCount;
size_t bufCount = 2;
while ((bufCount * frameCount) < minFrameCount) {
bufCount++;
}
mRecord = new AudioRecord(
inputSource, sampleRate, AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount),
opPackageName,
(size_t) (bufCount * frameCount),
AudioRecordCallbackFunction,
this,
frameCount /*notificationFrames*/);
mInitCheck = mRecord->initCheck();
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
mRecord.clear();
}
} else {
mInitCheck = status;
}
}
| 310,123,578,239,875,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-2499 | AudioSource.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not initialize certain data, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 27855172. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2499 |
8,388 | Android | 864e2e22fcd0cba3f5e67680ccabd0302dfda45d | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/864e2e22fcd0cba3f5e67680ccabd0302dfda45d | None | 1 | static ssize_t get_node_path_locked(struct node* node, char* buf, size_t bufsize) {
const char* name;
size_t namelen;
if (node->graft_path) {
name = node->graft_path;
namelen = node->graft_pathlen;
} else if (node->actual_name) {
name = node->actual_name;
namelen = node->namelen;
} else {
name = node->name;
namelen = node->namelen;
}
if (bufsize < namelen + 1) {
return -1;
}
ssize_t pathlen = 0;
if (node->parent && node->graft_path == NULL) {
pathlen = get_node_path_locked(node->parent, buf, bufsize - namelen - 2);
if (pathlen < 0) {
return -1;
}
buf[pathlen++] = '/';
}
memcpy(buf + pathlen, name, namelen + 1); /* include trailing \0 */
return pathlen + namelen;
}
| 270,563,786,775,080,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2494 | Off-by-one error in sdcard/sdcard.c in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 28085658. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2494 |
8,390 | Android | ad40e57890f81a3cf436c5f06da66396010bd9e5 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/ad40e57890f81a3cf436c5f06da66396010bd9e5 | None | 1 | void SoftMP3::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0 && inHeader->nFilledLen) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
mConfig->pInputBuffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
mConfig->pInputBuffer = NULL;
mConfig->inputBufferCurrentLength = 0;
}
mConfig->inputBufferMaxLength = 0;
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = 0;
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
mConfig->pOutputBuffer =
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer);
ERROR_CODE decoderErr;
if ((decoderErr = pvmp3_framedecoder(mConfig, mDecoderBuf))
!= NO_DECODING_ERROR) {
ALOGV("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
if (decoderErr != NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR
&& decoderErr != SIDE_INFO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("mp3 decoder returned error %d", decoderErr);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, decoderErr, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (mConfig->outputFrameSize == 0) {
mConfig->outputFrameSize = kOutputBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t);
}
if (decoderErr == NO_ENOUGH_MAIN_DATA_ERROR && mSawInputEos) {
if (!mIsFirst) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
memset(outHeader->pBuffer, 0, outHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
} else {
ALOGV_IF(mIsFirst, "insufficient data for first frame, sending silence");
memset(outHeader->pBuffer,
0,
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader) {
mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
}
} else if (mConfig->samplingRate != mSamplingRate
|| mConfig->num_channels != mNumChannels) {
mSamplingRate = mConfig->samplingRate;
mNumChannels = mConfig->num_channels;
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mIsFirst) {
mIsFirst = false;
outHeader->nOffset =
kPVMP3DecoderDelay * mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFilledLen =
mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t) - outHeader->nOffset;
} else if (!mSignalledOutputEos) {
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mConfig->outputFrameSize * sizeof(int16_t);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs + (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mSamplingRate;
if (inHeader) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength);
inHeader->nOffset += mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= mConfig->inputBufferUsedLength;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
mNumFramesOutput += mConfig->outputFrameSize / mNumChannels;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 230,108,350,087,941,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-2486 | mp3dec/SoftMP3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate the relationship between allocated memory and the frame size, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27793371. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2486 |
8,405 | Android | f22c2a0f0f9e030c240468d9d18b9297f001bcf0 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/f22c2a0f0f9e030c240468d9d18b9297f001bcf0 | None | 1 | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void) hComp;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE *pNal;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Config Called");
if (configIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData) {
OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData called");
if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc") ||
!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc")) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData AVC");
OMX_U32 extra_size;
nal_length = (config->pData[4] & 0x03) + 1;
extra_size = 0;
if (nal_length > 2) {
/* Presently we assume that only one SPS and one PPS in AvC1 Atom */
extra_size = (nal_length - 2) * 2;
}
OMX_U8 *pSrcBuf = (OMX_U8 *) (&config->pData[6]);
OMX_U8 *pDestBuf;
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize - 6 - 1 + extra_size;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(m_vendor_config.nDataSize);
OMX_U32 len;
OMX_U8 index = 0;
pDestBuf = m_vendor_config.pData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Rxd SPS+PPS nPortIndex[%u] len[%u] data[%p]",
(unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nPortIndex,
(unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nDataSize,
m_vendor_config.pData);
while (index < 2) {
uint8 *psize;
len = *pSrcBuf;
len = len << 8;
len |= *(pSrcBuf + 1);
psize = (uint8 *) & len;
memcpy(pDestBuf + nal_length, pSrcBuf + 2,len);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nal_length; i++) {
pDestBuf[i] = psize[nal_length - 1 - i];
}
pDestBuf += len + nal_length;
pSrcBuf += len + 2;
index++;
pSrcBuf++; // skip picture param set
len = 0;
}
} else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4") ||
!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2")) {
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize));
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,config->nDataSize);
} else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1")) {
if (m_vendor_config.pData) {
free(m_vendor_config.pData);
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = 0;
}
if (((*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData)) &
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) ==
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 simple/main profile");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData =
(OMX_U8 *) malloc(config->nDataSize);
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,
config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else if (*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData) == VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Advance profile");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData =
(OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize));
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,
config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP;
} else if ((config->nDataSize == VC1_STRUCT_C_LEN)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Simple/Main profile struct C only");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8*)malloc(config->nDataSize);
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData,config->pData,config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - Error: Unknown VC1 profile");
}
}
return ret;
} else if (configIndex == OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize) {
struct v4l2_control temp;
temp.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT;
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE);
pNal = reinterpret_cast < OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE * >(configData);
switch (pNal->nNaluBytes) {
case 0:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_STARTCODES;
break;
case 2:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_TWO_BYTE_LENGTH;
break;
case 4:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_FOUR_BYTE_LENGTH;
break;
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (!arbitrary_bytes) {
/* In arbitrary bytes mode, the assembler strips out nal size and replaces
* with start code, so only need to notify driver in frame by frame mode */
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &temp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
}
nal_length = pNal->nNaluBytes;
m_frame_parser.init_nal_length(nal_length);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize called with Size %d", nal_length);
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate) {
OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps);
if (config->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (config->bEnabled) {
if ((config->nFps >> 16) > 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)config->nFps >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(config->nFps, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) {
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
}
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, \
performance might be affected");
ret = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
client_set_fps = true;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Frame rate not supported.");
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: Disabled client's frame rate");
client_set_fps = false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_config: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)config->nPortIndex);
ret = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel) {
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData;
struct v4l2_control control;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", perf->ePerfLevel);
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL;
switch (perf->ePerfLevel) {
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL;
break;
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO;
break;
default:
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) {
ret = (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) ?
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting : OMX_ErrorNone;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigPriority) {
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *priority = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: priority %d", priority->nU32);
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY;
if (priority->nU32 == 0)
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_ENABLE;
else
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_DISABLE;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set Priority");
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate) {
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *rate = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: operating-rate %u fps", rate->nU32 >> 16);
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OPERATING_RATE;
control.value = rate->nU32;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
ret = errno == -EBUSY ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate %u fps (%s)",
rate->nU32 >> 16, errno == -EBUSY ? "HW Overload" : strerror(errno));
}
return ret;
}
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
| 143,331,426,835,081,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-2478 | mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles pointers, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27475409. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2478 |
8,476 | Android | 44749eb4f273f0eb681d0fa013e3beef754fa687 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/44749eb4f273f0eb681d0fa013e3beef754fa687 | None | 1 | void SoftAMR::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumSamplesOutput = 0;
}
const uint8_t *inputPtr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int32_t numBytesRead;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
numBytesRead =
AMRDecode(mState,
(Frame_Type_3GPP)((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f),
(UWord8 *)&inputPtr[1],
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
MIME_IETF);
if (numBytesRead == -1) {
ALOGE("PV AMR decoder AMRDecode() call failed");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
++numBytesRead; // Include the frame type header byte.
if (static_cast<size_t>(numBytesRead) > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
} else {
int16 mode = ((inputPtr[0] >> 3) & 0x0f);
if (mode >= 10 && mode <= 13) {
ALOGE("encountered illegal frame type %d in AMR WB content.",
mode);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mode);
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, frameSize);
int16_t *outPtr = (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer;
if (mode >= 9) {
memset(outPtr, 0, kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t));
} else if (mode < 9) {
int16 frameType;
RX_State_wb rx_state;
mime_unsorting(
const_cast<uint8_t *>(&inputPtr[1]),
mInputSampleBuffer,
&frameType, &mode, 1, &rx_state);
int16_t numSamplesOutput;
pvDecoder_AmrWb(
mode, mInputSampleBuffer,
outPtr,
&numSamplesOutput,
mDecoderBuf, frameType, mDecoderCookie);
CHECK_EQ((int)numSamplesOutput, (int)kNumSamplesPerFrameWB);
for (int i = 0; i < kNumSamplesPerFrameWB; ++i) {
/* Delete the 2 LSBs (14-bit output) */
outPtr[i] &= 0xfffC;
}
}
numBytesRead = frameSize;
}
inHeader->nOffset += numBytesRead;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= numBytesRead;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameNB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateNB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameNB;
} else {
outHeader->nFilledLen = kNumSamplesPerFrameWB * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumSamplesOutput * 1000000ll) / kSampleRateWB;
mNumSamplesOutput += kNumSamplesPerFrameWB;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
| 129,583,836,693,157,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2452 | codecs/amrnb/dec/SoftAMR.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bugs 27662364 and 27843673. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2452 |
8,479 | Android | 7fd96ebfc4c9da496c59d7c45e1f62be178e626d | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7fd96ebfc4c9da496c59d7c45e1f62be178e626d | None | 1 | void SoftVPXEncoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mCodecContext == NULL) {
if (OK != initEncoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize encoder");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
}
vpx_codec_err_t codec_return;
List<BufferInfo *> &inputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
while (!inputBufferInfoQueue.empty() && !outputBufferInfoQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inputBufferInfo = *inputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inputBufferHeader = inputBufferInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outputBufferInfo = *outputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outputBufferHeader = outputBufferInfo->mHeader;
if ((inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) &&
inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
return;
}
const uint8_t *source =
inputBufferHeader->pBuffer + inputBufferHeader->nOffset;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
source = extractGraphicBuffer(
mConversionBuffer, mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2,
source, inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (source == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else if (mColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
source, mConversionBuffer, mWidth, mHeight);
source = mConversionBuffer;
}
vpx_image_t raw_frame;
vpx_img_wrap(&raw_frame, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, mWidth, mHeight,
kInputBufferAlignment, (uint8_t *)source);
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags = 0;
if (mTemporalPatternLength > 0) {
flags = getEncodeFlags();
}
if (mKeyFrameRequested) {
flags |= VPX_EFLAG_FORCE_KF;
mKeyFrameRequested = false;
}
if (mBitrateUpdated) {
mCodecConfiguration->rc_target_bitrate = mBitrate/1000;
vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(mCodecContext,
mCodecConfiguration);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vp8 encoder failed to update bitrate: %s",
vpx_codec_err_to_string(res));
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
}
mBitrateUpdated = false;
}
uint32_t frameDuration;
if (inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp > mLastTimestamp) {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp - mLastTimestamp);
} else {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)1000000 << 16) / mFramerate);
}
mLastTimestamp = inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp;
codec_return = vpx_codec_encode(
mCodecContext,
&raw_frame,
inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp, // in timebase units
frameDuration, // frame duration in timebase units
flags, // frame flags
VPX_DL_REALTIME); // encoding deadline
if (codec_return != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vpx encoder failed to encode frame");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t encoded_packet_iterator = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t* encoded_packet;
while ((encoded_packet = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(
mCodecContext, &encoded_packet_iterator))) {
if (encoded_packet->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
outputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp = encoded_packet->data.frame.pts;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (encoded_packet->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
outputBufferHeader->nOffset = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = encoded_packet->data.frame.sz;
memcpy(outputBufferHeader->pBuffer,
encoded_packet->data.frame.buf,
encoded_packet->data.frame.sz);
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
if (inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
}
}
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
}
}
| 337,002,958,834,343,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2450 | codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27569635. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2450 |
8,480 | Android | b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | None | 1 | status_t Camera3Device::createDefaultRequest(int templateId,
CameraMetadata *request) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: for template %d", __FUNCTION__, templateId);
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
switch (mStatus) {
case STATUS_ERROR:
CLOGE("Device has encountered a serious error");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNINITIALIZED:
CLOGE("Device is not initialized!");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNCONFIGURED:
case STATUS_CONFIGURED:
case STATUS_ACTIVE:
break;
default:
SET_ERR_L("Unexpected status: %d", mStatus);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mRequestTemplateCache[templateId].isEmpty()) {
*request = mRequestTemplateCache[templateId];
return OK;
}
const camera_metadata_t *rawRequest;
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->construct_default_request_settings");
rawRequest = mHal3Device->ops->construct_default_request_settings(
mHal3Device, templateId);
ATRACE_END();
if (rawRequest == NULL) {
ALOGI("%s: template %d is not supported on this camera device",
__FUNCTION__, templateId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
*request = rawRequest;
mRequestTemplateCache[templateId] = rawRequest;
return OK;
}
| 26,728,933,723,318,532,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2449 | services/camera/libcameraservice/device3/Camera3Device.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not validate template IDs, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27568958. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2449 |
8,481 | Android | a59b827869a2ea04022dd225007f29af8d61837a | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/a59b827869a2ea04022dd225007f29af8d61837a | None | 1 | status_t IPCThreadState::executeCommand(int32_t cmd)
{
BBinder* obj;
RefBase::weakref_type* refs;
status_t result = NO_ERROR;
switch ((uint32_t)cmd) {
case BR_ERROR:
result = mIn.readInt32();
break;
case BR_OK:
break;
case BR_ACQUIRE:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
ALOG_ASSERT(refs->refBase() == obj,
"BR_ACQUIRE: object %p does not match cookie %p (expected %p)",
refs, obj, refs->refBase());
obj->incStrong(mProcess.get());
IF_LOG_REMOTEREFS() {
LOG_REMOTEREFS("BR_ACQUIRE from driver on %p", obj);
obj->printRefs();
}
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ACQUIRE_DONE);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)refs);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)obj);
break;
case BR_RELEASE:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
ALOG_ASSERT(refs->refBase() == obj,
"BR_RELEASE: object %p does not match cookie %p (expected %p)",
refs, obj, refs->refBase());
IF_LOG_REMOTEREFS() {
LOG_REMOTEREFS("BR_RELEASE from driver on %p", obj);
obj->printRefs();
}
mPendingStrongDerefs.push(obj);
break;
case BR_INCREFS:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
refs->incWeak(mProcess.get());
mOut.writeInt32(BC_INCREFS_DONE);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)refs);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)obj);
break;
case BR_DECREFS:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
mPendingWeakDerefs.push(refs);
break;
case BR_ATTEMPT_ACQUIRE:
refs = (RefBase::weakref_type*)mIn.readPointer();
obj = (BBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
{
const bool success = refs->attemptIncStrong(mProcess.get());
ALOG_ASSERT(success && refs->refBase() == obj,
"BR_ATTEMPT_ACQUIRE: object %p does not match cookie %p (expected %p)",
refs, obj, refs->refBase());
mOut.writeInt32(BC_ACQUIRE_RESULT);
mOut.writeInt32((int32_t)success);
}
break;
case BR_TRANSACTION:
{
binder_transaction_data tr;
result = mIn.read(&tr, sizeof(tr));
ALOG_ASSERT(result == NO_ERROR,
"Not enough command data for brTRANSACTION");
if (result != NO_ERROR) break;
Parcel buffer;
buffer.ipcSetDataReference(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(tr.data.ptr.buffer),
tr.data_size,
reinterpret_cast<const binder_size_t*>(tr.data.ptr.offsets),
tr.offsets_size/sizeof(binder_size_t), freeBuffer, this);
const pid_t origPid = mCallingPid;
const uid_t origUid = mCallingUid;
const int32_t origStrictModePolicy = mStrictModePolicy;
const int32_t origTransactionBinderFlags = mLastTransactionBinderFlags;
mCallingPid = tr.sender_pid;
mCallingUid = tr.sender_euid;
mLastTransactionBinderFlags = tr.flags;
int curPrio = getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, mMyThreadId);
if (gDisableBackgroundScheduling) {
if (curPrio > ANDROID_PRIORITY_NORMAL) {
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, mMyThreadId, ANDROID_PRIORITY_NORMAL);
}
} else {
if (curPrio >= ANDROID_PRIORITY_BACKGROUND) {
set_sched_policy(mMyThreadId, SP_BACKGROUND);
}
}
Parcel reply;
status_t error;
IF_LOG_TRANSACTIONS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "BR_TRANSACTION thr " << (void*)pthread_self()
<< " / obj " << tr.target.ptr << " / code "
<< TypeCode(tr.code) << ": " << indent << buffer
<< dedent << endl
<< "Data addr = "
<< reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(tr.data.ptr.buffer)
<< ", offsets addr="
<< reinterpret_cast<const size_t*>(tr.data.ptr.offsets) << endl;
}
if (tr.target.ptr) {
sp<BBinder> b((BBinder*)tr.cookie);
error = b->transact(tr.code, buffer, &reply, tr.flags);
} else {
error = the_context_object->transact(tr.code, buffer, &reply, tr.flags);
}
if ((tr.flags & TF_ONE_WAY) == 0) {
LOG_ONEWAY("Sending reply to %d!", mCallingPid);
if (error < NO_ERROR) reply.setError(error);
sendReply(reply, 0);
} else {
LOG_ONEWAY("NOT sending reply to %d!", mCallingPid);
}
mCallingPid = origPid;
mCallingUid = origUid;
mStrictModePolicy = origStrictModePolicy;
mLastTransactionBinderFlags = origTransactionBinderFlags;
IF_LOG_TRANSACTIONS() {
TextOutput::Bundle _b(alog);
alog << "BC_REPLY thr " << (void*)pthread_self() << " / obj "
<< tr.target.ptr << ": " << indent << reply << dedent << endl;
}
}
break;
case BR_DEAD_BINDER:
{
BpBinder *proxy = (BpBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
proxy->sendObituary();
mOut.writeInt32(BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)proxy);
} break;
case BR_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION_DONE:
{
BpBinder *proxy = (BpBinder*)mIn.readPointer();
proxy->getWeakRefs()->decWeak(proxy);
} break;
case BR_FINISHED:
result = TIMED_OUT;
break;
case BR_NOOP:
break;
case BR_SPAWN_LOOPER:
mProcess->spawnPooledThread(false);
break;
default:
printf("*** BAD COMMAND %d received from Binder driver\n", cmd);
result = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
break;
}
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
mLastError = result;
}
return result;
}
| 244,901,844,557,781,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2440 | libs/binder/IPCThreadState.cpp in Binder in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 mishandles object references, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 27252896. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2440 |
8,482 | Android | 9b534de2aca5d790c2a1c4d76b545f16137d95dd | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/9b534de2aca5d790c2a1c4d76b545f16137d95dd | None | 1 | bt_status_t btif_dm_pin_reply( const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, uint8_t accept,
uint8_t pin_len, bt_pin_code_t *pin_code)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: accept=%d", __FUNCTION__, accept);
if (pin_code == NULL)
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (pairing_cb.is_le_only)
{
int i;
UINT32 passkey = 0;
int multi[] = {100000, 10000, 1000, 100, 10,1};
BD_ADDR remote_bd_addr;
bdcpy(remote_bd_addr, bd_addr->address);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
passkey += (multi[i] * (pin_code->pin[i] - '0'));
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_pin_reply: passkey: %d", passkey);
BTA_DmBlePasskeyReply(remote_bd_addr, accept, passkey);
}
else
{
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
}
#else
BTA_DmPinReply( (UINT8 *)bd_addr->address, accept, pin_len, pin_code->pin);
if (accept)
pairing_cb.pin_code_len = pin_len;
#endif
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
| 80,634,627,258,604,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2439 | Buffer overflow in btif/src/btif_dm.c in Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long PIN value, aka internal bug 27411268. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2439 |
8,483 | Android | b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/flac/+/b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c | None | 1 | FLAC__bool read_metadata_vorbiscomment_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment *obj, unsigned length)
{
FLAC__uint32 i;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__bitreader_is_consumed_byte_aligned(decoder->private_->input));
/* read vendor string */
if (length >= 8) {
length -= 8; /* vendor string length + num comments entries alone take 8 bytes */
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_ENTRY_LENGTH_LEN == 32);
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->vendor_string.length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
if (obj->vendor_string.length > 0) {
if (length < obj->vendor_string.length) {
obj->vendor_string.length = 0;
obj->vendor_string.entry = 0;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= obj->vendor_string.length;
if (0 == (obj->vendor_string.entry = safe_malloc_add_2op_(obj->vendor_string.length, /*+*/1))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, obj->vendor_string.entry, obj->vendor_string.length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
obj->vendor_string.entry[obj->vendor_string.length] = '\0';
}
else
obj->vendor_string.entry = 0;
/* read num comments */
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_NUM_COMMENTS_LEN == 32);
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->num_comments))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
/* read comments */
if (obj->num_comments > 100000) {
/* Possibly malicious file. */
obj->num_comments = 0;
return false;
}
if (obj->num_comments > 0) {
if (0 == (obj->comments = safe_malloc_mul_2op_p(obj->num_comments, /*times*/sizeof(FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment_Entry)))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < obj->num_comments; i++) {
/* Initialize here just to make sure. */
obj->comments[i].length = 0;
obj->comments[i].entry = 0;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_ENTRY_LENGTH_LEN == 32);
if (length < 4) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= 4;
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->comments[i].length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
if (obj->comments[i].length > 0) {
if (length < obj->comments[i].length) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= obj->comments[i].length;
if (0 == (obj->comments[i].entry = safe_malloc_add_2op_(obj->comments[i].length, /*+*/1))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
memset (obj->comments[i].entry, 0, obj->comments[i].length) ;
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, obj->comments[i].entry, obj->comments[i].length)) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
obj->comments[i].entry[obj->comments[i].length] = '\0';
}
else
obj->comments[i].entry = 0;
}
}
else
obj->comments = 0;
}
skip:
if (length > 0) {
/* This will only happen on files with invalid data in comments */
if(!FLAC__bitreader_skip_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
}
return true;
}
| 298,457,634,124,847,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2429 | libFLAC/stream_decoder.c in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not prevent free operations on uninitialized memory, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 27211885. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2429 |
8,484 | Android | 5d4405f601fa11a8955fd7611532c982420e4206 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/aac/+/5d4405f601fa11a8955fd7611532c982420e4206 | None | 1 | static int aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap (
HANDLE_AAC_DRC self,
HANDLE_FDK_BITSTREAM hBs,
CAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo *pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo[],
UCHAR pceInstanceTag,
UCHAR channelMapping[], /* Channel mapping translating drcChannel index to canonical channel index */
int validChannels )
{
CDrcPayload threadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS];
CDrcPayload *validThreadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS];
CDrcParams *pParams;
UINT backupBsPosition;
int i, thread, validThreads = 0;
int numExcludedChns[MAX_DRC_THREADS];
FDK_ASSERT(self != NULL);
FDK_ASSERT(hBs != NULL);
FDK_ASSERT(pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo != NULL);
pParams = &self->params;
self->numThreads = 0;
backupBsPosition = FDKgetValidBits(hBs);
for (i = 0; i < self->numPayloads && self->numThreads < MAX_DRC_THREADS; i++) {
int bitsParsed;
/* Init payload data chunk. The memclear is very important because it initializes
the most values. Without it the module wouldn't work properly or crash. */
FDKmemclear(&threadBs[self->numThreads], sizeof(CDrcPayload));
threadBs[self->numThreads].channelData.bandTop[0] = (1024 >> 2) - 1;
/* Extract payload */
bitsParsed = aacDecoder_drcParse( hBs,
&threadBs[self->numThreads],
self->drcPayloadPosition[i] );
if (bitsParsed > 0) {
self->numThreads++;
}
}
self->numPayloads = 0;
if (self->dvbAncDataAvailable)
{ /* Append a DVB heavy compression payload thread if available. */
int bitsParsed;
/* Init payload data chunk. The memclear is very important because it initializes
the most values. Without it the module wouldn't work properly or crash. */
FDKmemclear(&threadBs[self->numThreads], sizeof(CDrcPayload));
threadBs[self->numThreads].channelData.bandTop[0] = (1024 >> 2) - 1;
/* Extract payload */
bitsParsed = aacDecoder_drcReadCompression( hBs,
&threadBs[self->numThreads],
self->dvbAncDataPosition );
if (bitsParsed > 0) {
self->numThreads++;
}
}
self->dvbAncDataAvailable = 0;
/* Reset the bitbufffer */
FDKpushBiDirectional(hBs, FDKgetValidBits(hBs) - backupBsPosition);
/* calculate number of valid bits in excl_chn_mask */
/* coupling channels not supported */
/* check for valid threads */
for (thread = 0; thread < self->numThreads; thread++) {
CDrcPayload *pThreadBs = &threadBs[thread];
int numExclChns = 0;
switch ((AACDEC_DRC_PAYLOAD_TYPE)pThreadBs->channelData.drcDataType) {
default:
continue;
case MPEG_DRC_EXT_DATA:
case DVB_DRC_ANC_DATA:
break;
}
if (pThreadBs->pceInstanceTag >= 0) { /* if PCE tag present */
if (pThreadBs->pceInstanceTag != pceInstanceTag) {
continue; /* don't accept */
}
}
/* calculate number of excluded channels */
if (pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask > 0) {
INT exclMask = pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask;
int ch;
for (ch = 0; ch < validChannels; ch++) {
numExclChns += exclMask & 0x1;
exclMask >>= 1;
}
}
if (numExclChns < validChannels) {
validThreadBs[validThreads] = pThreadBs;
numExcludedChns[validThreads] = numExclChns;
validThreads++;
}
}
if (validThreads > 1) {
int ch;
/* check consistency of excl_chn_mask amongst valid DRC threads */
for (ch = 0; ch < validChannels; ch++) {
int present = 0;
for (thread = 0; thread < validThreads; thread++) {
CDrcPayload *pThreadBs = validThreadBs[thread];
/* thread applies to this channel */
if ( (pThreadBs->channelData.drcDataType == MPEG_DRC_EXT_DATA)
&& ( (numExcludedChns[thread] == 0)
|| (!(pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask & (1<<ch))) ) ) {
present++;
}
}
if (present > 1) {
return -1;
}
}
}
/* map DRC bitstream information onto DRC channel information */
for (thread = 0; thread < validThreads; thread++)
{
CDrcPayload *pThreadBs = validThreadBs[thread];
INT exclMask = pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask;
AACDEC_DRC_PAYLOAD_TYPE drcPayloadType = (AACDEC_DRC_PAYLOAD_TYPE)pThreadBs->channelData.drcDataType;
int ch;
/* last progRefLevel transmitted is the one that is used
* (but it should really only be transmitted once per block!)
*/
if (pThreadBs->progRefLevel >= 0) {
self->progRefLevel = pThreadBs->progRefLevel;
self->progRefLevelPresent = 1;
self->prlExpiryCount = 0; /* Got a new value -> Reset counter */
}
if (drcPayloadType == DVB_DRC_ANC_DATA) {
/* Announce the presentation mode of this valid thread. */
self->presMode = pThreadBs->presMode;
}
/* SCE, CPE and LFE */
for (ch = 0; ch < validChannels; ch++) {
int mapedChannel = channelMapping[ch];
if ( ((exclMask & (1<<mapedChannel)) == 0)
&& ( (drcPayloadType == MPEG_DRC_EXT_DATA)
|| ((drcPayloadType == DVB_DRC_ANC_DATA) && self->params.applyHeavyCompression)
) ) {
/* copy thread to channel */
pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo[ch]->drcData = pThreadBs->channelData;
}
}
/* CCEs not supported by now */
}
/* Increment and check expiry counter for the program reference level: */
if ( (pParams->expiryFrame > 0)
&& (self->prlExpiryCount++ > pParams->expiryFrame) )
{ /* The program reference level is too old, so set it back to the target level. */
self->progRefLevelPresent = 0;
self->progRefLevel = pParams->targetRefLevel;
self->prlExpiryCount = 0;
}
return 0;
}
| 333,694,284,843,331,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2428 | libAACdec/src/aacdec_drc.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not properly limit the number of threads, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (stack memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 26751339. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2428 |
8,485 | Android | 81df1cc77722000f8d0025c1ab00ced123aa573c | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/81df1cc77722000f8d0025c1ab00ced123aa573c | None | 1 | char* engrave_tombstone(pid_t pid, pid_t tid, int signal, int original_si_code,
uintptr_t abort_msg_address, bool dump_sibling_threads,
bool* detach_failed, int* total_sleep_time_usec) {
log_t log;
log.current_tid = tid;
log.crashed_tid = tid;
if ((mkdir(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0755) == -1) && (errno != EEXIST)) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to create %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
if (chown(TOMBSTONE_DIR, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM) == -1) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to change ownership of %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
int fd = -1;
char* path = NULL;
if (selinux_android_restorecon(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0) == 0) {
path = find_and_open_tombstone(&fd);
} else {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Failed to restore security context, not writing tombstone.\n");
}
if (fd < 0) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Skipping tombstone write, nothing to do.\n");
*detach_failed = false;
return NULL;
}
log.tfd = fd;
int amfd = activity_manager_connect();
log.amfd = amfd;
*detach_failed = dump_crash(&log, pid, tid, signal, original_si_code, abort_msg_address,
dump_sibling_threads, total_sleep_time_usec);
ALOGI("\nTombstone written to: %s\n", path);
close(amfd);
close(fd);
return path;
}
| 68,274,991,570,167,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2420 | rootdir/init.rc in Android 4.x before 4.4.4 does not ensure that the /data/tombstones directory exists for the Debuggerd component, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 26403620. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2420 |
8,486 | Android | 5a856f2092f7086aa0fea9ae06b9255befcdcd34 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/5a856f2092f7086aa0fea9ae06b9255befcdcd34 | None | 1 | status_t BnDrm::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case INIT_CHECK:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(initCheck());
return OK;
}
case IS_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
String8 mimeType = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(isCryptoSchemeSupported(uuid, mimeType));
return OK;
}
case CREATE_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
reply->writeInt32(createPlugin(uuid));
return OK;
}
case DESTROY_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(destroyPlugin());
return OK;
}
case OPEN_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
status_t result = openSession(sessionId);
writeVector(reply, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case CLOSE_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(closeSession(sessionId));
return OK;
}
case GET_KEY_REQUEST:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, initData;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, initData);
String8 mimeType = data.readString8();
DrmPlugin::KeyType keyType = (DrmPlugin::KeyType)data.readInt32();
KeyedVector<String8, String8> optionalParameters;
uint32_t count = data.readInt32();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
String8 key, value;
key = data.readString8();
value = data.readString8();
optionalParameters.add(key, value);
}
Vector<uint8_t> request;
String8 defaultUrl;
DrmPlugin::KeyRequestType keyRequestType;
status_t result = getKeyRequest(sessionId, initData, mimeType,
keyType, optionalParameters, request, defaultUrl,
&keyRequestType);
writeVector(reply, request);
reply->writeString8(defaultUrl);
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(keyRequestType));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case PROVIDE_KEY_RESPONSE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, response, keySetId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, response);
uint32_t result = provideKeyResponse(sessionId, response, keySetId);
writeVector(reply, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case REMOVE_KEYS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> keySetId;
readVector(data, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(removeKeys(keySetId));
return OK;
}
case RESTORE_KEYS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keySetId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keySetId);
reply->writeInt32(restoreKeys(sessionId, keySetId));
return OK;
}
case QUERY_KEY_STATUS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
KeyedVector<String8, String8> infoMap;
status_t result = queryKeyStatus(sessionId, infoMap);
size_t count = infoMap.size();
reply->writeInt32(count);
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
reply->writeString8(infoMap.keyAt(i));
reply->writeString8(infoMap.valueAt(i));
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_PROVISION_REQUEST:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 certType = data.readString8();
String8 certAuthority = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> request;
String8 defaultUrl;
status_t result = getProvisionRequest(certType, certAuthority,
request, defaultUrl);
writeVector(reply, request);
reply->writeString8(defaultUrl);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case PROVIDE_PROVISION_RESPONSE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> response;
Vector<uint8_t> certificate;
Vector<uint8_t> wrappedKey;
readVector(data, response);
status_t result = provideProvisionResponse(response, certificate, wrappedKey);
writeVector(reply, certificate);
writeVector(reply, wrappedKey);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case UNPROVISION_DEVICE:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
status_t result = unprovisionDevice();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
List<Vector<uint8_t> > secureStops;
status_t result = getSecureStops(secureStops);
size_t count = secureStops.size();
reply->writeInt32(count);
List<Vector<uint8_t> >::iterator iter = secureStops.begin();
while(iter != secureStops.end()) {
size_t size = iter->size();
reply->writeInt32(size);
reply->write(iter->array(), iter->size());
iter++;
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_SECURE_STOP:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> ssid, secureStop;
readVector(data, ssid);
status_t result = getSecureStop(ssid, secureStop);
writeVector(reply, secureStop);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case RELEASE_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> ssRelease;
readVector(data, ssRelease);
reply->writeInt32(releaseSecureStops(ssRelease));
return OK;
}
case RELEASE_ALL_SECURE_STOPS:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(releaseAllSecureStops());
return OK;
}
case GET_PROPERTY_STRING:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
String8 value;
status_t result = getPropertyString(name, value);
reply->writeString8(value);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case GET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> value;
status_t result = getPropertyByteArray(name, value);
writeVector(reply, value);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SET_PROPERTY_STRING:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
String8 value = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setPropertyString(name, value));
return OK;
}
case SET_PROPERTY_BYTE_ARRAY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
String8 name = data.readString8();
Vector<uint8_t> value;
readVector(data, value);
reply->writeInt32(setPropertyByteArray(name, value));
return OK;
}
case SET_CIPHER_ALGORITHM:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setCipherAlgorithm(sessionId, algorithm));
return OK;
}
case SET_MAC_ALGORITHM:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
reply->writeInt32(setMacAlgorithm(sessionId, algorithm));
return OK;
}
case ENCRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, input);
readVector(data, iv);
uint32_t result = encrypt(sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output);
writeVector(reply, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case DECRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, input);
readVector(data, iv);
uint32_t result = decrypt(sessionId, keyId, input, iv, output);
writeVector(reply, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SIGN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, message, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, message);
uint32_t result = sign(sessionId, keyId, message, signature);
writeVector(reply, signature);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case VERIFY:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, keyId, message, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
readVector(data, keyId);
readVector(data, message);
readVector(data, signature);
bool match;
uint32_t result = verify(sessionId, keyId, message, signature, match);
reply->writeInt32(match);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SIGN_RSA:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId, message, wrappedKey, signature;
readVector(data, sessionId);
String8 algorithm = data.readString8();
readVector(data, message);
readVector(data, wrappedKey);
uint32_t result = signRSA(sessionId, algorithm, message, wrappedKey, signature);
writeVector(reply, signature);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return OK;
}
case SET_LISTENER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
sp<IDrmClient> listener =
interface_cast<IDrmClient>(data.readStrongBinder());
reply->writeInt32(setListener(listener));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
| 306,119,041,075,688,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2419 | media/libmedia/IDrm.cpp in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not initialize a certain key-request data structure, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via unspecified vectors, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26323455. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2419 |
8,487 | Android | 8d87321b704cb3f88e8cae668937d001fd63d5e3 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/8d87321b704cb3f88e8cae668937d001fd63d5e3 | None | 1 | status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
void *params = malloc(size);
data.read(params, size);
status_t err;
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
MetadataBufferType type;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index, &bufferProducer, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_PERSISTENT_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer;
status_t err = createPersistentInputSurface(
&bufferProducer, &bufferConsumer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferProducer));
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(bufferConsumer));
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer =
interface_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer>(data.readStrongBinder());
MetadataBufferType type;
status_t err = setInputSurface(node, port_index, bufferConsumer, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
MetadataBufferType type;
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable, &type);
reply->writeInt32(type);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
OMX_U32 allottedSize = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer, allottedSize);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
bool haveFence = data.readInt32();
int fenceFd = haveFence ? ::dup(data.readFileDescriptor()) : -1;
reply->writeInt32(emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length, flags, timestamp, fenceFd));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
| 171,586,091,327,500,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2418 | media/libmedia/IOMX.cpp in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not initialize certain metadata buffer pointers, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via unspecified vectors, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26324358. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2418 |
8,488 | Android | 1171e7c047bf79e7c93342bb6a812c9edd86aa84 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1171e7c047bf79e7c93342bb6a812c9edd86aa84 | None | 1 | status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
void *params = malloc(size);
data.read(params, size);
status_t err;
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index,
&bufferProducer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(bufferProducer->asBinder());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle = NULL;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if(err == OK){
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
reply->writeInt32(
emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length,
flags, timestamp));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
| 160,402,952,686,152,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2417 | media/libmedia/IOMX.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not initialize a parameter data structure, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via unspecified vectors, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26914474. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2417 |
8,489 | Android | a40b30f5c43726120bfe69d41ff5aeb31fe1d02a | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/a40b30f5c43726120bfe69d41ff5aeb31fe1d02a | None | 1 | void BufferQueueConsumer::dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
const IPCThreadState* ipc = IPCThreadState::self();
const pid_t pid = ipc->getCallingPid();
const uid_t uid = ipc->getCallingUid();
if ((uid != AID_SHELL)
&& !PermissionCache::checkPermission(String16(
"android.permission.DUMP"), pid, uid)) {
result.appendFormat("Permission Denial: can't dump BufferQueueConsumer "
"from pid=%d, uid=%d\n", pid, uid);
} else {
mCore->dump(result, prefix);
}
}
| 23,928,984,506,025,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-2416 | libs/gui/BufferQueueConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for the android.permission.DUMP permission, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via a dump request, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27046057. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2416 |
8,494 | Android | 5a6788730acfc6fd8f4a6ef89d2c376572a26b55 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/5a6788730acfc6fd8f4a6ef89d2c376572a26b55 | None | 1 | void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 111,088,913,803,452,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-1621 | libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1621 |
8,495 | Android | 1390ace71179f04a09c300ee8d0300aa69d9db09 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/dhcpcd/+/1390ace71179f04a09c300ee8d0300aa69d9db09 | None | 1 | valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
if (opt->type & UINT16)
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & (IPV4 | ARRAY))
return dl % sz;
return (dl == sz ? 0 : -1);
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
| 14,618,166,362,714,195,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-1503 | dhcpcd before 6.10.0, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 and other products, mismanages option lengths, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) via a malformed DHCP response, aka internal bug 26461634. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1503 |
8,500 | Android | f3199c228aced7858b75a8070b8358c155ae0149 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/f3199c228aced7858b75a8070b8358c155ae0149 | None | 1 | sp<IMemoryHeap> BpMemory::getMemory(ssize_t* offset, size_t* size) const
{
if (mHeap == 0) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IMemory::getInterfaceDescriptor());
if (remote()->transact(GET_MEMORY, data, &reply) == NO_ERROR) {
sp<IBinder> heap = reply.readStrongBinder();
ssize_t o = reply.readInt32();
size_t s = reply.readInt32();
if (heap != 0) {
mHeap = interface_cast<IMemoryHeap>(heap);
if (mHeap != 0) {
mOffset = o;
mSize = s;
}
}
}
}
if (offset) *offset = mOffset;
if (size) *size = mSize;
return mHeap;
}
| 190,601,952,558,380,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0846 | libs/binder/IMemory.cpp in the IMemory Native Interface in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not properly consider the heap size, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26877992. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0846 |
8,508 | Android | ebbb82365172337c6c250c6cac4e326970a9e351 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/audio/+/ebbb82365172337c6c250c6cac4e326970a9e351 | None | 1 | static int vol_prc_lib_release(effect_handle_t handle)
{
struct listnode *node, *temp_node_next;
vol_listener_context_t *context = NULL;
vol_listener_context_t *recv_contex = (vol_listener_context_t *)handle;
int status = -1;
bool recompute_flag = false;
int active_stream_count = 0;
ALOGV("%s context %p", __func__, handle);
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
list_for_each_safe(node, temp_node_next, &vol_effect_list) {
context = node_to_item(node, struct vol_listener_context_s, effect_list_node);
if ((memcmp(&(context->desc->uuid), &(recv_contex->desc->uuid), sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0)
&& (context->session_id == recv_contex->session_id)
&& (context->stream_type == recv_contex->stream_type)) {
ALOGV("--- Found something to remove ---");
list_remove(&context->effect_list_node);
PRINT_STREAM_TYPE(context->stream_type);
if (context->dev_id && AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPEAKER) {
recompute_flag = true;
}
free(context);
status = 0;
} else {
++active_stream_count;
}
}
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("something wrong ... <<<--- Found NOTHING to remove ... ???? --->>>>>");
}
if (active_stream_count == 0) {
current_gain_dep_cal_level = -1;
current_vol = 0.0;
}
if (recompute_flag) {
check_and_set_gain_dep_cal();
}
if (dumping_enabled) {
dump_list_l();
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
return status;
}
| 36,450,942,016,344,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-0839 | post_proc/volume_listener.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 mishandles deleted effect context, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25753245. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0839 |
8,515 | Android | 7a282fb64fef25349e9d341f102d9cea3bf75baf | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7a282fb64fef25349e9d341f102d9cea3bf75baf | None | 1 | status_t MPEG4Source::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK(mStarted);
if (mFirstMoofOffset > 0) {
return fragmentedRead(out, options);
}
*out = NULL;
int64_t targetSampleTimeUs = -1;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
uint32_t findFlags = 0;
switch (mode) {
case ReadOptions::SEEK_PREVIOUS_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_NEXT_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagAfter;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC:
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagClosest;
break;
default:
CHECK(!"Should not be here.");
break;
}
uint32_t sampleIndex;
status_t err = mSampleTable->findSampleAtTime(
seekTimeUs, 1000000, mTimescale,
&sampleIndex, findFlags);
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
}
uint32_t syncSampleIndex;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->findSyncSampleNear(
sampleIndex, &syncSampleIndex, findFlags);
}
uint32_t sampleTime;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
sampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &sampleTime);
}
if (err != OK) {
if (err == ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
err = ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGV("end of stream");
return err;
}
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
targetSampleTimeUs = (sampleTime * 1000000ll) / mTimescale;
}
#if 0
uint32_t syncSampleTime;
CHECK_EQ(OK, mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
syncSampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &syncSampleTime));
ALOGI("seek to time %lld us => sample at time %lld us, "
"sync sample at time %lld us",
seekTimeUs,
sampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale,
syncSampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale);
#endif
mCurrentSampleIndex = syncSampleIndex;
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
}
off64_t offset;
size_t size;
uint32_t cts, stts;
bool isSyncSample;
bool newBuffer = false;
if (mBuffer == NULL) {
newBuffer = true;
status_t err =
mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
mCurrentSampleIndex, &offset, &size, &cts, &isSyncSample, &stts);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&mBuffer);
if (err != OK) {
CHECK(mBuffer == NULL);
return err;
}
if (size > mBuffer->size()) {
ALOGE("buffer too small: %zu > %zu", size, mBuffer->size());
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
}
if ((!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) || mWantsNALFragments) {
if (newBuffer) {
ssize_t num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
}
if (!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) {
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
CHECK(mBuffer->range_length() >= mNALLengthSize);
const uint8_t *src =
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data() + mBuffer->range_offset();
size_t nal_size = parseNALSize(src);
if (mNALLengthSize > SIZE_MAX - nal_size) {
ALOGE("b/24441553, b/24445122");
}
if (mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize < nal_size) {
ALOGE("incomplete NAL unit.");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *clone = mBuffer->clone();
CHECK(clone != NULL);
clone->set_range(mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize, nal_size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(
mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize + nal_size,
mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize - nal_size);
if (mBuffer->range_length() == 0) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
*out = clone;
return OK;
} else {
ssize_t num_bytes_read = 0;
int32_t drm = 0;
bool usesDRM = (mFormat->findInt32(kKeyIsDRM, &drm) && drm != 0);
if (usesDRM) {
num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t*)mBuffer->data(), size);
} else {
num_bytes_read = mDataSource->readAt(offset, mSrcBuffer, size);
}
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (usesDRM) {
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
} else {
uint8_t *dstData = (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data();
size_t srcOffset = 0;
size_t dstOffset = 0;
while (srcOffset < size) {
bool isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, mNALLengthSize);
size_t nalLength = 0;
if (!isMalFormed) {
nalLength = parseNALSize(&mSrcBuffer[srcOffset]);
srcOffset += mNALLengthSize;
isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, nalLength);
}
if (isMalFormed) {
ALOGE("Video is malformed");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (nalLength == 0) {
continue;
}
CHECK(dstOffset + 4 <= mBuffer->size());
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 1;
memcpy(&dstData[dstOffset], &mSrcBuffer[srcOffset], nalLength);
srcOffset += nalLength;
dstOffset += nalLength;
}
CHECK_EQ(srcOffset, size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, dstOffset);
}
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
}
| 294,730,701,852,712,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-0837 | MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 27208621. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0837 |
8,516 | Android | 8b4ed5a23175b7ffa56eea4678db7287f825e985 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libmpeg2/+/8b4ed5a23175b7ffa56eea4678db7287f825e985 | None | 1 | IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_vld_decode(
dec_state_t *ps_dec,
WORD16 *pi2_outAddr, /*!< Address where decoded symbols will be stored */
const UWORD8 *pu1_scan, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD8 *pu1_pos, /*!< Scan table to be used */
UWORD16 u2_intra_flag, /*!< Intra Macroblock or not */
UWORD16 u2_chroma_flag, /*!< Chroma Block or not */
UWORD16 u2_d_picture, /*!< D Picture or not */
UWORD16 u2_intra_vlc_format, /*!< Intra VLC format */
UWORD16 u2_mpeg2, /*!< MPEG-2 or not */
WORD32 *pi4_num_coeffs /*!< Returns the number of coeffs in block */
)
{
UWORD32 u4_sym_len;
UWORD32 u4_decoded_value;
UWORD32 u4_level_first_byte;
WORD32 u4_level;
UWORD32 u4_run, u4_numCoeffs;
UWORD32 u4_buf;
UWORD32 u4_buf_nxt;
UWORD32 u4_offset;
UWORD32 *pu4_buf_aligned;
UWORD32 u4_bits;
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
WORD32 u4_pos;
UWORD32 u4_nz_cols;
UWORD32 u4_nz_rows;
*pi4_num_coeffs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = 0;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = 0;
u4_nz_cols = ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols;
u4_nz_rows = ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows;
GET_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,pu4_buf_aligned,ps_stream)
/**************************************************************************/
/* Decode the DC coefficient in case of Intra block */
/**************************************************************************/
if(u2_intra_flag)
{
WORD32 dc_size;
WORD32 dc_diff;
WORD32 maxLen;
WORD32 idx;
maxLen = MPEG2_DCT_DC_SIZE_LEN;
idx = 0;
if(u2_chroma_flag != 0)
{
maxLen += 1;
idx++;
}
{
WORD16 end = 0;
UWORD32 maxLen_tmp = maxLen;
UWORD16 m_iBit;
/* Get the maximum number of bits needed to decode a symbol */
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,maxLen)
do
{
maxLen_tmp--;
/* Read one bit at a time from the variable to decode the huffman code */
m_iBit = (UWORD8)((u4_bits >> maxLen_tmp) & 0x1);
/* Get the next node pointer or the symbol from the tree */
end = gai2_impeg2d_dct_dc_size[idx][end][m_iBit];
}while(end > 0);
dc_size = end + MPEG2_DCT_DC_SIZE_OFFSET;
/* Flush the appropriate number of bits from the stream */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,(maxLen - maxLen_tmp),pu4_buf_aligned)
}
if (dc_size != 0)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits;
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned, dc_size)
dc_diff = u4_bits;
if ((dc_diff & (1 << (dc_size - 1))) == 0) //v Probably the prediction algo?
dc_diff -= (1 << dc_size) - 1;
}
else
{
dc_diff = 0;
}
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = dc_diff;
/* This indicates the position of the coefficient. Since this is the DC
* coefficient, we put the position as 0.
*/
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = pu1_scan[0];
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
if (0 != dc_diff)
{
u4_nz_cols |= 0x01;
u4_nz_rows |= 0x01;
}
u4_numCoeffs = 1;
}
/**************************************************************************/
/* Decoding of first AC coefficient in case of non Intra block */
/**************************************************************************/
else
{
/* First symbol can be 1s */
UWORD32 u4_bits;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,1)
if(u4_bits == 1)
{
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,1, pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned, 1)
if(u4_bits == 1)
{
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = -1;
}
else
{
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = 1;
}
/* This indicates the position of the coefficient. Since this is the DC
* coefficient, we put the position as 0.
*/
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = pu1_scan[0];
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
u4_numCoeffs = 1;
u4_nz_cols |= 0x01;
u4_nz_rows |= 0x01;
}
else
{
u4_numCoeffs = 0;
}
}
if (1 == u2_d_picture)
{
PUT_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, pu4_buf_aligned, ps_stream)
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = u4_nz_cols;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = u4_nz_rows;
return ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE);
}
if (1 == u2_intra_vlc_format && u2_intra_flag)
{
while(1)
{
UWORD32 lead_zeros;
WORD16 DecodedValue;
u4_sym_len = 17;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,u4_sym_len)
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_one_1_9[u4_bits >> 8];
u4_sym_len = (DecodedValue & 0xf);
u4_level = DecodedValue >> 9;
/* One table lookup */
if(0 != u4_level)
{
u4_run = ((DecodedValue >> 4) & 0x1f);
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
else
{
if (DecodedValue == END_OF_BLOCK_ONE)
{
u4_sym_len = 4;
break;
}
else
{
/*Second table lookup*/
lead_zeros = CLZ(u4_bits) - 20;/* -16 since we are dealing with WORD32 */
if (0 != lead_zeros)
{
u4_bits = (u4_bits >> (6 - lead_zeros)) & 0x001F;
/* Flush the number of bits */
if (1 == lead_zeros)
{
u4_sym_len = ((u4_bits & 0x18) >> 3) == 2 ? 11:10;
}
else
{
u4_sym_len = 11 + lead_zeros;
}
/* flushing */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
/* Calculate the address */
u4_bits = ((lead_zeros - 1) << 5) + u4_bits;
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_one_10_16[u4_bits];
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG2 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else if(u2_mpeg2 == 1)
{
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,18)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 12);
u4_level = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FFF);
if (u4_level)
u4_level = (u4_level - ((u4_level & 0x0800) << 1));
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG1 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* MPEG-1 Stream
*
* <See D.9.3 of MPEG-2> Run-level escape syntax
* Run-level values that cannot be coded with a VLC are coded
* by the escape code '0000 01' followed by
* either a 14-bit FLC (127 <= level <= 127),
* or a 22-bit FLC (255 <= level <= 255).
* This is described in Annex B,B.5f of MPEG-1.standard
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* First 6 bits are the value of the Run. Next is First 8 bits
* of Level. These bits decide whether it is 14 bit FLC or
* 22-bit FLC.
*
* If( first 8 bits of Level == '1000000' or '00000000')
* then its is 22-bit FLC.
* else
* it is 14-bit FLC.
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,14)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 8);
u4_level_first_byte = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FF);
if(u4_level_first_byte & 0x7F)
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* First 8 bits of level are neither 1000000 nor 00000000
* Hence 14-bit FLC (Last 8 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_First_Byte - 256 : Level_First_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_level = (u4_level_first_byte -
((u4_level_first_byte & 0x80) << 1));
}
else
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* Next 8 bits are either 1000000 or 00000000
* Hence 22-bit FLC (Last 16 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_Second_Byte - 256 : Level_Second_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,8)
u4_level = u4_bits;
u4_level = (u4_level - (u4_level_first_byte << 1));
}
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
}
}
u4_nz_cols |= 1 << (u4_pos & 0x7);
u4_nz_rows |= 1 << (u4_pos >> 0x3);
}
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,u4_sym_len)
if (u4_numCoeffs > 64)
{
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
}
}
else
{
while(1)
{
UWORD32 lead_zeros;
UWORD16 DecodedValue;
u4_sym_len = 17;
IBITS_NXT(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, u4_bits, u4_sym_len)
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_zero_1_9[u4_bits >> 8];
u4_sym_len = BITS(DecodedValue, 3, 0);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
if (0 != u4_level)
{
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
else
{
if(DecodedValue == END_OF_BLOCK_ZERO)
{
u4_sym_len = 2;
break;
}
else
{
lead_zeros = CLZ(u4_bits) - 20;/* -15 since we are dealing with WORD32 */
/*Second table lookup*/
if (0 != lead_zeros)
{
u4_bits = (u4_bits >> (6 - lead_zeros)) & 0x001F;
/* Flush the number of bits */
u4_sym_len = 11 + lead_zeros;
/* Calculate the address */
u4_bits = ((lead_zeros - 1) << 5) + u4_bits;
DecodedValue = gau2_impeg2d_tab_zero_10_16[u4_bits];
u4_run = BITS(DecodedValue, 8,4);
u4_level = ((WORD16) DecodedValue) >> 9;
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
if (1 == lead_zeros)
u4_sym_len--;
/* flushing */
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*Escape Sequence*/
else if(u2_mpeg2 == 1)
{
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,18)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 12);
u4_level = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FFF);
if (u4_level)
u4_level = (u4_level - ((u4_level & 0x0800) << 1));
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
/*********************************************************************/
/* MPEG1 Escape Code */
/*********************************************************************/
else
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* MPEG-1 Stream
*
* <See D.9.3 of MPEG-2> Run-level escape syntax
* Run-level values that cannot be coded with a VLC are coded
* by the escape code '0000 01' followed by
* either a 14-bit FLC (127 <= level <= 127),
* or a 22-bit FLC (255 <= level <= 255).
* This is described in Annex B,B.5f of MPEG-1.standard
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
/*-----------------------------------------------------------
* First 6 bits are the value of the Run. Next is First 8 bits
* of Level. These bits decide whether it is 14 bit FLC or
* 22-bit FLC.
*
* If( first 8 bits of Level == '1000000' or '00000000')
* then its is 22-bit FLC.
* else
* it is 14-bit FLC.
*-----------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_sym_len = 6;
FLUSH_BITS(u4_offset,u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_sym_len,pu4_buf_aligned)
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,14)
u4_decoded_value = u4_bits;
u4_run = (u4_decoded_value >> 8);
u4_level_first_byte = (u4_decoded_value & 0x0FF);
if(u4_level_first_byte & 0x7F)
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* First 8 bits of level are neither 1000000 nor 00000000
* Hence 14-bit FLC (Last 8 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_First_Byte - 256 : Level_First_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_level = (u4_level_first_byte -
((u4_level_first_byte & 0x80) << 1));
}
else
{
/*-------------------------------------------------------
* Next 8 bits are either 1000000 or 00000000
* Hence 22-bit FLC (Last 16 bits are used to get level)
*
* Level = (msb of Level_First_Byte is 1)?
* Level_Second_Byte - 256 : Level_Second_Byte
*-------------------------------------------------------*/
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,8)
u4_level = u4_bits;
u4_level = (u4_level - (u4_level_first_byte << 1));
}
u4_numCoeffs += u4_run;
u4_pos = pu1_scan[u4_numCoeffs++ & 63];
pu1_pos[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_pos;
pi2_outAddr[*pi4_num_coeffs] = u4_level;
(*pi4_num_coeffs)++;
}
}
}
u4_nz_cols |= 1 << (u4_pos & 0x7);
u4_nz_rows |= 1 << (u4_pos >> 0x3);
}
if (u4_numCoeffs > 64)
{
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
}
IBITS_GET(u4_buf,u4_buf_nxt,u4_offset,u4_bits,pu4_buf_aligned,u4_sym_len)
}
PUT_TEMP_STREAM_DATA(u4_buf, u4_buf_nxt, u4_offset, pu4_buf_aligned, ps_stream)
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols = u4_nz_cols;
ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows = u4_nz_rows;
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
| 336,908,326,224,068,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-0836 | Stack-based buffer overflow in decoder/impeg2d_vld.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25812590. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0836 |
8,523 | Android | d06421fd37fbb7fd07002e6738fac3a223cb1a62 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/d06421fd37fbb7fd07002e6738fac3a223cb1a62 | None | 1 | status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
| 124,232,297,314,560,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-254"
] | CVE-2016-0829 | The BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact function in libs/gui/IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not initialize a certain output data structure, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering a QUEUE_BUFFER action, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26338109. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0829 |
8,524 | Android | dded8fdbb700d6cc498debc69a780915bc34d755 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/dded8fdbb700d6cc498debc69a780915bc34d755 | None | 1 | status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = data.readInt64();
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(slotMask);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(w, h);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t defaultFormat = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
| 24,980,289,808,997,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-254"
] | CVE-2016-0828 | The BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact function in libs/gui/IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not initialize a certain slot variable, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering an ATTACH_BUFFER action, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26338113. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0828 |
8,526 | Android | c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | 1 | status_t CameraService::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
if (checkCallingPermission(String16("android.permission.DUMP")) == false) {
result.appendFormat("Permission Denial: "
"can't dump CameraService from pid=%d, uid=%d\n",
getCallingPid(),
getCallingUid());
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
} else {
bool locked = tryLock(mServiceLock);
if (!locked) {
result.append("CameraService may be deadlocked\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
bool hasClient = false;
if (!mModule) {
result = String8::format("No camera module available!\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
return NO_ERROR;
}
result = String8::format("Camera module HAL API version: 0x%x\n",
mModule->common.hal_api_version);
result.appendFormat("Camera module API version: 0x%x\n",
mModule->common.module_api_version);
result.appendFormat("Camera module name: %s\n",
mModule->common.name);
result.appendFormat("Camera module author: %s\n",
mModule->common.author);
result.appendFormat("Number of camera devices: %d\n\n", mNumberOfCameras);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
for (int i = 0; i < mNumberOfCameras; i++) {
result = String8::format("Camera %d static information:\n", i);
camera_info info;
status_t rc = mModule->get_camera_info(i, &info);
if (rc != OK) {
result.appendFormat(" Error reading static information!\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
} else {
result.appendFormat(" Facing: %s\n",
info.facing == CAMERA_FACING_BACK ? "BACK" : "FRONT");
result.appendFormat(" Orientation: %d\n", info.orientation);
int deviceVersion;
if (mModule->common.module_api_version <
CAMERA_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_0) {
deviceVersion = CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_1_0;
} else {
deviceVersion = info.device_version;
}
result.appendFormat(" Device version: 0x%x\n", deviceVersion);
if (deviceVersion >= CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_2_0) {
result.appendFormat(" Device static metadata:\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
dump_indented_camera_metadata(info.static_camera_characteristics,
fd, 2, 4);
} else {
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
}
sp<BasicClient> client = mClient[i].promote();
if (client == 0) {
result = String8::format(" Device is closed, no client instance\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
continue;
}
hasClient = true;
result = String8::format(" Device is open. Client instance dump:\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
client->dump(fd, args);
}
if (!hasClient) {
result = String8::format("\nNo active camera clients yet.\n");
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
if (locked) mServiceLock.unlock();
write(fd, "\n", 1);
camera3::CameraTraces::dump(fd, args);
int n = args.size();
for (int i = 0; i + 1 < n; i++) {
String16 verboseOption("-v");
if (args[i] == verboseOption) {
String8 levelStr(args[i+1]);
int level = atoi(levelStr.string());
result = String8::format("\nSetting log level to %d.\n", level);
setLogLevel(level);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
}
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
| 314,859,826,444,985,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0826 | libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0826 |
8,527 | Android | c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | 1 | status_t Camera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("Client2[%d] (%p) Client: %s PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
String8(mClientPackageName).string(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
#define CASE_APPEND_ENUM(x) case x: result.append(#x "\n"); break;
const Parameters& p = mParameters.unsafeAccess();
result.append(Parameters::getStateName(p.state));
result.append("\n Current parameters:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview size: %d x %d\n",
p.previewWidth, p.previewHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Preview FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.previewFpsRange[0], p.previewFpsRange[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Preview HAL pixel format: 0x%x\n",
p.previewFormat);
result.appendFormat(" Preview transform: %x\n",
p.previewTransform);
result.appendFormat(" Picture size: %d x %d\n",
p.pictureWidth, p.pictureHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg thumbnail size: %d x %d\n",
p.jpegThumbSize[0], p.jpegThumbSize[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg quality: %d, thumbnail quality: %d\n",
p.jpegQuality, p.jpegThumbQuality);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg rotation: %d\n", p.jpegRotation);
result.appendFormat(" GPS tags %s\n",
p.gpsEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
if (p.gpsEnabled) {
result.appendFormat(" GPS lat x long x alt: %f x %f x %f\n",
p.gpsCoordinates[0], p.gpsCoordinates[1],
p.gpsCoordinates[2]);
result.appendFormat(" GPS timestamp: %lld\n",
p.gpsTimestamp);
result.appendFormat(" GPS processing method: %s\n",
p.gpsProcessingMethod.string());
}
result.append(" White balance mode: ");
switch (p.wbMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_INCANDESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_WARM_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_CLOUDY_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_TWILIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_SHADE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Effect mode: ");
switch (p.effectMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_MONO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_NEGATIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SOLARIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SEPIA)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_POSTERIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_WHITEBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_BLACKBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_AQUA)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Antibanding mode: ");
switch (p.antibandingMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_50HZ)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_60HZ)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Scene mode: ");
switch (p.sceneMode) {
case ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_UNSUPPORTED:
result.append("AUTO\n"); break;
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_ACTION)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_LANDSCAPE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_THEATRE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BEACH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SNOW)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SUNSET)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_STEADYPHOTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_FIREWORKS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SPORTS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PARTY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_CANDLELIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BARCODE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Flash mode: ");
switch (p.flashMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_ON)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_TORCH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_RED_EYE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus mode: ");
switch (p.focusMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_MACRO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_VIDEO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_PICTURE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_EDOF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INFINITY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_FIXED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus state: ");
switch (p.focusState) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_INACTIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_FOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_UNFOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_ACTIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_NOT_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focusing areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.focusingAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.focusingAreas[i].left,
p.focusingAreas[i].top,
p.focusingAreas[i].right,
p.focusingAreas[i].bottom,
p.focusingAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Exposure compensation index: %d\n",
p.exposureCompensation);
result.appendFormat(" AE lock %s, AWB lock %s\n",
p.autoExposureLock ? "enabled" : "disabled",
p.autoWhiteBalanceLock ? "enabled" : "disabled" );
result.appendFormat(" Metering areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.meteringAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.meteringAreas[i].left,
p.meteringAreas[i].top,
p.meteringAreas[i].right,
p.meteringAreas[i].bottom,
p.meteringAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Zoom index: %d\n", p.zoom);
result.appendFormat(" Video size: %d x %d\n", p.videoWidth,
p.videoHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Recording hint is %s\n",
p.recordingHint ? "set" : "not set");
result.appendFormat(" Video stabilization is %s\n",
p.videoStabilization ? "enabled" : "disabled");
result.appendFormat(" Selected still capture FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[0],
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[1]);
result.append(" Current streams:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview stream ID: %d\n",
getPreviewStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Capture stream ID: %d\n",
getCaptureStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Recording stream ID: %d\n",
getRecordingStreamId());
result.append(" Quirks for this camera:\n");
bool haveQuirk = false;
if (p.quirks.triggerAfWithAuto) {
result.appendFormat(" triggerAfWithAuto\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.useZslFormat) {
result.appendFormat(" useZslFormat\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.meteringCropRegion) {
result.appendFormat(" meteringCropRegion\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.partialResults) {
result.appendFormat(" usePartialResult\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (!haveQuirk) {
result.appendFormat(" none\n");
}
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
mStreamingProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mCaptureSequencer->dump(fd, args);
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mZslProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
#undef CASE_APPEND_ENUM
}
| 325,525,759,053,967,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0826 | libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0826 |
8,528 | Android | c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | 1 | status_t CameraClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
const size_t SIZE = 256;
char buffer[SIZE];
size_t len = snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "Client[%d] (%p) PID: %d\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
len = (len > SIZE - 1) ? SIZE - 1 : len;
write(fd, buffer, len);
return mHardware->dump(fd, args);
}
| 133,141,520,970,782,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0826 | libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0826 |
8,529 | Android | c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | 1 | status_t CameraDeviceClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("CameraDeviceClient[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
| 243,629,828,105,865,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0826 | libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0826 |
8,530 | Android | c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122 | None | 1 | status_t ProCamera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("ProCamera2Client[%d] (%p) PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
}
| 65,916,263,427,337,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0826 | libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0826 |
8,548 | Android | 5403587a74aee2fb57076528c3927851531c8afb | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fframeworks%2Fav/+/5403587a74aee2fb57076528c3927851531c8afb | None | 1 | status_t MPEG4Source::fragmentedRead(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
ALOGV("MPEG4Source::fragmentedRead");
CHECK(mStarted);
*out = NULL;
int64_t targetSampleTimeUs = -1;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
int numSidxEntries = mSegments.size();
if (numSidxEntries != 0) {
int64_t totalTime = 0;
off64_t totalOffset = mFirstMoofOffset;
for (int i = 0; i < numSidxEntries; i++) {
const SidxEntry *se = &mSegments[i];
if (totalTime + se->mDurationUs > seekTimeUs) {
if ((mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_NEXT_SYNC) ||
(mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC &&
(seekTimeUs - totalTime) > (totalTime + se->mDurationUs - seekTimeUs))) {
totalTime += se->mDurationUs;
totalOffset += se->mSize;
}
break;
}
totalTime += se->mDurationUs;
totalOffset += se->mSize;
}
mCurrentMoofOffset = totalOffset;
mCurrentSamples.clear();
mCurrentSampleIndex = 0;
parseChunk(&totalOffset);
mCurrentTime = totalTime * mTimescale / 1000000ll;
}
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
}
off64_t offset = 0;
size_t size;
uint32_t cts = 0;
bool isSyncSample = false;
bool newBuffer = false;
if (mBuffer == NULL) {
newBuffer = true;
if (mCurrentSampleIndex >= mCurrentSamples.size()) {
Sample lastSample = mCurrentSamples[mCurrentSamples.size() - 1];
off64_t nextMoof = mNextMoofOffset; // lastSample.offset + lastSample.size;
mCurrentMoofOffset = nextMoof;
mCurrentSamples.clear();
mCurrentSampleIndex = 0;
parseChunk(&nextMoof);
if (mCurrentSampleIndex >= mCurrentSamples.size()) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
}
const Sample *smpl = &mCurrentSamples[mCurrentSampleIndex];
offset = smpl->offset;
size = smpl->size;
cts = mCurrentTime;
mCurrentTime += smpl->duration;
isSyncSample = (mCurrentSampleIndex == 0); // XXX
status_t err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&mBuffer);
if (err != OK) {
CHECK(mBuffer == NULL);
ALOGV("acquire_buffer returned %d", err);
return err;
}
if (size > mBuffer->size()) {
ALOGE("buffer too small: %zu > %zu", size, mBuffer->size());
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
}
const Sample *smpl = &mCurrentSamples[mCurrentSampleIndex];
const sp<MetaData> bufmeta = mBuffer->meta_data();
bufmeta->clear();
if (smpl->encryptedsizes.size()) {
bufmeta->setData(kKeyPlainSizes, 0,
smpl->clearsizes.array(), smpl->clearsizes.size() * 4);
bufmeta->setData(kKeyEncryptedSizes, 0,
smpl->encryptedsizes.array(), smpl->encryptedsizes.size() * 4);
bufmeta->setData(kKeyCryptoIV, 0, smpl->iv, 16); // use 16 or the actual size?
bufmeta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, mDefaultIVSize);
bufmeta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, mCryptoMode);
bufmeta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 0, mCryptoKey, 16);
}
if (!mIsAVC || mWantsNALFragments) {
if (newBuffer) {
if (!isInRange((size_t)0u, mBuffer->size(), size)) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
ALOGE("fragmentedRead ERROR_MALFORMED size %zu", size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ssize_t num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
ALOGE("i/o error");
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
}
if (!mIsAVC) {
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
CHECK(mBuffer->range_length() >= mNALLengthSize);
const uint8_t *src =
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data() + mBuffer->range_offset();
size_t nal_size = parseNALSize(src);
if (mNALLengthSize > SIZE_MAX - nal_size) {
ALOGE("b/24441553, b/24445122");
}
if (mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize < nal_size) {
ALOGE("incomplete NAL unit.");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *clone = mBuffer->clone();
CHECK(clone != NULL);
clone->set_range(mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize, nal_size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(
mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize + nal_size,
mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize - nal_size);
if (mBuffer->range_length() == 0) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
*out = clone;
return OK;
} else {
ALOGV("whole NAL");
ssize_t num_bytes_read = 0;
int32_t drm = 0;
bool usesDRM = (mFormat->findInt32(kKeyIsDRM, &drm) && drm != 0);
void *data = NULL;
bool isMalFormed = false;
if (usesDRM) {
if (mBuffer == NULL || !isInRange((size_t)0u, mBuffer->size(), size)) {
isMalFormed = true;
} else {
data = mBuffer->data();
}
} else {
int32_t max_size;
if (mFormat == NULL
|| !mFormat->findInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, &max_size)
|| !isInRange((size_t)0u, (size_t)max_size, size)) {
isMalFormed = true;
} else {
data = mSrcBuffer;
}
}
if (isMalFormed || data == NULL) {
ALOGE("isMalFormed size %zu", size);
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
num_bytes_read = mDataSource->readAt(offset, data, size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
ALOGE("i/o error");
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (usesDRM) {
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
} else {
uint8_t *dstData = (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data();
size_t srcOffset = 0;
size_t dstOffset = 0;
while (srcOffset < size) {
isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, mNALLengthSize);
size_t nalLength = 0;
if (!isMalFormed) {
nalLength = parseNALSize(&mSrcBuffer[srcOffset]);
srcOffset += mNALLengthSize;
isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, nalLength)
|| !isInRange((size_t)0u, mBuffer->size(), dstOffset, (size_t)4u)
|| !isInRange((size_t)0u, mBuffer->size(), dstOffset + 4, nalLength);
}
if (isMalFormed) {
ALOGE("Video is malformed; nalLength %zu", nalLength);
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (nalLength == 0) {
continue;
}
CHECK(dstOffset + 4 <= mBuffer->size());
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 1;
memcpy(&dstData[dstOffset], &mSrcBuffer[srcOffset], nalLength);
srcOffset += nalLength;
dstOffset += nalLength;
}
CHECK_EQ(srcOffset, size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, dstOffset);
}
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
}
| 334,402,466,690,289,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-0815 | The MPEG4Source::fragmentedRead function in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 26365349. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0815 |
8,549 | Android | 22f824feac43d5758f9a70b77f2aca840ba62c3b | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fframeworks%2Fav/+/22f824feac43d5758f9a70b77f2aca840ba62c3b | None | 1 | status_t BnCrypto::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case INIT_CHECK:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(initCheck());
return OK;
}
case IS_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
reply->writeInt32(isCryptoSchemeSupported(uuid));
return OK;
}
case CREATE_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
uint8_t uuid[16];
data.read(uuid, sizeof(uuid));
size_t opaqueSize = data.readInt32();
void *opaqueData = NULL;
if (opaqueSize > 0) {
opaqueData = malloc(opaqueSize);
data.read(opaqueData, opaqueSize);
}
reply->writeInt32(createPlugin(uuid, opaqueData, opaqueSize));
if (opaqueData != NULL) {
free(opaqueData);
opaqueData = NULL;
}
return OK;
}
case DESTROY_PLUGIN:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(destroyPlugin());
return OK;
}
case REQUIRES_SECURE_COMPONENT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
const char *mime = data.readCString();
reply->writeInt32(requiresSecureDecoderComponent(mime));
return OK;
}
case DECRYPT:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
bool secure = data.readInt32() != 0;
CryptoPlugin::Mode mode = (CryptoPlugin::Mode)data.readInt32();
uint8_t key[16];
data.read(key, sizeof(key));
uint8_t iv[16];
data.read(iv, sizeof(iv));
size_t totalSize = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> sharedBuffer =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
int32_t offset = data.readInt32();
int32_t numSubSamples = data.readInt32();
CryptoPlugin::SubSample *subSamples =
new CryptoPlugin::SubSample[numSubSamples];
data.read(
subSamples,
sizeof(CryptoPlugin::SubSample) * numSubSamples);
void *secureBufferId, *dstPtr;
if (secure) {
secureBufferId = reinterpret_cast<void *>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(data.readInt64()));
} else {
dstPtr = calloc(1, totalSize);
}
AString errorDetailMsg;
ssize_t result;
size_t sumSubsampleSizes = 0;
bool overflow = false;
for (int32_t i = 0; i < numSubSamples; ++i) {
CryptoPlugin::SubSample &ss = subSamples[i];
if (sumSubsampleSizes <= SIZE_MAX - ss.mNumBytesOfEncryptedData) {
sumSubsampleSizes += ss.mNumBytesOfEncryptedData;
} else {
overflow = true;
}
if (sumSubsampleSizes <= SIZE_MAX - ss.mNumBytesOfClearData) {
sumSubsampleSizes += ss.mNumBytesOfClearData;
} else {
overflow = true;
}
}
if (overflow || sumSubsampleSizes != totalSize) {
result = -EINVAL;
} else if (offset + totalSize > sharedBuffer->size()) {
result = -EINVAL;
} else {
result = decrypt(
secure,
key,
iv,
mode,
sharedBuffer, offset,
subSamples, numSubSamples,
secure ? secureBufferId : dstPtr,
&errorDetailMsg);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
if (isCryptoError(result)) {
reply->writeCString(errorDetailMsg.c_str());
}
if (!secure) {
if (result >= 0) {
CHECK_LE(result, static_cast<ssize_t>(totalSize));
reply->write(dstPtr, result);
}
free(dstPtr);
dstPtr = NULL;
}
delete[] subSamples;
subSamples = NULL;
return OK;
}
case NOTIFY_RESOLUTION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(ICrypto, data, reply);
int32_t width = data.readInt32();
int32_t height = data.readInt32();
notifyResolution(width, height);
return OK;
}
case SET_MEDIADRM_SESSION:
{
CHECK_INTERFACE(IDrm, data, reply);
Vector<uint8_t> sessionId;
readVector(data, sessionId);
reply->writeInt32(setMediaDrmSession(sessionId));
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
| 30,970,997,826,481,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2016-0811 | Integer overflow in the BnCrypto::onTransact function in media/libmedia/ICrypto.cpp in libmediaplayerservice in Android 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, by triggering an improper size calculation, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25800375. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0811 |
8,552 | Android | 2c5a4fac8bc8198f6a2635ede776f8de40a0c3e1 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/broadcom/wlan/+/2c5a4fac8bc8198f6a2635ede776f8de40a0c3e1 | None | 1 | void wifi_cleanup(wifi_handle handle, wifi_cleaned_up_handler handler)
{
hal_info *info = getHalInfo(handle);
char buf[64];
info->cleaned_up_handler = handler;
if (write(info->cleanup_socks[0], "Exit", 4) < 1) {
ALOGE("could not write to the cleanup socket");
} else {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
int result = read(info->cleanup_socks[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
ALOGE("%s: Read after POLL returned %d, error no = %d", __FUNCTION__, result, errno);
if (strncmp(buf, "Done", 4) == 0) {
ALOGE("Event processing terminated");
} else {
ALOGD("Rx'ed %s", buf);
}
}
info->clean_up = true;
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
int bad_commands = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGI("Command left in event_cb %p:%s", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
}
while (info->num_cmd > bad_commands) {
int num_cmd = info->num_cmd;
cmd_info *cmdi = &(info->cmd[bad_commands]);
WifiCommand *cmd = cmdi->cmd;
if (cmd != NULL) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s", cmd, cmd->getType());
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
cmd->cancel();
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
/* release reference added when command is saved */
cmd->releaseRef();
if (num_cmd == info->num_cmd) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s did not work", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
bad_commands++;
}
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGE("Leaked command %p", cmd);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
internal_cleaned_up_handler(handle);
}
| 255,439,191,767,375,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0809 | Use-after-free vulnerability in the wifi_cleanup function in bcmdhd/wifi_hal/wifi_hal.cpp in Wi-Fi in Android 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to gain privileges by leveraging access to the local physical environment during execution of a crafted application, aka internal bug 25753768. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0809 |
8,553 | Android | ed4c8d79153baab7f26562afb8930652dfbf853b | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/minikin/+/ed4c8d79153baab7f26562afb8930652dfbf853b | None | 1 | static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
| 104,556,194,916,257,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-19"
] | CVE-2016-0808 | Integer overflow in the getCoverageFormat12 function in CmapCoverage.cpp in the Minikin library in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G and 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (continuous rebooting) via an application that triggers loading of a crafted TTF font, aka internal bug 25645298. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0808 |
8,556 | Android | d917514bd6b270df431ea4e781a865764d406120 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fsystem%2Fcore/+/d917514bd6b270df431ea4e781a865764d406120 | None | 1 | static bool get_build_id(
Backtrace* backtrace, uintptr_t base_addr, uint8_t* e_ident, std::string* build_id) {
HdrType hdr;
memcpy(&hdr.e_ident[0], e_ident, EI_NIDENT);
if (backtrace->Read(base_addr + EI_NIDENT, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&hdr) + EI_NIDENT,
sizeof(HdrType) - EI_NIDENT) != sizeof(HdrType) - EI_NIDENT) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < hdr.e_phnum; i++) {
PhdrType phdr;
if (backtrace->Read(base_addr + hdr.e_phoff + i * hdr.e_phentsize,
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&phdr), sizeof(phdr)) != sizeof(phdr)) {
return false;
}
if (phdr.p_type == PT_NOTE) {
size_t hdr_size = phdr.p_filesz;
uintptr_t addr = base_addr + phdr.p_offset;
while (hdr_size >= sizeof(NhdrType)) {
NhdrType nhdr;
if (backtrace->Read(addr, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&nhdr), sizeof(nhdr)) != sizeof(nhdr)) {
return false;
}
addr += sizeof(nhdr);
if (nhdr.n_type == NT_GNU_BUILD_ID) {
addr += NOTE_ALIGN(nhdr.n_namesz);
uint8_t build_id_data[128];
if (nhdr.n_namesz > sizeof(build_id_data)) {
ALOGE("Possible corrupted note, name size value is too large: %u",
nhdr.n_namesz);
return false;
}
if (backtrace->Read(addr, build_id_data, nhdr.n_descsz) != nhdr.n_descsz) {
return false;
}
build_id->clear();
for (size_t bytes = 0; bytes < nhdr.n_descsz; bytes++) {
*build_id += android::base::StringPrintf("%02x", build_id_data[bytes]);
}
return true;
} else {
hdr_size -= sizeof(nhdr);
size_t skip_bytes = NOTE_ALIGN(nhdr.n_namesz) + NOTE_ALIGN(nhdr.n_descsz);
addr += skip_bytes;
if (hdr_size < skip_bytes) {
break;
}
hdr_size -= skip_bytes;
}
}
}
}
return false;
}
| 108,685,928,117,399,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2016-0807 | The get_build_id function in elf_utils.cpp in Debuggerd in Android 6.x before 2016-02-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that mishandles a Desc Size element in an ELF Note, aka internal bug 25187394. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0807 |
8,557 | Android | 224858e719d045c8554856b12c4ab73d2375cf33 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fframeworks%2Fav/+/224858e719d045c8554856b12c4ab73d2375cf33 | None | 1 | void NuPlayer::GenericSource::notifyPreparedAndCleanup(status_t err) {
if (err != OK) {
mMetaDataSize = -1ll;
mContentType = "";
mSniffedMIME = "";
{
sp<DataSource> dataSource = mDataSource;
sp<NuCachedSource2> cachedSource = mCachedSource;
sp<DataSource> httpSource = mHttpSource;
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDisconnectLock);
mDataSource.clear();
mCachedSource.clear();
mHttpSource.clear();
}
}
cancelPollBuffering();
}
notifyPrepared(err);
}
| 283,223,926,142,180,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-0804 | The NuPlayer::GenericSource::notifyPreparedAndCleanup function in media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49G and 6.x before 2016-02-01 improperly manages mDrmManagerClient objects, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25070434. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0804 |
8,560 | Android | 69bfe2d957d903521d32324190c2754cb073be15 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/kernel%2Fcommon/+/69bfe2d957d903521d32324190c2754cb073be15 | None | 1 | static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long tmp;
struct vm_area_struct * vma, *prev;
int unmapped_error = 0;
int error = -EINVAL;
/*
* If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address
* ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end.
* - this matches the handling in madvise.
*/
vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
if (vma && start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
for (;;) {
/* Still start < end. */
error = -ENOMEM;
if (!vma)
return error;
/* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */
if (start < vma->vm_start) {
unmapped_error = -ENOMEM;
start = vma->vm_start;
if (start >= end)
return error;
}
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (end < tmp)
tmp = end;
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */
error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, end,
(const char __user *)arg);
if (error)
return error;
start = tmp;
if (prev && start < prev->vm_end)
start = prev->vm_end;
error = unmapped_error;
if (start >= end)
return error;
if (prev)
vma = prev->vm_next;
else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
}
}
| 218,699,380,730,482,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2015-6640 | The prctl_set_vma_anon_name function in kernel/sys.c in Android before 5.1.1 LMY49F and 6.0 before 2016-01-01 does not ensure that only one vma is accessed in a certain update action, which allows attackers to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (vma list corruption) via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20017123. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6640 |
8,561 | Android | cd5f15f588a5d27e99ba12f057245bfe507f8c42 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/ril/+/cd5f15f588a5d27e99ba12f057245bfe507f8c42 | None | 1 | static void debugCallback (int fd, short flags, void *param) {
int acceptFD, option;
struct sockaddr_un peeraddr;
socklen_t socklen = sizeof (peeraddr);
int data;
unsigned int qxdm_data[6];
const char *deactData[1] = {"1"};
char *actData[1];
RIL_Dial dialData;
int hangupData[1] = {1};
int number;
char **args;
RIL_SOCKET_ID socket_id = RIL_SOCKET_1;
int sim_id = 0;
RLOGI("debugCallback for socket %s", rilSocketIdToString(socket_id));
acceptFD = accept (fd, (sockaddr *) &peeraddr, &socklen);
if (acceptFD < 0) {
RLOGE ("error accepting on debug port: %d\n", errno);
return;
}
if (recv(acceptFD, &number, sizeof(int), 0) != sizeof(int)) {
RLOGE ("error reading on socket: number of Args: \n");
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
if (number < 0) {
RLOGE ("Invalid number of arguments: \n");
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
args = (char **) calloc(number, sizeof(char*));
if (args == NULL) {
RLOGE("Memory allocation failed for debug args");
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
for (int i = 0; i < number; i++) {
int len;
if (recv(acceptFD, &len, sizeof(int), 0) != sizeof(int)) {
RLOGE ("error reading on socket: Len of Args: \n");
freeDebugCallbackArgs(i, args);
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
if (len == INT_MAX || len < 0) {
RLOGE("Invalid value of len: \n");
freeDebugCallbackArgs(i, args);
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
args[i] = (char *) calloc(len + 1, sizeof(char));
if (args[i] == NULL) {
RLOGE("Memory allocation failed for debug args");
freeDebugCallbackArgs(i, args);
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
if (recv(acceptFD, args[i], sizeof(char) * len, 0)
!= (int)sizeof(char) * len) {
RLOGE ("error reading on socket: Args[%d] \n", i);
freeDebugCallbackArgs(i, args);
close(acceptFD);
return;
}
char * buf = args[i];
buf[len] = 0;
if ((i+1) == number) {
/* The last argument should be sim id 0(SIM1)~3(SIM4) */
sim_id = atoi(args[i]);
switch (sim_id) {
case 0:
socket_id = RIL_SOCKET_1;
break;
#if (SIM_COUNT >= 2)
case 1:
socket_id = RIL_SOCKET_2;
break;
#endif
#if (SIM_COUNT >= 3)
case 2:
socket_id = RIL_SOCKET_3;
break;
#endif
#if (SIM_COUNT >= 4)
case 3:
socket_id = RIL_SOCKET_4;
break;
#endif
default:
socket_id = RIL_SOCKET_1;
break;
}
}
}
switch (atoi(args[0])) {
case 0:
RLOGI ("Connection on debug port: issuing reset.");
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_RESET_RADIO, NULL, 0, socket_id);
break;
case 1:
RLOGI ("Connection on debug port: issuing radio power off.");
data = 0;
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_RADIO_POWER, &data, sizeof(int), socket_id);
if (socket_id == RIL_SOCKET_1 && s_ril_param_socket.fdCommand > 0) {
close(s_ril_param_socket.fdCommand);
s_ril_param_socket.fdCommand = -1;
}
#if (SIM_COUNT == 2)
else if (socket_id == RIL_SOCKET_2 && s_ril_param_socket2.fdCommand > 0) {
close(s_ril_param_socket2.fdCommand);
s_ril_param_socket2.fdCommand = -1;
}
#endif
break;
case 2:
RLOGI ("Debug port: issuing unsolicited voice network change.");
RIL_UNSOL_RESPONSE(RIL_UNSOL_RESPONSE_VOICE_NETWORK_STATE_CHANGED, NULL, 0, socket_id);
break;
case 3:
RLOGI ("Debug port: QXDM log enable.");
qxdm_data[0] = 65536; // head.func_tag
qxdm_data[1] = 16; // head.len
qxdm_data[2] = 1; // mode: 1 for 'start logging'
qxdm_data[3] = 32; // log_file_size: 32megabytes
qxdm_data[4] = 0; // log_mask
qxdm_data[5] = 8; // log_max_fileindex
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_OEM_HOOK_RAW, qxdm_data,
6 * sizeof(int), socket_id);
break;
case 4:
RLOGI ("Debug port: QXDM log disable.");
qxdm_data[0] = 65536;
qxdm_data[1] = 16;
qxdm_data[2] = 0; // mode: 0 for 'stop logging'
qxdm_data[3] = 32;
qxdm_data[4] = 0;
qxdm_data[5] = 8;
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_OEM_HOOK_RAW, qxdm_data,
6 * sizeof(int), socket_id);
break;
case 5:
RLOGI("Debug port: Radio On");
data = 1;
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_RADIO_POWER, &data, sizeof(int), socket_id);
sleep(2);
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_SET_NETWORK_SELECTION_AUTOMATIC, NULL, 0, socket_id);
break;
case 6:
RLOGI("Debug port: Setup Data Call, Apn :%s\n", args[1]);
actData[0] = args[1];
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_SETUP_DATA_CALL, &actData,
sizeof(actData), socket_id);
break;
case 7:
RLOGI("Debug port: Deactivate Data Call");
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_DEACTIVATE_DATA_CALL, &deactData,
sizeof(deactData), socket_id);
break;
case 8:
RLOGI("Debug port: Dial Call");
dialData.clir = 0;
dialData.address = args[1];
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_DIAL, &dialData, sizeof(dialData), socket_id);
break;
case 9:
RLOGI("Debug port: Answer Call");
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_ANSWER, NULL, 0, socket_id);
break;
case 10:
RLOGI("Debug port: End Call");
issueLocalRequest(RIL_REQUEST_HANGUP, &hangupData,
sizeof(hangupData), socket_id);
break;
default:
RLOGE ("Invalid request");
break;
}
freeDebugCallbackArgs(number, args);
close(acceptFD);
}
| 310,260,919,278,077,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2017-0823 | An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android system (rild). Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-37896655. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0823 |
8,563 | Android | 87fb7909c49e6a4510ba86ace1ffc83459c7e1b9 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libhevc/+/87fb7909c49e6a4510ba86ace1ffc83459c7e1b9 | None | 1 | WORD32 ihevcd_decode(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 proc_idx = 0;
WORD32 prev_proc_idx = 0;
/* Initialize error code */
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size; //Restore size field
}
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT_REACHED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* If reset flag is set, flush the existing buffers */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 1;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
/* In case the decoder is not in flush mode check for input buffer validity */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN)
{
if((WORD32)ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes > 0)
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
else
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
#ifdef APPLY_CONCEALMENT
{
WORD32 num_mbs;
num_mbs = (ps_codec->i4_wd * ps_codec->i4_ht + 255) >> 8;
/* Reset MB Count at the beginning of every process call */
ps_codec->mb_count = 0;
memset(ps_codec->mb_map, 0, ((num_mbs + 7) >> 3));
}
#endif
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf && ps_codec->i4_header_mode == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_codec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_codec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
if(ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ihevc_disp_mgr_get(
(disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, &ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id);
/* In case of non-shared mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
&& ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
|| (IV_YUV_420P
== ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx];
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
/* Output buffer check */
ret = ihevcd_check_out_buf_size(ps_codec);
RETURN_IF((ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS), ret);
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], 0,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
if(NULL == ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
{
/* If in flush mode and there are no more buffers to flush,
* check for the reset flag and reset the decoder */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
/* In case of shared mode, check if there is a free buffer for reconstruction */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_header_mode) && (1 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf))
{
WORD32 buf_status;
buf_status = 1;
if(ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr)
buf_status = ihevc_buf_mgr_check_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
/* If there is no free buffer, then return with an error code */
if(0 == buf_status)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pic_present = 0;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = NULL;
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
ithread_set_affinity(0);
}
while(MIN_START_CODE_LEN < ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining)
{
WORD32 nal_len;
WORD32 nal_ofst;
WORD32 bits_len;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
WORD32 next_slice_addr = ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x +
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y * ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx == next_slice_addr)
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
if(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic)
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic;
}
else
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_static;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_static;
}
nal_ofst = ihevcd_nal_search_start_code(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf,
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining);
ps_codec->i4_nal_ofst = nal_ofst;
{
WORD32 bytes_remaining = ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - nal_ofst;
bytes_remaining = MIN((UWORD32)bytes_remaining, ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size);
ihevcd_nal_remv_emuln_bytes(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf + nal_ofst,
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bytes_remaining,
&nal_len, &bits_len);
/* Decoder may read upto 8 extra bytes at the end of frame */
/* These are not used, but still set them to zero to avoid uninitialized reads */
if(bits_len < (WORD32)(ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size - 8))
{
memset(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf + bits_len, 0, 2 * sizeof(UWORD32));
}
}
/* This may be used to update the offsets for tiles and entropy sync row offsets */
ps_codec->i4_num_emln_bytes = nal_len - bits_len;
ps_codec->i4_nal_len = nal_len;
ihevcd_bits_init(&ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm, ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bits_len);
ret = ihevcd_nal_unit(ps_codec);
/* If the frame is incomplete and
* the bytes remaining is zero or a header is received,
* complete the frame treating it to be in error */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx != ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb))
{
if((ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN) ||
(ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
continue;
}
}
if(IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE == ret)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = MAX(0, (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx - 1));
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
continue;
}
if((IVD_RES_CHANGED == ret) ||
(IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED == ret))
{
break;
}
/* Update bytes remaining and bytes consumed and input bitstream pointer */
/* Do not consume the NAL in the following cases */
/* Slice header reached during header decode mode */
/* TODO: Next picture's slice reached */
if(ret != IHEVCD_SLICE_IN_HEADER_MODE)
{
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_slice_error) ||
(ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN))
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
}
if(ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
break;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
break;
}
else
{
ret = IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
break;
}
/* Allocate dynamic bitstream buffer once SPS is decoded */
if((ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done == 0) && ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
WORD32 ret;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->i4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
BREAK_AFTER_SLICE_NAL();
}
if((ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt == 0) && (ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS))
{
ps_codec->i4_error_code = ret;
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(1 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
WORD32 i;
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 1;
/*TODO temporary fix: end_of_frame is checked before adding format conversion to job queue */
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1 && ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
{
/* Add job queue for format conversion / frame copy for each ctb row */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) &&
((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
/* If format conversion jobs were not issued in pic_init() add them here */
if((0 == ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead) ||
(ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id == ps_proc->i4_cur_pic_buf_id))
for(i = 0; i < ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb; i++)
{
proc_job_t s_job;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i2_ctb_cnt = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_x = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_y = i;
s_job.i2_slice_idx = 0;
s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst = 0;
ret = ihevcd_jobq_queue((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq,
&s_job, sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if(ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
return (WORD32)ret;
}
}
/* Reached end of frame : Signal terminate */
/* The terminate flag is checked only after all the jobs are dequeued */
ret = ihevcd_jobq_terminate((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq);
while(1)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
proc_job_t s_job;
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
ret = ihevcd_jobq_dequeue((jobq_t *)ps_proc->pv_proc_jobq, &s_job,
sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret)
break;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_cnt = s_job.i2_ctb_cnt;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_x = s_job.i2_ctb_x;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_y = s_job.i2_ctb_y;
ps_proc->i4_cur_slice_idx = s_job.i2_slice_idx;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst);
ihevcd_process(ps_proc);
}
else if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
WORD32 num_rows = 1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
num_rows = MIN(num_rows, (ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - (s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)));
if(num_rows < 0)
num_rows = 0;
ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size,
num_rows);
}
}
}
/* In case of non-shared mode and while running in single core mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
else if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) && ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) ||
(IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)) &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx];
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht
- ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
if(ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows < 0)
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = 0;
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row,
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows);
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row += ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows;
}
DEBUG_DUMP_MV_MAP(ps_codec);
/* Mark MV Buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_mv_bank_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Insert the current picture as short term reference */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_insert_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].ps_cur_pic,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id);
/* If a frame was displayed (in non-shared mode), then release it from display manager */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) && (ps_codec->ps_disp_buf))
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Wait for threads */
for(i = 0; i < (ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i])
{
ithread_join(ps_codec->apv_process_thread_handle[i], NULL);
ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i] = 0;
}
}
DEBUG_VALIDATE_PADDED_REGION(&ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx]);
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt > 0)
{
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_PU(ps_codec);
}
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_BUFFERS(ps_codec);
/* Increment the number of pictures decoded */
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt++;
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
return ret;
}
| 64,768,586,686,001,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-682"
] | CVE-2017-0819 | A vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63045918. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0819 |
8,564 | Android | d07f5c14e811951ff9b411ceb84e7288e0d04aaf | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/d07f5c14e811951ff9b411ceb84e7288e0d04aaf | None | 1 | status_t MyOpusExtractor::readNextPacket(MediaBuffer **out) {
if (mOffset <= mFirstDataOffset && mStartGranulePosition < 0) {
MediaBuffer *mBuf;
uint32_t numSamples = 0;
uint64_t curGranulePosition = 0;
while (true) {
status_t err = _readNextPacket(&mBuf, /* calcVorbisTimestamp = */false);
if (err != OK && err != ERROR_END_OF_STREAM) {
return err;
}
if (err == ERROR_END_OF_STREAM || mCurrentPage.mPageNo > 2) {
break;
}
curGranulePosition = mCurrentPage.mGranulePosition;
numSamples += getNumSamplesInPacket(mBuf);
mBuf->release();
mBuf = NULL;
}
if (curGranulePosition > numSamples) {
mStartGranulePosition = curGranulePosition - numSamples;
} else {
mStartGranulePosition = 0;
}
seekToOffset(0);
}
status_t err = _readNextPacket(out, /* calcVorbisTimestamp = */false);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
int32_t currentPageSamples;
if ((*out)->meta_data()->findInt32(kKeyValidSamples, ¤tPageSamples)) {
if (mOffset == mFirstDataOffset) {
currentPageSamples -= mStartGranulePosition;
(*out)->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyValidSamples, currentPageSamples);
}
mCurGranulePosition = mCurrentPage.mGranulePosition - currentPageSamples;
}
int64_t timeUs = getTimeUsOfGranule(mCurGranulePosition);
(*out)->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, timeUs);
uint32_t frames = getNumSamplesInPacket(*out);
mCurGranulePosition += frames;
return OK;
}
| 271,239,919,656,121,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-772"
] | CVE-2017-0818 | A vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63581671. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0818 |
8,577 | Android | 7fa3f552a6f34ed05c15e64ea30b8eed53f77a41 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7fa3f552a6f34ed05c15e64ea30b8eed53f77a41 | None | 1 | status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t numSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (numSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)numSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Sync sample table size too large.");
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTotalSize += allocSize;
if (mTotalSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Sync sample table size would make sample table too large.\n"
" Requested sync sample table size = %llu\n"
" Eventual sample table size >= %llu\n"
" Allowed sample table size = %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)allocSize,
(unsigned long long)mTotalSize,
(unsigned long long)kMaxTotalSize);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[numSyncSamples];
if (!mSyncSamples) {
ALOGE("Cannot allocate sync sample table with %llu entries.",
(unsigned long long)numSyncSamples);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, mSyncSamples,
(size_t)allocSize) != (ssize_t)allocSize) {
delete mSyncSamples;
mSyncSamples = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < numSyncSamples; ++i) {
if (mSyncSamples[i] == 0) {
ALOGE("b/32423862, unexpected zero value in stss");
continue;
}
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
mNumSyncSamples = numSyncSamples;
return OK;
}
| 130,569,535,020,946,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-772"
] | CVE-2017-0813 | A denial of service vulnerability in the Android media framework (libstagefright). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-36531046. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0813 |
8,578 | Android | 7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f | None | https://android.googlesource.com/device/google/dragon/+/7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f | None | 1 | static ssize_t read_and_process_frames(struct audio_stream_in *stream, void* buffer, ssize_t frames_num)
{
struct stream_in *in = (struct stream_in *)stream;
ssize_t frames_wr = 0; /* Number of frames actually read */
size_t bytes_per_sample = audio_bytes_per_sample(stream->common.get_format(&stream->common));
void *proc_buf_out = buffer;
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
audio_buffer_t in_buf;
audio_buffer_t out_buf;
int i;
bool has_processing = in->num_preprocessors != 0;
#endif
/* Additional channels might be added on top of main_channels:
* - aux_channels (by processing effects)
* - extra channels due to HW limitations
* In case of additional channels, we cannot work inplace
*/
size_t src_channels = in->config.channels;
size_t dst_channels = audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(in->main_channels);
bool channel_remapping_needed = (dst_channels != src_channels);
size_t src_buffer_size = frames_num * src_channels * bytes_per_sample;
#ifdef PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
if (has_processing) {
/* since all the processing below is done in frames and using the config.channels
* as the number of channels, no changes is required in case aux_channels are present */
while (frames_wr < frames_num) {
/* first reload enough frames at the end of process input buffer */
if (in->proc_buf_frames < (size_t)frames_num) {
ssize_t frames_rd;
if (in->proc_buf_size < (size_t)frames_num) {
in->proc_buf_size = (size_t)frames_num;
in->proc_buf_in = realloc(in->proc_buf_in, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_in != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_in");
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
in->proc_buf_out = realloc(in->proc_buf_out, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_out != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_out");
proc_buf_out = in->proc_buf_out;
}
}
frames_rd = read_frames(in,
in->proc_buf_in +
in->proc_buf_frames * src_channels * bytes_per_sample,
frames_num - in->proc_buf_frames);
if (frames_rd < 0) {
/* Return error code */
frames_wr = frames_rd;
break;
}
in->proc_buf_frames += frames_rd;
}
/* in_buf.frameCount and out_buf.frameCount indicate respectively
* the maximum number of frames to be consumed and produced by process() */
in_buf.frameCount = in->proc_buf_frames;
in_buf.s16 = in->proc_buf_in;
out_buf.frameCount = frames_num - frames_wr;
out_buf.s16 = (int16_t *)proc_buf_out + frames_wr * in->config.channels;
/* FIXME: this works because of current pre processing library implementation that
* does the actual process only when the last enabled effect process is called.
* The generic solution is to have an output buffer for each effect and pass it as
* input to the next.
*/
for (i = 0; i < in->num_preprocessors; i++) {
(*in->preprocessors[i].effect_itfe)->process(in->preprocessors[i].effect_itfe,
&in_buf,
&out_buf);
}
/* process() has updated the number of frames consumed and produced in
* in_buf.frameCount and out_buf.frameCount respectively
* move remaining frames to the beginning of in->proc_buf_in */
in->proc_buf_frames -= in_buf.frameCount;
if (in->proc_buf_frames) {
memcpy(in->proc_buf_in,
in->proc_buf_in + in_buf.frameCount * src_channels * bytes_per_sample,
in->proc_buf_frames * in->config.channels * audio_bytes_per_sample(in_get_format(in)));
}
/* if not enough frames were passed to process(), read more and retry. */
if (out_buf.frameCount == 0) {
ALOGW("No frames produced by preproc");
continue;
}
if ((frames_wr + (ssize_t)out_buf.frameCount) <= frames_num) {
frames_wr += out_buf.frameCount;
} else {
/* The effect does not comply to the API. In theory, we should never end up here! */
ALOGE("preprocessing produced too many frames: %d + %zd > %d !",
(unsigned int)frames_wr, out_buf.frameCount, (unsigned int)frames_num);
frames_wr = frames_num;
}
}
}
else
#endif //PREPROCESSING_ENABLED
{
/* No processing effects attached */
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
/* With additional channels, we cannot use original buffer */
if (in->proc_buf_size < src_buffer_size) {
in->proc_buf_size = src_buffer_size;
in->proc_buf_out = realloc(in->proc_buf_out, src_buffer_size);
ALOG_ASSERT((in->proc_buf_out != NULL),
"process_frames() failed to reallocate proc_buf_out");
}
proc_buf_out = in->proc_buf_out;
}
frames_wr = read_frames(in, proc_buf_out, frames_num);
ALOG_ASSERT(frames_wr <= frames_num, "read more frames than requested");
}
if (channel_remapping_needed) {
size_t ret = adjust_channels(proc_buf_out, src_channels, buffer, dst_channels,
bytes_per_sample, frames_wr * src_channels * bytes_per_sample);
ALOG_ASSERT(ret == (frames_wr * dst_channels * bytes_per_sample));
}
return frames_wr;
}
| 143,207,795,850,676,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2017-0812 | An elevation of privilege vulnerability in the Android media framework (audio hal). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62873231. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0812 |
8,580 | Android | 7737780815fe523ad7b0e49456eb75d27a30818a | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libmpeg2/+/7737780815fe523ad7b0e49456eb75d27a30818a | None | 1 | IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD16 *pi2_vld_out;
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
pi2_vld_out = ps_dec->ai2_vld_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv,0,sizeof(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv));
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
ps_dec->u2_picture_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_picture_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
WORD32 ret;
UWORD32 u4_x_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD32 u4_y_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_out_p;
UWORD8 *pu1_pred;
WORD32 u4_pred_strd;
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
ret = impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(ps_dec);
else
ret = impeg2d_dec_p_mb_params(ps_dec);
if(ret)
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
u4_x_dst_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
u4_y_dst_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
if(ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb == 0)
{
UWORD32 offset_x, offset_y, stride;
UWORD16 index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
/*only for non intra mb's*/
if(ps_dec->e_mb_pred == BIDIRECT)
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[index];
}
else
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[index];
}
stride = ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
offset_x = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
offset_y = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_y = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + offset_y * stride + offset_x;
stride = stride >> 1;
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_u = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_v = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
PROFILE_DISABLE_MC_IF0
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_mc(ps_dec);
}
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & (1 << (BLOCKS_IN_MB - 1 - i))) != 0)
{
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, Y_LUMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
if(ps_dec->u2_field_dct == 0)
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
else
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_fld[i] ;
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
}
/* For U and V blocks, divide the x and y offsets by 2. */
u4_x_dst_offset >>= 1;
u4_y_dst_offset >>= 2;
/* In case of chrominance blocks the DCT will be frame DCT */
/* i = 0, U component and i = 1 is V componet */
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x02) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, U_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x01) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, V_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return e_error;
}
| 183,259,684,569,948,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-0810 | A remote code execution vulnerability in the Android media framework (libmpeg2). Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-38207066. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0810 |
8,584 | Android | ebaa71da6362c497310377df509651974401d258 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libhevc/+/ebaa71da6362c497310377df509651974401d258 | None | 1 | IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_pps(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
WORD32 pps_id;
pps_t *ps_pps;
sps_t *ps_sps;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
UEV_PARSE("pic_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
pps_id = value;
if((pps_id >= MAX_PPS_CNT) || (pps_id < 0))
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pps_done)
return IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_PPS_ID;
else
pps_id = 0;
}
ps_pps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps_base + MAX_PPS_CNT - 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
UEV_PARSE("seq_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = value;
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = CLIP3(ps_pps->i1_sps_id, 0, MAX_SPS_CNT - 2);
ps_sps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + ps_pps->i1_sps_id);
/* If the SPS that is being referred to has not been parsed,
* copy an existing SPS to the current location */
if(0 == ps_sps->i1_sps_valid)
{
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
/*
sps_t *ps_sps_ref = ps_codec->ps_sps_base;
while(0 == ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_valid)
ps_sps_ref++;
ihevcd_copy_sps(ps_codec, ps_pps->i1_sps_id, ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_id);
*/
}
BITS_PARSE("dependent_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_dependent_slice_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("output_flag_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_output_flag_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("num_extra_slice_header_bits", value, ps_bitstrm, 3);
ps_pps->i1_num_extra_slice_header_bits = value;
BITS_PARSE("sign_data_hiding_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_sign_data_hiding_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cabac_init_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cabac_init_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l0_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_default_active = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l1_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_default_active = value + 1;
SEV_PARSE("pic_init_qp_minus26", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_init_qp = value + 26;
BITS_PARSE("constrained_intra_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_constrained_intra_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transform_skip_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transform_skip_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("diff_cu_qp_delta_depth", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = value;
}
else
{
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = 0;
}
ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size = ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size - ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cb_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cb_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cr_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cr_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
BITS_PARSE("slicelevel_chroma_qp_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_bipred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_bipred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transquant_bypass_enable_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transquant_bypass_enable_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag = value;
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_columns_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_rows_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = value + 1;
if((ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
BITS_PARSE("uniform_spacing_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = value;
{
WORD32 start;
WORD32 i, j;
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("column_width_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + j * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + i;
ps_tile->u1_pos_x = start;
ps_tile->u2_wd = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows); i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("row_height_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + i * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + j;
ps_tile->u1_pos_y = start;
ps_tile->u2_ht = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
}
else
{
/* If tiles are not present, set first tile in each PPS to have tile
width and height equal to picture width and height */
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = 1;
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = 1;
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = 1;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_x = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_y = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_wd = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_ht = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_control_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag = value;
/* Default values */
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = 0;
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = value;
if(!ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("pps_beta_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = value;
SEV_PARSE("pps_tc_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = value;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag)
{
COPY_DEFAULT_SCALING_LIST(ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
ihevcd_scaling_list_data(ps_codec, ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
}
BITS_PARSE("lists_modification_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_lists_modification_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("log2_parallel_merge_level_minus2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_log2_parallel_merge_level = value + 2;
BITS_PARSE("slice_header_extension_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_slice_header_extension_present_flag = value;
/* Not present in HM */
BITS_PARSE("pps_extension_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_codec->i4_pps_done = 1;
return ret;
}
| 99,654,993,984,378,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-0637 | A remote code execution vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process.Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34064500. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0637 |
8,585 | Android | 523f6b49c1a2289161f40cf9fe80b92e592e9441 | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/523f6b49c1a2289161f40cf9fe80b92e592e9441 | None | 1 | status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
| 295,713,217,252,725,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2017-0635 | A remote denial of service vulnerability in HevcUtils.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as Low due to details specific to the vulnerability. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35467107. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0635 |
8,591 | Android | a1424724a00d62ac5efa0e27953eed66850d662f | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libhevc/+/a1424724a00d62ac5efa0e27953eed66850d662f | None | 1 | IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_slice_header(codec_t *ps_codec,
nal_header_t *ps_nal)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 sps_id;
pps_t *ps_pps;
sps_t *ps_sps;
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr;
WORD32 disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
WORD32 idr_pic_flag;
WORD32 pps_id;
WORD32 first_slice_in_pic_flag;
WORD32 no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 0;
WORD8 i1_nal_unit_type = ps_nal->i1_nal_unit_type;
WORD32 num_poc_total_curr = 0;
WORD32 slice_address;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error == 1)
return ret;
idr_pic_flag = (NAL_IDR_W_LP == i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_IDR_N_LP == i1_nal_unit_type);
BITS_PARSE("first_slice_in_pic_flag", first_slice_in_pic_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if((NAL_BLA_W_LP <= i1_nal_unit_type) &&
(NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23 >= i1_nal_unit_type))
{
BITS_PARSE("no_output_of_prior_pics_flag", no_output_of_prior_pics_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
UEV_PARSE("pic_parameter_set_id", pps_id, ps_bitstrm);
pps_id = CLIP3(pps_id, 0, MAX_PPS_CNT - 2);
/* Get the current PPS structure */
ps_pps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps_base + pps_id;
if(0 == ps_pps->i1_pps_valid)
{
pps_t *ps_pps_ref = ps_codec->ps_pps_base;
while(0 == ps_pps_ref->i1_pps_valid)
ps_pps_ref++;
if((ps_pps_ref - ps_codec->ps_pps_base >= MAX_PPS_CNT - 1))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
ihevcd_copy_pps(ps_codec, pps_id, ps_pps_ref->i1_pps_id);
}
/* Get SPS id for the current PPS */
sps_id = ps_pps->i1_sps_id;
/* Get the current SPS structure */
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + sps_id;
/* When the current slice is the first in a pic,
* check whether the previous frame is complete
* If the previous frame is incomplete -
* treat the remaining CTBs as skip */
if((0 != ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt || ps_codec->i4_pic_present) &&
first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
return ret;
}
else
{
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
}
if(first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
}
else
{
/* If the current slice is not the first slice in the pic,
* but the first one to be parsed, set the current slice indx to 1
* Treat the first slice to be missing and copy the current slice header
* to the first one */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 1;
}
ps_slice_hdr = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
if((ps_pps->i1_dependent_slice_enabled_flag) &&
(!first_slice_in_pic_flag))
{
BITS_PARSE("dependent_slice_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
/* If dependendent slice, copy slice header from previous slice */
if(value && (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx > 0))
{
ihevcd_copy_slice_hdr(ps_codec,
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1)),
((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx - 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1)));
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag = value;
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag = 0;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type = i1_nal_unit_type;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_first_slice_in_pic_flag = first_slice_in_pic_flag;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 1;
if((NAL_BLA_W_LP <= i1_nal_unit_type) &&
(NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23 >= i1_nal_unit_type))
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = no_output_of_prior_pics_flag;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
WORD32 num_bits;
/* Use CLZ to compute Ceil( Log2( PicSizeInCtbsY ) ) */
num_bits = 32 - CLZ(ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb - 1);
BITS_PARSE("slice_address", value, ps_bitstrm, num_bits);
slice_address = value;
/* If slice address is greater than the number of CTBs in a picture,
* ignore the slice */
if(value >= ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
else
{
slice_address = 0;
}
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pic_output_flag = 1;
ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_pps->i1_num_extra_slice_header_bits; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_reserved_undetermined_flag[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
UEV_PARSE("slice_type", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type = value;
/* If the picture is IRAP, slice type must be equal to ISLICE */
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type >= NAL_BLA_W_LP) &&
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type <= NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23))
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type = ISLICE;
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type < 0) ||
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type > 2))
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
if(ps_pps->i1_output_flag_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("pic_output_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_pic_output_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_colour_plane_id = 0;
if(1 == ps_sps->i1_separate_colour_plane_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("colour_plane_id", value, ps_bitstrm, 2);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_colour_plane_id = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_temporal_mvp_enable_flag = 0;
if(!idr_pic_flag)
{
WORD32 st_rps_idx;
WORD32 num_neg_pics;
WORD32 num_pos_pics;
WORD8 *pi1_used;
BITS_PARSE("pic_order_cnt_lsb", value, ps_bitstrm, ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = value;
BITS_PARSE("short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag = value;
if(1 == ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag)
{
WORD32 numbits;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx = 0;
if(ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets > 1)
{
numbits = 32 - CLZ(ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets - 1);
BITS_PARSE("short_term_ref_pic_set_idx", value, ps_bitstrm, numbits);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx = value;
}
st_rps_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_short_term_ref_pic_set_idx;
num_neg_pics = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].i1_num_neg_pics;
num_pos_pics = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].i1_num_pos_pics;
pi1_used = ps_sps->as_stref_picset[st_rps_idx].ai1_used;
}
else
{
ihevcd_short_term_ref_pic_set(ps_bitstrm,
&ps_sps->as_stref_picset[0],
ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets,
ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets,
&ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset);
st_rps_idx = ps_sps->i1_num_short_term_ref_pic_sets;
num_neg_pics = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.i1_num_neg_pics;
num_pos_pics = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.i1_num_pos_pics;
pi1_used = ps_slice_hdr->s_stref_picset.ai1_used;
}
if(ps_sps->i1_long_term_ref_pics_present_flag)
{
if(ps_sps->i1_num_long_term_ref_pics_sps > 0)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_long_term_sps", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps = value;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps,
0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - num_neg_pics - num_pos_pics);
}
UEV_PARSE("num_long_term_pics", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics = value;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics,
0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - num_neg_pics - num_pos_pics -
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps);
for(i = 0; i < (ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps +
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics); i++)
{
if(i < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps)
{
/* Use CLZ to compute Ceil( Log2( num_long_term_ref_pics_sps ) ) */
WORD32 num_bits = 32 - CLZ(ps_sps->i1_num_long_term_ref_pics_sps);
BITS_PARSE("lt_idx_sps[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, num_bits);
ps_slice_hdr->ai4_poc_lsb_lt[i] = ps_sps->ai1_lt_ref_pic_poc_lsb_sps[value];
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i] = ps_sps->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_sps_flag[value];
}
else
{
BITS_PARSE("poc_lsb_lt[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
ps_slice_hdr->ai4_poc_lsb_lt[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i] = value;
}
BITS_PARSE("delta_poc_msb_present_flag[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i] = value;
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_present_flag[i])
{
UEV_PARSE("delata_poc_msb_cycle_lt[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] = value;
}
if((i != 0) && (i != ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps))
{
ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i] += ps_slice_hdr->ai1_delta_poc_msb_cycle_lt[i - 1];
}
}
}
for(i = 0; i < num_neg_pics + num_pos_pics; i++)
{
if(pi1_used[i])
{
num_poc_total_curr++;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_sps + ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_long_term_pics; i++)
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->ai1_used_by_curr_pic_lt_flag[i])
{
num_poc_total_curr++;
}
}
if(ps_sps->i1_sps_temporal_mvp_enable_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("enable_temporal_mvp_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_temporal_mvp_enable_flag = value;
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag = 0;
if(ps_sps->i1_sample_adaptive_offset_enabled_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_sao_luma_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("slice_sao_chroma_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand = 1;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_cabac_init_flag = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cb_qp_offset = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cr_qp_offset = 0;
if((PSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type) ||
(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type))
{
BITS_PARSE("num_ref_idx_active_override_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag = value;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_active_override_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = value + 1;
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = value + 1;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_default_active;
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_default_active;
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
if(0 == num_poc_total_curr)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
if((ps_pps->i1_lists_modification_present_flag) && (num_poc_total_curr > 1))
{
ihevcd_ref_pic_list_modification(ps_bitstrm,
ps_slice_hdr, num_poc_total_curr);
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_ref_pic_list_modification_flag_l0 = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->s_rplm.i1_ref_pic_list_modification_flag_l1 = 0;
}
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
BITS_PARSE("mvd_l1_zero_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_mvd_l1_zero_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_cabac_init_flag = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_cabac_init_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("cabac_init_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_cabac_init_flag = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag = 1;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx = 0;
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_temporal_mvp_enable_flag)
{
if(BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)
{
BITS_PARSE("collocated_from_l0_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag = value;
}
if((ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag && (ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active > 1)) ||
(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_from_l0_flag && (ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active > 1)))
{
UEV_PARSE("collocated_ref_idx", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx = value;
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_collocated_ref_idx, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
if((ps_pps->i1_weighted_pred_flag && (PSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)) ||
(ps_pps->i1_weighted_bipred_flag && (BSLICE == ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type)))
{
ihevcd_parse_pred_wt_ofst(ps_bitstrm, ps_sps, ps_pps, ps_slice_hdr);
}
UEV_PARSE("five_minus_max_num_merge_cand", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand = 5 - value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i1_max_num_merge_cand, 1, 5);
SEV_PARSE("slice_qp_delta", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_qp_delta = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("slice_cb_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cb_qp_offset = value;
SEV_PARSE("slice_cr_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_cr_qp_offset = value;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_deblocking_filter_override_flag = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_beta_offset_div2 = ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2;
ps_slice_hdr->i1_tc_offset_div2 = ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2;
disable_deblocking_filter_flag = ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag)
{
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_override_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_deblocking_filter_override_flag = value;
}
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_deblocking_filter_override_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = value;
disable_deblocking_filter_flag = ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag;
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_disable_deblocking_filter_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("beta_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_beta_offset_div2 = value;
SEV_PARSE("tc_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_tc_offset_div2 = value;
}
}
}
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag;
if(ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag &&
(ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_luma_flag || ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_sao_chroma_flag || !disable_deblocking_filter_flag))
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = value;
}
}
/* Check sanity of slice */
if((!first_slice_in_pic_flag) &&
(ps_codec->i4_pic_present))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_base = ps_codec->ps_slice_hdr_base;
/* According to the standard, the above conditions must be satisfied - But for error resilience,
* only the following conditions are checked */
if((ps_slice_hdr_base->i1_pps_id != ps_slice_hdr->i1_pps_id) ||
(ps_slice_hdr_base->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb != ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb))
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
}
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ihevcd_calc_poc(ps_codec, ps_nal, ps_sps->i1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb, ps_slice_hdr->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
}
if(!first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
/* Check if the current slice belongs to the same pic (Pic being parsed) */
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt == ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt)
{
/* If the Next CTB's index is less than the slice address,
* the previous slice is incomplete.
* Indicate slice error, and treat the remaining CTBs as skip */
if(slice_address > ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx)
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
return ret;
}
else
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
}
/* If the slice address is less than the next CTB's index,
* extra CTBs have been decoded in the previous slice.
* Ignore the current slice. Treat it as incomplete */
else if(slice_address < ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx)
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
else
{
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
}
/* The current slice does not belong to the pic that is being parsed */
else
{
/* The previous pic is incomplete.
* Treat the remaining CTBs as skip */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
return ret;
}
/* If the previous pic is complete,
* return if the current slice is dependant
* otherwise, update the parse context's POC */
else
{
if(ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
}
}
}
/* If the slice is the first slice in the pic, update the parse context's POC */
else
{
/* If the first slice is repeated, ignore the second occurrence
* If any other slice is repeated, the CTB addr will be greater than the slice addr,
* and hence the second occurrence is ignored */
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt == ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt;
}
ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets = 0;
if((ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag) ||
(ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag))
{
UEV_PARSE("num_entry_point_offsets", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets = value;
{
WORD32 max_num_entry_point_offsets;
if((ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag) &&
(ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag))
{
max_num_entry_point_offsets = ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns * (ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - 1);
}
else if(ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag)
{
max_num_entry_point_offsets = ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows;
}
else
{
max_num_entry_point_offsets = (ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - 1);
}
ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets = CLIP3(ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets,
0, max_num_entry_point_offsets);
}
if(ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets > 0)
{
UEV_PARSE("offset_len_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i1_offset_len = value + 1;
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i4_num_entry_point_offsets; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("entry_point_offset", value, ps_bitstrm, ps_slice_hdr->i1_offset_len);
/* TODO: pu4_entry_point_offset needs to be initialized */
}
}
}
if(ps_pps->i1_slice_header_extension_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("slice_header_extension_length", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_slice_hdr->i2_slice_header_extension_length = value;
for(i = 0; i < ps_slice_hdr->i2_slice_header_extension_length; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("slice_header_extension_data_byte", value, ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
}
ihevcd_bits_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_bitstrm);
{
dpb_mgr_t *ps_dpb_mgr = (dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr;
WORD32 r_idx;
if((NAL_IDR_W_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_IDR_N_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_BLA_N_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_BLA_W_DLP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(NAL_BLA_W_LP == ps_slice_hdr->i1_nal_unit_type) ||
(0 == ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt))
{
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DPB_BUFS; i++)
{
if(ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf = ps_dpb_mgr->as_dpb_info[i].ps_pic_buf;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf;
/* Long term index is set to MAX_DPB_BUFS to ensure it is not added as LT */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_del_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr, (buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc);
/* Find buffer id of the MV bank corresponding to the buffer being freed (Buffer with POC of u4_abs_poc) */
ps_mv_buf = (mv_buf_t *)ps_codec->ps_mv_buf;
for(i = 0; i < BUF_MGR_MAX_CNT; i++)
{
if(ps_mv_buf && ps_mv_buf->i4_abs_poc == ps_pic_buf->i4_abs_poc)
{
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, i, BUF_MGR_REF);
break;
}
ps_mv_buf++;
}
}
}
/* Initialize the reference lists to NULL
* This is done to take care of the cases where the first pic is not IDR
* but the reference list is not created for the first pic because
* pic count is zero leaving the reference list uninitialised */
for(r_idx = 0; r_idx < MAX_DPB_SIZE; r_idx++)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = NULL;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = NULL;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = NULL;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = NULL;
}
}
else
{
ihevcd_ref_list(ps_codec, ps_pps, ps_sps, ps_slice_hdr);
}
}
/* Fill the remaining entries of the reference lists with the nearest POC
* This is done to handle cases where there is a corruption in the reference index */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf_ref;
mv_buf_t *ps_mv_buf_ref;
WORD32 r_idx;
dpb_mgr_t *ps_dpb_mgr = (dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr;
buf_mgr_t *ps_mv_buf_mgr = (buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr;
ps_pic_buf_ref = ihevc_dpb_mgr_get_ref_by_nearest_poc(ps_dpb_mgr, ps_slice_hdr->i4_abs_pic_order_cnt);
if(NULL == ps_pic_buf_ref)
{
ps_pic_buf_ref = ps_codec->as_process[0].ps_cur_pic;
ps_mv_buf_ref = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_cur_mv_buf;
}
else
{
ps_mv_buf_ref = ihevcd_mv_mgr_get_poc(ps_mv_buf_mgr, ps_pic_buf_ref->i4_abs_poc);
}
for(r_idx = 0; r_idx < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active; r_idx++)
{
if(NULL == ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
}
for(r_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_active; r_idx < MAX_DPB_SIZE; r_idx++)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list0[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
for(r_idx = 0; r_idx < ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active; r_idx++)
{
if(NULL == ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
}
for(r_idx = ps_slice_hdr->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_active; r_idx < MAX_DPB_SIZE; r_idx++)
{
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_pic_buf = (void *)ps_pic_buf_ref;
ps_slice_hdr->as_ref_pic_list1[r_idx].pv_mv_buf = (void *)ps_mv_buf_ref;
}
}
/* Update slice address in the header */
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_first_slice_in_pic_flag)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x = slice_address % ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y = slice_address / ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(!ps_slice_hdr->i1_dependent_slice_flag)
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_x = ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_y = ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr->i2_independent_ctb_y = 0;
}
/* If the first slice in the pic is missing, copy the current slice header to
* the first slice's header */
if((!first_slice_in_pic_flag) &&
(0 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_prev = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base;
ihevcd_copy_slice_hdr(ps_codec, 0, (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1)));
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
ps_slice_hdr_prev->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_prev->i2_ctb_y = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
if((ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x == 0) &&
(ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_y == 0))
{
ps_slice_hdr->i2_ctb_x++;
}
}
{
/* If skip B is enabled,
* ignore pictures that are non-reference
* TODO: (i1_nal_unit_type < NAL_BLA_W_LP) && (i1_nal_unit_type % 2 == 0) only says it is
* sub-layer non-reference slice. May need to find a way to detect actual non-reference pictures*/
if((i1_nal_unit_type < NAL_BLA_W_LP) &&
(i1_nal_unit_type % 2 == 0))
{
if(IVD_SKIP_B == ps_codec->e_pic_skip_mode)
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
/* If skip PB is enabled,
* decode only I slices */
if((IVD_SKIP_PB == ps_codec->e_pic_skip_mode) &&
(ISLICE != ps_slice_hdr->i1_slice_type))
{
return IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE;
}
}
return ret;
}
| 145,592,509,685,862,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-252"
] | CVE-2017-0599 | A remote denial of service vulnerability in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34672748. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0599 |
8,596 | Android | 594bf934384920618d2b6ce0bcda1f60144cb3eb | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/594bf934384920618d2b6ce0bcda1f60144cb3eb | None | 1 | void SoftAACEncoder2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (!mSentCodecSpecificData) {
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ALOGE("Unable to initialize encoder for profile / sample-rate / bit-rate / channels");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
OMX_U32 actualBitRate = aacEncoder_GetParam(mAACEncoder, AACENC_BITRATE);
if (mBitRate != actualBitRate) {
ALOGW("Requested bitrate %u unsupported, using %u", mBitRate, actualBitRate);
}
AACENC_InfoStruct encInfo;
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncInfo(mAACEncoder, &encInfo)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get AAC encoder info");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFilledLen = encInfo.confSize;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
uint8_t *out = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
memcpy(out, encInfo.confBuf, encInfo.confSize);
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mSentCodecSpecificData = true;
}
size_t numBytesPerInputFrame =
mNumChannels * kNumSamplesPerFrame * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mAACProfile == OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectELD && numBytesPerInputFrame > 512) {
numBytesPerInputFrame = 512;
}
for (;;) {
while (mInputSize < numBytesPerInputFrame) {
if (mSawInputEOS || inQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
const void *inData = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
size_t copy = numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize;
if (copy > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
copy = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
if (mInputFrame == NULL) {
mInputFrame = new int16_t[numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t)];
}
if (mInputSize == 0) {
mInputTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
memcpy((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize, inData, copy);
mInputSize += copy;
inHeader->nOffset += copy;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= copy;
inHeader->nTimeStamp +=
(copy * 1000000ll / mSampleRate)
/ (mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEOS = true;
memset((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize,
0,
numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize);
mInputSize = numBytesPerInputFrame;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inData = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
}
}
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
uint8_t *outPtr = (uint8_t *)outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
size_t outAvailable = outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset;
AACENC_InArgs inargs;
AACENC_OutArgs outargs;
memset(&inargs, 0, sizeof(inargs));
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
inargs.numInSamples = numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t);
void* inBuffer[] = { (unsigned char *)mInputFrame };
INT inBufferIds[] = { IN_AUDIO_DATA };
INT inBufferSize[] = { (INT)numBytesPerInputFrame };
INT inBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(int16_t) };
AACENC_BufDesc inBufDesc;
inBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(inBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
inBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&inBuffer;
inBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = inBufferIds;
inBufDesc.bufSizes = inBufferSize;
inBufDesc.bufElSizes = inBufferElSize;
void* outBuffer[] = { outPtr };
INT outBufferIds[] = { OUT_BITSTREAM_DATA };
INT outBufferSize[] = { 0 };
INT outBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(UCHAR) };
AACENC_BufDesc outBufDesc;
outBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(outBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
outBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&outBuffer;
outBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = outBufferIds;
outBufDesc.bufSizes = outBufferSize;
outBufDesc.bufElSizes = outBufferElSize;
AACENC_ERROR encoderErr = AACENC_OK;
size_t nOutputBytes = 0;
do {
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
outBuffer[0] = outPtr;
outBufferSize[0] = outAvailable - nOutputBytes;
encoderErr = aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder,
&inBufDesc,
&outBufDesc,
&inargs,
&outargs);
if (encoderErr == AACENC_OK) {
outPtr += outargs.numOutBytes;
nOutputBytes += outargs.numOutBytes;
if (outargs.numInSamples > 0) {
int numRemainingSamples = inargs.numInSamples - outargs.numInSamples;
if (numRemainingSamples > 0) {
memmove(mInputFrame,
&mInputFrame[outargs.numInSamples],
sizeof(int16_t) * numRemainingSamples);
}
inargs.numInSamples -= outargs.numInSamples;
}
}
} while (encoderErr == AACENC_OK && inargs.numInSamples > 0);
outHeader->nFilledLen = nOutputBytes;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
if (mSawInputEOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mInputTimeUs;
#if 0
ALOGI("sending %d bytes of data (time = %lld us, flags = 0x%08lx)",
nOutputBytes, mInputTimeUs, outHeader->nFlags);
hexdump(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset, outHeader->nFilledLen);
#endif
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
outInfo = NULL;
mInputSize = 0;
}
}
| 171,759,780,075,161,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2017-0594 | An elevation of privilege vulnerability in codecs/aacenc/SoftAACEncoder2.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of a privileged process. This issue is rated as High because it could be used to gain local access to elevated capabilities, which are not normally accessible to a third-party application. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34617444. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0594 |
8,608 | Android | 5c3fd5d93a268abb20ff22f26009535b40db3c7d | None | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libavc/+/5c3fd5d93a268abb20ff22f26009535b40db3c7d | None | 1 | WORD32 ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num)
{
UWORD32 u4_next_frm_num, u4_start_frm_num;
UWORD32 u4_max_frm_num;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i4_poc;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pic_params;
WORD8 i1_gap_idx;
WORD32 *i4_gaps_start_frm_num;
dpb_manager_t *ps_dpb_mgr;
WORD32 i4_frame_gaps;
WORD8 *pi1_gaps_per_seq;
WORD32 ret;
ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num == u2_frame_num)
return 0;
}
u4_next_frm_num = ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num + 1;
u4_max_frm_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_u4_max_pic_num_minus1 + 1;
if(u4_next_frm_num >= u4_max_frm_num)
{
u4_next_frm_num -= u4_max_frm_num;
}
if(u4_next_frm_num == u2_frame_num)
{
return (0);
}
if((ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
&& (u4_next_frm_num >= u2_frame_num))
{
return (0);
}
u4_start_frm_num = u4_next_frm_num;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
ps_pic_params = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
i4_frame_gaps = 0;
ps_dpb_mgr = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr;
/* Find a empty slot to store gap seqn info */
i4_gaps_start_frm_num = ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_gaps_start_frm_num;
for(i1_gap_idx = 0; i1_gap_idx < MAX_FRAMES; i1_gap_idx++)
{
if(INVALID_FRAME_NUM == i4_gaps_start_frm_num[i1_gap_idx])
break;
}
if(MAX_FRAMES == i1_gap_idx)
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
i4_poc = 0;
i4_gaps_start_frm_num[i1_gap_idx] = u4_start_frm_num;
ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_gaps_end_frm_num[i1_gap_idx] = u2_frame_num - 1;
pi1_gaps_per_seq = ps_dpb_mgr->ai1_gaps_per_seq;
pi1_gaps_per_seq[i1_gap_idx] = 0;
while(u4_next_frm_num != u2_frame_num)
{
ih264d_delete_nonref_nondisplay_pics(ps_dpb_mgr);
if(ps_pic_params->ps_sps->u1_pic_order_cnt_type)
{
/* allocate a picture buffer and insert it as ST node */
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(0, u4_next_frm_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice,
ps_pic_params, 1, 0, 0,
&i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq =
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering
+ 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u4_next_frm_num;
}
if(ps_dpb_mgr->i1_poc_buf_id_entries
>= ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering)
{
ret = ih264d_assign_display_seq(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ret = ih264d_insert_pic_in_display_list(
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr, (WORD8) DO_NOT_DISP,
(WORD32)(ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq + i4_poc),
u4_next_frm_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
pi1_gaps_per_seq[i1_gap_idx]++;
ret = ih264d_do_mmco_for_gaps(ps_dpb_mgr,
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ih264d_delete_nonref_nondisplay_pics(ps_dpb_mgr);
u4_next_frm_num++;
if(u4_next_frm_num >= u4_max_frm_num)
{
u4_next_frm_num -= u4_max_frm_num;
}
i4_frame_gaps++;
}
return OK;
}
| 250,752,518,935,200,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-0591 | A remote code execution vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34097672. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0591 |