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By virtue of operating a mobile phone network, AT&T knows its customers’ real- time locations because it has to collect that information to provide service to its customers’ cellular phones. Cellular phone networks work by routing phone calls, text messages, and data for email messages, Internet browsing, mobile applications, and other operations from a network of fixed towers containing antennas to an individual customer’s cell phone. A. AT&T Has Access to Its Customers’ Real-Time Location Data by Virtue of Operating a Mobile Cellular Phone Network. A. AT&T Has Access to Its Customers’ Real-Time Location Data by Virtue of Operating a Mobile Cellular Phone Network .........................................................................................9 B. Public Reports Reveal AT&T’s Sale of Access to Its Customers’ Real-Time Location Data, and the Rampant Abuses Flowing from Such Sale ..................................................10 C. Defendants Developed and Profit from a Robust Market for Customers’ Real-Time Location Data .....................................................................................................................21 D. Defendants Sell Access to Location Data Intended for Enhanced 911- Purposes .............27 E. AT&T Allowed Unauthorized Third Parties to Access Customers’ Location Data ..........32 F. Defendants’ Sale of Access to Customers’ Location Data Is Outrageous and Harmful ...36 G. The Sale of Location Data Violates Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Is Highly Offensive ............................................................................................................................39 H. AT&T’s Misrepresentations and Omissions Concerning the Sale of Customer Location Data ....................................................................................................................................55 I. Fraudulent Concealment and Tolling ................................................................................62 J. Named Plaintiff Allegations ..............................................................................................62

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Defendant specializes in flowback and well testing for oil and natural gas energy producers throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania and Ohio. To complete their business objectives, Defendant employed independent contractors. Many of the individuals who worked for Defendant, were paid on a day-rate basis, misclassified as independent contractors, and make up the proposed Putative Class. While the exact job titles and job duties may differ, the Putative Class Members are and were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. These so-called independent contractors were paid a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) without any overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. As a Flowback Operator, Plaintiff spent his time operating and monitoring flowback equipment as the fluid used to hydraulically fracture a shale formation was recovered from the well at the surface. The work Plaintiff performed was an essential and integral part of Defendant’s core business. While he was classified as an independent contractor, Defendant exercised control over all aspects of his job. Defendant did not require any substantial investment by Plaintiff or the Putative Class Members for them to perform the work that was required. Defendant determined Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members opportunity for profit and loss. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other employees in their respective position) to perform their job duties. Defendant and its clients controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. Defendant and its clients determined the hours and locations Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked, tools used, and rates of pay received. Even though Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members often worked away from Defendant’s offices without the presence of a direct supervisor employed by Defendant, Defendant still controlled all aspects of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Defendant and its client’s policies and procedures. More often than not, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members utilized equipment provided by Defendant and/or its clients to perform their job duties. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not provide the equipment he worked with on a daily basis. Defendant and/or its clients made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, equipment, tools, and supplied in the business in which Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were economically dependent on Defendant during their employment. Defendant set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members rates of pay, their work schedules, and prohibited them from working other jobs for other companies while they were working on jobs for Defendant. Defendant directly determined Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members opportunity for profit and loss. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members earning opportunities were based on the number of days Defendant scheduled them to work. Moreover, the job functions of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. Defendant’s policy of failing to pay their independent contractors, including Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, overtime violates the FLSA, the Ohio Wage Acts and PMWA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties. Because Plaintiff (and Defendant’s other independent contractors) were misclassified as independent contractors by Defendant, they should receive overtime for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. VI. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. Numerous other individuals who worked with Plaintiff indicated they were improperly classified as independent contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. Based on his experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as independent contractors and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. Plaintiff has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to them under state and/or federal law. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Defendant employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning of the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA, the Ohio Wage Acts and PMWA; b. Whether the Putative Class Members were improperly misclassified as independent contractors; c. Whether Defendant’s decision to classify the Putative Class Members as independent contractors was made in good faith; d. Whether Defendant’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the Putative Class Members was made in good faith; e. Whether Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, the Ohio Wage Acts and PMWA was willful; and f. Whether Defendant’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation to all Putative Class Members. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform employment policy. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. X.

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- en Ol u.. s: I- <( 13 UJ () <( UJ 0 L() ('") 17 The San Diego City Council did not design or intend for Municipal Code 18 19 §54.0110 ("Illegal Encroachment" or "MC §54.011 O") to be used against people 20 living on the street. It is an obscure ordinance intended to address trash cans and 21 dumpsters left on the sidewalks too long after trash pickup. The City's 22 23 Environmental Services Department recommended MC §54.01 lO's adoption, and 24 an October 18, 2007 Authorizing Ordinance reveals that it was intended to address 25 "unauthorized solid waste or recycling dumpsters and bins discovered in the public 26 27 right-of-way or on public property." No community participation took place before 28 MC §54.0llO's enactment, and there was no public discussion or written record - 19 - Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalves and on behalf of all other - _J cc 0 cc I- CJ 14 UJ en UJ I I - UJ en 0 15 cc <( z persons similarly situated. The Class of people that Plaintiffs represent consists of 0 <( s: en 16 all those persons in the City of San Diego who are homeless and ( 1) have nowhere 0 L() C') 17 to place themselves or their belongings other than in public; (2) who fear being 18 19 ticketed for violation of MC §54.0110 ("encroachment") if they set anything down; 20 (3) who have been issued one or more citations for "encroachment;" (4) who have 21 become the subject of"stay away" orders resulting from an "encroachment" citation; 22 23 and/or (5) have been arrested or jailed for violating MC §54.0110. 24 The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all 25 members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l). The Class is comprised of 26 27 thousands of individuals who are homeless in the City of San Diego, and who are 28 potentially committing a crime every time they place their belongings on public - 4 - Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 1-43 above. 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides that, "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for d " re ress .... efendants' actions violate Plaintiffs' civil and constitutional rights, including, but not limited to, Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, §7, Article 1, § 15; and Article 1, § 1 7 of the California Constitution. - 26 - Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 1-43 above. Forces beyond Plaintiffs' control, such as unemployment, poverty, medical conditions, and the failure of the Defendant to provide alternatives, including but not limited to those which may be mandated by law, have compelled Plaintiffs and others to live and place their belongings in public. Because of Plaintiffs' status as homeless and unsheltered, Plaintiffs must carry their belongings-including items necessary for their health, safety, and security-with them in their daily lives. Plaintiffs must set themselves and their belongings down on public property because they do not have access to private shelter or storage. Placing belongings on public property constitutes an involuntary and unavoidable manifestation of the Plaintiffs' status as homeless. Plaintiffs may not avoid committing acts that violate MC §54.0110, which criminalizes placing any object on public property, at any time for any length of time, even a moment, ever. 14 14 In a Statement of Interest of the United States in Bell v. City of Boise 834 F.Supp.2d 1103, filed August 6, 2015 (available at: htfps:l/wwwjustice.gov/crt/fi,_le/761211rdownloa~ the U.S. Department of Justice clarified its recommended framework for analyztng Eighth Amendment claims relating to criminalization of homelessness: "If sufficient shelter space is unavailable because a) there are inadequate beds for the entire population, orb) there are restrictions on those - 27 - Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 1-43 above. b~ds tqat disqualify certau~ groups_ of homeless in.dividuals (e.g., _because of disability access or exceeding maxunum stay requirements), then 1t would be impossiole for some .homeless tndividuals to comply with these ordiµances. As set forth below, m those circumstances enforcement of the ordinances am.aunts to the criminalization of homelessness, in violation of the Eighth Amendment." - 28 - Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the United States and California Constitutions Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 Violation of Due Process Under the United States and California Constitutions

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant Convergent sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. containing deceptively worded settlement offers; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §l692e. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff have no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to February 4, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to T- Mobile, USA by the Plaintiff. The T-Mobile, USA obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically telecommunication services. The alleged T-Mobile, USA obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). T-Mobile, USA is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). Defendant Convergent, a debt collector, was contracted by T-Mobile, USA to collect the alleged debt which originated with T-Mobile, USA Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – February 4, 2021 Collection Letter On or about February 4, 2021, Defendant Convergent sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant T-Mobile, USA See Exhibit A. The collection letter states: “We have been authorized to accept payment of 35% of the total balance, which is $1,347.12, in exchange for which T-Mobile, USA will recall your account and cease all collection activity. If you are interested in taking advantage of this offer, call our office within 14 days of the date of this letter. Please note that this is not an offer to accept 35% of your debt as payment in full, but an offer for T-Mobile, USA to remove your account from further collection efforts. We are not obligated to renew this offer.” The letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange of 35% of the balance the consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in actuality it is unclear what form of settlement the letter is offering. The letter states that T-Mobile, USA will recall the account and cease all collection activity but does not clarify what will occur with the rest of the balance and whether the rest of the balance would be collected by another collection company in the future. Nor does the letter clearly state that the account will be reinstated upon payment of 35% of the balance. The letter deceives and misleads the consumer by implying that paying 35% would achieve results akin to a settlement offer, when in reality the Defendant’s offer contains no significant benefits and is unclear to what the benefits of the settlement would actually be. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to §1692e (10). b. by failing to delineate to which listed amount the “adjustment” may be applied. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Estee Lauder is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other Representatives. There are many similarly-situated current and former Representatives who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, notice should be sent to the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are known to Estee Lauder, are readily identifiable and can be located through Estee Lauder’s records. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff seeks to prosecute her NYLL claims as a class action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Estee Lauder in New York State as Representatives (collectively, the “NY Class Action Members”) at any time from six years from the date of filing this Complaint until entry of judgment in this case (the “Class Action Period”). The persons in the NY Class are so numerous that their joinder is impracticable. A class action in superior to other methods of adjudicating the NYLL claims set forth in this case. Estee Lauder employed Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective, and the New York Rule 23 Class as Representatives. Consistent with Estee Lauder’s policy, pattern and practice, Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective, and the New York Class regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without being paid premium overtime wages, in violation of the FLSA and/or the NYLL. Plaintiff worked 41.5 to 58 hours per week for which she was not paid proper wages or overtime premium wages. For example, during the weeks of June 29, 2015 and November 21, 2016, Plaintiff worked 58 hours and 48 hours, respectively, for which she was not paid overtime compensation. Furthermore, Defendants instructed Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff routinely worked outside, her scheduled shift (e.g., to prepare and setup the store before opening and after closing) without compensation. Estee Lauder assigned the work Representatives performed and is aware of the work that they have performed. During the Collective Action Period, upon information and belief, Estee Lauder failed to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and overtime wage requirements, as required by the FLSA. This failure to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and overtime wages was willful and in reckless disregard of the Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated Representatives’’ rights under the FLSA. Due to the foregoing, Estee Lauder’s failure to pay overtime wages for work performed by the Collective and the New York Rule 23 Class in excess of 40 hours per workweek was willful and reckless, and has been widespread, repeated and consistent. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference allegations in paragraphs 1-37. Estee Lauder has engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Class Action Complaint. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Estee Lauder is an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). Estee Lauder has failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint, have been willful and intentional within the meaning of the FLSA.87 Estee Lauder has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1- Because Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. Estee Lauder has engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the NYLL, as detailed in this Complaint. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class have been employees and Estee Lauder has been an employer within the meaning of the NYLL. As a result of Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with the FLSA. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Estee Lauder and protect Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class. As a result of the unlawful acts of Estee Lauder, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Estee Lauder has failed to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL. By Estee Lauder’s knowing and intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, it has willfully violated the NYLL 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, including but not limited to the regulations in 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142. Due to Estee Lauder’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Estee Lauder their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1- The provisions of NYLL Article 6 §§ 190 et seq. of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Estee Lauder and protect Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class have been employees and Estee Lauder has been an employer within the meaning of the NYLL §§ 190, 651(5). Estee Lauder has engaged in a pattern, practice, and policy of failing to compensate the Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class at their agreed regular rates of pay for all hours either worked or required to be compensated by the terms of Estee Lauder’s employment agreements with Plaintiff and the Class members. Estee Lauder’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class their wages at their agreed hourly regular and overtime pay rates for all hours worked or required to be compensated by law violates the NYLL Article 6, §§ 190 et seq. Due to Estee Lauder’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Estee Lauder their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective NYLL – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Rule 23 Class New York Labor Law Article 6 – Unpaid Regular Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class)

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Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered oo1" through"z3" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Upon information and belief, Defendants, on behalf of a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiffs. Upon information and belief, and better known to the Defendants, the Defendants began their collection efforts and campaign of communications with the Plaintiffs by calling their cell phones and leaving automated messages. The calls would come in from numbers 407-732-2415,847-426-9203 and 2t0-520-64A0. In response to these calls the Plaintiffcalled the Defendant Chase on May 25,20178nd was connected with a female representative The Plaintiffgave the representative the last four digits of her credit card and verified her account. The Plaintiffthen asked for some infonnation on her account and informed the representative that she did not want to receive uriy *o.. calls from the Defendant. After receiving the information she requested from the representative the call was then concluded. In October of 2077 the PlaintiffJakob Padwa started receiving calls from the Defendant Chase as well to his cell phone number of 347-977'6613. The calls would come from the same mentioned numbers from Chase as the calls made to Miriam Padwa and he too would be left automated messages on his cell phone. In response to the phone calls the Plaintiffcalled the Defendants on October 2, 2017 ardwas connected \rrith a male representative. The Plaintiffgave the representative the last four digits of his social security number to access his account. The Plaintiffinformed the representative that he had two cards and the representative stated that he had located both accounts. The Plaintiffstated that he would like the phone calls to stop and informed the 'representative that he would see what he could do about bringlng the account current. The representative questioned when that would be and the Plaintiffsaid he would call back the next day. The Plaintiffthen resra*ted that he did not want to receive any more calls and the conversation was concluded. ,$ince the conclusion of the call and the requests for the phone calls to cease, the Defendants continued to contact the Plaintifts. To date the Plaintiffs have received at least 200 calls to their cell phones. Following the phone call;dated January ll,'2018 Plaintiff Miriam Padwa received a collection letter from Defendant Nationwide Credit lnc informing her that she owed $9,266.27, originally to Chase Bank USA NA. The letter stated "Nationwide Credit lnc previously sent you a letter more than thirty (30) days ago, advising you that your past due account was placed with us for collection. It then $4,262.48. This ofler or before 1124/2018. stated is valid "We are offering you an opportunity to settle this amount for . for a one-time payment of the settlement amount and is due on However, towards the bottom of the letter it then states oolf we sefile this debt with you for less than the full outstanding balance. Chase may offer you less than favorable terms in the future for some Chase products or services or may deny you applications. " A copy of the Defendant's collection letter is attached hereto as exhibit'.A". Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and incorporate the allegations contained in t- 'ii paragraphs numbered "1" through "45" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15 USC fi1692 e-preface states that a debt collEctor may not use false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendants violated 15 USC $1692 e-preface when they sent out a collection letter dated January 11, 2018 and deceptively stated that if the Plaintiffchose to take the settlement offer and pay her debt for less than the flrll amount owed then she would possibly be in poor standing with the original creditor and have less favorable dealings with them in the future. Either Chase has a policy or providing less favorable terms for those who pay less than the full balance or they have a policy of providing the same favorable terms as those who are not in debt to them. Either way it is a misleading statement. The threat of receiving less favorable terms is unfair, deceptive and misleading, as it is ambiguous and confusing, and forces the consumer to fear not paying the full amount to receive, as implied, urfavorable temrs. However, the letter again confuses and misleads the consumer to believe if she pays she will definitely receive favorable terms. Nowhere in the letter is it spelled out that paying the full balance will result in favorable terms. As a result of Defendant's violations of the FDCPA, the Plaintiffhas been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA sECO"np cAUSE-gr ACTIO, N (Wolations of the TCPA) Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "l" through "53" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. It is thus clear from the plain language of the TCPA, and its considerable body of resultant case law that the TCPA is violated when a cellular telephone is called with an automatic dialer without consent, even if no charges are alleged or incurred. With the autodialed calls to Plaintiffs' telephones commencing on or about May 2017 and continuing at atate of approximately (200) times thereafter, the Defendants violated various provisions of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 USC $227(b)(AXiii). The Defendants, having been informed that Piaintiffs requested that no further calls be received, willfully violated the TCPA at least (200) tiles. Pursuant to the TCPA Omnibus Declaratory Ruling and Order, July 2015, paragraphs 138 and 139, communications from banking institutions which are exempt "...are all intended to address exigent circumstances in which a quick, timely communication with a consumer could prevent considerable consumer harms from occurring or, in the case of the remediation calls, could help quickly mitigate the extent of harm that will occur." Pursuant to Paragraph 139, (3) and (7) "In light of these considerations, we adopt the following conditions for each exempted call (voice call or text message) made by a financial institution: 3) voice calls and text messages are strictly limited to purposes discussed in paras. 129-137 above and must not include any telemarketing, cross-marketing, solicitation, debt collection, or advertising content; 7) a financial institution must honor opt-out requests immediately." Defendants violated various provisions of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 USC $227(bXAXiii). * DEMANp ron TBI4I{ BY JU.RY Plaintiffs hereby respectfully request a trial by jury for all clarms and issues in its Complaint to which it is or may be entitled to a jury tial. PRAYER rqR REL{Sr WHEREFORE, Plaintitrs demands judgment &omthe Defendaots as follows: A. For actual damages provided and pursuant to 15 USC $16ek (a) (l); B. For statutory damages provided aild pursuant to 15 USC $16e2(2XA); C. For statutory darnages provided and pursuant to 15 usc$16e2k(2xB); D. For attorneys' fees and costs provided and pursuant to I5USC$1692(a)(3); E. A declaration that the Defendants' practices violated the

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An order certifying that Count I may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel to represent the Plaintiff Class as previously set forth and defined above; On or about August 11 2005, the Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt (the “Debt” or “Mortgage Loan”). The Debt arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, namely fees emanating from a personal mortgage loan on the Plaintiff’s personal residence. The Mortgage Loan is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). According to a foreclosure complaint filed against Plaintiff earlier this year, Green Tree (which is now Ditech) was assigned plaintiff’s mortgage on June 10, 2013. According to the foreclosure complaint, Plaintiff has been in default on his mortgage since 2009. An award of statutory damages for Aaron Cohen and the Plaintiff Class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; Shortly after the foreclosure complaint was filed, Plaintiff received in the mail a foreclosure complaint providing him with the alleged amount of the debt ($545,425.53), the alleged name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed (Green Tree Servicing LLC), dispute rights and rights relating to obtaining information. The name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed at the time of the foreclosure complaint was not Green Tree Servicing, LLC. The name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed at the time of the foreclosure complaint was Fannie Mae according to a letter in response to a qualified written request by Plaintiff. Shortly after the foreclosure complaint was filed Plaintiff received a certificate of merit as well as a request for judicial intervention. The certificate of merit, the foreclosure complaint and the request for judicial intervention are “communications” as defined by the FDCPA. The foreclosure complaint is a formal pleading in a civil action. The request for judicial intervention and the certificate of merit are not formal pleadings in a civil action. The identification of the “creditor to whom the debt is owed” was readily available to Rosicki and Ditech at the time of Rosicki’s communications with Plaintiff. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. In their collection efforts, Ditech and Rosicki violated 15 U.S.C. §§1692, 1692e, and §1692g(a)(2). Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and Section 15 U.S.C. §1692e provides: 1692e False or misleading representations A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Rosicki and Ditech violated §1692e of the FDCPA because they falsely stated that Green Tree Loan Servicing, LLC was the creditor to whom the Plaintiff’s debt and the debts of the putative class members was owed when, in fact, Green Tree Servicing, LLC was not the creditor to whom the Plaintiff’s debt and the debts of the putative class members was owed. As such the Defendants used a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in the collection of a debt in violation of the FDCPA. See Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2012). Section 15 USC §1692g provides: (a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing -- (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; Rosicki and Ditech violated §1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA because Rosicki did not state the name the creditor to whom the Plaintiff’s debt and the debts of the putative class members was owed. The current “creditor to whom the debt is owed” is not Green Tree Servicing, LLC as stated in the foreclosure complaint. Despite Rosicki making an “initial communication” with plaintiff, neither Rosicki nor Green Tree informed Plaintiff of the correct name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. Rosicki and Ditech are liable to the Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k because of the FDCPA violations. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The class consists of all natural persons with a New York address who were sent or hand delivered a foreclosure complaint and another communication relating to a mortgage incurred to purchase a residential owner occupied house where Rosicki names Green Tree the creditor when it is not the creditor on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this complaint. Upon information and belief the identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Rosicki and Ditech. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. On information and belief, there are at least 40 members of the class. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. Dated: Decatur, Georgia November 25, 2015 The Law Offices of Shimshon Wexler, PC By: /s Shimshon Wexler Shimshon Wexler Attorney for Plaintiff 315 W Ponce de Leon Ave Suite 250 Decatur, Georgia 30030 Tel: (212)760-2400 Fax: (917)512-6132 swexleresq@gmail.com Admitted to practice law in New York and Georgia Plaintiff requests a trial by jury on all issues so triable. By: /s Shimshon Wexler Shimshon Wexler Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether Defendants satisfied their “g” notice obligations and whether the communication is false, deceptive or misleading. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer litigation. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: a. Individual actions are not economically feasible; b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; c. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the class and against Defendants for: VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq.

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12 13 14 15 16 '7 18 '9 20 21 11 CHARLES E. WARD; FELICIA VIDRJO and ) PAUL BRADLEY, individ11y. and on behalf of ) all others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., and Does 1 through ) 25, inclusive, ) ) Defendants. .. ) CaseNo.: Pilots employed by Defendants are required to report for duty at the airport, in 60 minutes before their first flight in the duty period for domestic flights, 90 minutes before their all flight in the duty period for international flights, and 30 minutes before each additional flight that in the same duty period. The duty period begins when a pilot is required to report for duty and --to 11 11 perform during the 60, 90, and 30-minute pre-flight reporting time periods. Defendants only compensal 12 the pilots for actual flight time, that is, the time beginning when all cabin and cargo doors on the airci 13 are closed and the parking brakes are released, and ending when the aircraft arrives at a passeni 14 unloading point and the first cabin or cargo door is opened. The duties performed by the pilots dun 15 the unpaid 60, 90, and 30-minute pre-flight reporting time periods include, but are not limited 160 obtaining the flight plan, loading the flight, plan onto the aircraft's computer, calculating the corr 17 amount of fuel needed f6i the flight plan, recalculating the flight plan and fuel requirements as needed 18 adjust for bad weather, checking all switches in the cockpit to ensure 'they are physically set in correct position for the pushback sequence, input all' non-safety related repair/maintenance if 20 received from the flight attendant's cabin inspection, and conducting a physical inspection'of 21 exterior of the aircraft ('e.g. one of the, pilots 'inspects' the tires, tire pressure, engines, lights, ft 22 . . 2311 aileron, flight service controls, pitot static system intakes, and checks for hydraulic leaks and oil leaks) 2411 The pilots receive no compensation for performing these important pre-flight duties. 14 1511 UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 16 15 WAITING TIME PENALTIES 20 UNPAID MINIMUM WAGE 21 22 11 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs I through 24 above as though fully 4 set forth herein. Plaintiffs rendered services to Defendants benefiting Defendants, to wit, pre-flight work 711 performed in California and on-call "reserve status" work performed in California, but were not compensated by Defendants for sUch work. Injustice has resulted to Plaintiffs and the Class Members III providing the bnefith of this work to Defendants without compersation,and Defendants have thereby lOj been unjustly enriched Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek recovery for themselves and the other Class Members for the reasonable value of the services they provided to Defendants without compensation. 1211 Plaintiffs and the other Class Members seek restitution from Defendants of all unpaid waged for pre- 13 flight work performed in California and all unpaid wages for on-call "reserve status" work performed in 14 California, and seek restitution of these unpaid wages as measured by the applicable regular hourly rates 15 16 11 listed on their wage statements multiplied by the number of unpaid hours of pre-flight work and on-call 17H reserve status work perfontied by each Class Member in California during the applicable statutory isll period; plus interest. 19 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs I through 26 above as though fully set forth herein. 23 24 25 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs I through 28 above as though fully 17 set forth herein. 18 Labor Code 201(a) statesthat if an employer discharges an employee, all wages 20 and unpaid at the time of discharge ae due and payable immediately. Likewise pursuant to Labor Co 21 § 202(a), if an employee resigns,. the employer must pay all wages earned and unpaid not later than 22 hours after resignation: If an employer fails to comply with its obligations under Labor Code §201( 23 and 202(a), then pursuant to Labor Code § 203, the employer must pay statutory penalties to the affect( Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Patagraphs I through 32 above as though filly 17 setforthherein. 'U California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq., prohibits acts of unfair 'It competition, which includes any 'unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice..." The Class 20 21 Members, including Plaintiffs, have suffered and continue to suffer injuries in fact, due to the unfair and 22 unlawhil business practices of Defendants as alleged herein above. Defendants' conduct alleged above 2311 violated California's Labor Code and FWC Wage Order No. 9-2001. -. A. Unpaid Pre-Flight Duties Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 16 above as though full: set focth herein. Class Definitions. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated as a class action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §382. The Classes that seek to represent are defined as follows: (1) All persons who werd employed by UNITED AIRLINES, INC. as pilots at any time from four years before the filing of the Complaint up through the time of the judgment in this action, who performed any unpaid pre-flight work in California. QUANTUM MERUIT/QUASI-CONTRACT 3 STREETODRESS 400 McAllister MAiLING cooREss- 400 lvlcAlisster, Room 103 CITYANQ1IPCOOE. San bi'ancisco, CA 94102 BRAICH NAME: Civic Center courthouse

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Sito is a company specializing in mobile location-based advertising and mobile messaging. Sito provides a platform serving businesses, advertisers and brands, and allowing them to create real-time targeted content based on location, interests, behaviors and loyalty. Via the platform, Sito delivers display advertisements and videos on behalf of its customers. The platform also allows customers to build and control both messaging and customer incentive programs. Sito rebranded itself in September 2014, in an effort to emphasize the mobile location-based advertising and mobile messaging. Sito then focused on maximizing its messaging and media placement businesses on mobile devices. The Class Period begins on February 9, 2016, when Sito issued a press release also attached as exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K filed with the SEC announcing the Company’s financial and operating results for the first fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2015 (“1Q2016 Press Release”). For the quarter, the Company reported a total revenue of $7.2 million, compared to a total revenue of $3.8 million in the previous year’s comparable quarter. The 1Q2016 Press Release stated in pertinent part: JERSEY CITY, N.J., February 9, 2016 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- SITO Mobile Ltd. (NASDAQ:SITO), a leading mobile engagement platform, today announced results for its fiscal first quarter ended December 31, 2015. First Quarter 2016 Business Highlights  TOTAL REVENUE: Total revenue was $7.2 million, an increase of 87% year-over-year and 60% sequentially.  MEDIA PLACEMENT REVENUE: Media Placement revenue (SITO Mobile’s programmatic advertising revenue) was $5.3 million, more than triple year-over-year and an increase of 77% sequentially over Q4 2015.  WIRELESS APPLICATIONS REVENUE: Wireless Applications Revenue (SITO Mobile’s SMS Revenue) was $1.6 million, an increase of 20% sequentially.  ADJUSTED EBITDA: SITO produced approximately $677,000 in Adjusted As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that they knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Sito, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Sito’s allegedly materially misleading statements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Sito, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Sito common stock during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by the defendants’ respective wrongful conduct in violation of the federal laws complained of herein. Plaintiff has and will continue to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct in a substantially identical manner. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel who are experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests which conflict with those of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. This Count is asserted by Plaintiff on behalf of themselves and the Class against all the Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. C 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder. Defendants, by the use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce: (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers and acquirers of the Company’s common stock in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Sito’s common stock in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10-5. Defendants engaged in the fraudulent activity described above knowingly and intentionally or in such a reckless manner as to constitute willful deceit and fraud upon Plaintiff and the Class. Defendants knowingly or recklessly caused their reports and statements to contain misstatements and omissions of material fact as alleged herein. As a result of Defendants’ fraudulent activity, the market price of Sito common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the true financial condition of Sito, Plaintiff and other members of the Class, relying on the integrity of the market and/or on the statements and reports of Sito containing the misleading information, purchased or otherwise acquired Sito’s common stock at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants were aware of material non- public information concerning Sito fraudulent conduct (including the false and misleading statements described herein). Throughout the Class Period, Defendants willfully and knowingly concealed this adverse information, and Plaintiff’s and the Class’s losses were the foreseeable consequence of Defendants’ concealment of this information. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of Sito common stock during the Class Period. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation above as though fully set forth herein. The Individual Defendants also were able to, and did, directly or indirectly, control the conduct of Sito’s business, the information contained in its filings with the SEC, and its public statements. Moreover, the Individual Defendants made or directed the making of affirmative statements to securities analysts and the investing public at large, and participated in meetings and discussions concerning such statements. Because of their positions and access to material non-public information available to them but not the public, the Individual Defendants knew that the adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed to and were being concealed from the public and that the positive representations that were being made were false and misleading. As a result, the Individual Defendants are responsible for the accuracy of Sito’s corporate releases detailed herein and is therefore responsible and liable for the misrepresentations contained herein. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Sito and the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period. I. Company Background Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against the Individual Defendants) Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 (Against All Defendants)

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of the PWMA) A. PMWA COVERAGE 120. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 121. The PMWA Class is defined as: (Class Action Alleging Violations of the Ohio Acts) A. OHIO ACTS COVERAGE (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE Advanced Oilfield claims to be “a nationally recognized and growth-oriented energy services company providing critical completion and production related services to Oil & Gas companies throughout the United States.”3 Specifically, Advanced Oilfield provides construction, maintenance, trucking and roustabout services nationwide.4 Advanced Oilfield currently has locations and operations in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, North Dakota and Colorado.5 To provide their services, Advanced Oilfield employed numerous workers— including the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. While exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work in the oilfield. Plaintiff Brotherton worked for Advanced Oilfield as a Rig Welder from approximately November 2014 through September 2015 and again from June 2016 until March 2017. Plaintiff Brotherton was based out of Advanced Oilfield’s Claysville, Pennsylvania location, while working in both Pennsylvania and Ohio. Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Advanced Oilfield did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ primary job duties included performing daily checklists, assisting with the preparation of equipment, and performing other oilfield related functions on various job sites, including for example in the State of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and throughout the United States. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would conduct their day-to-day activities within mandatory and designed parameters and in accordance with pre-determined operational plans created by Advanced Oilfield and/or its clients. Upon further information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Advanced Oilfield and/or its clients. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Advanced Oilfield and/or its clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the schedule of work, and related work duties. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the predetermined parameters. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not (and currently do not) have the authority to hire or fire other employees, and they were not (and currently are not) responsible for making hiring or firing recommendations. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not (and currently do not) supervise two or more employees. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) concern work directly related to the management or general business operations of Advanced Oilfield or its customers. Advanced Oilfield determined the hours Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked. Advanced Oilfield set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ pay and controlled the number of hours they worked. Advanced Oilfield set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. Advanced Oilfield maintained control over pricing and marketing. Defendants also chose equipment and product suppliers. Advanced Oilfield owned or controlled the equipment and supplies that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used to perform their work. Advanced Oilfield made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members an hourly wage with no overtime pay. Advanced Oilfield reimbursed Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for expenses and bought or provided tools and equipment that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked continuously for Advanced Oilfield on a permanent full-time basis. Advanced Oilfield, instead of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, made the large capital investments in vehicles, buildings, equipment, tools, and supplies. Moreover, Advanced Oilfield paid operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, insurance, and bills. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members relied on Advanced Oilfield for their work. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not market any business or services of their own. Instead, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked the hours assigned by Advanced Oilfield, performed duties assigned by Advanced Oilfield, worked on projects assigned by Advanced Oilfield, and worked for the benefit of Advanced Oilfield and its customers. Advanced Oilfield paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members on a weekly basis. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not earn a profit based on any business investment of their own. Rather, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ only earning opportunity was based on the number of hours they were allowed to work, which was controlled by Advanced Oilfield and/or its customers. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. The FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA mandate that overtime be paid at one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay. Under the Ohio Acts overtime shall be paid in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the FLSA. O.R.C. § 4111.03(A). Under the PMWA regular rate shall include all remuneration for employment paid to or on behalf of the employee, with exceptions that are inapplicable here. 34 Pa. Code § 231.43. Advanced Oilfield denied Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay as a result of a widely applicable, illegal pay practice. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation. Advanced Oilfield applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that states that the manual labor/technical, routine duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members consisted of non-exempt work. Accordingly, Advanced Oilfield’s pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA. V. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all those who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff. Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Advanced Oilfield’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 60. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Indeed, the FLSA Collective Members are blue-collar oilfield workers entitled to overtime after forty (40) hours in a week. Advanced Oilfield employed a substantial number of similarly situated workers since June 21, 2014. Upon information and belief, these workers are geographically dispersed, residing and working in locations across the United States. Because these workers do not have fixed work locations, they may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Advanced Oilfield will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. The Ohio Acts Class is defined as:

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This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of MRS BPO, L.L.C. and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of MRS BPO, L.L.C., and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. -6- The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the -7- absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the -8- Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through forty six (46) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about May 31, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), 1692(f), and 1692f(1) for attempting to collect prohibited collection fees. -9- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Dated: Brooklyn, New York October 2, 2017 /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Attorneys for the Plaintiff Maxim Maximov, LLP 1701 Avenue P Brooklyn, New York 11229 Office: (718) 395-3459 Facsimile: (718) 408-9570 E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03) Defendant is a home health care business. 4 Plaintiff Carmel Solis was employed by Defendant between 2012 and January 15, 2018. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a home health aide. Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendant as home health aides. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were employed by Defendant as non-exempt employees under the FLSA. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were paid an hourly wage. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides worked more than 40 hours per week, but Defendant failed to pay them overtime compensation for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. Rather than paying overtime compensation, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were only paid straight time for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides. (Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA) Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. 5 Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All current and former home health aides employed by Emerald Medical Staffing LLC at any time between February 15, 2015 and the present. The amount of overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated home health aides worked are reflected on their time sheets and pay stubs. Plaintiff estimates, that on average she worked between ten (10) and fifty(50) overtime hours per week. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, by upon information and belief, avers that is consists of at least 50 persons. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of 6 this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All current and former home health aides employed by Emerald Medical Staffing LLC at any time between February 15, 2015 and the present. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 50 persons. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its home health aides for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff Carmel Solis and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10. The claims of the named Plaintiff Carmel Solis are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. Named Plaintiff Carmel Solis will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of 7 the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 Plaintiff in corporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA,

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As hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees of Defendant, Plaintiff and others similarly situated, have the primary duties of performing manual manufacturing tasks in the production of Gates’ products. This primary duty established the Plaintiff and others similarly situated as being entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA and KWPA (i.e., nonexempt employees under the FLSA and the KWPA). On a weekly basis throughout their employment with Defendant, the Plaintiff and others similarly situated routinely worked in excess of forty hours per workweek without receiving proper overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked as required under the FLSA and the KWPA. Defendant has a policy and practice requiring all hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees to arrive at their work station between early before each shift (usually 10-15 minutes, but longer on other occasions) to perform work related activities such as, but not limited to: meeting and transitioning with prior shift on any issues regarding production, supply, maintenance, and other pre-shift activities. Defendant also has a policy and practice requiring hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees to remain after their shift if necessary to perform work to assist in the transition to the next shift. Defendant does not permit the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to report this pre-shift or post-shift time as work performed, and in turn, they are denied overtime compensation resulting from this policy and practice. Regarding the allegations asserted in ¶ 15, the Plaintiff observed the other hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees in her respective work areas throughout her employment as being subject to the same policy of requiring pre-shift and post-shift “off the clock” work and thereby denying these persons overtime pay. Defendant has a policy or practice of counseling, disciplined or terminating hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees for a failure to be present at their work stations for the pre-shift and post-shift work described in ¶ 15. The FLSA and KWPA requires covered employers such as Defendant to compensate all nonexempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. The Defendant’s policy and practice as alleged herein violates the FLSA and the KWPA in that Defendant knowingly allows, permits and/or requires Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, to perform work “off the clock” which in turn denies overtime pay in violation of the FLSA and KWPA. Defendant’s conduct was willful and in bad faith. Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, that Plaintiff and others similarly situated performed work that required payment of the correct overtime compensation for all hours actually worked, and that its policy and practice of requiring pre-shift and post-shift “off the clock” work denied them of such compensation required under the FLSA and KWPA. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as Defendant, to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week. Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The proposed collective class for the FLSA claims is defined as follows: All persons who worked as hourly nonexempt employees in the manufacturing process for Defendant (including “Team Leads”) at all its manufacturing locations within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint (hereafter the “FLSA Collective”). This Complaint may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for all claims asserted by the Plaintiff because the claims of the Plaintiff are similar to the FLSA Collective. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without receiving overtime compensation at the proper overtime rate of pay for their overtime hours worked in violation of the FLSA. Defendant is liable under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for overtime pay owed. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are victims of Defendant’s widespread, repeated, systematic and consistent illegal policies that have resulted in violations of their rights under the FLSA, and that have caused significant damage to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) as Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for, the fact that its compensation practices were in violation of these laws. As the direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered, and will continue to suffer, a loss of income and other damages. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective under § 216(b) of the FLSA are entitled to liquidated damages and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with enforcing this claim. The Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered from Defendant’s common policies and would benefit from the issuance of a Court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings her overtime wage claim pursuant to the KWPA, Kan. Stat. § 44-313 et seq. as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of the following class: All persons who worked as hourly nonexempt employees in the manufacturing process for Defendant (including “Team Leads”) at its Iola, Kansas plant within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint (hereafter the “Kansas Overtime Class”). Defendant violated the KWPA by failing to compensate Plaintiff and the Kansas Overtime Class overtime wages due at each pay period for all overtime hours worked as required under the FLSA. Class action treatment of Plaintiff’s KWPA claim is appropriate because, as alleged in paragraphs 38-43, infra, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. The Kansas Overtime Class includes over fifty individuals and, as such, is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Kansas Overtime Class, and she has retained competent and experienced counsel who will effectively represent the interests of the Kansas Overtime Class. Questions of law and fact are common to the class. The Plaintiff and the Kansas Overtime Class have been subjected to the common business practices described in paragraph 39, supra, and the success of their claims depends on the resolution of common questions of law and fact. Common questions of fact include whether the Plaintiff and the Kansas Overtime Class worked in excess of forty hours per work week, whether they were paid overtime as required, and whether Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that Plaintiff and others similarly situated worked more overtime hours than reported. Common questions of law include, inter alia, whether Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein violated the KWPA for failing to pay all wages due on each and every pay period as required under the FLSA. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) because the prosecution of separate actions by individual Kansas Overtime Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and/or because adjudications with respect to individual class members would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of non-party Kansas Overtime Class members. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the KWPA as Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for, the fact that its compensation practices were in violation of these laws. In turn, under KWPA, Kan. Stat. § 44-315(b), Plaintiff and the Kansas Overtime Class are also entitled to liquidated damages set forth in this statute. FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION RULE 23 CLASS UNDER KWPA FOR OVERTIME OWED

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Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay 4 them minimum wage and overtime premium at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. In or about April 2015, Plaintiff JIMENEZ was hired by Defendants and/or their predecessors, as applicable, to work as a sales representative for Defendants’ jewelry shop located at 1204 Broadway, New York, New York, 10001. Plaintiff JIMENEZ worked for Defendants until on or about November 5, 2018. During his employment, Plaintiff JIMENEZ worked over forty (40) hours per week. Specifically, Plaintiff worked the following schedule: a) From the beginning of his employment until on or about December 31, 2017, Plaintiff worked from 8:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. for six (6) days a week, for total of sixty (60) hours each week. b) From on or about January 1, 2018 until November 5, 2018, Plaintiff worked from 9 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. for four (4) days a week, and from 11:00 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. for one (1) day a week, for a total of forty-five and half (45.5) hours each week. 5 Plaintiff JIMENEZ received his compensation on a fixed salary basis at the following rates: a) From the beginning of his employment until on or about December 31, 2015, Plaintiff was paid daily rate of $95; b) From on or about January 1, 2016 until on or about December 31, 2016, Plaintiff was paid daily rate of $100; and c) From on or about January 1, 2017 until November 5, 2018, Plaintiff was paid daily rate of $115. There was never any agreement that Plaintiff’s fixed salary was intended to cover his overtime compensation. During her employment by Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked shifts exceeding ten (10) hours in duration. However, she never received any spread-of-hours premium for working such shifts, as required under the New York Labor Law. During his employment, Plaintiff received his compensation entirely in cash and was never provided with a pay stub from Defendants. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half) or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half). Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying the New York State minimum wage to the Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. Defendants unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees spread-of-hours premium for working shifts exceeding ten (10) hours in duration, as required under the New York Labor Law. 6 Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying full wages to Plaintiff. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing a proper wage notice to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees at the beginning of employment and anytime thereafter, in violation of the New York Labor Law. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing a proper wage statement to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, in violation of the New York Labor Law. Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent him and other employees similarly situated in this litigation and have agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. Plaintiff realleges and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiff is covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff within the meaning of the FLSA. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Corporate Defendant LX 1204 JEWELRY INC had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 7 At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for their hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. At all relevant times, the Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for their hours worked. Records, if any, concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs intend to obtain these records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs at the statutory rate of time and one-half for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week when Defendants knew or should have known such was due. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of his rights under the Plaintiff realleges and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, §§2 and 651. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to pay Plaintiff minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to pay “spread-of-hours” premium to Plaintiff for each workday that exceeded ten (10) or more hours. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing a proper wage statement to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees, in violation of the New York Labor Law. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing a proper wage notice to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees at the beginning of employment and annually thereafter, in violation of the New York Labor Law. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by paying him on a salary basis, because Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee who must be paid on an hourly basis under the New York Labor Law. 9 Due to the Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants his unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid spread-of-hours, statutory penalties, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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Defendants Bombay Pizza Company, LLC d/b/a Bombay Pizza Co.; Bombay Pizza Company Telfair, LLC and Sovijai, Inc. (collectively referred to as “Bombay Pizza Co.”) own and operate restaurants located in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Defendants Viral Patel and Sonali Patel are officers and/or directors and/or managing members of Bombay Pizza Co. As such, they have operational control of Bombay Pizza Co. and/or effectively dominate its administration or otherwise act, or have the power to act, on behalf of Bombay Pizza Co. vis-à-vis its employees. This is includes, but is not limited to, developing and implementing pay practices, hiring and firing employees, undertaking managerial responsibilities, and otherwise exercising control of the work situation. In connection with their business operations, Defendants collectively employ numerous waiters, waitresses, bartenders, busboys, food runners, cooks, kitchen help, dishwashers, etc. From approximately November 2009 through November 2011, Lopez was employed by Defendants as a cook. Cooks, including Lopez, are responsible for preparing food. Defendants do not pay cooks, including Lopez, overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per each seven (7) day workweek at a rate of time and one- half as required by the FLSA. Instead, cooks, including Lopez, are paid at their regular rate for all overtime hours worked. On information and belief, these same illegal pay practices were applied to all employees of Defendants who were compensated in the same or similar manner to that of Plaintiff. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in the above-sections of this Complaint. On information and belief, Plaintiff was a nonexempt employee under the guidelines of the FLSA. As a nonexempt employee, Plaintiff was legally entitled to be paid at the minimum wage for all hours worked and at one and one-half times his “regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) during each seven (7) day workweek. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a). Instead, Defendants paid Plaintiff at his straight time rate for all hours worked over forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA. As a result, Plaintiff was regularly “shorted” on his paycheck by not being paid at a rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. In the event that Defendants classified Plaintiff as exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff was misclassified, as no proper exemption enumerated within the guidelines of the FLSA excused Defendants from appropriately paying Plaintiff full overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek, as is specifically required by the FLSA. Rather, Defendants knowingly, willfully, and with reckless disregard, carried out his illegal pattern and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff proper overtime wages. B. Defendants Failed to Keep Accurate Records of Time Worked. The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by nonexempt employees. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA identified above, Defendants also failed to keep proper time records as required by the FLSA. C. Defendants’ Illegal Actions Were and Are Willful Violations of the FLSA. The illegal pattern or practice on the part of Defendants with respect to compensation and failure to maintain accurate time records are direct violations of the Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in the above-sections of this Complaint. On information and belief, other employees have been victimized by Defendants’ patterns, practices and policies identified above in violation of the FLSA. These employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff because, during the relevant time period, they held similar positions, were compensated in a similar manner, and were denied overtime wages at a rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. Defendants’ patterns or practices of failing to pay overtime compensation are generally applicable policies or practices and do not depend on the personal circumstances of the Members of the Class. Since, on information and belief, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the Members of the Class, collective action treatment is appropriate. Plaintiff has retained counsel well versed in FLSA collective action litigation who is prepared to litigate this matter vigorously on behalf of Plaintiff and any other Members of the Class. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in the above-sections of this Complaint. Defendants’ practice of failing to pay their nonexempt employees overtime compensation at one and one-half times their regular rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek is in direct violation of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Defendants violated the FLSA as well as the Texas Labor Code by failing to pay Plaintiff his full and proper compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 61.011-61.020. Plaintiff is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to his unpaid regular and overtime wages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the requirements of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). A. Defendants Failed to Properly Compensate Plaintiff at the Rate of Time and One-Half for All Overtime Hours Worked.

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At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Florida. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). The text message received by Plaintiff originated from telephone number 267-613- 9146, which is owned and/or controlled by Defendant. Further, this is a “spoofed” number in that it is not active and states that it is disconnected if a call is attempted to the number. The text message received by Plaintiff is identical to the generic messages received by thousands of other individuals as outlined above. This fact establishes that Defendant used an ATDS in transmitting the above text message to Plaintiff. The link (http://app.ever.pics/Uldk/He9qv6ygwx) provided in the text message received by Plaintiff is a link to Defendant’s website (www.ever.com), where Plaintiff was encouraged to download the Ever App. Therefore, Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services – i.e. Defendant’s mobile application. Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. Plaintiff has never used Defendant’s application or services, has never downloaded the Ever App on her mobile device, and has never had any type of relationship with Defendant. Plaintiff has never provided Defendant her telephone number, or provided any type of consent to receive automated text messages from Defendant. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5368 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 5368 Number. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused a disruption to her life as a result of Defendant’s deceptive statement suggesting that photographs of Plaintiff were being displayed on Defendant’s platform without her permission (“…just recommended you check out your photos on Ever.”). Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes: All persons residing within the United States who received telephone calls and/or text messages from Defendant to their cellular telephone within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action, for the purpose of selling or attempting to sell Defendant’s goods and/or services using an automatic telephone dialing system, and who did not provide prior express consent for such call(s). Numerosity Upon information and belief, based on the widespread Internet complaints about Defendant’s telemarketing text messages, the members of the class are believed to number in the thousands or millions such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or prerecorded message; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express consent to make such calls; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. Defendant routinely places automated calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone thus, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Typicality Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Classes are economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Classes are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant’s wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Defendant violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff and the Class members on their cellular phones without first obtaining their prior express consent and using equipment which constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system for the express purpose of marketing Defendant’s goods and/or services. As a result of the aforementioned violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in negligent violation of the TCPA, or up to $1,500 in statutory damages for each call in willful violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)

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 Defendants  refused  to  pay  Plaintiff  and  those  similarly  situated  overtime  wages   for  hours  worked  beyond  forty  each  workweek  and  beyond  twelve  each  workday.      Rather,   Defendant   only   paid   overtime   wages   when   an  employee   exceeded   80   hours   in   a   two-­week   period,   rather   than   when   an   employee   exceeded   40   hours   in   a   given  workweek,  or  twelve  hours  in  a  given  workday,  as  is  required  by  law.  This  practice   resulted  in  Defendants  failing  to  pay  employees  their  earned  overtime  wages.    For   example,   during   the   pay   period   running   from   February   23,   2020   through   March  7,  2020,  Plaintiff  worked  a  total  of  59.25  hours  and  was  not  paid  overtime  wages   per  Defendants’  practice.  Plaintiff  worked  10  hours  during  the  first  workweek  of  the  pay   period   (February   23   through   February   20,   2020)   and   worked   49.25   hours   during   the   second  workweek  of  the  pay  period  (March  1  through  March  7,  2020).  Defendants  failed   to  pay  Plaintiff  overtime  premiums  for  the  hours  worked  beyond  40  during  the  second   workweek  of  the  pay  period.    Similarly,   during   the   period   from   March   9   through   March   13,   2020,   Plaintiff   worked  47.5  hours  and  was  not  paid  at  a  time-­and-­one-­half  rate  for  the  hours  he  worked   beyond  40.    Employing   this   overtime   avoidance   scheme,   Defendants   willfully   violate   their   employees’  right  to  be  paid  overtime  wages  for  overtime  hours  worked.    At   all   times   relevant   to   this   action,   Defendants   employed   persons,   including   Plaintiff,  within  the  State  of  Colorado.      At   all   times   relevant   to   this   action,   Plaintiff   and   Defendants’   other   employees   performed   woodworking   labor   for   the   benefit   of   Defendants   wherein   Defendants   commanded  when,  where,  and  how  much  labor  Plaintiff  and  others  were  to  perform.    Defendant  Ark  Woodworks,  Inc.  sold  and  offered  for  sale  a  service  (woodworking   services)   to   the   consuming   public,   and   generated   50%   or   more   of   its   annual   dollar   volume  of  business  from  such  sales.    Plaintiff   and   Defendants’   other   employees  handled   woodworking   materials   and   equipment,  such  as  wood,  glue,  hardware,  hand  tools  and  power  tools,  which  moved  in   interstate  commerce  each  year  relevant  to  this  action.    Defendants  enjoyed  more  than  $500,000.00  in  gross  receipts  each  year  relevant   to  this  action.    Plaintiff  asserts  his  First  Claim,  brought  under  the  MWO,  as  a  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  23   class   action,   on   his   own   behalf   and   on   behalf   of   a   class   for   which   Plaintiff   seeks   certification.      Pending   any   modifications   necessitated   by   discovery,   Plaintiff   preliminarily   defines  this  “Rule  23  Class”  as  follows:   All  Ark  Woodworks  hourly  employees  who  worked  on  or  after  April   21,  2014.          This  action  is  properly  brought  as  a  class  action  for  the  following  reasons.    Defendants  failed  to  pay  all  their  hourly  employees  overtime  wages  for  overtime   hours  worked.    The   class   is   so   numerous   that   joinder   of   all   the   potential   class   members   is   impracticable.   Plaintiff   does   not   know   the   exact   size   of   the   Class   because   that   information  is  within  the  control  of  Defendants.  However,  Plaintiff  believes  and  alleges   that  the  number  of  Class  Members  is  in  the  50-­75  persons  range.  Membership  in  the   class  is  readily  ascertainable  from  Defendants’  employment  records.        Numerous   questions   of   law   and   fact   regarding   the   liability   of   Defendants   are   common   to   the   Class   and   predominate   over   any   individual   issues   that   may   exist.   Common  questions  of  law  and  of  fact  include:  Whether  Defendants  failed  to  pay  all  their   employees  overtime  wages  for  overtime  hours  worked.    A   class   action   is   superior   to   other   available   methods   for   the   fair   and   efficient   adjudication  of  this  controversy  because  numerous  identical  lawsuits  alleging  identical   causes  of  action  would  not  serve  the  interests  of  judicial  economy.        The  representative  Plaintiff  will  fairly  and  adequately  protect  the  interests  of  the   Members  of  the  Class.  Because  all  Class  Members  were  subject  to  the  same  violations   of  law  perpetrated  by  Defendants,  the  interests  of  absent  Class  Members  are  coincident   with,  and  not  antagonistic  to,  those  of  Plaintiff.  The  representative  Plaintiff  will  litigate   the  Class’s  claims  fully.      The  representative  Plaintiff  is  represented  by  counsel  experienced  in  wage  and   hour  class  action  litigation.    The  prosecution  of  separate  actions  by  individual  Class  Members  would  create  a   risk  of  inconsistent  or  varying  adjudications  with  respect  to  individual  Class  Members   which  would  establish  incompatible  standards  of  conduct  for  Defendants.      Plaintiff  is  unaware  of  any  members  of  the  putative  class  who  are  interested  in   presenting  their  claims  in  a  separate  action.        Plaintiff  is  aware  of  no  pending  litigation  commenced  by  members  of  the  Class   concerning  the  instant  controversy.    It  is  desirable  to  concentrate  this  litigation  in  this  forum  because  all  claims  arose   in  Colorado.    This  class  action  will  not  be  difficult  to  manage  due  to  the  uniformity  of  claims   among  the  Class  Members  and  the  susceptibility  of  wage  and  hour  cases  to  both  class   litigation   and   the   use   of   representative   testimony   and   representative   documentary   evidence.    The   contours   of   the   class   will   be   easily   defined   by   reference   to   the   payroll   documents  that  Defendants  were  legally  required  to  create  and  maintain.  7  CCR  1103-­1   at  12;;  29  C.F.R.  §  516.2.  Notice  will  be  easily  distributed  because  all  members  of  the   putative  class  are  or  were  employed  by  Defendants  and  Defendants  were  required  to   create  and  maintain  records  containing  the  mailing  addresses  of  each  class  member.     §  216(b)  COLLECTIVE  ACTION  ALLEGATIONS    The   relevant   time   period   dates   back   three   years   from   the   date   on   which   this   Complaint  was  filed  and  continues  forward  through  the  date  of  judgment  because  the   FLSA  provides  a  three-­year  statute  of  limitations  for  claims  of  willful  violations  brought   under  the  Act.  29  U.S.C.  §  255(a).    All   potential   collective   action   Members   are   similarly   situated   because   they   worked  for  Defendants  as  hourly  employees  and  were  subject  to  Defendants’  common   policy  of  avoiding  overtime  wage  payments.    Plaintiff  repeats  and  realleges  each  of  the  above  allegations  as  if  fully  set  forth   herein.    Plaintiff  asserts  this  count  on  his  own  behalf  and  on  behalf  of  all  other  similarly   situated  employees.  Fed.R.Civ.P.  23.    Defendant   Ark   Woodworks,   Inc.   was   Plaintiff’s   and   others’   “employer”   as   that   term  is  defined  by  the  MWO  because  it  employed  Plaintiff  and  others  in  Colorado.    7    Plaintiff  repeats  and  realleges  each  of  the  allegations  above  as  if  fully  set  forth   herein.        Plaintiff  asserts  this  count  on  his  own  behalf  and  on  behalf  of  all  others  similarly   situated.    29  U.S.C.  §  216(b).        Plaintiff  and  others  were  “employees”  as  that  term  is  defined  by  the  FLSA.    29   U.S.C.  §  203(e).        Defendants   “employed”   the   Plaintiff   and   others   as   that   term   is   defined   by   the   FLSA.    29  U.S.C.  §  203(g).    Defendants  were  Plaintiff’s  and  others’  “employers”  as  that  term  is  defined  by  the   FLSA.    29  U.S.C.  §  203(d).    Defendants’  violations  of  the  FLSA  were  willful.  29  U.S.C.  §  255(a).    Plaintiff  and  others  have  suffered  lost  wages  and  lost  use  of  those  wages  in  an   amount  to  be  determined  at  trial.    Plaintiff  and  others  are  entitled  to  recover  unpaid  overtime  premiums,  liquidated   damages,  attorney  fees  and  costs.    29  U.S.C.  §  216(b).       WHEREFORE:  As  to  his  FIRST  CLAIM  brought  pursuant  to  the  MWO,  Plaintiff   respectfully  requests  an  Order  from  the  Court  that:   a.   This  action  be  certified  as  a  class  action  pursuant  to  Fed.  R.  Civ.P.  23;;   b.   Plaintiff  be  certified  as  the  class  representative  of  the  Rule  23  Class;;   c.   Undersigned  counsel  be  appointed  Rule  23  class  counsel;;   d.   Prompt  notice  of  this  litigation  be  sent  to  all  potential  Rule  23  class   members;;   e.   Plaintiff  and  the  Rule  23  Class  be  awarded  the  wages  they  are  due,   together  with  attorney  fees  and  costs  of  suit.  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §  8-­6-­118;;  7   Violation  of  the  CMWA  (Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §§  8-­6-­101,  et  seq.)  as  implemented  by  the   MWO  (7  CCR  1103-­1)   Violation  of  the  FLSA  (29  U.S.C.  §  201  et  seq.)  

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Prior to sending the form letter, Defendant knew: Plaintiff’s home address and phone number; and upon information and belief, the home address and phone number of the class members. Plaintiff brings this action individually, and pursuant to F.Civ.R.P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). The class under the first claim for relief is defined as: all Ohio consumers who have or will receive from Defendant at any time on or after October 10, 2014 the form letter. The class under the second claim for relief is defined as: all Ohio consumers who have or will receive from Defendant at any time on or after October 10, 2013 the form letter. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all parties is impracticable. At this time, the precise number cannot be determined. Upon information and belief, there appears to be hundreds in the class. There are questions of law or fact common to the class, including whether the form letter violates the FDCPA. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members in that she alleges the same claims asserted on behalf of the class as a whole. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class in that she has a personal desire to vindicate the rights of the class and she has retained competent counsel to represent the class. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final equitable relief for the class as a whole. 4 Unless Defendant is enjoined and restrained from continuing the foregoing illegal practices, Plaintiff and the putative class will suffer substantial and irreparable injury for which they have no adequate remedy at law. Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members creates risk of individual adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create risk of varying individual adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants who are expected to oppose the class. Questions of law and fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other methods available for the efficient adjudication of the controversy; the relief sought by all members of the class will be effective and appropriate for the entire class; all members of the class have a right to damages or other relief which may be readily computed in each case or otherwise readily determined. Many of the persons with whom Defendant has dealt, or who were affected by its activities, may not be aware of their rights, or are not in a financial position to assert such rights readily. Because relegation of their claims to individual actions would result in an unreasonable multiplicity of suits and a corresponding burden on this and other courts, a class action is far superior to all other methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 5 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in the above paragraphs. At all times relevant herein, Defendant had Plaintiff’s home address and phone number. On or about February 3, 2015, Defendant’s authorized agent, Denise M. Hayes (“Ms. Hayes”), who at all times relevant herein was acting in the scope of her authority for Defendant, contacted Plaintiff’s sister. Ms. Hayes stated it was a personal matter and left her phone number with extension. On or about February 11, 2015, Ms. Hayes contacted Plaintiff’s employer (J.P. Morgan Chase). Ms. Hayes did not identify herself, or state that se was confirming or correcting location information concerning Plaintiff. She stated it was personal. The email that Plaintiff received from her employer is attached hereto as Exhibit B. On or about February 11, 2015, Ms. Hayes contacted Plaintiff by phone on this date, and stated that she could make substantial payments ($6,000 to $12,000), which Plaintiff could not make. Ms. Hayes told her to take out a credit card, ask family for money or take out a personal loan. Plaintiff’s offer of $200 per month was unacceptable, and she asked for more time to try and come up with the money. Ms. Hayes gave her through the end of February to do so. On or about February 25, 2015, Defendant’s authorized agent, Tom Johnson, who at all times relevant herein was acting in the scope of his authority for Defendant, called Plaintiff, and left a nasty message that she needed to contact him before Friday. He stated, inter alia, that the payment of $200 per month was not acceptable and that their lawyers would garnish her wages, and that she needed to 6 contact her HR department because there are some employers (reading off a list) that often fire their employees if they had wage garnishments other than child support. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with a notice of her rights as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. On or about March 11, 2015, Plaintiff sent Defendant a request for validation of the debt, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C, and incorporated herein by reference. Defendant has failed to respond to the request for validation. As a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff suffered headaches, embarrassment, anxiety, fear, mental anguish/emotional distress, loss of sleep, humiliation, worry, outrage, and/or anger. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in the above paragraphs. Defendants routinely sent out the form letter to consumers in an effort to collect consumer debts in the state of Ohio. The form letter violated Plaintiff’s and the classes’ rights under the FDCPA in several ways, including, but not limited to: a. Implying that nonpayment of the debt will result in the seizure, garnishment, attachment of exempt property in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4). . b. Threatening and/or implying to take action it does not actually intent to take or that it cannot legally take in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). c. Threatening to conduct ASSET DEVELOPMENT of her/his PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT when it knew where he/she worked in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 7 c. Threatening to contact relatives and neighbors to locate consumers, when it knew her/his home address and phone number in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. d. Threatening and/or implying to contact relatives and neighbors is a false representation of the actions that Defendant could legally take in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). As a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff and the class are entitled to relief as provided for by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in the above paragraphs. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was a supplier under the OCSPA. The debt arose out of a consumer transaction with a supplier as defined in Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by references all of the allegations contained in the above paragraphs. Defendant’s actions and inactions constitute a violation of common law invasion of privacy. See, Housh v. Pleth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (1956). Defendant’s actions and inactions were intentional, wanton, and/or in reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. 8 As a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff is entitled to actual and punitive damages based upon common law invasion of privacy. On or about January 23, 2015, Defendant sent Plaintiff the form letter, which forms the basis of the class claims against Defendant. The form letter, in an attempt to collect a consumer debt, states: “Please call me to discuss repayment options to avoid [“ASSET DEVELOPMENT”] of your: Under O.R.C § 2329.66, pension accounts, 401k, and deferred compensation plans are exempt from garnishment and attachment. Thus, the letter objectively frustrates a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his/her response. The form letter further states that the ASSET DEVELOPMENT search: “will include contact of your relatives and neighbors to locate you” and that “[t]hese assets will be used to determine whether to recommend to the creditor legal remedies to force collection of your debt.” 3 EQUITY, AUTOMBILE EQUITY, PENSION ACCOUNTS, 401K AND DEFERRED COMPENSATON PLANS, WHOLE LIFE PLANS AND ANNUITIES.

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To complete its business objectives, Ascent hires personnel, such as Rhiel, to perform services on its oil and gas ventures. Ascent does not hire these workers on a project-by-project basis. Rather, Ascent hires and treats these workers just like regular, even if sometimes short-term, employees. Many of these individuals worked for Ascent on a day rate basis (without overtime pay). These workers make up the proposed collective of Day Rate Workers. While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these employees are subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. For example, Rhiel worked for Ascent as an Operator from approximately May 2018 until March 2019. From May 2018 until October 2018, Rhiel was paid a flat rate for each day worked regardless of the total hours worked in a day or week with no overtime compensation (“day rate pay plan”) and was classified as an independent contractor. In October 2018, Ascent reclassified Rhiel as an employee and started paying him on an hourly basis. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked for Ascent under its day rate pay scheme. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not receive a salary as required to be exempt under the FLSA or the Ohio Wage Acts. If Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not work, they did not get paid. This is despite the fact Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers often worked more than 12 hours a day, for 7 days a week, for weeks at a time. Although he typically worked 2 days a week, for more than 12 hours a day, Rhiel did not receive any overtime pay. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers received the day rate regardless of the number of hours they worked in a week, even when they worked more than 40 hours. Rhiel’s work schedule is typical of the Day Rate Workers. Ascent knows Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers work for more than 12 hours a day, for 7 days a week. Ascent’s records reflect the fact that Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers regularly work far in excess of 40 hours in certain workweeks. Ascent does not pay Rhiel or the Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in any of those weeks. Instead, Ascent pays Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers on a day rate basis. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers are not employed on a salary basis. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers do not, and have never, received guaranteed weekly compensation from Ascent irrespective of the day worked (i.e., the only compensation they receive is the day rate they are assigned for all hours worked in a single day or week). Ascent knew Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked more than 40 hours in a week. Ascent controls Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers’ work. Ascent requires Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers to follow Ascent’s policies and procedures. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers’ work must adhere to the quality standards put in place by Ascent. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers are not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other workers in their respective positions) to perform their job duties. As an Operator, Rhiel’s primary responsibilities included going to wellsites and conducting preventative maintenance in accordance with Ascent’s policies and procedures. Without the job performed by Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers, Ascent would not be able to complete its business objectives. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers relied on Ascent for work and compensation. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked in accordance with the schedule set by Ascent. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers cannot subcontract out the work they are assigned by Ascent. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers must follow Ascent’s policies and procedures. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not substantially invest in the tools required to complete the overall job to which they were assigned. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not possess any specialized or unique skill set. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not market their services while employed by Ascent. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked exclusively for Ascent during the relevant period. Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and/or insurance. Ascent set Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers’ work schedule, which prohibited them from working other jobs for other companies while working on jobs for Ascent. At all relevant times, Ascent maintained control, oversight, and direction of Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers, including, but not limited to, hiring, firing, disciplining, timekeeping, payroll, and other employment practices. Ascent knew Rhiel, and other Day Rate Workers, worked more than 40 hours in a week. Ascent knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the Day Rate Workers were not exempt from the FLSA or the Ohio Wages Acts’ overtime provisions. Nonetheless, Ascent failed to pay Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers overtime. Ascent’s failure to pay overtime compensation to these employees was neither reasonable, nor was the decision not to pay these employees overtime made in good faith. Ascent willfully violated the FLSA and the Ohio Wages Acts. Rhiel brings his claim under the Ohio Wages Acts as a Rule 23 class action. The conduct alleged violates the Ohio Wages Acts. At all relevant times, Ascent was subject to the requirements of the Ohio Wages Acts. The Ohio Wage Acts requires employers like Ascent to pay employees at 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in any week. Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers are entitled to overtime under the Ohio Wage Acts. Ascent has and has had a policy and practice (its day rate pay plan) that failed to pay Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers seek unpaid overtime in amount equal to 1.5 times their regular rates of pay for work performed in excess of 40 in a workweek, prejudgment interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers also seek recovery of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of this action, to be paid by Ascent, as provided by the Ohio Wage Acts. Rhiel brings this claim as a class and collective action under the FLSA and Ohio Wage Acts. The Day Rate Workers were victimized by Ascent’s day rate pay plan which is in willful violation of the FLSA and Ohio Wage Acts. Other Day Rate Workers worked with Rhiel and indicated they were paid in the same manner (a day rate with no overtime) and performed similar work. OHIO WAGE ACT VIOLATIONS

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The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are at least thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Loma Negra or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (a) whether Defendants violated the Securities Act; (b) whether the Registration Statement contained false or misleading statements of material fact and omitted material information required to be stated therein; and (c) to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages. Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference. This Cause of Action is brought pursuant to § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, on behalf of the Class, against all Defendants. The Registration Statement contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein. Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the misstatements and omissions. None of the Defendants named herein made a reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Registration Statement were true and without omissions of any material facts and were not misleading. By reason of the conduct herein alleged, each Defendant violated or controlled a person who violated § 11 of the Securities Act. Plaintiff acquired Loma Negra ADS pursuant to the Registration Statement. Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages. The value of Loma Negra ADS has declined substantially subsequent to and due to Defendants’ violations. Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference. By means of the defective Prospectus, Defendants promoted, solicited, and sold Loma Negra shares to Plaintiff and other members of the Class. The prospectus for the IPO contained untrue statements of material fact, and concealed and failed to disclose material facts, as detailed above. Defendants owed Plaintiff and the other members of the Class who purchased Loma Negra shares pursuant to the prospectus the duty to make a reasonable and diligent investigation of the statements contained in the Prospectus to ensure that such statements were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated in order to make the statements contained therein not misleading. Defendants, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the misstatements and omissions contained in the prospectus as set forth above. Plaintiff did not know, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could Plaintiff have known, of the untruths and omissions contained in the prospectus at the time Plaintiff acquired Loma Negra shares. Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference. This Cause of Action is brought pursuant to § 15 of the Securities Act against all Defendants. The Individual Defendants were controlling persons of Loma Negra by virtue of their positions as directors or senior officers of Loma Negra. The Individual Defendants each had a series of direct and indirect business and personal relationships with other directors and officers and major shareholders of Loma Negra. The Selling Shareholder controlled the Company. The Company controlled the Individual Defendants and all of Loma Negra’s employees. Loma Negra, the Selling Shareholder, and the Individual Defendants were culpable participants in the violations of §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act alleged in the First and Second Causes of Action above, based on their having signed or authorized the signing of the Registration Statement and having otherwise participated in the process which allowed the IPO to be successfully completed. For Violation of § 11 of the Securities Act Against All Defendants For Violation of § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act Against All Defendants For Violation of § 15 of the Securities Act Against All Defendants

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Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain any express written consent prior to sending autodialed text messages to consumers, such as Plaintiff. In placing the calls that form the basis of this Complaint, Defendant utilized an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS” or “autodialer”) in violation of the TCPA. Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendant has the capacity to generate and store random numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s automated dialing equipment also is, or includes features substantially similar to, a predictive dialer, meaning that it is capable of making numerous phone calls simultaneously and automatically connecting answered calls to then available callers and disconnecting the rest (all without human intervention). An IMC Sales Representative is expected to initiate between 55-65 dials per hour: 6 Upon information and belief, including complaints about IMC’s telemarketing calls and Plaintiff’s experience, IMC contact center agents place calls to consumers using an autodialer. IMC also sends unsolicited, autodialed text messages to consumers like the ones Plaintiff received. There are a number of online complaints about Defendant’s calls to consumers who never gave consent to be called, including consumers that requested Defendant stop calling only to receive more calls: • 7 • “I have asked over and over to stop calling…”8 • “Iconic mortgage, these people will not stop.calling and switch numbers after you block them, all times of the night and day and weekends, never had any dealings with them but they seem adamant on calling”9 • “Robocall. Non-stop calls. Always a pause when I answer. Definite robocaller.”10 • “Unwanted Call”11 On February 27, 2019 Plaintiff registered her phone number on the DNC. Plaintiff uses her cell phone for personal use only. It is not used for business purposes. On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff received an unsolicited call from IMC using phone number 540-215-1008 to her cell phone. This call was not answered. Plaintiff called 540-215-1008 on December 9, 2019 at 2:25 PM and spoke to a live agent, specifically asking for the calls to stop. Despite her clear opt-out request, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, autodialed call to her cell phone from Defendant using phone number 540-215-1008 on December 13, 2019 at The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted solicitation telephone calls/text messages to phone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. These solicitation calls/texts were made/sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation calls. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) is “applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”14 Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, phone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective phone numbers on the DNC, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Do Not Call Registry Class are each entitled to up to $1,500 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. Defendant made marketing calls to Plaintiff and members of the Internal DNC Class without implementing internal procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to be called by the entity and/or by implementing procedures that do not meet the minimum requirements to allow Defendant to initiate telemarketing calls. 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(d)(1)-(6). The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Internal Do Not Call Class are each entitled to up to $1,500 per violation. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Arising From IMC’s Calls IMC Repeatedly Called and Texted Plaintiff Without Consent, Despite Plaintiff Having Registered Her Phone Number on the DNC IMC Markets its Products and Services by Making Autodialed Calls to Consumers Without Consent, Regardless of Whether Their Numbers are Registered on the DNC Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Correll and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to January 3, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Citibank, N.A. by the Plaintiff. The Citibank, N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically a Citi Mastercard account. The alleged Citibank, N.A. obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Citibank, N.A. is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). Defendant UCB, a debt collector, was contracted by Citibank, N.A. to collect the alleged debt which originated with Citibank, N.A. On or about January 3, 2020, Defendant UCB sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant Citibank, N.A. See Exhibit A. The collection letter provides the following description for the amount owed. 1) Account Balance: $12,197.02 2) Minimum Payment Due: $1882.02 The collection letter states: “Because of interest and/or other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after your payment is received.” The Defendant’s Letter fails to explain whether the potential “adjustment” is applicable to a payment of the “Minimum Payment Due,” or the “Account Balance.” Plaintiff is without any guidance on where the purported amount written for each category is sufficient or whether the adjustment will be applied to both the “Minimum Payment Due,” and the “Account Balance,” or neither. Additionally, Defendant’s letter does not explain the term “other charges” and Plaintiff has no way of determining what the “other charges” may be. Plaintiff has no basis to determine what “other charges” could affect his balance day to day besides interest and late fees. If Defendant is aware of “other charges” that would lead to an increase in the balance, Defendant should clarify and explain them in the letter. Plaintiff is unable to evaluate how much is owed, and what charges may actually be included in an overall balance upon the time of payment. This statement from the Defendant is also a threat to collect an amount that is not provided in the contract or by law. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to §1692e (10). b. by failing to delineate to which listed amount the “adjustment” may be applied. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated this section by a. unfairly stating that the balance may increase due to “other charges”, when no other charges are allowed by contract or law; By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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Plaintiff and those similarly situated worked for a base salary in addition to commissions based on their sales numbers. Plaintiff Paul White was paid $50,000.00 per year plus commissions. Plaintiff and those similarly situated worked over forty (40) hours routinely and with Defendant’s knowledge and behest throughout their employment with Defendant. During the hiring process, Defendant, through its managers, represented to Plaintiff and those similarly situated that the job was a forty (40) hour per week position. Plaintiff and the class of similarly situated employees routinely worked over forty (40) hours each week with Defendant’s knowledge and behest throughout their employment with Defendant. Shortly after his employment began, Plaintiff’s superiors began to pressure, urge and encourage him and all other inside sales representatives to work beyond the scheduled 40 hours, including coming in early, staying late and working through lunches in order to meet goals and quotas and maximize sales. Defendant, through its managers, encouraged and pressured Plaintiff and those similarly situated to work as many hours as necessary to meet sales production numbers. There was no time tracking methods used by the Defendant to track time worked by Plaintiff and those similarly situated in the office. In February 2017, Defendant told its employees that some were entitled to pay for hours over forty (40), but not others. Those employees that were paid were only paid for those hours at an $8 – $9 overtime rate, and Defendant did not pay overtime on the employee commissions. During one short period of time, Defendant did instruct employees against working overtime and even represented that they would pay overtime wages, but very quickly is was “business as usual”, the majority of sales reps working overtime hours without being paid and continually warned about hitting numbers and goals no matter how many hours it took. Plaintiff, like all other inside sales representatives, was not entirely concerned over recording or documenting his hours since Defendant made it clear that they would not and do not pay overtime wages. Defendant’s managers readily observed Plaintiff and those similarly situated working overtime within the offices of Defendant. Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives, accessed electronic and computer systems, telephone, and e-mails, which would, if produced, help reflect the true hours that they worked. However, Defendants did not accurately record the hours of these non- exempt employees. It is unclear whether the Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives as Exempt employees, a clearly unlawful and erroneous position and action, or whether they simply just willfully refused to pay overtime wages for non-exempt employees and did not throughout the period of the 3 years preceding the filing of this Complaint properly and accurately record and track the hours inside sales representatives worked in violation of the FSLA. Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives did not negotiate or ever agree that their salaries were intended to pay them for all hours, and had they known that they were non-exempt employees under the FLSA when hired and entitled to a premium for overtime hours, they never would have agreed to the compensation plan provide and would have complained and objected to not being paid overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a work week. Upon information and belief, the class size during the relevant class period is upwards of 3000 employees nationwide. Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated inside sales representatives, handle either inbound or outbound calls to sell telecommunications to businesses. Inside sales representatives do not supervise two (2) or more full time employees, and thus cannot meet the Executive Exemption. The primary job duties of inside sales representatives do not involve the exercise of independent discretion and judgment in matters of significance, they are in the production aspect of Defendant’s business, selling its products and following scripts. Thus they cannot meet the Administrative Exemption. Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives are micro managed and highly scrutinized on a daily and weekly basis with very little room if at all in deviating from strict regulated manners in which to perform their job duties and responsibilities. Inside sales representatives do not have decision making authority. Plaintiff and all inside sales representatives work in a very high pressured, boiler room type environment. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. The FLSA requires employers to pay employees wages at a rate no less than one-and-a-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks. 19 U.S.C. § 207. Defendant is an “employer” of Plaintiff and those similarly situated within the meaning of the FLSA. Defendant is an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA and engaged in interstate commerce. Plaintiff and those similarly situated are not exempt employees under the FLSA or other Federal rules and regulations. Defendant has willfully violated the FLSA and is liable for wages for a three (3) year period of time preceding the filing of this complaint. Defendant has known for the past three years that the inside sales representatives were non- exempt employees, and continued refuse to compensate Plaintiff and the class of similarly situated for overtime hours worked. Defendant did not make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA and owes Plaintiff and those similarly situated liquidated damages and an equal sum of all wages owed. Defendant also has failed to pay overtime at the proper rate of one and one half time the employees’ regular rate of pay including the value of all commissions and bonuses earned. Defendant has also violated the record keeping provision of the FLSA, 29 CFR 516.2, which mandates that an Employer record and track the hours of non- exempt employees. Defendant employs inside sales representatives, upwards of one thousand or more, working in multiple offices selling telecommunications to businesses throughout the United States. Defendant provides telecommunications services, including telephone services, managed solutions, data products, and network integration, to businesses throughout the United States. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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The amount of the debt; Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to April 5, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Discover Bank (hereinafter, “Discover”). The Discover obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services were the subject of the transactions, specifically extending a revolving line of credit on a personal credit card. The alleged Discover obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). Discover is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). Defendant Van Ru, a debt collector, was contracted by Discover to collect the alleged debt. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet On or about April 5, 2019 Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial contact notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. Shortly after receiving the Letter, Plaintiff’s husband under instruction from the Plaintiff and as per the Letter stated, placed a telephone call to Defendant attempting to dispute the Discover account. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector; When asked by the Defendant the reason for the call, Plaintiff advised it was to dispute the Discover account referenced in the Letter. Immediately thereafter Defendant requested a reason for the dispute, to which Plaintiff’s husband stated the he was just disputing the debt as per the instructions in the Letter. Plaintiff then sought to affirm Defendant’s disclosure regarding the dispute process, specifically that the dispute must be in writing or the account would not be disputed. Defendant advised that he was correct, that the dispute must be in writing. To demand both a dispute to be in writing and/or contain a specific reason is completely contradictory to both the specific consumer rights stated in the initial collection letter as well as relevant case law in this Jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is a clear attempt to circumvent the verification process and pause collection efforts for any period of time. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by stating that they would only accept disputes in writing. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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This matter is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) in that: (a) The Putative Class, which potentially includes in excess of sixty persons, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (b) There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class; (c) The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the Putative Class; and (d) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Putative Class. The case is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(3), in that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The relief sought in this action will effectively provide relief to all of the class members. There are no unusual difficulties foreseen in the management of this class action. Once Defendant had granted an application in the exercise of its discretion, its Streets Department was required to erect a sign at the location of the exclusive electric vehicle parking space, designating it as such. After the adoption of Section 12-1131, and in reliance thereon, Plaintiffs and the members of the Putative Class each took a series of steps in order to apply for approval of a reserved electric vehicle parking space. Plaintiffs and members of the Putative Class each applied to the Philadelphia Parking Authority ("PP A") for approval of a designated electric vehicle parking space, paid all fees associated with such applications, and submitted all materials in support of their respective applications as required by the PPA and Section 12-1131, including but not limited to proof that an electric vehicle had been purchased or leased and registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation to a resident of each of their respective homes. By installing the curbside electrical vehicle chargers, solely at their own cost and expense, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class made substantial improvements upon public property. In response to the respective applications of the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class, the PPA granted its approval for the exclusively reserved, designated electric vehicle parking spaces, and Plaintiffs and the members of the Putative Class thus obtained such a parking space at their place of residence, all in conformity with Section 12-1131. On or about April 6, 2017, the City, through City Council, and without due process to the Plaintiffs or members of the Putative Class, passed Bill No. 170093-A, which amended Section 12-1131 by imposing a "moratorium on new electric vehicle parking spaces, under certain terms and conditions." The amendment further changed Section 12-1131 ( c ), providing that instead of the Streets Department posting signs at the existing approved electric parking spaces that prohibited all parking in such spaces by non-electric vehicles, the signs to be posted at the spaces now only reserved those spaces for the use of electric vehicles during the hours from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Pursuant to the amendment, City Council further provided that the signs were to specifically indicate that non-electric vehicles were permitted to park in the previously exclusively-reserved spaces for two hours at a time during the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The City thus amended Section 12-1131, depriving each Plaintiff and member of the Putative Class of the exclusively-reserved electric vehicle parking spaces which they had previously obtained upon application and compliance \vith the City's ordinance, and upon expending substantial funds in furtherance of such applications. Instead, under the revised version of Section 12-1131, for twelve hours of every day, non-electric vehicles are now permitted to occupy the parking spaces that were previously exclusively designated for electric vehicles, thus depriving Plaintiffs and the Putative Class of access to their electrical vehicle chargers. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Each Plaintiff and member of the Putative Class applied for a reserved electric vehicle parking space according to the process and standards established and required by the City, as articulated in Section 12-1131, before it was subsequently amended. In so doing, each Plaintiff and Putati,,e Class member expended substantial sums of money so as to comply with the requirements of Section 12-1131, and made substantial improvements upon public property. Pursuant to Section 12-1131, the City approved the application of each Plaintiff and Putative Class member and designated a reserved electric vehicle parking space in close proximity to their respective homes. By unilaterally amending Section 12-1131 so as to allow non-electric vehicles to park in the parking spaces that previously were reserved exclusively for electric vehicles, Defendant has unlawfully deprived each Plaintiff and the Putative Class members of his or her protectable property interest without due process. Defendant's amendment to Section 12-1131 reflects its policy, practice, procedure and/or custom, and exhibits deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. Defendant's actions violated Plaintiffs' and the Putative Class's constitutional due process rights and have caused them injury. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Defendant's actions have operated to treat Plaintiffs and the Putative Class differently than other similarly situated persons. There is no permissible basis for Defendant's arbitrary and capricious discrimination toward and against Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. Defendant's actions violated the constitutional equal protection rights of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class, and caused injury to each of them. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have made substantial improvements upon public property. Defendant appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit conferred upon it by Plaintiffs and the Putative Class. By stripping Plaintiffs and the Putative Class of their exclusively reserved electric vehicle parking spaces after they had expended substantial funds installing the electrical charging stations servicing those spaces, Defendant has caused Plaintiffs and the Putative Class to lose the benefit and value of their respective investments in the charging stations, and the improvements they have made upon public property. At the same time, Defendant unjustly has gained the value of and been enriched by these improvements. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have been injured by Defendant's actions in this regard.

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Plaintiff Christopher Coleman files this case as an opt in collective action, as is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The class that Plaintiff Christopher Coleman seeks to represent may be described as follows: All current and former employees of Defendant who 1) worked as a Police Dispatcher during the class period, and 2) claims that he or she either (a) failed to receive all of his or her overtime pay, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. and seeks payment for such lawfully earned overtime pay, or (b) failed to receive all of his or her compensation for work performed, but not recorded or paid (“off-the clock”), in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiff, Christopher Coleman, seeks to represent only those members of the above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt in to this action, have provided consent in writing to be represented by counsel for Plaintiff Christopher Coleman as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Plaintiff’s class”, will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue will be filed with the Court. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. For purposes of this action, the relevant period is defined as such period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter. Defendant employed Plaintiff Christopher Coleman from March 2014 until February 2016 as a Police Dispatcher for the City of Cairo, Illinois. As a Police Dispatcher, Coleman responded to emergency and non- emergency calls for assistance and information and provided dispatch and communication support services for police, fire, emergency, and related services. Only one Police Dispatcher works at the dispatch desk per shift. Police Dispatchers work one of three shifts: 2 P.M. to 10 P.M.; 10 P.M. to 6 A.M.; or 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. Defendant posted monthly schedules as to when each dispatcher is scheduled to work. The shifts were indicated by a “1” “2” or “3” on the schedule. Defendant requires Police Dispatchers to be at the dispatch desk between fifteen and twenty minutes before each shift. Defendant requires Police Dispatchers to stay at the dispatch desk until the end of their shift. This means that Defendant requires Police Dispatchers to work 8 hours and 15 minutes per shift. Defendant did not provide time sheets or a time clock for Police Dispatchers to record the time they worked. Defendant paid Police Dispatchers for 8 hours of time for each shift worked, regardless of the actual time spent working. During Plaintiff’s employment, while working for the Defendant, Plaintiff was required to work overtime hours in excess of 40 hours worked during many seven- day workweeks. Plaintiff often worked in excess of 40 hours per week during his employment with the Defendant. Defendant required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform work which routinely required them to work overtime hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for which they failed to receive overtime compensation as required by the Act. VI. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re- alleged as if fully written herein. Plaintiff Christopher Coleman and all others similarly situated are considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. Defendant has failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA, and have willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal statute. Defendant has failed to maintain a complete, accurate, and contemporaneous record of the number of hours worked per workweek by Plaintiff and by all other similarly situated employees, as required by law. The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid in a workweek. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re- alleged as if fully written herein. Plaintiff Christopher Coleman and all others similarly situated are considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. Plaintiff Christopher Coleman and all others similarly situated are entitled to receive overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven- day workweek. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours they worked in excess of 40 per week. Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Defendant has failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA, and have willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal statute. The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding overtime compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re- alleged as if fully written herein. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendant that is in violation of the FLSA. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendant has been imposed on other workers. Accordingly, each Defendant’s pattern and practice of failing to pay the overtime pay (at time and one-half) of employees as required by the FLSA results from the Defendant’s general application of policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Plaintiff’s class. Plaintiff Christopher Coleman’s experience is typical of the experience of the Plaintiff’s class as it pertains to compensation. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week, are similarly situated. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. All current and former police dispatchers, who at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment who were denied overtime pay by Defendant for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class. Collective Action Allegations Failure to compensate for “off-the-clock” work Unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA

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In and around September 2020, via the telephone number 301-368-****, Marketpro or a person acting at its direction or control sent the following generic text message to mobile telephone subscribers: Hi. I am with MarketPro Homebuyers, I am a local buyer in DC, VA, MD. I’d like to speak with you about buying [property address] for cash if you might be interested in selling? Reply STOP for opt- out. The sender’s telephone number is associated with the area code for Rockville, Maryland, where Marketpro maintains its headquarters. The next three digits of the sender’s telephone number, 368, are associated with at least three other telephone numbers that are or have been used by Marketpro. The generic reference to “DC, VA, MD” indicates that the text message was indiscriminately sent to property owners, or suspected property owners, in Virginia and other states. In multiple statements by Marketpro to the Better Business Bureau, Marketpro reported that it maintains a database of prospective sellers and targets them for solicitations. To the extent Marketpro inserts property addresses into text messages, these addresses appear to have been exported or populated using a database or similar automated application. Marketpro’s text messages have several elements indicating the use of an automatic telephone dialing system. a. The text messages are generic, and with the exception of the address of real property, they have no personalized information about the recipient. b. The generic reference to “DC, VA, MD” indicates that the text message was indiscriminately sent to property owners, or suspected property owners, in multiple states and the District of Columbia. c. The procedure for “STOP” indicates an automated text messaging system that processes replies without human involvement. Several persons have complained to the Better Business Bureau about Marketpro spamming them with unwelcome and unsolicited telephone calls. Others have posted complaints on the Yelp website about Marketpro sending unwelcome, harassing text messages. Through the Do Not Call Registry maintained by the FCC, consumers may register their telephone numbers and express their unwillingness to receive unsolicited text messages. Plaintiff Kevin Cavey subscribes to a wireless cellular telephone service and his telephone number is ***-***-9273. Plaintiff registered this number with the Do Not Call Registry in July 2003. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Marketpro. He has never given Marketpro permission or consent to send him text messages for any reason. By sending unwanted text message solicitations to Plaintiff and others, Marketpro intrudes on their privacy and interferes with the regular use and enjoyment of their telephones. Each Class is so numerous that joinder of individual plaintiffs is not practical. The actual number of members in each Class is not precisely known, but each class is likely to number in the hundreds or thousands. Marketpro is likely to have or control information making it feasible to determine how many members are in each Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of all Class members. When Marketpro engaged in wrongdoing against Class members, that common course of misconduct resulted in substantially similar harms to both Plaintiff and Class members. a. Like all members of the National and Virginia Robodialing Classes, Plaintiff received texts from Marketpro, through an automated texting application, and Plaintiff had not provided prior express consent to the texts. b. Like all members of the Virginia Do Not Call Registry Class, Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Virginia, and a person with telephone assigned a Virginia area code, who had a registered number on the Do Not Call Registry and received one or more text-message solicitations from Marketpro. c. Like all members of the Virginia Unidentified Sender Class, Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Virginia, and a person with telephone assigned a Virginia area code, who received one or more text-message solicitations from Marketpro, where the sender did not identify themselves by first and last name. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff retained experienced counsel with the necessary expertise and resources to prosecute class action litigation. Plaintiff and his counsel do not anticipate circumstances where Plaintiff’s interests would be adverse to those of Class members. Marketpro has acted on grounds that generally apply to the Classes such that final injunctive relief is appropriate. Such grounds include injunctive relief to prevent Marketpro from texting persons whose numbers are registered on the Do Not Call Registry and to forbid Marketpro from sending text messages without its solicitors identifying themselves by first and last name. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the prior paragraphs of this Complaint. The TCPA states that it is unlawful “to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone.” 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(1)(A)(iii). Text messages constitute telephone calls for purposes of the TCPA. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, Text Message Senders Must Comply with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, DA 16-1299 (Nov. 18, 2016); see also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). As indicated by the generic content of text messages, the insertion of data through databases or other automated systems, and the presence of automated opt-out features (by texting “STOP” in reply), Marketpro used an automatic telephone dialing system to text Plaintiff and Class members. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1); In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 566 (2008). Marketpro violated the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to send texts to Plaintiff and other Class members without their prior written consent. A person aggrieved by violations of the TCPA may bring action against the violator for $500 in statutory damages. If the violations of the TCPA are willful or knowing, the damages may be trebled. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Because Marketpro ignored repeated complaints about unsolicited and harassing text messages, Marketpro’s violations of the TCPA were willful. Plaintiff and the Classes demand judgment against Marketpro for statutory damages, treble damages, attorney fees and costs, and any other relief provided by law. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the prior paragraphs of this Complaint. The VTPPA states, “No telephone solicitor shall initiate, or cause to be initiated, a telephone call to a telephone number on the National Do Not Call Registry ….” Va. Stat. Ann. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the prior paragraphs of this Complaint. Marketpro or telephone solicitors acting for its benefit made a call to Plaintiff and other Class members by sending text messages to their wireless cellular telephones. The text messages were sent for the purpose of offering or advertising Marketpro’s services, and because the text messages were made for Marketpro’s benefit as the seller of such services, they constituted telephone solicitation calls under the VTPPA. When Marketpro or telephone solicitors acting for its benefit sent text messages to Plaintiff and other Class members, the texts failed to identify the senders by their first and last names. Marketpro, as a telephone solicitor itself or jointly and severally through telephone solicitors acting for its benefit, is liable for telephone solicitation calls that violate the VTPPA. Because Marketpro ignored repeated complaints about unsolicited and harassing text messages, Marketpro’s violations of the VTPPA were willful and each violation qualifies for special damages up to $5,000. Plaintiff and the Class demand judgment against Marketpro for statutory damages, special damages, attorney fees and costs, and any other relief provided by law. Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Calls Using Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems (Individually and on Behalf of the National and Virginia Robodialing Classes) Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act Calls to Members of the Do Not Call Registry (Individually and on Behalf of the Virginia Do Not Call Registry Class) Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act Failure of Telephone Solicitors to Identify (Individually and on behalf of the Virginia Unidentified Sender Class)

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EY is an accounting and consulting firm offering services to clients throughout the world. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt AML at all times relevant hereto. Plaintiff worked in this capacity from approximately September 2016 through August 2017. Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him, routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week as part of their regular job duties. Despite working more than forty (40) hours per week, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him, overtime compensation at a rate of time and a half their regular rate of pay for hours worked over forty in a workweek. Defendant has employed and is employing hundreds of other individuals as AMLs who performed and continue to perform the same or similar job duties under the same pay provision as Plaintiff and the class members companywide. Defendant has violated Title 29 U.S.C. §207 and the NYLL from September 2016 and continuing to date, in that: a. Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week for the period of employment with Defendant; b. No payments or provisions for payment, have been made by Defendant to properly compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one and one-half times hiss regular rate for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week as provided by the FLSA and the NYLL; and c. Defendant has failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA and the NYLL. Plaintiff and the class members were all AMLs and performed the same or similar job duties as one another in that they performed AML duties for Defendant and its clients as part of its anti-money laundering advisory service function. Defendant’s failure to compensate employees for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week as required by the FLSA results from a policy or practice of failure to assure that AMLs are/were paid for overtime hours worked based on their uniform pay policy, applicable to all putative class members herein. This policy or practice was applicable to Plaintiff and the class members. Application of this policy or practice does/did not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice which resulted in the non-payment of overtime to Plaintiff applies to all class members. Accordingly, the class members are properly defined as: All AMLs who worked for Defendant within the last three (3) years who were not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more work weeks Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime compensation with respect to Plaintiff and the class members. Defendant did not act in good faith nor rely upon any of the following in formulating its pay practices: (a) case law, (b) the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (c) Department of Labor Wage & Hour Opinion Letters or (d) the Code of Federal Regulations. Defendant has acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members in accordance with the law. Defendant has failed to maintain accurate records of Plaintiff’s and the class members’ work hours in accordance with the law. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff brings his New York Labor Law claim on behalf of all persons who were employed by Defendants at any time since February 2013, to the entry of judgment in this case (the “Class Period”), who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York Labor Law and have not been paid for hours actually worked as well as overtime wages as required in violation of the New York Labor Law (the “Class”). The persons in the Class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendant, upon information and belief, there are thirty-five (35) or more members of the Class during the Class Period. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. This policy or practice was applicable to Plaintiff and the class members. Application of this policy or practice does/did not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice which resulted in the non-payment of overtime to Plaintiff applies to all class members. Accordingly, the class members are properly defined as: All AMLs who worked for Defendant within the last six (6) years who were not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more work weeks. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the class and Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. Plaintiff realleges and reavers paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. From at least September 2016 and continuing until August 2017, Plaintiff worked in excess of the forty (40) hours per week for which Plaintiff was not compensated at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay. Plaintiff was, and is entitled to be paid at the statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours. At all times material hereto, Defendant failed, and continues to fail, to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA. Defendant has failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights under the FLSA. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendant, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer damages and lost compensation for time worked over forty (40) hours per week, plus liquidated damages. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Plaintiff realleges and reavers paragraphs 1 through 51 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay for all work in excess of forty hours per workweek. Through their knowing or intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, Defendant has willfully violated the NYLL, Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. Plaintiff realleges and reavers paragraphs 1 through 51 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Defendant failed to supply Plaintiff and the Class Members with accurate statements of wages as required under the NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3). Specifically, Defendant failed to provide an accurate number of hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class Members because Defendant failed to list the time Plaintiff and the Class worked, their regular rate of pay, and/or their overtime rate of pay. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the Class Members with the accurate wage statements required under the NYLL, Defendant has willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. Due to Defendant’s willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to statutory penalties, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §198(1-d). VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE WAGE STATEMENTS VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 OVERTIME COMPENSATION VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW - UNPAID OVERTIME

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On or about August 7, 2012, Plaintiff withdrew funds from the ATM inside Brother’s Deli, located at 41 Market Street, Lynn, Massachusetts (the “Brother’s ATM”). At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, it was owned and operated by Defendant. At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, a fee notice was inconspicuously posted near the bottom of the machine, below the currency dispensing slot. A true and correct copy of a photograph of the Brother’s ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As shown in Exhibit A, the “Fee Notice” is placed in an inconspicuous location, at or below knee level and out of eyesight of any person accessing the Brother’s ATM. At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, he was charged a service fee in the amount of $2.75. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s receipt from the Brother’s ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. The Class of consumers that Plaintiff seeks to protect is defined as: All persons who within the one year period preceding the initiation of this action were charged a transaction fee for use of the Brother’s ATM. B. Numerosity Upon information and belief, since the date of Plaintiff’s transaction at the Brother’s ATM, Defendant has not posted a conspicuous notice disclosing the amount of the service fee on the outside of the Brother’s ATM. The members of the Class are therefore believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Although the exact numbers and identities of class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are thousands of individuals throughout Massachusetts who have claims identical to Plaintiff’s. Therefore, bringing the action as a class will fairly ensure the adequate representation of all who may sue. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact Plaintiff identifies the following questions of fact and law common to the Class which predominate any questions affecting only individual Class members: a) Whether Defendant was, at all relevant times during the class period, an ATM operator who imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services; b) Whether the Brother’s ATM provided disclosure in a prominent and conspicuous location that the ATM transaction was subject to the imposition of a specified fee; and c) Whether Defendant imposed fees on consumers without notice. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members since each of the claims arises from the use of an ATM owned and operated by Defendant in their regular course of business. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members, all of whom are victims of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. All of the Class members’ claims arise from substantially the same course of conduct and specific activities complained of herein and require application of identical legal principles. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and consumer class claims and who stands ready, willing and able to represent the Class and advance the costs of this litigation. F. Proceeding via Class Action is Superior and Advisable A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and therefore would have no effective remedy at law. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the court and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. The amount of money at issue is such that proceeding by way of a class action is the only economical and sensible manner in which to vindicate Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) provides that any ATM operator who imposes a fee on any consumer for providing host transfer services must provide a notice stating: (i) The fact that a fee is imposed by such operator for providing the service; and (ii) The amount of any such fee. The notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) must “be posted in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine at which the electronic fund transfer is initiated by the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(B)(i). In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(c) provides: No fee may be imposed by any automated teller machine operator in connection with any electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer for which a notice is required under subparagraph (A), unless: (i) The consumer receives such notice in accordance with subparagraph (B); and (ii) The consumer elects to continue in the manner necessary to effect the transaction after receiving such notice. 12 C.F.R. 205.16(c) further provides: An automated teller machine operator must comply with the following: (1) Post the notice required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine In addition, 12 C.F.R. 205.16(e) states: An automated teller machine operator may impose a fee on a consumer for initiating an electronic fund transfer of a balance inquiry only if: (1) The consumer is provided the notices required under paragraph (c) of this section; and (2) The consumer elects to continue the transaction or inquiry after receiving such notices. Defendant is an automated teller machine operator who provided host transfer services at all times relevant to this action. Defendant failed to comply with the EFTA in connection with providing such services to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class as the notice on the Brother’s ATM was in neither a prominent nor conspicuous location. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of the EFTA in that they were charged a fee that was not properly disclosed. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693m, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for the amount of actual damages incurred, as well as for statutory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. A. The Class Violation of the EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq., (On Behalf of All Class Members)

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Cory is in the business of providing the delivery of appliances, furniture, and other merchandise to its customers. Cory provides delivery services throughout the United States, and in Illinois specifically, for companies such as Bob’s Discount Furniture, Ethan Allen, Rooms to Go, Crate & Barrel, Carson Pirie Scott, and Wayfair.com. In order to carry out this central function, Cory purports to contract with individuals, such as Plaintiffs, to drive a delivery truck and to deliver merchandise to customers’ homes. Cory provides delivery services in Illinois from various warehouses at which Cory’s employees oversee and manage Defendant’s deliveries. Plaintiffs and other delivery drivers performed delivery services for Cory. In order to receive such work, Cory required its delivery drivers to sign an agreement drafted by Cory, which stated that they were independent contractors. Plaintiffs worked full-time for Cory, often working six to seven days per week and 12 to 16 hours per day making deliveries for Cory. Though Plaintiffs and other class members routinely worked more than 40 hours per week for Cory, they did not receive an overtime premium for those hours worked over forty in a workweek. Plaintiffs, as well as the other class plaintiffs, performed work which is in the usual course of business of Cory – i.e., they performed delivery services and Cory is engaged in the business of providing delivery services to its customers. Cory deducted certain expenses directly from Plaintiffs’ and the other class plaintiffs’ checks, including deductions for insurance, any related insurance claims, truck rentals, and uniforms. Cory required Plaintiffs and other class members to provide a safety deposit to Cory at the outset of their work relationship. Cory did not return the safety deposit to Plaintiffs upon their contracts terminating. When Cory determined that a delivery had been made in a manner it deemed to be unsatisfactory (e.g., damaged goods, damage to customer property), Cory would deduct the costs of such damage from Plaintiffs’ and the proposed class members’ pay checks. Plaintiffs and the proposed class could not appeal such deductions. Cory did not get Plaintiffs’ and other class members’ freely given express written consent at the time it made deductions from their pay. The deductions taken by Cory per paycheck were not for a uniform amount, but rather varied with each paycheck. Cory compelled Plaintiffs and other class members to incur certain other expenses that would normally be borne by an employer, such as for workers’ compensation or similar insurance coverage. The Illinois Class and the Nationwide Class are together referred to as the “Class.” Plaintiffs reserve the right to redefine the Class prior to class certification, or thereafter, as necessary. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Plaintiffs believe that the Class numbers exceed forty (40) members. Common issues of law and fact predominate the claims of the entire Class. Specifically, all claims are predicated on a finding that Cory misclassified its drivers as independent contractors when they were in fact employees. In short, the claims of the named Plaintiffs are identical to the claims of the class members. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representative of the class because all potential plaintiffs were subject to Cory’s uniform practices and policies. Further, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered the same type of economic damages as a result of Cory’s practices and policies. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs’ counsel is competent and experienced in litigating large wage and hour class and collective actions. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1- 31 herein. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the Illinois Class were “employees” of Cory as defined by the IWPCA. At all relevant times, Cory was an employer of Plaintiffs and the Illinois Class as defined by the IWPCA. The IWPCA, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/9, prohibits employers from making deductions from employees’ wages. Cory violated the IWPCA, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/9, by making unlawful deductions from Plaintiffs and the Illinois Class’ wages. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Illinois Class, seek all reimbursement for all unlawful deductions taken by Cory from Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Class’ wages. Count II New Jersey Wage Payment Law (N.J. Stat. §§ 34:11-4.2, 24:11-4.4) (Class Action on behalf of the Nationwide Class) (In the alternative to Count I) Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1- 31 herein. As employees of Cory, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to the protections of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”). The NJWPL requires that Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class receive all wages owed. See N.J. Stat. § 34:11-4.2. As set forth herein, Cory has misclassified Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class as independent contractors when they are actually employees under the NJWPL, who are entitled to the protection and benefits of these laws. Cory violated the NJWPL by failing to pay Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class all their wages due, and subjecting them to wage deductions and withholdings that are not specifically permitted by the NJWPL, including deductions for workers’ compensation, equipment rental, insurances, and other business costs of Cory. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to damages in an amount to be proved at trial. Count III New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (N.J. Stat. §§ 34:11-56a(4)) (Class Action on behalf of the Nationwide Class) Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1- 31 herein. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are employees entitled to the protections of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”). Cory is an employee covered by the NJWHL. The NJWHL provides that employees who work over 40 hours in a workweek shall receive “1 ½ times such employee’s regular hourly wage for each hour of working time in excess of 40 hours in any week.” N.J. Stat. § 34.11-56a4. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per week without any overtime compensation. Cory fails to accurately track all hours that Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class work. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1-31 herein. As a result of Cory’s mischaracterizing of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class as “independent contractors,” Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class were forced to pay substantial sums of money for work-related expenses, including but not limited to costs associated with the purchase of worker’s compensation or similar insurance. Further, by mischaracterizing Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class as “independent contractors” Cory evades its own employment-related obligations, such as providing workers’ compensation coverageby illegally shifting these costs to Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class. By misclassifying their employees as “independent contractors,” and by requiring those employees to pay its expenses, Cory has been unjustly enriched. Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter the following relief: A. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); B. Restitution for all deductions taken from Plaintiffs and the Class’ pay and all other appropriate compensatory relief; C. Prejudgment interest on the unpaid wages in accordance with, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/2; D. Statutory damages pursuant to the formula set forth in the IWPCA, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/14(a); E. Reasonable Attorney’s fees, costs, and interest; F. Any other relief to which Plaintiff and the Class members may be entitled.

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(Against All Defendants For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) Aveo is a biopharmaceutical company focused on discovering, developing, and commercializing cancer therapeutics. The Company’s lead product candidate is an oral inhibitor of the vascular endothelial growth factor (“VEGF”) receptors. One of the Company’s principal products is Tivopath or tivozanib, marketed by the Company for the treatment of advanced kidney cancer. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Aveo securities during the Class Period (the “Class”); and were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are defendants herein, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that: • defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period; • the omissions and misrepresentations were material; • Aveo securities are traded in efficient markets; • the Company’s shares were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during the Class Period; • the Company traded on the NASDAQ, and was covered by multiple analysts; • the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and • Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased and/or sold Aveo securities between the time the defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to influence the market for Aveo securities and options. Such reports, filings, releases and statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about Aveo’s finances and business prospects. Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of Aveo, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of Aveo’s internal affairs. The Individual Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs complained of herein. Because of their positions of control and authority, the Individual Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of Aveo. As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate timely, accurate, and truthful information with respect to Aveo’s businesses, operations, future financial condition and future prospects. As a result of the dissemination of the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements, the market price of Aveo securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. In ignorance of the adverse facts concerning Aveo’s business and financial condition which were concealed by defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased Aveo securities at artificially inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities, the integrity of the market for the securities and/or upon statements disseminated by defendants, and were damaged thereby. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had disseminated false financial statements to the investing public related to its prospects for FDA approval. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Aveo’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Aveo which had become materially false or misleading. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which Aveo disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning Aveo’s financial prospects. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause Aveo to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of Aveo within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of Aveo securities. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of Aveo. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of Aveo, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, Aveo to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of Aveo and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. BACKGROUND

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Defendant manufactures, labels, markets, promotes, advertises, and sells Barlean’s Greens Products. Defendant markets and labels the Products with the Representations described herein. The following images depict the Products and the uniform, material Representations made on the Products: B. Defendant’s Failure to Include the Proposition 65 Warning Is A Material Misrepresentation and Omission Absent from the label of the Products is any disclosure that the Products contain lead and a “clear and reasonable warning” pursuant to California’s Proposition 65, that the Products exceed the .5 mcg/day allowable limit for lead. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein. Defendant’s conduct constitutes an unfair business act and practice pursuant to California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (the “UCL”). The UCL provides, in pertinent part: “Unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” Plaintiff brings this claim seeking equitable and injunctive relief to stop Defendant’s misconduct, as complained of herein, and to seek restitution of the amounts Defendant acquired through the unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices described herein. Defendant’s knowing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes an “unfair” and/or “fraudulent” business practice, as set forth in California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17208. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein. California Business & Professions Code § 17500 prohibits “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” Defendant violated § 17500 when it represented, through its false and misleading Representations and omissions, that Defendant’s Products possessed characteristics and value that they did not actually have. Among other things, Defendant made Structure/Function Representations and omissions, which do not comply with the DSHEA requirements, as described herein. In addition, Defendant failed to include the required Proposition 65 warning and to disclose that the Products exceeded the allowable lead limits. Defendant’s deceptive practices were specifically designed to induce reasonable consumers like Plaintiff to purchase the Products. Defendant’s uniform, material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the Products were likely to deceive, and Defendant knew or should have known that its uniform misrepresentations and omissions were untrue and/or misleading. Plaintiff purchased the Products in reliance on the Representations made by Defendant, as alleged herein. Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass have been directly and proximately injured by Defendant’s conduct in ways including, but not limited to, the monies paid to Defendant for the Products, interest lost on those monies, and consumers’ unwitting support of a business enterprise that promotes deception and undue greed to the detriment of consumers, such as Plaintiff and Subclass members. The above acts of Defendant were and are likely to deceive reasonable consumers in violation of § 17500. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. The CLRA provides that “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful.” The Products are “goods,” as defined by the CLRA in California Civil Code §1761(a). Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein. By advertising and selling the Products at issue, Defendant made promises and affirmations of fact on the Products’ packaging, and through its marketing and advertising, as described herein. This labeling and advertising constitutes express warranties and became part of the basis of the bargain between Plaintiff and members of the Class, and Defendant. A. Defendant Manufactures, Labels and Advertises the Products Breach of Express Warranty (for the Nationwide Class and California Subclass) Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.) (for the California Subclass) Deceptive Advertising Practices (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq.) (for the California Subclass) QUASI-CONTRACT (for the Nationwide Class and California Subclass) 104. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 105. By purchasing the Products, Plaintiff and members of the Class conferred a benefit on Defendant in the form of the purchase price of the Products. 106. Defendant had knowledge of such benefits. 107. Defendant appreciated the benefit because, were consumers not to purchase the Products, Defendant would not generate revenue from the sales of the Products. 108. Defendant’s acceptance and retention of the benefit is inequitable and unjust because the benefit was obtained by Defendant’s fraudulent and misleading representations and omissions. 109. Equity cannot in good conscience permit Defendant to be economically enriched for such actions at the expense of Plaintiff and members of the Class, and therefore restitution and/or disgorgement of such economic enrichment is required Unfair and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices (Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.) (for the California Subclass)

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On or about November 16, 2020, Defendant made a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 7799 (the “7799 Number”) using a prerecorded voice. When Plaintiff listened to the voicemail, he was easily able to determine that it was a prerecorded message. See Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”). Defendant’s prerecorded call constitutes telemarketing because it encourages the future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services. The prerecorded call Plaintiff received originated from (417-366-9171) a telephone number owned and/or operated by Defendant. Plaintiff received the subject call with a prerecorded voice within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted with a prerecorded call. Plaintiff is the subscriber and/or sole user of the 7799 Number. Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded call caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s prerecorded call also inconvenienced Plaintiff. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, received a prerecorded voice call on their telephone from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, promoting and/or advertising Defendant’s goods and/or services Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmit prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendant transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 227(b)(1)(B) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-43 as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any telephone call…using an…artificial or prerecorded voice…To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 C.F.R. § Defendant transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) and § 64.1200(a)(3) by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 200(a)(1)(iii). PROPOSED CLASS Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Plaintiff pays for and maintains a cellular telephone number ending in 3436. Beginning in January 2013, Defendants began placing calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number, sometimes multiple times per day. During at least some of these calls, Defendants left a voice message for Plaintiff using artificial or prerecorded voice. Other than Defendants' calls, Plaintiff has had no contact with Defendants. Plaintiff never solicited Defendants' calls and never otherwise gave Defendants express permission to call. Plaintiff has tried repeatedly to make Defendants stop these incessant calls. On four separate occasions in 2013 - February 28, March 1, March 4, and March 5 - Plaintiff called Defendants to request that the calls stop. On each occasion, Defendants assured Plaintiff that her number would no longer be called. Defendants have called Plaintiff at least thirty-six (36) times since she last requested that Defendants cease calling her. Defendants' calls for Plaintiff were placed from Defendants' automatic telephone dialing system, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), from the phone number that is registered to Defendants. Specifically, Defendants' dialing system has the capacity to store, dial, and generate phone numbers such as Plaintiff's. Defendants' calls were made to Plaintiff's cellular phone and she was charged for those phone calls. Plaintiff never provided express consent for Defendants to place calls to her cellular phone with Defendants' automatic telephone dialing system or to call her using an using an artificial or prerecorded voice. Defendants' conduct has caused Plaintiff to incur actual damages including but not limited to cellular phone charges, anxiety, sleeplessness, and worry and she was forced to tend to unwanted calls. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. It is a violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), to call a person's cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system. Defendants called plaintiff and others on their cellular telephones using an automatic telephone dialing system. Defendants called plaintiff and others on their cellular telephones using an using an artificial or prerecorded voice. Plaintiff and the class are entitled to have their rights, status and legal relations under the TCPA relating to defendant's calling of cell phones using an automatic dialing system. The Defendants’ calls were negligent, or alternatively, as evidenced by Defendants’ refusal to comply with Plaintiff’s requests to cease calling, they were willful. 47 U.S.C. §312(f)(1). Class Allegations Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of a class, which consists of: All persons nationwide who AHB, Homeland or some person on their behalf called on their cell phone using a device that has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, where the recipient of the call did not give either defendant the phone number for purposes such calls, where any call was made on or after a date four years before the filing of this complaint. The class is sufficiently numerous to make joinder impracticable. The only use for automatic dialing equipment is to make a high volume of telephone calls in a short period of time. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class and predominate over any questions solely affecting any individual member of the class, including plaintiff. Such questions common to the Class include, but are not limited to: a. Whether defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system as that term us defined in the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and orders; and b. Damages, including whether the violation was willful. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class, should they realize their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. The identity of the class is likely readily identifiable from defendant's records. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs of this complaint. It is a violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) to have insufficient procedures in place to ensure requests that calls cease are honored. It is a violation of the TCPA, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3) to call a residential or cellular telephone for telemarketing purposes, if the consumer has requested that calls cease. A private right of action attaches when more than two such calls are made within a twelve month period. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). Defendants called Plaintiff and others more than once within a 12 month period on her residential and cellular telephone for telemarketing purposes, without having sufficient procedures in place to avoid calling persons who previously requested that calls cease. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). Alternatively, Defendants had no procedures at all. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of a class, which consists of: All persons nationwide who AHB, Homeland or some person on their behalf called on their residential or cell phone for the purpose of selling goods or services, where defendants had in place the same or similar company specific do not call policy, practice or procedure (or lack thereof) as when plaintiff was called, where the phone number was called more than twice in a 12 month period. Plaintiff alleges a subclass of persons who were called more than twice after they had requested that calls cease. The class is sufficiently numerous to make joinder impracticable. The only use for automatic dialing equipment is to make a high volume of telephone calls in a short period of time. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class and predominate over any questions solely affecting any individual member of the class, including plaintiff. Such questions common to the Class include, but are not limited to: c. Whether Defendants’ company specific do not call policies, practices and procedures complied with the TCPA, including 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d); and d. Damages, including whether the violation was willful. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has no interests that might conflict with the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in pursuing his claims vigorously, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class, should they realize their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. The identity of the class is likely readily identifiable from Defendant's records.

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action for all unpaid overtime pay, 100% liquidated damages, and attorneys fees and costs arising out of the Plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act; Finds that NPS is liable to the Plaintiff and all members of the proposed Rule 23 Upon information and belief Guzman, who was classified and paid by NPS as an hourly employee, would frequently during the past two years receive shift differential pay equal to 15 minutes of straight time pay for each workday, in which she worked in whole or in part on a shift different than her primary shift. At all of its facilities in Wisconsin, NPS made attendance bonus pay available to each of its hourly employees. The attendance bonus pay, which was promised to induce the employees to improve their attendance, became mandatory when the employees met the required defined standards to qualify for the bonuses. 1 3 . During at least a portion of the time period that she worked for NPS within the last two years, Guzman received attendance bonus pay from NPS. Like all machine operators employed by NPS at any of its facilities, at all times during the last two years Guzman was eligible for receiving bonus payments for exceeding the defined hourly standard for her classification and machine. The production bonuses, which were promised by NPS to induce its machine operators to improve the speed of their work, became mandatory when the machine operators exceeded the defined standard for their classifications and machines. During the past two years, and while working as a machine operator, Guzman Based on online job advertisements posted by NPS, at NPS' Green Bay Facilities its hourly employees also frequently worked overtime by working, for example, four 12 hour shifts during some workweeks. During workweeks that Guzman received shift differential pay, or earned a production bonus, or formed a portion ofthe time period for which Guzman received an attendance bonus for her good attendance during the time period, Guzman still received overtime pay equal to no more than 1 .5 times her base hourly wage rate. 2 1 . Plaintiff brings her First Claim for Relief, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, on her own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated NPS hourly employees whose shift differential pay and/or attendance bonuses were not included by NPS when computing their regular rate for overtime pay. classes for all unpaid straight time and overtime wages that they are owed under Wisconsin law, plus 50% increased damages on all unpaid wages, plus their attorneys fees and costs arising out of the Plaintiffs' claims under Wisconsin law; Grants to the Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and NPS thus applied to Guzman, just like it applied to each of its hourly employees at its Green Bay and Cudahy facilities, its uniform policy of excluding shift differential pay, production bonuses, and attendance bonuses when computing their regular rate for overtime pay. maintained as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §2 16(b), for prospective members of the FLSA Class that are similarly situated to Plaintiff and have claims similar to her first claim for relief. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are representative of the claims of members of the FLSA Class in that all members of the class were hourly paid employees of NPS who received shift differential pay, attendance bonuses, and/or production bonuses, and were subject to NPS' uniform policy of computing overtime pay as time and a half the employees' base rate of pay, so that shift differential pay, attendance bonuses, and production bonuses were excluded from the computation of the regular rate used to compute their overtime pay. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all employees of NPS who fall within any of the following two subclasses pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: All hourly paid employees of NPS who, during the time period on or after November 22, 2017 received some shift differential pay or attendance bonus pay from NPS, and could have been scheduled to work more than 40 hours per week; All hourly paid machine operators of NPS who, during the time period on or after November 22, 201 7 received some production bonus pay from NPS and could have been scheduled to work more than 40 hours per week. The persons in the class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all There are questions of law and fact common to the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class (Rule 23 Class) that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including, but not limited to: (a). Whether the Plaintiffs' shift differentials were paid for the perceived inconvenience of working on a different shift, rather than because they performed different kinds of work on different shifts; (b). Whether the attendance and production bonuses were announced in advance to encourage NPS employees to improve their work performance; Whether fact and/or payment of the attendance and production bonuses were guaranteed once the employees met the program eligibility requirements that were announced to the employees long before the payment of the bonuses; (c)- (d). How the employees' overtime pay should be computed after incorporating the attendance, production, and shift differential pay into their regular rates; (e). The employees' eligibility for liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs for the underpayments of overtime pay that they have experienced. Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 class in that she just like members of both of the proposed subclasses received attendance, production, and shift differential pay from NPS, but always had her overtime pay computed as time and a half her base wage rate, so that the attendance, production, and shift differential pay were never included in computing her overtime pay. Named Plaintiffwill fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 class; and have retained counsel experienced in complex wage and hour litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient paragraphs 1- 30 of the Complaint. NPS cannot utilize the exemption method outlined in §207(g)(2) of the FLSA to compute the Plaintiffs overtime pay when the Plaintiffs received different pay rates for performing the same work on different shifts, rather than for performing different kinds of work on different shifts. Shift differential pay paid to the Plaintiff for the inconvenience of working on a less desirable shift constitutes remuneration for employment that must be included in the computation of the Plaintiffs regular rate under §207(e) of the FLSA. Plaintiff therefore is entitled to receive overtime pay computed using her regular rate, with shift differential pay included in computing her regular rate. Production bonuses and attendance bonuses received by the Plaintiff must be Alternatively, the production bonuses and attendance bonuses must be included in the regular rate when they were announced to employees by NPS in order to induce the employees to improve their work performance and attendance. NPS therefore violated the FLSA by failing to use the regular rate, computed including the shift differential pay, production bonuses, and pro-rata portion of attendance bonuses the Plaintiff earned during each workweek, to compute the Plaintiffs overtime pay for each week. NPS either knew or should have known that its method of computing the Plaintiffs overtime pay violated the FLSA, so that Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to all overtime wages owed to her, an equal amount as liquidated damages; plus the application of a three years statute of limitations. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from NPS her reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this count of the Complaint. Count II. Claim for Straight Time and Overtime Pay Under Wisconsin Law. Plaintiff re-allege, and incorporate by reference, the allegations contained in paragraphs 1- 39 of the Complaint. Because Wisconsin law uses the same concept of the "regular rate" as the FLSA, Plaintiffs shift differential pay, production bonuses, and attendance bonuses must be included in the regular rate under Wisconsin law for the same reasons why they must be included in the regular rate under the FLSA. NPS therefore violated Wis. Stat. §109.03(1) and (5) by failing to pay to the Plaintiff, within 3 1 days of when the overtime wages were earned, all overtime pay required to be paid to her pursuant to DWD §274.03. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. §109.03(5), Plaintiff is entitled to maintain a lawsuit against Froedtert for all straight time and overtime wages that they are entitled to but did not receive pursuant to Wis. Stat. §109.03 and DWD Chapter 274. In such a lawsuit they are also entitled to receive the 50% increased damages authorized by Wis. Stat. § 1 09. 1 1 (2)(a) on all straight time and overtime wages that remain unpaid at the time of the filing of this lawsuit, along with their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of prosecuting their claims as authorized by Wis. Stat. §109.03(6). WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to enter an order that: Finds that NPS is liable to the plaintiff and all members of the proposed collective At all of its facilities in Wisconsin, NPS made shift differential pay available to

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Matador is an independent energy company engaged in the exploration, development, production and acquisition of oil and natural gas resources in the United States. Its operations “are focused primarily on the oil and liquids-rich portion of the Wolfcamp and Bone Spring plays in the Delaware Basin in Southeast New Mexico and West Texas” and “in the Eagle Ford shale play in South Texas and the Haynesville shale and Cotton Valley plays in Northwest Louisiana and East Texas.”1 To complete its business objectives, Matador hires personnel to perform the necessary work. Over the past three years, Matador employed dozens of individuals – including Martin – as Rig Hands, Directional Drillers, Mud Engineers, Mud Loggers, and Drilling Superintendents (or similar positions) in several states. While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these oilfield workers are subjected to the same illegal pay practice for similar work. Specifically, Matador paid these workers a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to pay them overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. For example, Matador employed Martin as a Drilling Superintendent from approximately June 2016 through February 2018. As a Drilling Superintendent, Martin’s primary job duties included observing drilling operations on the rig and ensuring that the team followed safety protocol. Martin worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by Matador. The work Martin performed was an essential part of Matador’s core business. During Martin’s employment with Matador while he was classified as an independent contractor, Matador exercised control over all aspects of his job. Matador did not require any substantial investment by Martin for him to perform the work required of him. Matador determined Martin’s opportunity for profit and loss. Indeed, Matador controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Martin. Matador controlled the hours and locations Martin worked, the tools he used, and the rate of pay he received. Matador controlled all aspects of Martin’s job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Matador’s policies and procedures. He worked on Matador’s well sites and utilized equipment and software provided by Matador to perform his job duties on Matador’s behalf. Martin did not provide the equipment he used on a day-to-day basis. Matador made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, drilling equipment, personnel, tools, and supplied in the business in which Martin worked. Martin did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, and marketing. Martin was economically dependent on Matador during his employment. Matador directly determined Martin’s opportunity for profit and loss. Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Martin to perform his job duties. Martin performed routine duties that were largely dictated by Matador. Martin was not employed by Matador on a project-by-project basis. In fact, while Martin was classified as an independent contractor, he was regularly on call for Matador and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. The daily and weekly activities of the Day Rate Workers were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Matador. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Matador, including the tools to use at a job site, the data to compile, the schedule of work, and related work duties. The Day Rate Workers were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the pre-determined parameters. Moreover, the job functions of the Day Rate Workers were primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. For the purposes of an FLSA overtime claim, the Day Rate Workers performed substantially similar job duties related to servicing oil and gas operations in the field. The Day Rate Workers also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. The Day Rate Workers all worked in excess of 40 hours each week and were often scheduled for daily 12-hour shifts for weeks at a time. Instead of paying them overtime, Matador paid the Day Rate Workers a day-rate. Matador’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Martin, overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for FLSA purposes, non-exempt employees. It is undisputed that the contractors are maintaining and working with oilfield machinery, performing manual labor, and working long hours out in the field. These Day Rate Workers carry out the hands-on, day-to-day production work of Matador. Because Martin and the other Day Rate Workers were misclassified as an independent contractors, Matador owes them overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Despite knowing the FLSA and NMMWA’s requirements, Matador failed to pay Martin and the Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA and the NMMWA. Dozens of other individuals who worked with Martin indicated they were improperly classified as contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. Matador employed dozens of Day Rate Workers across New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. As a result, joinder of their individual claims is impracticable, and a class and collective action serves the interests of judicial economy. Based on his experiences and tenure with Matador, Martin is aware that Matador’s illegal practices were imposed on other Day Rate Workers. Matador used day rate contractors across the United States. The Day Rate Workers (including the subset that makes up the NMMWA Class) were all improperly classified as contractors and not afforded overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty 40 hours per week. Matador is an “employer” of Martin and the Day Rate Workers. Matador’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Day Rate Workers. Martin’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Day Rate Workers. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Day Rate Workers do not prevent class or collective treatment. Martin has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the members of the class. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. Absent this action, many members of the class likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Matador will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and the NMMWA.

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The Local Union represents the Southwest Airlines Flight Attendants. Local 556 of the Air Transport Division of the TWU was chartered as a Local on October 13, 1981, in the city of Dallas. Plaintiff Jackson began the process of obtaining signatures on recall petitions in August of 2015. The effort was made in response to actual violations of the Constitution and By- Laws committed by certain Executive Board members. At all times the recall effort was conducted in accordance with the union Constitution and By-Laws. On December 15, 2016, valid recall petitions signed by 7,592 TWU members in good standing were presented to the Local for verification as required by the By-Laws. The recall petitions alleged violations of the Local By-Laws Objectives Article II (b) and the TWU International Constitution Article XIX Section 5. The petitions met or exceeded the form requirements described in the By-Laws. The recall petitions sought the recall of Local 556 President Audrey Stone, 1st Vice President Todd Gage, 2nd Vice President Brett Nevarez, Recording Secretary Cuyler Thompson, Financial Secretary/Treasurer John Parrott, Board Member at Large Sam Wilkins, Board Member at Large Crystal Reven, DEBM1 Andrea Garnett, DEBM Stacey Vavakas, DEBM David Jackson, DEBM Pamila Forte, DEBM Rachel Brownfield, DEBM Jimmy West, and DEBM Matt Hettich. An appeal was filed with TWU International on January 17, 2017 at the request of union leadership. As of the date of filing, TWU International has refused to verify the recall petitions and comply with the Constitution and By-Laws. Multiple attempts were made, both by plaintiff Jackson and her counsel, to confer with legal counsel for International to assist and cooperate in the recall petition validation. Attempts to communicate and assist were ignored completely. In continuing to ignore the recall petitions of more than 50% of the eligible membership, both Local and International are depriving the members of rights as conferred in the Act and the governing documents of International and Local. IV. Each of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated and re-alleged. “The Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership.” Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982). Although the LMRDA as originally enacted focused on disclosure requirements and regulating union elections, over time various amendments have shifted the focus toward “protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution[.]” Id. To state a claim under § 412, plaintiffs must show (1) that they are members of a labor organization and (2) that the organization infringed a right secured by § 411, 412, 413, 414, or 415. See Martinez v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 980 F.2d 1039, 1041–42 (5th Cir. 1993). In repeatedly ignoring the valid recall petitions of plaintiffs, both Local and International have denied plaintiffs the equal rights provided for in the Act. Specifically, the Act recognizes that a member’s exercise of their equal rights are “subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” Here, plaintiffs are attempting to participate and engage in the rights described in the Act in conformity with the by-laws and constitution, but are improperly being blocked from doing so. In repeatedly ignoring the valid recall petitions of plaintiffs, the defendants have in effect deprived the plaintiffs of their freedom of speech and assembly, barring plaintiffs from having a voice in the conduct of the union’s business. Thus, the defendants violated§ 411(a)(1) and (2) and deprived Plaintiffs and other Local 556 members in good standing of their right to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business and elections of the union. Local 556 has adopted By-Laws that provide for the proper procedures and methods for the recall of an Officer of the Local. Said By-Laws apply to Local 556 members in good standing. The By-Laws are a contract between the Local 556 and its members. Local 556 Executive Board violated the By-Laws when it rejected Plaintiffs’ recall petitions and refused to verify signatures as required by the Constitution and By-Laws. As of the date of filing, Local and TWU International have refused to verify the recall petitions and comply with the Constitution and By-Laws. In their recall petitions, Plaintiffs allege violations of the Constitutions and By- Laws that severely and materially affect the members of the union on a daily basis. A recall election is a method by which the members can remove from power those who negatively impact their rights, do not work in their best interests, and violate the governing documents and principles of the union. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that may be granted only if the plaintiff establishes four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1998). Unless Defendants are restrained, Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured, and suffer loss and damage by Defendants' wrongful conduct described above. Specifically, the conduct complained of in the recall petitions will continue, and the plaintiffs will continue to be harmed. Unless this Court issues a preliminary injunction, the Board will continue to block a democratically held election for new Executive Board members. Further, unless Defendant is immediately enjoined, Plaintiffs will have no adequate remedy at law. An injunction would not disserve the public interest. On the contrary, an injunction blocking the defendants’ attempts to violate the rights conferred to plaintiffs under the Act would serve the public interest and fulfill the purpose of the Act as envisioned by Congress. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from any and all such conduct that serves to block or prevent the recall election as provided in Article X of the By-Laws. Preliminary injunction is also sought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 412. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court concerning the rights and legal relations as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they have complied with the requirements of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Local and International and are thus entitled to a recall election. Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The putative class members are defined as: all Local 556 members in good standing who affixed their signature, employee number, and the date to a recall petition as set forth in Article X of the By-Laws of the Local. Numerosity: The class consists of approximately 8,000 members (additional recall petitions are received daily). The class is therefore so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact that are common to the class. Because each class member affixed their signature to the same recall petition, the violations alleged herein apply to each class member equally. Typicality: The claims of the representative Jeanna Jackson are typical of the class members as each have sought recall of Officers of the Local pursuant to Article X of the By-Laws. Adequacy of Representation: As a member in good standing of the Local, plaintiff Jackson’s claims are so identical to those putative class members that her claim and efforts to enforce the provisions of the By-Laws show prima facie evidence of adequacy of representation. Plaintiff Jackson was the party initiating the recall effort on behalf of the putative class. The Transport Workers Union of America is affiliated with the AFL-CIO and the World Wide International Transport Workers Federation. All TWU Members belong to Locals formed on the basis of interest and geographic location. The Members elect their own Local Officers who handle most of their issues and business. The International coordinates the activities of the Divisions and the Locals and assists in negotiations, organizing drives and legislative campaigns. It provides professional legal, education, research and public relations services to the Locals and Divisions.

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. Violations New Yot~k Labor Law Nonpayrnent of Straight \Vages 190 et .\·eq. and (J50 et !>;eq. and "'12 NYCRR I C~unille Forest and the New York Class) Due to Defendants' violations of the NYLL, are entitled to recover from attorneys' and costs of the action, and Plaintiffs do not seek liquidated In embers of the York Class but reserves their right to do so. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. 8 all 216(b ), specifically, on state years were: (a) not (b) were not -L., 'L'" ~ and (c) were not compensated tor time worked over forty hours per week at overtime rates (the '·FLSA Collective controlling interest in the Company or JCP. excluded are and entities who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion fro1n the Collective Plaintiti is unable to state the exact nmnber of the without discovery of Defendants' books and records but estimates the hundred if not thousands individuals. and during required tneal periods and to perfonn work on-the-clock and/or off-the-clock for vvhich they were not fully compensated. Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff and n1en1bers of the FLSA Collective Class time and one half their regular rate of pay tor hours worked beyond forty hours in a workweek. Defendants' unlawful conduct has been \videspread, repeated and consistent. Defendants' conduct was willful and in bad faith and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class. 9 the tn are known to Defendants and are identifiable Excluded from the New York Class are Defendants, their legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has or had a controlling interest in the Company or JCP. Also excluded are persons and entities who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the New York Class. As of January 28, 2012, JCP operated 43 stores in New York State. In addition, Defendants employed hundreds of hourly-wage employees at its New York based department 10 numerous were not rv•~"""""'"~'<Cl1'£::.r1 and during meal to comply with the NYLL. The Plaintiffs and other New York that they have uncompensated or under-compensated comn1on uv''"'·.d,\.1.:>. practices, and patterns of conduct. H4U,l\,LLL<J and Defendants' have been to Defendants' Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the York PlaintitTs have retained counsel competent and experienced in cmnplex class action and and hour litigation. There is no cont1ict between the Plaintiffs and the New York Con11non law and fact as to the that are not lin1ited to, the following: (a) vVhether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class for off-the-clock tin1e spent working in violation of New York Law; (b) Whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay PlaintitTs and the New York Class for all of the compensable time that they worked for Defendants while clocked-in; (c) Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time records for all 11 (f) (g) (h) Whether to compensated; Whether willfully or with The nature and extent of InJUrieS. adjudication of the controversy to York Labor § the the posting and notice practice York Plaintitis and New York Class Defendants~ benefit which was not tailing to pay was instituted tC't"t:>Cr'l!r'rl of the law; and and the tneasure of datnages for treattnent will pern1it a large nmnber of sitnilarly situated persons to prosecute their cmnn1on clain1s in a single forum siinultaneously, efficiently and 'Without the duplication of eflort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. Individual class members' damages are inadequate to justify the costs of prosecuting their claims in any manner other than a class action. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Members of the New York Class are readily identifiable from Defendants' own 12 L their nr't'r..-..•~,,~,, course that will result ..,, ... T .... "''""' ~·-U11--~....,""" to Plaintitls and the New intend to send notice to all 1ne1nbers of the New York Class to the extent The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the satne were fully set forth herein. Pursuant to New York Labor Law §§ 190, 191, 193, 198 and 652, Defendants have willfully failed to pay the straight wages due as set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint to Plaintiffs and the New York Class in violation of New York Labor Law §§ 190, 191,193,198 and652 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 142-2.1 and 142-2.2. Defendants were not and are not permitted by state or federal law, or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, to withhold or divert any portion of the Plaintiffs' and the New 15 concern to not court worked at established rate. New York Class, seek the amount of at least the tninimum Labor Law., and such other not but reserves their right to do so. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 142-2.1 and 142-2.2 apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiffs and 16 to '""'1"\rt"r'r•"V\"'1'~r of Regulations. New York Labor Law- Unpaid Overtime (On Behalf of the New York Class) The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff, Afza AnJum and the FLSA Collective Class) same were fully set forth herein. At all relevant Defendants and to be, "employers'' commerce, within the § At all relevant continue to etnploy, employees, including Plaintiff and of the of are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth bring Anjum, Terrana, Veronica Monahan and Camille Forest own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Article 9 of New York on behalf of a Class consisting of: years not 'fJ'-'"k'"'"'"'". f(x all work perton11ed while clocked-in; (b) were not all work perfonned while off-the-clock; and (c) were not c01npensated for titne worked over torty hours per week at overtitne rates (the ··New York Class'').

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Halliburton is an oil and natural gas company operating worldwide and throughout the United States and employs oilfield personnel to carry out its work. For example, Plaintiff worked exclusively for Halliburton from approximately April 2015 to March 2015 and October 2015 until February 2016 as an oilfield contractor/solids control operator. Throughout his employment with Halliburton, he was classified as an independent contractor and paid on a day-rate basis. As an oilfield contractor/ solids control operator, his primary job duties included maintaining and operating solids control equipment and rigging up and rigging down oilfield equipment. Halliburton typically scheduled Plaintiff to work 12 hour shifts, for as many as 7 days a week. Plaintiff worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by Halliburton. The work Plaintiff performed was an essential party of Halliburton’s core business. During Plaintiff’s employment with Halliburton while he was classified as an independent contractor, Halliburton and/or the company it contracted with exercised control over all aspects of his job. Halliburton did not require any substantial investment by Plaintiff in order for him to perform the work required of him. Halliburton determined Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit and loss. Plaintiff was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other individuals working in his same job position) to perform his job duties. Plaintiff worked exclusively for Halliburton, while working for Halliburton. Indeed, Halliburton and/or the company it contracted with controlled all of the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Plaintiff. Halliburton ordered the hours and locations Plaintiff worked, tools used, and rates of pay received. No real investment was required of Plaintiff to perform his job. More often than not, Plaintiff utilized equipment provided by Halliburton and/or its client to perform his job duties. Plaintiff did not provide the equipment he worked with on a daily basis. Halliburton and/or its clients made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, equipment, tools, and supplied in the business in which Plaintiff worked. Plaintiff did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. Plaintiff was economically dependent on Halliburton during his employment. Halliburton set Plaintiff’s rates of pay, his work schedule, and prohibited him from working other jobs for other companies while he was working on jobs for Halliburton. Halliburton directly determined Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit and loss. Plaintiff’s earning opportunity was based on the number of days Halliburton scheduled him to work. Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Plaintiff to perform his job duties. Plaintiff performed routine manual and technical labor duties that were largely dictated by Halliburton and/or its clients. Plaintiff was not employed by Halliburton on a project-by-project basis. In fact, while Plaintiff was classified as an independent contractor, he was regularly on call for Halliburton and/or its clients and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. The Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. The Putative Class Members all worked in excess of 40 hours each week and were often scheduled for 12 hour shifts for weeks at a time. Instead of paying them overtime, Halliburton paid the Putative Class Members a day-rate. Halliburton denied the Putative Class Members overtime for any and all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Halliburton’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Plaintiff, overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non- exempt job duties. It is undisputed that the Putative Class Members are maintaining and working with oilfield machinery, performing manual labor, and working long hours out in the field. Halliburton’s day-rate system violates the FLSA because Plaintiff and the other day- rate workers classified as independent contractors did not receive any pay for hours worked over 40 hours each week. VI. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the members of the Class. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA. Based on his experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the members of the Class. The members of the Class were all improperly classified as independent contractors and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the members of the Class. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the members of the Class. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various members of the Class do not prevent class or collective treatment. Plaintiff has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the members of the Class. Like each member of the Class, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed under state and/or federal law. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. Absent this Action, many members of the Class likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA. Furthermore, even if some of the members of the Class could afford individual litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. The questions of law and fact common to each of the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Defendant employed the members of the Class within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the members of the Class were improperly misclassified as independent contractors; c. Whether Defendant’s decision to classify the members of the Class as independent contractors was made in good faith; d. Whether Defendant’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the members of the Class was made in good faith; e. Whether Defendant’s violation of the FLSA was willful; and f. Whether Defendant’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation to all members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform employment policy. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective action. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective action treatment. X.

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California Copyright Law The facts in support of this action are based on Plaintiff’s review of publicly- available information. Based on a review of these documents, and as described in greater detail herein, Plaintiff believes that discovery will result in the production of many more inculpatory documents within Defendants’ sole possession, custody, or control. A. State Copyright Law Regulates Pre-1972 Recordings Under the 1972 Amendments of the United States Copyright Act, Congress provided that sound recordings “fixed” (i.e., recorded) before February 15, 1972 are within the exclusive province of state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). Thus, state common and statutory law applies to these Pre-1972 Recordings. Plaintiff asserts claims under California, New York, and Florida law. Each of these state’s protections for Pre-1972 Recordings is discussed in greater detail below. The music industry is synonymous with California. The making and exploitation of sound recordings in California employs tens of thousands of Californians and contributes millions upon millions of dollars to the state and local economies. California, in turn, has Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page4 of 18 This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of itself and members of a Class defined as follows: All owners of sound recordings or musical performances that were initially “fixed” on a physical medium (i.e., recorded) prior to February 15, 1972 and whose sound recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited by Sony in the States of California, New York and Florida through its Music Unlimited and for which Sony had not received authorization or license to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit. Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page8 of 18 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. Under California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and members of the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the performances embodied in those recordings. Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Music Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page10 of 18 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of unfair competition, which mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices. Fair dealings with artists are matters of great public concern in California and elsewhere. As a society, we value creative expression, and accordingly foster and protect such expression through copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws. Specifically applicable here is Senate Bill No. 1034, where the California Legislature determined that “the recording industry is an important industry to the State of California,” and that “artistic labor is an important resource to the people of California that is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant recording industry.” As alleged herein, Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Music Unlimited. As such, Defendants have infringed Plaintiff’s and Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page11 of 18 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. Under California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the members of the Class possess exclusive ownerships in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. Plaintiff and the members of the Class (or their predecessors in interest) invested substantial time and money in developing the Pre-1972 Recordings that Defendants reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited on Music Unlimited. Because Defendants did not obtain licenses to the Pre-1972 Recordings, they did not incur any of the costs that a licensee would otherwise be obligated to pay in order to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit these recordings. Defendants have and continue to misappropriate for its commercial benefit the Pre-1972 Recordings through its Music Unlimited. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ misappropriation, Defendants have received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the Class. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, but which is likely to be tens of millions of dollars. Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendants’ conduct was undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and other members of the Class’s rights to the Pre- 1972 Recordings. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to punitive damages against Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page13 of 18 Misappropriation Under California, New York And Florida Law Unlawful and Unfair Business Acts and Practices in Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2)

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However, Defendant does not solicit individuals and businesses for their permission to list their information in its online directories. Instead, Defendant collects contact information from several data aggregation and collection companies, such as Acxiom and Infogroup. As such, Defendant publishes the information without the listed individuals or companies verifying the accuracy of the information. Nevertheless, once Defendant has collected and published the acquired information, it places marketing calls to the phone numbers listed. Defendant makes these calls in an attempt to sell to the recipient upgraded, paid-for directory offers (e.g., enhanced or prioritized business listings). These marketing calls primarily come from 913 area codes, which covers the Overland Park, Kansas area, which is home to Defendant’s $20 million call center.1 The phone numbers used by Defendant include, but are not limited to, (913) 725-7588, (913) 725-7773, (913) 725-7738, (913) 725-7971, and (913) 725-7784. Recipients of these marketing phone calls, like Plaintiff and the putative Class, did not request or desire to be called by Defendant, and did not provide any form of consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff registered his landline telephone number with the National Do Not Call Registry on January 20, 2011 for the express purpose of preventing unwanted telemarketing calls. As Plaintiff did not recognize the numbers the calls were coming from, he did not answer them. However, on at least one occasion, Defendant’s telemarketer left a message on Plaintiff’s voicemail. The message indicated that it was Defendant Dex Media calling and that the telemarketer wanted to speak with Plaintiff about opportunities related to his “listings.” Plaintiff had no knowledge of any of the listings mentioned by the telemarketer, and he had not created any listing on SuperPages or DexPages. Upon investigation, Plaintiff viewed that Defendant had published his full name and residential landline number (as well as his city and state) on its business directory websites under the category “Psychologists.” Plaintiff is not, and never has been, a psychologist. Plaintiff’s wife, on the other hand, is a licensed psychologist but does not currently practice and has not for several years. Nevertheless, neither Plaintiff nor his wife has ever used their residential landline telephone number for any purpose related to a psychologist practice. Likewise, neither Plaintiff nor his wife ever requested or desired that anything related to any psychologist practice be placed on Defendant’s business websites. Defendant is and was aware that the unsolicited phone calls at issue were (and are continuing to be) made, and that the calls were being made to consumers and entities that had not consented to receive them. Plaintiff Stephen Dierks brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals and entities defined as follows (the “Class”): All individuals in the United States (1) who had his or her telephone number(s) registered with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (2) to whom Defendant Dex Media, Inc. initiated more than one telephone call promoting Defendant’s products or services; (3) within a 12-month period; and (4) for whom Defendant has no current record of consent to place such calls to him or her. The following persons are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families, (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors, (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class, (4) persons who have had their claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released, (5) the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of any such excluded persons, and (6) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common and predominant questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; (b) Whether Defendant and/or its agents systematically made telephone calls to members of the Class who Defendant and/or its agents did not have a current record of consent to make such telephone calls; (c) Whether Defendant and/or its agents systematically made telephone calls to members of the Class whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry; and (d) Whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and making of unsolicited telephone calls. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s policies challenged herein apply and affect members of the Class uniformly and Plaintiff’s challenge of these policies hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward members of the Class. The factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class are the same, resulting in injury to the Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 47 U.S.C. §227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” Defendant violated § 64.1200 (c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to wireless and residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. These individuals requested to not receive calls from Defendant or its agents, as set forth in § 64.1200 (d)(3). Defendant and/or its agents made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and members of the Class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the Class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Defendant (or its agents) and/or Defendant (and/or its agents) does not have a current record of consent to place telemarketing calls to them. Defendant violated § 64.1200 (d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the Class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Class. 200. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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As joint employers, Defendants provide home health care services to elderly and/or infirm individuals through home health care aides such as Plaintiff. Defendants serve clients in Connecticut. Defendants employ individuals as home health care aides within their clients' homes. The specific work assignments and hours of operation are determined by Defendants. Defendants assign the home health care aides employed by them to work fixed schedules based upon the needs of Defendants’ clients. Defendants require the home health care employed by them to obtain Defendants’ approval in advance of any change to their schedule, including for vacation, personal days or sick days. Defendants require the home health care aides employed by them to record their hours spent at each client’s residence. Defendants require the home health care aides employed by them to address to Defendants any concerns, complaints, requests or other issues that arise in connection with the provision of services to Defendants’ clients; Defendants specifically prohibit the home health care aides employed by them from bringing such matters directly to the attention of Defendants’ clients. Defendants do not require that the home health care aides employed by them provide any financial investment in the operation of Defendants’ business. Defendants market their service through various forms of advertising, license and insure their home health care aides in the performance of service for Defendants’ clients, coordinate the placement of their home health care aides with specific clients, arrange for coverage of services to clients when Defendants’ home health care aides request time off and handle all billing and collection for home health care services performed by their home health care aides. During her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Scott was not entitled to earn any incentive, bonus, commission or profit share other than the compensation paid to her by Defendants as wages for hours worked. Upon information and belief, Defendants have never paid any other individual employed by them as a home health care aid any incentive, bonus, commission or profit share other than the compensation paid to them as wages for hours worked. Upon information and belief, Defendants are compensated by various payors, including Medicaid, Medicare, private insurance companies, and directly by their clients. The payors are billed hourly based on the amount of time Defendants’ aides spend within the clients' homes. For purposes of the FLSA collective action, the collective is defined as: All home health care aides employed by Defendants on and after three years from the date this action is commenced who were not paid overtime for hours worked over forty in a workweek. Similarly situated former and current employees are readily identifiable through Defendants' records. These similarly situated employees can be located and should be notified of and allowed to opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a class of employees who were and are employed as home health aides by Defendants from April 7, 2011 through the present day and who were not properly paid overtime pay and/or had unlawful deductions taken from their wages pursuant to the CGS for the period March 12, 2017. Common questions of fact exist as to all of the members of the proposed class and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members -- namely, whether Defendants did not pay overtime wages to and/or made unlawful wage deductions from their employees who were and are home health care aides. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed class, as Plaintiff and the other members' sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct of Defendants in failing to pay overtime wages and making unlawful wage deductions. Plaintiff is represented by [local counsel] and Charny & Wheeler P.C. which has the resources, expertise and experience necessary to prosecute this class action and their attorneys do not have knowledge of any conflicts among the potential members of the class or their respective counsel. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy raised in this lawsuit because: (1) the prosecution of separate actions would be inefficient and wasteful of judicial resources; (2) the members of the proposed class are likely located throughout the Northeast Region and are not likely to be able to vindicate and enforce their claims unless this action is maintained as a class action; (3) the issues raised can be more fairly and efficiently resolved in the context of a single action rather than piecemeal litigation in separate actions; (4) the resolution of litigation in a single forum will avoid the risk of confusion and possible inconsistent determinations; (5) the prosecution of separate actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individuals pursuing claims against the defendants which would establish incompatible standards of conduct; (6) the defendants have acted on grounds applicable to all class members, making final declaratory relief on behalf of all members necessary and appropriate; and (7) questions of law and fact common to members of the class on issues of liability predominate over any questions, such as those of individual damages, that will affect individual class members. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations. Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated for workweeks longer than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated for the time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular hourly rate, in violation of the requirements of the FLSA. As a consequence of the willful underpayment of wages, Plaintiff and those employees similarly situated have incurred damages and Defendants are indebted to them in the amount of the unpaid overtime compensation, together with interest, liquidated damages and attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations. Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated for workweeks longer than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff for the time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular hourly rate, in violation of the requirements of the CGS. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations. During the term of her employment with Defendants, Defendants deducted a meals credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated. Defendants represented that the basis for such deductions was the existence of an arrangement by which their client would provide meals to Plaintiff and others similarly situated at a value equivalent to the amount of such deduction. By way of their complaints, Defendants had actual and constructive notice that Plaintiffs and other employees similarly situated did not receive the meals for which the meals credit were intended to be deducted. Notwithstanding such notice, Defendants deducted the meal credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated. Defendants' deduction of the meals credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated constitutes an unlawful deduction within the meaning of CGS. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME IN VIOLATION OF THE FLSA Collective Action FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES IN VIOLATION OF STATE LAW Class Action UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION OF WAGES IN VIOLATION OF CGS Class Action

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of the PWMA) A. PMWA COVERAGE 119. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 120. The PMWA Class is defined as: (Class Action Alleging Violations of the Ohio Acts) A. OHIO ACTS COVERAGE (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE Rice Energy is an oil and natural gas company operating primarily in Pennsylvania and Ohio in the Marcellus, Utica and Upper Devonian Shales.”3 To provide their services, Rice Energy employed numerous Completion Consultants—including the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. While exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work in the oilfield. Plaintiff Phillips has worked for Rice Energy as a Completion Consultant from approximately March 2014 through the present. Plaintiff Phillips has worked for Rice Energy in both Pennsylvania and Ohio. Rice Energy paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a day rate for each day and all hours worked. Specifically, Plaintiff Phillips was paid $1,100.00 per day worked in the field, but did not receive overtime compensation at the required rate of time-and-one-half for all hours worked over forty (40) each workweek. Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Rice Energy did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would conduct their day-to-day activities within mandatory and designed parameters and in accordance with pre-determined operational plans created by Rice Energy and/or its clients. Upon further information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Rice Energy and/or its clients. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Rice Energy and/or its clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the schedule of work, and related work duties. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the predetermined parameters. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. Indeed, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are blue-collar workers. They rely on their hands, physical skills, and energy to perform manual and routine labor in the oilfield. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not (and currently do not) have the authority to hire or fire other employees, and they were not (and currently are not) responsible for making hiring or firing recommendations. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) concern work directly related to the management or general business operations of Rice Energy or its customers. Rice Energy determined the hours Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked. Rice Energy set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ pay and controlled the number of days (and hours) they worked. Rice Energy set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. Rice Energy maintained control over pricing and marketing. Rice Energy also chose equipment and product suppliers. Rice Energy owned or controlled the equipment and supplies that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used to perform their work. Rice Energy had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. Rice Energy made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members an hourly wage with no overtime pay. Rice Energy reimbursed Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for expenses and bought or provided tools and equipment that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked continuously for Rice Energy on a permanent full-time basis. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members relied on Rice Energy for their work. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not market any business or services of their own. Instead, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked the hours assigned by Rice Energy, performed duties assigned by Rice Energy, worked on projects assigned by Rice Energy, and worked for the benefit of Rice Energy and its customers. Rice Energy paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members on a weekly basis. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not earn a profit based on any business investment of their own. Rather, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ only earning opportunity was based on the number of days (and hours) they were allowed to work, which was controlled by Rice Energy and/or its customers. Rice Energy improperly classified Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members as independent contractors. The classification was improper because Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not in business for themselves. Instead, they were economically dependent upon Rice Energy for their work. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. The FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA mandate that overtime be paid at one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay. Under the Ohio Acts overtime shall be paid in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the FLSA. O.R.C. § 4111.03(A). Rice Energy denied Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay as a result of a widely applicable, illegal pay practice. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation. Rice Energy applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that states that the manual labor/technical, routine duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members consisted of non-exempt work. Accordingly, Rice Energy’s pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA. V. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. The FLSA Collective is defined as: All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all those who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff. Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Rice Energy’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 59. Rice Energy’s failure to pay any overtime compensation results from generally applicable policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the individual FLSA Collective Members. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Rice Energy employed a substantial number of similarly situated workers since August 31, 2014. Upon information and belief, these workers are geographically dispersed, residing and working in locations across the United States. Because these workers do not have fixed work locations, they may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Rice Energy will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 59 and notice should be promptly sent. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. The Ohio Acts Class is defined as:

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The name of the original creditor to whom the account is owed: The Complaint contained the numerical code "1564980,, in the footer. See id. The Clerk of the Court issued a Summons on December 3, 2015. See Exhibit No. 2. RMC prepared the Summons. The Summons contained the numerical code "1564980" in the footer. See id. The Complaint was accompanied by an "Affidavit and Assignment of Account" which contained the numerical code "R-1564980" in the footer. See Exhibit No. 3. RMC served the Complaint, Affidavit and Summons on the Plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.) The "Information and Instructions,, stated: l~PORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS 156t910 crv. 1Tcv-1c:zz3'7t'J A lawsuit has been filed again.t you. The relief demanded i• stated in the attached coaiplaint. Within 30 days after aervice of the 8WllllOn8 on you (not counting the day you received it) or 60 d&ya if you are incarcarated in any jail, penitentiary, or other correctional facility in Arkan8aa-you 11Uat file with the clerk of this court a written anawer to the COlllplaint or a 1110tion under Rule 12 of the Arltanaaa Rules of Civil Procedure. Below, pl-•• find an a~r form to fill out and return to the Court. You are alao required to mail a copy of the an.ewer to the Plaintiff. Ple&M ~ a copy of this foni for your records. :.;. IMPORTAJIT: IP YOO PAIL TO PILlt A MR:ITTD NISWD WITHill THS TDG ~; ALLOWSD, A DSPAULT JUDGMINT WILL BB BNTSUD .MU.INST YOU POR THB AMOt4f'r OP THI CLAIM PILED, PLUS COURT COSTS, ATTORllBY nu. SBJtVICB nss ~ ,· INTD&S'l'. IP THIS OCCtJRS, YOUR WAGES MY BB QMUIJ:SDD OR YOOR ~-. PROPBRTY MAY Bl TAKBll AND SOLD TO PAY THB JUDGMBRT. ~~- ~~ ~ Plaintiffbrings this Action as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff sues on her own behalf and for the following class: All consumers residing in Arkansas who, commencing one year before the date of filing this Complaint, were served by RMC "Information and Instructions,,, in an attempt to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, to the date of certification. (the "Class"). Plaintiff is a member of the Class. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all Class members in that all putative Class members were served "Information and Instructions,,, forms by 3001 W ROOSEVELT LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72004 Plaintiff incorporates all paragraphs by reference. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. §1692k, reasonable attorney's fees and costs. NATURE AND AMOUNT OF RELIEF CLAIMED: THAT THE DEFENDANT ONE METHOD TO PREVENT THE PLAINTIFF FROM SEEKING JUDGMENT IS TO PAY THE PRINCIPAL, COURT COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES AND SERVICE FEES WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE YOU RECEIVE THIS OR 60 DAYS IF YOU ARE INCARCERATED IN ANY JAIL, PENITENTIARY, OR OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IN ARKANSAS - YOU MUST FILE WITH OWED BY THE DEFENDANT. PLAINTIFF: RMC OF AMERICA vs. civ: eccv-1s--c~10 RMC OF AMERICA vs. PLAINTIFF CIV: fC.CV-15-2~70 The undersigned authorized representative of the Creditor herein, being first duly sworn and deposed do hereby state on oath as follows:

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Plaintiff seek to represent a class of individuals (“the Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States, from four years prior to the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom Defendant, using the Autodialer or another device with identical characteristics, made text message telephone calls to the persons’ cellular telephone, that are identical or substantially similar to the text message telephone calls Defendant made to Plaintiff on or about September 11, 2015. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the Class’s members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. Upon information and belief the Class contains at a minimum thousands of members. Upon information and belief, the Class’s size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s call records. Members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to the Class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the Class. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s making text message calls to Plaintiff’s and the members of Class’s cellular telephones, which text message was identical or substantially similar to the text message Defendant sent to Plaintiff on September 11, 2015, using the Autodialer or another device with identical characteristics, violated the TCPA? (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class provided Defendant with prior express consent to the above-described text message calls? (c) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under the TCPA? (d) Whether Defendant’s violations of the TCPA were willful or knowing? (e) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to up to triple statutory damages under the TCPA from Defendant for Defendant’s willful and knowing violations of the TCPA? (f) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction under the TCPA enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct? Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the Class are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendant by any member of the Class. The likelihood of the individual members of the Class prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the Class. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. By Defendant's above-described conduct, Defendant committed more than 10,000 violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and the members of the Class. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $5,000,000 and an injunction against Defendant ordering them to cease their violations of the TCPA. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA through its calls to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, Plaintiff and the members of the Class request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $15,000,000.

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) In an effort to solicit more clients on behalf of third parties, Defendants sent unsolicited text messages, without consent, to cellular telephones while using automatic telephone dialing equipment having the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, en masse. As a result, Defendants has repeatedly violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (the “TCPA”). Given the relatively low cost associated with sending bulk text messages, many marketers have turned to disseminating advertisements or promotions through mass text message campaigns. Seeking to market the services of third parties to consumers and, in turn, grow their customer bases, Defendants engaged in this especially invasive form of advertising. Defendants sent unauthorized text messages to the phones of thousands of consumers. In fact, the promotional text message calls alleged herein were exclusively made by Defendants and not by any consumer. Defendants made the same (or substantially the same) text message calls en masse to thousands of cellular telephone numbers. While Defendants sent these unauthorized text messages to consumers to market its services, it never obtained recipients' express consent to do so. Through its conduct, Defendants caused consumers actual harm by sending unauthorized text message calls at issue. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not only subjected to the aggregation that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unauthorized text messages, but also because consumers frequently have to pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such unauthorized text messages. Defendants sent a text message call from an SMS-enabled land-line phone number, 504-608-2546, to Plaintiff’s telephone number. The software and/or hardware used by Defendants to enable texting on the landline also had the capacity to store, produce, and dial random and sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. The message was an advertisement written in an impersonal manner and Plaintiff had no other reason to be in contact with Defendants. Plaintiff did not provide prior express written consent to receive text messages from Defendants. Defendants' intrusive text messages adversely affected Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Defendants were and are aware that the above-described text message calls were being made on a widespread basis, and that the text message calls were being made to consumers who had not consented to receive them. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have sent promotional text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendants' records. Typicality: Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants' uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff’s claims are representative of the claims of the other members of the Class. That is, Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct and received substantially the same text messages. Plaintiff also has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Class. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing "Class Allegations" and "Class Definition" based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. In an effort to obtain clients, Defendants made unsolicited and unwanted text message calls to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephones without their prior express consent. Defendants sent the promotional text messages to Plaintiff and the Class's cellular telephone numbers using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse. Defendants utilized equipment that sent the promotional text messages to Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human intervention. By sending the promotional text messages to Plaintiffs and members of the Class's cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). Because Defendants' misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. Additionally, as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Defendants’ violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future. As a result of the foregoing and as per applicable law including, but not limited to, the doctrines of respondeat superior, franchisor and franchisee, as well as principal and agent, INTELIQUENT, INC. has been named herein as a party-defendant, and to whom liability for the negligent and/or willful violations of the TCPA committed by Defendant

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On or about September 15, 2015, Defendant sent an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Exhibit A. The Fax advertises the commercial availability and quality of Defendant’s new Musculoskeletal Newsletter. On that basis, the Fax is an advertisement under the TCPA and regulations implementing the TCPA. Defendant provides managed healthcare services. See Internet Google result: eviCore healthcare Organization CareCore National, LLC, doing business as eviCore healthcare, provides managed healthcare services. The Company offers radiology, radiation therapy, cardiology, medical oncology, lab management, and health plan, as well as other specialty solutions. Additionally, see from Defendant’s website, www.evicore.com: ABOUT EVICORE: Empowering the Improvement of Care Specifically designed with the size and scale to address the complexity of today’s and tomorrow’s healthcare system, eviCore is a company committed to advancing healthcare management through intelligent care – and enabling better outcomes for patients, providers, and health plans. Ours is an evidence-based approach that leverages our exceptional capabilities, powerful analytics, and acute sensitivity to the challenges and needs of everyone involved across the healthcare continuum. By applying proven talent and leading-edge technology, we harness healthcare’s evolving demand and inherent change to realize healthcare innovation and deliver improved results and a positive experience for everyone. Who We Empower eviCore empowers the improvement of care by connecting patients, providers, and health plans with intelligent, evidence-based solutions to enable better outcomes. Plaintiff did not give “prior express invitation or permission” to Defendant to send the Fax. On information and belief, Defendant faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimile advertisements without compliant opt-out language to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized fax advertisements. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. Defendant’s facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of Defendant advertising the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods or services of during the Class Period. Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for himself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. Defendant has acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar fax or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). The Fax. On or about September 15, 2015, Defendant sent the Fax via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act and the regulations implementing the Act. Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and Defendant is precluded from sustaining the EBR safe harbor with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes this Fax and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. The TCPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods or services; (b) Defendant transmitted advertisements; (c) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (d) Defendant’s transmission of unsolicited advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful.

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(FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938) (NEW JERSEY WAGE AND HOUR LAW) (NEW JERSEY WAGE PAYMENT LAW) Plaintiff and all Collective Group/Class Members have been employed by Defendant and worked as Laborers and/or Operators out of Defendant’s office/facility in the State of New Jersey. Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members for their time spent traveling to and from Defendant’s office/facility to customer locations and performing physical tasks after beginning their work day as required by the FLSA and NJWHL. At the Defendant’s office/facility, Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members were required to pick-up the keys to their work vehicles, load their work vehicles with the equipment needed for the day’s work and, at times, repair equipment that needed to be so repaired. At the end of the workday, unless they were staying overnight at local lodging, the Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members were required to return back to the Defendant’s office/facility and turn-in the keys to their work vehicles and, at times, unload the equipment from their work vehicles. Defendant took unlawful deductions from Plaintiff and the Collective Groups’/Class Members’ pay in violation of the NJWPL in the form of charging them “company benefit costs” which were costs for gloves, ear plugs, Tyvek suits and other similar items that were required to perform work for the Defendant. Defendant’s failure to pay the Collective Group/Class Members for all time worked, including time spent traveling for Defendant’s purposes to and from its offices, to and from the customer locations resulted in the Collective Group/Class Members being denied legally required compensation. When factoring in the additional hours described above, Defendant also failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members 1.5 times their hourly rate for all hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week as required by the NJWHL. Defendant’s unlawful deductions from the Collective Groups’/Class Members’ pay denied them compensation to which they were legally entitled to receive. Plaintiff brings count one set forth below as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and all other individuals who, any time after April 2015, worked as Laborers and/or Operators out of the Defendant’s New Jersey office/facility. Plaintiff and all individuals who, any time after April 2015, worked as Laborers and/or Operators out of the Defendant’s New Jersey office/facility are similarly situated in that they have all been subject to the Defendant’s common wage payment practices. Upon information and belief, Defendant knew that the Plaintiff and all similarly situated individuals performed work that required payment. As a result, Defendant’s conduct was willful. Count one of this Complaint for violations of the FLSA may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because the Plaintiff’s claim is similar to the claims of all Laborers and/or Operators who worked out of the Defendant’s New Jersey office/facility. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and Collective Group members, and notice of this lawsuit should be sent to them. Those similarly situated individuals are known to the Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. Class action treatment is appropriate because, as summarized in Paragraphs 28-34 below, all of Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied. The class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is a Class Member, his claims are typical of the claims of other Class Members and he has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of other Class Members. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class Members and their interests, and he has retained competent and experienced counsel who will effectively represent the Class Members’ interests. Questions of law and fact are common to all Class Members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would run the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. Prosecution as a class action will also eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation. Plaintiff reasserts Paragraphs 1-34 as if set forth at length herein. Defendant’s conduct against Plaintiff and the Collective Group Members violates the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Collective Group Members have endured significant economic damages. Plaintiff reasserts Paragraphs 1-37 as if set forth at length herein. Defendant’s conduct against Plaintiff and the Class Members violates the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a38. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class Members have endured significant economic damages. Defendant’s conduct against Plaintiff and the Class Members violates the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -4.14, by reducing the payments made to Plaintiff and the Class Members to account for various deductions, charges and/or expenses that do not benefit Plaintiff or other Class Members. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class Members have endured significant economic damages.

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Named Plaintiffs bring this action for violations of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons presently and formerly employed by Defendants who were non-exempt employees, who were subject to Defendants’ unlawful pay practices and policies discussed herein, and who worked for Defendants at any point in the three years preceding the date the instant action was initiated (the members of this putative class are referred to as “Collective Plaintiffs”). Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs are similarly situated, have substantially similar job duties, have substantially similar pay provisions, and are all subject to Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as discussed herein. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who were compensated improperly for overtime work in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a Court Supervised Notice of the instant lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who Defendants failed to pay an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek, all of whom would benefit from the issuance of a Court Supervised Notice of the instant lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. Similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable by Defendants, and can be located through Defendants’ records. Therefore, Named Plaintiffs should be permitted to bring this action as a collective action for and on behalf of themselves and those employees similarly situated (i.e., “Collective Plaintiffs”), pursuant to the “opt-in” provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Named Plaintiffs were hourly employees of Defendant East Coast, who within the last three years were employed by Defendant East Coast. Collective Plaintiffs were/are hourly employees of Defendant East Coast, who within the last three years were employed by Defendant East Coast. Upon information and belief, each paycheck issued to Collective Plaintiffs provides that they were hourly employees and were paid an hourly wage. Defendants did not designate Named Plaintiffs as exempt employees under federal or state law. Defendants did not designate Collective Plaintiffs as exempt employees under federal or state law. Upon information and belief, Defendants have maintained an unlawful wage payment system for at least the last three years and have enforced such unlawful policies. At all times relevant herein, Defendants have and continue to be employers within the meaning of the FLSA. At all times relevant herein, Defendants were responsible for paying wages to Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs. At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs were employed with Defendants as “non-exempt employees” within the meaning of the FLSA. Under the FLSA, an employer must pay a non-exempt employee at least one and one half times his or her regular rate for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA include, but are not limited to, not paying Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs proper overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek and issuing paychecks designed to hide Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs properly is willful and not based upon any reasonable interpretation of the law. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs have suffered damages as set forth herein. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. At all times relevant herein, Defendants were responsible for paying wages to Named Plaintiffs. At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiffs were employed with Defendants as “non-exempt employees” within the meaning of the New Jersey Wage Laws. Under the New Jersey Wage Laws, an employer must pay a non-exempt employee at least one and one half times his or his regular rate for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Defendants’ violations of the New Jersey Wage Laws include, but are not limited to, not paying Named Plaintiffs proper overtime compensation for time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and issuing paychecks designed to hide Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiffs properly was willful and not based upon any reasonable interpretation of the law. Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (Failure to pay Overtime Compensation) (Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs v. Defendants) New Jersey Wage Laws (Failure to pay Overtime Compensation) (Named Plaintiffs v. Defendants)

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Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. that have received collection attempts from Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, for debts originating with Synchrony Bank, while said consumers were in Disaster Areas as designated by FEMA or State Governments for debts incurred for personal, familial, or household use, c. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §§ l692e,1692f. c. Typicality: The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to April 14, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Synchrony Bank by the Plaintiff. The Synchrony Bank obligation arose out of credit card transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged Synchrony Bank obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). Sometime thereafter, Defendant PRA purportedly purchased the alleged debt and is collecting the alleged debt. Defendant PRA collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – April 14, 2020 Collection Letter On or about April 14, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to PRA. See Letter attached as Exhibit A. Upon information and belief, PRA purchased Plaintiff’s alleged debt from Synchrony Bank and the sale of this alleged debt is subject to relevant conditions that Synchrony Bank imposes on its debt purchasers. Synchrony Bank contracts of sale (a/k/a Forward Flow Agreements) for defaulted debt provide specific limitation on the ability of its debt purchasers to make any collection attempts while alleged debtors are in disaster areas as determined by FEMA or any other appropriate government entity. Accordingly, upon information and belief, PRA purchased Plaintiff’s alleged debt from Synchrony Bank and the Forward Flow Agreements evidencing proof of sale, prohibits PRA from seeking to collect against Plaintiff’s alleged debt, while Plaintiff resides in a disaster area. The state of affairs in New York, and frankly the whole world, is well known. The Covid-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc across the world, the United States, and New York. On March 7, 2020, Governor Cuomo declared a State of Emergency across the entire State. On March 13, 2020, President Donald Trump declared a nationwide emergency, including for the State of New York, as recognized by the Federal Register. Despite the fact that Plaintiff clearly resided in a disaster area in April 2020, PRA pursued collection activities by sending collection letters to Plaintiff. Given the express conditions of sale, PRA misrepresented its ability to collect Plaintiff’s debt by sending collection letters in April 2020. Accordingly, PRA has violated the Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-36 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, e(2), e(5), e(10), and f. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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As background, it is generally accepted that female mammals (including humans) are born with a fixed amount or supply of eggs. As those eggs age, they lose energy. Energy is stored in mitochondria, so the loss of energy relates to the decline in mitochondrial function. One often used analogy is to that of a flashlight: if an egg is seen as a flashlight and it has been sitting on the shelf for 38 years, it may still function, but will require new batteries (or mitochondria). Studies have been conducted using the mitochondria from younger donor eggs and inserting it into “older eggs.” However, this was not a permissible procedure because it involved three persons: the father (sperm), the mother (egg), and a donor (younger mitochondria). One of OvaScience’s founders, Jonathan Tilly, Ph.D. (“Tilly”), was involved in the discovery of EggPCs and began to study whether the mitochondria from those EggPCs in the lining of the ovaries could be injected into eggs, thereby using the same woman’s mitochondria and eggs. This is the basis of the AUGMENT treatment whereby mitochondria are co-injected with the sperm during an IVF procedure. Therefore, the procedure is a traditional IVF process with the addition of the first extraction surgery and the injection of the mitochondria with the sperm. The IVF market has grown dramatically over the past twenty years and is highly lucrative. In 2012, IVF market revenue was approximately $9.3 billion, and that number is expected to grow up to $21.6 billion by 2020.4 Another analyst has projected that by 2022, the global IVF market will reach $27 billion.5 As women opt to have children later and later in life, and as infertility rates continue to rise, the IVF market is only expected to continue to rapidly grow moving forward. Due to the personal and time-sensitive nature of the market, it can be described as frantic or reactive. However, on September 10, 2013, in a press release entitled “OvaScience Provides Update on AUGMENT,” filed on Form 8-K with the SEC, the Company announced that it “has chosen to suspend enrollment of AUGMENT in the U.S. while moving forward with its plans for enrollment outside of the U.S.” The Company previously had a number of communications with the FDA, who advised that the Company should file an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) application. The IND application would mean the trial would need to meet much more stringent and costly approval standards. Instead of conforming to the more stringent and costly standards for approval, OvaScience took its IVF clinics outside of the U.S. In 2014, the Company launched a trial in Turkey at the Gen-art IVF clinic in Ankara, overseen by Kutlul Oktay, M.D., F.A.C.O.G., involving eight women who had previously failed three or more IVF cycles. Of the eight, only two women reported a clinical pregnancy, although only one resulted in an ongoing pregnancy, meaning an actual success rate of just one in eight, or 12.5%. The women in the Turkish trial ranged in age from 27 to 41. Also in 2014, OvaScience launched a clinic in Toronto, Canada involving 26 women who had previously failed one to three IVF cycles. This clinic was overseen by Robert F. Casper, M.D., F.R.C.S.(C), Medical Director of TCART Fertility Partners of Toronto, Canada. The average age of the pregnant women in the Canadian study was 33, which is very young for IVF. Nine of the women in the study became pregnant with seven ongoing pregnancies, or a success rate of 26.9% (7/26). OvaScience is likewise attempting studies at the Fakih IVF clinic in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. II. For Violations of §15 of the Securities Act Against the Individual Defendants 171. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 172. The Individual Defendants were controlling persons of the Company within the meaning of §15 of the Securities Act. By reason of their ownership interest in, senior management positions at, and/or directorships held at the Company, as alleged above, these Defendants invest in, individually and collectively, had the power to influence, and exercised the same, over the Company to cause it to engage in the conduct complained of herein. 173. By reason of such wrongful conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to §15 of the Securities Act. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct, Class members suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s shares. I. OVASCIENCE AND THE AUGMENT FERTILITY TREATMENT RETIREMENT SYSTEM, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v.

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Defendant is one of the nationwide credit reporting companies in the United States. 1 Defendant sells consumer Credit Reports to millions of American consumers annually. Defendant is a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis and, as such, is regulated by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f), (p). One purpose of the FCRA is to require consumer reporting agencies to “adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). In furtherance of this goal, the FCRA mandates that Defendant, upon request, shall clearly and accurately provide to a consumer all information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). In addition, when the request is made through the FCRA’s Centralized Source, Defendant is required provide a consumer with a free copy of their Credit Report each year. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A). The only requirement for a consumer to obtain his or her file disclosure or free report is that the consumer provide “proper identification.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1). Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for willfully and negligently failing to provide consumers such as Plaintiff with a disclosure of all information in their consumer files at the time of the request, following the furnishing of proper identification, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a). Specifically, Plaintiff and the Class members provided proper identification as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1), but were denied the information in their file. As a result of Defendant’s practices, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered damages in the form of payment of the fees described above. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for willfully and negligently failing to provide consumers such as Plaintiff with their free annual credit reports and file disclosures free of charge following the furnishing of proper identification through Centralized Source, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681j. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Class members provided proper identification as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1), but were denied their free reports and instead required to pay for reports that should have been free of charge. As a result of Defendant’s practices, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered damages in the form of payment of the fees described above. As a result of Defendant’s acts and practices as alleged in this Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Class members, seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Class members, additionally seeks costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the CLRA, seeking injunctive and monetary damages. Defendant’s actions, representations, and conduct have violated, and continue to violate, the CLRA because they extend to transactions that are intended to result, or which have resulted, in the sale or lease of goods or services to consumers. Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers” as that term is defined by the CLRA. See CIV. CODE § 1761(d). Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the CCCRAA individually and on behalf of the California Subclass. Defendant is a “consumer credit reporting agency” as defined by the CCCRAA. See CIV. CODE § 1785.3(d). Plaintiff and the California Subclass members are “consumer[s]” as defined by the CCCRAA. See id. § 1785.3(b). The above-referenced Credit Reports are “consumer credit reports” as defined by the CCCRAA. See id. § 1785.3(c). A. Defendant Is Required to Provide a Free Credit Report to Plaintiff and the Members of the Class Unfair and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices, In Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. On Behalf of the Class Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CIV. CODE § 1785.1 et seq. On Behalf of the California Subclass Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act – CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq. On Behalf of the Class Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1681j On Behalf of the Class Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) On Behalf of the Class

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The Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are (or were) cashiers at various Factor Sales’ owned grocery stores located in southwestern Arizona. By way of example: A. Plaintiff Juvera worked as a cashier for Factor Sales at the time of his termination in August, 2011; B. Plaintiff Nunez worked as a cashier for Factor Sales from December, 2008 until she resigned her employment in October, 2011; C. Plaintiff Romero has worked as a cashier for Factor Sales from July, 2010 through the present date; and D. Plaintiff Vazquez has worked as a cashier for Factor Sales from June, 2011 through the present date. On occasion, the cash till for the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class does not add up correctly. When that happens, the Defendants require the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class to reimburse Factor Sales for any such shortage. When the error is of the sort that the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class collect too much money, the Defendants do not permit the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class to keep the overage nor do they permit them to credit such overages against shortages they may have incurred on other days. The Defendants maintain detailed logs setting forth how much each employee purportedly “owes” the Defendants. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an example of one such log, dated August 18, 2011, involving, inter alia, Plaintiff Vazquez. On these forms, the “Saldo” column sets forth the balance “owed” by each employee, the “Abono” column sets forth the amounts of payments made by each employee, and the “Fecha” column sets forth the date each payment was made. Once the employees pay back their “debt” to Factor Sales, they receive a note stating “FELICIDADES!!!”, which in Spanish means “Congratulations!!!” When a Plaintiff and member of the proposed class receive their paycheck and they “owe” money to Factor Sales for the reasons set forth in ¶24, supra, and ¶32, infra, they are required to make a payment to Factor Sales from their earnings. Upon information and belief, the dates of all of these payments are recorded on receipts such as the one attached hereto as Exhibit C. Exhibit C, in fact, memorializes Plaintiff Vazquez’s $16.69 payment to Factor Sales or on or about August 18, 2011 for “Pago Faltantes”, which in Spanish means “missing payment”. As errors of this sort seem to be commonplace at Factor Sales, the cycle set forth in ¶¶ 24 through 28, supra, repeats itself over and over. By way of example, no sooner did Plaintiff Vazquez pay the $16.69 referenced in ¶27, supra, when she was informed that she now “owed” an additional $70.36 as set forth on attached Exhibit D. The legal problem is, however, that once these payments are made to Factor Sales, the Plaintiffs and member of the proposed class are making less than minimum wage. To illustrate the point, the illegality of this arrangement becomes obvious when one compares attached Exhibits B and C. To make matters worse, the Defendants also charge the Plaintiffs and member of the proposed class twelve dollars ($12.00) for the cost of a second (or more) uniform and five dollars ($5.00) for security badges. In select payroll periods involving particular cashiers, these charges also have the effect of making the employees work below the minimum wage. Under a long line of established legal authority, “it is unlawful for an employer to deduct the cost of a uniform ... from an employee’s wages when the deduction reduces the wages of that employee below the minimum.” Id. at §9.VI.F at 9-57 to 9-59. In addition to the legal problems set forth in ¶¶30 and 32, supra, the Defendants’ policy of demanding and collecting payments from its employees as a term and condition of their employment also violates, inter alia, A.R.S. §§23-202 and 203. Defendants have willfully failed to pay wages due the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class in violation of the federal minimum wage law, 29 U.S.C. §206(a). As such, the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to recover all unpaid wages and liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Defendants have willfully failed to pay wages at the rate of the Arizona Minimum Wage, in violation of the Arizona Minimum Wage Act, codified at A.R.S. §23-363(A). The Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to recover the balance of the wages owed, including interest thereon, and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid wages pursuant to A.R.S. §23-364(G). Defendants have willfully failed to pay wages to the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class for labor performed as required pursuant to A.R.S. §23-351[c]. As this Court has concluded previously, the treble damages provision set forth in A.R.S. §23-355(A) may be applied to treble a liquidated damages award received under the FLSA pursuant to this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Davis v. Jobs for Progress, 427 F.Supp. 479, 483 (D. Ariz. 1976). Violation of FLSA Minimum Wage Standard Violation of Arizona Wage Law Violation of Arizona Minimum Wage Act

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Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the class defined as follows: all past and current employees of defendant FCA who were dues paying members of the UAW impacted by the illegal, improper, and collusive conduct of FCA and the UAW in violation of the LMRA. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impractical, if not impossible. The members of the class can be identified easily through a review of the business records of FCA and the UAW. There are common questions of fact and law affecting all class members that arise as a result of the allegations in this complaint. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed class as they are injured employees of FCA and injured members of the UAW. A class action is a superior method of resolution to the other available methods for a fair, efficient, and just resolution of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation are impediments to class members’ seeking relief for the wrongful conduct alleged. This action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because common questions of fact and law predominate over questions affecting only individual class members (individual questions focus almost exclusively on the amount of damages owed in the form of dues paid by the class members, and other compensation, including compensatory damages, punitive damages, and interest). The amount in controversy with respect to each individual member of the class is relatively modest when compared to the costly prosecution of separate actions. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. FCA unlawfully paid bribes to executives of the UAW to take FCA- friendly positions during collecting bargaining negotiations, including those in 2011 and 2015. FCA, through the acts of its designated agents, who included officers, directors, senior managers, and executives, knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. Members of the conspiracy made prohibited payments with the intention of impermissibly influencing the collective bargaining process. The prohibited payments did impermissibly influence the collective bargaining process by allowing FCA to obtain company-friendly concessions from the UAW during the collective bargaining process. The prohibited payments caused at least one designated agent of the UAW, a co-conspirator with FCA, to direct and/or impermissibly influence the decision of the UAW Executive Board to expend billions of dollars in the non- arm’s length purchase of an equity interest in FCA. As a result of FCA’s violation of the LMRA, plaintiffs and other class members have been harmed in that potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of their dues paid to the UAW for the purposes of good-faith negotiations have instead been spent on tainted and/or illegal collective bargaining negotiations. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. The UAW engaged in willfully requesting, receiving, accepting, and agreeing to receive and accept, money and things of value from persons acting in the interest of FCA. The UAW gave authority to its designated agents, including Holiefield and King, among others, to represent its members who were employees of FCA. The UAW had an obligation to serve the interests of all members without favoritism to the company, and/or without favoritism or hostility to any members, to exercise its representational discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. The UAW breached its duty to its membership, by acting based upon the improper motivation of FCA’s bribery, and the UAW’s requesting and receiving prohibited payments and things of value. The UAW’s representation of its membership was arbitrary, perfunctory, or inexcusably neglectful. By its involvement in the FCA/UAW conspiracy, the UAW, through its designated agents, lacked a rational basis for decision-making when it chose to expend millions of dollars of its members’ dues in the tainted bargaining process. By its involvement in the conspiracy, the UAW, through its designated agents, lacked a rational basis for decision making and acted egregiously neglectful when it expended billions of dollars of its membership’s dues on a non-arm’s length purchase of an equity interest in FCA. By the multiple UAW actors in the FCA conspiracy, the UAW failed in its duty to investigate the actions of its designated agents, to the detriment of its members’ rights, and to the expense of its membership through hundreds of millions of dollars of dues having been wasted on tainted bargaining. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER THE LMRA VIOLATION OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

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(as to Donor No. 1’s claims) For the First Amendment claim, Donor No. 1 proposes to certify a class of all United States citizens who made anonymous donations to the Free Barrett Brown campaign. For the Stored Communications Act claim, Donor No. 1 proposes to certify a class of all United States citizens who made donations to the Free Barrett Brown campaign. For the California constitutional right to privacy claim, Donor No. 1 proposes to certify a class of all California citizens who made anonymous donations to the Free Barret Brown campaign. Excluded from the classes are: Ms. Heath and Agent Smith, and each of their agents and legal representatives. Also excluded are the judge and staff to whom this case is assigned, and the judge’s immediate family. Donor No. 1 incorporates each of the allegations set forth above into this claim for relief. Defendants acted under color of law by serving the WePay Subpoena. The WePay Subpoena’s bald assertion that the information it requested would be used at Mr. Brown’s trial, without any indication or evidence of a connection to the crimes Mr. Brown was charged with, demonstrates the complete lack of relevance of the information requested. The WePay Subpoena’s true purpose was to gather information regarding the donors. When WePay produced documents in response, the violation was complete. Because Defendants had no cause to suspect wrongdoing by the donors, and thus could not otherwise obtain information about the donors legally, they used the trial of Mr. Brown, and the WePay Subpoena, as an illegal work-around. The donations were acts of political expression, showing the donors’ frustrations with what they perceived to be government bullying and prosecutorial overreach. Donations made in support of litigation are protected by the First Amendment. The donors violated no law by sending money to support Mr. Brown’s legal defense, and instead were exercising their constitutionally protected rights. Thus, Defendants’ surveillance of the donors was unlawful. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations set forth above into this claim for relief. The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provides that government entities must obtain a warrant to compel the disclosure of the contents of electronic communications that are less than 180 days old from electronic communication service providers. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). Government entities may require the disclosure of contents of electronic communications that are more than 180 days old with a subpoena only if prior notice is given to the customer or subscriber. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). An “electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). The “contents” of “electronic communications” include “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 The surveillance program also violated Donor No. 1’s right of privacy set out in Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution. Donor No. 1 brings this claim on behalf of a subclass of donors who are California citizens. If discovery demonstrates that donors from other states with constitutional privacy protections were ensnared in Defendants’ surveillance program, Donor No. 1 will seek leave to amend his complaint to bring claims on their behalf as well. States with applicable constitutional privacy protections include, without limitation, Alaska (Art. I, § 22), Arizona (Art. II, § 8), Florida (Art. I, § 23), Hawaii (Art. I, § 6), Illinois (Art. I, §6), Louisiana (Art. I, § 5), Montana (Art. II, § 10), South Carolina (Art. I, § 10), and Washington (Art. I, § 7). A. Declaring that the conduct alleged above violated the California constitutional right to privacy; B. Awarding Donor No. 1 and the subclass damages according to proof at trial; C. Awarding Donor No. 1 the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, associated with bringing this action; and D. Any other relief the Court deems proper. A. Declaring that the conduct alleged above violated the First Amendment rights of Donor No. 1 and the class; B. Directing the FBI, DOJ, and other agencies or entities that received donors’ private, sensitive information to destroy such information; C. Enjoining Defendants from engaging in similar unlawful surveillance in the future; D. Awarding Donor No. 1 the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, associated with bringing this action; and E. Any other relief the Court deems proper. OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT; AND THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND ASSOCIATE ANONYMOUSLY (Donor No. 1 and the Class Against Defendants Heath and Smith) THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT (Kevin Gallagher, Donor No. 1, and the Class Against the United States) UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (Donor No. 1 And Subclass Against All Defendants)

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Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against Vigo. Vigo, as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller, expressly warranted that its Octopus Products contained octopus. In fact, the Octopus Products contain squid instead of octopus and Vigo’s express warranties that the Octopus Products contained octopus are therefore false. As a direct and proximate cause of Vigo’s breach of express warranty, Plaintiff and Class members have been injured and harmed because: (a) they would not have purchased the Octopus Products on the same terms if they had known the true facts that the Octopus Products contained squid instead of octopus; (b) they paid a price premium for the Octopus Products due to Vigo’s promises that it contained octopus; and (c) Vigo’s Octopus Products did not have the characteristics, ingredients, uses or benefits, as promised. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against Vigo. Plaintiff and Class members conferred benefits on Vigo by purchasing the Octopus Products. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Subclass against Vigo. California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(5), prohibits “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he or she does not have.” California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(9), prohibits “[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.” Vigo violated this provision by misrepresenting that its Octopus Products contained octopus when in fact they contained squid. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Subclass against Vigo. Vigo is subject to California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. The UCL provides, in pertinent part: “Unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising ….” Vigo’s misrepresentations and other conduct, described herein, violated the “unlawful” prong of the UCL by violating the CLRA as described herein; the FAL as described herein; and Cal. Com. Code § 2607. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Subclass against Vigo. California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq., makes it “unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, ... in any advertising device ... or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning ... personal property or services, professional or otherwise, or performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Vigo committed acts of false advertising, as defined by §17500, by misrepresenting that its Octopus Products contained octopus when in fact they contained squid. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against Vigo. As discussed above, Vigo misrepresented that the Octopus Products contained octopus when in fact they contained squid. Vigo had a duty to disclose this information. At the time Vigo made these representations, Vigo knew or should have known that these representations were false or made them without knowledge of their truth or veracity. At an absolute minimum, Vigo negligently misrepresented and/or negligently omitted material facts about the Octopus Products. The negligent misrepresentations and omissions made by Vigo, upon which Plaintiff and Class members reasonably and justifiably relied, were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiff and Class members to purchase the Octopus Products. Plaintiff and Class members would not have purchased the Octopus Products if the true facts had been known. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against Vigo. As discussed above, Vigo provided Plaintiff and Class members with false or misleading material information and failed to disclose material facts about its Octopus Products, including but not limited to the fact that it contained squid when the product was represented to contain octopus. These misrepresentations and omissions were made with knowledge of their falsehood. The misrepresentations and omissions made by Vigo, upon which Plaintiff and Class members reasonably and justifiably relied, were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiff and Class members to purchase the Octopus Products. Vigo’s fraudulent actions caused damage to Plaintiff and Class members, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose Breach of Express Warranty Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability Fraud Negligent Misrepresentation Unjust Enrichment Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. (Injunctive Relief Only) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation of California’s False Advertising Law, California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq.

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Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf. As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, among other things. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 4 The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. That letter, dated June 11, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning the alleged Debt. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these purposes thousands of times. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy 5 of the information which it discloses to such third-party. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party vendor. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in Suffolk County. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks 6 that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws.

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Defendant owns, manages and/or operates the Hotel. As part of its operations, Defendant provides its customers and the public reservations services, including, but not limited to, the ability to reserve rooms online via the Website. Within the applicable limitations period, Plaintiff visited the Website to identify the accessible features of the Hotel and its guest rooms to determine whether it met her accessibility needs. Plaintiff was unable to independently ascertain the accessible features of the Hotel and its guest rooms by reference to the Website as required by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1) et seq. (“ADA Accessibility Standards”). An investigation performed on Plaintiff’s behalf confirmed the allegations made by Plaintiff in paragraphs 16 through 17. The barriers to access on the Website, all encountered by Plaintiff, include but are not limited to, the following: a) The Website fails to disclose the physical barriers to access identified in the preceding section. These physical access barriers represent material elements of the Hotel that do not comply with applicable ADA Standards. Defendant’s failure to identify them prevents Plaintiff and other individuals with disabilities from independently determining if the Hotel meets his or her accessibility needs. b) On the homepage of www.choicehotels.com/ohio/cleveland/comfort-inn- hotels/oh167?source=gyxt, there is a general description of the Hotel's location and features; however, none of the information provided relates to accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws. c) On the homepage there is a section labeled "Amenities" which offers a list of various amenities that the Hotel provides; however, none of the information provided relates to accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws. d) On the homepage there is a section labeled "Policies" that offers a list of the Hotel's various policies; however, there was no information pertaining to accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws. e) Remaining links from the homepage do not contain information regarding accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws. e) When attempting to make a reservation, Plaintiff was unable to book a room because she was unable to find any information or room option pertaining to accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws. Defendant’s failure to modify its policies, practices and procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms is discriminatory and violates ADA Accessibility Standards. Plaintiff is a tester in this litigation and a consumer who wishes to access Defendant’s good and services at the Hotel. Plaintiff is being deterred from patronizing the Hotel on particular occasions but intends to return to the Hotel and the Website for the dual purpose of availing herself of the goods and services offered to the public by the Hotel and to ensure that Defendant ceases evading its responsibilities under federal law. However, the lack of accessible reservations services has deterred Plaintiff from staying at the Hotel. Plaintiff has been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to provide accessible reservations services to persons with disabilities. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the federal rules of civil procedure and on behalf of herself and the following class: “All individuals with disabilities who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of reservations services offered to guests at the Hotel because of the lack of accessible reservations services through the Website.” Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court and will facilitate judicial economy. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s goods, services and facilities due to the policies and practices described above. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of litigation under the ADA. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations stated in paragraphs “1” through “29” of this complaint as if fully stated herein. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the class. Plaintiff is an individual with a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.

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(Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act) (Violations of 29 CFR 516) Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, files this case as an “opt in” collective action, as it is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The class that Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, seeks to represent may be described as follows: All current and former employees of Defendant who worked as “Care Givers” and/or “Cooks”, and was not compensated at time and a half for hours worked above forty each workweek and who were not compensated for off-the- clock work performed, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et. seq. Plaintiff, KRISTY REYES, seeks to represent only those members of the above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt into this action, have provided consent in writing to be represented by counsel for Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Putative class members”, will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue will be filed with the Court. Plaintiff KRISTY REYES contends that this action is appropriate for collective action status because Defendant herein has acted in the same manner with regard to all members of the putative class. For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter. Defendant employed Plaintiff KRISTY REYES from approximately June 19 2015 to January 18, 2016. Plaintiff worked as a Care Giver whose job was to care for the elderly. During her employment and in the routine performance of day-to-day job duties, Plaintiff has performed non-exempt work, during a significant period of most days, as classified by the Act, because the performance of Plaintiff’s job required it and because Defendant’s management required the performance of those non-exempted job duties, as a condition of her continued employment. During Plaintiff KRISTY REYES’S employment, she and similarly situated employees wore a uniform and were given instructions by Defendant as to their day-to-day job duties and responsibilities. Defendant supervised Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. Plaintiff was not an independent contractor. Plaintiff was paid an hourly rate and was therefore not a salaried employee. Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee, as no lawful exemption excused defendant from paying her at a rate of time and a half for all hours worked above forty in a given week. Plaintiff’s regular workweek schedule was 6:00AM to and 6:00PM Monday through Sunday. Although Plaintiff worked 84 hours per week, her overtime pay would not begin until she had worked fifty-six (56) hours. Plaintiff was required to work the first sixteen (16) hours above forty (40) hours each week at her regular rate of $9.17 per hour instead of the overtime rate of $13. 75 per hour. Plaintiff was denied sixteen (16) hours of overtime pay for the duration of her employment with defendant. Further, during these hours worked, Plaintiff performed the function of her job, which included the performance duties typically performed by “hourly” paid non-exempt employees because the job required it and the Defendant’s management required it, as a condition of Plaintiff’s continued employment. Defendant required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform all necessary work to include the performance of those duties otherwise typically performed by “hourly” employees which routinely required Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to work “overtime” and “off-the-clock” hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for which they failed to receive overtime compensation as required by the Act. Defendant failed to pay statutory overtime as required by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully written herein. Plaintiff KRISTY REYES and all others similarly situated are entitled to receive overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven-day workweek and minimum wage for off-the-clock hours worked. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours they worked in excess of 40 per week. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week and for off-the-clock work performed. Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees “overtime” pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Defendant failed to Compensate Plaintiff for overtime hours worked both on and off the clock and failed to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated employees at minimum wage for off-the-clock hours worked. Defendant failed to keep or record accurate time records reflecting the hours employees, such as the Plaintiff and those similarly situated actually worked. The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week or for time worked off the clock. Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding overtime a n d o f f - t h e - c l o c k compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully written herein. Other employees have been victimized by the above referenced pattern, practice, and policy of Defendants in violation of the FLSA. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendant have been imposed on other workers. Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages. Plaintiff KRISTY REYES experiences are typical experiences of the putative class as it pertains to compensation. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week and not paid for off- the-clock work performed, are similarly situated. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. All current and former employees who worked as “Caregivers” or “Cooks” who at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment were denied overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) and not compensated for off-the-clock work in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class.

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Published reports indicate that Defendant is working to have four business locations in Washington within a short period of time, and that Defendant will open at least four to six new business locations every few years. 90.060. This violation, per statute, is a per se violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, et seq. Representative Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself and as a representative of the following class of persons (the “National Class”) entitled to remedies under federal law including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and damages: All persons in the United States of America and its territories who were sent, to their cellular telephone numbers, at least one unsolicited text message by Defendant, or someone acting on behalf of Defendant. Representative Plaintiff also brings this class action on behalf of herself and as a representative of the following persons (the “Washington Subclass”) who are entitled to remedies under Washington State law including, but not limited to, damages: All persons in Washington State who were sent, to their cellular telephone numbers, at least one unsolicited text message by Defendant, or someone acting on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiffs’ class claims satisfy all of the requirements for class action certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3). Satisfying all requisite numerosity requirements, numerous consumers in Washington State and numerous consumers throughout the United States are believed to be members of this class. Joinder of so many class members in to a single action is impracticable. In fact, given the number of class members, the only way to deliver substantial justice to all members of the class is by means of a single class action. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as if the same were alleged herein this count. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. Negligently, recklessly, willfully, and/or intentionally, Defendant directly and/or vicariously engaged in acts, omissions, and/or other conduct as referenced herein this complaint that violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Defendant directly and/or vicariously created, designed, deployed, and otherwise used an ATDS which initiated numerous telephone calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers. These telephone calls transmitted unsolicited commercial text messages to the cellular telephones of Representative Plaintiff and the other Plaintiffs as referenced in this complaint. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $500 in damages from the Defendant for each violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to all damages referenced herein and in accord with proof, attorneys’ fees, costs, treble damages, and other remedies allowed by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act or else otherwise permitted by law. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the Washington Consumer Protection Act and related Washington statutes. Defendant’s practice of transmitting and/or assisting in the transmission of electronic commercial text messages to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones is a violation of RCW Defendant’s practice of transmitting and/or assisting in the transmission of electronic commercial text messages to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones is conduct that vitally affects the public interest and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair method of competition for the purpose of applying the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, et seq. Defendant conducted these practices in the scope of its trade and in furtherance of the development and preservation of such business services. Defendant’s violations of the Consumer Protection Act are intentional, willful, and subject to treble damages under RCW 19.86.010, et seq. Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons and property as a direct result of Defendant’s numerous violations of RCW 19.86.010, et seq. Defendant’s practices are emblematic of organizational policies and agreements which have caused and, if unabated, will continue to cause incidents, occurrences, and conduct which violate RCW 19.86.010, et seq., and RCW 19.190.010, et seq. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for each of the violations of RCW Defendant and others acting on its behalf operate and market a profit-making enterprise known as “Universal Men’s Clinic.” Defendant advertises the business as a clinic specializing in medication for erectile dysfunction and low testosterone. Defendant previously conducted business as Hawaii Male Medical Clinic, from multiple locations in Hawaii. In early 2013, Defendant changed the business name in connection with an aggressive growth business strategy. Defendant re-branded the business “Universal Men’s Clinic” and began working to generate revenue on the mainland United States. Violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (Representative Plaintiff and the Washington Subclass vs. Defendant) Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Representative Plaintiff and the National Class vs. Defendant)

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Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts and/or has purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member and in that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to March 31, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Citibank, N.A./Best Buy. The alleged Citibank, N.A./Best Buy obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). Citibank, N.A./Best Buy is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). Defendant Cavalry purportedly purchased the rights to collect the Citibank, N.A./Best Buy debt who contracted with Defendant C&B to collect the alleged debt. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – March 31, 2020 Collection Letter On or about March 31, 2020, Defendant C& B sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) on behalf of the Defendant Cavalry regarding the alleged debt owed to Citibank, N.A./Best Buy. A true and correct copy of the Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Letter lists a balance of $3,347.65. The letter offers various offers of settlement on the full balance. The letter offers a “3 Month Payment Plan” and offers the following terms: “Take $502.15 off the balance. Pay 3 equal monthly installments of $948.50. First Payment due no later than 05/15/20 and every 30 days thereafter. Your account will be considered “Settled in Full” after we post your final payment.” The letter states that the first payment is due no later than 05/15/20 and every 30 days thereafter. The letter is confusing and deceptive by offering a settlement agreement with unclear terms as to due date of the payments. This could easily confuse and deceive the consumer as the Letter does not indicate whether the payment is due on the 15th of each month or within 30 days of the last payment. This language is false and deceptive as Plaintiff was unable to determine when the settlement payments would be due. Defendants’ collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right to be not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action for the collection of any consumer debt. Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to its collection effort were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability to intelligently respond to Defendants’ collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately respond to the Defendants’ demand for payment of this debt. Defendants’ actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond or handle Defendants’ debt collection. Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for the statutory violation(s). As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated § 1692e: a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.

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Defendant has repeatedly placed calls using an ATDS and containing a prerecorded and/or artificial voice to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone (336) XXX-8932. Plaintiff’s number was and is assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). AMEX calls Plaintiff from telephone numbers 866-884-0976, 801-945-9064 and 800-528-4800. AMEX has inserted Plaintiff’s telephone number in an automated calling campaign to further its efforts to contact “Jessica,” a person who Plaintiff does not have any relationship with and does not know. AMEX has bombarded the Plaintiff with multiple daily automated and prerecorded message calls throughout January 2018 regarding “Jessica.” Nevertheless, the calls to Plaintiff at the -8932 number have persisted and continued. At all times mentioned herein, AMEX called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“autodialer”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). When Plaintiff answered calls from AMEX, he heard a prerecorded greeting from AMEX before the call would be routed to a live agent. This is indicative of AMEX’s use of a “predictive dialer.” The Federal Communications Commission has defined ATDS under the TCPA to include “predictive dialers.” See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 F.C.C.R. 559, at ¶ 12, 2008 WL 65485 (F.C.C.) (2008). In addition, upon information and belief the hardware and software combination utilized by AMEX has the capacity to store and dial sequentially generated numbers, randomly generated numbers or numbers from a database of numbers. Defendant uses prerecorded and artificial messages when it calls the Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. As noted, when Plaintiff answers AMEX’s calls, he heard an artificial and/or prerecorded voice stating the call was from AMEX and the call may be recorded. The same message has been used by the Defendant on multiple occasions. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to place automated calls to Plaintiff on her cellular telephone. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following two classes: Class A All persons within the United States to whom AMEX or its agent/s and/or employee/s called said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint where such person was not a customer of AMEX. Class B All persons within the United States to whom AMEX or its agent/s and/or employee/s called said person’s cellular telephone with an artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint where such person was not a customer of AMEX. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. B. Numerosity Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated and/or prerecorded message calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers, after being informed it was calling the wrong party, throughout the United States. The members of the Classes, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant made calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b. Whether Defendant made calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice; c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to make each call; d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing willful, and/or negligent; e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely places automated and prerecorded calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. D. Typicality Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against AMEX is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties. Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012). Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. Defendant negligently placed multiple automated and prerecorded/artificial voice calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: a. Defendant violated the TCPA; b. Defendant utilized an ATDS to call Plaintiff and the Classes; c. Defendant placed artificial and prerecorded voice calls to Plaintiff and the Classes; d. Defendant placed automated and artificial and prerecorded voice calls to the Plaintiff and the Classes without prior express consent. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated and prerecorded/artificial voice calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Plaintiff and the Classes are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: a. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA; b. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully used an ATDS to call Plaintiff and the Classes; c. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed artificial and prerecorded voice calls to Plaintiff and the Classes; d. Defendant willfully placed artificial and prerecorded voice calls to non- customers such as Plaintiff and the Classes, knowing it did not have prior express consent to do so; and e. It is Defendant’s practice and history to place automated and artificial/prerecorded voice calls to non-customers without their prior express consent. A. The Class Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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The 2015 FCC Order also clarified that telephone calls and text messages have the same protections under FCC rules, and that text messages are “calls” for purposes of the Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) & (b)(3) on behalf of herself, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as a member of the “Class,” defined as follows: All persons in the United States of America to whom Defendant has placed any automated phone calls or sent any automated commercial text message for whom Defendant has no record of prior express consent and/or for whom Defendant has no record of providing the required disclosures between October 16, 2013 and the date of class certification of this action. Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant, its assigns, successors, and legal representatives; (ii) any entities in which Defendant has controlling interests; (iii) federal, state, and/or local governments, including, but not limited to, their departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels, and/or subdivisions; (iv) all persons presently in bankruptcy proceedings or who obtained a bankruptcy discharge in the last three years; and (v) any judicial officer presiding over this matter and person within the third degree of consanguinity to such judicial officer. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or otherwise alter the class definition presented to the Court at the appropriate time, or to propose or eliminate sub-classes, in response to facts learned through discovery, legal arguments advanced by Defendant, or otherwise. Numerosity: Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is presently unknown, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that Class members number in the thousands of persons, if not more. This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the reasons set forth herein. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class she seeks to represent because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the absent Class Members. Plaintiff has retained highly competent counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and the interests of members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. Superiority and Substantial Benefit: The class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ claims. The damages suffered by each individual Class are limited and prescribed by law. Damages of such magnitude are small given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. Further, it would be virtually impossible for the Class members to redress the wrongs done to them on an individual basis. Even if members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system, due to the complex legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class- action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefit of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is also appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein. Defendant sent commercial text messages (“calls” in FCC parlance) to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class. On information and belief, Defendant used an ATDS to place commercial phone calls and send commercial text messages to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class. Defendant did not obtain express written consent prior to placing commercial phone calls or sending commercial text messages to Plaintiff or the Class. Defendant did not provide to Plaintiff or the Class the disclosures required by the FCC concerning the use of an ATDS. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, awards of $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation because Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s conduct was and is willful, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. The purpose of the TCPA is to protect consumers from unwanted calls and text messages, such as those that Defendant placed and sent to Plaintiff. Under the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Order (the “2015 FCC Order”), Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; American Association of Healthcare Administrative Management, Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling and Exemption; et al, Federal Communications Commission, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (July 10, 2015), companies wishing to place certain call or text messages must obtain prior express written consent. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. On behalf of Plaintiff and the Putative Class The TCPA

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Plaintiff Abante is the owner and customary user of a cellphone number ending in 5154. At no time did Abante provide its cellphone number to Defendant or provide Defendant, or any of Defendant’s agents, with prior express consent to call. At all times relevant hereto, and for a period of at least thirty (30) days prior to the relevant period of time, Plaintiff’s cellphone number was and remains registered on the DNC Registry. Plaintiff brings this action in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and two Classes defined as follows: Autodialed Class: All persons in the United States who (1) from the date four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date notice is sent to the Class; (2) Defendant caused to be called; (3) on the person’s cellphone; (4) for the same purpose as Defendant called Plaintiff; (5) using the same equipment that was used to call the Plaintiff, and (6) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to call the Plaintiff. Stop Class: All persons in the United States (1) who were called by Defendant; (2) who requested that Defendant not call them again; and (3) who, despite asking not to be called, received at least one additional call from Defendant using the same equipment that was used to call the Plaintiff. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Defendant made or caused to be made calls to Plaintiff’s and the other Autodialed Class Members’ cellphones. These calls were made using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator, to receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without human intervention. The telephone dialing equipment utilized by Defendant, also known as a predictive dialer, dialed numbers from a list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic manner. Defendant’s autodialer disseminated information en masse to Plaintiff and other consumers and is an ATDS under the TCPA. The calls were for telemarketing purposes, specifically to apprise Plaintiff and others of the availability of Harbortouch’s credit/debit card processing services. Neither Plaintiff nor any other consumer ever provided prior express consent under the TCPA to be called by or on behalf of Harbortouch. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and each member of the Autodialed Class are each entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Class. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff and other members of the Stop Class expressly requested that Defendant no longer place calls to them. Rather than honor these requests or place Plaintiff and the members of the Stop Class on its internal do not call list, if any, Defendant Harbortouch continued to call Plaintiff and others who asked not to be called. No consent was ever provided, and any consent that was ever hypothetically provided had been revoked. Despite this, Harbortouch continued to make calls, or to cause calls to be made, to Plaintiff and other members of the Stop Class. The calls were made using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator, to receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without human intervention. The telephone dialing equipment utilized by Defendant, also known as a predictive dialer, dialed numbers from a list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic manner. Defendant’s autodialer disseminated information en masse to Plaintiff and other consumers and is an ATDS under the TCPA. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Stop Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and each member of the Stop Class are entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. In the event the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the DNC Stop Class. Defendant Harbortouch is a merchant processing company that contracts with businesses to provide credit card and debit card processing services, including point of sale card readers and related equipment. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Stop Class)

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Paragraphs 1-102 are incorporated in this count. 104. Honeywell promised Honeywell-sponsored healthcare until age 65 for Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members who retired under the Honeywell- sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA. 105. Honeywell-sponsored healthcare for plaintiffs Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members vested at the retirement of each class member who retired under age 65 under the Honeywell-sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA. The Honeywell-sponsored healthcare began for each employee under age 65 at the time of retirement and is to continue until that retiree turns age Paragraphs 1-113 are incorporated in this count. 115. Honeywell’s collectively-bargained promises of healthcare for retirees and their families constitute an employee welfare benefit plan (“plan”) within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(1). 116. Honeywell is the plan sponsor and plan administrator within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1002(16)(A) and (B). 117. Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members are participants in, or beneficiaries of, the plan within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1002(7) and (8). 30 118. The plan entitles Pacheco, Hansen, and other retirees to Honeywell- sponsored healthcare beginning at retirement. The healthcare is to continue for each retiree, spouse, and surviving spouse until age 65 and for each retiree’s dependent child until age 26. 119. Under the plan, each retiree’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare vested at the time of retirement, with healthcare to begin at retirement and to continue for each retiree until that retiree turns age 65. 120. Under the plan, each retiree’s spouse’s or surviving spouse’s and dependent child’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare vested at the time of the retiree’s retirement and is to continue until the spouse or surviving spouse turns age 65 and the dependent child turns age 26. 121. Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare is wrongful and violates the plan and ERISA, and is actionable under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3), which entitle participants or beneficiaries to bring federal civil actions to enforce ERISA rights. 122. Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare breaches Honeywell’s ERISA and plan obligations and has caused, and will continue to cause, damage and harm to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members. 31 123. Honeywell is liable to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members under ERISA and the plan for the consequences, damage, and harm caused by Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of healthcare and for plan breaches. Paragraphs 1-123 are incorporated in this count. 125. Honeywell is the sponsor and plan administrator of the plan providing healthcare for the retirees and their families. 126. Honeywell is a plan fiduciary. 127. As a plan fiduciary, Honeywell has the duty to act in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. 128. As a plan fiduciary, Honeywell has the duty of fairness, accuracy, and honesty, and the duty to not mislead plan participants and beneficiaries, by expression, implication, or omission, regarding the nature or duration of the participants’ and beneficiaries’ healthcare and rights under the plan and ERISA. 129. Under ERISA, Honeywell has a duty to disclose to participants and beneficiaries—and to not mislead participants and beneficiaries, by expression, implication, or omission—about circumstances which may result in loss of coverage. 130. Under ERISA, Honeywell has a duty to make disclosures to participants and beneficiaries about the circumstances which may result in loss of 32 coverage in a manner which may be understood by the average participant and beneficiary. 131. Honeywell communicated to employees taking early retirement under the Honeywell-sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA, to the employees collectively and individually, and to the employees collectively through Teamsters, that each employee would receive Honeywell-sponsored healthcare starting at retirement and continuing until age 65 for each retiree and each retiree’s spouse and surviving spouse and up to age 26 for each retiree’s dependent child. 132. Honeywell communicated to employees taking retirement under the Honeywell-sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA that their healthcare began at retirement and that they were guaranteed continued healthcare until age 65. 133. Honeywell action, omissions, and representations about retiree healthcare, encouraged and induced employees to end their Honeywell employment and retire early with reduced pension benefits. 134. Honeywell’s representations about Honeywell-sponsored retiree healthcare had the purpose and effect of encouraging employees to take early retirement and give up their Honeywell jobs to ensure Honeywell-sponsored healthcare after retirement for employees and their families. But Honeywell now 33 plans, and asserts authority, to terminate all retiree healthcare, including for retirees and retirees’ spouses and surviving spouses and dependents. 135. Honeywell never told employees, participants, or beneficiaries, until March 27, 2017, when it sent its letter, Ex. 12, to retirees and spouses, that Honeywell believed it had the unilateral authority to terminate Honeywell- sponsored post-retirement healthcare regardless of a retiree’s or spouse’s or surviving spouse’s or dependent child’s age. 136. Honeywell never told employees, participants, or beneficiaries that Honeywell believed that it was obligated to continue retiree healthcare only for the duration of the 2007 CBA or for the duration of the 2010 CBA. 137. Pacheco, Hansen, and other retirees in the class would not have taken early retirement and given up their Honeywell jobs had Honeywell communicated to them that Honeywell believed it could terminate healthcare regardless of a retiree’s or spouse’s or dependent child’s age. 138. Honeywell’s representations, misrepresentations, actions, omissions, and failures to disclose breach Honeywell’s fiduciary duties and have caused, and continue to cause, damage and harm to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members. 139. Honeywell breached its fiduciary duties and is liable under ERISA to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members for the consequences, damage, and harm caused by Honeywell fiduciary breaches. 34 106. The CBAs entitle Pacheco, Hansen, and other retirees, and retirees’ spouses, surviving spouses, and dependents to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare beginning at each retiree’s retirement. The healthcare is to continue for each 28 retiree, spouse, and surviving spouse until age 65 and for each retiree’s dependent child until age 26. 107. Under the CBAs, each retiree’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare vested at the time of retirement, with healthcare beginning at retirement to continue for each retiree until that retiree turns age 65. 108. Under the CBAs, each retiree’s spouse’s or surviving spouse’s and dependent child’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare vested at the time of the retiree’s retirement and is to continue until the spouse or surviving spouse turns age 65 and up to age 26 for each dependent child. 109. Employees who retired under age 65 before May 1, 2007—during the 2007 CBA—are entitled to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare until age 65, subject to retiree-paid monthly premium contributions. 110. Employees who retired under age 65 between May 1, 2007 and April 30, 2010—during the 2007 CBA or during the first three months of the 2010 CBA—are entitled to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare until age 65, subject to retiree-paid monthly premium contributions and subject to the dollar limits on Honeywell’s annual healthcare contributions set at $20,304 for single coverage and $40,608 for family coverage. 111. Employees who retired under age 65 during the 2010 CBA on May 1, 2010 or later are entitled to Honeywell-sponsored retiree healthcare, subject to 29 retiree-paid monthly premium contributions. The dollar limits on Honeywell’s annual healthcare contributions do not apply to the retirees who retired under the 2010 CBA on or after May 1, 2010. 112. Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare breaches Honeywell’s promises and the CBAs and has caused, and will continue to cause, damage and harm to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members. 113. Honeywell is liable to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members for the consequences, damage, and harm caused by Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare and contract breaches.

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas; b. to whom Defendant ERC sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. containing deceptively worded settlement offers; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §l692e. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff have no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to March 5, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile by the Plaintiff. The Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically telecommunication services. The alleged Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). Defendant ERC, a debt collector, was contracted by Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile to collect the alleged debt which originated with Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile. Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – March 5, 2021 Collection Letter On or about March 5, 2021, Defendant ERC sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to T-Mobile See Exhibit A. The letter states an original balance of $1,213.49 The collection letter states: “Our records indicate that your balance with Sprint, now part of the T-Mobile Network, remains unpaid; therefore, your account has been placed with ERC for collection efforts. We are authorized to settle your account for less than the full original balance in the amount of $667.42. Upon completion of the settlement agreement, all future collection efforts will cease, and the residual balance will remain with Sprint.” The letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange for payment of less than the full balance the consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in actuality it is unclear what form of settlement the letter is offering. This is especially deceptive because the letter actually uses the term “settlement agreement.” The letter states that Sprint will cease all collection activity but does not clarify what will occur with the rest of the balance and whether the rest of the balance would be collected by another collection company in the future. Nor does the letter clearly state that the account will be reinstated upon payment of part of the balance. The letter deceives and misleads the consumer by implying that paying “the settlement” amount would achieve results akin to a settlement offer, when in reality the Defendant’s offer contains no significant benefits and is unclear to what the benefits of the “settlement agreement” would actually be. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to §1692e (10). By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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On or about March 10, 2010, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Defendants created or made Exhibit A which Defendants knew or should have known is a good or product which Defendants intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff and the other members of the class. Exhibit A is part of Defendants’ work or operations to market Defendants’ goods or services which were performed by Defendants and on behalf of Defendants. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendants’ work or operations. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and similar unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) from whom Defendants did not obtain prior express permission or invitation to send those faxes, (4) with whom Defendants did not have an established business relationship, and (5) did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class reassert and incorporate herein by reference the averments set for in paragraphs 1-25 above. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to "use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement …" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). The JFPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise." 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in §(b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. The Fax. Defendant sent the March 10, 2010 Fax via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted advertisements under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax, which contained no Opt-Out notice whatsoever. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted an advertisement; and (d) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice. Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.

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Requiring SCS to hire a Court-approved, independent auditing company to (a) investigate all allegations of TCPA violations, and (b) audit no less than 10% of SCS’s outbound calls to ensure that SCS had consent and that the consumer had not previously asked that calls stop, and (c) report the results of the above investigations to the Court and Plaintiff’s counsel on a quarterly basis. D. Damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), for each and every nonconsensual call to each and every class member; E. Treble damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), as to each violation; F. Attorneys’ fees and costs, as permitted by law; and G. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 8 In response to Defendant’s phone calls, Plaintiff consulted with the attorneys at Community Lawyers Group, Ltd., who, on July 19, 2017 sent a letter to SCS demanding that it cease communication with Plaintiff and direct all calls to Plaintiff’s attorney. SCS received Plaintiff’s letter on July 19, 2017. Yet SCS continued calling Plaintiff, and on August 22, 2017, left a pre-recorded voice message on Defendant’s cellular telephone, without her permission. During Defendant’s calls, pre-recorded voice messages were left asking Plaintiff to press a number depending on her identity, which is the result of a dialer calling and no operator or representative of Defendant being immediately available to speak. Therefore SCS used software which has the capacity to predictively dial in its telephone calls to Defendant. SCS’s business model is to knowingly use an auto-dialer to call cellular telephones it knows it does not have consent to call, and to hide behind an arbitration clause when challenged in court. Many of the numbers SCS calls to collect a debt are obtained by “skip-tracing,” an investigative method used to obtain consumer phone numbers from online databases and credit reports, rather than from consumers themselves. As a result, many of these numbers are called without express consent of the consumer, who did not provide the number in the first place. Many of the numbers SCS calls are obtained when consumers seek medical services, even though those consumers do not give their consent to be called by SCS’ autodialer. 4 Upon information and belief, SCS already keeps records and data from which it can determine which autodialed calls it made without consent, but has elected not to engage such to prevent TCPA violations for business reasons. Defendant knew about the TCPA before making the calls to plaintiff and the class, but made these autodialed calls to cellular phones in spite of such knowledge. Defendant also knew that they did not have “prior express consent” to call phone numbers that had been obtained through skip trace or any means other than directly from the called party, or that any such consent had been revoked. On information and belief, SCS has used an Aspect Software, Inc. brand autodialer for some of the calls. On information and belief, SCS also used third party vendors to make calls, including Livevox and others. Documents in SCS’s possession will show that she never gave her consent to receive calls to her cellular telephone. Those documents will also confirm that Plaintiff notified SCS to stop calling her cellular telephone. SCS’s records will show that it logged Plaintiff’s withdrawal of any apparent consent in its computer. The telephone calls were annoying to Plaintiff, invaded Plaintiff’s privacy interests, and temporarily blocked use of her cellular telephone line for other potential callers. The telephone calls were intentionally, willfully and knowingly initiated. The telephone calls were not initiated by accident or mistake. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class consisting of: All persons in the United States whose cellular telephone number, on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, SCS called using the same or similar dialing system used to call Plaintiff, where such calling occurred without the person’s permission. Plaintiff additionally brings this action on behalf of a subclass consisting of: All persons in the United States whose cellular telephone number, on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, SCS called using the same or similar dialing system used to call Plaintiff, where the person or their representative revoked any prior consents to be called. Upon information and belief, in the four years prior to the filing of this action, there were more than 100 persons whose cell phone number SCS called without permission using the same equipment used to call Plaintiff. Common questions of law or fact exist as to all members of the class, which predominate over any questions solely affecting any individual member, including Plaintiff. Such questions common to the class include but are not limited to: a. Whether the calls to Plaintiff and the class were made using an “automatic telephone dialing system” as such term is defined or understood under the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and orders; b. Whether the calls to Plaintiff and the class were made using a prerecorded message as such term is defined or understood under the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and orders; c. Whether SCS had prior express consent to the cell phone numbers of Plaintiff and the other members of the class; and 6 d. Damages, including whether any violations were performed willfully or knowingly such that Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to treble damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class. The factual and legal bases of SCS’s liability to Plaintiff and the other members of the class are the same: SCS violated the TCPA by causing automated calls to be made to the cellular telephone number of each member of the class, without permission. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has no interests that might conflict with the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in pursuing her claims vigorously, and she has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual action would entail. There are, on information and belief, thousands of class members, such that joinder of all members is impracticable. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other members of the class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class, should they even 7 realize that their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. The identity of the class is, on information and belief, readily identifiable from Defendant’s records. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kathleen Taylor, individually and on behalf of the class, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment against Defendant for: A. Certification of the class and subclass as alleged herein; B. A declaration that SCS violated the TCPA as to Plaintiff and each class; C. Injunctive relief aimed at ensuring the prevention of SCS from violating the TCPA in the future, including: 5 Plaintiff has received multiple calls to her cellular telephone from Defendant. Most of these calls are believed to have happened in March through August 2017, although there very well may have been calls before and after that period. Calls made to Plaintiff were unanswered but left pre-recorded voice messages directed to Plaintiff. 3

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Each of the Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). Plaintiff Antista has possessed her current cellular telephone number for approximately 14 years. Plaintiff Antista received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on November 15, 2016, from telephone number 480-448-3778; on January 3 and January 4, 2017, from telephone number 602-362-4190. Each and all of these telephone calls were not for Plaintiff Antista. A MCM representative informed Plaintiff Antista that the calls were regarding her husband and her husband’s Capital One account. Plaintiff Antista told MCM to stop calling but MCM continued to call. Plaintiff Toft has possessed her current cellular telephone number since August 2, 2011. Plaintiff Toft received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on January 6 and January 11, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1545; on January 16, 2017, from telephone number 947-333-9327; on February 20, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1550; on November 21, 2017, from telephone number 800-416-6433; on December 23 and December 29, 2017 from telephone number 248-216-1545. Plaintiff Toft received a call from MCM around April 2017 and told the female representative not to call her anymore. Yet, Plaintiff Toft received at least three additional calls. Plaintiff Toft never provided MCM or the original creditor, CitiFinancial Services, Inc. (“CitiFinancial”) her current cellular telephone number. Plaintiff Toft opened a CitiFinancial account on August 20, 2008 and defaulted on the account sometime in June 2010. Defendants are, and at all times mentioned herein were, each a “person” as defined pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). The telephone numbers at which Plaintiffs were contacted on, utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” were each assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Moreover, Defendant’s calls placed to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone number were not made “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Defendant’s calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” made for non- emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiffs’ prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to the TCPA and the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, it is Defendant’s burden to demonstrate that Plaintiffs provided Defendant with “prior express consent” within the meaning of the Statute.7 VI. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as the “Class”). Plaintiffs propose the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons in the United States who, at any time on or after November 14, 2016, received one (1) or more non-emergency telephone call(s) from Midland Credit Management, Inc., to a cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, but had not provided prior express consent to receive such calls and/or had requested to stop calling. Plaintiffs are unaware of the exact number of the Class Members, but reasonably believes that Class Members number, at a minimum, is in the thousands. Plaintiffs and all Class Members have been harmed by Defendant’s acts because their privacy has been violated; they were subject to annoying and harassing telephone calls that constitute a nuisance; and they were charged for Defendant’s incoming telephone calls. The subject Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. Joinder of all Class Members is impracticable due to both the large Class size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The claims’ disposition as a Class Action suit will provide substantial benefit to the parties and to the Court, avoiding multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can easily be identified by way of records maintained by Defendant and/or by the creditors on whose behalf Defendant placed the subject telephone calls. As a person who received telephone calls via “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” without their “prior express consent” within the meaning of the TCPA and FCC Rules, Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each and all Class Members. Plaintiffs have no interest that is antagonistic to the interest of any other Class Member, and they will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class’ interests. Plaintiffs has retained counsel experienced in handling Class Action claims that involve federal and state consumer protection statute violations, including claims made pursuant to the TCPA. A Class Action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide relief is essential for compelling Defendant to comply with the TCPA. Each Class Member’s interest in individually controlling the prosecution of a separate claim against Defendant is minute because an individual action’s statutory damages for TCPA violation is small. Management of these claims is likely to be significantly less difficult than management of many other Class claims, as all of the telephone calls at issue are automated and the Class Members did not provide the statutorily required “prior express consent” to authorize the calls placed to their cellular telephone numbers. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate the overall Class’ final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief. Plaintiffs additionally allege, upon information and belief, that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. Congress found that “automated or pre-recorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call” and decided that “banning” such calls made without consent was “the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.” Pub. L. No. 102-243, §§ 2(10-13) (Dec. 20, 1991), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227; see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371 (2012) (“The Act bans certain practices invasive of privacy[.]”). By effectuating these unlawful phone calls, Defendant caused Plaintiffs the very harm that Congress sought to prevent—namely, a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.” Defendant’s aggravating and annoying phone calls trespassed upon and interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights and interests in their cellular telephone and cellular telephone line, and intruded upon Plaintiffs’ seclusion. Defendant’s phone calls harmed Plaintiffs by wasting their time, trespassing on their phone, invading their privacy as well as causing aggravation and inconvenience. Defendant’s foregoing acts and omissions constitute multiple violations of the TCPA; including, but not limited to, each and all of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. Due to Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and each Class Member are entitled, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every telephone call that constitutes a statutory violation. Plaintiffs and all Class Members are also entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief to prohibit Defendant from engaging in future conduct that will violate the TCPA. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.

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On or about December 15, 2014, Ms. Connolly applied for employment with Umpqua in Seattle, Washington. As part of the application process, Ms. Connolly was directed to sign a document that purported to be a combination disclosure and authorization to procure a background check on Ms. Connolly. A copy of this form is attached as Exhibit A. The document states that the background investigation may include criminal convictions, motor vehicle and other reports, as well as records relating to credit, and information relating to character, work habits, and employment. Ms. Connolly brings these claims on behalf of a class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The class consists of: (a) all individuals; (b) who applied for employment with Umpqua, or were employed by Umpqua; (c) about whom Umpqua obtained a consumer report for employment purposes during the Class Period; (d) who completed a disclosure and authorization form that was not a stand alone document, and was not clear and conspicuous. By including additional language, questions, blanks, and disclaimers in its consumer report disclosure and authorization form that Plaintiff and other class members were required to execute, Umpqua violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA. Umpqua’s disclosure and authorization form was not “clear and conspicuous” and it did not consist solely of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA. Umpqua’s actions were willful. Umpqua knew or should have known that its disclosure form should consist solely of the disclosure, and not include extraneous information or questions. Ms. Connolly and class members are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100, and not more than $1,000 for each violation of the FCRA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). Ms. Connolly and class members also seek punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). Umpqua violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) by procuring consumer reports for employment purposes without first obtaining valid authorizations from Ms. Connolly and class members. Umpqua’s violations of the FCRA in this regard were willful. Umpqua knew or should have known that its authorization form was not valid. Umpqua violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2), (3) by failing to provide subclass members with the name, address, and telephone number of the entity that provided the consumer report to them, and to provide a numerical credit score. Umpqua’s actions were willful. Umpqua knew or should have known that it did not provide a copy of the disclosures required after taking adverse action. Ms. Connolly and members of the subclass seek statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each such violation, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). Ms. Connolly and members of the subclass also seek punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs for this violation, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). Sterling violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) by failing to notify job applicants prior to its taking adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in their consumer report. Sterling violated 1681m(a) by failing to provide subclass members with adverse action notices after it took adverse action against them. FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADVERSE ACTION DISCLOSURES ON BEHALF OF STERLING ADVERSE ACTION SUBCLASS 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(3); 1681m(a)(2), (3) FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADVERSE ACTION DISCLOSURES ON BEHALF OF UMPQUA ADVERSE ACTION SUBCLASS 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2), (3) FAILURE TO OBTAIN PROPER AUTHORIZATION BEFORE PROCURING A CREDIT REPORT IN VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(II) FAILURE TO PROVIDE A CLEAR, CONSPICUOUS, AND STAND-ALONE DISCLOSURE IN VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I)

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Plaintiff, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-41 as though fully set forth herein. Section 1692c(b) with certain inapplicable exceptions, prohibits debt collectors from communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.” As discussed above and below, Defendant violated Section 1692c(b) when it used a third-party vendor to mail the October 24, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff. Defendant violated Section 1692c(b) when it used a third-party vendor to mail the October 24, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff because by using a third-party vendor to mail out the letters, Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s personal contact information and information identifying the Subject Debt to Defendant’s letter vendor. ARS’s transmittal of Plaintiff’s personal information, Plaintiff’s purported status as a debtor relative to a debt allegedly owed to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and the amount of the 9 Subject Debt to Defendant’s letter vendor constitutes a "communication" within the meaning of Section 1692a(2) which defines “communication” as "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). Defendant’s use of a third-party letter vendor to merge Plaintiff’s demographic data and status as a debtor into Defendant’s form collection letters for the purpose of printing and mailing the October 24, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff violated Section 1692c(b). ARS’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and her status as a purported debtor posed a material risk of harm to the privacy interests protected by the FDCPA. ARS’s disclosures of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a purported debtor to its third-party letter vendor violated Plaintiff’s rights privacy that was recognized by Congress when it enacted the FDCPA. ARS’s transmittal of Plaintiff’s personal information and information identifying the Subject Debt to its letter vendor was not done in an attempt to comply with Section 1692b. ARS’s disclosure to its letter vendor of Plaintiff’s personal information and her purported status as a person owing the Subject Debt violated Section 1692c(b)’s prohibition on disclosure of debtor information to third-parties Section 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a privacy invasion that American courts have long recognized as cognizable. Congress's judgment indicates that violations of Section 1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury. As set forth above, ARS’s disclosures to its third-party letter vendor (of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a purported debtor) caused Plaintiff to suffer from embarrassment, aggravation and emotional distress. 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff has standing to sue ARS for its improper and unlawful disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a debtor to third-party letter vendors. The claims asserted in this Count satisfy the elements of FRCP 23(a)(1)-(4) and FRCP 23(b)(3). The proposed class encompasses: (a) all consumers with addresses in the State of Texas; (b) where Defendant utilized form collection letters for the purposes of attempting to collect to a consumer based debt allegedly owed to to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A; (c) where Defendant used a third-party letter vendor to transmit the collection letters; and (d) Defendant’s use of a third-party letter vendor resulted in Defendant sending the demographic information of the subject consumers as well as their status as alleged debtors to the letter vendor in violation of Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. Defendant is not entitled to invoke arbitration, because upon information and belief, the Subject Debt is not governed by an arbitration clause. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in her favor and against Defendant ARS as follows: a. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful; b. Awarding Plaintiff and class members statutory damages of $1,000.00 as provided under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) and 1692k(a)(2)(B); c. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages as provided by 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(1)); d. Awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3); and e. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and appropriate. 11 Class Action Violations of § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA Resulting From Defendant’s Sharing of Plaintiff’s Personal Information and her Status as a Debtor

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Sometime before May 15, 2017, Plaintiff is alleged to have incurred certain financial obligations to the City of Tempe Utilities. These financial obligations were primarily for personal, family or household purposes and are therefore a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Sometime thereafter, but before May 15, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly fell behind and defaulted on the payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt. Subsequently, but before May 15, 2017, City of Tempe assigned, placed, or otherwise transferred the alleged debt to VCS for collection. On or about May 15, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter attempting to collect the alleged debt. In Defendant’s May 15, 2017 letter to Plaintiff, the language of which overshadowed, weakened, and failed to comply with, the notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), because it attempted to limit the rights available to Plaintiff in a manner that creates a contradiction would confuse the least sophisticated consumer into disregarding his or her rights pursuant to the validation notice required in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by stating: The above account has been assigned to this office for collection. Please remit payment in full of the current balance to this office in resolution of this matter. If this debt is not paid within 30 days from your receipt of this notice, we may exercise various options to enforce collection activity, including the reporting of this debt to credit reporting agencies… The deadline imposed by Defendant as well as their threat enforce collection activity are misleading as it does not account for Plaintiff’s ability to dispute the debt and to request verification and/or validation pursuant to 1692g, which would halt all collection activity pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). The purpose for this confusing language was to limit the rights available to Plaintiff in a manner that creates a contradiction that would confuse the least sophisticated consumer into disregarding his or her rights pursuant to the validation notice required in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. This conduct was a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of the alleged debt. As such, this action by Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10). Through this conduct, Defendant used an unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Consequently, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Plaintiff bring this action on her own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. This action pleads the following class action allegations. Plaintiff defines “The Class” as (i) all persons with addresses within the state of Arizona; (ii) who were sent an initial collection letter, which was similar or identical to Defendant’s May 15, 2017 to Plaintiff; (iii) to recover a consumer debt; (iv) which were not returned undelivered by the United States Postal Service. The class period is one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. For purposes of the FDCPA Claim, the class period is one year prior to the filing of the original Complaint. There are more than 40 members of the class, and the class members are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. The individual identities of the individual members are ascertainable through Defendants’ records or by public notice. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the members of the Class. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and include, but are not limited to, the following: A) Whether Defendants violated the FDCPA; B) Whether members of the Class are entitled to the remedies under the Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all other paragraphs. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the FDCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. As a result of each and every violation of the FDCPA, Plaintiff is entitled to any actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1); statutory damages in an amount up to $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); and, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) from Defendant. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 ET SEQ.

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On or about November 26, 2018, Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9978 (“9978 Number”) with a pre-recorded message. Upon Plaintiff answering the phone, a pre-recorded message asked Plaintiff to press 1 if she was interested in a vacation promotion. After Plaintiff pressed 1, she was connected to a live representative who notified Plaintiff that he was an employee of Defendant and that he wanted to sell Plaintiff insurance. The employee represented that Defendant had obtained Plaintiff’s number from Facebook. Plaintiff does not list her phone number on Facebook. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9978 Number. Defendant called Plaintiff from 305-514-0228, a number which upon information and belief, Defendant owned and/or operated. Plaintiff received the subject calls within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar calls to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with written express consent to be contacted using a pre-recorded message. Defendant’s unsolicited calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s calls also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a pre-recorded call, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without their prior express written consent. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely calls telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded or artificial voice… to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used pre-recorded calls to make non-emergency marketing telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using a pre-recorded message to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Isabel Gutierrez, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using pre-recorded messages to call telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Belk, Plaintiff consistently worked more than 40 hours per workweek. Belk failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked by Plaintiff. Although Belk failed to keep accurate records of Plaintiff’s hours worked, Belk required, suffered, or permitted Plaintiff to work in excess of 40 hours per week. Belk was aware that Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per workweek, yet Belk failed to pay Plaintiff any overtime compensation for any of the hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Defendant classified Plaintiff as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Upon information and belief, Belk did not perform an individual analysis of Plaintiff’s job duties when making the decision to classify Plaintiff as exempt from the overtime protections of the FLSA. Plaintiff’s primary duties were non-exempt. The tasks that Plaintiff regularly performed included but were not limited to: a. restocking products; b. marking down sale items; c. keeping clothes organized; d. operating the register; e. selling merchandise; f. working the sales floor; and g. performing other general customer service related duties. Plaintiff’s primary job duties did not include: 5 a. hiring, firing, promoting, or disciplining other employees; b. implementing management policies, practices, and procedures; c. committing Belk in matters having significant financial impact; d. setting employees’ wages; or e. determining how many labor hours could be allocated to Plaintiff’s store. The performance of non-exempt duties occupied the vast majority of Plaintiff’s working hours. Plaintiff’s primary duties did not differ substantially from the duties of non-exempt hourly paid employees. Plaintiff did not exercise a meaningful degree of independent discretion with respect to the exercise of Plaintiff’s duties. Plaintiff did not have the discretion or authority to make any decisions with respect to matters of significance and was required to follow the policies, practices, and procedures set by Belk. Plaintiff did not have any independent authority to deviate from these policies, practices, and procedures. Store managers and district managers were responsible for the overall performance of the store, not Plaintiff. Belk has intentionally, willfully, and regularly violated the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff by: a. willfully failing to record all of the time the Plaintiff worked for the benefit of Belk; b. willfully failing to keep accurate time records as required by the FLSA; c. willfully failing to credit Plaintiff for all hours worked including overtime hours, consistent with the requirements of the FLSA; d. willfully failing to pay Plaintiff wages for all hours worked including overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; 6 e. willfully classifying Plaintiff as exempt despite Plaintiff’s primary duties being non-exempt in nature; and f. failing to provide sufficient resources in the labor budgets for non-exempt employees to complete all of the non-exempt tasks at Plaintiff’s location of employment, knowing or recklessly disregarding the fact that doing so resulted in Plaintiff having to work more than 40 hours in a workweek primarily performing non-exempt duties during Plaintiff’s workweeks without receiving overtime compensation—which allowed Defendant to avoid paying additional wages (including overtime) to the non-exempt employees. As a sophisticated employer operating hundreds of locations throughout the country, Defendant was aware or recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff primarily performed non-exempt duties and did not perform activities sufficient to satisfy the requirements for any FLSA exemption. Inasmuch as Defendant is a substantial corporate entity aware of its obligations under the FLSA, Defendant acted willfully or recklessly in failing to classify Plaintiff as a non-exempt employee. V. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding Paragraphs as if they have been set forth herein. The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to Belk. Belk violated the FLSA, as described in this Complaint. Belk failed to pay Plaintiff the overtime wages to which Plaintiff is entitled under the FLSA. Belk’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint, were willful and intentional. Belk failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of Plaintiff. Because Belk willfully violated the FLSA, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 7 As a result of Belk’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. As a result of Belk’s unlawful acts, Plaintiff has been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). VI. Count One – Unpaid Overtime Compensation In Violation of the FLSA

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Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are covered individuals within the meaning of the Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Defendants employed Plaintiffs within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of by failing to pay Plaintiffs the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and required overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (1) additional hour' s pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiffs with a statement with every payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.3. Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661. Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages for each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law § 194(4), and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.1. At the time of their hiring, Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs of their rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(1). Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants the difference between their actual wages and the amounts that were owed under the New York Labor law. The deficiency accounts for minimum wage for all straight time hours, overtime compensation for all overtime hours, "spread of hours" premium, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198. Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law§ 663(1), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant to the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs with wage notices, as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by Plaintiffs as their primary language, containing Plaintiffs’ rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiffs with the wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs with accurate statements of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars each day that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b). Due to Defendants’ willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiffs are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-d).

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In the last line of the Collection Letter, in much smaller print, Defendant states, "The law limits how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau." Nor did the letter inform Plaintiff that a partial payment on the debt would restart the running of the statute of limitations. In fact, had Plaintiff chosen a payment plan option, and advised Defendant of this in writing, the partial payment would revive the statute of limitations rendering the Plaintiff worse off than if she had rejected the offer. It is the position of the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency that when "collecting on a time barred debt a debt collector [Defendant] must inform the consumer [Plaintiff] that (1) the collector cannot sue to collect the debt and (2) providing a partial payment would revive the collector's [Defendant's] ability to sue to collect the balance." McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 774 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2014); see White v. First Step Grp. LLC, 2017 LEXIS 153569 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017). The Defendant engaged in misleading, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices in violation of the FDCP A by its Collection Letter to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff brings this as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following classes, initially defined as follows: Class: All consumers with a Pennsylvania address that have received collection letters similar to Exhibit A from Defendant concerning debts for GE Capital Retail Bank used primarily for personal, household, or family purposes within one year prior to the filing of this complaint. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent collections letters in attempt to collect a debt to hundreds if not thousands of consumers Pennsylvania, each of which violates the FDCP A. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable. The letters sent by Defendant, and received by the Class, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer." The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's records. Common Questions of Law and Fact There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominates over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: (i) whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCP A; (ii) whether the Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by the conduct of Defendant; (iii) whether the Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendants wrongdoing and, if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and (iv) whether the Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. Typicality Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members' interests, in that the Plaintiffs counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted, this being specifically envisioned by Congress as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA, as codified by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692(k). The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiffs Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant's breaches of Class members' statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant's conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains. Defendant has acted, and will act, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate a final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates them as if specifically set forth at length herein. Defendant's Collection Letter is false, deceptive, and misleading, and violates the below provisions of the FDCP A. On a date better known by Defendant, Plaintiff incurred a debt from the use of a credit card to purchase goods used for personal, family, and household purposes. On a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began attempting to collect on said debt allegedly owed by the Plaintiff. On or about January 11, 201 7, Defendant sent Plaintiff the letter attached as Exhibit A, presenting the "current balance" as $470.52, for a personal debt originating with GE Capital Retail Bank and Old Navy. The Collection Letter offered three available payment options. Option one (1) was for a payment due by February 10, 2017 for 40% off. Option two (2) was for 20% off with payments over 3 months. Option three (3) was for "monthly payments as low as $50 per month." See Exhibit A. Therefore, Options 2 and 3 clearly offered payments over time. The Class VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.

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Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom PCB sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. while the consumer was in an active bankruptcy case; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. On a date better known to the original creditors Northwell Heath Leonx Hill Hospital (“Northwell”), the Plaintiff incurred an obligation. The Northwell obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The Northwell obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Northwell is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). Northwell or a subsequent owner of the debt contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – November 8, 2019 Collection Letter On or around September 4, 2019 the Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. Within the bankruptcy petition the Plaintiff listed all his creditors including the original creditor Northwell. Upon the filing of the Bankruptcy Petition the Court sends out notices of filing to each listed creditors and debt collector notifying them of the filed bankruptcy. Despite the Plaintiff filing his Bankruptcy and receiving an automatice stay form the collection of any debt, the original creditor Northwell contracted the account to Defendant PCB to collect. Defendant PCB failed to perform a proper bankruptcy check and sent collection notices to the Plaintiff. The collection notice specifically demanded payment for a debt that was included in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy and was stayed from collecting. The Defendant should have had systems in place to detect if this account has been included in a bankruptcy filing. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, was an illegal practice. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, constitute the threat to take an action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken because Defendant cannot collect a debt included in bankruptcy. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, constitutes harassment and the unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff, were deceptive and misleading and caused the Plaintiff to be upset and confused about the status of the debt. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated §1692e : a. As the Letter was attempt collection a debt stayed from being collected in violation of §1692e(2), and §1692e(5). b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. ‐  Untrue or Misleading Advertising)  (Unjust Enrichment)  (Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes)  Throughout the Class Periods (as defined below), Bayer engaged in a  widespread marketing campaign to mislead consumers about the nature, composition,  and nutritional and health benefits of its One A Day multivitamins in order to make  these multivitamins more desirable to consumers, increase sales, and gain market share.  Each type of Bayer One A Day multivitamin is substantially similar to the  multivitamin purchased by Plaintiffs because each multivitamin prominently bears the  One A Day logo, makes one or more of the unlawful Disease Prevention and Energy  Claims, and provides a substantially similar combination of vitamins.   Bayer deceptively markets its One A Day multivitamins using the  following unlawful claims:  11 Bayer AG, 2013 Annual Report 110 (2014).  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page6 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 6‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2),  and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Plaintiffs seek to represent the  following classes:  National:  All persons in the United States who purchased Bayer One A  Day multivitamins containing one or more Disease Prevention and Energy  Claim at any time during the applicable limitations period (the “National  Class Period”).  Excluded from the Class are Defendants’ officers and  directors and the immediate families of Defendants’ officers and directors.   Also excluded from the Class are the Defendants and their subsidiaries,  parents, affiliates, joint venturers, and any entity in which Defendants have  or have had a controlling interest.   California:  All persons in California who purchased Bayer One A Day  multivitamins containing one or more Disease Prevention and Energy  Claim between October 15, 2010 and the date of filing (the “California  25 One A Day website, One A Day Energy, http://oneaday.com/energy.html (last visited  Aug. 14, 2014) (emphasis added).  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page15 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 15‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege the unlawful business acts and  practices of Bayer as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.  Plaintiffs and Class Members are consumers who purchased Bayer One A  Day multivitamins for personal, family, or household purposes.  Bayer had a statutory duty to refrain from unfair or deceptive acts and  practices in the manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling of One A Day  multivitamins.  Bayer violated this duty through its misleading and deceptive marketing  and labeling practices with respect to its One A Day multivitamins.   Plaintiffs and Class Members were misled or deceived by Bayer’s  misleading and deceptive marketing and labeling practices with respect to its One A  Day multivitamins.   As a result of Bayer’s misleading and deceptive marketing and labeling  practices with respect to its One A Day multivitamins, Plaintiffs and Class Members  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page18 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 18‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege Bayer’s deceptive marketing and  labeling practices as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.   As a result of Bayer’s deceptive marketing and labeling of its One A Day  multivitamins, as described above, Bayer was enriched, at the expense of Plaintiffs and  those similarly situated, through the payment of the purchase price for One A Day  multivitamins.   Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience  to permit Bayer to retain the ill‐gotten benefits that it received from Plaintiffs and those  similarly situated, in light of the fact that the One A Day multivitamins purchased by the  Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated were not what Bayer purported them to be.  Thus,  it would be unjust or inequitable for Bayer to retain the benefit without restitution to  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page22 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 22‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege the untrue or misleading advertising  practices of Bayer as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above, each of which  constitutes untrue or misleading advertising under California Business and Professions  Code §§ 17500, et seq.  At all material times, Bayer engaged in a scheme of offering its One A Day  multivitamin varieties for sale to Plaintiffs and other members of the Class by way of,  inter alia, commercial marketing.  These marketing materials misrepresented or omitted  the true results of taking these multivitamins.  Said advertisements and inducements  were made within the State of California and come within the definition of advertising  as contained in Business and Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. in that such marketing  materials were intended as inducements to purchase One A Day multivitamins and are  statements disseminated by Bayer to Plaintiffs and the Class and were intended to reach  members of the Class.  Bayer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have  known, that these statements were untrue or misleading.   In furtherance of this plan and scheme, Bayer has prepared and distributed  within the State of California via commercial marketing, statements that deceptively  represent the ingredients contained in, and the nature and quality of, One A Day  multivitamins.  Consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, necessarily and  reasonably relied on these materials concerning One A Day multivitamins.  Consumers,  including Plaintiffs and the Class, were among the intended targets of such  representations and would reasonably be deceived by such materials.   The above acts of Bayer, in disseminating said deceptive and untrue  statements throughout the State of California to consumers, including Plaintiffs and  members of the Class, were and are likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page23 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 23‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601

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Plaintiff was hired by Defendants in May 2016 as a Client Service Manager Senior. Plaintiff’s employment agreement was entered into with AJG “on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries, divisions and affiliated and related companies”. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s “Employee Agreement” and Employment Offer Letter are attached as Exhibits A and B respectively. Plaintiff’s payslips list “Arthur J. Gallagher Service Company” as the “Business Group” and list the “Employer name” as “47615 GGB US – White & Co. Commercial.” GGB US is believed to stand for Gallagher Global Brokerage US, which is believed to be a division of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. acquired White & Company Insurance, Inc. in or around February 2016, prior to the beginning of Plaintiff’s employment. True and correct exemplar copies of Plaintiff’s payslips are attached as Exhibit C (with personal information redacted). Plaintiff has also received a document from the Employment Development Department of the State of California which lists here employer as “Arthur J. Gallagher Service Company LLC.” A true and correct copy of that document is attached as Exhibit D (with personal information redacted). As evidenced in Plaintiff’s Employment Offer Letter, dated May 19, 2016, Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff that her position, Client Service Manager Senior, was exempt. See Exh. B, p. 1. As such, Plaintiff received an annual salary paid in twenty-four equal installments on a semi-monthly basis for 37.5 hours per week without overtime compensation. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of the following Class: a) All persons who are or were previously employed by Defendants as Client Service Managers in California and were classified as exempt from overtime wages. b) With respect to the UCL claim, the class period is four (4) years prior to the filing of this Complaint (the “UCL Class Period”). c) With respect to all other claims, the class period is three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint (the “Labor Code Class Period”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition and class period(s). Excluded from the proposed Class are any person(s) employed by Plaintiff’s counsel and any judicial officers assigned to this case, as well as their staff. Numerosity: While the exact number of Class Members can only be determined by appropriate discovery, membership in the Class is ascertainable based upon the employment and payroll records maintained by Defendants. At this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Class includes hundreds of Clients Service Managers in California. Therefore, the Class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members of the Class in a single action is impracticable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(1), and the resolution of their claims through a class action will be of benefit to the parties and the Court. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges Paragraphs 1 through37 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Defendants routinely require Plaintiff and the Class Members to work in excess of eight (8) hours per workday and/or in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Defendants, however, failed to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and the Class. Defendants instead improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt to avoid paying them overtime wages. California Labor Code § 510 and Wage Order 4-2001 require that an employer compensate non-exempt employees for all work performed in excess of eight (8) hours per workday and forty (40) hours per workweek, at the rate of 1½ times the employee’s regular rate of pay. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. California Labor Code § 512(a) provides, in relevant part, that “an employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes” and that “[a]n employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes . . . .” Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 50 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. California Labor Code § 226 provides, in relevant part, that every employer must furnish each employee with an itemized wage statement that shows the total number of hours worked each pay period, gross wages, net wages, all deductions, all applicable hourly rates of pay, the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, the last four digits (only) of the employee’s social security number and other information. Plaintiff, on behalf of the putative Class, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 57 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Gallagher performs insurance brokerage services. Clients retain Gallagher’s experts, called Producers, to consult and develop suitable risk management programs tailored to the individual client’s needs and requirements. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 63 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein For Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements [Cal. Lab. Code § 226] (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants) For Failure to Pay Wages Due At Termination [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 and 203] (By Plaintiff on Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants) For Failure to Provide Off-Duty Meal Periods [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 512 and 226.7 and Wage Order 4-2001] (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants) For Failure To Pay Overtime Compensation [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, et seq. and Wage Order 4-2001] (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law [Cal. Bus. And Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.] (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants)

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Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they purposefully and willfully chose, and choose, not to do so. Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty, in violation of the FLSA. In November 2009, Defendant Tom Rohlman, on behalf of Pine Management, hired Plaintiff to work for Defendants as a maintenance worker, porter, and superintendent. Plaintiff worked for Defendants in that capacity until his employment ended on August 12, 2015. At all times during Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendants, Pine Management’s vice-presidents, brothers Daniel and Jason Rohlman, oversaw and controlled Plaintiff’s work assignments, work hours, and the calculation and payment of his wages. 5 hours of that work per week. Plaintiff’s duties as a maintenance worker consisted of plastering, painting, garbage removal, cleaning windows, mopping, sweeping, and repairing apartment units and common areas within Defendants’ buildings. During the entire period of Plaintiff’s employment, the Defendants required Plaintiff to reside, and Plaintiff did reside, in Defendants’ building located at 211 West 80th Street, Apt. 1-C, New York, New York. Plaintiff performed work for the Defendants in that building, as well as in Defendants’ buildings located at 205, 207 and 209 West 80th Street, New York, New York. During the calendar years 2013-2015, up until and including August 12, 2015, the Defendants required Plaintiff to perform his regular maintenance work duties five days per week, Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m., without being permitted a scheduled or uninterrupted break each day, totaling 42.5 hours per week. Additionally, on the weekends, Defendants required Plaintiff to spend additional hours working as a porter and superintendent at the four buildings. In total, in addition to his 42.5 hours per week spent as a maintenance worker, Plaintiff worked between 19.25 hours and twenty-five hours per week in his role as a porter and superintendent. Thus, throughout his employment, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, a total of at least 61.75 hours per week and sometimes as many as 67.5 hours per week. During at least the three-year period pre-dating the commencement of this action up until his last day of work, Defendants paid Plaintiff an hourly rate, for all hours that he spent fulfilling his maintenance worker responsibilities as follows: $15.00 per hour through December 2014; and $16.00 per hour from January 2015 through the end of his employment on August 12, 2015. During that same time period, Defendants paid Plaintiff an additional $300 per week to cover his superintendent/porter responsibilities, which at his hourly rate of $16, operated to cover By way of example only, during the workweek of January 26 through February 2, 2015, Plaintiff worked the following regular schedule as a maintenance worker: Monday, January 26, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. Tuesday, January 27, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. Wednesday, January 28, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. Thursday, January 29, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. Friday, January 30, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. Saturday, January 31, 2015: off Sunday, February 2, 2015: off Plaintiff also, during that same week, worked a total of 19.25 hours performing his porter and superintendent duties, which consisted of 2.25 hours of work on each weekday and four hours of work on each weekend day. Thus, adding up the hours for this representative workweek, Plaintiff worked 61.75 hours for the week. During this week, Defendant paid Plaintiff at the rate of $16.00 per hour for 61.25 hours worked and nothing for .5 hours of work, and thus not at the rate of time and one-half his straight-time rate, or $24 per hour, for all hours that Plaintiff worked in excess of forty. Defendants employed several FLSA Plaintiffs at their various buildings throughout Manhattan and Brooklyn, and treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs in the manner described herein. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits while minimizing their labor costs and overhead. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA, while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA

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Fitbit is manufacturer of activity trackers founded in 2007 and headquartered in San Francisco, California. Its products’ functions have included, among other things, step counting, distance calculating, calorie calculating, and sleep monitoring. In October 2014, Fitbit announced a new feature: wrist-based heart rate monitoring. The two products equipped with this technology, dubbed PurePulse, are the Charge HR and the Surge, which typically retail at approximately $1505 and $250 respectively. Those products are shown below: I. Fitbit Falsely Claims the PurePulse Trackers Consistently Record Accurate Heart Rate. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated as members of the proposed Class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), and/or (b)(1), (b)(2), and/or (c)(4). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. Because this Complaint is brought in California, California’s choice of law regime governs the state law allegations in this Complaint. Under California’s governmental interest/comparative impairment choice of law rules, California law applies to the claims of all Class members, regardless of their state of residence or state of purchase. Because Fitbit is headquartered—and made all decisions relevant to these claims—in California, California has a substantial connection to, and materially greater interest in, this the rights, interests, and policies involved in this action than any other state. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. This claim is brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class and California Subclass to seek injunctive relief as well as monetary damages against Fitbit under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. Fitbit is a “person” as defined by the CLRA. Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(c). Plaintiffs and Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the CLRA, as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d), who purchased one or more PurePulse Trackers. The CLRA prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). Fitbit engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices that violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a), as described above and below, by, among other things, failing to disclose the defective nature of the PurePulse Trackers, representing that the PurePulse Trackers had characteristics and benefits that they do not have (e.g., the ability to consistently record accurate heart rates, even during high-intensity exercise), representing that the PurePulse Trackers were of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they were of another, and advertising PurePulse Trackers with the intent not to sell them as advertised. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5), (a)(7), (a)(9). Fitbit knew, should have known, or was reckless in not knowing that its products did not have the qualities, characteristics, and functions it represented, warranted, and advertised them to have. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for themselves and on behalf of the Nationwide Class and California Subclass. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Fitbit’s conduct related to the Heart Rate Defect violated each of this statute’s three prongs. Fitbit committed an unlawful business act or practice in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., by their violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq., as set forth above, by the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint. CHOICE OF LAW ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................ 19 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................. 20 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................. 38 I. Fitbit Falsely Claims the PurePulse Trackers Consistently Record Accurate Heart Rate. ........................................................................................................................ 6 II. The PurePulse Trackers Fail to Consistently Record Accurate Heart Rate As Promised and Warranted. ............................................................................................... 11 III. Fitbit Attempted to Keep Class Members Out of Court Through An Unconscionable Post-Purchase Agreement, Which Class Members Were Required to Accept in Order to Render Operational the PurePulse Trackers They Already Purchased. ......................................................................................................... 13 Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. – Based On the Heart Rate Defect Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. – Based On the Post-Purchase “Terms of Service”

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(Violations of the FDCPA) Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “20” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Upon information and belief, Defendant, on behalf of itself or a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. Upon information and belief, and better known to the Defendant, Defendant commenced its campaign of communications with Plaintiff by sending Plaintiff two (2) mass-produced form letters in the mail both dated December 11, 2013. One letter was a collection letter (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant’s Collection Letter”) which bore Defendant’s letterhead with company name identifying Defendant as “Law Office” (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). Defendant’s Collection Letter began: “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account in the sum of $____. Beneath this was a heading in large type, upper case letters centered on the page: “VALIDATION NOTICE.” Said “validation notice” consisted of: “The amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor.” Immediately after this sentence begins Defendant’s required 30- day dispute language regarding consumer rights. Thereafter, with no space to separate it from the preceding text, Defendant stated: “At this time no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account.” Thereafter, with no space to separate it from the preceding text, Defendant provided required FDCPA disclosures in all uppercase letters. Thereafter Defendant informed the consumer that if they did not dispute the alleged debt or require further information offered in the 30-day disclosure language and “wish to pay this claim,” that they should contact Defendant’s office. Defendant’s Collection Letter was signed: BY:___[Script initials “JS”]___ [Defendant’s company name] Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “33” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15 USC §1692e – preface prohibits a debt collector from using any false, misleading or deceptive representations in connection with the collection of a debt. The Defendant violated 15 USC §1692e – preface by creating a mass- produced form letter for dissemination to consumers as exemplified by Defendant’s Collection Letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit “A”) which uses deception throughout. Defendant’s letter states that “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account,” with no indication of whether “us” means attorneys but implying that it does by the inclusion of “Law Office” above the company name in the masthead. Equally deceptive is Defendant including a heading above the body of its letter in large, bold, upper case type centered on the page: “VALIDATION NOTICE,” after which Defendant states “The amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor,” and then immediately continues, “Unless you notify us with thirty days,” etc. stating the required 30-day disclosure language in the same paragraph as the so-called “Validation Notice.” Defendant has deliberately designed the aforementioned letter so that all of the text following the heading, in fact the entire letter, can be easily misconstrued as “validation” of the consumer’s debt, which is clearly not the case. Further down, Defendant deceptively squeezes the statement, “At this time no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account,” with no space to separate the paragraph from the preceding or following text. In clear contradiction of this statement, Defendant’s Collection Letter was signed by John J. Sheerin, an attorney with Defendant’s firm, who deceptively did not identify himself as an attorney, but beneath his signature printed the name of his firm and a direction to “refer to” a “J. Kennedy” and a telephone number. Evidence that Attorney Sheerin signed said letter is provided by Defendant’s Legal Letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit “B”) where Attorney Sheerin includes his name beneath his signature. A comparison of Attorney Sheerin’s signatures in Plaintiff’s Exhibits “A” and “B” evidence that they are identical. Defendant dates two letters on the same day, falsely informing the Plaintiff that they are debt collectors and no attorney has personally reviewed particular circumstances of his account and at the same time that they have been retained as attorneys for the creditor and enclose an executed Consent to Change Attorneys which they claim has been sent to “the Court” for filing. Defendant’s Collection Letter deliberately and deceptively prints, “Refer to: J. Kennedy” directly beneath Mr. Sheerin’s signature and firm name, with no indication of “J. Kennedy’s” title. In Defendant’s Legal Letter, J. Kennedy is identified as “Collection Manager” and Mr. Sheerin is not identified as an attorney. Both letters conclude by asking the consumer to contact Defendant to make a settlement. Taken together, Defendant letters clearly illustrate Defendant’s deceitful and reprehensible attempts to imply legal action is imminent as a means to compel Plaintiff and the consumer to cooperate with Defendant’s debt collection objectives. 15 USC §1692 f –preface prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable actions in connection with the collection of a debt. 38. The Defendant violated 15 USC §1692 f – preface by unfairly and unconscionably mass-producing and sending letters, exemplified by Defendant’s Collection Letter sent to Plaintiff, designed to convince consumer recipients that they are being contacted regarding a debt with all the implications associated with a pending legal procedure. Defendant prints a letter on letterhead indicating “Law Office” above the company name, states that “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account” without stating who “us” entails in order to encourage the belief that “us” means attorneys. Moreover, by centering the large upper case, bold typed heading, “VALIDATION NOTICE,” above the body of its letter, Defendant unfairly attempts to give the impression that what follows is a validation of the consumer’s debt when said “validation” consists of the words: “The amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor.” Further, Defendant deliberately squeezes the language that no attorney has reviewed the particular circumstances of the consumer’s account between required dispute notification language and above the all upper case disclosure language that “THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT,” etc. Further Defendant unfairly includes a signature of two initials, difficult to decipher, with no identity of the individual who sent the letter so as to encourage the consumer to assume it is from an attorney. By Defendant’s use of stationery with a legal masthead designated “Law Office,” it’s illusive signature and failure to identify the signatory or the individual, “J. Kennedy” whom the consumer is directed to “refer to,” and it’s misleading design and placement of information, Defendant intends to unfairly intimidate and unsettle consumers and convince them that legal action against them is imminent, thereby provoking the consumer into contacting Defendant in furtherance of Defendant’s debt collection objectives. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 23, on behalf of himself and all persons/consumers, along with their successors-in-interest, who have received similar debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation of the FDCPA, as of the date of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant is impracticable. Upon information and belief, hundreds of persons have received debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant, which violate various provisions of the

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At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: a.All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from Defendants InboundProspect, Inc., d/b/a Senior Mobility Care, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for the marketing purposes, to non-customers of InboundProspect, Inc., d/b/a Senior Mobility Care, at the time of the calls. Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendants or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records and/or Defendants’ agent’s records. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, Defendants made any call(s) (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; ii.Whether Defendants called non-customers of Defendants for marketing purposes; iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and iv.Whether Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendants to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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(Under NYTL § 1139 and 20 NYCRR §§ 534.2 and 534.8 for Violations of § 526.5(c)(4)) (Violations of GBL § 349) As relevant here, Costco’s coupon booklets were distributed in two different standard formats before the beginning of the Class Period: (i) the pre-August 8, 2013 format; and (ii) the format effective on and after August 8, 2013 until the beginning of the Class Period. Beginning with the coupon booklet valid October 3-27, 2013, an “Instant Savings” notation in small print was again included for many of the coupons immediately above the “$[X] OFF” and any applicable quantity limit for the pictured product. However, unlike the pre-August, 2013 format, there was no asterisked message below the “Instant Savings” notation stating “See inside cover for terms and conditions.” An “Instant Savings” notation was not added for the limited number of coupons that included a blue arrow pointing at the price and stating “Book Or App Required,” or the “ONLINE-ONLY OFFER” coupons. No other changes were made to the format of the coupon booklets prior to the beginning of the Class Period. As with the August 8-September 1, 2013 coupon booklet, the coupon booklets did not include any reference to “Manufacturer’s coupon” for the coupons that were not “ONLINE-ONLY OFFERS,” and the coupon booklets did not include any statement that “[t]he instant savings in this booklet are Manufacturers’ savings” for the coupons that included an “Instant Savings” notation. And the coupons themselves did not show that they were “manufacturers’ coupons” and that the reduced price was the result of a “manufacturer’s reimbursement” to Costco. B. Costco’s Coupon Booklets During the Class Period The Costco receipt issued to customers for warehouse purchases is produced in a standard, computer generated, structured data format. Generally, for each item purchased, the receipt includes a line that lists the assigned identifying item number, a brief textual description of the product such as a name abbreviation, and the full price. For taxable items, the receipt includes a letter code to the right of the price which depends on the rate at which the Sales Tax is charged. For example, an “A” to the right of the price indicates that Sales Tax is charged at the full rate imposed by New York—for items including but not limited to household cleaning and paper products, home goods like sheets and towels, and taxable beverages like beer and soft drinks. An “F” to the right of the price is assigned to items of clothing, which if priced at less than $110 per item, are exempt from New York State Sales Tax but may still be subject to county sales tax. For items purchased involving coupon price reductions, the coupon number, generally the notation “CPN/[Item number]” and the amount of the coupon’s price reduction are listed on a line immediately below the line for the item whose price is reduced by that coupon. Only by manually totaling the full price of all “A” taxable items on the receipt and applying the stated sales tax rate shown on the receipt can customers determine that Costco has charged Sales Tax on the full price rather than the reduced price of purchased items involving the coupons. And even then, the customers would have to subtract the total coupon- related price reductions for all “A” taxable items to calculate the amount of Costco’s Sales Tax liability that Costco has illegally charged the customers on the full price rather than the reduced price of their coupon-related warehouse purchases subject to Sales Tax, and Costco’s liability for Sales Tax under § 526.5(c)(4) that it has illegally shifted its to its New York customers. By contrast, all of this information and the related computations for all New York customers can be derived from the structured data that resides and is maintained in Costco’s computer systems. Plaintiff brings this action, individually and as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of the following class: All Costco customers who, for the period beginning three years prior to the commencement of this action and continuing up to and including the present (the “Class Period”), paid New York State Sales Tax to Costco for their purchases at Costco’s New York warehouses on the full price rather than the reduced price of taxable items when the price reduction was based on a coupon issued by Costco in its monthly coupon booklet (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Costco and Costco’s directors, officers, parents, affiliates, subsidiaries and successors. Plaintiff and the Class satisfy the requirements for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Although the number of members of the Class is not precisely known to Plaintiff at this time and can be determined only from appropriate discovery, it is reasonably estimated based on the 18 Costco warehouses in New York State and the average number of members and cardholders per warehouse worldwide as disclosed in Costco’s Form 10-K that the Class includes many hundreds of thousands and probably in excess of one million members. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with the Class, and Plaintiff has retained competent counsel with extensive experience in consumer and other types of class actions involving, among other things, deceptive consumer acts and practices regarding taxes under the New York Tax Law, to further ensure the protection of those interests and who intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. Costco has violated § 526.5(c)(4) by charging and collecting from Plaintiff and the Class Sales Tax for their purchases at Costco’s New York warehouses on the full price rather than the reduced price of taxable items when the price reduction was based on a coupon issued by Costco in its monthly coupon booklet, thereby illegally shifting its liability for Sales Tax on the difference between the full price and the reduced price to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Costco’s illegal Sales Tax practices. Costco is liable for, and should be required to repay to Plaintiff and the Class, the Sales Tax that Costco has illegally shifted to and collected from them, in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. In determining what types of conduct may be deceptive practices under GBL § 349, the courts of New York have applied an objective standard which asks whether the “representation or omission [is] likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances,” while taking into account not only the impact on the “average consumer” but also on “the vast multitude which the statutes were enacted to safeguard ... including the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general impressions.” Costco’s Sales Tax practices described in this Complaint constitute deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of services in this State which affects the public interest under GBL § 349. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Costco’s conduct. Additionally, because Costco has willfully or knowingly violated § 349, Plaintiff and the Class each are entitled to recover an amount not to exceed three times their actual damages up to $1,000. I. Costco’s Monthly Coupon Booklets And Coupons During The Class Period Do Not Indicate That The Coupons Are “Manufacturers’ Coupons,” And Do Not Disclose That The Reduced Price Is The Result Of A “Manufacturer’s Reimbursement” To Costco

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Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff seeks to prosecute his FLSA claims as a collective action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Defendants as 3 ASMs at any time from three years from December 15, 2013, to the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) (collectively, the “Collective Action Members”). Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other ASMs. There are many similarly-situated current and former ASMs who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, notice should be sent to the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily- identifiable and can be located through Defendants’ records. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as ASMs. Defendants independently or jointly maintained control, oversight, and discretion over the operation of all of its restaurants, including its employment practices with respect to the ASMs. Plaintiff’s and the ASMs’ work was performed in the normal course of Defendants’ business and was integrated into it. Consistent with the Defendants’ policy, pattern and/or practice, Plaintiff and ASMs regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without being paid overtime wages, in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiff worked an average of 55 hours per workweek. Plaintiff sometimes worked 65-75 hours per workweek. All of the work that the ASMs performed was assigned by Defendants, and/or Defendants are aware of all of the work that they have performed. 4 The work that ASMs performed as part of their primary duty required little skill and no capital investment. The work that ASMs performed as part of their primary duty did not include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of meaningful independent judgment and discretion. Regardless of the store at which they worked, ASMs’ primary job duties included: a. preparing food; b. helping customers; c. bussing tables; d. cleaning the restaurant; e. checking to make sure that supplies were properly shelved; and f. checking inventory. Regardless of the store at which they worked, ASMs’ primary job duties did not include: a. hiring; b. firing; c. disciplining other employees; d. scheduling; e. supervising and delegating; or f. exercising meaningful independent judgment and discretion. ASMs’ primary duties were manual in nature. The performance of manual labor duties occupied the majority of their working hours. Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and/or practice, Defendants have classified all ASMs as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of the At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff, and employed or continues to employ each of the Collective Action Members, within the meaning of the FLSA. Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in Collective Action Complaint. Plaintiff consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 7 § 216(b). The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., apply to Defendants. At all relevant times and continuing to the present time, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to its ASMs and similarly-situated employees in comparable positions but holding different titles, for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action members, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendants have violated and continue to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). As a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of minimizing labor costs by underfunding the labor budgets for its restaurants, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were primarily performing manual labor and non-exempt tasks. Due to Defendants’ failure to provide enough labor budget funds, failure to take into account the impact of the underfunded labor budgets on the job duties of Plaintiff and the 8 Collective Action Members, Defendants’ actual knowledge through its managerial employees/agents that the primary duties of the Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members was manual labor and included other non-exempt tasks, Defendants’ failure to perform a person-by-person analysis of Plaintiff’s and the Collective Action Members’ job duties to ensure that they were performing exempt job duties, Defendants’ instituting a policy and practice that did not allow Plaintiff and Collective Action Members to record all hours worked, and Defendants’ failure to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and overtime wage requirements, Defendants knew and/or showed reckless disregard that its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). As a result of Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Collective Action Members, is entitled (a) to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime wages, (b) to recover an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, and (c) to recover their unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff PATRICK COYNE and the FLSA Collective

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During the call, Plaintiff was never informed that he may have his credit pulled, nor was Plaintiff informed of any reason that Cox would be pulling his credit. After learning of the pull, Plaintiff mailed Cox a letter stating that the inquiry was not authorized and requesting that Cox have the inquiry removed. Cox took no action in response to this letter, leaving Plaintiff with an unauthorized hard inquiry on each of his three credit reports. This is not the first time that Cox has made an unauthorized “hard inquiry.” One consumer on FicoForums has written: So a Cox communications salesman was coming door to door looking for business. He offered me a great deal on internet service and I'm fed up with my slow at&t dsl. I filled out no paperwork or application the guy just took my info and went to his car to set up the install. Today I get the Fico alert that I had an inquiry on 10/2 by cox communications. I'm assuming this is a hp. Do I have any recourse? they never told me they were going to do a hp and if they did I would have declined their offer.1 Plaintiff’s experience, along with the above publicly available information, demonstrates that Cox has a habit of performing unauthorized inquiries on consumers’ credit reports. Upon information and belief, Defendant instructs its agents to request identification information from consumers prior to providing information about the availability and pricing of services. Defendant does not notify consumers that upon providing identifying information, Defendant will perform a credit inquiry on his or her credit report. Defendant’s practice causes real and concrete injury to consumers. Plaintiff and other consumers had their personal, private financial information impermissibly accessed in the absence of any written request for services, and without consent. The impermissible access of private and confidential information contained within a consumer’s credit report violates the privacy rights conveyed by Congress in enacting the FCRA. Defendant’s interference with a consumer’s legally protected interest in ensuring his or her credit is not impermissibly accessed and used constitutes injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing. Here, Defendants’ action resulted in a concrete and particularized harm – a hard inquiry and an attendant score drop. Accordingly, Defendant impermissibly invaded Plaintiff and other consumers’ legally protected interest in ensuring their credit reports are only accessed and used for legally permissible purposes, proximately causing cognizable injury. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following classes, initially defined as follows: Class 1 – Impermissible Access. All natural persons residing in the United States or its territories, excluding the Court and staff, whose consumer reports display an inquiry by Defendant, and for which Defendant has no open account or record of a written request for an account. Class 2 – Impermissible Use. All natural persons residing in the United States or its territories, excluding the Court and staff, whose consumer reports are recorded as received by Defendant, and for which there is a record of a review of that data in Defendant’s possession. Excluded from the Classes is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the Defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant. Numerosity Upon information and belief, Defendant has made impermissible credit pulls, and impermissibly used credit information of hundreds of consumers throughout the United States, each of which violates the FCRA. The members of the classes, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number and identities of the class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. Common Questions of Law and Fact The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all potential class members have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other members of the Class. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members' interests, in that the Plaintiff's counsel is associated with experienced counsel and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed classes, final injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the classes as a whole may be appropriate and as such, Plaintiff may seek certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). Without an injunction, Defendant’s violative business practices are likely to continue. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a class action, the class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant’s breaches of class members’ statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant's conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates them as if specifically set forth at length herein. Section 1681b of the FCRA limits access to consumer credit reports and requires that specific requirements be met before a report is requested. Defendant willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) by obtaining consumer reports without a permissible purpose. Defendant maintained procedures and practices under which its agents, contractors or employees obtained reports before the consumer signed up for telecom services, filled out a credit application, or otherwise requested services. Defendant maintained procedures and practices under which its agents, contractors or employees misrepresented whether and under what circumstances Defendant would access consumer reporting data. Defendant represented to the credit reporting bureau(s) from which it obtained consumer reports that it would request and use reports obtained from such bureau(s) only for lawful purposes pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. Merely inquiring as to the availability of service in a certain area and simple rate shopping does not invoke a business transaction initiated by the consumer, and thus, Defendant did not have any of the permissible purposes set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A-G) when it obtained Plaintiff’s and the proposed class members’ consumer reports. There was no agreement to exchange goods or services for money as Plaintiff and the proposed class members had not signed up for telecom services when Defendants accessed their consumer reports. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681n, and 1681q by obtaining Plaintiff’s and the proposed class members’ consumer reports under false pretenses, without a permissible purpose, and without consent. Defendant had no legitimate business need to obtain these consumer reports since no business transactions had been initiated by these consumers at the time that Defendant accessed those reports. On or around July 18, 2016, Plaintiff contacted Cox by phone to learn about its services and pricing. After hearing about Cox’s offerings, Plaintiff chose not to proceed with the services offered. The Class VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

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OhDAP was initially established in 1990 under the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff, et seq. This federal legislation has been renewed four times -- 1996, 2000, 2006 and 2009 -- and is now called the Ryan White Program within Ohio and nationwide. There are three main components within OhDAP. One component is for direct drug provision for eligible uninsured individuals (i.e., individuals with HIV who are not eligible for Medicaid due to income level or citizenship status). Another component is used to provide premium assistance to eligible individuals (i.e., ACA, Medicare Part D, private health insurance Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 5 of 17 PAGEID #: 5 - 5 - or the employee copayment or coinsurance portion of employer-based insurance). The last component assists insured individuals with their co-pays for their life-saving HIV specialty medications. In March 2017, the Ohio Department of Health awarded an exclusive contract for pharmaceutical provision services for OhDAP to CVS, effective July 2017. Under that contract, CVS is to provide OhDAP-eligible clients with HIV medications and is responsible for communications with participants relating to such medications. Beginning in approximately late July or early August 2017, Defendants mailed a letter containing membership cards and information about the CVS program and how persons would access their HIV-related prescriptions. This letter was mailed to an estimated 6,000 participants in OhDAP, regardless of whether they were active pharmacy customers of CVS. Even though the information contained in this letter contained the Personal Health Information (“PHI”) of each individual, specifically information relating to their HIV-positive status, the envelopes containing these mailings had two clear glassine windows. One, in the upper left, contained the logo of “CVS/caremark,” the words “Ohio Department of Health,” and an address for the Ohio Department of Health, and the envelope refers in big red letters to “new prescription benefits,” thereby revealing that the mailing involved health-related information, including information about prescription medications. A second window contained the recipient’s name and address, with the designation “PM 6402 HIV” directly above the person’s name. This reference to the recipient’s HIV status was plainly visible through the glassine window. The designation “HIV” in the program identification number was not required by the Ohio Department of Health, but rather was created by CVS. Defendants clearly made no advance effort to test or review the disclosure of such information prior to disseminating the mailing, Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 6 of 17 PAGEID #: 6 - 6 - since had they done so they would have seen that the identification number with “HIV” next to it was prominently visible through the envelope, as shown by the following: The Defendants’ combined use of a glassine windowed envelope, their design of the letter containing the HIV status of the individual recipient such that it could be seen through the envelope window instead of using an opaque envelope or a letter that was properly spaced not to publicly reveal such information through the envelope window, and an identification reference with the term “HIV,” resulted in the potential or actual disclosure of recipients’ HIV status to numerous individuals, including their families, friends, roommates, landlords, neighbors, mail carriers, and complete strangers. The use of envelopes with transparent windows contravenes the standard practice of the Ohio Department of Health, which is to send all mailings relating to HIV-related issues in opaque, non-windowed envelopes. Defendants either knew or reasonably should have known that this mailing was disseminated in violation of both federal and state laws. Defendants also acted with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 7 of 17 PAGEID #: 7 - 7 - substantial harm. Defendants knew that it is unlawful and likely harmful to disclose patients’ HIV status to the public, and that any persons whose PHI was disclosed were to be separately notified of that breach. CVS’s “Notice of Privacy Practices” states, “We are required by law to protect the privacy of your PHI and to provide you with this Notice explaining our legal duties and privacy practices regarding your [Protected Health Information]…. You have a right to be notified in the event there is a breach of your unsecured PHI as defined by HIPAA.” https://www.cvs.com/content/patient-privacy (accessed March 14, 2018). Fiserv advertises its compliance as well: “From enrollment to payment, let Fiserv help you create, maintain and grow member engagement while adhering to the strongest risk and compliance standards, including This action is brought by the Plaintiffs both on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiffs seek to represent the following class (“Class”): All participants in OhDAP to whom Defendants sent a mailing in or about July or August 2017 in which the participant’s name and the letters “HIV” were visible through the envelope window. The precise number and identity of Class members are unknown to the Plaintiffs but can be obtained from the records of Defendants. News reports have estimated the recipients of the mailings to be more than 6,000 persons. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting individual members of the Class. Such common legal and factual questions include the following: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct was tortious and violated the applicable standard of care; Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 11 of 17 PAGEID #: 11 - 11 - (b) Whether Defendants’ conduct was unlawful, including in violation of the state and federal statutes and regulations cited above; (c) Whether the Class members are entitled to damages and the extent of those damages; and (d) Whether the Class members are entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class members because similar mailings to those identified above were sent to Plaintiffs and every Class member. The Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve the Court and the proposed Class in a representative capacity. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and have no interests adverse or antagonistic to or that materially and irreconcilably conflict with the interests of the other members of the Class. Based on the facts detailed above, the interests of the Plaintiffs are reasonably coextensive with those of absent Class members. The Plaintiffs have engaged the services of counsel who are experienced in complex class litigation and the issues raised in this Complaint who will vigorously prosecute this action, and who will assert and protect the rights of and otherwise adequately represent the rights of the Plaintiffs and absent Class members. Prosecuting separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. By sending similar mailings to thousands of people and later refusing to send notification thereof Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 12 of 17 PAGEID #: 12 - 12 - the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. Because all Class members are seeking the same relief based on the same course of conduct by Defendants, the questions of law or fact common to Class members as set forth in this Complaint predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Thus, a class action is superior to other available group-wide methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy, to the extent necessary in order to maintain this action on behalf of the Class. Damages need not be proven for each Class member because Ohio law permits the award of damages without individualized proof of the extent of emotional distress. But even if damages must be proven individually, the Class can be certified for purposes of determining whether the actions of Defendants were tortious and violated applicable Ohio law.

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Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Complaint as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff, Angelia Ruffin has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since on or about March 11, 2002. Plaintiff, Constance Hudson has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since December 2002. Plaintiff, Pamela Girton-Hart has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Sean Baldwin has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Philip Tibbs has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Alan Oden has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since 1999. Plaintiff, Gregory Mosley has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since December 1999. Plaintiff, Charles Moses has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Michaele Jackson has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 3 of 8 Pg ID 3 4 Plaintiff, Raphael Cosby has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Eugene Hickman has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since on or about March 11, 2002. Plaintiff, Cary Bryan has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Robin White has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Plaintiff, Falikau Fofana has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift for roll call. Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call. Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and of the Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 of the Complaint as though fully set forth herein. Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift for roll call. 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 4 of 8 Pg ID 4 5 Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call. The Fair Labor Standard Act 29 U.S.C. § 206 requires that Defendant pay to each of its employees in an amount at least at the current minimum wage, Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and specifically U.S.C. § 206. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s repeated and willful refusal to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards, Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards have sustained damages and are entitled to the following relief: a. unpaid compensation; b. liquidated damages; c. civil penalties in the amount of $1,100 per violation; and d. costs and attorney fees. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment in their favor and against Defendant in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus exemplary damages, together with costs, interest, attorney fees and punitive damages as allowed by statute and any other relief this Honorable Court deems appropriate. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 45 of the Complaint as though fully set forth herein. Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift for roll call. 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 5 of 8 Pg ID 5 6 Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call. The Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. requires that Defendant pay to each of its employees in an amount at least at the current minimum wage, Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s repeated and willful refusal to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards, Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards have sustained economic and non- economic damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment in their favor and against Defendant in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus exemplary damages, together with costs, interest, attorney fees and punitive damages as allowed by statute and any other relief this Honorable Court deems appropriate. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 51 above as though more fully set forth herein. Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana and all similarly situated current and former security guards in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act which creates a class so numerous that joinder of all numbers is impractical. (FRCP 23A1). 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 6 of 8 Pg ID 6 7 The question of whether the Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana and all similarly situated current and former security guards involves questions of law or fact which are common to the entire class. The claims or defenses of the representative class parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the entire class. The prospective Plaintiffs class representatives, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana, will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the entire class. Prosecuting the multitude of separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or variant adjudications with respect to individual class members and would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. The questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions effecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS VIOLATIONS OF THE MICHIGAN WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS ACT, MCLA 408.471, et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

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At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing in the State of Tennessee. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 2 The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (114 P.L. 74, 129 Stat. 584, 2015 Enacted H.R. 1314, 114 Enacted H.R. 1314), enacted into law on November 2, 2015, amends the Communications Act of 1934 to exempt calls made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States. 3 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003). 4 In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“FCC Declaratory Ruling”), 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 43 Communications Reg. (P&F) 877, 2008 WL 65485 Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”). Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but based upon the representations of Defendants as to their market share, Plaintiff reasonably believes that Class members number at minimum in the thousands. This Class size includes consumers holding loans owned or serviced by Defendants, persons who co-signed loans owned or serviced by Defendants, and all other persons who Defendants (mis)dialed. This Class size also includes consumers who received calls from other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of Defendants and/or of other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants. This Class Action Complaint seeks money damages and injunctive relief. There are well defined, nearly identical questions of law and fact affecting all parties. The questions of law and fact involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether, beginning on December 21, 2011, Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants can meet their burden of showing they obtained prior express consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls; c. Whether the complained of conduct was knowing and/or willful; d. Whether Defendants are liable for damages, and if so the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system, without his prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and he has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes such as the TCPA. Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. As a result of the alleged knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. COUNT: NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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On or about July 25, 2016 Defendant sent an advertisement to Plaintiff in the County of St. Louis, Missouri by facsimile transmission. A true and correct copy of the facsimile is attached as Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by reference. 3 On or about August 16, 2016 Defendant sent an advertisement to Plaintiff in the County of St. Louis, Missouri by facsimile transmission. A true and correct copy of the facsimile is attached as Exhibit B, and incorporated herein by reference. Defendant approved, authorized and participated in the scheme to broadcast faxes by (a) directing a list to be purchased or assembled; (b) directing and supervising employees or third parties to send the faxes; (c) creating and approving the form of fax to be sent; and (d) determining the number and frequency of the facsimile transmissions. Defendant created or made Exhibit A, as well as other advertisements, which Defendant distributed to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class via facsimile transmission (collectively “Subject Faxes”). Defendant sent multiple advertising facsimiles to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class, all without an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, throughout the time period covered by the class definition. Defendant faxed the same and similar facsimiles, all without an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, to the members of the proposed Class in Missouri and throughout the United States. The Subject Faxes are a part of Defendant’s work or operations to market Defendant’s goods or services, to be performed by Defendant, and were sent on behalf of Defendant. The Subject Faxes constitute material furnished in connection with Defendant’s work or operations. The Subject Faxes constitute material advertising of the commercial availability of property, goods, or services. 4 The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii) that informs the recipient of the ability and means to avoid future fax advertisements. The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(A) that is clear and conspicuous. The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class did not did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(B) that states that the recipient may make a request to the sender of the advertisement not to send any future advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines and stating that the sender’s failure to comply within 30 days would be unlawful. The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class did not did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(C) that sets forth the requirements listed under paragraph 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(v). The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class did not did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(D)(1) that includes a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine number for the recipient to transmit an opt-out request to the sender The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class did not contain a notice that complied with the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C. §§227(b)(2)(D)(ii), (iii) and (vi), and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). 5 The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class were required to contain a notice that complied with the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C. §§227(b)(2)(D)(ii), (iii) and (vi), and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other Class member) to avoid receiving unlawful faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. Defendant knew or should have known that the Subject Faxes were advertisements and the Subject Faxes did not display an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. The transmissions of Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class caused destruction of the property of Plaintiff and each member of the proposed Class. The transmissions of Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class interfered with the exclusive use of the property of Plaintiff and each member of the proposed Class. The transmissions of Subject Faxes to Plaintiff interfered with the business and personal communications of Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Plaintiff brings Count I pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, on behalf of the following Class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendant, (3) which did not display an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. On information and belief, the Class includes more than forty persons and is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 6 There are numerous questions of law or fact are common to the members of the Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and the answers to which would drive class-wide resolution of this case, including: a. Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending fax advertisements; b. Whether the Subject Faxes contains material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods or services; c. Whether the Subject Faxes advertised the commercial availability of property, goods, or services; d. The manner and method Defendant used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which they sent the Subject Faxes and other faxed advertisements; e. Whether Defendant violated the provisions of 47 USC § 227; f. Whether Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to statutory damages; g. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; h. Whether the Court should award trebled damages; i. Whether the Subject Faxes displayed the proper opt-out notice required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200; and j. Whether the Subject Faxes failed to include an opt-out notice compliant with Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C.§ 227, provides, in pertinent part: (b)(3) Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 8 The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if the violation was knowing. 47 U.S.C. § 227. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and the Defendant are liable to Plaintiff and the other Class members even if their actions were only negligent. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. by transmitting the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class by not displaying an opt-out notice compliant with 47 TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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Plaintiff is an individual, employed as a real estate agent. One aspect of Plaintiff’s job is that he must be constantly available via his cell phone Plaintiff frequently receives calls from numbers not saved in the contact list of known callers on his phone. He feels obligated to answer all calls received, in order to ensure he gives his clients and potential clients the best service possible. Likewise, he must ensure that his voicemail box maintains sufficient capacity for incoming calls. At all times relevant herein Plaintiff has owned and maintained a cell phone, and subscribed to cellular telephone phone service associated with the number XXX-XXX-0714, for which he was and is charged a monthly fee. He uses this cell phone for personal and professional purposes. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff maintained exclusive custody and control over the cellular telephone and number at issue. Plaintiff maintains service for this cell phone via a “cellular telephone service” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff is the subscriber of services that relate to the cellular service associated with XXX-XXX-0714, At some unknown time, ACI began to attempt to collect a debt associated with one “John Carlson.” Plaintiff has never heard of a “John Carlson.” Plaintiff has no relationship to anyone named “John Carlson.” Plaintiff does not have an “established business relationship” with ACI as that term is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2). Plaintiff does not owe any money to ACI. Plaintiff never gave ACI his cell phone number. At no point did Plaintiff provide prior express consent for ACI to call his cell phone. None of the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were placed for an “emergency purpose” or with “prior express consent of the called party” within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A). In early 2016, Plaintiff began receiving pre-recorded voice messages from ACI. These calls referenced one “John Carlson,” reference number XXXX-881. ACI used an ATDS to place these calls. Plaintiff received no less than 30 calls from ACI to his cellular telephone that utilized an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice beginning in or about early 2016. After ACI began placing calls to Plaintiff, Plaintiff notified ACI that its calls for “John Carlson” were not reaching their intended recipient. Plaintiff also notified ACI that he had no relationship with ACI or “John Carlson.” Plaintiff demanded that ACI stop calling his cell phone. Notwithstanding receipt of Plaintiff’s requests that the calls stop, ACI continued to place calls to Plaintiff using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. These unauthorized calls harmed Plaintiff because they caused him to suffer a nuisance and an invasion of privacy. Further, the calls wasted Plaintiff’s time and money, as they required him to take time out of his schedule to deal with them, they trespassed on his use of the phone for which he was charged a monthly fee, they used up space on his voicemail, and they depleted the battery on his cellular telephone. B. Common Allegations ACI used equipment that has or had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers, to place calls and/or text messages to the cellular telephone number belonging to Plaintiff, and thus constituted an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §227(a)(1). ACI uses an ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice to contact large numbers of persons in the process of debt collection ACI does not use ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(I). ACI regularly contacts people who have not consented to be called by ACI using both prerecorded messages and an ATDS. ACI’s ATDS and customer service representative have the capacity to identify those individuals who have been wrongly contacted by ACI concerning an account which is associated with a different individual. However, ACI does not disassociate a wrong number from a customer in its ATDS database. Thus, wrongly targeted cell phone subscribers, whose names or cell phone numbers are associated with particular debtors of ACI may expect to receive calls even after they have complained asked ACI to stop the wrong number calls. There is no exception or justification of the numerous violations of the TCPA by Plaintiff and the putative class members have a legally protected privacy interest arising out of the TCPA to be free from unwanted calls and prerecorded messages to their cellular phones. That protected interest bars ACI from intruding upon the Plaintiff’s and the putative class members’ privacy. Specifically, the TCPA bars ACI from calling these individuals on their cellular phones using restricted technology, unless ACI first obtained express consent. Plaintiff and each putative class members received calls placed to their cell phones by ACI. Such harm was proximately caused by ACI’s violation of the TCPA all as more particularly set forth herein. Accordingly, the acts and misconduct of ACI have caused the Plaintiff and each putative class member to have suffered injury in fact. It is ACI’s policy and practice to place, in the course of business, to place calls using an ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice to individuals who have not consented to such calls, including those whose cellular telephone numbers are not assigned to a debtor’s account. Therefore, Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated as members of the proposed class, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. This action satisfied the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23. The proposed ATDS Class consists of all persons in the United States excluding the Court and its staff: (a) To whose cellular telephone ACI placed one or more nonemergency call within four (4) years prior to the filing of this complaint; (b) To whom ACI used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”); (c) Who did not provide their prior express consent for such calls; and (d) Who are not the actual account holders that ACI sought to contact in relation to the call. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all claims would be impracticable. While the exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, that number exceeds 40 persons. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, which predominate over any questions affecting individual class members. The predominant common questions include: (a) Whether ACI used an ATDS, or an artificial or prerecorded voice within the meaning of the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations, to place calls to the class; (b) Whether the class members gave consent to be called by ACI, since they were not party to any agreement with ACI; (c) The means used by ACI to identify class members as potential targets for calls concerning ACI’s borrowers; and (d) Damages, including whether the violations were negligent, willful or knowing. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class. ACI’s conduct has caused Plaintiff and members of the class to sustain the same or substantially similar injuries and damages. ACI’s conduct has caused each member of the class to suffer a nuisance or invasion of privacy, intrusion upon their seclusion and use of the cell phones for which they paid a subscriber fee. ACI has acted in a uniform manner with respect to Plaintiff and the other class members. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff is a member of the class and does not have any conflict of interest with other class members. Plaintiff has retained and is represented by competent counsel who are experienced in complex class action litigation and claims involving violations of the TCPA. A. ACI’s Calls to Plaintiff

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Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC paid Plaintiff Manolo Tayum straight time, not time and a half, for the hours he worked above forty (40) during his employment with defendants. Mr. Manolo Tayum’s job duties included delivering and setting up furniture and performing manual labor for defendant. The work performed by plaintiff is the primary type of work that the company provides for its customers. The work performed by Plaintiff is an essential part of the services provided for Defendant’s Customers. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s Drivers and Manual Laborers rely on the companies for their work. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC determined where its Drivers and Manual Laborers worked and how they performed their duties. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC sets Drivers and Manual Laborer’s hours and requires them to report to work on time and leave at the end of their scheduled shift. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s Drivers and Manual Laborers work exclusively for Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC during their employment. Since they work between 9 and 10 hours a day, as a practical matter, they cannot work anywhere else. Drivers and Manual Laborers are not permitted to hire other workers to perform their jobs for them. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC provides all of the machinery, equipment and supplies that its Drivers and Manual Laborers use to perform their work. While they are working, the Drivers and Manual Laborers use Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s equipment. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s investment in the machines and equipment used by its Drivers and Manual Laborers far exceeds any investment by plaintiff and putative class members. Drivers and Manual Laborers do not provide any material portion of the required equipment or any of the necessary products to perform their jobs. Drivers and Manual Laborers are paid based upon the hours they work. They cannot earn a “profit” by exercising managerial skill, and they are required to work the hours required by Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC each day. The Drivers and Manual Laborers cannot suffer a loss of capital investment. Their only earning opportunity was based on the number of hours they were told to work, which is controlled exclusively by Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC pays Drivers and Manual Laborers in return for their labor. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC decided to treat its Drivers and Manual Laborers as independent contractors. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC made large capital investments in inventory, delivery trucks, equipment, tools and supplies in order for it to sell furniture. Its Drivers and Manual Laborers do not. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC incurs operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. Its Drivers and Manual Laborers do not incur such operating expenses. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC keeps records of the hours it instructed its Drivers and Manual Laborers to work. It also keeps records of the amount of pay plaintiffs and putative class members receive. Plaintiff and putative class members were paid directly via weekly pay check issued to them from Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC. Despite knowing of the FLSA’s requirements and that plaintiff and putative class members regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant paid them straight time instead of time and a half for the overtime hours that they worked. Plaintiff and putative class members seek unpaid overtime wages for the three year period of time preceding the filing of this lawsuit. In addition to Manolo Tayum, defendants employed other Drivers and Manual Laborers who worked over forty hours per week, were paid straight time instead of time and a half for overtime hours worked, and were misclassified as independent contractors. These FLSA Class Members performed the job duties described above and they were subjected to the same unlawful policies. The FLSA Class Members are similarly situated to Manolo Tayum. By failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime at one and one-half times their regular rates, Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC violated the FLSA. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC owes Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime wages equal to one-half their regular rates for each overtime hour worked during the last three years. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its failure to pay overtime violated the FLSA. Their failure to pay overtime to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members is willful. Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC owes Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as well as liquidated damages. Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action. Manolo Tayum was an employee of Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC. Manolo Tayum was not an independent contractor.

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Plaintiff answered the phone and was greeted by a prerecorded or artificial voice noting that he could be eligible to save money on his home energy bills by getting solar panels installed on his home and receive government credits to assist with the cost. After the prerecorded or artificial voice finished, a woman who identified herself as Leanna came on the line. After Plaintiff inquired, Leanna indicated that she was calling from “Smart Home Solar”. Leanna then asked Plaintiff questions about his energy bills and his home. She then told Plaintiff that he would likely qualify to have low or no cost solar panels installed on his home. After asking additional questions about Plaintiff’s finances and credit, Leanna then offered to set up an appointment. Plaintiff recalls having received other calls similar to the June 14, 2018, Solar Call. Upon information and belief, Defendants placed other Solar Calls to Plaintiff during the preceding 12-month period. Upon information and belief, Defendants used an ATDS, artificial voice, or a prerecorded voice to place the Solar Calls to Plaintiff and other persons and entities. In order to investigate who was behind this marketing scheme, Plaintiff accepted Leanna’s offer, and set up an appointment. On June 20, 2018, a male person driving a black Toyota Prius wrapped with an advertisement for vivint.Solar arrived at Plaintiff’s home. The male person indicated that his name was Seth Bringhurst and said that he worked for Vivint Solar. Mr, Bringhurst was wearing a shirt with the name Vivint on it in orange lettering. Mr. Bringhurst gave Plaintiff a business card and a pamphlet that both contained the words “Vivint Solar.” Plaintiff asked Mr. Bringhurst who “Smart Home Solar” was, as that was the name of the company that was provided to him during the June 14, 2018, Solar Call. Mr. Bringhurst responded that Smart Home Solar is a company that generates sales leads, and that Mr. Bringhurst uses Smart Home Solar for that purpose. Mr. Bringhurst conducted an inspection, asked Plaintiff questions, and otherwise touted the products and services of Defendants. Mr. Bringhurst told Plaintiff that he had been employed by Vivint Solar for over ten years, and has worked for Vivint Solar in multiple cities. Mr. Bringhurst provided Plaintiff with his business card that says vivint.Solar on one side, and included the Vivint Solar website address, and Mr. Bringhurst’s email address at vivintsolar.com. Prior to leaving, Mr. Bringhurst asked Plaintiff to sign a form permitting Defendant Vivint Solar Developer, LLC to obtain Plaintiff’s consumer credit report. On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff received an email from “Vivint Solar Team” noting that its sales representative had recently spoken with him, and asking that Plaintiff confirm his email address. Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, calls placed using an artificial voice, or a prerecorded voice, that include or introduce an advertisement or constitute telemarketing may not be placed to persons or entities whose telephone numbers have been assigned to a cellular telephone service or a residential line without obtaining Prior Express Written Consent. Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, calls placed using an ADTS that include or introduce an advertisement or constitute telemarketing may not be placed to telephone numbers that have been assigned to a cellular telephone service without obtaining Prior Express Written Consent. Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, 47 C.F.R. However, Defendants placed the Solar Calls without obtaining the Prior Express Written Consent of Plaintiff or the other putative class members. Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, telephone solicitations may not be placed to persons and entities that are registered with the National Do-Not-Call Registry at least 30 days prior to being called more than once within a 12- month period, and without obtaining prior express invitation or permission evidenced by a signed, written agreement between the consumer and seller which states that the consumer agrees to be contacted by this seller and includes the telephone number to which the calls may be placed. However, Defendants placed the Solar Calls despite the fact that Plaintiff’s and other putative class members’ phone numbers were on the National Do-Not-Call Registry, and without obtaining the Requisite Do-Not-Call Permission of Plaintiff or the other putative class members. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for statutory damages on behalf of himself and a class of all persons similarly situated. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff avers that the proposed class is in excess of 50 persons. The class size is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members. Plaintiff is committed to this cause, will litigate it vigorously, and is aware of the fiduciary duties of a class representative. Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with and not antagonistic to the interests of the other class members. Plaintiff has a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action and has retained experienced class counsel to represent his and the other class members. Class Counsel is experienced in class action litigation and has successfully litigated class claims. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates herein by reference the averments set forth in paragraphs 1 through 40, above. Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendants for sending Solar Calls to himself and to members of the Plaintiff Class in violation of the TCPA and its implementing regulations. Defendants violated the TCPA and implementing regulations 47 C.F.R. § Defendants violated the TCPA and implementing regulation 47 C.F.R. § The named Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class are entitled to $1,500 for each violation of each of the Solar Calls that violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a) and $1,500 for each of the Solar Calls that violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) that was placed to them willfully or knowingly. 200(c), by initiating or authorizing the placement of the Solar Calls to the phone numbers of Plaintiff and the members of the Plaintiff Class where such persons and entities were registered with the National Do-Not-Call Registry at least 30 days prior to being called by Defendants more than once within a 12-month period, and without obtaining Requisite Do-Not-Call Permission from Plaintiff or members of the Plaintiff Class. 200(a), by initiating or authorizing the placement of the Solar Calls to the phone numbers of Plaintiff and the members of the Plaintiff Class without receiving Prior Express Written Consent. On June 14, 2018, Defendants placed the June 14, 2018, Solar Call to Plaintiff’s cell phone, while he was in the District of Columbia. The call came from a number with a 202 area code.

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(Terms and Conditions of Hertz’ Gold Plus Rewards Program) (Terms and Conditions for Use of Hertz’ Website) Hertz allows consumers to use its website, www.hertz.com, to make reservations for rental of cars and other motor vehicles. On a web page entitled, “THE HERTZ CORPORATION WEBSITE GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF USE,” (“Hertz’ General Terms of Use”) Hertz provides notice to consumers of terms and conditions to which they must agree in order to use Hertz’ website and states that the terms and conditions constitute an “Agreement”: “We offer this website, subject to the following terms and conditions (“Agreement”). Please read this Agreement carefully before using this website. By using this website, you accept the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.”4 Hertz’ General Terms of Use contains a New Jersey choice of law provision: “Except to the extent expressly provided in the following paragraph, this Agreement (including any of our policies referred to herein) shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey in the United States without regard to New Jersey’s conflict of law provisions.” Hertz’ General Terms of Use also states: “Except as otherwise required by law …, price, rate and availability of products or services are subject to change without notice.” 5 This statement is shown in the screenshot below with the above language highlighted: Nowhere on this page does Hertz specify whether the provision that “price, rate and availability of products or services are subject to change without notice” is or is not applicable to reservations made using the Hertz website by New Jersey citizens or whether New Jersey is (or is not) one of the places where the law requires “otherwise.” This statement in shown in the screenshot below with the above language highlighted: Nowhere on this page does Hertz specify whether the provision that “not all products or services discussed or referenced in this website are available to all persons or in all geographic locations or jurisdictions. In addition, restrictions may apply to use of products or services obtained in one jurisdiction in other jurisdictions” is or is not applicable to reservations made using the Hertz website by New Jersey citizens or whether New Jersey is (or is not) one of the places where there are restrictions applicable to “use of products or services.” Hertz’ General Terms of Use states that it was last updated on April 30, 2013. 6 However, past versions of the same webpage containing provisions identical to those referenced above can be found dating back to June 1, 2011.7 Accordingly, those terms and conditions have been in place, at a minimum, for more than four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Terms and Conditions of Hertz’ Gold Plus Rewards Program The webpage containing Hertz’ Gold Plus Terms states, “Gold Plus Rewards offers are void where prohibited by law.”9 The following screenshot shows the above statement as it appears on the Hertz website with the statement in question highlighted: Nowhere on this web page does Hertz specify whether such offers are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey or whether the State of New Jersey is or is not one of the locations where such offers are prohibited by law. Past versions of this page can be found dating back to June 8, 2012.10 On that date, the page stated, as it does now, that Gold Plus Rewards offers are void where prohibited by law without specifying whether the State of New Jersey is or is not one of the places where such offers are void because they are prohibited by law. This action is brought and may properly proceed as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). The members of the Classes for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes he seeks to represent, because all such claims arise out of the same, or similar, notices or contracts used by Defendant in its transactions with Plaintiffs. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff does not have any interests which are incompatible or contrary to those of the Classes. The questions of law or fact common to the Class members, as detailed above, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Plaintiffs and the putative Classes. Specifically, the Classes are too numerous for individual actions and the economic damages, statutorily required for Plaintiff and the putative Class members, are too small to warrant individual actions when compared to the expense and burden of individual litigation. The members of the Classes are readily identifiable from the records of Defendant. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel who is experienced in the prosecution of consumer class action litigation. The proposed Class Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. Proposed Class Counsel has identified and investigated the potential claims in this action. Proposed Class Counsel has extensive experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and consumer claims of the type asserted in the instant action. Proposed Class Counsel has knowledge of the applicable law for this action and will commit the necessary resources to representing this Class. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Hertz Gold Plus Rewards Program Class re- asserts and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though stated in full herein. Plaintiff and the members of the Hertz Gold Plus Rewards Program Class are “consumers” within the meaning of TCCWNA. Hertz’ web page entitled “Gold Plus Rewards Reward Terms and Conditions” is a consumer contract, notice, or sign within the meaning of TCCWNA, as set forth at N.J.S.A. 56:12- 15 and -16. TCCWNA states, in relevant part: No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey[.] Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Hertz Renters Class, re-asserts and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though stated at length herein. Plaintiff and the members of the Hertz Renters Class are "consumers" within the meaning of TCCWNA. Hertz’ web page entitled, “THE HERTZ CORPORATION WEBSITE GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF USE” is a consumer contract, notice, or sign within the meaning of TCCWNA. TCCWNA states, in relevant part: No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey[.] Terms and Conditions for Use of Hertz Website Terms and Conditions for Use of Hertz’ Website ....................................................................... 3 Terms and Conditions of Hertz’ Gold Plus Rewards Program ................................................... 5 CLASS ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................................... 6

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Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they purposefully and willfully chose and choose not to do so. Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty, in violation of the FLSA. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), individually, on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of those who are similarly situated who, during the applicable limitations period, were subjected to violations of the NYLL and the On August 7, 2013, Kim Celic, SFS Director of Human Resources, hired Plaintiff to work as a negotiator for one of SFS’s then-affiliated entities “Legal Helpers.” In early July 2014, Defendant SFS reassigned Plaintiff to Defendant Pioneer, where Plaintiff continued working as a negotiator until January 2015, with the exception of a four month period when Plaintiff was on maternity leave from July 29, 2014 through October 2014. Throughout her time working for Defendants as a negotiator, regardless of the entity to which Defendants formally assigned her, Plaintiff’s duties consisted of assisting Defendants’ attorney-employees by speaking with Defendants’ clients and their respective creditors to communicate offers to settle the clients’ debts. From the beginning of her employment through January 2015, Defendants required Plaintiff to work five days a week, from Monday to Friday, for shifts of between nine and eleven hours per day, with a one hour lunch break. However, during many days, Defendants did not allow Plaintiff to take her one-hour lunch break. Thus, Defendants required that Plaintiff work between forty-five and fifty hours each week. For her pay each week, including the week described in the prior paragraph, Defendants paid Plaintiff a flat salary of $33,500.00 that was meant to cover only her first forty hours worked per week, and which amounts to a straight-time rate of $16.11 per hour. Throughout her employment, Defendants paid her nothing for her time worked each week in excess of forty hours, and thus failed to pay her at one and one-half her regular rate of pay, or $24.17, for all hours worked over forty each week. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a semi-monthly basis. On each occasion when Defendants paid Plaintiff, Defendants intentionally failed to provide Plaintiff with a wage statement that accurately listed her actual hours worked for that week and/or her straight and overtime rates of pay for all hours worked. Defendants also intentionally did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the time of her hire that accurately contained, inter alia, Plaintiff’s rates of pay as designated by Defendants. Defendants treated Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the manner described above. Each hour that Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked was for the Defendants’ benefit. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits while minimizing labor costs and overhead. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. N.Y. Lab. Law § 160 and 12 NYCCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for any hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR, while Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3) requires that employers furnish employees with wage statements containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria on each occasion when the employer pays wages to the employee. Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL, while Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR. As described above, Defendants, on each payday, failed to furnish Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements containing the criteria required under the NYLL. Prior to February 27, 2015, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(1-d), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the amount of $100.00 for each workweek that the violation occurred, up to a statutory cap of $2,500.00. Failure to Furnish Proper Wage Statements in Violation of the NYLL Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA Unpaid Overtime under the NYLL and the NYCCRR

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to May 13, 2020 an obligation was allegedly incurred to a creditor. The obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transactions, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The alleged obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). Defendant Midland Credit purportedly purchased the alleged debt and is currently collecting the alleged debt. On or about March 13, 2020, Defendant Midland Credit sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. See Exhibit A. The letter states a total balance of $12,889.53. The letter further provides a settlement offer of $10,319.62 which expires on 6/12/2020. The letter further states in part: “A judgment could be awarded by the court before the expiration of the discount offer listed in this letter. A judgment may include costs and post- judgment interest which may increase the balance owed. If you pay the discount offer in this letter by 06/12/2020, we will satisfy the judgment in full upon receipt of payment based on the balance stated in this letter.” The letter states that if the discount offer is paid by 6/12/2020, Defendant will satisfy the judgment in full “based on the balance stated in this letter.” This statement is confusing and deceptive because it implies that the payment will only satisfy the judgment based on the balance stated in the letter, which is $12,889.53 and not if the balance rises which Defendant’s letter indicates may happen (“A judgment may include costs and post-judgment interest which may increase the balance owed.”) Alternatively, the letter could be read to mean that payment of the discounted amount will satisfy the debt entirely, whether or not the balance increases due to costs and post-judgment interest. In addition, the letter is misleading and deceptive by alluding to a possible judgment without referencing any actual case and whether an actual lawsuit that could lead to a judgment currently exists. Furthermore, the letter discusses the judgment in extremely speculative terms, stating that a judgment “could” be awarded and “may” include costs, when, upon information and belief, the Defendant knows whether its legal counsel plan on filing for judgment and the speculation is intended only to frighten and harass the Plaintiff to make an immediate payment. Defendant's collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right to be not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action for the collection of any consumer debt. Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to its collection effort were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability to intelligently respond to Defendant's collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately respond to the Defendant's demand for payment of this debt. Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond or handle Defendant’s debt collection. Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for the statutory violation. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Defendant violated § 1692e: a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Defendant violated this section by a. Using threatening and harassing language regarding the possible judgments. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692f et seq.

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Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. Exhibit A was the first letter GCS sent to Plaintiff regarding this alleged debt. Exhibit A includes the FDCPA debt validation notice. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). GCS’ letter as a whole is confusing and misleading to the unsophisticated consumer. Exhibit A states: New Balance: $972.44 Minimum Payment Due: $972.44 Exhibit A, thus, informs the unsophisticated consumer that GCS is "here to work with [her] to find a mutually agreeable solution," while at the same time, stating that the minimum payment she may make is the entirety of the balance. Exhibit A is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer because there cannot be other opportunities available if the minimum payment is in the amount of the entire balance. Exhibit A also states: * As of the date of this letter, you owe $972.44. Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount owed on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your payment, in which event we will inform you. Exhibit A, thus, informs the unsophisticated consumer that additional charges may be added after GCS receives payment of "the amount shown above." Exhibit A is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer. Because the "new balance" is equal to the "minimum payment due," it is unclear whether the minimum payment due is also subject to "interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day," in which case the unsophisticated consumer would not know whether the minimum payment at the time was $972.44 or some other amount. The "New Balance" and "Minimum Payment Due" amounts, read alongside the note that the "amount owed on the day you pay may be greater," render Exhibit A confusing to the unsophisticated consumer, who would not be able to determine, or would be confused as to, the actual minimum payment required. Moreover, the alleged debt here is an unsecured credit card account and, upon information and belief, GCS and DNSB would accept any payment of any amount at any time. Plaintiff was confused by Exhibit A. Plaintiff had to spend time and money investigating Exhibit A, and the consequences of any potential responses to Exhibit A. Plaintiff had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of Exhibit A. The FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) specifically prohibits the “false representation of the character, amount, or legal status” of an alleged debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) states, in part: (b) Disputed debts … Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. Moreover, Congress has explicitly described the FDCPA as regulating “abusive practices” in debt collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a) – 1692(e). Any person who receives a debt collection letter containing a violation of the FDCPA is a victim of abusive practices. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”). For this reason, and to encourage consumers to bring FDCPA actions, Congress authorized an award of statutory damages for violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether GCS was authorized to approve a payment schedule that called for payments less than the "minimum payment due." The unsophisticated consumer would also be confused as to whether the minimum payment due was subject to day-to-day increases as interest, late fees, and/or other charges accrued. GCS’ conduct violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(a), 1692e(10), 1692(f) and 1692g(a)(1). Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin, (b) who were sent an initial collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt, incurred for personal, family or household purposes (d) between July 28, 2016 and July 28, 2017, inclusive, (e) that was not returned by the postal service. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Exhibit A violates the FDCPA. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. On or about June 25, 2017 mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to “Department Stores National Bank" (“DSNB”). A copy of this letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A. The alleged debt referenced in Exhibit A was a credit card account, and the alleged debt was incurred for personal, family or household purposes, including purchases of clothing and other personal goods at Macy's.

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Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New Jersey; b. to whom Defendant Convergent sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. containing deceptively worded settlement offers; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Some time prior to March 20, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to T- Mobile, USA by the Plaintiff. The T-Mobile, USA obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically telecommunication services. The alleged T-Mobile, USA obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). T-Mobile, USA is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). Defendant Convergent, a debt collector, was contracted by T-Mobile, USA to collect the alleged debt which originated with T-Mobile, USA On or about March 20, 2021, Defendant Convergent sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant T-Mobile, USA See Exhibit A. The letter states a balance of $602.65. The collection letter further states: “We have been authorized to accept payment of 50% of the total amount owed, which is $301.33, in exchange for which T-Mobile, USA will recall your account and cease all collection activity. If you are interested in taking advantage of this offer, call our office within 60 days of the date of this letter. Please note that this is not an offer to accept 50% of your debt as payment in full, but an offer for T-Mobile, USA to remove your account from further collection efforts. We are not obligated to renew this offer.” The letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange of 50% of the balance the consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in actuality it is unclear what form of settlement the letter is offering. The letter states that T-Mobile, USA will recall the account and cease all collection activity but does not clarify what will occur with the rest of the balance and whether the rest of the balance would be collected by another collection company in the future. Nor does the letter clearly state that the account will be reinstated upon payment of 50% of the balance. In addition, the letter contains a misleading heading stating “Reduced Balance Opportunity.” The letter states that Plaintiff can pay half of her balance, seemingly without reducing the balance beyond the amount that the Plaintiff actually paid. Paying half of the balance with a result of the other half of the balance still remaining cannot be described as a “Reduced Balance Opportunity,” as the option of paying half of the balance is always available as a means of reducing a balance. Moreover, the letter implies that this offer is expiring which is deceptive because the option of paying half of a balance never actually expires. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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Chemmis Porter was an employee of RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC, at its location in Sugarland, Texas. Chemmis Porter was not an independent contractor. No exemption to the provisions of the FLSA excused defendants from its obligation under the FLSA to pay Chemmis Porter time and a half for the hours worked past forty (40) each week while employed by defendants. 4 RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. paid Plaintiff Chemmis Porter a day rate, not time and a half, for the hours he worked above forty (40) during his employment with defendants. Chemmis Porter was employed by Defendants as a Trainer and Instructor from August 2015 to present throughout the course and scope of his employment, Plaintiff trained oil and gas workers and performed manual labor. The work performed by Plaintiff was the primary type of work that the companies provide for their respective customers. The work performed by Plaintiff is an essential part of the services provided for Defendants’ Customers. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., Trainers and Instructors relied on Defendants for their work. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., determined where its Trainers and Instructors worked and how they performed their duties. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., set Trainers’ and Instructors’ hours and requires them to report to work on time and leave at the end of their scheduled hours. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., Trainers’ and Instructors’ at all locations work exclusively for RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., since they work at least 12 hours a day, as a practical matter, they cannot work anywhere else. Trainers and Instructors are not permitted to hire other workers to perform their jobs for them. The Trainers and Instructors do not employ staff, nor do they maintain independent places of business. 5 Trainers and Instructors employed by defendants are paid based upon the hours they work. They cannot earn a “profit” by exercising managerial skill, and they are required to work the hours required by RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC each day. The Trainers and Instructors employed by Defendants cannot suffer a loss of capital investment. Their only earning opportunity is based on the number of hours they were told to work, which is controlled exclusively by RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC pays Trainers and Instructors in return for their labor. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC deducted taxes from the paychecks of Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. keeps records of the hours it instructed its Trainers and Instructors to work. It also keeps records of the amount of pay plaintiffs and putative class members receive. Plaintiffs and putative class members were paid directly via bi-weekly paycheck. Despite knowing of the FLSA’s requirements and that Plaintiff and putative class members regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant paid them straight time instead of time and a half for the overtime hours that they worked. Plaintiff and putative class members seek unpaid overtime wages for the three year period of time preceding the filing of this lawsuit. In addition to Chemmis Porter, defendants employed dozens of other Trainers and Instructors at the location where Plaintiff worked and at other locations. 6 These employees worked over forty hours per week and were paid a day rate instead of time and a half for overtime hours worked. These FLSA Class Members performed similar job duties and they were subjected to the same unlawful policies. The FLSA Class Members are similarly situated to Chemmis Porter. The FLSA Class Members should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Therefore, the class is properly defined as: All Trainers and Instructors hired and employed by RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. at all of its locations throughout the United States while receiving a day rate instead of time and a half for overtime hours worked in the last three years. By failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime at one and one-half times their regular rates, RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. violated the FLSA. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. owes Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime wages equal to one-half their regular rates for each overtime hour worked during the last three years. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its failure to pay overtime violated the FLSA. Its failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members is willful. RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC owes Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as well as liquidated damages. Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action.

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Plaintiff, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-38 as though fully set forth herein. Section 1692c(b) with certain inapplicable exceptions, prohibits debt collectors from communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.” As discussed above and below, Defendant violated Section 1692c(b) when they disclosed Plaintiff’s personal contact information and information identifying the Subject Debt to CBHV’s Letter Vendor. CBHV’s transmittal of Plaintiff’s personal information, Plaintiff’s purported status as a debtor relative to a debt allegedly owed to Midnight Velvet, and the amount of the Subject Debt to Defendant’s letter vendor constitutes a "communication" within the meaning of Section 1692a(2) which defines “communication” as "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). Defendant’s use of a third-party letter vendor to merge Plaintiff’s demographic data and status as a debtor into Defendant’s form collection letters for the purpose of printing and mailing the May 14, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff violated Section 1692c(b). CBHV’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and her status as a purported debtor posed a material risk of harm to the privacy interests protected by the FDCPA. CBHV’s disclosures of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a purported debtor to its third-party letter vendor violated Plaintiff’s rights privacy that was recognized by Congress when it enacted the FDCPA. CBHV’s disclosure to its Letter Vendor of Plaintiff’s personal information and her purported status as a person owing the Subject Debt violated Section 1692c(b)’s prohibition on disclosure of debtor information to third-parties Section 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a privacy invasion that American courts have long recognized as cognizable. Congress's judgment indicates that violations of Section 1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury. As set forth above, CBHV’s disclosures to its third-party letter vendor (of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a purported debtor) caused Plaintiff to suffer from embarrassment, aggravation and emotional distress. Accordingly, Plaintiff has standing to sue CBHV for its improper and unlawful disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a debtor to third-party letter vendors. The claims asserted in this Count satisfy the elements of FRCP 23(a)(1)-(4) and FRCP 23(b)(3). The proposed Midnight Velvet class encompasses: (a) all consumers with addresses in the State of California; (b) who originally owed debts to Midnight Velvet; (c) where Defendant caused form collection letters to be mailed to be sent for the purposes of attempting to collect to a consumer based debt allegedly owed to Midnight Velvet; and (d) Defendant used a letter vendor to transmit the letters which resulted in the vendor being sent the demographic information of the consumers as well as their status as alleged debtors. The above classes are limited to one year prior to the filing of the Complaint until such time as Defendant ceases the offending conduct. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in her favor and against Defendant CBHV as follows: a. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful; b. Awarding Plaintiff and class members statutory damages of $1,000.00 as provided under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) and 1692k(a)(2)(B); c. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages as provided by 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(1)); d. Awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3); and e. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and appropriate. Plaintiff, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-38 as though fully set forth herein. California Civil Code § 1788.17 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of Section 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, of, and shall be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k of, Title 15 of the United States Code. As alleged, above, CBHV violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. In violating Section 1692c(b), Defendant violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. Individual Based Violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq.)

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