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10. FHL is wholly owned by Defendant. 11. Furthermore, Defendant does business as FHL in states where it is allowed to do so and does business as “InterContinental Capital Group, Inc.” in states where it is not, e.g., the State of New York. 23. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 24. The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 25. The class concerning the National Do-Not-Call violation (hereafter “The DNC Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendant prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendant that promoted Defendant’s products or services, within any twelve-month period, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint. 8. Beginning in or around May of 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -9695, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant identified itself as “Fellowship Home Loans” (“FHL”). Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff shopped and purchased items at a Sur La Table retail store location in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. 11. To consummate the purchase, Plaintiff elected to use, and did use, her credit card as her form of payment. 12. As a condition of using her credit card, Plaintiff was required by Sur La Table to enter personal identification information associated with the credit card, including her full and complete zip code. Sur La Table would not allow Plaintiff to complete her purchase without supplying such information. 13. Sur La Table is not required by credit card issuers to require this information from consumers. 15. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has determined that a zip code constitutes personal identification information (“PII”) within the meaning of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105(a). See Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 2013 Mass. LEXIS 40 (2013). Receipt of Unwanted Marketing Materials 16. Subsequent to Plaintiff’s purchases at Sur La Table – detailed above – Plaintiff received unwanted marketing materials from Sur La Table via United States Mail. Consumers Place a High Value on Their PII 17. At a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) public workshop in 2001, then- Commissioner Orson Swindle described the value of a consumer’s personal information as follows: The use of third party information from public records, information aggregators and even competitors for marketing has become a major facilitator of our retail economy. Even [Federal Reserve] Chairman [Alan] Greenspan suggested here some time ago that it’s something on the order of the life blood, the free flow of information.1 18. Though Commissioner’s Swindle’s remarks are more than a decade old, they are even more relevant today, as consumers’ personal data functions as a “new form of currency” that supports a $26 billion per year online advertising industry in the United States.2 2. 20. Recognizing the high value that consumers place on their PII, many companies now offer consumers an opportunity to sell this information to advertisers and other third parties. The idea is to give consumers more power and control over the type of information that they share – and who ultimately receives that information. And by making the transaction transparent, consumers will make a profit from the surrender of their PII.4 This business has created a new market for the sale and purchase of this valuable data.5 21. In fact, consumers not only place a high value on their PII, but also place a high value on the privacy of this data. Thus, the question is not whether consumers value such privacy; the question is “how much [consumers] value” that privacy.6 23. Consumers thus value their personal data highly, and place an economic value on the privacy of that data. In fact, when consumers were surveyed as to how much they valued their personal data in terms of its protection against improper access and unauthorized secondary use – two concerns at issue here – they valued the restriction of improper access to their data at between $11.33 and $16.58 per website, and prohibiting secondary use to between $7.98 and $11.68 per website.8 V. 24. Plaintiff brings Count I, as set forth below, on behalf of herself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class defined as All persons from whom Sur La Table requested and recorded personal identification information in conjunction with a credit card transaction occurring in Massachusetts (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Sur La Table and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and any immediate family members thereof 26. Numerosity – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The members of the class are so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members in impracticable. On information and belief, there are thousands of consumers who have been affected by Sur La Table’s wrongful conduct. The precise number of the Class members and their addresses is presently unknown to Plaintiff, but may be ascertained from Sur La Table’s books and records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice. 27. Commonality and Predominance – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3). This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members, including, without limitation: a. whether Sur La Table engaged in the conduct as alleged herein; b. whether Sur La Table’s conduct constitutes violations of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105(a) and Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9; c. whether Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to statutory, or other forms of damages, and other monetary relief and, if so, in what amount(s); and d. whether Plaintiff and other Class members are entitled to equitable relief, including but not limited to injunctive relief and restitution. 28. Typicality – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Class members’ claims because, among other things, all Class members were comparably injured through the uniform misconduct described above. 30. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Sur La Table has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described below, with respect to Class members as a whole. 32. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 33. Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105(a) provides: No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credit card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, a credit card holder's address or telephone number. 34. Sur La Table is a corporation that accepts credit cards for retail transactions. 35. Through the practices detailed above, Sur La Table has violated, and continues to violate, Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105. 36. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § 105(c) provides that: “Any violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice, as defined in section 2 of chapter 93A.” 37. Accordingly, Sur La Table’s violations of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105 constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices within the meaning of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 39. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been injured by Sur La Table’s collection of their zip codes in connection with their credit card transactions and resultant violations of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9. 40. First, Plaintiff and the Class have been injured because they have received unwanted marketing materials from Sur La Table as a result of having provided their zip codes when using credit cards at Sur La Table. And second, Plaintiff and the Class have been injured because Sur La Table misappropriated their economically valuable PII without consideration. 41. More than 30 days prior to filing suit, Plaintiff made a pre-suit demand pursuant to Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9(3) (the “93A Demand”), in which Plaintiff sought: class-wide relief limited to statutory damages of $25 pursuant to Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9, for each violation of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105; injunctive relief; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Sur La Table did not accept the terms of this demand. A true and correct copy of the 93A Demand is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 42. Sur La Table’s failure to accept the terms of this demand was made in bad faith, because Sur La Table has knowledge or reason to know that the practice complained of does, in fact, violate Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 § 105 and Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9, and that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to the relief demanded as a matter of law. 43. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to double or treble damages as a result of Sur La Table’s bad faith violations of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9. Sur La Table’s Unlawful Collection of PII Violation of Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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20. Defendant operates MANHATTAN WELLNESS Centers as well as the MANHATTAN WELLNESS website, offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Wellness Centers (hereinafter, its “Centers”). 21. Defendant operates its Centers across the United States, including its location in New York City at 133 East 54th Street, New York, NY 10022. 22. These Centers constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Centers provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of information and services including Center locations and hours, access to details regarding its many programs and services, including pain management, chiropractic, acupuncture, physical and massage therapy, the ability to learn more about the treatments it offers, including information about the wellness professional staff and potential health insurance coverage, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Centers. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Centers and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. These access barriers have deterred Plaintiff from revisiting Defendant’s website and/or visiting its physical locations, despite an intention to do so. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired consumers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website, despite his intention to do so. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 37. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s Center locations and hours, access details regarding its many programs and services, including pain management, chiropractic, acupuncture, physical and massage therapy, the ability to learn more about the treatments it offers, including information about the wellness professional staff and potential health insurance coverage, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Centers are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Centers. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or his civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind consumers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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AT NASHVILLE STATE OF TENNESSEE, Plaintiff, vs.

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31. BOS says it is “the leading provider of Solids and Liquids Waste Separation Solutions” operating throughout the United States, including in New Mexico. 32. To complete its business objectives, BOS hires personnel, such as Licon, to perform solids control services. 33. BOS labels Licon and the Putative Class Members to be contractors. 34. But BOS does not hire these workers on a project-by-project basis. 35. Rather, BOS hires and treats these workers just like regular, even if sometimes short term, employees. 36. Many of these individuals worked for BOS on a day rate basis (without overtime pay). 37. These day rate workers make up the proposed Putative Class. 38. For example, Licon worked for BOS as a Solids Control Technician from approximately November 2016 until October 2017. 40. As a Solids Control Technician, Licon spent his time separating drilling fluid from the solids crushed by the drill bit and carried up to the surface in the drilling fluid. 41. Licon did not have any supervisory duties. 42. Licon did not hire for fire employees. 43. Licon did not exercise discretion and judgment as to matters of significant. 44. Licon was a blue-collar worker. 45. BOS paid Licon and the Putative Class Members under its day rate pay scheme. 46. Licon and the Putative Class Members do not receive a salary. 47. If Licon and the Putative Class Members did not work, they did not get paid. 48. Licon and the Putative Class Members receive a day rate. 49. Licon and the Putative Class Members do not receive overtime pay. 50. This is despite the fact Licon and the Putative Class Members often worked more than 10 hours a day, for as many as 7 days a week, for weeks at a time. 51. Although Licon typically worked up to 7 days a week, for 10 or more hours a day, he did not receive any overtime pay. 52. Licon and the Putative Class Members received the day rate regardless of the number of hours they worked, and even if they worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 53. Without the job performed by Licon and the Putative Class Members, BOS would not be able to complete its business objectives. 54. Licon and the Putative Class Members relied on BOS for work and compensation. 55. Licon and the Putative Class Members worked in accordance with the schedule set by BOS and/or its clients. 57. Licon and the Putative Class Members must follow BOS and/or its clients’s policies and procedures. 58. Licon and the Putative Class Members’s work must adhere to the quality standards put in place by BOS and/or its clients. 59. Licon and the Putative Class Members did not substantially invest in the tools required to complete the overall job to which they were assigned. 60. Licon and the Putative Class Members did not market their services while employed by BOS. 61. Licon and the Putative Class Members worked exclusively for BOS during the relevant period. 62. Licon and the Putative Class Members did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and/or insurance. 63. BOS and/or its clients set Licon and the Putative Class Members’ work schedule, which prohibited them from working other jobs for other companies while working on jobs for BOS. 64. At all relevant times, BOS maintained control, oversight, and direction of Licon and the Putative Class Members, including, but not limited to, hiring, firing, disciplining, timekeeping, payroll, and other employment practices. 65. Licon’s work schedule is typical of the Putative Class Members. 66. BOS controls Licon and the Putative Class Members’s pay. 67. Likewise, BOS and/or its clients control Licon and the Putative Class Members’s work. 69. Licon and the Putative Class Members are not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other workers in their respective positions) to perform their job duties. 70. BOS knows Licon and the Putative Class Members work for 10 or more hours a day, for as many as 7 days a week. 71. BOS’s records reflect the fact Licon and the Putative Class Members regularly work far in excess of 40 hours in certain workweeks. 72. Licon and the Putative Class Members do not receive overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in any of those weeks. 73. Instead, Licon and the Putative Class Members are paid on a day rate basis. 74. BOS and/or its clients set these workers’s schedules and compensation; supervises them; requires them to adhere to strict guidelines, directive, and its (or its clients’s) policies and procedures. 75. BOS controls Licon and the Putative Class Members’s opportunities for profit and loss by dictating the days and hours they work and the rates they are paid. 76. While working for BOS, BOS controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties Licon and the Putative Class Members perform. 77. BOS exercises control over the hours and locations Licon and the Putative Class Members work, the tools and equipment they use, and the rates of pay they receive. 78. Even when Licon and the Putative Class Members work away from BOS’s offices without the constant presence of BOS supervisors, BOS still controls significant aspects of their job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with its (or its clients’) policies and procedures. 80. BOS (and/or its clients) make these large capital investments in buildings, machines, equipment, tools, and supplied the business in which Licon and the Putative Class Members work. 81. Licon and the Putative Class Members do not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. 82. The daily and weekly activities of Licon and the Putative Class Members are routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by BOS. 83. BOS prohibits Licon and the Putative Class Members from varying their job duties outside of the predetermined parameters and requires Licon and the Putative Class Members to follow BOS’s (or its clients’s) policies, procedures, and directives. 84. All of the Putative Class Members perform similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities they perform. 85. All of the Putative Class Members work similar hours and are denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 86. All of the Putative Class Members work in excess of 40 hours each week. 87. BOS uniformly denies Licon and the Putative Class Members overtime for the hours they work in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 88. Licon and the Putative Class Members do not, and have never, received guaranteed weekly compensation irrespective of the day worked (i.e., the only compensation they receive is the day rate they are assigned for all hours worked in a single day or week). 89. BOS’s day rate policy violates the FLSA because it deprives Licon and the Putative Class Members of overtime for the hours they work in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 90. BOS knew Licon and the Putative Class Members worked more than 40 hours a week. 92. Nonetheless, BOS did not pay Licon and the Putative Class Members overtime. 93. BOS knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the conduct described in this Complaint violated the FLSA and the NMMWA.

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1. 52.4, Plaintiffs suffered harm, including shock, fright, distress, grief, and anguish, in an amount to be determined at trial. Heaps’s acts of gender violence against Plaintiffs entitle them to actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Section 52.4 of the California Civil Code. A. Heaps Assaulted Plaintiffs Gender Violence Civil Code § 52.4 (Against Heaps) Plaintiffs incorporate the above allegations by reference. Heaps’s acts committed against Plaintiffs, including his sexual harassment, molestation, and abuse of them, constitute gender violence and sex discrimination. One or more of Heaps’s acts would constitute a criminal offense under California law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, committed in part based on the gender of the victim, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction. Heaps’s conduct caused a physical intrusion and invasion of a sexual nature to Plaintiffs under coercive conditions, whether or not such conduct has resulted in criminal complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction. As a direct and proximate result of Heaps’s violations of Civil Code Section

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10. On or about November 17, 2016, Plaintiff Kara Teggerdine visited a Speedway gasoline station with the intent to purchase gasoline based on the posted and advertised price of gasoline on outdoor signs located at the premises. 11. The gas pumps at this station are equipped with self-service, point-of-sale, card reading systems so that patrons may use a debit/check card or credit card at the pump without entering the store. 12. Plaintiff Teggerdine purchased and pumped what the display screen indicated to be $5.01 worth of gas using her check card. 14. Later that same day, Plaintiff Teggerdine went to make another purchase and her card was declined for insufficient funds. Upon checking on the account transactions, she learned that there had been a charge to her bank card that wiped out the $59.70 in her bank account, leaving her with a zero balance. 15. Suspecting that her bank card had been breached or hacked, Plaintiff Teggerdine went to her bank for assistance. The bank representative reviewed the transactions on Plaintiff’s account and determined that the charge had been made by Speedway. 16. Plaintiff Teggerdine then called the Speedway store where she had purchased her gas to ask if Speedway had made the charge as a hold or if other customers had reported having fraudulent charges made to their cards used to purchase gas. The Speedway manager responded that the charge was not part of any Speedway policy and denied that the charge was made by Speedway. The manager gave Plaintiff a toll-free number to call the corporate office of Speedway for further assistance. 17. Plainitff Teggerdine called the corporate office of Speedway and learned that Speedway had implemented a new policy effective, Wednesday, November 16, to place holds of $125 on the bank accounts of customers making gas purchases. The Speedway representative told Plaintiff that the hold on the account would be released within 2 hours, but this did not occur. The charge on Plaintiff’s bank account was not reversed for approximately 48 hours. 18. The $125 charge made by Speedway completely wiped out all the money in Plaintiff’s bank account. Because Plaintiff did not have access to the money she had in her bank account, she did not have enough money on hand to make her rent payment. 20. With the implementation of the Real Time Clearing program, Speedway changed its authorization hold policy and increased authorization holds for debit/check card transactions from $1.00 to $125.00. 21. Speedway made this change in its policy without disclosure or notification to its customers, and seemingly without notice to even many of its own personnel. 22. Real Time Clearing is a program which is intended to allow debit/check card transactions to be processed immediately, thereby reducing any authorization hold times that the merchants place on customers’ financial accounts for pre-authorization.2 25. Plaintiff seeks relief in her individual capacity and as representative of all others who are similarly situated. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2), (b)(3) and (c)(4), Plaintiffs seek certification of a Nationwide class defined as follows: All persons residing in the United States who made a gasoline purchase with a debit/check card at a Speedway station from November 16, 2016 through and including November 17, 2016, and had a $125 authorization hold placed on their personal financial account (the “Nationwide Class”). 26. Excluded from each of the above Classes are Speedway, including any entity in which Speedway has a controlling interest, is a parent or subsidiary, or which is controlled by Speedway, as well as the officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns of Speedway. Further excluded are the judges and court personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. 27. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The members of the Class are so numerous that the joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, it is estimated that Speedway serves approximately 3.7 million customers per day.4 29. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because, inter alia, all members of the Class were injured through the common misconduct described above and were subject to Defendants’ unfair and unlawful conduct. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and all members of the Class. 31. Superiority of Class Action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all the members of the Class is impracticable. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the possibility of inconsistent and potentially conflicting adjudication of the asserted claims. 32. Damages for any individual class member are likely insufficient to justify the cost of individual litigation, so that in the absence of class treatment, Speedway violations of law inflicting substantial damages in the aggregate would go un-remedied. 33. The conduct of Speedway as to all members of the Class has been identical. 34. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 32 as if fully set forth herein. 35. The law imposes an affirmative duty on Speedway to sell gasoline at the advertised price. 36. Speedway had a duty to disclose to its customers, including Plaintiff and the Class, any policies that would cause an amount different from the purchase price of a transaction to be withdrawn from their financial accounts. 37. By accepting debit/check cards, Speedway had a duty to Plaintiffs and the Class, as paying customers, to use reasonable care to ensure that only the advertised and agreed upon purchase price of a transaction would be withdrawn from their financial accounts. 38. Speedway failed to use reasonable care in communicating the change in policy regarding the authorization hold. 40. Speedway breached its duties to Plaintiff and the Class by charging the $125 authorization hold to customer accounts or, alternatively, by not reversing the authorization hold within a timely manner. 41. Speedway failed to use reasonable care to ensure that only the purchase price of a transaction was withdrawn from the financial accounts of Plaintiff and the Class. 42. Speedway knew, or reasonably should have known, that breaching these duties would harm Plaintiff and Class members. It was reasonably foreseeable to Speedway that charging customers an additional $125 for purchases and not reversing the hold for an extended period of time would deprive customers of access to the monies in their financial accounts causing hardship and injury. 43. Speedway should have anticipated potential problems, been adequately prepared to resolve them quickly, and properly advised Plaintiff and the Class of the possibility of a prolonged authorization hold of $125 on their financial accounts. 44. Further, through its failure to provide timely and clear notification of the change in policy to consumers, Speedway prevented Plaintiff and Class Members from taking meaningful, proactive steps to ensure that they did not lose access to the monies in their financial accounts. 46. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 32 as if fully set forth herein. 47. Speedway solicited and invited Plaintiffs and Class members to purchase gasoline using their debit/check cards at the self-service gasoline pumps. Plaintiff and Class members accepted Speedway’s offers and used their debit/check cards to make gasoline purchases at Speedway. 48. With each purchase, Plaintiff and Class members entered into an implied contract with Speedway to purchase gasoline based on the advertised price per gallon. 49. It was not bargained for and Speedway did not inform Plaintiff and Class members that they had an additional obligation or would incur an additional expense of $125 in relation to the transaction. 50. With each use of the debit/check card by Plaintiff and the Class, Speedway, without customers’ knowledge or permission, sought a form of added protection in regards to the pending transaction by requiring through its point-of-sale machine an additional $125 authorization charge. 51. Speedway breached the implied contract with Plaintiff and the Class by secretly requiring the excessive authorization charge in the amount of $125 which prevented Plaintiff and the Class from use of said funds for an extended period of time. 53. As a direct and proximate result of Speedway’s breaches of its implied contracts with Plaintiff and Class members, Plaintiff and Class members sustained actual losses and damages as described in detail above. 54. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 32 as if fully set forth herein. 55. Plaintiff and the proposed Class have conferred a monetary benefit upon Speedway by entering a contract with Speedway for the purchase of gasoline at a specified and advertised price. 56. By the unfair, misleading and inequitable conduct alleged herein, Speedway has unjustly received and retained benefits at the expense of Plaintiff and the proposed Class, particularly the additional $125 charged for each point-of-sale transaction. 57. Speedway wrongfully charged an additional $125 to Plaintiff and Class members and deprived them of the use of $125 of their personal funds by causing an authorization hold to be placed on their financial accounts. 58. During the time Plaintiff and the proposed Class did not have access to the funds held by Speedway, Speedway accrued interest on the monies collected from Plaintiff and Class members through the authorization hold. 59. Under principles of equity and fairness, Speedway should not be permitted to retain money belonging to Plaintiffs and the proposed Class that Speedway unjustly received as result of their unfair, misleading and inequitable conduct alleged herein without providing compensation to Plaintiff and the proposed Class. 60. Plaintiff and the proposed Class have suffered pecuniary harm as a direct and proximate result of the Speedway’s inequitable conduct. 62. Plaintiffs restate and reallege Paragraphs 1 through 32 as if fully set forth herein. 63. The purpose of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq., (“FDUTPA”) is to “protect the consuming public…from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive or unfair acts or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2). 64. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by Florida Statute § 501.203(7), and the subject transaction is “trade or commerce” as defined by Florida Statute § 501.203(8). 65. FDUPTA was enacted to protect the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises from those who engage in unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, and in unfair methods of competition. 66. For the reasons discussed herein, Speedway violated FDUPTA by engaging in the unconscionable, deceptive, unfair acts or practices described herein and proscribed by Florida Statute § 501.201, et seq. Speedway’s unconscionable, deceptive, and unfair acts and practices described herein were likely to, and did in fact, deceive members of the public, including consumers (like Plaintiff) acting reasonably under the circumstances and to their detriment. Negligence (Asserted on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Unjust Enrichment (Asserted on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. (Asserted on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 21. Defendant is an outdoor equipment and apparel company that owns and operates www.mammut.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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12. Defendants manufacture, market and sell the Nivea line of skin and body care products. This lawsuit concerns one of those products – NIVEA Skin Firming Hydration Body Lotion with CoQ10 Plus. Defendants launched NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion in 2010. NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion is sold online and in virtually every major food, drug, and mass retail outlet in the country. 13. Since the Product’s launch, Defendants have consistently conveyed the message to consumers throughout the United States, including California, that their NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion is “proven” to “improve skin firmness within two weeks.” It is not. Defendants’ skin firming representations are false, misleading and deceptive. 14. The skin firming ingredient in Nivea CoQ10 Lotion is Co-Enzyme Q10. Co-Enzyme Q10, also known as ubiquinone or CoQ10, is a vitamin-like substance with antioxidant properties. CoQ10 is a deep orange color. 16. Reducing the CoQ10 in the Product to nanoparticle size is a very expensive process and would be cost prohibitive if employed in this Product. But even if nanotechnology has been employed – which is unlikely – the trace amounts of CoQ10 in the Product cannot provide firmer more toned skin within or in as little as two weeks or ever. NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion Is Not Proven to Firm or Tighten the Skin In as Little as Two Weeks or Ever 17. The NIVEA CoQ10 bottle states that the Product is “Proven to firm and tighten the skin’s surface in as little as two weeks.” By prefacing the skin firming representations with the word “proven”, Defendants are representing to consumers that credible scientific evidence supports the skin firming representations. In fact, scientific analyses have shown that the Product contains insufficient amounts of CoQ10 to provide skin firming benefits in as little as two weeks, or ever, and the trace amounts of CoQ10 particles in the Product have not been reduced in size to facilitate penetration into the dermal layer of the skin. 19. MSA, which looks for the presence of CoQ10 according to molecular weight, confirmed that only a trace amount of the ingredient is present in the Product. 20. And, a TLC analysis comparing a sample of the lotion extracted with an organic solvent in which CoQ10 is soluble with an authentic sample on a TLC silica gel plate failed to detect the presence of any CoQ10. 21. Thus, no less than three separate chemical analyses performed on the Product consistently showed trace amounts, at most, of CoQ10 in the Product. Further indicative of the trace amount of CoQ10 in the Product is its bright white color without a hint of CoQ10’s deep orange coloring. 22. The trace amount of CoQ10 in the Product is incapable of providing skin firming benefits within or in as little as two weeks as represented, or ever, particularly since the CoQ10 particles are not sufficiently processed to make them readily capable of penetrating the skin. 23. Scientific studies that have reported skin firming benefits from CoQ10 used preparations containing much higher concentrations of CoQ10 than are in the Product, with CoQ10 reduced to nanoparticle size. Even then the reported positive effects at this much higher doses occurred well after two weeks and in some instances after months of continued use – not within two weeks of use as Defendants represent. The Impact of Defendants’ Wrongful Conduct 25. Each and every consumer who purchases NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion is exposed to Defendants’ deceptive skin firming representations because they appear prominently and conspicuously, and almost exclusively on the front of each bottle as follows: 27. As the manufacturer and/or distributor of NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion, Defendants possess specialized knowledge regarding the content and effects of the ingredients contained in NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion and are in a superior position to learn of the effects―and have learned of the effects―NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion has on consumers. 29. Plaintiff and Class members have been and will continue to be deceived or misled by Defendants’ deceptive skin firming representations. Plaintiff purchased and used the Product during the Class period and in doing so, read and considered the NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion labeling and packaging and based her decision to buy the Product on the skin firming representations. Defendants’ skin firming representations were a material factor influencing Plaintiff’s decision to purchase and use the Product. Plaintiff would not have purchased the Product had she known that Defendants’ skin firming representations were false and misleading. 30. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged in their purchases of the Product and have been deceived into purchasing a Product that they believed, based on Defendants’ representations, would firm and tone skin within two weeks, when, in fact, it is incapable of firming and toning skin. 31. Based upon the purported skin firming representations conveyed in their marketing and advertising campaign, Defendants are able to price NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion at a substantial multi-dollar premium over Defendants’ other Hydra- IQ and glycerin lotions that do not make the deceptive skin firming representations.4 32. Defendants have reaped enormous profits from their false marketing and sale of NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion. 33. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated California consumers pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: 4 For example, a 16.9 ounce bottle of Nivea CoQ10 Lotion retails for $10.79, while 34. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class: California-Only Class All consumers who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, purchased NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion in California. Excluded from this Class are Defendants and their officers, directors and employees and those who purchased NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion for the purpose of resale. 35. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Class contains thousands of purchasers of NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion who have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 37. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described above and were subject to Defendants’ deceptive skin firming representations that accompanied each and every bottle of NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and all members of the Class. 38. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff has no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Class. 40. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. 41. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies received as a result of their conduct that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be deceived. 42. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 43. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 44. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. 46. The Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. (“UCL”), and similar laws in other states, prohibits any “unlawful,” “fraudulent” or “unfair” business act or practice and any false or misleading advertising. 47. In the course of conducting business, Defendants committed unlawful business practices by, inter alia, making the skin firming representations (which also constitutes advertising within the meaning of §17200) and omissions of material facts, as set forth more fully herein, and violating Civil Code §§1572, 1573, 1709, 1711, 1770(a)(5), (7), (9) and (16) and Business & Professions Code §§17200, et seq., 17500, et seq., and the common law. Plaintiff and the Class reserve the right to allege other violations of law, which constitute other unlawful business acts or practices. Such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date. 49. Further, as stated in this Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of consumer protection, unfair competition and truth–in–advertising laws resulting in harm to consumers. Defendants’ acts and omissions also violate and offend the public policy against engaging in false and misleading advertising, unfair competition and deceptive conduct towards consumers. This conduct constitutes violations of the unfair prong of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. 50. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendants’ legitimate business interests, other than the conduct described herein. 51. Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq., also prohibits any “fraudulent business act or practice.” 52. In the course of conducting business, Defendants committed “fraudulent business act or practices” by, inter alia, making the skin firming representations (which also constitutes advertising within the meaning of §17200) and omissions of material facts regarding the NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion in their advertising campaign, including the Product’s packaging, as set forth more fully herein. 53. Defendants misrepresented on each and every Product package that the Product is “proven” to “improve[] skin firmness within 2 weeks” when, in fact, the Product contains insufficient amounts of oversized CoQ10 particles to provide skin firming benefits within or in as little as two weeks or ever. 54. Defendants’ actions, claims, omissions and misleading statements, as more fully set forth above, were also false, misleading and/or likely to deceive the consuming public within the meaning of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. 56. Defendants knew, or should have known, that their material representations and omissions would be likely to deceive the consuming public and result in consumers purchasing Nivea CoQ10 Lotion and, indeed, intended to deceive consumers. 57. As a result of their deception, Defendants have been able to reap unjust revenue and profit. 58. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendants will continue to engage in the above-described conduct. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, all others similarly situated, and the general public, seeks restitution of all money obtained from Plaintiff and the members of the Class collected as a result of unfair competition, an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing such practices, corrective advertising and all other relief this Court deems appropriate, consistent with Business & Professions Code §17203. 60. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 62. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §1750, et seq. (the “Act”) and similar laws in other states. 63. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by California Civil Code §1761(d). Defendants’ NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion is a “good” within the meaning of the Act. 64. Defendants violated and continue to violate the Act by engaging in the following practices proscribed by California Civil Code §1770(a) in transactions with Plaintiff and the Class which were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion: (5) Representing that [NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion has] . . . approval, characteristics, . . . uses [and] benefits . . . which [it does] not have . . . . * * * (7) Representing that [NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion is] of a particular standard, quality or grade . . . if [it is] of another. * * * (9) Advertising goods . . . with intent not to sell them as advertised. * * * (16) Representing that [NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion has] been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when [it has] not. 66. Pursuant to California Civil Code §1782(d), Plaintiff and the Class seek a Court order enjoining the above-described wrongful acts and practices of Defendants and for restitution and disgorgement. 67. Pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff notified Defendants in writing by certified mail of the particular violations of §1770 of the Act and demanded that Defendants rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers of Defendants’ intent to so act. Copies of the letters are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 68. If Defendants fail to rectify or agree to rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers within 30 days of the date of written notice pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to add claims for actual, punitive and statutory damages, as appropriate. 69. Defendants’ conduct is fraudulent, wanton and malicious. 70. Pursuant to §1780(d) of the Act, attached hereto as Exhibit C is the affidavit showing that this action has been commenced in the proper forum. NIVEA CoQ10 Lotion Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. Violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act – Civil Code §1750 et seq.

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(Collective Action Claim for Violation of FLSA Wage Provisions) (Individual Claim for Unjust Enrichment) (Individual Claim for Violation of FLSA Wage Provisions) 17. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all preceding paragraphs of the Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 18. At all times material and relevant herein, Defendants were jointly the "employer" of Plaintiff and similarly situated employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §203(d) and Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:900. 19. At all times material and relevant herein, Defendants either directly or indirectly hired Plaintiff and similarly situated Cashiers; controlled their work schedules and conditions of employment; determined the rate and method of the payment of wages; and kept at least some records regarding their employment. 20. Upon information and belief, during the applicable statutory period, Defendants employed, in aggregate, at least ninety (90) Cashiers at the above-listed thirty-two (32) branch stores. 22. Upon information and belief, at all times material and relevant herein, Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED, and all other similarly situated Cashiers were required by Defendants and did regularly work well over forty (40) hours per week. 23. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times herein, Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED, and all other similarly situated Cashiers were treated as non-exempt hourly employees by Defendants. 24. At all relevant times Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED, and all other similarly situated Cashiers did not receive overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 25. At all relevant times herein, Defendants maintained control, oversight, and direction over the Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED, and the putative members of the proposed collective/class, including the promulgation and enforcement of policies affecting the payment of wages for overtime compensation. 26. Upon information and belief, Defendants never posted a notice explaining the minimum hourly wage and overtime pay rights provided by FLSA in any area of its business facility where Plaintiff and similarly situated employees were employed, in violation of 29 32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 33. Plaintiff brings this collective and class action individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated Cashiers who were/are affected by Defendants’ willful and intentional violation of the FLSA and Louisiana Civil Code as described in this Complaint. 34. Plaintiff brings this collective action to recover monetary damages owed by Defendants to Plaintiff and members of the putative Collective for all unpaid overtime compensation for hours in a work week in excess of forty (40) pursuant to the FLSA. 36. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA, as a collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Collective is defined as follows: All current and former employees of Defendants, who were/are 1) employed as Cashiers in the State of Louisiana during the applicable statutory period; and 2) not paid overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for hours in a work week in excess of forty (40). 37. Plaintiff brings this class action claim for relief under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Louisiana Civil Code § 2298. The Class is defined as follows: All current and former employees of Defendants, who were/are 1) employed as hourly employees in the State of Louisiana during the applicable statutory period; and 2) not paid proper overtime compensation, without cause, for hours worked in a week in excess of forty (40). 38. This action is properly brought as a collective action pursuant to the collective action procedures of the FLSA and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Collective/Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of putative Collective and Class members are unknown at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that at least ninety (90) putative collective and class members have worked for Defendants during the applicable statutory period, without receiving appropriate overtime compensation, as required by law. 40. This litigation is properly brought as a collective/class action because Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Collective/Class, inasmuch as all such claims arise from Defendants’ standard policies and practices, as alleged herein. Like all Collective/Class members, Plaintiff was damaged by Defendants’ system-wide policies and practices of failing to pay overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for all hours in a work week in excess of forty (40), in violation of the FLSA and Louisiana Civil Code § 2298. 42. Collective/Class certification is also fair and efficient because prosecution of separate actions by individual Collective/Class members would create a risk of differing adjudications with respect to such individual members of the Collective/Class, which as a practical matter may be dispositive of the interests of other members no parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 43. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. This litigation presents FLSA claims of a type that have often been prosecuted on a classwide basis, and the manner of identifying the Collective/Class and providing any monetary relief to it can easily be effectuated from a review of Defendants’ records. 44. Plaintiff and the putative collective and class members demand a trial by jury. 45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 46. Defendants required Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Cashiers to work hours in a work week in excess of forty (40). 48. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED, and the Collective/Class proper overtime compensation for hours in a work week in excess of forty (40) violates the FLSA. 49. Defendants’ uniform conduct and practices, as described above, was/is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 50. Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, as aforesaid, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 51. As a result of Defendants’ uniform policy and practice described above, Plaintiffs were illegally deprived of overtime compensation earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, pre- judgment interest, costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 52. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 53. Defendants required Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED and all other similarly situated Cashiers employed in the State of Louisiana to work hours in a work week in excess of forty (40). 55. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Cashiers proper overtime compensation for hours in a work week in excess of forty (40) violates the FLSA. 56. Defendants’ uniform policy and practice, as described above, was/is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 57. Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, as aforesaid, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 58. As a result of Defendants’ foregoing violation, Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Cashiers were illegally deprived of overtime compensation earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, pre-judgment interest, costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendants recognized the benefits conferred upon them by Plaintiff, YUSIF AHMED, and all other similar situated Cashiers. 61. Defendants accepted and retained the benefits under circumstances that would render such retention inequitable. 62. Defendants were aware and/or notified of the work performed without compensation and demand was made for payment for such work. 64. The payment requested by Plaintiff for the benefits produced by him is based on customary and reasonable rates for such services at the time and in the locality where the services were rendered, and the amount by which Plaintiff was impoverished and Defendants were enriched is identical. 65. No other remedy exists under the laws of the State of Louisiana to recover these unlawfully unpaid wages. 66. Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to all unpaid wages due within three (3) years preceding the filing of this Complaint plus periods of equitable tolling, as allowed by Louisiana Civil Code § 3494(1). 67. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the applicable legal rate.

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13. This action is properly maintainable as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and as a Class Action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 14. This action is brought on behalf of Named Plaintiffs and a class consisting of similarly situated employees who worked for Defendants as electrical workers or in other electrical related work. 16. The putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The size of the putative class is believed to be in excess of sixty (60) employees. 17. The questions of law and fact common to the putative class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. These questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to: (1) whether the Defendants failed to pay overtime wages, at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any given week, (2) whether Defendant kept adequate and proper records, and (3) whether Defendants provided Plaintiffs with the legally required wage notices. 18. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the putative class members. The Named Plaintiffs, like all members of the putative class, were subject to Defendants’ policies and willful practice of refusing to pay employees overtime compensation. The Plaintiffs and putative class members have thus sustained similar injuries as a result of the Defendants’ actions. 19. Named Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the putative class. Named Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex wage and hour collective and class action litigation. 21. Named Plaintiff Dennis performed electrical work for Defendants from approximately May 2015 through April 2016. 22. Plaintiff Dennis typically worked approximately six (6) to seven (7) days per week, from approximately 7:00 a.m. until 10:30 p.m. approximately five (5) days per week, and from approximately 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. two (2) day per week. 23. As a result, Plaintiff Dennis regularly worked over forty (40) hours in a week. 24. During his employment, Plaintiff Dennis was paid approximately $20.00 per hour regardless of how many hours he worked. 25. When Plaintiff Dennis worked more than 40 hours in a week, he was not paid overtime compensation in an amount equal to one and one half times his regular rate of pay. 26. Named Plaintiff Duane Foxe performed electrical work for Defendants from approximately August 2015 through November 2015. 27. Plaintiff Foxe typically worked from approximately 7:00 a.m. until between 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m, approximately five (5) to seven (7) days per week. 28. As a result, Plaintiff Foxe regularly worked more than 40 hours in a week. 29. During his employment, Plaintiff Foxe was paid between approximately $15.00 to $18.00 per hour regardless of how many hours he worked. 30. When Plaintiff Foxe worked more than 40 hours in a week, he was not paid overtime compensation in an amount equal to one and one half times his regular rate of pay. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and applicable State law by failing to maintain proper and complete timesheets and payroll records. 33. Upon information and belief, when Plaintiffs were hired by Defendants, they were not provided with any notification whatsoever indicating their regular or overtime rate of pay. 34. Upon information and belief, during Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendants, Plaintiffs were not provided with any wage statements that reflected the hours worked, the amount being paid, the regular or overtime rates of pay. 35. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs’ co-workers, like Plaintiffs, also were not provided with wage notifications at the time of hire or wage did not receive wage statements or wage notices. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant Patrick Kenelly is an owner and director of Defendants AGF and AF Electrical and (i) had the power to hire and fire employees; (ii) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (iii) determined the rate and method of payment for employees; and (iv) maintained employment records. 37. Upon information and belief, Defendants are part of a single integrated enterprise that jointly employed Named Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees at all relevant times. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kenelly dominated the day-to-day operating decisions of Defendants AGF and AF Electrical, made major personnel decisions for Defendants AGF and AF Electrical, and had complete control of the alleged activities of Defendants AGF and AF Electrical which give rise to the claims brought herein. 40. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kenelly, in his capacity as president, actively participated in the unlawful method of payment for employees of Defendants AGF and AF Electrical. Upon information and belief, the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class performed labor for the benefit of and at the direction of Defendant Kenelly. 41. Upon information and belief, Defendants are a single and/or joint employer in that they share a common business purpose and ownership, maintain common control, oversight and direction over the operations of the work performed by Plaintiffs, including payroll practices. Upon information and belief, each Defendant has had substantial control of Plaintiffs’ working conditions and over the unlawful policies and practices alleged herein. 42. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ operations are interrelated and unified. 43. Upon information and belief, during all relevant times, Defendants shared a common management, and were centrally controlled and/or owned by Defendants. 44. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants had the power to determine employee policies, including but not limited to policies governing the payment of overtime compensation to employees. 45. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000. 46. Upon information and belief, Defendants engage in interstate commerce, including handling and working with goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for interstate commerce such as construction materials, equipment and tools. 48. Pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C § 207, “no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 49. Further, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), an “employer” includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” 50. Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class are employees within the meaning contemplated in Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §203. 51. Defendants are “employer[s]”, within the meaning contemplated in the FLSA, 29 55. Named Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the proceeding paragraphs. 56. 12 NYCRR §142-2.2 requires that “[a]n employer shall pay an employee for overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate.” 57. New York Labor Law § 663, provides that “[i]f any employee is paid by his employer less than the wage to which he is entitled under the provisions of this article, he may recover in a civil action the amount of any such underpayments, together with costs and such reasonable attorney’s fees.” 58. Named Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and supporting Regulations. 59. Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and supporting Regulations. 60. Named Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class worked more than forty hours per week while working for Defendants. 61. Named Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class did not receive overtime compensation in an amount equal to one and one half times their regular rates of pay for the hours worked after the first forty hours of work in a week. 62. Consequently, by failing to pay to Named Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class overtime compensation for work they performed after the first forty hours worked in a week, Defendants violated New York Labor Law § 663 and 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. 64. Named Plaintiffs repeat and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 65. Pursuant to Section 195(1) of the NYLL, an employer is required to provide its employees at the time of hiring a notice containing information, such as, “the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; . . . the regular pay day designated by the employer . . .; [and] the name of the employer . . . . For all employees who are not exempt from overtime compensation . . ., the notice must sate the regular hourly rate and overtime rate of pay.” 66. Pursuant to Section 198-1(b) of the NYLL, an employee that does not receive a wage notification, as required by NYLL § 195(1), may bring a civil action to recover damages of $250 for each work day that the violation occurs or continues to occur, but not to exceed $5,000. 67. At the time of hire, Defendants did not provide Named Plaintiffs or members of the putative class with a wage notification informing Plaintiffs of, among other things, (1) their regular rates of pay, (2) their overtime rates of pay, (3) the basis of their rates of pay (e.g., whether they were hourly employees), or (4) the regular pay day designated by Defendant. 68. Defendants violated NYLL § 195(1) by failing to provide Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class with wage notifications containing the information required by NYLL § 195, et seq. 69. The failure of Defendants to provide Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class with wage notifications in violation of NYLL § 195 was willful. 71. Named Plaintiffs repeat and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 72. Pursuant to Section 195(3) of the New York Labor Law, an employer is required to furnish each employee with a statement with every payment of wages that identifies, among other things, whether the employee is paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or in another manner. For employees that are not exempt from overtime compensation under New York state law or regulation, such wage statement must also include “the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked.” 73. Pursuant to Section 198-1(d) of the New York Labor Law, an employee that does not receive a wage statement, as required by NYLL § 195(3), may bring a civil action to recover damages of $50 for each work day that the violation occurs or continues to occur, but not to exceed $5,000. 74. Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class did not receive any wage statements from the Defendants. 75. Defendants violated NYLL § 195(3) by failing to provide Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class with wage statements containing the information required by AGAINST DEFENDANTS -- NEW YORK OVERTIME COMPENSATION LAW AGAINST DEFENDANT -- FLSA OVERTIME COMPENSATION NEW YORK § 195(3) WAGE STATEMENT VIOLATION NEW YORK § 195(1) WAGE NOTICE VIOLATION

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(Violation of the Rosenthal FDCPA) (Violation of the FDCPA) 18. Sometime after April 4, 2016, Plaintiff received his first collection notice dated April 4, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “Validation Notice”) from Defendant, attempting to collect a debt in the amount of $23,450.21. The debt was allegedly owed to LendingClub. A copy of the Validation Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and is incorporated herein by reference. 19. Defendant’s Validation Notice does not state that the $23,450.21 debt is accruing interest, the interest rate interest at which the interest is accruing, or the portion of the debt that is principal and the portion of the Debt that is accrued interest or other fees. In fact, Defendant’s Validation Notice is completely devoid of any language that would either confirm or deny the existence of acquiring interest. 20. Upon information and belief, Defendant was charging daily accruing interest on the debt. 21. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s debt collection practice is largely automated and utilizes standardized form letters or templates. 22. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 42. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(a)(1) because its Validation Notice failed to clearly state the amount of the debt. Defendant failed to clearly state the amount of the debt because it failed to disclose that the debt was subject to daily accruing interest. It is well established that a debt collector, who attempts to collect accruing interest on a debt, must use some type of safe harbor language informing the debtor that the debt increases due to daily accruing interest. See Akram v. California Business Bureau Inc., 2016 WL 7029262 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016); Chuway v. National Action Financial Services, Inc., 362 F.3d 944, 949 (7th Cir. 2004); Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000); Dragon v. I.C. System, Inc., 483 F.Supp.3d 198, 203 (D. Conn. 2007). 44. Plaintiff re-alleges all paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 45. Any violation of the FDCPA is a violation of California Civil Code section 1788.17, also known as the Rosenthal FDCPA, because section 1788.17 incorporates the FDCPA. 46. Defendant violated Civil Code section 1788.17 because it violated 15 U.S.C. sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10), and 1692g(a)(1), as discussed above. 47. The Ninth Circuit in Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1066 (9th Cir. 2011) has ruled that the Rosenthal FDCPA incorporates the FDCPA’s class action damages provision in 15 U.S.C. section 1692k(a)(2)(B) via California Civil Code section 1788.17. 48. As a result of each and every violation of the Rosenthal FDCPA, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages and harm resulting from Defendant’s actions as heretofore alleged, including but not limited to worry, emotional distress, anxiety, and humiliation, the exact amount of which is to be proven at trial. 49. As a result of each and every violation of the Rosenthal FDCPA, Plaintiff incurred additional actual damages including, but not limited to, transportation and gasoline costs to the law firm, telephone call charges, copies, postage, and other damages.

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29. Each of Defendant Panera, LLC‟s bakeries and cafés are open to the general public and as such, are places public accommodation subject to the requirements of Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulation; 42 U.S.C. §12182, §§s 12181(7)(B) and (E) and 28 C.F.R. Part 36, by virtue of the fact that Defendant operates bakeries (42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(E)) and by virtue of the fact that the Defendant operates café-casual fast-food restaurants (cafés) which offer food and drink to the general public 31. On information and belief, Defendant Panera is well aware of the need to accommodate their customers who are visually impaired, and is aware of the requirements of the ADA for effective communication and access. 32. As a public accommodation, Defendant Panera must provide appropriate auxiliary aids or services that comply with its effective communication and access obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); 28 C.F.R. §§s 36.303(a), (c)(1). 33. Defendant Panera has not provided full and equal access and full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations provided by and through its Panera Bread bakeries and cafés located within the State of Florida and other regions of the United States where they business operations. 35. Such barriers have resulted in segregation of individuals with disabilities who are visually impaired and directly caused a diminished lifestyle and societal ostraization. 36. As a public accommodation with many places of public accommodation within the United States of America, Defendant Panera is well aware of requirements the need to accommodate their customers who are visually impaired within each of its places of public accommodation. Further, the Defendant Panera is aware of the requirements of the ADA for effective communication and access. iPad6 Touchscreen Kiosks 38. The iPad kiosks permit consumers to (i) view the assortment of bakery items and menu of café food and drink items available for purchase, independently (on their own), (ii) to select and order bakery, café and drink items, (iii) to direct that said items be packaged for take-out or set up in trays for eating and drinking in the Panera bakery and café, and (iv) to purchase of such items. 39. Defendant Panera has failed to reasonably accommodate the visually impaired and disabled by developing their news iPad kiosks to include a blind interface system which employs an audio interface system, a tactile keyboard, and/or interactive screen reader technology or other auxiliary aids for the visually impaired. 40. Defendant Panera has failed to provide the minimum ability of the blind to use Panera technologies like other non-vision impaired customers. 41. Such failure is not only outrageous conduct, the lack of management forethought into building these incapability devises amounts to extreme insensitivity, a malo arbitio, but also is/was willful, malicious, oppressive, and in complete disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs and in violation of 28 C.F.R. §36.303 42. Barriers to effective communication include (but are not necessarily limited to) Defendant Panera‟s failure to reasonably accommodate visually impaired individuals by providing creating their iPad kiosks assistive listening devices (which are readily accessible and that they be maintained in working condition and available on request) to individuals who are visually impaired is/was willful, malicious, and oppressive and in complete disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs and in violation of 28 77. Defendant Panera, LLC‟s website www.panerabread.com (“website”) is offered to provide the general public information including but not limited to information on the various locations of the Defendant Panera Bakeries and Cafés throughout the United States and within the state of Florida. 79. Since the Defendant Panera‟s bakeries and cafés are places of public accommodation and they are serviced by Defendant‟s website, the website is also characterized as a place of public accommodation (42 U.S.C. §§S 12181(7)(B) and (E)), and has a direct nexus between the site and its stores. 80. The website allows the general public access to the food, drink, and bakery menu, and the ability to purchase food, drink, and bakery items on online in a substantially similar way as if an individual were to purchase food, drink and bakery items from one of the Defendant Panera‟s bakery and café locations. As such, the website is a service, which is a public accommodation; 42 U.S.C. §§s 12181(7)(B) and (E) and must comply with the ADA, which means it must not discriminate against individuals with disabilities and may not deny full and equal enjoyment of the services afforded to the general public. As such, Defendant Panera has subjected itself and the website it has created and maintains, to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).11 82. Plaintiffs Gomez and Gil are customers of bakeries and cafés such as Panera Bakeries and Cafés. 83. Plaintiffs Gomez and Gil frequently utilize the internet. In order to comprehend information available on the internet and access/comprehend websites, Plaintiffs Gomez and Gil use commercially available screen reader software to interface with the various websites. 84. In order to comprehend Defendant Panera‟s website and to become informed of the bakery and café locations, menu and bakery items, and to food, drink, and bakery items online for in store pick up, which the general public may do online, Plaintiffs Gomez and Gil must use screen reader software. 85. Both Plaintiffs Gomez and Gill attempted to utilize the Defendant‟s website. However, the Defendant‟s website did not integrate with either of the Plaintiff‟s screen reader software so Plaintiffs Gomez and Gill were barred from accessing the Defendant‟s website. 86. The Defendant‟s website does not provide screen reader software or other means to accommodate the visually impaired, nor does it interface with screen reader software in order that visually impaired individuals can comprehend the website. 88. The Defendant‟s website did\does not offer an adequate system to permit a disabled person with a visual impairment (who requires screen reader software) to comprehend its website in an effective manner. 89. The Defendant‟s website is\was not designed and programmed to interface with commercially available screen reader software for disabled individuals who are visually impaired in the same manner as the website is offered to the general public. 90. The Defendant‟s website is\was so poorly functional for visually impaired individuals who require screen reader software, that any utilization of the website contains barriers that prevent full and equal use (of the website) by individuals with disabilities who are visually impaired. 91. On information and belief, the Defendant has not designated an employee as a Web Accessibility Policy to insure full and equal use of its website by individuals with disabilities. 92. On information and belief, the Defendant has not instituted a Web Accessibility Committee to insure full and equal use of its website by individuals with disabilities. 93. On information and belief, the Defendant has not designated an employee as a Web Accessibility Coordinator to insure full and equal use of its website by individuals with disabilities. 95. On information and belief, the Defendant has not instituted a User Accessibility Testing Group to insure full and equal use of its website by individuals with disabilities. 96. On information and belief, the Defendant has not instituted a Bug Fix Priority Policy. 97. On information and belief, the Defendant has not instituted an Automated Web Accessibility Testing program. 98. On information and belief, the Defendant has not created and instituted a Specialized Customer Assistance line, nor service, or email contact mode for customer assistance for the visually impaired. PHYSICAL LOCATIONS

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21. All conditions precedent to the filing of this Complaint have been performed or have occurred. 22. Conn’s, its agents, and/or vendors, violated the TCPA by placing unlawful telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, including the number ending in -6546. 23. Conn’s, at all material times, was attempting to collect a debt. 24. On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff received an e-mail from AcceptanceNOW stating she was “APPROVED for a lease-purchase agreement for up to $2,500 worth of merchandise” from AcceptanceNOW (approval #2566416). See Exhibit 1, approval e-mail from AcceptanceNOW. 25. The approval for purchasing “up to $2,500 worth of merchandise” was only valid at a Conn’s Home Plus store, located at 120 S. Rainbow Blvd., Las Vegas, NV 89145. Id. 26. The phone number listed for Conn’s Home Plus was (702) 240-8382. See Exhibit 1, approval e-mail from AcceptanceNOW. 28. On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff received an e-mail from AcceptanceNOW acknowledging her order and purchase from AcceptanceNOW. See Exhibit 2, purchase order acknowledgement e-mail from AcceptanceNOW. 29. Plaintiff signed the Lease-Purchase Agreement with AcceptanceNOW on December 1, 2016 via the “click-through AcceptanceNOW web portal.” See Exhibit 3, Lease-Purchase Agreement with AcceptanceNOW (agreement #hxj00508). 30. The Lease-Purchase Agreement is between Plaintiff and AcceptanceNow, despite being physically present in the Conn’s Home Plus store at the time of purchase. See Exhibit 3, Lease-Purchase Agreement with AcceptanceNOW (agreement #hxj00508). 31. On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff also signed a Consumer Arbitration Agreement with AcceptanceNOW as part of her purchase of the laptop. See Exhibit 4, Consumer Arbitration Agreement with AcceptanceNOW (“Arbitration Agreement”). 32. The Arbitration Agreement only covers disputes between Plaintiff and AcceptanceNOW. Id. 33. Plaintiff has never signed any agreement or contract with defendant Conn’s. 34. Defendant Conn’s is not a party to the Arbitration Agreement. Id. 35. Defendant Conn’s is not relying on any representations in the Arbitration Agreement. Id. 37. In or around late December of 2016, defendant Conn’s began calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone without her consent demanding payment for the laptop computer that Plaintiff purchased from AcceptanceNOW. 38. In or around late December of 2016, Plaintiff verbally spoke with Conn’s and told Conn’s to stop calling her cellular telephone. 39. However, defendant Conn’s continued calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone despite Plaintiff’s request for Conn’s to stop calling. 40. On February 16, 2017, Plaintiff received an e-mail from AcceptanceNOW demanding payment for her purchase. See Exhibit 6, AcceptanceNOW e-mail demanding payment on her account with AcceptanceNOW. 41. The harassing phone calls from Conn’s to Plaintiff’s cell phone were made through an automated telephone dialing system; and were so severe in volume that Plaintiff felt compelled to file a formal complaint against Conn’s with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) (reference #90635152). See Exhibit 7, Plaintiff’s FTC complaint against Defendant Conn’s. 42. According to Conn’s statements and representations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), AcceptanceNow is a third-party “payment solutions provider not affiliated with us [Conn’s].” See Exhibit 8, Conn’s SEC 10-K excerpts. 43. Plaintiff never consented to receive automated dialing system calls from Conn’s or its agents. 44. Plaintiff is the regular user and carrier of her cellular telephone number, including but not limited to the number ending in -6546, and she is the called party/recipient of telephone calls from Conn’s automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice messages. 46. Conn’s knowingly and/or willfully harassed and abused Plaintiff by calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone multiple times per day after Plaintiff revoked any alleged consent for Conn’s to contact Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 47. Conn’s used an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or pre-recorded voice to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 48. Conn’s has possession and control of call logs, account notes, auto- dialer reports, and other records detailing the total number of all calls made to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. 49. Conn’s automatic phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone included delays in time before the telephone calls were transferred to a representative to begin speaking. 50. Some of the Conn’s representatives who called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone sounded like an artificial or pre-recorded voice. 51. None of Conn’s telephone calls placed to Plaintiff were for “emergency purposes” as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 52. None of Conn’s telephone calls placed to Plaintiff were made with Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 53. In order to redress injuries caused by Conn’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the TCPA, which prohibits unsolicited voice and text calls to cell phones. 54. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff also seeks an injunction requiring Conn’s to cease all TCPA violations and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 55. All conditions precedent to the filing of this class action Complaint have been performed or have occurred. 82. Common issues predominate when, as here, liability can be determined on a class wide basis, even where there will be some individualized damages and determinations. 83. This action is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of the Class of individuals defined as (i) all persons to whom a call was initiated by either Conn’s or its agent (ii) to such person’s cellular telephone number (iii) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (iv) in the four year period preceding the filing of this action (v) and where Conn’s did not have permission to make the call (vi) or the person revoked consent to receive future calls. 85. When determining whether common questions predominate, courts focus on the liability issue, and, if the liability issue is common to the class, common questions will be held to predominate over individual questions. In this case, each proposed class member owed a debt related to a home furnishings account, which Conn’s was attempting to collect. 86. At some point during the life of the customers’ home furnishings account Conn’s contacted the customers via cellular telephone in an attempt to collect the consumer debt; however, the customer revoked any alleged express consent to be contacted via cellular telephone. 87. Despite the revocation of express consent to be contacted via cellular telephone, Conn’s continued to call the customer’s cellular telephones using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. 88. There are uniform and statutory damages available to class members for the Conn’s knowing non-compliance with the TCPA. 90. Plaintiff brings this action against Conn’s pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class: All persons within the United States who received a non-emergency telephone call from Conn’s to a cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system where Conn’s did not have consent to make such calls. 91. Excluded from this class are Defendant Conn’s, its affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, board members, directors, officers, and employees, and Plaintiff’s counsel. 92. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definitions of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 93. The individual class members are numerous, and joinder of all members is impracticable. 94. The individual class members are ascertainable because the names and addresses of all class members can be identified in the business records maintained by the Conn’s. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulties in the management of the action as a class action. 95. Plaintiff is a member of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because of the similarity, uniformity, and common purpose of the unlawful conduct of Conn’s. Each class member has sustained and will continue to sustain damages in the same manner as Plaintiff as a result of Conn’s wrongful conduct. 97. A class action is superior to individual actions in part because of the non-exhaustive factors listed below: (a) Individual claims by class members are impractical because the costs to pursue individual claims exceed the value of what any one class member has at stake. As a result, individual class members have no interest in prosecuting and controlling separate actions, yet if the action is not prosecuted, Conn’s will continue its wrongful actions; (b) There are no known individual class members who are interested in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions; (c) The interests of justice will be well served by resolving the common disputes of potential class members in one forum; (d) Individual suits would not be cost effective or economically maintainable as individual actions; (e) The action is manageable as a class action; and (f) Attorney’s fees are not recoverable under the TCPA, making it unlikely for individual claims to be prosecuted. 98. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein.

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2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 21. Defendant is a clothing and activewear company that owns and operates www..kyodan.clothing (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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12. The Defendant’s letter is deceptive and misleading in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) as it falsely implies that the Defendant has actual knowledge about Yehoshua C. Minsky’s financial conditions and what intentions he has or does not have regarding the alleged debt. 13. The said statement: “WE BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE UNABLE TO BORROW THE MONEY TO PAY OFF THE ABOVE ACCOUNT” is an unaccountable claim, not only regarding the Plaintiff’s ability to borrow, but also about his wish or intention to do so. 14. Defendant continues to state that it wishes to “ALLOW YOU MORE TIME TO GET YOUR FINANCES IN ORDER,” which is a further baseless and presumptuous statement, as it implies that the Defendant has actual knowledge of the Plaintiff’s personal circumstances. 15. The said statement that “AT THE END OF THE THREE MONTHS THE ARRANGEMENT WILL BE REVIEWED…,” is a vague statement, as it does not explain precisely what the Defendant is going to further review. 16. More importantly, by stating that “HOPEFULLY YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PAY THE REMAINING BALANCE IN FULL,” the Defendant opts out from identifying what precisely will occur in the event that the Plaintiff is unable to do so. -4- 17. Defendant further states that its “ARRANGEMENT” could be accepted by writing or calling the Defendant and “THAT YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS MENTIONED ABOVE,” when the “terms” had been deliberately obscured or excluded from the Defendant’s letter. 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. (10) the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides: A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 20. Said language can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is false.1 21. The letter concludes with a statement encouraging the Plaintiff to contact the Defendant and indicate that he agrees to “THE TERMS MENTIONED,” and ending with the words “IT'S THAT EASY!!!” when no clear terms have been provided which a consumer would be able to easily understand. 22. Defendant, as a matter of pattern and practice, mails letters, or causes the mailing of letters, to debtors using language substantially similar or materially identical to that 1 Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989). (Because the collection notice was reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading, it was deceptive within the meaning of the Act.), Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993). (Collection notices are deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.), Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996). (A collection notice is deceptive when it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. The fact that the notice's terminology was vague or uncertain will not prevent it from being held deceptive under § 1692e(10) of the Act.) -5- utilized by Defendant in mailing the above-cited letter to the Plaintiff. 23. The letters the Defendant mails, or causes to be mailed, are produced by Defendant's concerted efforts and integrated or shared technologies including computer programs, mailing houses, and electronic databases. 24. The said letter is a standardized form letter. 25. Defendant's February 5, 2015 letter is in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692f for deceptive and misleading misrepresentations and for using unfair and unconscionable means to collect on an alleged debt. 26. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through twenty five (25) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 27. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 28. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about February 5, 2015; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Barclays Bank Delaware; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692f for deceptive and misleading misrepresentations and for using unfair and unconscionable means to collect on an alleged debt. -6- 29. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 30. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of -7- inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 31. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 33. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE UNABLE TO BORROW THE MONEY TO PAY OFF THE ABOVE ACCOUNT, WE ARE EXTENDING TO YOU ANOTHER OPTION. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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(Declaratory Relief) (Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages – FLSA – 29 U.S.C. § 207) (Misclassification as Independent Contractor) 20. Defendants provide, among other services, out-sourced technical support for firms involved in sales, marketing and/or telemarketing. 21. Two of the firms for whom Defendants provide out-sourced technical support were and/or are F9Group, Inc., and Ytel, Inc. 22. Upon information and belief, Defendants also operate their own businesses that provide, among other things, telemarketing and transcription services. 23. In or around June 2009, Defendants hired Plaintiff Louisa Rettler to provide technical support for customers of other firms who had business relationships with Defendants, and other duties as requested by Defendants. Her rate of pay varied from $9.00 per hour initially up to $11.00 per hour at present. 24. On or about June 1, 2011, Defendants hired Plaintiff David Hicks to provide technical support for customers of other firms who had business relationships with Defendants, and other duties as requested by Defendants. His rate of pay is $9.40 per hour. 25. Plaintiffs were employed to perform various tasks for Defendants, including taking calls for Defendants’ clients, answering customer questions if they called in for technical support, taking sales and billing calls, attending weekly meetings, filling out service tickets on each customer call, performing investigations to insure technical systems are working properly, troubleshooting client service issues, sending emails to other employees. 26. The majority of work performed by Plaintiffs was acting as online technical support for various clients of Defendants. 28. From their date of hire until present, Defendants exerted control over Plaintiffs by establishing what work they would perform. 29. From their date of hire until present, Defendants exerted control over Plaintiffs by establishing when the work would be performed. 30. From their date of hire until present, Defendants exerted control over Plaintiffs by establishing how the work would be performed. 31. From their date of hire until present, Defendants exerted control over Plaintiffs by establishing where the work would be performed. 32. Despite exercising the control alleged above, from their date of hire until the present, Defendants have classified Plaintiffs as independent contractors. 33. Upon information and belief, most if not all of Defendants’ workers are classified as independent contractors. 34. Plaintiffs’ services are integral to the success of Defendants’ business operation. 35. Plaintiffs did not work for a predetermined amount of wages but instead their pay was entirely dependent on the amount of time they spent working during any given day. 36. From their dates of hire until approximately May 20, 2012, Plaintiffs routinely worked with knowledge of Defendants in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 37. Despite being routinely required to work in excess of forty hours per week, Plaintiffs were not paid the premium one and one-half times their regular rate as required under the FLSA for hours worked over forty in a work week. 38. For example, from approximately August 1, 2010 through May 20, 2012, Plaintiff Louisa Rettler worked an average of 10.74 hours in excess of forty (40) hours per week, for which Plaintiff Louisa Rettler was paid her regular hourly rate of pay rather than the premium one and one half times her hourly rate as required under the FLSA. 40. Defendants wrongfully withheld wages from Plaintiffs by failing to pay all overtime wages due to Plaintiff for hours Plaintiff worked. 41. The additional persons who may become plaintiffs in this action are customer service and/or technical support agents who held positions similarly situated to Plaintiffs and who worked in excess of forty (40) hours during one or more work weeks during the relevant time periods but who did not receive pay at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all of their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours. 42. Upon information and belief, the records concerning the number of hours worked and amounts paid to Plaintiffs any other similarly situated employees are in the possession and custody of Defendants and the amount of employees is numerous. 43. Defendants’ failure and/or refusal to properly compensate Plaintiffs at the rates and amounts required by the FLSA was willful and knowing. 44. Defendants refused and/or failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of his rights under the FLSA. 45. Plaintiffs have retained the law firm of Phillips Law Group, P.C., to represent them in this litigation and have agreed to pay a reasonable fee for the services rendered in the prosecution of this action on his behalf. 46. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt paragraphs 1 through 45 above as if fully set forth herein. 48. Defendants’ systems and practices relating to their non-payment of overtime to technical support and customer service employees have existed for at least three years throughout Defendants’ business. 49. There are numerous similarly situated employees and former employees of Defendants who have been improperly compensated in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of Court-Supervised Notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. 50. The similarly situated employees are numerous technical support and customer service employees who have the same or similar job description as Plaintiff and perform the same or similar job functions. 51. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable and locatable through Defendants’ records. Specifically, all technical support and customer service employees and former technical support and customer service employees of Defendants who have been employed with Defendants, would benefit from Court-Supervised Notice and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit and should be so notified. 52. Defendants further have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees and former employees in accordance with § 207 of the FLSA, as described in the previous paragraphs. 53. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs, as well as all others similarly situated, have suffered damages by failing to receive compensation in accordance with § 207 of the FLSA. 55. Defendants’ actions in failing to compensate Plaintiffs, as well as all other similarly situated employees and former employees, in violation of the FLSA, were willful. 56. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA. 57. Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request a judgment be entered in their favor and against Defendants for actual and liquidated damages, as well as costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees, and such other and further relief as deemed just and proper by this Court. 58. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt paragraphs 1 through 57 above as if fully set forth herein. 59. Plaintiffs’ working relationships with Defendants as described above were as employees. 60. Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs as independent contractors. 61. In addition to providing Defendants with presumed justification to violate the FLSA, the misclassification also allowed Defendants not to pay employment taxes, shifting the burden onto the Plaintiffs in the form of self-employment taxes. 63. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt paragraphs 1 through 62 above as if fully set forth herein. 64. Plaintiffs and Defendants have a FLSA dispute pending, which the Court has jurisdiction to hear pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as a federal question exists. 65. The Court also has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. 66. Plaintiffs may obtain declaratory relief. 67. Defendants employed Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 68. Defendants business is an enterprise covered by the FLSA, as concerns its employer-employee relationship with Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 69. Plaintiffs were individually covered by the FLSA. 70. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to overtime wages pursuant to

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(Declaratory Relief) 113. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 112 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 26 114. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Spencofootwear.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Spencofootwear.com, which Fourfoot owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 115. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 101. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 100 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 102. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of 24 . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 103. Spencofootwear.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 104. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Spencofootwear.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 105. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Spencofootwear.com, causing Spencofootwear.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 106. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or 25 (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 107. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 108. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Spencofootwear.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 109. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 110. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 111. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 112. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 25. Defendant, Fourfoot, LLC, controls and operates Spencofootwear.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Spencofootwear.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse footwear and related products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Spencofootwear.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Fourfoot on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various lines of comfort and support footwear,, insoles, and related products; and (c) the ability to “ask the experts” about foot related problems, learns about sales and promotions, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of Fourfoot’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Spencofootwear.com. Due to Fourfoot’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Spencofootwear.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Fourfoot, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Spencofootwear.com. 29. Fourfoot denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Spencofootwear.com by preventing them from freely navigating Spencofootwear.com. 9 30. Spencofootwear.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Spencofootwear.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Spencofootwear.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Spencofootwear.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Spencofootwear.com, these forms include search fields to locate footwear, fields that specify the size and color, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, including size and color, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. In fact, when Plaintiff attempted to a color and size, her screen- 10 reader could not recognize the buttons and she was unable to “add to cart.” Consequently, she was unable to proceed to checkout and unable to complete a transaction. 33. Additional accessibility issues with the spencofootwear.com website include: Summary The Spenco Footwear website has a lot of accessibility issues. The website is full of unlabeled graphics, buttons, and links. It also has a lot of random errors. Plaintiff could not successfully add an item to the cart. Homepage  Navigation is confusing. Plaintiff first heard the website name, followed by the search field, and then the website name again then the URL is announced. There isn’t a visible focus so Plaintiff had no idea what is being read.  After the menu items were announced, Plaintiff only heard unlabeled graphics or unlabeled links until the footer.  The search field doesn’t have the correct role. It’s announced as a list instead of a field. Product page  When Plaintiff clicked on a product, she was directed to the product page but instead of announcing the product name, heard a product id. In the case of the Women’s Oasis Slide” she heard: “product equals product ID 699 link.”  All product images were unlabeled. Plaintiff just heard the generic product id that she heard when we first landed on the page.  After the product id, she heard a URL announced, but no focus on the screen so she wasn’t sure what was being read or why.  The review button and social media buttons were skipped.  The size section is announced as a list and then just a number without any indication as to what was being hearing. Therefore, Plaintiff was unable to select size.  The color section label isn’t announced. Plaintiff first heard 4 blank links followed by 4 colors.  Plaintiff couldn’t select a color or size with a keyboard. 34. On Spencofootwear.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as footwear, have been added to the shopping cart because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product. Moreover, blind customers are unable to select the size or color of the product they desire. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Spencofootwear.com. 11 35. Furthermore, Spencofootwear.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Spencofootwear.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 36. Spencofootwear.com also lacks accessible forms. Color and size boxes allow customers to specify the color and size of certain items. On Spencofootwear.com, blind customers are unable to select specific color and size because the screen-reader does not indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the color and size box. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Spencofootwear.com. 37. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Spencofootwear.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 38. Spencofootwear.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. 12 Thus, Spencofootwear.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Spencofootwear.com. 39. Due to Spencofootwear.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and- mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Spencofootwear.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Spencofootwear.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Spencofootwear.com. 40. Spencofootwear.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Spencofootwear.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Spencofootwear.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff, Mary Conner, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Spencofootwear.com, most recently on November 16, 2019, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Spencofootwear.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, 13 blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase the “Women’s Oasis Slides.” 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Spencofootwear.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 43. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Spencofootwear.com. 44. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 45. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 46. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Spencofootwear.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal 14 Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Spencofootwear.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Spencofootwear.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Spencofootwear.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Spencofootwear.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 49. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 50. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Spencofootwear.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Spencofootwear.com. 51. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Spencofootwear.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Spencofootwear.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; 15 (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Spencofootwear.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Spencofootwear.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 52. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Fourfoot has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Spencofootwear.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 53. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 54. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 55. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial 16 system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 56. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 57. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 58. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 59. Spencofootwear.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 60. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Spencofootwear.com. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 62. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful 17 discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 63. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 64. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 18 66. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Fourfoot who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Spencofootwear.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Spencofootwear.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 69. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 19 74. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 75. Spencofootwear.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 76. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Spencofootwear.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Spencofootwear.com, causing Spencofootwear.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 79. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would 20 fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 80. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 81. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Spencofootwear.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et 21 seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 84. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 88. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 89. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 22 91. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 92. Spencofootwear.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 93. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Spencofootwear.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Spencofootwear.com, causing Spencofootwear.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 95. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 96. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each 23 and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 97. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 98. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 99. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 100. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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10. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 11. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 12. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s letter, violates 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, and 1692g. 15. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 16. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 17. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 18. Some time prior to October 17, 2019 an obligation was allegedly incurred to Desert Springs Hospital. 19. The Desert Springs Hospital obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically medical services. 20. The alleged Desert Springs Hospital obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 22. Defendant MRS collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation October 17, 2019 Collection Letter 23. On or about October 17, 2019, Defendant MRS sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt. See Exhibit A. 24. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication, provide the consumer with a written validation notice, known as a “G notice,” which must include the following information: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). (emphasis added) 26. However, the next paragraph states in pertinent part: “In order to respect these important rights provided under the Fair Deb Collection Practices Act, this office will provide the above rights, whether you provide notice of your dispute orally or in writing, within 30 days from receiving this notice.” 27. The G- Notice contained in the letter states that a dispute must be in written form to obtain verification of the debt and to be provided the name and address of the original creditor. 28. Yet, the letter further states that a dispute may be made orally, which absolutely contradicts the information contained in the G-Notice. 29. This is a false statement and contradicts the rights contained in the G-Notice which unequivocally states that certain disputes must be in writing. 30. The least sophisticated consumer reading the two paragraphs could be easily confused and misled by the contradiction between the G-Notice and the paragraph that follows the G-Notice. 31. Defendant could have avoided this confusion by simply not requiring a writing requirement in the G-Notice and then explaining that they are expanding the rights of the consumer by allowing oral disputes as well. 32. Defendant instead chose to insert a template of a G- Notice which blatantly contradicts the following paragraph. 34. This false and inaccurate portion of the Letter is deceptive and misleading because it fails to advise Plaintiff of the proper method for exercising her validation rights under the 38. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 39. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 40. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 42. Due to the fact that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 43. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in in the foregoing paragraphs with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 46. Defendant violated this section by deceptively misrepresenting the requirements of §§1692g(a)(4) and (5) in omitting the requirement that the consumer must dispute or request information in writing as required under the FDCPA. 47. Plaintiff sustained an informational injury as her rights were presented in contradictory fashion. 48. Due to the fact that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 8. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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(Breach Of Express Warranty) (Breach Of Implied Warranty Of Merchantability) (Deceptive Acts Or Practices, New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349) (False Advertising, New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350) (Fraud) (Negligent Misrepresentation) (Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act) (Unjust Enrichment) (Violation Of The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq.) 13. Nothing boosts the prestige (and price) of a food or beverage like the perception that it is traditional, hand-picked, fresh, or otherwise limited in production. 14. For example, Whole Foods lists prices for its fruits and vegetables on what appear to be chalkboards. The implication is that prices change regularly as if responding to local crop conditions. In fact, the prices are permanently printed on the faux chalkboards, which are part of a marketing strategy meant to “evoke the image of Grapes of Wrath-era laborers piling box after box of fresh fruit into the store.” 16. These truffles help dishes “jump off the plate” with an aroma that is captivating. These fickle cousins of mushrooms have proven impossible to mass produce; they are still dug up individually by dogs that track their scent. 17. The truffle stands in stark contrast to our era of convenience: the preservatives in bread that allow it to stay fresh for weeks and the year-round availability of seasonal fruits and vegetables. Admirers contend that the truffle begins to lose its flavor as soon as it is pulled from the ground, and fresh truffles are seasonal. The rarity of truffles has made them—at thousands of dollars per pound for Italy’s prized white truffles—the most expensive food in the world. In 2007, a Macau casino owner set a record by paying $330,000 for a 3.3-pound truffle unearthed in Tuscany. 18. The combination of these two trends—the desire for a convenient, ever-ready supply of an ingredient, and a hunger for the traditional, the rare, and “real food”—has created an environment ripe for fraudulent behavior. This, in turn, led to what seems to be a remarkably successful scam on foodie culture: truffle oil. 19. Despite the name, some manufacturers produce “truffle oil” that does not contain even trace amounts of truffle; it is olive oil mixed with 2,4-dithiapentane, a compound that makes up part of the smell of truffles and is entirely the product of a laboratory. Essentially, truffle oil is olive oil plus a synthetic injection imitating truffles’ famous taste and smell. 21. What it does contain, however, is 2,4-dithiapentane—a petroleum-based, synthetically-produced imposter chemical that imitates the distinct taste and smell of real truffles. 22. The Material Safety Data Sheet on 2,4-dithiapentane has many cautions and warnings. This compound is listed as a flammable, as well as being a severe eye, lung and skin irritant. If ingested, this chemical “may cause CNS [central nervous system] depression,” and if it is inhaled, it can lead to delayed pulmonary edema. 23. And many consumers are tricked into purchasing what they believe to be truffle oil because 2,4-dithiapentane is often disguised on truffle oil product labels as “aroma,” “flavor,” or “essence.” 24. To make matters worse, according to the New York Times, “one teaspoon of ‘truffle aroma,’ the amount typically used in an eight-ounce bottle of white truffle oil (black truffle oil is made with a lesser quantity of the same chemical) costs about 40 cents.” By comparison, actual truffles cost hundreds or even thousands of dollars per ounce. 25. Nonetheless, Monini capitalizes on this trickery to dupe consumers into paying an enormous price premium for oil that is not flavored by actual truffles. 26. Monini intentionally designs its packaging so that the words “White Truffle” appear in large lettering on the front of the Product’s label. Directly underneath the “White Truffle” representation is an even bigger picture of actual white truffles. 28. Reasonable consumers must and do rely on food label representations and information in making purchasing decisions. 29. Defendant’s statement that the Product is flavored by “White Truffle” is material to a reasonable consumer’s purchase decision because reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiffs, care whether a food product is actually flavored by what Defendant purports, especially when the product claims to be flavored by “White Truffle,” which carries with it an enormous price premium. 30. Defendant markets and advertises the Product as flavored by “White Truffle” to increase sales derived from the Product. Defendant is well aware that the “White Truffle” claim is material to reasonable consumers, and knowingly mislabeled its Product. 31. Upon information and belief, in making the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant knew and intended that consumers would pay a price premium for Monini Truffle Oil if it were labeled as flavored by “White Truffle,” a coveted delicacy. Indeed, Defendant prominently marked the front packaging of Monini Truffle Oil with the words “White Truffle” in extra-large font, and even incorporated a massive image of white truffles directly underneath the words “White Truffle,” precisely because it knew that consumers like Plaintiffs attach great importance to the presence of white truffle in Monini Truffle Oil. 32. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class defined as all persons in the United States who purchased Monini Truffle Oil (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are persons who made such purchase for purpose of resale. 34. Plaintiff Burnett also seeks to represent a subclass of all Class members who purchased Monini Truffle Oil in California (the “California Subclass”). 35. Members of the Class and Subclasses are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. The precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time but may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendant and third party retailers and vendors. 37. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class and Subclasses in that the named Plaintiffs purchased one or more containers of Monini Truffle Oil. 38. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class and Subclasses because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members they seek to represent, they have retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions, and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of Class members will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel. 39. The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Class and Subclass members. Each individual Class member may lack the resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendant’s liability. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case. Individualized litigation also presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. In contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of Defendant’s liability. Class treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and claimants are before this Court for consistent adjudication of the liability issues. 41. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, New York Subclass, and California Subclass against Defendant. 42. Monini Truffle Oil is a consumer product as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 43. Plaintiffs and Class members are consumers as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 44. Defendant is a supplier and warrantor as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4) and (5). 45. In connection with the sale of Monini Truffle Oil, Defendant issued written warranties as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), which warranted that Monini Truffle Oil was, in fact, flavored by “White Truffle.” 46. In fact, Monini Truffle Oil is an adulterated product that is not flavored by real “White Truffle,” but rather is flavored by artificial chemicals that emulate the taste and smell of real truffles. 47. By reason of Defendant’s breach of warranty, Defendant violated the statutory rights due to Plaintiffs and Class members pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq., thereby damaging Plaintiffs and Class members. 49. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 50. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, New York Subclass, and California Subclass against Defendant. 51. Defendant, as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller, expressly warranted that Monini Truffle Oil was, in fact, flavored by “White Truffle.” 52. In fact, Monini Truffle Oil is an adulterated product that is flavored by artificial chemicals, and not by white truffles. 53. Plaintiffs and Class members were injured as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation because (a) they would not have purchased Monini Truffle Oil had they known that it was flavored by artificial chemicals, and not flavored by “White Truffle,” (b) they overpaid for Monini Truffle Oil because it is sold at a price premium when compared to similar products that do not contain this misrepresentation, and (c) Monini Truffle Oil did not have the characteristics, uses, or benefits as promised, namely that it was flavored by “White Truffle.” As a result, Plaintiff and members of the Class have been damaged either in the full amount of the purchase price of the Monini Truffle Oil or in the difference in value between Monini Truffle Oil as warranted and Monini Truffle Oil as actually sold. 55. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, New York Subclass, and California Subclass against Defendant. 56. Defendant, as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller, impliedly warranted that Monini Truffle Oil was, in fact, flavored by “White Truffle.” 57. Defendant breached the warranty implied in the contract for the sale of Monini Truffle Oil because it could not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, the goods were not of fair average quality within the description, and the goods were unfit for their intended and ordinary purpose because Monini Truffle Oil is an adulterated product that is flavored by artificial chemicals, not “White Truffle.” As a result, Plaintiffs and Class members did not receive the goods as impliedly warranted by Defendant to be merchantable. 58. Plaintiffs and Class members purchased Monini Truffle Oil in reliance upon Defendant’s skill and judgment and the implied warranties of fitness for the purpose. 59. Monini Truffle Oil was not altered by Plaintiffs or Class members. 60. Monini Truffle Oil was defective when it left the exclusive control of Defendant. 61. Defendant knew that Monini Truffle Oil would be purchased and used without additional testing by Plaintiffs and Class members. 62. Monini Truffle Oil was defectively designed and unfit for its intended purpose, and Plaintiffs and Class members did not receive the goods as warranted. 64. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 65. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, New York Subclass, and California Subclass against Defendant. 66. Plaintiffs and Class members conferred benefits on Defendant by purchasing Monini Truffle Oil. 67. Defendant has been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiffs and Class members’ purchases of Monini Truffle Oil. Retention of those moneys under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Monini Truffle Oil is an adulterated product that consists artificial flavoring, not “White Truffle,” and resulted in purchasers being denied the full benefit of their purchase because they did not purchase a product that was actually flavored by “White Truffle.” 69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 70. Plaintiff Jessani brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed New York Subclass against Defendant. 71. By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts and practices by misrepresenting that Monini Truffle Oil was, in fact, flavored by “White Truffle.” 72. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 73. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices are misleading in a material way because they fundamentally misrepresent the characteristics of Monini Truffle Oil to induce consumers to purchase same. 75. On behalf of himself and other members of the New York Subclass, Plaintiff Jessani seeks to enjoin the unlawful acts and practices described herein, to recover his actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, three times actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 76. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 77. Plaintiff Jessani brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed New York Subclass. 78. Based on the foregoing, Defendant has engaged in consumer-oriented conduct that is deceptive or misleading in a material way which constitutes false advertising in violation of Section 350 of the New York General Business Law by misrepresenting the nature of the ingredients contained in Monini Truffle Oil. 79. The foregoing advertising was directed at consumers and was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 80. This misrepresentation has resulted in consumer injury or harm to the public interest. 82. On behalf of himself and other members of the New York Subclass, Plaintiff Jessani seeks to enjoin the unlawful acts and practices described herein, to recover actual damages or five hundred dollars per violation, whichever is greater, three times actual damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 83. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 84. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, New York Subclass, and California Subclass against Defendant. 85. As discussed above, Defendant represented that Monini Truffle Oil is, in fact, flavored by “White Truffle,” but failed to disclose that it is actually an adulterated product that is flavored by artificial chemicals, not by “White Truffle.” Defendant had a duty to disclose this information. 87. At an absolute minimum, Defendant negligently misrepresented and/or negligently omitted material facts about Monini Truffle Oil. 88. The negligent misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendant, upon which Plaintiffs and Class members reasonably and justifiably relied, were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiffs and Class members to purchase Monini Truffle Oil. 89. Plaintiffs and Class members would not have purchased Monini Truffle Oil if the true facts had been known. 90. The negligent actions of Defendant caused damage to Plaintiffs and Class members, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result. 91. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 92. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, New York Subclass, and California Subclass against Defendant. 93. As discussed above, Defendant provided Plaintiffs and Class members with false or misleading material information and failed to disclose material facts about Monini Truffle Oil, including but not limited to the fact that it is an adulterated product that is flavored by artificial chemicals, not by “White Truffle.” These misrepresentations and omissions were made with knowledge of their falsehood. 95. The fraudulent actions of Defendant caused damage to Plaintiffs and Class members, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result. 96. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 97. Plaintiff Burnett brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and members of the California Subclass. 98. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750-1785 (the “CLRA”).

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11. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following class (the “Class”): All persons who are royalty owners in Oklahoma wells where Defendants (including their affiliated predecessors and affiliated successors) are or were the operator (or a working interest owner who marketed their share of gas and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners) from January 1, 2008 to the date Class Notice is given. The Class claims relate to royalty payments for gas and its constituents (such as residue gas, natural gas liquids, helium, nitrogen, or drip condensate). Excluded from the Class are: (1) agencies, departments or instrumentalities of the United States of America, including but not limited to the U.S. Department of the Interior (the United States, Indian tribes, and Indian allottees); (2) the State of Oklahoma or any of its agencies or departments that own royalty interests; (3) Defendants, their affiliates, predecessors, and employees, officers, and directors; (4) any publicly traded company or its affiliated entity that produces, gathers, processes, or markets gas; (5) the claims of royalty owners to the extent covered by arbitration clauses or prior settlement agreements, if any, still in effect at the time suit was filed herein; (6) overriding royalty owners and others whose interest was carved out from the lessee’s interest; (7) royalty owners who have already filed and still have pending lawsuits for underpayment of royalties against Defendants at the time suit is filed herein; (8) royalty owners only to the extent they take gas in-kind, if any; and, (8) royalty owners only to the extent receiving “Blanchard” payments. 13. Defendants operate or have operated hundreds of Class Wells that produce gas. Defendants hold a working interest in these Wells, with at least one, and usually multiple, royalty owners for each well. 14. Defendants have within their possession or control records that identify all persons to whom they (including affiliated predecessors and those for whom it is legally responsible) have paid royalties from Class Wells during the Class Period. 16. Plaintiff is typical of other class members because Defendants pay royalty to Plaintiff and other Class members using a common method. Defendants pay royalty based on the net revenue Defendants receive under their gas contracts which terms royalty owners do not know or approve. The contracts are for services necessary to place the gas and its constituent parts into marketable condition so they can be sold into recognized, active, and competitive commercial markets. 17. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff is a royalty owner to whom Defendants pay royalty. Plaintiff understands his duties as Class representative. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action and royalty owner litigation. 18. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. Common questions of law or fact exist as to all members of the Class, and those common questions predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of such Class. See ¶15, above. There is no need for individual Class members to testify in order to establish Defendants’ liability to or damages sustained by Plaintiff and members of the Class. 20. Class action treatment in this matter is further superior to the alternative of numerous individual lawsuits by all or some members of the Class. Joinder of all Class members would be either highly impracticable or impossible. And the amounts at stake for individual Class members, while significant in the aggregate, would be insufficient to enable them to retain competent legal counsel to pursue claims individually. In the absence of a class action in this matter, Defendants will likely retain the benefit of their wrongdoing. 61. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference the allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 62. Plaintiff and the other Class Members entered into written, fully executed, oil and gas leases with Defendants, and those leases include implied covenants requiring Defendants to prepare the gas and its constituent parts for market at Defendants’ sole cost. The leases also place upon Defendants the obligation to properly account for and pay royalty interests to royalty owners under the mutual benefit rule and good faith and fair dealing. 63. At all material times, Plaintiff and the Class have performed their terms and obligations under the leases. 64. Defendants breached the leases, including the implied covenants, by their actions and/or inactions in underpaying royalty or not paying royalty on all products sold from the gas stream. 65. As a result of Defendants’ breaches, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged through underpayment of the actual amounts due. 66. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference the allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 68. A fiduciary duty was created and vested when Defendants (or their predecessor in interest) requested and received unitization orders from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission pursuant to those statutes. 69. Defendants are the unit operator by appointment from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for Class members. 70. Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Class members by failing to properly report, account for, and distribute gas proceeds to the Class members for their proportionate royalty share of gas production. 71. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct in breaching their fiduciary duties, Class members are entitled to recover actual damages. 72. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek pre-judgment interest, post- judgment interest, attorneys’ fees from the common fund, expenses, and costs. 73. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference the allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 74. Defendants made uniform misrepresentations and/or omissions on the monthly check stubs sent to Class members reflecting the wrong volume and price, and not detailing all of the monetary fee and in-kind volumetric deductions. 76. Defendants also concealed or failed to disclose facts about the price, volume, value, various products produced, and deductions, which Defendants had a duty to disclose to avoid presenting half-truths or misrepresentations. 77. Defendants undertook the duty to properly account by making the statements in check stubs on a monthly basis to royalty owners. By speaking on the issue, Defendants had a duty to make full and fair disclosure of all relevant facts. This is especially so because Defendants had superior and/or specialized knowledge and/or access to information when compared to royalty owners. 78. Defendants knew that their representations or omissions on the monthly check stubs were at least ambiguous and created a false impression of the actual facts to the royalty owners. 79. Defendants knew the facts were peculiarly within Defendants’ knowledge and that the Class was not in a position to discover the facts pertaining to the proper volume, values, and constituents coming from their wells. Accordingly, having spoken on the subject matter, Defendants had a duty to make full and fair disclosure of all material facts such that their statements were not misleading, but did not. 81. The misrepresentations and omissions were intentionally made. They were intended to suggest that the price was a third party commercial price without hidden deductions, the volumes were accurately measured without volumetric deductions, and that deductions would be shown on the check stub when in fact they were not. 82. By creating and mailing misleading check stubs to the Class, Defendants have fraudulently and deceitfully misled the Class into believing that the Class Members had been paid on the full value of the production from their wells. 83. Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class Members, on a uniform basis, by not properly paying royalty owners, by deceiving them with check stubs that were misleading, and by failing to correct Defendants’ royalty payment practices after being sued multiple times for underpaying royalties such that punitive damages should be awarded and that Defendants acted intentionally and with malice toward Plaintiff and the Class Members subjecting Defendants to punitive damages. 84. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deceit and fraud, Plaintiff and the Class were underpaid monthly for royalties and are entitled to recover actual and punitive damages. 85. In addition, the money wrongfully obtained by Defendants as a result of what should have been paid to Plaintiff and the Class should be held in constructive trust along with monetary interest for Plaintiff and the Class.

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(Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation in Violation of the FLSA) 172. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 173. Plaintiffs consent in writing to be a part of this action, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs’ written consent forms are attached hereto. Plaintiffs anticipate that as this case proceeds, other individuals will sign consent forms and join as plaintiffs. 174. At all relevant times, Defendants have been an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed and/or continue to employ employees, including Plaintiffs, and members of the Collective. 175. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 176. The FLSA requires each covered employer to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per work week. 177. During their employment with Defendants, within the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs and the other Collective members worked in excess of forty hours per workweek without lawful overtime compensation. 28 178. Despite the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective members, Defendants willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the FLSA, failed and refused to pay them overtime compensation. 179. Plaintiffs were not paid FLSA mandated overtime premiums uniformly and based on the policies and practices articulated above. 180. Also, by failing to accurately record, report, and/or preserve records of hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective, Defendants have failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 181. Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees are victims of uniform and employer-based compensation policies. Upon information and belief, these uniform policies, in violation of the FLSA, have been applied, and continue to be applied, to all Security Agents, Operations Assistants and/or Supervisors employed by Defendants in JFK. 182. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation to Plaintiffs and the Collective. 183. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 184. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, a 3-year statute of limitation applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 185. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and the members of the Collective are entitled to recover from Defendants damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and interest. 29 (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation in Violation of NYCRR § 142.2.2 and Article 19 of the NYLL) 197. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 198. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees and the Defendants have been employers within the meaning of the NYLL. 199. The overtime wage provisions of NYLL Article 19 and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants. 200. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the New York Labor Law. 201. By Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class Members premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, they have willfully violated NYLL Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, including but not limited to the regulations in 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142. 31 202. Also, Defendants have violated NYCRR 142-2.2 and NYLL §§ 191 and 193 by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class at least one and one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over 40 in any workweek during the Class Period. 203. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are entitled to recover from Defendants all unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. (Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of NYLL §195(3)) 213. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 214. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees and the Defendants have been employers within the meaning of the NYLL. 215. The recording keeping provisions of NYLL Article 19 and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants. 216. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs and members of the Rule 23 Class with a legally sufficient wage statement upon the payment of wages, as required by NYLL § 195(3). 217. NYLL §195(3) requires that employers furnish employees with wage statements containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria required under the NYLL. 218. Due to Defendants’ NYLL violations, Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to statutory penalties of $100 for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide them with 33 accurate wage statements, or a total of $2,500.00, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief. (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage Compensation in Violation of the FLSA) 186. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 187. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. 188. The FLSA regulates, among other things, the payment of minimum wage by employers whose employees are engaged in interstate commerce, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, per 29 U.S.C. §206(a); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 189. The Defendants are subject to the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA because they acted as an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce and its employees are engaged in commerce. 190. Defendants, pursuant to their policy and practice, violated the FLSA by refusing and failing to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees a lawful minimum wage for all hours worked. 191. Section 13 of the FLSA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213, exempts certain categories of employees from minimum wage obligations. None of the FLSA exemptions apply to Plaintiffs or other similarly situated employees. 192. Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees are victims of uniform and employer-based compensation policies. Upon information and belief, these uniform policies, in violation of the FLSA, have been applied, and continue to be applied, to all Security Agents, Operations Assistants and/or Supervisors employed by Defendants in JFK. 30 193. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation to Plaintiffs and the Collective. 194. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 195. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, a 3-year statute of limitation applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 196. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and the members of the Collective are entitled to recover from Defendants damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and interest. (Failure to Pay Minimum Wages and “Gap Time” Wages in Violation of NYLL §§ 191, 193 and 652 and Article 19) 204. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 205. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees and the Defendants have been employers within the meaning of the NYLL. 206. The minimum wage provisions of NYLL Article 19 and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants. 207. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class the minimum wages to which they were entitled under the NYLL. 208. By Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class Members minimum wages, they have willfully violated the NYLL Article 19, §§ 652 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 209. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 32 210. Similarly, Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class the difference between the New York State minimum wage and their hourly rate of pay as determined by Defendants for all hours worked in a workweek, a practice that is unlawful under the NYLL. 211. Specifically, Defendants failure to pay these – known as “gap time” wages under the relevant precedent – is prohibited by NYLL Section 193 which expressly prohibits an employer from making unauthorized deductions from employees’ wages. 212. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are entitled to recover from Defendants all unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 138. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 139. Defendants employed Plaintiffs during the Collective Period. 140. Defendants classified Plaintiffs and Members of the Collective as nonexempt for the purposes of the FLSA, paying them an hourly wage rather than an annual salary. 21 141. Upon information and belief, there are more than 300 current and former employees who are similarly situated to the Lead Plaintiff and who were similarly denied overtime compensation. 142. Lead Plaintiff Douglas represents other employees, and is acting on behalf of Defendants’ current and former employees’ interests as well as his own interests in bringing this action. 143. Defendants unlawfully required Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals employed as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors to work through their unpaid meal breaks. 144. Defendants also unlawfully required Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals employed as Security Agents to arrive early for work for a required roll call without compensation for such time. 145. Further, Defendants unlawfully required Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals employed as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors to work past the end of their shifts without compensation. 146. At all times during the Collective Period, Defendants, as a matter of common policy and/or practice, have not paid Lead Plaintiff Douglas and all individuals employed as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors lawful overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week and/or minimum wage compensation for hours worked under 40 in a work week. 147. Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a collective action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of themselves and the following class of persons: 22 Proposed Collective: All individuals employed by Defendants as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors at JFK and who, at any point during the Collective Period, earned but were not paid lawful FLSA overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 in a work week and/or the applicable federal statutory minimum wage for hours worked under 40 in a workweek during the Collective Period based on the practices alleged herein. 148. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Collective is further defined as involving (i) claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wage compensation for Defendants’ practice of forcing Plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock” and without compensation during unpaid meal breaks; (ii) claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wage compensation for Defendants’ practice of forcing Plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock” before the beginning and after the end of their shifts, which they knowingly suffered and permitted, and/or commonly enforced FLSA recordkeeping practice violations which resulted in unpaid wages. 149. As such, Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective suffered damages for unpaid earned overtime wages under the FLSA in nearly all, if not all, the weeks they worked during the Collective Period. 150. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the law required them to pay all non-exempt employees, including Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective, an overtime premium of 1 and ½ times their regular rate of pay for all work-hours Defendants suffered or permitted them to work in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 151. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective. 152. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Collective, and as such, notice should be sent to the Proposed Collective. 23 153. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who were subject to the aforementioned policies in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. 154. Those similarly situated employees are known to the Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ records. 155. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 156. Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following defined classes: Proposed Class: All individuals employed by Defendants as Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors at JFK and who, at any point during the Class Period, who earned but were not paid lawful NYLL overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 in a work week and/or the New York minimum wage for hours worked under 40 in a workweek during the Collective Class Period based on the practices alleged herein. 157. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Class is further defined as involving: (i) claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wage compensation for Defendants’ practice of forcing Plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock” and without overtime and/or “gap time” compensation both during unpaid meal breaks, before the beginning of their shift and/or after the end of shifts which they knowingly suffered and permitted, and/or commonly enforced NYLL recordkeeping practice violations which resulted in unpaid wages; and (ii) claims for wage statement violations for Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs’ with accurate wage statements on each payday that 24 include the information required by NYLL §195(3), including the correct number of hours worked during the pay period. 158. Defendants have violated NYCRR 142-2.2 and NYLL §§ 191, 193 by failing to pay Lead Plaintiff Douglas and the Proposed Class at least one and one-half times the New York state minimum wage for all hours worked over 40 during the class period pursuant to the same illegal practices and policies alleged above. 159. Numerosity: The Proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that during the Class Period, Defendants employed over 300 people who satisfy the definition of the Proposed Class. 160. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Proposed Class. Representative Plaintiff Douglas is informed and believes that, like other Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors, the Class Members were subjected to Defendants’ policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans alleged herein concerning the failure to pay proper wages, failure to keep adequate records and failure to furnish accurate wage statements. 161. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 162. Adequacy: Representative Plaintiff Douglas will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Proposed Class, and have retained counsel experienced in complex FLSA and NYLL class and collective action litigation. 163. Lead Plaintiff Douglas’s interests are co-extensive with those of the Proposed Class that they seek to represent. They are willing and able to fairly represent the Proposed Class and to vigorously pursue their similar individual claims in this action. 25 164. Commonality: Common questions of law and fact exist to all members of the Proposed Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Proposed Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay lawful overtime premiums for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek for those violations stated above; b. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay lawful “gap time” wages for all hours worked under forty (40) in a workweek for those violations stated above;Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay the state statutory minimum wage to members of the Proposed Class in violation of the NYLL; c. Whether those violations were pursuant to a common policy or practice applicable to all class members; d. Whether Defendants furnished class members with accurate wage statements on each payday containing the information required by NYLL § 195(3); e. Whether Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to each hour worked by Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class; f. Whether those violations were pursuant to a common policy or practice applicable to all class members; g. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class within the meaning of New York law; h. The proper measure of damages sustained by the Proposed Class; and i. Whether Defendants’ actions were “willful.” 165. These common questions of law and fact arise from the same course of events, and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove liability. 26 166. Further, adjudication of each individual member’s claim as a separate action would be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not party to this action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 167. The case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the class would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 168. Further, adjudication of each individual member’s claim as a separate action would be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not party to this action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 169. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Proposed Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Proposed Class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendants’ common and uniform policies and practices denied the Proposed Class the wages to which they are entitled. The damages suffered by the individual Proposed Class members are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. In addition, class certification is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendants’ practices. 170. Plaintiffs intend to send notice to all members of the Proposed Class to the extent required by Rule 23. The names and addresses of the Proposed Class are available from Defendants. 171. During the class period, and upon information and belief, Plaintiffs each worked more than 1 hour of gap time for which they were not paid the lawful straight time wage under 27 either the NYLL and more than 1 hour of overtime-eligible work during the class and collective class periods for which they were not paid a lawful overtime premium of time and one half of their regular rate of pay. 27. Defendants provide security services, janitorial services, and personnel services throughout the United States, including the New York metropolitan area. 28. Since 2013, Defendants have provided security to facilities and property at JFK pursuant to a contract between and among Defendants and the PANYNJ. 29. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants have directly employed approximately 300 Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors at JFK pursuant to Defendants’ contract with the PANYNJ. 30. Work rules required that Plaintiffs begin the workday by reporting to a central location at JFK, Building 14. 31. At Building 14 Plaintiffs would receive their location assignments for the day. 32. Defendants did not have an FLSA compliant timekeeping system, and instead required Plaintiffs and every member of the putative Collective and Class to sign in and out of a daily attendance log at the start and end of the shift, respectively. 33. Plaintiffs could not enter the actual time that they started or finished their workday, nor were they allowed to record the hours that they were on meal or rest breaks. 34. Instead, the Plaintiffs’ standard shift hours were pre-printed on the sheet and could not be altered without management’s approval. 7 35. ASAs were assigned to stationary posts throughout the airport and tasked with various security responsibilities, such as checking airport and airline employee identification credentials, performing inspections on vehicles entering airport areas through secured gates, and guarding against trespassers. 36. LASAs were assigned tasks such as patrolling perimeter fences around airport runways and tarmacs, and watching the monitors in JFK’s remote camera control room. 37. Operations Assistants reported to Supervisors and helped the Supervisors carry out their office-related functions. 38. Supervisors would typically be assigned two to a shift and were responsible for overseeing the work of Operations Assistants and Security Agents. As such, Supervisors’ duties included driving, or riding as a passenger, from location to location on JFK property, and much of their time was spent outside of their offices. 39. In order to reach their assigned location, Plaintiffs were required to drive, or be a passenger in, official security vehicles owned and/or operated by Defendants. The time Plaintiffs spent driving in such official security vehicles was always considered “on duty,” even if their shifts had ended. 40. Security Agents, Operations Assistants, and Supervisors were all paid on an hourly basis. Paid shifts would consist of eight (8) hours of regular time, and forty (40) total hours per week. 41. Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ union contract, Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors were supposed to be allotted one fifty (50) minute unpaid lunch break per shift. 42. Plaintiffs’ meal breaks were scheduled; that is, an employee would have to take his/her break at specified times during his/her shift. 8 43. While Plaintiffs were to receive a fifty (50) minute unpaid meal break, they were in practice only allotted ten (10) to twenty (20) minutes of a bona fide meal break time during their shifts to take their meal break. 44. Additionally, as set forth in further detail below, Plaintiffs also had other twenty (20) minutes of unpaid time that should have been allotted towards Plaintiffs’ lunch breaks was instead used by Defendants for an unpaid pre-shift “roll call”. 45. Because most, if not all, of Plaintiffs’ lunch break was unpaid, and the daily twenty (20) minute roll call was also unpaid, in order to complete an eight-hour shift, Security Agents had to be present for at least nine (9) hours and twenty (20) minutes each day. 46. When Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors worked more than forty hours in a scheduled week, they were entitled to one and one-half time their regular hourly rate of pay for that additional time, as overtime pay. Defendants’ Unlawful “Off the Clock” Practice of Forcing Security Agents to Work Before Their Shifts 47. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 48. All Security Agents were required to report for work twenty (20) minutes before the start of every shift for a “roll call” or attendance drill. 49. At this time, Security Agents would sign in for the start of their shift, but were not permitted to sign in at the actual time they arrived for “roll call.” 50. Instead, Security Agents would sign in for the time their assigned shift was supposed to begin, on a pre-printed sheet and did not record the twenty (20) minutes of unpaid pre-shift time required for “roll call.” 9 51. Because Security Agents were required to arrive at least twenty (20) minutes early each work day, without compensation for such time, each and every full five-day workweek (all weeks besides those weeks where a Security Agent took a sick day or vacation day) they worked at least 1 hour and 40 minutes of unpaid overtime. 52. Lead Plaintiff Douglas worked at least one (1) hour and forty (40) minutes of unpaid overtime, due to time spent arriving early for the pre-shift “roll call” approximately forty (40) weeks or more each year of his employment with Defendants as a Security Agent. 53. By way of further example, Ms. LaDonna Powell is a former Security Guard and Supervisor with Defendants, who began her employment with nonparty FJC in or around 2012, and continued to work for pre-merger Allied Barton when that entity contracted with PANYNJ to provide security services for JFK. 54. Ms. Powell worked as a Security Guard until June 2014, at which time she became a Supervisor. She was terminated from her position with Allied Barton in early 2016. 55. By way of example, Ms. Powell worked at least one (1) hour and forty (40) minutes of unpaid overtime, due to time spent arriving early for the pre-shift “roll call” approximately forty (40) weeks or more each year of her employment with Defendants as a Security Agent. Defendants’ Unlawful “Off the Clock” Practice of Forcing Security Agents to Work During Unpaid Lunch Breaks 56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 57. Defendants’ work rules prohibited Security Agents, Operations Assistants and Supervisors from consuming food anywhere except designated areas on JFK property. 10 58. An employee found consuming food at a post or inside a vehicle, for example, would be subject to disciplinary sanctions, and ultimately, termination. 59. Security Agents, assigned to specific posts at JFK, would have to wait to take a meal break until a replacement showed up at their post to replace them. The replacement would be driven in a vehicle belonging to Defendants to the post in question, and the Security Agent leaving for his/her lunch break would then ride in the vehicle that had brought his/her replacement to the designated place for taking meals. 60. After getting picked up, the Security Agents would be driven from post to post to pick up other Security Agents and then travel to the designated meal area. 61. If a Security Agent’s replacement appeared late to the post, the Security Agent’s lunch break would not be extended on the back end – that is, the Security Agent was on-duty, at his/her post, during his/her allotted unpaid lunch break and was nonetheless required to return to his/her post at the scheduled end time of the lunch break, despite not being relieved of their duties at the start of their lunch break. 62. Because of JFK’s vast geographic size, many employees were stationed far from their designated lunch area; thus, it would frequently take approximately twenty (20) minutes for Plaintiffs to reach the designated lunch area, including time spent on-duty at their posts waiting to be picked up. 63. This process would be repeated on the way back to a Security Agent’s post, taking another approximately twenty (20) minutes, leaving Plaintiffs only about 10 minutes to take a bona fide break. 11 64. As detailed further below, the time spent in the Defendants’ vehicle traveling to and from the lunch area was compensable time because Plaintiffs were not fully relieved of their security related duties during such travel time. 65. By way of example only, time spent waiting for late replacements and traveling to and from the designated lunch area resulted in approximately three (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime for Plaintiff Douglas each and every full five-day workweek (all weeks besides those weeks where they took a sick day or vacation day) during his employment with Defendants as a Security Agent. 66. Similarly, Ms. Powell worked approximately three (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime per week each and every full five-day workweek (all weeks besides those weeks where they took a sick day or vacation day) during her employment with Defendants as a Security Agent, due to waiting for replacements and traveling to and from the designated lunch area. 67. Upon information and belief, all Security Agents experienced the same travel time and late relief issues that resulted in significant unpaid overtime hours each week. 68. Furthermore, at least once per week, no relief would ever appear to allow a Security Agent to take their lunch break; however, Security Agents were not paid for these breaks that were missed entirely. 69. By way of example only, Ms. Powell was not relieved for her lunch break approximately once a week for the entirety of her time as a Security Agent. 70. Ms. Powell frequently complained that she had not been relieved and was therefore unable to take any lunch break whatsoever. 12 71. Despite her complaints, her manager and supervisor would simply promise that she would get paid for the time – but Ms. Powell was not paid for all her missed lunch breaks. 72. Additionally, pursuant to Defendants’ work rules, while driving or riding in a vehicle controlled by Defendants, all employees were “on duty.” Thus, they were required to be on the lookout for any security-related issues and in the event that they observed a security- related incident occurring while riding in or driving the vehicle, employees were required to take any and all necessary action. 73. In addition, drivers were subject to Defendants’ rules regarding the operation of the vehicle. If the employee driving the vehicle committed a traffic infraction and was ticketed by PANYNJ Police, or if the driver drove in a manner contrary to Defendants’ rules regarding proper driving, that employee was subject to disciplinary action by Defendants, including termination. 74. Further, if, while riding in a vehicle, an employee-passenger observed the vehicle’s driver committing a traffic infraction or otherwise driving in a manner contrary to Defendants’ rules regarding proper driving, the employee-passenger was duty-bound to report such infraction to a supervisors or management. If the employee-passenger failed to report the driver’s infraction, that employee was herself subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination. 75. By way of example only, Plaintiff Douglas, as a former supervisor, is aware of specific situations which occurred during his employment in which ASAs, as employee- passengers, were disciplined for failing to report traffic infractions to management. 76. By way of further example, on one occasion as an ASA, as Ms. Powell was on her way to lunch, she witnessed a vehicle accident on the tarmac. Ms. Powell was required to stop at 13 the accident, assist the driver and passengers, alert the proper authorities and compose a witness incident report. This process took at least an hour, requiring Ms. Powell to work through her entire break. 77. Nonetheless, Ms. Powell was not paid for that time. 78. Security Agents did not receive any overtime pay for the additional time they spent “on-duty” during their lunch breaks while waiting for a replacement, driving in a vehicle to or from a lunch break, responding to a security incident, or monitoring driving infractions. During that time each week Plaintiffs were working without pay. 79. Upon information and belief, all Plaintiffs were subject to the same policies and practices that resulted in significant unpaid overtime for working through their meal break. 80. The SEIU would not file grievances on behalf of Security Agents who were forced to perform unpaid work during lunch breaks. Defendants’ Unlawful “Off the Clock” Practice of Forcing Supervisors and Operations Assistants to Work During Unpaid Lunch Breaks 81. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 82. Supervisors and Operations Assistants were not permitted to take their fifty (50) minute lunch breaks. 83. Supervisors were typically in the field to supervise the work of Security Agents, write incident reports, and send quality reports to upper management and corporate management. 84. Further, during “meal break shifts,” so-called meal break shift Supervisors were required to work through their lunch while driving between locations relieving ASAs and LASAs to allow them to take their break. 14 85. Finally, regardless of whether they worked the “meal break shift” or not, Supervisors were frequently unable to take a meal break or afternoon break since they were driving between posts and, because of the substantial drive time, did not have time to take a break. 86. Despite being deducted the full fifty (50) minutes from each shift for an unpaid meal break, Supervisors worked through their lunch nearly every day. 87. By way of example, as a Supervisor, Ms. Powell was unable to take an uninterrupted meal break at least four (4) times per week, resulting in approximately three (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime each full five-day workweek. 88. Ms. Powell was explicitly told on more than one occasion by her supervisor, Al Diaz, that Supervisors were not permitted to eat anywhere that someone could “see them,” making it impossible to take a bona fide meal break. 89. Furthermore, during her time as an Operations Assistant, Ms. Powell was not permitted to leave her desk for lunch and was required to answer phones at all times during her shift. 90. Therefore, on the rare occasion during which she asked a Security Agent to pick her up something to eat, Ms. Powell was still unable to take a bona fide meal break because she was required to remain at her desk to be available to answer any phone call or request from upper management regarding the Supervisor that she was assisting, or face serious discipline. 91. Upon information and belief, all Supervisors and Operations Assistants were subject to the same policies and practices that resulted in significant unpaid overtime for working through their meal break. 15 Defendants’ Unlawful, “Off-The-Clock” Post-Shift Practices for Security Agents at JFK 92. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 93. After clocking in, Security Agents drove or rode to their posts in vehicles owned/and or operated by Defendants, and either spent their shifts in those vehicles riding around JFK and/or at a designated posting. 94. Rather than clock out at Building 14 – where they had clocked in – the Security Agents would sign out of their shifts at their posts, or in the vehicles to which they were assigned, at the exact end time of their scheduled shifts. 95. Once they had signed out for the day, either at their post or in their vehicle, Security Agents were “off-the-clock” and not paid for any further time. 96. Nonetheless, Defendants required Security Agents to continue working after their shift had ended between twenty (20) and forty-five (45) minutes per day at least three (3) days per week, resulting in a minimum of sixty (60) minutes of unpaid post-shift overtime per week per Security Agent. 97. For example, despite signing out at their post, Security Agents were required to return to Building 14 at the ends of their shifts, in order to return the equipment and/or vehicles they had been provided that day. 98. Because of the large geographic area of JFK, after being relieved it could often take a Security Agent up to 35 minutes to travel back to Building 14. 99. While driving back to Building 14 after their shifts had ended, Security Agents were “on duty,” in the same way they were during their travel time to the lunch area during their lunch breaks. 16 100. Security Agents were obligated to fulfill identical duties as security guards and supervisory security guards while traveling back to Building 14 as they were expected to while standing at their posts. 101. By way of example only, on at least two occasions as a Security Agent, Ms. Powell witnessed a vehicle accident and was required to stop, provide assistance and prepare an incident report, despite being “off-the-clock” after her shift had ended. 102. This process takes approximately forty-five (45) minutes to complete. However, Ms. Powell was not paid any wages for this post-shift off-the-clock work. 103. In addition, and again, similar to their lunch breaks, at the end of their shifts Security Agents were required to stay at their posts until the Security Agent working the following shift arrived. 104. If the Security Agent for the following shift arrived at her assigned post after the end of the prior shift, the Security Agent assigned to the prior shift would not be paid for either the additional time spent at the post, or the time spent traveling back to Building 14. 105. By way of example, including late relief, Lead Plaintiff Douglas spent at least twenty (20) minutes and upwards of forty (40) minutes traveling back to Building 14 to drop off their vehicles each shift during the entirety of his employment with Defendants as a Security Agent, resulting in between one (1) hour and twenty (20) minutes and three (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime per week. 106. Ms. Powell also worked between one (1) hour and twenty (20) minutes and three (3) hours and twenty (20) minutes of unpaid overtime per week for off-the-clock post-shift work as a Security Agent. 17 107. Upon information and belief, all Security Agents were subject to the same policies and practices that resulted in significant unpaid post-shift overtime for late shift relief and travel time. 108. The SEIU would not file grievances on behalf of Security Agents who were forced to perform the “off the clock” work after their shift. Defendants’ Unlawful, “Off-The-Clock” Post-Shift Practices for Supervisors at JFK 109. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the factual allegations made in the preceding paragraphs. 110. The majority of a Supervisor’s work during their shift was comprised of traveling around the airport to monitor performance and quality of the work of Security Agents and provide assistance if necessary. 111. Therefore, Supervisors were rarely in their offices at the end of their shift and were frequently at least thirty (30) minutes away from their office at the end of their shifts. 112. Nonetheless, Supervisors would technically “sign out” of their shift the moment that their shift was scheduled to end. 113. While traveling back to the office, in uniform, Supervisors were required to perform identical duties as during their shift, despite being technically “off-the-clock.” 114. By way of example only, while Ms. Powell was employed as a Supervisor, she was frequently required to stop her vehicle on the way back to her office in order to compose an incident report, send it to corporate management for approval, and report back that the incident was properly recorded, despite being “off-the-clock.” 18 115. By way of example only, this occurred at least two times per week and took approximately one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes. Including travel time, on these occasions Ms. Powell worked approximately two (2) hours of unpaid overtime. 116. Furthermore, Supervisors frequently had paperwork to complete upon returning to Building 14, requiring approximately forty-five (45) minutes of work several times per week after the end of their shifts. 117. Finally, all Supervisors were required to attend a mandatory conference call, lasting approximately (3) hours, once a week on Tuesdays, regardless of whether the Supervisor was even scheduled for work that day. 118. Supervisors, including Lead Plaintiff Douglas and Ms. Powell, were not paid for their time on this conference call, resulting in up to three (3) hours of unpaid overtime per week. 119. Overall, on an average week, during their time as Supervisors, Lead Plaintiff Douglas and Ms. Powell, at minimum worked approximately ten (10) hours of overtime per week in post-shift work alone. 120. Upon information and belief, all Supervisors were subject to the same policies and practices that resulted in such unpaid overtime for travel time and post-shift off-the-clock work. Defendants Have Knowledge Of The Widespread “Off-The-Clock” Practices at JFK 121. Defendants’ knowledge of the widespread “off-the-clock” practices at JFK was well known at all times relevant to this action. 122. Defendants had on-site Human Resources personnel at JFK. In addition, the JFK operations were run by a Project Manager. 123. During the relevant time period, Thomas Tarantola was the Project Manager. 19 124. Plaintiffs repeatedly made both Human Resources personnel and Mr. Tarantola aware of Defendants’ “off the books” practices with respect to both lunch breaks and the end of shifts, both orally and in writing. However, those complaints went unheeded. 125. In one incident, when a guard complained to management about not receiving overtime for meals and working at the post past the end of the shift, a management employee took a dollar bill out of his pocket and threw it at the guard in an act of hostility. 126. The amount of overtime due to Plaintiffs can be verified by time records and other documents that were contemporaneously maintained by Defendants. 127. Plaintiffs came to understand that the Defendants’ refused to pay them the overtime to which they were legally entitled because Defendants’ contract with the PANYNJ did not provide for reimbursement of overtime by the PANYNJ to Defendants. 128. Supervisors were unable to control the compensation and scheduling practices dictated by Defendants. 129. Supervisors often received complaints directly from Security Agents, but were not authorized to make any changes to a Security Agent’s pay. 130. By way of example, while Ms. Powell was employed by Defendants as a Security Agent, she frequently complained about working unpaid overtime before and after her shift, as well as being unable to take a bona fide lunch break. 131. Supervisors would tell Ms. Powell that they would “look into it” and get her paid. 132. However, Ms. Powell was never paid for this off-the-clock pre- and post-shift time nor was she paid for time worked during an unpaid meal time. 20 133. In or around 2015, when Ms. Powell became a Supervisor, she came to realize that Supervisors were under direct orders by upper management not to compensate Security Agents for their off-the-clock work, even when they complained. 134. By way of example only, Managers Martin Feeney, Francisco Oravallo, and Christopher Timberlake all reacted in a similar manner when Ms. Powell would attempt to get Security Agents paid for their off-the-clock time. 135. On numerous occasions, Ms. Powell was told by Mr. Feeney, Mr. Oravallo, and/or Mr. Timberlake, “What are they [Security Agents] complaining about? It’s only 30 minutes!” or, “It’s only 45 minutes!” On those occasions, Ms. Powell was instructed not to pay for the requested time. 136. On numerous other occasions, Ms. Powell was told by Mr. Feeney, Mr. Oravallo, and/or Mr. Timberlake to simply “take [the requested time] out of their break.” In other words, to apply the off-the-clock work to an unpaid break in order to have the timesheets show that a break was taken. 137. In actuality, of course, the Security Agents had not taken that break and were being forced to work unpaid overtime by the Defendants.

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1. An award of the maximum statutory damages for Michael Beeh and the Plaintiff Class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; 12. On January 12, 2013 at 11:42am, being within one year immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, the Plaintiff received the following message on his cellular voicemail system which could only be left by dialing his cellular telephone number, the voice message was 7 seconds in duration, and is transcribed as follows: “1-800-746-2936 thank you and have a nice day” 13. On January 21, 2013 at 11:27am, being within one year immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, the Plaintiff received the following message on his cellular voicemail system which could only be left by dialing his cellular telephone number, the voice message was 7 seconds in duration and is transcribed as follows: “1-800-746-2936 thank you and have a nice day” 14. On January 21, 2013 at 2:15pm, being within one year immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, the Plaintiff received the following message on his cellular voicemail system which could only be left by dialing his cellular telephone number, the voice message was 7 seconds in duration and is transcribed as follows: “1-800-746-2936 thank you and have a nice day” 16. The personal mortgage loan is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 17. Each of the voice messages transcribed in Paragraphs 12-14 qualifies as a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 18. The mortgage loan went into default on April 1, 2009. (Annexed and attached hereto as “Exhibit A” is a “Notice of Default and Intention to Foreclose” dated February 18, 2013 and received by the Plaintiff which states that the mortgage loan has been in default since April 1, 2009) 19. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. transferred servicing rights on the mortgage loan to Ocwen on April 2, 2012. (Annexed and attached hereto as “Exhibit B” is a letter dated March 12, 2012 from JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. stating that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. was transferring servicing rights on the mortgage loan to Ocwen effective April 2, 2012) 2. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and 20. Ocwen formally took over serving of the loan on April 2, 2012. (Annexed and attached hereto as ‘Exhibit C’ is a copy of a letter from Ocwen to the Plaintiff dated April 10, 2012 welcoming the Plaintiff as a customer) 22. The telephone number “1-800-746-2936”, which is the number left on the voicemails transcribed in Paragraphs 12-14 and is also the number that appeared on the Plaintiff’s caller identification system, is answered by employees of Ocwen. As a precursor to speaking to a live representative a prerecorded message stating, “Although your call may be general in nature we are required by law to advise you that Ocwen is a debt collector and any information obtained will be used for that purpose if needed” is played for anyone who calls. 3. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 36. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 38. Upon information and belief the identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Ocwen. 39. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Ocwen and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 40. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. Those principal issues are whether the Defendants’ telephonic voice messages, such as the Messages transcribed in Paragraphs 12-14 of this Complaint, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(11). 41. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 44. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

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10. Plaintiff was charged a fee by the ATM. A redacted copy of the receipt issued to plaintiff is attached as Exhibit A. 11. No notice stating that a fee would or may be charged was posted at or near the ATM. Photographs of the ATM are attached as Exhibit B, 18. This claim is brought on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons who used the ATM operated by Global Cash Network, Inc. at or around 1023 West Addison Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60613, (b) and were charged a fee (c) during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 20 days after the filing of this action. 19. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 20. On information and belief, there are more than 50 persons who used the ATM operated by Global Cash Network, Inc. at or around 1023 West Addison Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60613, and were charged a fee, during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 20 days after the filing of this action. 8 21. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, which questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether defendant’s ATM was posted with the notices required by law. 22. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same legal and factual issues. 23. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in the prosecution of consumer credit claims and class actions. 24. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient prosecution of this litigation. Classwide liability is essential to cause defendant to stop its improper conduct. Many class members may be unaware that they have been victims of illegal conduct. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor and in favor of the class for: a. Statutory damages; b. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; c. Such other or further relief as is appropriate. s/Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner 8. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, plaintiff conducted an electronic funds transfer at the ATM operated by Global Cash Network, Inc. at or around 1023 West Addison Street, Chicago, IL 60613. 9. Any transaction carried out through an ATM is governed by EFTA. The EFTA, 15 U.S.C. §1693a, provides: . . . (6) the term "electronic fund transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions . . . .

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10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in New York; b. to whom Defendant sent a collection letter related to a consumer debt; c. attributing “adjustments” to the consumer that do not reflect any activity on the account which is attributable to the consumer, without disclosing that fact; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violates 15 U.S.C. § l692e. and § 1692g et seq. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 20. At a time better known to Defendant, an obligation was allegedly incurred to the original creditor, HSBC Bank Nevada N.A. (hereinafter “HSBC”). 21. Subsequently, upon information and belief, HSBC sold or transferred the debt to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. (hereinafter “Capital One”). 22. Capital One, upon information and belief, sold or transferred the defaulted debt to Defendant for the purpose of debt collection on September 15, 2020. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(6). 23. Upon information and belief, the original subject obligation arose out of credit card transactions. The subject debt was incurred by Plaintiff solely for personal, household or family purposes. 24. The Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(3). 25. The subject obligation is consumer-related, and therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 27. On or about February 23, 2021, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter related to the subject debt. (See “Letter” at Exhibit A.) 28. In relevant part, towards the top of Defendant’s Letter, it states: Total Amount of Debt Due at charge-off: $6,191.42 Interest: $0.00 Non-Interest Charges/Fees or Balance Adjustments: $-0.04 Payments: $0.00 Balance: $6,191.38 29. The Letter goes on to state: “This letter is in reference to the account listed above. We purchased this account on 09/15/2020 and have recently been notified by CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA) N.A. of a balance reduction on your account.” 30. Defendant refers to the .04 balance reduction in the above list. 31. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff did not make a payment to Defendant in the amount of $0.04. 32. Based on Defendant’s representations in the Letter, Defendant purchased the subject debt more than five months before the date of this Letter. 33. Plaintiff is not aware of any reason that Defendant reduced the balance to the subject debt, especially several months after purchasing the defaulted debt. 34. Defendant failed to provide any explanation for why a balance reduction was made to her account. 35. However, upon information and belief, Defendant did not sua sponte credit the account for $0.04. 37. No such notice was provided to Plaintiff describing the $0.04 amount other than that which is provided in the Letter attached hereto as Exhibit A, which only characterizes the $0.04 amount as “Non-Interest Charges/Fees or Balance Adjustments.” 38. Therefore, the nature of the $0.04 amount is unknown and its deduction from the total amount due was in error. 39. Thus, Defendant misstates the current balance on the account and the Letter is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 40. The characterization as “Non-Interest Charges/Fees or Balance Adjustments” is deceptive and misleading. 41. In fact, Defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of attributing purported “balance adjustments” to consumers that do not reflect any activity on the account which is attributable to the consumer, without disclosing that fact. 42. Defendant created and inserted numbers as “balance adjustments” which are not attributable to the consumer. 43. Regarding the subject incident, the implication of the $0.04 value is that it represents actual activity on the account and is attributable to the consumer’s action or request. 44. This is material because it goes to the amount of the debt, which is the most material term in a collection letter. It is further material because it serves to undermine Defendant’s right to collect this debt and casts a suspicious shadow over Defendant’s collection activities in general, which affects the decision-making of Plaintiff. 46. The fact that the amount sought by Defendant is less than the charge-off amount does not exonerate Defendant of its obligation to provide clarity to Plaintiff about the nature of the balance adjustment. 47. The difference between the amount due and the charge-off amount is more than just a technical defect. It goes to the essence of Defendant’s right to collect the debt. 48. By failing to explain the nature of the balance adjustment, Defendant failed to effectively provide notice of the amount of the debt to Plaintiff. 49. The inclusion of “balance adjustments” which post-date any actual account activity by the consumer, without disclosure of the material fact that the “balance adjustments” were not a result of real consumer activity is deceptive. 50. Defendant seeks to collect an amount that misrepresents the total amount of debt due, in violation of 15 U.S. Code § 1692e and §1692g et seq. 51. In result, Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendant misstated and mischaracterized the total amount of the debt. 52. Congress is empowered to pass laws and is well-positioned to create laws that will better society at large. 53. As it relates to this case, Congress identified a concrete and particularized harm with a close common-law analogue to the traditional tort of fraud. 54. Now, consumers have a right to receive proper notice of the amount of debt due. When a debt collector fails to effectively inform the consumer of the nature of a balance adjustment, in violation of statutory law, the debt collector has harmed the consumer. 56. These violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. 57. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendant’s statutory violations. 58. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 59. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 60. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 61. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 63. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 64. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 65. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 67. Defendant violated §1692g: a. As Defendant did not state the correct amount of the debt, in violation of § 1692g(a)(1); 68. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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24. Purple Land Management operates throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. To complete its business objectives, Purple Land Management hires personnel, such as Prinkey, to perform landman services. 25. Purple Land Management’s Landmen are required to assist Purple Land Management’s customers in securing title, signing leases, communicating with attorneys regarding land acquisitions, and serving as the liaison between land owners and Purple Land Management’s clients. 26. Many of these individuals worked for Purple Land Management as “independent contractors” on a day-rate basis and make up the proposed Putative Class. While exact job titles and job duties may differ,1 these employees are subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. 27. For example, Prinkey worked exclusively for Purple Land Management from approximately May 2017 to November 2019 as a Landman. Throughout her employment with Purple Land Management, she was classified as an independent contractor and paid on a day-rate basis. Prinkey was never paid on a salary basis. She never received any guaranteed weekly compensation from Purple Land Management irrespective of days worked (i.e., the only compensation she received was the day-rate for each day that she actually worked). 28. Prinkey worked for Purple Land Management throughout the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. For example, Prinkey reviewed land records on behalf of Purple Land Management in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. 30. The day to day activities of the Putative Class Members were conducted within designated parameters defined by Purple Land Management. 31. Prinkey and the Putative Class Members worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by Purple Land Management. 32. The work Prinkey and the Putative Class Members performed was an essential part of Purple Land Management’s core business. 33. During Prinkey’s employment with Purple Land Management while she was classified as an independent contractor, Purple Land Management exercised control over all aspects of her job. Purple Land Management did not require any substantial investment by Prinkey for her to perform the work required of her. 34. Prinkey was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other Landmen) to perform her job duties. 35. Purple Land Management determined Prinkey’s opportunity for profit and loss. 36. Indeed, Purple Land Management controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Prinkey. 37. Purple Land Management ordered the hours and locations Prinkey worked, the equipment and forms she used, and the rates of pay she received. 38. Purple Land Management controlled all aspects of Prinkey’s job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Purple Land Management’s policies and procedures. 39. No real investment was required of Prinkey to perform her job. More often than not, Prinkey utilized equipment provided by Purple Land Management to perform her job duties. 40. Purple Land Management made the large capital investments in buildings, tools, and supplies in the business in which Prinkey worked. 42. Prinkey was economically dependent on Purple Land Management during her employment. 43. Purple Land Management set Prinkey’s rates of pay, her work schedule, and prohibited her from working other jobs for other companies while she was working on jobs for Purple Land Management. 44. Purple Land Management directly determined Prinkey’s opportunity for profit and loss. Prinkey’s earning opportunity was based on the number of days Purple Land Management scheduled her to work and the assignments she was provided. 45. Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Prinkey to perform her job duties. 46. Indeed, the daily and weekly activities of the Putative Class Members were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Purple Land Management. 47. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Purple Land Management, including the tools used, the data to research and compile, the work schedule, and related work duties. 48. The Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the pre-determined parameters. Moreover, the job functions of the Putative Class Members were primarily technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. 49. The Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. 50. For the purposes of their overtime claims, the Putative Class Members performed substantially similar job duties related to servicing Purple Land Management’s core business. 52. Prinkey worked exclusively for Purple Land Management from approximately May 2017 to November 2019 as an independent contractor. 53. Prinkey typically worked 12 hours per day during a five-day workweek for Purple Land Management. 54. Prinkey was not employed by Purple Land Management on a project-by-project basis. 55. In fact, while Prinkey was classified as an independent contractor, she was regularly on call for Purple Land Management and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. 56. All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. 57. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were subjected to the same illegal pay practice for similar work. 58. Specifically, Purple Land Management paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a day rate, regardless of the number of hours that they worked each day (or in a workweek). 59. Purple Land Management did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 60. Purple Land Management did not guarantee Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a minimum salary per week. 61. Purple Land Management paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a day rate equal to less than $455. 63. Purple Land Management’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Prinkey, overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties. 64. Because Prinkey (and Purple Land Management’s other independent contractors) were misclassified as independent contractors by Purple Land Management, she and the Putative Class Members should receive overtime for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. 65. Purple Land Management’s day-rate system violates state and federal law because Prinkey and the other Landmen did not receive any pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours each week. VI. 69. Purple Land Management is subject to the overtime requirements of the PMWA because Purple Land Management is an employer under 43 P.S. § 333.103(g). 70. During all relevant times, Prinkey and the PMWA Class were covered employees entitled to the above-described PMWA’s protections. See 43 P.S. § 333.103(h). 71. Purple Land Management’s compensation scheme that is applicable to Prinkey and the PMWA Class failed to comply with either 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) or 34 Pa. Code § 231.43(b). 72. At all relevant times, Purple Land Management was subject to the requirements of the 78. Plaintiff brings this claim under the Ohio Wage Act as a Rule 23 class action. 79. The conduct alleged violates the Ohio Wage Act (O.R.C. §§4111). 80. At all relevant times, Defendants were and are subject to the requirements of the Ohio Wage Act. 81. The Ohio Wage Act requires employers like Defendant to pay employees at one and one-half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one week. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are entitled to overtime pay under the Ohio Wage Acts. 82. Defendants had a policy and practice of misclassifying Plaintiff and each member of the Ohio Wage Act class as independent contractors and failing to pay these workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 83. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members seek unpaid overtime in amount equal to 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, prejudgment interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 84. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 85. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA. 87. Based on her experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 88. The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as independent contractors and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 89. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 90. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 91. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 92. Plaintiff has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to them under state and/or federal law. 93. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 94. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. 95. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 97. The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Defendant employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning of the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA; b. Whether the Putative Class Members were improperly misclassified as independent contractors; c. Whether Defendant’s decision to classify the Putative Class Members as independent contractors was made in good faith; d. Whether Defendant’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the Putative Class Members was made in good faith; e. Whether Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA was willful; and f. Whether Defendant’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation to all Putative Class Members. 98. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform employment policy.

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 106. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 107. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension the Stores, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 108. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 21. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 24. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of the Website and the Stores. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse the Website and by extension the goods and services offered through the Website by the Stores. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally blind. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 28. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 29. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 32. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 33. Among the features offered by the Website are the following: (a) a list of Defendant’s Store locations; (b) weekly sales circulars for Defendant’s Store locations; (c) recipes; (d) and other information about the Stores and Defendant. 34. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Stores, as well as to the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 35. Defendant denies the blind access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website. 36. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 38. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to blind people. These guidelines have been in place for at least several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse; adding alternative text to non-text content; and adding headings so that blind people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic components, a website will be inaccessible to a blind person using a screen reader. 39. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include but are not limited to: the denial of keyboard access; the use of images of text, rather than text, to display essential content; and the inability to skip repeated blocks of content. 41. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.4.5, text should be used to convey information, rather than images of text. The weekly sales circulars for Defendant’s Store located at 431 W. 16th Street, New York, New York 10011 are rendered as images, rather than as text that would be accessible via a screen reader. In fact, the weekly sales circulars for all of Defendant’s Stores are rendered as images. Because of this formatting, blind users such as Plaintiff are unable to view the sales advertised in the circulars, although sighted users do not have the same trouble. Without this information, Plaintiff is unable to plan a shopping trip that allows her to save money as sighted customers are able to. Thus, the Website’s inaccessible design promotes an environment in which blind customers are financially penalized because of their disability and denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently access information on the Website and fully enjoy the goods and services of Defendant and its Stores. 42. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the Website. Plaintiff must tab through every menu option on the Website in order to reach the main content. Thus, the Website’s inaccessible design denies Plaintiff and blind users the ability to independently navigate the Website. 44. Plaintiff has made several attempts to browse weekly sales circulars on the Website, most recently in September 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on the Website. These access barriers have caused the Website to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 45. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing it to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 46. After Defendant removes the barriers on the Website to make it accessible to visually impaired users, Plaintiff intends to browse weekly sales circulars on the Website and shop at the Store located at 431 W. 16th Street, New York, New York 10011. 47. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of the Website and the Stores. 48. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 50. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 51. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 52. The Stores are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). The Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Store. Independent of the Stores, the Website is also a public accommodation. 53. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Website. 54. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 56. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 57. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 58. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 60. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 61. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website and the Stores in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 62. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 63. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 64. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 65. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 67. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 68. The Stores are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Stores. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Store. Independent of the Stores, the Website is a public accommodation. 69. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Stores and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 70. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 71. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 73. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 74. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 75. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 81. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 82. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 85. The Stores located in New York State are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Stores. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 86. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Stores and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 89. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 90. Specifically, under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 95. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 96. The Stores are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Stores. Independent of the Stores, the Website is a public accommodation. 97. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Stores and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1).

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11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that imposed an additional fee for credit card payments; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692f. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Class defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 § l692e and §1692f. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to December 18, 2018, an obligation was allegedly incurred to “Cleveland Clinic Main Campus/Family Heath.” (“Clinic”) 22. The obligation arose out of a transaction involving medical services allegedly provided to Plaintiff by the Clinic and which was incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 23. The alleged Clinic obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. Clinic is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 25. Clinic contracted with the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 26. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – December 18, 2018 Collection Letter 27. On or about December 18, 2018, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to the Clinic. See December 18, 2018 Collection Letter – Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 28. The collection letter indicated that Defendant charges a $3.50 fee for payment via credit card. 29. Plaintiff did not agree to such a collection charge. 30. The addition of this collection fee by Defendant was not authorized by the agreement creating the debt. 31. The addition of this collection fee also runs afoul of New York State Law. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 601(2) specifically prohibits this type of action insomuch as the law states that “No principal creditor, as defined by this article, or his agent shall…Knowingly collect, attempt to collect, or assert a right to any collection fee, attorney’s fee, court cost or expense unless such changes are justly due and legally chargeable against the debtor. 32. Defendant misled and deceived Plaintiff into the belief that she falsely owed an additional $3.50 if she elected to pay by credit card, when this charge is a violation of the 35. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 36. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A). 37. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A), a debt collector may not mischaracterize the character, amount or status of a debt in connection with the collection of any debt. 38. Defendant violated said section by: a. Falsely charging a processing fee which altered the amount of the debt violation of §1692e(2)(A). 39. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA, in the form of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 40. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 41. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 42. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 43. Defendant violated said section by: b. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 44. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA, in the form of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 45. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 46. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 47. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 48. Defendant violated this section by a. unfairly advising Plaintiff that she owed Defendant more money than the amount of her debt; and b. attempting to collect an amount not expressly authorized by the underlying agreement creating the debt or permitted by law in violation of § 1692f(1). 49. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f(1) of the FDCPA, in the form of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f (1). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10)

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23. On or about August through November 2020, Defendant caused a prerecorded voice message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 8280 (“8280 Number”): 24. The prerecorded voice message states that the prerecorded message was being sent from Defendant and sought for Plaintiff to come to Defendant’s dealership, see their inventory and purchase a vehicle. 25. Plaintiff is the subscriber and/or sole user of the 8280 number. 26. When Plaintiff listened to the voice message, she was easily able to determine that it was a prerecorded message. Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”). 27. Defendant’s prerecorded message calls constitute telemarketing/advertising because they promote Defendant’s business, goods and services. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted by prerecorded message. 29. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 31. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 32. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows: NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the filing of this action, (1) were sent a prerecorded message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) regarding Defendant’s goods, products or services, and (4) for which Defendant failed to secure the called party’s express written consent 33. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 34. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 37. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using a prerecorded message; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 38. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 44. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any …artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 45. It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any telephone call…using an… artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii). PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and No Consent Class)

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2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 3. Whether the hotel provides a braille and/or large print menu for restaurants and/or room service and, in the alternative, if they have trained staff to read the menu to blind or vision-impaired guests. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s hotel. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s hotel and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 34. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 35. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical hotel location, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical hotel on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting or returning to the location, book a room or make a reservation, check availability and prices, browse photo gallery, purchase gift cards, details about guest rooms, meeting and event space, dining and entertainment options, including on- site restaurant, in-room services and lobby lounges and to learn about and other important information. 37. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 38. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 39. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 41. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 43. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 44. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 45. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features 46. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in New York. This location also offers dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 47. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about their hotel. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotel, serving as their gateway. 49. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 51. Due to the lack of information relating to the accessibility features of Defendant’s hotel through the reservation system on the Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public in their hotel. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis using the services that the hotel offers to the public because of the lack of information on accessibility through the reservation system on the Website. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant’s hotel or book rooms in Defendant’s hotel in the future if the Plaintiff was able to learn about the accessibility of Defendant’s hotel and guest rooms for blind and vision-impaired persons through the reservation system on their website and those accessibility features meet the needs of the Plaintiff. 53. If the hotel and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 54. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 55. Because simple compliance with the provisions of the ADA relating to providing information about accessibility features of the hotel and the guest rooms on its Website reservation system would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the services and facilities at Defendant’s hotel, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the failure to provide information on its Website reservation system sufficient to advise that the hotel is fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 56. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 58. Because Defendant’s Website reservation system has never included the required information, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the Website reservation system to include the required information relating to accessibility, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with the ADA regulations requiring certain accessibility information to be included on Defendant’s Website reservation system. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website for accessibility and compliance to identify and describe accessible features in the hotel and guest rooms on the Website reservation system and a statement that the hotel is fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room including a detailed description of the features of such facility so that a blind or visually-impaired person can determine if the features meet such person’s needs, and the communications features in the room including a detailed description of the communications features so that a blind or visually-impaired person can independently determine if the features meet such person’s needs, including, but not limited to: 59. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotel and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 61. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of including the information required under the ADA regulations on the Website reservation system in order to make its facilities and guest rooms equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 64. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 65. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotel or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 69. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 7. Whether or not the hotel has removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 73. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotel. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotel and is a gateway thereto. 75. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 76. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 78. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 79. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 81. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 82. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 84. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 85. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 87. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and their physical location under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 90. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 93. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 96. Defendant’s location is a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 97. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates a physical location in New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

win

127. Individually named Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) and 23(b)(2). 128. Plaintiffs Brose, Volkman, Tambor, and Finkelstein seek certification of a class defined as: 19 All chronic ventilator users who are or will be subjected to the New York State Department of Health Ventilator Allocation Guidelines. 129. The proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 130. Upon information and belief, the class consists of at least 40 members. 131. All members of the proposed class share common issues of law and fact with respect to the Defendants’ obligation to prohibit the reallocation of the personal ventilators of chronic ventilator users to other individuals. Common questions include whether subjecting chronic ventilator users who seek acute healthcare in New York State to the Guidelines constitutes discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. 132. The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the proposed Plaintiff Class. Each Named Plaintiff and all members of the proposed class have applied for, are chronic ventilator users who are or will be subjected to the New York State Department of Health Ventilator Allocation Guidelines. 133. The Named Plaintiffs have all experienced harm as a result of the Defendants’ failure or refusal to allow them access to participate in or benefit from a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan. 134. Similarly, all proposed class members, as chronic ventilator users who are or will be subjected to the New York State Department of Health Ventilator Allocation Guidelines have or will experience harm with regard to the deprivation of participation in or the lack of a benefit from programs and services as a result of Defendants’ systemic failure or refusal to provide them with a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness system. The named individual Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed Class. 20 135. Plaintiffs have a personal and clearly defined interest in vindicating their rights as well as the rights of the Class in order to obtain prospective injunctive relief prohibiting the reallocation of the personal ventilators of chronic ventilator users. 136. Plaintiffs seek relief that will benefit the entire Class. 137. Plaintiffs’ counsel, attorneys at the National Center for Law and Economic Justice (NCLEJ) and Disability Rights New York (DRNY) are attorneys experienced in federal class action litigation involving claims of noncompliance with the ADA, Section 504, and the ACA. 138. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual Class members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class, could be dispositive of the interests of the other Class members, or could substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 139. Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the named Plaintiffs and each absent member of the proposed class, thereby making final adjudicative and declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the proposed Class as a whole. 31. The Guidelines state that the NY DOH is “empowered to issue voluntary, non- binding guidelines for health care workers and facilities; such guidelines are readily implemented and provide hospitals with an ethical and clinical framework for decision-making.” Guidelines at 32. The New York State Administrative Procedure Act (“SAPA”) defines a “guidance document” as “any guideline, memorandum or similar document prepared by an agency that provides general information or guidance to assist regulated parties in complying with any statute, rule or other legal requirement.” N.Y. A.P.A. Law § 102(14). 33. The Guidelines are a “guidance document” within the meaning of the NY SAPA. 34. The Guidelines acknowledge that hospitals will likely follow the Guidelines even if they are non-binding, stating: “Hospitals have expressed a preference for State guidance over drafting their own policies.” Guidelines at 206. 35. The Task Force also explicitly encouraged adherence to the Guidelines: “Although the Guidelines are voluntary, the Task Force strongly recommends that they be adopted and followed by all health care providers and entities in a pandemic.” Id. at 206. 36. New York’s largest healthcare provider, Northwell Health, which operates twenty-three hospitals in New York State, stated publicly that it would follow the Guidelines if it ran out of ventilators. See Tyler Foggatt, Who Gets a Ventilator?, The New Yorker, April 11, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/20/who-gets-a-ventilator 7 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/20/who-gets-a-ventilator (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). Ventilator Allocation Protocol 37. The Guidelines set forth a process for an acute medical facility to follow to determine who will receive a ventilator when there is a shortage of ventilators in the facility. Guidelines at 3. 38. Under the Guidelines, a patient’s physician does not determine whether the patient receives or continues to receive a ventilator, instead, a triage officer or triage committee makes the decision of whether a patient receives or gets to keep a ventilator. Id. at 5. 39. A triage officer or triage committee does not have any direct contact with the patient. “Instead, a triage officer or triage committee examines the data provided by the attending physician and makes the determination about a patient’s level of access to a ventilator.” Id. 40. The triage officer or triage community only uses clinical factors to evaluate a patient’s likelihood of survival and to determine the patient’s access to ventilator therapy. Id. 41. The Guidelines state that, “This role sequestration allows the clinical ventilator allocation protocol to operate smoothly. The decision regarding whether to use either a triage officer or committee is left to each acute care facility (i.e., hospital) because available resources will differ at each site.” Id. 42. The Guidelines use a multi-step process with a Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score to determine which patients will have access to a ventilator during a time of triage. 8 43. A SOFA score is a number used to track a person’s status during an intensive care stay that adds points based on clinical measures of the function of six key organs and systems: lungs, liver, brain, kidneys, blood clotting, and blood pressure. Id. at 14. 44. Chronic ventilator users automatically have reduced SOFA scores because their disabilities significantly impair the functioning of key organ systems such as the lungs, among others. 45. The Guidelines permit hospitals to take chronic ventilator users’ personal ventilators upon their arrival into a hospital and place them into the general ventilator allocation pool for distribution to those with higher SOFA scores. Id. at 40. 46. The Guidelines acknowledge that the policy “may place ventilator-dependent individuals in a difficult position of choosing between life-sustaining ventilation and urgent medical care.” Id. at 41. 47. The Guidelines also recognize that the triage policy “may deter chronic care patients from going to an acute care facility for fear of losing access to their ventilator” and that “if the ventilator is removed from a person known to depend upon it, s/he will not survive, regardless of the reason requiring hospitalization.” Id. at 41-42. 48. The Guidelines further conclude that “[r]esource limitations may require that ventilation therapy be withheld or withdrawn from some persons without obtaining prior first person (or proxy) consent.” Id. at 206-07. Plaintiff Specific Facts Michelle Brose 49. Plaintiff Michelle Brose is a 45-year-old chronic ventilator user and a resident of Staten Island, New York. 9 50. Ms. Brose is studying biology at Columbia University. Although she usually lives on campus at Columbia, she currently attends classes remotely from her family home in Staten Island due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 51. Ms. Brose is a member of organizational plaintiff NMD United. 52. Ms. Brose is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. She has Charcot Marie-Tooth disease, which causes motor and sensory neuropathy of the peripheral nervous system characterized by progressive loss of muscle tissue and touch sensation across various parts of the body, and which affects her ability to breathe on her own. 53. Ms. Brose has used a ventilator since 1994. She is completely ventilator dependent and uses a ventilator 24 hours per day because she cannot breathe on her own. 54. Ms. Brose uses one ventilator during the day and the other ventilator at night. 55. Ms. Brose knows of the provision in the New York Ventilator Allocation Guidelines that permits hospitals to reallocate personal ventilators during triage scenarios. 56. Ms. Brose first learned of the Guidelines from her biology classmates who were joking about the pandemic and ventilator shortages in an online forum. Ms. Brose clicked on the link they shared and discovered with horror that the Guidelines specifically contemplated taking her personal ventilator from her. 57. Ms. Brose understood the Guidelines to mean that she could not go to a hospital if she tested positive for the coronavirus for fear of losing access to her life-sustaining personal ventilator. 58. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ms. Brose had 24-hour personal care attendants. However, once the pandemic began, she no longer felt safe risking aides coming into 10 her home due to her greater susceptibility to the virus. As a result, her mother and sister have been tending to her care since the beginning of the pandemic. 59. Ms. Brose knows that during COVID-19, hospital policies have limited family members’ ability to stay with patients, and she fears that in a triage scenario with nobody there to advocate for her, she could have her ventilator taken away from her pursuant to the Guidelines. 60. As a New York State resident and chronic ventilator user to whom the Guidelines would apply, Ms. Brose fears having to make the impossible choice between foregoing needed medical care or going to the hospital where, due to the lack of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan, her personal ventilator could be taken away, resulting in her inability to breathe and imminent death. Mike Volkman 61. Plaintiff Mike Volkman is a 55-year-old chronic ventilator user and a resident of Albany, New York. 62. Mr. Volkman serves on the Board of Directors of organizational plaintiff Not Dead Yet. 63. Mr. Volkman is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. He has spinal muscular atrophy (SMA), a progressive condition characterized by weakness and atrophy of skeletal muscles, which affects his ability to breathe on his own. 64. Mr. Volkman has used a ventilator since 2015 and uses it 24 hours per day. 65. Mr. Volkman has two ventilators, a stationary ventilator used at night and a portable ventilator that he keeps on the back of his wheelchair. 11 66. Mr. Volkman lives independently in his community and receives 24-hour care from home health aides who assist him with daily tasks. 67. Mr. Volkman has been admitted to the hospital nine times since he started using his ventilator. 68. Mr. Volkman considers hospital stays to be extremely dangerous for him. He does not have a family member or other person available to stay with him at the hospital and is also without his home health aides who are trained in the specifics of his medical conditions. 69. As a result, he fears that he will encounter circumstances in which he will not be able to advocate for himself and medical decisions will be made on his behalf without his input. 70. During previous hospital admissions both prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic, in accordance with hospital policies, the hospital has removed Mr. Volkman from his personal ventilator and placed him on a hospital ventilator despite his preference to remain on his own personal ventilator. 71. Mr. Volkman knows of the provision in the Guidelines that permits hospitals to reallocate personal ventilators during triage scenarios. 72. He fears that, especially in the midst of this ongoing global pandemic, where the number of patients presenting with respiratory symptoms is increasing and the demand for ventilators could potentially outpace the supply, if he as a chronic ventilator user goes to a hospital, his personal ventilator could be considered a hot “commodity” for someone else’s benefit and he will have to compete for survival. 73. As a New York State resident and chronic ventilator user to whom the Guidelines would apply, Mr. Volkman fears having to make the impossible choice between foregoing needed medical care or going to the hospital where, due to the lack of a nondiscriminatory 12 emergency preparedness plan, his personal ventilator could be taken away, resulting in his inability to breathe and eventual death. Jessica Tambor 74. Plaintiff Jessica Tambor is a 34-year-old chronic ventilator user and a resident of Queens, New York. 75. Ms. Tambor works at the Bronx Independent Living Services as an Independent Living Specialist. 76. Ms. Tambor is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. She sustained a spinal cord injury at birth, which affects her ability to breathe on her own. 77. Ms. Tambor has used a ventilator throughout her entire life. She uses the ventilator approximately 12 hours per day, throughout the night and occasionally during the day. 78. She lives with her family in Queens and her parents assist her with daily tasks. 79. Ms. Tambor knows of the provision in the Guidelines that permits hospitals to reallocate personal ventilators during triage scenarios. 8. 80. She learned about the Guidelines on Facebook where she saw friends and other ventilator users posting about the potential need for rationing of ventilators and the possibility that people’s personal ventilators could be taken away and given to other patients. 81. As a New York State resident and a chronic ventilator user to whom the Guidelines would apply, Ms. Tambor fears having to make the impossible choice between foregoing needed medical care or going to the hospital where, due to the lack of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan, her personal ventilator could be taken away, resulting in her inability to breathe and eventual death. 13 Peri Finkelstein 82. Plaintiff Peri Finkelstein is a 20-year-old chronic ventilator user and resident of West Hempstead, New York. 83. Ms. Finkelstein is studying marketing at Adelphi University. 84. Ms. Finkelstein is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. She has a rare form of Muscular Dystrophy and has used a ventilator since the age of two. 85. Ms. Finkelstein is completely ventilator dependent and uses a ventilator 24 hours per day because she cannot breathe on her own. She has two ventilators that she uses at different times throughout the day and night. 86. Ms. Finkelstein lives with her parents, and they assist her with daily tasks. 87. Ms. Finkelstein has spent a significant amount of time in the hospital. Each time, her parents accompanied her at all times and advocated for her needs. 88. Ms. Finkelstein knows of the provision in the New York Ventilator Allocation Guidelines that permits hospitals to reallocate personal ventilators during triage scenarios. 89. Ms. Finkelstein first learned about this provision of the Guidelines on the Internet in March of 2020. She discovered that the Guidelines place people with disabilities at risk and that if she had to go to the hospital, her ventilator could be taken away. 90. After hearing about the Guidelines, Ms. Finkelstein did not leave her house for months. 91. She and her mother also feared having to go to the hospital during this time. 92. Additionally, Ms. Finkelstein will turn 21 years old this year. This impending milestone has compounded her fears about the Guidelines. 14 93. As a legal adult, Ms. Finkelstein will no longer qualify for services from the pediatric division of the hospital, which means that the hospital may prevent her parents from staying with her at all times and advocating for her needs. 94. Ms. Finkelstein would have great difficulty advocating for herself while hospitalized, particularly at night, because the night-time configuration of her ventilator inhibits her ability to speak. 95. As a New York State resident and a chronic ventilator user to whom the Guidelines would apply, Ms. Finkelstein fears that her ventilator could be taken away from her and reallocated in a triage scenario. 96. Due to the lack of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan, she would have to make the impossible decision of whether to stay home and not access medical care, or to go to the hospital, where her personal ventilator would likely be taken away, resulting in her inability to breathe and eventual death. Not Dead Yet 97. Plaintiff Not Dead Yet is a not-for-profit corporation and grassroots disability rights group that opposes legalization of assisted suicide, and euthanasia as deadly forms of discrimination, and the non-voluntary withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment, including but not limited to, futility policies involving health care provider decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. 98. Not Dead Yet provides information and referral services, including legal referrals, to individuals who face discrimination in the provision of life-sustaining medical care as well as to people who are being denied lifesaving medical treatment. 15 99. Not Dead Yet’s constituents are qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. 100. Several of Not Dead Yet’s constituents are chronic ventilator users who reside in New York State, including its President and CEO, Rochester resident Diane Coleman. 101. Staff and board members of Not Dead Yet regularly give presentations to disability rights groups, people with disabilities, and their families, on a variety of topics related to disability discrimination and the provision of healthcare services, including assisted suicide, the withholding of medical treatment, the effects of end-of-life policies on people with disabilities, and health care disparities based on race. 102. Not Dead Yet has known about the Guidelines since shortly after their publication in November 2015. 103. At that time, a Not Dead Yet staff member responsible for tracking developments in healthcare reviewed the Guidelines and raised concerns to the rest of the staff about language in the Guidelines that allowed hospitals to reallocate personal ventilators and the life-threatening consequences that this would create for the constituents Not Dead Yet serves. 104. As COVID-19 spread across the country and New York State, in particular, with discussion of possible ventilator shortages, Not Dead Yet constituents expressed concerns about having their ventilators taken away if they needed to go to the hospital. 105. In response to these concerns, the organization has expended significant time and resources to inform and advocate for its constituents with respect to the Guidelines. 106. Staff of Not Dead Yet has given a number of presentations about disability discrimination and triage policies, including ventilator reallocation, during COVID-19. 16 107. In March and April of 2020, Diane Coleman wrote posts on the Not Dead Yet Blog about the ventilator reallocation provision of the Guidelines. 108. Due to the lack of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan, Not Dead Yet’s New York constituents who rely on personal ventilators would face the impossible choice between foregoing needed medical care or going to the hospital where their personal ventilators could be taken away, resulting in an inability or reduced ability to breathe and leading to respiratory failure and death. NMD United 109. Plaintiff NMD United is a non-profit organization serving adults living with neuromuscular disabilities. NMD United is a peer-led organization that works to foster interactions and provide informational resources to increase self-direction while promoting independence. 110. NMD United’s members are qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 of the ACA. 111. Several of NMD United’s members are chronic ventilator users who reside in New York State. 112. NMD United supports its membership through a variety of programs. These programs include a free series called NMD United Virtual University for adults with neuromuscular disabilities to discuss important issues relevant to their lives and independence and a grant program that helps adults living with neuromuscular disabilities by providing funding for medical supplies, vehicle maintenance and repair, assistive technology, and personal care attendant advertisement fees. NMD United has given out more than 100 grants to date. 17 113. NMD United also has an active Facebook group, which it uses to communicate with members and other people it serves. 114. NMD United frequently solicits the opinions and concerns of its members and constituents through surveys and polls. Interaction with members is essential to ensuring that NMD United fulfills its mission. 115. In March of 2020, NMD United published a COVID-19 Guide for adults living with neuromuscular disabilities. This guide provided members with information about how to reduce and prevent the spread of COVID-19, as well as life-management strategies for people with neuromuscular disabilities living through the pandemic. 116. Additionally, from March through May of 2020, NMD United conducted an anonymous online survey of its members’ primary concerns and advocacy priorities in light of COVID-19. Responders identified themselves according to their zip codes. 117. Several responders located within zip codes of New York State identified themselves as personal ventilator users. 118. In response to a survey question asking what supplies, resources, and equipment responders might need, several responders with zip codes within New York State asked “Do I need to be afraid that my ventilator or other necessary equipment will be taken away?” They also expressed fears about having to seek medical attention at a hospital. 119. Due to the lack of a nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness plan, NMD United’s New York members who rely on personal ventilators would face the impossible choice between foregoing needed medical care or going to the hospital where their personal ventilator could be taken away, resulting in their inability to breathe and eventual death. 18 Disability Rights New York 120. DRNY is the Protection and Advocacy Agency for New York State. 121. As early as March 2020, DRNY began to receive calls and inquiries from chronic ventilator users who expressed concerns that they could lose access to their personal ventilator should they seek acute healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic. 122. In response to complaints from chronic ventilator users stating that they feared seeking acute medical care at a hospital during COVID-19 because of the Guidelines, on March 26, 2020, DRNY sent a letter to Andrew Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York. 123. The DRNY letter requested that NY DOH issue clear guidance regarding the potential for discrimination against people with disabilities seeking medical care during the COVID-19 pandemic, including an unequivocal statement that a chronic ventilator user would never be extubated without another ventilator readily available for their use. 124. As of the commencement of this action, DRNY has received no response to this letter. 125. On April 7, 2020, DRNY filed a complaint of discrimination with the Office for Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 126. Conciliation efforts associated with this complaint have failed, and as of the commencement of this action, the complaint remains pending. New York State Ventilator Allocation Guidelines SECTION 1557 OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 42 U.S.C. § 18116 161. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if specifically alleged herein. 162. Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) states, in relevant part: Except as otherwise provided for in this title (or an amendment made by this title), an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any 26 part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments). The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 504, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (a). 163. The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a final rule implementing Section 1557 on June 19, 2020. 85 FR 37160 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 92). 164. Section 1557 prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in certain health programs and activities. 45 C.F.R. § 92. 165. Section 1557 states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under...Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973] ...shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.” 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (a). 166. NY DOH was, at all times relevant to this action, and is currently a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Section 1557 of the ACA. 167. NY DOH provided and provides a “health program or activity” where “health program or activity’’ is defined as “encompass[ing] all of the operations of entities principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare that receive Federal financial assistance....For any entity not principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare, the requirements applicable to a ‘‘health program or activity’’ under this part shall apply to such entity’s operations only to the extent any such operation receives Federal financial assistance.” 45 C.F.R. § 92.3(b). 27 168. Section 1557 adopts the definition of disability from Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 45 C.F.R. § 92.2(b)(4) 169. Chronic ventilator users who seek acute medical care in New York State are individuals with disabilities under Section 1557 of the ACA. 170. NY DOH’s Guidelines violate Section 1557 of the ACA's prohibition on discrimination “under any health program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...on the grounds of...disability.” 45 C.F.R. § 92.1. 171. As a result of NY DOH’s acts and omissions, chronic ventilator users seeking acute medical care in New York State have and will continue to be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, and subjected to discrimination from a healthcare system subject to the NY DOH Guidelines. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794 152. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if specifically alleged herein. 153. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides, in pertinent part that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States… shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 24 subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 154. NY DOH was, at all times relevant to this action, and is currently a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Section 504. 155. NY DOH provided and provides a “program or activity” where “program or activity” is described as “all operations of a department, agency, special purpose district or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government.” 29. U.S. C. § 794(b)(1)(A). 156. The Guidelines are a “program or activity” of the NY DOH within the meaning of Section 504. 157. A disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (citing 42 TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. 140. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if specifically alleged herein. 141. Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 21 12101(b)(1). Congress specifically found, inter alia, that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . access to public services.” Id. § 12101(a)(3). 142. Title II of the ADA states, in pertinent part: [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

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23. Defendant operates, manages, and markets its retail stores, sells store gift cards to the public, and uses them as a form of communication. One or more of its retail stores is located in New York City. Defendant’s retail stores constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s retail stores provide important goods and services to the public. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s store gift cards, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public at its retail stores. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from purchasing, accessing, and utilizing the store gift cards and, as a result, Defendant’s retail stores. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s store gift cards have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to purchase a Braille store gift card related to Defendant’s physical retail locations, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations. Plaintiff intends to immediately purchase a store gift card issued by the Defendant as soon as they become available in Braille. 27. If the store gift cards were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently purchase the store gift cards and complete a desired transaction utilizing gift cards as sighted individuals do. 28. Through his knowledge about the lack of Braille store gift cards, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations provide “appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 32. Defendant discriminates on the basis of disability because they fail to afford individuals who are visually impaired with the same ability to independently access the goods and services provided to others, thus failing to ensure effective communication with its visually impaired customers during transactions for its goods and services. 33. The regulation sets forth numerous examples of “auxiliary aids and services”, including, without limitation, “Brailled materials and displays..." 28 C.F.R. § 34. In addition to this general nondiscrimination mandate, Title III prohibits public accommodations from engaging in specific types of discrimination, including the failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, services, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, (emphasis added) . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) Nothing in this section shall require a person with disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization … does not intend to comply with its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) 36.303 (b)(2). “[I]n order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability. 28 CFR 36.303 (c)(ii).6 37. If the store gift cards were accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently utilize them. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding its store gift cards, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in marketing and selling its store gift cards and has generated significant revenue from the store gift cards. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its store gift cards equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the store gift cards, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s retail stores are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s retail stores. The store gift cards are a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the store gift cards, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in the State of New York and constitute sales establishments and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s store gift cards are a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and sells its store gift cards. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available manufacturing and/or printing capabilities exist for making store gift cards accessible to the blind and visually impaired. The addition to store gift cards of Braille on the gift card and packaging thereof and other related marketing materials would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s store gift cards and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its store gift cards are a service that is integrated with its establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its store gift cards, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant is: a. developing, marketing and selling store gift cards that are inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failing to sell store gift cards that are sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its store gift cards and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, Defendant’s store gift cards contain access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its store gift cards and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 87. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers On Its Store Gift Cards VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 48. Defendants own and/or operate as Freightco Acquisitions LLC, an enterprise located in Denver County, Colorado. 49. Freightco is a third-party logistics company headquartered in Denver, Colorado, that facilitates the domestic transportation of nationally. 50. Freightco functions as a broker connecting companies that need to ship freight with carriers to ship that freight. 52. Freightco’s profit derives from the margin between the fees it collects from customers and the payments it makes to carriers. 53. At all relevant times in their work for Defendants as Freight Brokers, Plaintiff and the Collective Members performed and continue to perform straightforward inside sales tasks. 54. At all relevant times in their work for Defendants, Freight Brokers had and have the primary job duties of cold-calling current and potential customers and selling Freightco’s services to them. They call and email current and potential customers to obtain the customer’s agreement to ship their freight using Freightco’s services. Their primary job duties also include cold-calling current and potential carriers and securing contracts for the carriers to transport Freightco customers’ freight. Freight Brokers obtain customers’ agreements to ship their freight with Freightco and then must find a carrier to ship that freight at the lowest possible cost. 55. At all relevant times in their work for Defendants, Freight Brokers are and have been classified as FLSA- and CWA-exempt and paid a base salary. 56. On approximately February 1, 2019, Plaintiff began employment with Defendants as a Freight Broker, performing primarily non-exempt tasks, such as the aforementioned primary duties. 57. Defendants paid Plaintiff $55,000 annually for his work as a Freight Broker. 59. In a given workweek, and during each and every workweek, of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, he worked between five (5) and fifteen (15) hours of overtime without being compensated at one-and-one-half times his regular rate of pay for such time worked. 60. In a given workweek, Plaintiff and the Class Members worked in excess of 12 hours within a single day without being compensated one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for such work performed, in violation of the CWA and all relevant COMPS Orders. 61. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members were non-exempt employees. 62. At all relevant times, Defendants have required and require Freight Brokers to be constantly available by phone and email and immediately responsive to customers’ and carriers’ needs, as well as in touch with each other to monitor ever- changing freight needs and carrier availability. 63. At all relevant times, Freightco has required and requires Freight Brokers to work continuously throughout the day, communicating with potential and current customers and carriers by phone, text, and email, finalizing shipping arrangements and contracts. 65. These factors caused Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members to consistently work significant overtime. 66. In addition, Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members worked and work extensive time outside of normal business hours, during mornings, evenings, and weekends. 67. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members were not outside sales employees. 68. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members were not commissioned sales employees half of whose total earnings consisted of commissions. 69. At no point during any workweek during which Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members worked for Defendants did more than half of their total earnings consist of commissions. 70. In their work for Defendants in the Covered Positions, Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ primary duty was not managing the enterprise that is Freightco, or managing a customarily recognized department or subdivision of the enterprise that is Freightco. 71. In their work for Defendants as Freight Brokers, Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members did not customarily and regularly direct the work of at least two or more other full-time employees or their equivalent. 73. In their work for Defendants as Freight Brokers, Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ primary duty was not the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Freightco or Freightco’s customers. 74. In their work for Defendants as Freight Brokers, Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ primary duty did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 75. From the beginning of Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ employment through the present day, Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members for any of their overtime hours. During each and every workweek during which Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members worked for Defendants, they worked approximately forty-five (45) to fifty-five (55) hours per week, including routinely working through lunch periods, routinely working from home after regular business hours, and routinely working from home on weekends for which time Defendants failed to accurately record Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ time worked while suffering or permitting them to work nonetheless. 77. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of willfully failing to pay Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all time that they suffered or permitted Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 78. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendants paid Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members less than the applicable overtime wage rate for such work that Plaintiff and the Collective Members performed in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 79. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of failing to accurately, if at all, record the time during which Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members to work. As such, Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ time records understate the duration of time each workweek that Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members to work. 80. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Members the applicable overtime wage rate for such hours worked, Defendants have violated 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 82. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – their failure to pay to Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members one- and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, would violate federal and state law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA overtime wage requirements during Plaintiff’s, the Collective Members’, and the Class Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 83. Defendants have and continue to willfully violate the FLSA by not paying Plaintiff and the Collective Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 84. Defendants have and continue to willfully violate the CWA and all relevant COMPS Orders by not paying Plaintiffand the Class Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 85. Defendants individually and/or through an enterprise or agent, directed and exercised control over Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ work and wages at all relevant times. 87. In a given workweek, and during each and every workweek of Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ employment with Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class Members worked for Defendants for more than 40 hours and were not paid the applicable overtime wage premium of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay under the CWA and all relevant COMPS Orders. 88. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are covered employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 89. Plaintiff and the Class Members are covered employees under the CWA and all relevant COMPS Orders. 90. Defendants wrongfully withheld wages from Plaintiff, the Collective Members, and the Class Members by failing to pay all wages due for hours they worked. 91. Due to Defendants’ illegal wage practices, Plaintiff and the Collective Members are entitled to recover from Defendants compensation for unpaid overtime wages, an additional amount equal amount as liquidated damages, interest, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of this action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 92. Due to Defendants’ illegal wage practices, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants compensation for unpaid overtime wages, interest, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of this action under the CWA and all relevant COMPS Orders. 93. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 94. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on his own behalf and as representatives of individuals similarly situated who are current or former Freight Brokers of Defendants. 95. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on his own behalf and as representatives of individuals similarly situated who are current and former Freight Brokers of Defendants, who are not or were not paid one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all time in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek that Defendants suffered or permitted them to work, in violation of pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), who agree in writing to join this lawsuit seeking recovery under the FLSA. 97. Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked more than forty (40) hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) during that workweek. Further, Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked more than forty (40) hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that workweek. 98. Plaintiff and the Collective Members were all paid a base annual salary, regardless of how many hours they worked per workweek.

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127. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 126 as if written herein. 128. Defendant's actions violated Plaintiffs' individual rights under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 et seq. 129. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 128 as if written herein. 130. Defendant's actions violated Plaintiffs' individual rights based on Ohio overtime statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.03. – 20 – Case: 1:18-cv-00033-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/18/18 Page: 20 of 22 PAGEID #: 20 131. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 130 as if written herein. 132. Defendant's actions violated the rights of the Collective Plaintiffs pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 et seq. 133. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 132 as if written herein. 134. Defendant's actions violated the rights of the Rule 23 Class members based on Ohio overtime statute Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.03.

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22. This action is brought against Apple on behalf of Plaintiff and all current and former owners of the Watches. 23. Apple designed, manufactured, distributed, marketed, warranted, and sold the Watches. Upon information and belief, Apple has sold—directly or indirectly through authorized stores and other retail outlets—millions of Watches in California and nationwide. Watches Manufactured, Advertised, and Sold by Apple 24. Apple began selling its Watches in April 2015, when it introduced the Series 0 Watch. Apple exclusively manufactured and sold Series 0 Watches from April 2015 until September 2016, when Apple discontinued their manufacture. Upon information and belief, consumers of the Series 0 Watch could choose between a number of models varying in price when purchasing their Watch: The Watch, Sport, Edition, or Hermès. Depending on the model, Series 0 Watches had steel, aluminum, or gold cases, and “Ion-X glass” or “Sapphire crystal” screens. Consumers could further select between a smaller, 38mm case, or a larger 42mm case. Prices for Series 0 Watches ranged from $349 to $1,099, depending on the model and other above-described features. 25. Starting in September 2016, Apple discontinued the manufacture of its Series 0 Watches and began to produce and sell both the Series 1 and Series 2 Watches. Apple still sells the Series 1 Watch, but discontinued manufacture of the Series 2 Watch in September 2017. 26. The Series 1 Watches only use aluminum cases with “Ion-X glass” screens, but consumers can choose a 38mm case or a 42mm case. Initially, prices for Series 1 watches varied between $269 and $299—depending on the size chosen—but have since dropped to $249 and $279. 58. Plaintiff requests this Court certify the following Class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: All current and former consumer owners of all models and sizes of First Generation, Series 1, Series 2, and Series 3 Apple Watches purchased in the United States. 59. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests this Court certify the following Class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: All residents of Colorado who are current and former consumer owners of all models and sizes of First Generation, Series 1, Series 2, and Series 3 Apple Watches purchased in the United States. 60. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend these Class definitions and, if deemed appropriate, to divide the class into additional subclasses. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 65. Apple’s business practices, as alleged above, constitute unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. 66. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably expected that their Watches would not be defective such that the screens would detach, crack, or shatter unexpectedly during normal use. 75. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 76. This claim arises under the CLRA. 93. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 94. Apple provided a one-year written Limited Warranty to consumers in connection with every sale of an Apple Watch (this warranty period is two years for Hermès and Edition models). Under the terms of the Limited Warranty, Apple warranted “against defects in materials and workmanship” in the Apple Watch “when used normally in accordance with Apple’s published guidelines for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of original retail purchase by the end-user purchaser. . . .” 95. Apple’s Limited Warranty provides that if the warranty is triggered during the warranty period, Apple will either: “(i) repair the Apple Product using new or previously used parts that are equivalent to new in performance and reliability, (ii) replace the Apple Product with the same model (or with your consent a product that has similar functionality) formed from new and/or previously used parts that are equivalent to new in performance and reliability, or (iii) exchange the Apple Product for a refund of your purchase price.”14 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, ET SEQ. On Behalf of the Nationwide Class IN VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ. (UCL) On Behalf of the Nationwide Class On Behalf of the Nationwide Class and Colorado Subclass

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14. World-Wide owns and manages buildings throughout the United States, including The Luna, located at 42-15 Crescent Street, Long Island City, New York. It rents within this building, studio apartments, and apartments with one or more bedrooms. 15. The Website is heavily integrated with The Luna, serving as a gateway to it. Through the Website, World-Wide’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about Luna, including its location, apartment features, available units, and building amenities; view images and floorplans of the apartments; learn about the team behind Luna, read News about the company and contact the leasing Center via a form contained on the Website. 16. It is, upon information and belief, World-Wide’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its apartment building. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to the Luna and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 19. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services World-Wide offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Lack of alt-text for images. For example, images are labeled “lunatilegreen.png,” or “lunatilesubway.png.” b. Document titles are blank. c. PDFs are not tagged and therefore are inaccessible by screen readers, d. Webpages have duplicate IDs, which cause problems with screen readers. e. Links use general text like “read more” but don’t have text explaining the link’s purpose. f. Webpages have no headings and headings are not nested properly. g. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to a different destination. h. Webpages have markup errors. World-Wide Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about available apartments, and contact The Luna as sighted users can. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 23. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that World-Wide has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 26. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because World-Wide lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring World-Wide to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist World-Wide to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 compliant; b. Training World-Wide employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that World-Wide’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on World-Wide’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. World-Wide has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 30. World-Wide has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access World-Wide’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in The Luna, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in The Luna, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 34. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether The Luna is a place of “public accommodation”; b. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 35. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that World-Wide has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. The Luna is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of The Luna. The Website is a service that is integrated with this building. 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. 47. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. The Luna constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of The Luna. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with The Luna. 49. World-Wide is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its New York apartment building, The Luna, and the Website. World-Wide is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 51. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 52. World-Wide’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that World-Wide has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 54. As World-Wide’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 55. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. World-Wide’s New York City building, The Luna, is a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with that establishment. 57. World-Wide is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates The Luna and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 58. World-Wide is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with The Luna to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that World-Wide makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 60. As such, World-Wide discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins World- Wide from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 61. As World-Wide’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 62. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. World-Wide, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers

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27. The Pennsylvania Legislature has authorized the City of Philadelphia to impose a fee of $300.00 per day for each offense under the Philadelphia Code to “[a]ny person who violates any provision of [the] code or regulations adopted thereunder; or who fails to comply with any order issued pursuant to any Section thereof; or who erects, constructs, installs, removes, alters, or repairs a structure, equipment or system in violation of the approved construction documents or directive of the code official or of a permit or certificate issued under the provisions of [the] code or the technical codes.” Philadelphia Administrative Code, Section A-601. 28. Section 1-109(1) of the Philadelphia Code states that “[u]nless otherwise provided, the penalty for violation of any provision of the Code or any regulation adopted under it is a fine not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300) for each offense. Each day the violation continues is a separate offense.” Philadelphia Code, Section 1-109(1). 30. Section 1-109(3) of the Philadelphia Code states: For violations that are designated in this Code as "Class III" offenses, the maximum fine shall be as follows: (a) for any violation committed between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005, seven hundred dollars ($700) for each violation; (b) for any violation committed between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006, one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100) for each violation; (c) for any violation committed between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007, one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) for each violation; (d) for any violation committed between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008, one thousand nine hundred dollars ($1,900) for each violation; and (e) for any violation committed on January 1, 2009 or thereafter, two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each violation. Philadelphia Code, Section 1-109(3). 31. On December 20, 2017, the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections began issuing notices to Tunskai that its property was in violation of Title 4 of the Philadelphia Administrative Code, Section A-601. 32. Pursuant to Philadelphia Code, Section 1-109, L&I fined Tunskai $7,200 per day. 33. Plaintiff was cited and ordered to pay a total of $2,045,100. II. 7. Tunskai bring this class action on behalf of itself and as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of the following Classes: I. VIOLATION NOTICES VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION TO DUE PROCESS (As Against All Defendants on behalf of the Class) 117. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein. 118. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, section 1, prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 119. The Defendants’ excessive fines scheme and their enforcement, as well as the execution proceedings that result from the same, as alleged above, have deprived Plaintiff and the Class Members of their property in violation of due process, resulting in a wide reach into their personal and real property. 120. As a direct result of such violation of due process, Plaintiff and the Class Members have been damaged. 121. The Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to the recovery of damages, and appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, as alleged herein.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates a commercial website, www.caselogic.com which serves as a retailer of cases and accessories for laptops, tablets, cell phones, cameras, drones, battery charges, hard drive and USB cases. The Defendant’s website offers potential consumers the option to purchase accessories and cases for their electronic devices through their website and various retailers around the country. 21. Defendant’s website offers consumers the ability to purchase products and goods through its website or search for a retail store location within a distance of the consumers zip code. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. -8- 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March of 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information about Defendant’s website and products and services it offers, the ability to browse various models of cases and goods, and related services available online. Plaintiff was unable to browse and proceed with the ordering process due to accessibility barriers. 25. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually- impaired prospective customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, look for Store locations and hours, the ability to browse -9- the products, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available both in Stores and online. b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific goods and services available for purchase and delivery, because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. -10- 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . .42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). -11- 33. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated -12- to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. -13- 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. -14- 44. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 45. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -15- 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -16- 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless -17- such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -18- c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -19- 70. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 73. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 74. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and -20- services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 77. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 79. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. -21- 80. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 83. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 84. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] -22- from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 87. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. -23- 90. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 93. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 96. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. -24- DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Equifax has not retrieved actual public records from courthouses or actual government offices for many years. 11. Nevertheless, on its credit reports that it provides to consumers, Equifax falsely still lists the names of courthouses or other government offices as the true “source” of its public records information. 12. The public records information that Equifax receives from its vendors are not the actual court or taxing authority records. Rather, it receives a distilled version of those records, which does not include all the information or most up-to- date information available at the actual courthouses or government offices where the true records are housed. 13. Equifax knows that both it and its public records vendors make mistakes in the distilled public records information that is acquired for purposes of credit reporting. 15. Defendant’s practices and procedures regarding the reporting of civil judgment information, specifically its failure to report the most up-to-date status of paid or satisfied civil judgments, causes widespread harm to Alabama consumers. 16. Defendant also routinely fails to remove Alabama civil judgments from consumers’ reports when those judgments have become nullities. 17. In 2016 and 2017, Equifax delivered reports about Ms. Peters to multiple end users, each of which used Equifax’s report to evaluate Ms. Peters’ creditworthiness. After the judgment was satisfied, Equifax continued to report the judgment to several existing and potential creditors resulting in a negative impact on Plaintiff’s credit standing regarding these transactions. 18. More specifically, Plaintiff lost an opportunity to purchase a lawn mower tractor at a fifty percent discount because of the inaccurate reporting on Plaintiff’s Equifax consumer report. 19. With respect to Ms. Peters, on or about March 29, 2011, judgment was entered against Ms. Peters in favor of Corporate Billing, Inc. (hereafter “Corporate Billing”) in Dale County, Alabama case number DV10-241, and in the original amount of $5,207.51. 21. On or about September 14, 2016, Full Satisfaction of Judgment was filed in Dale County, Alabama case number DV10-241. 22. On or about June 12, 2017, Ms. Peters requested and received a copy of her personal credit report from Equifax. The Equifax credit report contained inaccurate information, including but not limited to, reporting that Ms. Peters allegedly had an outstanding civil judgment lodged against her in the amount of $5,207. 23. The civil judgment information Equifax included on Ms. Peters’ report was woefully deficient. This civil judgment had been paid and satisfied more than eight months earlier. Full Satisfaction of Judgment was filed in the public record for the County of Dale, Alabama on September 14, 2016. 24. Despite the Full Satisfaction of Judgment being recorded in the public record, and pursuant to its usual and systematic practice, Defendant did not update its records to show that the civil judgment had been paid and satisfied. 25. The FCRA provides: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 27. The reporting of Ms. Peters’ civil judgment by Equifax was inaccurate and occurred because Equifax failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of Ms. Peter’s consumer report. Specifically, Equifax does not follow the same automated and systematically rigorous processes to obtain all satisfactions and releases of civil judgments that it follows to obtain the original civil judgment information. 28. Indeed, Equifax follows no procedure which assures that, every time a civil judgment in Alabama is paid or satisfied, the updated status is promptly obtained and reflected upon the consumer’s credit report, or that the judgment is removed from that consumer’s credit file. 30. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant was acting by and through its agents, servants and or employees who were acting within the course and scope of their agency or employment, and under the direct supervision and control of the Defendant herein. 31. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 32. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following class: All natural persons who: (i) had a civil judgment recorded in the State of Alabama, (ii) the civil judgment appeared on an Equifax consumer report dated within five years prior to the filing of this Complaint, and (iii) the State of Alabama public record indicated that the civil judgment had been paid or satisfied on a date prior to the date of the Equifax consumer report. 33. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Class based on discovery or legal developments. 34. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A)(1). The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. Upon information and belief Defendant sells hundreds if not thousands of consumer reports each year, and those persons’ names and addresses are identifiable through documents maintained by Defendant. 36. Typicality. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class member. Plaintiff has the same claims for statutory and punitive damages as Class members, arising out of Defendant’s common course of conduct. 37. Adequacy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class. Her interests are aligned with and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class she seeks to represent, she has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference those paragraphs set out above as though fully set forth herein. 40. The above mentioned reports are “consumer reports” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 42. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o, Equifax is liable to Plaintiff and all Class members for its failure to comply with FCRA § 1681e(b), in an amount equal to the sum of (1) damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 per violation; (2) actual damages; (3) punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury; (4) attorney’s fees; and (5) litigation costs, as well as such further relief as may be permitted by law. 6. Defendant is one of the “big three” credit reporting agencies (singular “CRA”) in the United States. 7. Defendant sells consumer reports (commonly called “credit reports”) about millions of consumers annually, including consumers in Alabama. 9. Upon information and belief, for several years Defendant has obtained its information about Alabama and federal bankruptcies, civil judgments and tax liens (i.e. “public records” information) from private businesses that it calls “vendors,” which furnish such information to national CRAs.

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14. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former non-managerial employees of Defendants, who during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants as bartenders or waitresses, or in a similar role, and who consent to file a claim to recover damages for overtime compensation that is legally due to them (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 15. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay, or one and one-half times the minimum wage rate, if greater, for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. 16. At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay, or one and one-half times the minimum wage rate, if greater, for all hours worked each week over forty, yet they purposefully and willfully chose and choose not to do so. 18. Defendant Galeas owns and operates Dyckman, a bar and restaurant located at 221 Dyckman Street, New York, New York. 19. At all times relevant herein, Defendants have employed and continue to employee at least eleven employees. 20. In March 2015, Defendant Galeas, on behalf of Dyckman, hired Plaintiff to work for Defendants as a bartender and waitress. 21. Defendants, prior to or at Plaintiff’s hire, failed to provide Plaintiff with a written notice of her pay rate, their intent to claim a tip credit against the minimum wage, or her regular payday. 22. Defendant Galeas personally hired Plaintiff and supervised Plaintiff’s day-to-day duties at the bar and restaurant. 23. As a bartender and waitress, as its name suggests, Plaintiff’s main duties consisted of preparing drinks and food orders, polishing glasses, serving customers, and providing bottle service. 25. During the month of February 2017, Dyckman required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, at The Kilt (also known as The Bronx Public) in addition to her regularly scheduled hours at Dyckman. In February 2017, Defendants required Plaintiff to work up to seven days per week at both The Kilt and Dyckman Bar. 26. From the beginning of Plaintiff’s employment up until the date of filing of this Complaint, Defendants paid and continue to pay Plaintiff an hourly rate of $7.50 for all hours worked. Throughout this employment, Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff an overtime premium of one and one-half times her regular hourly rate for any hours that she worked in a week in excess of forty. 27. By way of example only, during the week of February 26 through March 4, 2017, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, seven days as follows: Sunday from 4:30 p.m. until 5:00 a.m.; Monday through Thursday from 5:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m.; and Friday through Saturday from 4:30 p.m. until 5:00 a.m., without any scheduled or uninterrupted breaks. During that week, Defendants paid Plaintiff at the rate of $7.50 per hour for all hours worked, including those that she worked in excess of forty. 28. Additionally, throughout her employment, on every workday that Plaintiff worked for Defendants on Friday through Sunday, her spread of hours from the beginning of each shift to the end exceeded ten. However, on those days, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff with an additional hour’s pay at the New York State minimum wage rate. 29. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis by check. 31. Additionally, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the time of her hire that accurately contained, inter alia, Plaintiff’s rates of pay as designated by the employer or an intent to claim a tip credit. 32. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs in the same manner described herein. 33. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits and minimize their labor costs and overhead. 34. Each hour that Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 35. Making matters much worse, in a letter dated July 11, 2017, Plaintiff complained to Defendants, in writing, about Defendants’ failure to pay her for all overtime hours worked, as well as Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at the minimum wage or provide Plaintiff with spread of hours premiums, proper wage statements on each payday, or a proper wage notice at the time of hire, all as the NYLL requires. Immediately upon receiving this letter, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by cutting her schedule from five days per week to one day per week, effectively cutting her hours from fifty-three and one-half hours to eight hours per week. As a result, Defendants reduced Plaintiff’s pay from approximately $300.00 per week to approximately $60.00 per week, and Plaintiff lost approximately $240.00 in her weekly income. 37. Defendants did not allow Plaintiff to cover coworkers’ shifts on approximately five subsequent occasions, to wit on August 19, 2017; August 31, 2017; September 2, 2017; September 3, 2017; and September 9. 2017. 38. Moreover, on August 22, 2017, Defendant Galeas called Plaintiff’s employer from another establishment, Jeffrey Pichardo, and said he should hire Plaintiff full-time as an additional act of retaliation. 39. Defendants never refused Plaintiff permission to cover coworkers’ shifts prior to receiving Plaintiff’s complaint about Defendants’ unlawful payroll practices. 40. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 41. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than not less than the greater between one and one-half times their regular rates of pay, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek . 42. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA, while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 43. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 44. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 46. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 47. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 48. N.Y. Lab. Law § 160 and 12 NYCCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than the greater between one and one-half times their regular rates of pay, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 49. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR, while Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR. 50. As also described above, Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the NYLL’s and the NYCCRR’s overtime provisions. 51. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are entitled to their overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay, one and one-half times the minimum wage rate, if greater. 53. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 54. N.Y. Lab. Law § 652 and 12 NYCCRR § 146-1.2 prescribe a minimum wage that employers must pay to their employees for each hour worked. 55. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR, while Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR. 56. As also described above, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff, or any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, at the minimum hourly rate required by the NYLL and NYCCRR for all hours worked. 57. At the least, Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are entitled to the minimum rate of pay required by the NYLL and NYCCRR for all hours worked. 58. Plaintiff, and any FLSA Plaintiff that opts in to this action, are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the NYLL’s and NYCCRR’s minimum wage provisions. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages under the NYLL and the NYCCRR Unpaid Overtime Under the NYLL and the NYCCRR Unpaid Overtime Under the FLSA

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49. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access, or will attempt to access, Defendant’s ATMs. 50. The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 51. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct.

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16. State Farm issued the Subject Policies in the United States using standardized contracts notated as FORM-94030 between roughly January 1, 1994 and June 30, 2004. On information and belief, State Farm continues to accept payments on the ’94 Policy from roughly 540,000 policyholders in the United States. 17. Owners of the Subject Policies were not permitted to negotiate any of the terms; the terms of the Subject Policies are not subject to individual negotiation and are materially the same across the Class. They cannot be altered by an agent’s representations at the time of sale, and any endorsements, amendments, or riders must be signed by an officer to be valid. 18. State Farm has administered and currently administers all aspects of Subject Policies. In this capacity, State Farm has (and continues to) collected premiums and set, assessed, and deducted policy charges, including the COI charge, on the Subject Policies. 19. Unlike standard term life insurance policies, the Subject Policies provide policy holders an investment, savings, or interest-bearing component. The Subject Policies refer to this component as “Cash Value,” “Account Value,” or something similar.5 56. This action is brought by Plaintiff individually and on behalf of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 66 above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 67. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class. 68. The Subject Policies are binding and enforceable contracts. 73. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 66 above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 74. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class. 75. The Subject Policies are binding and enforceable contracts. 76. Each of the contracts include an implied covenant that State Farm will act in good faith and deal fairly with Plaintiff, and that neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract. 77. State Farm breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Plaintiff and the Class by not reducing its COI charges in light of the well-established decreased mortality rates. As a consequence thereof, Plaintiff and the Class suffered financial losses and were therefore injured. 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 66 above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 81. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class. 82. Plaintiff and the Class had a property interest in the funds State Farm deducted from their Cash Values in excess of the amounts permitted by the terms of the Subject Policies. 83. By deducting COI Charges and Expense Charges in unauthorized amounts from the Cash Values of Plaintiff and the Class, State Farm misappropriated or misapplied specific funds placed in the custody of State Farm for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Class for use consistent with the terms of the Subject Policies, without authorization or consent, and diverted those funds for its own use. 84. As a direct and proximate result of State Farm’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged. A. The Subject Policies BREACH OF CONTRACT BREACH OF THE CONVENANT OF GOOD FAITH & FAIR DEALING CONVERSION

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(For Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) (Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. and 720 ILCS 295/1a) 101. Plaintiff DeLisle and Class Members re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above. 102. Plaintiff DeLisle brings this count individually and on behalf of members of the Illinois Subclass against Defendant. 103. Defendant is a “person” as that term is defined in 815 ILCS 505/1(c). 104. Plaintiff and the Illinois Class are “consumers” as that term is defined in 815 ILCS 505/1(e). 105. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Illinois Act”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact … in the conduct of trade or commerce … whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” 815 (Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et seq.) 31. The Sig family of companies designs and manufactures both military and civilian firearms. Currently Sig claims that about one-third of police forces in the United States use Sig’s firearms. 32. Until recently, Sig primarily designed and manufactured hammer-fired pistols. Hammer-fired pistols rely upon the falling of an internal or external hammer to impact the firing pin or transfer bar. 33. In Sig’s hammer-fired pistols, a disconnector safety stops the pistol from being able to fire out-of-battery. Modern semi-automatic pistols include a single fixed firing chamber that is integral to the rear of the barrel, as well as, a combination of parts that allow for the firearm to lock prior to the cartridge being fired, and a feeding device (e.g., a magazine) that allows for a new round to be placed in the chamber at the end of the firing cycle. 68. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The proposed Class includes all individuals who purchased one or more Sig model P320 Pistols in the United States (the “Class”) from 2014 until the present (the “Class Period”). Excluded from the Class are assigned judges and members of their families within the first degree of consanguinity, Defendant, and their subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, and directors. 80. Plaintiffs and Class Members reallege and incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above. 81. Sig Pistols are consumer products as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 82. Plaintiffs and Class Members are consumers as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 83. At all relevant times, Defendant were suppliers and warrantors as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4) and (5). 84. The amount in controversy of each individual’s claim is more than the sum or value of twenty-five ($25) dollars. 85. In connection with the sale of Sig Pistols, Defendant issued written warranties as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), which expressly warranted that Sig Pistols could safely be used for the intended purpose. In fact, Sig Pistols did not have a disconnect safety rendering them susceptible to out-of-battery discharge events. 87. Plaintiff Hartley re-alleges and incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above. 88. Plaintiff Harley brings this count individually, and on behalf of the National Class and the Missouri Subclass. 89. The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act broadly prohibits false, fraudulent or deceptive merchandising practices. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020. 90. At all relevant times, Defendant’s sales or distribution of Sig Pistols was a “sale” as defined by Section 407.010 because such sale or distribution constituted a sale, lease, offer for sale or lease, or attempt to sell or lease merchandise for cash or on credit. 91. At all relevant times, Defendant’s manufacturing, marketing, advertising, sales and/or distribution of Sig Pistols was an “advertisement” as defined by Section 407.010 because such manufacturing, marketing, advertising, sales or distribution constituted an attempt by publication, dissemination, solicitation, circulation, or any other means to induce, directly or indirectly, any person to enter into any obligation or acquire any title or interest in any merchandise. 96. Plaintiff Hartley and Class Members re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation set forth above. 97. Plaintiff Hartley brings this count individually, and on behalf of the nationwide Class and the Missouri Subclass under Missouri law. 98. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit on Sig by purchasing Sig Pistols. Defendant was aware of this benefit, and at the same time aware of the undisclosed defects the Pistols. A. Sig’s Model P320 Pistols

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(Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 21. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 22. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 25. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 28. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 29. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 31. Defendant operates the Website, which is an online store and informational website allowing visitors to order food for delivery, make reservations, and purchase merchandise, amongst other features. It delivers information to millions of people across the United States. 32. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 33. The Website allows users to browse and read reviews, view photographs, and watch videos, including a prominently displayed video on the website’s homepage (and on other pages of the website), about the restaurants’ features and atmosphere. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 35. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 36. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 37. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 39. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 40. The Website contains a prominent video that lacks captioning. The video, appearing on the homepage of the website is about the restaurant, describing its food and drinks and its atmosphere and does not contain closed captioning. The lack of captioning prevents Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing people from understanding the content of that videos, thus preventing them from learning about Defendant’s establishment. 41. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 42. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 45. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 46. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 50. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), a “place of education,” a “place of exhibition or entertainment,” a “place of recreation,” and “service establishments.” 51. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 52. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 53. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 54. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. §36.211. 55. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 57. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 58. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Individuals who are deaf and hard of hearing have been denied full and equal access to the Website have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 60. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 63. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 66. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 71. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 72. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 73. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 76. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 77. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 83. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . . ” 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 85. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 86. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . . ” 89. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . . ” 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 92. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation . . . [b]ecause of any person’s . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly . . . [t]o refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation.” 95. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102. 96. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102. 97. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf. This inaccessibility denies deaf patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 99. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 100. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 101. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 102. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 103. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 104. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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1. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to M.G.L. c. 149, § 150 and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; 2. With respect to the FLSA overtime claim, certification of this case as a collective action and an order conditionally certifying classes of similarly-situated individuals, permitting the issuance of notice informing affected employees of their right to opt in to this action; 3. With respect to the FLSA overtime claim, a finding that Defendants’ violations were willful and knowing, and therefore subject to a three- year statute of limitations; 4. An award of damages for all wages and other losses to which Plaintiff and all class members are entitled, including mandatory treble damages under Massachusetts law and liquidated damages under the FLSA; 5. Attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest; and FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME – FLSA (COLLECTIVE ACTION) As set forth above, Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay their hourly employees overtime wages violates the overtime provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). This claim is asserted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216. FAILURE TO PAY WAGES – MASSACHUSETTS LAW (CLASS ACTION) As set forth above, Defendants violated M.G.L. c. 149, § 148, by failing to pay on a timely basis all wages due to Plaintiff and other hourly workers, including all overtime wages required under federal law. This is claim is brought pursuant to M.G.L. c. 149, § 150. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court enter the following relief:

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13. McAfee markets and sells subscriptions to its anti-virus computer software products. Generally, the subscriptions are one year in length. Three of the software products that McAfee has marketed and sold subscriptions to throughout the relevant time period are McAfee AntiVirus Plus, McAfee Internet Security, and McAfee Total Protection. These three products are collectively referred to herein as the “McAfee Software.” 14. McAfee represents to consumers that subscribing to McAfee Software will help them protect their computers from hackers and other “online threats,” computer viruses, and other computer problems. For example, McAfee represents that its McAfee Total Protection software will help “Guard your PC, social network, identity, family, and home network with our ultimate protection against hackers, malware, thieves, phishing, and other online threats.” Similarly, McAfee represents that its McAfee AntiVirus Plus software will allow customers to “Confidently surf, shop, and socialize online as our essential antivirus, antimalware, and firewall protect your PC and data.” 15. Consumers can purchase McAfee Software directly from McAfee’s website or from a retailer authorized to sell McAfee Software, such as Amazon.com, Wal-Mart, Target, Best Buy, or Office Depot. 16. In addition, some consumers initially sign up for “free trial” subscriptions to McAfee Software (e.g., for a 30-day or 60-day “trial” period), after which McAfee aggressively encourages them, through expiration warning messages and other advertising and prompts, to purchase a one-year paid subscription to McAfee Software, which the customer can do via McAfee’s website or by following a purchase path provided by McAfee in their McAfee Software. B. The Auto-Renewal Program 17. For consumers who purchase a one-year subscription to McAfee Software through McAfee’s website or through the McAfee Software itself, McAfee automatically enrolls them in Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page4 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 5 - 54. On October 8, 2011, Plaintiff Sam Williamson purchased a desktop computer from a Micro Center retail store in Tustin, California. The computer that Mr. Williamson purchased came pre-installed with a 60-day “free trial” subscription to McAfee AntiVirus Plus. Later that day, Mr. Williamson activated the “free trial” subscription on his new computer by clicking an icon on the desktop and following instructions provided by McAfee. 55. While Mr. Williamson was in the process of activating the “free trial” subscription, McAfee displayed advertising on his computer encouraging him to purchase a one- year paid subscription to the software. McAfee’s prompts and advertising promised Mr. Williamson that if he immediately purchased a one-year subscription, he would receive a discount from McAfee’s purported regular selling price for the product. McAfee offered to sell Mr. Williamson a one-year subscription to McAfee AntiVirus Plus for $29.99, at a promised discount of $20.00 from the purported regular price of $49.99. McAfee prominently displayed both the purported “regular” price and the representation that Mr. Williamson would supposedly save $20.00 by making the purchase at that time. 56. Relying on McAfee’s representations, Mr. Williamson clicked on one of McAfee’s advertising prompts, which took him to a page in the software where he could purchase a paid subscription to McAfee AntiVirus Plus. On that page, McAfee again prominently represented to Mr. Williamson that its regular selling price for a one-year subscription to McAfee AntiVirus Plus was $49.99, and that the $29.99 price offered to Mr. Williamson that day reflected a discount of $20.00 from the purported regular price. Relying on McAfee’s representations, Mr. Williamson purchased a one-year subscription to McAfee Anti-Virus Plus for $29.99 by entering his credit card information as prompted by McAfee. 57. The purported discount that McAfee represented to Mr. Williamson was false and misleading, because the purported regular price of $49.99 that McAfee represented was fabricated and failed to represent McAfee’s true regular or former price for a one-year McAfee AntiVirus Plus subscription. On information and belief, McAfee did not offer for sale, or make substantial sales of, McAfee AntiVirus Plus at a price of $49.99 within a reasonable period of time before Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page19 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 20 - 62. Plaintiff brings this class-action lawsuit on behalf of himself and the proposed members of the “Class” pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and on behalf of himself and the proposed members of the “Reference Price Class” pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 63. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following “Class”: Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page21 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 22 - 78. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 79. McAfee entered into valid contractual agreements with Plaintiff and all Class members. 80. The material terms of McAfee’s contracts with Plaintiff and the Class members included McAfee’s obligation that, under the Auto-Renewal program, customers enrolled in the program would have their McAfee Software subscriptions renewed at a price no higher than the normal, then-current price that McAfee charged other customers for the same products. 81. Plaintiff and all Class members gave consideration that was fair and reasonable, and have performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required to be performed under their contracts with McAfee. 82. McAfee has breached its contracts with Plaintiff and the Class members by charging them prices that were higher than the normal, then-current prices that McAfee charged other customers for the same products. Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page27 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 28 - 85. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 86. A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract, including in the contracts between McAfee and Plaintiff and the Class members. 87. Where a contract vests one party with discretion, the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies, and the party exercising the discretion must do so in a manner that satisfies the objectively reasonable expectations of the other party. A party may not perform an agreement in a manner that would frustrate the basic purpose of the agreement and/or deprive the other party of its rights and benefits under the agreement. 88. It was objectively reasonable under the circumstances for Plaintiff and the Class to expect that, when their McAfee Software subscriptions were renewed by McAfee pursuant to the Auto-Renewal program, McAfee would charge them prices that were no higher than the normal, then-current prices that McAfee charged other customers for the same products, and not some special, higher price that was only charged to Auto-Renewal customers. 89. McAfee has abused any and all power it has to impose the prices charged to Plaintiff and the Class. Moreover, McAfee’s conduct alleged herein is inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of Plaintiff and the Class, and is inconsistent with what an objectively reasonable consumer would have expected under the circumstances. Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page28 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 29 - 94. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 95. McAfee has knowingly been enriched, at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class members, as a result of its misconduct alleged herein. Such enrichment includes substantial revenues that McAfee has received from Plaintiff and the Class members for additional amounts that McAfee charged them, over and above what McAfee should have charged them. 96. Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ detriment, and McAfee’s enrichment, are traceable to, and resulted directly and proximately from, the misconduct challenged in this Complaint. 97. It would be inequitable for, and good conscience militates against permitting, McAfee to retain the amounts that it received as a result of its misconduct alleged herein. Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page29 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 30 - 99. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 100. McAfee’s practices alleged herein constitute unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. 101. McAfee’s misrepresentations and omissions, as alleged herein, constitute unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. 102. The misrepresentations and omissions by McAfee alleged herein were the type of representations and omissions that are regularly considered to be material, i.e., a reasonable person would attach importance to them and would be induced to act on the information in making purchase decisions. 103. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff and each Class member have been injured and have lost money or property and are entitled to restitution and injunctive relief. 104. Unless restrained by this Court, McAfee will continue to engage in unfair, deceptive, and unlawful conduct, as alleged above, in violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et. seq. A. McAfee Software Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (On Behalf of the Class) Breach of Contract (On Behalf the Class) In The Alternative, Violations of New York General Business Law §349 134. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 135. This Count is alleged, in the alternative, on behalf of those Class members residing in the State of New York. 136. New York General Business Law § 349 prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service….” 137. The misconduct by McAfee alleged in this Complaint is consumer oriented, is of a recurring nature, is directed at consumers and the public at large, and has affected and continues to affect at least thousands of consumers. Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page34 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 35 - In the Alternative, Violations of New York General Business Law § 350 144. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 145. This Count is alleged, in the alternative, on behalf of those Class members residing in the State of New York. 146. New York General Business Law § 350 prohibits “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service….” 147. With respect to Class members residing in the State of New York, the false advertising by McAfee alleged herein has occurred in the conduct of business, trade or commerce, and/or in the furnishing of a service, in the State of New York. Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page35 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 36 - Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of the Class) Violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et. seq. (On Behalf of the Class) Violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et. seq. (On Behalf of the Class) 105. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page30 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 31 - Violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750 et. Seq. (On Behalf of the Class) 119. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 120. McAfee is a “person,” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(c). 121. Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers,” as defined by California Civil Code §1761(d). 122. McAfee Software subscriptions and the Auto-Renewal program constitute “goods” and “services,” as defined by California Civil Code §1761(a) and (b). 123. Plaintiff’s and Class members’ purchases and renewals of McAfee Software subscriptions constitute “transactions,” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(e). 124. Plaintiff and Class members purchased McAfee Software subscriptions for personal, family, and household purposes as meant by California Civil Code § 1761(d). Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page32 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 33 - Violations of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq, California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq, and California Civil Code § 1750 et seq. (On Behalf of the Reference Price Class) 153. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 154. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the proposed members of the Reference Price Class. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to enjoin McAfee from continuing to advertise false former prices and false discounts, as alleged herein. 155. McAfee uses its Auto-Renewal pricing scheme, alleged above, to help carry out yet another unlawful pricing scheme—this one perpetrated by McAfee on those customers who purchase new McAfee Software subscriptions or manually renew existing subscriptions via McAfee’s website or their McAfee Software. 156. To these customers, McAfee advertises two prices for McAfee Software subscriptions: (a) the selling price; and (b) directly next to the selling price, a higher expressly- referenced former price with a line, or “slash,” through it. McAfee also expressly represents that Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page36 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 37 - Violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17600 et seq. (On Behalf of the Class) 111. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 112. Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers” under California Business & Professions Code § 17601(d). 113. McAfee’s Auto-Renewal program constitutes an “automatic renewal” plan or arrangement under California Business & Professions Code § 17601(a). 114. McAfee’s contractual promises and representations regarding Auto-Renewal pricing, as alleged herein, constitute “automatic renewal offer terms” under California Business & Professions Code §§ 17601(b) and 17601(b)(3). Case5:14-cv-00158-EJD Document1 Filed01/10/14 Page31 of 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1148285.3 - 32 -

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10. In or around January 2018, Plaintiff SEBASTIAN LEON was hired by Defendants to work as a cook for Defendants’ Murray’s Bagels Restaurant located at 242 8th Avenue, New York, NY 10011. In or around March 2018, Plaintiff LEON was transferred by Defendants to work at Defendant’s Zucker’s Bagels & Smoked Fish Restaurant located at 370 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10017, where he worked for the remainder of his employment by Defendants. Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants terminated in May 2019. 11. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff worked four (4) days per week for ten and a half (10½) hours per day, and one (1) day per week for eleven (11) hours per day, for a total of fifty three (53) hours each week. During Plaintiff LEON’s employment with Defendants, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members worked similar hours. 13. Plaintiff LEON and other employees of Defendants were expected to work, but not permitted to clock in, at the beginning of each of their scheduled shifts every week. On three (3) days of the week, Plaintiff LEON and other employees of Defendants were expected to work, but not permitted to clock in, for twenty (20) minutes at the beginning of their scheduled shift. In addition, for two (2) days of the week, Plaintiff LEON and other employees of Defendants were expected to work, but not permitted to clock in, for one (1) hour at the beginning of their scheduled shift. Thus, Plaintiff LEON and other employees of Defendants performed three (3) hours of off-the-clock work each week. Plaintiff LEON and other employees of Defendants were not paid for this off-the-clock work. 15. Defendants never provided Plaintiff LEON with wage notices, as required by the NYLL. Similarly, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members were never provided with any wage notices. 16. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff LEON with proper wage statements at all relevant times. Similarly, the Class members also did not receive proper wage statements, in violation of the NYLL. 17. Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class members had workdays that regularly exceeded ten (10) hours in length. However, Defendants routinely failed to pay them spread of hours premiums due under the NYLL. 18. Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class members were required by Defendants to perform unpaid off-the-clock work, resulting in unpaid wages and overtime premium. 19. At no time during the relevant time periods did Defendants provide Plaintiff or the Class members with wage notices or proper wage statements as required by NYLL. 19. At all relevant times, Plaintiff LEON and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs have been and are similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and have been and continue to be subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules—all of which have culminated in a willful failure and refusal to pay Plaintiff LEON and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all hours worked, including overtime premium at one-and-one half times their base hourly rates for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. Plaintiff LEON’s claims stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 20. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 20. In or around May 2019, Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and Class members, in this litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. 21. In or around June 2019, Plaintiff LEON sent a demand letter addressed to Defendants’ Restaurant located at 370 Lexington Avenue—Plaintiff LEON’s last place of employment with Defendants. 21. Plaintiff brings claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 23, on behalf of all current and former non-exempt employees, including but not limited to cooks, food preparers, cashiers, counter persons, and cleaning persons employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six (6) years before the filing of the Complaint (the “Class” or “Class Members”). 23. The proposed Class is so numerous such that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown because the facts on which the calculation of that number rests are presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is no doubt that there are more than forty (40) members of the Class. 23. The demand letter further stated that Plaintiff LEON intended to proceed with his claims on a class-wide basis on behalf of similarly situated employees of Defendants, but would be amenable to expedient resolution of this matter. To that end, Plaintiff’s demand letter included a tolling agreement requesting a timely response from Defendants. 24. Plaintiff LEON’s claims are typical of those claims that could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subjected to the same corporate practices of Defendants, including (i) mandating unpaid off-the-clock work, (ii) failing to pay overtime premium, (iii) failing to pay spread of hours, (iv) failing to provide wage statements in compliance with the New York Labor Law, and (v) failing to provide wage and hour notices upon hiring and as required thereafter, pursuant to the New York Labor Law. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiffs and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries, and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures by Defendants. 24. At all relevant times, Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs’ rights by failing to pay them wages in the lawful amount for all hours worked, including those in excess of forty (40) hours worked each week, due to time-shaving. 24. Defendants did not, and to date have not, signed or otherwise responded to the tolling agreement. 25. However, approximately one week after the demand letter was sent, Defendants appeared to respond by mailing Plaintiff LEON a paycheck in the amount of $829.14. Plaintiff did not then, and to date has not, cashed this check. A copy of this check has been attached hereto as Exhibit A. 26. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy—particularly in the context of the wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class Members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class Members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 26. Defendants did not, and to date have not, provided any statement, reasoning, or context regarding the $829.14 paycheck sent to Plaintiff LEON. 27. In or around the time Plaintiff LEON received the paycheck from Defendants, he was informed by his former coworkers that employees of Defendants—including but not limited to cooks, food preparers, cashiers, counter persons, and cleaning persons at all the Restaurants— each received a check for $300. 29. Notwithstanding this admission of fault, Defendants did not provide, and still have not provided, any time or wage statements supporting the claim that each employee was owed only, and exactly, $300 for Defendants’ timekeeping discrepancies. 30. Plaintiff LEON believes that the $829.14 he received from Defendants, and the $300 other employees individually received, constitute an illicit attempt by Defendants to quiet this dispute without allowing for a proper investigation of Plaintiff’s claims brought on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 31. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 30 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 32. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 33. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 34. At all relevant times, each Corporate Defendant had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 35. Records, if any exist, concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiff intends to obtain these records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, Plaintiff will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. 36. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 38. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid overtime premium, and an equal amount as liquidated damages. 40. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 41. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Class members were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 42. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members for all hours worked, including at the statutory rate of time and one-half the regular rate for overtime hours worked, due to Defendants’ policy of time-shaving. 43. In addition, Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff and the Class members’ rights by failing to pay them spread of hours premiums required by state law; 44. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff and the Class members’ rights by refusing to compensate them for off-the-clock hours during which they were required to work; 45. Defendants failed to properly notify employees of their hourly pay rate and overtime rate, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law; 46. Defendants failed to provide a proper wage and hour notice, on the date of hiring and annually, to all non-exempt employees, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law; 47. Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements with every payment issued to Plaintiff and the Class members, as required by New York Labor Law § 195(3). VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND FLSA COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBERS

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24. Plaintiff, GRACE LAMEY, readopts and realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 23 above. 25. Plaintiff is entitled to be paid time and one-half of her applicable regular rate of pay for each hour she worked for Defendants in excess of Forty (40) hours per work week during the three (3) year statute of limitations period between April 2016 and March 2017. 26. All similarly situated employees who have worked for Defendants in the position known as “Shuttle Experience Manager” throughout the United States are also entitled to be paid time and one-half of their applicable regular rates of pay for each and every overtime hour they have worked for Defendants but were not properly compensated for working on Defendants’ behalf during any work weeks within the three (3) year statute of limitations period between June 2014 and the present. 27. Defendants have knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and the other employees similarly situated to her at time and one-half of their applicable regular rates of pay for all hours worked for Defendants in excess of Forty (40) per week between June 2014 and the 8 present. 28. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendants had constructive and/or actual notice that Defendants’ compensation practices did not provide Plaintiff and the other “Shuttle Experience Managers” with time and one-half wages for all of their actual overtime hours worked between June 2014 and the present based upon, inter alia, Defendants knowingly failing to pay time and one-half wages for all of the actual hours worked in excess of Forty (40) hours per week by Plaintiff and other similarly situated non-exempt “Shuttle Experience Managers,” however variously titled. 29. By reason of the said intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, all Plaintiffs (the named Plaintiff and those “Shuttle Experience Managers” similarly situated to her who have worked for Defendants between June 2014 and the present) have suffered damages plus incurring costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 30. Defendants did not have a good faith basis for their failure to pay time and one-half wages for all of the actual hours worked by Plaintiff and the other similarly situated “Shuttle Experience Managers” in one or more weeks during the three (3) year statute of limitations period between June 2014 and the present, as a result of which Plaintiff and those similarly situated to her are entitled to the recovery of liquidated damages from Defendants pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 31. Plaintiff has retained the undersigned counsel to represent her in this action, and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA. 32. Plaintiff demands a jury trial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, GRACE LAMEY, and any current or former employees 9 similarly situated to her who join this action as Opt-In Plaintiffs, demand judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, JETSMARTER, INC. and SERGEY PETROSSOV, for the payment of all unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and for all proper relief including prejudgment interest. OVERTIME VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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1.5 times his regular rate of pay, which should have included all wages received and not just those labeled as hourly rates of pay. As a result, BAR S significantly underpaid Shaw for overtime hours worked. 19. Consistent with their policies and patterns or practices as described herein, Defendant harmed Plaintiff, individually, as follows: Kenny Shaw 20. Shaw was employed by BAR S as a load operator from approximately October 2018 through March 23, 2020 in Wyoming. 21. During the course of his employment, Shaw regularly worked over 40 hours per week up to approximately 90 hours in a workweek. 22. Despite regularly working over 40 hours per week, BAR S did not properly pay Shaw proper overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40. In this regard, BAR S compensated Shaw in part on an hourly basis on his paystubs. In addition to this hourly wage, Shaw would also receive additional wages on the same or separate paystub. This additional compensation was subject to taxes, included in his year to date wage amounts, and depended upon the hours worked by Shaw. 23. BAR S failed to pay Shaw proper overtime compensation because it failed to pay him 24. Plaintiff brings the First Cause of Action, an FLSA claim, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked as Non-Exempt Laborers for BAR S throughout the United States who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 26. Consistent with Defendant’s policies and patterns or practices, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were not paid the proper premium overtime compensation of 1.5 times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 27. All of the work that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have performed has been assigned by Defendant, and/or Defendant has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have performed. 28. As part of their regular business practice, Defendant has intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to, willfully failing to pay their employees, including Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, proper premium overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 29. Defendant’s unlawful conduct, as described in this Complaint, is pursuant to a corporate policy or practice of minimizing labor costs by failing to properly pay overtime compensation to its employees. 30. Defendant is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 31. There are many similarly situated current and former Non-Exempt Laborers who have been denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. This notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 33. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 34. The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendant and protect Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective. 35. During this time, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 36. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the premium overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA – at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rates of pay, which should have included all compensation earned per workweek – for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 37. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime compensation in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)

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20. For all times relevant herein, Mr. Thompson was the owner of a cellular telephone line with the (216) prefix and ending in 3056. 21. Mr. Thompson registered the phone number referenced above on the National Do Not Call Registry on June 25, 2009. 22. Mr. Thompson received a text message from Defendants on December 7, 2019, from the number identified on his caller ID as 657-360-4652. The unsolicited robotext stated: “Congrats Brian! Your code 7SR-K9M2 printed on your last receipt is among 7 we randomly picked for $1,000 Walmart gift card promotion c6rzc.info/lg6RF72BTV87.” 23. Mr. Thompson replied “Stop.” 24. Defendants sent the unsolicited robotext to Mr. Thompson’s cellular telephone for the purpose of sending Mr. Thompson spam advertisements and promotional offers, via text messages, like those described above. 25. For all relevant times herein, Mr. Thompson never consented to receive phone calls or text messages from Defendants. 26. For all relevant times herein, Mr. Thompson never provided his telephone number to Defendants. 27. For all relevant times herein, Mr. Thompson never did business with Defendants. 29. Ms. Thompson registered the phone number referenced above on the National Do Not Call Registry on June 16, 2012. 30. On December 24, 2019, at 9:09 a.m., Ms. Thompson received an unsolicited robotext message from Defendants from the number identified on her caller ID as 951-391-2478. This unsolicited message stated: “Congrats WAYNE L! Your code R5Z-M9T8 printed on your last receipt is among 7 we randomly picked for $1,000 Walmart gift card promotion n1xrn.info/A9lcOJ4mtGyC.” 31. Since December 24, 2019 until the present, Defendants have continued to send Ms. Thompson spam advertisements and promotional offers, via unsolicited text messages. 32. Ms. Thompson received an unsolicited robotext from Defendants purporting to be from Amazon, stating: “FINAL NOTICE: WAYNE L, please review your address details for shipment ID: 7S86J3 HERE: l8cr.xyz/M5GpXbsJCe Sender: AMAZON.” 33. For all relevant times herein, Ms. Thompson never consented to receive phone calls or text messages from Defendants. 34. For all relevant times herein, Ms. Thompson never provided her telephone number to Defendants. 35. For all relevant times herein, Ms. Thompson never did business with Defendants. 36. Plaintiffs’ telephone numbers that Defendants texted were assigned to a cellular telephone service. 38. Each of Defendants’ text messages to Plaintiffs constitutes a violation or multiple violations of the TCPA, including 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)’s prohibition against the use of an ATDS. 39. Based on reviewing the text messages sent to each of the Plaintiffs, it is reasonable to infer that the messages had been sent automatically rather than manually typed by a human for the following reasons: a. None of the messages were in response to any action either Plaintiff had taken; b. All of the messages came from caller IDs that neither Plaintiff recognized; c. None of the messages identified the sender of the message; d. With the exception of the December 7, 2019 message to Mr. Thompson, none of the messages to either Plaintiff was accurately personalized; e. All of the messages contained unusual punctuation or other grammatical errors that would allow it to evade certain programs that block spam calls, such as a missing “e” in “Rply”; f. One message purported to provide opt-out instructions. 84. Do Not Call Class: Ms. Thompson also brings this action on behalf of a nationwide class of similarly situated individuals and entities (the “DNC Class”), defined as follows: All person(s) who received more than one unsolicited text message within a twelve month period from Defendants and/or a third party acting on Defendants’ behalf where the text message (1) was sent to a telephone number registered with the National Do Not Call Registry prior to the text message being sent, (2) contained a message marketing a product or service of Defendants or their agents, and (3) was sent on or after March 31, 2016 Excluded from the DNC Class are: (1) Defendants, Defendants’ agents, subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendants or its parents have a controlling interest, and those entities’ current and former employees, officers, and directors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s immediate family; (3) any person who executes and files a timely request for exclusion from the DNC Class; (4) any persons who have had their claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released; and (5) the legal representatives, successors and assigns of any such excluded person. 85. Numerosity: Upon information and belief, the Classes are comprised of tens of thousands of Class members. Thus, the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Class members can easily be identified through Defendants’ records, or by other means. 87. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of members of the Classes. All claims are based on the same legal and factual issues. Plaintiffs received multiple text messages from the Defendants to their cellular phones within a twelve-month period. 88. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to those of members of the Classes and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. The questions of law and fact common to the proposed Classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Classes. 90. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-89 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 91. Based on the allegations above herein, Defendants or their agents violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), by placing non-emergency calls (including text messages) to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiffs and members of the ATDS Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice without obtaining prior express written consent. 92. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 93. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 94. Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 95. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-89 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 97. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 98. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Knowing and Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of the Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class) Knowing and Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the DNC Class) 103. Ms. Thompson (“Plaintiff” for purposes of this Count Four) incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-89 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 104. Based on the allegations herein, Defendants knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), by placing unsolicited telemarketing calls (including text messages) to the telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the DNC Class even though those numbers were listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. 105. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 106. Plaintiff and members of the DNC Class are entitled to and seek an award of up to $1,500 in damages for each such violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of the Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class) Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Ms. Thompson and the DNC Class)

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03) 13. Defendant Norman Noble manufactures products for the medical and aerospace industries and has manufacturing facilities in Highland Heights and Cleveland, Ohio. 14. Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly, non-exempt manufacturing employee (a quality control inspector) in its Highland Heights, Ohio manufacturing facility between October 6, 1997 and January 19, 2018. 15. Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendant as non-exempt manufacturing employees in Defendant’s manufacturing facilities. 16. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other similarly-situated non-exempt manufacturing employees an hourly wage. (Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked) 17. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated non-exempt employees were only paid for work performed between their scheduled start and stop times, and were not paid for the following work performed before and after their scheduled start and stop times: a) changing into and out of their uniforms and personal protective equipment, including but not limited to a shirt, pants, boots, glasses, a hard hat, glasses and/or hearing protection; b) walking to and from their assigned area of the production floor; and c) getting tools and equipment necessary to perform their production work. 18. The amount of time Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees spent on this required and unpaid work amounted to approximately 30 minutes each day. (Failure to Pay For Donning Time) 4 19. Before Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees began their shifts, they donned uniforms, a shirt, pants, boots, glasses, a hard hat, glasses and/or hearing protection. 20. The time Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees spent donning their uniforms and personal protective equipment was an integral and indispensable part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), and was performed for Defendant’s benefit in that it helped keep the production floor safe and sanitary, and helped promote a more safe and efficient manufacturing process. 21. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid for time spent donning their uniforms and personal protective equipment. (Failure to Pay For Postdonning Walk Time) 22. After donning their uniforms and personal protective equipment, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees walked from the area in which they changed into personal protective equipment to the production floor. Such time constitutes “postdonning walk time.” 23. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid for their postdonning walk time. (Failure to Pay for Time Spent Retrieving Tools) 24. Before Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees began their shift, they retrieve tools necessary to perform their job duties. 25. The time Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees spent retrieving their tools was an integral and indispensable part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit in that it allowed Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees to perform their job. 5 (Failure to Pay For Predoffing Walk Time) 26. After the end of their shifts, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees walked from the production floor to the area in which they changed out of their personal protective equipment. Such time constitutes “predoffing walk time.” 27. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid for their predoffing walk time. (Failure to Pay for Doffing Time) 28. At the end of their shifts, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees doffed their personal protective equipment and uniforms. 29. The time Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees spent doffing their uniforms and personal protective equipment was an integral and indispensable part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and OSHA, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit in that it helped keep the manufacturing floor safe and helped promote a more safe and efficient manufacturing process. 30. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid for time spent doffing their personal protective equipment and uniforms. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 31. As a result of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees not being paid for all hours worked, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 32. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. 33. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 34. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current manufacturing employees of Norman Noble, Inc. between February 13, 2015 and the present. 35. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least several hundred persons. 36. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 37. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 38. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: 7 All former and current manufacturing employees of Norman Noble, Inc. employed in the State of Ohio between February 13, 2015 and the present. 39. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least several hundred persons. 40. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff and other members of the class for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; (b) whether Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and other members of the class for donning time, postdonning walk time, time spent retrieving tools, predoffing walk time, and doffing time; and (c) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10. 41. The claims of the named Plaintiff Khrystyne Hill are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 42. Named Plaintiff Khrystyne Hill will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 8 43. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 44. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 46. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for all time worked and overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 and 29 CFR § 785.24. 47. Defendant’s failure to keep records of all of the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 29 CFR 516.2(a)(7). 48. By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendant willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly violated the provisions of the FLSA. 9 49. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly- situated employees have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 51. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for all time worked and overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the 6

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11. Lytx, pursuant to its uniform compensation policy during the calendar year of 2015, required Plaintiff and the Class to pre-enter their hours in advance of actually having worked them. Lytx required that employees enter the hours they believed they would work. Lytx paid Plaintiff and the Class based on these pre- entered hours, rather than for the hours actually worked. Lytx then, during the following pay period, “corrected” the hours in subsequent pay periods either by supplementing employees’ checks or by withholding money for hours paid but not previously worked. 12. Plaintiff and many other similarly situated employees worked for Lytx under these conditions, were non-exempt, and were forced to pre-enter their time as described above. 13. Lytx’s pre-clocking practice caused Plaintiff and his fellow employees to be routinely under-paid in violation of federal and California law. 14. Furthermore, Lytx’s practice of occasionally subtracting from subsequently earned wages (when Lytx’s illegal practice happened to result in an earlier over-payment), was and is tantamount to penalizing employees for Lytx’s illegal behavior. In other words, Lytx subtracting from employee pay was the equivalent of having the employees reimburse Lytx for its efforts to cut down on payroll and administrative overhead, forcing employees to finance Lytx payroll operations in violation of, among other laws, California Labor Code Section 2802. 16. By its actions, Defendant violated the FLSA and Plaintiff now brings a collective action for violations of the FLSA on behalf of the COLLECTIVE ACTION GROUP which is defined as: All persons nationwide employed by Defendant in a non-exempt position and who were or will be required to pre-enter their hours worked. 17. To the extent equitable tolling operates to toll claims by the COLLECTIVE ACTION GROUP against the Defendants, the applicable statute of limitations and period for calculating damages should be adjusted accordingly. The COLLECTIVE ACTION GROUP includes all such persons, whether or not they were paid hourly, by piece rate, by commission, by salary, or by part hourly, part commission and/or part salary. 18. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on behalf of himself individually and the COLLECTIVE ACTION GROUP as a collective action. Defendant is engaged in communication, business, and transmission throughout the United States and therefore is engaged in commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. section 203(b). 19. The FLSA states that an employee must be compensated for all hours worked, including all straight time compensation and overtime compensation. See 29 C.F.R. section 778.223 and 29 C.F.R. section 778.315. 20. Defendant has willfully engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the provisions of the FLSA by failing to timely pay required wages. 36. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 37. The FLSA requires, among other things, that employers like Lytx timely pay their employees, like Plaintiff, wages for all hours worked. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 206(a). Wages required by the FLSA are due, furthermore, on the regular payday for the pay period covered. 38. Lytx forced employees to pre-clock their hours, and then only paid them for what was pre-clocked and not what was actually worked. This resulted in employees, like Plaintiff, routinely working hours that they were not timely paid for. 41. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 42. The FLSA, at 29 U.S.C. 207, provides in relevant part that: no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce … for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 43. Overtime wages required by the FLSA are due, furthermore, on the regular payday for the pay period covered. 44. None of Defendant’s practices as alleged above fell within any recognized exception to Section 207’s requirements. 45. Plaintiff and The Collective Action Group often worked over 40 hours in a workweek, thereby entitling them to overtime under the FLSA. 46. However, Defendant knowingly, willfully, and intentionally failed to timely compensate Plaintiff and The Collective Action Group all overtime wages due and owed to them under the FLSA. 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 49. California Labor Code, including at Sections 204 and 223, together with the Wage Orders and the common law, provide that employees have an immediate and vested right to receive agreed wages for work they were engaged, suffered, and permitted to perform. 50. Throughout the Class period, as a result of uniform policies maintained and enforced by Lytx, the object and/or foreseeable consequence of which were to deny such wages to Plaintiff and the Class, Lytx employed Plaintiff and the Class at agreed wages and refused to pay such wages to Plaintiff and the Class for all hours they worked by a multitude of unlawful practices, including but not limited to requiring employees to pre-enter their time and receive compensation not commensurate with the hours actually worked. 51. Lytx at all times knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff and the Class were performing the aforementioned work without pay and deprived Plaintiff and the Class of wages for work performed by them. 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 54. Labor Code Section 1197 provides that it is unlawful to pay less than the minimum wage established by law. Throughout the Class period, Lytx repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class the minimum wage for all hours worked, as required by the Wage Orders, violating the provisions of Section 1197. 55. Labor Code Section 1194 provides that “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit.” 56. Wages required by the California Labor Code are due, furthermore, on the regular payday for the pay period covered. 57. Lytx forced employees to pre-clock their hours, and then only paid them for what was pre-clocked and not what was actually worked. This resulted in employees, like Plaintiff, routinely working hours that they were not timely paid for. 58. Lytx, thus, knowingly and intentionally failed to pay their employees the required minimum wages at the required time. 59. As a direct result of Lytx’s unlawful wage practices, Plaintiff and the Class have been denied full compensation for all hours worked by them, including but not limited to minimum wages for hours worked. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 62. California Labor Code Section 226(a) and the Wage Orders require Lytx to accurately itemize in wage statements all deductions from payment of wages and to accurately report total hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class and keep the records on file at the place of employment or at a central location in California. Lytx knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with Section 226(a) and the Wage Orders with respect to wage statements it provided to Plaintiff and the Class. 63. Section 226(a) and the Wage Orders further provide that every employer shall, semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, furnish each of its employees with an accurate itemized statement in writing showing, among other things, the applicable rate of pay, gross wages earned, total hours worked by the employee, all deductions, net wages earned, and the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid. Moreover, the Wage Orders require Lytx to maintain time records for each employee showing things including, but not limited to, when the employee begins and ends each work period, meal periods, and total daily hours worked in itemized wage statements, and must show all deductions from payment of wages, and accurately report total hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 70. California Labor Code Section 201 provides that if an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately. 71. California Labor Code Section 202 provides that an employee is entitled to receive all unpaid wages no later than 72 hours after an employee quits his or her employment, unless the employee has given 72 hours’ previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting. 72. California Labor Code Section 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay wages owed in accordance with California Labor Code Sections 201 and 202, then the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date, and at the same rate until paid, but the wages shall not continue for more than thirty days. 74. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 75. Plaintiff and the other Class members were sometimes required to, and did, work in excess of eight hours per workday and/or 40 hours per week, thereby entitling them to be timely paid overtime pay under California law. 76. Defendant did not properly compensate Plaintiff and the other Class members for the overtime hours they worked by virtue of their mandatory pre-clock policy and pay structure. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the other Class members the correct overtime wages, Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime, interest, attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, and costs of suit. 78. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 82. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION GROUP FOR VIOLATION OF THE FLSA: FAILURE TO PAY REQUIRED MINIMUM AND AGREED WAGES BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION GROUP FOR VIOLATION OF THE FLSA: FAILURE TO PAY REQUIRED OVERTIME WAGES BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE: FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ITEMIZED WAGE STATEMENTS BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE: FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGES BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE: FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES UPON SEPARATION BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE: FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE: FAILURE TO INDEMNIFY OR REIMBURSE EMPLOYEES FOR EXPENSES BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAWS BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND THE CLASS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE: FAILURE TO PAY AGREED WAGES

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50. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 51. Farm Bureau regularly permitted and required the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class to work more than 40 hours per week without overtime compensation. 52. Upon information and belief, Farm Bureau knew that the Named Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals performed work that required overtime pay. 10 53. Farm Bureau has therefore operated under a scheme to deprive these misclassified agents of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all time worked. 54. Farm Bureau's conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and has caused significant damage to the Named Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. 55. Count I of this Complaint for violations of the FLSA may be brought and maintained as an "opt-in" class action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because the claims of the Named Plaintiffs are similar to the claims of current and former misclassified agents who work and/or have worked for Farm Bureau. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Therefore, the Named Plaintiffs should be permitted to bring this action as a class action and on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated individuals pursuant to the "opt-in" provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S. C. § 216(b). 56. Counsel for the Plaintiffs has conducted significant investigation as to potential claims and parties in this case. 57. Prosecuting this case as a class action for similarly situated employees who have been unlawfully and/or wrongfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interests of the class members. 58. Counsel for the Plaintiffs is knowledgeable and experienced in the field of employment law and can and will fairly and competently represent the interest of all class members. 59. Counsel for the Plaintiff has and will commit the human and financial resources necessary to represent the class. 60. Farm Bureau is liable under the FLSA for failing to keep proper records of hours worked as mandated by the FLSA and for failing to properly compensate the Named Plaintiffs 11 and all similarly situated individuals, and notice of this lawsuit should be sent to all similarly situated individuals. Those similarly situated individuals are known to Farm Bureau and are readily identifiable through Farm Bureau's records. 61. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 62. The Named Plaintiffs and all similarly situated misclassified agents have all been victimized by Farm Bureau's common policy and plan to violate their rights under the FSLA by denying them proper overtime compensation. 63. Farm Bureau operates a business enterprise of selling and servicing insurance and insurance-related products and services including auto insurance, homeowner's insurance, renter's insurance, manufactured home insurance, farm & ranch insurance, property insurance, health insurance and life insurance. 64. The primary job duties of the Named Plaintiffs and the similarly situated misclassified agents were selling and servicing Farm Bureau's insurance services and products. 65. The services provided by Plaintiffs and other similarly situated insurance agents were integrated into Farm Bureau's business operation of selling and servicing insurance products, which is inconsistent with a bona fide independent-contractor classification. 66. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated sold and serviced policies exclusively from Farm Bureau and were prohibited from selling and servicing insurance for other companies while working for Farm Bureau. 67. Alternatively, Farm Bureau limited and controlled the policies, products and services Plaintiffs and others similarly situated could sell, and only a select group of agents statewide were allowed to write Blue Cross Blue Shield health insurance policies. 12 68. Farm Bureau issued business cards to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated with its name and logo which identified Plaintiffs and others similarly situated as insurance agents for Farm Bureau. Alternatively, Farm Bureau required Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to acquire business cards with its name and logo which identified Plaintiffs and others similarly situated as insurance agents for Farm Bureau. 69. The work of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated was/is closely and directly supervised, managed and/or controlled by other Farm Bureau employees. 70. Farm Bureau provided Plaintiffs and others similarly situated with email addresses. 71. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were required or encouraged to use a signature that identified them as Farm Bureau agents. 72. Farm Bureau alone set the price of insurance policies sold by Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 73. Farm Bureau controlled the substantive content of all signage, advertising, marketing and/or promotions done on its behalf. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated who wished to advertise and/or market were required to have their advertisements and/or marketing materials approved by Farm Bureau. They were required to have their signage approved by Farm Bureau. They were also required to pay into an agent's fund for office expenses, advertising and marketing and to turn in receipts to Agency Managers. 74. Farm Bureau controlled the placement of policies and could remove a policy from one agent and give it to another, thereby assigning the commission from the first agent and giving it to the second. Similarly, Farm Bureau's Agency Managers held and retained the right to recode any account of any agent at any time without agent approval or authorization. 13 75. Farm Bureau required the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend meetings and training sessions. 76. Farm Bureau's investment in infrastructure designed to underwrite, administer and pay claims of the insurance products sold by Plaintiffs and others similarly situated far exceeded any investment by the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated. 77. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked for Farm Bureau for years and even decades. 78. Plaintiffs and other misclassified agents similarly situated frequently and routinely worked over 40 hours per week. 79. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are and/or were nonexempt Farm Bureau employees. 80. Farm Bureau failed to make payroll tax or other withholdings from monies paid to Plaintiffs and other similarly situated insurance agents. 81. Farm Bureau illegally and/or wrongfully classified their insurance agents, including the Named Plaintiffs, as independent contractors; however, they were actually employees as that term is defined by the FSLA and relevant case law. 82. Farm Bureau controlled the hiring, firing, assignment or reassignment, and commission rates of the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated misclassified insurance agents. It prohibited Plaintiffs and other similarly situated agents from assigning any of their rights to third parties. 83. Farm Bureau set and/or closely monitored and effectively controlled the work and vacation schedules for Plaintiffs and other similarly situated misclassified insurance agents. It required its agents to submit to quarterly evaluations with Agency Managers where they were 14 evaluated on sales performance, punctuality, appearance, community involvement, product knowledge, and attitude. 84. Farm Bureau retained the right to discipline insurance agents for not following its company rules. 85. Farm Bureau tracked the days and time its insurance agents worked. It set and/or controlled agent work hours and/or required its agents to sign out when leaving their offices. 86. Farm Bureau instructed its insurance agents regarding when, where and how they were to perform their work. It required its agents to conduct a certain number of reviews per year. 87. Farm Bureau, the Named Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated contemplated that the employment relationship between Farm Bureau and its insurance agents would be for a long and indefinite time period. 88. Farm Bureau determined the location of the branch offices from which agents worked. 89. Farm Bureau provided the physical facilities and requirements of the work and regulates behavior in the facilities. 90. Farm Bureau customers made payments directly to Farm Bureau for purchased services and products. They did not pay Plaintiffs or others similarly situated for the services and products they offered. 91. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were required to sign non-complete agreements. 92. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were required to meet company quotas set by State Sales Managers, District Sales Managers, and/or Agency Managers. 15 93. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were treated as "at will" employees. 94. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were required to adhere to business ethics and codes of conduct set by Farm Bureau. 95. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were required to taking continuing education courses on business ethics through a company-based education system. 96. Farm Bureau owned and/or maintained control of the books of business of policy holders rather than Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Farm Bureau insurance agents. It provided agents with potential customers to contact and maintained control over all information related to clients and/or policy holders. 97. Farm Bureau set and controlled the dress code for its agents. 98. Farm Bureau required Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend mandated meetings (including weekly meetings, district meetings, and state meetings) and to prepare mandated production reports and business plans. 99. Farm Bureau retained the right to unilaterally fire its insurance agents without their consent, authorization or approval. 100. Farm Bureau provided and required Plaintiffs and its other agents to use the computer and software components it provided. 101. Farm Bureau dictated, monitored and/or controlled agent computer usage. For example, it monitored website usage and retained and exercised the right to block websites at its sole discretion. It monitored and controlled storage of information, deletions, search histories, and email correspondence. 102. Farm Bureau set, imposed and required Plaintiffs and other similarly situated agents to comply with its document retention requirements. 16 103. Farm Bureau set and controlled production requirements for its agents. 104. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated agents were prohibited from writing property and casualty insurance across county lines without prior approval from Farm Bureau. 105. Farm Bureau discouraged its agents from incorporating. 106. Farm Bureau required Plaintiffs and other similarly situated agents to sell and collect Farm Bureau Federation Memberships to customers as a prerequisite to selling them insurance products and services. 107. Farm Bureau required Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to call customers and collect past due federation memberships. 108. Farm Bureau required some or all of its agents to pay payroll into an account owned by its Agency Managers. 109. Farm Bureau's Agency Managers required some or all of the Farm Bureau agents to give raises to and pay additional payroll expenses for their secretaries. 110. Farm Bureau required its agents to pay into an account for postage and paper. Each agent was required to pay the same amount regardless of the number of clients each agent had or the book of business each agent wrote. 111. Farm Bureau misclassified Plaintiffs and other similarly situated insurance agents as independent contractors to avoid the obligation to pay them pursuant to the FLSA. 112. Farm Bureau's mischaracterization of Plaintiffs and other similarly situated insurance agents as independent contractors, the concealment or non-disclosure of the true nature of the relationship between Farm Bureau and the agents, and the attendant deprivation of substantial rights and benefits of employment, including the refusal to pay overtime wages as 17 required by the FSLA, are part of an on-going unlawful practice by Farm Bureau which this Court should enjoin. 113. Plaintiffs' Consents to Join as Class Representatives are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits "1," "2," "3," "4," "5," "6," “7” and “8.” VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) 118. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 119. Farm Bureau failed to keep adequate records of the work hours and pay of Plaintiffs and other similarly situated agents in violation of the FSLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). 120. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were damaged in an amount to be proved at trial as a result of Farm Bureau's violation of 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). 18 VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. § 207. 114. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 115. Farm Bureau's practice of failing to pay Plaintiffs and other agents similarly situated at a time-and-a-half rate of pay for hours in excess of 40 hours per workweek violates the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 116. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are employed are applicable to Farm Bureau or the Plaintiffs. 117. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were damaged in an amount to be proved at trial as a result of Farm Bureau's violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207.

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13. On or about July 4, 2014, Enerson mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to “CAPITAL ONE, N.A.” A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit A. 14. Upon information and belief, Enerson first became involved in the collection of the alleged debt identified in Exhibit A after the alleged debt was in default. 15. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A was the first letter Enerson sent Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt to which the letter refers. 16. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 18. Plaintiff did not receive any other written communications from Enerson containing the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) notice, either before or after Exhibit A. 19. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 20. Enerson failed to provide to Plaintiff the required notice pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 21. Enerson has thus failed to comply with the debt validation notice requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 22. Failure to provide the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) notice is also a false representation or deceptive means to collect a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 23. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a) and 1692e(10). 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent an initial collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (d) on or after September 3, 2013, (e) that was not returned by the postal service. 25. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 27. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 28. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 29. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (925) 359-2273. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 52. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 21st Day of January, 2020. 8. Beginning in or around November 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -6443, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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25. On or about January 5, 2019, Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 6305 (“6305 Number”) with a pre-recorded message. 26. Upon Plaintiff answering the phone, a pre-recorded message asked Plaintiff to press a number to be connected to a live representative if he was interested in saving money on his energy bills. 27. After Plaintiff pressed the number, he was connected to a live representative who identified themselves as being with “my green energy”. 28. After answering questions about his energy consumption, Plaintiff was given an appointment for 8 pm on January 7, 2019 for a sales representative to come to the address (the “House”) that Plaintiff had provided. 30. Also on January 7, 2019, Defendant called Plaintiff at the 6305 Number, identified himself as being with Sun-Tec, and notified Plaintiff that he had missed their scheduled appointment. 31. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6305 Number. 33. Plaintiff received the subject calls within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 34. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar calls to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 35. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted using a pre-recorded message. 36. Defendant’s unsolicited calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s calls also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 37. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 38. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint; were sent a pre-recorded call; from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf; to said person’s cellular telephone number; using the same equipment, or type of equipment, used to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 39. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 42. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using pre-recorded messages; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 43. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely calls telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 49. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded or artificial voice… to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 50. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used pre-recorded calls to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 51. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using a pre-recorded message to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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19. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 & 216(b), Plaintiffs brings their First Cause of Action as a collective action under the FLSA on behalf of themselves and the following collective: All persons employed by Defendant at any time since January 10, 2014 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) who worked as concierges/door men (the “Collective Action Members”). 20. A collective action is appropriate in this circumstance because Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members are similarly situated, in that they were all subjected to Defendant’s illegal policy of automatically deducting from their work time an hour for a “lunch break” each 5 day, despite the fact that they were not permitted to take an uninterrupted lunch break during their shift because they were not permitted to leave the door unattended. As a result of this policy, Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members did not receive the legally-required overtime premium payments for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 21. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members have substantially similar job duties and are paid pursuant to a similar, if not the same, payment structure. 22. At all relevant times, Defendant has been in the real estate investment and development business, specializing in complex urban development, including large-scale multifamily residential buildings. (www.lcor.com/about). 23. According to the New York State Department of State, Division of Corporations, LCOR’s principal executive office is located at 850 Casset Road, Suite 300, Berwyn, Pennsylvania 19312 and its initial DOS filing date was on March 9, 1992. 24. According to LCOR’s website, 34 Berry is a 7-story, 142-unit luxury rental building situated in the thriving Williamsburg section of Brooklyn. The website also provides that the building opened in 2010 and was fully leased in under seven (7) months. (See https://goo.gl/ch2d8D)1. 25. LCOR’s website also provides that 250 North 10th Street is a six-story high-end rental building with 234 units. The website also provides that the building is 185,000 square feet and was anticipated to be completed in February 2014. (See https://goo.gl/lx88M3). 26. According to the Property Tax Benefit Information found on the New York City 1 The original URL for this page was shortened using Google’s URL Shortener (https://goo.gl). 6 Department of Finance website (https://a836-propertyportal.nyc.gov/#), 34 Berry has a 15-year “421A Exemption” for the period July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2026, resulting in a tax benefit amount of $7,843,780. 27. According to the Property Tax Benefit Information found on the New York City Department of Finance website (https://a836-propertyportal.nyc.gov/#), 250 North 10th Street has a 15-year “421A Exemption” for the period July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2027, resulting in a tax benefit amount of $18,945,580. § 421-a Prevailing Wage Requirements 28. On December 28, 2006, the Mayor signed Local Law No. 58 of 2006. This legislation, which contained major reforms to the 421-a tax exemption program, including the prevailing wage requirement for service workers, became effective on December 28, 2007. 29. The specific prevailing wage requirement written into Section 421-a of the New York Real Property Tax Law provides that: “No benefits under this section shall be conferred for any construction commenced on or after December twenty-eighth, two thousand seven for any tax lots now existing or hereafter created except where the applicant agrees that all building service employees employed at the building, whether employed directly by the applicant or its successors, or through a property management company or a contractor, shall receive the applicable prevailing wage for the duration of the building’s tax exemption.” (N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421-a (8)(b)). 30. The “prevailing wage” requirement set forth in Section 421-a refers to the wages determined by the fiscal officer to be prevailing for the various classes of building service employees in the locality pursuant to NYLL § 230. (See § 421-a (8)(a)(ii)). 31. The New York City Comptroller’s NYLL § 230 Prevailing Wage Schedules for 7 building service employees contain the following rates for cleaner/porter and doorperson2: a. 07/01/2009 – 10/20/2009: $19.20 plus $7.08 supplemental benefit; b. 10/21/2009 – 06/30/2010: $19.47 plus $7.08 supplemental benefit; c. 07/01/2010 – 12/31/2010: $19.84 plus $8.28 supplemental benefit; d. 01/01/2011 – 04/20/2011: $19.84 plus $8.68 supplemental benefit; e. 04/21/2011 – 06/30/2011: $20.22 plus $8.68 supplemental benefit; f. 07/01/2011 – 04/20/2012: $20.22 plus $8.68 supplemental benefit;3 g. 04/21/2012 – 06/30/2012: $20.77 plus $8.68 supplemental benefit; h. 07/01/2012 – 04/20/2013: $20.77 plus $8.68 supplemental benefit; i. 04/21/2013 – 06/30/2013: $21.34 plus $9.43 supplemental benefit; j. 07/01/2013 – 12/31/2013: $21.34 plus $ 9.43 supplemental benefit; k. 01/01/2014 – 06/30/2014: $21.34 plus $9.83 supplemental benefit; l. 07/01/2014 – 04/20/2015: $21.98 plus $9.83 supplemental benefit; and m. 04/21/2015 – 06/30/2015: $22.51 plus $10.38 supplemental benefit. Plaintiffs’ Work for Defendants 32. Plaintiff Marshall was employed by Defendant as a concierge/doorman from in or around June 2010 through in or around May 2015 (the “Marshall Employment Period”). 33. From the beginning of the Marshall Employment Period through approximately the end of 2014, Marshall worked for Defendant at 34 Berry. Thereafter, until the end of the Marshall Employment Period, Marshall worked for Defendant at 250 North 10th. 34. For his work, Marshall was paid on an hourly basis at the following rates: from the 2 The NYLL § 230 schedules were amended in 2014 to explicitly include the title of “doorperson” under the same classification as cleaner/porter. Accordingly, the rates from prior to 2014 are for the cleaner/porter classification. 3 Beginning with the 2011-2012 NYLL § 230 schedules, the rates were adjusted for “new hire” employees, as defined by months worked for the employer. 8 beginning of the Marshall Employment Period until 2012 he was paid approximately $14.42 per hour; from in or around 2012 to 2013, he was paid approximately $14.85 per hour; from 2013 until 2014, he was paid approximately $15.00 per hour; from 2014 to 2015 he was paid approximately $15.76 per hour; and from 2015 until the end of the Marshall Employment Period, he was paid approximately $17.00 per hour. 35. Plaintiff Soto was employed by Defendant from in or around May 2010 through in or around May 2015 (the “Soto Employment Period”). 36. Plaintiff Soto worked for Defendant as a porter at 34 Berry until approximately the end of 2014, when he was transferred to work at 250 North 10th Street. When he was transferred to work at 250 North 10th Street, he began working for Defendant as a concierge/door man. 37. For his work, Soto was paid on an hourly basis at the following rates: from the beginning of the Soto Employment Period until May 2011, he was paid approximately $13.00 per hour; from May 2011 until May 2012, he was paid approximately $13.26 per hour; from May 2012 until May 2013, he was paid approximately $13.76 per hour; from May 2013 until the end of 2014, Soto was paid approximately $14.25 per hour; from the end of 2014, when he transferred to 250 North 10th Street until in or around February 2015, he was paid approximately $17.00 per hour; from in or around February 2015 until May 2015, he was paid approximately $21.00 per hour. 38. Throughout their respective employment periods, Plaintiffs typically worked five (5) days per week, nine (9) hours per shift, and sometimes more if they covered a shift for a co- worker. 39. Defendants automatically deducted one (1) hour from Plaintiffs’ hours each day for a lunch break, despite the fact that, while working as concierge/door men, Plaintiffs were not able to take a full one (1) hour interrupted lunch break. As such, Plaintiffs were not paid for all hours 9 worked each week including overtime hours when working over 40 hours in a week. 40. Throughout their respective employment periods, Plaintiffs were not paid the applicable prevailing wage rates for their work and were not provided with supplemental benefits. 41. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Collective Action Members, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 42. By automatically deducting one (1) hour from Plaintiffs’ work time for each day of work for a “lunch” break, despite the fact that Plaintiffs were not provided with a 1-hour uninterrupted lunch break, Defendants failed to pay overtime for all hours worked at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants have thus violated and continue to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a)(2). 43. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 44. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime caused Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime premium compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 10 45. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the opt-in plaintiffs, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 46. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ rights by failing to pay overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 each week, in violation of the NYLL and regulations promulgated thereunder. 47. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime premium compensation caused Plaintiffs to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to NYLL §§ 663(1) et seq. 48. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the opt-in plaintiffs, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 49. Upon information and belief, Defendants entered into a contract with local and/or state government entities when they agreed to the terms of the 421-a Tax Abatement, among which terms included the requirement of paying the building service employees prevailing wages. 50. Upon information and belief, the contract entered into by Defendants upon receipt 11 of the § 421-a Tax Abatement contained provisions for the payment of prevailing wages to building service employees prevailing rates of wages, daily overtime and supplemental benefits pursuant to the Office of the Comptroller, City of New York’s Building Service Employees Prevailing Wage Schedule. 51. Those prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits were made part of the contract for the benefit of the Plaintiffs and the other employees performing work pursuant to such contract. In the event that the contract or agreement entered into to enact the 421-A Tax Abatement failed to explicitly containing prevailing wage schedules, the prevailing wage requirements were supplemented as a matter of law, requiring Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs and other building service employees prevailing wages, daily/weekly overtime and supplemental benefits for all work performed. 52. Defendants breached the 421-a Tax Abatement agreement by failing to pay Plaintiffs, who were third-party beneficiaries of such contract, at New York State and/or New York city prevailing wage rates, overtime hours at the prevailing wage overtime rates for all hours worked on prevailing wage projects in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek or eight (8) hours per day and supplemental benefits on prevailing wage jobs as required by the New York City and New York State prevailing wage schedules pursuant to Tit. 28, Ch. 6 of the Rules of the City of New York and § 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law of the State of New York. 53. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs at the correct prevailing wage rates for straight time, overtime, and supplemental benefits for work performed in the building constituted a material breach of the contracts entered into between Defendants and certain public entities. 54. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs at prevailing wage rates, they are entitled to relief from Defendants for breach of contract under New York common law of contracts. 12 55. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the opt-in plaintiffs, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 56. Based on Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs the appropriate prevailing wage rates, Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs. 57. Equity and good conscience require that Defendants pay restitution to Plaintiffs. 58. Upon information and belief, when Defendants entered into the contract, they agreed to pay the required prevailing wages, overtime, shift-differential and holiday premiums, and supplemental benefit rates of pay to Plaintiffs and other employees who performed work pursuant to the contract. 59. Plaintiffs provided valuable services to Defendants performing prevailing wage jobs for which Plaintiffs expected compensation. Defendants knowingly accepted such services yet failed to pay Plaintiffs the reasonable value of such services as defined by the New York State and New York City prevailing wage schedules. 60. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs at prevailing wage rates on prevailing wage jobs and Defendants’ corresponding unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from Defendants under New York’s common law of unjust enrichment. 61. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs the reasonable value of the valuable services they rendered, Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from Defendants under New York’s common law of quantum meruit. 13 BREACH OF CONTRACT (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs) Defendant’s Buildings FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT – UNPAID OVERTIME (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members) NEW YORK LABOR LAW – UNPAID OVERTIME (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs) UNJUST ENRICHMENT & QUANTUM MERUIT (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Pled In The Alternative)

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1. The planter was model year 2014 or later and number 1770NT or 1775NT; and/or 106. John Deere, either directly and/or through its agents, represented to the world, Plaintiff, and class members that the planters provided even distribution and emergence. 107. The planters were not capable of providing even distribution and emergence in the condition in which they were delivered to Plaintiff and class members. 108. John Deere knew these representations were false or acted with reckless disregard to the truth with respect to the planters. 109. John Deere made these representations either directly or through its agents for the purpose of increasing sales and convincing Plaintiff and class members to purchase the planters despite the planters not possessing the very quality they were advertised to have. 110. Plaintiff and class members justifiably relied upon John Deere’s representations in purchasing and/or leasing the planters. 111. Because Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents, Plaintiff and class members bought and/or leased planters that they would not have purchased or leased but for the misrepresentation. 112. Because Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents, Plaintiff and class members used the planters to seed their crops. The undisclosed defect caused Plaintiff and class members to suffer financial harm in the form of wasted fertilizer and decreased yield. 113. Plaintiff’s and class members’ purchases and/or leases of the planters from John Deere and/or its agents constitute contracts. 22 114. A basis of the bargain was the representation that the planters provide even distribution and emergence. 115. Because the planters do not provide even distribution and emergence, John Deere has committed a material breach of the contract with Plaintiff and each class member. 116. Plaintiff and class members have substantially complied with all obligations under the contracts. 117. Plaintiff and class members have suffered damages in the diminished value of their planters, in the waste of fertilizer, and in the loss of crop yield. 118. The damages of Plaintiff and class members are the reasonably foreseeable damages of purchasers of the planters. 119. Implied into the contract for the purchase and/or lease of the planters between John Deere and Plaintiff and class members is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 120. At all relevant times, John Deere knew or should have known that the planters did not conform to the marketing and representations made by John Deere and/or its agents. 121. John Deere stood silent instead of informing Plaintiff and class members of the defective condition of the planters. 122. Plaintiff and class members relied upon John Deere’s silence in purchasing and using the planters. 123. John Deere knew or should have known Plaintiff and class members would not discover the defect prior to using the planters to seed their crops. 124. John Deere breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by remaining silent when it had material knowledge of the defective condition of the planters. 23 125. Because John Deere stood silent, Plaintiff and class members suffered damages. 12. Plaintiff Craig Armstrong is an Indiana farmer. Armstrong had used John Deere planters for years without substantial problems. In 2014, however, Armstrong purchased a John Deere 1770NT planter for use on approximately 2,740 acres of land for the purpose of growing corn. 126. John Deere concealed and suppressed material facts concerning the quality and performance capabilities of its planters. 127. John Deere concealed and suppressed material facts concerning the defects plaguing the planters, and John Deere valued cost-cutting over the functionality of its planters. 128. John Deere did so in order to boost confidence in its planters and to falsely assure purchasers and lessees that its planters functioned in accordance with the marketing and representations by John Deere and/or its agents. The false representations were material to Plaintiff and class members because the representations played a significant role in the value of the vehicles. 129. John Deere had a duty to disclose the defects in its planters because they were known and/or accessible only to John Deere; John Deere had superior knowledge and access to the facts; and John Deere knew or should have known the facts were not known to, or reasonably discoverable, by Plaintiff and class members. 130. John Deere also had a duty to disclose because it made many general affirmative representations about the quality of the planters, as set forth above, which were misleading, deceptive, and incomplete without the disclosure of the additional facts set forth above regarding the actual defects in its planters. Having volunteered to provide information to Plaintiff and the class members, John Deere had the duty to disclose not just the partial truth, but the entire truth. These omitted and concealed facts were material because they directly impact the value of the planters purchased or leased by Plaintiff and class members. Whether a manufacturer’s products are reliable are material concerns to a consumer. 24 131. John Deere actively concealed and/or suppressed these material facts, in whole or in part, to protect its profits and avoid recalls that would hurt the brand’s image and cost John Deere money, and it did so at the expense of Plaintiff and the class members. 132. On information and belief, John Deere has still not made full and adequate disclosure and continues to defraud Plaintiff and class members and conceal material information regarding defects that exist in the planters. 133. Plaintiff and class members were unaware of these omitted material facts and would not have acted as they did if they had known of the concealed and/or suppressed facts, in that they would not have purchased and/or leased the planters; and/or would have fixed the defect prior to using the product to their detriment in planting their crops; and/or not paid the same price elevated by the representation of performance; and/or would have taken other affirmative steps. Plaintiff’s and class members’ actions were justified. John Deere was in exclusive control of the material facts and such facts were not known to the public, Plaintiff, or class members. 134. Because of the concealment and/or suppression of the facts, Plaintiff and class members sustained damage because they own planters that diminished in value as a result of John Deere’s concealment of, and failure to timely disclose, the defects. Plaintiff and class members also sustained damages because they used the planters to plant crops causing a waste in fertilizer and a decrease in crop yield. 135. Had they been aware of the concealed defects that existed in the planters, Plaintiff and class members either would have paid less for their planters and/or would not have purchased and/or leased them at all; and no class members, regardless of time of purchase and/or lease, would have used the planters in their defective condition to plant their crops. 25 136. Accordingly, John Deere is liable to Plaintiff and class members for damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 137. John Deere’s acts were done maliciously, oppressively, deliberately, with intent to defraud, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s and class members’ rights and well-being to enrich John Deere. John Deere’s conduct warrants an assessment of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to deter such conduct in the future, which amount is to be determined according to proof. 13. The John Deere planters at issue not only seed the soil but also distribute liquid fertilizer at the time of such planting to increase yield. 138. John Deere has received and retained a benefit from Plaintiff and inequity has resulted. 139. John Deere has benefitted from selling and/or leasing the planters whose value was artificially inflated by John Deere’s concealment of the defects described throughout this Complaint, and Plaintiff and class members have overpaid for the planters and been forced to pay other costs. 140. Plaintiff and class members, therefore, conferred a benefit on John Deere. 141. It is inequitable for John Deere to retain these benefits. 142. Plaintiff and class members were not aware of the true facts about the planters, and did not benefit from John Deere’s conduct. 143. John Deere knowingly accepted the benefits of its unjust conduct. 144. As a result of John Deere’s conduct, the amount of its unjust enrichment should be disgorged, in an amount to be proven at trial. 26 14. Modern farming is a complex scientific industry that requires precise measurements and calculations to maximize production and yield. Key components in this process, as recognized by John Deere in its marketing materials for its planters, are: “1) Achieving even emergence; 2) Achieving the correct plant population; 3) Achieving uniform 4 spacing; and 4) Planting within the optimum window.” John Deere marketing materials have called these “the four key agronomic principles of planting.” 15. John Deere has marketed its planters as “[t]he only planter on the market that can offer even emergence, correct population, uniform spacing, and speed to get the most production within the optimum window.” 16. To Armstrong, like any farmer, even distribution and emergence is of the utmost importance. The amount of fertilizer used at the time of seed planting is calculated to provide the maximum yield. Consequently, where there is uneven distribution of fertilizer, the yield is impacted. If a crop row is deprived of the optimal amount of fertilizer, it will not reach its optimal yield. Where a row is over fertilized it will not increase the yield in that row and may actually cause a decrease in production in that specific row. Thus, where the distribution of fertilizer is uneven, the yield will invariably suffer and be inconsistent across rows. 17. Armstrong purchased the John Deere 1770NT planter because John Deere promised in marketing materials and in documents that were part of the purchase contract that it would provide even distribution and emergence. Historically, these representations had been more or less accurate in Armstrong’s experience. 18. The planters use hoses to move the liquid fertilizer across the planter to ultimately be distributed in the numerous planting rows. Historically, each of the many fertilizer distribution nozzles on John Deere planters were connected to the fertilizer reservoir by hoses of equal lengths, despite those nozzles being varying distances from the reservoir. These hoses of equal lengths ensured that pressure in the lines was even, and that distribution of fertilizer to each nozzle was identical, which ultimately promoted even emergence. 5 19. Starting with its 2014 model planters, John Deere changed that design by connecting fertilizer nozzles to the reservoir with hoses of varying lengths depending on the nozzles’ distance from the reservoir. 2. The planter was model year 2014 or later and used fertilizer hoses of varying lengths to connect the distribution nozzles to the fertilizer reservoir; and/or 20. John Deere did not notify customers of the changes and used the same marketing that promised and emphasized even distribution and emergence. 21. The John Deere 1770NT planter Armstrong purchased was among the planters containing these changes. The varying hose lengths resulted in uneven fertilizer distribution, such that the relative amount of fertilizer delivered to each nozzle on the planter varied in direct proportion to on its distance from the reservoir, with the most fertilizer delivered to the nozzles closest to the reservoir and least to those furthest away. 22. The net result of this defect was uneven fertilizer distribution, uneven emergence and growth of crops, and, ultimately, decreased overall crop yield and profits. 23. Armstrong discovered the uneven fertilizer distribution problem on and after April 20, 2014, only after he had planted approximately 2,740 acres of corn crops. Even if Armstrong had discovered the serious design flaw prior to planting his crops, the economic realities of farming deprived him and any similarly situated person from acquiring a different planter. As John Deere’s marketing materials, discussed above, recognize that the science of farming permits narrow windows for seeding, necessitating use of even defective equipment to meet the tight window. 24. Once Armstrong began using the planter on and after April 20, 2014, he discovered the problem and brought the defect to the attention of his John Deere dealer and to John Deere itself. John Deere representatives examined Plaintiff’s planter and conducted numerous empirical tests on the planter. The results of those tests confirmed what Plaintiff 6 suspected: that the planter failed to evenly distribute fertilizer to the many nozzles, and that fertilizer distribution decreased in direct proportion to the length of the hose connecting each nozzle to the fertilizer reservoir. 25. Despite its confirmation of the fertilizer distribution problem, and its knowledge that the planter did not conform to its express representations, John Deere did not fix the problem, offer to compensate Plaintiff for his wasted fertilizer and reduced crop yield, or otherwise take any corrective action. 26. Armstrong is not alone. Each and every farmer in the proposed class who used planters with uneven hose lengths or that otherwise distributed fertilizer unevenly would necessarily have uneven fertilizer distribution when planting, which necessarily would have caused uneven emergence, decreased crop yield, and decreased profits. 27. Plaintiff brings this case pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on his own behalf and on behalf of the proposed Class, defined as: All persons or entities domiciled or residing in the United States who purchased or leased a new planter manufactured by Deere & Company that meet one or more of the following criteria: 28. The Class is comprised of thousands of purchasers and lessees of John Deere planters. Although the exact number of class members is presently unknown, the number and identity of class members can be readily determined through John Deere’s records. 29. The disposition of the numerous claims of these class members in a single class action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court. 3. The planter otherwise did not evenly distribute fertilizer among each of the fertilizer distribution nozzles. 7 30. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 31. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the class members. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and include without limitation the following: A. Whether the John Deere planters were inherently and permanently defective, due to uneven fertilizer distribution and crop emergence; B. Whether John Deere planters failed to perform in a manner consistent with Defendant’s marketing and warranties, and with the Plaintiff’s and class members’ reasonable expectations; C. Whether and when John Deere knew of the defects in the design of its planters; D. Whether the design of John Deere planters constitutes a design defect; E. Whether John Deere knew or should have known of these defects prior to selling planters to Plaintiff and the class members; F. Whether John Deere had a duty to Plaintiff and the class members to disclose the defective nature of its planters; 8 G. Whether the facts concealed and/or otherwise not disclosed by John Deere to Plaintiff and the class members are material facts; H. Whether John Deere knew or should have known that, due to the defects, the planters were not suitable for the purposes for which they were intended to be used, and otherwise were not as warranted and represented; I. Whether the planters were not as advertised and/or promoted by John Deere and its agents; J. Whether John Deere expressly warranted to original purchasers and lessees of the planters that it would repair, replace, or adjust all items on those planters that were defective in material, workmanship, or factory preparation; K. Whether John Deere expressly warranted to original purchasers and lessees of the planters that the planters would evenly distribute fertilizer; L. Whether John Deere breached its express warranties because it was unable or unwilling to successfully repair or otherwise remedy the defects with the planters purchased or leased by Plaintiff and class members; M. Whether John Deere breached its express warranties because Plaintiff and class members have been deprived of the value of the bargain; N. Whether John Deere breached its express warranties by selling and/or leasing planters that did not evenly distribute fertilizer; O. Whether John Deere impliedly warranted to original purchasers and lessees of the planters that those planters were merchantable and/or fit for a particular purpose; 9 P. Whether John Deere breached its implied warranties of merchantability by selling Plaintiff and class members planters with inherent defects; Q. Whether Plaintiff and class members are entitled to compensatory damages for the diminution in the fair market value of their planters as a result of the common defect described herein, and the amount of such damages; R. Whether Plaintiff and class members are entitled to compensatory damages for the loss in crop yield and the waste of fertilizer as a result of the common defect described herein, and the amount of such damages; S. Whether John Deere should be required to compensate Plaintiff and class members for the cost of replacing the defective hoses and for otherwise correcting the defects, and the amount of such compensation; T. Whether Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to injunctive relief to remedy the defects; and U. Whether John Deere should be declared financially responsible for notifying all class members of the defective nature of its planters. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff and class members have similarly suffered harm arising from John Deere’s legal violations as identified in causes of action enumerated and set forth below. 33. Plaintiff’s and class members’ claims flow, in each instance, from a common nucleus of operative facts – John Deere’s legal violations as identified in causes of action enumerated and set forth below. 10 34. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with and are not antagonistic to the interests of the class members he seeks to represent. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 35. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel. 36. Plaintiff and class members have all suffered and will continue to suffer substantial harm and damages due to John Deere’s conduct. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the subject controversy. Absent a class action, most class members likely will find the cost of litigating their individual claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effective remedy at all. Absent a class action, class members will continue to sustain damages, and John Deere’s misconduct will proceed without remedy. 37. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. Additionally, John Deere has acted, and failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the Class, requiring court imposition of uniform relief to insure compatible standards of conduct toward Plaintiff and the Class. 39. John Deere knew or should have known that its planters did not evenly distribute fertilizer. 11 40. John Deere knew or should have known that the uneven distribution of fertilizer from its planters resulted in uneven emergence. 41. John Deere knew that the marketing materials and other express representations by it or its agents would lead prospective purchasers of its planters, including the Plaintiff and the class members, to believe that its planters would provide even distribution of fertilizer and to rely on these representations of even distribution and emergence. 42. John Deere knew or should have known that its planters were not in conformity with its marketing materials and other express representations. 43. John Deere knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the class members would and did rely on these representations of even distribution and emergence. 44. John Deere intended that Plaintiff and the class members rely on representations of even distribution and emergence. 45. John Deere’s representations that its planters would provide even distribution and emergence was the basis of the bargain for the sale and/or lease of its planters. 46. John Deere knew or should have known that its planters were not in conformity with the representations that it made to the world, Plaintiff, and the class members. 47. John Deere knew or should have known that its planters were not of the kind, quality, and/or character that were represented to the world, Plaintiff, and the class members. 48. John Deere has refused to cure the harm caused by the defect in its planters. 49. John Deere’s sale and/or lease of its planters in a defective condition not in conformity with the representations made by it and/or its agents was part of a scheme and/or artifice perpetrated with the intent to defraud and/or mislead Plaintiff and the class members. 12 50. Plaintiff and the class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents as outlined above. 51. Plaintiff and the class members tendered money or other consideration to John Deere and/or its agents based upon these representations. 52. John Deere’s marketing and/or representations of the function and quality of its planters provide it an unfair market advantage over its competitors. 53. Unless John Deere is prevented from continuing in its deceptive marketing practices, Plaintiff, class members, competitors, and other market participants will be injured in the future. 54. Plaintiff and other members of the class, due to business necessity, must purchase new planters such as those at issue in this case on an annual basis. 55. Plaintiff notified John Deere in writing of the defect in the fertilizer delivery system, and John Deere refused to remedy the situation. 56. John Deere’s actions violate consumer and market protection statutes of the fifty states, including, but not limited to, the statutes codified at Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1 et seq., Ala. Code § 8-19-1 et seq., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 et seq., Arizona Rev. Stat. § 44-1521 et seq., Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq., Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq., Col. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 et seq., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110A et seq., 6 Del. Code § 2513 et seq., 6 Del. Code § 2532 et seq., Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq., Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-370 et seq., Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-390 et seq., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480 et seq., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 481A et seq., Idaho Civ. Code § 48-601 et seq., 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et seq., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 295/1A, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/1 et seq., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 295/1A, Iowa Code § 714H.1 et seq., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-623 et seq., Ky. Rev. 13 Stat. § 367.110 et seq., La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1401 et seq., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 205-A et seq., Md. Code Com. Law § 13-101 et seq., Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A § 1 et seq., Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.901 et seq., Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.67 et seq., Minn. Stat. § 325D.43-48 et seq., Minn. Stat. § 325F.68 et seq., Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-1 et seq., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq., Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-101 et seq., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1601 et seq., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0903 et seq., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358A:1 et seq., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-1 et seq., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 & 350, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74-1.1 et seq., N.D. Cent. Code § 51-15-02, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01 et seq., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4165.01 et seq., Okla. Stat. tit. 15 § 751 et seq., 78 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 51 et seq., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 646.605 et seq., 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq., R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1 et seq., S.C. Code Ann. § 39- 5-10 et seq., S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-10 et seq., S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-6, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.41 et seq., Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 2451 et seq., Va. Code Ann. 15 §§ 59.1-196 et seq., Rev. Code Wash. Ann. §§ 19.86.010 et seq., W. Va. Code § 46A-1-101 et seq., Wisc. Stat. § 110.18, and Wyo. Stat. §§ 45-12-105 et seq. 57. The damages suffered by Plaintiff and the class members include, but are not limited to: the decreased market value of the planters; the decrease yield in crops; the cost to repair the defect; and the waste of fertilizer. 58. John Deere is and was at all relevant times a merchant with respect to planters. 59. In the course of selling the planters, John Deere expressly warranted in writing that all parts on the planters are covered by warranty. 14 60. John Deere breached this express warranty to by failing to repair or replace the defective hoses and/or other parts of the planters when John Deere knew or should have known of the defective condition of the planters. John Deere has not repaired or adjusted the planters. 61. In addition to this warranty, John Deere expressly warranted several attributes, characteristics, and qualities. 62. These warranties are only a sampling of the numerous warranties that John Deere made relating to reliability and operation of the planters. Generally these express warranties promise superior performance, such as but without limitation: “The only planter on the market that can offer even emergence, correct population, uniform spacing, and speed to get the most production within the optimum window.” These warranties were made, inter alia, in advertisements, in John Deere brochures, its website, and in uniform statements provided by John Deere to be made by salespeople. These affirmations and promises were part of the basis of the bargain between the parties. 63. These additional warranties were also breached because the planters were not fully operational or reliable, nor did they comply with the warranties expressly made to purchasers or lessees. John Deere did not provide at the time of sale, and has not provided since then, planters conforming to these express warranties. 64. Furthermore, the limited warranty of replacing defective parts fails in its essential purpose because the contractual remedy is insufficient to make Plaintiff and class members whole and because John Deere has failed and/or has refused to adequately provide the promised remedies within a reasonable time. 65. Accordingly, recovery by Plaintiff and class members is not limited to the limited warranty on parts, and Plaintiff and class members seek all remedies as allowed by law. 15 66. Also, as alleged in more detail elsewhere in this Complaint, at the time that John Deere warranted and sold the planters it knew that the planters did not conform to the warranties and were inherently defective, and John Deere wrongfully and fraudulently misrepresented and/or concealed material facts regarding its planters. Plaintiff and class members were therefore induced to purchase the planters under false and/or fraudulent pretenses. 67. Moreover, many of the damages flowing from planters cannot be resolved through the limited warranty on parts, as those incidental and consequential damages have already been suffered due to John Deere’s fraudulent conduct as alleged herein, and due to its failure and/or continued failure to provide such limited remedy within a reasonable time, and any limitation on Plaintiff’s and class members’ remedies would be insufficient to make Plaintiff and class members whole. 68. Finally, due to John Deere’s breach of warranties as set forth herein, Plaintiff and class members assert as an additional and/or alternative remedy, as set forth in U.C.C. § 2-608, as adopted by the fifty states, for a revocation of acceptance of the goods, and for a return to Plaintiff and to class members of the purchase and/or lease price of all planters currently owned and/or leased. 69. As a direct and proximate result of John Deere’s breach of express warranties, Plaintiff and class members have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 70. John Deere was a merchant with respect to the planters within the meaning of U.C.C. § 2-104(1), as adopted by the fifty states. 16 71. Under U.C.C. § 2-314, as adopted by the fifty states, a warranty that the planters were in merchantable condition was implied by law in the transactions when Plaintiff and class members purchased and/or leased the planters. 72. The planters, when sold and at all times thereafter, were not merchantable and are not fit for the ordinary purpose for which the planters are used. Specifically, the unequal length of hoses and other causes for uneven distribution of fertilizer prevent the planters from meeting the essential functions of even distribution and emergence. 73. John Deere was provided notice of these issues by numerous individual letters and communications sent by Plaintiff, class members and independent John Deere dealers. 74. As a direct and proximate result of John Deere’s breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, Plaintiff and class members have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 75. Plaintiff and class members had no knowledge of the defects described herein, were unaware of these defects, and reasonably could not have discovered them when they purchased and/or leased the planters from John Deere and/or its agents. On the other hand, John Deere was aware of the defects and nonconformities at the time of sale and thereafter. 76. Acceptance was reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery of the defects and nonconformities before acceptance. 77. There has been no change in the condition of Plaintiff’s and class members’ planters not caused by the defects and nonconformities. 78. Plaintiff and class members would suffer economic hardship if they returned their planters but did not receive the return of all payments made by them. Because John Deere would 17 refuse to acknowledge any revocation of acceptance and return immediately any payments made, Plaintiff and class members have not re-accepted their planters by retaining them. 79. These defects and nonconformities substantially impaired the value of the planters to Plaintiff and class members. This impairment stems from two basic sources. First, the planters fail in their essential purpose because they do not function in the very capacity that they are marketed as exceeding all other planters in functionality, namely in even distribution and emergence. Second, the parts warranty has failed its essential purpose because John Deere was aware of the defect and took no action to prevent Plaintiff or class members from using the planters in their defective condition, thereby generating damages well in excess of mere replacement costs. 80. Plaintiff and class members provided notice of their intent to seek revocation of acceptance by a class-action lawsuit seeking such relief. In addition, Plaintiff and class members have requested that John Deere accept return of their planters and return all payments made. Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the Class hereby demands revocation and tender their planters. 81. Plaintiff and class members would suffer economic hardship if they returned their planters but did not receive the return of all payments made by them. Because John Deere is refusing to acknowledge any revocation of acceptance and return immediately any payments made, Plaintiff and class members have not re-accepted their planters by retaining them, as they must continue using them due to the financial burden of securing alternative means for an uncertain and substantial period of time. 82. Consequently, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to revoke their acceptances, receive all payments made to John Deere, and to all incidental and consequential 18 damages, including the costs associated with purchasing properly functioning planters, and all other damages allowable under law, all in amounts to be proven at trial. 83. Plaintiff and class members had valid business relationships and reasonable expectancy of continued business relationships with purchasers of their crops. 84. John Deere had knowledge of such relationships and/or possessed knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that such relationships existed. 85. John Deere intentionally or recklessly caused an interference with those business relationships. 86. John Deere’s interference was wrongful and illegal because, among other things, it was accomplished with fraud and was intentional. Additionally, John Deere’s actions constitute violations consumer and market protection statutes as set forth above. 87. John Deere’s interference proximately caused damage to Plaintiff and class members. 88. Plaintiff and class members are thus entitled to an award of compensatory damages and prejudgment and post- judgment interest. 89. John Deere willfully and wantonly subjected the Plaintiff and class members to probable injury, with an awareness of such impending danger and with heedless indifference of the consequences. Punitive Damages are therefore warranted. 90. John Deere as the manufacturer and seller/lessor of the planters had a duty to inform Plaintiff and class members of known defects in the planters. 19 91. John Deere marketed and represented the planters as providing even distribution and emergence despite knowing that the planters did not meet those representations. 92. Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents that the planters would provide even distribution and emergence. 93. Because Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents, Plaintiff and class members bought and/or leased planters that they would not have purchased or leased but for the misrepresentation. 94. Because Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents, Plaintiff and class members used the planters to seed and fertilize their crops. The undisclosed defect caused Plaintiff and class members to suffer financial harm in the form of wasted fertilizer and decreased yield. 95. John Deere gained an advantage in the form of receiving money and other consideration from Plaintiff and class members. 96. John Deere gained an advantage in the marketplace by fraudulently representing that its planters were “[t]he only planter on the market that can offer even emergence, correct population, uniform spacing, and speed to get the most production within the optimum window[,]” when its planters were unable to provide the represented superiority. 97. Justice requires that John Deere be disgorged of its ill-gotten gains and that Plaintiff and class members be compensated in full for the damages they have and will have suffered as a result of John Deere’s fraudulent representations, misrepresentations, and omissions when it had a duty to speak. 20 98. John Deere either directly or through its agents represented to the world, Plaintiff, and class members that the planters provided even distribution and emergence. 99. The planters were not capable of providing even distribution and emergence in the condition in which they were delivered to Plaintiff and class members. 100. John Deere knew these representations were false or acted with reckless disregard to the truth with respect to the planters. 101. John Deere made these representations either directly or through its agents for the purpose of increasing sales and convincing Plaintiff and class members to purchase the planters despite the planters not possessing the very quality they were advertised to have. 102. Plaintiff and class members justifiably relied upon John Deere’s representations in purchasing and/or leasing the planters. 103. Because Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents, Plaintiff and class members bought and/or leased planters that they would not have purchased or leased but for the misrepresentation. 104. Because Plaintiff and class members relied upon the representations of John Deere and/or its agents, Plaintiff and class members used the planters to seed their crops. The undisclosed defect caused Plaintiff and class members to suffer financial harm in the form of wasted fertilizer and decreased yield. 105. John Deere’s misrepresentations and omissions were the direct and foreseeable cause of the injuries to Plaintiff and class members. 21 MARKET PROTECTION STATUTES

win

70. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), permits a plan fiduciary, participant, beneficiary, or the Secretary of Labor to bring a suit individually on behalf of the Plan to recover for the Plan the remedies provided under ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).

win

14. Plaintiff has a checking account with Members 1st. 16. Pursuant to its standard account agreement, Members 1st charges fees (currently in the amount of $37) for debit card transactions that purportedly result in an overdraft. A. Members 1st Account Documents 17. Plaintiff’s checking account with Members 1st was, at all relevant times, governed by Members 1st’s standardized contract for deposit accounts, the material terms of which are drafted by Members 1st, amended by Members 1st from time to time at its convenience and complete discretion, and imposed by Members 1st on all of its customers. 19. Similarly, the account’s fee schedule states: 2017 Service Charges Non-Sufficient Funds Posted Point-of-Sale Item $37 each (does not apply to declined transactions) Non-Sufficient Funds Courtesy Paid Check, Debit, Bill Pay or Point-of-Sale Item $37 each “Fee Schedule,” attached as Exhibit B. 20. Federal law requires that banks and credit unions receive affirmative consent from accountholders before charging overdraft fees for ATM and/or non-recurring debit card purchases. 21. Regulation E required Members 1st to provide its customers the information required to obtain their legally binding informed consent because. But Members 1st failed to do this, because its opt-in disclosures contained the same or similar misrepresentations regarding Members 1st’s true overdraft policies as the account contract documents did. 22. The importance of Regulation E is highlighted by the fact that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s ("Bureau") study of actual practices found that: 1) ATM and debit card transactions are by far the most frequent transactions that occur; 2) overdraft fee policies entail expensive fees at very little risk to the financial institutions; and 3) opted-in accounts have seven times as many overdrafts that result in fees as not opted-in accounts. B. Plaintiff’s Experience 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 25. The proposed classes are defined as: All Members 1st checking account holders who, during the applicable statute of limitations through the date of class certification, were charged OD Fees on transactions that did not overdraw their checking accounts. All Members 1st checking account holders that reside within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who, during the applicable statute of limitations through the date of class certification, were charged OD Fees on transactions that did not overdraw their checking accounts. 26. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 27. Excluded from the Class are Members 1st, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which Members 1st has a controlling interest, all customers who make a timely election to be excluded, governmental entities, and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members. 28. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. The Class consist of thousands of members, the identity of whom is within the knowledge of and can be ascertained only by resort to Members 1st’s records. 30. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class and those common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 31. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are whether Members 1st: a. Imposed OD Fees on debit card transactions when those transactions did not overdraw accounts; b. Breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Plaintiffs and other members of the Classes through its overdraft policies and practices; c. Violated the consumer protection acts of certain states through its overdraft policies and practices. d. Violated Regulation E and EFTA. Other questions of law and fact common to the Class include: e. The proper method or methods by which to measure damages, and f. The declaratory relief to which the Class are entitled. 33. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions and, in particular, class actions on behalf of consumers and against financial institutions. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 34. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the amount of each individual Class member’s claim is small relative to the complexity of the litigation, and due to the financial resources of Members 1st, no Class member could afford to seek legal redress individually for the claims alleged herein. Therefore, absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses and Members 1st’s misconduct will proceed without remedy. 36. Plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 through 35 above. 37. Plaintiff and Members 1st have contracted for bank account deposit, checking, ATM, and debit card services. 38. Under the laws of Pennsylvania, good faith is an element of every contract pertaining to the assessment of overdraft fees. Whether by common law or statute, all such contracts impose upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith and fair dealing, in connection with executing contracts and discharging performance and other duties according to their terms, means preserving the spirit – not merely the letter – of the bargain. Put differently, the parties to a contract are mutually obligated to comply with the substance of their contract in addition to its form. Evading the spirit of the bargain and abusing the power to specify terms constitute examples of bad faith in the performance of contracts. 40. Members 1st has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its account agreement with customers through its overdraft policies and practices as alleged herein. 41. Members 1st breached promises included in the account documents as described herein when it charged overdraft fees on transactions that did not overdraw checking accounts. 42. Plaintiff and members of the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the contract. 43. Plaintiff and members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of Members 1st’s breach of the contract. 44. Plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 through 44 above. 45. This claim is asserted on behalf of the Subclass of Members 1st customers who are Pennsylvania residents and enjoy the protections of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq. 46. The UTPCPL, PA ST 73 P.S. § 201-3 prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 48. Pursuant to PA ST 73 P.S. § 201-9.2, et seq., Plaintiff and members of the Pennsylvania Class purchased services, in the form of banking services, from Members 1st that were used primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 49. Members 1st engaged in unlawful conduct, made affirmative misrepresentations, or otherwise violated the UTPCPL by, inter alia, knowingly and intentionally employing an unfair and deceptive policy and practice regarding its overdraft policy in its Deposit Agreement and related documents. 50. Specifically, Members First affirmatively promises to customers like the Plaintiff to only charge OD Fees on transactions which actually overdraw an account. These promises are a written guarantee of how the Plaintiff and Class Members’ money will be handled by Members 1st. However, Members 1st does charge OD Fees even when the transaction has not overdrawn an account. 51. Members 1st intended that Plaintiff and all Class Members rely on the affirmative misrepresentations which were false and deceived the Plaintiff and Class Members in the process of choosing a retail bank, in making purchase decisions, and in conducting their day to day activities in an objective effort not to be charged OD fees. Plaintiff and all Class Members justifiably relied upon Members 1st's promises and guarantees. 53. Members 1st intended that Plaintiff and all Class Members rely on the acts of concealment and omissions, so that Plaintiff and all Class Members would continue to incur overdraft fees. 54. Members 1st’s conduct caused Plaintiff and Class members to suffer ascertainable losses in the form of excessive overdraft fees that, but for Members 1st’s unfair and deceptive policy, would not otherwise have been imposed. 55. A causal relationship exists between Members 1st’s unlawful conduct and the ascertainable losses suffered by Plaintiff and the Class. Had Members 1st processed transactions as it should have, Plaintiff and the Class would not have incurred excessive overdraft fees in violation of the UTPCPL. 56. As redress for Members 1st’s repeated and ongoing violations of these consumer protection statutes, Plaintiff and the Subclass are entitled to, inter alia, damages and declaratory relief. 57. Plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 through 54 above. 58. By charging overdraft fees on ATM and nonrecurring transactions, Members 1st violated Regulation E (12 C.F.R. §§1005 et seq.), whose “primary objective” is “the protection of consumers” (§1005.l(b)) and which “carries out the purposes of the [Electronic Fund Transfer Act 15 U.S.C. §§1693 et seq.), the “EFTA”] (§1005. l(b)), whose express “primary objective” is also “the provision of individual consumer rights” (15 U.S.C. §1693(b)). 60. The intent and purpose of this Opt-In Contract is to “assist customers in understanding how overdraft services provided by their institutions operate .... by explaining the institution's overdraft service ... in a clear and readily understandable way”-as stated in the Official Staff Commentary (74 Fed. Reg. 59033, 59035, 59037, 5940, 5948), which is “the CFPB’s official interpretation of its own regulation,” “warrants deference from the courts unless ‘demonstrably irrational,’” and should therefore be treated as “a definitive interpretation” of Regulation E. Strubel v. Capital One Bank (USA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41487, *11 (S.D. N.Y. 2016) (quoting Chase Bank USA v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 211 (2011)) (so holding for the CFPB’s Official Staff Commentary for the Truth In Lending Act’s Regulation Z)). 62. As exhibited by the transactions above, Plaintiff’s account had funds to cover the transactions, which were paid, yet Members 1st charged overdraft fees. 63. As a result of violating Regulation E’s prohibition against assessing overdraft fees on ATM and non-recurring debit card transactions without obtaining affirmative consent to do so, Members 1st has harmed Plaintiff and the Class. 64. Due to Members 1st’s violation of Regulation E (12 C.F.R. § 1005.17), Plaintiff and members of the Classes are entitled to actual and statutory damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693. Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing1 (On Behalf of the Class) Violation of Electronic Fund Transfers Act (Regulation E) C.F.R. § 1005 et seq. (authority derived from 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.)) (On Behalf of the Class) Violations of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice Laws (On Behalf of the Pennsylvania Class)

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10. Plaintiff and those she seeks to represent in this action were employed as servers and bartenders for Bobby Hotel. 11. Bobby Hotel paid Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders an hourly wage below $7.25. Typically, they earned $4.15 per hour. During special events and banquets, servers were paid $6.00 per hour. Bartenders with whom Plaintiff worked along side were also paid $6.00 per hour. 12. In seeking to comply with the FLSA mandate that employees receive a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, Bobby Hotel purported to utilize a “tip credit” for each hour worked by Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). For example, the “tip credit” for Plaintiff as a server was $3.10 ($7.25 – $4.15 = $3.10) for each hour worked. 13. Plaintiff and other bartenders and servers were required to share tips with barbacks, who have no customer interaction, whose sole responsibility is stocking the bar area, and who are paid in excess of the $7.25 statutorily mandated minimum wage. 4 14. Additionally, Bobby Hotel agreed to pay its employees all accrued PTO hours they had earned during their employment so long as they were not terminated for cause or good reason. 15. Bobby Hotel laid Plaintiff off due to Bobby Hotel’s financial condition on or about March 17, 2020. The termination of Plaintiff’s employment was not for cause or good reason. 16. Bobby Hotel has not paid Plaintiff for all accrued PTO hours in accordance with its agreement. 17. Like Plaintiff, other servers and bartenders were also laid off by Bobby Hotel on or after March 17, 2020 due to Bobby Hotel’s financial condition and did not receive payment for their accrued PTO hours. 18. Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders relied on Bobby Hotel’s promise and representation that it would pay all agreed PTO hours and by failing to pay Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders, Bobby Hotel has received the benefit of their work already performed without compensating them for the accrued PTO which they earned and were entitled to be paid. 19. Plaintiff asserts her FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following individuals: All current and former servers and bartenders employed by Bobby Hotel at any time since March 19, 2020. 20. Plaintiff’s claims should proceed as a collective action because Plaintiff and other similarly situated servers and bartenders, having worked pursuant to the common policies described herein, are “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the associated decisional law. 21. Plaintiff also asserts claims for breach of contract and, in the alternative, unjust enrichment on a collective basis on behalf of those members of the collective class definition above 5 whose employment was terminated on or after March 17, 2020 and who were not paid for all accrued PTO hours earned. This claim is suitable for collective treatment under O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 581 (6th Cir. 2009), which held that employees with only supplemental claims can be part of a collective action, and subsequent cases from within this district permitting the assertion of supplemental claims on a collective basis.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a wine investment company, and owns and operates the website, www.vinovest.co (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.vinovest.co, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse wine investment portfolios for purchase, view a blog, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in May 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various wine investment portfolios for purchase, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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234. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 235. SFBL's practice of failing to pay the Plaintiffs and other Agents similarly situated at a time-and-a-half rate of pay for hours in excess of 40 hours per workweek violates the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 236. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are employed are applicable to SFBL or Plaintiff and other similarly situated Agents. 237. The Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were damaged in an amount to be proved at trial as a result of SFBL's violations of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 246. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 247. SFBL acted in bad faith when it failed to properly pay the Plaintiff and other similarly situated Agents for their overtime work. 248. SFBL knew or should have known that it was violating the FLSA when it failed to properly pay the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Agents for their overtime work. 249. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs and the other putative class members are entitled to recover double or liquidated damages from SFBL. 51. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 52. The Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (and other applicable statutes, laws and common law) on their own behalf and on behalf of the putative class described hereinabove. 53. The Plaintiffs do not bring this action on behalf of any executive, administrative or professional employee exempt from coverage under the FLSA. 54. A collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the Agents described are "similarly situated" to the Plaintiffs. The employees on behalf of whom the Plaintiffs bring this collective action are similarly situated because they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; they were or are subject to the same or similar wrongful and unlawful practices, policies and/or plans; and their claims are based upon the same legal theories. 55. The Plaintiffs estimate that the collective class, including both current and former Agents over the relevant period, will include well over 400 members. The precise number of collective class members should be readily available from a review of the Farm Bureau Defendants' records and from input received from the collective class members as part of the notice and "opt-in" process provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 57. Similarly, the classification status of the Plaintiffs and the putative class members involve an identical legal question regarding whether the Farm Bureau Defendants' Agents acted as employees, and not independent contractors, such that the Defendants owed (and owe) them a minimum wage, overtime and record-keeping obligations under the FLSA. 58. The Plaintiffs and the putative class members share the same interest in that the outcome of this action will determine whether they were (or are) either independent contractors or employees under the FLSA. Because the facts in each case are similar, if not altogether identical, the factual assessment and legal standards lend themselves to a collective action. 59. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 60. The Plaintiffs also bring this action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a putative class defined hereinabove. The Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the putative class definition as necessary. 62. Upon information and belief, the Farm Bureau Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals performed work that required overtime pay. 63. The Farm Bureau Defendants have operated under a scheme to deprive the misclassified Agents of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all time worked. 64. The Farm Bureau Defendants' conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and has caused significant damage to the Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. 65. The Plaintiffs share the same interests as the putative class members and will be entitled to overtime compensation, liquidated damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, costs of prosecution of this action, and pre- and post-judgment interest owed to them under nearly identical factual and legal standards as the remainder of the putative class. 66. The putative class meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) because, during the relevant time period, the Farm Bureau Defendants employed a number of persons in all or nearly all counties in South Carolina who were all subjected to working as Agents in excess of forty hours per work week, without being paid overtime pay. The precise number of class members should be readily available from a review of the Farm Bureau Defendants' records and from input received from the putative class members. 68. The statuses of all individuals similarly situated to the Plaintiffs raise an identical legal question: whether the Farm Bureau Defendants' Agents acted as independent contractors or employees to whom the Farm Bureau Defendants owed, owe or would owe a minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping obligations under the 76. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 77. The Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals have all been victimized by the Farm Bureau Defendants' common policies and plans to violate their rights under the FLSA by refusing or failing to keep proper records and denying them proper overtime compensation. 79. The Plaintiffs and the other putative class members were (and are), as a matter of economic reality, reliant upon the Farm Bureau Defendants to earn a living. They were neither self-reliant nor independent. 80. The Plaintiffs and the other putative class members' work was (and is) an integral part of the Farm Bureau Defendants' businesses. Their services were integrated into the Farm Bureau Defendants' business operations of soliciting, selling and servicing insurance products, which is consistent with an employee classification and not an independent contractor classification. 81. The Plaintiffs and the other putative class members' investments into the Farm Bureau Defendants' Agencies was (and is) miniscule compared to the Farm Bureau Defendants' investments. The Farm Bureau Defendants' investments in the infrastructure designed to underwrite, administer and pay claims of insurance products sold by the Plaintiffs and other putative class members far exceed any investment by them. 82. The Plaintiffs and other putative class members had or have indefinite, lengthy and ongoing working relationships with the Farm Bureau Defendants and received (and/or continue to receive) promotions and advanced (and/or continue to advance) along career paths as is typical for employees. 83. The Farm Bureau Defendants' practice has been to hire, train, promote and retain their Agents for numerous years. 85. The Plaintiffs and other putative class members worked exclusively for the Farm Bureau Defendants for years and even decades. 86. Some putative class members were required to adjust claims in the manners detailed in the Farm Bureau Defendants' guidelines, instructions, and Agents' Manuals. 87. The Plaintiffs and the other putative class members solicited, sold and serviced, personally and through Farm Bureau-appointed agents, insurance policies exclusively from the Farm Bureau Defendants. They were prohibited from soliciting, selling and/or servicing insurance from other companies while working for the Farm Bureau Defendants unless they obtained prior written consent and authorization to do so. 88. Alternatively, the Farm Bureau Defendants limited and controlled the policies, products, and services the Plaintiffs and the other putative class members could solicit, sell and/or service, personally or through Farm Bureau-appointed agents. 90. The Plaintiffs and the other putative class members were (and are) prohibited from representing any insurance company, other than a Farm Bureau insurance company, unless they first obtained the Farm Bureau Defendants' written consent to do so. 91. The Farm Bureau Defendants prohibited the Plaintiffs and the other putative class members from claiming any right to any of the books of business they wrote for the Farm Bureau Defendants and expressly stated that the entire books of business written by their Agents, together with all rights of renewal or expiration thereof, "shall be and remain the sole and exclusive property of the [Farm Bureau] Companies." 92. The Plaintiffs and the other putative class members were required to surrender their entire books of business to the Farm Bureau Defendants upon their termination or departure, whether voluntary or involuntary, from the Farm Bureau Defendants. 93. The Farm Bureau Defendants claimed ownership of and prohibited the Plaintiffs and other putative class members from claiming ownership of or any right to any information regarding persons to whom they sold or serviced insurance including "all information, names, addresses and ages of policy holders and contract holders." 95. The Farm Bureau Defendants required the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to pay commissions to their predecessors for prior work they rendered to Farm Bureau. 96. The Farm Bureau Defendants required Plaintiff and other putative class members to authorize it to print their names and to utilize their electronic signatures on various insurance documents. 97. The Farm Bureau Defendants expressly limited the authority of the Plaintiffs and other putative class members in a number of ways as detailed in its Agent’s Contracts and in its advertising and social media policies.

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19. AZZ provides galvanizing and metal coating services, welding solutions, specialty electronic equipment and highly engineered services to the power generation, transmission, distribution, refining, and industrial markets. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 34. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired AZZ securities between July 3, 2018 and October 8, 2019, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 40. The market for AZZ’s securities was open, well-developed and efficient at all relevant times. As a result of these materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failures to disclose, AZZ’s securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired AZZ’s securities relying upon the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities and market information relating to AZZ, and have been damaged thereby. 41. During the Class Period, Defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of AZZ’s securities, by publicly issuing false and/or misleading statements and/or omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make Defendants’ statements, as set forth herein, not false and/or misleading. The statements and omissions were materially false and/or misleading because they failed to disclose material adverse information and/or misrepresented the truth about AZZ’s business, operations, and prospects as alleged herein. 52. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 63. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 64. Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of AZZ within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in, and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings, and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 65. In particular, Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. Background Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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10. Defendant is an accounts receivable management company. 11. Defendant’s regular business practices include contacting alleged debtors and third parties by telephone in connection with collecting alleged debts. 12. Within the four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendant initiated telephone calls to cellular telephones using an artificial or pre-recorded voice to deliver a message. On information and belief, Defendant caused dialing Case3:14-cv-03866-JCS Document1 Filed08/26/14 Page4 of 12 16. Beginning in or around January of 2014, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number ending in 3186, in an attempt to collect an outstanding debt allegedly owed by another person. 17. Defendant placed several collection calls a week to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone seeking to collect an outstanding debt allegedly owed by a person other than Plaintiff and not known by Plaintiff. Case3:14-cv-03866-JCS Document1 Filed08/26/14 Page5 of 12 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as members of the proposed class (the “Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of the complaint in this action, through the date of certification, Defendant or its agent/s or employee/s caused to be made any telephone calls to said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, where such person had not previously consented to receiving such call. 27. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, having been called by Defendant on her cell phone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice without her prior express consent. 28. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 29. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its Case3:14-cv-03866-JCS Document1 Filed08/26/14 Page7 of 12 37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 38. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 39. “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has “the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See 2003 FCC Ruling, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14092, para. 132. 40. Defendant caused equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to be used to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. 41. Some, if not all, of Defendant’s calls also utilized an artificial and/or prerecorded voice. 42. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phone of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class when the autodialed and/or artificial or prerecorded voice calls were made. 43. As such, Defendant’s calls were willful or, at a minimum, negligent. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(1). 44. Defendant has, therefore, violated Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by causing an automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or Case3:14-cv-03866-JCS Document1 Filed08/26/14 Page10 of 12 Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Against All Defendants)

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(CONVERSION AND MISAPPROPRIATION) 111. The allegations contained in the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 112. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the Nationwide Class under the laws of all states. 113. Defendants have no authority to charge and collect “Taxes & Fees” amounts in excess of the taxes and fees owed to the appropriate governmental authorities for each reservation transaction; they are certainly not entitled to retain the overcharges as extra revenue. 114. Defendants’ collection of overcharged “Taxes & Fees” constitutes a conversion and misappropriation of funds belonging to Plaintiff and the Class members. 115. On information and belief, the conversion and misappropriation of these funds is illegal, unjustified, intentional, and deliberate. Defendants’ conduct is, at a minimum, indicative of wanton and reckless neglect. 116. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class members are entitled to actual damages as determined by a jury at trial. 1. The Tax Fraud Enterprise 1. The Tax Fraud Enterprise ........................................................................ 16 2. Mail and Wire Fraud ................................................................................ 20 21. Reservations.com claims to offer bookings at 250,000 hotels around the world through its website and call centers. The Reservations.com website came online in April of 2014, and the website now boasts that Reservations.com has booked “4 million room nights” for its customers. 22. All the hotel rooms listed on Reservations.com are provided by Expedia subsidiaries (including EAN, Travelscape, and Hotels.com) and other third-party suppliers. 23. Reservations.com does not contract with hotels directly. Instead, EAN and other third-party suppliers coordinate Reservations.com customers’ bookings with the hotels, collect the room rate and the “Taxes & Fees,” and remit some of these monies to the hotels and, sometimes, directly to governmental taxing authorities. Reservations.com is not involved in the “Taxes & Fees” collection and remission process. 24. Sunil Bhatt, one of the co-founders of Reservations.com, was the Vice-President and General Manager of EAN from 2009 until June of 2011. Mr. Bhatt served as CEO of Reservations.com from June 2014 until July of 2015. 25. Reservations.com indicates on its website that it has a “partnership” with Expedia. On information and belief, Expedia has provided Reservations.com with a significant portion of the 4 million room nights sold on the Reservations.com website. 26. So close is the relationship between Reservations.com and Expedia that Expedia operated a call center for Reservations.com from April 2014 until April of 2017. 27. Expedia sells hotel reservations through many different channels, including its own websites (most notably, expedia.com., hotels.com, orbitz.com, travelocity.com, and hotwire.com), and through EAN, which Expedia describes as its “purely partner-focused arm.” EAN provides room inventory to online retailers, including Reservations.com. 74. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 75. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class against Defendants Expedia, EAN, Travelscape, and Hotels.com. 76. The Defendants are “persons” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) because they are capable of holding, and do hold, a “legal or beneficial interest in property.” 77. Expedia, EAN, Travelscape, and Hotels.com, along with other entities and individuals, including Reservations.com, were associated with, and conducted or participated in the affairs of, a RICO enterprise (the “Tax Fraud Enterprise”), whose purpose was to deceive consumers into believing they were paying a legitimate “Taxes & Fees” charge. A. Nationwide Class ................................................................................................. 13 B. Washington Subclass ........................................................................................... 13 A. Expedia, not Reservations.com, determines the amount of the “Taxes & Fees,” and collects that amount directly from Reservations.com’s customers. A. Expedia, not Reservations.com, determines the amount of the “Taxes & Fees,” and collects that amount directly from Reservations.com’s customers. .............................................................................. 5 B. Plaintiff’s experience ............................................................................................. 9 C. The Tax Overcharge practice occurs throughout the United States. ................... 10 V. COUNT III (UNJUST ENRICHMENT) .................................................................................... 24 COUNT IV (CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST) .................................................................................. 25 COUNT V (VIOLATIONS OF THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (“RICO”) ........................ 16 VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C)–(D): THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (“RICO”)

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1. A statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt- out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 12. On information and belief, on or about January, 2015, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 13. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the faxes. 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 17. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) which Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 18. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, avers that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 23. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 25. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 27. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 3. A statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines. The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of the telephone lines and fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. 30. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, avers that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, avers that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 32. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 33. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful.

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11. Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. Whether Defendants did so directly or with the assistance of a third party (yet unknown to Plaintiff), Defendants are directly liable for violating the TCPA. 12. Plaintiff has received at least one of Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax received in September 2015 is attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiff intends to discover the number of other Defendants’ advertisements sent to Plaintiff by fax. 14. Exhibit A includes Global’s name, web address, and contact information. 15. Exhibit A does not include the mandatory clear and conspicuous opt- out notice required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 16. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A or any other advertisement from Global to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 17. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 18. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendants. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendants’ unlawful advertisements. 19. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as members of a class, initially defined as follows: Each person that was sent one or more telephone facsimile messages promoting the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services offered by “Global,” but not stating on its first page that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future ads and that failure to comply with such a request within 30 days is unlawful. Plaintiff expressly reserves the right to modify the proposed class definition or propose subclasses. 21. On information and belief, Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns involved other, substantially-similar advertisements also sent without the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Plaintiff intends to locate those advertisements in discovery. 22. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims separately from the putative class’s claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 23. Numerosity/impracticality of joinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but will be obtained from Defendants’ records or the records of third parties. 25. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendants’ conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 26. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 28. A class action is the superior method of adjudicating the common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual questions. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The likelihood of individual class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the class would be proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 29. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 31. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 33. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 34. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 35. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 36. The TCPA requires that every advertisement sent by facsimile must include an opt-out notice clearly and conspicuously displayed on the bottom of its first page. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 38. Exhibit A does not provide all of the information the TCPA requires for a compliant opt-out notice. For example, Exhibit A fails to state on the advertisement’s first page that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future advertisement by facsimile and that the sender’s failure to comply within 30 days is unlawful. 39. Defendants violated the TCPA by failing to state on the first page of each fax advertisement that their failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days would be unlawful. Exhibit A. 40. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt-out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt-out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender’s failure to comply with the opt-out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 41. Defendants’ failure to include a compliant opt-out notice on their fax advertisements makes irrelevant any express consent or established business relationship (“EBR”) that otherwise might have justified Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 42. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were negligent. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 44. If Defendants’ actions were knowing or purposeful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to 3 times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 45. Global is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes were sent on its behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 46. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about Defendants’ goods, products, or services, that Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship with Defendants, that Exhibit A is an advertisement, and that Exhibit A did not display a compliant opt-out notices as required by the TCPA. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 50. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendants’ own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendants’ own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendants’ own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 51. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 52. By sending them unsolicited faxes, Defendants permanently misappropriated the class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to their own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 53. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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1. Issuance of notice as soon as possible to all students of Texas Chiropractic College Foundation who worked in the Moody Clinic from January 1, 2016 to the present. Generally, this notice should inform them that this action has been filed, describe the nature of the action, and explain their right to opt into this lawsuit if they were not paid for work performed or hours worked during any portion of the statutory period; 2. Judgment against Defendant for an amount equal to Plaintiff’s and the Members of the Class’s unpaid minimum wages; 25. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to compensate Plaintiff and Members of the Class at the federally mandated minimum wage, in violation of the requirements of the FLSA. 26. Plaintiff and Members of the Class have suffered damages as a direct result of Defendant’s illegal actions. 27. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and Members of the Class for all unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs of Court under the FLSA from January 1, 2016 to the present. Jury Demand 28. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all claims asserted herein. Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and all individuals similarly situated who join in this action demand: 3. An equal amount to the minimum wage damages as liquidated damages; 4. Judgment against Defendant that its violations of the FLSA were willful; 5. To the extent that liquidated damages are not awarded, an award of prejudgment interest; 6. All costs and attorneys’ fees incurred prosecuting these claims; 8. Leave to amend to add claims under applicable law; and 9. For such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. Respectfully submitted, Violation of the FLSA – Failure to Pay Minimum Wage

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18. UNIVERSAL regularly collects, and attempts to collect, defaulted debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and Internet. 19. By letter dated June 19, 2017 (“Long Letter”), UNIVERSAL attempted to collect from LONG an allegedly defaulted financial obligation that arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which were the subject of the transaction were incurred for personal, family, and household purposes. 20. A true copy of the Long Letter is attached as Exhibit A except that the undersigned counsel has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, partially redacted the financial account numbers to protect LONG’s privacy. 21. On information and belief, UNIVERSAL obtained the financial obligation (“Long Debt”) described in Exhibit A for collection purposes after it was in default. 22. It is unknown if Exhibit A is the initial letter UNIVERSAL sent LONG regarding the Long Debt. 23. On information and belief, Exhibit A is a computer-generated, template form letter that UNIVERSAL uses to collect debts. 24. Page One of Exhibit A refers to UNIVERSAL’s client, but never identifies the creditor. 26. The FDCPA in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c requires a debt collector to stop contacting a consumer when a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that they (i) refuse to pay a debt, or (ii) wish the debt collector cease further communication with the consumer. 27. Exhibit A deprived LONG of truthful, non-misleading, information in connection with UNIVERSAL’s attempt to collect a debt. 28. By letter dated January 4, 2018 (“Volkman January Letter”), UNIVERSAL attempted to collect from VOLKMAN an allegedly defaulted financial obligation that arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which were the subject of the transaction were incurred for personal, family, and household purposes. 29. A true copy of the Volkman January Letter is attached as Exhibit B except that the undersigned counsel has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, partially redacted the financial account numbers to protect VOLKMAN’s privacy. 30. On information and belief, UNIVERSAL obtained the financial obligation (“Volkman Debt”) described in Exhibit B for collection purposes after it was in default. 31. It is unknown if Exhibit B is the initial letter UNIVERSAL sent VOLKMAN regarding the Volkman Debt. 32. On information and belief, Exhibit B is a computer-generated, template form letter that UNIVERSAL uses to collect debts. 33. Page One of Exhibit B refers to “Bradford Authenticated” and states that UNIVERSAL was asked by “Bradford Authenticated” to contact VOLKMAN “regarding [his] account.” 35. Exhibit B does not identify the creditor of the Volkman Debt. 36. Exhibit B also states “there is still time to respond in order to prevent further contact by Universal Fidelity LP.” 37. The FDCPA in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c requires a debt collector to stop contacting a consumer when a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that they (i) refuse to pay a debt, or (ii) wish the debt collector cease further communication with the consumer. 38. By letter dated February 15, 2018 (“Volkman February Letter”), UNIVERSAL attempted to collect from VOLKMAN the Volkman Debt. 39. A true copy of the Volkman February Letter is attached as Exhibit C except that the undersigned counsel has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, partially redacted the financial account numbers to protect VOLKMAN’s privacy. 40. It is unknown if Exhibit C is the initial letter UNIVERSAL sent VOLKMAN regarding the Volkman Debt. 41. On information and belief, Exhibit C is a computer-generated, template form letter that UNIVERSAL uses to collect debts. 42. Page One of Exhibit C refers to “Bradford Authenticated,” identifies an “Account No.” and then states “[t]he debt that you owe to the above-referenced client has been placed with Universal Fidelity LP….” 43. There is no “client” referenced on Exhibit C. 44. Page One of Exhibit C then instructs VOLKMAN to mail a payment “made payable to UFLP.” 46. Exhibits B and C deprived VOLKMAN of truthful, non-misleading, information in connection with UNIVERSAL’s attempt to collect a debt. 47. The reverse side of Exhibits A, B, and C all contain the following statement: 48. Exhibits A, B, and C state that the consumer has the right to seek validation of the debt “within 30 days after receiving your initial notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof . . . .” but do not state whether Exhibits A, B, and C are the “initial notice.” 49. Exhibits A, B, and C mislead the unsophisticated consumer to believe the validation period began before receiving Exhibits A, B, and C and had, potentially, already expired. 50. An unsophisticated consumer could understand “your initial notice” to mean the initial validation notice, was provided by some other debt collector that had previously collected on the same debt. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Jackson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160776, at *27 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2016) (“the notification provisions of § 1692g apply to the initial communication made in connection with the collection of a debt by each successive debt collector.”) 53. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 54. Plaintiffs seek to certify a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). 55. This claim is brought on behalf of a Class of all persons to whom UNIVERSAL mailed a written communication that was not returned as undeliverable, to an address in the State of Wisconsin, during the period of June 19, 2017 through July 10, 2018, in an attempt to collect a defaulted account, and which states: 56. The identities of the Class members are readily ascertainable from UNIVERSAL’s business records. 57. The Class claims include all claims Class members may have for a violation of the FDCPA based on a letter from UNIVERSAL, such as Exhibits A, B, and C, which seek to collect defaulted debts. 60. Based on discovery and further investigation (including, but not limited to, UNIVERSAL’s disclosure of class size and net worth), Plaintiffs may, in addition to moving for class certification using modified definitions of the class, class claims, and the class period, and/or seek class certification only as to particular issues as permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Such modified definitions may be more expansive to include/exclude consumers from the foregoing definitions. 61. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 62. UNIVERSAL is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 63. Exhibit A is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 64. Exhibit B is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 65. Exhibit C is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 66. The Long Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 67. The Volkman Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5) 68. LONG is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 69. VOLKMAN is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 70. Exhibit A was mailed to LONG to collect the Long Debt. 71. Exhibit B was mailed to VOLKMAN to collect the Volkman Debt. 72. Exhibit C was mailed to VOLKMAN to collect the Volkman Debt. 74. UNIVERSAL’s use of Exhibits A, B, and C violated the FDCPA in one or more following ways: (a) Using false, deceptive, and misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e including, but not limited to, violations of §§ 1692e(2), 1692e(10), and 1692g(a); and (b) Failing to identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a footwear and accessories retailer that owns and operates www.swims.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in December of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.swims.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(All Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the FLSA collective v. All Defendants) (All Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the FLSA collective v. All Defendants) (Plaintiff Muhammad on behalf of himself and similarly-situated officers v. All Defendants) 15. This is a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly-situated for the recovery of compensation for time spent engaging in washing-up activities after the end of their shifts within the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”), including washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining personal protective equipment (“PPE”), and showering. 16. Specifically, the activities for which minimum and overtime compensation are due to Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers are: 5 a. Sanitizing and washing their uniforms, gear, belts and equipment, boots and shoes, and bags for necessary items, such as with Lysol, Clorox, or other chemicals and then washing their uniforms after each shift; b. Sanitizing their vehicles with Lysol, Clorox, or other chemicals either before or after (or both) their shifts to avoid contamination within their vehicles present due to working in 51. Plaintiff Rashid Muhammad received an email on March 27, 2020 offering time-and-a- half-pay for officers who volunteer to work at the MHTC while COVID-19 positive detainees are housed there: From: Rashid Muhammad (Sheriff) <Rashid.Muhammad@cookcoun tyi l.gov> Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 11:44:26 PM To: Martha Yoksoulian (Sheriff) <Mart ha.Yoksoulian@ cookcount yil.gov> Subject: Re: Mental Health Transiti on Center Assignments Available Hello Supt. I am interested in volunteering for the 11-7 shift if and only if the time and a half is for pay. I'm not interested in putting myself in potential harms way for time on the books. Dep. R. Muhammad #17016 From: Martha Yoksoulian (Sheriff) <Mart ha.Yoksoulian@cookcountyi l.gov> Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 12:46 PM To: Division 10 Supervisors <divison10supervi sors@ cookcounty.onmicrosoft.co m>; Division Ten Officers <divisi ontenofficers@cook county .onmicrosoft. com> Subject: Mental Health Transiti on Center Assignments Available Hello all, As some of you may have heard on the news, the sheriff is opening some of the barrack's at the Mental Health Transition Center for the inmates that have tested positive for the COVID-19 virus. We are asking if anyone wants to volunteer working at MHTC for a while until we pass this crisis. It will be all three shifts 11-7, 7-3 and 3-11. 11-7 will be placed in details 1 and 7. 7-3 will be placed in details 2 and 7 as well as 3-11 details 2 and 7. You will receive time and a half pay however, it has not been decided if it will be in time or pay. As always you will have protective gear to protect to work with and you will be stationed a minimum of ten feet away from the inmates. We need both officers and supervisors. We are looking from 3-5 officers per division. If you are intere sted , please reply to this email. Thank you, Superintende nt Martha Yoksoulian Cook County Sheriff's Office Division 10 2700 S California Avenue Chicago, II 60608 12 Office (773) 674-4429 Mobile (312) 758-5029 Email: Martha .Yoksoulian@cookcountyil.gov The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) named in this message. This communication is intended to be and to remain confidential and may be subject to applicable work product privileges. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please alert the sender immediately by reply e-mail and then delete this message and its attachments. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this message and/or any attachments and if you are not the intended recipient, do not disclose the contents or take any action in reliance upon the information contained in this communication or any attachments. Thank you 52. As noted above, Muhammad replied to the email that he would volunteer for the MHTC if he received pay. 53. The CCSO accepted Muhammad’s offer and transferred him to MHTC starting March 30, 2020, in the following memorandum: 57. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in this Count. 58. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires that an employer compensate an employee a minimum hourly rate for all hours suffered or permitted to work. 59. Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers to work at the beginning of, and after, their shifts, in sanitizing activities, including by washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining PPE, and showering. 60. Each Plaintiff, and all similarly-situated officers, are due to be paid wages for approximately 20 - 30 minutes of sanitation activities at the beginning of, and the end of, each shift worked between March 9, 2020 and through the cessation of the COVID-19 protocols at 62. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in this Count. 63. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires that an employer compensate an employee one-and- one-half-times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a given workweek. 64. Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers to work at the beginning of, and after, their shifts, in sanitizing activities, including by washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining PPE, and showering without paying them for such activities that were performed at an overtime rate of pay where the Plaintiffs had performed over forty (40) hours of work in the workweek. 65. Each Plaintiff, and all similarly-situated officers, are due to be paid wages for approximately 30 minutes of sanitation activities at the beginning of, and the end of, each shift worked between March 9, 2020 and through the cessation of the COVID-19 protocols at 67. Plaintiff Muhammad restates and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in this Count. 68. Plaintiff Muhammad and similarly-situated officers entered into an agreement with Defendant Sheriff to voluntarily work at the MHTC for time-and-a-half pay (in Muhammand’s case), or time-and-a-half pay or comp time (in others’). 69. Via email on March 27, 2020, Plaintiff Muhammad notified the Sheriff, through his Superintendent, that he would work at the MHTC if he received pay for doing so. 70. On March 30, 2020, Defendant Sheriff transferred Plaintiff Muhammad to MHTC, where he then worked, including by providing safety and security, and welfare, functions for COVID- 19 positive detainees at great risk of exposure to himself. 71. As of payday on April 17, 2020, Defendant Sheriff failed to pay Plaintiff Muhammad, or any similarly-situated officer assigned to MHTC, the time-and-a-half pay owed under the transfer agreement. 72. Plaintiff Muhammad and similarly-situated officers are entitled to recover all amounts owed under the transfer agreement for time spent assigned at MHTC, two percent of the amount of such underpayments for each month they remain unpaid, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Muhammad requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor, and against Defendants, and order that Defendants pay him and all similarly-situated officers for all underpaid overtime wages between March 30, 16 2020 and the date of cessation of his assignment at MHTC, two percent of the amount of such underpayments for each month they remain unpaid, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, the certification of a class for purposes of this IWPCA claim, and for such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. I. FACTS RELATING TO ALL PLAINTIFFS AND SIMILARLY-SITUATED OFFICERS. PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM DISTRIBUTION A

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1. This case is about Regional Transportation District’s (RTD’s) and First Transit, Inc.’s (First Transit’s) admitted policy of automatically denying employment to potential bus drivers with more than ten points on their driver’s licenses, whether or not those points arise from violations that might bear on an applicant’s ability to drive safely. 10. Ms. Taylor brings this case, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, to obtain damages and other relief for the wrongful denial of her application for employment as a bus driver and an injunction that would require RTD and First Transit to perform an individualized assessment of each applicant’s driving record. 2. That policy is described here as the “automatic denial” policy. 27. Under Colorado law, drivers may be assigned a certain number of “points” per traffic violation. 28. Points may be assigned for a range of violations from speeding, to driving without proof of insurance, to driving with a defective headlamp. 29. There is abundant evidence that people of color are disproportionately likely to be pulled over in a traffic stop and disproportionately likely to be cited for traffic violations of all kinds, including minor traffic violations. 3. People of color are disproportionately likely to be the subject of traffic stops and are disproportionately likely to be ticketed for minor traffic violations, which may increase the points on a driver’s record. 30. In official postings advertising bus driver positions, RTD has announced that it will not accept job applicants who have “more than five points assessed against [their] motor vehicle record in the past two years” and “not more than ten points on the seven year record.” 31. First Transit’s contract with RTD specifies that First Transit may not hire bus drivers to drive for RTD and First Transit unless those drivers meet certain criteria including that they may not have more than ten points on their license in the preceding seven years. 32. Pursuant to its contract with RTD, First Transit applies the automatic denial policy when it jointly hires and employs RTD drivers. 34. In 2017, after she obtained her CDL, Ms. Taylor applied to work as a bus driver with RTD. 35. RTD informed Ms. Taylor that she could not obtain employment as a bus driver because she had more than 10 points assessed against her driving record in the preceding seven- year period. 36. Those points including points for driving an unsafe vehicle, driving with defective headlamps, and failing to provide proof of insurance. 37. In 2018, Ms. Taylor saw an advertisement for work as an RTD bus driver through First Transit. 38. The advertisement specified that applicants did not need to have a CDL to obtain employment as an RTD bus driver. 39. Because RTD and First Transit were apparently not requiring a CDL to obtain employment, Ms. Taylor assumed that the points on her driving record would also not prevent her from obtaining employment, especially because the vast majority of the points on her license related to her vehicle being defective or not having proof of insurance. 4. Therefore, Defendants’ automatic denial policy has a disparate impact on people of color and violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 40. In March 2018, Ms. Taylor submitted her application to First Transit to apply as a bus driver for RTD and First Transit. 41. First Transit granted Ms. Taylor an interview for the position. 42. In the interview, First Transit did not ask Ms. Taylor about her driving record. 43. Ms. Taylor received a contingent offer from RTD and First Transit by email after her interview. 45. At the time Ms. Taylor applied for a position with RTD in 2017, none of the points on her record were from convictions for moving violations in the prior seven years. 46. At the time Ms. Taylor applied for a position with RTD and First Transit in March 2018, none of the points on her record were from convictions for moving violations in the prior seven years. Rather, six were for driving a defective vehicle, eight were for not having proof of insurance or driving without insurance, and one was for defective headlamps. 47. Ms. Taylor believes that were she white, she would not have received many of the points on her driving record. 48. For example, Ms. Taylor was assessed points for not having proof of insurance when two police cars pulled her over for no clear reason after having followed her out of a convenience store parking lot. 49. Had RTD and First Transit performed an individualized assessment of Ms. Taylor’s driving record, she would not have been denied employment with RTD and First Transit. 50. Were it not for the automatic denial policy, Ms. Taylor would apply in the future for a bus driver position with RTD or with First Transit to work for First Transit and RTD. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully rewritten herein. 52. Plaintiff asserts her Count I as a Fed R. Civ P. 23 class action on their own behalf and on behalf of classes for which they seek certification. 54. The classes are so numerous that joinder of all potential class members is impracticable. 55. There are questions of law or fact common to the classes that predominate over any individual issues that might exist. Common questions of law and fact include whether Defendants’ policy and practice of automatically rejecting applicants based on the number of points on their driving records violates Title VII because it has a disparate impact on black and Latino applicants. 57. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the class. She applied to work for Defendants and was a victim of the same violations of law as the other class members, including violations of the federal anti-discrimination laws. 58. Plaintiff is represented by counsel experienced in litigating employment claims. 59. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual putative class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual potential class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 6. Plaintiff Shanita Taylor is a black African American woman who lives in the Denver area. 60. Each Class Member’s claim is relatively small. Thus, the interest of potential Class Members in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions is slight. In addition, public policy supports the broad remedial purposes of class actions in general and that the pertinent federal laws are appropriate vehicles to vindicate the rights of those employees with small claims as part of the larger class. 61. Plaintiff is unaware of any members of the putative classes who are interested in presenting their claims in a separate action. 62. Plaintiff is unaware of any pending litigation commenced by putative class members. 63. It is desirable to concentrate this litigation in this forum because the positions applied for existed in this jurisdiction and Plaintiff is domiciled in this jurisdiction. 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint. 66. Plaintiff is black and African America and within the classes protected by Title 7. Ms. Taylor worked hard to obtain her commercial driver’s license because she believed it would allow her to obtain jobs that paid decent wages and provided good benefits. 8. When she applied to work for RTD and First Transit as a bus driver, however, Ms. Taylor was denied employment due to no other reason than that her driving record had more than 10 points in the preceding seven years. 9. The vast majority of those points arose from violations that have no bearing on Ms. Taylor’s ability to drive safely or effectively for RTD, but Defendants did not undertake an individualized assessment of Ms. Taylor’s driving record. AUTOMATIC DENIAL POLICY BUS DRIVER BUT WHOSE APPLICATIONS WERE REJECTED BECAUSE THEY HAD MORE THAN TEN POINTS ON THEIR DRIVER’S LICENSE IN THE SEVEN DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE AND COLOR, TITLE VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E ET SEQ. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Damages Class and Rule 23 Injunction Class vs. All Defendants Defendants. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

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13. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 14. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Washington; b. to whom Defendant Convergent sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. on behalf of Defendant LVNV; d. containing settlement offers; e. without disclosing that if a partial payment is made along with signed, written acknowledgement, it will restart the statute of limitations; f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(VIOLATION OF FLSA) A. FLSA COVERAGE 17. Progrexion employs more than 1,500 employees at its call centers in Utah, Idaho, Arizona, and Oklahoma. Progrexion’s hourly call-center employees receive calls from Progrexion’s clients and assist those clients with repairing their credit reports.3 18. Upon information and belief, Progrexion is a privately-held company with call centers located in Salt Lake City, Utah; North Salt Lake, Utah; West Valley, Utah; Provo, Utah; Rexburg, Idaho; Idaho Falls, Idaho; Phoenix Arizona; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 19. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of handling phone calls with Progrexion’s clients, answering customer inquiries, troubleshooting on behalf of customers, and generally assisting customers with matters related to their credit reports. 20. Plaintiff Cristin Born was employed by Progrexion in customer service at its call center located in Phoenix, Arizona from approximately January 2016 until April 2019. 21. Plaintiff Jessica Chauhan is currently employed by Progrexion in customer service at its call center located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma from approximately June 2016 to the present. 22. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour. 23. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members work approximately forty (40) “on-the- clock” hours per week. 25. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Progrexion as a result of Progrexion’s corporate policy and practice of requiring all hourly call-center employees to be ready to take their first phone call the moment their official shift starts. 26. Specifically, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are required to start and log-in to their computer, open multiple different Progrexion computer programs, log in to each Progrexion program, and ensure that each Progrexion program is running correctly—all of which can take up to thirty minutes—before they are able to take their first phone call, which comes in as soon as their official shift starts. 27. During this start up time, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were not compensated although they were expected to have completed this process in advance of their official start time. 28. Progrexion required Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members to be ready to accept their first customer call at the moment the employee’s official shift starts. As such, Progrexion required (and continues to require) that Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members perform these start up tasks “off-the-clock” (and without pay) before their official shift begins. 29. During this start up time, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were not compensated although Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were expected to have completed this process in advance of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members official “on the clock” start time. 31. Moreover, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members worked weeks wherein the commission payments were greater than the hourly “draw.” During those weeks, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were not paid by the hour and did not receive any overtime for hours worked over forty, but were instead misclassified as exempt and paid only commissions. 32. As a result, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 33. Progrexion has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiffs. 34. Progrexion is aware of its obligation to pay for all hours worked and overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members but has failed to do so. 35. Because Progrexion did not pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members time and a half for all hours worked and overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week, Progrexion’s pay policies and practices violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA. 36. On December 7, 2019 Plaintiff’s Counsel filed an Original Petition in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; Cause of Action No. 2:18-cv-04541-DMF. 37. On February 13, 2019 Progrexion filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. 39. From August 2019 until September 2019 the parties prepared to mediate this matter and on November 15, 2019, the Parties attended Mediation, which ended with no resolution. 40. On November 15, 2019, after it became apparent that a resolution would not be reached, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed a current list of clients to Progrexion, in order to obtain arbitration agreements to be filed with the American Arbitration Association.4 As of November 15, 2019, Plaintiffs requested arbitration agreements for 108 individuals. 41. While some arbitration agreements were produced, a number remain outstanding.5 42. On December 3, 2019, Plaintiff’s Counsel sent a second email to Progrexion requesting that the outstanding Arbitration Agreements be produced so that those individuals could proceed in arbitration. 6 43. On December 5, 2019, Progrexion sent eleven (11) Arbitration Agreements to Plaintiff’s Counsel.7 At that time, 37 agreements remained outstanding. 45. On December 13, 2019, while sending a fourth email requesting Progrexion to produce the outstanding arbitration agreements, Plaintiffs’ Counsel asked Progrexion to agree to toll the statute of limitations for those individuals whose arbitration agreements were outstanding, while Plaintiff’s Counsel waited on the production of the remaining Arbitration Agreements.10 46. On December 13, 2019, Progrexion produced another eleven (11) Arbitration Agreements, but did not respond to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s suggestion on tolling the statute of limitations.11 At that time, 31 arbitration agreements remained outstanding 47. On December 19, 2019 Plaintiffs sent an email to Progrexion with an updated list of individuals missing Arbitration Agreements, and again requested a response to the suggestion that the statute of limitations be tolled for those individuals waiting on their arbitration agreements to proceed in the arbitral forum.12 48. On December 20, 2019, Progrexion produced another twelve (12) Arbitration Agreements and again failed to respond to the suggestion that the statute of limitations be tolled for those individuals waiting on the production of their arbitration agreements.13 50. From November 15, 2019 until December 20, 2020 Plaintiffs’ Counsel filed ninety- five (95) Arbitration Demands. 51. As of the date of this filing, twenty-one (21) Arbitration Agreements remained outstanding. Because those Arbitration Agreements were not timely produced, and because their statutes of limitations continued to run on their valuable and viable claims, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. 53. As of the date of this filing, Progrexion has not produced the Arbitration Agreement for any Plaintiff in this action despite repeated requests for the same. 54. As of the date of this filing, Progrexion hasnot agreed to toll the statute of limitations and because Progrexion has not agreed to toll the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claims are running. V. 55. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 56. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 73. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 74. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Progrexion’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiffs with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. 75. Other similarly situated employees of Progrexion have been victimized by Progrexion’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 76. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 70. 77. Progrexion’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Progrexion, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiffs or the FLSA Collective Members. 78. Thus, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 79. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 80. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) hours each week. 81. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 83. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 84. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 70 and notice should be promptly sent.

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11. The instant action arises out of Defendants’ attempts to collect upon outstanding credit card debt (“subject debt”) said to be owed by Plaintiff. 12. The subject debt stems from Plaintiff’s purported past due payments on a personal credit card said to be issued to Plaintiff by Credit One Bank, N.A. (“Credit One”). 13. After Plaintiff’s purported default on the subject debt, Credit One charged off and sold the subject debt to LVNV. 14. On information and belief, Scott, on behalf of or at the direction of LVNV, began attempting to collect on the subject debt in approximately the Fall of 2019. 15. In connection with these collection efforts, Scott, at the direction of LVNV, filed a small claims action against Plaintiff, and subsequently caused a summons to be served on Plaintiff in October 2019. 17. This yellow card was not covered by any sort of envelope when provided to the process server by Defendants, and was handed to Plaintiff by the process server prior to Plaintiff being handed the summons. 18. The yellow card and its contents were entirely visible to the process server, and the process server viewed the document prior to handing it to Plaintiff. 19. As such, Defendants’ use of the yellow card constitutes an impermissible communication with a third party under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), as it communicated to the process server that Plaintiff owed a debt that was being collected by Defendants. 20. Additionally, the yellow card was not the first communication Plaintiff received from Defendants. 21. As such, the failure to disclose that the yellow card was from a debt collector is in direct violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 23. Defendants’ conduct harmed Plaintiff’s statutorily protected interest to be free from deceptive and misleading collection communications, and further invaded Plaintiff’s privacy by virtue of improperly communicating with a third party. 24. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf and as a class action on behalf of the following class: All persons residing in the state of Texas who received a yellow card from Defendants in conjunction with being served legal process in connection with Defendants’ efforts to collect upon a debt during the one year preceding the filing of this action through the date of class certification. 25. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). 26. Upon information and belief, the Class consists of hundreds or more persons throughout the state of Texas, such that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 27. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class members that relate to Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA, particularly because they are based on a common course of conduct by Defendants. 28. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the proposed Class because they are based on the same legal theories, and Plaintiff has no interest that are antagonistic to the interests of the Class members. 29. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and has retained competent legal counsel experienced in class actions and complex litigation. 31. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, as the pursuit of hundreds of individual lawsuits would cause a strain on judicial resources and could result in inconsistent or varying adjudications, yet each Class member would be required to prove an identical set of facts in order to recover damages 32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 31 as though fully set forth herein. 33. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 34. Defendants are debt collectors, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a, because they are persons who use any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, and because they regularly use the mails and/or telephones to collect, or attempt to collect, directly or indirectly consumer delinquent debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 36. Although Scott is the entity referenced in the yellow card Plaintiff received, LVNV’s relationship with Scott renders it either directly liable for the below referenced violations of the FDCPA, or vicariously liable for the FDCPA violations engaged in by Scott. a. Violations of FDCPA § 1692c(b) 37. The FDCPA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), provides that “without the prior express consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” 39. The FDCPA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 40. In addition, this section enumerates specific violations, such as: “The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). “The failure to disclose . . . in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

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12 MEAL-PE?IOD LIABILITY UNDER LABOR CODE S 226.7 13 (Against All Defendants) 14 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 JENNIFER CAMPOS, an individual, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. 14 FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGES '5 (Against All Defendants) 16 15 REST-BREAK LIABILITY UNDER LABOR CODE § 226.7 16 (Against All Defendants) 17 16 18 VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 221 19 (Against All Defendants) 20 18 VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 226(a) 19 (Against All Defendants) 20 28. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself an all others similarly situated 10 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Plaintiff seeks to represent a Class (or "the Class" or "Class members") defined as follows: "All individuals employed by Defendants at any time 12 during the period of four (4)years prior to the filing of this lawsuit and ending on a date as 13 determined by the Court ("the Class Period"), and who have been employed by Defendants as 14 non-exempt, hourly associate employees within the State of California." 15 Further, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following Subclasses composed of and defined as 16 follows: 17 a. Subclass 1. Minimum Wages Subclass. All Class members who were not IS compensated for all hours worked for Defendants at the applicable minimum wage. 19 b. Subclass 2. Waaes and Overtime Subclass. All Class members who were not 20 compensated for all hours s('orked for Defendants at the required rates of pay, including for all 21 hours worked in excess of eight in a day and/or forty in a week. 22 C. Subclass 3. Meal Period Subclass. All Class members who were subject to 23 Defendants' policy and/or practice of failing to provide unpaid 30-minute uninterrupted and duty- 24 free meal periods or one hour of pay at the Employee's regular rate of pay in lieu thereof. 25 d. Subclass 4. Rest Break Subclass. All Class members who were subject to 26 Defendants' policy and/or practice of failing to authorize and pennit Employees to take 27 uninterrupted, duty-free, 10-minute rest periods for every four hours worked, or major fraction 28 thereof, and failing to pay one hour of pay at the Employee's regular rate of pay in lieu thereof. -12- 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in 17 full herein. 18 44. Defendants failed to pay Employees minimum wages for all hours worked. 19 Defendants had a consistent policy of misstating Employees time records and failing to pay 20 Employees for all hours worked. Employees would work hours and not receive wages, including 21 as alleged above in connection with off the clock work and regarding rounding of timekeeping 22 entries and revisions made to timekeeping records to reflect less time worked than was actually 23 worked. Defendants, and each of them, have also intentionally and improperly rounded, 24 changed, adjusted and/or nbdified Employee hours, and imposed difficult to attain job and shift 25 scheduling requirements on Plaintiff and the Class members, which resulted in off the clock work 26 and underpayment of all wages owed to employees over a period of time, while benefiting 27 Defendants. During the relevant time period, Defendants thus regularly failed to pay minimum 28 wages to Plaintiff and the Class members, including by unlawful rounding to their detriment. 17- 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in 14 full herein. IS 57. California Labor Code § 1194 provides that "any employee receiving less than the 16 legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to 17 recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime 18 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." The action 19 may be maintained directly against the employer in an employee's name without first filing a 20 claim with the Department of Labor Standards and Enforcement. 21 58. By their conduct, as set forth herein, Defendants violated California Labor Code § 22 510 (and the relevant orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission) by failing to pay Employees: 23 (a) time and one-half their regular hourly rates for hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a 24 workday or in excess of forty (40) hours in any workweek or for the first eight (8) hours worked 25 on the seventh day of work in any one workweek; or (b) twice their regular rate of pay for hours 26 worked in excess of twelve (12) hours in any one (I) day or for hours worked in excess of eight 27 (8) hours on any seventh day of work in a workweek. Defendants had a consistent policy of not 28 paying Employees wages for all hours worked, including by requiring off the clock work and by 6 VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 203 7 (Against All Defendants) 8 100. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in 9 ; I full herein. 10 101. Numerous Employees are no lonàer employed by Defendants; they either quit II Defendants' employ or were fired therefrom. 12 102. Defendants failed to pay these Employees all wages due and certain at the time of 13 termination or within seventy-two (72) hours of resignation. 14 103. The wages withheld from these Employees by Defendants remained due and owWng 15 for more than thirty (30) days from the date of separation of employment. 16 104. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class members without abatement, all 17 wages as defined by applicable California law. Among other things, these Employees were not 18 paid all regular and overtime wages, including by failing to pay for all hours worked or requiring 19 off the clock work or by unlawful rounding of time entries to the detriment of Employees, and by 20 failing to correctly calculate the regular rate used to calculate and pay overtime compensation, and 21 failed to pay premium wages owed for unprovided meal periods and rest periods, as further 22 detailed in this Complaint. Defendants' failure to pay said wages within the required time was 23 willful within the meaning of Labor Code § 203. 24 105. Defendants' failure to pay wages, as alleged above, was willful in that Defendants 25 knew wages to be due but failed to pay them; this violation entitles these Employees to penalties 26 under Labor Code § 203, which provides that an employee's wages shall continue until paid for up 27 to thirty (30) days from the date they were due. 28 f/I 65. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in full herein. 6 66. At all relevant times hereto, Defendants have been an "enterprise engaged in 7 commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 67. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants have required the Plaintiff and FLSA collective Employees as part of their employment to work off the 10 clock and for less than minimum wage under 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). That Section provides the following: 12 Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in 13 commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: 14 (I) except as othenvise provided in this section, not less than— (A) $5.85 an hour, beginning on the 60th day after May 25, 2007; C! 15 (B) $6.55 an hour, beginning 12 monthsafter that 60th day; and 16 (C) $7.25 an hour, beginning 24 months after that 60th day;... 17 68. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that certain or all of the IX Employees were not exempt employees under the FLSA's overtime provisions and that 19 Defendants also required Plaintiff and require the FLSA collective. Employees to work without 20 overtime in excess of the forty (40) hours per week maximum under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). That 21 Section provides the following: 22 Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives 23 compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate which is not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 24 69. In the performance of their duties for Defendants, Employees as members of the 25 FLSA collective often did work off the clock and over forty (40) hours per week, received non- 26 hourly payments that were not incorporated by Defendants into the regular rate used to calculate 27 and pay overtime compensation. and did not receive minimum wages and other required 28 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in IS full herein. 16 77. Employees regularly worked shifts greater than five (5) hours and in some 17 instances, greater than ten (10) hours. Pursuant to Labor Code § 512 an employer may not employ 18 someone for a shift of more than five (5) hours without providing him or her with a meal period of 19 not less than thirty (30) minutes or for a shift of more than ten (10) hours without providing him or 20 her with a second meal period of not less than thirty (30) minutes. 21 78. Defendants failed to provide Employees with meal periods as required under the 22 Labor Code. Employees were often required to work through their meal periods or provided with 23 them after working beyond the fifth hour of their shifts. Furthermore, upon information and 24 belief, on the occasions when Employees worked more than 10 hours in a given shift, they did so 25 without receiving a second uninterrupted thirty (30) minute meal period as required by law. 26 79. Defendants thus failed to provide Plaintiff and the Class members with meal 27 periods as required by the Labor Code, including by not providing them with the opportunity to 28 take meal breaks, by providing them late or for less than thirty (30) minutes, or by requiring them - 25 - 8. The Employees who comprise the Class and collective, including Plaintiff, are 17 nonexempt employees pursuant to the applicable Wage Order of the IWC and applicable federal IS regulations. Defendants hire associate Employees who work in non-exempt positions at the 19 direction of Defendants in the State of California and throughout the United States. Plaintiff and 20 the Class members were either not paid by Defendants for all hours worked or were not paid at the 21 appropriate minimum, regular and overtime rates. Plaintiff also contends that Defendants failed to 22 pay Plaintiff and the Class members all wages due and owing, including by unlawful rounding to 23 their detriment or under-recording of hours worked, made unlawful deductions from their pay, 24 failed to provide meal and rest breaks, and failed to furnish accurate wage statements, all in 25 violation of various provisions of the California Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders, and the 26 FLSA where applicable. 27 82. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in 18 full herein. 19 83. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and paragraph 12 of the applicable IWC Wage Orders 20 provide that employers must authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods at the rate of 21 ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) work hours. 22 84. Employees consistently worked consecutive four (4) hour shifts and were generally 23 scheduled for shifts of greater than 3.5 hours total, thus requiring Defendants to authorize and 24 permit them to take rest periods. Pursuant to the Labor Code and the applicable IWC Wage Order, 25 Employees were entitled to"paid rest breaks of not less than ten (10) minutes for each consecutive 26 four (4) hour shift, and Defendants failed to provide Employees with timely rest breaks of not less 27 than ten (10) minutes for eaáh consecutive four (4) hour shift. 28 85. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and paragraph 12 of the applicable IWC Wage Orders 89. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in 21 full herein. 22 9. During the course of Plaintiff and the Class members' employment with 28 Defendants, they were norpaid all wages they were owed, including for all work performed 90. California Labor Code § 226(a) requires an employer to furnish each of his or her 23 employees with an accurate, itemized statement in writing showing the gross and net earnings, 24 total hours worked, and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate; these 25 statements must be appended to the detachable part of the check, draft, voucher, or whatever else 26 serves to pay the employee's wages; or, if wages are paid by cash or personal check, these 27 statements may be given to.the employee separately from the payment of wages; in either case the 28 employer must give the employee these statements twice a month or each time wages are paid. 96. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in 21 full herein. 22 97. Labor Code § 221 provides, "lt.shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or 23 receive from an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer to said employee." 24 Additionally, pursuant to California Labor Code § 204, other applicable laws and regulations, and 25 public policy, an employermust timely pay its employees for all hours worked. Defendants failed 26 to do so. 27 98. Defendants unlawfully received and/or collected wages from the Employees in the 28 Class by implementing a policy of automatically deducting 30 minutes worth of vested wages, - 29 - FAILURE TO PAY WAGES AND OVERTIME UNDER LABOR CODE § 510 12 (Against All Defendants) 13 FOR FAILURE TO PAY WAGES UNDER THE FLSA (Against All Defendants) 4 VIOLATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 ET SEQ. (Against All Defendants) Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs, as though set forth in full herein. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, Employees, and the general public, brings this claim pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 17200 ci seq. The conduct of Defendants as alleged in this Complaint has been and continues to be unfair, unlawful, and harmful to Employees and the general public. Plaintiff seeks to enforce important rights affecting the public interest within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. Plaintiff is a "person" within the meaning of Business & Professions Code 12 § 17204, has suffered injury, and therefore has standing to bring this cause of action for injunctive 13 relief, restitution, and other appropriate equitable relief. 14 109. Business & Professions Code § 17200 ci seq. prohibits unlawful and unfair 15 business practices. By the conduct alleged herein, Defendants' practices were deceptive and 16 fraudulent in that Defendants' policy and practice failed to provide the required amount of 17 compensation for missed meal and rest breaks, and failed to adequately compensate Plaintiff and IS Class members for all houri worked, due to systematic business practices as alleged herein that 19 cannot be justified, pursuaht to the applicable California Labor Code and Industrial Welfare 20 Commission requirements in violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, ci 21 seq., and for which this Court should issue injunctive and equitable relief, pursuant to California 22 Business & Professions Code § 17203, including restitution of wages wrongfully withheld. 23 110. Wage-and-hour laws express fundamental public policies. Paying employees their 24 wages and overtime, providing them with meal periods and rest breaks, etc., are fundamental 25 public policies of California. Labor Code § 90.5(a) articulates the public policies of this State 26 vigorously to enforce minimum labor standards, to ensure that employees are not required or 27 permitted to work under substandard and unlawful conditions, and to protect law-abiding 28 employers and their employees from competitors who lower costs to themselves by failing to -31-

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23. The Property is commercial property with a public accommodation, a convenience store/restaurant, located right on McKinney Ave. The Property has its own parking. There are public transportation stops located right on McKinney Ave and a trolley that runs in front of the Property as well. L.P. and HERMITAGE INVESTMENTS, INC., Defendants § § § § Discrimination Under the A.D.A.

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11. Upon information and belief, Restaurant Depot employs over one thousand employees. Plaintiff James Goodman 12. On or about April 15, 2018, Plaintiff James Goodman commenced working for Restaurant Depot in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He began work as a cashier, and generally worked 40 hours per week. 13. When he was hired, he was told by management that his initial salary would $10.00 per hour, and that after sixty days, it would be raised to $10.50 per hour. 14. One week after starting, he was given the opportunity to work in the Seafood Department, by Branch Manager Al Savinski. He was told that upon accepting, he would receive an immediate pay raise to $10.75 per hour. Further, Al Savinski stated after he completed sixty days of employment, his hourly salary would increase to $11.00 per hour. 15. Plaintiff Goodman accepted that position based upon management’s representation. 16. Despite accepting the new position and working in seafood, Plaintiff Goodman's paychecks did not reflect his properly hourly rate of $10.75 per hour. Plaintiff Goodman initially pointed this out this error to the Human Resources Manager named Linda, last name unknown. 17. Despite these complaints, the error was not fixed. 18. Beginning in June 2018, Plaintiff Goodman's salary was $11.00 per hour, but his paycheck still reflected the original $10.00 per hour. 20. Plaintiff Goodman complained against to Human Resource Manager Linda, and she informed Plaintiff Goodman that the raise from $10.00 to $10.50 was a Union raise. 21. On or about August 12, 2018, Al Savinski was terminated as Branch Manager. 22. Plaintiff Goodman continued to protest to management, including Tim, a Regional Manager. 23. During this time frame, Plaintiff Goodman worked over forty hours per week on numerous occasions. He was paid overtime based on his incorrect hourly rate, and he did not receive all of the overtime pay he was entitled to. 24. Also in early August, 2018, Restaurant Depot, through Human Resource Manager Linda, announced an incentive award of $1,000 to be paid to each employee who remained with the Restaurant Depot through October 1, 2018. 25. Plaintiff James Goodman remained employed by Restaurant Depot through October 1, 2018, but he did not receive the incentive award. Plaintiff Dominic Schroeder 26. Plaintiff Dominic Schroeder began working for Restaurant Depot in February, 2018. His initial rate of pay was $9.50 per hour. 27. At the time of his hire, Branch Manager Al Savinski informed Mr. Schroeder that his pay rate would be increased to $11.00 per hour starting in May, 2018. 28. However in May 2018, Mr. Schroeder received a raise to $9.75 per hour. In May, 2018, Mr. Schroeder complained to Branch Manager Al Savinski, who promised to have payroll correct the error. No correction was ever made. 30. During this time frame, Plaintiff Schroeder worked over forty hours per week on many occasions. He was paid overtime based on his incorrect hourly rate, and he did not receive all of the overtime pay he was entitled to. 31. Also in early August, 2018, Restaurant Depot, through Human Resource Manager Linda, announced an incentive award of $1,000 to be paid to each employee who remained with the Restaurant Depot through October 1, 2018. 32. Plaintiff Dominic Schroeder remained employed by Restaurant Depot through October 1, 2018, but he did not receive the incentive award. 33. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) provides: Every employer subject to any provision of this chapter or of any order issued under this chapter shall make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by him, and shall preserve such records for such periods of time, and shall make such reports therefrom to the Administrator as he shall prescribe by regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter or the regulations or orders there-under. The employer of an employee who performs substitute work described in section 207(p)(3) of this title may not be required under this subsection to keep a record of the hours of the substitute work. 35. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) provides that it shall be unlawful “to violate any of the provisions of section 211(c) of this title.” 37. Wis. Stats. § 104.09 provides: Each employer shall keep a record of the names and addresses of all student learners and employees, the hours of employment and wages of each, and such other records pertaining to ability as the department requires, except that an employer is not required to keep a record of the hours of employment of an employee who is exempt under rules promulgated by the department from the requirement under s. 103.02 that an employee be paid overtime compensation, as defined in s. 103.025 (1) (c), and who is not compensated on an hourly rate basis. 38. Wis. Stats. § 109.03, in relevant part, provides: “Every employer shall as often as monthly pay to every employee engaged in the employer’s business, except those employees engaged in logging operations and farm labor, all wages earned by the employee to a day not more than 31 days prior to the date of payment.” 39. Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.10, in relevant part, provides: “An employer shall state clearly on the employee's paycheck, pay envelope, or paper accompanying the wage payment the number of hours worked, the rate of pay and the amount of and reason for each deduction from the wages due or earned by the employee….” 40. Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.11(1) provides: “Every employer shall make and keep for at least 3 years payroll or other records for each of their employees which contain: …. (d) Time of beginning and ending of work each day. …. (f) Total number of hours worked per day and per week.” 41. Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.03 provides: “Except as provided in s. DWD 274.08, each employer subject to this chapter shall pay to each employee time and one-half the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.” 43. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 44. Retention bonuses are wages pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 109.01(3), which specifically includes “bonuses” within the definition of wages. 45. Plaintiffs satisfied the Defendant’s announced conditions for earning the retention bonuses. 46. Defendant refused to pay the retention bonuses. 47. Plaintiffs have a statutory right to sue for payment of wages. Wis. Stats. § 109.03(5). 48. Plaintiffs have been injured by Defendant’s refusal to pay wages. 49. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 50. Plaintiffs were entitled to be paid at the rates contracted for with Defendant. 51. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs their wages earned pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 104.02 and 109.03, and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.03 by not compensating them at the rates agreed to by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. 52. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 53. During the three (3) years preceding this action, or since the commencement of employment (whichever is applicable), Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members earned retention bonuses. 54. As a matter of law, the retention bonuses must be included when calculating the “regular rate of pay.” See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(3). 55. Defendant failed to account for the retention bonuses in Plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay, and therefore, Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members at the rate of one and one half (1 1/2) times their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in a single week, as required under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) and Wis. Admin DWD §274.03. 56. Defendant’s violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) is "willful" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 57. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were employed by Restaurant Depot, Inc. as an hourly employee, (c) within the last three (3) years, inclusive. 58. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 60. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 61. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 62. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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(Declaratory Relief on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) 11 20. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules ofCiv 1 7 Procedure, the Named Plaintiffs bring this action, for injunctive and declaratory relief, an 8 statutory damages, on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated. T class 9 the Named Plaintiffs seek to represent is composed of "all persons with disabilities who . se 10 wheelchairs and scooters as mobility aids who have been or who are currently being deni d 11 equal access to point of sale terminals at Wal-Mart stores in California." 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21. The persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons i impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the partie and to the Court. 22. This case arises out ofWal-Mart's policy and practice of continuing to us inaccessible POS devices that deny persons in wheelchairs and scooters equal access to e benefits and services of its POS terminals and the benefits and services provided throug its POS terminals, at multiple Wal-Mart stores. 23. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class a a 20 whole because the Named Plaintiffs, or their members, are similarly affected by Defend t's 21 failure to provide accessible POS terminals at multiple Wal-Mart stores. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24. The Named Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives because they, or heir members, are directly impacted by Defendant's discrimination against them by failing t provide accessible POS terminals at Wal-Mart stores. The interests of the Named Plaintiffs are ot antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the interests of the class as a whole. The attorneys representing the class are experienced in representing clients with disabilities with class ction I' II civil rights claims. 1 1 II I 5 /:,11 28. There are over 2. 7 million wheelchair users in the United States. 12 325,000 wheelchair users reside in California. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 29. Wal-Mart has approximately 9,600 retail stores in 28 countries and consi three different divisions: Wal-Mart Stores U.S., Sam's Club and Wal-Mart International. Wal- Mart claims to have over 200 million customers visiting its stores each week. Through is Wal- Mart and Sam's Club divisions, Wal-Mart operates over 4,000 stores across the United tates. In California, Wal-Mart operates 76 Supercenters, 103 Discount Stores and 33 Sam's Club . In its last fiscal year, Wal-Mart had sales exceeding $310 billion in the United States. When s domestic and international operations are taken into account, Wal-Mart's sales totaled$ 19 20 billion. 21 30. Wal-Mart sells items at discount prices and prides itself on saving peopl money. 22 Individuals who shop at Wal-Mart generally do so in part because Wal-Mart's prices ar lower 23 and its goods more affordable than at other retail stores. 24 25 26 27 28 31. At multiple stores, Wal-Mart refuses to provide accessible POS termina for its disabled customers even though accessible designs are readily available and affordable Wal- Mart continues to deny patrons in wheelchairs and scooters who shop at these stores fu 1 and I 4 Violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.) 45. Plaintiffs incorporate, by reference herein, the allegations in paragraphs 1 ough 44, inclusive. I 46. Title III of the ADA entitles disabled individuals to the full and equal enjo ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place f public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 4 7. Title III prohibits public accommodations from excluding an individual disability or a class of individuals with disabilities on the basis of a disability or disabiliti s of such individual or class, from participating in or benefiting from the goods, services, faci ities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of the entity or otherwise discriminating agai st a person on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i). 48. Title III prohibits public accommodations from affording an individual o individuals with a disability, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, I advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded other individuals. 42 U .. C.§ 12182(b )(1 )(A)(ii). 49. Title III prohibits public accommodations from providing an individual r class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, with a ood, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate fr m that provided to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(iii). 50. Title III provides that goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, d I accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integra ed setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(B). 10 54.l(a)(l). 6 61. Plaintiffs incorporate, by reference herein, the allegations in paragraphs 1 ough 44, inclusive. 62. Defendant operates business establishments within the jurisdiction of the s ate of California, and as such is obligated to comply with the provisions of the California Unru . Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code§ 51 et seq. 63. The Unruh Act guarantees, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are en tled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all busine s establishments of every kind whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the state of California. Cal. Civ. Code§ 5l(b). 64. The Unruh Act provides, inter alia, that a violation of the ADA,§§ 12101 et seq., also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code§ 5l(f). 65. Wal-Mart is a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh ct. Cal Civ. Code§ 5l(b). 66. Defendant generates hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue from the ale of goods in California through its approximately 200 stores in California. The POS term· Wal-Mart stores are accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, and services pr ided by I Defendant. The POS terminals at multiple Wal-Mart stores are inaccessible to patrons +house wheelchairs and scooters. By providing POS terminals that are inaccessible, Wal-Mart i/ 12 70. Plaintiffs incorporate, by reference herein, the allegations in paragraphs 1 hrough 44, inclusive. 71. The CDP A guarantees, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are entitle to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations, advantag , facilities, and privileges of all "places of public accommodation" and "other places to w ich the general public is invited" within the jurisdiction of the state of California. Cal. Civ. Co § 72. Defendant offers retail goods and services to the general public at a place, of public accommodation and in a place to which the general public is invited, within the 25 jurisdiction of the state of California, and therefore is obligated to comply with the follo ing 26 27 28 provisions of the California Disabled Persons Act: California Civil Code§§ 54-54.3. 73. The CDPA provides, inter alia, that a violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., also constitutes a violation ofthe CDPA. Cal. Civ. Code§ 54.l(d). 13 78. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if set fort fully herein. 79. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in Plaintiffs contend, and are informed and believe that Defendant denies that by providin 19 inaccessible POS terminals at public accommodations and business establishments thro 20 California it fails to comply with applicable laws including but not limited to Title III o the 21 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq., California Civil Code§§~ 1, et 22 seq., and California Civil Code§§ 54-54.3. 23 24 25 26 27 28 80. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order t, at each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request relief as set forth below. 9 Violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (California Civil Code§ 51 et seq.) Violation of the California Disabled Persons Act (California Civil Code §§ 54-54.3)

win

NEW YORK LABOR LAW – OVERTIME VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the NY Class) 194. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all NY Class members, reallege and incorporate by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 195. Plaintiffs were employed by Aldi within the meaning of the NYLL. 196. At all relevant times, Defendant had a willful policy and practice of misclassifying Plaintiffs and similarly situated Store Managers as “exempt” in order to avoid paying them for all hours worked or appropriate overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 197. As a result of the Defendant’s willful failure to compensate its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the NY Class, for all hours worked and at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Aldi has violated and, continues to violate, N.Y. Lab. Law Article 19 §§ 650, et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 198. Due to the Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the members of the NY Class are entitled to recover from the Defendant: compensation for unpaid wages; an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law Article 19 § 663.

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13. On information and belief, Defendants launched their Flavor God seasoning business in 2012. Defendants first generated sales by selling their seasonings at farmer’s markets. On information and belief, Flavor God began selling products to customers in the United States through its website (https://flavorgod.com) by at least January 1, 2014, and now exclusively sell their Flavor God-branded seasonings, rubs, and other products online. Today, Defendants market, sell, and ship their products worldwide. 14. Flavor God makes a wide variety of flavored seasonings including Lemon & Garlic, Chipotle, Italian Zest, Garlic Lover’s, and Everything. In total, Defendants make 18 different flavors of seasonings. In addition to their seasonings, Defendants make “toppers,” which are flavored powders meant to be added to a completed meal to infuse a different flavor into the meal. Defendants make six topper flavors including Buttery Cinnamon Roll, Chocolate Donut, Gingerbread Cookie, and Pumpkin Pie. Defendants also make three rubs for seasoning meats and two flavors of salt. 37. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following class: All persons in the United States who purchased one or more Flavor God products from https://flavorgod.com/ between November 30, 2016 through the present (the “Class Period”) at a discount from a higher reference price and who have not received a refund or credit for their purchase(s). 38. The above-described class of persons shall hereafter be referred to as the “Class.” Excluded from the Class are any and all past or present officers, directors, or employees of Defendants, any judge who presides over this action, and any partner or employee of Class Counsel. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand, limit, modify, or amend this class definition, including the addition of one or more subclasses, in connection with his motion for class certification, or at any other time, based upon, inter alia, changing circumstances and/or new facts obtained during discovery. A. Company Background

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(FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT) (MISSOURI WAGE PAYMENT LAW) Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.527 111. This count sets forth a claim by the Farmworkers for Defendants’ violations of the Missouri wage payment law, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.527, during the 2018 southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest. 112. By their actions described in Paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 72, 73 and 76, Defendants paid the Farmworkers less wages than the wages to which they were entitled. 113. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay wages as described in Paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 72, 73 and 76, the Farmworkers are entitled to the full amount of their unpaid wages for their work during the 2018 southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest and an amount equal to twice the unpaid wages as liquidated damages, as well as costs and attorney’s fees. 12. The H-2A program was created by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1188, and is implemented through regulations set out at 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.100 to 655.185 and 29 C.F.R. §§ 501.0 to 501.47. The H-2A program authorizes the admission of non-immigrant workers to perform agricultural labor or services of a seasonal or temporary nature. 15. The clearance order also functions as an employment contract between the agricultural employer and the H-2A workers. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(q). 17. In or about April 2018, Marin J submitted two separate temporary labor certification applications to the Office of Foreign Labor Certification of the DOL’s Employment and Training Administration seeking workers to harvest and pack watermelons in southeastern Missouri. One application sought admission of 27 workers for employment from June 25, 2018 through August 17, 2018, with the workers scheduled to be housed at 200 Slicer Street, Kennett, Missouri 63857 (ETA case number H-300-18102-843410). The second application requested the admission of 80 workers for employment from June 25, 2018 through October 20, 2018, with the workers scheduled to be housed at the 84 West Motel, 1433 Saint Francis Street Kennett, Missouri 63857 (ETA case number H-300-18124-947696). Both of these temporary labor certification applications were signed on behalf of Marin J by Jorge J. Marin. 18. In or about July 2018, Marin J submitted a temporary labor certification application to the Office of Foreign Labor Certification of the DOL’s Employment and Training Administration seeking workers for employment in North Carolina harvesting apples and hemp. The application sought admission of 15 workers to harvest apples and hemp near Hendersonville, North Carolina from August 8, 2018 through November 10, 2018 (ETA case number H-300-18169-075975). The temporary labor certification application was signed on behalf of Marin J by Jorge J. Marin. 19. Each of the temporary labor certification applications described in Paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 explicitly and implicitly incorporated the DOL’s regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 655 Subpart B, including the terms described in Paragraph 14. 21. A true and correct copy of the clearance order (ETA case number H-300-18102-843410) submitted by Defendants as part of its request for 27 workers for employment in Missouri from June 25, 2018 through August 17, 2018 is attached as Exhibit A. 22. A true and correct copy of the clearance order (ETA case number H-300-18124-947696) submitted by Defendants as part of its request for 80 workers for employment in Missouri from June 25, 2018 through October 20, 2018 is attached as Exhibit B. 23. The DOL accepted the temporary labor certification applications and clearance orders submitted on behalf of Marin J as described in Paragraphs 16 through 20. The clearance orders were circulated to local job service offices in an effort to recruit U.S. workers to fill the positions offered. 24. On or about April 18, 2018, the DOL’s National Processing Center granted in full Marin J’s temporary labor certification application seeking 28 workers for employment harvesting watermelons in central Florida from April 25, 2018 through June 3, 2018. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security in turn issued H-2A visas to fill the manpower needs described in the temporary labor certification application and accompanying clearance order. 26. On or about June 8, 2018, the DOL’s National Processing Center granted in full Marin J’s temporary labor certification application seeking 80 workers for employment harvesting, loading, transporting, grading and packing watermelons in Missouri from June 25, 2018 through October 20, 2018. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security in turn issued H-2A visas to fill the manpower needs described in the temporary labor certification application and accompanying clearance order (Exhibit B). 27. On or about July 23, 2018, the DOL’s National Processing Center granted in full Marin J’s temporary labor certification application seeking 15 workers for employment harvesting apples and hemp in North Carolina from August 8, 2018 through November 10, 2018. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security in turn issued H- 2A visas to fill the manpower needs described in the temporary labor certification application and accompanying clearance order. 28. Defendants failed to contractually forbid its agents and recruiters who they engaged to recruit potential H-2A workers to fill the manpower requirements of the temporary labor certification applications described in Paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 from seeking or receiving payments from prospective employees. 30. Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio incurred and paid a number of expenses in conjunction with obtaining an H-2A visa and entering the United States to come to work in Florida for Defendants. These expenses included transportation from his home in Puebla to Matamoros and from Matamoros to Defendants’ jobsite, lodging expenses while in Matamoros awaiting the processing of his visa application, a fee for assistance in completing his visa application and related documents, and a $6.00 (U.S.) fee paid at the U.S./Mexico border for issuance of an arrival-departure document referred to as Form I-94. The Form I-94 was necessary for Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio to enter the United States and work for Defendants. 31. The expenses incurred and paid by Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio as described in Paragraph 30 were incurred primarily for the benefit or convenience of Defendants within the meaning of the regulations implementing the FLSA, 29 C.F.R. § 531.3(d)(1). 32. Defendants employed Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio harvesting watermelons in central Florida during May 2018. The temporary labor certification application described in Paragraph 16 and the accompanying clearance order served as the employment contract between Defendants and Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio with respect to his central Florida employment. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(q). 34. Although Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio worked for Defendants through the conclusion of the central Florida contract period, Defendants never reimbursed him for his inbound transportation and subsistence expenses, as promised in Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio’s employment contract and required by 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h)(1). 35. Defendants transported Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio and the other members of the central Florida harvesting crew between the jobsite and their living quarters each day in various vans and buses owned by Defendants. These same vehicles were used by Defendants to transport Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio and the other crewmembers to nearby stores to purchase foodstuffs and to laundromats to wash their clothes. 36. At no time during the 2018 central Florida watermelon harvest did Defendants have in effect an insurance policy in the amounts prescribed by 29 C.F.R. § 500.121(b), or a liability bond meeting the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 500.124, which insured either of them against liability for damage to persons or property arising from the operation of the vehicles described in Paragraph 35. Instead, Defendants sought to satisfy the vehicle insurance requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h)(4) through a workers’ compensation insurance policy issued to Harbor America Florida, a professional employer organization that Defendants hired to provide payroll and other services with respect to Defendants’ employees. 38. Defendants failed to maintain payroll records accurately recording the compensable hours worked by Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio in the central Florida watermelon harvest. Defendants chronically underreported the number of hours worked by Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio. The hours and earning statements Defendants provided to Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio were based on the same inaccurate data as contained in the payroll records, and similarly underreported the number of hours worked. 39. For his work harvesting watermelons in central Florida for Defendants, as described in Paragraph 32, Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio was paid on a piece-rate basis, as delineated in the Clearance Order. His weekly piece-rate earnings frequently totaled less than the AEWR. At times, these piece-rate earnings were less than the amount due under the minimum hourly wage provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), and the Florida Minimum Wage Act. On such occasions, Defendants were required to supplement Martinez-Gregorio’s piece-rate earnings so that they at least equaled these wage rates. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(l)(2). These supplemental wages are commonly referred to as a “make up” wage or “build up pay.” 41. To meet the manpower requirements for their Missouri jobs described in the temporary labor certification applications referenced in Paragraph 17 and the accompanying clearance orders (Exhibits A and B), Defendants recruited and hired workers both from their Florida watermelon-harvesting operations and from Mexico. 42. As the central Florida watermelon harvest was finishing, in or about the beginning of June, 2018, Defendants recruited and hired Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio to work with their crew in the southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest under the job terms set out in Defendants’ temporary labor certification applications and accompanying clearance orders relating to that work (Exhibits A and B). Martinez-Gregorio accepted Defendants’ job offer, after which time Defendants transported him from central Florida to Kennett, Missouri. Upon his arrival in southeastern Missouri, Martinez-Gregorio was employed harvesting and packing watermelons as part of Defendants’ agricultural labor crew pursuant to Defendants’ temporary labor certification applications described in Paragraph 17. 43. Defendants recruited Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez-Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza and other individuals in Mexico to fill the Missouri watermelon harvesting and packing jobs described in the temporary labor certification applications referenced in Paragraph 17 and the accompanying clearance orders (Exhibits A and B). 45. After being recruited by Defendants, Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Sabino Campuzano- Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez- Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza traveled at their own expense from their respective hometowns in Mexico to Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico, where they were interviewed at the U.S. Consulate and issued H-2A visas. 46. Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez- Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez-Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar and Bernardo Santiago- Zaragoza entered the United States at Brownsville, Texas in late June 2018 and traveled at their own expense from Brownsville to Kennett, Missouri. 47. Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso entered the United States at Brownsville, Texas on July 6, 2018 and traveled at his own expense from Brownsville to Kennett, Missouri. 48. Upon their arrival in southeastern Missouri, Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez-Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza were employed harvesting watermelons as part of Defendants’ agricultural labor crew pursuant to Defendants’ temporary labor certification applications described in Paragraph 17. 50. The expenses incurred and paid by Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Sabino Campuzano- Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez- Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza as described in Paragraphs 44 and 49 were incurred primarily for the benefit or convenience of Defendants within the meaning of the regulations implementing the FLSA, 29 C.F.R. §531.3(d)(1). 51. Defendants failed to reimburse Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Sabino Campuzano- Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez- Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar, and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza for the expenses described in Paragraphs 44, 49 and 50. Although they issued checks purportedly intended to reimburse these individuals for a portion of the pre-employment expenses described in Paragraphs 44, 49 and 50, Defendants required these individuals to immediately return or kick-back these funds. As a result, the wages of Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Eduardo Rodriguez-Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar, and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza for their respective first workweeks of employment with Defendants’ crew in Missouri were less than the FLSA mínimum wage and the applicable AEWR. 53. Upon their arrival in Missouri, the Farmworkers were assigned by Defendants to housing facilities in Kennett or Senath, Missouri. 54. Defendants housed a number of crewmembers at the Budget Inn, 215 East South Bypass Avenue, Kennett. Defendants never disclosed to the DOL as part of their temporary labor certifications that they would be housing H-2A workers at the Budget Inn. 55. Among the workers housed at the Budget Inn were Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Miguel Angel Ceredo-Rodriguez, Eduardo Rodriguez-Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar, and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza. 56. The accommodations at the Budget Inn were cramped, with many instances of four or more workers sharing a room. Because of the large number of occupants in each room, crew members often slept two to a bed, with other roommates forced to sleep on the floor due to lack of beds. 57. Because of overcrowding in their room at the Budget Inn, Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso, Gustavo Cortez-Romero, Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Miguel Angel Ceredo-Rodriguez, Eduardo Rodriguez-Cruz, Casimiro Rodriguez-Escobar, and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza developed a nightly sleeping rotation where they shared a bed with a coworker one night and slept on the floor the following night for the duration of their stay. Luis Gerardo Alvarez-Alonso and Miguel Angel Cerecedo-Rodriguez had to sleep on the tile bathroom floor upon occasion. 59. Defendants also housed members of their agricultural labor crew at a wood frame house located at 9348 State Highway C, Unit #16, Senath, Missouri. The wood frame house was owned by Defendant Jorge J. Marin. 60. Among the occupants of the wood frame house was Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio. The accommodations at the wood frame house failed to meet either the Occupational Safety and Health Administration temporary labor camp standards set out at 29 C.F.R. §1910.142, or the Employment and Training Administration migrant labor camp standards set out at 20 C.F.R §§654.404, et seq. Among other things, during the period he resided at the wood frame house during the 2018 southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest, Martinez-Gregorio was allotted less than 50 square feet of living space. In addition, the facility was structurally unsound, doors and windows were missing screens, no laundry facilities were provided, and garbage was allowed to accumulate. 61. During a portion of the 2018 watermelon harvest, the Farmworkers and a substantial portion of the remainder of Defendants’ agricultural labor crew were housed at 200 Slicer Street in Kenneth. The facility at that location was the former Dunklin County jail and was purchased by Defendants in or about April 2018. 63. After an investigation by the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division in July 2018 and the issuance of a preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on August 6, 2018, Defendants relocated members of their crew, including those workers who had been previously residing at the 200 Slicer Street facility, to the 84 West Motel in Kennett. 64. The facilities at the Budget Inn, the former jail at 200 Slicer Street and the 84 West Motel all lacked convenient cooking and kitchen facilities. Defendants arranged for meals to be catered to the Farmworkers and other members of the crew residing in these facilities. The charge for these meals was in excess of $12.26 per day. Although the clearance order promised that they would be provided three meals daily, the Farmworkers frequently were not provided with breakfast. The Farmworkers’ Employment with Defendants in Missouri 65. Defendants employed the Farmworkers harvesting, loading, transporting, grading and packing watermelons in southeastern Missouri at various points in June, July and August 2018. The temporary labor certification applications described in Paragraph 17 and the accompanying clearance orders served as the employment contract between Defendants and the Farmworkers with respect to the Missouri employment. 20 C.F.R. §655.122(q). 66. The Farmworkers were employed packing and loading watermelons, including at the packing facilities operated by Jones & Jones Enterprises, Inc. and/or Elite Farm & Produce. 68. At no time during the 2018 Missouri watermelon harvest did Defendants have in effect a liability bond meeting the requirements of 29 C.F.R. §500.124, which insured either of them against liability for damage to persons or property arising from the operation of the vehicles described in Paragraph 67. 69. Defendants sought to satisfy the vehicle insurance requirements of 20 C.F.R. §655.122(h)(4) through a workers’ compensation insurance policy issued to Harbor America Central, a professional employer organization that Defendants hired to provide payroll and other services with respect to Defendants’ employees. 70. The workers’ compensation policy maintained by Harbor America Central and referenced in Paragraph 69 did not cover all travel provided by Defendants to the Farmworkers and the other crew members. Among other things, the policy did not cover travel during periods when the passengers were not actively engaged in harvesting activities, such as travel to stores, banks and laundromats, or interstate trips between jobsites in different states. 72. For their work cutting, harvesting, transporting, loading, grading, and packing watermelons in southeastern Missouri for Defendants, as described in Paragraphs 65, the Farmworkers were paid only sporadically, and the sums tendered them constituted only a fraction of the wages the Farmworkers had earned. As provided in their employment contracts, the Farmworkers were to be paid on a piece-rate basis for their labor. On those occasions when Defendants paid wages to the Farmworkers, the payments, as reflected on Farmworkers’ wage statements, were at piece-rates lower than those set out in the Farmworkers’ employment contracts. 73. The Farmworkers’ individual weekly piece-rate earnings frequently totaled less than the $13.42 AEWR for Missouri. At times, these piece-rate earnings were less than the amount due under the minimum hourly wage provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §206(a). On such occasions, Defendants were required to supplement the Farmworkers’ individual piece-rate earnings so that they at least equaled the mandatory wage rates. 29 C.F.R. §776.5; 20 C.F.R. §655.122(l)(2). Defendants failed to supplement the Farmworkers’ individual piece-rate earnings from their work in the Missouri watermelon harvest so as to ensure that that these weekly earnings equaled or exceeded the applicable AEWR, as required by the contract and 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(l)(2). As a result, the Farmworkers were paid wages less than the applicable AEWR and, on occasion, less than the FLSA minimum wage for their work for Defendants in the Missouri watermelon harvest. 75. Defendants failed to maintain payroll records accurately recording the compensable hours worked by the Farmworkers in the southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(j). Among other things, Defendants chronically underreported the number of hours worked by the Farmworkers. The hours and earning statements Defendants provided to the Farmworkers were based on the same inaccurate data as contained in the payroll records, and similarly underreported the number of hours worked. 76. The Farmworkers’ southeastern Missouri employment with Defendants’ crew ended in August 2018, well before the October 20 end date set out in their employment contracts. As a result, the Farmworkers were not offered employment for at least three-fourths of the workdays covered by the contracts. Sabino Campuzano-Dominga and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza worked for Defendants through the conclusion of the 2018 southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest, on or about August 22, 2018. Nevertheless, Defendants failed to pay them the amount due under the three-quarters guarantee contained in their employment contracts and set out at 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i). 77. Defendants failed to reimburse Sabino Campuzano-Dominga and Bernardo Santiago- Zaragoza for the full amount of the travel and subsistence expenses they incurred traveling from Missouri back to their respective homes in Mexico following the conclusion of the 2018 Missouri watermelon harvest, as required by these workers’ employment contracts and 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h)(2). 79. To meet the manpower requirements for their North Carolina apple and hemp harvest jobs described in the temporary labor certification applications referenced in Paragraph 18, Defendants recruited and hired workers both from their Missouri watermelon harvest crew and from Mexico. As the southeastern Missouri watermelon harvest was finishing, in or about the end of August 2018, Defendants recruited and hired Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio to work with their crew in the North Carolina apple and hemp harvest under the job terms set out in Defendants’ temporary labor certification application relating to that work. 80. Defendants transported Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio from Missouri to Hendersonville, North Carolina, in a vehicle owned by Defendants. Upon his arrival in western North Carolina, Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio was employed harvesting apples and hemp as part of Defendants’ agricultural labor crew pursuant to Defendants’ temporary labor certification application described in Paragraph 18. Defendants employed Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio harvesting apples and hemp in western North Carolina during September and October 2018. The temporary labor certification application described in Paragraph 18 and the accompanying clearance order served as the employment contract between Defendants and Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio with respect to his North Carolina employment. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(q). 82. At no time during the 2018 North Carolina apple and hemp harvest did Defendants have in effect a liability bond meeting the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 500.124 which insured either of them against liability for damage to persons or property arising from the operation of the vehicles described in Paragraph 81. Instead, Defendants sought to satisfy the vehicle insurance requirements through a workers’ compensation insurance policy issued to Harbor America Florida, a professional employer organization that Defendants hired to provide payroll and other services with respect to Defendants’ employees. 83. The workers’ compensation policy maintained by Harbor America Central and referenced in Paragraph 82 did not cover all travel provided by Defendants to Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio and the other crew members. It did not cover travel during periods when the passengers were not actively engaged in harvesting activities, such as travel to stores and laundromats, or interstate trips between jobsites in different states. 84. Defendants failed to maintain payroll records accurately recording the compensable hours worked by Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio during the 2018 North Carolina apple and hemp harvest. Defendants chronically underreported the number of hours worked by Fidencio Martinez- Gregorio. The hours and earning statements Defendants provided to Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio were based on the same inaccurate data as contained in the payroll records, and similarly underreported the number of hours worked. 86. Defendants failed to supplement Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio’s piece-rate earnings from his work harvesting apples and hemp in North Carolina so as to ensure that his weekly earnings equaled or exceeded the AEWR, as required by the contract and 20 C.F.R. §655.122(l)(2). As a result, Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio was paid wages less than the applicable AEWR of $11.46 and, on occasion, the FLSA minimum wage, for his work harvesting apples and hemp in North Carolina for Defendants. 87. Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio worked for Defendants through the conclusion of the 2018 North Carolina apple and hemp harvest, on or about October 23, 2018. Defendants failed to reimburse Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio for the full cost of his travel and subsistence expenses incurred while traveling from North Carolina back to his home in the Mexican state of Puebla following the conclusion of the 2018 North Carolina apple and hemp harvest, as required by his employment contract and 20 C.F.R. §655.122(h)(2). 88. Because Defendants failed to reimburse Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio for the full cost of his return travel and subsistence expenses following the conclusion of the 2018 North Carolina apple and hemp harvest, Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio was paid less than the applicable AEWR and the FLSA minimum wage for his final week of employment with Defendants. Collective Action Allegations 90. During the 2018 Missouri watermelon harvest, from June through August 2018, Defendants employed in excess of 80 different persons, including the Farmworkers. Defendants failed to pay the Farmworkers and other similarly situated employees the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. 91. As delineated in Count I, these violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions resulted from Defendants’ failure to supplement the H-2A workers’ piece-rate earnings so that their respective workweek earnings equaled or exceeded the minimum wage and from Defendants’ failure to reimburse the H-2A workers during their first week of employment for pre-employment expenses incurred and facilities primarily benefitting the Defendants, including the fees and expenses set out in Paragraphs 44, 49, 50, 51 and 73. 93. This count sets forth a claim by the Farmworkers for Defendants’ violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 94. Defendants violated the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), by failing to pay the Farmworkers at least $7.25 for every compensable hour of labor performed in each workweek during which they were employed. 95. The violations of the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA as set out in Paragraph 94 resulted in part from Defendants’ failure to reimburse the Farmworkers during their first workweek of employment for expenses incurred primarily for the benefit of Defendants, as set out in Paragraphs 44, 49, 50 and 51. 96. The violations of the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA as set out in Paragraph 94 resulted in part from Defendants’ failure to reimburse Sabino Campuzano-Dominga, Fidencio Martinez-Gregorio and Bernardo Santiago-Zaragoza during their final week of employment for their complete expenses in returning to their homes in Mexico after concluding their employment with Defendants in Paragraphs 78 and 88. 97. The violations of the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA as set out in Paragraph 94 resulted in part from Defendants’ failure to credit the Farmworkers with all compensable hours worked, as described in Paragraphs 39, 40, 73 and 85. 98. Defendants violated the compensable time provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), by failing to pay Farmworkers for all hours the employer suffered or permitted the Farmworkers to work. The Federal H-2A Visa Program

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18. Defendant employs a Store Manager at each of its retail stores and gas stations. 19. Employees who work for Defendant as Store Managers are classified by Defendant as exempt under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. 20. Defendant tracks Store Managers’ hours worked by requiring them to clock in and out on company computers, and records the number of hours worked on Store Managers’ weekly pay statements. 22. Despite the Store Managers being classified as exempt, the primary job duties of Defendant’s Store Managers consist of non-exempt work, including customer service and merchandising work, rather than “managerial” duties. Specifically, Store Managers spend the vast majority of their time performing duties such as ringing up sales on the cash register, making coffee, customer service, putting items on shelves, and cleaning. 23. The primary job duties of Store Managers do not materially differ from the duties of non-exempt employees such as store associates. Their primary duties are manual in nature. The performance of manual labor and non-exempt duties occupies the vast majority of Store Managers’ working hours. 24. Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and/or practice, Defendant classifies all Store Managers as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. 25. The hours for which Defendant does not pay its Store Managers are overtime hours, for which Defendant owes the Store Managers compensation at time-and-a-half their regular hourly rates. 26. Through its unlawful actions, Defendant has deprived its Store Managers of overtime wages owed to them. 28. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiffs bring their FLSA claim on behalf of all similarly situated individuals who have worked for Defendant in the United States as Store Managers, have not received overtime wages owed to them during the three-year period prior to the filing of the Complaint, and who may choose to “opt in” to this case under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 29. The claims under the FLSA meet the requirements for collective action certification set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 30. Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Complaint. 31. All potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated as to these claims, because they primarily perform the same or similar job duties, Cumberland Farms classified all of them as exempt under the FLSA and did not pay them overtime, and Cumberland Farms’ compensation practices are uniform as to all potential plaintiffs and result in the alleged violation of the FLSA. 33. As to the claims under Massachusetts law, the proposed class meets the requirements for class certification in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and/or M.G.L. c. 151, § 1B. 34. Defendant has in excess of 100 stores in Massachusetts, each of which has had one or more Store Managers during the relevant liability period. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 35. There are issues of fact and law common to all class members because Cumberland Farms’ misclassification of its Store Managers as exempt and its compensation practices are uniform as to all Store Managers. Common questions include, but are not limited to, whether Cumberland Farms’ Store Managers classified its Store Managers as excluded under Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 § 1A, whether Cumberland Farms’ Store Managers were subject to any exclusion under Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 § 1A, whether Cumberland Farms’ Store Managers were entitled to receive overtime compensation for hours worked over 40. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting individual class members. 36. The claims of Plaintiff Stafford are typical of the claims of all members of the class, because all members of the class were subject to the same unlawful practices as set forth herein. 37. Plaintiff Stafford and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. 39. A class action is superior in this case for several reasons including, but not limited to, that: the case challenges uniform wage payment practices; many employees may be reluctant to bring claims individually for fear of retaliation; some class members may not have the motivation or resources to bring their claims individually; and it would be an inefficient use of scarce judicial resources to require each employee affected by the practices challenged herein to bring his or her own individual claim. 42. As set forth above, Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation to employees who have worked for Defendant as Store Managers and have not received overtime wages owed to them during the three-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint violates the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207. This claim is brought by the named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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1.5 times the higher average straight time wage rate earned by the employee during the workweek. 10. At the end of the day Jim Fischer required all jobsite employees to drive from their last jobsite for the day back to the Appleton shop. Once at the shop employees would fill out their time cards. Jim Fischer required all jobsite employees to write down on their time cards the job number and job name for each job that they worked throughout the day, the number of hours that they worked in each trade for each job, each piece of equipment that they operated throughout the day, as well as the amount of time spent operating each piece of equipment. 11. The employees would spend at least 5-10 minutes per day filling out their time cards, which was primarily for Jim Fischer’s benefit given that accurate time cards permitted Jim Fischer to accurately keep track of its labor and equipment costs for jobs, to accurately keep track of the hours worked, work experience, and skills development of each of its employees, and correctly bill its customers for its services. 12. In addition to filling out their time cards, Jim Fischer jobsite employees also sometimes helped unload trucks, and perform other work in the shop, after they returned to the Appleton shop from their last jobsite for the day. 14. Jim Fischer also never paid the Plaintiffs for their time spent receiving work instructions, loading trucks, unloading trucks, and filling out their time cards at the Appleton shop. 15. On the other hand, when the Plaintiffs travelled between two jobsites during the course of their workday, and worked at the second jobsite on the day of travel, the Plaintiffs received compensation at their regular shop rate. For each hour that they work for Jim Fischer the employees would either receive a rate of $0, or would receive at least their regular shop rate. 16. While Jim Fischer in theory maintained a policy that would deduct 30 minute lunch breaks unless employees wrote “no lunch” on their time cards, upon information and belief Jim Fischer would automatically deduct the half hour lunch from the employees’ hours worked, even if they did write “no lunch” on their time cards. 17. Jim Fischer frequently performed work on projects where the minimum rate of compensation for the Plaintiffs was set by the Davis-Bacon Act, State Prevailing Wage Laws, or equivalent laws. According to the employee handbook, which by its own terms is not a contract, and can be revised, supplemented or rescinded at anytime, for prevailing wage projects Jim Fischer would make an hourly contribution to its employees 401(k) account that equaled the total fringe benefit rate shown on the prevailing wage determination. 19. Jim Fischer did not include the 401(k) contributions that it contributed to the Plaintiffs for their hours worked by prevailing wage projects, when computing their regular rate to be used in computing their overtime pay. 20. Jim Fischer would not make any 401(k) contributions to the Plaintiffs for each of their hours worked on non-prevailing wage projects, or while travelling between projects. Jim Fischer therefore claimed a 401(k) contribution credit that is often higher, than if it had divided its 401(k) contribution during each contribution period by the total number of hours worked by its employees during said contribution period. 21. Jim Fischer made contributions to its employees’ 401(k) accounts only during higher paid prevailing wage hours for the purpose of reducing its liability for employment taxes and overtime pay, rather than to contribute to its employees’ retirement. 22. When the Plaintiffs performed overtime work on a non-prevailing wage project, during a week when they received pay at both their shop rate and at a higher prevailing wage rate, Jim Fischer would pay to the Plaintiff a rate equal to 1.5 times their shop rate, rather than 23. During the course of his employment with Jim Fischer, Named Plaintiff Laughlin, who was not an indentured apprentice, frequently engaged in the work of smoothing and finishing surfaces of poured concrete. 25. When Laughlin complained to Jim Fischer that he should have been classified as, and paid at the higher rate for a cement finisher, Jim Fischer informed Langhlin that his work as a cement finisher was not sufficiently fast to qualify for cement finisher pay. 26. Jim Fischer has never obtained authorization from the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development to pay Laughlin as a subjourneyperson for his cement finisher work on prevailing wage projects. 27. Upon information and belief, Laughlin did not receive the correct prevailing wage rate as a laborer, even assuming Jim Fischer can claim a credit equal to the full amount of 401(k) contributions that it made to Laughlin’s account for each hour that he worked on a prevailing wage project. 28. Named Plaintiff brings his First Claim for Relief, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, on his own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated Plaintiffs who was not paid the correct amount of overtime pay because of Jim Fischer’s uniform policies of (1) failing to count as hours worked their work in the shop; (2) failing to count as hours worked travel time that is all in a day’s work, given that the travel would occur right after their trip to the first jobsite at the beginning of the day, and their trip from the last jobsite back to the Appleton shop at the end of the day; (3) continuing to deduct lunch breaks when they wrote “no lunch” on their time cards; and (4) Excluding 401(k) contributions for their hours worked on prevailing wage projects when computing their overtime pay. 30. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are representative of the claims of members of the FLSA Class in that all members of the class were hourly paid employees of Jim Fischer; and were deprived of overtime pay as a result of Jim Fischer’s uniform application of its policies concerning determining its employees’ hours worked and computing their overtime pay. Brothers who received Non-Elective Contributions and/or pit pay from Wieser Brothers; and then were subject to Wieser Brothers’ uniform policy of not counting the contributions/pit pay when calculating their regular rate for calculating overtime pay. 31. Named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all employees of Jim Fischer who fall within the following class description, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: All employees of the Defendant who, on or after October 6, 2014, and for all of their work subject to Chapter 109 of the Wisconsin statutes either (a) was not paid for all hours worked as a result of Jim Fischer deductions of their travel time, shop work time, and meal break time; (b) had 401(k) contributions deducted from the computation of their regular rate for overtime pay; or (c) was paid for non- prevailing wage overtime hours worked at a rate lower than 1.5 times the average straight time wage rate earned during the workweek. 33. There are questions of law and fact common to the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class (Rule 23 Class) that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including, but not limited to: (a). Whether the Davis Bacon Profit Sharing Contributions made by Jim Fischer to the Plaintiffs’ accounts constitute contributions to a bona fide fund, plan, or program; so that said contributions can be excluded from computing the employees’ rate for overtime pay; (b). Whether under Wisconsin law overtime pay must be calculated using the Plaintiffs’ regular rate, defined as the average wage rate earned by the Plaintiffs during the workweek; (c). Whether time spent by the Plaintiffs spent working at the shop must both be paid, and be counted as hours worked; (d). Whether time spent by the Plaintiffs travelling to their first jobsite for the day after working in the shop; and travelling from their last jobsite for the day back to the shop before working in the shop, must both be paid, and must be counted as hours worked; (e) Whether time spent by the Plaintiffs in lunch breaks that they worked through, which they reported to Jim Fischer as lunches that they worked through, must both be paid, and must be counted as hours worked. (f). The Appropriate remedy for the Plaintiffs hours worked that Jim Fischer failed to pay, and/or failed to count as hours worked. 34. Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class. Named Plaintiff, like other Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class members, were deprived of straight and overtime pay as a result of Jim Fischer’s application of its uniform policies that undercounted their hours worked, and used a regular rate to compute their overtime pay lower than the rate required by law. 36. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Defendant’s common and uniform policies and practices denied the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class the wages for work performed to which they are entitled. The damages suffered by the individual Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class members are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. In addition, class certification is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendant’s pay practices. 37. Class certification of the First Claim for Relief is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), because questions of law and fact common to the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Count I. Overtime Pay Claim Under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 38. Plaintiffs re-allege, and incorporate by reference, the allegations contained in paragraphs 1- 37 of the Complaint. 39. Jim Fischer was required by the FLSA to count as hours worked time spent by the Plaintiffs loading and unloading trucks, filling out time cards, and receiving work instructions while at the Appleton shop given that the work was indispensable to Jim Fischer’s operation, and was pursued primarily for Jim Fischer’s benefit. 41. The Plaintiffs additionally are entitled to have counted, as hours worked, time that they spent working through their lunch breaks, which they then reported to Jim Fischer by writing “no lunch” or equivalent language on their time cards. 42. The Plaintiffs would have additional overtime hours worked, had Jim Fischer counted as hours worked time spent by the Plaintiffs performing the work activities described in paragraphs 39-41 of the Complaint. 43. 401(k) contributions that Jim Fischer contributed on behalf of the Plaintiffs cannot be excluded from the regular rate computation, given that the contributions were made for the purpose of reducing Jim Fischer’s liability for employment taxes and overtime pay, rather than for providing old-age, retirement, or related benefits to the Plaintiffs. 44. Additionally, Jim Fischer’s 401(k) contributions are not bona fide, and cannot be excluded from the regular rate computation, given that the amount of contributions is determined pursuant to a formula that both does not have a minimum required contribution amount per contribution period, and permits too great a variation between the minimum and maximum amount to be contributed during each contribution period. 45. Jim Fischer therefore violated the FLSA when it excluded from the computation of the Plaintiffs’ regular rate 401(k) contributions that it made to the Plaintiffs accounts for their hours worked on prevailing wage projects. 9. Jim Fischer required all of its employees to report to its shop located in Appleton, Wisconsin each morning. While at the Appleton shop employees would help load trucks, receive work instructions, and then ride together to jobsites.

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24. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated. 25. Plaintiffs propose the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States who (a) received a telephone call; (b) on his or her cellular telephone or residential telephone line; (c) made by or on behalf of Defendant; (d) for whom Defendant had no record of prior express written consent; (e) at any time in the period that begins four years before the filing of the complaint in this action to the date that class notice is disseminated.” 26. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of, the proposed Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, any Judge and/or Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned, and any member of such Judges’ staffs and immediate families. 27. Numerosity. Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of members in the proposed Class, but reasonably believes, based on the scale of Defendant’s business, that the Class are so numerous that individual joinder would be impracticable. 29. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a plethora of identical suits. 30. The proposed Class can be easily identified through records maintained by Defendant. 31. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. The questions of law and fact involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual members of the proposed Class. Those common question of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendant made calls to Plaintiffs and the Class using an ATDS and/or an artificial or prerecorded call without their prior express written consent; b. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; c. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and d. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 32. Typicality. Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each member of the Class because they are all persons who received calls on their cellular or landline telephones and were not the intended recipient of those calls, nor did they consent to those calls. 34. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes. 35. Superiority. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. 36. The interest of the members of the proposed Class in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA are relatively small. 37. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because members of the Class, by definition, did not provide the prior express written consent required under the statute to authorize calls to their cellular or landline telephones. 38. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the proposed Class as a whole appropriate. 39. Moreover, upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 41. Plaintiffs bring this claim against Defendant on behalf of themselves, and members of the Class. 42. Defendant made numerous unauthorized calls to Plaintiffs’ cell phone using an artificial or pre-recorded voice and/or an ATDS without prior express consent. 43. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA. 44. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., and 47 C.F.R. §64.1200, et seq., Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every call made in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 45. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Class are also entitled to, and do, seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by Defendant in the future. 46. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Class are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 47. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 48. Plaintiffs bring this claim against Defendant on behalf of themselves, and members of the Class. 50. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200, et seq., Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call made in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and (C). 51. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by Defendant in the future. 52. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Class are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq.

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19. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“The Class”). 20. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, “The Class” defined as follows: “All persons in California whose inbound cellular telephone conversations were recorded without their consent, by Defendant within one year prior to the filing of the original Complaint in this action.” 21. Defendant, and its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believe this number to be in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 7. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation. 8. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing within the State of California, City of San Diego. INVASION OF PRIVACY: VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE § 632.7

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10. Mr. Cole’s financial woes caused him to fall behind and default on some of his debts and obligations, including a credit card account with Chase Bank (USA), N.A. (“Chase”) and a medical debt to Norton Hospitals, Inc. (“Norton”). 11. Chase charged off Mr. Cole’s account and assigned it to First Resolution Investment Corp. (“First Resolution”), who sued him on September 25, 2014 to collect the debt. -3- 12. First Resolution later moved for and was granted a default judgment against Mr. Cole, which was entered of record on November 13, 2014. 13. Norton sued Mr. Cole on August 21, 2014 in order to collect the Norton debt. 14. Norton later moved for and was granted a default judgment against Mr. Cole, which was entered of record on December 31, 2014. 15. Mr. Cole paid off the First Resolution and Norton default judgments in full. 16. Norton filed a notice of satisfaction of record in the Norton case on June 23, 2015. 17. First Resolution filed a notice of satisfaction of record in the First Resolution case on September 15, 2016. 18. The filed notices of satisfaction in the First Resolution and Norton cases are public records that are freely and readily available to all. 19. On September 26, 2016, Mr. Cole obtained copies of his consumer credit report from Defendant, Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”). 20. Mr. Cole’s September 26th consumer credit report from Experian inaccurately stated, in the section of the report devoted to information concerning public records, that both the First Resolution and Norton judgments remained unpaid and unsatisfied with positive amounts still due and owing. 21. Mr. Cole was denied credit and financing because of inaccurate credit information published by Experian in connection with the First Resolution and Norton judgments. In particular, Experian falsely and incorrectly published to one or more of its subscribers and users of its consumer reports that the First Resolution and Norton judgments were not satisfied and that a positive balance was still owed on each of the judgments. 22. Experian’s reporting of the First Resolution and Norton judgments as unsatisfied was inaccurate in violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Experian failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of Mr. Cole’s credit reports and credit files each publishes and maintains concerning Mr. Cole. If Experian had reasonable procedures in place, Experian each would have discovered that First Resolution and Norton had filed a notice of satisfaction before publishing Mr. Cole’s credit report to its subscribers and users of each’s consumer reports in connection with Mr. Cole’s loan and credit applications. 23. Experian failed to maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of the FCRA in connection with publishing credit information concerning Mr. Cole and the satisfied First Resolution and Norton judgments. -4- II. Further Factual Allegations 24. As a pattern and practice, Experian falsely and incorrectly published information to its subscribers and users of its consumer reports that judgments against numerous Kentucky consumers which had been satisfied or vacated were not satisfied and that a positive balance was still owed on each of the judgments. 25. As a pattern and practice, Experian failed to maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of the FCRA in connection with publishing credit information concerning satisfied or vacated judgments against numerous Kentucky consumers. 26. As a pattern and practice, Experian has failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of credit reports and credit files it publishes regarding numerous Kentucky consumers. 27. Plaintiff Christopher Cole (“Cole”) brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons in the Commonwealth of Kentucky similarly situated comprised of the following persons: CLASS: All Kentucky consumers regarding whom Defendant, Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), has, within two (2) years of the filing of the present complaint, falsely and incorrectly published information to its subscribers and users of its consumer reports that a judgment against the consumer that was satisfied, vacated, or non-final at the time Experian published the information remained unsatisfied, final, and/or with an outstanding balance due and owing. 28. This action seeks actual damages and maximum statutory damages for Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s violations of the FCRA for all members of the proposed classes; for injunctive relief against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. enjoining it from further violation of such federal law; for punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n for Experian’s willful conduct as alleged supra; and for an award of attorneys’ fees and allowable court costs. 29. The proposed Class as set out supra and so represented by Plaintiff Christopher Cole in this action, and of which he himself is a member, consists of those persons defined above which are so numerous that joinder of individual members is impracticable. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the proposed Class as set out supra. 31. There are common questions of law and fact applicable to the members of the proposed Class in this action that relate to and affect the rights of each member of the proposed classes, and the relief sought is common to the entire proposed class. In particular, all members of the proposed Class have the same issues of law and fact in common: -5- (a) Whether Experian had a duty of maximum possible accuracy pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) with regard to the public records information it collected and published regarding Mr. Cole and members of the Class, and whether its conduct satisfied said duty under the FCRA; (b) Whether Experian maintained reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of the FCRA in connection with publishing public records information concerning Mr. Cole and members of the Class. 32. There is no known conflict between Plaintiff and any other members of the proposed Class with respect to this action, or with respect to the claims for relief herein set forth. 33. Plaintiff is the representative party for the proposed Class and is able to, and will, fairly and adequately protect the interest of the proposed Class. 34. Plaintiff’s attorneys are experienced and capable in the field of consumer rights, including FDCPA violations. 35. Plaintiff’s attorneys have successfully represented other claimants in similar litigation. 36. The action is properly maintained as a class action in that the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members of the proposed Class creates a risk of individual adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest. 37. This action is properly maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the proposed Class would create risk of varying individual adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 38. This action is properly maintained as a class action inasmuch as the questions of law and fact common to the proposed class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; a class action is superior to other methods available for the efficient adjudication of the controversy; the relief sought by all members of the proposed Class will be effective and appropriate for the entirety of each proposed class; and all members of the proposed Class have a right to damages or other relief that may be readily computed in each case or otherwise readily determined. 39. The identity of each individual member of the proposed Class can be ascertained from the books and records maintained by Defendant. 40. Because many of the persons who comprise the proposed Class in this case may not be aware of their rights, or may not be in a financial position to readily assert their rights, and because relegation of their claims to individual actions would result in an unreasonable -6- multiplicity of suits and a corresponding burden on this and other courts, a class action is far superior to all other methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 9. As a result of the great economic recession of 2008, Mr. Cole suffered economic harm and loss through no fault of his own. I. Facts as to Christopher Cole

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 22. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Progenics (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 24. Progenics is an oncology company focused on the development and commercialization of targeted medicines and artificial intelligence to find, fight and follow cancer. The Company’s pipeline includes therapeutic agents designed to precisely target cancer and prostate-specific membrane antigen targeted imaging agents for prostate cancer. 26. Progenics is well-positioned for financial growth and the Merger Consideration fails to adequately compensate the Company’s shareholders. It is imperative that Defendants disclose the material information they have omitted from the S-4/A, discussed in detail below, so that the Company’s shareholders can properly assess the fairness of the Merger Consideration for themselves and make an informed decision concerning whether or not to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction. 27. If the false and/or misleading S-4/A is not remedied and the Proposed Transaction is consummated, Defendants will directly and proximately have caused damages and actual economic loss (i.e. the difference between the value to be received as a result of the Proposed Transaction and the true value of their shares prior to the merger), in an amount to be determined at trial, to Plaintiff and the Class. II. The Materially Incomplete and Misleading S-4/A 29. During the negotiation of the of the Original Merger Agreement, Velan Capital L.P. (“Velan”) was involved in a proxy fight that would lead to the removal of the majority of the Company’s original board of directors and replacement with Velan nominated directors. On November 19, 2019, after the Velan directors were elected to the Board, the Board began interviewing potential financial advisors seeking to replace Jefferies LLC (“Jefferies”). S-4/A 118. The S-4/A fails to explain why the Board replaced Jefferies even though Jefferies already issued a fairness opinion and was paid for its work. 30. When Jefferies was advising the original board of directors on the Original Merger Agreement, Jefferies performed a small market check where it contacted five potential strategic acquirors. Id. at 99. From the Background of the Merger, it does not appear that BofA conducted its own market check or contact any potential non-strategic acquirors. The S-4/A fails to explain why BofA did not conduct its own market check, or even inquire into the market check performed by Jefferies. 31. The Company has already paid Jefferies $2.25 million for its services, and according to the S-4, will pay Jefferies $6.95 million upon the completion of the merger. S-4 137. The S-4/A is silent as to whether Jefferies will be paid the remaining $6.95 million. 33. A company’s financial forecasts are material information a board relies on to determine whether to approve a merger transaction and recommend that shareholders vote to approve the transaction. Here, the S-4/A discloses “Progenics management prepared and provided certain projections regarding Progenics’ future operations for fiscal years 2020 through 2033, on a stand-alone basis, assuming Progenics would continue as an independent company, without giving effect to the completion of the merger, to the Progenics Board in connection with its evaluation of the merger, and to BofA, its financial advisor, in connection with its financial analyses[.]” S-4/A 157. 35. When soliciting proxies from shareholders, a company must furnish the information found in Schedule 14A (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101). Item 14 of Schedule 14A sets forth the information a company must disclose when soliciting proxies regarding mergers and acquisitions. In regard to financial information, companies are required to disclose “financial information required by Article 11 of Regulation S-X[,]” which includes Item 10 of Regulation S- K. See Item 14(7)(b)(11) of 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101. 36. Under Item 10 of Regulation S-K, companies are encouraged to disclose “management’s projections of future economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate format.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b). Although the SEC recognizes the usefulness of disclosing projected financial metrics, the SEC cautions companies to “take care to assure that the choice of items projected is not susceptible of misleading inferences through selective projection of only favorable items.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(2). 38. Here, Progenics’ shareholders would clearly find complete and non-misleading financial projections material in deciding how to vote, considering that the Board specifically relied on the financial forecasts “[i]n reaching its decision to approve, and declare advisable, the merger agreement and to recommend that Progenics stockholders adopt the merger agreement[.]” 68. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 70. As set forth above, the S-4/A omits information required by SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100, which independently violates Section 14(a). SEC Regulation G, among other things, requires an issuer that chooses to disclose a non-GAAP measure to provide a presentation of the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure and a reconciliation “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” of the non-GAAP measure to the “most comparable” GAAP measure. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(a). 71. The failure to reconcile the non-GAAP financial measures included in the S-4/A violates Regulation G and constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). 72. As a direct and proximate result of the dissemination of the false and/or misleading S-4/A Defendants used to recommend that shareholders approve the Proposed Transaction, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer damages and actual economic losses (i.e. the difference between the value they will receive as a result of the Proposed Transaction and the true value of their shares prior to the merger) in an amount to be determined at trial and are entitled to such equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate, including rescissory damages. 73. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 75. Regulation G similarly prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes by “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure . . . contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b) (emphasis added). 76. Defendants have issued the S-4/A with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the S-4/A, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things, the financial projections for the Company. 77. In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as directors and/or officers, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted from the S-4/A but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information to shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort. 79. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the S-4/A, rendering the sections of the S-4/A identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. 80. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the S-4/A. The preparation of a registration statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the S-4/A or failing to notice the material omissions in the S-4/A upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. 81. Progenics is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the S-4/A. 82. The misrepresentations and omissions in the S-4/A are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Transaction. 84. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 85. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Progenics within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of Progenics, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the S-4/A filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 86. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the S-4/A and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 87. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein and exercised the same. The S-4/A at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly involved in preparing the S-4/A. 89. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 90. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. I. The Proposed Transaction

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21. Defendant is a clothes store that operates its clothes store as well as the Website to the public. The clothes store is located at 53 Greene Street, New York, New York. Defendant’s clothes store constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s clothes store provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the clothes store location and hours, clothes, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the clothes store for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s clothes store. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s clothes store and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the clothes store, clothes, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the clothes store for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical clothes store on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to purchase clothing. 29. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s clothes store’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s clothes store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s clothes store. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth. 63. Because of the Defendants’ violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for every call in violation of the statute, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 64. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants’ violation of the TCPA. 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully stated. 66. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 67. Because of the Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class may treble damages of up to $1,500 for every call in violation of the statute, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) A. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 29. Defendants operate adult-oriented entertainment facilities located at 1350 SW 2nd Street, Pompano Beach, Florida, 33069. (Figure 1 – Solid Gold Pompano) 88. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth in each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 89. Plaintiff brings this action as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all persons who were or are employed by Defendants as exotic dancers/entertainers at any time during the three (3) years prior to the commencement of this action to present. 90. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that FLSA Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek and have been denied pay at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. That is, Plaintiff worked with other dancers/entertainers at Solid Gold. As such, she has firsthand personal knowledge of the same pay violations throughout Defendants’ club. Furthermore, other exotic dancers/entertainers at Defendants’ club have shared with her similar pay violation experiences as those described in this Complaint. UNLAWFUL TAKING OF TIPS IN VIOLATION OF THE FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (By Plaintiff Individually and on Behalf of the Collective Against All Defendants) 126. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth in each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 127. Plaintiff customarily and regularly received more than thirty U.S. Dollars ($30.00) a month in tips and therefore is a tipped employee as defined in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(t), see also 29 C.F.R. § 531.50. 128. At all relevant times, each Defendants were “employer(s)” or “joint employer(s)” of Plaintiff within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 129. Defendants are engaged in “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” as those terms are defined in the FLSA. 130. Defendants operate an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning for the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), because it has employees engaged in commerce, and because its annual gross volume of sales made is more than five hundred thousand U.S. Dollars ($500,000). 131. Under TIPA: [a]n employer may not keep tips received by its employees for any purpose including allowing managers or supervisors to keep any portion of employees’ tips, regardless of whether or not it takes a tip credit.

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2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 21. Defendant is a men’s care company that owns and operates www.justformen.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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18. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Pace as bus operators within the last 3 years, and who elect to opt-in to this action. 19. Pace unlawfully required plaintiff and all individuals employed as bus operators, to work without paying them for all of the time that they worked, including some overtime that they should have been compensated for every hour worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 20. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members are “similarly situated,” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), because, among other things, all such individuals worked pursuant to Pace’s previously described common pay practices and, as a result of such practices, were not paid for all of the time that they worked, which includes some overtime that they should have been compensated 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for every hour worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 21. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, among other things, Pace’s common compensation, timekeeping, and payroll practices. 5 22. Plaintiff seeks to proceed as a collective action with regard to the first cause of action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and the following class of persons: All Pace bus operators who performed uncompensated work for Pace, for the three years prior to filing their respective consent forms, through the present, and who suffered similar wage and related damages as alleged in the complaint (hereinafter the “FLSA Collective Action”). 23. Pace was aware or should have been aware that the law required it to pay non- exempt employees, including plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members, for all of the time that they worked, which includes some overtime that they should have been compensated for every hour worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at an overtime premium of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay. 24. Upon information and belief, there are approximately 1,200-1,300 members in the FLSA Collective Action, and Pace applied the same unlawful policies and practices to its bus operators throughout the Chicago metropolitan area. 25. The FLSA Collective Action members are readily identifiable, and may be located through Pace’s records, as well as the records of any payroll companies that Pace utilizes. Pace employs many FLSA Collective Action members throughout the Chicago metropolitan area. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail and/or other appropriate means, and should be allowed to opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for regular and overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 6 26. Plaintiff brings the second and third causes of action on his own behalf and as a class action, pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b), on behalf of the following class of persons: All Pace bus operators who performed uncompensated work for Pace, for the three years prior to the complaint filing date, through the present, and who suffered similar wage and related damages as alleged in the complaint (hereinafter the “Illinois Wage Class”). 27. The members of the Illinois Wage Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, the facts on which the calculation of that number can be based are presently within the sole control of Pace. 28. Upon information and belief, there are approximately 1,200-1,300 members in the Illinois Wage Class. 29. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed Illinois Wage Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Illinois Wage Class members, including, without limitation: a. whether Pace failed to keep accurate time records for all hours worked by the Illinois Wage Class representative and the Illinois Wage Class; b. whether Pace failed to pay proper compensation to the Illinois Wage Class representative and the Illinois Wage Class for all hours worked, including regular work-hours and those that were in excess of 40 hours per workweek, in violation of and within the meaning of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105; c. whether Pace failed to pay proper compensation to the Illinois Wage Class representative and the Illinois Wage Class for all hours worked, in violation of Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105; 7 d. the nature and extent of Illinois Wage Class-wide injury and the appropriate measure of damages sustained by the Illinois Wage Class representative; e. whether Pace acted willfully or with reckless disregard in its failure to pay the Illinois Wage Class representative and the Illinois Wage Class; and f. the nature and extent of class-wide injury and the measure of damages for those injuries. 30. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Illinois Wage Class members because there is no conflict between the claims of plaintiff and those of the Illinois Wage Class, and plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Illinois Wage Class. Plaintiff has previous payroll experience in his career, is knowledgeable and proficient with the issues herein alleged, and was elected union steward in March 2017. 31. Plaintiff has retained competent and skilled counsel, experienced in complex litigation, including wage and hour litigation like this one, and both attorneys have the ability, skill, and resources to manage this particular lawsuit. 32. Further, the Illinois Wage Class representative and the Illinois Wage Class members have been equally affected by Pace’s failure to pay proper wages. 33. Pace has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Illinois Wage Class, thereby making appropriate, any final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Illinois Wage Class. Plaintiff and the other Illinois Wage Class members were subjected to Pace’s policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans alleged herein, concerning Pace’s failure to pay proper wages and its failure to keep adequate records. Plaintiff’s job duties are typical of those of the class members. 8 35. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives, for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 36. The Illinois Wage Class is readily identifiable from Pace’s own records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Illinois Wage Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Illinois Wage Class members, which would very likely establish incompatible standards of conduct for Pace. 37. A class action is superior to other available methods for adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all class members is impracticable. Further, the amounts at stake for many of the Illinois Wage Class members, while substantial, is not great enough to enable them to maintain separate suits against Pace. 38. Without a class action, Pace will retain the benefit of its wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to plaintiff and the Illinois Wage Class. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the maintenance and management of this action as a class action. 39. Upon information and belief, Pace engaged in a “time-shaving” policy, whereby Pace failed to pay plaintiff and members of the classes for all of the hours that they worked for Pace. 9 40. Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective Action and Illinois Wage Class (collectively “Class Members”) are victims of Pace’s common policies and plans that violated their rights under the FLSA, IMWL, and IWPCA, by failing to pay proper compensation for all hours that the Class Members worked, including Pace’s time-shaving from employees’ hours, and failure to compensate regular and overtime hours at the proper rates, including an overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. At all relevant times, Pace’s unlawful policies and patterns or practices have been willful. 41. Pace Suburban Bus Service is the foremost suburban transportation company which services customers in the Chicago metropolitan area, including the counties of Cook, Will, DuPage, Kane, Lake, and McHenry counties. One of the largest bus services in North America, Pace covers 3,446 square miles, an area nearly the size of the state of Connecticut and about 15 times the size of the City of Chicago. 42. Pace employs bus operators, including plaintiff, to perform transportation services for its customers across the aforementioned Chicago metropolitan service area. 43. At all relevant times, plaintiff was acting directly or indirectly in the interest of Pace, and therefore defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of state and federal wage laws. 44. Plaintiff and the classes are all blue-collar workers who are not subject to any of the exemptions of the FLSA, IMWL, or IWPCA. 45. Plaintiff and other Pace bus operators worked on average of around 8 or more hours per day and 5 or more days per week. Plaintiff’s current hourly rate of pay is $21.57. 10 46. Pace instituted a policy whereby plaintiff and other Pace bus operators would fill out a “Pay Exception Slip” at the end of their shift (commonly known as a “pink slip” at the garage where plaintiff works); this pink slip would specify the amount of excess time the bus operator spent above and beyond Pace’s pre-designated scheduled or budgeted time (run time), including the reason for such excess (e.g., traffic, accident, weather, etc.). (See exhibit 2 for an example of a pink slip and run sheet, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference). 47. Pace instructed plaintiff and other bus operators to specifically refrain from putting “unrealistic schedule” as a reason for their excess time; instead, Pace insisted on employees using the term “traffic.” 48. Once the pink slip was filled out, the bus operators would give the pink slip to a dispatcher, who forwarded the slip to a supervisor, who would then initial the approved excess time. 49. Singer kept detailed records of his pink slip excess time, and he estimates that Pace failed to pay him excess time of about $1,000 in earned wages over the relevant statutory time period. 50. As a transportation services company that operates throughout the Chicago metropolitan area, there is no question that Pace has access to human resources expertise and extensive legal counsel, who can duly advise Pace on its wage and hour compliance obligations. 51. During the entire relevant time period, Pace was aware that plaintiff and the classes were not properly compensated under the FLSA, IMWL, and IWCPA, because Pace did not keep accurate records of the time that plaintiff and the Class Members worked each day and week. 11 52. Pace has acted willfully and/or with reckless disregard of the applicable FLSA, IMWL, and IWCPA provisions, by failing to properly record hours and failing to properly compensate plaintiff and the Class Members for all of the time that they worked, including hours worked in excess of 40 during the workweek. 53. Furthermore, Pace failed to properly track, monitor, or record the actual number of hours per day that the class members worked, as required by the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.5(a), 516.6(a)(1), 516.2(c) (requiring employers to maintain payroll records for three years and time sheets for two years, including the exact number of hours worked each day and each week). 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 55. Plaintiff Rick Singer was an employee of Pace, working under its direct supervision and control. 56. Singer has been employed by Pace from approximately June 3, 2013 to the present. 57. At all times relevant to this complaint, Singer was an “employee” within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), and within the meaning of both the IMWL and IWCPA. 58. Singer’s paychecks failed to properly list all of his hours that he worked for Pace, and therefore Pace failed to properly compensate him for all of the hours that he worked, including any applicable overtime compensation. 12 59. Specifically, Singer’s actual paychecks from Pace failed to accurately reflect the aforementioned “pink slip” excess time, and therefore Pace intentionally and willfully failed to pay him for all of the hours that he worked for Pace. 60. For his own personal files, information, and records, Singer made a practice of taking the data that he filled-out on the pink slips, and duplicating this data with specific notations, on his daily “trip cards.” 61. A “trip card” is a pre-trip checklist that each bus operator fills out before his daily shift, and so Singer’s personal calculations of unpaid excess work time, the impetus for this action, is based largely on the difference between the excess time that he worked for Pace, and corresponding shortages of actual pay that he received on his paychecks from Pace. (See exhibit 3 for an example of a trip card, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference). 62. These shortages of pay are derived from those hours that Pace failed to properly reflect and compensate plaintiff for the aforementioned approved pink slip excess time. 63. On more than one occasion, Singer brought this pay shortage issue to the attention of Pace payroll personnel and management, and after noticing a 1-hour pay shortage on one of his checks, Singer had a conversation with Louella Morgan, administrative secretary and payroll. 64. This conversation with Morgan took place in or around January/February 2017, and to plaintiff’s recollection, either superintendent Laura Lindsey or division manager Mike Cutler were present; however, Morgan ended the conversation rather abruptly, telling plaintiff something to the effect of, ‘our records are right and you’re wrong’—declining Singer’s request to see the time sheets. 13 65. Article 15(e) of the Pace North Shore Division union contract states that: “employees shall be paid for all time during which they are required by Pace North Shore to perform any duties.” (See exhibit 4 for the pertinent part of the contract, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference). 66. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members are “similarly situated,” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), because, among other things, all such individuals worked pursuant to Pace’s previously described common pay practices and, as a result of such practices, were not paid for all of the time that they were required by Pace to perform duties, including regular hours and the legally mandated overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 during the workweek. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 68. Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective Action are non-exempt employees entitled to be paid regular and applicable overtime compensation for all of the hours that they worked. 69. In violation of the requirements of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1) and 207(a)(1), Pace employed plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective Action for workweeks longer than 40 hours, but willfully failed to compensate plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members for all of the time that they worked, including time in excess of 40 hours per week, at the required rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate of pay. 14 70. Pace’s compensation scheme applicable to plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members fails to comply with 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1) and 207(a)(1). 71. Plaintiff has expressed his consent to make these claims against Pace by filing a written consent form pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). (See exhibit 1). 72. Pace failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members. 73. Because Pace’s violations of the FLSA were willful, a 3-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 74. As a consequence of the willful underpayment of wages alleged above, plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective Action incurred damages thereby, and Pace is indebted to them in the amount of the unpaid regular and overtime compensation, together with interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, all in an amount to be determined at trial of this action. 75. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 76. Pace has employed plaintiff and members of the Illinois Wage Class and has failed to pay them for all of the time that they worked, in violation of the requirements of the 84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 85. By the course of conduct set forth above, Pace has violated the IWPCA. 86. Due to Pace’s violations of the IWPCA, plaintiff and the Illinois Wage Class is entitled to recover from Pace all of their unpaid regular and overtime compensation, and such other legal and equitable relief stemming from Pace’s unlawful and willful conduct, as the Court deems just and proper. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Illinois Wage Class, seeks recovery of liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by Pace as provided by the Plaintiff Rick Singer Violation of the FLSA for unpaid regular and overtime wages (Brought on behalf of plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action) Violation of the IWPCA for unpaid regular and overtime wages (Brought on behalf of plaintiff and the Illinois Wage Class) Violation of the IMWL for unpaid regular and overtime wages (Brought on behalf of plaintiff and the members of the Illinois Wage Class)

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12. Swagway sells the Swagway Hoverboard. 13. According to Swagway’s, website, “SWAGWAY is very meticulous” with respect to the manufacture of Swagway Hoverboards. “We make sure our boards are made with the finest parts. All of our boards come with a high quality aluminum alloy frame. Our batteries are a high-powered lithium ion Samsung/LG battery. Our technology is built on a strong platform, which eliminates reaction time from rider to board, giving the ability to maneuver wherever the user pleases. We are still a higher quality but for an even more affordable price.” 14. A February 4, 2015 CNBC article quoted a Swagway corporate representative as stating, “These types of boards are new so there seems to be a lot of varying information out there, but for sake of safety, we can’t stress enough how the caliber of the components used can make an impact in the overall safety of these boards.” USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 3 of 15 4 15. The Swagway Hoverboard runs off of a battery that is charged via an ordinary electric wall socket. The Swagway User Manual provides: “Locate the charging port on the back of the Swagway. • Ensure the charging port is dry. • First plug the charger into the wall (100V-240V; 50, 60Hz). Verify the green light lights up, then plug the other end of the charger into the Swagway. • The red indicator light on the charger indicates that it is charging properly. If the light does not come on, check that the charger is connected securely to the wall and to the Swagway.” 16. Upon information and belief, Swagway Hoverboards are sold throughout the United States. The following graphic, copied from Swagway’s website, www.swagway.com, provides transit time for shipping Swagway Hoverboards to every state: USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 4 of 15 5 17. Swagway Hoverboards are available for purchase from Modell’s website, www.modells.com. They are also available for sale at Swagway.com, Amazon.com, newegg.com, pcdirect.com, Target.com, and Walmart.com. 18. Swagway markets its Swagway Hoverboards on its own website, as well as Facebook (facebook.com/swagwayusa), Twitter (twitter.com/swagwayusa), Pinterest (www.pinterest.com/swagwayusa), Youtube (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCncZXPMRgIOQcmpKjhCT9oA), and Instagram (instagram.com/swagwayusa), and through additional channels, including QVC. 19. Swagway Hoverboards have been featured in the following television shows with a nationwide audience: Good Morning America, The Inside, The Today Show, The Ellen Degeneres Show, and CBS This Morning. They have also been featured in such publications as USA Today, Wired, People, and PC Magazine. 20. In actuality, the Swagway Hoverboard is unsafe for its intended use inasmuch as it is defective and presents a material likelihood that it will self-combust or short-circuit while charging, leading to fire and/other damage. 21. In marketing and selling Swagway Hoverboards on its website, as well as otherwise, Swagway did not disclose the defects in the product that could cause it to be self-combusting and otherwise dangerous, and, rather, impliedly or expressly represented that the product would be safe for its intended purposes and free from defect and/or failed to disclose that the product was unsafe, not fit for its intended purposes and not free from defect. 22. In deciding to market and sell Swagway Hoverboards, as on its website, as well as within its stores, Modells failed to take proper steps to ensure that the product was USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 5 of 15 6 safe and free from defect and not inherently dangerous as a result of its defect, and, rather impliedly or expressly represented that the product would be safe for its intended purposes and free from defect and/or failed to disclose that the product was unsafe, not fit for its intended purposes and not free from defect. 23. Unless enjoined, Defendants will continue to market and sell the defective and dangerous Swagway Hoverboards. Hoverboards In America and Throughout the World Have Been Self-Combusting 24. Upon information and belief, self-balancing electric scooters have been combusting across the country and the world. 25. On December 9, 2015, Newsweek published an article with the headline “Another Day, Another Hoverboard Explosion: Concern Over Safety Continues to Grow.” The article reported that a family home in Louisiana and an apartment in Hong Kong burned down because of hoverboard fires. 26. The Newsweek article added that “nearly all hoverboards are manufactured in China with little safety oversight.” 27. On November 9, 2015, the website BuzzfeedNews published an article entitled “Those Hoverboard Things Kids Ride Around On Keep Exploding.” The article reported that a woman in England suffered burns after the hoverboard she was riding on caught fire. The article added that within the past month, London firefighters responded to two calls where hoverboards caught fire in homes. 28. Similarly, on December 3, 2015, the Wall Street Journal published a video under the caption “Hoverboard Fire Safety Concern Grows.” Plaintiff’s Swagway Hoverboard Self-Combusts USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 6 of 15 7 29. On or about November 24, 2015, Plaintiff purchased a Swagway Hoverboard on www.modells.com. 30. The cost of the unit was $399.99 (and the total price was $443.49). 31. Plaintiff purchased the Swagway Hoverboard for his children, as a Chanukah present. 32. Neither Swagway nor Modell’s warned Plaintiff that there was a substantial risk that the Swagway Hoverboard could burst into flames while charging. 33. On December 6, 2015, on the first night of Chanukah, the Swagway Hoverboard was removed from its box. 34. After approximately thirty minutes of use, the Swagway Hoverboard indicated low battery. 35. The Swagway Hoverboard was then plugged into an electrical outlet in accordance with Swagway’s instructions. 36. Approximately 45 minutes later, the Swagway Hoverboard burst into flames. 37. The flames ignited the packaging materials, which were located nearby the Swagway Hoverboard. 38. The fire was so substantial that the fire department had to respond to the scene. 39. The fire destroyed the Swagway Hoverboard and damaged Plaintiff’s home, as is shown by the following: USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 7 of 15 8 40. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of the Class and Subclass as defined above, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) seeking to assert the claims set forth below. 41. The Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of purchasers of Swagway Hoverboards is unknown, the number sold and identity of such purchasers is known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of members of the Class and the Subclass. 42. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class and Subclass that predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Class and Subclass. USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 8 of 15 9 43. The critical question of law and fact common to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass that will materially advance the litigation is whether, and if so when, Defendants learned that there was a substantial risk that the Swagway Hoverboard was defective and posed a danger of a fire hazard by bursting into flames during normal charging operation. 44. Other questions of law and fact common to the Class and Subclass that will materially advance the litigation include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendants failed to warn Plaintiff and the members of the Class and the Subclass that there was a substantial risk the Swagway Hoverboard could burst into flame during normal charging operation; b. Whether Defendants’ failure to inform Plaintiff and members of the Class and the Subclass that there was a substantial risk that the Swagway Hoverboard was combustible during normal charging operation was a deceptive act and material omission of fact to reasonable purchasers of Swagway Hoverboards; c. Whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed by Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass, including, without limitation, compensatory, punitive and statutory damages, restitution, interest, costs and disbursements, and attorneys’ fees; d. Whether Defendants’ failure to inform consumers that the Swagway Hoverboards were defective and susceptible to combustion constituted a deceptive or unfair act or acts in violation USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 9 of 15 10 of the claims set forth in this Complaint, for which plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to recover damages; and e. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from continuing to market and sell an unsafe and defective product and from continuing to market and sell the Swagway Hoverboards in a misleading and deceptive manner as set forth in this Complaint and whether Defendants should be compelled, among other things, to offer to the members of the Class and Subclass with an option to return for the full amount paid (and incidental cost such as shipping and taxes) and/or repair and replacement the product by providing them with a safe and non-defective product, at Defendants’ expense. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class and Subclass. 46. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative, is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in consumer class action litigation. 47. Class certification of Plaintiff’s claims is appropriate pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclass, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class and Subclass. The members of the Class and Subclass are USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 10 of 15 11 entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendants’ common and uniform policy under the claims set forth herein. 48. Class certification of Plaintiff’s claims is also appropriate pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Class and Subclass predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the Class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 50. The Subclass, as defined above, is also proper pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 50 as if they were set forth again herein. 52. The Swagway Hoverboard was advertised and sold by Defendants as safe and fit its ordinary purpose of transportation and use and free from defect. 53. Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members purchased the Swagway Hoverboard on the Defendants’ implied warranties that the Swagway Hoverboard was safe and fit the purposes for which it was intended to be used and free from defects. Had they known that, contrary to the implied warranties that the Swagway Hoverbaord was not safe and fit the purposes for which it was intended to be used and not free from defect, they would not have purchased it. USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 11 of 15 12 54. The Swagway Hoverboard was inherently defectively designed or manufactured so as to cause it to not to be safe and fit for the purposes for which it was intended to be used and not to be free from defect. 55. Any disclaimers of implied warranties are ineffectual, as they were not provided to Plaintiffs or Class or Subclass members or otherwise made known to them, who were not informed of the material non-compliance of the goods. In addition, any such disclaimers are unconscionable under the circumstances. 56. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of implied warranties, Plaintiffs and the Class and Subclass members have sustained economic losses and other damages for which they are entitled to compensatory and/or equitable damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 50 as if they were set forth again herein. 58. Defendants had a statutory duty to refrain from unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with their activities set forth above vis-à-vis Swagway Hoverboards. 59. Had Defendants not engaged in the wrongful and deceptive conduct described above, Plaintiffs and members of the Class and Sublcass would not have purchased Swagway Hoverboards and they have therefore proximately suffered injury in fact and ascertainable losses. 60. Defendants’ deceptive, unconscionable or fraudulent representations and material omissions to consumers, including the failure to inform consumers of the USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 12 of 15 13 dangers and defects with the product, constituted unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of state consumer protection statutes. Defendants’ failure to abide by their statutory duties has been or may be continuing. 61. Defendants engaged in their wrongful conduct while at the same time obtaining sums of money from Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members. 62. Defendants' actions, as complained of herein, constitute unfair competition or unfair, unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of state consumer protection statutes, including, but not limited to, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 et seq. and 350-e, et seq., as well as substantially similar statutes in effect in the other States. 63. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a judgment that declaring that Defendants’ actions have been in violation of their statutory duties, that provides injunctive relief in order to ensure continued wrongful and similar acts do not occur hereafter, and that provides for, as provided for law, compensatory damages, treble damages, attorneys' fees, and/or costs of suit. 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 50 as if they were set forth again herein. 65. Defendants benefitted from the sale of the Swagway. 66. Defendants’ benefit came at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class given their wrongful acts and practices, as discussed above. USDC IN/ND case 3:15-cv-00588-RL-CAN document 1 filed 12/10/15 page 13 of 15 14 67. Defendants’ retention of some or all of the monies they have gained through their wrongful acts and practices would be unjust considering the circumstances of their obtaining those monies. 74. Defendants should be required to disgorge their unjustly obtained monies and to make restitution to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class, in an amount to be determined, of the monies by which they have been unjustly enriched. BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY FOR UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES UNDER STATE LAW The Swagway Hoverboard Unjust Enrichment

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12. On information and belief, on a date better known to Defendants, Defendants began their campaign of communicating with the Plaintiff via the use of an automated telephone dialing system and prerecorded messages throughout the past year by calling her cell phone number of (661) 472-4330 numerous times in attempts to market its services. 46. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference into this cause of action the allegations set forth above. 47. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. including the implementing regulations of 47 C.F.R. 50. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference into this cause of action the allegations set forth above at Paragraphs 1-41. 51. Plaintiff had no wish to be contacted on her cell phone via the use of an autodialer, and expressly directed Defendants to stop calling her cell phone number on numerous occasions. 52. Defendant willfully continued calling the Plaintiff’s cellular phone via an autodialer and prerecorded messages despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests to cease contacting her. 53. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 64.1200(c) and (d). Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.

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21. Despite the FCRA’s requirements, Equifax regularly declines to block the reporting of fraudulent information by wrongfully rejecting valid identity theft reports outright and relying instead on the same verification procedures it uses for common disputes. 22. In violation of the FCRA, Equifax willfully and negligently fails to provide the notice required by section 1681c-2(c)(2) after declining to block information that, pursuant to section 1681c-2(c)(1), a consumer has alleged is the result of identity theft. 23. In further violation of the FCRA, Equifax willfully and negligently declines to block the reporting of information alleged by consumers to result from identity theft in violation of section 1681c-2(a) despite its receipt of all required documentation from the consumers. 24. The plain language of section 1681c-2 is clear and Equifax is on notice of its requirements, both from guidance from the Federal Trade Commission and the prior decision in Osada, supra. 25. According to standardized policies and procedures, Equifax willfully treats valid identity theft claims as regular credit disputes. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 46. Equifax willfully and negligently failed to comply with section 1681c-2(a) of the FCRA by failing to block information alleged by consumers to result from identity theft despite receiving all information required by Section 1681c-2(a). 47. Plaintiff and Class Members seek actual damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and o. 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. A. Factual Allegations Regarding Defendant’s Practices Failure to Provide Required Notice Violation of Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(2) Failure to Block Fraudulent Information Violation of Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)

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14. Plaintiff began working for Defendants in June or July 1997 as a general laborer, earning about $6.50 per hour. 15. Sometime around late 2000 or early 2001, Plaintiff began working for Defendants as a concrete framer/finisher. 17. In October 2006, Plaintiff received a pay increase to $22.00 per hour. 18. In May 2009, Plaintiff’s hourly rate was reduced to $19.80 per hour. 19. In September 2009, Plaintiff’s hourly rate was reduced to $18.00 per hour. 20. On or about June 3, 2011, Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury, which limited his ability to perform his regular duties. 21. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment on or about October 21, 2011. 22. Beginning in early 2009, Defendants implemented a policy requiring or permitting employees, including Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class members, to “volunteer” their work time. 23. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class members worked about two hours of “volunteer” time per day, Monday through Friday. 24. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class members worked about four to six hours of “volunteer” time two or three Saturdays per month. 25. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class members performed work for Defendant for which they were not paid. 26. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class members were not paid one-and-a-half times their regularly hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per work week. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant retaliated against employees who refused to work “volunteer” time by subjecting them to adverse employment actions, including but not limited to, reducing their work schedules and ultimately forcing those employees who refused to work “volunteer” time to voluntarily resign. V. 28. Plaintiff files this case as an “opt-in” class action as specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). (See Plaintiff’s Consent Form attached hereto as Exhibit A). 30. Plaintiff contends that this action is appropriate for class action status because of the large number of potential plaintiffs, and because Defendants have acted in the same manner with regards to Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class. 31. By failing to pay Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class members for all hours of work, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the FLSA and implementing regulations, including but not limited to 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.11 and 785.12. 32. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members for all hours of work was knowing, willful, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights under the

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20. On March 19, 2020, Governor Wolf issued the COVID-19 Closure Order, which mandated the shutdown of all business not deemed “life sustaining.” 21. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) identified the novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”) as a “public health emergency of international concern.” 22. Likewise, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) declared that COVID-19 has created a public health emergency. 23. On March 6, 2020, Governor Wolf proclaimed the existence of a disaster emergency throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(c). 24. As the perambulatory language of the COVID-19 Closure Orders indicate, Governor Wolf relies upon a number of different sources to justify the executive action he undertook to address the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. See e.g., Exhibit A (citing 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(b). 25. Specifically, Governor Wolf asserted his authority “to control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area and the movement of persons within it and the occupancy of premises therein[.]” See Exhibit A (citing 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(f)). 27. The COVID-19 Closure Orders allow only businesses categorized as “life sustaining” to remain in operation at their physical locations. See Exhibit A (“No person or entity shall operate a place of business in the Commonwealth that is not a life sustaining business regardless of whether the business is open to members of the public.”). 28. The COVID-19 Closure Orders authorize “life sustaining” businesses to remain operational at their physical locations, so long as those businesses implemented safety precautions delineated by the CDC. 29. The Order of March 19, 2020 included as an attachment a list of businesses deemed to be “life sustaining.” The Governor subsequently issued a revise list when he issued his second Order on March 20, 2020. Wolf then issued a third revised list on the afternoon of March 24, 2020. See Exhibit A. 30. Governor Wolf originally sought to enforce these mandated shutdowns by March 21, 2020, at 12:01 a.m.; however, he decided to delay enforcement until March 23, 2020, at 8 a.m. 31. Any business operating out of compliance with the COVID-19 Closure Orders is subject to the possibility of severe fines and penalties, including the denial of government assistance and disaster relief. 32. Notably absent from the COVID-19 Closure Orders, or any other executive orders issued by Governor Wolf, is any provision addressing the inherent financial burden inflicted by the Orders on individuals and businesses throughout Pennsylvania – a direct result of the mandated shutdowns. 34. As of the filing of this Complaint, these Orders remain in effect with no end date announced. Schulmerich Bells, LLC 35. Plaintiff Schulmerich is the oldest manufacturer of orchestral quality musical handbells and handchimes in the United States. 36. Schulmerich is based at its Hatfield Facility in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. 37. In the COVID-19 Closure Orders, Schulmerich’s business was not categorized as an “essential” or “life-sustaining” business that would be permitted to stay open when Governor Wolf ordered several categories of businesses to close for the stated public purpose of controlling COVID-19 to protect public health. 38. Schulmerich’s busiest time of year is the spring and summer when various handbell performing groups send their instruments to Schulmerich for repair and refurbishment at its Hatfield facility. 39. Timing is crucial for these repairs. 40. School based performing groups must contract in early spring, generally February and March, for one of a limited number of available refurbishment slots on Schulmerich’s calendar that will ensure that a particular school’s instruments can be sent to Schulmerich in the narrow window between the end of the school’s performing season in the early spring and the commencement of the school’s next performing season at the start of the following school year. 42. A group that misses these narrow booking windows may not be able to refurbish their instruments and will generally wait a year until the following summer to refurbish. 43. The refurbishment business is a substantial portion of Schulmerich’s overall business each year. 44. The COVID-19 Closure Orders closed Schulmerich in the midst of its spring refurbishment season. 45. Schulmerich already had in its factory a number of time sensitive refurbishment orders sent to Schulmerich by schools and churches across the world under tight scheduling constraints designed to return the instruments to groups with publicly announced performance and concert schedules. 46. To enable it to perform this refurbishment work, Schulmerich had ordered and received hundreds of thousands of dollars in parts from its suppliers. Some parts have acquisition lead times as long as sixteen (16) weeks. 47. With the COVID-19 Closure Orders, Schulmerich was unable to book additional refurbishments or undertake the refurbishments that were already in its factory when the factory was ordered closed by Governor Wolf. 48. Under threat of fines, unspecified criminal penalties and denial of access to disaster relief funding and services, Schulmerich and other Business Class Members are substantially denied the use of their Tangible Property and their Physical Locations for the full duration of the COVID-19 Closure Orders. 50. As a result, the working capital of Schulmerich and other Business Class Members was severely constrained and they were forced to immediately reduce their expenses in order to survive until the COVID-19 Closure Orders are lifted. 51. The same day as the first COVID-19 Closure Order, Schulmerich was forced to lay off nine (9) workers, irreparably damaging its sterling reputation with its workforce. Many Business Class Members were forced to undertake similar layoffs. 52. With his forced closures, Governor Wolf caused considerable damage to Schulmerich’s business and the business of all Business Class Members, to their reputations, and to their relationships with their customers, vendors and employees. 53. Specifically, the closures occurred when Schulmerich was preparing to book and receive its summer refurbishments and when it was undertaking its early spring refurbishments. This only added to the damage caused to its business reputation and relationships. 54. Neither Governor Wolf, Dr. Levine, nor the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania offered compensation to Schulmerich in exchange for the total regulatory seizure of Schulmerich’s property. 55. The COVID-19 Closure Orders prevent Schulmerich and other Business Class Members from using their Physical Location or their Tangible Property in any economically beneficial manner. The Orders require that Schulmerich, other Business Class Members and their Tangible Property sit idle in Physical Locations they are prohibited from accessing. 57. Frank Carbalo, a male, has worked at Schulmerich for approximately 6 years. 58. Wendy Helverson, a female, has worked at Schulmerich and its predecessor entities for approximately 15 years. 59. Frank and Wendy are hardworking and committed employees, who routinely receive praise for their work at Schulmerich. Both are highly skilled artisans with deeply specialized skills in the manufacture of tuned musical handbells. 60. Wendy’s and Frank’s skills are not easily transferrable to other professions, particularly since there is only one other manufacturer of musically tuned handbells in the entire world and it, too, is located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. That other Pennsylvania handbell manufacturer, a member of the Business Class, was also forced to close as a result of COVID-19 Closure Orders. 61. Frank is a navy veteran who came to this country as a child after being chased from Cuba by Castro and his communists. 62. Wendy is a widow and is the primary breadwinner in a three-generation household, where she cares for her daughter and grandchild. 63. Before the COVID-19 Closure Orders, Frank had been contemplating his eventual retirement and Wendy had been satisfied in the knowledge that she earned a living capable of providing for her family. 65. The COVID-19 Closure Orders purported to shutdown all non-“life-sustaining” businesses to preserve public health, safety and welfare; however, the Orders paid no attention to the substantial and adverse impact such closures would have on the livelihoods of workers like Frank, Wendy and other Employee Class Members. 66. The COVID-19 Closure Orders forced Schulmerich to layoff both Wendy and Frank; countless other Pennsylvania workers, who were similarly situated – the other Employee Class Members – suffered the same consequences as the Governor’s Orders closed other businesses. 67. With no revenue coming in and no orders shipping, small employers like Schulmerich and other Business Class Members cannot afford to continue paying workers when their businesses are forced to close their doors at Governor Wolf’s direction. 68. Because of Governor Wolf’s Orders, Wendy, Frank and other Employee Class Members no longer have a regular paycheck or healthcare benefits (unless they choose, at their own expense, to pay the costs of health insurance individually). 69. All Employee Class Members, like Frank and Wendy, recognize the exigent nature of the extant public health emergency; nevertheless, they question why employees and small business are asked to bear the cost for the measures that Governor Wolf and Dr. Levine have determined are necessary to support public health. 71. The COVID-19 Closure Orders specify that they “will remain in effect until further notice[,]” which is terrifying for workers like Frank, Wendy and other Employee Class Members. They fear contracting the novel coronavirus, but they equally fear the ominous and looming possibility that – soon – they will be unable to pay their bills or buy food for their families without paychecks. 72. The longer the COVID-19 Closure Orders remain in effect, and the longer Pennsylvanians live without a clear end date for the closure of their businesses, the greater the fear of economic ruin becomes for employees like Wendy, Frank and other Employee Class Members. 73. Frank, Wendy and other Employee Class Members cannot simply find new employment or an alternative source of income. This is particularly true of Frank and Wendy, who have highly specialized skill sets. Moreover, the COVID-19 Closure Orders direct Employee Class Members to stay home until the Orders are lifted, making a job search a near impossibility. 75. Schulmerich brings this action on behalf of the all Business Class Members pursuant to provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(1)-(3). 76. Schulmerich and Business Class Members are, as noted above, affected businesses ordered to shutdown by the COVID-19 Closure Orders. 77. The class consists of all businesses who satisfy each of the following criteria: (a) At the time when the COVID-19 Closure Orders became effective, they were (i) categorized as “non-life sustaining” and, thus, (b) instructed to shutdown by the COVID-19 Closure Orders; (b) They applied for an exemption waiver from the Pennsylvania Department of Community Development, as directed, and either received no response or received a denial; and (c) They cannot perform all of their normal business operations through alternative means, such as telecommuting. 79. This class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The class is composed tens of thousands of businesses across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 80. As the named Plaintiff, Schulmerich’s claims are typical of the claims of the Business Class. All of the claims are based on the same factual and legal theories. 81. Schulmerich will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. It is committed to litigating this matter vigorously. Schulmerich has retained counsel experienced at handling constitutional claims against government actors, often involving questions of substantive and procedural due process and violations of the Takings Clause. Neither Schulmerich, nor counsel for Schulmerich, has any interest that might cause either not to pursue this action vigorously. 82. Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) is appropriate in this action because prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of either: (a) Inconsistently or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing class; or (b) Adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 85. Indeed, the only individual question appears to be the amount of monetary damage suffered as a result of the COVID-19 Closure Orders – and thus, just compensation owed – which is attributable to each Business Class Member. 87. Frank and Wendy bring this action on behalf of the all Employee Class Members pursuant to provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(1)-(3). 88. Frank, Wendy and Employee Class Members are, as noted above, individual workers displaced from their gainful employment as a result of the Governor’s COVID-19 Closure Orders. 89. The class consists of all displaced workers who satisfy each of the following criteria: (a) At the time when the COVID-19 Closure Orders became effective, they were employees of businesses (i) categorized as “non-life sustaining” and, thus, (b) instructed to shutdown by the COVID-19 Closure Orders; and (b) As a result of the mandated shutdown, they were subject to a layoff, furloughed, or suffered a reduction in work hours or overall compensation. 91. This class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The class is composed tens of thousands – and possibly millions – of individual workers across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 92. As the named Plaintiffs, Frank and Wendy’s claims are typical of the claims of the Employee Class. All of the claims are based on the same factual and legal theories. 93. Frank and Wendy will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. They are committed to litigating this matter vigorously. Frank and Wendy have retained counsel experienced at handling constitutional claims against government actors, often involving questions of substantive and procedural due process and violations of the Takings Clause. Neither Frank, Wendy, nor their counsel, has any interest that might cause them not to pursue this action vigorously. 95. Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is appropriate in this action because Governor Wolf and Dr. Levine have acted on grounds that apply generally to the Employee Class – that is, inter alia, issuance of the COVID-19 Closure Orders – so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 96. Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) is appropriate in this action because there are numerous questions of law and fact which are common to the Employee Class and which predominate over any questions affecting individual members of the Class, including, without limitation, the following: (a) Whether the COVID-19 Closure Orders violated the substantive due process rights of affected individual workers by arbitrarily, capriciously and irrationally interfering with, inter alia, the right to pursue any “lawful calling, business, or profession [Employee Class Members] may choose” in such a manner that would shock the conscience. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-122 (1889)). COVID-19 Pandemic and Governor Wolf’s Executive Order on March 19, 2020 Carbalo, Helverson and Similarly Situated Employee Class Members v. Defendants Schulmerich, and Similarly Situated Business Class Members v. Defendants Schulmerich, and Similarly Situated Business Class Members v. Defendants Schulmerich, and Similarly Situated Business Class Members v. Defendants Schulmerich Bells, LLC and Business Class Members

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21. Defendant is a hot sauce manufacturing company that owns and operates the website, www.mohotta.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances, an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by disabled individuals. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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