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"date_created": "2010-04-28T17:12:49Z"
} | 461 U.S. 238 (1983)
OLIM ET AL.
v.
WAKINEKONA
No. 81-1581.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 19, 1983.
Decided April 26, 1983.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
*239 Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was James H. Dannenberg, Deputy Attorney General.
Robert Gilbert Johnston argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Clayton C. Ikei.[*]
*240 JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the transfer of a prisoner from a state prison in Hawaii to one in California implicates a liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
A
Respondent Delbert Kaahanui Wakinekona is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a result of his murder conviction in a Hawaii state court. He also is serving sentences for various other crimes, including rape, robbery, and escape. At the Hawaii State Prison outside Honolulu, respondent was classified as a maximum security risk and placed in the maximum control unit.
Petitioner Antone Olim is the Administrator of the Hawaii State Prison. The other petitioners constituted a prison "Program Committee." On August 2, 1976, the Committee held hearings to determine the reasons for a breakdown in discipline and the failure of certain programs within the prison's maximum control unit. Inmates of the unit appeared at these hearings. The Committee singled out respondent and another inmate as troublemakers. On August 5, respondent received notice that the Committee, at a hearing to be held on August 10, would review his correctional program to determine whether his classification within the system should be changed and whether he should be transferred to another Hawaii facility or to a mainland institution.
*241 The August 10 hearing was conducted by the same persons who had presided over the hearings on August 2. Respondent retained counsel to represent him. The Committee recommended that respondent's classification as a maximum security risk be continued and that he be transferred to a prison on the mainland. He received the following explanation from the Committee:
"The Program Committee, having reviewed your entire file, your testimony and arguments by your counsel, concluded that your control classification remains at Maximum. You are still considered a security risk in view of your escapes and subsequent convictions for serious felonies. The Committee noted the progress you made in vocational training and your expressed desire to continue in this endeavor. However your relationship with staff, who reported that you threaten and intimidate them, raises grave concerns regarding your potential for further disruptive and violent behavior. Since there is no other Maximum security prison in Hawaii which can offer you the correctional programs you require and you cannot remain at [the maximum control unit] because of impending construction of a new facility, the Program Committee recommends your transfer to an institution on the mainland." App. 7-8.
Petitioner Olim, as Administrator, accepted the Committee's recommendation, and a few days later respondent was transferred to Folsom State Prison in California.
B
Rule IV of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections Division, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, approved in June 1976, recites that the inmate classification process is not concerned with punishment. Rather, it is intended to promote the best interests *242 of the inmate, the State, and the prison community.[1] Paragraph 3 of Rule IV requires a hearing prior to a prison transfer involving "a grievous loss to the inmate," which the Rule defines "generally" as "a serious loss to a reasonable man." App. 21.[2] The Administrator, under ¶ 2 of the Rule, is required to establish "an impartial Program Committee" to conduct such a hearing, the Committee to be "composed of at least three members who were not actively involved in the process by which the inmate . . . was brought before the Committee." App. 20. Under ¶ 3, the Committee must give the inmate written notice of the hearing, permit him, with certain stated exceptions, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, afford him an opportunity to be heard, and apprise him of the Committee's findings. App. 21-24.[3]
The Committee is directed to make a recommendation to the Administrator, who then decides what action to take:
"[The Administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker:
"(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or
"(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of the staff, inmate *243. . . , other inmates . . . , institution, or community and refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation." Rule IV, ¶ 3d(3), App. 24.
The regulations contain no standards governing the Administrator's exercise of his discretion. See Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 144-145, 621 P. 2d 976, 980-981 (1981).
C
Respondent filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against petitioners as the state officials who caused his transfer. He alleged that he had been denied procedural due process because the Committee that recommended his transfer consisted of the same persons who had initiated the hearing, this being in specific violation of Rule IV, ¶ 2, and because the Committee was biased against him. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the complaint, holding that the Hawaii regulations governing prison transfers do not create a substantive liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 459 F. Supp. 473 (1978).[4]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. 664 F. 2d 708 (1981). It held that Hawaii had created a constitutionally protected liberty interest by promulgating Rule IV. In so doing, the court declined to follow cases from other Courts of Appeals holding that certain procedures mandated by prison transfer regulations do not create a liberty interest. See, e. g., Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934 (CA2 1979); Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13 (CA1 1977). The court reasoned that Rule IV gives Hawaii prisoners a justifiable expectation that they will not be transferred to the mainland absent a hearing, before an impartial committee, concerning the facts alleged in the *244 prehearing notice.[5] Because the Court of Appeals' decision created a conflict among the Circuits, and because the case presents the further question whether the Due Process Clause in and of itself protects against interstate prison transfers, we granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 1005 (1982).
II
In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976), this Court held that an intrastate prison transfer does not directly implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Meachum, inmates at a Massachusetts medium security prison had been transferred to a maximum security prison in that Commonwealth. In Montanye, a companion case, an inmate had been transferred from one maximum security New York prison to another as punishment for a breach of prison rules. This Court rejected "the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause." Meachum, 427 U. S., at 224 (emphasis in original). It went on to state:
"The initial decision to assign the convict to a particular institution is not subject to audit under the Due Process Clause, although the degree of confinement in one prison may be quite different from that in another. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty *245 interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.
"Neither, in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose." Id., at 224-225 (emphasis in original).
The Court observed that, although prisoners retain a residuum of liberty, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974), a holding that "any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts." 427 U. S., at 225 (emphasis in original).
Applying the Meachum and Montanye principles in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), this Court held that the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital did implicate a liberty interest. Placement in the mental hospital was "not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual," because it brought about "consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime." Id., at 493. Respondent argues that the same is true of confinement of a Hawaii prisoner on the mainland, and that Vitek therefore controls.
We do not agree. Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State.[6] Often, confinement *246 in the inmate's home State will not be possible. A person convicted of a federal crime in a State without a federal correctional facility usually will serve his sentence in another State. Overcrowding and the need to separate particular prisoners may necessitate interstate transfers. For any number of reasons, a State may lack prison facilities capable of providing appropriate correctional programs for all offenders.
Statutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other States. On the federal level, 18 U. S. C. § 5003(a) authorizes the Attorney General to contract with a State for the transfer of a state prisoner to a federal prison, whether in that State or another. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U. S. 473 (1981).[7] Title 18 U. S. C. § 4002 (1976 ed. and Supp. V) permits the Attorney General to contract with any State for the placement of a federal prisoner in state custody for up to three years. Neither statute requires that the prisoner remain in the State in which he was convicted and sentenced.
On the state level, many States have statutes providing for the transfer of a state prisoner to a federal prison, e. g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-18 (1976), or another State's prison, e. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 33.30.100 (1982). Corrections compacts between States, implemented by statutes, authorize incarceration of a prisoner of one State in another State's prison. See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 11189 (West 1982) (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); § 11190 (codifying Western Interstate Corrections Compact); Conn. Gen. *247 Stat. § 18-102 (1981) (codifying New England Interstate Corrections Compact); § 18-106 (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 355-1 (1976) (codifying Western Interstate Corrections Compact); Idaho Code § 20-701 (1979) (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 196.610 (1982) (same). And prison regulations such as Hawaii's Rule IV anticipate that inmates sometimes will be transferred to prisons in other States.
In short, it is neither unreasonable nor unusual for an inmate to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was convicted and sentenced, or to be transferred to an out-of-state prison after serving a portion of his sentence in his home State. Confinement in another State, unlike confinement in a mental institution, is "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose." Meachum, 427 U. S., at 225.[8] Even when, as here, the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing, the confinement remains within constitutional limits. The difference between such a transfer and an intrastate or interstate transfer of *248 shorter distance is a matter of degree, not of kind,[9] and Meachum instructs that "the determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight." 427 U. S., at 224. The reasoning of Meachum and Montanye compels the conclusion that an interstate prison transfer, including one from Hawaii to California, does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in and of itself.
III
The Court of Appeals held that Hawaii's prison regulations create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In Meachum, however, the State had "conferred no right on the *249 prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct," 427 U. S., at 226, and "ha[d] not represented that transfers [would] occur only on the occurrence of certain events," id., at 228. Because the State had retained "discretion to transfer [the prisoner] for whatever reason or for no reason at all," ibid., the Court found that the State had not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Similarly, because the state law at issue in Montanye "impose[d] no conditions on the discretionary power to transfer," 427 U. S., at 243, there was no basis for invoking the protections of the Due Process Clause.
These cases demonstrate that a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion. An inmate must show "that particularized standards or criteria guide the State's decisionmakers." Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 467 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). If the decisionmaker is not "required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria," but instead "can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all," ibid., the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See id., at 466-467 (opinion of the Court); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S., at 488-491 (summarizing cases).
Hawaii's prison regulations place no substantive limitations on official discretion and thus create no liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. As Rule IV itself makes clear, and as the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held in Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw., at 144-145, 621 P. 2d, at 980-981, the prison Administrator's discretion to transfer an inmate is completely unfettered. No standards govern or restrict the Administrator's determination. Because the Administrator is the only decisionmaker under Rule IV, we need not decide whether the introductory paragraph *250 of Rule IV, see n. 1, supra, places any substantive limitations on the purely advisory Program Committee.[10]
The Court of Appeals thus erred in attributing significance to the fact that the prison regulations require a particular kind of hearing before the Administrator can exercise his unfettered discretion.[11] As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently stated in Shango v. Jurich, 681 F. 2d 1091, 1100-1101 (1982), "[a] liberty interest is of course a substantive interest of an individual; it cannot be the right to demand needless formality."[12] Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. See generally Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 146, 186 (1983). If officials may transfer a prisoner "for whatever reason or for no reason at all," Meachum, 427 U. S., at 228, there is no such interest for process to protect. The State may choose to require procedures for reasons other than protection against deprivation of substantive *251 rights, of course,[13] but in making that choice the State does not create an independent substantive right. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 471 (1983).
IV
In sum, we hold that the transfer of respondent from Hawaii to California did not implicate the Due Process Clause directly, and that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create a protected liberty interest.[14] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, and with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins as to Part I, dissenting.
In my view, the transfer of respondent Delbert Kaahanui Wakinekona from a prison in Hawaii to a prison in California implicated an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.
I
An inmate's liberty interest is not limited to whatever a State chooses to bestow upon him. An inmate retains a significant residuum of constitutionally protected liberty following his incarceration independent of any state law. As we stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974): "[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons *252 of this country. . . . [Prisoners] may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
In determining whether a change in the conditions of imprisonment implicates a prisoner's retained liberty interest, the relevant question is whether the change constitutes a sufficiently "grievous loss" to trigger the protection of due process. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 488 (1980). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The answer depends in part on a comparison of "the treatment of the particular prisoner with the customary, habitual treatment of the population of the prison as a whole." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 486 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This principle was established in our decision in Vitek, which held that the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital implicated a liberty interest because it brought about "consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime." 445 U. S., at 493. Because a significant qualitative change in the conditions of confinement is not "within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual," ibid., such a change implicates a prisoner's protected liberty interest.
There can be little doubt that the transfer of Wakinekona from a Hawaii prison to a prison in California represents a substantial qualitative change in the conditions of his confinement. In addition to being incarcerated, which is the ordinary consequence of a criminal conviction and sentence, Wakinekona has in effect been banished from his home, a punishment historically considered to be "among the severest."[1] For an indeterminate period of time, possibly the *253 rest of his life, nearly 2,500 miles of ocean will separate him from his family and friends. As a practical matter, Wakinekona may be entirely cut off from his only contacts with the outside world, just as if he had been imprisoned in an institution which prohibited visits by outsiders. Surely the isolation imposed on him by the transfer is far more drastic than that which normally accompanies imprisonment.
I cannot agree with the Court that Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236, 243 (1976), compel the conclusion that Wakinekona's transfer implicates no liberty interest. Ante, at 248. Both cases involved transfers of prisoners between institutions located within the same State in which they were convicted, and the Court expressly phrased its holdings in terms of intrastate transfers.[2] Both decisions rested on the premise that no liberty interest is implicated by an initial decision to place a prisoner in one institution in the State rather than another. See Meachum, supra, at 224; Montanye, supra, at 243. On the basis of that premise, the Court concluded that the subsequent transfer of a prisoner to a different facility within the State likewise implicates no liberty interest. In this case, however, we cannot assume that a State's initial placement of an individual in a prison far removed from his family and residence would raise no due process questions. None of our *254 prior decisions has indicated that such a decision would be immune from scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.
Actual experience simply does not bear out the Court's assumptions that interstate transfers are routine and that it is "not unusual" for a prisoner "to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was convicted and sentenced." Ante, at 247. In Hawaii less than three percent of the state prisoners were transferred to prisons in other jurisdictions in 1979, and on a nationwide basis less than one percent of the prisoners held in state institutions were transferred to other jurisdictions.[3] Moreover, the vast majority of state prisoners are held in facilities located less than 250 miles from their homes.[4] Measured against these norms, Wakinekona's transfer to a California prison represents a punishment "qualitively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime." Vitek v. Jones, supra, at 493.
I therefore cannot agree that a State may transfer its prisoners at will, to any place, for any reason, without ever implicating any interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
II
Nor can I agree with the majority's conclusion that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create a liberty interest. This Court's prior decisions establish that a liberty interest *255 may be "created"[5] by state laws, prison rules, regulations, or practices. State laws that impose substantive criteria which limit or guide the discretion of officials have been held to create a protected liberty interest. See, e. g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979); Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (ND Cal. 1976), summarily aff'd, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978). By contrast, a liberty interest is not created by a law which "imposes no conditions on [prison officials'] discretionary power," Montanye, supra, at 243, authorizes prison officials to act "for whatever reason or for no reason at all," Meachum, supra, at 228, or accords officials "unfettered discretion," Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 466 (1981).
The Court misapplies these principles in concluding that Hawaii's prison regulations leave prison officials with unfettered discretion to transfer inmates. Ante, at 249-250. Rule IV establishes a scheme under which inmates are classified upon initial placement in an institution, and must subsequently be reclassified before they can be transferred to another institution. Under the Rule the standard for classifying inmates is their "optimum placement within the Corrections Division" in light of the "best interests of the individual, the State, and the community."[6] In classifying inmates, the Program *256 Committee may not consider punitive aims. It may consider only factors relevant to determining where the individual will be "best situated," such as "his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Divisions, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors." Paragraph 3 of Rule IV establishes a detailed set of procedures applicable when, as in this case, the reclassification of a prisoner may lead to a transfer involving a "grievous loss," a phrase contained in the Rule itself.[7] The procedural rules are cast in mandatory language, and cover such matters as notice, access to information, hearing, confrontation and cross-examination, and the basis on which the Committee is to make its recommendation to the facility administrator.
The limitations imposed by Rule IV are at least as substantial as those found sufficient to create a liberty interest in Hewitt v. Helms, supra, decided earlier this Term. In Hewitt an inmate contended that his confinement in administrative custody implicated an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. State law provided that a prison official could place inmates in administrative custody "upon his assessment of the situation and the need for control," or "where it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a serious threat to the individual or others," and mandated certain procedures such as notice and a *257 hearing.[8] This Court construed the phrases " `the need for control,' or `the threat of a serious disturbance,' " as "substantive predicates" which restricted official discretion. Id., at 472. These restrictions, in combination with the mandatory procedural safeguards, "deman[ded] a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest." Ibid.
Rule IV is not distinguishable in any meaningful respect from the provisions at issue in Helms. The procedural requirements contained in Rule IV are, if anything, far more elaborate than those involved in Helms, and are likewise couched in "language of an unmistakably mandatory character." Id., at 471. Moreover, Rule IV, to no less an extent than the state law at issue in Helms, imposes substantive criteria restricting official discretion. In Helms this Court held that a statutory phrase such as "the need for control" constituted a limitation on the discretion of prison officials to place inmates in administrative custody. In my view Rule IV, which states that transfers are intended to ensure an inmate's "optimum placement" in accordance with considerations which include "his changing needs [and] the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division," also restricts official discretion in ordering transfers.[9]
The Court suggests that, even if the Program Committee does not have unlimited discretion in making recommendations for classifications and transfers, this cannot give rise to a state-created liberty interest because the prison Administrator retains "completely unfettered" "discretion to transfer *258 an inmate," ante, at 249. I disagree. Rule IV, ¶ 3(d)(3), provides for review by the prison Administrator of recommendations forwarded to him by the Program Committee.[10] Even if this provision must be construed as authorizing the Administrator to transfer a prisoner for wholly arbitrary reasons,[11] that mere possibility does not defeat the protectible expectation otherwise created by Hawaii's reclassification and transfer scheme that transfers will take place only if required to ensure an inmate's optimum placement. In Helms a prison regulation also left open the possibility that the Superintendent could decide, for any reason or no reason at all, whether an inmate should be confined in administrative custody.[12] This Court nevertheless held that the state scheme as a whole created an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 459 U. S., at 471-472. Helms thus necessarily rejects the view that state laws which impose substantive *259 limitations and elaborate procedural requirements on official conduct create no liberty interest solely because there remains the possibility that an official will act in an arbitrary manner at the end of the process.[13]
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
NOTES
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, J. Kirk Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Judith W. Rogers, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Aviata F. Fa'alevao of American Samoa, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Jim Smith of Florida, David H. Leroy of Idaho, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, William A. Allain of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Richard H. Bryan of Nevada, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, John J. Easton of Vermont, Gerald L. Baliles of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and Steven F. Freudenthal of Wyoming; and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Stephen R. Delinsky, Barbara A. H. Smith, and Leo J. Cushing, Assistant Attorneys General, Anthony Ching, Solicitor General of Arizona, and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Aviata F. Fa'alevao of American Samoa, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Jim Smith of Florida, David H. Leroy of Idaho, William A. Allain of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert O. Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, John J. Easton of Vermont, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, and Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin.
[1] Paragraph 1 of Rule IV states:
"An inmate's . . . classification determines where he is best situated within the Corrections Division. Rather than being concerned with isolated aspects of the individual or punishment (as is the adjustment process), classification is a dynamic process which considers the individual, his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates . . . , the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors. It never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division." App. 20.
[2] Petitioners concede, "for purposes of the argument," that respondent suffered a "grievous loss" within the meaning of Rule IV when he was transferred from Hawaii to the mainland. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 25.
[3] Rule V provides that an inmate may retain legal counsel if his hearing concerns a "potential Interstate transfer." App. 25.
[4] Respondent also had alleged that the transfer violated the Hawaii Constitution and state regulations and statutes. In light of its dismissal of respondent's federal claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over these state-law claims. 459 F. Supp., at 476.
[5] Several months before the Court of Appeals handed down its decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii had held that because Hawaii's prison regulations do not limit the Administrator's discretion to transfer prisoners to the mainland, they do not create any liberty interest. Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 621 P. 2d 976 (1981). In a petition for rehearing in the present case, petitioners directed the Ninth Circuit's attention to the Lono decision. See 664 F. 2d, at 714. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the Hawaii court's interpretation of the regulations was not different from its own; the Hawaii court merely had reached a different result on the "federal question." The Court of Appeals thus adhered to its resolution of the case. Id., at 714-715.
[6] Indeed, in Vitek itself the Court did not read Meachum and Montanye as stating a rule applicable only to intrastate transfers. The Court stated: "In Meachum v. Fano . . . and Montanye v. Haymes . . . we held that the transfer of a prisoner from one prison to another does not infringe a protected liberty interest." 445 U. S., at 489 (emphasis added). The Court's other cases describing Meachum and Montanye also have eschewed the narrow reading respondent now proposes. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 467-468 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976).
[7] This statute has been invoked to transfer prisoners from Hawaii state facilities to federal prisons on the mainland. See Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F. 2d 1130 (CA7 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hawaii v. Mederios, 453 U. S. 902 (1981).
[8] After the decisions in Meachum and Montanye, courts almost uniformly have held that an inmate has no entitlement to remain in a prison in his home State. See Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F. 2d 239, 246-247 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 453 U. S. 912 (1981); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934, 937, n. 4 (CA2 1979); Sisbarro v. Warden, 592 F. 2d 1, 3 (CA1), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 849 (1979); Fletcher v. Warden, 467 F. Supp. 777, 779-780 (Kan. 1979); Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926, 931-933 (DC 1976); McDonnell v. United States Attorney General, 420 F. Supp. 217, 220 (ED Ill. 1976); Goodnow v. Perrin, 120 N. H. 669, 671, 421 A. 2d 1008, 1010 (1980); Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt. 448, 449-450, 378 A. 2d 105, 106-107 (1977); In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d 216, 227-228, 622 P. 2d 373, 379 (1980); cf. Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d 468 (CA9 1974) (pre-Meachum transfers from Alaska to other States); Hillen v. Director of Department of Social Services, 455 F. 2d 510 (CA9), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 989 (1972) (pre-Meachum transfer from Hawaii to California). But see In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d, at 233, 622 P. 2d, at 382 (concurring opinion); State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N. W. 2d 621 (N. D. 1977); cf. Tai v. Thompson, 387 F. Supp. 912 (Haw. 1975) (pre-Meachum transfer).
[9] Respondent's argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. The Court in Montanye took note that among the hardships that may result from a prison transfer are separation of the inmate from home and family, separation from inmate friends, placement in a new and possibly hostile environment, difficulty in making contact with counsel, and interruption of educational and rehabilitative programs. 427 U. S., at 241, n. 4. These are the same hardships respondent faces as a result of his transfer from Hawaii to California.
Respondent attempts to analogize his transfer to banishment in the English sense of "beyond the seas," arguing that banishment surely is not within the range of confinement justified by his sentence. But respondent in no sense has been banished; his conviction, not the transfer, deprived him of his right freely to inhabit the State. The fact that his confinement takes place outside Hawaii is merely a fortuitous consequence of the fact that he must be confined, not an additional element of his punishment. See Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt., at 449-450, 378 A. 2d, at 106-107. Moreover, respondent has not been exiled; he remains within the United States.
In essence, respondent's banishment argument simply restates his claim that a transfer from Hawaii to the mainland is different in kind from other transfers. As has been shown in the text, however, respondent's transfer was authorized by his conviction. A conviction, whether in Hawaii, Alaska, or one of the contiguous 48 States, empowers the State to confine the inmate in any penal institution in any State unless there is state law to the contrary or the reason for confining the inmate in a particular institution is itself constitutionally impermissible. See Montanye, 427 U. S., at 242; id., at 244 (dissenting opinion); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d, at 470.
[10] In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), unlike this case, state law limited the decisionmakers' discretion. To the extent the dissent doubts that the Administrator's discretion under Rule IV is truly unfettered, post, at 258, and n. 11, it doubts the ability or authority of the Hawaii Supreme Court to construe state law.
[11] In Meachum itself, the Court of Appeals had interpreted the applicable regulations as entitling inmates to a pretransfer hearing, see Fano v. Meachum, 520 F. 2d 374, 379-380 (CA1 1975), but this Court held that state law created no liberty interest.
[12] Other courts agree that an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Jiles, 658 F. 2d 194, 200 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 923 (1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287, 1298-1299 (CA6 1980); Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F. 2d 916, 924-925 (CA2 1980); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d, at 938; Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13, 14-16 (CA1 1977); Adams v. Wainwright, 512 F. Supp. 948, 953 (ND Fla. 1981); Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw., at 144-145, 621 P. 2d, at 980-981.
[13] Petitioners assert that the hearings required by Rule IV not only enable the officials to gather information and thereby to exercise their discretion intelligently, but also have a therapeutic purpose: inmate participation in the decisionmaking process, it is hoped, reduces tension in the prison. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53.
[14] In light of this conclusion, respondent's claim of bias in the composition of the prison Program Committee becomes irrelevant.
[1] 4 J. Elliott, Debates on the Federal Constitution 555 (1836). Whether it is called banishment, exile, deportation, relegation, or transportation, compelling a person "to quit a city, place, or country, for a specified period of time, or for life," has long been considered a unique and severe deprivation, and was specifically outlawed by "[t]he twelfth section of the English Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. II, one of the three great muniments of English liberty." United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 269-270 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
[2] Thus in Meachum the Court stated that the State, by convicting the defendant, was "empower[ed] to confine him in any of its prisons," 427 U. S., at 224 (emphasis deleted), that a "transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system" implicated no due process interest, id., at 225, and that "[c]onfinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose." Ibid. See also Montanye, 427 U. S., at 242 ("We held in Meachum v. Fano, that no Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison to another within the State").
[3] U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics - 1981, Table 6.27, pp. 478-479 (T. Flanagan, D. Van Alstyne, & M. Gottfredson eds. 1982). These figures reflect "all inmates who were transferred from one State's jurisdiction to another to continue sentences already in force," and "[d]oes not include the release if [the] State does not relinquish jurisdiction." Id., at 590.
[4] U. S. Dept. of Justice, Profile of State Prison Inmates: Sociodemographic Findings from the 1974 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities 1 (1979). Over 70 percent of state inmates are held in institutions located less than 250 miles from their homes.
[5] But see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 488 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (Prison regulations "provide evidentiary support for the conclusion that the transfer affects a constitutionally protected interest in liberty," but they "do not create that interest" (emphasis in original)).
[6] Paragraph 1 of Rule IV provides:
"An inmate's/ward's classification determines where he is best situated within the Corrections Division. Rather than being concerned with isolated aspects of the individual or punishment (as is the adjustment process), classification is a dynamic process which considers the individual, his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors. It never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division." App. 20.
[7] While the term "grievous loss" is not explicitly defined, the prison regulations treat a transfer to the mainland as a grievous loss entitling an inmate to the procedural rights established in Rule IV, ¶ 3. This is readily inferred from Rule IV, ¶ 3, which states that intrastate transfers do not involve a grievous loss, and Rule V, which permits inmates to retain counsel only in specified circumstances, one of which is a reclassification that may result in an interstate transfer. App. 25.
[8] See 459 U. S., at 470-471, n. 6.
[9] See also Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (ND Cal. 1976), summarily aff'd, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978). In that case, the District Court held that the language of a prison policy statement, stating that "[i]nmates may be segregated for medical, psychiatric, disciplinary, or administrative reasons," 462 F. Supp., at 403, was sufficient to create a protected expectation that an inmate would not be segregated for arbitrary reasons. See also Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287, 1293 (CA6 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1093 (1981); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F. 2d 996, 107 (CA3 1980) (en banc).
[10] Rule IV, ¶ 3(d)(3), provides:
"The facility administrator will, within a reasonable period of time, review the Program Committee's recommendation. He may, as the final decisionmaker:
"(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or
"(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of the staff, inmate/ward, other inmates/wards, institution, or community and refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation." App. 21.
[11] I doubt that Rule IV would be construed to permit the Administrator to order a transfer for punitive reasons, since Rule IV expressly disallows punitive transfers.
[12] That provision stated: "All decisions of the Program Review Committee shall be reviewed by the Superintendent for his sustaining the decision or amending or reversing the decision in favor of the inmate." Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction Administrative Directive BC-ADM 801, Rule III(H)(7). App. to Brief for Respondent in Hewitt v. Helms, O. T. 1982, No. 81-638, p. 12a. Because an inmate could be confined in administrative custody only if the Program Review Committee determined that such confinement is and continues to be "appropriate," id., at 18a, the Superintendent in Helms was the "decisionmaker," ante, at 249-250, who determined whether inmates would be held in administrative custody.
[13] This view was also implicitly rejected in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979). The Court held that the Nebraska statute governing the decision whether or not to grant parole created a "protectible entitlement," id., at 12, even though the statute, which listed a number of factors to be considered in the parole decision, also authorized the Parole Board to deny parole on the basis of "[a]ny other factors the board determines to be relevant." Id., at 18.
To the extent that Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 144-145, 621 P. 2d 976, 980-981 (1981), on which the majority relies, ante, at 249, suggests that no liberty interest is created as state law has not entirely eliminated the possibility of arbitrary action, it is inconsistent with both Helms and Greenholtz. | {
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BURTONv.DORMIRE, SUPERINTENDENT, JEFFERSON CITY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL.
No. 02-9170.
Supreme Court of United States.
April 28, 2003.
1
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
2
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 295 F. 3d 839. | {
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12 Pet. 507
9 L.Ed. 1174
PIERRE CHOTEAU, SENIOR, PLAINTIFF IN ERRORv.MARGUERITE, A WOMAN OF COLOUR, DEFENDANT.
January Term, 1838
ERROR to the supreme court of the third judicial district of the state of Missouri.
In 1825, Marguerite, a woman of colour, by her next friend, Pierre Barrebeau, filed a declaration in the circuit court for the county of Jefferson, in the state of Missouri, alleging that Pierre Choteau, sr., had beat and bruised her, and unlawfully detained her in prison, against her will, &c. The object of this proceeding was to establish that the complainant, the descendant of an Indian woman, Marie Scipion, was free, and was unlawfully held as a slave by the defendant.
Pierre Choteau appeared to the suit, and pleaded that Marguerite was a slave, in his lawful possession, and so detained by him.
The case was submitted to a jury in Jefferson county, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff; which was afterwards set aside by the court, and a new trial ordered. The suit was afterwards tried before the same court, and a verdict was given for the defendant. The plaintiff filed a bill of exceptions; and on a writ of error to the supreme court of Missouri, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and the cause was remanded to that court. It was afterwards remanded to the circuit court of St. Charles county, and was there tried again before a jury; and a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant, on the trial, moved the court to instruct the . If the jury find, from the evidence, that the mother of Marie Scipion was an Indian woman, of the Natchez nation, taken captive in war by the French; and that she and her descendants were publicly and notoriously held as slaves, in the province of Louisiana, while the same was held by the French, prior to the year 1769; and that she and her descendants were so publicly and notoriously held as slaves, without interruption, in the said province, until the 30th April, 1803, and thence to the time of the commencement of this suit; the jury ought to find for the defendant.
2d. If the jury find, from the evidence, that the mother of Marie Scipion was an Indian woman, taken captive in war, and reduced to slavery by the French; and that from the time of her capture she and her descendants were publicly and notoriously held as slaves, in the province of Louisiana, while the same was held by the French, before the year 1769, and afterwards, while the same province was in the possession of, and held by Spain and France, until the 30th day of April, 1803, and thence until the commencement of this suit; they ought to find for the defendant.
3d. That Indians taken captive in war by the French, might, lawfully, be reduced and held in slavery in the province of Louisiana; whilst it was held by the crown of France.
4th. If the jury find, from the evidence, that the said Marie Scipion was born while her mother was so held in slavery, within the province of Louisiana, while the same was held by the French, prior to the year 1769; that the said mother was held in slavery, in the province of Louisiana, from the time of her birth until the 30th April, 1803, and thence until the time of her death; then the jury ought to find for the defendant.
5th. If the jury find, from the evidence, that Marie Scipion was born while her mother was held in slavery, and that she, she said Marie Scipion, was publicly and notoriously held as a slave, from the time of her birth until her death, within the territory ceded to the United States, by the treaty between the United States of America and the French Republic, bearing date the 30th April, 1803, and that, at the date of said treaty, the said Marie Scipion was so held as a slave, within the said ceded territory, by an inhabitant thereof; then the jury ought to find for the defendant.
The court refused to give these instructions: and the defendant sued out a writ of error to the supreme court of Missouri, where the judgment of the circuit court of Jefferson county was affirmed.
The defendant then sued out the writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, to the supreme court of Missouri.
Mr. Butler, for the defendant in error, moved to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that the case is not within the provisions of the 25th section of the judiciary act.
He contended that no question had arisen in the case, in which this Court could be called on to interfere with its revising powers. The plaintiff in error claimed that the treaty of Louisiana, of 30th April, 1803, protected him in his property in the defendant, as she was his slave. The question before the circuit court, and which was submitted to the jury, was, whether the plaintiff was a slave; and the jury found that she was free.
Under the 25th sec. of the judiciary act, the jurisdiction of this Court in writs of error to the supreme courts of the state, prevails in those cases in which a treaty of the United States has been drawn in question, and has been misconstrued; or a statute of the United States has been misconstrued and disregarded.
It has been supposed that this suit is within the class of cases cognizable in the Supreme Court of the United States; as the defendant claimed Marguerite as a slave, under the Louisiana treaty.
The first instruction has no reference to the treaty. The counsel sought to have the instructions of the court, that if the plaintiff was always held as a slave, up to the time of the treaty, she continued such. The court held that she could not be a slave. Whether this opinion was right or not, the construction of the treaty was not drawn in question. The protection of the treaty was not denied; and the decision of the court was such as did not make the case within its provisions. The plaintiff had no property in Marguerite, which the treaty operated upon.
But this Court decided that the general provisions of the ordinance of 1787, could not give to the Supreme Court jurisdiction, where rights of property were asserted to have been violated by the decision of a state court. Menard v. Aspasia, 5 Peters, 525.
In the case of Crowell v. Randall, 10 Peters, 368, there is a review of all the cases on the question of the jurisdiction of this Court, in cases from the highest court of the states of the United States. In that, and in all the other cases, the law is laid down to be, that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court can only be sustained when it appears that the question over which the jurisdiction exists must appear to have been brought before the Court, and decided according to the provisions of the twenty-fifth section; or that by clear and necessary intendment, the question must have arisen and must have been decided.
The very point involved in this case has been decided. In the case of the Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, it was held that the protection of the treaty existed, and its provisions were applicable and would be enforced by the courts of the United States, until the territory became a state; afterwards, that protection was given by the constitution and laws of the state. If such a case as this could be entertained, then all questions of property, arising in the states erected in the country acquired by the United States, by the Louisiana treaty, could be brought here; as the guaranty of the treaty applies to all property.
Mr. Key, with whom was Mr. Benton, opposed the motion. He contended that the decision of this Court, in Crowell v. Randall, 10 Peters, 368, did not in any way enlarge the principles which had prevailed before. All the Court are required to do before they take jurisdiction, is to see that the case is such as presented a question cognizable by the Court. The Court, if its consideration was essential to the decision of the cause, will hold that it did arise, and was decided. He argued that the treaty of Louisiana must have been considered by the supreme court of Louisiana in this case.
Mr. Justice STORY said that it had been thought that the decisions of the Court had been misunderstood:
1
and the Court, in the case of Crowell v. Randall, 10 Peters, had revised all the cases; and had laid down the law as they wished it should be universally understood.
2
The motion to dismiss the case was sustained. | {
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DOLE, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.
v.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA ET AL.
No. 88-1434.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued November 6, 1989
Decided February 21, 1990
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
*28 Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Leonard Schaitman, and Marleigh D. Dover.
Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents United Steelworkers of America et al. were George H. Cohen, Jeremiah A. Collins, David C. Vladeck, Alan B. Morrison, and Elihu I. Leifer. Maurice Baskin filed a brief for respondents Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al.[*]
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Among the regulatory tools available to Government agencies charged with protecting public health and safety are rules which require regulated entities to disclose information directly to employees, consumers, or others. Disclosure rules protect by providing access to information about what dangers exist and how these dangers can be avoided. Today we decide whether the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has the authority under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U. S. C. § 3501 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), to review such regulations.
I
In 1983, pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. (1982 ed.), which authorizes the Department of Labor (DOL) to set health and safety standards for workplaces, DOL *29 promulgated a hazard communication standard. 29 CFR § 1910.1200 (1984). The standard imposed various requirements on manufacturers aimed at ensuring that their employees were informed of the potential hazards posed by chemicals found at their workplace. Specifically, the standard required chemical manufacturers to label containers of hazardous chemicals with appropriate warnings. "Downstream" manufacturers - commercial purchasers who used the chemicals in their manufacturing plants - were obliged to keep the original labels intact or else transfer the information onto any substitute containers. The standard also required chemical manufacturers to provide "material safety data sheets" to downstream manufacturers. The data sheets were to list the physical characteristics and hazards of each chemical, the symptoms caused by overexposure, and any pre-existing medical conditions aggravated by exposure. In addition, the data sheets were to recommend safety precautions and first aid and emergency procedures in case of over-exposure and provide a source for additional information. Both chemical manufacturers and downstream manufacturers were required to make the data sheets available to their employees and to provide training on the dangers of the particular hazardous chemicals found at each workplace.
Respondent United Steelworkers of America, among others, challenged the standard in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That court held that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had not adequately explained why the regulation was limited to the manufacturing sector, in view of the OSH Act's clear directive that, to the extent feasible, OSHA is to ensure that no employee suffers material impairment of health from toxic or other harmful agents. The court directed OSHA either to apply the hazard standard rules to workplaces in other sectors or to state reasons why such application would not be feasible. United *30 Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F. 2d 728, 739 (1985).
When DOL responded by initiating an entirely new rulemaking proceeding, the union and its copetitioners sought enforcement of the earlier order. The Third Circuit directed DOL, under threat of contempt, to publish in the Federal Register within 60 days either a hazard communication standard applicable to all workers covered by the OSH Act or a statement of reasons why such a standard was not feasible, on the basis of the existing record, as to each category of excluded workers. United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass, 819 F. 2d 1263, 1270 (1987).
DOL complied by issuing a revised hazard communication standard that applied to work sites in all sectors of the economy. See 52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (1987). At the same time, DOL submitted the standard to OMB for review of any paperwork requirements. After holding a public hearing, OMB approved all but three of its provisions. OMB rejected a requirement that employees who work at multiemployer sites (such as construction sites) be provided with data sheets describing the hazardous substances to which they were likely to be exposed, through the activities of any of the companies working at the same site. The provision permitted employers either to exchange data sheets and make them available at their home offices or to maintain all relevant data sheets at a central location on the work site. 29 CFR § 1910.1200(e)(2) (1988). OMB also disapproved a provision exempting consumer products used in the workplace in the same manner, and resulting in the same frequency and duration of exposure, as in normal consumer use. § 1910.1200(b)(6)(vii). Finally, OMB vetoed an exemption for drugs sold in solid, final form for direct administration to patients. § 1910.1200(b)(6)(viii). See 52 Fed. Reg. 46076 (1987).
OMB disapproved these provisions based on its determination that the requirements were not necessary to protect employees.[1]*31 OMB's objection to the exemptions was that they were too narrow, and that the standard, therefore, applied to situations in which disclosure did not benefit employees.[2]Id., at 46077-46078. DOL disagreed with OMB's assessment, but it published notice that the three provisions were withdrawn. DOL added its reasons for believing that the provisions were necessary, proposed that they be retained, and invited public comment. 53 Fed. Reg. 29822 (1988).
The union and its copetitioners responded by filing a motion for further relief with the Third Circuit. That court ordered DOL to reinstate the OMB-disapproved provisions. The court reasoned that the provisions represented goodfaith compliance by DOL with the court's prior orders, that *32 OMB lacked authority under the Paperwork Reduction Act to disapprove the provisions, and that, therefore, DOL had no legitimate basis for withdrawing them. United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass, 855 F. 2d 108 (1988).
Petitioners sought review in this Court. We granted certiorari to answer the important question whether the Paperwork Reduction Act authorizes OMB to review and countermand agency regulations mandating disclosure by regulated entities directly to third parties. 490 U. S. 1064 (1989). We hold that the Paperwork Reduction Act does not give OMB that authority, and therefore affirm.
II
The Paperwork Reduction Act was enacted in response to one of the less auspicious aspects of the enormous growth of our federal bureaucracy: its seemingly insatiable appetite for data. Outcries from small businesses, individuals, and state and local governments, that they were being buried under demands for paperwork, led Congress to institute controls.[3] Congress designated OMB the overseer of other agencies with respect to paperwork and set forth a comprehensive scheme designed to reduce the paperwork burden. The Act charges OMB with developing uniform policies for efficient information processing, storage, and transmittal systems, both within and among agencies. OMB is directed to reduce federal collection of all information by set percentages, establish a Federal Information Locator System, and develop and implement procedures for guarding the privacy of those providing confidential information. See 44 U. S. C. §§ 3504, 3505, 3511 (1982 ed. and Supp. V).
The Act prohibits any federal agency from adopting regulations which impose paperwork requirements on the public unless the information is not available to the agency from another source within the Federal Government, and the agency *33 must formulate a plan for tabulating the information in a useful manner. Agencies are also required to minimize the burden on the public to the extent practicable. See 44 U. S. C. § 3507(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). In addition, the Act institutes a second layer of review by OMB for new paperwork requirements. After an agency has satisfied itself that an instrument for collecting information - termed an "information collection request" - is needed, the agency must submit the request to OMB for approval. See 44 U. S. C. § 3507(a)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. V). If OMB disapproves the request, the agency may not collect the information. See 44 U. S. C. § 3507(a)(3) (1982 ed.).
Typical information collection requests include tax forms, Medicare forms, financial loan applications, job applications, questionaires, compliance reports, and tax or business records. See S. Rep., at 3-4. These information requests share at least one characteristic: The information requested is provided to a federal agency, either directly or indirectly.[4] Agencies impose the requirements on private parties in order to generate information to be used by the agency in pursuing some other purpose. For instance, agencies use these information requests in gathering background on a particular subject to develop the expertise with which to devise or finetune appropriate regulations, amassing diffuse data for processing into useful statistical form, and monitoring business records and compliance reports for signs or proof of nonfeasance to determine when to initiate enforcement measures.
By contrast, disclosure rules do not result in information being made available for agency personnel to use. The promulgation of a disclosure rule is a final agency action that represents a substantive regulatory choice. An agency charged with protecting employees from hazardous chemicals has a *34 variety of regulatory weapons from which to choose: It can ban the chemical altogether; it can mandate specified safety measures, such as gloves or goggles; or it can require labels or other warnings alerting users to dangers and recommended precautions. An agency chooses to impose a warning requirement because it believes that such a requirement is the least intrusive measure that will sufficiently protect the public, not because the measure is a means of acquiring information useful in performing some other agency function.
No provision of the Act expressly declares whether Congress intended the Paperwork Reduction Act to apply to disclosure rules as well as information-gathering rules. The Act applies to "information collection requests" by a federal agency which are defined as
"a written report form, application form, schedule, questionnaire, reporting or recordkeeping requirement, collection of information requirement, or other similar method calling for the collection of information." 44 U. S. C. § 3502(11) (1982 ed., Supp. V).
"Collection of information," in turn, is defined as
"the obtaining or soliciting of facts or opinions by an agency through the use of written report forms, application forms, schedules, questionnaires, reporting or recordkeeping requirements, or other similar methods calling for either -
"(A) answers to identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed on, ten or more persons, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States; or
"(B) answers to questions posed to agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States which are to be used for general statistical purposes." 44 U. S. C. § 3502(4) (1982 ed.).
Petitioners urge us to read the words "obtaining or soliciting of facts by an agency through . . . reporting or recordkeeping *35 requirements" as encompassing disclosure rules. They contend that an agency is "soliciting facts" when it requires someone to communicate specified data to a third party and that the hazard communication standard's rules are "reporting and recordkeeping requirements" within the meaning of the Act because the employer is required to report hazard information to employees. Petitioners submit that the provisions requiring labeling and employee training are "reporting requirements" and that the provision requiring accessible data sheets containing health and safety information is a "recordkeeping requirement." We believe, however, that the language, structure, and purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act reveal that petitioners' position is untenable because Congress did not intend the Act to encompass these or any other third-party disclosure rules.
"On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using traditional tools of statutory construction." NLRB v. Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 123 (1987). Our "starting point is the language of the statute," Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U. S. 1, 5 (1985), but " `in expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115 (1989), quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987). See also K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988) (same).
Petitioners' interpretation of "obtaining or soliciting facts by an agency through . . . reporting or recordkeeping requirements" is not the most natural reading of this language. The commonsense view of "obtaining or soliciting facts by an agency" is that the phrase refers to an agency's efforts to gather facts for its own use and that Congress used the word "solicit" in addition to the word "obtain" in order to cover information requests that rely on the voluntary cooperation of information suppliers as well as rules which make compliance *36 mandatory. Similarly, data sheets consisting of advisory material on health and safety do not fall within the normal meaning of "records," and a Government-imposed reporting requirement customarily requires reports to be made to the Government, not training and labels to be given to someone else altogether.
That a more limited reading of the phrase "reporting and recordkeeping requirements" was intended derives some further support from the words surrounding it. The traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, dictates that " `words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.' " Massachusetts v. Morash, supra, at 114-115, quoting Schreiber, supra, at 8. The other examples listed in the definitions of "information collection request" and "collection of information" are forms for communicating information to the party requesting that information. If "reporting and recordkeeping requirements" is understood to be analogous to the examples surrounding it, the phrase would comprise only rules requiring information to be sent or made available to a federal agency, not disclosure rules.
The same conclusion is produced by a consideration of the object and structure of the Act as a whole. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 220-221 (1986) (concluding that the meaning of a phrase was clarified by the language and purpose of the Act as a whole). Particularly useful is the provision detailing Congress' purposes in enacting the statute. The Act declares that its purposes are:
"(1) to minimize the Federal paperwork burden for individuals, small businesses, State and local governments, and other persons;
"(2) to minimize the cost to the Federal Government of collecting, maintaining, using, and disseminating information;
"(3) to maximize the usefulness of information collected, maintained, and disseminated by the Federal Government;
*37 "(4) to coordinate, integrate and, to the extent practicable and appropriate, make uniform Federal information policies and practices;
"(5) to ensure that automatic data processing, telecommunications, and other information technologies are acquired and used by the Federal Government in a manner which improves service delivery and program management, increases productivity, improves the quality of decisionmaking, reduces waste and fraud, and wherever practicable and appropriate, reduces the information processing burden for the Federal Government and for persons who provide information to and for the Federal Government; and
"(6) to ensure that the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of information by the Federal Government is consistent with applicable laws relating to confidentiality, including . . . the Privacy Act." 44 U. S. C. § 3501 (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (emphasis added).
Disclosure rules present none of the problems Congress sought to solve through the Paperwork Reduction Act, and none of Congress' enumerated purposes would be served by subjecting disclosure rules to the provisions of the Act. The statute makes clear that the first purpose - avoiding a burden on private parties and state and local governments - refers to avoiding "the time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to provide information to a Federal agency." 44 U. S. C. § 3502(3) (1982 ed.) (defining "burden") (emphasis added). Because Congress expressed concern only for the burden imposed by requirements to provide information to a federal agency, and not for any burden imposed by requirements to provide information to a third party, OMB review of disclosure rules would not further this congressional aim.
Congress' second purpose - minimizing the Federal Government's cost of handling information - also would not be advanced by review of disclosure rules because such rules do not impose any information processing costs on the Federal *38 Government. Because the Federal Government is not the consumer of information "requested" by a disclosure rule nor an intermediary in its dissemination, OMB review of disclosure rules would not serve Congress' third, fourth, fifth, or sixth purposes. Thus, nothing in Congress' itemized and exhaustive textual description of its reasons for enacting this particular Act indicates any legislative purpose to have OMB screen proposed disclosure rules. We find this to be strong evidence that Congress did not intend the Act to authorize OMB review of such regulations.
This conclusion is buttressed by the language and import of other provisions of the Act. For instance, every federal agency is required to take three internal preliminary steps before adopting an information collection request. The agency must take action to
"(A) eliminate, through the use of the Federal Information Locator System and other means, information collections which seek to obtain information available from another source within the Federal Government;
"(B) reduce to the extent practicable and appropriate the burden on persons who will provide information to the agency; and
"(C) formulate plans for tabulating the information in a manner which will enhance its usefulness to other agencies and to the public." 44 U. S. C. § 3507(a)(1) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added).
These requirements affect agencies only when they gather information for their own use. The first directs an agency not to ask for information that it can acquire from another agency.[5] The second requires an agency to consider the burden it places on the public, but only as to information provided to the agency. The third encourages an agency to *39 make the information it has obtained useful to others as well. Significantly, no provision relates to disclosure rules. For example, no provision requires agencies to ensure that a paperwork requirement is effective or that its burden on one party is not disproportionate to the benefit afforded a third party.
Also instructive are the provisions governing OMB's review of proposed agency information collection requests that cast that review in terms applicable to information-gathering regulations but not to disclosure rules. OMB's examination is limited to "determining whether the collection of information by an agency is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility for the agency." 44 U. S. C. § 3504(c)(2) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added). "Practical utility" is defined in the statute as "the ability of an agency to use information it collects, particularly the capability to process such information in a timely and useful fashion." 44 U. S. C. § 3502(16) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).
However, in reviewing the disclosure rules at issue in this case, OMB was unable to consider what OSHA planned to do with information regarding hazardous chemicals at the various work sites, because OSHA was not to be the recipient of this information. Nothing was to be given to OSHA to process - in a timely fashion or otherwise. OMB instead disapproved the three OSHA rules on the ground that the mandated disclosures would be of little benefit to the employees OSHA sought to protect. But there is no indication in the Paperwork Reduction Act that OMB is authorized to determine the usefulness of agency-adopted warning requirements to those being warned. To the contrary, Congress focused exclusively on the utility of the information to the agency. And the only criteria specified are whether the agency can process the information quickly and use it in pursuit of its substantive mandate.
*40 Yet a third provision reinforcing our conclusion that disclosure rules are not subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act is the statute's mechanism for assuring agency compliance with its terms. When OMB approves an information collection request, it issues a control number which is placed on all forms. If a request does not receive OMB approval, it is not issued a control number and the agency is prohibited from collecting the information. See 44 U. S. C. §§ 3504(c)(3)(A), 3507(f) (1982 ed.). In addition, if the agency nevertheless promulgates the paperwork requirement, members of the public may ignore it without risk of penalty. See 44 U. S. C. § 3512 (1982 ed.).[6] However, this protection of the public is applicable only to information-gathering rules. Section 3512 provides that "no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to maintain or provide information to any agency if the information collection request involved . . . does not display a current control number assigned by the [OMB] . . . ." Ibid. (emphasis added).
While the grammar of this text can be faulted, its meaning is clear: the public is protected under the Paperwork Reduction Act from paperwork regulations not issued in compliance with the Act, only when those regulations dictate that a person maintain information for an agency or provide information to an agency. By its very terms, the statute's enforcement mechanism does not apply to rules which require disclosure to a third party rather than to a federal agency. Thus either Congress intended the Paperwork Reduction Act to cover information-gathering rules only, or Congress intended the Act to cover disclosure rules but intended to exempt them from this agency compliance mechanism. Because the latter is counterintuitive and contrary to clear legislative history,[7] § 3512 is further evidence that Congress did not intend the Act to cover disclosure rules.
*41 III
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the terms "collection of information" and "information collection request," when considered in light of the language and structure of the Act as a whole, refer solely to the collection of information by, or for the use of, a federal agency; they cannot reasonably be interpreted to cover rules mandating disclosure of information to a third party. In addition, we find unpersuasive petitioners' claims that there is a "clearly expressed legislative intention [to the] contrary," see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 432, n. 12 (1987).
Petitioners rely on statements from various stages of the Act's legislative history as evidence that Congress intended "collection of information" to include disclosure rules.[8] However, the statements show merely that the Act was intended *42 to reach not only statistical compilations but also information collected for law enforcement purposes and information filed with an agency for possible dissemination to the public (i. e., when the agency is an intermediary in the process of data dissemination). This sheds no light on the issue before this Court: Whether the Act reaches rules mandating disclosure by one party directly to a third party. Moreover, other statements in the Committee Reports reinforce respondents' position.[9]
Because we find that the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention, we decline to defer to OMB's interpretation.[10] See Board of Governors of Federal Reserve *43 System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U. S. 361, 368 (1986) ("The traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress"); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter"). We affirm the judgment of the Third Circuit insofar as it held that the Paperwork Reduction Act does not give OMB the authority to review agency rules mandating disclosure by regulated entities to third parties.[11]
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
The Court's opinion today requires more than 10 pages, including a review of numerous statutory provisions and legislative history, to conclude that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA or Act) is clear and unambiguous on the question whether it applies to agency directives to private parties to collect specified information and disseminate or make it available to third parties. On the basis of that questionable conclusion, the Court refuses to give any deference to the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) longstanding and consistently applied interpretation that such requirements fall within the Act's scope. Because in my view the Act is not clear in that regard and deference is due OMB under *44 Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), I respectfully dissent.
In Chevron, supra, we set forth the general principles to be applied in cases such as this one:
"When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id., at 842-843 (footnotes omitted).
As the Court acknowledges, there is no question in this case that OMB is the agency charged with administering the PRA. Unless Congress has directly spoken to the issue whether an agency request that private parties disclose to, or maintain for, third parties information such as material safety data sheets (MSDS's) is an "information collection request" or a "recordkeeping requirement" within the Act's scope, OMB's interpretation of the Act is entitled to deference, provided of course that it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
The Court concedes that the Act does not expressly address "whether Congress intended the Paperwork Reduction Act to apply to disclosure rules as well as information-gathering rules." Ante, at 34. Curiously, the Court then almost immediately asserts that interpreting the Act to provide coverage for disclosure requests is untenable. Ante, at *45 35. The plain language of the Act, however, suggests the contrary. Indeed, the Court appears to acknowledge that petitioners' interpretation of the Act, although not the one the Court prefers, is nonetheless reasonable: "Petitioners' interpretation. . . is not the most natural reading of this language." Ibid. (emphasis added). The Court goes on to arrive at what it believes is the most reasonable of plausible interpretations; it cannot rationally conclude that its interpretation is the only one that Congress could possibly have intended. The Court neglects to even mention that the only other Court of Appeals besides the Third Circuit in this case to address a similar question rejected the interpretation that the Court now adopts.[1] In addition, there is evidence that *46 for years OMB has been reviewing proposals similar to the standard at issue in this case routinely and without objection from other agencies.[2] As I see it, by independently construing the statute rather than asking if the agency's interpretation is a permissible one and deferring to it if that is the case, the Court's approach is clearly contrary to Chevron.
The hazard communication standards propounded by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) require chemical manufacturers to develop hazard information about their products, to adequately label such products, and to prepare for their products MSDS's to be sent to downstream employers who utilize those products. See 29 CFR §§ 1910.1200(d), (f) and (g) (1988). Those employers are directed to prepare written hazard communication programs that include a list of hazardous chemicals known to be present at the work site, § 1910.1200(e); to ensure that containers are properly labeled, § 1900.1200(f); and to collect, maintain, and make available to their employees copies of MSDS's with respect to hazardous chemicals that they use in their business, § 1910.1200(g).
OMB, as I see it, reasonably concluded that these requirements were subject to its approval under the PRA, which *47 makes OMB responsible for implementing the statutory purpose of minimizing the burden and maximizing the usefulness of the Government's information collection requirements. OMB is instructed to do this through a process of reviewing agency "information collection requests" in order to determine whether "the collection of information by an agency is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility for the agency." 44 U. S. C. § 3504(c)(2) (1982 ed.).
An "information collection request" is defined as "a written report form, application form, schedule, questionnaire, reporting or recordkeeping requirement, collection of information requirement, or similar method calling for the collection of information." 44 U. S. C. § 3502(11) (1982 ed., Supp V). A "recordkeeping requirement" is defined as "a requirement imposed by an agency on persons to maintain specified records." § 3502(17). "Collection of information" is defined as
"the obtaining or soliciting of facts or opinions by an agency through the use of written report forms, application forms, schedules, questionnaires, reporting or recordkeeping requirements, or other similar methods calling for either -
"(A) answers to identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed on, ten or more persons, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States; or
"(B) answers to questions posed to agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States which are to be used for general statistical purposes." 44 U. S. C. § 3502(4) (1982 ed.).
"Reporting requirement" is not specifically defined by the statute.
As it is directed to do by the PRA, see § 3516, OMB has issued regulations and rules for exercising its authority under the statute. Although the statute itself does not in so many *48 words reach agency directives to collect, disseminate, or make available to third parties specified information that is not delivered to the agency itself, OMB regulations so interpret the Act. The regulations also plainly reach the hazard communication standards that OSHA has presented for OMB's approval in this case.[3]
*49 I cannot say that these regulations, so far as they are involved here, are inconsistent with the Act. It is not unreasonable to characterize as a "reporting requirement" an employer's obligation to disclose hazard information, by labeling or making MSDS's available, especially in light of the absence of a definition in the statute. Nor is it unreasonable to characterize the obligation to compile copies of MSDS's as a "recordkeeping requirement," or the directive to prepare a hazard communication program with its list of dangerous chemicals as an "information collection request" within the meaning of 44 U. S. C. § 3502 (1982 ed., Supp. V). Since that definitional section, after including reporting and recordkeeping requirements, concludes with the words "or other similar method calling for the collection of information," it is tenable to conclude that reporting and recordkeeping are among the information collection requests requiring OMB approval.
Section 3502(4) likewise defines "collection of information" as including reporting and recordkeeping requirements, but that definition begins with the words "the obtaining or soliciting of facts or opinions by an agency" through written report forms, etc. The Court's argument is that this definition limits the PRA to facts or opinions obtained by an agency for its own use and hence excludes recordkeeping, reporting requirements, and information collection designed to inform or benefit third parties such as employees, customers, or the public. This argument, however, pays too little attention to the precise language of the provision. First, an agency does not "obtain" information when it imposes a recordkeeping requirement. Second, § 3502(4) not only speaks of "obtaining" facts and opinions by an agency but of the "soliciting" of facts and opinions by an agency. The word "soliciting" would appear to mean something beside "obtaining" and is commonly understood as including a request for another person to perform *50 some act. It is not unreasonable therefore to construe this language as extending OMB's authority to requests for recordkeeping, reporting, and information collection that is intended to benefit third parties but is not delivered to the agency itself.
Furthermore, the Court does not explain why if "information collection requests" and the "collection of information" are limited to agency directives that information be provided to the agency, the statutory definitions of those terms explicitly include "recordkeeping requirement[s]." See 44 U. S. C. §§ 3502(4) and (11) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). One response might be that Congress intended to limit the term "recordkeeping requirement" to records prepared for the agency and which must be provided to the agency upon request. But Congress specifically defined the term "recordkeeping requirement" without including such a limitation and it is unlikely Congress intended to imply such a limitation. An agency can certainly "use" information without collecting and analyzing it or periodically auditing it for compliance or enforcement purposes. It can hardly be said that requiring recordkeeping and reporting for the benefit of employees is not useful to the agency or an appropriate means for the agency to carry out its obligation to provide a safe workplace.
It is common ground in this case that if the information required to be reported or made available to employees were first sent to the agency and then distributed to employees, there would be no question about OMB's authority. Likewise, as I understand it, the mere fact that the records ordered to be kept are not physically delivered to the agency does not bar OMB jurisdiction, so long as the records are kept for examination and use by the agency. The Court concedes as much, noting that requests for information provided indirectly to an agency, such as requirements that tax and business records be kept on hand, fall within the PRA's scope because those documents are subject to "possible examination as part of a compliance review." Ante, at 33, n. 4.
*51 In support of its argument that the Act applies only when information is actually transmitted to an agency, the Court points to language in the Act's general statement of purpose indicating that Congress was concerned with minimizing "the cost to the Federal Government,' " maximizing " `the usefulness of information collected, maintained, and disseminated by the Federal Government.' " and reducing the paperwork burdens " `for persons who provide information to and for the Federal Government.' " Ante, at 36-37 (emphasis deleted), quoting 44 U. S. C. § 3501 (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The Court ignores, however, the very first statement of purpose in the Act, which declares that Congress intends that the Act "minimize the Federal paperwork burden for individuals, small businesses, State and local governments, and other persons." 44 U. S. C. § 3501(1) (1982 ed.). Reading the Court's discussion of the Act, one might think that Congress was only concerned with minimizing the Government's costs and reducing the paperwork burdens on federal agency employees who are forced to process massive amounts of information. Common sense and § 3501(1) clearly belie that conclusion.[4] Complaints from the private sector about bureaucratic red tape far predate the enactment of the PRA.
Also curious is the Court's reliance on the statement that one purpose of the Act was to reduce the paperwork burden "for persons who provide information to and for the Federal Government." 44 U. S. C. § 3501(5) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). Aside from reiterating the point just made regarding the Act's focus on reducing the paperwork *52 burdens on the private sector, the natural reading of the statement is that Congress recognized that agencies may sometimes request that private parties provide information to others as part of an agency's administration of its duties. It is surely reasonable to conclude that the word "for" means something different than the word "to" and that it includes not only situations in which private parties must keep records available for use and review by an agency, but also requirements that private parties collect and provide information to third parties.
Contrary to the Court's assertions, disclosure requests do present some of the problems Congress sought to solve through the PRA. The Court concedes that Congress intended the Act to apply when information is "filed with an agency for possible dissemination to the public (i. e., when the agency is an intermediary in the process of data dissemination)." Ante, at 42. But if that is true, how can it be so clear that Congress intended to permit agencies to bypass the Act by simply requesting private parties to submit information directly to third parties? From a policy perspective, and certainly from the private sector's perspective, it makes little difference whether an agency collects information and then disseminates it or requires those in possession of the information to submit it directly to the relevant third parties. In fact, the latter option generally will impose greater paperwork burdens on private parties, although either choice results in a federal agency imposing major paperwork burdens on the private sector. The Court's response is that one approach imposes costs on the Federal Government and the other does not. But that distinction is flawed because it promotes a secondary objective of the PRA and ignores what I consider to have been Congress' primary objective in enacting the statute.
In addition, the legislative history on which the Court relies is unconvincing. Like the statute itself, the legislative history never expressly addresses the question of disclosure *53 requirements. Of course, the Court can find and cite to legislative history that is allegedly relevant to and supports its interpretation of the statute, but one can just as easily point to legislative history of similar quality supporting an alternative construction of the Act. See ante, at 41-42, and nn. 8, 9.[5]
Since the statute itself is not clear and unambiguous, the legislative history is muddy at best, and OMB has given the statute what I believe is a permissible construction, I cannot agree with the outcome the Court reaches. If Chevron is to have meaning, it must apply when a statute is as ambiguous on the issue at hand as the PRA is on the subject of disclosure requirements. Contrary to the Court of Appeals and to the majority, I would defer to OMB's position that the obligation to compile copies of MSDS's and the labeling requirements are information collection requests subject to its approval. It follows that OMB was not acting contrary to the statute in disapproving the three provisions specifically involved in this case.
But even accepting for the moment the Court's construction of the statute, it is notable that the Court fails to consider whether the requirement that employers at multiemployer work sites file all of the relevant MSDS's in a central location or exchange them and make them available at their home offices, see 29 CFR § 1910.1200(e)(2) (1988), might be considered a "recordkeeping requirement." Granted, one purpose of the multiemployer standard is to provide workers with an opportunity to learn the dangers associated with the handling of particular materials used on the work site; nonetheless, the proposed standard does not require employers to actually disseminate the MSDS's to their workers. Rather it requires them to physically compile and maintain massive quantities of paperwork at multiemployer job sites, such as construction sites, or their home offices. This requirement *54 certainly looks like a "recordkeeping requirement" in the plainest sense of the term. In addition, the Department of Labor may periodically check these records for compliance with substantive requirements, see §§ 1910.1200(e)(4) and (g)(11), a factor the Court emphasizes in describing which recordkeeping requests are subject to the Act. As I see it, even under the Court's interpretation of the Act, this portion of the standard should be subject to OMB review.
Finally, an argument that the Court does not make but which the United Steelworkers do is that Chevron should not apply in this case because OMB's regulations actually determine the scope of its jurisdiction under the Act. This Court has never accepted that argument and in fact, as JUSTICE SCALIA pointed out in his lucid concurrence in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U. S. 354, 377 (1988), there are good reasons not to accept it, reasons which JUSTICE SCALIA has adequately set forth and which I will not repeat here. I note, however, that Chevron itself and several of our cases decided since Chevron have deferred to agencies' determinations of matters that affect their own statutory jurisdiction.[6] See, e. g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 116-118 (1989); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 292-293 (1988); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 114-116 (1988); NLRB v. Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, *55 123-128 (1987); Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U. S. 221, 233 (1986); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 845 (1986); Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 125-126 (1985). The application of Chevron principles cannot be avoided on this basis.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
NOTES
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Business Council on the Reduction of Paperwork by Clark R. Silcox; for the National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association et al. by Arthur Y. Tsien; for the National Wholesale Druggists' Association by Lawrence W. Bierlein; and for Senator Lawton Chiles by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Wayne Hartke.
Burton D. Fretz, Toby S. Edelman, and Edward F. Howard filed a brief for the Action Alliance of Senior Citizens et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
[1] OMB concluded that workers on multiemployer sites would be adequately protected if each employer kept chemical manufacturers' labels intact, supplied data sheets to other employers on the site on request, and taught its own employees about the chemicals with which they worked directly and explained how to recognize hazards likely to be introduced by other employers. 52 Fed. Reg. 46077 (1987).
[2] The standard promulgated by OSHA had exempted, from any otherwise applicable labeling requirements, all food and drugs subject to the labeling requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. (1982 ed.), and all consumer products or hazardous substances subject to a consumer product safety standard or labeling requirements of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 86 Stat. 1207, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2051 et seq., or the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 74 Stat. 372, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1261 et seq., or regulations issued under those Acts by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. 29 CFR §§ 1910.1200(b)(5)(ii), 1910.1200(b)(5)(iv) (1988).
OMB wanted OSHA to exempt, in addition, all products packaged in the same form and concentration as a consumer product, whether or not used for the same purpose or with the same exposure, as well as all Food and Drug Administration regulated drugs handled in the nonmanufacturing sector. 52 Fed. Reg. 46078 (1987). OMB drew its recommended exemption for consumer products from § 311(e)(3) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 1615, 42 U. S. C. § 9601 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. V), a provision aimed at informing the general public about chemicals that could cause hazardous conditions during an emergency situation.
[3] See S. Rep. No. 96-930, pp. 3-4, 8 (1980) (S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 96-835, pp. 3, 17 (1980) (H. R. Rep.).
[4] Tax and business records are examples of information provided only indirectly to an agency. In these cases, the governing regulations do not require records to be sent to the agency; they require only that records be kept on hand for possible examination as part of a compliance review.
[5] See H. R. Rep., at 28 (the agency "is to eliminate any information collections which seek to obtain information available from other sources within the Federal Government").
[6] See id., at 20 (The Act "allow[s] the public, by refusing to answer these [information collection requests], to help control `outlaw forms' ").
[7] See S. Rep., at 52-53 ("The only collections of information by a Federal agency which are exempted, and for which a person or persons could not claim protection under section 3512, are those collections of information which this chapter does not apply to and are exempted by section 3518 [certain law enforcement and national security exceptions]"). See also H. R. Rep., at 30.
[8] See Report of Commission on Federal Paperwork, The Reports Clearance Process 1, 43 (Sept. 9, 1977) (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission did not interpret the Federal Reports Act of 1942, predecessor to the Paperwork Reduction Act, to apply to information it collected for law enforcement purposes nor did the Securities and Exchange Commission interpret that Act to apply to information the SEC collected for possible disclosure by the agency to the public); Paperwork and Redtape Reduction Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 1411 before the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices and Open Government of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1979) (testimony of SEC Commissioner Evans that the definition of collection of information in the Federal Reports Act was limited to collection for statistical purposes; testimony of Senator Chiles that Congress was not trying to cripple the mission of the agencies but was "trying to put some governor on this thirst for information"); S. Rep., at 39-40 (explaining that the Senate had rejected the SEC's attempt to limit "collection of information" to collection for statistical purposes, that the definition extended to documents filed with the SEC for possible disclosure to the public by the SEC, and that OMB's review of these filing requirements should consider whether the SEC could use the data either to carry out its regulatory functions or to make it available to the public).
[9] See, e. g., H. R. Rep., at 3 (the Act resulted from "a growing concern that the way the Government collects, uses, and disseminates information must be improved") (emphasis added); id., at 22 (explaining the "practical utility" review as a response to the tendency of agencies to "collect reams of data on the basis of need only to store the data unused" thereby imposing "an unnecessary reporting burden on those individuals or organizations being asked to provide it"); S. Rep., at 11 ("[T]he essential purpose of the legislation [is] to reduce the burden on the public in providing information to the Federal Government") (emphasis added); id., at 46 ("A Federal agency is considered to `sponsor' the collection of information if the agency itself collects information or if it uses a procurement contract and the contractor collects information for the agency"); Senate Hearings, supra, at 40-41 (testimony of Wayne G. Granquist, Assoc. Dir., OMB) ("No one questions the basic need of the government for information to plan, make policy decisions, operate and evaluate programs, and perform necessary research. The question is rather how much information is essential").
[10] OMB's assumption of the authority to review the three provisions of the hazard communication standard at issue was consistent with its own regulations. See 5 CFR § 1320.7(c)(2) (1988) ("Requirements by an agency for a person to obtain or compile information for the purpose of disclosure to members of the public or to the public at large, through posting, notification, labeling, or similar disclosure requirements, constitute the `collection of information' whenever the same requirment to obtain or compile information would be a `collection of information' if the information were directly provided to the agency"); § 1320.7(q) (defining "reporting requirement" as "a requirement imposed by an agency on persons to provide information to another person or to the agency"). Petitioners' argument that we should defer to OMB's interpretation, as expressed in these regulations, is foreclosed by our finding of clear congressional intent.
[11] We do not reach the question whether other provisions of the hazard communication standard might legitimately be subject to OMB review under the Paperwork Reduction Act. See 29 CFR § 1910.1200(e) (1988) (requiring employers to develop written programs describing their compliance and make them available to the agency on request); § 1910.1200(g)(11) (requiring employers to make their material safety data sheets available to the agency on request). Only the three provisions OMB disapproved are before us today.
[1] In Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Philadelphia v. Bowen, 269 U. S. App. D. C. 463, 846 F. 2d 1449 (1988), the court rejected an argument that the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 44 U. S. C. § 3501 et seq. (1976 ed.), the PRA's predecessor, did not cover an agency request that private parties conduct self-evaluations which should then be made available to the public and the agency upon request. The court stated:
"The claim is pure pettifoggery. Appellants cannot seriously believe that in enacting the Reports Act Congress was concerned solely or primarily with private parties' costs of mailing data to Washington; it is the recordkeeping and data-gathering that constitute the burden. Moreover, OMB and its predecessor, the Bureau of the Budget, have interpreted the statutory term `collection of information' for nearly half a century to encompass `[a]ny general or specific requirement for the establishment or maintenance of records . . . which are to be used or be available for use in the collection of information.' Regulation A, Federal Reporting Services, Clearance of Plans and Reports Forms, Title I(1)(e) (February 13, 1943). . . . Even under the deference we owe the agency, Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council [, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984)], we doubt we could uphold a view of the Reports Act that made physical delivery to an agency essential to the notion of `collection of information.' Happily we confront no such oddity." 269 U. S. App. D. C., at 467-468, 846 F. 2d, at 1453-1454 (emphasis in original).
Notably, by enacting the PRA Congress intended to expand the scope of authority OMB and its predecessor had been given under the Reports Act. See Paperwork and Redtape Reduction Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 1411 before the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices and Open Government of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 24-60, 119-125 (1979) (hereinafter S. 1411 Hearings) (comments of OMB and the Comptroller General noting that the proposed legislation would cure deficiencies in the coverage of the Federal Reports Act); S. Rep. No. 96-930. p. 13 (1980).
[2] For example, OMB has reviewed Environmental Protection Agency community right-to-know disclosure requests, 52 Fed. Reg. 38344, 38364 (1987), Federal Trade Commission textile fiber products identification disclosure and fair packaging and fair labeling disclosure requests, 53 Fed. Reg. 5986, 5987 (1988), and Food and Drug Administration nutrition labels. 52 Fed. Reg. 28607 (1987). In this case, the Secretary of Labor and OMB have consistently agreed that the hazard communication standard is subject to review under the Act. See 47 Fed. Reg. 12092, 12111 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 53280 (1983); 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31870 (1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 29822, 29826, 29849-29850 (1988). Courts should be particularly reluctant to intervene in the regulatory process when the executive agencies have been able to cooperate effectively.
[3] Relevant to this case are the following definitions promulgated by OMB as 5 CFR § 1320.7 (1989):
"(c) `Collection of information' means the obtaining or soliciting of information by an agency from ten or more persons by means of identical questions, or identical reporting or recordkeeping requirements, whether such collection of information is mandatory, voluntary, or required to obtain a benefit. For purposes of this definition, the `obtaining or soliciting of information' includes any requirement or request for persons to obtain, maintain, retain, report, or publicly disclose information. In the Act, a `collection of information requirement' is a type of `information collection request.' As used in this part, a `collection of information' refers to the act of collecting information, to the information to be collected, to a plan and/or an instrument calling for the collection of information, or any of these, as appropriate.
"(1) A `collection of information' includes the use of written report forms, application forms, schedules, questionnaires, reporting or recordkeeping requirements, or other similar methods. Similar methods may include. . . disclosure requirements [and] labeling requirements . . . .
"(2) Requirements by an agency for a person to obtain or compile information for the purpose of disclosure to members of the public or to the public at large, through posting, notification, labeling, or similar disclosure requirements, constitute the `collection of information' whenever the same requirement to obtain or compile information would be a `collection of information' if the information were directly provided to the agency. The public disclosure of information originally supplied by the Federal government to the recipient for the purpose of disclosure to the public is not included within this definition.
.....
"(p) `Recordkeeping requirement' means a requirement imposed by an agency on persons to maintain specified records and includes requirements that information be maintained or retained by persons but not necessarily provided to an agency.
"(q) `Reporting requirement' means a requirement imposed by an agency on persons to provide information to another person or to the agency. Reporting requirements may implicitly or explicitly include related recordkeeping requirements." (Emphasis added.)
[4] In this same vein, § 3504, in setting forth OMB's authority and functions in administering the Act, directs that the information collection request clearance and other paperwork control functions of the Office shall include "setting goals for reduction of the burdens of Federal information collection requests." 44 U. S. C. § 3504(c)(5) (1982 ed.). See also § 3505(1), which directs OMB to set goals to reduce the paperwork burdens by specified percentages, as well as § 3507(a)(1)'s requirement that agencies take action to reduce the paperwork burden of a proposal before submitting such proposals to OMB.
[5] In particular, see S. 1411 Hearings, at 61-87; H. R. Rep. No. 96-835, pp. 18-23 (1980); S. Rep. No. 96-930, pp. 13, 39-40 (1980).
[6] In any event, the PRA itself provides a check on OMB's ability to expand its jurisdiction, at least with respect to independent regulatory agencies. Section 3507(c) provides as follows:
"Any disapproval by the Director, in whole or in part, of a proposed information collection request of an independent regulatory agency . . . may be voided, if the agency by a majority vote of its members overrides the Director's disapproval or exercise of authority. The agency shall certify each override to the Director, [and] shall explain the reasons for exercising the override authority. Where the override concerns an information collection request, the Director shall without further delay assign a control number to such request, and such override shall be valid for a period of three years." | {
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{
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HEWITT ET AL.
v.
HELMS
No. 85-1630.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 4, 1987
Decided June 19, 1987
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
*756 Thomas G. Saylor, Jr., First Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General, Allen C. Warshaw, Executive Deputy Attorney General, Andrew S. Gordon, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Gregory R. Neuhauser, Senior Deputy Attorney General.
*757 Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Harriet S. Shapiro, and William Kanter.
Robert H. Vesely argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John M. Humphrey.[*]
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the peculiar-sounding question whether a party who litigates to judgment and loses on all of his claims can nonetheless be a "prevailing party" for purposes of an award of attorney's fees.
Following a prison riot at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, inmate Aaron Helms was placed in administrative segregation, a form of restrictive custody, pending an investigation into his possible involvement in the disturbance. More than seven weeks later, a prison hearing committee, relying solely on an officer's report of the testimony of an undisclosed informant, found Helms guilty of misconduct for striking a corrections officer during the riot. Helms was sentenced to six months of disciplinary restrictive confinement.
While still incarcerated, Helms brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against a number of prison officials, alleging that the lack of a prompt hearing on his misconduct charges and his conviction for misconduct on the basis of uncorroborated hearsay testimony violated his rights to due process. The prison officials asserted qualified immunity from suit and contested the constitutional claims on the merits. Before any decision was rendered, Helms was released from prison on parole.
Nearly six months after Helms' release, the District Court rendered summary judgment against him on his constitutional *758 claims without passing on the defendants' assertions of immunity. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding that "Helms was denied due process unless he was afforded a hearing, within a reasonable time of his initial [segregative] confinement, to determine whether he represented the type of `risk' warranting administrative detention," Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F. 2d 487, 500 (1981) (Helms I), and that he "suffered a denial of due process by being convicted on a misconduct charge when the only evidence offered against him was a hearsay recital, by the charging officer, of an uncorroborated report of an unidentified informant." Id., at 502. The District Court was instructed to enter summary judgment for Helms on the latter claim unless the defendants could establish an immunity defense.
Before the proceedings on remand could take place, we granted certiorari to determine whether Helms' administrative segregation violated the Due Process Clause. We concluded that the prison's informal, nonadversarial procedures for determining the need for restrictive custody provided all the process that is due when prisoners are removed from the general prison population. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983). Certiorari was not sought on, and we did not decide, the question whether Helms' misconduct conviction violated his constitutional rights. When the case was returned to the Court of Appeals, it therefore reaffirmed its instruction to the District Court to enter judgment for Helms on this claim unless the defendants established a defense of official immunity. Helms v. Hewitt, 712 F. 2d 48 (1983) (Helms II).
In the District Court, Helms pursued only his claims for damages. The District Court granted summary judgment for all the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, because the constitutional right at issue was not "clearly established," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982), at the time of Helms' misconduct hearing. See App. 22a-47a. Helms appealed, seeking both damages and expungement of his misconduct conviction. The defendants argued to the *759 Court of Appeals that all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief had been waived by the failure to pursue them in the District Court, and in any event were moot because Helms was no longer in prison. While that appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections revised its regulations to include for the first time procedures for the use of confidential-source information in inmate disciplinary proceedings. See BC-ADM 801 Administrative Directive: Inmate Disciplinary Procedures § V(F) (1984), App. 101a-102a (Directive 801). The District Court's decision was affirmed without opinion. Helms v. Hewitt, 745 F. 2d 46 (1984) (Helms III).
Helms then sought attorney's fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which provides in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§ 1983], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." The District Court denied the claim on the ground that Helms was not a "prevailing party": the defendants' official immunity precluded a damages award, Helms' release from prison made his claims for injunctive relief moot, and he could not claim that his suit was a "catalyst" for the amendment of Directive 801 because he neither sought nor benefited from that action. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a-39a. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that its prior holding that Helms' constitutional rights were violated was "a form of judicial relief which serves to affirm the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants' actions were unconstitutional and which will serve as a standard of conduct to guide prison officials in the future." 780 F. 2d 367, 370 (1986) (Helms IV). The court also directed the District Court to reconsider whether Helms' suit was a "catalyst" for the amendment of Directive 801. We granted certiorari. 476 U. S. 1181 (1986).
In order to be eligible for attorney's fees under § 1988, a litigant must be a "prevailing party." Whatever the outer boundaries of that term may be, Helms does not fit within *760 them. Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail. See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 757 (1980). Helms obtained no relief. Because of the defendants' official immunity he received no damages award. No injunction or declaratory judgment was entered in his favor. Nor did Helms obtain relief without benefit of a formal judgment - for example, through a consent decree or settlement. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980). The most that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim. That is not the stuff of which legal victories are made. Cf. Hanrahan, supra, at 758-759.
The Court of Appeals treated its 1981 holding that Helms' misconduct conviction was unconstitutional as "a form of judicial relief" - presumably (since nothing else is even conceivable) a form of declaratory judgment. It was not that. Helms I explicitly left it to the District Court "to determine the appropriateness and availability of the requested relief," 655 F. 2d, at 503; the Court of Appeals granted no relief of its own, declaratory or otherwise. The petitioners contend that the court in fact could not have granted declaratory or injunctive relief at that point, since all of Helms' nonmonetary claims were moot as a result of his release from prison. Even if that is not correct, and Helms' interest in expungement of the misconduct conviction from his prison record was enough to keep those claims alive, the fact is that Helms' counsel never took the steps necessary to have a declaratory judgment or expungement order properly entered. Consequently, Helms received no judicial relief.
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988. A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a judgment - e. g., a monetary settlement or a *761 change in conduct that redresses the plaintiff's grievances. When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor. See Maher, supra, at 129. The Court of Appeals held, and Helms argues here, that the statement of law in Helms I that Helms' disciplinary proceeding was unconstitutional is a "vindication of . . . rights," Brief for Respondent 19, that is at least the equivalent of declaratory relief, just as a monetary settlement is the informal equivalent of relief by way of damages. To suggest such an equivalency is to lose sight of the nature of the judicial process. In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces - the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. This is no less true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any other action. The real value of the judicial pronouncement - what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a "case or controversy" rather than an advisory opinion - is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. The "equivalency" doctrine is simply an acknowledgment of the primacy of the redress over the means by which it is obtained. If the defendant, under the pressure of the lawsuit, pays over a money claim before the judicial judgment is pronounced, the plaintiff has "prevailed" in his suit, because he has obtained the substance of what he sought. Likewise in a declaratory judgment action: if the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct (or threatened conduct) towards the plaintiff that was the basis for the suit, the plaintiff will have prevailed. That is the proper equivalent of a judicial judgment which would produce the same effect; a judicial statement that does not affect the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is not an equivalent. As a consequence of the present lawsuit, Helms obtained nothing *762 from the defendants. The only "relief" he received was the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that his rights had been violated. The same moral satisfaction presumably results from any favorable statement of law in an otherwise unfavorable opinion. There would be no conceivable claim that the plaintiff had "prevailed," for instance, if the District Court in this case had first decided the question of immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion which said: "The defendants are immune from suit for damages, and the claim for expungement is either moot or has been waived, but if not for that we would reverse because Helms' constitutional rights were violated." That is in essence what happened here, except that the Court of Appeals expressed its view on the constitutional rights before, rather than after, it had become apparent that the issue was irrelevant to the case. There is no warrant for having status as a "prevailing party" depend upon the essentially arbitrary order in which district courts or courts of appeals choose to address issues.
Besides the incompatibility in principle, there is a very practical objection to equating statements of law (even legal holdings en route to a final judgment for the defendant) with declaratory judgments: The equation deprives the defendant of valid defenses to a declaratory judgment to which he is entitled. Imagine that following Helms I, Helms' counsel, armed with the holding that his client's constitutional rights had been violated, pressed the District Court for entry of a declaratory judgment. The defendants would then have had the opportunity to contest its entry not only on the ground that the case was moot but also on equitable grounds. The fact that a court can enter a declaratory judgment does not mean that it should. See 28 U. S. C. § 2201 (a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration") (emphasis added); Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111, 112 (1962); Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood, 333 U. S. 426, *763 431 (1948). If, for example, Helms I had unambiguously involved only a claim for damages, the requested declaratory judgment would not definitively "settle the controversy between the parties," 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2759, p. 648 (2d ed. 1983), because immunity might still preclude liability. See generally E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 299 (2d ed. 1941). If the only effect of a declaratory judgment in those circumstances would be to provide a possible predicate for a fee award against defendants who may ultimately be found immune, and thus to undermine the doctrine of official immunity, it is conceivable that the court might take that into account in deciding whether to enter a judgment. The same considerations may not enter into the decision whether to include statements of law in opinions - or if they do, the court's decision is not appealable in the same manner as its entry of a declaratory judgment.
We conclude that a favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff does not suffice to render him a "prevailing party." Any other result strains both the statutory language and common sense.
The Court of Appeals held in the alternative, and Helms argues in the alternative here, that a hearing is needed to determine whether Helms' lawsuit prompted the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections to amend its regulations in 1984 to provide standards for the use of informant testimony at disciplinary hearings. We need not decide the circumstances, if any, under which this "catalyst" theory could justify a fee award under § 1988, because even if Helms can demonstrate a clear causal link between his lawsuit and the State's amendment of its regulations, and can "prevail" by having the State take action that his complaint did not in terms request, he did not and could not get redress from promulgation of the informant-testimony regulations. When Directive 801 was amended, Helms had long since been released from prison. *764 Although he has subsequently been returned to prison, and is presumably now benefiting from the new procedures (to the extent that they influence prison administration even when not directly being applied), that fortuity can hardly render him, retroactively, a "prevailing party" in this lawsuit, even though he was not such when the final judgment was entered.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is
Reversed.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The Court makes a number of sweeping statements in its opinion, most of which are of no help in resolving the present case. In my view, the application of settled law to the facts of this case, tangled as they are, leads to conclusions other than those reached by the Court.
I
The Court's account of the history of this litigation is complete, but a summary may be helpful. Respondent originally claimed in the District Court both procedural and substantive violations of due process in connection with his prison misconduct conviction, and raised in addition a pendent state claim. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and the expungement of his prison disciplinary record. App. 19a-21a. Petitioners alleged immunity defenses, as well as contesting the merits of the federal and state claims. The District Court initially dismissed both the procedural and substantive due process causes of action. The Court of Appeals reversed as to both claims. Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F. 2d 487 (CA3 1981). We granted certiorari only as to procedural due process and reversed, reinstating the District Court's grant of summary judgment for petitioners. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983). On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals noted that its substantive due process *765 holding concerning the use of anonymous informant evidence was unaffected by our decision, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of respondent unless petitioners were immune. Helms v. Hewitt, 712 F. 2d 48, 49 (1983); see 655 F. 2d, at 502-503 ("[O]n remand, if the defendants do not establish official immunity . . . the district court should enter summary judgment for Helms").
The District Court, on remand from the Court of Appeals, concluded that petitioners were immune from the payment of damages because the law concerning the use of anonymous informant evidence in prison disciplinary proceedings "was not so clear and well established" at the time of respondent's disciplinary proceeding as to overcome petitioners' qualified official immunity. App. 47a. Respondent appealed from this second order granting summary judgment for petitioners. During the pendently of this appeal the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued Administrative Directive 801, App. 85a-116a, which incorporated policies with respect to the use of anonymous informant evidence in prison misconduct proceedings consistent with the earlier holding of the Court of Appeals. Id., at 101a-102a. The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the District Court's judgment in a summary order. Helms v. Hewitt, 745 F. 2d 46 (CA3 1984). Respondent then moved for fees in the District Court pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
II
Some aspects of the procedural development of this case may be difficult to fathom, but at the very least the case does not present, as the Court declares, a fee application by "a party who litigates to judgment and loses on all of his claims." Ante, at 757. Respondent's complaint alleged two federal causes of action. We held that respondent had not stated a viable cause of action for violation of his right to procedural due process. The final word on the substantive due process claim, however, was spoken by the Court of Appeals, which directed the District Court to enter summary judgment *766 for respondent on that claim unless the petitioners were immune.
The Court devotes much of its opinion to demonstrating on theoretical grounds that this statement by the Court of Appeals was not a declaratory judgment. I think that effort unnecessary; it is plain from the language of the first opinion of the Court of Appeals that it was not entering judgment for respondent. Instead, consistent with the ordinary practice of appellate courts, it simply found respondent's cause of action good as a matter of law, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for respondent insofar as such a judgment was not incompatible with petitioners' immunity, if any. 655 F. 2d, at 502-503. The District Court then found that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity. This precluded any remedy in damages against petitioners, but by no means prevented the ordering of declaratory or injunctive relief or a grant of attorney's fees. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522, 543-544 (1984). Respondent's complaint sought relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and an injunction expunging his prison disciplinary record.[1] Under the Court of Appeals' remand order, the District Court could, and probably should, have entered judgment granting the requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Instead, the District Court *767 first took up the question of immunity, and upon finding qualified immunity precipitately issued an order closing the case. App. 48a. No order was entered disposing of respondent's pending claims for equitable relief.[2]
Respondent contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the issuance of Administrative Directive 801 during the pendently of the subsequent appeal might be the sort of informal relief justifying a fee award, if the Commonwealth's change of policy was "catalyzed" by respondent's lawsuit. There is no dispute that informal relief may be sufficient to support a fee award under § 1988. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129-130 (1980). The Court wisely leaves for another day any discussion of the general circumstances under which action "catalyzed" by a lawsuit may be characterized as informal relief for purposes of § 1988. Ante, at 763. But the Court errs in holding that Administrative Directive 801 cannot constitute relief, even under a "catalyst" theory, because respondent derived no benefit from it. The Directive does not, of course, provide an informal equivalent to respondent's request for injunctive relief, because it did not effect an expungement of his disciplinary record. But the Directive may be, in substance, functionally equivalent to respondent's requested declaratory relief. As the Court correctly states, in a declaratory judgment action "if the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct (or threatened *768 conduct) towards the plaintiff . . . the plaintiff will have prevailed." Ante, at 761. The Court observes that respondent is once again an inmate of the Commonwealth's prisons. Ante, at 764. The behavior of the Commonwealth's officials toward respondent is as effectively constrained by Directive 801 today as it would have been by a formal declaratory judgment.[3]
In sum, respondent's claim for fees is based upon the following premises: that the Court of Appeals held his civil rights cause of action good as a matter of law; that at the time of the District Court's judgment on the issue of immunity, respondent had outstanding meritorious claims for equitable relief; that the judgment as to petitioners' immunity did not foreclose the granting of equitable relief or an award of attorney's fees; and that the issuance of Directive 801 during the pendently of litigation provided respondent, by the voluntary action of petitioners and those in privity with them, informal relief substantially equivalent to the relief sought in respondent's prayer for a declaratory judgment. None of these propositions is subject to serious dispute, and none is rejected by the Court today. The question remains, of course, whether there is any causal connection between the litigation instituted by respondent and the Commonwealth's promulgation of Directive 801. This is an issue of fact which can only be resolved in the District Court. Should the District Court find that the promulgation of Directive 801 was not "catalyzed" by this litigation, then the error of respondent's counsel in failing to move in the District Court for formal entry of a declaratory judgment, to which respondent was clearly entitled *769 under the Court of Appeals' two remand orders, would probably foreclose any fee award. But any such conclusion must await further factfinding.
III
The disposition of this chaotic case depends upon the procedural accidents of extended litigation conducted with less than exemplary precision by the parties and the District Court. While the Court sensibly declines to establish any broadly applicable doctrine upon a basis as unreliable as the present record, it nonetheless indulges in a theoretical exposition which varies substantially from the few ascertainable facts. If further review of this litigation was a prudent exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction, which I doubt, it should have occurred after the necessary facts had been found, and the general fog of confusion dispelled, by the District Court. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it remanded to the District Court for factual findings on respondent's "catalyst" theory.
NOTES
[*] Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Peter J. Kalis filed a brief for the National Governors' Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
[1] Petitioners have taken the position that these requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were somehow mooted by respondent's release on parole in the early stages of this litigation. Brief for Petitioners 24. Indeed, petitioners represent to the Court that the District Court found that "[respondent's] claim for injunctive relief had been rendered moot by his release from prison in 1980." Id., at 10. This statement is flagrantly inaccurate. The District Court in fact held that "plaintiff did not seek any relief which became mooted during the controversy." App. to Pet. for Cert 38a. Petitioners have offered no authority, nor can they, for the remarkable proposition that the request for expungement of respondent's record became moot upon his parole. Nor, since the expungement would have depended upon the finding that respondent's due process rights were violated, have they explained how the request for declaratory relief supposedly became moot.
[2] The record does not contain the briefs, if any, filed with the Court of Appeals on respondent's appeal from the District Court's order. Accordingly it is not clear whether respondent challenged only the District Court's holding on immunity, or also its failure to award equitable relief. Nor is it clear, since the District Court's order did not dispose of all respondent's outstanding claims, whether respondent might not even now move in the District Court for the equitable relief requested in the complaint. The issuance of such equitable relief would, of course, support a fee award under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. The remand ordered by the Court of Appeals in the judgment presently before us would give the District Court an opportunity to rectify the substantial confusion engendered by its earlier proceedings.
[3] The Court characterizes respondent's renewed incarceration as a "fortuity," evidently implying that it has no relevance to this case. But the record does not disclose whether respondent was imprisoned after parole revocation proceedings, or instead as the result of a subsequent criminal conviction. If respondent's parole was revoked, then it is his temporary release during the course of the litigation, rather than his reincarceration, which is a "fortuity" in determining respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees. | {
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18 How. 418
RICHARD C. STOCKTON, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES C. FORD.
Supreme Court of United States.
It was submitted, on printed arguments, by Mr. Stockton and Mr. Johnson, for appellant, and by Mr. Duncan, for appellee.
*419 Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.
The bill was filed by the plaintiff to charge the plantation and slaves of the defendant with a judicial mortgage, originally obtained by one Prior, against the firm of N. and E. Ford and Co. The plaintiff claims an interest in this mortgage, first, by purchase on execution against Prior; and second, by a trust created in the assignment of the same by Prior, under which the defendant derived title to it. The bill sets out the sale of the mortgage and purchase by the plaintiff, and also the assignment of the same by Prior to Jones, and by him to the defendant. The assignment to Jones provided for the payment first of the attorney's fees and all other costs out of the proceeds of the judgment, and the balance to be applied to the debts of Prior for which Jones was responsible, and the surplus, if any, to the assignor.
The plaintiff prayed that the defendant might be decreed to pay the attorney's fees and costs on obtaining the judicial mortgage, according to the condition of the assignment; and, also, any balance that might be found due after satisfying the debts for which Jones was responsible.
The defendant, among other defences, set up a former suit in bar.
A previous bill had been filed by the plaintiff against the defendant, seeking to foreclose this judicial mortgage, in which the same title as in this case under the execution and sale against Prior was relied on. And among other defences to that suit, the defendant set up the assignment of the mortgage by Prior to Jones previous to the said sale on execution, and by Jones to the defendant.
This right of the plaintiff to the judicial mortgage under the sale on execution, and of the defendant under the assignments, were directly involved in that suit, and presented the principal questions in the case. The validity of the assignments over the claim of the plaintiff was maintained by the judgment of the court below, and which was affirmed on appeal to this court. 11 How. 232. This court, after a full examination of the pleadings and proof, say, "that in any view, therefore, that can be properly taken of the case, the plaintiff has shown no right or interest in the judicial mortgage, which he seeks to enforce against the plantation and slaves in question. The whole interest is in the defendant.
The court also observed, "that the assignment (to Jones) was made upon, full consideration, without any concealment, or, for aught that appears, intent to hinder and delay creditors; and *420 was well known to the plaintiff long before he became the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. It passed the legal interest in the judicial mortgage out of Prior, and vested it in Jones, as early as the 12th of March, 1840, and we are wholly unable to perceive any ground of equity in the plaintiff, or of those under whom he holds, for disturbing it through a judgment against the assignor, rendered nearly two years afterwards. The sheriff's sale, therefore, could not operate to pass any interest in it to the plaintiff."
One of the questions now sought to be agitated again is precisely the same as this one in the previous suit; namely, the right of the plaintiff to the judicial mortgage under the execution and sale against Prior. The other is somewhat varied; namely, the equitable right or interest in the mortgage of the plaintiff, as the attorney of Prior, for the fees and costs provided for in the assignment to Jones. But this question was properly involved in the former case, and might have been there raised and determined. The neglect of the plaintiff to avail himself of it, even if it were tenable, furnishes no reason for another litigation. The right of the respective parties to the judicial mortgage was the main question in the former suit. That issue, of course, involved the whole or any partial interest in the mortgage. We are satisfied, therefore, that the former suit constitutes a complete bar to the present.
The court, in the former suit, also expressed the opinion that the plaintiff was not in a situation to maintain his claim of title to the mortgage under the execution and sale against Prior; as it appeared in that case that he was the attorney of Prior in the judicial mortgage, and stood in that relation to Jones at the time of the purchase, and, for aught that appears, had made the purchase without his knowledge or consent; and that, under such circumstances, the purchase would enure to the benefit of the client and those holding under him.
It is due to the plaintiff to say, that the evidence in this case, explanatory of the point in the former, shows that he did not stand in the relation of attorney to Jones at the time of the sale; or, at least, had no reason to suppose that he stood in that relation; and that no just ground for censure exists in the transaction against him: the explanatory evidence has fully removed it.
We think the decree below is right, and should be affirmed. | {
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NEW YORK GASLIGHT CLUB, INC., ET AL.
v.
CAREY.
No. 79-192.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 19, 1980.
Decided June 9, 1980.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
*56 Albert N. Proujansky argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Marvin Luboff.
James I. Meyerson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, and Lutz Alexander Prager.[*]
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal court may allow the prevailing party attorney's fees for legal services performed in prosecuting an employment discrimination claim in state administrative and judicial proceedings that Title VII requires federal claimants to invoke.
I
Respondent Cidni Carey, in August 1974, applied for work as a cocktail waitress with petitioner New York Gaslight Club, Inc. After an interview, she was advised that no position was available.
The following January, respondent filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that petitioners, the Club and its manager, had denied her a position because of her race. App. to Brief for Respondent a1-a3. As required by § 706 (c) of Title VII of the Civil *57 Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, as redesignated, 86 Stat. 104, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c), respondent's complaint was forwarded to the New York State Division of Human Rights (Division).
In May 1975, after an investigation during which respondent was represented by counsel,[1] the Division found probable cause to believe that petitioners had engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice. Efforts at conciliation failed, and the Division, pursuant to N. Y. Exec. Law § 297 (4) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1979), recommended that a public hearing be held.
Counsel for respondent wrote to the EEOC on May 20, advising the Commission that respondent was proceeding in the Division. He asked that the Commission "reassume" jurisdiction over the claim so that, if necessary, respondent could obtain a right-to-sue letter at an appropriate time. On May 22, the EEOC responded, stating that an investigator would be assigned to respondent's matter as soon as possible.
The state administrative hearing was held on two separate days in late 1975 and early 1976. Both respondent and petitioners were represented by counsel. App. 68. No attorney for the State appeared. On August 13, 1976, the hearing examiner found that petitioners had discriminated against respondent because she is black. Id., at 70. Petitioners were ordered to offer respondent employment as a cocktail waitress and to pay her back wages from August 1974. Id., at 70-72. No attorney's fee was awarded.
Petitioners appealed to the New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, an agency established to hear appeals from orders of the Division. N. Y. Exec. Law § 297-a (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1979). The Board held a hearing in December 1976 at which counsel for petitioners, respondent, and the Division appeared.
*58 Meanwhile, EEOC proceedings had begun. Giving due weight to the state finding of probable cause, see § 706 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b), the EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe petitioners had violated Title VII. The EEOC's attempts at conciliation also failed. The Commission's General Counsel chose not to sue, and, as required by § 706 (f) (1), § 2000e-5 (f) (1), the EEOC issued respondent a right-to-sue letter. This was issued on July 13, 1977; respondent, under § 706 (f) (1), then had 90 days to file a Title VII action in federal district court.
On August 26, the Appeal Board confirmed the Division's order. Petitioners immediately appealed the Board's decision to the New York Supreme Court. The Division cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order.
On September 30, respondent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Title VII, and the Thirteenth Amendment. App. 29. Respondent alleged that petitioners did not hire her because she is black, and that petitioner Club had employed only four blacks as waitresses during its 20-year existence. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that petitioners' practices were unlawful under federal law, an order requiring petitioners to hire respondent, backpay with interest, retroactive employment-related benefits, attorney's fees, and other appropriate relief. Petitioners' answer denied virtually all the allegations in the complaint and cited the pendency of the state proceedings as an affirmative defense.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on November 3 unanimously affirmed the Appeal Board's determination. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 59 App. Div. 2d 852, 399 N. Y. S. 2d 158 (1977). Petitioners unsuccessfully moved for reargument, and then filed a motion with the New York Court of Appeals for leave to appeal.
*59 On February 3, 1978, while that motion was pending, the Federal District Court held a pretrial conference, after which petitioners agreed that if the state court denied their motion for leave to appeal, they would comply with the Division's order. App. 73. One week later the New York Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion. 43 N. Y. 2d 951 (1978).
The parties thereafter apparently agreed that the federal action could be dismissed, except for respondent's request for attorney's fees. See App. 75-79. Respondent sought an award for 82 hours of attorney's time. Of that total, 9 hours were spent in preparing and filing the EEOC charge and the federal suit, 22 hours were spent in preparing and presenting the case before the hearing examiner, 29 hours were spent in defending the Division's order before the Appeal Board and the state courts, and 22 hours were spent seeking the fee award. App. to Pet. for Cert. A39-A40.
In July 1978, the District Court dismissed respondent's complaint, App. 35, but left pending the application for attorney's fees. After further briefing, the court denied the fee request. 458 F. Supp. 79 (SDNY 1978).
The District Court found the propriety of the EEOC's issuance of a right-to-sue letter while state proceedings were pending "very doubtful." Id., at 80. Although the EEOC's action had given respondent no choice but to preserve her rights by filing a complaint in federal court, the District Court ruled that the mere filing of a federal suit does not entitle an aggrieved party to attorney's fees. The court reasoned that the fortuity of a need to file a protective federal suit should not make the defendants responsible for the costs of representing the plaintiff in the state forums. Id., at 81.
The District Court also relied on its conclusion that respondent "had the option of pursuing her state administrative remedies without incurring any expenses at all for legal services," since state law, N. Y. Exec. Law § 297 (4) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1978), provides that the case in support of the complaint is to be presented to the hearing examiner by one *60 of the attorneys for the Division. 458 F. Supp., at 81. The decision in Parker v. Califano, 182 U. S. App. D. C. 322, 561 F. 2d 320 (1977), upholding an award of attorney's fees for prosecution of a federal employee's Title VII claim in mandatory preliminary proceedings within the employee's agency, was distinguished on the ground that the agency did not provide an independent attorney to prosecute the complaint. 458 F. Supp., at 81.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 598 F. 2d 1253 (1979). The court ruled: "A complaining party who is successful in state administrative proceedings after having her complaint under Title VII referred to a state agency in accordance with the statutory scheme of that Title is entitled to recover attorney's fees in the same manner as a party who prevails in federal court." Id., at 1260. The court relied on several factors in reaching its decision. Among them were the significant role of state human rights agencies in the Title VII enforcement scheme; the statute's strong preference for administrative resolution of a discrimination complaint; the importance of providing an incentive for complete development of the administrative record; the language of the statute's fee provision; and the desirability of encouraging a complainant to retain private counsel notwithstanding participation of a Division attorney at certain points during the state proceedings.
We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 897 (1979), to consider this question that is significant to the enforcement of the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII.
II
Section 706 (k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k), provides:
"In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
*61 The question presented is whether, in the words of the statute, respondent was the "prevailing party" in an "action or proceeding under this title." An examination of the language and history of the statute, the nature of the proceedings in which respondent participated, and the relationship of those proceedings to Title VII's enforcement mechanisms, together persuade us that Congress clearly intended to authorize awards of attorney's fees to persons in respondent's situation.
The words of § 706 (k) leave little doubt that fee awards are authorized for legal work done in "proceedings" other than court actions. Congress' use of the broadly inclusive disjunctive phrase "action or proceeding" indicates an intent to subject the losing party to an award of attorney's fees and costs that includes expenses incurred for administrative proceedings. This conclusion is supported by a comparison of § 706 (k) with another fee provision in the same Act, namely, § 204 (b) of Title II, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b). The pertinent language of § 204 (b) is identical to that of § 706 (k) except that § 204 (b) permits an award only with respect to "any action commenced pursuant to this title." The two provisions were enacted contemporaneously as parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The omission of the words "or proceeding" from § 204 (b) is understandable, since enforcement of Title II depends solely on court actions. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 401 (1968). It is apparent, therefore, that the two fee provisions were carefully tailored to the enforcement scheme of each Title. It cannot be assumed that the words "or proceeding" in § 706 (k) are mere surplusage.
It might be argued that the words "or proceeding" authorize fee awards only for work done in federal administrative proceedings,[2] such as those before the EEOC, but not for *62 state administrative or state judicial proceedings. This reading at least would not render the words "or proceeding" a complete nullity. We find nothing in the statute, however, to suggest that Congress intended to draw this particular line. Rather, other provisions of the statute that interact with § 706 (k); the purpose of § 706 (k); the humanitarian remedial policies of Title VII; and the statute's structure of cooperation between federal and state enforcement authorities, all point to the opposite conclusion.
Section 706 (k) authorizes a fee award to the prevailing party in "any . . . proceeding under this title." (Emphasis added.) The same Title creates the system of deferral to state and local remedies. The statute uses the word "proceeding" to describe the state and local remedies to which complainants are required to resort. For example, § 706 (c), 86 Stat. 104, provides:
"[N]o charge may be filed . . . before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated. . . . If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent. . . ." (Emphasis added).
Indeed, throughout Title VII the word "proceeding," or its plural form, is used to refer to all the different types of proceedings in which the statute is enforced, state and federal, *63 administrative and judicial.[3] The conclusion that fees are authorized for work done at the state and local levels is inescapable.
This Court recently examined the legislative history and purpose of § 706 (k). In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), it was noted that, although the legislative history of § 706 (k) is "sparse," 434 U. S., at 420, it is clear that one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the section was to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit." Ibid., quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Because Congress has cast the Title VII plaintiff in the role of "a private attorney general," vindicating a policy "of the highest priority," a prevailing plaintiff "ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances." 434 U. S., at 416, 417. See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S., at 402. It is clear that Congress intended to facilitate the bringing of discrimination complaints. Permitting an attorney's fee award to one in respondent's situation furthers this goal, while a contrary rule would force the complainant to bear the costs of mandatory state and local proceedings and thereby would inhibit the enforcement of a meritorious discrimination claim.
Title VII establishes a comprehensive enforcement scheme in which state agencies are given "a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by victims of the discrimination." Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 755 (1979). Congress envisioned that Title VII's procedures and remedies would "mes[h] nicely, logically, and coherently with the State and city legislation," and that remedying employment *64 discrimination would be an area in which "[t]he Federal Government and the State governments could co-operate effectively." 110 Cong. Rec. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
Pursuant to this policy of cooperation, Title VII provides that where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred in a State or locality which has a law prohibiting the practice and in which an agency has been established to enforce that law, "no charge may be filed [with the EEOC] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." § 706 (c). In practice, § 706 (c) has resulted in EEOC's development of a referral and deferral system, which the Court approved in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972). When a charge is filed with the EEOC prior to exhaustion of state or local remedies, the Commission refers the complaint to the appropriate local agency. The EEOC then holds the complaint in "suspended animation." Id., at 526. Upon termination of the state proceedings or expiration of the 60-day deferral period, whichever comes first, the EEOC automatically assumes concurrent jurisdiction of the complaint. Ibid.[4]
Of course, the "ultimate authority" to secure compliance with Title VII resides in the federal courts. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44-45 (1974). The statute *65 authorizes civil enforcement actions by both the EEOC and the private plaintiff. After the deferral period, the EEOC assumes jurisdiction, and, "as promptly as possible" it determines whether there is probable cause to believe that the charge is true. § 706 (b). After an additional 30 days, the EEOC is authorized to bring an action, in which the complainant has an absolute right to intervene. § 706 (f). If the Commission does not file suit, or enter into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party, within 180 days after it reassumes jurisdiction, it must issue a "right to sue" letter notifying the complainant of his right to bring an action within 90 days. Ibid.[5]
It is clear from this scheme of interrelated and complementary state and federal enforcement that Congress viewed proceedings before the EEOC and in federal court as supplements to available state remedies for employment discrimination. Initial resort to state and local remedies is mandated, and recourse to the federal forums is appropriate only when the State does not provide prompt or complete relief. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 48-50.
The construction of § 706 (k) that petitioners advocate clashes with this congressional design. Complainants unable to recover fees in state proceedings may be expected to wait out the 60-day deferral period, while focusing efforts on obtaining federal relief. See n. 6, infra. Only authorization of fee awards ensures incorporation of state procedures as a meaningful part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.
The District Court felt that granting a fee award to respondent would be a "windfall" based on the unforeseeable fortuity that filing a protective federal suit became necessary. 458 F. Supp., at 81. We agree with the District Court that the *66 availability of a federal fee award for work done in state proceedings following EEOC referral and deferral should not depend upon whether the complainant ultimately finds it necessary to sue in federal court to obtain relief other than attorney's fees. But our agreement with the District Court compels us to reject its conclusion. It would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant who is unsuccessful or only partially successful in obtaining state or local remedies, but to deny an award to the complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress' plan that federal policies be vindicated at the state or local level. Since it is clear that Congress intended to authorize fee awards for work done in administrative proceedings, we must conclude that § 706 (f) (1)'s authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings.[6]
III
Against the strong considerations favoring an award of fees, petitioners make three arguments. First, they contend that awarding fees for work done in state proceedings for *67 which the State does not authorize fees[7] infringes on the State's powers under the Tenth Amendment. Second, they argue that Congress' intent to pre-empt the state law has not been clearly expressed. Third, they contend that even if § 706 (k) authorizes fees for work done in state proceedings in some instances, denial of an award here was within the District Court's discretion.
We must reject petitioners' Tenth Amendment argument. Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad, and overrides any interest the State might have in not authorizing awards for fees in connection with state proceedings. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976).
Petitioners cite Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 (1963), Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199 (1952), and Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931), in support of their argument that Congress' intent to pre-empt state regulation of the administration of state proceedings is not clearly expressed in § 706 (k) and should not be inferred. We find these cases inapposite. Section 706 (k) does not "pre-empt" state law. "Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 48-49. Title VII explicitly leaves the States free, and indeed encourages them, to exercise their regulatory power over discriminatory employment practices. Title VII merely provides a supplemental right to sue in federal court if satisfactory relief is not obtained in state forums. § 706 (f) (1). One aspect of complete relief is an *68 award of attorney's fees, which Congress considered necessary for the fulfillment of federal goals. Provision of a federal award of attorney's fees is not different from any other aspect of the ultimate authority of federal courts to enforce Title VII. For example, if state proceedings result in an injunction in favor of the complainant, but no award for backpay because state law does not authorize it, the complainant may proceed in federal court to "supplement" the state remedy. The state law which fails to authorize backpay has not been pre-empted. In any event, if it can be said that § 706 (k) pre-empts the state rule, we believe that Congress' intent to achieve this result is manifest.
We also find no merit in petitioners' suggestion that denial of a fee award was within the District Court's discretion. As noted earlier, the court's discretion to deny a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff is narrow. Absent "special circumstances," see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S., at 402; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S., at 416-417, fees should be awarded. Petitioners argue that the availability of a Division attorney to present the "case in support of the complaint" is a "special circumstance" which should deprive a prevailing complainant of a fee award. Clearly, however, an attorney is needed to assist the complainant during the state proceedings, and the Division employee does not take the place of private counsel.
The New York state procedure, to which respondent's charge was referred, provides for adversary quasi-judicial hearings leading to findings of fact, administrative appeals, and judicial review. The first stage of the state administrative action is the investigation; this results in either a finding of probable cause or a dismissal of the complaint. N. Y. Exec. Law § 297 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). A finding of probable cause after investigation is a necessary prelude to the public hearing. § 297 (4) (a). State law makes no provision for the participation of a Division attorney in the investigation, and a complainant is not represented by a Division attorney *69 at this preliminary stage. See Brief for New York State Attorney General and New York State Division of Human Rights as Amici Curiae 4-5.
Following the investigation, the Division attempts to conciliate the complainant's grievance with the employer. N. Y. Exec. Law §§ 297 (3) (a), (b), and (c) (McKinney 1972). No Division attorney participates in the conciliation efforts on behalf of the complainant, and the Division staff is even empowered to execute a settlement agreement with the employer over the complainant's objections. § 297 (3) (c).
If efforts at conciliation fail and a hearing is scheduled, state law provides:
"The case in support of the complaint shall be presented by one of the attorneys or agents of the division and, at the option of the complainant, by his attorney. With the consent of the division, the case in support of the complainant may be presented solely by his attorney." § 297 (4) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
At the time of the hearing on respondent's complaint, however, the practice of the Division was to involve one of its attorneys only if the complainant was not represented by private counsel. Brief for New York State Attorney General and New York State Division of Human Rights as Amici Curiae 5.[8] Complainants were "encouraged" to obtain private counsel due to a growing caseload and staff limitations. App. to Pet. for Cert. A58-A59.
At the appellate level, the Division attorney appears only to support and seek enforcement of orders issued by the Division and the Appeal Board. N. Y. Exec. Law § 298 (McKinney Supp. 1979). The Division attorney does not *70 represent the complainant on an appeal from an order adverse to the claimant. In addition, the Division cannot appeal from an order of the Human Rights Appeal Board reversing a Division order. See Brief for New York State Attorney General and New York Division of Human Rights as Amici Curiae 5-6.
It is thus obvious that the assistance provided a complainant by the Division attorney is not fully adequate, and that the attorney has no obligation to the complainant as a client. In fact, at times the position of the Division may be detrimental to the interests of the complainant and to enforcement of federal rights. Representation by a private attorney thus assures development of a complete factual record at the investigative stage and at the administrative hearing. At both, settlement is possible and is encouraged. A Division employee cannot act as the complainant's attorney for purposes of advising him whether to accept a settlement. Retention of private counsel will help assure that federal rights are not compromised in the conciliation process.
If a Division attorney appears at the public hearing, he does not represent the interests of the complainant, but rather those of the State. Id., at 5; App. to Pet. for Cert. A59-A60. He presents the "case in support of the complaint," not in support of the complainant. N. Y. Exec. Law § 297 (4) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Upon appeal, the Division attorney is authorized only to support the order entered by the Division or the Appeal Board. Without doubt, the private attorney has an important role to play in preserving and protecting federal rights and interests during the state proceedings.[9]
*71 In sum, we conclude that §§ 706 (f) and 706 (k) of Title VII authorize a federal-court action to recover an award of attorney's fees for work done by the prevailing complainant in state proceedings to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII. We also conclude that no special circumstances exist in this case that would justify denial of a fee award.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins the Court's opinion except footnote 6 thereof; in his view, resolution of the issue dealt with in that footnote is not necessary.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST would reverse the judgment essentially for the reasons given by Judge Mulligan in dissenting from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with most of what is said in the Court's opinion, it is useful to emphasize that this federal litigation was commenced in order to obtain relief for respondent on the merits of her basic dispute with petitioners, and not simply to recover attorney's fees. Whether Congress intended to authorize a separate federal action solely to recover costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in obtaining administrative relief in either a deferral or a nondeferral State is not only doubtful but is a question that is plainly not presented by this record.
*72 On July 13, 1977, when the EEOC issued respondent a letter notifying her that she had a right to file an action in federal court, and on September 30, 1977, when she commenced her federal-court action, state judicial review of the state administrative proceedings had not yet been completed. It was not until sometime in February 1978, after the federal judicial proceeding had been pending for several months, that all questions other than the fee issue were finally removed from the federal case. It is clear, therefore, that under the plain language of § 706 (k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k),[*] the Federal District Court then had jurisdiction to allow the prevailing party to recover attorneys fees as a part of her costs.
A quite different question would be presented if, before any federal litigation were commenced, an aggrieved-party had obtained complete relief in the administrative proceedings. It is by no means clear that the statute, which merely empowers a "court" to award fees, would authorize a fee allowance when there is no need for litigation in the federal court to resolve the merits of the underlying dispute. Indeed, it is not even clear that the EEOC has the authority to issue a "right to sue" letter, empowering the complainant to bring suit in federal court, after the complainant has obtained complete relief on the merits of his claim in administrative proceedings. See § 706 (f) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). In any event, the facts of this case present no occasion for the Court's resolution of the issue, ante, at 66. All that needs to be decided is whether an allowance of fees may properly cover the work *73 performed in the administrative proceedings that were a prerequisite to the court action. I agree with the Court's disposition of that issue, and would also observe that the same analysis would apply to work performed in appearing before the federal agency in a nondeferral State.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
NOTES
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, pro se, Shirley Adelson Siegel, Solicitor General, Judith T. Kramer, Arnold Flescher, and Barbara Levy, Assistant Attorneys General, and Ann Thacher Anderson for the New York State Attorney General et al.; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Bill Lann Lee for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; and by Charles C. Parlin, Jr., and Peter Bienstock for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.
[1] Respondent was represented by counsel employed by the NAACP Special Contribution Fund.
[2] In cases involving federal employees, all the Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have upheld fee awards under § 706 (k) for work done in federal administrative proceedings that must be exhausted as a condition to filing an action in federal court. E. g., Brown v. Bathke, 588 F. 2d 634, 638 (CA8 1978); Fischer v. Adams, 572 F. 2d 406 (CA1 1978); Parker v. Califano, 182 U. S. App. D. C. 322, 561 F. 2d 320 (1977); Foster v. Boorstin, 182 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 561 F. 2d 340 (1977); Johnson v. United States, 554 F. 2d 632 (CA4 1977).
[3] See, e. g., § 706 (f) (1), 78 Stat. 260, as redesignated, 86 Stat. 105, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (court may stay "further proceedings" pending the termination of "State or local proceedings"); § 706 (i), 78 Stat. 261, as amended, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (i) (Commission may commence "proceedings" to compel compliance with court order).
[4] Other provisions of Title VII also evidence the policy of promoting federal-state cooperation in enforcement. Section 706 (b), 78 Stat. 259, as redesignated, 86 Stat. 104, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b), requires the EEOC to "accord substantial weight" to a state administrative determination, and § 709 (b), 78 Stat. 262, as amended, 86 Stat. 108, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (b), authorizes the EEOC to "cooperate with State and local agencies charged with the administration of State fair employment practices laws" in funding research and other mutually beneficial projects, and to enter into work-sharing agreements with those agencies to facilitate the processing of complaints.
[5] We thus disagree with the District Court that the propriety of EEOC's issuance of the right-to-sue letter in this case is "very doubtful." 458 F. Supp. 79, 80 (SDNY 1978). As we read the statute, the Commission was required to issue the letter after 180 days, regardless of the posture of any state proceedings.
[6] We note that if fees were authorized only when the complainant found an independent reason for suing in federal court under Title VII, such a ground almost always could be found. Section 706 (f) (1) requires the EEOC to give the complainant a "right to sue" letter if, after it assumes concurrent jurisdiction over the complaint, it does not sue within 180 days. Thus, after waiting 240 days (60 days deferral to the state or local agency and 180 days for the EEOC to act after deferral), the complainant appears to have an absolute right to resort to an action in federal court. The federal court may stay the action for a maximum of 60 more days, to permit completion of state proceedings. § 706 (f) (1). It took three years for the New York proceedings in this case finally to provide respondent all the relief she desired other than attorney's fees. It is doubtful that the systems of many States could provide complete relief within 240 days. The existence of an incentive to get into federal court, such as the availability of a fee award, would ensure that almost all Title VII complainants would abandon state proceedings as soon as possible. This, however, would undermine Congress' intent to encourage full use of state remedies.
[7] The Human Rights Law of the State of New York does not authorize an award of counsel fees for work done in either state administrative or judicial proceedings. See State Commission for Human Rights v. Speer, 35 App. Div. 2d 107, 111-112, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 28, 33 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 29 N. Y. 2d 555, 272 N. E. 2d 884 (1971); State Division of Human Rights v. Gorton, 32 App. Div. 2d 933, 934, 302 N. Y. S. 2d 966, 968 (1969).
[8] On October 18, 1977, Division regulations were amended to provide for the presentation of the case in support of the complaint solely by the attorney for the complainant, upon consent of the Division. The regulation requires the Division attorney to submit a statement to the hearing examiner in lieu of appearance. 9 N. Y. C. R. R. § 465.11 (d) (2).
[9] We also reject petitioners' argument, not suggested in the petition for certiorari, that respondent's representation by a public interest group is a "special circumstance" that should result in denial of counsel fees. Federal Courts of Appeals' decisions are to the contrary. See, e. g., Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F. 2d 1166 (CA1 1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F. 2d 10, 13 (CA2 1976). Congress endorsed such decisions allowing fees to public interest groups when it was considering, and passed, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which is legislation similar in purpose and design to Title VII's fee provision. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, pp. 5 and 8, n. 16 (1976).
[*] That section provides in part:
"In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . ." | {
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{
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} | 94 U.S. 22 (1876)
HUMES
v.
SCRUGGS.
Supreme Court of United States.
*23 Mr. Thomas C. Fullerton and Mr. F.P. Ward for the appellant.
No counsel appeared for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not entirely certain what the court is called upon to review in the present case. By the decree of the court below it is recited that upon the hearing of the cause upon the pleadings it is adjudged that the bill be dismissed. The record, however, comes to us with voluminous evidence upon the merits, and we have not the advantage either of an opinion of the court or of a brief by the party obtaining the decree. It will be necessary, therefore, to give attention to the case in both of its aspects.
The bill was filed by the assignee in bankruptcy of John W. Scruggs against the bankrupt's wife, alleging the adjudication of bankruptcy made upon a voluntary petition filed in June, 1868, and the fraudulent conveyance, in January, 1866, of property of the value of $50,000; that this covered all the property of the bankrupt, and that he was then insolvent. The defendant answered, admitting the conveyance, denying the fraud, alleging that the property conveyed to her was purchased and paid for with her money and for her, and that she believed for *24 several years that the title was taken in her name; that it was improved by her husband at an expense not exceeding $18,000, of which $4,400 belonged to her separate estate, and $2,400 was realized from the sale of a portion of the land. She denied that the deed to her conveyed all the property that her husband possessed, but did not state how much remained, or what it was, and she denied knowledge of his insolvency, if it existed.
As a distinct defence in bar of the recovery sought, she further alleges that on the eleventh day of November, 1867, by her next friend, she filed a bill in the State court against her husband, to which he answered on the same day, in which proofs were taken; and that in December of that same year a decree was rendered, in which the said deed of Jan. 14, 1866, was in all things ratified and confirmed. A copy of the decree is annexed to her answer. To this answer the plaintiff, the assignee, filed a general replication. It is supposed that this suit and this decree, forming a part of the answer of Mrs. Scruggs, furnished the support to the decree dismissing the bill in the present suit on the pleadings.
To this result there are two valid objections: -
1. By the interposition of a general replication, every allegation in the answer of Mrs. Scruggs not responsive to the bill was denied. No such allegation could be taken as true, but must be proved before it could be used by the party making it. The allegation of a former suit and of the decree therein came under this rule. It was denied that there was such a former suit, and that a decree was rendered therein affirming the transaction of May 14, 1866. How, then, can it be said with accuracy, upon the pleadings, when the answer was not responsive, and when a replication was filed, that there was a former suit and decree, and that by reason thereof the present bill must be dismissed? Jacks v. Nichols, 5 N.Y. 178.
2. Let it be assumed that the former suit and the decree therein are proved in a legal manner, still we cannot assent to the theory of its conclusiveness here. There would be little difficulty in making and sustaining fraudulent transfers of property, if the parties thereto could by a subsequent suit between themselves so fortify the deed that no others could attack it. *25 Mrs. Scruggs files her bill on the 11th November against her husband, to obtain a confirmation of the former proceeding. Her husband, nothing loth, files his answer on the same day. Twenty-one days thereafter, viz., Dec. 2, the term of the court opens. The papers are presented, proofs are filed, the counsel appear, and a decree of confirmation is adjudged. Certainly no one can complain in this instance of the delays of justice.
But without reference to these indications of collusion, we are of the opinion that a decree between these parties alone, cannot bind the assignee in bankruptcy. The principle is well settled that a judgment binds only the parties to it and their privies. Bank v. Hodges, 12 Ala. 118, was a decision upon a case very similar to the one before us.
In Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U.S. 244, the principle is thus laid down: "The books abound in cases which show that a judgment upon the precise point in controversy cannot be given in evidence in another suit against one not a party or privy to the record. This rule is applied not only to civil cases, but to criminal cases, and to public judicial proceedings which are of the nature of judgments in rem." Many cases are cited in illustration of the principle.
This decree no doubt concluded Mr. Scruggs on the question of fraud. But he was already concluded by his deed, and we do not see that the estoppel by the decree is any more conclusive than that by the deed. Neither of them affect the assignee in bankruptcy, who is expressly authorized by the Bankrupt Act to attack any transfer made by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors. Sect. 14.
If we look at the case upon the merits, we also find the result to be in favor of the assignee.
On the 14th of May, 1866, the husband conveys to his wife certain real estate in Huntsville, Ala., called the racecourse property. The value of this property is estimated by the witnesses on the one side as high as $25,000, and by one of those on the other as low as $10,000. Others put it at $15,000 and $20,000. He conveyed to her at the same time the interest of one-third of the profits of a hotel in Corinth for five years, and afterwards conveyed to her the fee of the premises, the consideration for which is recited to be the sum of *26 $25,000. What the actual value of this property was does not distinctly appear. At this time he was hopelessly insolvent. Large debts are proved against him, and in his answer he admits his indebtedness then to have amounted to $300,000. In a deed of the same date, executed by the husband and wife to Francis Sanders, it is recited as follows, viz.: -
"Whereas the undersigned, John W. Scruggs, of the county and State aforesaid, is largely indebted to different persons residing in different localities and States; and whereas this indebtedness is individual and partnership indebtedness, being the partnership indebtedness of Scruggs, Donegan, & Co.; and whereas he is also largely involved as indorser for others, and likewise as surety, and as a member of the firm of Scruggs, Donegan, & Co., as acceptors of bills of exchange; and whereas, owing to the loss or displacement, resulting from the present civil war, of explanatory memoranda, schedules, &c., it is impossible for him at this time to state with accuracy the extent of his liabilities or their character, or to ascertain how much thereof has been remitted by the laches of creditors; and whereas he is anxious to adjust, settle, and discharge, to the extent of his ability, all just claims against him, but is unable at this time, for the reasons above stated, to nominate with accuracy his creditors."
This deed conveyed to Sanders certain lands in Huntsville, and certain lands in Arkansas, among others the plantation called "the Island Place," in trust, to convey the same to such creditors as Scruggs himself should, within twelve months, nominate and appoint.
We may safely assume the total insolvency of the husband at the time of the execution of the deed in question, and, if that is important, that the wife was aware of it.
It is sought to sustain the deed to the wife upon the theory that the land in question was purchased by her husband for her and with her money, and that she believed for years that the title had been taken in her name. Such is the allegation of her answer. The proof is to the contrary. It is true, according to some of the testimony, that she was entitled to certain sums from her relations, which were received by her husband, viz., $3,100 in 1852, or thereabouts; $2,300 at about the same time; $1,200 for a carriage in 1853, and $400 from *27 Mr. Coxe. These are the sums as stated by herself in her testimony, amounting to $7,000. In the deed of May, 1866, when we may suppose that both the husband and wife would place the sum at the highest amount that truth would permit, it is given at $4,500. We take it, therefore, at that sum. These sums so received he held and used in his business until the year 1866, when his failure occurred. Neither the husband nor the wife testifies that there was any agreement that the husband should hold these sums as and for the estate of his wife, or that when the property in question was purchased it was agreed to be held as her estate. On the contrary, the moneys were held and used by the husband for nearly fifteen years as his own property, and mingled with his personal and partnership affairs. The explanation given by his brother, if true, which is very doubtful, is essentially vicious. He states that it was at his suggestion that the deed was taken to Scruggs instead of his wife. He adds: "At the time referred to, John W. Scruggs was about to open a commission house in Charleston, and was without means or credit, and my reason for giving him this advice was, that the conveyance to himself would give him a credit, whereas then he had none."
But it is probably untrue in fact that this land was bought for her, as she alleges in the answer, or that she believed at any time that the title was taken in her name. As already suggested, the best possible case for the parties would be set forth in the deed which is the subject of the controversy. No such pretence is there set up. The consideration is based upon alleged indebtedness to the wife of a sum of $3,100 received on her account, of another like sum of $2,300, and of her release of dower in certain lands. The pretence that these sums had been agreed to be invested in these lands, and that she supposed it was done, is not suggested. We cannot but suppose this to be an afterthought.
If the money which a married woman might have had secured to her own use is allowed to go into the business of her husband, and be mixed with his property, and is applied to the purchase of real estate for his advantage, or for the purpose of giving him credit in his business, and is thus used for a series of years, there being no specific agreement when the *28 same is purchased that such real estate shall be the property of the wife, the same becomes the property of the husband for the purpose of paying his debts. He cannot retain it until bankruptcy occurs, and then convey it to his wife. Such conveyance is in fraud of the just claims of the creditors of the husband. Fox v. Meyer, 54 N.Y. 125, 131; Savage v. Murphy, 34 id. 308; Babcock v. Gokler, 24 id. 623; Robinson v. Stewart, 10 id. 190; Carpenter v. Roe, id. 227; Hard's Lessees v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. 199.
Fraud or no fraud is generally a question of fact to be determined by all the circumstances of the case. If the husband in a state of absolute bankruptcy conveys to his wife property fairly worth $15,000 to $20,000, with no present consideration passing, but with a recital of past indebtedness to her to less than a fifth of its value, the transaction is fraudulent and void as to creditors. Authorities supra.
We attach no importance to the recited releases of dower as adding a value to the consideration. The lands sold to Derrich, in which it is recited that the wife was dowable, had been conveyed to him in 1860, and the wife had joined in the conveyance and acknowledged the same. Derrich also denies that, in May, 1866, any release of dower was made or was delivered to him.
The lands sold to Peters do not appear ever to have been paid for by him, nor does it appear that they were ever conveyed to him. He had a bond for a title only.
The lands conveyed to Sanders were so conveyed in trust, to be conveyed to such persons as Scruggs should, within twelve months, nominate and appoint.
The pretended releases were mere devices to give color to a fraudulent deed. No benefit was given to the estate by means of them, nor did Mrs. Scruggs part with any thing of value.
Decree reversed and cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree for the complainant in accordance with this opinion. | {
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"case_ID": "86259.json",
"date_created": "2010-04-28T16:00:20Z"
} | 42 U.S. 289
1 How. 289
11 L.Ed. 135
JAMES TODD, APPELLANT,v.OTIS DANIELL, DEFENDANT.
January Term, 1843
1
AN agreement in writing between the counsel, as well for the appellant as for the appellee, that the decree of the Circuit Court in this case shall be affirmed with legal damages and costs for the said Daniell, having been filed; it is thereupon considered and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs and damages, at the rate of 6 per centum per annum; and also that the said appellee recover of the said appellant, the further sum of $125 for the costs of the transcript of the record in the Circuit Court according to the said agreement. | {
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} | "355 U.S. 80 (1957)\nROSENBLOOM\nv.\nUNITED STATES.\nNo. 451.\nSupreme Court of United States.\nDeci(...TRUNCATED) | {"alnum_ratio":0.7782426778,"avg_line_length":123.9259259259,"char_rep_ratio":0.0713215463,"flagged_(...TRUNCATED) | 13,898,387,730,282,877,000 |
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The Pile -- FreeLaw (refined by Data-Juicer)
A refined version of FreeLaw dataset in The Pile by Data-Juicer. Removing some "bad" samples from the original dataset to make it higher-quality.
This dataset is usually used to pretrain a Large Language Model.
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Refining Recipe
# global parameters
project_name: 'Data-Juicer-recipes-freelaw'
dataset_path: '/path/to/your/dataset' # path to your dataset directory or file
export_path: '/path/to/your/dataset.jsonl'
np: 50 # number of subprocess to process your dataset
open_tracer: true
# process schedule
# a list of several process operators with their arguments
process:
- clean_email_mapper:
- clean_links_mapper:
- fix_unicode_mapper:
- punctuation_normalization_mapper:
- whitespace_normalization_mapper:
- alphanumeric_filter:
tokenization: false
min_ratio: 0.3 # <3sigma (0.436)
- average_line_length_filter: # for code
max_len: 697 # 3sigma TBD
- character_repetition_filter:
rep_len: 10
max_ratio: 0.4 # >3sigma (0.350)
- flagged_words_filter:
lang: en
tokenization: true
max_ratio: 0.0053 # 3sigma
- language_id_score_filter:
min_score: 0.5 # < 3sigma (0.583)
- maximum_line_length_filter: # for code
max_len: 4229 # 3sigma
- perplexity_filter:
lang: en
max_ppl: 5322 # 3sigma
- special_characters_filter:
max_ratio: 0.7 # > 3sigma (0.626)
- stopwords_filter: # not use
lang: en
tokenization: true
min_ratio: 0.1 # > 3sigma (0.07)
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max_len: 84026 # 3sigma
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lang: en
tokenization: true
min_num: 100
max_num: 15208 # 3sigma
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lang: en
tokenization: true
rep_len: 10
max_ratio: 0.155 # 3sigma
- document_simhash_deduplicator:
tokenization: space
window_size: 6
lowercase: true
ignore_pattern: '\p{P}'
num_blocks: 6
hamming_distance: 4
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