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stringlengths 458
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Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release 2019/03/29 C03186503
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Cm/ml Inte/lzgmce Bz/Z/aim T are' 3 C) 15 January 1968
Approved for Release 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
Central Intelligence Bulletin
The Central Intelligence Bulletin is produced by the director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031865033.5(C)
1 \J 1.’ K11 1
3.5(c)
15 January 1958
# Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Laos: Communists overrun Nam Bac. (Page 3)
Cyprus: Makarios calls for presidential election. (Page 5)
Cuba: Castro criticizes US "imperialism" and Communists who lack revolutionary vigor. (Page 6)
Yugoslavia: Party purges opponents of Tito's liberal reforms. (Page 8)
West Germany - Yugoslavia: Diplomatic ties (Page 9)
3.3(h)(2)
# TOP RE
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# Approved for Release: CQ3186503
|J1|\,, .\,|NORTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|---|
|Demilitarized Zone| | |
|THAILAND|QUANG TIN| |
|QUANG NGAI|KONTUM| |
|BINH DINH|FLEIKU| |
|PHU YEN|CAMBODIA| |
|DARLAC|KHANH HOA| |
|VI|QUANG DUC| |
|PHUOC TUY|BA RIA| |
|LONG KHANH|THUAN THIEN| |
|TAY NINH|BINH THUAN| |
|LONG AN|THUAN THUAN| |
|PHUOC LONG|QUANG TRI| |
|Capital Special Zone| | |
|DINH TUONG|VIETNAM| |
|HA|SON| |
SOUTH VIETNAM
25 50 75 100 Miles
15 Jan 53 CTA
---
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# Vietnam:
South Vietnam: There are continued indications of Communist preparations for increased offensive activity in South Vietnam's northern provinces.
The enemy continues to re-position major command and control elements in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and the western end of the DMZ. Several recent small unit contacts with Communist forces point up the increased enemy presence in the Khe Sanh area. East of Khe Sanh, a reinforced enemy platoon in well-fortified positions ambushed a US Marine convoy on the morning of 13 January killing 19 and wounding 70 Marines in heavy fighting. At least ten enemy troops were killed.
In the central DMZ area, westward movement by major enemy elements.
The government's continuing pressure on striking workers in Saigon may be forcing labor to yield.
On 14 January, some electrical workers were headed back to work under orders of the government. Firm countermeasures against the strikers were authorized by President Thieu who fears that the strikes may be intended as a test of the new government's strength.
One unconfirmed press report says a general order for the Saigon area has been canceled by union leaders. They reportedly will confer with government officials today in another effort to seek a settlement.
15 Jan 68
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---
Approved for Release: %?"’5\*1<1:,Z2019/03/29 C03186503-(C)
3.3(h)(2)
North Vietnam:A ‘ A ' “ \ ' \ 3.3(h)
12 January attack on the Laotian outpost at Phou Elrthea Thi was conducted by four North Vietnamese AN-2 (COLT) aircraft. While two of the aircraft circled nearby, two others each made bombing and strafing runs on the position. One of the attackers was downed by rifle fire from an Air America helicopter and a second apparently by ground fire.
ct ' ‘ " ' \ 8-3(h)(2>‘
the flight originated in the Hanoi area and was controlled from the Hanoi/Gia Lam-Airfield.
This was the first time North Vietnamese aircraft have been used to attack a target in Laos.
3.5(C)
3.3(h)(2)l
3.5(c)
15 Jan 68 2
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
</
---
Laos: The Communists have succeeded in overrunning the important Laotian outpost at Nam Bac.
The collapse of the government's defense perimeter on 14 January culminated a ten-month campaign by the Communists to reoccupy an area they lost in August 1966, after controlling it for nearly ten years. Government forces are being redeployed approximately 20 miles to the south to block further Communist advances.
Lack of communication with Nam Bac has prevented an accurate assessment of the situation, but it appears that the Laotian Armed Forces General Staff, faced with growing Communist military pressure, decided that it was not worthwhile to hold the position. The King, fearing the loss of Nam Bac would threaten the approaches to the royal capital at Luang Prabang, had pressured the military into overextending itself in order to defend the area. This had resulted in a general weakening of the government’s defense posture throughout Laos, most significantly in the south.
The loss of Nam Bac is more a reflection of the lack of decisive leadership within the Royal Laotian Army than an indication that the Communists have embarked on a larger offensive role in Laos.
Commander in chief General Ouan Rathikoun's reputation will probably be eroded, and there may be a new round of political maneuvering within the military for control of the armed forces.
15 Jan 68
---
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---
Cyprus: President Makarios’ sudden call for national elections next month may represent a significant change in his public posture on the Cyprus dispute.
His widely publicized statement calling for new elections warned the Greek Cypriots that compromise will be necessary since "what is desirable" is not always "feasible." He appeared to be telling the Greek Cypriot community that enosis--union of the island with Greece--is no longer a realistic goal.
In an apparent gesture to the Turkish Cypriots, Makarios for the first time referred publicly to the "Turkish Community" rather than speaking of the Turkish minority on the island. He also noted that a "Charter of Rights" would be "entrenched" in the constitution.
Makarios further appeared to be calling for direct talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He declared that his government is developing a "document" which could become the basis for discussions and urged the other side to do likewise.
Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leaders have reacted cautiously to the announcement. Ankara has indicated it will not oppose elections if they are held according to the present constitution, but this could be a sticking point as Makarios no longer regards this constitution as valid. Turkish Cypriot leaders have thus far declined to comment, probably awaiting guidance from Ankara.
Although Makarios’ new overture to the Turkish Cypriots may clear the way for direct talks between the two communities, past experience with Makarios weighs heavily on the side of caution. He may be trying to consolidate support within his own community by silencing criticism from the right-wing element that has been pushing for enosis.
---
Cuba: Fidel Castro has delivered one of his most bitter verbal attacks against US "imperialism."
Speaking at the closing session of the international Havana Cultural Congress on 12 January, Castro abandoned the relatively passive tone of his more recent speeches. He called the US a "universal enemy," the "buttress of all the reactionary governments" in the world and compared US foreign policy with that of Hitler. He expressed special annoyance with the US economic denial program, saying that the US is "sabotaging" Cuban efforts to make trade deals in Western Europe.
Castro, returning to his theme of last summer, made some stinging remarks about Communists who are lacking in revolutionary vigor. Undoubtedly referring to the pro-Moscow parties in Latin America, Castro said that Marxism needs to be revamped to "conduct itself like a revolutionary force, not like a pseudorevolutionary church." Castro castigated those parties not supporting "armed struggle" as being in the "rear guard" of the struggle against imperialism.
He described Ernesto "Che" Guevara as a paragon of revolutionary virtue, and offered to trade 100 political prisoners in Cuba "to be selected by the CIA and the Pentagon" for Guevara's corpse.
---
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3.3(h)(2)
15 Jan 68 '7 s.5(¢) TOP RET
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---
Yugoslavia; The Yugoslav party has taken another step in its long-awaited purge by ousting 400 members of the Belgrade city organization.
The expulsions are the first large-scale reflection of Tito‘s call in a TV interview who oppose his on 29 December for cleansing the party of members liberal economic and social reforms. Most of those marked for expulsion are conservative older ex-par-tisans and minor bureaucrats who had backed former party secretary Aleksandar Raiikovic before he was ousted in July 1966 for opposing the reforms and plotting against Tito...
Replacement of his supporters with new, younger members, combined with a current reorganization of local party machinery, will be an important step by the liberals in consolidating their control prior to the party congress scheduled for December. The purge is likely to add to the regime"s already ticklish nationality problem. Many Serbs, in particular, regard the decentralizing reform program as a blow to their prestige and economic interests.
---
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West Germany - Yugoslavia
German and Yugoslav officials will meet in Paris pis week to discuss procedures for restoring diplomatic ties between Bonn and Belgrade. Despite some anxiety about repercussions in Bonn, bop countries are eager to normalize relations, which have been broken for more pan ten years. Neiper is expected to attach conditions to such a step. Controversial issues yet to be resolved, however, include pe Yugoslav demand for indemnification of victims of pe Nazis and Bonn's desire for Yugoslav support of pe German right of self-determination.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
pp,$e1fit
To ret
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602449].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin, intelligence reports on Vietnam, Laos, Cyprus, Cuba, Yugoslavia, West Germany, North Vietnam",
"When": "15 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Cyprus", "Cuba", "Yugoslavia", "West Germany", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
The President's Daily Brief
Volume 29, 8 March 1968
---
# NORTH VIETNAM
Location: Bai Chay, Ha Long Bay
Points of Interest:
|Huiphn|25'|
|---|---|
|CAC BA csu|NAUTICAL MILES|
|DoSon|GULF OF TONKIN|
|Novol Bose| |
Chinese Hydrofoil PT Boat
---
# DAILY BRIEF
8 MARCH 1968
|North Vietnam|Chinese-built hydrofoil torpedo boat-- the most modern craft of its kind. Because of greater speed and stability, the North Vietnamese will find it considerably superior to the Soviet torpedo boats which they already have. It is excellent for hit-and-run tactics, and could be used against US naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf.|
|---|---|
|South Vietnam|A motion of no confidence in the government of Premier Loc has been placed before the lower house, but it is not expected to be acted upon for some weeks. Action on the government budget has priority on the agenda, and any formal recommendation of no confidence must have the approval of both houses of the assembly.|
|Panama|Robles, in a nationwide radio-TV speech yesterday, virtually slammed the door on a negotiated settlement. He announced that he had not appeared before the assembly commission investigating the charges against him because he views the entire procedure as "illegal and immoral." The impeachment process, he said, is completely null.|
|Warsaw Pact|SofiaThe two-day pact meeting ended yesterday without any sign of a new Soviet-Rumanian confrontation. There are no reports yet on what was discussed, and a final communique has not been released.|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
FA 8-5(c) 3.3(h)(2)
5. Berlin
6. Western Europe
The informal arrangements by which the US and the West Europeans have traditionally organized themselves to sell gold to world buyers may be breaking down.
London Gold Pool system managed by the Bank of England. Under the system each member is expected to share the burdens of any reserves other who is hit hard by loss of to speculators and hoarders.
But Italy, for instance, now finds itself already purchasing directly from the US all of the gold that it is required to provide to the pool. Other members are also wavering.
If this trend continues, the pool would lose its purpose. The US would in effect assume a 100 percent share of the gold losses in the official European gold market. The other members would retain their gold reserves, while US reserves would continue to decline.
The immediate problem is that between 29 February and 5 March, losses of the pool reached $224 million; for US in turn has had to ask members for an additional contribution of $200 million.
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---
# 4. Czechoslovakia
The defection of the Czech general has caused a major stir in Prague. The main party daily because of protection general got away is suggesting that the Other voices secret police chief, and given him by are calling on the defense Novotny and his backers. minister, the the prosecutor general to resign. All of this comes at the best possible time for the new party secretary, Dubcek. As a result, the attacks on Novotny should pick up markedly; his resignation as president is probably not far off.
# 8. Philippines
US-Philippine relations took a strange turn yesterday. The Philippine Embassy in Saigon told our embassy there that, effective immediately, Clark Air Base and other US bases in the Philippines will be prohibited to US servicemen and civilian personnel visiting on leave. Clarification from Manila is expected shortly.
---
' =- “‘
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\
\
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Date: 8 March 1968
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
8 March 1968
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
further debriefing by US Embassy officers in Paris, More Comments from French Correspondent: Cabanes, the former French Press Agency correspondent in Hanoi, reports that the North Vietnamese were not completely satisfied with the Tet offensive.
In private conversations, North Vietnamese officials have displayed disappointment over the relatively good showing made by the South Vietnamese and the fact that few South Vietnamese members defected to the Viet Cong.
In other aspects of the war, Cabanes provided little beyond the standard optimistic North Vietnamese line.
He characterizes the party of the population as "strong and effective." He says the North Vietnamese leadership's political dependence on Moscow and Peking is minimal, and he tries especially hard to discount Chinese influence in Hanoi. He recounts a story about North Vietnamese officials being extremely disturbed over bomb damage to Chinese vessels in Haiphong because these officials feared it might trigger a Chicom response or the sending of Chinese volunteers into North Vietnam.
# North Vietnamese Combat Officer's View of the War:
A recently captured 7-page notebook, formerly concerned with combat strength ratios, is property of a North Vietnamese signals officer. The writer states that if the ratio is 15 allied to one Communist, the ratio is five to one. He believes that "the enemy will lose if the ratio is two to one," but "the enemy will win" after the ratio is one and one-half to one. After the 1966-67 dry season, North Vietnamese reinforcements "continue to increase day after day in order to prevent the enemy from increasing the ratio. We presently have 400,000 troops."
---
The writer asserts that the Communists have the initiative in the current winter-spring campaign. He says that in 1966-67 "we succeeded in deploying the enemy to the strategic positions selected by us." He feels this year’s campaign may be a good opportunity to achieve ultimate victory because opposing forces will be stretched thin. The writer's views may not be an entirely accurate reflection of North Vietnamese strategic thinking, but they are illustrative of an apparently widespread Communist conviction that the balance of forces favors them. In earlier phases of the war, Communists were instructed to believe in ultimate victory primarily the emphasis is on the superiority of their cause. Now because of the righteousness of Communist forces and strategy.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
---
# Internal Security Measures
In late 1967 the regime laid down strict measures to further tighten controls over the populace.
- Included increased patrols by the new measures in local security forces.
- More emphasis on detection of espionage, tighter controls over the rice ration, closer surveillance of individuals deemed "bad elements," and detention of "dangerous elements" in special camps to do forced labor.
None of these measures is new to life in North Vietnam, and it seems likely that increased vigilance last fall was prompted largely by the disruption caused by stepped-up US air attacks. There were at least two propaganda pieces last autumn emphasizing a similar theme. Our best guess is that the regime was simply taking further precautions to maintain its already tight control apparatus, especially because of the growing number of evacuees from urban areas. Evacuation was accelerated last autumn and it doubtless has created problems and confusion of which we are only dimly aware. Security almost certainly is a rural authorities were exhorted to be more responsible in caring for the needs of those evacuated from the cities, to be on guard for spies, rumormongers, and gossips who maligned the regime in the ranks of these refugees.
# French Medical Aid for the Viet Cong
The Franco-Vietnamese medical association in Paris has assembled medical supplies valued at about $20,000 for air shipment to Cambodia and onward to the Viet Cong. Funds for this particular shipment have come from the medical association and the Mouvement Du Milliard, which has previously sent medical aid to North Vietnam. The shipment reportedly will be received in Cambodia by the National Liberation Front representative there, Nguyen Van Hieu.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
Front Spokesman Discusses Tet Offensive: The deputy chief of the Liberation Front office in Moscow told recently that the Tet offensive had proven that Viet Cong military forces are still powerful and not "tired" as he claimed the Pentagon and President Johnson had alleged. He also said the objective of Viet Cong efforts is to get the Americans out of Vietnam. In tough and cocky language, he warned that the Communists are prepared to outlast the Americans despite "their stubborn nature," and that only after the US has "evacuated South Vietnam" will there be negotiations.
View of the POL situation in North Vietnam Overcomes POL Problems: A detailed review of the last year indicates that Hanoi has overcome the effects of the 1966 bombings of petroleum storage facilities. Specifically:
- POL imports were significantly larger in 1967 than in 1966. Most of the oil came by sea from the USSR.
- The system of lighters at Haiphong is working well.
- Consumption in 1967 was also higher than in 1966, partly because the North Vietnamese had to depend more heavily on truck transport and POL-driven electric power plants. But POL losses from bombing were drastically lower, and the net outcome was a modest increase in reserves.
- The North Vietnamese have dispersed most of their storage facilities and are not even bothering to repair the central facilities damaged in the 1966 bombings.
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
---
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NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317
7?:p~S¢+1=a.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617733].pdf | {
"Who": "US Government officials, US Embassy officers, French Correspondent Cabanes, North Vietnamese officials, Communist forces",
"What": ["Chinese-built hydrofoil torpedo boat in North Vietnam", "No confidence motion in South Vietnam government", "Impeachment process in Panama", "Informal gold arrangements breaking down", "Defection of Czech general", "Restrictions on US bases in the Philippines", "Special daily report on North Vietnam", "Internal security measures in North Vietnam", "French medical aid for Viet Cong", "North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes on the war", "POL situation in North Vietnam"],
"When": "8 March 1968",
"Where": ["Bai Chay, Ha Long Bay", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Panama", "Warsaw Pact", "Berlin", "Western Europe", "Czechoslovakia", "Philippines", "Paris", "Hanoi", "Haiphong", "Cambodia", "Moscow", "Prague"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
The President's Daily Brief
9 February 1968
---
# DAILY BRIEF
9 FEBRUARY 1968
Vietnam
We have no word of enemy action as of 5:30 AM in pe Khe Sanh area today. Reports say pat some 124 enemy troops were killed in pe fighting pere yesterday; US casualties were 21 killed and 27 wounded.
North Korea. No new developments have been reported overnight.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
3. Jerusalem
4. West Germany
Antiwar demonstrations by leftist students against US installations in West Germany are becoming more and more violent. An especially bold assault on pe Frankfurt Consulate early pis week almost broke in.
US officials on pe scene believe pat pe local auporities have been too lenient, and pat pis is encouraging pe agitators. "The next target is likely to be pe Hamburg Consulate pis weekend."
5. Soup America
Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia are considering pe establishment of diplomatic and formal commercial relations wip pe Soviet Union pis year. Influenced by events in Chile last monp, and by Chile, which restored relations in 1964, pese countries hope pe move might help pem unload some of peir hard-to-sell commodities and pus ease growing economic troubles.
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974269
|6. Sweden|The number of US deserters known to have been given asylum in Sweden now stands at 24.|
|---|---|
|7. Rhodesia|Soon, Ian Smith wants to visit the US.|
|8. Congo|Mobutu says he will propose at a meeting of the Organization of African Unity that the mercenaries be allowed to leave for Europe. Although Mobutu still believes these men should be punished, he apparently will not attach any strings to their departure.|
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974269
---
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974269
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974269
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
9 February 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
North Vietnamese Diplomat Comments: Hanoi is keeping the door to talks open but is not giving an appearance of flexibility.
U Thant Meets With Hanoi Representative in New Delhi
UN Secretary-General Thant met with the North Vietnamese consul general in New Delhi on 8 February, according to press reports. UN spokesmen characterized the meeting as "useful" and claimed that Thant met with the Hanoi representative in a personal capacity and not as Secretary-General. No indication was given as to the matters discussed.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
3-5<°>
3.3(h)(2)
Hanoi has maintained a consistent position in opposition to UN involvement in the Vietnam situation. The North Vietnamese have never openly criticized Thant personally; however, they view any meeting with him as an opportunity to convey their position on the war and negotiations to an influential international figure who is on record in favor of several aspects of their stand, particularly on the end of the bombing.
American Prisoners to be Released Today: Hanoi has confirmed its intention to send the three captured American pilots out of North Vietnam on the ICC flight today. Hanoi has cabled the head of the ICC in Saigon a manifest for the Hanoi-Vientiane leg of the flight; the names of the three pilots are on the passenger list at 11:30 local time today. The plane left Saigon for Phnom Penh and Hanoi.
3.3(h)(2)
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Saturated with propaganda relating to now been intensive. Hanoi radio has for some days the Tet offensive. time. There is nothing significant to report at this
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617699].pdf | {
"Who": "The President, US officials, UN Secretary-General Thant, North Vietnamese Diplomat, Hanoi representative",
"What": "Updates on Vietnam and North Korea, Antiwar demonstrations in West Germany, Establishment of relations with the Soviet Union by South American countries, US deserters in Sweden, Ian Smith's visit to the US, Mobutu's proposal at the Organization of African Unity, Special Daily Report on North Vietnam, American pilots release from North Vietnam, North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "9 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "North Korea", "Jerusalem", "West Germany", "Sweden", "Rhodesia", "Congo", "Bolivia", "Venezuela", "Ecuador", "Peru", "Colombia", "Chile", "United States", "Europe", "New Delhi", "Saigon", "Phnom Penh", "Hanoi", "Vientiane"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
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# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
# MEMORANDUM
The Si/zzaz/2'0/4 in Vietnam
To cret s.5(¢) 1 1 9
20 November 1967
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# Information as of 1600 20 November 1967
# HIGHLIGHTS
Fighting has broken out again southwest of Dak To, and US forces took serious losses in one engagement. In the air war, intensive North Vietnamese air defense measures have resulted in the loss of US aircraft in the past five days.
# I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Renewed fighting occurred southwest of Dak three-day Vietnamese paratroopers have concluded a sweep northeast of the US base (Paras. in III Corps 1-4). The position of Communist main force units suggests further attacks (Paras. Operation SHENANDOAH II has ended in northern III Corps (Paras. 9-10).
# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Conflicting statements in South Vietnam: Prime Minister Loc is complaining that directives from the President and vice president are hampering him at Da Nang. A Quaker relief ship has been denied landing rights. Eighteen US aircraft have been lost in the past five days to aggressive North Vietnamese air defense measures.
# III. Military Developments:
Elements of the probable 304th Infantry Division are in the process of moving southward. The 31st Regiment of the 341st Division has been located in the Laos panhandle just north of Route 922.
# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
# V. Communist Political Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
---
|VIETNAM|Hue|Da Nang|Ninh|Phuoc|Bin|Song|Tay|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | |USA|OPERATION|SHENANDOAH II| | |
| | | |RANH| | | | |
SOUTH VIETNAM
|Tahyubw|1|2|50|75|100Miles|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |13|25|50|75|100 Kilometers|
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Renewed fighting on 19-20 November has in the hills several miles southwest of Dak To been described as the most vicious in the two-and-one-half-week-old highlands campaign.
2. The largest of November when two company-several new engagements in the area began on 19 patrols ran into elements of the North size US reconnaissance 174th Regiment in well-Vietnamese bunkers. A third US company joined the fight and was immediately hit Preliminary casualty by another enemy incomplete information, show force reports, based losses of 40 killed, word yet on heavy and another 32 American missing. There is no 42 wounded, on enemy casualties.
3. Also on 19 November, engaged an enemy force northeast of the North Vietnamese 24th of Dak To. The enemy was identified as a subordinate which has been involved in the recent Division north of Dak To. This engagement culminated and accounted 34 killed and soldiers a three-day drive 51 enemy 161 wounded along three miles of ridge line for killed. Our losses were southwestern Kontum Province on 3 November.
4. Since the current campaign began in US forces 150 weapons. 868 enemy losses for the 18 have killed soldiers and captured nearly American day 41 missing. stand at 197 killed, 750 wounded, and period now The South Vietnamese say they have killed some 350 Communists, raising Dak To the overall number of enemy dead in the immediate area to more than 1,200.
20 November 1967
---
The Situation in Northwest II Corps
ments in the attacks can be that further III Corps area expected in thissuggests5.The disposition of north of Saigon regi-main force enemy region.
a commandUS Special Forces camp at near the 6.\ group of the Viet Cong Song Be in remain;5th Division west 3.3(h)(2) central Cong 275th and North Vietnamese controls the Viet Phuoc Long Provinces This group 88th regiments and conducts extensive reconnaissance activities. In addition, the 272nd Regiment—-a subordinate of the Viet Cong 9th along the Phuoc Long border just west to a P0SitiOn Division--has been noted moving recently of Song Be. Together these units make up a division- size force which could threaten Song Be or Phuoc Binh, the nearby provincial capital.
The other two subordinates of the Viet Cong 9th Division, the 271st and 273rd regiments, are believed to be Ninh and Binh Long provinces, where positioned along the Cambodian border in northern Tay attacks they are resupplying and reorganizing. Mortar area against allied positions have during the past week. Long fighting in the Loc withNew Province could eruptincreased in thisNinh area of northern Binh. 7th Division and its subordinate l0lst and 8. The headquarters of the North Vietnameseregi-l4sth re- main in their normal operating areasbut probably Tay ments have not been fixed recently, in northern Ninh Province. 3.3(h)(2) be positioning rice caches for ‘enemy forces may opera-planned.offensivedis- tions in this area. Likely objectives would be trict towns and Special Forces camps and possibly Tay 165th, wasNinh city. located\The 9th Division's third regiment, the November near a district town in southern Binh on Province.l5 3-3(h)(2) Long
20 November 1967
I-2
---
# Operation SHENANDOAH II Ends
The operation accounted for 956 enemy soldiers killed. The 51-day multibattalion search-and-destroy operation, SHENANDOAH II, ended on 19 November.
The sweep began in north-central Binh Duong Province some 38 miles north of Saigon and was extended to include all of Binh Long Province when Communist forces mounted a series of large-scale attacks in the Loc Ninh area.
American casualties totaled 107 killed and 322 wounded. Enemy losses also included nearly 400,000 pounds of rice and more than 100 weapons.
Date: 20 November 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Quaker Relief Ship Barred From South Vietnam
The yacht Phoenix, chartered by South Vietnam Quakers to deliver medical supplies to Nang, has been denied landing rights at Da Nang on 22 November. The decision was made by President Thieu and Vice President Ky after they learned that the Quakers would try to distribute their supplies to the militant Buddhists. The government contends that the Quaker plan violates the conditions under which entry visas were granted to them in Hong Kong—namely that the supplies would be turned over to the Vietnamese Red Cross for internal distribution. The US Embassy believes that the government apparently decided that the Quakers would get groups other than the militant Buddhists a share and that this may have influenced the Quakers to attempt to hand the supplies directly to the militants.
Date: 20 November 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
TOP/5-F:CRET 3-5(6)
4. An official spokesman told the press on 20 November that, since the medicines on the Phoenix had been brought to South Vietnam only the North, Hanoi refused to let them be landed denying entryin because the South Vietnamese Government was to the Quakers. Since this bare-bones explanation will probably leave the government open to criticism, the embassy is urging the government's action in a better light.
20 November 1967
II-2
TOP-S-E-CRET 3-5<°>
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# 4Kppr0ved for Release: 2019/03/29 C030297A
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Three more US aircraft were shot down by North Vietnamese air defense units on 20 November. This means that 18 US planes have been lost in the past five days. The heavy losses occurred on 16 November against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. In the preceding week, inclement weather had held air activity and losses to a minimum.
2. Communist air defense successes in recent days appear to have been the result of a more vigorous application of normal tactics, rather than any new weapons or procedures. SAMs accounted for 10 of the 18 US losses, while conventional gun fire was responsible for two.
3. The success on the part of the SAMs, which have been far less effective than AAA, is probably customarily attributable to the great number of missiles fired. An operational SAM site northwest of Hanoi on 19 November had assumed an active role, but there was no indication that any new techniques were being employed.
4. North Vietnam's MIG fighters accounted for a significant accomplishment in view of the limited number of fighters remaining in the country. The group of fighters which has been effective against US strike groups during the past five days probably consists of about eight aircraft, four of which may be MIG-21s.
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---
# NVA Division May Be Deploying in North Vietnam
|6|ments of the entire division are in the process ofthe probable 304th NVA Infantry Division and possibly southward.|
|---|---|
|6|deploying area of Central North has been based in The 304th Vietnam. Thanh Hoa|
|9|It is 304th Division whether they It is andtoo early to will move whether ele-determine into Laos thence into South Vietnam or will move southward toward the Demilitarized entire divisionZone. also or a single regiment iswhether move. too early to determine on the the|
|9|The 304th Division long has had a training role for units headed for South Vietnam. The 66th NVA To fighting was a subordinate, recently movedRegiment, for example, which is Other elementsinvolved in the Dak have trained by A Shau the 6th Regiment. they became part ofValley area through the 304th Division of South Vietnam where|
20 November 1967
---
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Kr TQP/8'E'CRE1 H
31st Regiment in Laos
|10.|Airborne radio direction finding on 19 November located the headquarters of the 31st Regiment of the north of Route 341st North Vietnamese Division justis a922 in the Laos panhandle. the regiment's ll November location near the junction of Routes 911/912.|
|---|---|
|11.|The ultimate destination of the 31st Regiment is not known. It would appear that the unit is headed for either the A Shau Valley area of Thua Thien Province.Sanh outpost. It could take up a flanking position near the Khe|
|12.|The unit had formerly confined its operations to the eastern part of the Demilitarized Zone area. Elements of the regiment were active, for example, around Con Thien and against South Vietnamese units farther east. The deployment of the regiment into the Laos panhandle after a period of refitting and rest in North Vietnam suggests that another unit has taken its place in the eastern DMZ. It is possible the 31st Regiment is preparing, in conjunction with other NVA units, for coordinated combat activity along the whole length of the Demilitarized Zone.|
20 November 1967
III-3
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---
# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
# V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report
20 November 1967
---
# DLKQOR AS'PE'C'TS
3.3(h)(2)
20 November 1967
s.5(¢)
3_5<c>
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
tgprovedfor Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
/Tupsecfi v
I
Epsefi
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602416].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military developments in South Vietnam, Political developments in South Vietnam, Communist military developments, Communist political developments, Military developments in North Vietnam",
"When": "20 November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: C02406640
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
TOP SECRET
Top Secret
LLIGEFNCA
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Top Secret
28 December 1967
TQP BECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
---
# Special for Daily Report on Eyes Only the President North Vietnam
Date: 28 December 1967
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Reports on living conditions in North Vietnam continue. More on Living Conditions:
- Great women have replaced men women about one half of the field of majority of endeavor the militia in "virtually every and that and constitute the armed security service.
- Natural and construction workers usually work about a seven-hour day and are subjected to short week--a political indoctrination excessive requirements sessions in view of war needs and the Communist penchant for about once not political of 18 and citing examples of the deferments are not indoctrination illegal successful the draft age.
- Uncommon medical officials and personnel cadre bribery that both of assignment and recruitment charge.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956 3.3(h)(2)
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
---
# C02406640
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
II - NORTHVIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
---
Co2406640
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485958
Walt workup(last paragraph) and get statement on what they do when they used someone someone we pause Senator the peace initiative to make 1t about how EBJ2887 LZ
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956 "SPECIAL DAILY REPORT ON N_15472908_.pdf" | {
"Who": "LLIGEFNCA, President",
"What": "Special Daily Report on North Vietnam, living conditions in North Vietnam, North Vietnamese reflections of US political attitudes on the war, Senator the peace initiative",
"When": "28 December 1967",
"Where": ["North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Intelligence Information Special Report
Country: South Vietnam
Date of Information: March 1968
Subject: Vietnamese Ambassador's View that President Thieu Must Demand Policies Conducive to Uniting GVN Leadership
Source: Central Intelligence Agency
1. Cooperation within and among the newly-organized anti-communist fronts gave rise to the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States following remarks by the following remarks by the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States:
2. According to Bui Diem, a number of Ky's supporters, particularly those in the military, have in the past urged Ky to seize initiatives and assert authority, but Ky has always refused to do this. Bui Diem warned that the day might come when these military officers could not be put off by Ky, but would move ahead on their own and "wipe out Thieu." They would not eliminate Ky, Diem remarked, because they understand his position. Diem speculated that some Major might be running things some day. He explained that he has no particular Major in mind but just wanted to make the point that an element might be running things some day.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 000210140K
---
of younger army slipping exists which will not be content to see the country officers down the drain because of inefficiency"
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4. Bui Diem said that=Ihi§uzwDuld§h6tTre§ént*§fiEh§§¥?oig ¢§§n€3§5§:%fi§;mQuld:n9$:rsa¢¢¢Q§sativelvffi think W°uld 3°? $h°W much reaction at all initially, but would the differenceThieu it over that night in bed. Diem explained that this is between Ky and Thieu.,gKyggpuldgreactgeuoriofiéllytfibfitfimhieu Wpu1?rfifiEfiR§Ei£Ih§§%Q§€zh§zEQQldsmecognizeitfiatfihefiwqgldshave €§O§§C§9P§1it;§§IfiSgwhowevqgqmmhifiuianfi3fi5f:K§:WH5:fi8Ed§z¢hiS lecture¢¢Dtemfisaidf*
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210148
5. Bui Diem reiterated that the essential point to be made to Thieu was that the United States supports him and would not support Ky over him. With this reassurance and the knowledge that his success or failure depends entirely on American support, Thieu would accept the admonition.
6. Bui Diem said it was difficult to talk in this manner to an American because he was "100% Vietnamese" and had the pride of the Vietnamese. He said to anyone else and under normal conditions would not want any American interference in Vietnamese politics. Conditions were not normal because of the war and because of American presence. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long.
7. FIELD DISSEM: 'STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER ONLY)'
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210148 VIETNAMESE_AMBASSADORS_VI[15617922].pdf | {
"Who": "Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem, President Thieu, General Ky",
"What": "Concerns about potential power struggles within GVN leadership, insights into Thieu and Ky's dynamic, importance of American support for Thieu",
"When": "March 1968",
"Where": ["United States", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
xéatk'
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# The Presidential Daily Brief
_‘]1UP_§.f-@,@@.;_ 26 February 1968
\ \ s.5(¢
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
# DAILY BRIEF
26 FEBRUARY 1968
1. Soup Vietnam
Enemy activity has dropped to its lowest level since pe Tet offensive began on 30 January. The preat to a number of urban areas continues, however.
In Saigon, pe Viet Cong are telling residents of Cholon pat a new attack is planned for tomorrow.
2. Laos
Communist forces are maintaining pressure in pe soupern panhandle. The towns of Attopeu and Saravane were attacked yesterday after two days of heavy pressure on peir outposts. The regional commander considers Attopeu untenable and intends to wipdraw if pe situation worsens.
3. Japan
Ambassador Johnson notes, "from bits and pieces" recently picked up, pat bop Sato and Foreign Minister Miki are privately showing deep concern about US prospects in Vietnam. Vietnam would realize pat US failure in Vietnam would destroy him politically, appears to be wondering wheper he should try to disengage himself. Miki, a prospective successor "who wants to carve out a political position for himself, is likely to be even more standoffish pan Sato. The ambassador believes bop men will wait to see how pe wind blows--and trim peir sails if necessary--before again publicly associating pemselves wip pe US position in Vietnam.
---
# Panama
Both Robles and Arias have backed off from the threat of major violence has on their collision course, diminished. The National Guard, still on full alert, ought to be able to quell any political arguments among pre-Lenten carnival-goers.
# Paraguay
Our embassy has it from a good source that President Stroessner, during his late March visit to Washington, may to Vietnam. Stroessner would probably offer to send a Paraguayan battalion to Vietnam. Stroessner would probably hope for some goodies in return. Other Latin American leaders, many of whom have a low regard for Stroessner, would not be impressed.
# Czechoslovakia
Party conservatives, possibly led by ex-boss Novotny, are attacking Dubcek's "liberalizing" program on grounds that it dilutes the power of the party. As the issue is shaping up, liberals nor hardliners can win. A real struggle on this issue too much. A real struggle on this issue with the possibility that neither the hardliners can win a clear-cut victory at the mid-March Central Committee meeting.
# Bahamas
The US consul general has been privately tipped off that Premier Pindling will announce today his decision to call general elections. The voting, which will then have to be set for sometime late March or early April, will surely strengthen Pindling's hand, both at home and in his determined efforts to get the British to give the colony more self-rule.
---
# 1 -Pep-seeng - Approved for Release" 2019/O4/17 CO5974297' 3_5<c>
8. Communist China 3-3(h)(2)
- 3-5(6)
Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974297
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974297
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Top Secret
26 February 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
Approved for Release 2019/04/17 CO5974297Z
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
26 February 1968
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
More US Prisoners to be Released?: Last Saturday, Ambassador Sullivan met the North Vietnamese chargé in Laos for the first time since the release of the three American fliers. The chargé, affable and willing to talk, considered the released pilots to be in good shape and had indicated they were treated satisfactorily in Hanoi's policy to treat prisoners well. He said, "You have already received three prisoners. There are two others..." At this point, the information officer rolled up, and the chargé never finished this tantalizing sentence. Ambassador Sullivan will see the chargé again to try to find out what he was about to say.
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---
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Views of Ex-French Correspondent in Hanoi; Bernard Cabanes, on His way back to Paris last week from his lengthy tour in Hanoi, talked with an officer of our embassy in Vientiane. Cabanes, who impressed the officer as an intelligent and reflective observer (and obviously sympathetic to North Vietnam), made the following points:
- Hanoi is not counting on the US elections to lead to a short-term end to the war favorable to North Vietnam, and the population has been given no such promises;
- The North Vietnamese had hoped the recently released US pilots would return to Hanoi via commercial air, but were "disappointed rather than surprised" that they chose to go on a US military plane;
- The release of these prisoners, Cabanes thought, was a "genuine gesture of good will" at a moment when it seemed that such a sign "might cover a little of the distance on the road to negotiations";
- He believes, on the basis of his experience with the temper of the North Vietnamese people, that they "will be the winners."
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A journalist has told our embassy in Prague to Hanoi Comments of Czech Ambassador to Hanoi: A Czech while the ambassador was the Czech ambassador recent conversation with in Prague on home leave.
According to the journalist, the ambassador has the impression that Moscow's influence in Hanoi is growing at Chinese expense. The ambassador also directed at improving its position in anticipation believes Hanoi's offensive in South Vietnam was di-of negotiations sometime this summer. as having affair, the ambassador was quoted On the Pueblo that this action was closely coordinated with Hanoi, and that the North Koreans were "playing a very dangerous game." There is no firm evidence that Hanoi and Pyongyang acted in concert regarding the Pueblo, although the timing of the incident has fostered considerable speculation to this effect.
French Communists to Hanoi: The French Press Agency on Saturday broadcast an announcement that a delegation of the French Communist Party would members of the party's leave for Hanoi today. top policy body and at least The delegation will include one member of the Central Committee.
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Nothing of significance to report.
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---
Approved for Release: 20%9/04/17 C05974297
I
/
\1'WfiԤ~e+1=e-L
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974297 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617949].pdf | {
"Who": "Various government officials, ambassadors, journalists, and correspondents",
"What": "Daily briefings on Vietnam, Laos, Japan, Panama, Paraguay, Czechoslovakia, Bahamas, Communist China, North Vietnam, US prisoners in North Vietnam, French Correspondent views on North Vietnam, Czech Ambassador to Hanoi's comments, French Communists visiting Hanoi",
"When": "26 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Japan", "Saigon", "Cholon", "Panama", "Paraguay", "Czechoslovakia", "Bahamas", "North Korea", "Czech Republic", "Hanoi", "Paris", "Prague"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196
The President's Daily Brief
Secret 29 December 1967
3.5(c)
23
---
# DAILY BRIEF
29 DECEMBER 1967
1. Cambodia
Sihanouk has been quoted by pe Washington Post saying he would "not intervene" if at least pese conditions were met: US troops entered Cambodia in pursuit of Vietnamese Communists--under certain conditions. One of pe conditions was pat he be convinced pe Vietnamese had entered Cambodia illegally, and in any attacks, it would be in an uninhabited region. He insisted pat Cambodian troops resist on areas where Vietnamese had been "incursion" for a long time, as well as any Soup Vietnamese troops. US officials said Sihanouk would not have talks, alpough he added he would gladly receive any envoy from President Johnson. All of pis would be a major flip-flop for Sihanouk, alpough we have no confirmation pat he has in fact changed his affirmed position, as recently as two days ago, pat pere would be no fighting in Cambodia to pe last man if Soup Vietnam or pe US invaded.
2. Laos
Small-scale skirmishing is continuing in pe soupern part of pe country. There is still no indication, however, pat a major Communist offensive is underway.
---
# 3. Hong Kong
over Peking, the use groups dissatisfied down Kong, concerned things Hong time of toning violence for in some probably encourage hopes Local to Communist the will Communist, other join in but "confrontation." out leaders will probably but try may to carry trouble Peking's directive, have reining in their bomb-throwers.
# 4. Nigeria
The federal government plans to announce on Saturday that all Nigerian currency will - Biafra be replaced now sometime next to probably Nigerian fairly try month. of sell its pounds sizable will have holdings discount hurry, to in a at a steep Up ging the now, been civil selling has for gradual Biafra's war - which source holdings chief of these is still of funds drag along.
# 5. Rumania
Moscow is purchase to said have "broken" a contract equipment to Prague Bucharest, drilling be oil pressuring fro~ to from railroad irri-cancel and a to large This order probably for Rumanian-made stems Soviet cars. stand tation on over important Rumania's international "independent" issues, and the in more offing economic such reprisals may be.
---
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---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
3.5(c)
16
29 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only 29 December 1967
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi commentary on President Thieu's domestic comments on his meeting with Thieu: Hanoi radio's service broadcast a Nhan Dan article last Sunday on President Johnson. The article goes about "acting shamelessly on the orders of his masters, raved traitor Thieu" referring to the joint national policy. The article on President Johnson's five-point peace proposal asserts that "cheap, recent Americans deceive themselves through the lie series of aggressive actions," according to the article. Included among these actions is the "urgent airlift" of US troops last week. Hanoi's international service summarized a similar editorial by Nhan Dan the next day. The US Embassy has conciliatory comments. Hanoi rejects all peace initiatives and shows three Red River crossings: causeway-pontoon, Photography Red bridges in north or south, and Doumer Bridge. The causeways are under construction across the River, just north and south of the Doumer Bridge. The gravel banks are constructed of rock and laid across sand bars. Pontoon sections are laid where necessary to complete about three-quarters of the causeway-pontoon crossings. Two are located a mile northwest of the Doumer Bridge, under construction. The others, about a mile and a half south of the new Red River bridge, should be operational. The crossings are believed to be truck traffic capable until the Red River returns to normal in June. There are twelve causeways washed out of low moderate level when the Red River is seasonally undermined by water for several months.
---
|rno|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974196 3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|other River, alternate them crossing facilities along the the DoumerRed bridge. half of within five miles of| |
|Truce: Heavy Traffic in Hanoi in Area compared traffic the Hanoi During during Christmas 24- 3.3(h)(2) hour roads Christmas truce observed heavy with on all in the Hanoi area and it similar high volumes of traffic weather have which occurred during periods when inclement prevented US air activity. observed because way-pontoon into traffic crossing 3.3(h)(2)| |
|Hanoi over what (apparently to appeared two pontoon or boat-borne bridges the recently darkness. Paul to Doumer complete bridges bombed referred Heavy Hanoi in traffic the Bridge previous was was item). also in almost observed The com-re-on highways leading into from all directions. 3.3(h)(2)| |
---
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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Hanoi Sends More Students to Europe: Despite demands on manpower reserves at home, Hanoi is continuing to send large groups of people to bloc countries for training.
3.3(h)(2)
Information on previous groups has indicated that many are being trained in industrial and technical skills which would be necessary in the postwar rebuilding of the North Vietnamese economy.
3.5(c)
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---
# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
The Front's Christmas Message to the American People: broadcast Liberation of The Front's radio on letter December the text the for a Solidarity Christmas from the Front's "Committee with The time the American people. American contrasted to People" letter happiness of Christmas in the US with the misery experienced by war those Vietnamese--especially the who children. It American that claimed people coming openly the the year of new will the be marked and by an unprecedented development the antiwar movement. demand movement, on, will The all wishes, US that troops. Government to respect Front message went war, the American people's put an end the and repatriate US
Reports in English an Hanoi without language Reports Antiwar broadcast antiwar Protest yesterday in Texas: re-Hanoi comment a recent in Texas. stated Quoting the Western War "members new the the held Austin the ranch broadcast End that of Committee to Vietnam Christmas protest day vigil outside war "to against the US sources, protest
President's of aggression in Vietnam."
---
#
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602445].pdf" | {
"Who": "The President, US officials, Hanoi, President Johnson, President Thieu",
"What": "Update on international situations in Cambodia, Laos, Hong Kong, Nigeria, Romania, North Vietnam; Hanoi's rejection of peace initiatives; North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "29 December 1967",
"Where": ["Cambodia", "Laos", "Hong Kong", "Nigeria", "Romania", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "US"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # WHITE HOUSE
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00193271 VIEWS_OF_O[15617714].pdf | {
"Who": "JCS, USAF, Army",
"What": ["Views of Army prisoners concerning the Tet Offensive", "Interrogation of, and reactions from, prisoners"],
"When": "January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Arlington"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
MEMORANDUM FOR: Sent for your information at the request of the Director.
Keith, Director National Estimates
Attachment: Memorandum for the Director, dated 26 February, "The Outlook in Vietnam"
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101 (47) 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
This is the Memorandum requested by Paul Nitze.
OCI and the Clandestine Services concur. George Carver does not agree with the last page: he thinks that either outcome (a) or outcome (b) is more probable than (c), but that one cannot at this time choose between them.
cc: DDI, WWADirector National Estimates 26 February 68 (DATE) FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101 (47) 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
# OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 February 1968
MEMORANUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam
1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.
2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:
GROUP l
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.
# Communist Plans and Prospects
Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.
The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy
---
infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.
5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.
6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present
---
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SECRET
If the push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.
GVN/ARVN Prospects
The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual outcome.
In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However, the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the countryside has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.
The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Saigon area.
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---
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S-E-G-R=E=T'
to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.
# 10. The overall position of the government has been weakened
Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.
# 11. The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus.
The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic
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of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.
12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.
Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase
13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C033_981y972 7
e. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.
b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.
c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197 THE_OUTLOOK_IN_VIETNAM[15617941].pdf | {
"Who": "Keith, Paul Nitze, George Carver, DDI, WWADirector, Abbot Smith",
"What": "Vietnam outlook, Communist plans, GVN/ARVN prospects, potential outcomes of the war",
"When": "26 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Saigon", "Washington"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
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Approveq for Releese: 2019/03/29 C06749694
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
---
# Information as of 1600 November 1967
# HIGHLIGHTS
The Communists are continuing their costly assaults against allied positions in northern Binh Long Province.
# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Another abortive assault on Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province early on 2 November resulted in heavy enemy casualties. A series of enemy attacks southwest of Da Nang on 2 November caused heavy damage to a South Vietnamese refugee center. The North Vietnamese 2nd Division is regrouping in a heavily forested hill area just west of Que Son in southern Quang Nam Province.
# Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
# Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
|104|\|166|l-Sa|W|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|VIETNAM| | | | |
|QUANG TRI| | | | |
|THUA THIE|Da Loc| | | |
|QUANG NAM| | | | |
|KONTUM| | | | |
|BL NH PHU| | | | |
|PLEIKU| | | | |
|PHU| | | | |
|EON| | | | |
|YENY| | | | |
|Turtle|M-BV'()_pD| | | |
|CQEQP5|DARLAC| | | |
|NGOU| | | | |
|TUYEN|Da Lat|RANH| | |
|PHUOC|Duc| | | |
|PHU| | | | |
|LPNG|LAM DONG|TU'AL':'I'| | |
|TAY| | | | |
|KIEN|KHCA/;<;7‘:..~E~| | | |
|CDHQACUZNONG TUONG| | | | |
|BA XUYENRK| | | | |
|SIAM| | | | |
|Bc__l_|Eu| | | | |
|SQUTH VIETNAM| | | | |
|25|50|75|100|Kilometers|
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Another abortive assault on allied positions at Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province was launched by Communist troops early on 2 November.
2. The two-pronged attack was directed at two battalions of US reinforcements near the Loc and South airstrip and at a nearby Special Forces camp Vietnamese outpost. Heavy allied artillery and mortar fire forced the enemy to withdraw shortly after daybreak leaving behind 238 dead thus raising the five-casualties during killed to nearly 850. The attacks were light. Allied casualties were twenty killed (eight US) and 118 wounded (32 US) during the five days of enemy attacks.
3. According to preliminary interrogation of an enemy soldier captured earlier this week, there is a large Communist base camp less than five miles north of Loc Ninh, just south of the Cambodian border. The prisoner claimed that the camp was receiving supplies daily from Cambodia. He said that two or three French-made ten-wheel trucks transported rice and foodstuffs across the border to the depot. The supply area allegedly houses an estimated 1,000 soldiers.
4. A series of well-coordinated enemy attacks in coastal Quang Nam Province some 15 miles west of Hoi An resulted in extensive damage to a South Vietnamese refugee village early on 2 November.
5. The activity began with a mortar attack followed by an estimated 100 Communist soldiers. The attackers were finally forced to withdraw by a heavy concentration of US artillery and air support. The Communists then shifted their target to a nearby US Marine position. Mortars, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges were used during a fierce one-hour attack. Simultaneously, two other nearby allied positions - another Marine night defensive position and a combined action platoon - came under heavy attack which included intense small arms fire.
2 November 1967
---
# During these actions
A group of enemy troops entered the refugee center at Dai Loc and burned 160 of the homes. to the northwest and en-The Communists then went to a populated area just burned another 180 homes. Casualties for the nine tire episode included ten Marines killed and wounded; nine South Vietnamese civilians were also killed. Only four enemy bodies were found in an initial sweep of the area.
# This tactic of multiple small-unit attacks
Targets, although cluster of military and civilian concentrated on a not new, is being used increasingly by Communist troops throughout South Vietnam. This tactic, involving several dispersed incidents within a short time, tends to restrict the effectiveness of allied reaction forces. Additionally, the tactic gives the enemy a greater psychological impact on the area and may also divert attention from the movement of supplies or personnel for future offensive activities.
# This trend also encompasses closer coordination
Among main force, local force, and guerrilla units throughout the country. The close coordination displayed in a series of attacks last week in the delta suggests they were planned and controlled at the province level. in Quang Nam Province. in the latest action This may have been the case
# North Vietnam's 2nd Division Regrouping
The headquarters of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division and all three of the division's heavesubordinate regiments are now concentrated in a hilly forested hill complex just west of the Que Son valley in southern Quang Nam Province. The 3rd Regiment has apparently extricated itself from its vulnerable position of last week in the coastal plains. The 2nd Division may be in the highlands to reorganize and receive replacements as it did in early October.
---
TOP SECRET
10.
During the past two months the 2nd Division has been the most active enemy division in South Vietnam. troops have been killed fighting it nearly 300 US Cong forces along the Quang Nam - Since the first week in September and local Viet Quang Tin border. Over 2,000 enemy soldiers have been reported killed in this sector.
2 November 1967
No Foreign Dissemination - Background Use Only
TOP SECRET
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694 93 5(0)
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---
# MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
There is nothing of significance to report.
2 November 1967
# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0674_96949
|TOP SECRET|S|E|RET|
|---|---|---|---|
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2 November 1957
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602457].pdf" |
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, US military forces, Communist troops",
"What": "Military situation in South Vietnam, Military Developments in North Vietnam, Other Communist Military Developments, Communist assaults, troop movements, enemy attacks",
"When": "2 November 1967",
"Where": ["Binh Long Province", "Da Nang", "Quang Nam Province", "Que Son", "Turtle Lake", "Da Loc", "Duc Phu", "Duc Pho", "Quang Tri", "Thua Thien", "Kontum", "Pleiku", "Phu Yen", "Darlac", "Da Lat", "Binh Phuoc", "Lam Dong", "Thu Duc", "Kien Hoa", "Nong Tuong", "Ba Xuyen", "Siam", "Quang Tin border"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
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{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
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---
# COMMUNIST MILITARY
THE COMMUNISTS ARE APPARENTLY PLANNING TO INTENSIFY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF 1 CORPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
AGENT REPORTS ALL POINT IN THIS DIRECTION.
NEW COMMUNICATIONS COMPLEX, FIRST HEARD
AN AGENT HAS REPORTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS PLAN A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK ON QUANG NGAI THIS MONTH.
A RECENT SOURCE STATED THAT A COMMUNIST BATTALION WAS FORMED FROM AND BETWEEN DECEMBER AND FEBRUARY.
THE "ENTIRE QUANG NGAI PROVINCE FORCE" PLANS TO ATTACK.
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---
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ABOOK ALSO SUGGESTS THAT FUTURE NQJOR COMMUNIST OF-vl
FENSIVES WILL BE MOUNTED ALONG THE COASTAL AREA
IOF CENTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM.
INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY EXPECTED IN THE SAIGON AREA
pr1).: 8. A NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS POINT TO
‘
.' :'
%g ,A PERIOD OF INCREASED TERRORISM AND HARASSMENT THIS
Em,r.-.
‘fi%.1 .4VQ-<14
’ WEEK IN AND AROUND SAIGON» REPORTEDLY INCLUDED IN
@*1. THE commumzsr PLANS ARE A SERIES or MORTAR--AQD P68-
SIBLY ROCKET--ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN T 2'11 P1
CAPITAL AREA. TAN SON NHUT AIRFIELD, WITH ITS
RUNAF AND MACV SEfiDQUARTERS COMPLEX, IS &"‘4_»\ ‘UC.) U‘ ‘QQ CU F» ("*1Kup
~
TARGET, AS IS exam sea AIR ease, wszcw, [::::::::::] -
‘
t~=} E U) CI U3 JECT OF EX-
\ L was BEE8
TENSIVE SURVEILLANCE QND RECOHflAISSANCE¢ THERE
\
~ J;,_‘.3‘ HAS BEEN A MINOR INCREASE IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDQ,
IQQEI":-'ii“?{ AND TERRORISM IN THE CAPITAL zg RECENT DAYS.. .
_. z_-
“QC 9. THREE COMHEMORATIVE DAYS FALL IN THE 19TH TO 22ND
PERIOD. THE FIRST OF THESE IS I9 DECE\?bi F1 2 o m a. ,1O
TIONAL RESISTAMCE DAY, cammsmoaarzxe THE comvrF5 Z3 W1 I
,.- /
-
\
z \ *'H (
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'*- \;. n‘w‘-if‘, "1!,.}<‘>'.-0‘ -",' x ' ' ~ ‘~-. . \ ~_"§H‘~ >,.; 5-‘ . .,, \_
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
# APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2019/03/29 C01001207
'J mzur or THE VIET MINM&g£$1SIANCE AGAINST was FRENNR
IN 1946. THE 7TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IS ON 20 DECEMBER, AND 22 DECEMBER IS THE 23RD ANNIVERSARY OF THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY.
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE USED SUCH OCCASIONS IN THE PAST TO STAGE DRAMATIC ATTACKS FOR A MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA EFFECT.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. DAMS nuc KROI, NEWLY APPOINTED SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO VICE PRESIDENT KY, BELIEVES POLICE DIRECTOR LOAN IS BEHIND THE RECENT UPSURGE IN ANTI-AMERICAN EDITORIALS IN THE PRESS AND TO RESTRAIN LOAN, KHOI REPORTEDLY MET WITH KY ON 13 TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM AND MENTIONED SEVERAL INSTANCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO LOAN AND HIS SUBORDINATE, EAL DEN, NHOM KHOI DESCRIBED AS THE 'MASTERMIND' OF THESE INCIDENTS. ONE WAS THE SERIES OF ANTI-AMERICAN ARTICLES WHICH HAVE RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE DAILY CONG CHUNG, A PAPER GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE UNDER AT LEAST A DEGREE OF CONTROL BY LOAN.
---
# S2. KHOI EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT, NHILE'THE LOAN - MAI DEN CAMPAIGN HAS NOT YET REACHED SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, CONTINUED FREE REIN FOR THEM COULD DAMAGE US-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS AND EVEN HURT THE NAB EFFORT. as THEREFORE Anv1szn, 3jMhX2)
THAT KY PERSUADE LOAN TO DISMISS MAI nan AND STOP PUBLICATION OF CONG CHUNG. KY REPORTEDLY PROMISED TO TALK T0 LOAN BUT SAID NE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME PERSUADING HIM TO LET MAI DEN GO; KY SAID HE HAD TRIED THIS ONCE BEFORE TO NO AVAIL.
# 3. KHOI SAID HE AD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION NITH LOAN. ALTHOUGH LOAN AGREED THAT THE AMERICANS POSED NO REAL LONG-RANGE THREAT TO VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE TWO COULD REACH NO COMMON GROUND ON HON TO LESSEN SHORTER RANGE FRICTIONS WHICH RESULT FROM THE MASSIVE AMERICAN PRESEWCEO LOAN J
REPORTEDLY TOLD KHOI THAT MAI DEN WAS A DEDICATED, CLEVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO HAD DONE NOTHING WORSE THAN CRITICIZE rd 2'3 I11 C1 U1 0‘ LOéN THEREFORE FELT IT WOULD BE INCONGRUOOSLTOMFIRE HIS SUBORDINATE P-4FE OTHm w m 3) ca c>UT NHOM LOAN HAD EVIDENCE OF SO NRONGDOING WERE KE?T ON BY THEIR SUPERIORS.
---
MOBILIZATION DECREE DEFENDED BEFORE ASSEMBLY
DEFENSE MINISTER NGUYEN URN VY MET WITH BOTH HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 18 DECEMBER TO DEFEND THE GOVERNMENT'S PARTIAL MOBILIZATION DECREE OF 24 OCTOBER. ALTHOUGH VY’S PERFORMANCE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE UPPER HOUSE MEETING ON 19 DECEMBER VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY TO REJECT THE GOVERNMENT'S JUSTIFICATION OF ITS DECREE. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION MAY BE SUPPORTED BY THE ASSEMBLY.
THERE IS AT LEAST ONE REPORT THAT THREE MEMBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE ARE CIRCULATING A DRAFT DECREE TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S DECREE.
VY MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE UPPER HOUSE FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS IN AN OPEN PLENARY SESSION ATTENDED BY ALL 66 MEMBERS. HE READ A STATEMENT OUTLINING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND DEFENDED THE FORMER RATE'S ACTION IN PROMULGATING THE DECREE AS LEGAL UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION. VY MAINTAINED THAT PROMULGATION IN OCTOBER WAS NECESSARY IN VIEW OF AN ANTICIPATED 1968 REQUIREMENT FOR 64,000 ADDITIONAL MEN AND BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO GIVE THOSE WHO WILL BE AFFECTED AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO PREPARE FOR THE EVENTUALITY. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT LOWERING THE DRAFT AGE FROM 20 TO 18 WAS NECESSARY.
---
“J'v_
I
1‘ ~._.» Y 7 Y A Qépproved for Release: 2019/03/29 C010012QZ}I§|e-__-__...- -_....e_~__-I_,_,_____»-
~< J‘) l8'NAS A LOGICAL COURSE"-3*-‘OR A NATION AT WAR. HE ADDED,
/fix7}v
‘Z-§";§‘}‘-L, '-:5 ‘ HONEVER, THAT 18 YEAR OLDS UILL NOT BE CALLED UP BE HQ ., .» FORE THE_ ,END OF I968» STUDENT DEFERNENTS, HE NOTED,
.. ,1 /> ,_ .'-*~.~:-.»~~N ' WOULD BE FLEXIBLE, ALLOWING SUPERIOR STUDENTS TO _' l. N """i5T'i‘=,
1,.L - 7‘J.1/4 ,~-Id"V-.1 -T -.» -34.; ICONTINUE THEIR STUDIES¢ THOSE WHO WANT TO STUDY ABROAD v ¢\ I -, 13,,-n '.. 1 WILL BE REQUIRED TO PASS SPECIAL EXANINATIO Z3U]0 3 AND THEY WILL HAVE TO PURSUE STUDIES THAT WTLL BENEFIT THE NATION.
6. THE QUESTION- AND-ANSWER PERIOD IN THE SENATE NAS GENERALLY ORDERLY AND WITHOUT RANCOR. VY ANSWERED QUESTIONS TOUCHING ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS THE RATES O? DESERTION AND DRAFT EVNSIONCBOTH DOWN ED PERCENT IN J >2 DESERTION AND DRAFT EVNSIONCBOTH DOWN ED PERCENT IN I967 FROM 1966); POSTPONENENT OE C IT) Z13 -4 3» v- 23' :y g,/My #%wI .-1 MOBILIZATION DEGREE UNTIL THE NNTIDNAL éSSZN3LY HAS W13? \‘.w|;~.';;. -1-":5. - THE OPPORTUNITY TO _P") (D 1*LIZE THE ORDER (THERE IS NO LONGER A QUESTION OF AMENDING OR SUSPENDING THE DEGREE-— THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO APPLY IT EAIRLY); QND THE SUBJECT OF DRAFT DEEERNENTS (NO FAVORS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SONS OF WEALTH? OR PRONINENT FAMILIES AND A CRACK-' DONN SHOULD SE MADE ON STUDENTS WHO USE THEIR STUDIES TO EVADE THE DRAFT). NNOTHER QUESTION TOUCHED ON THE wi, POINT OF WHY THE DRAFT QGE WAS LONERED IF ONLY A 64,0DD- NAN INCREASE IS NEEDED (REPLACENENTS ARE NEEDED FOR CASUALTIES AND DISCHARGES AS WELL AS TO INCREASE THE SIZE OE THE MILITARY-A \12 U] C) ‘LY 4D PEROENT OF B 4-< QJ» x H UT NEEDS WILL BE NET BY CONSCRIPTION IN I968). SUSPICIONS was vezczn THAT THE eovzawmznw uszn THE NGBILIZAT I’-‘I C)Z‘:
/
\ v I 1 I. 1 \ 1. \ ~.' - - _, -. -- 1‘ '44 1" ‘ >-.._>-. ‘_,_»_:_ - ) ‘Q ,_ _'phe ,\ .~___ _ ,. M. 1 ,\\ ‘, \ ~‘_y,'\- . -_ ‘F M1, "L '.- ~_r_: -_ ._-»‘ I '_,_. ;__> :,|'1', _\ ‘_; .<__.‘ 1‘. ‘ _. I,“¢_.. 1, -‘. ,l._ \ \ < 4:\' ‘ - - -3 . -\.\ _ _ Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
OF SPECIALISTS as A wa fife CONTROL oPPes1w1om1sIs‘E@%-"WT
DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS ARE THE ONLY COESIDERETION FOR
WHICH_ARE IN PARTICULAR SHORT SUPPLY).
1. VY APPEARED BEFORE A CLOSEu m w A m
LOWER nouss ow THE Airsamoom ow as nzczasR.[::::::]
VY’S~PERFORNANCE was ,
AS GOOD AS THE ONE HE GAVE BEFORE THE UPPER HOUSE@-
AFTER READING A PREPARED STATEMENT, HE REPLTED TO SOME
120 QUESTIONS. INQUIRIES REPORTEDLY FELL INTO THREE
BROAD CATEGORIEWGC I) THOSE CALLEEGIEG THE CONSTZTU'
TIONALITY OF THE DECREE ITSELF; 2) THOSE OUESTTONTNG
THE FAIREESS OF THE DEGREE; AND 3) THOSE RELATTNG TO
WHAT ACTION THE GOVERNMENT MTGHT TAKE IE_THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY "REJECTS" THE DEGREE OR REQUEST THAAT ITS
APPLICATION BE SUSPENDED. VY, 2 x M m 1 0 iv
QUESTIONS POSED, STREESED THE NEED FOR THE IMMEDZATE
APPLICQTION OF TEE DECZZIO HE DECLARED, HOWEVER, 4’THAT
THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FOLLOW ADOTHER *=“iLTZATTOS LQUin U
ONE QERE PASSED BY THE ASSE G F < 0 1
IF
—4P#&fi>#&%?%r+%i?E:::::]flfi-FOfiEi6fl-OISfifififfifififififififififi-DSE-fifitY 35¢»
---
# FARNER-HORKER-SOLDIER BLOC OF THE DOHNSWING
THE LOWER HOUSE CONTINGENT OF THE FARMER-WORKER-SOLDIER BLOC HAS REPORTEDLY DECIDED TO DISBAND FOR LACK OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION. THE UPPER HOUSE CONTINGENT MAY ALSO BE NEAR DISSOLVING.
MEMBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE SAID THEY MADE THE DECISION TO DISBAND ON 10 DECEMBER, FOLLOWING A SERIES OF MEETINGS WHICH WENT ALMOST UNATTENDED.
THEY ATTRIBUTE THEIR GROUP'S DEMISE TO THE DIMINISHING POPULARITY OF THE BLOC'S LEADERS, MOST OF WHOM ARE SENATORS. SENATOR DANG VAN SO38 AND OTHERS SAY THAT DINH IS TOO PRO-BUDDHIST AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT.
THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE BLOC, INCLUDING DOB AND DEER, ARE SAID TO BE GOOD MEN BUT NOT POLITICALLY ASTUTE. ACCORDING TO SENATOR NGUYEN GIQ HIEN, LEADER OF THE SENATE'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST BLOC, THE BLOC IS LOSING PRESTIGE IN THE UPPER HOUSE.
HIEN CLAIMS THAT BOTH DOB AND DEER ARE PRIMARILY MILITARY MEN, UNINTERESTED IN POLITICS OR POLITICAL AIMS.
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---
FIND NO CONFRONTATION GROUND WITH MEMBERS OF OTHER UPPER HOUSE
BLOCS AND WILL NOT DISCUSS PRACTICAL POLITICS
ALTHOUGH HIEN'S ATTITUDE MAY BE SLIGHTLY COLORED BECAUSE OF DON'S REFUSAL TO GO ALONG WITH A PROPOSAL THAT THEIR TWO BLOCS MERGE, THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS OF DON'S POLITICAL INEPTITUDE. THIS MAY HURT NOT ONLY HIS BLOC, BUT ALSO HIS CHANCES FOR ELECTION TO THE UPPER HOUSE CHAIRMANSHIP. HIEN HAS SAID THAT HIS BLOC'S VOTES WILL GO TO SENATOR NGUYEN VAN HUYEN, DESPITE DON'S APPEAL FOR HIEN'S SUPPORT. PRESIDENT THIEU, IN ADDITION, HAS REPORTEDLY INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR HUYEN OVER DON.
NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. THERE ARE BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT ELEVEN MIG-21S AND POSSIBLY SEVEN MIG-17S AT VARIOUS AIRFIELDS WITHIN NORTH VIETNAM. AT LEAST A
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
L V ' " __- 1 ~ V “ A ‘Approved for Release: 2_019/03/29 C010012Q];1
Two AND POSSIBLY Fouaéfihe-11s wznz snow Down BY k”?
US AIRCRAFT CANNON FIRE ON 18»AND 19 Dgcgmgggo
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILETAw < c£vELOP;~1Em'g
THERE IS wownzms OF SIGNIFZCANCE Y6 REPORT.
V. COMMUNIST PCLITICAL DEVELO FU E <""1 U):71
TO TAKE A woman LIJE on YHE QUES?’‘Q- (I)i
WAR. THEY INSEST THAI AN UNCGNDZYIONAL CZSSAEION c?
THE BOMBING M552 ‘U 3] [*1 Q F. C3 I’-=1 1> 2 ~< GC)1 »4 31> ‘>2.I-= C) 22 U? ll» 2.’U Tug;
A SETTLEMENT MUST BE ZN 1') ('2 ('2 (J 3'0 _t:"@593 W133 Igggg Twgmgo
IN A LENGTHY EUTERVIEW WIEH A UISTERM JOUR-NALIST LASTB-JEEZ(, 'IR.3=N V151" DUKGG, C0U;‘$S7Lca :0 0 ‘>1*
2'2 CL I0 1. vzzrmnmssz mzsszew IN FRANCE? REFSSZD re ca»-SIBZR ANY sueeasr P1 ca G "11 0R Acwxzvzxa A SETYLEMFHT EX-
02?: om THE BASIS 0? wELL—Z61 ZZ ('3= ~:.. ‘>- <.. ,- CGHHUNIS? PGSZ??OMS.
U‘? ‘D? n'- F“. "' "* "-‘Q’-.1~»~-- --. H
4r_.- - ..."C£_',D -1 3?._ q._..1H_| .4 0 :0 F” 1\-I $1~~ m“=‘!*l-\;lU;‘§REA-L3V Oi‘: 1:31. Us-.< -@~-.--~ 1::
VZE?NAM'S savzazzawrv awe BR:EdG) 2? INTO THE us "SPHERE
0? INFLUENCE." Bums ALU3 C) C‘) P" :5» ~F"-I3(“*1U Q- ‘J1 p Lii Pi 0-TI312 N1 F4 I-=4 DJ F1 DU J‘; '-I 0-4 C)
was UNABLE T0 AGREE T0 ox rs zvzm cC) m DJP1~ iv~:m0 A PR6-POSAL THAT THE CI U3 I2 Eli C3 $3 C) Y’-J Pi Z11 <1 l»-‘=4:"P3 Q.0;.~ <ZTHDRAW awn
LEAVE A COEPROHISE eovzawmsmr IN THE soars.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
# LIBERATION FRONT 5th ANNIVERSARY
"THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE USING THE OCCASION OF THE SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE LIBERATION FRONT TO VOICE THEIR DETERMINATION TO PRESS ON WITH THE WAR. AT A MEETING IN HANOI, FRONT AND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS SPOKE OF THEIR RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE. ONE SPOKESMAN PORTRAYED THE CONFUSION OF VIOLENT AND FIERCE BATTLES." BUT CLAIMED THAT THE PEOPLE WILL NOT SHRINK FROM ANY SACRIFICE OR TRIAL AND THAT THE NORTH ABIDES BY THE SLOGAN, "EVERYTHING FOR THE FRATERNAL SOUTH."
SIMILAR STATEMENTS WERE MADE AT A GATHERING OF FRONT OFFICIALS IN A "LIBERATED AREA" IN THE SOUTH.
HIGH-LEVEL, "PEACE NEGOTIATIONS" ACCORDING TO AN INSIDE SOURCE. HE ALSO SET FORTH THE FUTURE TREND OF THE 1953 OF THE SOUTHERN AND PEOPLE."
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 "HW SITUATION IN VIETNAM A[15602478].pdf" | {
"Who": "Military officials, Viet Cong, Communist military leaders, Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy, Senator Dang Van Son, President Thieu, Liberation Front officials",
"What": "Military situation updates, plans for attacks, political developments, defense mobilization, disbandment of political blocs, peace negotiations, propaganda",
"When": "18th to 22nd December 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Hau Nghia Province", "Quang Ngai", "North Vietnam", "Cambodia", "France", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
EH61
P»-5<<=> //6‘ /05Z,
/
# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
# Cm/ml Im‘e//zgmce Bu!/e/in
3554204C210
28 November 1967 saw
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
The CENTRAL Intelligence BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
---
# Cm/ml In/e//zgmce Bu//e/in
Cyprus: Negotiations are continuing. (Page 1)
Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 2)
France: De Gaulle sharper and more explicit in his latest press conference. (Page 4)
Canada-NATO: Ottawa may reduce NATO units in Europe. (Page 5)
Singapore: Ties wip Eastern Europe (Page 6)
---
# Cyprus
Ankara has submitted stiff counterproposals to Athens in the latest round of negotiations. Although no details are available, NATO Secretary General Brosio states that the new Turkish conditions "will be more difficult for the Greeks to accept." In addition to these latest demands, Ankara is insisting all Greek "illegals" leave Cyprus within 45 days.
The armed forces of both nations remain in a high state of alert; a number of patrol craft and minelayers which had been with the "invasion force" in southern Turkish ports suddenly left Mersin this morning. The transports carrying the troops, heavy weapons, and armor remained in port, however.
Despite a general lessening of tension on Cyprus, patrol activity by Greek Cypriot police and civil defense elements has increased. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot news coverage has become less strident in tone during the past day or so.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
|South Vietnam: In the area north of Con Thien|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|that new attacks are being prepared. A third unit, the 164th Artillery Regiment, is in position to provide supporting fire against Con Thien and Gio Linh.| |
|The South Vietnamese Government's recent mobilization decree, aimed at strengthening the armed forces, has run into difficulty with the new Senate. In its session on 25 November, the Senate indicated a general displeasure that the decree had been promulgated by the government before the new legislature was invested. The majority of the senators question the constitutionality of the decree.| |
|South Vietnamese Defense Minister Vy is reportedly dissatisfied with the caliber of Vietnamese Army officers and is considering revamping the officer selection process. Under Vy's reported plan college graduates would first be inducted as privates and then screened carefully for officer qualification before being awarded commissions. A college degree is now the prime criterion for admission to officer candidate school.| |
| |5(c)|
28 Nov 67
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
Appfqvedfor Release: 20‘19/03/29 C03009607 3 5 (C)
3.3(h)(2)
28 Nov 67 3
3-5“)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607 3 '5(C)
France: A sharper tone and more explicit terms than he has used previously characterized De Gaulle's press conference yesterday.
Aside from a fleeting prophecy of a downward trend for the dollar as a consequence of British devaluation, De Gaulle's major reference to the United States came in his treatment of the Middle East. Until Washington disengages itself "from the vile war it is conducting" in Vietnam, the big-four solution he envisages for the Middle East is impossible, he reiterated. He made clear that any settlement must include Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and international status for Jerusalem. In return, Israel would receive access to the Suez Canal.
De Gaulle's aggressive views on French-Canadian sovereignty focused on resistance to US domination and on the role of French Canada in assuring a global outlook for the French language. He clearly hopes to promote both aims through his espousal of an association of two Canadas similar to that recently endorsed by Quebec politician Rene Levesque.
In rejecting London's bid for early negotiations on Common Market membership, he specified that only British submission to French conditions can open the door. Until Britain radically transforms itself into "one of the pillars of a European Europe" he held out only the possibility of a free-trade association including the other Northern European countries.
De Gaulle began and ended his monologue on domestic matters. He again reminded everyone that his regime has given France political stability, and implied that the French populace should be thankful to him for the improved living standards they now enjoy.
28 Nov 67 4
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---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607 35(6)
Canada-NATO: Ottawa may be considering reducing its NATO forces in Europe.
The government's campaign to reduce spending is requiring the Department of National Defense to cut the budget sharply. Some defense officials are said to favor deactivating a major unit, and Canada's NATO forces are viewed as a likely candidate.
Senior government officials are considering a cut of about one third in Canada's forces in Europe. These now consist of 6,500 army troops and six squadrons of aircraft. As a partial alternative, Ottawa could deactivate the small NATO-committed forces stationed in Canada.
Defense Minister Cadieux told Parliament last week that he will discuss reduction of Canada's military strength at the NATO meeting in Brussels on 13 December.
28 Nov 67 5
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---
# NOTES
Singapore: Singapore's interest in expanding trade opportunities has led to pe establishment of diplomatic and economic ties wip a number of East European countries. Last week Bulgaria became pe first Communist country to open an embassy in Singapore, and pe Lee government has agreed to exchange diplomatic missions wip Rumania and Yugoslavia. Soviet and Polish trade missions are already functioning in Singapore. Hungary is expected to open one soon.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C030096073_5(C) T-9-P—S-ECKET
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 24 November 1967 approved the following national intelligence estimate:
NIE 70- 1- 67
"Liberation Movements of Southern Africa"
s.5(c)
28 NOV 67
TD-P-SE-6-RET 3'5“
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
Top ret
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602371].pdf" | {
"Who": "Director of Central Intelligence, CIA, Senior Government Officials",
"What": "Current intelligence on national security issues, classified information, international negotiations, military actions, diplomatic relations, intelligence estimate",
"When": "28 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cyprus", "South Vietnam", "France", "Canada", "Singapore"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786610.1
On 7 February, a member of my staff did an informal memorandum for me on the effects of the Tet offensive on the pacification program, an update of that memorandum I sent to you. Attached is a memorandum, done by the same officer, that you may find of interest.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
O. D. Rostow
Mr. Habib
Secretary McNamara
General DePuy
Governor Harriman
Magi
Mr. Leonhart
Ambassador William
Special Assistant to the President
---
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Effect of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive on the GVN Pacification Program
REF: Memo dtd 7 Feb 68, same subject
The data in this memorandum updates reference memorandum and utilizes all information received from province and corps situation reports received as of 0900 hours EST 12 February 1968.
Summary and Conclusions
There is little change in the situation since reference. The map attached to reference should now show Quang Duc Province as probable minor disruption to the reflect major disruption instead of "probable major disruption." To date, casualties reported for all programs (RDC, Truong Son, Static Census Grievance, and PRU) are 56 KIA, 83 WIA, and 37 MIA. VC casualties casualties caused by the RDC or PRU elements are 60 KIA (body count) and 1 captured.
|I Corps|Quang Nam|
|---|---|
|A. Hoi An RDC Team #28 located inside the city suffered 3 KIA and 7 WIA when it was hit by 2 VC mortar rounds on the night of 8 - 9 February.| |
|B. On 11 February Quang Nam reported that the next 10 days the pacification program for the moment refugees, transport, communications, and food or so until such items as was at a halt and would be for are dealt with.| |
|Quang Ngai reported on 11 February that since 31 January casualties are 2 PRU WIA; 10 RDC KIA, and 30 WIA; 1 soc KIA; 2 RDC Control Group KIA and 3 WIA.| |
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786610
1. Quang Tin reported that RDC casualties, as of 11 February, as listed by the National Police are 4 RDC KIA.
2. Quang Tri reported 10 February that refugees number 3,000 primarily from RD areas in Trieu Phong District. At least 3 New Life Hamlets were destroyed, are in the RAD areas. The refugees have stories of VC atrocities. At least 3 VC battalions ll Corps appear to be increasing problems for most provincial capitals.
3. On 9 February II Corps RDC reported that economic resulting dislocations from the influx of refugees and damage to the cities as a result of the military activity. With the major highways and lines of communications to the cities either cut or disrupted, food supplies are dwindling and prices rising. Hoarding of foodstuffs is occurring in some cities where the population is fearful of further attack.
4. Pleiku reported 8 February that the Montagnard Training Center was attacked at 0010 hours. The attack lasted three hours. Three guards were killed and two wounded. Ten local VC sappers were killed, grenades crew served and 5 individual weapons captured along with ammunition, and mines. Heavy damage was inflicted by the VC on the farm demonstration area, the farm classroom and barber shop were demolished. There was some damage caused by friendly rounds and supporting gunships. The guards' barracks damaged by southeast tower bunker was demolished and B-40 rounds. The camp security force performance was exemplary.
5. Quang Duc reported 10 February that the RDC and Truong Son teams have not been specifically targeted by the enemy although their movement to 1968 hamlets has been delayed due to better defensive position being located in their old locations.
6. Binh Long reported that during the night of 2 - 3 February during the VC attack on Phu Loc village that 2 RDC were killed and 2 wounded.
7. Hau Nghia reported that on 1 February RDC Team #2 had heavy VC contact along Rt. #1.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786610
12. Long Khanh reported that, as of 4 February, the PRU was located along Highway 1 but was unable to return to Xuan Loc because of the security situation. The Census Grievance Chief and Assistant Chief were unable to return from a currently insecure district where they spent the Tet holidays. The RD program situation was unclear at this time. Some of the hamlets where the RDC were located were reported in enemy hands, but other reports stated that the RDC had held off the VC. On 31 January a RDC Team reported killing 2 VCO. By 8 February, Long Khanh reported that the GVN pacification program was operative.
IV Corps
13. An Xuyen. Static Census Grievance Cadre were reporting, as of 8 February, on attitudes and reactions of the populace, VC movements, VC propaganda activities.
14. Bac Lieu reported 8 February that 1 RDC Team had been fired on twice but no casualties were reported. On 11 February, 30 PRU engaged the VC northeast of Bac Lieu city. The CORDS compound in the city had been attacked and was on fire as of 11 February.
15. Kien Giang reported 11 February that the CORDS compound had been destroyed in Rach Gia.
16. Kien Phong reported 11 February that all RDC Teams had been pulled back to either Cao Lanh or other district towns.
17. Vinh Long, in reviewing the VC attack of 31 January, reported that the RDC house was hit by B-40 rockets and sprayed with automatic fire. The house was never physically assaulted although it was frequently hit by harassing fire. The PRU assisted ARVN during the fighting, suffered 10 KIA, and 16 WIA when their compound came under helicopter rocket fire on 2 occasions and was hit by artillery on another occasion. The PRU compound was completely destroyed. On 12 February, Vinh Long reported that the Static Census Grievance program was back in operation reporting on VC forces used the U.S. in the attack on the city, people's complaints against the VC, ARVN, and others.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 006786610
---
Appr0\/'ed for Release: @019/04/17 006766610
- Distribution: EFFECT_OF_THE_VIET_CONG_T[15617861].pdf | {
"Who": ["George A. Carver, Jr.", "O. D. Rostow", "Mr. Habib", "Secretary McNamara", "General DePuy", "Governor Harriman", "Magi", "Mr. Leonhart", "Ambassador William", "Special Assistant to the President"],
"What": "Effects of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive on the GVN Pacification Program",
"When": "12 February 1968",
"Where": ["Quang Duc Province", "Quang Nam", "Quang Ngai", "Quang Tin", "Quang Tri", "II Corps", "Pleiku", "Binh Long", "Hau Nghia", "Long Khanh", "IV Corps", "An Xuyen", "Bac Lieu", "Kien Giang", "Kien Phong", "Vinh Long"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:
---
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830SbLrz
# C 0 N T E N T S
Information as of noon EST, December 1967
|THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE|Far East|Page|
|---|---|---|
|VIETNAM|Recent developments in the area surrounding Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province suggest that the Communists may be preparing for another major offensive. The recent resignation of Police Director Loan and the conviction of some vulnerable generals eased to Communist infiltration appears to have generated friction over the attempted inefficient|NR SECRET|
# WEEKLY SUMMARY Dec67
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# SECRET FAR EAST
Military activity in South Vietnam remained at relatively low levels last week but there were indications that Communist forces are preparing for a new offensive in northwestern Quang Tri near the Demilitarized Zone. There was further evidence of closer coordination between scattered Viet Cong and North Vietnamese operations relieving allied pressure with Viet Cong forces aimed at harassing attacks at widely scattered points.
With the approach of holiday truce periods, there have been renewed efforts to persuade the Soviets to agree to talks if the US refrained from setting the terminal date for the projected bombing pause. The North Vietnamese have not joined the Soviets in this effort and there is no indication that the Soviets are acting at Hanoi's behest. However, heightened concern that the war might spread into Cambodian territory was evident in Phnom Penh. The Cambodian statement reserved the right to pursue Communist forces into its territory, warning against any false pretexts on Cambodian soil and again denied that there are Communist forces on Cambodian territory.
# WEEKLY SUMMARY Dec 67
---
# SECRET
VIETNAM
|areas surrounding Khe Sanh in the western Quang Tri Province|Recent developments in tactical vi over the Vietnam|
|---|---|
|significant miles east of Saitozl|force battalion preparing for another major gest that the Communists may of be early this Dec some soldiers were killed 235 enemy about six day-long battle 13 Americans were Vietnamese and Forty-one South|
|Province suggest Cong 50 2nd week force battalion|staging from the US Marine US reconnaissance patrols rison numerous small enemy forces at Khe Sanh have encountered|
|gar- tered in the mountains northwest of their base|The engagement resulted from an allied probe deep into Viet Cong controlled territory - the first in this particular area|
|Special Forces positionshave been and recoil and other nearby friendly field atedly since 1961 US military offi- cials credited the strong of the lead- ership and aggressiveness with|cut deeply into the ful encounter that of the enemy trength unit|
|attacked by mortar recent weeks repe less increase in rifle fire tiated activity maybe|This Communist-initiated large-scale offensive prelude to costly ambush into success|
|lines Heavy overland rainshave disrupted monsoon allied upply|unit_ Politics in South Vietnam|
|movements of Long range tacti reconnaissance patrols into Khe Sanh only Vei Lang east--is road access Route 9_-the to and vehicular from presently will not be the upply points|Therecent friction gen- erated over of Police Director Loan and the conviction of some generalsthat the new government|
|closed to is inefficient and vulnerable generalsthat the new government|appears to have infiltration ap- to Communist eased for the moment troops and South Vietnamese Ma - In the Mekong De lta US|
|3.3(h)(2)|WEEKLY SUMMARY Dec 6 7|
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|c (H N N 0 R T h c H 1 N A B U RM V | E N A M HanOL = 6 ( L F "f L A 0 S To N K [N HATnAN VIENTTANE DemilifarizedZone Lang Vei Khe Sank Seecial ForcesCamp Hue T HA I L A N D IDa Nang BANGKOK A MB D 1 A TONLESAF GULF Or SIAM PHNOM PENH BICoN 5a -Dec SEA DAOPHU Quoc(Vietnam) SBerET cHINS 100 50 Miles 1C0 50 Kilometers CON SON sou"h 68883 12-67CIA SPERET| |
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
3.3(h)(2)
The moderating influence KyfarexertedbyVicePresident S0 whor reportedlyheadedoff Loantoaskingtheothergeneralsandbyhave chancetomay tion givethe governmentstabilizing effect thatThegovernmenthas announced Buddhiststrugglemovement, 1966ome20 leadersofthewhich centered in HueandDa Nang, will Sovietdiplomatspastweekon several be broughttoincludeseveralThe20 trial on 19Decem-army occasions duringthe ber be broughttoincludeseveralThe20 trial on 19Decem-army occasions duringthe ber includeseveralThe20 trial on 19Decem-army occasions duringthe ber officersand NguyenVanMan formermayorofDa Nang trialislikely to raise furor timewouldleadtotalkswithto amongoppositionelements p-ticularly militantBuddhistspar- the LowerHouse andoppositiondeputiesinthe to projectedpauseinVietnamduringthetothe bombing ofNorthday:effortsconducted prior TheUpperHouseinLowerHousehascallingjoined holi Theyaresimilar withthe Soviet totheChristmas truce period mobilizationdecreegovernmentreviewofthe Bothhouses proachesalthough there15are lastYearalongthislineisnoFurtherSovietap- haveclaimedthatthedecree expected proval becauseithaveinvitedgove rn-ap-an atHanoi behest 3.5(c) ment representatives toappear before thentode fendit
# SECRET
Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 Dec67
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830 "WEEKLY SUMMARY_15472969_.pdf" | {
"Who": "Unknown",
"What": "Weekly summaries on military activity in South Vietnam, potential Communist offensives, political developments, coordination between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, efforts for holiday truces and talks",
"When": "December 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Far East", "Quang Tri Province", "Demilitarized Zone", "Phnom Penh", "Cambodian territory", "Hue", "Da Nang", "Saitozl", "Khe Sanh", "Mekong Delta", "Soviet", "Hanoi", "Cambodian soil", "Lang Vei"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
The President's Daily Brief
Secret 20 December 1967
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
# DAILY BRIEF
|20 DECEMBER 1967|
|---|
|1. South Vietnam|3.3(h)(2)|
|2. Philippines|3.3(h)(2)|
---
# Communist China
Preparations for the next nuclear test are progressing.
# Common Market
Britain's application to join the Common Market has been formally vetoed by France. This was an avowal of Paris' isolated position--and as such was a "success" for the Five. The ball is now in their court. Their ability to do anything will probably depend on Germany's attitude. The Germans may try to play the crisis. Bonn's partners among the Five, however, are likely to attempt to smooth things over. German...
# Greece
Negotiations for the King's return have so far run into a stone wall. King Constantine has described the junta's latest terms as a deliberate attempt to humiliate and completely unacceptable. Other emissaries, however, still want to try and have the junta appear to their hands, and recognition seems still possible.
---
# Czechoslovakia
|6.|The off, last central week committee meeting post- from is apparently about to come and rancorous divisions among some duce the leadership fireworks. Thenow probably rumor mill pro- asis working overtime, but it sort looks if siveresult the compromise might that the has enabled inconclu-of the re- ime to muddle throu h ast crises.|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)| |
# Yemen
3.3(h)(2)
# Congo
|8.|Schramme and in his Rwanda. mercenaries are wants is languishing and in making them back get noisesthe discuss Kayibanda two his in about Congo sending for Mobututrial, army to hand them them if still refuses to over. The leaders were to the problem again today.|
|---|---|
|3.5(c)| |
---
#
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
20 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
20 December 1967
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
No Sign continuing of Give: North Vietnamese spokesmen abroad are to parrot the hard line on settling the war. They precede that insist in any an unconditional end to bombing must negotiations, and their terms. settlement a must be in accordance with last During Tran week, a lengthy Viet Dung, refused interview counselor with a journalist of Hanoi's representation for in France, to consider any suggestions achieving a settlement except on claimed the of well-known the basis the Communist positions. He and placed that blame American war squarely on the US the make is it to destroy North Vietnam's sovereignty influence." and part of the that US the "sphere much Dung also claimed Liberation but Front was unable stronger agree than "Saigon clique" he proposal to to or "compromise" to North even comprehend--a safely that, agree if to this was so, the Vietnamese could a government in the South. Communists Front of are Anniversary the using the Propaganda: anniversary seventh of the founding Liberation Front war. voice to their determination to press on with the
---
# TOP
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
* * *
Poles Talk to Governorthe Romney on Vietnam: on "feeds Foreign Minister Rapacki of is told preventing which Governor Sundayon choosing Rapacki a that the is itself," point "mechanism" at work has and repeatedly went how bombing. Rapacki, escalation, made on negotiations-- before. give words after his begin guarantees carefully, to say that he could no as to soon negotiations would cessation of How-
would a become in said unconditional ever, experience" weeks an would elapse and halt and the ing only that knows possible." Rapacki few after the last had year "reasons" half before a that negotiations to "sufficient for the "think- bombing, well added He "US Government lead perfectly that stopping the bombing would to negotiations."
3.3(h)(2)
* * *
-2-
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
|3.3(h)(2)|Miscellaneous Comments on Living Conditions:|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|Refugees details further who left of the austere life in frequently in the city, Hanoi. Electric power was but that portable generators seemed to take up the slack.|
|3.3(h)(2)| |
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
There was an active black market in Hanoi and that had rationed a right commodity marketeer; was purchased could be by those were to price. Black on I lit relatively actions easy identify that If trans carried out but the street. Marketeer the authorities observed the sale, not black would if even foodstuffs, had be he fined on been caught spot, before. and punished Rice watches other and further, cigarettes, clothing, were popular items on the black market.
3.3(h)(2)
The criterion for determining performed of the size rations was the amount of physical labor
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Officials: Front A 15 Reports on December of Liberation Planned Meeting Front reference Of-with commentary US includes of reports the a first planned Vietnamese between meeting Communist US and Front to officials in Saigon. The statement tricks that says have "all bankrupt--including deceitful the US aggressor" their vile proposal giving peace act of the rise gone to a myth about the so-called of Front to send representatives to the United Nations, the and Embassy the points. on about these in Front's Saigon. Representatives It went statement coming The of on to Front underscore did not to comment to the independence determination importance and "Vietnamese order and the voice "surge the forward the on all of battlefields" the in the people" to "realistically to greet" anniversary of Front.
3.5(c)
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602384].pdf" | {
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Daily briefings on various countries including South Vietnam, Philippines, Communist China, Common Market, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yemen, Congo, North Vietnam",
"When": "20 December 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Philippines", "China", "Britain", "France", "Germany", "Greece", "Czechoslovakia", "Yemen", "Congo", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT no: 150
SUBJECT: QUANG DA Special Zone; Organization, Geographic Boundaries, and Military Units Within.
DATE OF INFO: 5 February 1968
DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 17 February 1968 (C) on the Central Vietnam staff
DATE: 35/3/68
NUMBER OF PAGES: 3
DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 17 February 1968 (C) on the Central Vietnam staff
DATE: 35/3/68
NUMBER OF PAGES: 3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2019/04/17
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758625
The QUANG DA-DANANG Special Zone was established during November and December 1967 to take charge of all military/political activities within the zone at the request of the Central Vietnam (Regions Bo) Staff, an organization which ranks Region V over VIET GONG (VC) Military character of the Government of Vietnam and Allied forces in the area. Its creation was a response to the large and modern including the large installations in DANANG Municipality. Considered fully developed by January 1968, the Special Zone is composed of 11 Districts: VC HOA VANG, DIEN BAN, DAI UC, DUY XUYEN, TAY GIANG, BAC GIANG, NAM GIANG, HOI and Districts 1, 2 and 3. District 1 runs from the HUE and District 3 comprises the DONG GIANG area of NHON NUOC. The VC established in conjunction to THUY TU; District 2 falls within DANANG Municipality, BAC GIANG and NAM GIANG are newly created districts which TAY GIANG, are bounded by the THUONG DUC River. Of the 11 districts; District 2 is considered as the most critical. The cadres of District 2 will compose the DANANG Administrative Committee if the VC succeed in their offensive.
The Special Zone has both a headquarters base command staff and a mobile staff. The mobile staff is composed of about 20 officers who have mobile 15-watt radio. The command level, located at QUE SON Mountain, and who operate in DUY XUYEN, AI LOC, and GO NOI areas. DUY XUYEN is staffed by the following personnel: At HQ PHUOC, political officer of field grade rank, also a committee member of Military Region 5; Senior Colonel HOE, Assistant Chief; Colonel VO THU, Chief of the Special Zone; Major DUC, Chief of Staff; Major HOAN, Chief of the Staff Section; Lieutenant Colonel DU, Chief of the Political section; Chief of the Rear Service Section (name unknown).
---
f0_r Release: 2019/>(_)_4_/717 CO0758625
Appr0\v/ed,
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Page 3
The following VC units are in pe QUANG BA/DANANG zone and are available for use in pe general offensive.
A. Sapper Battalion T87, Composed of approximately 350 people and located norp of DANANG in pe NAM 0 area.
B. Sapper Battalion T89, composed of about 350 people and located in HAO THO and HOA THAI Villages near DANANG City.
C. Two rocket regiments (575 and 577) whose total strengp is approximately 2,100 men. Bop units are located west of DANANG City at approximately AT 810760.
D. Provincial Mobile Battalion R20 composed of approximately 500 people. It is located soup of DANANG and is operating in GO' A NOI, DU! XUYEN, and DAI LOC Districts.
E. Provincial Mobile Battalion R25, composed of about 500 troops. Located soup of DANANG, it is operating in HOI AN and DUY XUYEN Districts.
F. Norp Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment 31 which infiltrated from Norp Vietnam during January 1968 is located at AN HOA Village area; DUY XUYEN Districts.
G. One Special Mobile Company located inside DANANG City for pe General offensive, led by Company Commander HIEN, and Assistant Commander THAN who is also a DANANG City Security Committee Member. The strengp of pis company is approximately 140 people, most being between pe ages of 16 and 17. Their mission is to destroy gas tanks, power stations, and to occupy pe DANANG weapons depot during pe offensive. In addition, pey are to discover enemy intelligence personnel and peir employees and to eiper assassinate or kidnap pem. The unit is armed wip pistols (wip silencers) submachine guns, and TNT.
H. The DANANG City Combined Operational Section. This unit is charged wip pe mission of proselyting bop GVN military personnel and all classes of civilian personnel wipin pe DANANG City area.
X 3 3(h)(2) QUANG_DA_SPECIAL_ZONE__OR[15617798].pdf | {
"Who": "Central Vietnam (Regions Bo) Staff, South Vietnam Report no: 150",
"What": "Organization, Geographic Boundaries, and Military Units Within QUANG DA Special Zone",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["QUANG DA-DANANG Special Zone", "DANANG Municipality", "QUE SON Mountain", "DUY XUYEN", "AI LOC", "GO NOI", "NAM 0 area", "HAO THO", "HOA THAI Villages", "AN HOA Village", "DONG GIANG", "NHON NUOC"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005072858
|0.0|nzguzlssssn ossosss|zx K 0|L DE|
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|TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM-|SSO ACSI DA.|SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION|AFSSO USAF|
|CWO|A| | |
|DIA/ISC|A| | |
|JCS|A| | |
|NIC|A| | |
|NSA COMMAND CENTER|A| | |
|STATE (RC1)| | | |
|CIA-DCI| | | |
|ZEM-| | | |
|CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN-BLUESEM SECTION 1 OF 2-|33-(h)(2)-| | |
|012 TDCS 514/04205-as (ADVANCE) REPORT-CLASS-CONFIDENTIAL-NO-FOREIGN-DISSEM-| | | |
|COUNTRY|SOUTH VIETNAM| | |
II CORPS SITUATION REPORT AS-OF 13 HOURS 8 MARCH
SUBJECT ACQ SOURCE
1. THE SITUATION WAS GENERALLY QUIET CITY, PLEIKU THROUGHOUT THE II PROVINCE, AND KONTUM CITY, KONTUM PROVINCE, CORPS AREA DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS, PLEIKU REPORTED MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS, WHILE PHAN THIET CITY, THREATS OF LARGE SCALE SMALL ARMS FIRE-NEAR THE EXPERIENCED ATTACKS CONTINUE HAVE REPORTED IN THE HIGHLANDS AND SOME UNEASINESS NOTICEABLE II CORPS LOCAL POPULACE, A CERTAIN AREAS, PEOPLE IN THE COASTAL PROVINCES IN APPEAR TO BE VIETNAMESE CONG (VC) PROVINCE SEEM TO ATTACKS, THAT FORWARD, FROM FEAR OF THE VC CAN STRIKE AT TREMENDOUS. ECONOMICALLY. THE VIET THE PREPARING FORTIFICATIONS FOR IN. PHU YEN HAVE ADDITIONAL BELIEVE MADE A HILL AND THEIR LEAP ATTITUDES OF ADVERSE OF 7 MARCH, PLEIKU CITY, PLEIKU VARY ARE CONVINCED THE VC-TO BELIEF THE U,S, IS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE THE ROUNDS OF BZMM MORTAR FIRE, PRESSURE AT HOME, AS YET, NIGHT PROVINCE, RECEIVED SO NO CASUALTIES HAD BEEN REPORTED AND ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE WAS INFLICTED ON THE AREA, ONE ENEMY ROCKET 5, MACV HEADQUARTERS, KONTUM 8 MARCH, ROUND AT 0110 DURING LOCATED AROUND KONTUM CITY, HOURS, NO DAMAGE REPORTED TO THE INSTALLATION, HAMLETS THE NIGHT OF 7 MARCH, ENEMY FORCES ACTION HAS BECOME A INITIAL TET FOOD WHILE IN OF ENTERED NUMEROUS THIS TYPE SINCE THE START OF THE BUY OR TAKE AND DAK. TO HAS A, ATTACKS, ENEMY BEENTHALTED COPYROAD OF INTERDICTION BY ENEMY THE TROOPS PROPAGANDIZE, HAMLETS, BECAUSE TRAVEL BETWEEN RECRUIT, AND KONTUM CITY MINES,
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005072858
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I IN DARLAC PROVINCE, 1949/29°J2§€8NuR To ADDITIONAL ENEMY DEPLOY AROUND THE CITY OF BAN. UNITS HAVE BEEN REPORTED INFILTRATING SOME OF THESE NEW PROVINCES. BELIEVED TO BE OF REGIMENTAL SIZE.
WEEK ON 7BAN ME THUOT EXPERIENCED ITS TO REMAIN NIGHT OF THE ALTHOUGH MARCH, THE PEOPLE CONTINUE OF NEW ENEMY ATTACKS. HAMLETS VC CONTROL, THE PROVINCE. CELEBRATING TAKING THE AND ARE EXPLOITING ARE MANY VILLAGES OF THE TET THROUGHOUT ADVANTAGE AND THIS CONTROL IN THEY ATTACKS. TYPE AREAS TELLING VILLAGERS THE VC ARE BY THEIR "VICTORY" IN RECEIVED ATTACK FROM ME THUOT AND OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL ARE PROMISING THAT VIETNAM (COSVN) SOUTH THE PEOPLE OF THE ON 5 MARCH A SERIOUS TO ORDERS BAN LAUNCHED WHICH ME THUOT, THEY HAVE REPUBLIC LOCATION 12 (ARVN) AN ARVN NORTH THAT OF VIETNAM KILOMETERS BATTALION. SAME ARMY AT A NEW ATTACKS WILL OPERATION OF BAN WAS STARTED DEFEAT TO BEEN DEPLOYED RESULT-TWO BE SHORTLY. AN RESULTED IN BATTALIONS ENEMY CITY IS AS A IN THE OF THESE HAVE AREA AGAINST THE ARVN ADDITIONAL WELL-FORTIFIED THE FORCE. NOW MUCH MORE TROOPS LEAVING BAN ME THUOT, GROUND ASSAULT. VULNERABLE TO AN GENERALLY QUIET DURING FIRE WERE 5. THE SITUATION THE PHAN THIET, BINH THUAN PROVINCE WAS ENEMY IN NIGHT OF 7 MARCH. WEST TO NORTH- AND SMALL PROBING REPORTED WERE ALSO DETECTED, SEPARATE INCIDENTS OF SCATTERED SMALL ARMS ACTIONS.
NEST OF THE CITY LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE. MORTARING AN ENEMY BUT THESE WERE OF 6. 7 DUE PRIMARILY TO THE 4 MARCH OF THE THE LOKVL POPULACE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF OF CAM RANH GROUND ASSAULT HAVE SPREAD THROUGH AIRFIELD, WIDESPREAD RUMORS CAM RANH AREA. THE REPORTED THE AND NEW FACES" IN HOMES OF THE AN PEOPLE HAVE SEAT LAM DON, CITY QUANG BY THE MANY HAMLETS NEAR RESIDENTS ARE FORTIFYING THEIR OF "STRANGE GOVERNMENT PROVINCES, THREE WERE NOT HIT DUC AT BA NGOI. PROVINCES IN IITHUAN, WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE AND RECRUITMENT OFFENSIVE, HAVE ALL REPORTED ACTIVITY IS IN VC ACTIVITY HAMLET COUNTRYSIDE. 7. NINH CORPS GENERALLY THIS ENEMY'S. TET THE FORM OF IN ENTRY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSEf- EODD COLLECTION. or YOUTHS. CENSUS GRIEVANCE THERE INCREASED VC UCTIVITY, IN THE THE UNEASINESS WHILE OF VIETNAM- s;HHH2) sxns As INDICATE or THE IS A GENERAL REPORTS A THESE THERE HAS REMAIN STEADY EROSION _HIaHwAYs - cevN> ORIENTED, PROVINCES BEEN A BASICALLY GOVERNMENT RESULT PEOPLE IN IN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE IN NINH FOR THE MOST PART, BUT THHAN, ROUTES 1 GVN'S ABILITY AND PROTECT DONG, ROUTE 20, AND.11, IN QUANG NUC TRAFFIC 'IS TO IN LAM THEM. ARE SUBJECT PHU YEN PROVINCE, APPROXIMATELY 3200 HOMES HAVE .OPENT0-CONSTANT VC HARASSMENT-AND ATTACKS BEEN DESTROYED, As A RESULT OF THE SERIES OF TAXATION. 0N TUY HOA, WITH 1600 PEOPLE CURRENTLY LISTED HAVE owN As REFUGEES. FURNISHED QUARTERS. MANY OF THOSE PEOPLE FORMERLY LISTED HAVE BUILT SOME TYPE OF SHELTER OR As REFUGEES THEIR BEEN TEMPORARY NITH THE U.S. OUTSTANDING HAS BEEN "A THREE SECTOR S-2-ADVISOR HAS SAID PROVIDING THE DAY, THAT POLICE CO0PERATION_"- BEST DESCRIBED THAT HAS BEEN INFORMATION As THE BODIES WITH THE RECEIVED. RING CIRCUS", NITH BUT I POLICE DURING SOME OF THE TUY HOA IS PEOPLE-GOING To szz BEING LIKE AND wATcHINe THE FIGHTING, AT NIGHT THERE IS ALMOST NOTHING MOVING EXCEPT-THE-POLICE. A
GP—1\_ Xerox froH'AH1ck Copy Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072858
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072858
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ZEM N F I B E N T I-A L HOFORN-DiSSEM'FINAL SECTION OF TWO C-9 CITE TDCS 514/04203-63 (ADVANCE) IN 9. 'ECONOMICALLY, THE CONCENSUS AMONG VIETNAMESE CITIZENS TUY HOA, PHU YEN PROVINCE, IS THAT THE VC HAVE MADE A TREMENDOUS LEAP FORWARD. 'AFTER THE TET ATTACK, MANY OF THE MILITARY UNITS WERE PULLED IN TO PROTECT THE LARGER TOWNS-AND CITIES. AT THE END OF THE FALL HARVEST THE VC OBTAINED AN ESTIMATED 450 TONS OF RICE. OF THE 24,500 TONS OF RICE EXPECTED FROM THE WINTER/SPRING HARVEST WHICH HAS NOT YET ENED, IT FOR, WITH BETWEEN 4,000 TO 4,500 TONS GOING TO THE UNACCOUNTEDIS ESTIMATED THAT AT LEAST 6,000 TONS WILL BE VC. POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, THE VC HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE PEOPLE OF TUY HOA THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE ANY PLACE AND ANY TIME AT THEIR OWN CHOOSING AND THAT THE POPULATED URBAN AREAS ARE NO LONGERTHAT SECURE. .EVEN IF THE PEOPLE REALIZE THIS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THEEY WILL STAY IN THEIR RURAL TOWNS AND VILLAGES FOR THEY ARE AWARE THAT MOST OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED". ATTITUDE OF THTHE VC, TOWARD THE GVN AND TOWARD THE U.S. ISTHE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, ENDANGERING THEIR LIVES AND PROPERTY.PEOPLE IN PHU YEN PROVINCE, BOTH RURAL AND URBAN, TOWARD IS'A REAL FEAR OF THE VC AND WHAT THEY CAN DO. VARIED. “THERE THOSE WHO HAVE RELATIVES_AMONG THE VC RANKS ARE MORE INCLINED TO LEAN TOWARD THE VC, YET THEY DO NOT WANT THE VC IN THEIR AREA FOR FEAR.OF REPRISALS BY FREINDLY FORCES. ‘TOWARD THE GVN, THERE ARE THOSE WHO FEEL THAT THE GVN PERFORMED CREDITABLY WHILE OTHERS LOOK AT THE GVN AS DISUNITED AND CORRUPT,-ONLY INTERESTED IN BECOMING RICH AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RURAL PEOPLE AS A RESULT OF THE WAR. TOWARD THE U.S., SOME BELIEVE- THAT THE U.S. PERMITTED THE PENETRATION OF TOWNS AND CITIES: THE BEHAVIOR OF THE ANTI—COMMUNIST ELEMENTS OF SVN. TO DETERMINE THE FAAITHFULNESS OF THE BUDDHIST CHURCH ANDOTHERS BELIEVE THAT THEE U.S. IS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE OF ADVERSE PREESSURE ._u FROM THE PEOPLE IN THE U.S.
10. [:::::]n1sszm= IFFV conns 11 CORPS
SAIGON DISSEM: STATE MACV CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLTT 7TH AF II_CORPS_SITUATION_REPORT[15617943].pdf | {"Who": "CIA, White House Situation Room, DIA/ISC, JCS, NIC, NSA Command Center, State, CIA-DCI", "What": "Vietnam War situation reports, enemy movements, attacks, VC activities, urban areas security", "When": "8 March", "Where": ["White House Situation Room", "Arlington Hall Station", "II Corps", "Pleiku", "Kontum City", "Ban Me Thuot", "Binh Thuan Province", "Cam Ranh Airfield", "Phu Yen Province", "Tuy Hoa"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"} |
"
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} Text: ‘ lu—rhfiuz-H1-»mtJ'JHa-wfilm—£1.34.”...-ul‘--.¢|
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· ENTREI CENTRAL: INTELLIGENCE
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3.5(c)·
35(0)’
0,5, A 'FEEBUABY‘ 1953
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 1130 1150 HOURS 4 FEBRUARY 1968.
SUBJECT PLEIKU PROVINCE SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1130
HOURS 4 FEBRUARY 1968.
ACQ
SOURCE
3.3(h)(2)
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COMMITTEE COMMITTEE II, II, VHOWHO WAS CAPTUREDL______~
3.3(h)(2) ISj
JANUARY 1968, STATED THAT THAT THE THE AIM AIM OF OF THE THE PRESENT PRESENT ACTION ACTION IS
fro'AcHIEVE TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS SET FORTH GOALS SET FORTH IN IN RESOl.UT ION RESOLUTION 13
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772368..... ··~ ..... --,..... .
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772368
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CONFI AL NWEM
|CENTRAL|NORTH VIETNAM COMMUNIST CLAO (LAO DONG) PARTY, TH1~T THAT IS, 1;|
|---|---|
|GUIDE PEOPLE TO STRIKE AND DEMONSTRATE AND TO . TO LIBERATE ALL| |
|ARE/'. 5. WAS MAS SCHEDULED TO LAST SEVEN DAYS AND WILL EN~ END ON 5 FEB.| |
|ALLIED ACTION THIS WEEK VEEH RESULTED.IN ALMOST COMPLETE Ag| |
|AN:H!ULATION OF THE VC H-15 LOCAL FORCE BATTALION <BN>: #%! ..<~:| |
|TH:: TRF :.'('~~ANDING CCMMANDING OFFICER WAS MAS CAPTLJRED AND ONLY 23 25 MEN ARE UNACCOUNTEDUNACCOUNTED :2..;-·.. ,--., FOR.| |
|THE VC 407TH ABTTH AND 408TH ADBTH SAPPER SAPPER BNS BNS SUFFERED SEVERESEVERE GT LOSSES:| |
|THEIR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY IS EXTREMELY LIMITED. ER.| |
|THE 4TH AND THE 5TH BNS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY CNVA) <NVA> 11%| |
|958 953 RF.GIMENT <REGT> (REGT) AND THE NVA_52ND32ND REGT ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN THE NORT H~IEST ERN PART REPORT _OF OF PLE !KU PROV INCE. ACCORD ING TO A SPECIAL POLICE AGENT REPORT OF 4 4 FEBRUARY, TWO VC ' y” BATTALIONSBATTALIONS ARE ABOUT ABOUT 15 MILES NORTHWEST NORIHUEST OF PLEIKU CITY AND E POSE A POSSIBLE THREAT TO THE PLEIKU AREA. ·AN -AN ATTACK ATTACH AGAINST AGAINST FPS?| |
|PLEIKU CITY ON THE NIGHT OF 4 FEBRUARY IS A DEFINITE ISA DEFINITE POSSIBILITY • ;1| |
---
ROADBLOCKS
ROADBLOCKS HAVE BEEN SET UP/ALL DP/Kfi INGRESS ROUTES INTO THE CITY, AND ALL VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGNARDS ARE EE n1r. STOPPED AND SEARCHED. THE POLICE AND ARVN HAVE COMPLETED THEIR SEARCH OF MOST HOMES, HAVE APPREHENDED MANY VC SUSPECTS AND HAVE LOCATED SEVERAL CACHES.
REPORT CLASS
CONFIDENTIALDIA-NO N9_£93£IeN—eTSSEfiFORE Hrn 81 SSE':f'
ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED JCS TO NIC WHITE OCI. STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA
CONFIDENTIAL "PLEIKU PROVINCE SITUATION[15561453].pdf" | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State",
"What": "Intelligence Information regarding the situation in Pleiku Province, South Vietnam",
"When": "4 February 1968",
"Where": ["Pleiku Province, South Vietnam", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
Secret
3.5(c)
# UNTEDESLATES Current Intelligence Digest
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Secret
November 1967
No 0218/67
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718 3.5(c)
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718SEERET
# C 0 N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200EDT)
# GENERAL
|Vietnam|Situation|Report|
|---|---|---|
|(Page1)| | |
SECRET
Nov 67 Approved for Release:2018/06/28 Co6662718igest Page
---
# Vietnam
North Vietnam: Moscow delegation has top-drawer renew anti-government activities arrived in Vietnamese to participate militant orders have come the officials. According to Saigon headquarters, these come from the faction calling for a step-up in include activities to anti-government activ-immolations.
The First Secretary Le Duan delegation headed by The local police evidence of who claim to party includes Defense Minister Vo other politburo have substantial members Giap and Foreign Minister two Viet Cong efforts to manipulate Nguyen Buddhist organizations in Hue Nguyen Duy Trinh have taken measures to prevent.
The Soviets serious trouble greet the North Vietnamese trotted out their top brass to lead the reception committee was focused on action Military northern in the South General Secretary Brezhnev the III President Podgorny and Premier Corps are where the Communists Kosygin also met Vietnamese delegation the North Viet-at the airport. Ninh forces time on 31 Special in three days for the attacked the Loc Enemy South Vietnam Police au- the camp and suffered heavy failed again to overrun authorities in Hue believe that militant Buddhists are set to casualties. Over 350 Communist the soldiers have been killed in the two assaults So far.
Nov67
Current SECRET intelligence Digest
Page
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NR
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466630].pdf" | {
"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
"What": "Vietnam situation report, top-drawer anti-government activities in North Vietnam, manipulation efforts by Soviets and Viet Cong, militant Buddhists preventing measures",
"When": "November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Moscow", "Saigon", "Hue"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: F54 CIA,. Approveqfor Release: 2019/04/17 C001
To ssoHHTTE DA‘ ACSI HousE SITUATQ}N Room' sso ARLINGTON HALL STATIQN - AFSSO usAE cwo DIA/ISIC NIC 13526
A DIRNSA COMMAND ‘cENTER'g sTATE (RCI)“' cTA-OCI ZEM COUNTRY souTH VIETNAMEEBRuARY11g§§
001 117
SUJECT- SITUATION REPORT As OF Tqqqgmgpgg LOCAL TIME 17 FEBRUARY 1968 ACQ \/TETNAH SAIGON < 17 FEBR*U}§?_E§;$§§§:1§3_:6‘851_ §!_E_(§} SOURCE THIS IS A AT 1599 HOURS LOCAL T1MEE§LflLfi&§E5RUBBX§l953-
NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF ygQ;£%§§BELIABlflITY SUGGEST THAT A RENEWED ATTACK_ON SAIGON IS IMMIQEN1§@§§§£§£QRTS@POI&T@ TO THE TETH FEBRUARY As THE DATEy,QIEERg§fiQ§§§gfiAD£%QQ}Q§IED T TH: 11TH,‘l2TH, 15TH AND-15TH.
Hou:v:R, no HoT RT“THIS TIME*SUGGEST7THE§QMNiNENCE§&EfiANfi§TTACK
IN PRECINCTS ONE THROUGH FIVE MAY BE H0nTE1EDgs0HET1HEENExT WEEK TO ALLOW movEHEwT BY THE PoPuLAcE-’WMV_““ We UNTIL 2100 HouRs. <s0uRcE= AMERICAN
OF THE wTRTER5§PRTNefieAmRA1eN FURTHER WIYHIN THE ERAHEHQRH SIGNIFICANT vTET come /NORTH v1ETNAHEsE@ARMRwAcTTvTTY. CAN BE EXPECTED. EAvoR OF A QUICK E0EE0w;uR;T0 THE;TETh0FFENsTvE.MOREOVER, sTRATEeTc AND@$ACTICAL#CONSIDERATIONS HETEH HEAVILY TH IN THTs REGARD, HowEvER, THE ENEMY MUST REALIZE'THAI&IHE_LONGER HE WAIT5, THE HQRE DIFFICULT MILITARY TAsKHHE;wILLHHAvE@~ THE FIRST ATTACK, THE TET OFFENSIVE, WAS LAUNCHED*UNDER@TBE c0vER OF THE TET HQLIDAY, A KNOWN PERIOD OF SECURITT RELAXATION AND c0uRTRYTTDE CONCERN ONLY WITH cELEBRATT0N.REwHIEE”THE;§EHERAL OUTLINES 0E THE TET OFFENSIVE WERE DEscRTBEn¢To ENEMYECADRES IN SOME cAsEs LONG BEFORE THE ATTAcH wAsTEAuNcHE0;fiIHE;sREcTTTc'T .»g%H§%EER@;@§%@E§§EEE<H DETAILS or TIRE AHD PLACE WERE NOT PAssEn OUT UNTIL THE FTHALEMQMEHTTEEHTTHTH.THE GENERAL PLAN, WAS EHvTsTOREO,IT How APPEARS ERQR-RRTs0HER;IHTERR0eAT10NsiTHAT A SECOND ATTAcH WHETHE&@§§§§BhEN¥NQ§:§§@A}§§@lN€’ EFFECT, FGLLOUING THE RTETTARY EATLURE@0E§£§E$F¢RST?sTAeETTI§T NOT HHoHH,-
FIELD DISSEH: sTATE usHAcv 7TH ATRfiEQRcE§cTwcPAC§RAcEET' PACAF
45 O lp’r°v'e‘ for Release Data 1997
for Release: 2019/04/17 C001268903E!iHir'lIII‘||| SITUATION_REPORT_AS_OF_13[15617756].pdf | {
"Who": "CIA",
"What": "SITUATION REPORT regarding potential attack on Saigon during Tet Offensive in South Vietnam",
"When": "17 February 1968",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Arlington Hall Station", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # NANO INTERROGATION REPORT
This report is the result of the interrogation activity conducted by the National Interrogation Center under the auspices of the National Special Activities Group (U.S.), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the joint auspices of the National Interrogation Center and the Central Intelligence Organization.
COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM (SVN), SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SUBJECT: Reaction to Infiltration - December 1967
DATE OF REPORT: 26/1/68
NIC REPORT NO: 099/68
NIC CASE NO: 26/1/68
DATE OF INFO: 15 January 1968 (I-U), December 1967
PLACE: QUANG (I-V), DANANG, NAM
OF ACQUISITION: DANANG, NAM
This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 1 January 1968 in DANANG, Municipalit;y. The source is not available. Source was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 14 January 1968 in DANANG, NAM for further exploitation.
In preparation for infiltration in April 1967, Source received political indoctrination that emphasized the poorness of U.S. combat techniques and told the soldiers to remain as close as possible to the U.S. troops in order to avoid bombings and shellings.
Source's unit had not had to be used in combat yet. The cadres said that four-fifths of SVN had been liberated and a few units had to avoid combat. The death ratio in SVN units was extremely low and even in large victories, the unit suffered few casualties.
Source's major complaint was the heavy load and sickness. Source's unit was only called to the battlefield when necessary. During infiltration, Source read GVN leaflets secretly and was strongly affected by one that showed a corpse outside DUC CO Post. Food and medicine were also in short supply on the trip.
DISTRIBUTION: US MACV, US EMBASSY (OSA)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENTS: None
---
BegInning_from the deyhe received the pre-infiltration course
Afterthe for his family of his coming departurecourse, stay if in he NVN,whethergo He felt thatitwas or not he insigted hie rice ration would gurely be cut He felt he should wag his fate. or not the completion of the pre-infiltrationcut •he Bhould ask his superiors toallow him to stay in NVN,becaube if that it askhis his fate. would ration superiors He became hesitantand undecisive whether He became hesitant to and undecisive to allow him because if he insisted rice surely be .After completion of visitpre-infiltration the course, ba wesallowed to gootherwas wished. be allowed was Sourceto free .to inform his15 days leave hisnever wanted tolet his his aged parentskow about hi8 departure,to coming departureLike familye Like the other men,he wasfor the men, he free .to inform and never familywanted his that of for SVN,1f he wished SVN, Source was Bad and lethis however _ them,onesince he realized thatthiswa8 probably the lasttimeof the however, since before be returnedtohisunit ,he informedthem dey this the last he cried 'would see3.3(h)(2) bitterly,day ..,them, regretfvlly infiltration. infiltration.one whereas his father remained guiet _before Upon learning thisto Source's Upon learning be fatherhis this, returned Source' 9 motherhis unit, mother Source ga1d that hig parents he ito:: :: :: r•cried 3 .3(h)(2) also regrett\;ll,y pitterly., whereas accepted his departure &8 inevitable_ his remained departurequiet. Sour ~as parents .a.1.so . accepted as inevitable..
builtup thelr troops 'morale.. The infiltretion was thoroughly prepared ahead of time. Of the pre-infiltration course,companyand battalion J'he intiltra~ion was thorougltl.y prepared companyand battalion cadres ceagelesslyperioda.head of time. cadres Throughout the period ot the pre-infiltration course; Inell politicalindoctrination sessions, theyceaselessly muld never and the telling would never misg telling the soldiers thatthe U.S.combat techniques wereup their troops•morale. In all political indoctrination sessions, they needed todo miss very poor and then U,S. bombingsand ghellingsto U.S. very poor do during the actionweg during u.s~soldiers soldiers the U.S, soldiers werenot the were not that well-seasoned, 48 clobe to U,S,elementswell-seasoned, the only thing they the combat techniques the only thing were they said that four-fifths of SVN had beenmanage 88 possible, four-firths fight as possible, needed been 'uged in'U,S. of et all, because sometimesthoseunits Jaarm U.S. to then the bombings was action at SVN had because liberated., would hardly and to manage to stay as to ahellings liberated,and probably Source' 8elementswould hardly barm them.stay close to them. .s Cedres unit Cadres ····..:would that ·· ··nev~rWANVC Unitain SVN wasextremelylow., cagualties .those neversJtld the called to the sufferedextremely minor very sometimes the Consequently, according no1:.have ~een ·usedto in ' combat. combat . all, They explained thatthe percentage of deathof They been e.xp],.ainedrew infiltrated units had Largeunit low, a few infiltrated unit830 far had that and probably percentage unitsSource• of so death had far of ..' •. . . .:·· ·,v!:c;toriea . ... '· . , only :called ·and .yetSVNwas to the' cedrescadres, in Source' g unit would the battlefield when very necesbary .Conseauently, Source .• s unit very when would ! had large accordi~J 3.3(h)(2) 3 .3(h)(2) opl.y.,· ~' to the battlefield necessary • ..really tried .22 kilos, whichhe had' tocarry &llthe On the" infiltration route_ the first hardehip he experienced was the heavySource..During the ~-;:;''./,·~Q~.~~i( i~fil::t,r~t:i~n \ ,/_:, ~ '.•.~; ... really,a~ut ........prac .tice tried. 80 thathe would notgettired. ;.:lnd %1 aboutcarrying Same a8 the othere,he would throw off 8omestones from practice of carrying heavyth~ :.first .ot .o.f 22 The same ld.los, · which he. would loadsothers, tired.·the all throw way .tosome the'WOuld havetask~ z:oute~ heavy loada prior to theinfiltration, he hadprior t;o .hardship carry to to infiltration, SVN .. he to he the weyto Source never . waa..the stones~~vythe. During never . · to _carry es if hehad ' been torturedterribly. his . basket heavy ·that carry heavy things8 verylong The a. verynot ' get way, as the long way,but when hehe would He never thought he wuld heve He, never wasputto he well actual thought totheactual task, off he from . · tcf slippery hill.things been he felt terribly._especially when he climbedbut when he was put 3.3(h)(2) he telt as hill. if he Then, beginning\ had· tortured es_in in Lao8, he other infiltratorswereno driedfood slipperyinfiltrators other Then,were beginning be deadHe was exhausted stay 1still triedtofollow hib not bombed or ambushed . nQ.tothersnoticed ·were that still during Sourcecatch ableSourceused to reed GVN Leafleta secretly,wnitwa 83.3(h)(2) the : infiltration., to used up the was the to the Group. leaflets Group:-_ Fortunately,hi8and one of them very strongly affected him. QOmbedor .ambushed. This read on the written the SVN people who were lying dead within the fenceof to Governm~nt of them verystNngly the affected of DUC CO post ;on the back of the him. really Living in happine8s; that green aged mother that deceased within the deceased soldier' 8 letter to hie aged mother written in prose. really hewes deceived by the NVN green fieldsand gcenes in SVN were too lying dead the fence letter NVN Government to liberate DUCCO post; his back in SVN people to prose. leaflet He thought Hewas thought t~at he was deceived by the fieldsto liberate the in liberation; NVN,and he who were beautiful tobe had seen gentle and beloved mothere in SVN jugtlike his mother in NVN,and he b1autifulliving not gentlein smeared tobe smeared with blood because of the fooligh liberation; the the happiness; with that blood because SVN of by and the like NVN. Government was 80 scenes that could not understand why a had seen and beloved bloody liberation by the NVN mother mothers liberation in just his.Gove~nment in he necesgary. coμld why bloody the was so n'-cessary.I.~..
---
# REPORT NO: 099/68
Page 3
|6|In addition to psychological effects, Source found that his living conditions were except that 700 psychological According to sort of galty soup eat living were not receive poor-grade at of not pleasant at all. the they tried to prepare actually daily of to all. rice According to daily rations effects., Source found each rations., receive man was 500 or that each man was supposed each his conditions supposed to receive 700 grams of rice but actually each would receive about grams of poor-grade rice only. grams rice to some. 8:etas, they only. but They had no other food to eat with the rice, would about 500 or 600 600 sick were issued medicine, prepare They had no other not all their stomachs vegetables to make soup vegetables except their nu were get even medicine, Medicine was in who were not soup so that to even vitamins but they were allowed to rest only the stomachs. soup. they make tried In some areas, they could not even find consumable wild Irt Medicine 8 on 8 sort could salty where es wa8 in short something who were not really sick never short supply; only the seriously supply; really food to even find sick seriously unit 80 thet they could with they consumable wild the rice., could hoped to get locations quartering location: hoped sic~ issued vitamins whereas those but they were allowed to reat and stay in the unit and stay never in the|
|---|---|
|7|Source said that he could judge his comrades' reactions through their bold words, said that he while could in judge NVN hi s comrades' know the situation very well, reactions situation through their bold . _·, :·· .: wrds , - Previously Previously while in NN they did not but 8ince they-. judgement properly, in they arrived in SVN, Source strongly believed that they could use SVN, Source strongly lmow the they did not that very well, their judgement properly, although the majority of them are very young; from their since arrived majority believed they young:, could use from 17 to 23. Some openly said that they would not of them ar~ although the would from 17 s~w to 23. Some openly the thinge they hed been promised .a~d that they not believe anything until they believe anything until they gaw or received the or received things they took place only in NVN _ had been promised.|
|8|Ledej there were no more deserters; because from there it wuld be8 real problem notic~d. Source noticed that degertiong took Sourcethere that desertions place only in there desert NVN. it of seasoning real into As they entered into entered Ws~ problem for for were them to go back to NVN, ii' them the the to were baek no more deserters; go to NVN taking they if they wished to because wis~ed grams . from to desert. would Measures Measures a · · · pwdar from the goldiers against desertion soldiers applied (the amount of geasoning powder Bach s3ldier was by because with this seasoning pwder he could away 300 of seasoning isgued before the infiltration) 90ll it for 60 NVN piastres which WJs still in NVN) ; and spend entrusting way beok to his native village (1f he wee enough for NVN); and by entrusting the sell · for native ini'iltration), which because seasoning him to NVN piastres the amount of was emugh with for him to spend on the way this powder each powder he wa.s seasoning soldier on the could reliable men to guard the others back to his village others he• (if was still in by the reliable men to guard the|
|9.|.Before arriving in Laos, Source had little hope that he would be eble to route and wa8 told that he Source return to NVN, because he met a to and higher would be allowed cadres r,turn to and was told beaLlowed to return to NVN ro.ute s~me soldiers would combat units in SVN. However after they had turned OvBr NVN, because cadres combat unitshim that ranking NVN, ai'ter that the cadres ranking from Assistant Platoon Leader the met hard-core from cadres Assistant on the Platoon turned Leader the goldiers to and the higher to to in return SVN. after to However J when arriving in Laos he met when arriving thib wa8 m they had in Lao8 over he met longer happening. some other cadres who told hin that after 2 other who told 2 September 1967 September 1967 this was no|
|10.|Speaking of the treatment le>nger happening. treatment of local people, Source 8aid that hi8 infiltretion group did not giyup by they had received to local did ot the go go through any populated erea in SVN said of people., to in be indifferent his probably area Source SVN, but in NVN the treatment but that NVN the infiltration beceubethey given by the people to the troops appeared to be groups at1ll in some arees because in ebpecially those living in MRL;, had borne. given the had received to because the villagers tried to troops many infiltration groups already. and worse appeared indifferent., steal thinge from the already :. and probably worse troop8. still Source said that this rczulted fron the hard life which the NVN people, ti-QC>pa. pe~ple, especially Source said those that livine in MPJ~., from the had borne hard life which the NVN| REACTION-TO-INFILTRATION15478170.pdf | {
"Who": ["National Interrogation Center", "National Special Activities Group (U.S.)", "Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)", "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)"],
"What": ["Reaction to Infiltration", "Interrogation Report", "Preparation for Infiltration", "Living Conditions", "Deserters Measures", "Treatment of Local People"],
"When": "26/1/68",
"Where": ["NORTH VIETNAM (SVN)", "SOUTH VIETNAM", "LAOS", "DANANG", "QUANG (I-V)", "NAM", "DUC CO Post"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 3
(As of 4:30 P.M. EST)
1. Attacks on the US Embassy and Saigon:
A report on the Saigon offensive spread to Saigon before dawn on January 31 where mortar series in offensive area were launched. The enemy rocket attacks on the US Embassy and ground of Saigon with mortar and small arms fire was abated before dawn. The compound was subjected to fire assaults on Saigon.
2. Viet Cong penetrated the fire compound. The Embassy building and terrorists abated. Later reports indicate that the Viet Cong had apparently "control" of the Embassy. However, Marine guard reinforcements were sent to the compound. No casualties have been reported.
3. According to various reports, shelling and small arms fire have been occurring in and around Tan Son Nhut airfield. Both Bien Hoa and Saigon fire bases have been shelling elsewhere. There have been reports of ARVN casualties under mortar fire.
4. Da Nang: Allied mopping-up operations are sporadic in the Da Nang urban area following exchanges of fire with groups within the city of strategic points. Viet Cong attacks on Da Nang urban area are said to be continuing as of January 30.
5. Civilian casualties and strafing of sections of the city by government planes are reported to be heavy due to the fighting.
---
# TOP SECRET
city,city, 5 _ the provincial capitel5.the tbatan estima tedHoi HoiofprovincialIn installationsQuang An :
30 Januaryattack
200-300inc ludingpe pe_ January of Quang Nam ,on attack troopsnowNam,on pisittbisnow
capital200-300 of enemy it seized
appears numberpat ofa Iliedalliedestimated an ARWNengineerincludingtroopsenemy pe prov -seized
incial hospitaland a number andinstallations batta lion compound prov-
The incial Communist hospital forces_apparentlyARVNengineer stillbattalion control compound. .
The areaCommunist forces apparently still th _e _ area.
Ele - 3.3(h)(2)
Ele~ withto otherhave loca 1involved Cong in the Hoi An action, forces.
InfantrybeenreceTvedhad apparently occupied tion has Division in the that troopsof 7he6 6.Attacks Hestern Highlands :US4th
Kontum era l government Tbe enemyDivision installationsearlyofonoccupiedoutsev - eral tion Kontum city force Infantry hascity government been where theypushedtroops where installations estimatedatbave pushed have they bad apparently two the early battallonstrength_Communists on the 30 Januaryof US 4th January. outofsev- has
The beenbombardmentpositions allied, artilleryand enemy drivenforce, to positions estimated at on thetonorthern andTheViettwothebattalionnorthernstrength,out- attackingdrivencity, skirts ca 1 hasskirts airof the city forceandNorthNVA the was apparently fromNorthbeVietnamese soldiers_-thewbere can wherebe allied.composed can brought brought on composedbear.artillery bothof tacti- tobear Theout-tacti- Cong ' guerrillasfromtbe NVA24th Regiment_official attackingforce was apparently both of Viet latter Cong guerrillas probably and Vietnamese soldiers--the latter 7probably TheDHZ Area :the There24th baveRegiment. reports Sanba1rofThe Sanbthe7. Demilitarizedof STgnTTTcantaction todaybeenno DMZArea: There have been any that1n no sector of reports the significant closedZone due action Pressreportstodayreports bombardmentin anythat sectorKhe of official airDemilitarized confirmed dueorto clarified CommunistsKhestripwasconfirmedor toZone. enemy have have not yet been clarified through official channels _ continuedOtherthe8 8. Other theirRe la tedActionsRelated BroadcastsActions: begunThe begunThe on 30 Januarybave Communists have whichcondemn truce continued The which forces bave centra1havemany simultaneous condemnbroadcasts theirthe launchedmanySimultaneousbroadcast broadcastshave broadcasts,for violating theCommu -a 1lies allies for announced30the violating on thatJanuary,TetTet nist said spring in spring"thecampa ignwe re "punishing'° Vietnam.USOneCommu- nist northern and saidnorthernattacksand in the campaign attackshavecentral a imed at developingthe and were"punishingdeveloping forviolating andlaunched SouthVietnan_ that aimedSouth at announcedtbethe US forthe violatingOne broadcast attacks attacks "winter- ''winter-
# TOP SECRET
---
# TOP SECRET
statement claiming for the cessation of military the "order" for issued has "completely the Communist the Communist "order" also the cessation a Foreign Ministry of military attacks attacks. Hanoi Hanoi claiming has that has truce' air attacks during also truce" US has Foreign issued and condemning the US Ministry cancelled statement 1968 "completely Americans for cancelled the continuing the 1968 Tet and attacks condemning the Tet Americans for continuing the afr during Tet. 9 9. There bass0 There commentary, has the so current military action far been no far either no been other significant foreign commentary, either military from from bloc or non bloc sources on the South bloc sources on current action in South Vietnam.
# TOP SECRET THE-SITUATION-IN-SOUTH-VI15478305.pdf | {
"Who": "Intelligence analysts",
"What": "Document detailing attacks on US Embassy and Saigon, situation in South Vietnam including Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut airfield, Viet Cong's control of the US Embassy, and commentary on current military actions",
"When": "30 January",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Tan Son Nhut airfield", "Da Nang", "Hoi An", "Quang Nam", "Kontum city", "Western Highlands", "Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
12 January 1968 3.5(C)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
# Vietnam: Situation report (Page 1)
# France- Belgium: France is stepping up efforts to induce Belgium to buy Mirages. (Page 3)
# Congo (Kinshasa) - Rwanda: Break in relations (Page 4)
# Brazil: No support for US position in Vietnam (Page 4)
# Algeria: Gold reserves (Page 4)
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
I
Z
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THAILAND
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 002031014
Map
---
# Vietnam
South Vietnam: The arrest of six labor leaders may have prevented early settlement of an electrical workers' strike in Saigon and could precipitate wider labor trouble.
The strike began yesterday morning over demands for additional wage benefits. Union negotiators are reported to have made major concessions and to have been at the "half-way mark" toward settlement when the police made their arrests, invoking a little-used 1964 law forbidding strikes. The six men are scheduled to be tried by a military court for violation of the law.
It is not clear who authorized the arrests, but Police Director Loan recently indicated that the ban would be enforced. Moreover, the minister of labor, a controversial figure, has advocated police intervention in other recent labor disputes. The mayor of Saigon, who is Loan's brother-in-law, opposed the arrests and may exert some influence toward securing the release of the other labor leaders.
Other unions in Saigon, including port and transport workers, had earlier threatened sympathy walkouts if any arrests were made in connection with the electrical workers' strike. Action by these groups could put a crimp in public activities in Saigon.
North Vietnam: Unusual flight activity by two MIG-21s in the Thanh Hoa - Vinh area suggests that the North Vietnamese may be preparing to expand their MIG operations southward.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
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---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
France- Belgium: France is stepping up its efforts to induce Belgium to buy Mirage aircraft rather than US F-5s.
To overcome Belgian concern over availability of spare parts for the projected 116 Mirages, Paris had already offered to guarantee never to embargo parts shipments.
Despite the favorable French offer, the Belgians have delayed a decision, apparently to avoid appearing to reward Paris when its actions in NATO and the EC have aroused much displeasure in Belgium. Ambassador Knight in Brussels believes, however, that the political deterrent may have subsided and that the Mirage is now the probable choice.
One Belgian official has suggested that the US ought to link conclusion of the F-5 contract to any exceptions or concessions made on the new US balance of payments program. The Belgians want to negotiate for special treatment because they are counting on US help in their efforts to revitalize economically-depressed areas of their country.
12 Jan 68
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
Congo (Kinshasa) - Rwanda: The Congolese decision to break part of a plan diplomatic relations with Rwanda may be designed to shift the blame to Rwanda for the eventual repatriation of the mercenaries. Mobutu has privately expressed a willingness to let all but the mercenary leaders leave for Europe, but apparently feels he cannot publicly sanction the departure. He may claim a reason that, with relations broken, the Congo can now no longer able to influence what Rwanda does.
Brazil: Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto continues to refuse Brazil's active support for the US position in Vietnam. He told a visiting US senator on 9 January that Brazilian public opinion is influenced by what the foreign minister sees as disunity among the allies in Vietnam and by news reports that even Americans are not supporting the war. The foreign minister does not believe that the end of the Vietnam war will mean an increase in US aid to Brazil, and he has concluded that conditions for an understanding between the US and Brazil on Vietnam have not yet developed.
Algeria: On 5 January gold reserves had reached $400 million. If Algiers follows the French example of holding 75 percent of its reserves in gold, it could soon convert another $150 million into gold. It converted $150 million into gold last November and December.
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814|iii?|
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Top
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602432].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin containing intelligence information on national security matters",
"When": "12 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "France", "Belgium", "Congo (Kinshasa)", "Rwanda", "Brazil", "Algeria", "China", "Thailand"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: #
# Approved 0756606
RAND
0
11?‘ fr 6 so U '35”
1
SAIGON,
Vietnam
REF: 228/586
DATE OF INFO: 14-16 January 1968
DATE OF REPORT: 2/3/66
NO. OF PAGES: 2
SUBJECT: Prior Warning in KONTUM Province of Suspected B-52 Strike
DETAILS
1. On 26 February 1968, sometime between 1700 hours and 0600 hours, elements of Battalion 406 received notification of an impending B-52 strike on its base camp located about 3 kilometers south of KONTUM City. The notification was delivered to the battalion by a villager from the Zenaan hamlet on its base camp perimeter. The battalion announced the expected strike and ordered the KONTUM Province committee to move villagers from the area. The following day, the battalion abandoned its camp and moved south. There was no evidence that the attack was intentional.
2. The battalion abandoned its camp near grid 516168 during the Tet Offensive.
WARNING: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY: AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
---
# Page2
'*“*HAP*REFERENGE*
Scale 1/50,000, Edition 1.
1. At approximately 1700 hours sometime during the period 1L-16 January 1968, Independent Sapper Battalion L06, directly subordinate to the VC's KONTUM Provincial Comittee, received warning of an impending B-52 strike on its base camp. At that time, the battalion was located about three kilometers south of the Montagnard hamlet of KON GUN (AS 805105), KONTUM Province.
2. The notification of the attack was delivered to the battalion commander by a messenger from the KONTUM Provincial Committee (location unknown). It announced "the expected time of the air strike on the following day and ordered the battalion to move south towards KONTUM City to a specified location. The journey took one day to complete.= (Source had no knowledge of any means by which the VC/NVA obtain..ed information concerning B-52 strikes.)
3. While many trenches and foxholes had been prepared in the battalion's base camp area, they were not considered adequate protection for personnel in the event of a B-52 strike. Members of the battalion had been previously told that if a bomb hit within 10 meters of the trenches and foxholes they were hiding in, they would be killed.
4. Independent Sapper Battalion L06 abandoned its base camp and traveled by foot throughout the day to the new area designated by the KONTUM Provincial Comittee. (Exact location unknown.) Members of the battalion had not been ordered to carry all their equipment with them and some cooking utensils and weapons were left behind. Several days later, a few personnel from the battalion returned to the old base camp area to retrieve the equipment which had been left there. There was no evidence that such an attack had actually taken place. Upon returning to the battalion's new base camp, they reported that the area had not yet been bombed.
5. (SOURCE COMMENT: The warning of a B-52 strike had been false and had been intentionally sent to the battalion in order to have it move nearer to KONTUM City in preparation for its attack there during TET. He based his opinion upon the fact that no one had seen any enemy aircraft flying over their former position He was the period immediately prior to the receipt of the warning notification. convinced that the KONTUM Province Committee had used this means to move the battalion closer to KONTUM City without having to inform its members of the upcoming attack on the province capital.) PRIOR_WARNING_OF_SUSPECTE[15617760].pdf | {
"Who": "RAND",
"What": "Prior Warning in KONTUM Province of Suspected B-52 Strike during the Tet Offensive",
"When": "14-16 January 1968",
"Where": ["SAIGON, Vietnam", "KONTUM City", "Montagnard hamlet of KON GUN", "KONTUM Province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Current Intelligence Digest
|Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692|Secret|
|---|---|
|VEoSAEg AMERICD|42|
|DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE|13November0226/671967|
|No_|Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 06662692|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692 3.5(c)
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06862693SECRET
CONTENTS
Information as of 1200 EST
# GENERAL
|Vietnam|Situation Report|
|---|---|
|(Page 1)| |
13 Nov 67 SECRET
Current Intelligence Digest
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692 Page
---
# GENERAL
Vietnam
Three apparently US prisoners released in Cambodia
The release of three US prisoners in Cambodia was designed for maximum propaganda impact. The prisoners were turned over in Phnom Penh to a US peace committee representative. They were then held incommunicado until the following day when they were put on a Czechoslovakian Airlines plane bound for Prague. The prisoners and the peace committee representative left on the American commercial airliner and will return to the US on the plane at Beirut. The US commercial airliner, however, departed Beirut this morning. The Viet Cong's propaganda interest in getting as much mileage as possible from the release is underlined in an official Cambodian document describing the Viet Cong representative in Phnom Penh and the Cambodian foreign minister at a late August meeting. The Cambodian representative explicitly stated that the prisoners would be released for encouraging humanitarian reasons, but with the real aim of demonstrating that the Viet Cong and US anti-war groups had always treated prisoners well. He claimed that US officials in the past had kept freed prisoners out of reach of the public and prevented them from freely expressing their ideas.
Hanoi marking the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution
The 77-year-old President was a Soviet party paper contributor and writer for the occasion. Given his absence from the festivities, his illness may have prevented him from attending. Ho has made only three public appearances in recent months. The last was for national day celebrations in North Vietnam held in late August. Despite his apparent aloofness from the political scene, there has been no immediate leadership vacuum. The evidence suggests that the regime's major policies, particularly on strategy and negotiations for the war and peace, have been made on collective decisions.
Vice President Ky is not entirely pleased with the composition of the new cabinet. Reportedly, there are only five members of the cabinet or the directorates who can be called Ky supporters.
|Names|Ky supporters|
|---|---|
|Linh|(continued) 3.3(h)(2)|
13Nov67 SECRET
Current Intelligence Digest
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Quang Vien Nguyen minister of interior; Bao Tri minister of revolutionary development; Xuan Phong Truong minister of information; Thai Ton minister of economy of the directorate Ngoc Linh and Nguyen of information.
Sharp engagements continue to be reported in the Dak area of the central highlands.
Between US forces participating in Operation MACARTHUR and elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front the heavy fighting in Cumulative casualties for the first 12 days of November are: two missing; US - 96 killed, 48 wounded, and enemy - 619 killed, 101 individual and 25 crew-served weapons captured, seven detained.
# SECRET
13 Nov 67 Current Intelligence Digest
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# Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C06662692 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466671].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, US peace committee representative, Cambodian foreign minister, President of North Vietnam, Vice President Ky",
"What": "Information related to US prisoners released in Cambodia, 50th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, composition of the new cabinet, ministerial positions in Vietnam, Operation MACARTHUR in Dak area, casualties in November 1967",
"When": "13 November 1967",
"Where": ["Phnom Penh", "Prague", "Beirut", "North Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Dak area of the central highlands"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Memorandum
Date: 13 February 1968
Subject: Vietnam
1. In the aftermath of the Communist Tet offensive most observers have agreed on the need to suspend judgment until more data is available. Nevertheless, such avowals have been quickly followed by broad judgments ranging from the blackest pessimism to the wildly optimistic. Inevitably, judgments concerning the objective situation in Vietnam have been mixed with and influenced by a complex of attitudes on the justification or lack thereof of our policy in the area and its impact on life in the US and our posture in the world at large. Perhaps a non-emotional approach to the problem is no longer possible for anyone with any sense of involvement. (Many of us have been involved, in one way or another since at least 1950 and can point to this or that estimate, recommendation, or action which if properly followed through by wise statesmen and soldiers would have avoided our present frustration and malaise.)
2. But here we are and our first responsibility is to assess the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries and the will and
|GROUP 1|Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification|
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competence of our friends. Over the past two weeks the general trend has been to inflate the power of the former and to derogate the performance of the latter.
An objective appraisal of the Communist position should begin with the understanding that the winter-spring campaign -- in both its military and political aspects -- does represent a radical shift in tactics. Beginning last fall with the battles of Loc Ninh and Dakto, we witnessed a departure from the low-risk approach of a protracted war effort and the switch to a determined effort to force a relatively early and successful conclusion of the conflict. This new strategy was impelled, not by a sense of great strength, but by a realization in Hanoi that the US/GVN effort in South Vietnam was gathering momentum, that manpower in the South was increasingly being denied to the Viet Cong, and that a war of resistance in the South based on a predominately northern force was not politically viable. In brief, Hanoi calculated that the strain of the war could not be borne indefinitely and that something drastic had to be done to retrieve the situation.
The Tet offensive itself, far from demonstrating unexpected Communist strength (give it excellent marks for daring,
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Fair marks for coordination), confirmed the low state to which many local Viet Cong units had fallen. In Saigon a large number of inexperienced, recently impressed young men were used in attacks on key targets. It also appears that many local Viet Cong units had to be stiffened by North Vietnamese replacements. Surely, if better trained Viet Cong units familiar with the street plans of the various towns and cities had been available they would have been used, possibly to decisive effect. The failure of main force units -- Viet Cong and NVA -- to follow up quickly to exploit the confusion of initial attacks shows poor coordination, a lack of confidence, or both.
It might be said that the hoped for effect on the GVN was worth the sacrifice of the poorly trained local units and even their experienced cadre. But this does not detract from the argument that the Tet attacks are further evidence of high-risk tactics on Hanoi's part. Many of the attacks were in fact carried out by Main Force units -- Viet Cong and NVA. Hanoi could not be sure that surprise would be achieved; they were risking substantial losses of trained manpower. And as it turned out, losses to these units -- as in Kontum -- were high even with surprise. Exposing the 2nd NVA Division in the vicinity of Danang-Hoi-Hu
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where it was badly beaten between 8-10 February makes no sense
except in terms of a. high risk determined effort for an early
and decisive impact on the ARVN, the GVN, and the US.
6. Obviously, the military punishment which Communist
forces took last fall along the Cambodian border, around the
cities during Tet, and around Khe Sanh over the past month
has not forced Hanoi to call off its major effort. The scenario
is far from played out and the Communists probably have other
surprises yet to spring. More NVA Divisions can be committed across the DMZ, new Soviet-made weapons can be introduced, Viet Cong units can be replenished by impressment from the unprotected countryside, perhaps Khe Sanh can be over run by s. maximum effort But Communist forces in the field are not composed of supermen, they continue to demonstrate the inability to coordinate actions closely, to meet readiness deadlines, to stand up to the superior fire power and mobility of US/ARVN forces. Their chances of success continue to rest heavily on destroying the will and effectiveness of the ARVN and GVN.
T. The failures of the ARVN and the GVN are, of course, the source of much of our pessimism and frustration. We want or expect the GVN to snap to, vitalize national administration,
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raise taxes, weed out corruption, get cracking on pacification, stimulate democracy, and generally win the hearts and minds of the people. Progress toward many of these objectives in the short term is quite unrealistic in view of the cultural inertia of a traditional Confucian society and quite out of the question in the midst of a major war. Perhaps the US should be encouraged by the simple fact that a government of sorts has now been in continuous control since the emergence of Ky and Thieu in 1966. Certainly the GVN and the ARVN could and should do more -- the ARVN a good deal more -- to make the overall political and military effort more effective. But perhaps if we had expected a little less we would be more willing to acknowledge that some progress had been made before Tet, that ARVN and GVN reactions during Tet were not so futile, that South Vietnamese morale has stood up amazing well over the past two weeks, and that the outlook is not totally black. Obviously, if the US wavers at this juncture, the entire structure could unravel quickly.* But there is still no
And if "satisfactory" negotiation to ease the US departure from this should happen there would, of course, be no chance for a Whether or not the US should take this opportunity to Vietnam. shed its burdens and make a fast exit is another matter. if it The point here simply is that it would have no alternative appeared now to reduce its commitments.
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evidence of a widespread preference for the Communists in South Vietnam, even if there is little evidence of a passionate loyalty to the GVN. (Ho Chi Minh may be a popular nationalist figure in Vietnam, this does not mean that his party shares in this esteem either in North or South Vietnam.)
Thus, the issue remains in doubt. The Communists have risked much already, including their prestige and the morale of their forces. Many of their regular units have been subjected to prolonged and continuous harassment and attrition. If they back off now and return to a protracted war line they will risk an adverse reaction among their less committed adherents in the South who have been sustained by hopes of an early end to the war. Meanwhile, the strains of the war which led to the adoption of high-risk tactics will still be there. If they continue to commit their resources in all-out effort over the next few months and fail to achieve their purpose they will be in an even less advantageous position to prolong the fighting.
JAMES GRAHAM
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"Who": "James Graham",
"What": "Analysis of the Communist Tet offensive and assessment of the situation in Vietnam",
"When": "13 February 1968",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
19 February 1968
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# DAILY BRIEF 1968
19 FEBRUARY
|South Vietnam|The new round of Communist attacks has been directed thus far at targets in the southern provinces. Vinh Long in the delta and Phan Thiet on the coast east of Saigon have received the heaviest ground assaults. Casualties on both sides, however, have been considerably lighter than during the Tet offensive.|
|---|---|
|Saigon|Saigon itself appears to be a high-priority enemy target. It received sporadic rocket and mortar fire overnight, and additional high-level Communist command elements have moved in nearer the city.|
|The battle for the Citadel area of Hue|continues to be indecisive.|
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3.5(C)
# 3.3(h)(2)
2. Soviet Union
3. Pakistan
In a continuing effort to play down the seriousness of Ayub's illness, Pakistani newspapers over the weekend carried pictures of him in pajamas and robe with a newspaper in his lap. Defense Minister Khan--one of the three men currently holding the government reins--told Ambassador Oehlert that Ayub might wish to make a trip to Britain and the US as part of his recuperation. Khan suggested a meeting with the President might be arranged.
4. United Kingdom
A public opinion poll taken early this month gives the Tories a 22.5 percent lead--the greatest enjoyed by any party in the 31-year history of British polling. If this margin holds up, the Labor Party stands to lose five of the six seats for which by-elections are now pending.
3XNhX2)
3.5(C)
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# Laos
Over the strong objections of the Polish member, the International Control Commission has voted to visit the embattled city of Saravane. A preliminary ICC group is headed that way today and the commissioners are expected to follow about mid-week. Thus far, Laotian Army forces still hold the city.
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# FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on
19 February 1968
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# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
19 February 1968
# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Communists Focus Attention on Northern South Vietnam: Despite the relative lull in new fighting in the northern part of South Vietnam, Vietnamese Communist propaganda continues to zero in on that area in particular. Recent Viet Cong attacks and Hanoi broadcasts strongly imply that new military administrative control of wide areas in that part of the country will be accompanied by efforts to take over the country.
The North Vietnamese party daily on 18 February carried an editorial praising "initial victories" in the current "general offensive and simultaneous uprisings" in central Vietnam (most of I and II Corps). It claimed that Communist forces have "turned the military and political tide" there and quoted a communiqué from the Communist command in that region saying that "vast rural areas" had been "liberated" and Saigon's control had been broken in a "string" of provincial capitals and towns. According to the paper, this put the Communists in a position to "overwhelm the enemy in many areas," and it promised even bigger and more resounding victories in the future.
Similarly, Hanoi came down hard on 18 February with an endorsement of the establishment of a new "People's Revolutionary Committee" of Thua Thien Province and Hue city, which was announced by the Viet Cong radio last week. The announcement claimed this committee was in the process of taking over the administration of Thua Thien and Hue, and that Saigon's authority had been liquidated or was disintegrating. The new "provisional administration" in Hue city allegedly has been set up under the auspices of the "National, Democratic, and Peace Alliance," a front group unveiled by the Communists at the Tet offensive. Le Van Hoa, who was earlier head of the Hue "alliance," was also said to be the chief of the new "revolutionary committee."
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Hanoi said the committee had decided to "wipe out the South Vietnamese administration structure at all levels," and to "recognize" new revolutionary committees allegedly being set up throughout the Thua Thien Province.
Much of this doubtless is sheer propaganda designed to bolster Communist claims that "revolutionary elements" from all parts of South Vietnamese society are rising up of the claims, Thien to establish some sort of new political structure in the region through political agitation and organizational efforts now being conducted in both urban and rural areas.
Morale in Hanoi is high now because the people are convinced that the Communists have achieved important successes in the South in recent weeks. The people believe the war will be over within one or two months.
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# Pham Van Dong on the San Antonio Formula; Father Berrigan
Berrigan, who has been in Hanoi in connection with the release of the US pilots, told the press about Pham Van Dong's statement, but the press has garbled the report. The following, according to Ambassador Sullivan, is the correct version; "President Johnson-formula is an easy one to agree to. However, is unacceptable. It imposes conditions. Johnson demands productive conversation. That imposes conditions. Only a conqueror can ask this. We repeat our demand for unconditional cessation of bombing. At that time we will talk seriously. When we make war, we do it seriously. So when we talk of peace, we will do that seriously."
# French ambassador in Laos informed Ambassador Sullivan
More on Trinh's Interview of 8 February: Sullivan answered last week that Foreign Minister Trinh did not answer one of the questions posed by the French correspondent. That question was about the level and the composition of the negotiating teams which Hanoi has in mind for the talks it says it will agree to after a US bombing halt. The question was designed to draw out Hanoi on the role it envisaged for the Liberation Front in the talks. In his response to the question, Trinh simply noted that he preferred not to answer it now, but "would be pleased to reconsider at a later date." Ambassador Sullivan has the impression that Hanoi may be feeding questions to the French correspondent in an effort to smoke out answers of interest to French policy.
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# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
"Hanoi on Antiwar Activities in the US: On Saturday, to a speech of 15 February by John Kenneth Galbraith. Hanoi reported that Galbraith had defeated"pointed out that the Saigon regime would certainly be
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and its army would Galbraith had disintegrate." The broadcast went on to say that also "stressed that the recent military offensive of the National Liberation Front testifies to the wide support being given by the population."
The same broadcast claimed that more than universities law professors and students from 50 universities had signed a statement opposing US policies on Vietnam. The broadcast claimed. "The drive to collect signatures is continuing."
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"Who": "President of the United States, Communist forces in Vietnam, Pakistani officials, British politicians, North Vietnamese officials, US Ambassador to Laos, French Ambassador in Laos",
"What": "Communist attacks in South Vietnam, political situations in Pakistan and the UK, North Vietnamese propaganda, US political attitudes on the Vietnam War, negotiations between US and North Vietnam, US anti-war activities, release of US pilots in Hanoi",
"When": "19 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Vinh Long", "Phan Thiet", "Hue", "Thua Thien Province", "Hue city", "Laos", "San Antonio", "Hanoi", "US", "France"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence
Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)
Washington, January 18, 1968.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 80 R 01580 R, Executive Registry
Subject Files, Peace Talks
Secret.
An attached note from Helms to Rostow, January 22, reads: "Here are three copies of an effort on our part to fulfill your request for an examination of certain hypotheses in connection with Hanoi's intentions: I have sent copies to no one else. If you want further distribution, please advise me."
A second attached note from Smith to Helms, January 18, reads: "This has been revised after consultation with George Carver, Dean Moor, and DDI: I believe they are now satisfied with it."
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# VIV VL
# VIV l1/1
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CONTROL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
18 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Alternative Interpretations of Hanoi's Intentions
INTRODUCTION
1. There are several hypotheses concerning the progress of the war in coming months and the intentions of the Communists. Most of them can be argued plausibly, for and against, and can be supported by some evidence. None is capable of conclusive proof or disproof, mainly because the evidence is either insufficient or can be interpreted in various and often diametrically opposed ways.
2. For example, there is the question of whether the North Vietnamese are willing to "negotiate." Hanoi has declared that it will "talk" if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped. It is idle to say that this represents no change of attitude whatsoever.
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It is equally idle to assume that of itself it indicates an early end to the fighting. One may argue, quite plausibly, that Hanoi has finally comprehended that war against the power of the US can have but one ultimate conclusion, and is now probing to find out what US terms are. But one may also regard this latest statement simply as another political and psychological move to encourage dissent in the US and inflame world opinion against Washington.
In present circumstances, it is true that any multitude of things could happen, at almost any time. Hanoi could quit tomorrow, or at any time thereafter; the Chinese could enter the conflict with their own armed forces in great number; China could collapse in total chaos; the Soviets could take a far more active role, either in support of Hanoi to continue the war or in withdrawing such support; the South Vietnamese government and polity could disintegrate; the Sino-Soviet controversy could become far more or far less acute than it is, and thus change the context of the Vietnam struggle; the policy of the US government could change in any of a number of ways, and so on.
A balanced estimate of the situation cannot rule these and other possibilities wholly out of consideration. The best it can do is to decide, on the basis of evidence and careful argument.
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that many of that many of them are so unlikely as to be irrelevant, at least until more evidence appears and that others should be held as possible qualifications and correctives in a net judgment. In the paragraphs that follow we attempt to show how the evidence and arguments may fit or not fit into alternative estimates of the prospects in Vietnam.
******
|5.|There are three hypotheses under which the situation in Vietnam may be considered and to which most of the evidence may be related:|
|---|---|
|(1) Hanoi has decided that it must terminate the fighting in the course of this year;| |
|(2) Hanoi still feels a good measure of confidence in its prospects and firmly intends to fight on until a break in its favor in US policy;| |
|(3) Hanoi is less certain of its prospects and is keeping several options open. It intends to continue hard fighting in the months ahead but recognizes it may be advisable to seek a compromise solution within the next year, according to the way things develop.| |
I. EESSISH I HANOI
6. The more solid evidence supporting the proposition that Hanoi intends to quit at an early date comes from an analysis of
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Communist prospects in South Vietnam.
|Communist prospects in South Vietnam.|According to our view of the data, the leaders in Hanoi could conclude that their prospects in South Vietnam are steadily and surely diminishing. The toll on their forces is increasingly heavy; their losses cannot be reduced without undermining the effectiveness of their military and political operations; recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming more difficult, control over the population is diminishing, and morale is becoming more of a problem as the war continues without conclusive results. Even though such problems may not be critical, the overall effect is that the Communist position will be weaker at the end of 1968 than it is now. Military action can arrest the decline but cannot change it fundamentally.|
|---|---|
|Proceeding from this analysis, Hanoi's current efforts on the military and political fronts can be seen as one last push to gain the best possible terms in an early settlement. For example, it can be argued that Hanoi would not intentionally seek the bloody and costly battles it has unless it knew that the fighting would end fairly soon and replacements would not be a problem. Hanoi would not, under this hypothesis, commit part of its strategic reserve unless it believed there would be no real threat of an invasion from the US. Nor would the North|Secret|
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# Vietnamese
Vietnamese claim that 1968 would be "decisive" they actually lead to the formation of a "coalition" government unless they actually anticipated an early political settlement.
There are, of course, various other considerations factors which could cause Hanoi to seek an early end to the fighting; some of these have an evidential base. Perhaps the burden of the war on North Vietnam is in itself a factor. The leadership may find that the annual loss of young men, added to the sum of economic and material damage, is unacceptable in its implications for the future vigor and productivity of the nation.
Our the recent testimony based on the Spanish view, however, variety of sources and buttressed by the recent testimony of the Spanish repatriates, is that the strains of the war on North Vietnam are still well within manageable limits.
There are other possibilities which are no better than sheer conjecture, but which cannot be entirely excluded. For example, it could be that Moscow, concerned over a decline in Communist strength in Vietnam, a possible US invasion of the north, and greater Chinese involvement and influence in North Vietnam, such pressure could be exerting pressure on Hanoi to end the war. Such pressure could have taken the form of a threat to terminate major military aid.
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after pe completion of pe deliveries negotiated pis past fall, along wip a promise to provide substantial aid for economic development once pe fighting stops.
Pressures from Peking could also be responsible for pe decision to end pe fighting. The Chinese, for example, might have made peir continued aid conditional on Hanoi's acceptance of Chinese advice on bop military and political strategy.
Neiper of pese conjectures can be supported by any available evidence. Indeed, Peking and especially Moscow have appeared reluctant in pe past to apply direct and heavy pressures on Hanoi; neiper wants to force Hanoi into pe embrace of pe oper. While Moscow, unlike Peking, is not committed to prolongation of pe war, it has always seen some advantages in pe fighting and has demonstrated no willingness to intervene wip Hanoi in favor of early negotiations.
Alternatively, Hanoi may have concluded pat pe Sino-Soviet dispute will undermine effective aid. The USSR may be refusing to ship certain weapons prough China, or to risk delivery by sea. Hanoi may anticipate pat one of pe Communist giants will insist pat it takes a clear-cut stand in pe dispute.
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this would plece Hanoiin this would place Hanoi in the position of alienating at least one side.
Another possibility is that the North Vietnamese leaders may have concluded that turmoil and disruption in China make it a poor prospect as a "reliable rear area." Hanoi may fear that China's antics are encouraging the US to escalate the war without fear of Chinese reactions. And Hanoi might even fear that the time will come when the Chinese will insist that North Vietnam begin its own "cultural revolution."
There is, of course, evidence of Hanoi's concern over the Sino-Soviet dispute and over China's internal policy. Last year, the North Vietnamese Politburo and Central Committee apparently passed a resolution affirming Hanoi's neutrality in the dispute. Missions were sent to both Moscow and Peking to explain this position, which has been continually re-emphasized. At one point last year, Hanoi apparently had to become directly involved in ensuring that Soviet supplies transited more expeditiously through China. Hanoi also reacted to Mao's cultural revolution by issuing fairly pointed criticism of Chinese behavior and the cult of Mao. Added to these concerns is the
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A fairly open record of Chinese opposition to any hint of talks between Hanoi and the United States.
What is lacking, however, is any evidence that the tensions with China or the concern over Soviet support have reached the level where Hanoi would fear Soviet or Chinese disengagement. The physical evidence suggests that both Peking and Moscow are in fact increasing their aid.
If for any of the reasons discussed under this hypothesis Hanoi should decide to end the fighting, it would have at least two alternatives. It could simply decide to allow the conflict to die down, without seeking a political resolution. Or it could attempt to obtain the best possible terms for a settlement under the existing circumstances. In this latter case, the recent Trinh statement on talks with the US could be read as the first step in the gradual development of a negotiating position. The North Vietnamese, of course, recognize the need to be favorable would still bargain for favorable terms, but they would also recognize the need to be more forthcoming and to reduce their demands for a settlement. It would also make sense under this interpretation for Hanoi to get negotiations underway before.
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retherthan eftertheAmerican elections reasoningthat during rather than after the American elections, reasoning that during an election campaign It would have more room for maneuvering against the US. Hanoi's handling of the follow up to the Trinh Interview will be a test for this hypothesis; if it is correct confirmatory evidence should become available before long.
II. CONFIDENCE IN HANOI
17. The Norp Vietnamese may be more impressed wip peir achievements in pe past two years pan wip pe problems pey have encountered. They have wipstood pe massive American intervention in pe Soup and pe heavy bombing of pe Norp.
Despite pe bombing, pey now fight wip more and better arms and ammunition, and peir supply lines are more elaborately developed. The political infrastructure in pe Soup has been maintained, even if in somewhat weakened condition. Their military effort, based on pe increasing preat from pe border areas, not only presents a new challenge to pe US on pe ground but also introduces political complications for pe Americans.
Politically, of course, because of peir experience wip pe ebb and flow of pe French war, pe natural inclination of pe political leaders would be to exaggerate peir own strengp and expect pe
now of the French war, the natural inclination of the political leaders would be to exaggerate their own strength and expect the
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protected War defeat USto concede defeat rather than face the prospect of a protracted war.
18. Hanoi determination to keep fighting could also be explained by what it believes are fundamental weaknesses in the American and South Vietnamese position. The Communists may be convinced that the Saigon regime has little chance of becoming an effective government, generally accepted by the people. Moreover, Hanoi may be persuaded that the South Vietnamese army will never develop into a fighting force which is effective enough to assume part of the US burden. Thus, even if the US military effort is highly successful, in the end the US will find it has no political base in South Vietnam and will be forced to conclude a political settlement with the Front.
19: Even if Hanoi does not read the situation in South Vietnam in this way, it may be relying on assurances of substantial external support which will enable the Communists to fight effectively and even some combat units in order to meet any manpower needs in North Vietnam. The Soviets may have promised new weapons to cope with superior American firepower and the air and naval attacks on the North.
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# 20. Perhaps the best evidence in support of this general interpretation of Hanoi's outlook is the record of the past two years.
At each phase of the US buildup, Hanoi has been willing to respond by committing additional resources to the struggle in the South. A high level of infiltration has been maintained; the most recent deployments near the western end of the DMZ may express a determination not only to persist in the war but to try for a decisive defeat of the US in some local battle. Hanoi's leaders have not taken advantage of several opportunities for negotiations; this could mean that they believe nothing can be gained at the bargaining table unless it has already been won on the battlefield. Finally, a commitment to fight a protracted war was the main decision of the North Vietnamese Central Committee resolution of late 1965, was reaffirmed by the Central Committee in early 1967, and continues to be cited as basic policy.
# 21. As to evidence of external support, Hanoi has recently concluded a series of new agreements with its Communist allies.
Moscow has openly promised a variety of weapons; Soviet coastal defense missiles could be the first of several new items on the list. New Chinese weapons have shown up in the Delta for the
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first time in the war. We known of no increases in Chinese troop strength in North Vietnam in recent months. Recent high level reaffirmations of pledges to support Hanoi, however, could be read as a willingness to increase Chinese commitments. And air defense cooperation between Hanoi and Peking has grown markedly in recent months.
We know of no evidence that is totally inconsistent with an intention to continue the war for the same considerable period of time. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hanoi would never draw down its home army and weaken the defense of North Vietnam if it looked forward to a long war, particularly in light of continuing concern over an American invasion. And it could be further argued that Hanoi would not tell the troops in the South that this would be a "decisive" year if in fact it believed the war was likely to continue well beyond 1968. Finally, why Hanoi would want to keep alive hopes for negotiations, aggravating the Chinese in the process, if it had no intention of reaching a political settlement in the near future?
If Hanoi's mood and outlook is roughly as assumed under this hypothesis, then its attitude toward peace talks is
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Likely to be intransigent. Upon exploration, moves like the recent Trinh statement will come to nothing. Hanoi, of course, would welcome an end to the bombing, but will adamantly refuse to pay any price for it. Negotiations would be mainly to register the defeat of the US and the end of the Saigon regime.
Finally, one may conjecture that Hanoi's postulated confidence rests on some factor or event which is not yet apparent to the US, such as a major escalation by the Communists. This might take the form of a military offensive in Laos which would threaten to expand the area of conflict and further strain US resources in Southeast Asia. Or escalation might take the form of Chinese moves in Vietnam or elsewhere around its periphery. Or again, the North Vietnamese could be relying on the USSR to create a diversionary crisis, say in Berlin.
Such possibilities have been carefully considered almost since the beginning of the US intervention in Vietnam. Thus far, there is no persuasive evidence that Hanoi, Peking, or Moscow intends to enlarge the war beyond Vietnam or take major action elsewhere against the US.
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# III. SUSPENDED JUDGMENT IN HANOI
2.26.
The third hypothesis assumes that Hanoi's estimate of the situation is based on a mixture of increased pessimism and continuing confidence, which are compounded by other factors, particularly the American elections. Under this hypothesis, Hanoi is keeping several options open and will continue to do so at least until late spring or summer, when it should be in a better position to judge the effect of the American primaries and conventions and the results of its own military offensive. At that time, Hanoi will also be better able to judge the effectiveness and durability of its military offensive and the Saigon government.
27.
If this is so, Hanoi's winter-spring offensive is designed not only for its immediate military objectives but for its overall impact on the US. Hanoi would recognize that its chances for a military victory have evaporated, but it would still hope, by sustaining high levels of combat in the months ahead, to create the impression of a stalemate. It would not expect the US to capitulate, but it would see increased chances for a compromise on terms that would protect the Viet Cong infrastructure and provide the basis for a new political phase in the revolutionary struggle. Hanoi could not be confidently about the outcome of its.
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own efforts will be. But It would recognize that the next twelve months provide an unusual opportunity because of the American elections.
28. Even if political overtures combined with military pressures do not bear fruit, Hanoi could reason that by agitating the question of a coalition government and contacts with the Front, the strains between Washington and Saigon will grow and the US will come under increasing international pressures to modify its own terms. In short, Hanoi would do what it could to maintain its military pressures, its diplomacy, waiting for some time but would at the same time become more flexible in its diplomacy, waiting for some months more to decide whether to make the best deal possible, continue along present lines, or even to adopt a radically different way of fighting, i.e., guerrilla warfare.
29. This hypothesis rests on a different reading of much of the same evidence already cited. Hanoi has made military decisions which strike some observers as inexplicable given the nature of their problems; Hanoi cannot possibly hope to drive the US into the sea and probably cannot expect another Dien Bien Phu. Thus, it would seem better advised to conserve its forces for a protracted war in which it would hope to sap the will of the US.
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Instead, the North Vietnamese commit more troops and seek costly battles. Moreover, since last July they do seem to have indicated more interest in maintaining private contacts with the US and, in some cases, actually inviting US negotiating probes -- moves which their rather rigid public position would not justify.
This hypothesis is supported by some negative evidence. For example, why should China be so cool to the new program of the NFL unless Peking senses that the revision of the program was a step toward negotiating situations? Why did the Front try to send representatives to New York, if as Hanoi claims the UN has absolutely no business in the Vietnam question? And, above all, why do the captured documents contain intriguing tidbits suggesting that the war may not go beyond 1968? These contradictions or inconsistencies could be reconciled within the framework of this third hypothesis.
Uncertainty could also grow out of the state of relations with China and the USSR. In fact, we know little of Hanoi's relations with its allies. What we do know is based on glimmerings from captured documents, deductions from overt statements, and an occasional hint.
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Soviet Source. In any case, Hanoi cannot be very confident that Moscow and Peking will not fall into an even more bitter conflict, or that the situation inside China will not deteriorate further. Indeed, Hanoi could conclude that it would be better to explore US terms for a political settlement while China is still in disarray rather than later, when the Chinese leadership might be reunified and tempted to interfere more directly in Hanoi's affairs.
Indications of uncertainty could also be reconciled with an even more extreme variant of this hypothesis, namely, that the North Vietnamese Politburo is badly divided on policy and is pursuing an indecisive and at times contradictory policy. Perhaps Ho Chi Minh's health has declined, factionalism has reared its ugly head and led to a fairly even split between hawks and doves. Both factions could seek comfort and support from abroad, the hawks from Peking and the doves from Moscow. The hawks may insist on the need for further intensive military effort while the doves could be arguing for a shift to political tactics.
Though there is some evidence that the North Vietnamese leaders have engaged in debates over policy, mainly on the proper
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military tactics, there has never been sufficient evidence to conclude that the leadership is divided on basic policies of whether to fight or quit. A power struggle in Hanoi, of course, is a possibility after Ho and could be developing. But the evidence is lacking, and this explanation of Hanoi's behavior seems highly unlikely.
Even less likely but still within the realm of the imaginable is a split between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As Hanoi has assumed more of the burden and direction of the war, it may have alienated a faction within COSVN. The Viet Cong could argue, with support from certain figures in the Hanoi leadership, that Hanoi may suspect all Chinese bent in the Viet Cong, etc. There may be actual divergencies between Hanoi and some of the Viet Cong leaders, but a real split should be excluded as unlikely.
As noted at the outset of this discussion, we cannot rule out any of these three hypothetical explanations for Hanoi's behavior. It would certainly not be surprising if the North Vietnamese continued the war through next year and for some time.
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afterward. It would be more surprising if they decided to end it soon. We believe there is much to recommend the third case: in the months ahead Hanoi will continue its military effort but will probe more intently to discover what the shape of a political settlement might be.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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Footnote
VN Iqt)(Jff)OfcC00235986/ [z316
VN IC/ LI: (~5 Inf'
Xr _ Helt Rostou
Mr. Walt Rostov
Here are three copies of certain hypotheses at request. Intentions part of certain hypotheses to fulfill your request for examination. In connection with Hanoi's copies in connection of an examination. If you want further distribution, please advise.
Richard Helms
Attachments:
Attachments - Interpretations of X8 Jan
ONE's me of Henof '0 Intentions or Hanoi's - Interpretations of 22 January 1968. Alternative Interpretations.
SECRET SEGHEI
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00235986 MEMORANDUM-FROM-THE-CHAIR15478164.pdf | {
"Who": "Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Smith)",
"What": "Analysis of Hanoi's intentions in the context of the Vietnam War",
"When": "18 January 1968",
"Where": ["Washington", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "China", "Soviet Union", "United States", "Laos", "Berlin"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:
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# Lower House Activities
Period 13-16 November have been its membership and with validating the election of largely concerned Lower house plenary sessions during the
Validation election of some dated assembly for committee merits each case discussed by as continuing process carried members the on
Temporary with parliamentary procedures of its members and ue chairman iiamentary procedures of its temporary with par house miliarity also appears that opposition elements will their performance voice in student resolution issue It Nguyen Ba Luong this assembly judging and the unfa have influential by on the 10 the As of 16 November 100 of its 137 the lower house had validation is
Validation election of some dated assembly for committee merits each case discussed by as continuing process carried members the on
Individually on its vote recommendations and the assembly its own with and presented to the indi recommended validation To date the committee has in each case remaining cases voted to accept its probably be disposed of in the next few days will resolutions rather the 17 students who were arrested 11 lengthly debate was centered on government in some to intervene with the way on and drafted for The ten-man committee issue was behalf of anti-election by two representatives finally settled demonstration activity composed of deciding to appoint from each of the corps areas civilian life and Saigon and Gia Dinh of the will intervene for return The to student demonstrators look into the whole to committee reportedly matter of illegal detainees Three of the committee members Bard" Nguyen Trong Nhotrong supporters Nguyen Dai and Truc Vien were expected to play of the maybe generally major origina role in the new committee opponents of resolutions characteri and are These three the zed as men present government.
# Senate Rules Drafting Continues
12 submitted by During its the rules committee continuing consideration of draft rules the Senate on
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3.5(c)
November approved the against having establishment of secretary 12 standing general on its decided committees and board 11 and 14 November of presiding officers nine At subsequent sessions on standing committees articles dealing with approved the duties of these were tion, 13_culture The 12 committees and youth affairs agriculture; educa - are communications and public works fare foreign budget internal affairs and rules judiciary finance economics taxes and labor and social wel-information and health; between five and ten members include the affairs; and interior defense; with Each will the exception of many budget and finance committee form subcommittees Senate 14 voted to forgo election of In discussing its presiding officers general secretary the and establish instead the of secretary general was committee The position internal affairs and rules one of considerable power in the apparently reluctant Provisional National Assembly and the senators were will probably be responsible for again. to vest 80 much power in one man such tasks The committee as controlling the agenda and ruling on legislative procedures 15 major point of contention arose during duties articles dealing the debate on 11 and 14 November standing committees on with ators the attempted to have responsibility Several assigned to for defining sen- national defense committee was information of allied forces provision cases included the disapproved status annotational though defense committee and foreign affairs both In committee or the move was either the the as which an to the allied reports article by the committee "examines and tary to the on the terri on regulations upper house for mili forces such told forces tory here are officer that he of the Senator Tran Vietnam, when Republic of high expects Senate later Van Lam status an embassy the of forces question to rank on the list of priorities Some Senate Work on of the more has begun to slow after the 16 59 articles energetic start earlier in the month the rules than 200 have been ap- proved thus far The rules drafting process will I-5 3.5(c)
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probably continue well into December that it could some earlier optimistic predictions contrary to be completed by mid-or late November over the rules governing the establishment of blocs. There was lively debate on 15 November within the Senate. The minimum number to constitute had proposed that 21 - which would have insured the rules drafting committee bloc should be creation of no more than two blocs in accordance to the 60-member system. This would facilitate the movement toward Article committee upper house. This course encourages the progress toward the system. The committee also argued that in its opinion any sense voted rules which do not foster such progress would in however, be unconstitutional. Only ten senators forth the committee proposal from the floor to set to approve four Senate than went on the minimum bloc its own measure blocs to be organized. Recommendation was that while membership at 15 which will allow as argument many as against the committee. The progress toward the constitution commits the nation to "encourage two-party system," it says nothing about forcing such movement.
New Political Party Developing. Senator Tran composed largely of retired Van Don announced in early November that formed originally in July as party of-association ing Don subsequent the provisional group to become a political an embassy the veterans officer known who is chairman of the group clarified the as the Freedom Fighters objectives Association, association and plans. He does not expect that the group can be political party - a process which be organized as official requires says of the and village the establishment of national for structures throughout possibly two large part provin- Don has country already begun establishing contacts in at least year and some organize with persons who will probably agree to or- areas local chapters but little beyond this has.
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yet tion which can success mass been accomplished fully appeal yet the association Dinh but been drawn up or program outlining this no platform compete He foresees with the Communists mass organiza- Quang Hoang Mai Huu Xuan That Pham executive Among those generals Ton concept has on for the association committee are retired Nguyen Van Tran Tu Oai Thai Le Van Nghiem, Former General Van Dong1s also an association member Saigon chapter serving as chairman of the group the Farmer-Worker-Soldier group told relationship with 21 As for the association of which also provisional president would develop he the embassy Donis of- while maintaining considerable liaison because of ficer that the two groups independently 1ndependently their partially overlapping leadership it is not yet clear what Don organizations will be in the relationship Although to the two to the personal reference are the overlapping leadership--he and Ton future his That Dinh only two individuals who overlap--being, indicates that he intends at leas merger He may hope for the time that by to keep his hand in both groups group his the other fails attempt foundering or can two groups if so doing one he can of the if own political appears to be save skin by falling back on one Revolutionary Dai Viet Split Continues heading for Viet Party developed in few of October is having Another already established political party factional difficulties and 19 apparent ly tionary Dai leader Ha Thuc Ky and to go along with permanent split rift in early his followers the Revolu- when party the central committee refused on decision that the party should accept Van Ngai of the majority led by Senator Nguyen the assembly validation of the presidential elections the two factionshave collaborated on day Since then 3.3(h)(2) to-day party matters to but both Ky ceeded with efforts consolidate and Ngai their respective have pro- including some publications and 700 of control report- positions the party Ngai does however claim of 89 intellectual leaders its 900 cadre edly feels that he has the advantage as Ngai holder the
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|timepublicoffice|toimprovehisimageasbut thatheneedsnational politicallittlemore leaderand to expandhiscontrolof thepartybefore hecansuccessfullybreakwithKy .|
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|Buddhist Reconciliation Efforts|24 mixed group of Buddhists and politicians calling themselves the on Committee Campaigning to Unite Buddhism, met 12 November to seek resolution of the of both representatives current the militant and charter dispute the moderate repre- This may factionswereblesssignal not have the in fact, ing of either Tri Quang or present, the the beginning of the meeting apparently Tam Chau did third either without intended emerging as force reported to be middle-of-the-road grouping to work for the unity of to the extreme views of the church reference leader.|
|Some 30 people from various meeting, along the Buddhist sects with acting lower house chairman Nguyen Ba Luong and organizations were present at Soldiers late the Thich Huyen and Senator Trinh Quang Qui of the Farmer-Worker- faction and the chief Minh was repre- sentative of moderate Thich Phap problem faction the meeting Sieu appeared to be the militants length on Both Minh and Sieu spoke at some sole delegate the charter of his each professing his Minh for unity desire and the desire moreover expressed both hope that Buddhist congress which would examine to the convene charters and decided on the retention of exactly participants would work unsure of one The others present they however seemed what should do--whether to Tri tablishes formal organization to supersede both Chau Buddhist Quang and Tam merely factions informal initiate convene contact between the congress two or factions organizations note 26 but The meeting ended on significantly Buddhist group of six I-not including Phap Sieu--remained representatives of that inconclusive the behind to draft one militant representative declaration also rather inconclusive pledging The only to declaration was promote.| |
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|The creation of the association an association which would include permanent office and The Buddhist to leader many board of unite Buddhism. sects would have than directors rather ingle apparently declaration further calls off for the proposed association to congress consider specifics| |
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A recent decree of the Vietnamese government provides for clemency for 327 prisoners. Another government decree reduces the sentences of prisoners and directs the destruction of criminal records. The security situation for the affected number of persons in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces sharply decreased in September and continued to decrease in October. The number of Vietnamese Revolutionary Development (RD) teams is growing, but the strength per team is declining. The direct support to around a number of Vietnamese army battalions remains. Revolutionary Army battalions in Quang Nam rallied in November. As of the RD 25 Armsonly government under had 329 persons. The US increased to 653 persons at the same date last year. The rate of returnees to the Open program has been below 15,220 persons weekly. However, the number of returnees has recently doubled compared to last year. The status of prisoners in South Vietnam in conjunction with the recent National Day celebration and the presidential inauguration, the GVN reportedly released and reduced the sentences of approximately 6327 prisoners. In addition, a decree was issued on October 30 which grants complete freedom or erasure from records of charges and convictions for prisoners detained under specific categories. The status of how many people in Saigon are affected by the decree is uncertain. GVN officials have made vague statements concerning the decree and the release of prisoners.
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808D 3.5(c)
prisonerAnrecently ofJustice2 officialinformedUSofficialsin the Vietnamese Ministrythethat release andsentencereductionwasindividualsPresident Nguyen directactofclemency from VanThieutotheNationalPoliceGeneralNguyenconcerned_ The Directorofth personally NgocLoantolddowiththematter had nothingtotheprimeministercertainUS official thathebutthathetold be lievedthatchiefstorelease theprovinceon occasion ofNational Dayon November 3 Thesemi-officialVietnamPresson 31Octoberreportedthat482werereleased--l,167 who received clemency of the 327prisoners politicaldetaineesand4320suspects--and509 civilianand 336 military prisonershadtheir sen tencesreduced_ Since the specificselectionofpersonsapparentlyleftin lands tobereleasedwas USofficialsthe ofthepossiblethat itwas local authoritiesbeliefnumberofpoli-ticaldetaineesViet Congwerefeelthat includedamongThisthereportofandNovembersuspects released_ issomewhatsubstantiated by Kien statedthatPleikuafter they hadtakenantofight ThuaThien ofloyaltytotheCong_Hoa provincesgovernmentDinh Tuong ,whichin VietnamPresspoliticaldetaineeswere PhuYen and promisedreleasedandoath againsttheViet sentencedOfby 32385,5 Thecivilianprison andoverthis figure17,000arepopulationnowbeenalmoststill15000haveawaitingtrialtotals A breakdown 5,793areprobablyViet Congtheoffendershows(ethnic535 politicalprissonersthe categoryof 20 largestnumberof whon criminalprisoners 002Viet Cong suspects or armedrebelsKamputier KromandgroupdissidentssuchastheKhmer minorityFULRO) and5 ,055 militarypriprisoners000soners In addition thereareinapproximatelyinterrogation1centersthroughout atanygiventime thecountry
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808ULILL
As of the end of October, approximately US military officials have reported that military prisoners of war included about the government of Vietnam POW. This total of 260 were in the custody of persons whose origins are 224 regroupees, 59 southerners, and about 485 ethnic North Vietnamese, 612. All but about 385 captured since January 1966 prisoners have been 385 of these still unidentified. The total number - some 4,981 - have been and about half of by US forces. POWs in allied medical facilities who are not included in the prisoner total have constructed five major one US 7 to house these POWs detention centers and GVN forces capacity of only 11,000 these centers have under one in normal conditions each corps area and on Phu Quoc Island minor POW internal alterations they however with 14,000 POWs can quarter about. Security in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces 8 CORDS' report on pacification in South According in security during report declining security Vietnam during September substantiates earlier information which suggested situation some central coastal provinces decided decline in Nam provinces and Quang to set the CORDS in September in Quang Nga there was Tu severe Quang Ngai Nghia District for 10 setback when 5 pacification efforts suffered the days enemy occupied eastern August attack on the provincial capital following the 29-30 Tu Nghia is the most important of the intensity of campaign areas in five Eastern RD number (RF/PF) Force the enemy offensive drove the the province Regional and The Eroopalar reaction was delayed and cautious of hamlets soldiers and the RD cadres (ARVN) The Vietnamese Army after their forces were augmented by two battalions from even Quang Tin to have been successful the RF/PF Province ARVN forces staten pozadily however appear clearing the area in at least and cadres.
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3.5(c) have reportedly supporting returned to the hamlets The Quang Ngai ARVN and units have been Withdrawn from Vietnamese forces in the province have returned to the security skeptical of the status prior to September local forces US officials ability are topreserveandsecurity and feel that enemy forces could, Tuindeed may, repeat their seizure of eastern Nghia, 10 During September Quang Nam that Province experienced includes reversal caused Hieu Nhon Enemy pressure similar to of Quang Ngai of security loss in coastal least District temporary which its one point five RD hanlets because of continued the provincial capital of Hoi An team had to be temporarily At withdrawn from their October of security its offensive During forces and directed much of the enemy lack in Quang Nam and effort against the districts enclaves Loc to force government Hieu Duc, Enemy forces into seem of Dai attempting to be 1n Hoi An Da Nang and the district towns Revolutionary Development Cadre Vietnamese On 11 were deployed with RD teams October CORDS field strength 505 reported that of 23442 the number of team has increased during While the total field throughout South Vietnam. 1967 remained relatively constant properly Job expected 59-man and the tasks strength of the strength per team has team has decreased perform team RD the is the optimum size fewer men in motivated and of it with delta province required to trained team however assigned can do the under ideal security situations considerable For example Giang the relatively secure of An there are economic development whose 38 teams of 20 men function is primarily village They work one group to there 12 In addition to the Vietnamese RD teams were also 106 Truong Son (montagnard) RD teams and 5,340 Static Census Grievance Cadres in the field on October The total strength II-4
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808OLAJIL 3.5(c)
On that date of the three cadre groups, the 45295 command and control cadres and trainees was about the Vung an Despite 13 large number of graduates from prevented Tau National Training Center percent has cadres attrition rate of quantitative increase in about 34 Vietnamese for RD RD cadres basic course Vung Tau graduated 1,585 August on 373 students from the approximately on students basic the 000 trainees November recruits November with October on and 3222,675 an effort to now started Vung Tau who about training Tau qualitative efforts of the RD teams in prove on. In has the now offers technical Vung specialists or 400 initiated Intelligence cadre scheduled to will number of courses into train 1968 be Research and students in This course training course four classes is of 100 students train each include Other leadership and medical training. specialist cadre courses at Vung Tau level 14 off The Truong Son program is expected to at strength located of about 000 about The training center in 1,211 students the basic cadre course in Pleiku had during October and including trainees had 7,477 persons in the program direction of the military teams are also under the 15. Civil RD Cadre Directorate. There are 35 teams teams are composed 32 are in of II technical Civil-military Corps service cadres and Regional or Popular Force platoons 16. For September CORDS reported that 99 enemy-initiated lives of 54 cadres and anti-RD wounded about 142 this incidents cost the Vietnamese figure includes RD cadre losses killed for September were 597; discharged captured (11) and deserted (308) Vietnamese Armed Forces in Revolutionary Development under 17 battalions October As of 164 Vietnamese Army training (ARVN) the RD mobile training team program had completed their RD To.
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808SbUKE 3.5(c)
begin refresher training slippage is to ensure that there is no in the program. RD in November course scheduled to usually 18 committed to the direct support of RD. Although the number of ARVN battalions Corps 10 battalions fluctuating battalions in On averages 53, the units involved and 17 November the number per corps has been MACV report shows only 52 - 14 III Corps and 15 battalions and three US battalions in II Corps IV Corps in 13 battalions in 17 November US forces had deployed two in Corps Corps in support of RD. Corps one in II III.
Despite the difficulties imposed by operational requirements continuing trained in September Force approximately 219 of these companies are RF companies. 513 companies had been RD training through for the direct Regional support of RD. Throughout the platoon try coun are 745 Popular Force (PF) in direct support of RD 115 training. RF 20 companies addition in northern in the Corps Corps have received their 80 of the approximately platoons have completed their combined Motivation/RD. In 672 Popular Force (PF) their over-all Indoctrination military posture and RD reportedly Vietnamese training. To further enhance forces in Corps additional are in the process of activating an 15 RF companies and 41 PF platoons.
Since August, elements of the ARVN 22nd Division have been and Duong Corps province of Binh Dinh in the II Son Plain conduction Lieu Valley to prepare the an operation in the Bong this for pacification area operation has ambush operations in been to The increase the number general concept of small unit and vicinity of the Cay Giap mountains and the village and with the cordon-and-search techniques to ferret hamlets out enemy in the infrastructure area.
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# ECONOMIC SITUATION
One percent prices in Saigon declined in November because the week ending for Retail during domestic rice and other foods of lower prices. Free market economic and gold prime cabinet occupied by Ton in the unknowns currency posts relative ces increased. Most of Economy record during and Minister his previous. Import orders smaller than undistinguished the 1967 were position was first nine months of terms in the result of hands of importers during the existing large inventories anticipated as of personnel recently goods in the substantial USAID found insect infestation in PL-480 rice stored by the South Vietnamese Government. The relationship between increasing since 1965 supply future additions to that the of piasters price level has and the in-tightened supply will and place greater pressure on prices.
|Prices|sharply the previous week November declined during the week ending in Saigon food price index Retail prices|
|---|---|
|1 percent|risen domestic 3 percent as prices declined rice as well as the type dropped of pork of rice used in of most varieties of fish and chicken|
|The price of the USAID index declined to 22.5 piasters per kilogram, the lowest since croprice continued to arrive in mid-February as deliveries of new non-food| |
|Saigon|of the price of laundry as Prices soap rose increased slightly items Firewood the result again as and first the high cost of also coconut oil latter for charcoal prices tail prices early September the rose of weekly re-time since in Saigon is included in (A table the Annex.)|
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808OLOILL 3.5(c)
US-financed sheet resulted in rods flour and galvanized iron new arrivals imports index for wholesale prices because
The USAID of wheat also declined lightly ces of The price of stocks and however for these items because of low wire lower prices lack of new deliveries rose sharply
Currency and Gold Free November two The prices of green dollars market currency and gold prices increased on rose respectively to 155 and 115 graph leaf per the highest rates since mid-August and MPC piasters (scrip) dollar four piasters piastersto The 201 price of gold dollar increased piasters per is monthly and weekly currency and gold prices on included in the Annex.
New Economic Administration in the new while most of once again gone to economy Thai Ton, b1 engineer 1965 to figures his record was The cabinet has key portfolio of minister of Truong the related ministries will be headed less well known previous iyserved as and from Ton minister an of economy culture from June February 1966 government and economic consider hin capable and hard undistinguished at the time 1967 de experience in February 1967 to mid-March He has had Wi adviser in appointment was of his the prime minister but serving as but officials in administrative ability any US an lacking office working by past experience Judging they do not expect from trong leadership on economic matters to come his office.
The scope who it was of Ton his predecessor tion as post apparently will be Nguyen smaller than could minis at present Bank of Vietnam Hanh of the wield under retains his posi from Under Huu National which governor still try direct supervisory responsibility Hanh Finance he and commerce had but the finance two have now become the called the Ministry of Economy considerable influence communications industry for and transport and latter.
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|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|Separate Ministries|The departments of commerce, commercial Lyare for commerce and Vo Van Nhung for industry now headed by undersecretaries.|
|Nguyen Chanh Ly has been a junior official in the credit section of the electrical engineer. National Bank.| |
|As in the general finance minister of field in which he has been working for many years. Luu Van Tinh will continue as minister of finance under Tran budget and foreign aid as new.| |
|The an assistant to Hanh on communications is Luong as director of the Van Huong and in Ky 5 government as tax policy. The well minister of transport and Sieu, who has been technical director of government-owned Nong the coal mine near Da Nang.| |
|The other major economic ministries Ton That Trinh agriculture and labor, who worked with Ton as headed by the prime minister an advisers University of Da Lat while on Pho Ba Long teaching the defeated senatorial candidate who administration at has been political science and business leave from Esso where he worked in public and employee relations.| |
|Import Situation|Orders for imports this year result have been large inventories smaller than anticipated as in the hands of importers of goods goods ordered by nine months the of existing. The monthly value of in Vietnam during the first commercial importers Jelow quite high because of the 1966 to 25 percent 20 1967 (measured be letters of credit opened) the monthly average for was. The level in 1966 was removal of import quotas and restrictions entry of new joint Embassy / USAID study and the effect firms into the importing business and the according to the main concern now will have is end of June 1967 both bank and non-bank on the size of inventories it the market for imported goods next year financing of total of By the importers roughly 25 billion piasters inventories was estimated to the expected value of orders or for all of 1967 about 60 per.|
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
may readysupplies dampening effect on that importers. The large inventories have allowed consumers access of imported goods at stable prices, thus providing domestic price increases. Placing large new orders until inventories have been wary. The danger of, however, is the run down and prices start moving up, an unsettling effect on price increase. Orders would not only have an impact on bank liquidity but also on port operations, such as was experienced in 1966.
US officials in Saigon expect that the large inventories will discourage any increase in the import sector this year. They anticipate that orders will pick up through the end of 1968 but see major problems confronting the economy between the time orders are placed and the goods arrive. To reduce the time lag between orders and arrivals, adequate credit must be available to finance the imported goods and rapidly replace the stocks.
There is a shortage of imported goods and to maintain the shortage, the time lag must be reduced. About seven to nine months early in the year, importers should be able and willing to react quickly before shortages appear and currently, importers are running short. This year, the hope is to tackle the time lag of about nine months between orders and arrivals in order to somewhat reduce shortages.
Credit procedures are being viewed for streamlining, particularly by US officials in the hope of easing current bank pressure on importers to repay outstanding loans. Infestation of stored US rice by rodent and insect infestation in PL-480 rice. USAID personnel recently found substantial infestation in warehouses rented by the Vietnamese Government in Cholon and Thu Duc, which have two-thirds of the combined capacity of 108,000 metric tons of imported rice in the Saigon stock area at the end of September.
The infestation exists in warehouses both in Cholon and Thu Duc.
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
plans reportedlyisworstinmove thesestocksemergency controlledstoragespaceare underway tocontractprivateonwarehousesuntiltheCholonwarehousesUSAID, an intoUSAID-and basis and protectthericein officialsOctober the governmentcanhasalreadyreportedhiredtheThusuchservicesabout1futuresaid500tonscostlyforDucofspoiledricefirmtofumigateAID asof10derably greatertoteamalsoshipmentofdur-butandmuchmorerecommendedPL-480losses wouldbe consi fumigation Thesurvey thanthat iffeasible futurecontractsfor riceandotherfoods Vietnamships priortoandinclude provisions ing loadingandtoinhibit durth during for improvedinspectionoffoodswithingloadingvoyagesdustingoforeliminateinsecticidesinsect grow- 10studymadeinAugustisThisrecentsurveybyUSDAAtthattimereminiscentof simipri- andlarvateAmericanricemillers technicians they allowrecommendedfor goodventilationand urged frequentfumi-differentsystemof pilingto gation.
Inflation The CostofMorePiasterg countryrapid pacethedirectservicesavailableinat11_money supply(currency plus checking Undercertaincircumstanceschangesin accounts) canhave andsubstantial impact on thenthepriceIfgoodsandavailable that countrymorethe pricesofnstbuyersofthansupplyof moneyincreasesbyotherthosetheto bidmore vigorouslygoodsisvery of goodsto rise are forced agai ceivethesituationandaccommodatethebuyerseach Suppliersratherquicklyper- raisingprices ofmoneyfallsitsFurtheroftherisholdmoneylevel)as the purchasingpoweringprice verylongas noone is particularly(becauseanxioustowilldeclineeven purchasingpower for further Consequently most individualsattemptto spendtheir moneyincomeasthepressureonpriin- flationfurtherincreasingexplainthesevereIn This processseemsinSouthVietnamin1965 . itthusthat begantobest soon as theyreceiveces.
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|Selected Countries|Money Index 1960|Money Index 1965|Price Index 1960|
|---|---|---|---|
|Ceylon|107|152|104|
|India|122|193|119|
|Pakistan|126|195|116|
|Philippines|126|204|108|
|South Vietnam|138|391|95|
|Taiwan Korea|189|460|149|
|South|181|468|133|
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Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
3.5(c)
pace with the money the supply of piasters by the agricultural - second but significant factor was the absorption Vietnamese economy _ turalsectoroftraditionallySouthreliedonof This sector had apiytregorred instead barter of national goodsexchanged for goods Thiralls from the first two currency more and factors country money norma in the course growth and development piasters and piaster checking income increased more As South Vietnam number of transactions accounts were transactions required to and facilitate the greater the larger piaster amount of these came evident 1965 to South Vietnam slack 14 of In when the OS began sending large economy which that numbers troops there was little it quickly be left in the money stock without inflation. would allow substantial additions to of The remainder the subsistence sector became rather qui mone- because magnitude tized And the additions to the money additional piasters required were of such of economic growth were even that of lesser importance than the commercial they import and Food 1965 were before for Peace of prevent- Consequently Programs were left with almost all of the burden ing inflation in South Vietnam To lesser extent the growing black market in currency and gold actea and still acts as Vietnamese with deterrent to further inflation piasters ding currency then holding idle cash be by provi for purposes of stant value were used South future trangactions piaster is to hold as idle source of con- the would balances balances costly If becausedeclining. tantly the purchasing power of con- largely 15 responsible for the The South Vietnamese budget deficit is and upward growiral money consequently ing the government to raise necessary According to in more piasters appears to be for the spira the in prices employed by wholly inadequate revenue as tax collections not are the prospects based on addition to the money of price cent estimates 1968 are the possible budget deficit less borrowing good_ Estimates for price increases stability (which provides the net upply
III-7
3.5(c)
SECRET
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|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808ULL|3.5(c) for1968NationalBank)|
|---|---|
|fromthe Formerministerconservatiaseconomyandfinancegoof high as 75percent Hanh35-percenthoweverincreaseis vely predictingabout| |
|III-8|3.5(c)|
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|Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon|13 Jun 1966|3 Jan 1967|16 Oct 1967|23 Oct 1967|30 Oct 1967|6 Nov 1967|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Index for 61 Items|173|225|291|290|304|300|
|Index for Food Items|190|242|326|324|345|336|
|Of Which: (In Piasters)|Rice-Soc Nau 100 kg|1,250|1,700|2,300|2,300|2,300|2,250|
| |Pork Bellies 1 kg|90|130|200|200|230|220|
| |Fish - Ca Tre (jar 1 kg)|130|150|220|220|270|260|
| |Nuoc Mam|70| |150|150|150|150|
|Index for Nonfood Items|140|195|227|228|230|233|
|Of Which: In Piasters|Firewood cu. meter|360|560|500|500%|520|53016|
| |White Kerosene (liter)|207.8|33|10.5|#| |16|
Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100. Price level just prior to the 18 June devaluation.
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| |31OCT|6 NOV|
|---|---|---|
|1964|197|201|
|1965|153|155|
|1966| | |
| |1967|AUG|SEP|OCT|Nov|
GOLD: Bosisgoldloaf worth $35 per troy ounce
US $10 GREEN
US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip)
---
# Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
# Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI_15472957_.pdf" |
{
"Who": "Lower house members, Senate rules committee, Vietnamese government officials, Buddhist leaders, US military officials",
"What": "Discussion and validation of election results, drafting of Senate rules, development of new political party, reconciliation efforts among Buddhists, economic situation updates",
"When": "13-16 November",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE
The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.
|FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY|Date: FEBRUARY 1968|
|---|---|
|COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM|GROUP: 35H2|
|SUBJECT: POST-VC-OFFENSIVE PROBLEMS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND ANTICIPATED ENEMY ACTIONS|AGQ: 35H|
|SOURCE: 35C| |
SUMMARY: IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, WHERE MOST OF THE ASSAULT FORCES WERE NV'A, THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OF HIS STRENGTH AND PERHAPS ANOTHER ONE-FOURTH IN WOUNDED. THE ENEMY FOLLOWED HIS PLAN OF ATTACK EVEN THOUGH IT WAS
---
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’\_; ;oBv1ous RE HAD FAILED T0 ACCOMPLISH HIS 0BJECTIVES.P_M0ST _ . . --
*‘A§ALLiEn COMMANDERS WERE WELL PREPARED T0 MEET IHE ATTACK WHEN... E*~ "
“.§1r CAME. WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS evn OFFICIALS AND ARVN
1"§RERFoRmEn WELL. THE PEOPLE REDSED TO RALLY T0 THE ENEMY
OF THE PROVINCE ADMINISTRATION WERE OPEN AND Fuwcrxouxms.
THE ENEMY'S MOVE zmro FORMER RD PRIORITY AREAs 1s REGRETTABLE.
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ADDED TO THE RECOVER£RECONSTRUCTION
EFFORT THAT LIES AHEAD WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE.l968
PACIFICATION EFFORT. A SECOND VC/NVA ATTACK IN OUANG TRI
NOW SEEMS LESS OF A POSSIBILITY, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE,
THAN IT DID THE FIRST THREE WEEKS FOLLOWING TET.
THE ENEMY
j‘_DOES SEEM MOTIVATED, HOWEVER, BY AN OVERWHELMING COMPULSION'“
TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AND STARTLING VICTORY. ALTHOUGH THE
“ENEMY SAW AN OPPORTUNITY IN HUE, HE WILL SOONER OR LATER
TIRE OF THE HUE STRUGGLE AND DRIVE AT SOME OTHER TARGET
FOR A QUICK PSYCHOLIGICAL VICTORY, WHICH COULD BE A PRELUDE
TO NEGOTIATIONS. RRE sARR IS THE_MOST oBv1ous’oRPoRruR1rY.
BECAUSE OF u.s. AIR AND FIRE POWER HE PROBABLY wouuo BE '
FORCED TO USE AIR POWER As WELL AS TANKS. _WHEN THIS 1
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- .. -»~---Approved for Release: 2o19R>A/17 'c0e7sE477'?:'- '
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HAPPENS HE WILL IN REALITY BE ESCALATING THE WAR.L WHETHER HE IS READY AND WILLING TO DO SO IS OPEN TO QUESTION. THE CHARACTER OF THE TET OFFENSIVE INDICATED THE ENEMY. WAS MORE INTERESTED IN A QUICK END TO THE WAR. MOST ALLIED COMMANDERS FEEL THAT THE VC MUST EFFECTIVELY BLOCK ALLIED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY COMBAT ELEMENTS IF HE WANTS TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK IN QUANG TRI. THE ENEMY DOES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED BASES ON ROUTE NO. 9 AND EASTWARD TO CUA VIET WITH ARTILLERY. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN MORE ADEPT AT PROPAGANDAIZING THE PEOPLE THAN THE ALLIES. HE HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE AMONG THE PEOPLE, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ALLIES HAVE BEEN CONSTRAINED TO REMOVE THE PEOPLE AS REFUGEES. THE ENEMY NEEDS TO SUBSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF HIS OWN FOR THE PRESENT SYSTEM - WRECK GVN HAMLET AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS, LAND-USE SYSTEMS AND CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC TAPROOTS. THE OUTLOOK IN QUANG TRI IS THAT THE ENEMY WILL RESIST VIGOROUSLY ALLIED EFFORTS TO PERMANENTLY REESTABLISH RD SECURITY. HE WILL STEP UP HIS ATTACKS AGAINST BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY, IF NOT AS A PRELUDE TO A SECOND
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OFFENSIVE. HE PROBABLY WILL TRY TO HANG ONTO TO HUE,AND/OR THE ENVIRONS OF HUE. HE MAY IN DESPERATION TRY TO TAKE KHE SANH TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. WAR EFFORT. HAVING LOST FACE,
AND WITH COMMUNIST CHINA'S BACKING AND URGING, THE ENEMY MAY BE HEEDLESS OF THE ESCALATION FACTOR. IF THAT IS THE CASE THE ALLIES HAVE A NEW FACTOR TO WORRY ABOUT. END SUMMARY.
1. THE NATURE AND THE EFFECT OF THE ENEMY'S SO-CALLED TET OFFENSIVE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE APPEARED TO BE VERY MUCH LIKE "WHAT HAPPENED IN MOST PROVINCES UP AND DOWN THE COUNTRY. THERE WERE SOME SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES HOWEVER. FOR EXAMPLE, MOST OF THE ALLIED COMMANDERS IN-PROVINCE CORRECTLY DIAGNOSED THE ENEMY'S INTENT IN ADVANCE AND WERE WELL PREPARED TO MEET THE ATTACKS WHEN THEY CAME. AS A RESULT THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST ONE—FOURTH OF HIS TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE QUANG TRI LOWLANDS AND ANOTHER FOURTH MAY HAVE BEEN WOUNDED. IN QUANG TRI THE ASSAULT FORCES WERE MOSTLY REGULAR NVA UNITS, NOT VC. AS WAS THE CASE IN MANY PROVINCES, THE ENEMY'S PLAN WAS INCORRECT IN CONCEPT AND FAULTY IN EXECUTION. IN QUANG TRI HE TELEGRAPHED HIS PUNCH IN MANY WAYS AND HE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A COORDINATED EFFORT WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIM A MUCH GREATER SHOCK EFFECT.
---
# PULSIVELY FOLLOWED HIS PLAN OF ATTACK IN OUANG TRI EVEN THOUGH IT
IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE HAD FAILED T0 ACCOMPLISH HIS PRELIMINARY OBJECTIVES OF CUTTING OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND NEUTRALIZING. A
POUR COMBAT BASES..
2. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE ENEMY EXPECTED_A GREATER RESPONSE
FROM THE PEOPLE THAN HE RECEIVED. ITHE PEOPLE NOT ONLY REFUSED TO
RALLY TO THE ENEMY'S SIDE, IN MANY CASES THE COURAGEOUSLY FOUGHT BACK.
THE PERFORMANCES OF MANY POPULAR FORCE/REGIONAL FORCE (PF/-
50F) AND RD GROUPS NERE ESPECIALLY NOTENORTHY. ALTHOUGH MANY OF
THESE UNITS NERE REDEPLOYED TO MORE SECURE AREAS AS THE ENEMY'S
ATTACK UNFOLDED, OTHERS WERE LEFT IN POSITION TO FIGHT, AND FIGHT
IN SOME AREAS THE RURAL PEOPLE REFUSED FOOD TO FORAGING
THEY DID.
INVA SOLDIERS. THE PEOPLE WERE as(h) as(lh)
STILL PROVINDING TIMELY INFORMATION DESPITE THE SHARP INCREASE IN
THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS IN THEIR MIDST AND DESPITE THE INTENSE
ENEMY PSYNAR_EFFORT THAT ACCOMPANIED HIS BATTLE EFFORT
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477
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5. NO GVN OFFICIAL IN QUANG TRI DESERTED HIS POST OR OTHER-|
v
T?
WISE PROVED T0 BE A TRAITOOR on A cowmw.
THE CHIEF BUDDHISTPRIEST
IN OUANG TRI, THICH THIEN BINH, WAS DEMONSTRABLY PROPGVN THROUGHOUT
THE EMERGENCY PERIOD.
ONLY THE PROVINCE CHIEF, LIEUTENANT COLONEL
NGUYEN AM, APPEARED TO BE SHOCKED TO A POINT OF TOTAL INEFFECTIVE-
NESS AT THE HEIGHT OF THE ENEMY ATTACK. BUT HIS.BURDEN WAS
PICKED UP BY THE REST OF HIS STAFF AND BY HIS AMERICAN ADVISORS.
THE COMBINATION OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE TET HOLIDAY PREVENTED
THE PROVINCE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FROM FUNCTIONING FULLY FOR
SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE EMERGENCY ABATED.
BY 15 FEBRUARY, HOWEVER,
MOST OFFICES WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING.
FORTUNATELY THE SOCIAL
WELFARE AND REFUGEE SERVICES WERE ON gjE JOB THROUGHOUT THE MEER-
GENCY PERIOD. THEY FUNCTIONED VERY WILL INDEED.
4. THE MOST DISCOURAGING JFACTOR FROM THE FREE WORLD'S STAND-
POINT WAS THE PARALYSIS WHICH GRIPPED THE 1ST ARVN REGIMENT.
THIS
FOUR-BATTALION REGIMENT SUFFERED ONLY LIGHT CASUALTIES DURING THE
ATTACK BUT THEY FAILED TO SEIZE THE IOPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT THEIR-
ADVANTAGE AFTER THE ENEMY WAS REPULSED WITH HEAVY LOSSES. _THIS,
COUPLED WITH AN ALMOST COMPLETE ALLIED
SYWAR BREAKDOWN IN THE
PERMITTED THE ENEMY TO MOVE INTO THE POWER
RURAL AREAS, V-
Y
'-'AppFOV6d for Release: 2019/O4/17 C06786477"*5" I-F!"
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477
VACUUM IN THE FORMER RD PRIORITY AREA IN OUANG TRI PROVINCE.
THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF ENEMY-GENERATED BLACK PROPAGANDA PLOYS. A RADIO BROADCASTING STATION PURPORTING TO BE AN OFFICIAL GVN OUTLET STATED ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS THAT GENERAL MEN HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE AN OUANG BUDDHISTS IN SAIGON WHO HAD PUBLICLY GONE OVER TO THE VIET CONG; THAT AMERICAN B-52S HAD BOMBED HUE; THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PULLING OUT OF THE WAR AND OPTING FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE IMMINENT, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN THE CEDING OF QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES TO NORTH VIETNAM. IN THE RURAL AREAS THE ENEMY REPEATEDLY TOLD THE POPULACE THAT KHE SANH HAD FALLEN AND THAT HUE WAS IN VC HANDS. STORIES OF ARVN, POLICE, AND RF/PF MASS DESERTIONS TO THE ENEMY WERE ALSO BRUITED ABOUT. (COMMENT: LINH QUANG VIEN IS INTERIOR MINISTER; CAO VAN VIEN IS JGS CHIEF.)
INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH THE PEOPLE WE USUALLY CONSIDER TO BE THE ELITE IN THIS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE MORE AFFECTED BY RUMORS THAN THE COMMON FOLK. THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST ARVN REGIMENT IN FACT PUBLICLY CHASTISED THE AMERICAN MILITARY'S RESPONSE TO THE ENEMY'S CHALLENGE. HE SIMMERED DOWN LATER, BUT AT TIMES OTHER GVN OFFICIALS SEEMED TO BE DEEPLY DEPRESSED AND SOMEWHAT UNREASONABLE.
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IN THEIR ATTITUDES. THE HUE SITUATION AFFECTED MANY OFFICIALS WHO HAD FRIENDS AND RELATIVES IN THAT BESIEGED CITY. THE VORTEX OF POWER AND CULTURE WHICH DESCENDS FROM HUE TO THIS PROVINCE WAS SUDDENLY AND COMPLETELY WIPED OUT, OR SO IT SEEMED TO THE OFFICIALS IN OUANG TRI. IT WAS LAMENTABLE BUT NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, TO FIND ARVN COMMANDERS ESPECIALLY IN A STATE OF SHOCK. BY 25 FEBRUARY SOME ASPECTS OF NORMALCY HAD RETURNED AND AN EFFORT, STILL RELATIVELY FEEBLE, WAS BEING MADE TO SAT ON WITH RECOVERY AND PACIFICATION.
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN OUANG TRI AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS NOT SEVERE, BUT THE REFUGEE POPULATION GENERATED AS A RESULT OF PRE-TET AND POST-TET MILITARY OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN HUONG HOA (KHE SANH) AND CAM LO DISTRICTS, HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE. APPROXIMATELY 14,000 NEW REFUGEES WERE EXPECTED. THE CARE AND FEEDING OF THESE PEOPLE COMMANDED A GOOD PROPORTION OF THE STAFFS OF BOTH CORDS AND THE GVN AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR SOME TIME. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ADDED TO THE RECOVERY-REBUILDING EFFORT WHICH LIES AHEAD PROBABLY WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT. THE 1968 PACIFICATION EFFORT IN QUANG TRI.
THE SECOND ATTACK ON QUANG TRI CITY, WHICH, DURING THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF FEBRUARY, SEEMED INEVITABLE AND IMMINENT.
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# classification) fdlsscm controls
NOW SEEMS TO BE LESS OF A POSSIBILITY — AT umsr IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
THE ENEMY APPARENTLY COMMITTED THE BULK OF HIS AVAILABLE FORCES IN THIS AREA TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. WHEN THAT FAILED, HE SAW AN OPPORTUNITY IN HUE AND SHIFTED SOME FORCES, THE 8l2TH AND THE 95TH- TO THUA THIEN. IT DOES NOT NEW HE CAN REINFORCE HIS TROOPS IN AND AROUND HUE SOON ENOUGH. THE ENEMY DOES SEEM TO BE MOTIVATED HOWEVER, BY AN OVERWHELMING COMPULSION TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AND STARTLING VICTORY. HE THEREFORE MAY THROW GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD, GAMBLING ON WEAKENING OF OUR RESOLVE TO HOLD HUE. SOONER OR LATER THE ENEMY IS BOUND TO TIRE OF THE HUE STRUGGLE AND IN A LEMMING-LIKE FASHION DRIVE AT SOME OTHER TARGET FOR A QUICK PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY WHICH COULD BE A PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS FAVORABLE TO THE NFLSV.
THE MOST OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY OPEN TO HIM IS AT KHE SANH. ALTHOUGH KHE SANH NO‘LONGER HAS ANY POLITICAL VALUE VIS-A-VIS THE GVN, IT HAS ASSUMED AN IMAGE GREATER THAN IT DESERVES IN,TERMS OF U.S. MILITARY PRESTIGE IN VIETNAM. IT IS STILL, THEN, A,LEGITIMATE TARGET IN HANOI'S EYES. THE ENEMY NO LONGER HAS THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WORKING FOR HIM IN KHE SANH. HE MUST REALIZE THAT WHEN HE BEGINS HIS ASSAULT ON_KHE SANH HE WILL PROBABLY BE HIT ON THE &E€'R‘F['
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# FLANKS AND REAR BY ELEMENTS OF TWO AIR-MOBILE U.S. DIVISIONS..q AND
MASSIVE AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS. AT KHE»SANH THE ENEMY ET‘ 'DOES HAVE SHORT SUPPLY LINES AND FAVORABLE TERRAIN. ‘TO TIP THE SCALES IN THE ENEMY'S FAVOR, HOWEVER, THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY BE 'FORCED TO USE TACTICAL AIR AS WELL AS ARMOR@ WHEN THIS HAPPENS (T THE ENEMY PROBABLY REALIZES HE WILL IN REALITY BE ESCALATING THE iWAR ANOTHER NOTCH. WHETHER HE IS READY AND WILLINQ TO DO SO IS @0PEN T0 QUESTION.
K E '=VL§R§¢;V¥¢VHNNH4E
---
# THE CHARACTER OF THE TET OFFENSIVE; HOWEVER? INDICATED
THAT THE ENEMY WAS MORE INTERESTED IN A QUICK END T0 THE WAR, NOT.
AN ESCALATION. THE MUCH-HERALDED SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS ON CITIES
AND TOWNS IN VIET NAM WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THE ENEMY TO BRING
OFF BECAUSE THE FIRST ATTACK WAS SO EXPENSIVE FOR HIM.
HE SUFFERED GRIEVOUS LOSSES IN MANPOWER AND SUPPLIES. GUERRILLAS AND CADRES WHO HELPED HIM IN ALL PHASES (LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND GUIDES) HAVE BEEN HURT. THE PEOPLE, SOME or WHOM WERE MueQNumPs BEFORE, HAVE HARDENED AGAINST HIS CYNICAL AND BLOODTHIRSTY VISAGE- AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE HOW THE ENEMY CAN REPEAT IN ACHIEVING TACTICAL SURPRISE. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WOULD PROBABLY SHOW THAT WHERE THE ENEMY DID NOT ACHIEVE THE ELEMENT ow SURPRISE, HE was SOUNDLY DEFEATED. THIS WAS THE DIFFERENCE IN QUANG TRI AT LEAST.
# ASSUMING THAT THE ENEMY STILL WANTS TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK IN OUANG TRI, MOST COMMANDERS FEEL THE ENEMY MUST EFFECTIVELY BLOCK ALLIED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY COMBAT ELEMENTS.
HE MAY STILL STRIVE FOR TACTICAL SURPRISE BY SACRIFICING.HIS UNDER-/STRENGTH BATTALIONS NOW IN QUANG TRI IN DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS ON BASES AND CITIES FROM THE REAR, WHILE THROWING IN FRESH
---
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classification:
THE ENEMY HAS TROOPS IN A MAIN EFFORT FROM THE NORTH AND WEST. THE CAPABILITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED AREAS ON ROUTE N-oi AND EASTWARD TO CUA VIET WITH ARTILLERY. A MASSIVE ARTILLERY SIEGE OF THESE BASES COUPLED WITH THE GROUND TACTICS MENTIONED ABOVE COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME BUT NOT NECESSARILY CATASTROPHIC.
THERE IS A DANGER IN VIEWING THIS CAMPAIGN IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TERMS. THE ENEMY ALREADY HAS FORCED THE ALLIES IN KHE SANH AND ALONG THE DMZ TO THINK IN TERMS OF "SET PIECE" BATTLES, AFTER FORCING THE ALLIES INTO MILITARY POSTURES FOR ENGAGEMENTS OF THIS SORT, THE ENEMY THEN REVERTED TO REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE WHICH HAS TO DO MORE WITH PEOPLE AND POLITICS THAN IT DOES WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE ENEMY STILL CONTINUES TO HOLD THE RD AREA OR A GOOD PART OF IT, HE HAS BEEN MUCH MORE ADEPT IN PROPAGANDIZING THE PEOPLE THAN THE ALLIES HAVE. HE HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE AMONG THE PEOPLE, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ALLIES HAVE OFTEN BEEN CONSTRAINED TO REMOVE THE PEOPLE AS REFUGEES. THIS TENDENCY IS VIEWED BY MANY AS PACIFICATION IN REVERSE, THE ENEMY'S GOAL IS HAVOC AND ANARCHY - TO ELIMINATE "OUR" SYSTEM IN ORDER TO SUBSTITUTE ONE OF HIS OWN. THE ENEMY NEEDS TO WRECK GVN HAMLET AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS, LAND-USE SYSTEMS, AND CULTURAL AND
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393%
TDCS
6-pa-
4
PAGE /3 pr _/guess _
ECONOMIC TAPROOTS. THE DELIBERATE GENERATION OF REFUGEES,0 - ES-'
PECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE GVN-ORIENTED IN THE MAIN, IS TANTAMOUNT TO Hf AN ADMISSION OF PACIFICATION BANKRUPTCY.
THE OUTLOOK IN OUANG TRI IS THAT ENEMY WILL RESIST_
VIGOROUSLY ALLIED EFFORTS TO PERMANENTLY REESTABLISH RD SECURITY.
HE WILL STEP UP HIS ATTACKS AGAINST BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNIF CATIONS AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY IF NOT AS A PRELUDE TO A SECOND OFFENSIVE.
HE WILL PROBABLY TRY TO HANG ONTO HUE ANQ/ OR THE ENVIRONS OF HUE. HE MAY IN DESPERATION TRY TO TAKE HHE SANH TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. WAR EFFORT. HAVING LOST FACE, AND WITH.
QRED CHINA'S BACKING AND URGING, THE ENEMY MAY BE HEEDLESS OF THE ESCALATION FACTOR. IF THAT IS THE CASE THE ALLIES HAVE A NEW FACTOR TO WORRY ABOUT.
REPORT CLASS N_o__E.ua-Ea-err1>'1“ssErYT\* SITUATION_APPRAISAL_OF_PO[15617909].pdf | {
"Who": "CIA Field Station, Clandestine Services",
"What": "Intelligence information about post-VC-offensive problems in Quang Tri Province and anticipated enemy actions in South Vietnam, details on enemy's activities and motivations, ARVN and GVN responses, refugee problems, and propaganda efforts",
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Quang Tri Province", "Hue", "Khe Sanh", "Thua Thien"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists
16 November 196723
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768R I F!
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
s.5(¢)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003029708 3-5(°)
UL',§-l:'.*UK11;'1'\
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence16 November 1967
# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists
A Monthly Report
# Contents
- I. Military Developments: which had been basedMajor elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front, in Cambodia since 1966, have moved to the Dak To area of South Vietnam (Para. l).
- Other B-3 Front elements have moved from their normal operating areas in Cambodia into South Vietnam (Para. 2).
- There is no evidence that Communist units involved in the attack on Loc Ninh in late October staged from the territory, although it is likely that Cambodian territory was useful in a supplementary role for the enemy's operation (Paras. 3-4).
- There are more reports of Communist medical and communications facilities in Cambodia (Paras. 5-6).
- Cambodia is establishing a number of new outposts in the northeast, possibly to control tribal dissidence rather than to counter the Communists (Paras. 7-9).
The Vietnamese Communists continue to obtain foodstuffs and other nonmilitary supplies from Cambodia (Para. ll).
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.
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# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768
1. It procured ammunition in Cambodia, and his unit was based in Cambodia. The Cambodian border post promised his unit "tar fire support" if required during operations in South Vietnam (Paras. 12-15).
2. Political Developments:
- Prince Sihanouk again denies that Vietnamese Communist troops are based in Cambodia (Para. 20).
- Military operations warning of consequences of US belief that the Communists will win in South Vietnam (Paras. 21-22).
- Chou En-lai's most recent effort to improve Chinese-Cambodian relations receives favorable response from Sihanouk (Paras. 23-26).
---
|THAILAND|MEANCHEY|MONDOLKIRI|
|---|---|---|
|5D0k T0|RATA YAKIR|PHUGC LNB|
---
# Military Developments
# Communist Base Areas
1. During October, there was a northeastward movement of major elements of the North Vietnamese 66th – which are subordinate regiments – the 32nd and B-3 Front. Two of three NVA regiments to the Front, which apparently have been based in Cambodia since 1966, had relocated near the Dak To area of South Vietnam by late October. The third regiment, the 88th, was resubordinated in September and moved out of the border area of the highlands to Phuoc Long Province in South Vietnam.
2. Headquarters elements of the B-3 Front 1st Division also moved north from their normal operating area in Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia into the tri-border area. In addition, at least one element of the B-3 Front's 33rd Regiment moved eastward from Cambodia into South Vietnam's Darlac Province. This regiment has been located in South Vietnam during most of 1967.
3. Farther south, the headquarters and forward elements of the North Vietnamese 7th Division were located in Cambodia's Kompong Cham Province in early October, while units of the Viet Cong's 9th Light Infantry Division were located along the border in Kratie Province. There were, however, no indications of participating in the attack against Communist units that Loc Ninh in late October staged from Cambodian territory or took sanctuary there during the course of the battle.
4. Fighting at Loc Ninh and directed Cambodian border units to take precautionary defensive measures. In contrast with past practice, the Cambodians did not mention instances of Viet Cong intrusions across the border during the battle, or clearly state the posture that Cambodian forces were to maintain in the face of such border violations. The proximity of Loc Ninh to the border, however.
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the fact that the Communists have maintained medical facilities and have received foodstuffs and other supplies in this area, strongly suggest that Communist base areas often overlap the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.
|5.|A North Vietnamese recently, has described Communist facilities in Cambodia opposite southwestern Tay Ninh Province. He gave the location of a Viet Cong 300-man hospital and a hand-grenade factory on Cambodian territory and two Viet Cong broadcasting stations and a commo-liaison station along the border. He stated that at one time he had seen 250 North Vietnamese troops at the latter installation.|
|---|---|
|6.|The area in which these facilities are located is one long associated with heavy Communist use. Captured enemy documents reveal that one of the principal uses the Communists make of Cambodian territory is the location of medical facilities.|
This statement also underlines the extent to which Cambodian Communist base areas often overlap the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.
Cambodia Increasing Border Forces
7.
Meanwhile, there are signs that Phnom Penh is making a greater effort to increase the government's presence in isolated areas of the northeast. A number of new border outposts have been recently established in Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri provinces along the South Vietnamese and Laotian borders. The Cambodian elements of Army's 23rd Battalion were being deployed to positions in the Ia Drang Valley. North Vietnamese troops have been active in the valley since late 1965, when a major battle was fought on the South Vietnamese side of the poorly defined border. Other small Cambodian military detachments are moving into sparsely populated areas.
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‘i11()P Eflkflihll s.5(¢
inhabited and rugged country north of Route l9 in Ratanakiri Province.
cated in areas of these new Cambodian posts are lo-8.Although known or suspected Communist ac-"
t" ‘ty,ivi ommunists.their immediate purpose is to counterthere is no in d‘ica iont" 3.3(h)(2)
E;;:%;::]that e 3.3(h)(2)
In ad‘ 3.3(h)(2)
eratingto the problem of Cambodia is now tribal dition on its territory,serious outbreak offaced withNorth Vietnamese regulars op- a fresh and potentially been re- dissidence there. ported, tribal and in one case surrounded and forcedpeople have mounted a number Although no clashes have of large demonstrations of a police outpost. The tribesmen the evacuation The tribesmen have been provincial years thatCommunistthethere haveposts by in- the establishment of additional food shortages andpro-demonstrating against security been reports been over thebrought under authorities. some of influence, it is notAlthough montagnard tribes have spired.whether the current dissidents, however, did clear dissidence is Communist Some of the visit—-a line which the Com-tribal munists have Kennedy's other areas of Cambodia. protest Mrs. pushed in
l0. Phnom Penh is also showing some sensitivity to possible The Cambodian press reporting that USAllied intelligence agency on 7 Novemberoperations in the northeast. cited were placing sources" in forces"journalistic small teams in Ratanakiri the“Viet Cong" forces and to layProv- ince to seek out US "invasion." groundwork for a 3;xhX2)
[:::::::::::] Cambodian border units have been possiblein- US cross-border is also onevigilance against of heli- structed to copters. There operations unconfirmed report thatincrease their involving the use three South Vietnamese soldiers who allegedly par-The ticipated in such which Phnom however, suggests thatoperations have has thus far Penhbeen captured.ac- low—key corded the alleged it lacks hard evidence of any attention operations,such activities.
5 s.5(¢)
TO CRET 3-5<¢>
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---
# Supply Activity
The Communists are continuing to procure substantial amounts of foodstuffs and other non-military supplies from Cambodia. In September, a large number of boats were moving foodstuffs and medical supplies for North Vietnamese forces in Laos. Although some lengthy disruptions have been reported, the level of traffic on the river so far this year appears to be similar to that observed in 1966.
Meanwhile, supplies are also being transported along the South Vietnamese border, despite some Cambodian efforts to curtail this illicit flow.
A combat unit has given an account of its involvement in Cambodian territory and supply operations. The unit transported ammunition from a cache on the Mekong River a mile inside Cambodia to a transfer area, also within Cambodia. Another unit relayed the ammunition to the Seven Mountains area of South Vietnam's Chau Province. The ammunition, mostly of Chinese Communist origin, was for 60-mm. mortars, B-40 rocket launchers, and small arms.
The source did not explain how the ammunition arrived at the Mekong pickup point, but he said that the Viet Cong did not use the Mekong as a north-south transportation route. They crossed the Mekong only at night, as required by the Cambodians to avoid "diplomatic embarrassment." He claimed that Cambodian civilians feared the presence of the Viet Cong because of the danger of hostilities developing in the area. The Viet Cong did, however, enjoy compatible relations with Cambodian military personnel. There were no restrictions on the Viet Cong other than the regulation to move supplies only at night.
It was noted that his unit supported the Viet Cong last March in an attack on an Allied post across the border to Cambodia. The battalion later retreated in South Vietnam.
---
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|TOP SECRET|5|
|---|---|
|with the dead and wounded, and remained there to "prepare for future operations." the Viet Cong with a Cambodian border post provided He claimed that small amounts of recoilless rifle ammunition during the attack and that the Cambodians assured them of "mortar fire support" if needed.| |
|15. The area of the Communists for sanctuary and has 3.3(h)(2) long been used byments is at variance with captured Viet Cong ever, which specifically prohibit Viet Cong units supply. Efilrlaccount of the battle, docu-how- from crossing the border with weapons or conducting assaults from Cambodian territory. 3.3(h)(2) armed Viet Cong units found in Cambodia would not be allowed to remain. The source's account of Cambodian soldiers providing small amounts of Viet Cong tion may be true. It is doubtful that the ammunition were given a broad guarantee of Cambodian mortar support, or that instances of fire support are common along the border. evidence that the use of Cam- ever, provide further The rallier's statements, however, provide further bodian territory by Communists is often determined by the extent of friendly relations with local officials.| |
|TOP SECRET|5|
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*
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---
# Political Developments
20. Prince Sihanouk took advantage of the presence of a large Contingent of Western newsmen in Phnom Penh in early November to reiterate denials that Vietnamese Communist troops are based in Cambodia. As he has in the past when affecting a posture, Sihanouk admitted that it was possible that "small numbers" of Communist troops may occasionally pass through Cambodian territory. He asserted that when such troops are encountered by Cambodian patrols they are asked to return to South Vietnam. He also offered the newsmen government transportation to the northeast to "see for themselves" if North Vietnamese "divisions" are in Cambodia or whether the "Sihanouk trail" is being used.
21. Sihanouk did go farther than he has in the past to warn of the possible consequences of US military operations in Cambodia. He stated that Cambodia would resist any effort by the US to occupy territory along the border to prevent the Viet Cong from taking refuge there. He warned that such action would only serve Communists and Communist hands of the Vietnamese China.
22. Sihanouk also indicated that he still believes the Communists are going to prevail in South Vietnam. His reference to a US withdrawal within two years, however, does not jibe with his previous assertions that the US would not be driven from South Vietnam. He was also forced to admit that a Communist take-over in South Vietnam did bode well for Cambodia's future.
# Cambodia's Relations with Communist China
23. Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest effort to ease its relations with Cambodia. Sihanouk announced on 1 November that he had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai calling for the "re-establishment of sincere friendship" between the two countries. According to Sihanouk:
---
Chou acknowledged Sihanouk's leadership of the Cambodian people and reaffirmed China's adherence to the "Bandung principle" of nonintervention in Cambodia's internal affairs. Sihanouk has charged repeatedly activities in Cambodia over the past several months that amounted to repudiation of these "principles." The Chinese premier's message, which appears to be a more artful version of one Chou sent in mid-September which caused Sihanouk to reverse a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking.
In response to the latest message, anti-Sihanouk stated his willingness to terminate Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconciliation." Subsequently, he also called off a referendum he had previously intended as a vote of confidence in Sihanouk's government and, as such, would have been embarrassing for the pro-Peking leftists who have called for a change in Sihanouk's policies.
The Prince has also stated, however, that a real reconciliation will depend entirely on the cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. Thus, continued dissemination of Communist propaganda throughout the country, and a reported renewal of small-scale Communist dissident activity, could prove to be persistent irritants in Cambodia's relations with China. Nevertheless, although Sihanouk recently voiced his suspicion that Peking will continue to maintain at least a facade of discreet support of Cambodia's pro-Communists, to underline his desire to maintain relations.
---
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---
s.5(¢
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---
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768 "CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAME[15602369].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Military and Political Developments in Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists, Supply Activities, Communist Base Areas, Cambodia's Relations with Communist China",
"When": "16 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cambodia", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "Thailand", "Mondolkiri Province", "Ratanakiri Province", "Phnom Penh", "Chau Province", "Ia Drang Valley", "Darlac Province", "Kompong Cham Province", "Kratie Province", "Tay Ninh Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C05974113
SIES LERIS
The President's Daily Brief
Top Secret 10 November 1967
3.5(c)
23
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# TOP SECRET
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# DAILY BRIEF
10 NOVEMBER 1967
|1|South Vietnam|competent new have served in the pre-The one cabinet appears of the 17 ministers to be named, government revolutionary development held either by Ky and economy - generals or who served in the|
|---|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)| | |
NR
2
NR
NR
NR
3.5(c)
# TOP SECRET
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---
NR
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]
Page
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NR
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]
Page
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---
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Top Secret
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C05974113
# Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
3.5(c) Top Secret
16
10November1967
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---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President Eyes Only - 10 November 1967
NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
# TOP SECRET
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3.5(c)
3.3(h)2)
roleHoMissesCelebration:ntherathereTaborateHanoiHoChiceremoniesMinhplayednosurroundingthe5othanniversaryoftheoccasionwasSo_writeparty papercontributionto tion. HisonlyblandarticleonGiventheanniversarythethetherevolutionimportanceforCommunistshaveattachedtothis Ho absence from thefestivitieshave preventedhimisunusualfromattendingandsuggeststhat illness may tiesTherewasthekeyAtplaymeetingsreferencetoHowhereno androleasreceptionsduringhewouldthe festivi-normally livinglinkwithbyheadofstateorper-the period hapsmore importantlyion , hisas oftherevolution significantand aged. VicePresidentfilledpositionwasTonDucThanh _in-the FurthertheanniversaryevidenceofHanoi reluctancetoassociate public fromthnotice Howi the Sovietshis receivingto PresentationtheOrderofLenintois thefailuretogiveanyof thesameaward TonDucThanhwas publicized During thepasthealthandrestingoutsideofseveralmonths Hohasbeenre_ portedtobeinpoorpatternof . appearancesinthe past HanoimonthsHiserratic ninemadeonly has Septemberthree public appearancesnationaldayHehasalso suggestedthat he inailing isrecent months--thelatestatNorthVietnam on
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# TOP SECRET
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---
TOE SECRET
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dicationdifficultyinactivityandhishasbeen nessDespiteHopastyearthathissubordinates hadanyfrominthe. politicalscenethe inrunningthe countrywithouthisthereapparentaloof-nohavein- immediate leadershipanddirection Theevidence also suggestsstrategy peace negotiationstheregimewarandonpossiblede-that major policies-~par- ticularlyon for the aretheresultof collective cision-makingandarenotdependentonHo8 presence
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NORTHVIETNAMESEREFLECTIONSOFUSPOLITICAL ATTITUDESONTHEWAR HanoionAntiwarActivitiesinUS Hanoi Vietnamese Tanguagebroadcastof8 November reportsgroupofwritersandjournalistshavesigned thatstatement expressingtheirdetermination notto pay 23percentstatementreportedlytheirof theirtaxes as protest against thewarto joininrefusingtopayofprofessorsThe broadcastalsonotesthatThe group urgestaxestheAmericanatUS IowaUniversity toend the"aggressivewar"hasissued inVietnamurgingthestatement Hanoi quotes theTorontoStara5 revealing thatabout75American6 ,000 soldiershavedesertedtoCanadahave sought refugefromthedraftinandthat aboutCanada
NR
3 - 3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C05974113
Top Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C05974113 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15466665].pdf" | {
"Who": "The President, North Vietnam",
"What": "Daily Brief on North Vietnam, Political Activities, Statements, and Events in Vietnam",
"When": "10 November 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Iowa University", "Canada"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 003186510
|T|et|3.5(0)|
|---|---|---|
| |pRes| |
| | |MCI-E4?|~cwt,;:13526|
| | |13526|
| | |3.3(h)(2)i|
| | |3.3(h)(2)|
| | |EOEO|
| | |13526|
| | |13526|
| | |3.5(c)|
| | |3.5(0)|
# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Central Command Intelligence Memo
To
3.5(c)
3.5(0)
3 February 1968
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 003186510
---
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING: This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Controlled Dissem (Lbetrallea’Dz'o'em)
Jop Sec1er-
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---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin
Contents
Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Soupern Yemen: Left-wing elements gaining ascendancy in new government. (Page 6)
Saudi Arabia - Iran: Release of ARAMCO barge by Iran and prospect of talks to reduce tensions. (Page 7)
Belgium: New linguistic dispute preatens government. (Page 8)
Guyana-Surinam: Possible border troubles (Page 9)
---
# VIETNAM
|VIETNAM|1.".X.H|
|---|---|
|"'··,·'t. ”—4 ....n-lit-u.|Demilitarized Zone|
|QUANG TRI|RIKR'|
|HUA|THIE~|
|UANG Hoi An|.13-|
THAILAND
QUANG TIN
DARLAC
HOA
QUANG DUC
TUYEN
BA XUYEN
PLEIKU
BIAC LIEU
AN XUYEN
KE'I'I-g'
T.u./55_
SIAM
Map
---
South Vietnam:
|South Vietnam:|Communist forces retain considerable momentum in their offensive against key urban areas and allied installations throughout South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
|Isolated enemy groups are continuing to resist in the northern half of Hue, mopping-up in the country.| |
|Hoi An, Phan New Thiet, Loc attacks and Da Lat came during the night on two provincial capitals - Xuan Loe and Phuoc Le - in South Vietnam's III Corps. Heavy fighting continues within a delta.| |
|Saigon was relatively quiet during the night and this morning with only a few scattered clashes.| |
|Some reports indicate that groups of Viet Cong have been withdrawing from the city. Other reports have renewed attacks aimed at creating turmoil in preparation for another attack.| |
|Some 25 to 30 Viet Cong battalions are said to be staging in areas north and south of the city.| |
In addition, divisions of the North Vietnamese 7th and Viet Cong 9th divisions reportedly have taken up reserve positions north of the capital. These reports have not been confirmed.
The effectiveness of the Saigon government is being sorely taxed in the current military crisis. In the absence of President Thieu, Vice President Ky stepped in and authorized the declaration of martial law. Although Thieu himself has displayed a marked degree of confidence since his return, the stage is set for further unrest.
---
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may have been set for increased friction arising from Ky's desire for decisive actions and Thieu's normally cautious method of operation.
Prime Minister Loe has taken no initiatives in the past four days toward reassuring the public of the government's ability to provide the essential and emergency services to cope with the situation.
Loe, who was described as "bewildered" when the Viet Cong attacks erupted, believes that he must presently defer to the military and that civilians can do little until the military have restored some measure of normality.
The government has performed "reasonably well" but has been handicapped by a noticeable lack of coordination in issuing orders.
Not enough is yet being done, however, to reassure and rally the nervous population of Saigon, and that there is a further danger if the Viet Cong are not soon cleaned out of the city.
President Thieu has now delegated broad authority in the military to his own attention to these pressing political and psychological aspects.
The Vietnamese Communists may be putting together a new political apparatus to support claims that their current offensive has triggered a popular uprising and to lead toward setting up a new Saigon regime.
The Viet Cong radio broadcast an appeal from the "Alliance of National and Peace Forces." The objectives include overthrowing the Saigon government, forcing a US withdrawal, and negotiating with the National Liberation Front to achieve.
3 Feb 68
2
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these revolutionary "appeal" says theserevolutionary"appeal” up a goals. The government."says'n -"we ”we must muSt at once set at once set_ So Sofar the far the "Alliance" shows ”Alliance" shows no nsignssigns of being any- of being any- thing thing more than more thana paper organization. in It apaper organization. It isis billed as a billedas a ' "national" mentioned have been have been "natiOnal" mentionedSpecifically. organ, organ, .but specifically. but only branches inonly branchesTheSaigon and HueThe Saigon and Hue one in Hue onenonentity ofinHueseemsseems to be headed tobe headed by a non- Communistby a-non-Communistpoliticalpolitical nonentity of ' the same same-stripestripe found throughout the National Liberationfoundthroughoutthe National Liberation Front. Front. ' The enemy may believe that by enemy may believe that by stressing stressingthemesthemes ' of peace, anti-Americanism, peace, anti-Americanism, and and neutrality neutralityinin the namethe name ofof a new organization untainted they thea new organizationthe untaintedthey canby knownmuster by known links with eitherlinks with either the Communists or the Communists or Front, Front, can muster greatergreater support for their objectives than support‘for their objectivesIt than they have through the they havethrough the Front Front itself itself in the inthe past.past. It is conceivable that they isconceivable thatthey might might _ even try through eventry through "negotiations" with the "Alliance" to ”negotiations"withthe -_"Alliance" to fashion an administrative structure to pass fashionan administrative structure to pass off as a off as a "coalition government"--an objective frequently "coalitiongovernment”—eanobjectivefrequently men- men- tioned tioned in in captured documents as a goal captured documents as agoalof'theof the "winter- ”winter- Ispring" campaign. spring" campaign. // ;~----~ / j 3.5(c)
3 Feb 3Feb6868 3 3 .'
TO CRET 3.5(c)
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Southern Yemen:
Southern Yemen new Left-wing elements are gaining ascendancy in the new government. Southern Yemen established diplomatic relations with Communist China on 31 January. Defense Minister Baidh arrived in Moscow yesterday in search of foreign aid. The Ministry of Information on 1 February admitted that Baidh would be particularly interested in military assistance. The ministry, however, denied an earlier Aden radio broadcast which had quoted Baidh as saying that Southern Yemen's army had been equipped by imperialism and that it was not possible to have an army whose arms and ammunition were in "enemy" hands.
Within Southern Yemen, the leftists are moving to cow or prosecute "former rulers, to eliminate possible opposition. A court has handed down its first death sentence. It condemned a member of the local nobility for contacts with a British adviser before independence, legitimate.
It remains to be seen what attitude the Aden authorities will take in aid talks with the British, scheduled for a month hence. The British are not likely to continue their subsidy. The Southern Yemeni Government has not responded to US offers of nonfinancial assistance, it is "neutral" in its international alignment.
3 Feb 68
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# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510
Saudi Arabia - Iran: ARAMCO drilling barge and the prospect of eventual talks between the parties have reduced tensions.
The same afternoon the Saudi official on the barge, who had attempted to parley with the Iranian gunboat commander, was released. He and the ARAMCO representative accompanying him returned to Saudi Arabia. Most of the ARAMCO employees on the drilling barge also were allowed to return to the mainland. A skeleton crew remained to move the ARAMCO barge out of the disputed area.
No date has been set for talks, but if a face-to-face discussion between the two monarchs is arranged, it might go far toward removing problems caused by the machinations of minor officials on both sides.
Feb 68
TOP SECRET
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510
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Belgium:
Belgium government political dispute which could The linguistic The linguistic dispute issue at Louvain University down the has has become become a political issue which could bring bring down the government.
The dispute arose from dispute arose from Flemish nationalists' nationalists' demands departments Louvain's Minister French-speaking that Louvain's French-speaking faculties French-speaking faculties and departments be moved to be moved to the French-speaking section of Belgium.
Prime Minister Belgium Prime Vanden Boeynants' tried Boeynants' tried coalition of Social Christian and Liberal parties has has to avoid involvement, taking the taking authorities board. the it Catholic the position that position that it is a problem who bishops for for the university authorities governing board. the and Catholic bishops who constitute the
Activists on both on both sides appear sides appear determined to determined to drag the government into the dispute and and interpellations on in terpellations on the subject the next week. lines on next week. subject are are scheduled in both houses has. Significant The Social scheduled Social Christian Party such Christian the past. of parliament in both houses of parliament Party has has split along along linguistic of negative votes linguistic lines on such issues in issues abstentions in the past. next week Significant
numbers of negative Votes or or abstentions next week could lead could lead to the resignations of some or all of Of the cabinet.
time Vanden Boeynants apparently intends to play is for time in ably in the Vanden Boeynants the hope that party's passions will apparently intend to play for subside. subside. a He He is prob-prob- ably counting on counting on his party's realization his realization that a govern govern- ment
crisis parties. crisis and new and new elections’ Would elections would benefit benefit the the small opposition parties.
3 Feb 68 3 Feb 68 8 8
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Guyana-Surinam:
Guyana—Surinam: re-established A small detachment of Surinam police reportedly has re—established itself in the border area disputed with Guyana and Guyanese"armed with orders to re—respond with "armed resistance" if Guyanese troops attempt to evict it. If the Guyanese discover the outpost, or if Surinam's Minister Prime President Pengel publicly confirms its existence, Minister Burnham Guyana is been stressing diplomatic sharply. is likely to react sharply. The Guyanese have maneuvers to settle the dispute, but any unexpected encounter could lead to shooting.
3 Feb 68
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To ret
Top
To~ cret
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 003186510 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15561237].pdf" | {"Who": "Central Command Intelligence Memo", "What": "Intelligence updates on Vietnam situation, Saigon government unrest, Communist activities, political situations in Belgium, Yemen, Guyana-Surinam, Saudi Arabia-Iran tensions", "When": "3 February 1968", "Where": ["Saigon", "Hue", "Southern Yemen", "Saudi Arabia", "Iran", "Belgium", "Louvain University", "Guyana", "Surinam"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C05072862
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# KONTUM, HONTUN, HOLlRSEONTUNKONTi.rn PROVI11CE.1'l!LITARY PROVINCE.NILITARY
KONTUM HONTUN. ATCITY,; ATCITY;1630 1650RAY.NONTUN2PROVINCE;SIZE WAY.KONTUN HOURSACITY.BUTTHE BY WASUNIT 2 PROVINCE~ (VC) FE:3RU11RY FESRUARYFIGHTINGSTILLIN UNITS NASUNIT THE THE STILL THEINFLUID FLUIDSITUATION SITUATIONAl~D AND COULD COULDIN IN
GO GO WASEITHER WAS EITHER A CITY. BUT VIET VIET CONG CONS-(VG) REGIMENTAL REGINENTALOPERATING STRENGTH STRENGTHIN NAG NORTH THE INTERROGATIONUNKNOWN, ANDTHE CITY NORTHNAS UNHNONN, AND THEOF OF THE THE FIGHTING SIZE OF WAS OFVAS THE HEAVY. HEAVY.STRIKES,THE UNITS OPERATINGTHE THE PROVINCE PROVINCE.•IN THE INTERROGATION CITY CENTERLEVELED CENTERLEVELEDAND THESY ,WITHINMORTARFRIENDLYGENTER MORTARFRIENDLYCENTERCHIEU CHIEU HOI H01 STRIKES,THEHOLEDNEAR MACV MACV COMPOUND COMPOUND WERE NERE BEING EEING AIR ENENY AIRENEMY AND LONG LONG MACV IN STANDING MACVINSTANDING CASUALTY UP RECEIVED A BUILDING DAKSTATISTICSSEENPOSSIBLEEBUILDINGSTATISTICSBEEN POSSIBLE SNIPER SNIPER HAVE(UNSPECIFIED)KNO~N. NEARTHECITY.NOWAS- HAVE(UNSPECIFIED)#NITHINTHERE WEREDISCOVERED NEREDISCOVEREDAND NOT NOT HNONN.NEARTHE CITY. N0"CONPOUNDOF' FIRE. FIRE. ENEMYTHERE THE THE THE UAS THE~ASNACV MACV TUNNELS TUNNELS NAS COMPOUND.OFHOLED
I:ffORMATION INFORMATIONDAHITOCONCERNINGTOCONCERNING ENENY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OUTSIDE - HONTUN.E KONTUrl . OR OR IN 3•. KK~NH IN5.A. ENEMY OFHOA .A.-RHANHANYWHERE DISTRICT. DISTRICT.HOA PROVINCE.I PROVINCE.2 FEBRUARY. *SItz)3.3(h)(2) THE ENENY ANYNHEREHOURSKHANHAS AS OF.ISOO 1800 HOURS KHANH 2 FEBRUARY THERE PROVINCE.WASAN·THERE VAS AN 1NONVA NO NVACONTACT CONTACT. _ . . . ,U WITH THE INPRISONER,- • IPRISONER, I . E 3.3(h)(2 ihxz)
NEXT-THREE.DAYS THATTHAT NEXT A SECOND·ATTACK A THREE SECOND-ATTACK.DAYS ACCORDINGNHA ACCORDING ON ON NHATOTRANG PRISO~~ER. TO NVATHE ,WITH BEEN TRANGPRISONER.SUPPORT u:~ITS WILL WILL TAKE TAHE PLACE SUPPORTUNITS-OFTOPROVINCEPLACE ALL NITHIN WITHINLOCALTHE' LOCALTHEOF THE THE EUNITSREGH1ENT UNITSRESINENT 18/B IS/S WILL· PARTICIPATE, 95TH WILL'PARTICIPATE,,WITH'THE'THE YETBASEDACCORDING IRE-MNOF AND ELEMENTS THIS THE ELEMENTSETHISTHEOF OF NVA 95THHASREGIMENT. HASREGIMENT.BASEDACCORDINGYEN CONFIRMED.TOPROVINCE- 'I AND AND THE ITS ITS 95THPRESENCE IINCL.UDESIN IINCLUDESIN ANKHANH ANRHANH ARTILLERYHAS ARTILLERY BATTALION HOA HOA HASBATTALIONNOT NOT YET SEEN EOUIPPED.NITH EQUIPPED BEEN CONFIRMED.WITH 122 MM .. -3.3(h)(2)...
ROCKETS. ROCKETS. E 3.3(h)(2 3.3(h)(2) AsPLANNEDTHE ISIXPIC,OFFICERS, PIC 40 SIX- PIC,OFFICERS,PIC40BUT BUTD. D. THEOVER OVERWERE VEREHAS RAG NOTCONFIRMED CONFIRMED UNDER UNDERNOT OBTAINED OBTAINED INTERROGATION INFORMATION INTERROGATIONINFORMATIONVC VC AND AND ANY ANYNVA AT NVAAT THE PRISONERS, PRISONERS,THE KHANHINCLUDING- HHANH HOACONCERNING CONCERNING INCLUDING.HOA
ASPLANNED SECOND-PHASE -ROHAA A ROKA A A TACTICAL S-2,WITH TACTICAL8‘2,WITH PRISONERS,INTERROGATION PRISONERS,INTERROGATION SECOND-PHASE 15 15 ATTACK. ATTACH. INTERROGATORS INTERROGATORS ASSENOLEDCENTER CENTERTHE FOR ASSEMBLED FUNCTIONING THEFORPIC IS PIC PROCESSING PROCESSINGFROM INTELLIGENCE1 ISNON NOW FUNCTIONING FROi'1ALL THE., ALLTHEINTELLIGENCE,v,,;,_BUT BUT A I-I 'POLICE,D~TACHMENT,.,.._..,L.IJ.L...,_.___..._..n.,___.i,_,uu.:.,___~._.___.,,.L.....I.,!,,/,_,.______________....~ .DETACHNENT POLICE, ,C.,Ic.ARVN ARVN SPECIAL SPECIALV FORCES, FORCES,. THE THE 55TH NILITARY z-, 55TH ~HLITARYI,» .-.w~~D._''I;,-,.3.3(h)(2).SItz).L
P—T' -D.o. E NHAFTRANG .1LAUNCH DURING A1720 .A MM_-I L- u_-; . 3.3(h)(2) E MORTAR2 ATTACK ONIT MORTAR2ATTACK HOURS FEBRUARY FEBRUARY THE THEI~ ENEMY THE ENEMY WAS IN VAS EXPECTED REMNANTS OF THETHE 8TH120NIGHT"" EXPECTED TO TO LAUNCHAS OFA 120 OF' 2 FEBRUARY~FOLLONED SY ANPOSSIBLE BY POSSIBLEBY ELEMENTS THAT NORTAR ATTACKAND MORTAR 7THSTH -IBNS.ARE,STILL9TH 9TH SN.OF WILLBN NILL BE OF SE FOLLOWED THE THE 18/B IS/SBY REGIMENT. REGIMENT.AN ATTACK ATTACH REt1NANTS ELEMENTS OFTRANG.7TH.AFANDOF OF THETH2 7TH ' AND STH- 8TH .' ,I I. BNS.ARE STILL SCATTERED SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THROUGHOUT NRA CORDS NHACOROSTRANS.7TH USAR. .'nhXZ) , ..1 COMNAVFORV--~DISSEM:4. A. [:::::EDISSEM: STATE STATE(MR.USMACV (MR.USNACV AF CINCPACUSARV - ' 3.3(h)(2)- CONNAVFORV USAID PACFL T . ARPAC USAID DIR/JUSPAO PACAF.I" PAC-FLT ARPAC GP-l GP-1 900 - . .c-i-“n, I • l -“I .. :; ;
UNNNN‘NNNN. _"' . -~·. ,firovedfior;Rele_ase: 2971 NOFORN'. i:I*-, I"I;atAl .9/01/17777C05fl2862*--.I-HQFQRNI ta-I'EO’SIT'Ehilt);: : "II CORPS SITUATION REPORT[15561228].pdf" | {
"Who": "Military Intelligence Personnel",
"What": "Military operation details in Kontum, Hontun province",
"When": "2nd February 19XX",
"Where": ["Kontum", "Hontun province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066623
Approved for Release:
2018/06/28 C066627
Current Intelligence Digest
UNITED STATES OF
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Secret
November 1967
No. 0221/67
---
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C0666271SH€RE
CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200EDT)
# GENERAL
Vietnam
(Page1) Situation report
SEERET
Nov 67 Current Intelligence Digest Page
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# Vietnam
militant and moderate Buddhist Speculation Continues that weekend were confined to the IV break with the beheading for followers may ir leaders. Corps Tactical Zone where mortar and ground assaults launched against the towns of were Ho Huu Tuong lower house Chau Phu total of 38 soldiers and Cai Lay and Long My civilians were killed and another 179 were wounded in the attacks on 2 November that personal Tri which appeared to be continuation of series of this hostile actions begun in region of the militant and the moderate respectively 28 October likely factions Tuong said he is sees un-the quiet The situation remained merger middle-of-the-road removal of the only factions third force more as of Quang and Chau and the impasse solution to two into the where heavy fighting has occurred during officially in the adjusted casualty Of- the vicinity of Loc Ninh past ten days figures the current over the troops had ended ly and 720 indicated that through November charter issue 31 fr enemy enemy Significant contacts with forces reported Loc Ninh been killed around 3.3(h)(2) over the Ehe number of enemy dead subsequently had 3.3(h)(2) risen to 771.
Nov 67
Current Intelligence Digest
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662719
Secret
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066627 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466578].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Current Intelligence Digest on Vietnam in November 1967",
"When": "November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
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} Text: AcIITI ACTTI ACIMI AMMIY Fnjet 4CIMI
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CIA-RDP78B04560A006200010011-8.pdf | {
"Who": "CIA",
"What": "Document with code names and abbreviations",
"When": "Unknown",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
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} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C06650579
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C06650579
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C06650579
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"w-rm sumcxzur mzxonm m auocmon or azsouncz." "DATA TO MEASURE PROGRESS [15604020].pdf" | {
"Who": "Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS",
"What": "Discussion on formation and activities related to an entity in Vietnam, potential indicators and statistical research, recommendations on data collection",
"When": "Unknown",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
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} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051ApprovedforRelease:2019/01/17C06766051E
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No.
No. 01917/GS
01917/68
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation (As of in south Vietnam
No up. 8
“G's” OTT:WW.)1:00 A.fit. .5i EST)
The Situation in south Vietnam
Communist key day cities operations throughout South Tet offensive within forces or resisting Vietnam. Communist on the out- into The fighting still mopping-up with its skirts lied fourth key Communist in Saigon maintain Hue, strong is subsiding; positions Thuot, however, in the Com- on the the out- al- into The fighting still muniets capitals still in Saigon maintain Hue, strong is subsiding; positions Thuot, however, in the Da Daprov-1a-ov- incial of Kentum,;0an Me Lat, and several cities in the delta provinces.
Enemy losses Saigon continue to soar wip US 10,000 mili- tary auporities killed in Saigon first pree well claiming Communists individual 3,000 first pree killed in pe days of fight- ing. An additional 3,000 suspect Communists have been detained. By cona-ast only some 1,700 recovered pe crew-served fighting, enemy Friendly weapons losses now total (1,000 559 as) killed (232 US) and some 2,300 wounded
Saigon 851150 night 3 of Saigon 1-2 February was relatively quiet In early ear two y morning during action, the police however, precinct the Viet stations. Cong overran two s1101-radical South Sporadic South Vietnamese was reported at continued l\C ► rthwest imminent capital, Tanair-several other early points in the city and fighting early w1rnoftno-rning this morning near the Only Tan Son Ben Nhut airbase j\l&t Just northwest imminent capital. The Only was of the the limited aircraft traffic pormitted at air— field due to reports of a,1 an .-!; rocket attack.
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# C02833598
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C02833598
3.5(c) 3.5m3.5(c) 3.5(0)
|troops involved|Available|age 16 to 18|
|---|---|---|
|4. involved|Available in evidence|Saigon indicates area were armed mostly the enemy|
|and rocket launchers.|Oral city prisoners stated clothes rifles that had not where they infiltrated into civilian they wore were armed|from weapons Tho caches which beeh set appear well to in advance.|
|The enemy in Saigon did not appear to be well armed early in the fighting.| | |
5. Delta identified as units have north- tentatively Mekong ond from far west. Reports of fighting North Viet units but the in Saigon have nearby been confirmed, erners assigned to Viet Cong units as cadre and fillers possibly participated, Ge. e/the\8 Communistsom111un1sts th.a The'government burning are ca,P'ital are pla1'i11i11g planning ki'lli11g to to countorbegunto organize 3.3(h)(2) popular demonstrations indiscrim11\ate cafiital in in the to protest of the homes" "wanton by and allied indiscriminate forcos. action ''·governmo11t: burning forces. action The killing and has begun to organize special civic tea111s to counter these efforts.
II Corps 7. The enemy area. The city of resistance still of Hue is the focal point of stubborn Corps northe1·,.1 in the northern although them provinces are under the controlcon—ofof allied forces, scattered 1.;.2 attacks were conducted against some of on February.
8. Hue: The two-square-mile, walled citadel area- is still partially the South occupied by enemy forces this committed added morning. to US are morning. Two Two clearing Vietnamese operations around armored battalions may the be added to the effort. Three other South Vietnamese battalions clearing have cloariniJhave encountered stiff enemy resistance in city operations operations Allrcl\\ai.11 i.n South alliedin some atens areas on the outskirts of the tile within city. All US and unde1· South al1iod Vietnamese installations within Hue remain under control.
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766051
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C02833598
C02833598
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_ 9. Ii 9. Cam Cam Cam L(,,: Lo Tbe Lo:LoThewasCombined -Thdt WasCombined-TheattackedAQtion mortar Platoon Head- quarters a{. fire ai“Cam with and srna 11 small arms fire ea1•ly today. en.erny was forced to withdraw after~ heavy si~-ho~r battle.
10. Phu ~c: Ilu~ ,was last PhuLee: The1 Phu Lop area, located some 25 miles which south andod BBBIH"5T'Hue,waslastor aubjec~ed · subjected·ni$'ht.to The day-long· attaclt, ended 1at:o late Phu Loe District Headqua1•te1•,; P.nd and village were reported socura; however, generalsizeable According· enemy throat:1a unconfirmed in the the aroa. Loeto to an overrun report, tho\ho in the US Maril,e fighting. base at l>hu Phu Loo was 5'·overrun at one i,011,t incial 11. theTam· Ky were 1-~~ eapRals Tam 53 andwereand Quang iltac)("ed attKEkedNgaiz' Ngai:' Communist theseBy; Communist these by· Bot:h Both o! of 1nortarmen p1•ov- d\\1•i11g during ruportsthere1,orted.ly. included night of 1-2 February· The bombardment of Tam Ky reportedly included a1•tillcn•y fire. No reports of casu.alties or damage ;~avo been received. aeveJ~al Nam an 12. 111iloss-cruthwest theforce.'under coastal located Naman of !>rigado brigade Province 12. miles unlmown-sized has Duy Buy moved was Xuyen: ropo1•1t:ed into today: on1~111y enemy~rhis This today area An 1A South the of of still An still force."A district Uoi Hoi district area uncle1·coast allocated 'in infncapital in capital preparat1011 South tho the co11trol lCorean control Korean Quang for -aa counterattack later !!._£orps 13. Kon tun,: Kontum: continue:~most oxist: in continues most exist Tho The sc11•ious serious The'enemy in ofthi•eat Kon Corps in aroa Kontum II Corps tum attacksweste1l1 in area strongpointshi.ghlands.. c1 t.y, the the westena highlands., to to in The ·enemy has the city con- tinues attacks in and around the: city, a11d has es- tablished strongpoints in several’buildings, includi.ng 1,agodaa battalio1ich·u.rches. cit~: ent:l.ro airfieldand is of still city. entire in North An An The in North Vietnarctese Vietnamese battalion half is i,!i of still bolieved control has approximately of been cleared out half 1-s 110w now tho op~n: to the emergency airfield tratfic. 14, 14. North Bnn Vietnamese Ban Vietnamese Division c.i33rd lnst'report, of Me Thuot: Me Thuot; 33rd last: report, At elements of. tho the North Regime11t South wero still occupying uni ts, Infantry is of still occupying arc most Division to t.y. most of the the city. Two· South Vietnamese units, Infantry 23rd are attomptin~ attempting tobattalions, 1•ega in regain hastogether tho pontrol Control together the of with by c1US city. USty. The 'rho airfield small still. is 1 still open, opo11,• but but 3h"a been hit by 11\0l'tat• mortar al'ld and smal arms fi.re.
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C02833598
still 15. as well holatli'c"inarket last hola"pena Da scatterod scatteredLl\t: Lat: market strong points·wtpin effort At At strongpoints'wipin last pll\co placero1>ort,'Communist report,'Communist leading center pe in inp~ pe centerpeofforces of forcestown town city, Soup Vietnamese forces aro tl:\e are leading ci:tY•po pe effort to drive pe attackers out of pe city.
Soup Vietnamese fo1·ces are tl:\e leading ci:tY•po pe effort to drive plt pe atta.ckel'S out of pe city.
16. Tan1:b<ty some totalft.urc·o over1·un An: A total 0£ 208° 208two-hourtroops one~1y enemy battlowere reported whe11 reported turdny, terday, whenlcll1od killed pey someduring during attemr,tod attemptedn a fierce to overrun tll1S pis Villago Village yos- which •.1s- loeated dofande.d Tho The village was defended15 miles by Soup SoupSQUpwest soupwestVietttamesePlaiku. Vietnamese of of Pleiku. 11·1•ogulars irregulare who sustained light losses.
ported17.from17. fromp1e of Phan Phau Thiot: Thigt: Heavy Heavy fighting fightini;oapi.talstill was andprough was still re- coastal provinci.111 capital prough ported pis coastal provincial pe mid-morning Soup compounds Feb1·uary. of 2 2 February. The come MRCVunderSector MACV under Sectorand Hoadc1uarters Soup compounds bavo presentlyhave not yet· yet'come attack. US and Viotnamose troops havo have established to established a blocking position posi.ti.on and anel cityare are 1>1·esently attempting attempting to sweep prough proughout.po out.pe city i.n in an an efiort. effort.toto drive drive pe attackers 3 . 'fil_Corps 3;;Corps are12 been area whereTo where To l.8. 18. pe pepe current norp norp of Com1nunist Communist of Saigon· Saigon campaign in attackshas III IIICorps--pe Corps--pe has so so fnr far been pe lightest--several lightest--several1-2now new attacks woro l'epo1·ted reported during Long during pe ni.ght night of 1-2 February. February. Xuan Xuan Loe, Leo, pe capital of Long Kha11h Rhanh Provi,ice, Province, Onemo1·n1ng u11der was Cong was under heavy attack l\ttack pl"OUl"'hout proughout pe night. OtlG Viet.Cong platoon penetrated ponoti·atedtroopsinto into pe town, pe town, pem but out. morningby by allied reportsreac-reac- tion t1on t.1•oops US actio1\. Phuoc had h.acl cleared cloare3d pe111 Viatnam(!ee assaults and Tayindi-out, First First reports indi— cnttp cated pat USaction.and Soup and Soup Vietnamese casualties casualtiesand ware were light: in occurred in pe in pe Ope1· Oper enemy enemyJiauassaultsandandThy1norta1· mortar attacks occurred in Phuoc Tuy, Tuy, Ninh but but few-details few details were available.
IV Corps 19. wipin pe In pe pe Mekong Mekong D-elta, Delta, ·sharp sharpoapifighting fighting con- t11iues wipin smallersevoral provincial several provincial capitals tals and and a and a n.um- ber ber of smaller towns. to bo20. be20. n.sido 1 inside Some Den Ben 700-800 pe 700-800 pe T1·e, Tre, Viet Vietcapitalare 0p capital are Co1ig Cong of 9p of still Hoa still Hoa Kian Kien believed believed Pi-ov- Prov- inco, ,where ince,.where two two cc>mpanies companiesarrived' to US oJ: of tlje pe Us In£anti·y Infantry Division. companies companies have a1·r1.ved' to have _.-gI:l' rein:f'o1·ce reinforce ARVN AR'VN .miu. .... wn. !.o~-,;;_rm~ “an.EQ?EIcNSD3§§EMMH_p_~·~im11i1 - ....
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
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C02833598
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
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# forces.
Heavy fighting or forces over1un. during the Navy night painil\ the boat p1•oviu<~ial provincial c:api tal was capital city foi•ces. Vinh Vinh Long. AUS patrol t1~01 boat baso Viet11ainese base in in the city was overrun but lato1· retaken. by South Vietnamese 21. Allied troo1,s were Tho ." and engaged also with the Viet Cong forcos 111 in Can. Tho, My My The and Moc Rea, the capi i:al of Kicm Kien Tuong Thong P1•ovincea•ttack Province.' reportedlattcn• this Tha The latter city was under heavy mo2•tnr a1i.d and rocket 4 Gported lay-down rocket attack early this maiming. The Viot Cong woro 1 us occurred using loud- speakers to appeal to. ARVN troops to lay-down their arms.
# 2§9§pgpts_iq:_the Prof:!R~s fo_r the Immediate_Future
acteristicThe have 22. ofhave of situat:i.011 many bo,m manybeenareasreported areas reported at in SO\'l.that South Vietna1n,\1rba11 char- Vietnam, urban Sn 8a Dec is where enemy t'orces pusl\ed out of the area.- but continue eeen,s to mai11tai1\ positions 1n011 on strategic g1•ound nearby. CommunistIt It seems possillle that, 1·e11ew in some areas, the Communist areas, on ui•ban areas,uni ts will or tl1e nttenipt: w:Lll or will attemptsiattem1,t attemptto to tp remain. strongly suggest that tho iull weight careful,the i11to current application -rather a bit...ly selective fighting Vietnamese few,power.of his 1,owe1·. In the bitterly con.tested fighting in Hue, to1• for ex- aanpltl, 011ly eloments ident the of the North Vietnamese 6th R.oglmont bave been identified, ificd, along with woulda indicata,a few, possible of full possible one view in other three other of full local the local standard fo1•ce• NVA r-egiment: regiment forelements:. OB GB is the is the this 20 the this in in This in area, sector, at would miles. and that that indicate, and least least , 'at least three other regiment- regiments withtn within 20 miles.
24. AlthO\\(:h Although. 1:he the Commul,1StS Commudistsi are least, are probably probably in-in- 'capablo, theaincoordinated 111 the the immE~diate immediate :rutu1•e, future, at at least, ofta1•gets of agai.ll again mour1ting a coordinated attack as it\ in the past. four days, they do appear to have - 5 5 H - iI
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
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|C02833598|C02833598|
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|C02833598:T| |
|QJ•oa areaQS 25. Wl~Hi01'11 Of Marino weaiernKhe gar1•isohTri Sanh: Saab:~l~ftngTha finang The TrisituntiOl' Province remainsKhe i11 in the Khest.aSa11l1 static. tic• Sanh|The US Marine garrisonnight.there According: to ·oflight Communist Aeoording-‘toa1·ocoiv~d received R 'l light tu.ortar nttnck .dm••1g .durmg tho 1•allier endand a pr1soneri prisoner; however; however~ tho be1~i1'\ as thebeginsclcond secondon phase'O' onphase ti-oops."Communistthe with Kha Khe Sa11h Sanh offensive otfensivo willtanks,·will twi.ce 3 February "arl.1.l lo1•y, "arLillery, tanks, and twice as many troops."| "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15561324].pdf" | {
"Who": ["Central Intelligence Agency", "Directorate of Intelligence"],
"What": ["Vietnam War", "Tet Offensive", "Communist operations", "Enemy losses", "Military activities", "Situation reports"],
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "Hue", "Thuot", "Kentum", "Me Lat", "Tan Son Ben Nhut", "Phu Loe", "Tam Ky", "Quang Ngai", "Kontum", "Naman", "Da Nang", "Pleiku", "Phan Rang", "Phan Thiet", "Long Khanh", "Vinh Long"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202 S-E-CR-B-T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12 December 1967
SUBJECT: SNIE57/1-67: SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WAR EFFORT
# CONCLUSIONS
A. The Vietnamese Communists continue to use Cambodia in important ways to support their military effort in South Vietnam. Though the scale of this use has not increased significantly in the last year, the relative importance of Cambodian territory to Communist strategy is now greater. In consequence of growing pressure on their military structure in South Vietnam, the Communists have come to depend more heavily on the use of border areas. This trend will probably make Cambodia of increasing value to Communist military effort in 1968.
B. The Communists use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary to evade allied forces and more permanently as a refuge for rest, training, medical care, acquisition and storage of supplies, and as a convenient and secure route for the infiltration of personnel.
Group Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202
|from North Vietnam|The activities are concentrated in four major base areas along the South Vietnamese border.|
|---|---|
|Ca|Rice is the most important item of supply obtained by the Communists from Cambodia. This is particularly important for Communist troops operating in the tri-border and Chu Pong base areas in the rice-deficit highlands.|
|Da|We still have no firm evidence that military supplies or equipment are moved through Sihanoukville to Communist forces in South Vietnam on a sustained or substantial basis. Arms and ammunition for the Communist forces in South Vietnam are primarily supplied overland from North Vietnam through the Laotian corridor. However, the Communists continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from Cambodia, some of which probably represents unauthorized diversions from Communist arms imported by the Cambodian government for its own forces.|
|E|Over the past year, Sihanouk has become more aware of the extent of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia and more apprehensive over US intentions. Nevertheless, he has not taken any effective measures to control Communist activity and is not likely to do so in the coming year. Cambodia lacks the military|
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202
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Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202
capebillty tocloge It8 border with South Vletnam, and any determined effort to do g0 would runcounter to Sibanouk baslc 8108ofavoiding direct allgnment withthe US, &ndof maintaining ordlel relatlong with tbe Communlst8.
S-Ee-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202 "SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA _15472858_.pdf" | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Vietnamese Communist war effort, use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply route, significance of Cambodian territory",
"When": "12 December 1967",
"Where": ["Cambodia", "South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Laotian corridor", "Sihanoukville"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
# #
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Tan E"at 55 February 25, 1968 3.5(c)
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1 TO RET ' 3.5(c) 35(0) 3.5(c) 3.5(0)
Information 1968of 55 Information1968of February as 1600 1 3.5(c) 3502)
# HIGHLIGHTS
Allied most forces appear to be gaining areas. upper the hand alleviate caused stepped Vietnam's the February, were 'to in most of South Vietnam's urban areas. Most provincial capitals throughout 4-5 the February, were country relatively Saigon. plight the up quiet on the-night night 4—5 although the Communists plight government stepped up the their is their activity in and to around Saigon. The government is taking 170,000 steps alleviate the of fighting. refugees caused by the fighting.
# I. Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Allied forces appear be regaining areas the upper hand. in since claims South in most of South Vietnam's urban areas have MACV claims that about driven 20,300 A enemy have been killed since 30 January been (Para. 2). A Communist assault on Hill 861 has been back (Paras. 3-5). Communist forces security forces are maintaining strong pressure against government security installations in the in are·under area Saigon quiet pressure f9rces (Paras. 6-10). 11-13). forces (Paras. (Paras. (Paras. 6-10). but the encountering In 11-13). Quang situation city II elsewhere allied Corps and Hue in are-under I I to reaction to reaction is are encountering opposition Opposition reported III sweeps sweeps near area, several except cities (Paras. 14-15). The III Corps area, except for abated Saigon, The was Saigon, The was reported quiet on 4-5 February have (Para. 20). Communist offensive the seems 24 past hours to have abated (Paras. somewhat 21-22) in IV Corps during the
# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The deal government to problems is continuing resulting to mobilize from the Communist its resources mander confidence (Paras. President attacks a popular new confidence of support {Paras. the III 1-2). has 3-5). around the l—2). and Corps has President area 3—5). authorized around General Thieu steps Saigon, is Khang, rally to and area com- an- other itself, officer in be appointed by appointed to an command the capital area itself, may be accused by an Upper House committee of laxity in protecting Saigon (Paras. 6-7). Khang,
3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(0)
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# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
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|16J164|
|---|
| |VIETNAM|VIETNAM|
|Demilitarized zone|
|QUANG TRI|
|KHE SANH|KHE SANH|
|THUA THIEN|
|THAILAND|THAILAND|
| |KONTUM|NGAI|
|BINH DINH|
|PLEIKU|
| |DARLAC|PHUBON|TUYEN HOA|
|KHANH HOA|
|QUANG DUC|
|PHUOC TAY|
|NINH DINH|YUQV|
|QUANG NGAI|
|NINH THUAN|
|YUQV|
|CHUONG THIEN|BA XUYEN|
|AN GIANG|BAC LIEU|
| |SOUTH VIETNAM|VIETNAM|
|5 FEBRUARY|
69513 2-68 CIA
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
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# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772383
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Most of Soup Vietnam's provincial capitals appear to be regaining urban areas.
Most of pe provincial capitals were relatively quiet in pe morning, alpough pe Communists stepped up peir activity.
Heavy fighting in Hue continued.
US Marines drove back an enemy assault on Hill 861 in pe norp.
Communications in pe highlands suggest making preparations for battle.
MACV claims pat about 4,500 enemy have been killed since January.
Allied losses stand at 6,931 captured, killed, and wounded in pe same period.
Early on 5 February, US Marines drove back an assault on Hill 861, on the edge of the Khe Sanh defense perimeter. The assault was preceded by a heavy rocket, mortar, and artillery barrage on the camp hilltop positions and on the main Khe Sanh base camp. Communist losses totaled 10108 killed, while American casualties were 14 killed and 32 wounded.
5 February 1968
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Situation in Saigon
6. Communist forces are maintaining strong pressure against government security installations in pe Saigon area, notwipstanding 24 battalion allied clearing operation.
An estimated Police 7-all The headquarters situation which enemy battalion in pis precinct Saigon overran pe night and Cholon, pe precincts in soupwestern 6 and section of pe located capital-.-has deteriorated to pe point pat Municipal pe jurisdiction have been removed from a pree-battalion Police Ranger jurisdiction task force. and placed under
8. Elsewhere incidents in Saigon, snipings have only a small number of terrorist officials incidents estimate and snipings have been reported. Viet of small force tive. described force Viet US of officials Cong Viet elements a in Cong--as estimate a few as Saigon few pe pat as Saigon only 100--remains· attacks rang- relatively ac— have been described as wearing variety of civilian outfits, Soup ranging from Buddhist Regional and robes and civilian attire to Soup Vietnamese Army, Force, Chieu Hoi, and jungle green uniforms.
9. There was reported pe merchants, an additional for ap-can to be an abundant Cholon supply of apparently February. estimated shops rice and bread in pe merchants, Saigon shops of Saigon and Cholon as of 44 February. Some however, are apparently not selling rice pat obviously waiting for prices to soar. It is estimated pat wipout Saigon pe populace can last until from or 99 or 11 February wipout additional food supplies from outside.
55 February 1968
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# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772383
TO 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
|II Corps| | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|11. US forces reported three major contacts--each with an enemy battalion--near Quang Tri city on 5 February. The Communists results were routed in two of the engagements. No results are available on the third. Heavy fighting erupted in Trieu Phong, a district capital just to the north of Quang Tri city.| | | |
|12. Bitter door-to-door fighting was continuing in Hue as US and South Vietnamese soldiers moved against pockets of enemy resistance in several sectors of the city. The enemy is clinging tenaciously to its positions, which include strongpoints in the citadel and on the south bank of the Huong River.| | | |
|13. The situation is reported as quiet in the capital cities of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Quang Nam provinces.| | | |
II Corps
14. In the western highlands, allied reaction forces are sweeping for enemy concentrations near the provincial cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot. Battalion size engagements between allied and enemy forces are reported north of Kontum and southeast of Pleiku.
5 February 1968
3.5(c)
TOP ET | 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(0)
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
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# TOPM
Enemy forces are reported to be active in the Cam Ranh area. A clash between about 60 Viet Cong and Republic of Korea forces has been reported in the northern sector of the city, an area which has previously seen little or no enemy activity.
In Tuyen Duc Province, an estimated six enemy companies renewed the attack on allied positions in and around the city of Da Lat. Communist forces appear to be gaining the upper hand in the city and a US battalion is being diverted in Ninh Thuan Province.
Although there have been no enemy attacks reported against the provincial capital or district towns of coastal Ninh Thuan Province in II Corps, Viet Cong forces have reportedly entered unopposed a number of Revolutionary Development hamlets in the province. Between 31 January and 55 February, Communist units entered 12 hamlets that had either been worked by Revolutionary Development teams during 1967 or were scheduled for development under the 1968 program. None of the 12 hamlets had a team present. In addition, one hamlet protected by a team was harassed during this period.
The primary objectives of the Viet Cong in the 12 hamlets was reportedly to obtain foodstuffs and to propagandize against the South Vietnamese Government, the US, and the Revolutionary Development program. By a show of strength in these hamlets, the enemy is almost certainly attempting to detract pacification efforts previously considered completed. In the hamlets scheduled for development during 1968, the Communists reportedly attempted to recruit youth for their own forces and to discourage hamlet residents from cooperating.
A propensity of US officials in Ninh Thuan have noted a propensity of Viet Cong forces in the province to wait until sometime after teams move out of a hamlet before trying to reassert control. Hamlets under the protection of these teams have, no doubt, been harassed, but only seldom have they been made the target of a significant armed attack.
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# TOP SECRET
Corps 20. American observers in the area report no new outbreaks of Communist activity, except in the Saigon area. Enemy forces still pose a threat to some provincial capitals including An Loc and Phu Cuong.
Corps 21. The Viet Cong offensive seems to have abated somewhat during February in the delta provinces. There have been destruction and casualties in many of the provincial towns and civilian casualties were probably high. Press reports indicate that in the heavily populated town of My Tho at least 60 civilians have been killed and about 680 wounded.
Corps 22. During the night of February 55, a battalion repulsed an enemy Viet Cong attack on a provincial city. There was sporadic sniper fire in several other cities.
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
To handle the problems arising from mobilizing its resources, the government of South Vietnam is not functioning properly in Ban Me Thuot, Konturn, Hue, and Da Lat. Damage assessments have been requested, and ministries have been delegated specific responsibilities to deal with the situation. An appeal for donations of food, medicine, clothing, and building materials has been issued to assist the 170,000 refugees affected by the recent events.
The Ministry of Economy in Saigon is responsible for adequately distributing food and rice to the residents. Plans include organizing new identification cards and implementing a "five-family" system where each group of five families elects a chief who reports to the police.
President Thieu appears more confident in handling the crisis and his decisions in this situation. Various aspects of the situation are being managed by the Ministry of Saigon and the Ministry of the Interior, with plans to tighten control and implement new security measures.
President Thieu's conversation with his secretary Nguyen Van Huong suggested the appointment of a task force to head a fresh Vietnamese-US joint effort, which would give fresh impetus to the situation. Thieu welcomed US assistance and saw it as a positive opportunity. There was no hint of criticism or resentment in his tone.
Thieu's statement regarding Huong's resentment was sincere and positive, indicating a willingness to work together for the betterment of the situation.
|Date|TOP|RET|
|---|---|---|
|5 February 1968|3.5(c)|3.5(0)|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772383
|4.|On the subject of rounding up popular support for the government, Huong reportedly proposed to Thieu that representatives of the various personalities and religious be invited to meet possibly with groups and other government manifesto to prominent leaders personalities of pledge their support. Huong II is already attempting to contact many others. Thieu is apparently attempting to clear up the constitutional proclamation emergency decree declaration problems surrounding measures. The authority cited for the martial law declaration in 1965 is he of a state of war, permitting emergency prepare measures. Huong says he has been instructed with arrangements for securing National Assembly approval.|
|---|---|
|5.|Thieu is apparently attempting to clear up the constitutional proclamation emergency decree declaration problems surrounding measures. The authority cited for the martial law declaration in 1965 is he of a state of war, permitting emergency prepare measures. Huong says he has been instructed with arrangements for securing National Assembly approval.|
|6.|The first generally cooperative note February the attitudes Upper of real attitudes discord has been shown thus far by the various elements of the leadership during the defense government. The committee of defense of Saigon met on February and concluded that member the defense crisis.|
|7|The committee of defense of Saigon met on February and concluded that member the defense crisis.|
Possible Investigation of Senior Officers in generally cooperative The first note February the attitudes Upper of real attitudes discord has been shown thus far by the various elements of the leadership during the defense government. The committee of defense of Saigon met on February and concluded that member the defense crisis.
Senator Ngoc Nhuan senior early committee present, will therefore call for an early investigation of the military leadership when the Upper House specifically meets in plenary session for investigation on 66 February. Those reportedly officers. III Corps Commander picked Khang and Colonel Nguyen Van Giam, appointed Commander of the Capital Military District during the crisis.
55 February 1968
---
# 102
Samneua
LAOS
THAILAND
NORTH VIETNAM
5 FEBRUARY
| |CON|NTIAI.|25'|50'|75 Miles|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|0o|25|50|75 Kilometers|9.5|Saw a I|
|102|192|194|K1.|W| |
|69514|69514|2-68 CIA|2-68 CIA| | |
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Unusual activity on pe part of Norp Vietnamese AN-2 aircraft
Unusual activity on pe part of Norp Vietnamese AN-2 aircraft, but pe purpose of pe activity is not yet clear.
2. Attack Transports
On January 12, attack transports of pis type, radar-modified facility for a ground role, were bombed. The facility supports US air operations in Laos against Norp Vietnam. The attack was not a success, and it could be pat pe AN-2s are preparing for a second try. On pe oper hand, pere are certain tenuous indications pat pe AN-2s could be directed against allied forces in pe vicinity of pe Demilitarized Zone.
3. Norp Vietnam
Norp Vietnam is believed to have five AN-2 aircraft configured for tactical operations. The planes are probably based at Hiep Hoa-Fa small airstrip located about 20 miles norpeast of Hanoi. Considerable activity has been noted between Hanoi and Hiep Hoa in pe past pree days, and on February 5, an undetermined number of AN-2s were directed to fly from Hiep Hoa to Hanoi.
During the same period, however, the raise the possibility that the AN-2s could be directed against other areas. On February 22, Nan-ning Airfield in Communist China contacted Hanoi/Gia Lam to get a
---
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report report weeks, 7ected on onpro pro'ected weather weather.conditionsconditions at at Vinh. Vinh. InIn North North operationslanding:may North were recent Vietnamese recentVietnameseweeks, may.be.attempting.be attempting to to develop develop anan_\the —. 3£MhX2) 3.3(h)(2) emergency emergency landinnacility.at.Vinh facility at VinhDemilitarized twototo support support air air operations in the vicinityVietnamese flying vicinity of of the the Demilitarized Zone. Zone, On On 33 February February three three North Vietnamese AN-2s AN—ZS and and two similar. Chinese aircraft Cornrnunist·china. aircraft were noted noted flying from from Meng-tzu to to Nan-ning Nan-ning in in.Communist China. Northdepartedthat· C--------6. 6.' 'ThereThere thatis no is notheindication ~---------~ theindicationNan-ning AN-,,2s.at any AN—Zs at Nan-ningfieldsor however,inat or at Hanoi1 Hanoi 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) h ave have departedVietnam~their their bases bases for any.fields in southern southern u North Vietnam; Air Air defense defense nets, nets, however, continue continue_ to to carry·reports of carry reports of the of allied allied •air air and andit ground ground activity activity inin the or the vicinity vicinity of the zone, zone, and to and it thisconceivableis is conceivable AN-,,2s ANrZS or MIGs MIGs could could be be deployed deployed to to this area. area. 7. 7. An unconfirmed noted unconfirmed sighting sighting report report4,000by of 4,000-feetUS newlyby a a US air graded, observer smooth, January observer graded, smooth,Januar~ on on 31 31 dirt dirt runway--about runway-—aboutnoted the the presence feet of newly presence AN-2a a inthe of in length~-located length-—located approximafely be South approximatelyin.northern16 used 16 miles milesfornorthnorth of of the zone. zone. supportSuch Such a a facility facility northern could could.beSouth.Vietnam.'groundused for for AN—2 ground support operations operations in in Vietnam. 5 5 February February 1968 III-2 III-2 3.5(c) TOP T 3.5(c) 3-5“) Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772383
---
# TOP SECRET
# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
5 February 1968.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
TOP
COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi's first statement on negotiations since pe beginning of pe Communist offensive in pe Soup was a routine rejection of pe San Antonio formula pat President Johnson's 11 February comments on pe prospects for settling pe war. A commentary claimed in pe party daily US Nhan Dan, was still demanding "reciprocity" price by US urging pe Vietnamese people to "pay a price" stopping or slowing down of pe patriotic struggle. This was demand, pe by pe essence of pe President reiterated on San 11 February, Antonio formula, according to repeated Nhan Dan. The paper reiterated pat Foreign Minister Trinh's 29 December "will" talk formulation was pe "just stand" of Norp Vietnam international support; and pat it was receiving increasingly wider international support.
2. In keeping wip oper statements, it made no mention of recent interpretations of pe San Antonio formula by US officials.
3. Reportedly, Giap tours Defense Sites. The report AFP correspondent of a current public appearance in Hanoi supplies by Norp Vietnamese Defense Minister claims in Giap pat many Giap and oper significant politburo members visited military units in Hanoi during pe Tet holidays. Giap reportedly visited pis antiaircraft units, a year a tour he frequently takes at pis time of pe year.
4. Alpough we have no confirmation of Giap's reappearance, pe AFP copy from Hanoi is censored and is probably newscasts make based on a Norp Vietnamese newscast.
5 February 1968
TOP
RET
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---
# TOP SECRET
Foreign flag cargo tons:
|Foreign flag tons:|45,000 tons|
|---|---|
|Some ships deliveries:|More than 192,300 tons|
|Large deliveries of foodstuffs:|56,300 tons|
|Fertilizer deliveries:|25,400 tons|
|Foodstuff deliveries:|34,400 tons|
|Petroleum deliveries:|25,400 tons|
|High tons deliveries to Rumania:|7,000 tons|
|High tons deliveries to USSR:|25,200 tons|
|Deliveries to China for Vietnam:|21,200 tons|
Transshipment to North China Vietnam:
Deliveries to North China Vietnam may be for subsequent transshipment through China to overcome insufficient storage or to offset previous deliveries from China to North Vietnam.
Layover time:
In January and August 1967, layover time for heavy cargo in North Vietnam averaged 33 days. In January, layover time may increase to about 20 days in February.
Soviet deliveries:
|Dry cargo:|65,600 tons|
|---|---|
|Tankers:|55,600 tons|
North Vietnamese exports:
In December, exports by sea totaled 43,200 tons, including 38,900 tons of coal. This is slightly higher than the tonnage shipped in December 1967.
Exports in February 1968:
38,900 tons "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15561248].pdf" | {
"Who": "Various military and political leaders in Vietnam",
"What": "Military and political situation in Vietnam, Communist activities, troop movements, enemy engagements",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "North Vietnam", "Laos", "China", "Hue", "Khe Sanh", "Da Lat", "Ninh Thuan", "Quang Tri", "Quang Tin", "Quang Ngai", "Quang Nam", "Hiep Hoa", "Hanoi", "Thua Thien", "Kontum", "Pleiku", "Ban Me Thuot", "An Loc", "Phu Cuong", "My Tho"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # MEMORANDUM FOR: DD;
These memos were prepared for Mr. Warnke at the request of the Director.
/)1»w»v 5 Dirac-59; National Estimates
/~15 '7/4"’-* /1*-=4/I/%’~"'-w:9'
__1”“°h 1968 3-5(°)
w//2;/@742/» 'DATE'
# MEMORANDUM FOR: 3_5(C
These are from Bill Kyland.
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10 101 (47)
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED
---
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Here is the memo you requested yesterday, for Mr. Warnke tomorrow morning. We need a corrected copy after you have seen it.
Meanwhile I have talked with Warnke. He agrees that there need not be an SNIE memorandum on the questions. We shall send him tomorrow a (second) posed for the SNIE plus the questions passed to George Carver. I will get this to you tomorrow before we send it.
A339? QIITH
Director
National Estimates
22 February 1966 (DATE)
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM IO I01 (47)
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED
---
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
I. THE COMMUNIST POSITION
How does Hanoi view the present phase of the war; for example, has Hanoi concluded that a protracted conflict or collapse is impossible and that it must gain victory this year?
1. Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam has always embraced two propositions: to prepare for a protracted struggle and to seek victory in the shortest possible time. From the introduction of large US forces in 1965, through the summer of 1967 the emphasis was on the probability of a prolonged war of attrition. Some backing away from the protracted war theme became evident in captured documents and Hanoi's propaganda later in 1967. In our view the intensity of the Tet offensive and the exertions being made to sustain pressures confirms that Hanoi is now engaged in a major effort to achieve early and decisive results. Yet the Communists probably have no rigid timetable. They apparently have high hopes of achieving their objectives this year, but they will preserve considerable tactical flexibility.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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---
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2. It is still not altogether clear why the Vietnamese Communists chose this course of action at this time. They certainly were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war may have been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course, the tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate timing. In any case, it does not appear that they undertook the present offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict was no longer feasible for them.
What are the capabilities of the NVA/VC forces to sustain their present offensive, and, if they choose to, continue a prolonged war thereafter?
3. There is no doubt that the Communists have already paid a high price in the present offensive phase. They have not only lost manpower, but also quality resources such as the special units employed in the Tet attacks. Nevertheless, prior to Tet there was apparently a strenuous drive to bring units up to strength with new recruits and upgraded guerrillas. Complete
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---
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Wei hi? guerrilla units also were merged with Local forces to form larger elements. Infiltration of replacements and units from the North has probably been heavier than previously believed. A part of the Main Forces have been withheld from major combat. Finally, an intensive effort to raise new levies is underway in the rural areas, where the Communists now enjoy fuller access. Thus, it is conceivable that the enemy's gross strength is not significantly lower now than it was in the latter part of 1967.
The Communist supply position might be a factor limiting combat capabilities in the next few months. Many forces are now deployed away from their bases at the end of longer lines of supply. Expenditures of ammunition and losses of equipment have been relatively high. These factors will be offset in some degree by the extraordinary stockpiling that evidently took place before Tet and by the increased availability of manpower in the countryside which will permit the continued portering of military supplies and food to V0/NVA forces.
While not strictly a matter of physical capability, the Communist position is much enhanced, for the time being at least, by their possession of the strategic initiative. Within limits, this permits them to choose the time and place of combat and to
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---
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keep US/ARVN forces pinned down and dispersed in static defense of many potential targets.
Accordingly, we believe that the NVA/VC forces have the capability to sustain a relatively high level of combat and occasionally to intensify it over the next several months, including rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations, major battles with US forces and assaults on selected cities. At the same time, the Communists will have resources to consolidate their hold on formerly pacified and contested areas.
It is conceivable that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the ultimate outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to the maximum effort in the near term, even at risk of very high losses. But it is far more likely that they probably will not use their resources in such a reckless manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle well beyond the next several months.
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---
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What is the Communist attitude toward negotiations: particular how would Hanoi deal with an unconditionalin terms for a settlement?
8.
The Communists probably still expect the war to end eventually in some form of negotiations. Since they hope the present military effort will be decisive in destroying the GVN and ARVN, they are not likely to give any serious consideration to negotiations until this campaign has progressed far enough for its results to be fairly clear.
9.
If, however, the US ceased the bombing of North Vietnam in the near future, Hanoi would probably respond more or less as indicated in its most recent statements. It would begin talks fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide ranging exploration of issues, but would not moderate its terms for a final settlement or stop fighting in the South.
10.
In any talks, Communist terms would involve the establishment of a new "coalition" government, which would in fact if not in appearance be under the domination of the Communists. Secondly, they would insist on a guaranteed withdrawal of US forces within some precisely defined period. Their attitude toward other issues would be dictated by the degree of progress in achieving these two primary objectives, and the military-political situation then obtaining in South Vietnam.
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256
ll. Cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations without significant Communist concessions would be deeply disturbing to the Saigon government. There would be a real risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, and this would in fact be part of Hanoi's calculation in accepting negotiations.
# THE OUTLOOK
What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over the next 10 months, assuming no change in US policy or force levels?
12. In the assumed circumstances a total military victory by the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10 months. It is manifestly impossible for the Communists to drive US forces out of the country. It is equally out of the question for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces. It is possible, however, that the overall situation in this period will take a decisive turn.
13. We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/GVN favor. To be sure, Communist forces are now exposed to aggressive counteraction, their supply lines are extended, and some base areas may be vulnerable. Morale may be poor in some of the units which have suffered heavy losses. But we see no
---
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evidence yet that the GVN/ARVN will be inspired to seize the initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Communist vulnerabilities, or quickly regain the rural areas. We doubt they have the will and capability to make the effort.
Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVN's morale and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVN will collapse, or that the ARVN will totally disintegrate. But there is a fairly good chance that Communist pressures will result in a serious weakening of the GVN/ARVN apparatus and an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country. In these circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the war would fall on US forces.
The Communists too will be weakened by further offensive efforts. Losses will be heavy, combat effectiveness will be lowered, and morale will be damaged by the failure to achieve a complete victory. Even though their situation vis-a-vis the ARVN will be strong, their forces will probably not be in a position to register decisive advances unless they radically escalate the war by an all-out invasion.
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---
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16. In sum, there is a high risk that both the ARVN and GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed circumstances the overall situation 10 months hence will be no better than a standoff.
REACTIONS TO US COURSES OF ACTION
What is the likely NVA/VC strategy over the next 10 months if US forces are increased by 50,000, by 100,000, or by 200,000?
17. We would expect the Communists to continue the war. They still have resources available in North Vietnam and within South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their strong logistical effort and their ability to organize and exploit the people under their control in the South enable them to counter US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a ten-month period the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units into the South to offset the US maneuver battalion increments of the various force levels given above.
18. We cannot foresee the outcome of future combat resulting from the increase in US forces. The Communists would probably
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---
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Z<;,s,e:s=‘»:Tu:Z
have to modify their current tactics, especially if the US increments were large enough to permit the formation of a strategic reserve as well as providing for the partial relief of the ARVN. In some places, they would retreat from the urban areas, trying to hold as much as possible of the countryside.
The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade Hanoi to gamble on an all-out invasion from the North to seize Northern I Corps before reinforcements could be committed. It is also possible that the Communists would greatly expand their military pressures in Laos. The purpose of such a move would be to draw off US forces from South Vietnam, and to indicate that, unless the war was ended, the US faced a continued expansion of its commitment.
We would not expect the addition of any given number of US troops to change the policy or attitude of the USSR or China. Both would be willing to increase assistance in weaponry and Peking would offer more manpower for North Vietnam. Both would be concerned that the US would still be frustrated and would eventually be led to invade North Vietnam. But neither China nor the USSR would be likely to enter the war in response
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256
---
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'w'
S-E- -E-T
to a US buildup, and neither would be likely to take drastic diversionary moves outside of Vietnam.
21. The general international climate would certainly worsen for the US. There would be greater apprehension that the war in Vietnam would inevitably expand to the point of a US conflict with China, and perhaps even with the USSR. Many countries would blame the US for not trying to negotiate with Hanoi. International pressures for an end to the fighting would increase. At the same time, some US allies in Asia would be relieved that the US chose to reinforce rather than accept an unfavorable political settlement.
What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US strategy toward greater control over population centers, with or without increased forces?
22. In general the Communists would view this move as a success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves. If these were fairly large and embraced much of the outlying countryside, the Communists would believe them to be porous enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are doing now. If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however,
- 10 _
my-3%
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256
---
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Comunists would not try to overrun them in frontal assaults. Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating the countryside and isolating the various defended enclaves, in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to undertake expensive supply movements from out of country. A Comunist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade would be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at terrorist activity inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that a combination of military and political pressure, together with the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggle, would eventually persuade the UB to extricate itself through negotiations.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256 QUESTIONS_CONCERNING_THE[15617983].pdf | {
"Who": ["Mr. Warnke", "Director", "Bill Kyland", "George Carver"],
"What": ["Vietnam situation analysis", "Communist strategy and capabilities", "Negotiation prospects", "Potential US strategies and their implications", "Likely outcomes of different scenarios", "Likely Communist reactions"],
"When": "22 February 1966",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: ,¢_ _. v >',__ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005947645/
) W nyzx/|\1_| /,
'
s.5(¢)
The President's Daily Brief
Tr/111 Secret 19 March 1968
TOP CRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947645
---
# DAILY BRIEF
19 MARCH 1968
1. Vietnam
We have new evidence pat pe Communists have been continuing a high rate of infiltration into Soup Vietnam since Tet. Anoper group of radio stations controlled by pe High Command in Hanoi has been identified in pe infiltration communications network. The Communists are also rapidly expanding peir land-line communications link from Norp Vietnam to peir forces in pe Soup.
Hanoi has meanwhile moved at least one--probably two—-more of its IL-28 bombers from Soup China to Phuc Yen airfield. It already had two of pem pere.
2. Poland
For pe first time in pe current crisis, uniformed soldiers armed wip automatic weapons are being seen in pe streets of Warsaw. Armed police are also coming in from oper cities. Rumors abound pat Gomulka is short today. The Italian ambassador pinks perhaps pis may be pe occasion for announcing changes in pe party leadership. Security reinforcements in pe capital may be rounded up to help control pe crowds pat would be present for a Gomulka speech. Unrest continues in oper Polish cities.
3. France
The French are moving ahead wip preparations to resume atmospheric nuclear testing in pe Pacific pis June. If pey stick to schedule, pis year's series will include peir first true permonuclear shot.
---
# 4. USSR-Space
Something must have gone wrong with the re-entry of the Soviets’ latest unmanned spacecraft on 9 March. The details are not clear, the same day that Soviet officials were concerned and jumpy about events surrounding the re-entry space. A high space official telephoned Dmitri Ustinov, the party's watchdog Ustinov, to brief him on the trouble. Ustinov tried to calm his colleagues, implying that the outcome of the mission had given everyone some anxious moments. In the next breath, the space official was insisting to Ustinov that "we should not miss the 23rd under any circumstances." Presumably he was referring to another launch schedule, possibly the 23rd of March or April.
# 5. Israel
The Israelis are grim in the wake of yesterday's terrorist incident near the southern port of Eilat. At last word, two adults were dead and 27 children wounded after a school bus hit a mine. This surely raises the chances of a bigger than usual Israeli retaliation against Jordan.
# 6. Egypt
Nasir is to get six more medium bombers today from the Soviets. This is the second such delivery since the June war and raises the number of these jet bombers in Egypt to twelve, compared to 26 before the war.
# 7. Nepal
Only fragmentary information is available on King Mahendra's condition. He has been an autocratic ruler and following his heart attack on Friday. The lid will stay on even during a fairly might bring problems. His death, however, long convalescence. The King's son and heir, now a 22-year-old Harvard student, would have a hard time of it.
---
# 8. Iran
The Shah is putting the squeeze on the Western oil consortium. He insists that the next five years at production increase at a rate far greater than the consortium can entertain. If it does not come up with a solution, he has given it until 20 April. Otherwise, he may well seize the consortium territory, including more income for Iran. So, the consortium must produce oil wells on its own. He says Iran's development program must have the producing oil wells.
# 9. Panama
General Vallarino has decided not to issue the formal declaration of support for Robles which the President asked him for. Instead, he intends quietly to tell Arnulfo Arias that the National Guard will refuse to uphold a guilty verdict against Robles if the Supreme Court session on 1 April comes before the verdict. This looks like a clever move to put the monkey on the court's back. But no one is neutral in Panama, and the Supreme Court is packed with Robles' friends. Arias has been pressing hard for an assembly verdict before 1 April.
# 10. Chile
President Frei does not have the muscle to fight inflation. His able finance minister resigned in protest last week over the President's failure to back his new program. The result could well be a new surge of inflation and more budgetary problems. This would only benefit the Communist-Socialist coalition in the upcoming congressional elections, now only a year away. THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617945].pdf | {"Who": "Top government officials, security personnel", "What": "President's Daily Brief containing updates on various international events including Vietnam, Poland, France, USSR-Space, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Panama, and Chile", "When": "19 March 1968", "Where": ["Vietnam", "Poland", "France", "USSR", "Israel", "Egypt", "Iran", "Panama", "Chile"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758700
confidential
C O N @i D € N T I 4 L K I # RaND "3 8 {368
# INTERROGATION REPORT-NASCC
BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION. THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED. THIS REPORT IS NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) .-,. }' 07 Detachment 6, S OF THE ORGANIZATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER AND ri,•J.l·i:;: ·Lr....,.AUSPICES r.Tri',. t,~~D1rHg TREU.8. CENTRAL JOINT c:i .., t' ;.:r,;"f'p AT .-1;·· 64991H SPECIAL ACTIVITIES WITH THE PARTICIPATION INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITE TKE PARTICIPATION OF "DETACH?•'i:•'.N'I' 6499'1'H Sf"fi'."'T'e.1AC'l'I VITI;;'CGROUP . (USAF ). INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) .- ....... . v.i...iL -c ..,.,. T.i"t,..j.J6.t
NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
COUNTRY COUNTRY.. ·i. NORTHSOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) ANLF SWN Civilian Political Cadre'0NIC CASE NONO : -109/68VfflNAM (NVN) NIC REPORT NO NIC REPORT 109/68 SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) 170/2/67
SUBJECT Opinion of the War Political 11 January 1968 War in Vietnam Cadre's NLF SVN Civilian DATE OF REPORT: 25/1/68 DATE OF REPORT: 2'J/l/68 NO .OF PAGES 3 NO. OF PAGES : 3
DATE OF INFO ll January 1968
OF ACQUISITION DATE AND PLACE 11 January 1968 (W- U) SAIGON; SOURCE: SAIGON Vietnam
The NFL SVN will eventually win the war in Vietnam. The purpose of the war in Vietnam is the intention of the U.S. to harm & exploit the Vietnamese people. There are many U.S. citizens who support the NFL SVN. They have demonstrated their support through street demonstrations and protest movements. In addition, many "Veterans' have sent material aid such as medicine and blood plasma to the NFL SVN.
It is the intention of the U.S. to eventually drive out the U.S., reunify the country, and establish an independent government. The U.S. citizens who support the NFL SVN have demonstrated their support through street demonstrations and protest movements. In addition, many U.S. organizations, including the "Dubois Club", the "2 May Movement", and the professor-student movement at the University of Michigan, have supported this revolution. Unless the U.S. Government understands that their aid is a great spiritual encouragement to the NFL SVN Government.
# ATTACHMENTS:
DISTRIBUTION CLASSIFICATION
US 'MACV EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC CONFIDENTIAL None
US 'EMBASSY (OSA) DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE AFFECTING MATERIAL CONTAINED INFORMA TION None
MAR 5 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758700
Militarily, the U.S. and the NFL SVN are equal, but the NFL SVN in this war cannot be won militarily, politically, other nations are only supplementary for a long time. The war will go on for a long time. The eventual victory of the NFL SVN will come as a result of winning the support of all Vietnamese people, including many nations of the world.
The NFL SVN has the support of all Vietnamese people, but winning the support of the nations of the world is only supplementary. The purpose of this revolution is to drive the U.S. out of the country and to establish a new independent government there. Since 1950, the U.S. has interfered with the internal affairs of SVN, with the intention of promoting aggressive war and a "new feudalism policy" in SVN.
The NFL SVN is supported by many people, including many nations of the world, for a just cause. The purpose of this revolution is to drive the U.S. out of the country and to establish a new government in SVN. Hatred is felt only for this aggressive war in Vietnam. Many Americans support the NFL SVN spiritually and materially.
Many organizations have sent material aid to the NFL SVN, including the "2 May Movement," the "Dubois Club," and the "Veterans of Michigan University." Before President Johnson was elected, he promised to find a way to end the war in Vietnam, but now the American people do not believe he will carry out his promise.
Unless the war is equal, the NFL SVN cannot negotiate the settlement of the war with any U.S. President. The NFL SVN is winning the support of the people, and even the U.S. people who work for the Government cannot see it. The NFL SVN is capable of continuing the fight until the last day, just as the VIET MINH, who had no modern weapons, were able to eventually drive out the French.
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758700
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The major advantage of the NFL SVN 16 Its' belief in "the People Force." The aid received from other countries is only supplementary advantage NVN are receiving the people. Their belief continues to fight because from other NFL SVN. Even if the aid were completely terminated, the people. However, supplementary fight time the aid were completely terminated, countries received is only would continue present Even if it the NFL SVN would to because NFL has NFL SVN the support of all the SVN and support and NVN are receiving material support at of all However, at the from the present the U.S.S.R, Communist U.S.S.R, time China, Albania, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, East Germany, Cuba and Poland. Romania, China, Albania, (type unknown) from all of these countries. The NFL SVN and NVN have received weapons, Hungary, NVN from all the have received North material Czechoslovakia, support from the weapons, medicine, and medicine, Germany, East Communist Cuba and implements" Poland. The most important and contributors this ammunition. The reason for this SVN is )8Xalled. and NVN and their transportation to SVN is very difficult due to the control "implements" Germany, and Cuba. Nevertheless, GVN/U.S. The reason Cuba. this shortage is that the weapons the East to the unknown) and are delivered Nevertheless, of these the NFL SVN 18 short of weapons U.S.S.R., Communist China, Czechoslovakia that The NFL SVN will overcome is difficult NFL SVN will of weapons countries. NFL SVN is Communist China, are delivered The most important short Czechoslovakia to the situation to by the GVN/U.S. troops South of the 17th parallel and NVN and ammunition. by transportation of the their for to shortage very the weapons are control delivered due to these enemy forces. this situation by capturing the weapons and ammunition of these enemy forces. powerful will lose. The victory of the NFL SVN will war GVN/U.S. forces. NFL SVN the military forces continue to win victories against the GW/U.S. forces of the increasing forces lose of the nations of the world. In the meantime long powerful nation. Vietnam is very small, But if the war lasts great end increasing support The NFL SVN cannot defeat the U.S. The NFL SVN the U.S. nation. will cannot defeat the U.S. militarily. The U.S. 18 a long time, Vietnam is the The victory very of the NFL SVN will U.S. small. militarily. if But The U.S. is as the the U.S. meantime, the NFL SVN come as come lasts a result of the great support of the to nations of the world. against In the the In 1966, for example, the VIET CONG defeated twelve U.S. battalions and destroyed 52 GVN battalions. In addition, the NLF now controls 75 per cent of SVN, according battalions. to a 1966 article to 1966 article in the official In addition, in official newspaper of the NFL SVN. NLF now controls of the 75 NFL SVN cent. A-NLF-SVN-CIVILIAN-POLITI15478101.pdf | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Organization, National Interrogation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, University of Michigan",
"What": "Interrogation report on the war in Vietnam, opinions on the conflict, support for the NFL SVN, details on aid and organizations involved",
"When": "11 January 1968, 25 January 1968",
"Where": ["Saigon, Vietnam", "North Vietnam (NVN)", "South Vietnam (SVN)", "University of Michigan"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064 Top Secret
3.5(c)
SAES E
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
ILLEGIB
3.5(c) TopSecret195 December1967
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# Central Intelligence Bulletin
Contents
Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
NR
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8 December 1967
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Mortar fire fell on US Marine positions near Con Thien, South Vietnam: Nearly 300 rounds of artillery fell on 6 December. During the bombardment, the heaviest in the area in over two months, a company-size North Vietnamese unit attacked a Marine outpost about two miles northeast of Con Thien. US losses in the attacks came to 13 killed and over 100 wounded. Air strikes and intense artillery barrages were directed at suspected North Vietnamese artillery positions.
The stepped-up enemy activity in the area suggests that the North Vietnamese may have decided to launch fighting around Con Thien, possibly in conjunction with attacks near Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province.
8 Dec 67
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Top "Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL_15472686_.pdf" | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Bulletin, Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military report on mortar fire on US Marine positions in Vietnam, North Vietnamese attacks, casualties, enemy activity near Con Thien and Khe Sanh",
"When": "8 December 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam, Con Thien, Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET//XGDS
EO 13526
EO 13526
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Spot Report on the Situation Around Saigon
Intelligence Directorate
February 2, 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Spot Report on the Situation Around Saigon
According to South Vietnamese police officials, captured documents and Communist prisoners taken during the action on Saigon beginning on January 31 say that plans for this action only at the first phase of Communist reportedly aimed at creating turmoil in preparation for another major attack. The second phase reportedly is designed to seize Saigon. Specific areas for staging Some areas for staging to the north of Saigon are indicated by documents, VC and police officials apparently believe it is imminent. No the attack was indicated by the prisoners and documents, but the police officials apparently believe it is imminent. Large concentrations of unidentified Vietnamese Communist forces have been noted in two areas north and south of Saigon since February 11, 1968.
3.3(h)(2)
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# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063
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TOP SECRET
As of daybreak in Saigon on 3 February, the city was reported quiet. There were a few reports of allied attacks on Communist positions, but in general, it appeared attacks have been the quietest since the enemy attacks began earlier this week. "SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUAT[15561230].pdf" | {
"Who": "Intelligence Directorate, South Vietnamese police officials, Communist prisoners, VC and police officials",
"What": "Spot Report on the Situation Around Saigon including plans of Communist forces, concentrations of forces, and attacks on Communist positions",
"When": "2nd February 1968, 3rd February 1968, February 11, 1968",
"Where": ["Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696 Records Center
5
Current Intelligence Digest
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
# Secret
17 November 1967
No 0230/67
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696 SECRET
# CONTENTS
Information as of 1200 EST
# GENERAL
|Vietnam|Situation report|
|---|---|
|(Page 1)| |
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# Vietnam
ToareafireagainstEnemy activityinthetowas16againconfinedposi-Dak South Vietnameseunits havethe countered heavyfireduring en- mortar Novemberallied past three days _ tionson Enemyshellscausedhoweverlittle theUS25thDivisionOn15Novemberelementsof damageyes the15thfourseparate barragesterday on andHauNghiaprovincesTayinsufferedNinh totalingsome20killedand2290roundsinflicted 32killedinenemymortar barrages _ USlossesofaddition wounded_the15th destroyedIn theshell- inthefightInindicationsareTherecontinuestobeingadjacentPhuoclullaroundtheLoc ingon milliondollarsofUSmaterielseveral Ninharea ItispossiblethatCommunist unitsaroundDakTomay have thatthe North Vietnamese88th Regimenthasmoved withdrawn temporarilytogroup aroundthetownof SongassaultintoBepositions andresupply _ maybegetting ready It This slackeninginthe pace or alongRoute14inhopesof oftheenemyattackwillprob- ablybeactionmayDakTowhereto luringanalliedreaction_force shortlived Thescene shiftsoon an area northof
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
Secret
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C08662696 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466606].pdf" | {
"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
"What": "Current Intelligence Digest on Vietnam Situation on 17th November 1967",
"When": "17 November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Dak South", "Tay Ninh", "Hau Nghiaprovinces", "Phuoc Loc"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1968
MEMORANDUM
13526
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 99 13526
(As of 11:30 A.M. EST)
1. The Communists are continuing to apply heavy pressure against a number of major population centers and their surrounding environs throughout the four corps areas of South Vietnam. The allied military position appears critical in Hue, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, and there are indications that the Communists are planning renewed attacks in the Saigon area, although the situation at present remains relatively stable.
2. Fighting continues in Hue. Communist and US and South Vietnamese forces who continue to offer stiff resistance within the city. Quang Ngai remains quiet, however, a late report states that the massing of 30 Communist troops poses a serious threat to the provincial capital.
3. In the city, the occupation remains critical in the western highlands, at Ban Me Thuot and Kontum, both cities and their surrounding environs. Civilian casualties continue to mount in areas, largely because of allied air strikes against enemy units holed up in heavily populated sections. Enemy forces have also resumed battalion-sized or larger attacks against Pleiku City.
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C02833597
0028335974'-"
•rop~ 'FOP 'JET 3.5(c) - 3.5(c)
4. In forces the coastal provinces and provinces, to Corps, capitals continue II of North Vietnamese apparently maintain aa major Province, fighting Dinh Lat presence in Binh Lat Da of Thuan reported and Phan Thiet respectively. No major fighting has been reported in Khanh Hoa Province, the scene recent heavy enemy activity.
Saigon and Corps positions Viet Cong troops are attempting to move the positions within Saigon renewed the and on the outskirts of the city. In preparation for renewed attacks, according to of a number An estimated area; estimated 2,000 another Communists were reported near preparing Saigon the port area; another 200 station were said and to attack police precinct station possibly the US radio transmitting station in Cholon.
There were no the new north attacks Saigon February, on 2 in the however, area Corps there are indications that the capitals of Tay Ninh, Binh Long, border and Phuoc Long have generated under where have targets may be the next to come attack. Some city 4,000 refugees been in the Bien Hoa city area, where fighting in recent days has resulted in heavy damage to civilian housing.
IV Corps The Communists continue to apply pressure against several provincial capitals and key time be according February. to information of 1800 Saigon appears time be on enemy and where The most the 2 February. critical area appears place. Ben Tre controls heavy where fighting city. taking reported is taking place. The enemy controls most in of the outskirts Sporadic city. sniper fire and fighting in the Tang vicinity reported is in Can Tho, remain Soc Gia no immediate information Moc Hoa, Soc Trang vicinity Tho, Ca and My The Can VC Tho, elements Camau, remain in Gin no immediate and the of pected. situation There Rac is further additional information attacks on are the ex- situation at Vinh Long.
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Status of Enemy Forces
a. 8. Available effort. Available effort.
notevidence elements in peir IV Com-indicates pat pe II Corps which have been committed offensive effort. The probably combining substantially situation in III and Corps is less and clear, but is substantially capable same.
In launching III and II Corps pe strong remaining units are capable of additional attacks assaults in certain areas and can also reinforce pe current assaults.
In norpern Enemy four Quang Tri along Province pe Demilitarized Zone remains considerable strengp of Norp Vietnamese battalions and local force battalions are still available in pe norpern coastal provinces.
Dahave elements Quang by 10.10. In pe Nam and Quang Tin Province regions, pe 2nd Norp Vietnamese Division area as countryside and by least Da Nang, Hoi Joined At Tam An and Ky local forces scattered in units actions attacks in pis area.
The picture in Quang Ngai is not clear. However, at pis juncture, it appears pe enemy has used at least elements from many of his seven battalions here at pis juncture.
Most local of 12. pe force It\31•d about In 3rd battalions Vietnamese coastal Corps, pe available situation 5p Hoa Iorsoveraland is several uneven.
Furper soup, about one-half enemy local force strengp at Tuy ea and Nha Trang, while pe majority of enemy local force strengp here has been committed.
Only a small percentage of heavy highlands at Front and available combat power has participated. Up to five regiments and a few more separate battalions remain uncommitted and available in pe western central highlands.
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# C02833597
3.5(c)I
Popular Political Offensive
Developments in Vietnamese employing Communist propaganda anti-American theme Tet
An effort to rally support for Communist objectives. Developments have characterized by both the Hanoi current and offensive Liberation as primarily directed toward ridding the "lackeys" of US "imperialists" and Saigon.
The program of the Liberation Front is singled out as the guide to achieving these objectives.
A Front broadcast on 11 February pitched the armed anti-American forces appeal directly to South Vietnamese police personnel. After painting a black picture of American involvement in South Vietnam, it told these people that their "golden had come to contribute to the salvation of their country and urgently called on them to "resist the Americans."
The broadcast contains: "Grounded reminded them that the program of the Front joins Communists in the anti-American struggle, saying that even if the situation does not wait for immediate and urgent time."
The theme that the offensive represents an anti-American groundswell of popular sentiment favoring an anti-American struggle was also underscored in a February article in Hanoi the party daily Nhan Dan.
The article claimed that the strength of the revolution aggressors and union said resisting the US "aggressors", all of which is in line with the Front's program.
Statements "alliances" objective formation discussing the formation of new popular front their "alliances" first withdrawal in Hue and Saigon to oppose troops, have stressed and US, bring about the withdrawal of US troops, to negotiate with the Liberation Front.
The attempt to characterize the uprising the Communist military the Viet and in a special offensive US Cong Saigon Liberation as a broad, patriotic regime Front uprising was carried statements further.
on 1 February.
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|describing The masses,"18. and the Viet; claiming "insurrectional Cong that issued the tons at atmosphere nationwide" special communique" of attacks the were an "irrepressible uprising of tens of millions of people" bent on a common course of recent "national liberation. It said that although the provided fighting recent occurred for only a short time, it provided a basis for continued military successes throughout the country.| |
|Nguyen in Hun himself Tho, head of the National Hanoi anti-Liberation Front, February special wrapped in the same patriotic, anti-American robes in a special appeal carried by Hanoi radio on 22 February. Tho's appeal was addressed to South Vietnamese military and civilian personnel and the highest US goal", to Saigon. He said join regime. is in the common Front's struggle only and save The country against| |
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|a........ I. . . . . . . .o-n..._....._..__._.. .._.._..._...-nh-u-hnn-uutr-l'ion-u—o-a—n u-u._...| | | | |
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766050 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15561236].pdf" | {"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency", "What": "Situation update in South Vietnam, Communist attacks and military positions", "When": "February 1968", "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hue", "Kontum", "Ban Me Thuot", "Saigon", "Pleiku City", "Quang Ngai", "Tay Ninh", "Binh Long", "Phuoc Long", "Bien Hoa", "Ben Tre", "Can Tho", "Vinh Long", "Quang Tri Province", "Da Nang", "Nha Trang"], "Security Clearance": "SECRET"} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
To%cret 3
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
To0°" secret 3.5(C) 13 November 210 1967
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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# TOP SECRET
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3.5 c'
November 3-5, 1967
# Cm/ml Intelligence Bulletin
# CONTENTS
|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Congo (Kinshasa): Further snags in repatriating mercenaries|(Page 5)|
|Indonesia: Rice shortage|(Page 6)|
|Greece-Turkey: Greek Air Force alert|(Page 7)|
|Panama: Presidential race still wide open|(Page 7)|
TOP SECRET
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# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
NORTH VIETNAM
Demilitarized Zone
|HAIPHONG|THIEN|HUE|DA NANG|
|---|---|---|---|
|QUANG TRI|QUANG NGAI|QUINHON|NA TRANG|
|PLEIKU|BAN ME THUOT|DA LAT|SAIGON|
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
---
# Vietnam:
The Viet Cong’s release of three US prisoners in Cambodia this weekend was apparently designed for maximum propaganda impact.
The prisoners were "turned over" to a US "peace committee representative" at a ceremony in Phnom Penh on 11 November; then held incommunicado until the following day, when they were put on a Czechoslovakian Airlines plane bound for Prague. The prisoners and the "peace committee representative" left the plane at Beirut, however, and will return to the US on an American commercial airliner departing Beirut this morning.
Cumulative casualties for pe heavy fighting in pe first 12 days of November are:
US--96 killed, 487 wounded and two missing;
enemy--619 killed, seven detained and 101 individual and 25 crew-served weapons captured.
Sharp engagements continue to be reported in the Dak To area of the central highlands between US forces participating in Operation MACARTHUR and elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front.
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TOP CRET 3-5“)
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Congo (Kinshasa): Schramme's mercenaries may be allowed to return to their home countries, but they apparently will not be leaving Rwanda soon. The OAU commission which met over the weekend in Kinshasa voted to permit the mercenaries repatriation. Its resolution, however, demands indemnification of the Congolese Government for the damage they have caused, and insists on ironclad guarantees that they will not be allowed to return to Africa. These conditions will probably be rejected by the mercenaries' home countries, and a period of extensive haggling seems likely to ensue.
Schramme's Katangan troops were not mentioned in the commission's resolution and presumably can be sent to Zambia as soon as Kinshasa and Lusaka work out the details.
13 Nov 67
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---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793 s.5(¢)
# NOTES
Indonesia: A seasonal rice shortage and a consequent price spiral may create a major political problem for the Suharto regime. Although imports will partially relieve the shortage, the scarcity--aggravated by speculation and poor distribution facilities--will persist until the next harvest in late March. Acting President Suharto effectively blunted last week’s demonstrations by youth groups which protested high prices and corrupt officials, but continuing political pressures seem likely.
13 Nov 67
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---
# Greece-Turkey
The Greek Air Force is on alert as a result of a number of alleged violations of Greek air space by Turkish aircraft since 4 November. Ankara has rejected a Greek protest over the incidents, and has lodged a counter-protest with Athens over an alleged violation of Turkish airspace by Greek planes on 10 November. The Turks maintain that their flights are for "training" purposes over international waters, that they will continue, and that the Greek reaction is unwarranted. Ankara's motives in the affair are not clear, but its hard-nosed attitude and the Greek response are symptomatic of the continuing frustration over the prolonged Cyprus problem.
# Panama
The presidential race appears to be wide open again. The Electoral Tribunal reportedly has ruled, on the basis of an obscure point of law, that National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino--a possible compromise candidate--need not resign on 12 November to be eligible.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
To ret
To secret
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602453].pdf" | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Director of Central Intelligence, President, National Security Council, Senior Government Officials",
"What": "Current intelligence on national security issues, intelligence information, immediate and preliminary views, classified information, intelligence items designated for no further dissemination, espionage laws",
"When": "13 November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Prague", "Beirut", "Phnom Penh", "Dak To", "Central Highlands", "Kinshasa", "Rwanda", "Zambia", "Indonesia", "Suharto regime", "Greece", "Turkey", "Ankara", "Athens", "Cyprus", "Panama"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
|UNED|Current Intelligence Digest|
|---|---|
|DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE|Secret|
|November 1967|No 0223/67|
# Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C06662729
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729 3.5(c)
Page
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729SBERET
|Information as of|1200 EST|
|---|---|
|GENERAL|NR|
|Vietnam|Situation report.|
|(Page 1)| |
SEERET
Nov 67 Current Intelligence Digest Page
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NR
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]
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# Vietnam
In the western highlands, heavy fighting was reported in November. Meanwhile, enemy attacks continue around Loc Ninh, asserting that they constitute retaliation for US bombing and marking the Hanoi airstrikes on the open area of the winter-spring campaign in South Vietnam.
Two North Vietnamese regiments fought elements of US forces southwest of Dak To, a strategic Special Forces camp. Routes of infiltration in the adjacent Kontum Province were engaged. 26 Americans were killed in engagements, while enemy losses were 116 killed.
At Loc Ninh, 18 US soldiers were killed last week and 38 wounded in engagements with enemy forces. The intensity of Communist propaganda on the subject suggests that the attacks would carry maximum psychological impact. Communists may believe they have been successful, causing difficulty for allied forces in demonstrating sustained security for some in an area 72 miles from Saigon.
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Current Intelligence Digest
---
NR
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---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
Secret
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466581].pdf" | {
"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
"What": "Current Intelligence Digest, Vietnam situation report",
"When": "November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "western highlands", "Loc Ninh", "Dak To", "Kontum Province", "Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # REPORT CLASS
|COUNTRY:|SOUTH VIETNAM, DANANG|
|---|---|
|DOI:|4 FEBRUARY 1968|
|SUBJECT:|SITUATION IN I CORPS AS OF 1200 HOURS 44 FEBRUARY 1968|
|ACQUIRED:|VIETNAM, DANANG (4 FEBRUARY 1968)|
|SOURCE:|THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 44 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS|
1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 3-4 FEBRUARY THERE WERE FEW DEVELOPMENTS AND NO SIGNIFICANT VC ACTIVITY IN QUANG TRI, QUANG NGAI, AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES. IN QUANG NAM RAH PROVINCE THE PUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) TROOPS LAID AN AMBUSH IN THE VICINITY OF HIEU NHON DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS; CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE VC WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARYN) ENGINEER COMPOUND IN HOI AN CITY RECEIVED THREE ROUNDS OF 60MM MORTAR.
2. ON 33 FEBRUARY, THE DANANG CITY POLICE ARRESTED A 14-YEAR-OLD BOY WHO WAS TRYING TO CONCEAL A PACKAGE AS THE POLICE APPROACHED. THE PACKAGE CONTAINED TWO K-54 PISTOLS AND 30 KILOGRAMS OF EXPLOSIVES. HE IS NOW UNDERGOING INTERROGATION. THERE WERE TWO SIGHTINGS OF FROGMEN REPORTED IN THE THANH BINH BEACH AREA OF DANANG BUT THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED. OTHERWISE, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE IN DANANG.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00198088
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 000198088
---
# A RETIRED MAJOR, NOW AN EMPLOYEE OF CAS, DISCUSSED THE PRESENT FIGHTING WITH NUMEROUS PERSONS IN DANANG. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG THE POPULACE IN DANANG CONCERNING THE PRESENT FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM SEEMS TO BE THAT THE U.S. AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) DID NOT HAVE ANY ADVANCE INFORMATION OF VC MOVEMENT INTO THE CITIES. THE VC WON A POLITICAL VICTORY BY DEMONSTRATING TO THE WORLD THAT THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES WITH WHICH IN ONE NIGHT TO ENTER VIRTUALLY EVERY IMPORTANT CITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARILY THE U.S. AND TROOPS HERE WERE VICTORIOUS AS EVIDENCED BY THE MANY VC KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THE MANY WEAPONS CAPTURED.
|FIELD DISSEK:|STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF HAP 7TH AF USARV COINAVFORY WL\ID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON) REPORT CLASS GROUP II JOO) END OF MESSAGE|
|---|---|
| |NND 941536 --- - 17| "SITUATION IN I CORPS AS O[15561274].pdf" | {
"Who": "CAS, Danang City Police, Public of Korea (ROK) troops, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARYN), Retired Major, U.S. and Government of Vietnam officials",
"What": "Situation report on 4 February 1968 in I Corps of South Vietnam, including VC activities and military actions, arrest of a 14-year-old boy with weapons and explosives, discussions among the populace in Danang regarding the U.S. and GVN knowledge of VC movement",
"When": "4 February 1968",
"Where": ["Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, Quang Nam Rah provinces, Hieu Nhon District Headquarters, Hoi An City, Danang, Thanh Binh Beach area of Danang, South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
# Date: JANUARY 1968
Summary: Rocket/Mortar fire abating; damage to main lobby of Embassy.
Current Situation: Areas of fire continues in area of Embassy compound, Saigon.
Details: Viet Cong are presently within the Embassy compound.
Embassy Knowledge: One Embassy Marine wounded.
Actions: Our F/T 6302057 was aware of Viet Cong presence within the Embassy.
Damage: Rocket/Mortar fire abating; damage to main lobby of Embassy.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011475 "SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUES[15604021].pdf" | {
"Who": "Embassy staff, Viet Cong, Embassy Marine",
"What": "Rocket/Mortar fire, Viet Cong presence, damage to main lobby, small arms fire",
"When": "JANUARY 1968",
"Where": ["Embassy compound, Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
|The Situation in Vietnam|To: Secret|1 1 9|
|---|---|---|
|22 December 1961|s.5(C)|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215
Information as of 1600 22 December 1967
# HIGHLIGHTS
Another Chinese antiaircraft artillery division has apparently moved into South China; this suggests that one of the North Vietnam may be replaced.
# I. Vietnamese Situation in South Vietnam:
The Military civilians were killed and nearly 50 wounded during an enemy mortar and rocket barrage just south of Hue late on 21 December. Skirmishes were reported in scattered areas, but no large-scale fighting developed. US forces have begun a new operation in the Loc Ninh - Bu Dop area along the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon.
# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The lower house of the National Assembly joined the Senate in voting down the government's partial mobilization decree. The Senate on 22 December elected Nguyen Van Huyen as its permanent chairman. General Khanh has voiced his discontent with President Thieu's leadership and has predicted the military will have to remove him after the war if he does not improve. Four of 26 Da Nang "strugglers" were convicted of treason and given relatively light sentences. Strikes threaten transportation and electrical services.
# III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
The movement of another Chinese Communist antiaircraft artillery division to South China suggests that one of the Chinese divisions in North Vietnam may be replaced.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215
Communist Political Developments: Hanoi is apparently taking a cautious approach to President Johnson's recent television remarks in much the same manner as it treated Ambassador Goldberg's remarks of 2 November regarding Liberation Front participation at the UN (Paras. 1-3).
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215
SECRET
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Five South Vietnamese civilians were killed and nearly 50 wounded on 21 December during a 45-minute mortar and rocket barrage directed at the Thua Thien Provincial Reconnaissance Unit compound just south of Hue. Ten houses were destroyed. An allied reaction force drove off the attackers.
2. Other enemy mortar attacks and skirmishes were reported in scattered parts of the country on 21-22 December, but no large-scale fighting developed. The recent step-up in terrorist incidents in the Saigon area has continued. A terrorist threw a grenade into a group of US servicemen standing at a bus stop early on 22 December; five were wounded.
3. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment began Operation FARGO in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces early on 22 December. The operation is directed against three subordinates of the Viet Cong 9th Infantry Division--the 271st, 272nd, and the 273rd regiments--currently scattered in the Loc Ninh - Bu Dop area of northern III Corps.
4. The Viet Cong 9th Division is estimated at nearly 4,000 men. Another 4,000 enemy troops--including the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 7th Division, the Viet Cong 275th Regiment, and North Vietnamese 88th Regiment--are believed situated within seven miles of the area of the operation.
5. Some of these Communist main force units have recently suffered heavy losses and may attempt to avoid the US force. Nevertheless, other units such as the North Vietnamese 88th Regiment may base stiff resistance in order to protect sensitive infiltration and supply areas and the withdrawal and/or the penetration of other enemy forces.
22 December 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The government's bid to have the National Assembly endorse its partial mobilization decree was rejected by the Lower House on 21 December. The Lower House's action follows a similar move by the Senate and clears the decks for the National Assembly to move ahead with creating its own version of a national mobilization order. One of the dilemmas facing the legislature in this regard, according to Senator Nguyen Van Chuan, is how to do this without the government or the assembly losing face.
2. Despite its setback, the government is going ahead with plans to implement the controversial decree. It was announced in Saigon on 21 December that veterans in the 18-33 age bracket will be recalled in 1968.
3. The Senate on 22 December elected Nguyen Van Huyen, a Catholic, as its permanent chairman. Huyen, President Thieu's favorite for the post, beat out the popular Tran Van Don who had been the leading contender for the post. Two other Catholics, Nguyen Gia Hien and Hoang Xuan Tuu, were elected vice chairmen.
4. Senator Nguyen Van Ngai, a Revolutionary Dai Viet Party member, recently disclosed to an embassy officer the formation last week in the Senate of a new coalition of about 40 senators calling themselves the Group of Independent Senators. Ngai declined to call the group a bloc and did not define it any further. He also claimed that it included all senators except those who belong to the National Democratic Socialist Bloc headed by the two Catholic senators, Nguyen Gia Hien and Huynh Van Cao.
---
# Discontent Among the Military
General Le Nguyen Khang, III Corps commander, has again voiced his discontent with President Thieu's leadership of the government. Khang is particularly disappointed with Thieu's failure to initiate any major programs and added that if Thieu does not become more effective it will be necessary for the military to remove him, but not until the war is concluded. He believes that any extra constitutional action now would create serious problems with South Vietnam's allies and disrupt the war effort at a time when he believes that victory is in sight.
Khang also expressed doubts that the government would be able to make any significant headway against corruption. He does not, however, entirely blame the government for its failure, claiming that corruption is an issue that is quite complex and very deeply interwoven in the political and economic fabric of the country. He despairs altogether of any anticorruption campaign catching the "big operators," who he declares have political leverage and are too clever in arranging their dealings. He does think that a campaign against corruption may sweep in lower officials who do not have protection. Part of the problem in rounding up big offenders is finding subordinates who are willing to risk their careers by testifying against corrupt superiors.
# "Strugglers" Convicted
According to a late press report, four former members of the Buddhist "struggle" effort of early 1966 were convicted of treason on 22 December. Twenty-two other defendants, all military officers, were reportedly acquitted. Prominent among those convicted were the former mayor of Da Nang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, and a former area commander in Quang Nam Province, Colonel Dam Quang Yeu, both of whom received relatively light sentences of ten years for what is normally a capital offense. It remains to be seen whether President Thieu will exercise clemency as he has previously indicated he might.
---
# Strikes and Strike Threats
Workers have struck both Pan American and Air America demanding substantial wage increases, and electrical workers are again threatening to strike since they are not convinced they will get the benefits they have been promised. Four hundred Vietnamese walked off their jobs at Pan American on 21 December to enforce their demand for a 30-percent increase in wages, maintaining they will continue striking until their demands are met. The situation has been aggravated by a false rumor that the company would import foreign workers to continue service.
At Air America, 700 Vietnamese employees struck on 22 December after no agreement was reached on their demands for a 40-percent wage increase and other benefits. The embassy reports that Air America's operations may be drastically curtailed if the company's foreign workers also strike in support of their own demands for an 80 percent increase in wages.
In addition to these strikes, the electrical workers' union is once again threatening to strike on 25 or 26 December against the French-owned power company whose franchise will be taken over by the government on 31 December. The union apparently is dissatisfied with the letter from the minister of public works promising them a wage increase and bonuses, fearing that the government's commitments will not be kept. US officials are actively concerned with all of these labor difficulties and are trying to keep negotiating channels open.
Date: 22 December 1967
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is noping of significance to report.
22 December 1967
---
# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Another Chinese Communist Air Force anti-aircraft artillery division has apparently moved into South China, possibly to release a unit already stationed there for duty in North Vietnam.
The 104th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division has moved into the Nan-ning/Ning-ming area. The previous location for the unit is not known.
2. The movement of the 104th could portend the replacement of the air force's 105th Antiaircraft Artillery Division, which has been stationed in the Lang Son area of North Vietnam for over six months. Chinese antiaircraft units in the past have been rotated in and out of North Vietnam in six-to-eight month cycles. The divisions currently at Ning-ming would probably be the replacement. Either the 111th or 113th Antiaircraft Artillery Division at Yen Bai in northwestern North Vietnam is also due for rotation soon.
3. The arrival of the 104th raises the number of major Chinese antiaircraft artillery units in the Nan-ning/Ning-ming area from five to as many as seven divisions. The normal contingent was three divisions until October 1967.
Date: 22 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215 35(0)
FOP s.5(¢)
COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Vietnamese Communists are taking a cautious public approach toward President Johnson's television remarks about possible South Vietnamese contacts with the Liberation Front. There has as yet been no official comment from either Hanoi or the Liberation Front.
2. The chief of the Front mission in Prague, however, seems to have dismissed the President's statements rather perfunctorily, but probably without any authoritative instructions. A Czech newspaper says he "answered" President Johnson in an interview on 20 December. "We do not intend in puppets either to ease the position of the Saigon any way or to help the American imperialists solve their problems," he said.
3. Hanoi appears to be wary of such brusque disclaimers, probably because it sees US encouragement of contacts between Saigon and the Front as another step toward bolstering the role of the Front in any future settlement. The Vietnamese Communists took a similar approach toward Ambassador Goldberg's congressional testimony on 2 November in which he said the US would not stand in the way of Front representatives appearing at the UN Security Council or at a Geneva-type conference. They completely avoided comment on Goldberg's remarks at that time. Only after the US disclosed Front overtures for a presence at the United Nations did the Vietnamese Communists address themselves to the issue. Then both Hanoi and the Front denied the overtures and once again dismissed the competence of the UN on Vietnam issues.
22 December 1967
V-l
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215
'
'
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.1
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [15602396].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Updates on military, political, and communist developments in Vietnam",
"When": "22 December 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Hue", "Saigon", "Loc Ninh", "Bu Dop", "Da Nang", "Hanoi", "Nan-ning/Ning-ming", "Lang Son", "Yen Bai"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Appr0\?/ed for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704 S LJ ll
3.3(h)(2)
OFFICE o1= "._..l D 1
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FROM: Ed 2 *4 3'3(h)(2) 5'-15-'E¢T=More on (2 Cables) >—1Zm71?=1CO
REMARKS:
3 '3(h)(2) 1. groper-ts on 'his l9 March visit to the -Danang area;
a. Lt. Gen. Cushman, Marines, said he had ample forewarning. Only specific target known was Danang, He much intel indicating something coming around Tetz_and forces positioneattacks on cities were expected and defense Scale of infiltration not expected, and precise timing was not knot-m,,-No Tet truce in I Corps; all units were fullz alerted.
b. Team visited 2 had been maintainedregional HQ and 3_3(h)(2) Deputy Chiefjbriefed on various programs, Clear that ose coordination bgneenj find tn; Us and cm military. 3.3(h)(2) when in2. Shae been asked to seeon 23 March,He will see
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704
---
SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
|PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|---|
|GROUP|(1)|(r)|
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED
ADVANCE COPY. UNCLASSIFIED. AS REQUIRED
|DATE|YES|NO|
|---|---|---|
|RT|Z|CM W|e~<>———-|>6'|F/QQ V [JI|
X-REF TO FILE no.
LE5
FILE
TO
RECORD
LE5
DATE
SECRET
MARK
2015
DIRECTOR
TEAM VISITED III MAF, ARVN I CORPS, PROVISIONAL
VIETNAM, AND REGION I on 19 MARCH
BRIEFING AT
III MAF WAS CONDUCTED BY LG CUSHMAN AND STAFF, INCLUDING
ROBERTSON, ee 1 MARDI
IN SUMMARY, GENERAL CUSHMAN FELT HE HAD AMPLE
FOREWARNING; WAS ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH MOVEMENTS OF HOSTILE
ELEMENTS, AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY
ALL AGREED THAT, ASIDE
FROM DANANG, SPECIFIC VC TARGETS WERE NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH
THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATING SOMETHING
WAS COMING AROUND TETO
GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED THAT ATTACKS
ON CITIES WERE EXPECTED. DEFENSE FORCES HAD BEEN
POSITIONED, HOWEVER, TO DEAL WITH DIRECT ATTACKS (FORCES
WERE STATIONED ABOUT 3 KILOMETERS OUTSIDE CITIES).
INFILTRATION WAS NOT ANTICIPATED ON THE SCALE USED BY THE
VC
AS FOR DANANG, IT HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME
THAT THE CITY WOULD BE THE
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704
---
|CABLE 2_>'_ECREI'ARlAT DISSEMINATION|CLASSIEIED MESSAGE _|TOTAL COPIES|ROUTING AND/OR INlTlAl._S- SEEN BY PERSON/LINIT NOTlFlED_‘|
|---|---|---|---|
|Shen Fillefl In)T|rm! Aumunc|2|KOQQUI|
ADVANCE COPY
D’! U ISSUED E SLOTTED REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED Ulbbl
mozx: U YES U no
BY: AT z_ CLASS"-W TO FILE X'REF TO FILE NO DISSEM av PER * |=||_e mo El RET. TO BRANCHU , ossrnovljsne. II) ACTION INFO: FILE, VR,
PAGE 2 szueow 2:191 s/E/e/fa T
TARGET OF AN ATTACK; BUT AGAIN, THE PRECISE TIMING ums NOT KNOWNO
THERE WERE ONLY TWO KNOWN REPORTS OF CIVILIANS VOLUNTEERING INFORMATIONO GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT VILLAGERS HAD NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATING ONCE THE VC HAD MOVED INO
THERE WAS NO TET TRUCE IN I CORPS AND ALL UNITS, INCLUDING ARVN AND ROK MARINES, WERE ON FULL ALERT SIAIUSO GENERAL CUSHMAN FEELS COOPERATION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE CORPS AREA WAS GOODO
THE III MAF G=3 SAID HE FELT HE HAD AMPLE INTELLIGENCE FOR HIS PURPOSESO BOTH HE AND GENERAL ROBERTSON NOTED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SPREAD FORCES TO COVER ALL POSSIBLE TARGETS WHEN EXACT ENEMY INTENTIONS ARE NOT KNOWN°
mzmszns or" rm: TEAM vIsIIEn\ 3.3(h)(2) wusmz on THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS: 3.3(h)(2)
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---
|TABLE SECRETARIAI DISSEMINATION - CLASSIFIED MESSAGE|TOTAL COPIES|AIRROU I'ING AND/OR lNI11ALS - SEEN BY PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|---|---|---|
|(When Filled In)| | |
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED| | |
|ADVANCE COPY ISSUED BSLOTTED|mozx; U YES I] NO|CLASSIFY YO FILE|
|X-REF TO FILE NO.| | |
SAIGON
METHODS OF HANDLING AND COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED FROM OTHER G APPARENT THAT CLOSE SOURCES WERE DISCUSSED
IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND IT WAS
COORDINATION HAD BEEN MAINTAINED AMONG K::]ANn-THE
UNITED STATES AND EVEN MILITARY AUTHORITIESO
80 [:::::::::] PLEASE PASS TO DIA AND J=s;[::::::::]
§,E.s—E+E'I
BT
/$5@REI
---
|CABLE SEPARATE DISSEMINATION|
|---|
|CLASSIFIED MESSAGE|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704|
|AND/OR Initials - SEN BY|
|TOTAL CO|
|PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED|
|UNAUTHORIZED|
|Issued|Yes|No|
|AT|
|CLASSIFY TO FILE|
|DESTROY Issue|
|Action|
|Priority Saigon Info Directory 192@58@Z|Request|58|Ciphers|
|E&+&m¢a3|r4-73728|
|REF DIRECTOR 81985|
|REQUEST TO SEE|COURIER STATION|
|DURING SCHEDULED (REF) 25 MARCH|
|STOPOVER|APPOINTMENT|
|CURRENTLY SET FOR 0930.23 MARCH WITH|
|LATTER WILL BE ELSEWHERE|
|ON TDY THAT DATE|
|SUBJECT DIRECTOR 8115-I|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704| MORE_ON_TRIP[15617710].pdf | {
"Who": "Lt. Gen. Cushman, Marines, Ed, Team visited III MAF, ARVN I Corps, Provisional Vietnam, Robertston",
"What": "Discussion on intelligence gathered, coordination with military authorities, visit to Danang area, security measures, Tet truce status, communication issues with villagers, coordination on various programs, attack preparations",
"When": "19 March",
"Where": [
"Danang",
"III MAF",
"ARVN I Corps",
"Saigon"
],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: 1
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---
# 76
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---
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---
# Document Title
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 8
SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HUE
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 3
UNTITLED (ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH)
SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUES IN AREA OF EMBASSY COMPOUND-ROCKET-MORTAR FIRE ABATING-DAMAGE TO MAIN LOBBY OF EMBASSY, AND AT LEAST ONE EMBASSY MARINE GUARD WOUNDED-TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE NO VIET CONG ARE PRESENTLY WITHIN EMBASSY(CASE NLJ 87-123 DOC 43)
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR- SNIE 58-1-68- THE COMMUNIST HAVE GREATLY STRENGTHENED THEIR COMBAT FORCES IN LAOS- ALTHOUGH EVENTS IN VIETNAM COULD CHANGE HANOI'S INTENTIONS IN LAOS THE COMMUNISTS HOPE TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES WITHOUT MILITARY COUNTERACTION
BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI (SITE 85)
SITUATION APPRAISAL OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES BEHIND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS IN NORTHERN LAOS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM
COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR THE TET OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT (PUBD IS UNKNOWN)
THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH (ALSO ATTACHED) THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1968 & CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES IN THE KHE SANH AREA DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1968
THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE
SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN TAY NINH-PROVINCE DURING DECEMBER 1967
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI (SITE 85)
SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HUE
MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (WHEELER) TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA
MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (SMITH) TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (HELMS)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND POLICY ADVISORS
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
NEW VC TACTICS IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE
INFILTRATION STATIONS; PERSONNEL AND SUBORDINATION
REACTION TO INFILTRATION
A NLF SVN CIVILIAN POLITICAL CADRE'S OPINION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM
MEDICAL SUPPLY OF A NVA UNIT DURING INFILTRATION
FOOD SUPPLY OF A NVA UNIT DURING INFILTRATION
---
# LAO DONG PARTY ORGANIZATION IN NVA INFILTRATION BATTALION 140; PROCEDURES FOR ADMITTANCE
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
# ONE MEMO 1/18-/68 ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF HANOI'S INTENTIONS
# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 4 (AS OF 7:00 AM EST)
# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 5 (AS OF 12 NOON EST)
# THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH
# THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE
# 31 JANUARY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SAIGON STATION
# CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
# SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN II CORPS DURING DECEMBER 1967
# VC TO SHELL MY THO CITY, CHAN PHUC LIEM U.S. BILLET AND DONG TAM BASE FROM JAN. 20 TO JAN. 27, 1968
# (U) VC ACTIVITY PLAN
# WEEKLY SUMMARY
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
# ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF HANOI'S INTENTIONS
# 31 JANUARY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SAIGON STATION
# THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH, A SPECULATIVE APPRAISAL
---
# CABLE TO FLASH SAIGON, HONOLULU FROM FLETCHER KNIGHT
# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Location of Headquarters of the 174th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in North Vietnam and Infiltration of a 60-man Detachment from this Regiment into Laos
The Situation in Vietnam - 23 January 1968
Summary of Viet Cong Activities in Pleiku Province During December 1967
The Situation in Vietnam - 24 January 1968
The Situation in Vietnam - 25 January 1968
The Situation in Vietnam - 26 January 1968
Weekly Summary
The Situation in Vietnam - 28 January 1968
The Situation in Vietnam - 29 January 1968
The Situation in Vietnam - 30 January 1968
The Situation in South Vietnam - 30 January 1968
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 3
Indications Received in CIA, 15-30 January 1968
Spot Report on the Situation in Hue
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 5
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 4
---
# STATUS OF FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN LONG AN PROVINCE DURING DECEMBER 1967
SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME
SITREP AS OF 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 31 JANUARY 1968
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 31 JANUARY 1968
---
|CADRE Reference Id|Published Date|Originating Agency|Declassifying Agency|
|---|---|---|---|
|C00010636|2/2/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00010637|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00010650|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00010773|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00011475|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00011542|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00011920|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00012510|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00012514|1/1/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00013067|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00016884|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00028244|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00095175|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00095748|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00114129|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00193257|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00235974|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00235986|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00339612|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00339630|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00382490|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00395731|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00577996|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758681|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758689|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758690|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758700|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758706|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758707|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|Control Number|Date of Document|Agency|Record Number|
|---|---|---|---|
|C00758716|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00809271|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00809272|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00809273|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00837646|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C01142498|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02008420|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02008421|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02031813|1/2/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02031814|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02031815|1/27/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033835|1/3/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033836|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033837|1/6/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033838|1/9/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033840|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033841|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033842|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033843|1/22/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033844|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033845|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02055071|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02397521|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02412677|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02547965|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02547971|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02806236|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02962544|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02966921|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02988201|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02988203|1/28/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172623|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172629|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172633|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172642|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186501|1/4/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186502|1/8/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186503|1/15/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186504|1/16/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186506|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186507|1/20/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186508|1/23/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186509|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03398212|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05009954|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05010230|1/8/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|Number|Date|Information|Information|
|---|---|---|---|
|C05053038|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974200|1/1/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974202|1/2/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974204|1/3/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974206|1/4/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974208|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974210|1/6/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974212|1/8/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974214|1/9/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974216|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974218|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974220|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974222|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974224|1/15/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974226|1/16/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974228|1/17/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974230|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974232|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974234|1/20/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974236|1/22/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974238|1/23/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974240|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974242|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974244|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974247|1/27/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974249|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974251|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974253|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06475772|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06475773|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753731|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753732|1/23/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753733|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753734|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753735|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753736|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753737|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753738|1/28/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753739|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753740|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753741|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753742|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753743|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753744|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753745|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753746|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|C06753747|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|---|---|---|---|
|C06753748|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753749|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753750|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753751|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|Number of Pages|OGA Referral|
|---|---|
|6|LBJ Library|
|2|LBJ Library|
|3|LBJ Library|
|1|LBJ Library|
|1|LBJ Library|
|12|LBJ Library|
|2|LBJ Library|
|3|LBJ Library|
|11|LBJ Library|
|10|LBJ Library|
|5| |
|35| |
|5|LBJ Library|
|9|LBJ Library|
|3|LBJ Library|
|2|LBJ Library|
|13| |
|21| |
|4| |
|12| |
|10| |
|10| |
|5|NSA|
|3| |
|3| |
|3| |
|3| |
|2| |
|3| |
---
|4|NSA|
|---|---|
|3| |
|4| |
|5|NSA|
|19| |
|11|NSA|
|14| |
|11| |
|10|NGA, NSA|
|13|NSA|
|13|NSA|
|11| |
|12| |
|14| |
|13| |
|17|NSA|
|14| |
|11| |
|13|NSA|
|16| |
|12| |
|11|NSA|
|8| |
|13|NSA|
|7| |
|4| |
|13| |
|6| |
|4|
|---|
|7|DIA|
|34|
|37|
|40|
|39|
|12|
|13|
|15|NSA|
|11|
|10|
|13|NSA|
|17|NSA|
|15|NSA|
|20|
|4|
|1|
---
|4|4|9|13|NSA|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|10|10|13|9|13|
|13|10|11|11|12|
|8|12|11|12|11|NGA|
|12|10|12|7|11|
|10|11|12|5|5|
|2|24|3|21|22|NSA|
|4|12|12|11|3|3|35|NSA|
|2|10|5| | |
---
# 3 6 5 3 15 Jan-1968-Tet-Metadata-Spreadsheet-for-CIA-Pre-battle-Collection.pdf | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Documents related to the situation in South Vietnam, enemy threats, communist activities in Laos, and military operations",
"When": "January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hue", "Khe Sanh", "Laos", "Phou Pha Thi"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
9 November 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF
9 NOVEMBER 1967
# 1. Congo
Mobutu has called an emergency committee meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for tomorrow to discuss the evacuation of the mercenaries now in Rwanda. He has also asked the Rwandans not to allow any evacuation until the meeting considers the matter.
Mobutu has backed down somewhat in his demands for extradition of the mercenaries, and now says he will allow them to leave if he can get a guarantee that they will not return. Whether the Rwandans will allow the mercenaries to stay in their country until uncertain. OAU the acts, however, remains
# 2. Nigeria
3.3(h)(2)
# 3. West Germany
Chancellor Kiesinger is holding firm to the middle ground on the delicate question of Britain's entry into the European Communities.
His recent public statements have been so vague as to lead the press into contradictory interpretations. Thus, one West German newspaper concludes "Kiesinger supports De Gaulle," while another maintains that the Chancellor is demanding "De Gaulle, give in."
Embassy Bonn views wump tactics as further determination to avoid continue gentle persuasion vis the French.
Kiesinger's mugr evidence of his a crisis and con tactics vis-a-
---
'✓·. T _L___________________~.1
4. Communist China There are a number of signs that Peking is having trouble convincing militant Red Guards to abandon violence and return to school. Tensions between opposing Red Guard organizations remain high in many areas and clashes between rival groups appear to have increased. The level of violence, however, is still lower than that of last summer.
5. Vietnam We have an unconfirmed report that a Soviet ship Hai is carrying military equipment to Hanoi which they have tentatively identified as two PT boats. The Soviet freighter Yasnomorsk has probably been identified as carrying cargo on a dry barge and tugboat. Efforts are underway to conclusively identify the cargo involved in the deck question. If the gunboats are the first known delivery of weapons by sea from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam.
6. Cuba A large number of "old-line" Cuban Communists have been arrested whether renewed campaign against this pre-Castro Communists. If so, it will certainly inflame the grievances between the old guard and the "new" types and probably further damage Havana's relations with Moscow.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
3.5(c)
9th November 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
9 November 1967
# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi Reaffirms Terms for Settlement: Premier Pham Van Dong reaffirmed settlement terms to US delegation visiting Hanoi. He honored the war talks basis for settling the Vietnamese Dong problem on the anniversary of the Vietnam-Soviet talks. The settlement is the genuine political program of the representative Liberation Front - the only North Vietnamese Government declared act that "must act if South Vietnamese people." He further stated on 28 January US talks statement of Hanoi, Foreign Minister Nguyen Trinh. That statement called for all other US to halt the war unconditionally, no bombing against North Vietnam and gave such indication as the bombings halt that is "definitive" conditions for Hanoi acts now (i.e., final or permanent) as Party First Secretary Supreme Soviet Duan in Moscow speech before.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974111
The Premier and also provided of published North a similar statement on British Dong November. Expect negotiations reporter, the escalation that the subjects No-told a variety reporter were other the war on and Vietnamese to names ready further it. He pointed Russell to the forthcoming session Bertrand war crimes tribunal as that event of great more international importance, claiming will throw light on the some monstrous crimes the US. Dong also went to length be Front's stressing representative in the and importance of Liberation new true program that the organization's claim Saigon Vietnamese only to the South people. Quislings termed are Dong present administration who not taken seriously, and asserted that the struggle against the Americans favor compels everyone to take a stand--no either road.
Construction Continuing at Yen Bai Airfield: Photography to continuing of the 29 October at runway and appears Bai Yen construction airfield been north-1s west of Hanoi. Concrete to have taxiway laid on part of the aprons, runway the parallel. Three parking were 13 the aircraft revetments, and dispersal taxiway that also preparations since This June observed when first it progress appeared noted field were 20 under way to surface the runway.
---
# Effects
Correspondent River of US Mining Operations: A has 3.3(h)(2) stationed North Vietnam
told US officials that, as of early August, the people of North Vietnam were distressed by the fact that mines had been dropped into rivers. The mines had not been removed because the North Vietnamese Navy was not familiar with minesweeping methods. The traffic of river craft carrying rice and vegetables was restricted and river navigation appeared to be greatly obstructed, especially on rivers between Hanoi and Haiphong.
# Hanoi Says "Get in the Rice":
On 5 November, Hanoi issued its seasonal exhortation to mobilize labor in the countryside to harvest this month's rice
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974111
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Largely because of thisa long period of drought, it is estimated that year's important 10th month two-thirds of about 4.5 million ton average yearly crop-will be croppercent 10 or 200-300earlythousand had Graintonsanshort. The harvested summer shortfall in estimated 200have thousand ton imports imports year this been running far ahead of 1966
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Hanoi on Negro Servicemen: A 6 November Hanoi English: asserts Vietnam language that broadcast America to US denied are in not free-Negroes troops South only "suffering racial brutality are and their against the broadcast in claims and domin ghettos," the armed forces Negro but and also in "discriminated Vietnam." The few soldiers can get as officer's that rank quotes Senator Edward Brooke saying "the Negro Hanoi not is given cites the authority to, attain command." T~n also that 28 a May to be a report in the US magazine desk Tob claiming Negro colonel was given a from that never existed fore, "simply to keep him being assigned a field command."
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974111
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602367].pdf" | {
"Who": "President",
"What": "Emergency committee meeting in Congo, evacuation of mercenaries, North Vietnam situation, construction at Yen Bai Airfield, Communist China struggles with Red Guards, Nigeria, West Germany and Brexit, Cuba arresting Communist supporters, US mining operations in North Vietnam, Hanoi's seasonal exhortation for rice harvest, reflections on US political attitudes on the war from North Vietnam",
"When": "9 November 1967",
"Where": ["Congo", "Rwanda", "Nigeria", "West Germany", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Yen Bai Airfield", "Communist China", "Cuba", "US"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
The President's Daily Brief
3.5(c)
23
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
---
# DAILY BRIEF
4 DECEMBER
|1. Cyprus|Greece|Turkey|
|---|---|---|
|Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey have accepted the official word of the UN's offer. As of 5:00 PM EST, Thant's good news that Cyprus has accepted. Consultations to end the crisis at the UN are now expected to shift.| | |
|2. South Vietnam|Saigon officials|
|---|---|
|South Vietnam is considering resuming diplomatic relations with Indonesia. The South Vietnamese have suggested opening a consulate general's office in Djakarta. Some South Vietnamese want a full embassy, but others, including Ky and the Foreign Minister, appear willing to get what they want.| |
3. Nigeria
The Nigerian federal government can now buy military equipment in London from Britain. Previously, arms sales were restricted. The British government is willing to sell to pe Nigerians what pey want. The federal representative has sent a military shopping list.
|4. Congo|Rwanda|Katangese rebels|
|---|---|---|
|Most of the Katangese rebels who had fled to Congo have been repatriated. They have been treated decently so far. However, the white mercenaries are still in Rwanda, causing irritation. They are being "processed" by the Organization of African Unity.| | |
---
# Soviet Union
3.3(h)(2)
# Communist China
Units clashes between rival Red from The Guard widely continue scattered west to parts of China. Key railroad closed to through traffic firearms of the Red Guard activities. Many of Guards again was using summer on a as did during however, then. Still the bloody months. Fighting is smaller scale than it.
# Cambodia
Sihanouk has been saying on this the Sino-Cambodian relations back track; he has underlined by accepting military Cambodia gesture things Chinese new Chinese offer of aid. The have since been 1964, supplying with arms but this latest is clearly a peace offering to smooth over after Sihanouk's fall. Earlier this anti-Chinese Peking's outbursts new aid will include a number of planes, ammunition, patrol boats, and an unspecified reconnaissance.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
3.5(c)
4 December 1967
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
4 December 1967
# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Traffic Moves rail Hanoi: in the principal and highway Hanoi area as of 1 December, heading of Most trains toward the Hanoi. Both Doumer and Canal des Râpides bridges were operating at full capacity on Friday night. Train and truck movement on both bridges had been heavy and continual during the preceding week. At the Canal des Râpides rail bridge, an alternate pontoon bridge was still out, but carrying additional truck traffic.
Military truck convoys were reported moving from Haiphong to Hanoi south Route, and traffic was also observed moving on Route 1A. Moderate truck activity was noted. No delays were evident on Highway 3. It is suggested that Hanoi is taking advantage of heavy supplies to replenish the poor flying weather over North Vietnam weeks to consumed during the past six weeks of bombing in the capital.
* * *
---
/TO p ,Ui
CRET~_____________________J.Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974153 3 5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
-'2-
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
---
Peking Protests Ship Incident: The Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry issued a statement Saturday protesting an anchored freighter on 25 November at the US Northair attack Vietnamese port on Chinese Hon Gai. The crew from Peking claimed the attack damaged the ship, wounded eight Chinese members, and seriously injured some.
The Chinese protest rhetoric went further than standard "Vietnamese stand for the anti-US people," and its pledges of support.
---
# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Liberationon More Radio Secretary crowed McNamara: and on 30 November Viet The that Cong's "McNamara has been dismissed," defeated that "all this happened because the Communists have strategies and tactics of the most talented that is "now collaborator aggression of Johnson." The reviews imperialists commentary US says going the to war collapse of 1961 completely." It US was progress "McNamara Vietnam in himself" since and the says strategies it that who devised and tactics and by guided their execution. The commentary concludes asserting that "any talented leaves man ignominious shoulder behind, dares who defeats." the more heavy bitter, (McNamara) load will surely face stronger, and more.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602388].pdf" | {
"Who": "The President, Saigon officials, Nigerian federal government, Organization of African Unity",
"What": "Updates on international relations with Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, South Vietnam, Indonesia, Britain, Congo, Rwanda, Katangese rebels, Soviet Union, Communist China, Cambodia, North Vietnam, Chinese protests, US political attitudes on the Vietnam War",
"When": "4 December 1967",
"Where": ["Cyprus", "Greece", "Turkey", "South Vietnam", "Indonesia", "London", "Congo", "Rwanda", "Soviet Union", "China", "Cambodia", "North Vietnam", "China", "Hanoi", "Haiphong", "US Northair attack Vietnamese port", "Hon Gai"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area
Intelligence Memorandum
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area
February 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C011656-70
---
# WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws: Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
3.5(c)
---
CENTRAL Directorate INTELLIGENCE AGENCY of Intelligence AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1968
# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area
Summary
The deployment of more than 22,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in the Khe Sanh area has been paralleled by a rapid acceleration of enemy logistic point construction and activities to offensive operations. The construction of resupply facilities from two new roads from Laos to the Khe Sanh area will facilitate the enemy's positions and weapons emplacements. These emplacements in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh appear to be well fortified and will be extremely difficult to neutralize, providing the enemy with an improved capability to defend the area and interdict friendly movement.
Information on logistic operations during the past five months indicates a sharp increase in supplies moved into the area. The estimated traffic has been more than adequate to meet the hate.
Note: This memorandum was prepared jointly by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff and the CIA. It should be read in conjunction with the Current Intelligence Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh memo of 2 February 1968.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670
The ammunition, logistic requirements greatly intensified these forces, particularly rates of combat come to 20 tons by 60-90 days. There is no reason to doubt that the daily Communist rear estimated units can service both the 35 and tons at Khe Sanh in the north-central DMZ area under heavy conditions.
---
# New Road Construction
Aerial photography has revealed two new roads near Ban Dong in Laos. These roads converge in the Khe Sanh area. One road is from Vietnam to the north and the other from the south and southwest. Work on both roads has progressed to the Laos-South Vietnam border. This new road network significantly increases the logistic capability of North Vietnamese forces near the DMZ.
This new capability reflects the intensive nature of enemy preparations for major operations in the Khe Sanh area. The North Vietnamese have gained the use of Route 9, which had been blocked by Communists since late January. Large storage bunkers and numerous strikes have been detected in the area.
# Supply Depots
The Vietnamese have established numerous new depots and distribution points to support combat preparations. A series of storage depots or way stations have been established across the border zone, about 10 to 15 miles from the Laos panhandle. Additional storage areas have been detected near the eastern terminus of the southernmost Laos border.
Recent developments preclude estimating the main US capacity at Khe Sanh, but the facilities appear to be extensive.
---
# Fortifications
Fortifications emplacements, northwest heavy construction to and large strongpoints. Khe of those built in foxholes.
There are indications from recent entrenchments, fortifications bunkers, and strongpoints. Khe Sanh of Vietnam.
Large quadrant indications ranging from recent weapons. Some of Sanh groups had been under heavy Communist pressure in May and some in April 1967. One Vietnamese regiment that has remained in these positions since then may have maintained recent usable condition.
More construction includes a large number of points in the southeast positions and large mass of bunkers, entrenchments, south of Khe Route Sanh have been built to extend westward.
Other fortifications and entrenchment activity has also been observed north of Route 99 along the main hills and ridges west and southwest of the US base.
Photography taken in late January shows several large hut groups within and unoccupied foxholes on the main base.
Forces are to encircle prepared activities US to defend the suggest completely areas that are the assembly to now siege Communist, to extend now their positions progressively closer to ours in siege fashion, and to prepare in mounted advance areas from which subsequently assaults can be mounted. If these positions are subsequently connected by communications trenches, airfield to Communists of fire from the battlefield will be able to maneuver their forces under cover from one portion of friendly battlefield. They would also be able to block Communist techniques on similar movement from the main base at to the northwest outlying US. These techniques are similar positions are on the hills siege those to the employed by the Communists in their prolonged siege campaign at Dien Bien Phu.
---
# Location of Mortar and Rocket Sites
Sanh37.are TheThe rangesareThe The37. representativedrawn various shown selected weapons of many sites~shownfiiniFigureg'Qifffuf;_ i" sites such map sites in the Sanh area. the which weapons of to approximates indiCate; ;;Kherepresentative many suchmap sites in the Sanh area.the whichcircles drawn on various types indicate on the map ranges on fired on from base. weapons organic include _These-include of some types weapons can be (82-mm.Ut¥~3__fl._ mortars) The 75-mm. in range are which which are area organic-to approximates is enemy infantry the Units. the units. _f. ;1_
The 120-mm. pack lZO-mm. in range howitzers also mortar ring also range ;Qfqp" o:E of 75—mm. pack howitzers the Thewhich which the mortar the enemy believed mates to have the the the area. of the'The l60—mm.Khe-Sanh. have approxi-' 122—mm. at 160-mm. rockets mortar which ring approxi;fi_;11 ring the the Com—_; munists have already employed 37-mm.Khe 37—mm. which Sanh.have at · Thus 'Thus faryfa‘ a:ntiaircraft detected only positions positions for weapons weapOns been d,etected rear depot 152—mm. northeast-of the observed-Withinil,500ui;-only areas. positions at positions Positions been Positionshave of for from which from for 12.7—mm.-antiaircraftp~~37§ 12.7-mm. they antiaircraft can protect; machine north meters for guns, and 152-mm. northeast however, have been weapons airfield. the observed been airfield.',EmplaCee'éflbeenEmplace-within 1,500 ments artillery weapons of have detected-f at distances outpoststhese beyond maximum emplacements airfield US range of the main reach although the some of weapons outposts these in northwest emplacements airfieldVeiof to the could reachi',7j 1rf___-Jand Special Forces camp at Lang Vei to the west. ments.8. positions to of enemy vulnerable Prcifiles It is evident that of interdiction enemy Khe the from a these known the terrain Khe the from to straight Sanh terrain and known terrain a features n and gui in in-a these base straight and features airfield linei“hm~32+” line emplace- emplacefj7_ _and offf·€;.,yIN-,§_] _ from Khe the each Sanh has runway to fire, attack. nearly air. are . indicated indicated runway enemy that shew show that position of in nearly to and every the eVEIY-CaSefgfl center case of the from enemy vulnerable advantage although There pesitions has the advantage although. the of cover the cover. and positions concealment concealment friendly ground fire. little may be more vulnerable to air attack. .There. is there is doubt which that cannot for every be detected location noted the noted from the there are air. many "WV
# The Logistic Build-up
9. Khe The deployment of deployment was upwardsthan 12,500 and of more more than 22;00§_NVAttroOPSi§eif_: 22,000 in NVA troops#2 in the Sanh area area logistic the of and upwardS'of“12.500 ain rapid·the fiw the ig~~= north—central of acceleration operations acceleration of DMZ enemy enemy area logistic the was accomplished activities. by by agIntelligence Intelligencerapid- E;;j,-:u on cm logistic operations during the during the were an five past past fiVe months 120~calso else-[y :Lndicates into a the sharp sharp increase increase in January in January the volume estimated volume-cfof supplies supplies ;_ _ moved of moved tons t°ns 0f supplies or area. more area. or more During During per day were an moved moved. thr0ughuthe g,g; gestimatedtlZOffgpy,_through the
---
# Laos</h10>
|Laos panhandle|twice from North Vietnam.|
|---|---|
|This volume is more than needed from North Vietnam.| |
Supplies normally needed from North Vietnam are substantial in Laos and South Vietnam. In addition, substantial amounts of ammunition traffic are moved directly to the DMZ 60590 area, providing adequate support for combat at intensified rates.
Traffic through the Laos Panhandle has significantly increased during the last five months compared to the past. The volume of supplies moved into the Laos panhandle from North Vietnam during this period has been estimated to provide stockpiles sufficient for rates of 60-90 days of combat at intensified rates.
Increases in traffic deployment of supplies and troops destined for Khe Sanh have closely paralleled the heavy deployment of forces along the border in Laos.
According to reports, truck traffic in Laos has significantly increased, with trucks moving towards Laos averaging about 17 per day. These trucks could have delivered over 5,000 tons of supplies to Communist-held forces in Laos during this period.
Roadwatch reports are not available for Routes 137/912 from North Vietnam. Aerial reconnaissance over this route reveals a substantial increase in activity in 1967, although there is no way to quantify the tonnage moved. The tonnage moved on Routes 137/912 could have been more than the tonnage moved on Route 15.
Moreover, truck aerial reconnaissance reports show considerable activity on Route 911 and Route 9, which could indicate operations for supplies.
Estimates for losses in transit and due to air losses are also included.
---
# two~~-~ branch
lead Routeto lead to the the thethetwoborder new néw roads Scuth roadsSouththat that now new branch off off from fromiy ..JU;'. Route 99 to border Of of Vietnam in the the direca tion southaofKhe level southoflow observedindicating in in ofKheSanh. Sanh. of Roadwatch Roadwatch teams on_Routes teams consistently and consistently_re+re-96 port a of discharged9,the truck lowfirst9,their increase reconnaissance level cf_truck traffic on Routes 92 may 927and396;ffgt'f;i indicating_thatthatthemost trucks trucksofmay, haveFurthermore, theirincrease_in 9. discharged the loads loads aerial 1967.truckin truck_traffioiin_-vicinity vicinity_oiouterii‘-traffic Route in this afterarea this area °bserV6d by bY.aerial-reconnaissanceqbegan'13?;ufii;began J‘" after the first of'Novemberj1967;'¢_~ Traffic to the DMZ Area' : I I'd ._ 13.13. 1 _believedmovement _ 3.3(h)(2)
K: continuedDMZbelievedmovementlevel units :JtheIthe to highlocatedin be located injustof of amNUnition ammunitionjust northto to .orf"'" _ Communist the south continuedDMZ of units reached reached jtohigh and a be level NoVember-'or Novembernorth
and high high in in December December it is and.January;;estimated e'S”tI‘LIm=1L*~--e<.iJanuary.that that at“ ,i ** 3.3(h)(2) least of leastof area 500 500 tons DMZof DMZofinammunition inammunition_were it-iswe+e aboutshipped aboutshipped'to_thef7to in the area the Nevember, lowerJanuary.De-420 420-tonstons in Des =f ej9V¥ = cember, camber,forandand aboutmonths 250 250.tens_duringr1922=JanuarYa rtons during 1-22 Data for earlier months show show muchmush'lower.volume5, volumes, 1“ -‘_3£t2)3.3(h)(2)j thirds thirds lery 14. of During November 14.ofDuringammunition. the second.Shipments identified identifiedNoVember ,Shipments-of:antiaircraftgammuniéW.¢<1and and_December“nearlYLtwofeff*ffw, tonnage tonnage small antiaircraft of December shipped shippedtherewasammuni-gqif "nearly was twoartil- artile,"] tion tion ranked cannot_be rankedcannot second,--The-small explained,shipments explained,shipmentsidentified_a The thereof ofismortarmortar ammunition ammunitionunidentified be but .The tabulation:large_gJis_aglargejfp1 a volume volume of of unidentified ammunition. shipments shipments are are shoWn_in shown in thethe follOWing'tabulation:, .. .._.
Short T¢hsi-.-»»—fTons
November1967{December}
NOVembEr.'1967,.__._ DecemberF? _
Total ((rounded) rounded) _ 'ffi . :f_ 500 500 _ “420o."I420 -v—-vw-u
|Artillery|(152 and 122 mm.,|320'|""'|“uh—.—|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Artillery|(152 antitank)antitank)mm.,and 122|320;|' .,-;_240 ff"|.,___u...|
|Antiaircraft|12.7 (100,-85,mm.)|57,._-|41|HeiS3 5 tH5 __..—|
|Antiaircraft|37, and 12.7 mm.)|41|83| |
|Mortar|(82 mm.)| |240|-.\|
|Rocket|(140rifle mm.) (122.4a‘_|7|°1 ;;o,'.1”“0| |
|Recoilless mm.)and 82| | | |3|3|
|Explosives, unidentified grenades, mines,|120 =I.j*T '_94:f ff;*f| | | |
-7-
3.5(c)I
---
# Logistic Requirements for Communist Forces
15. Communist forces currently deployed in pe area of Khe Sanh would require:
- 37 tons of supplies per day under sustained heavy combat conditions.
- Actual daily resupply would depend on consumption rates and regimental requirements.
- The 325C regiments and pe 304p NVA artillery are likely to receive support from Laos.
- The forces in pe area of Khe Sanh would probably receive peir supplies from Laos.
16. In addition to pese forces, Vietnamese infantry regiments have been deployed to harass pe Norp Vietnamese Division in pe DMZ.
- The 320p Division is likely to receive reinforcements from pe central area.
- Moving peir logistic requirements from east to west toward Khe Sanh would be relatively less pan pose in pe Khe Sanh area.
- The 320p Division forces probably receive peir supplies from across pe DMZ.
17. Since pe deployment of pese forces in pe Khe Sanh and DMZ areas, Communist forces probably began stockpiling weapons, ammunition, and equipment by mid-November.
- Wip estimated traffic flow of 60 days, pe Communists have a daily resupply capability to maintain peir stockpiles.
- The infantry battalions and pe two AAA battalions are given a higher combat rate pan pe artillery battalions.
*The rates of combat used by MACV as representative of the 1967 campaigns.
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670|
|---|
|Routes|.9221v|
|Muqnwhiré| |
|69504|2-68 CIA|
|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670| |
|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670| |
---
ENEMY POSITIONS AROUND KHE SANH - BASE
Harv.
---
#
Approved
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670fer Release 2019/01/17 C01165670
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670 Approved fer Release 2019/01/17 CO1-16567.0 "CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC[15561281].pdf" | {
"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL Intelligence AGENCY",
"What": "Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area, Deployment of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, Enemy logistic point construction and activities, Resupply facilities construction, Fortifications emplacements, Location of mortar and rocket sites, Logistic Build-up, Truck traffic in Laos, Logistic Requirements for Communist Forces",
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["Khe Sanh Area", "Laos", "South Vietnam", "DMZ area", "Vietnam", "Ban Dong", "Lang Vei"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
The Situation in Vietnam
To:
15 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 006752207
Information as of 1600 15 December 1967
# HIGHLIGHTS
Chinese fighters were conducting low-altitude bombing exercises near the North Vietnamese border on 11 and 12 December.
# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
North Vietnamese artillery units in the DMZ area are experiencing difficulties due to rains. Action in the ground war was relatively light on 14-15 December.
# Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Quang Nam San, a member of the Lower House from Bui Quang Province, was assassinated on 14 December by two unknown persons. The Lower House is upset by the impending trial of 26 struggle-leaders, calling for either a postponement or a complete strike for 18 December. The Electrical Workers' Union is threatening a strike if its demands for increased benefits are not met.
# Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
# Other Communist Military Developments:
Chinese troops have lived in North Vietnam for a number of years. Spanish refugees have reported on the activities of Chinese troops there.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
# Communist Political Developments:
Chinese residents of North Vietnam who have fled to China apparently are causing some concern to Peking (Paras; 3-5).
15 December 1967
---
# SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
# MILITARY
North Vietnamese artillery units in the area of the Demilitarized Zone are experiencing difficulties as a result of heavy winter rains. The rains, however, have not prevented the sporadic firing of 287 rounds on 14 December.
Ground Action
Action in the ground war was light on 14-15 December. The US Americal Division of Da Nang continues to report sporadic enemy resistance south of the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province border area. A notebook captured recently in this region reveals that the North Vietnamese 2nd Division has been ordered to launch an offensive prior to the Christmas truce period. This is unusual in view of the heavy losses suffered by this unit during the past four months. The document itself notes that the division failed to achieve its 1967 autumn campaign objectives.
15 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06_752207
In Binh Dinh Province during pe early morning Vietnamese Popular Force company was overrun by an enemy company. At first light US and Soup Vietnamese reinforcements were moved into pe area and fighting continued proughout pe day. The enemy force wipdrew at dusk. Allied losses were 21 killed and 22 wounded (ten US).
Enemy losses were put at 55 dead (pree US).
# 15 December 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Lower House deputy Bui Quan San from Quang Nam Province was killed on the evening of 14 December by in Saigon is that the killing may have been the result of a squabble within the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) or a Viet Cong terrorist act; There is substance for the former belief. San was involved in a factional dispute and switched allegiance within the party. His "second wife," who apparently saw the murderers, reported that they had familiar faces and spoke the patois of Quang Nam.
2. Some elements in the Lower House have already seized on the killing to flay the government for not providing protection to National Assembly members. Their complaints were cut off by interim Lower House Chairman Nguyen Ba Luong who counseled that judgment should be reserved until the official investigation is completed. Luong also reported that an assassination note was found pinned to San's chest, but that its contents had not been disclosed. Western press reports, however, claim that the note accused San of wife-stealing, torturing civilians, and having a son working for US intelligence. Under the constitution, a special election must be held within three months to fill the vacancy left by San's death.
3. The Lower House during its 13 and 14 December sessions devoted lengthy debate to the for pending trial of 26 struggle movement leaders im- treason. Placed on the agenda because of a petition signed by 70 deputies, the subject evoked considerable protest, and it was eventually decided in that the house should "make known its attitude" opposition to the trial. A decision on the exact form of any action was deferred until the 15 December session.
4. Deputy Nguyen Dai Bang of Hue started off of the discussion by reading a letter from relatives the defendants claiming that the struggle had been for legitimate purposes and that it had, in fact, resulted in the establishment of the present government.
15 December 19.1
---
Characterizing the trial as an act of revenge against genuine nationalists, Bang said that he personally intended to write letters to President Thieu, the chairmen of both houses of the National Assembly, and the president of the Third Military Field Court conveying the views of the defendants' families.
Another deputy, Nguyen Ngoc Nghia of Thua Thien, argued that it was not the 26 defendants who had led the struggle, but rather the monks who issued the orders. He asked rhetorically why the monks themselves were not put on trial--a line also taken by militant Buddhist Thich Thien Hoa, a leading participant in the struggle, in a communiqué issued on 13 December.
Those deputies who favored proceeding with the trial spoke cautiously, and the majority appeared strongly in favor of some sort of leniency, if not cancellation of the trial and release of the defendants. The two alternatives placed before the house for later consideration at its 15 December session were the immediate release of the prisoners or the establishment of a special committee to draft an amnesty law covering political prisoners arrested since 1 November 1963. If the latter alternative is adopted, the Lower House would request that the trial be postponed during the drafting process. The Upper House has already decided to drafting process resolution, and Senator Tran Van Don recently told Vietnam Press that the Senate would definitely send a letter to the President requesting postponement of the trial.
As part of its other business during the 13 and 14 December sessions, the Lower House also decided to establish 14 permanent committees. Deputy Ho Huu Tuong attempted to have a committee on foreigners' affairs established to examine violations of Vietnamese sovereignty by foreigners, but his proposal received the support of only five deputies. The majority felt that the judiciary and interior committees could handle such cases.
In connection with the legislature's challenge of the mobilization decree, the government will send a delegation to answer questions at the morning session of the Lower House on 18 December and the afternoon session of the Upper House. The government representatives will include Defense Minister Vy, Minister for Legislative Liaison Tuong, and Undersecretary for University and Technical Education Cung. The Lower House session probably will be closed, while the Upper House will probably open its session to the public.
15 December 1967
---
# Possible Electrical Workers' Strike
9. The Electrical Workers' Union has threatened a strike to begin on 18 December. The Compagnie des Eaux et d'Electricite, a French-owned public utility, does not meet its demands for severance pay, an extra month's salary, a 15-percent cost of living allowance, and a 1,000-piaster Tet bonus. The unions are retroactively asking for these benefits, with the company turning its operations over to the government and all payments to be made by 31 December. The company intends to give the workers severance pay and Tet bonuses, but any increase in the cost of living allowance must be discussed with the Ministry of Public Works after 31 December.
10. Vo Van Tai, general secretary of the Saigon Council of Unions, stated that the council will provide moral and financial support if a strike occurs. He believes there will not be a strike as the minister of labor has not taken any action to mediate the dispute or address the workers' concerns.
11. Tran Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, has urged Prime Minister Loc to take action on the issue. The strike agenda was placed on the Council meeting for 14 December, affecting not only Saigon but also other cities where affiliated French companies have installations. The union has agreed to stagger power outages so that all areas will not be completely cut off.
15 December 1967
---
# III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
15 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Chinese Activity in Norp Vietnam
Several of pe recent Spanish repatriates from Norp Vietnam have told of pe activities of Chinese Communist engineer and antiaircraft troops in Norp Vietnam. Their reports give a detailed picture of pe Chinese activities.
Some of pe refugees described in detail pe personal appearance and movements on truck and foot, bivouac areas of pe Chinese. In performing pe tasks, pe Chinese were mainly involved in construction and antiaircraft tasks.
15 December 1967
---
# 6. The Spaniards described Chinese troops manning AAA guns and repairing bridges and railroads at Lang Son, Lao Chai, and other areas in northern North Vietnam.
Said that Chinese engineers were building a huge airfield near Yen Bai, and a "strategic" road from Lao Cai through Yen Bai to Son Tay
3.3(h)(2)
# 7. According to the Spaniards' reports, Chinese troops were billeted in tents and caves near Chi Ne, about 35 miles south of Hanoi.
Some of the caves were used for AAA guns. The guns were controlled electrically and moved on tracks to the cave entrances when planes appeared.
3.3(h)(2)
# 8. The refugees probably reflected the claim-feelings of many of their Vietnamese neighbors in feeling that, in effect, the Chinese had "taken over" certain areas.
All the refugees noted, however, that an official North Vietnamese presence was maintained in all regions where numerous Chinese were observed, and none said the Chinese exercised any control over the population or attempted to disseminate Maoist propaganda.
Some of the Spaniards indicated the unhappiness and uneasiness of the Vietnamese because of the many Chinese, but there were no reports of serious friction or any actions by resentment. The Chinese which might arouse popular
15 December 1967
---
# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Chinese Refugees From North Vietnam avoid the war are apparently causing Chinese who have fled North some concern to Peking. According to a Red Guard publication, Chou En-lai told a group of Red Guards on 14 November that among the people causing trouble in Canton were those who have fled from Vietnam. The Chinese premier asserted that air attacks, although actually fled from fear of US, not study Chairman Mao's left because they could they were claiming they thought in North Vietnam.
Chou admitted that there was revisionism in both China and North Vietnam but pointed out that this was not the real reason for the refugee's flight. He minimized the importance of revisionism.
Date: 15 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 0067522073-5(9)
(.
TOP,SECRET M 35¢:>
in North Vietnam, asserting that the major preoccupation there was fighting the US.
Chou's comments suggest that Peking finds the refugees unwelcome. They spread stories detrimental to feedto Sino-Vietnamese relations and are extra mouths
15 December 1967
V-2
s.5(¢
E?/SECRET s.5(¢)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 006752207
To cret
I
.
T ecret
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [15602379].pdf" | {
"Who": "Military Personnel, Political Figures, Red Guard",
"What": "Military and Political Developments in Vietnam, Chinese Activity in North Vietnam, Strike Threat by Electrical Workers' Union",
"When": "15 December 1967",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Saigon", "Binh Dinh Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Quang Tin Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
SNIE
L10
HG
SPECIAL
NATIONAL
nuauozuce
ESHMATE
uumasage-1-as
Intention
Communist
Capubi|§fiE§
and
Laos
Qver
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United States
APPYUYHI FUR RHUSE
um: .3.£.E!§=eL’.§.L.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this document:
- The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
- Vice Adm. Rufin Taylor, the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
- Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- U. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- U. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Director, National Security Agency
Abstaining:
- Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
- Mr. William O. Gregg, for the Acting Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
WARNING:
This material contains information concerning the
national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR
# CONCLUSIONS
A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 56,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. We do not think that the RLG could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.
B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, Le4%chz?>\?|5rovolce US entry into the Laotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communists to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla forces, to strengthen their bargaining position. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be halted as a prerequisite to discussions of an internal settlement that must be based on "the realities of the current situation."
C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter Hanoi's intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further reinforcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi's calculations concerning Laos, in general, we believe that the Communists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction.
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
DISCUSSION
1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provoking a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory.
2. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with military factors operating on the RLG and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side.
3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Jarres Agreements, which established a tripartite government - rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the Communists are developing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. Moreover, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have demanded that the internal settlement must take into account "the realities of the current situation."
5. PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such 'realities' mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and one-half the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvanna no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present government is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying the groundwork to claim a larger role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction.
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrangement, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a "permanent feature" of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the N00 Lao Halt Xat (NL.HX) spokesman in Vientiane.
The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage.
7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political indoctrination programs. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying to consolidate their hold over the rice-rich Se-done Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been attached to the Communist administration for the first time.
8. By the fall of 1967, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962. The Communists finally responded by turning an RLC offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Communists administered a series of defeats to the RLC government setback since the precarious days of which added up to the worst. The psychological impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.
9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted themselves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than heretofore. RLC forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the Se: ccnter spread maps.
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
(tn-.1 .rtuuntl .\fuung l'l|;tl;tnt'. lll.(; prugrttxx hut been ml Ht the ht-<l.mr \';tlle\ tn the wntli, in liurakliattte lrnxtmv, zmtl III other putt-ntiully stgtttftt-;t|tt regtuln.)
10. 'l‘lnn\e tlt"-t-luprm'|tt.~. in tlt-;- |mlit;tr>' ztnrl political fields. seent to form part of :1 pattern related III large part to Cornniuni.\t strategy in South Vii,-tntun. In i71VItKt(‘\I3Z7\7tVl7tt8 that 1963 would he 1| “<leei~.i\'e" plntse in Vietnam, Hanoi rnoved to wage,» wincre:Tst- it; logiatie ezlpuliilitit-s in Laos, Strengthen its forces there, rL“C0ver km 'm,t‘nt$ they have set the stage for demanding ground, and set bnelt and rli-moralizc RLC a new And in their recent state-forces.settlement on more favor-able f£‘fTDS shouid the situation in South Vietnam move into Serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed :1 stronger military position while at the same tirneithey are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into g _m__Qrg active political phase in Laos.
12. PL and FAR troops are probably or battalions, and man for man theabout evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, however, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat.f This however success_ 7as the 7RUwith effectiveV en]oy d *51 since 1962 is due largely to the air support use of friendly guerrilla forces.
13. For several years, Souvztnna and other RLC leaders, includirg the military of NVA troops, RLC forces felt that if it were not for the presence eoultl prohzthly q\ti(‘kl.v tlirsprrw of the Pl. threat. ln our view, this is proliablv tn0 Optirnintic. Although in term}; of present _\treng_th\" on lmtlt aides. flu_\-ul
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
---
# Lao Communist Forces
Outnumber those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions.
While the Royal Lao Government (RLG) Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the enemy it confronts, we also believe that the RLG forces could almost certainly contain them.
In northern Laos, the RLG forces could probably not reduce Pathet Lao forces and territory very rapidly--if at all--without substantial outside logistical and air support.
We estimate that the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Army (PL/NVA) forces in Laos have the military capability to reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do so without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North.
We do not think that RLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.
# Communist Intentions
There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun most of Laos.
They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. As long as the outcome in Vietnam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new political settlement there had been tested.
We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on the RLG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, they will probably make a considerable effort to reduce the number of guerrilla sites and consolidate their claims.
They will also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the south, they will constitute the threat to the Mekong from Thakhel to Champassak Province.
They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs and protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotiations on better terms.
18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi’s calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi's policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them.
19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military campaign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
---
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
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Approved for Release 2019/04/04 C00011542
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Approved for Release 2019/04/04 C00011542 "COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AN[15604018].pdf" | {
"Who": ["Central Intelligence Agency", "Department of State", "Department of Defense", "NSA"],
"What": ["Communist capabilities and intentions in Laos", "Military pressures in Laos", "Political strategies", "Intelligence findings"],
"When": "2019/04/04",
"Where": ["Laos", "South Vietnam", "Geneva", "Vietnam", "Vientiane", "North Vietnam", "Savannakhet Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:
---
---
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
TOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2)
Walt Rostow said is the most promising way if we are establishment of confidence serious. The key to is the with Thieu about this type of dialogue. The President said there are four areas for immediate attention. The first is the expediting of additional troops to Vietnam. The second is the equipping of the South Vietnamese army with the best equipment. Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working on this presently.
The third area was the placement of B52's in Thailand. Secretary Rusk said he would discuss this with Ambassador Unger. The United States wants to place 25 rather than 50 B52's in Thailand.
The fourth area is the need for additional road money. Secretary McNamara said he would try to get this.
The President asked what would United States policy be on the proposal pointed out that the Viet Cong had added of pauses over the holidays. He to the number of days. Secretary Rusk said that the government should announce an offer to meet Hanoi about extending the truce. As before, he does not expect that they will meet with us.
General Wheeler said that the U.S. Troops have rules of engagement which will protect our supplies just north of the DMZ troops. He pointed out that last Tet North Vietnam moved 23,000 tons of.
General Wheeler said we must assume they will do everything possible to take maximum advantage of these pauses.
The President said, "We should announce what we are going to do and then let them have it" if they violate the truce. "We have been too tolerant of these people."
Bob Komer asked about the possibility of a reciprocal military standdown. General Wheeler said we cannot do it.
The President said we make an agreement and stand by it; They make an agreement and break it:
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
The President asked why we are so silent about the Cambodian particularly in light of recent press reports about base camps along the Cambodian border.
Secretary Rusk said that Prince Sihanouk has invited 20 newsmen to visit Cambodia and is also writing the United Nations on this matter good opportunity to invite the United Nations to act on this matter of Cambodia being used as a sanctuary. The Secretary said this will provide for North Vietnamese troops.
The President said he was tired of Sihanouk's actions.
Secretary McNamara said we need to surface more information about Cambodia.
General Westmoreland explained that his men had tipped off the two discussed in the press this morning: United States newsmen about the location of the camp which had been the thing on which "This is the one we can get cooperation from the Saigon press.
The President said we should get Ambassador Goldberg to deliver some speeches on this.
The President asked about recommendations for operations inside Laos.
General Westmoreland said he was anxious to initiate action in base pointed out that the missiles that hit Da Nang came area 607. He said this action would require two Vietnamese battalions through this base area and raid of three to four days.
Ambassador Bunker said he was anxious to see this act taken. "80% of their supplies come through Laos. To give them free hand is Suicidal."
General Wheeler said over the past 12-18 months the enemy has built truck road through this area. He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that within the next 60 to 90 days General Westmoreland should be authorized to initiate action in this area.
The President asked about the increase in the number of planes lost. beginning to agree with Bob McNamara that it does not appear the targets are worth the loss in planes.
# TOP SECRET
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
General Wheeler explained that the North Vietnamese have changed their tactics in barrage pattern. The MIGS have developed firing Sams. He said the United States forces are going to have to vary the pattern of attack. The President emphasized "the clock is ticking opposition in this country." The bombing arouses so much opposition. Get the targets.
In addition, General Wheeler said that we lost 25 aircraft this month compared with 42 in May. Secretary McNamara said it was his opinion that the raids were not worth the losses in aircraft. He pointed out that five aircraft were lost against Phu Yen. Secretary asked about possible increase in the number of sorties being used in close support of ground troops.
General Westmoreland said it was no problem on this since B52's were used for mass bombing and he has preemptive authority over tactical air missions. "The B52's have done a fantastic job." The President asked about the reports of large scale civilian casualties.
Secretary McNamara said we have killed a lot of civilians but not as many as the enemy claims. General Westmoreland said, "We have killed fewer civilians in this war than in any previous war in which America has been involved." The President said there is a need to remove the emphasis on statistics in battle casualties.
Ambassador Bunker pointed out we report not only men killed in action and hospital cases, but casualties of non-authorized nature. In contrast, the North Vietnamese report only the ones who are hospitalized, especially since they make it appear that U.S. troops are suffering more.
The President asked why do we continue to release these statistics, casualties than South Vietnamese troops. General Westmoreland said we report these figures because the pattern was established, and because "we would catch hell from the press if we were to change the system."
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
---
The President said just because we have been doing something wrong for several years doesn't mean we can't correct our error.
Secretary McNamara said he dared not stop reporting these casualties because of the fear of a tremendous press attack.
General Westmoreland says he has the system of reporting under examination by his staff.
Ambassador Bunker said it would be good to bring out a comparison of the Vietnamese casualties which more accurately reflect the situation.
Secretary McNamara said it was a fact that our regular Army losses, but if you include popular and regional losses, are higher than the South Vietnamese.
The American press believes that we are lying on any body counts.
General Westmoreland said that survey details have found that the United States counts of enemy dead are reasonable and the reporting system is "If anything, conservative."
General Westmoreland says he has hard evidence that the enemy KIA is larger than reported, since there is no "I have told the American press that I will investigate any incident in which they believe are counts are bad."
General Westmoreland said he was very skeptical of any proposal to change the casualty reporting method. Since this is not a live issue in Saigon now, we have more to lose than to gain by changing the system.
General Wheeler said that we are at an obvious disadvantage in that we charges that the war is being lost rather than the current accusation that cannot stop reporting our figures. If we were to stop, we would have many there is a stalemate.
General Westmoreland said we cannot help that our casualties are reported since there are reporters with most of the large units in Vietnam being reported and the enemy. It would be a matter of our casualties Saigon are reasonably satisfied that being reported.
I believe the press in we are trying to give an accurate record of casualties.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634TQP SECRET
The President said that the press in this country does not believe this. They believe we are lying to them about these figures.
Ambassador Bunker agreed with the President.
Secretary McNamara said he believed that the press in this country was skeptical of the figures but that he agreed with General Westmoreland that we should not change the method of reporting.
General Westmoreland said the answer to this is to convince the press that the counts are reasonably accurate.
The President suggested that General Westmoreland appoint a five-member committee of four correspondents to investigate the system of body counts.
Secretary McNamara agreed with this recommendation indicating that it would strengthen our credibility with the press and the American public.
The President said no matter what others may believe, this is an issue in this country and we need a committee to investigate this.
General Westmoreland said that he has a program to get reporters on the right track on this by sending teams to count bodies themselves.
General Wheeler said the best evidence of our figures come from the other side in the form of captured documents.
The President then asked plans for departure by Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Komer, and General Westmoreland.
General Westmoreland said he was leaving on Wednesday, Ambassador Bunker said he was leaving on Friday, and Ambassador Komer said he was leaving with Ambassador Bunker.
General Westmoreland said we should encourage more groups, not less, to visit Vietnam and get a first-hand check. He suggested that more preachers, more educators, more Congressmen be invited, and added to that group, groups of women.
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
Ambassador Bunker summarized by saying that we have set our priorities for the United States program in Vietnam. He said that President Thieu and Vice President Ky have almost identical priorities which is encouraging. The President asked if President Thieu planned to come to the United States.
Ambassador Bunker said yes at a later date when he settles down the government a bit.
Secretary Rusk said he favors President Thieu coming to the United States, but only if he brought Ky with him.
General Westmoreland said he had no fear of any coup taking place but that if a situation should arise he thought he could handle it.
General Westmoreland summarized by saying that the quantities of men and materiel were fine. The M16's are coming in at a steady clip. There are few shortages but nothing that cannot be taken care of easily.
Secretary McNamara said that we are going all out to get choppers and Colt Company was working around the clock to get M16s, that the General Westmoreland said there is no problem with the number of fixed-wing aircraft trucks. He said there is a need for more getting are all I can "the men and materiel we are one and a half ton reasonably expect. I would have difficulty absorbing troop much faster.
General Westmoreland said that South Vietnamese troops would be equipped with the M16's to get what he wants as soon as possible.
The President said his main concern possible was that General Westmoreland General Westmoreland said from a practical standpoint he had all he needed at this stage. Secretary McNamara said General Westmoreland would have 106 battalions 102 by December 31 and the others by April.
General Westmoreland said that 525,000 men will be well balanced, hard-hitting force.
The President said he hopes we will lower the boom to get the extra troops which they have promised.
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C0038863461627
General Westmoreland said the main problem is one of leadership, and that we must watch closely to strike balance of quantity and quality among the Vietnam troops. Komer stressed needs in two areas. The first was a need for an infrastructure. He said he needed not more than $10 million for detention centers. The second is the need for civil and military consolidation. Colby, We need more good military people. Komer said he would like Bill, one of Dick Helms' top men, to go to Vietnam to assist in pacification. The President said for him to get the best people available including Colby if Helms could spare him and Colby wanted to go. The President said Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland should figure out a way to get Thieu to establish better rapport with the American press. Secretary Rusk expressed his appreciation on behalf of the official Washington family for the excellent leadership being provided by Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland. George Christian pointed out that the refugee problem was a big one. He mentioned that the American press was beginning to place a deal of emphasis on this problem. Ambassador Komer said we great would try to do better on this. George Christian stressed the need to get a man with known prestige to handle the information duties within Saigon. The President and Secretary Rusk agreed with Christian. General Wheeler said he, Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, and Bob Komer went to see General Eisenhower at Walter Reed yesterday. General Eisenhower expressed his strong support for Our position. The President said he wanted General Wheeler to tell General Goodpaster that we want to make available to General Eisenhower everything the President knows. General Westmoreland asked for approval to take away from AID the responsibility for the war veterans advisory commission and place it under his responsibility. The President approved this action.
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634 "NOVEMBER 21 MEETING WITH [15466684].pdf" | {
"Who": "President, Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland, Ambassador Bunker, General Wheeler, Secretary Rusk",
"What": "Discussion on Vietnam War strategies, troop deployments, bombing campaigns, Cambodian border, casualty reporting, relations with the press",
"When": "November 21, year unspecified",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Thailand", "Laos", "Cambodia", "United States", "Walter Reed"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:
---
CIA-RDP78B04549A000600010060-9.pdf | {
"Who": "CIA",
"What": "Document with reference number CIA-RDP78B04549A000600010060-9",
"When": "Not specified",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
|Top Secret|8 January 1968|
|---|---|
|3.5(c)3.5(c)|2323|
---
# TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
DAILY BRIEF
DAILY BRIEF JANUARY 1968
1. North Vietnam
missile repeatedly by of US Thanh no Hoa defense missile The sites south The two suspected coastal defense struck sites south US Thanh Hoa aircraft were on struck and from repeatedly January There or is pilot however time photography evidence and January There or is no reports evidence however from that of either photography the attacks pilot occupied site was reports either site was occupied at the at the time of the attacks.
2. South Vietnam
at some meeting with President at a meeting of the senior generals with President Thieu on Thieu General it Thang of was the senior resignation accept 5 generals to not to accept on General Revolutionary Popular Forces ary it was decided not as chief Thang's resignation as chief of and the Instead of the Revolutionary and Development cadres and the Regional the reasons reasons and for Popular his discontent Forces. would Instead be the investigated for his discontent would be investigated. Thang has Thang has charged privately charged privately that the lagging because Development the Revolutionary Revolutionary Development of foot-dragging by program is the lagging is corps commanders to political Their because of be power attempts patronage reorganization to the hang on commanders. to to delay on are said to hang corps to political Their power causing causing and Thieu attempts and to delay and provincial patronage are said be of the armed Thieu forces to reorganization administrative of the armed reforms and provincial administrative reforms.
3. NR
# TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212 NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
]
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212 NR
Approve d fo r Release: 20 18/07/26 C059742 12
]
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approve d fo r Release: 20 18/07/26 C059742 12
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Top Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
8 January 1968
---
# TOP SECRET
|Special for Daily Report on North Vietnam|Eyes Only|
|---|---|
|January 1968|January 1968|
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
French Views on Hanoi's Negotiating Posture:
Etiene Manac'h, the French Manac'h, in Paris on Saturday had confirmed in the Paris, "official nature" of Trinh Mai's statement to him on January 3. Manac'h claimed the Bo intended this confirmation to be passed to US authorities. Manac'h went on to say that there were no changes in Hanoi's position; the French government in Paris already knew that Hanoi was ready to enter into talks if bombing were halted unconditionally.
---
# TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
On the living and working conditions of the Vietnamese people continue to come in the North
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Vietnamese people continue to come in the North
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
One report gives details of the peacetime organization crews. The state requirement was broadened in 1965 to respond to the workers' length of duty. Only the state that for all the work anywhere to supply the workers' length of duty. A medical technician who worked in the northwestern part of the country for ten years reports that the young Vietnamese-educated
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
# TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
3.5(c)
medical doctors are not nearly as well trained as the older French-educated ones in his hospital.
He also reports that political considerations in his hospital severely hampered the administration.
# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report.
-3-
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212 THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478062.pdf | {
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Daily briefings on North and South Vietnam in January 1968, reflections on US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "8 January 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Paris", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
Secret 18 November 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF 18 NOVEMBER 1967
|1. Cyprus| |
|---|---|
|Athens Belcher has recalled Grivas (whom Ambassador considers an "un-guided missile") for "consultations," and he is expected to leave the island tomorrow. Even in the face of atrocities, however, reports of Greek Cypriot atrocities in the distribution of arms to which Cypriot police have been "appreciated" since last November.| |
|Johnson's letter to President Makarios, and said he will call off patrols for the next few days.| |
|2. Middle East| |
|Recent developments in the Middle East are somewhat disquieting. Israeli accusations that Husayn is condoning terrorism in occupied Jordan are becoming a crescendo. The Demirel government is still under intense pressure to take firm military action.| |
|The Arabs are now alarmed by Israeli troop "rotations." One difference now seems to be that the Soviets do not seem to be feeding the fears to the extent they did in May. Rather, they may be trying to win us with the possibility of a crisis.| |
---
1IQP
sccRe: r-I~-------------------------~13 5( c)Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
3. Singapore
3.3(h)(2)
4. Greece The junta has twice within a week renewed pressure on the King to make strongman Papadopoulos deputy prime minister. One of these days the King will have to knuckle under.
3.5(c)
-TO p Si cer:tET - Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
|5. Cambodia|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|6. Soviet Union|3.3(h)(2)|
|3.5(c)|3.5(c)|
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
7. Japan
Opposition parties in Japan are already jumping on pe issue of Okinawa, characterizing pe feelings of pe Bonins as a "capitulation" to pe Japanese press. However, some view Sato's initial visit as a step forward.
The opposition will continue to hinge its success on arousing popular feelings about pe Okinawa government, depending on how effectively pe government publicizes pe concessions made to Japan during pe visit.
8. Gibraltar
3.3(h)(2)
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
18 November 1967
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes
18 November 1967
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Bomb Damage to the Hanoi Diplomatic Quarter:
Press sources report military installations of the Soviet attache, the Consulate International Control Commission, and the British were hit during yesterday's air raids on targets in the ICC city. One British sergeant was killed and another wounded. Limited Indian casualties confirmed.
It is not clear whether the damage was caused by fires or by defensive measures.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127 3.5(b)
* * *
3.3(h)(2)
. --2-
TOP SECRET - 3.5(b)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
# Hanoi's Comment on Postponement of Executions in South Vietnam:
Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam yesterday that the Liberation Front's "severe warning" had caused "the US rulers in Saigon to exert great pressure behind the scenes to force the Thieu-Ky clique" to suspend the scheduled execution of "the three patriots."
# Soviet Newsmen Have Trouble Getting In and Out
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127 3.5(c)
* * *
~~-------~Injured: 3.3(h)(2)
Hand describes injuries which he suffered recently. The charge said he hurt the muscles of his right leg while descending to his bomb shelter one night during a bombing raid on Hanoi. This is the man who was recently cited for bravery in remaining at his post in Hanoi. 3.3(h)(2)
# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There was nothing of significance to report today.
-4-
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127:... ~
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602465].pdf" | {
"Who": "President, Athens Belcher, Ambassador, Johnson, President Makarios, Husayn, Demirel government, Soviets, King, Papadopoulos, Opposition parties in Japan, Sato, Bonins, Japanese press",
"What": "Recalling of Grivas, Greek Cypriot atrocities, Israeli accusations, military action pressure, Israeli troop rotations, Soviet influence, Cambodia, Soviet Union, North Vietnam air raids, diplomatic quarter bomb damage, postponement of executions in South Vietnam, Soviet newsmen issues, North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes",
"When": "18 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cyprus", "Middle East", "Singapore", "Greece", "Cambodia", "Soviet Union", "Japan", "Okinawa", "Gibraltar", "Hanoi", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343
"
T3
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# The President's Daily Brief
23 March 1968
s.5(¢
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343
---
# DAILY BRIEF
23 MARCH 1968
1. North Vietnam
New armed units are apparently being organized in North Vietnam and seem to be moving the country southward through the central part of Some 16 newly organized groups have so far been identified, ranging in size up to 600 men. They seem to have been pulled together from various places and include reservists and civilians.
It is still unclear whether the new groups are headed for South Vietnam or whether they are to stay in the country to free regular troops for duty in the South. It is also possible that some new concern in Hanoi about an invasion from the South.
2. Korea
3. Philippines
Marcos has got himself in a first-class mess. Some energetic newsmen are playing up the discovery of a secret training camp on Corregidor apparently training Philippine guerrillas to infiltrate Malaysian Borneo. Congress is demanding a full investigation, and Marcos is said to feel he has no choice but to agree. This won't help his already difficult relations with Congress, to say nothing of Philippine-Malaysian relations.
---
# Eastern Europe
An unusually tight curtain of secrecy surrounds the East leaders from German city of Dresden six countries gather for as top Communist their weekend conclave. Even the fact that to the meeting is taking place is unknown-public.
The meeting was clearly arranged on short notice and on an urgent basis.
Events in Poland recent defiance at the bloc solidarity, are likely to be heart of the discussions.
# Rumania
The government appears to be bracing for some kind of political or economic pressure may be justified, and could explain the efforts it has been making in recent days to strengthen ties with Yugoslavia. Ambassador Bogdan may be behind the sudden call to come home from Washington for consultations.
Rumania is evidently Dresden this the one pact remember not represented in weekend.
---
# Poland
Prudent police action in Warsaw yesterday has, at least for now, cooled student agitation. Tension is still high, however, and Gomulka has not yet succeeded in insulating the public from the student campaign. In fact, Warsaw's industrial workers may be warming up a bit to the student cause.
# Panama
Hope remains that this weekend will pass without serious violence--but it is sure to be eventful. Robles’ opponents remain dead set on pressing impeachment proceedings, and the Assembly is to meet for that exact purpose tomorrow. A guilty verdict could come tomorrow night or on Monday. Most keep cool, trying to ignore the Assembly proceedings. Robles apparently intends the expectation that the Supreme Court will "rectify" the situation after 1 April. Arnulfo Arias, still scrupulous about the constitutional path, has warned his following hotheads to stay in line. Vice President Max Delvalle, an Arias man, is preparing to be sworn but says he will step down if the court rules against him. All this display of reason and moderation could evaporate quickly, however. It could happen during the big demonstrations Arias is trying to pull off tomorrow.
# Sweden
The government clearly intends to press on with its critical line against the US. Government leaders were as abusive as ever during this week's parliamentary debate on foreign policy. Even the opposition--also with its eye on the September elections--seems to have decided to get what political mileage it can from the Vietnam issue.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Top Secret - 3-5
23 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
23 March 1968
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
I. Contacts with Switzerland: the full establishment The North Vietnamese apparently received less than relations which they were seeking from Switzerland. Less formal "contacts" have been set up. The recent talks with the Swiss publicizing behavior have nevertheless again served Hanoi's purpose of its position on the war by putting the Communist case before a wider Western audience.
A communique was issued by the Swiss Government at the end of a four-day visit by Bo, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, on 22 March. Hanoi's desire for an exchange of ambassadors, a move claimed before, was expressed at the time but the Swiss claimed the day the exchange was not yet ripe for such a move. Mai Van Bo was quoted as saying that Swiss "recognition" of North Vietnam would take place in a few days.
The Communiqué available at the end of the visit also notes that Switzerland remains ready to make good offices to help end the war, and that during Hanoi's repeated standard line of being ready to negotiate any time the US unconditionally halts the bombing.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
#eP-s-E-e-RE; -a
s.5(¢)
1
3.3(h)(2)
-2-
IO-B-S-E6-R-ET -\
8-5(¢)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
---
Hanoi's New Sedition Law:
Hanoi has just publicized a new decree on "crimes against the state" which was put into effect last November. A broadcast of the new law on 21 March, and an accompanying Nhan Dan editorial on the same day, claim that the new law is a formal codification and updating of existing regulations. This explanation appears reasonable. The law was passed at a time when the Hanoi regime was instituting a general tightening up of internal security procedures throughout the country. National authorities had conducted special provincial conferences on security problems last fall and had told local officials to increase security patrols and impose closer surveillance measures on The party theoretical journal also had elements. ran special articles on the subject last fall.
The need for new security procedures does not appear to come from any significant increase in dissidence. New procedures were necessitated in part by the evacuation of large segments of the population from urban areas and a breakdown in traditional security procedures.
An unusual admission in the newspaper editorial of 21 March, however, is the reference to security problems in the North Vietnamese Army and to antiwar sentiment among the population at large. Hanoi does not usually publicly admit the existence of such problems. The editorial specifically included "army elements who did not want to transform themselves"--a possible reference to resistance to the draft or to a reluctance to accept combat assignments. The editorial also listed "the prevention of the Northern people's support for the liberation war in the South" as one of the crimes of counterrevolution.
---
# The new law also includes certain "counterrevolutionary crimes" which have a distinct foreign flavor-- as though it were aimed at aliens fostering subversion of North Vietnam from outside its borders. Captured the US pilots, for example, could be accused of some of crimes listed in the new law. Other crimes would seem to apply specifically to the operation of US naval forces off the North Vietnamese coast. Such crimes could have been included in an effort to lay the legal groundwork for Hanoi's handling of captured American prisoners. However, Most of the crimes included in the new law, have been crimes for years and would be crimes against the state in any society. Furthermore, both the law and the editorial stress the fact that the regime will not treat the accused harshly or abusively.
The punishments threatened range from a two-year prison term to capital punishment, but the accused are promised leniency if they can demonstrate that they were "forced, misled, or enticed." The emphasis on leniency and the routine nature of the new law tend to reinforce the belief that the regime's concern about security does not represent extreme anxiety, but is rather the usual and periodic type of warning which Hanoi frequently gives to recalcitrants, malingerers, and grumblers in an effort to keep them in line.
# III. ATTITUDES ON THE WAR.NORTH.VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
There is nothing of significance to report.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
‘
‘Tu, 1:
,
fiP“5¢‘@’<'1 .
‘ .
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617705].pdf | {
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Daily briefings on various countries including North Vietnam, Korea, Philippines, Eastern Europe, Rumania, Poland, Panama, Sweden; Special Daily Report on North Vietnam; Sedition law in North Vietnam",
"When": "23 March 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "Korea", "Philippines", "Dresden", "Poland", "Panama", "Sweden", "Switzerland"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
# OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 February 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The "Second Front" Hypothesis
1. Will the Soviets pose a major challenge to the US at some other point of confrontation in order to assist the Communist cause in Vietnam? When put previously, this question has been answered in the negative. The present stage of the struggle in Vietnam perhaps makes it relevant again.
2. There has not been much doubt, at least since 1964, that the Soviets regard the "national liberation" struggle in Vietnam and the burdens it places on American policy and resources as advantageous to them in the perspective of the broader Soviet-American competition. They have given great and essential material aid to the North Vietnamese. Their propaganda and diplomacy have been tireless in support of Hanoi, increasing wherever possible the political costs the US has had to bear because of its involvement. Clearly, they would welcome an
|GROUP|1|
|---|---|
|Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification| |
---
outcome which constituted a defeat for the US, not only because this would mean a local advance for Communist forces, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because of the setback to US power and influence generally. If some diversionary action of theirs could insure this result, it might appear that they would have every reason to undertake it.
How the Soviet Leaders Might Calculate
3. A Soviet decision to move in this way is more complex than appears at first blush, however. Some sense of this can be obtained by posing the questions which the Soviet leadership would ask itself in making its calculations about a diversionary action.
4. Is the Soviet move necessary to assure Communist success in Vietnam? The actual Soviet estimate of the outlook for the war is not known. If Moscow believes that Communist victory is certain eventually, it has no incentive to do much more than it is already doing. If it believes the war is at a stalemate, it probably considers that a more direct involvement would limit its ability to help the Communist side in eventual negotiations. Meantime, Soviet propaganda can continue to exploit the war against the US in many areas. Probably only if the Soviets believed that
---
diversionary move by them.was necessary to avert collapse of the Communist effort in South Vietnam would they have compelling reason to entertain such a move at all. There is no indication that they estimate the situation in Vietnam in this way.
Is Hanoi's victory in the South vital for the USSR? It is unlikely that the Soviets believe that it is. They were not a party to Hanoi's initial decisions, and everything we know about the North Vietnamese leadership indicates that it would probably not assert that the Soviets had an obligation to act to ensure success. There is evidence that in the early phase of American direct involvement the Soviets counseled negotiations and were rebuffed. They do not assert that any security interest of their own is involved. Finally, the Soviets must know that, even if Hanoi won, its support for Moscow in the latter's contest with Peking for influence in the Communist movement would not be assured. In this regard, in fact, a failure of Hanoi's adventure in South Vietnam might be as auspicious.
Could there be assurance that pressures on the US elsewhere would achieve the desired effect, i.e., cause the US to abandon its objectives in Vietnam?
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200
probably have to give a problematical answer. They would recognize pat a preat to transform pe issue into a general Soviet-American confrontation could harden American will raper pan pe contrary. Some if not all of pose in pis and oper countries who oppose pe American course in Vietnam would take a new view of what was at stake. The resulting political climate might make it easier for pe US Administration to undertake a fuller mobilization of military resources. Furper, when world opinion recognized pat pe Vietnam issue had broadened into a dangerous Soviet-American confrontation, demands would mount sharply pat all parties negotiate at once. Hanoi, too, would pen be heavily pressured to abandon its dilatory tactics and to negotiate wipout pre-conditions, pe precise result US policy has long sought.
Could pe cure turn out to be worse pan pe disease, i.e., might a diversionary crisis bring on direct Soviet-American hostilities, or at least high and uncontrollable risks of pem? Someping would obviously depend on pe locale and intensity of pe challenge posed. But if pe Soviets aimed at a significant diversion of American military resources from Vietnam, or at convincing pe US pat it faced a major setback in some oper area, pen pe challenge would have to be formidable indeed. Ugly
---
Approved
words or gestures would not be enough; Soviet practice has long since depreciated such currency. If Moscow actually did someping big enough to have a serious effect on pe US, pen it could scarcely escape some considerable measure of risk. It is entirely possible pat pe Soviets pink pat pere is no effective diversionary move pey can make, pe risks of which are not out of all proportion to whatever stake pey have in Communist success in Soup Vietnam. Moreover, to make pe attempt and fail would not only be costly to pe USSR itself but damaging to pe Communist cause in Vietnam.
Would pe challenging move by pe USSR involve costs for oper aspects of Soviet policy or in oper areas? The Soviet leaders are aware pat in many countries pey are credited wip having renounced old aggressive habits in favor of peaceful mepods. For some opinion, pe US involvement in war has heightened Soviet repute by contrast. Threatening Soviet moves in areas oper pan Vietnam would revive old memories, even pough some would still find it easy to blame pe US for such a turn in Soviet policy. The tactics of Communist parties in Western countries, now aimed at establishing political alliances wip non-Communist groups, would probably be compromised. The Soviets
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Would even consider the cost to bilateral relations with the US.
Bad as these have been, they have not precluded movement on some matters in which the Soviets have an interest, for example, the NPT.
And Washington's hopes for certain constructive developments in Soviet-American relations have caused it to tolerate Soviet aid to Hanoi. Sharp new Soviet-American tensions would change the setting and the play in many ways which Moscow would probably see as potentially disadvantageous.
Where and How
Questions like those above, which the Soviet leaders would inevitably ask themselves, make it clear that a decision to incite a major crisis elsewhere would be at least a very complicated one. Still, they obviously have such a capability. When they ask themselves where and how specifically they should act, however, the decision would probably seem even tougher.
Berlin. -- This chronic focus of crisis has the advantage of insuring maximum Soviet control; the screw has been turned there with great delicacy in the past. Beyond a certain point, however, no area of possible confrontation carries greater danger. Even well short of maximum risk, moreover, gains which have been
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registered in Western European attitudes toward the USSR, with all that these imply for Soviet hopes of undermining the American position in Europe, would tend to be reversed. While some might blame American policy for causing new tensions in Europe, very few would accept a Soviet power play in Berlin with equanimity. Even the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe, except perhaps East Germany, would be appalled by a new crisis over Berlin.
Korea. The Soviets appear to have given at least tacit approval to North Korea's policy of armed subversion against the ROK. So far this has had no effect on US and ROK policy in Vietnam. And Pyongyang, despite the Pueblo incident, appears to have no stomach for raising the ante to the point where renewed hostilities could result. The Soviets must recognize that the margin for additional pressure in this theater without bringing this result is narrow. Yet, if there is war, they would be committed in a far more overt way to a regime over which they have far less control than was the case in 1950. The risk of direct Soviet-American hostilities would be greater. The US effort in Vietnam would appear much more plausibly as resistance to a general thrust of Communist aggression in Asia. The resultant change in perspectives would set back Soviet policy.
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in a number of Asian states, and especially in Japan, where a burgeoning trade must seem to hold promise for future Soviet influence.
12. The Middle East -- Here the Soviets would presumably have to act through clients whose reliability and controllability is far from assured. The Arabs will hardly be ready for another round with Israel very soon, and the Soviets have already demonstrated that they do not care to take a direct hand in that quarrel. Moreover, the June war had no effect on the US effort in Vietnam, even though insofar as they played a part in the preliminaries to that event, the Soviets may have thought they were storing up diversionary trouble for the US. Other Middle East tensions could become aggravated (e.g., in the Persian Gulf), but it is hard to see how these could be either on a scale sufficient to have a bearing on the US effort in Vietnam or manipulable by the Soviets to that end.
13. The three areas mentioned are obvious examples; no doubt there are others where Soviet mischief-making might contrive to produce crises of some sort. But it is doubtful that such crises would meet what would appear to be essential criteria: to create a disturbance significant enough to have a real effect on
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American policy in Vietnam; to permit close management of risks by the USSR and preclude irresponsible conduct by clients; to avoid important compromises or setbacks for Soviet policy, in the immediate area or generally, which could outweigh whatever the Soviets might gain from possible Communist success in South Vietnam.
Conclusion
14. This analysis, like that made in earlier estimates, finds little to credit in the "second front" hypothesis. It still seems unlikely that the Soviets, in order to further Communist aims in Vietnam, would move against the US elsewhere in some dramatic way. It seems out of character for the present leadership, and incompatible with what it appears to believe it has at stake in Vietnam. But, as indicated, the calculations involved are complicated, and there can be no complete assurance that Soviet judgments would fall out in the manner set down here, either now or at some later stage as the context changes.
15. It is certain, however, that short of the kind of dramatic move considered in this paper, Soviet policy will continue to seize all occasions to harass and complicate the
---
American effort in Vietnam. Where possible, others will be incited to do the same. Anywhere that the American preoccupation with Vietnam offers an opportunity to extend the USSR's influence and reduce that of the US, it will be taken. This much at least seems clearly dictated by the Soviet leaders' present view of their interests.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
Chairman JOHN HUIZENGA
Acting Chairman "THE SECOND FRONT HYPOTHES[15561321].pdf" | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates",
"What": "Second Front Hypothesis, Soviet involvement in Vietnam, potential Soviet diversionary actions, analysis of Soviet decision-making process",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Berlin", "Korea", "Middle East"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637225 Doc Ref ID: A6637224
J/O/STY/R.42-68
3/0/STY /R42-68
SECUR 18 Feb 68 20002
DIST: 18 Feb o/ur68 2000Z
DIST:SIGSUM 42
SEA 0/UT
SEA SIGSUM 42
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SOUTHEAST ASIA
SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6637225
# Doc Ref ID: A6637224
LTOpSECRET FRHE
TOP i~CR~T TRINE
INon - Non Responsive
Respons i ve
DIST: 18Feb682000z
3 /0 / STY /R42-68
18 Feb 0/ur
3 /o / STY /R42-6868 200oz
DIST: O/UT
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
NATIONAL ASIASIGINT SUMMARY SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
SOUTHEAST SIGINT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Asia information in this report of publication on throughout available to summarizes This report NSA at time of developments based entirely 18 February 1968 noteds Southeast
All available to NSA at time is publication entirely on SIGINT on 18 on February except 1968
where otherwise All information specifically indicated in this report is based SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
# CONTENTS
|Situation Summary|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Communist Southeast Asia|1|
|Military| |
|Vietnamese Communist Communications| |
|South Vietnam Communist Communications|2|
|DRV Communications|6|
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|Doc ID|6637225|Doc Ref ID|A6637224|
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|INon - Responsive|TTOP SECRET TRTNETOP|51!:Clll!: I|llINI!:|
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|3/0 / STY /R42-58| | | |
|3 /o / STY /R42-68| | | |
SITUATION SUMMARY
Allied tactical indications of impending moves and reflections of relocations in Vietnam's Allied Military Region (MR) 5 highlighted unusually high volume of activity. Additionally, during 16 and 17 February, messages passed an unusually high volume of activity in this MR.
On 16 February, a possible element of CO SVN was located in the coastal provinces, marking the first time this entity has been observed outside its normal base area in Tay Ninh Province.
In the northwest corner of Quang Tri Province, a probable forward observer was associated with the intensification of obstacles and fortifications in the area of the PAVN 325C Division.
In the eastern DMZ area, communications indicated possible impending action by the PAVN 27th Independent Battalion. Farther south, communications reflected intensified activity in the area of Quang Tri city.
---
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIESIN QUANGNAM PROVINCEIN QUANG NAM PROVINCE
RS 44 SUBHQ, RS 44 SUBDA NANG DA NANG®
QUANG NAM QUANG NAM Hoi ANO
HQ_PAVN 3Ist REGTo HOIAN® QUANG NAM Pu
HQ, PAVN 31st REGT•HQ, RS 44_ HQ FAVN Znd DIV ,-- f DIVQUANSUBNAM PU
HQ, RS 44 SUB HQ, MRs PUC
HQ, MRS PUC,.----/ SEGPiiT C tlfltl
---
# COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
# MILITARY
|Vietnamese Communist Communications|South Vietnam|
|---|---|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications|South Vietnam|
# Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue
On 17 February, attack against and occupying of an element of YD against the probable PAVN 6th Regiment near Hue at An Hoa (16-29N 107-34E) and coordinating with Company 9, Allied forces near Hue at An Hoa (16-29N 107-34E, YD 730232), and the occupying unit specified positions, and coordinating with Company 9, (2/Gll/VCM/Tl327-66, 1715202).
# Military Region 5
Moves, reported their intent to relocate Vietnamese Communist units throughout MR 5 disclosed a variety of difficulties. Concurrently, MR 5 transmitted an unusually large volume of messages to Hq, 518002 on the region. During the period of 16 February through 1659Z on the following day, Hq, MR passed 1800Z an unusually high number of messages to the region. Usually, Dinh 3rd Sapper Regiment; the probable Hq, PAVN Element in Battalion, usually high number of messages to Hq, 2nd Division; Binh Dinh Provincial Hq, 5 Forward Tactical Unit; the probable in Binh Hq, VC 401st or 3rd Battalion, Hq, 68th Artillery Regiment; and the probable Hq, VC 402nd Sapper Battalion with rear services activities and several other units associated with rear services activities.
In Quang Nam Province, Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control was located on Services Group 15 February position (ZC 003256), 12 of 16 February near 15-35N 107-49E. Hq, Rear Services Group 44 moved 24 km south-southwest on 16 February near 15-35N 107-49E between Hq, Rear Services 17 February, when it was located near 24 km southwest 107-57E between east-central (ZC 172776).
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|Doc ID: 6637225|Doc Ref ID: A6637224|
|---|---|
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES| |
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST IN MR 5 ACTIVITIES| |
|HQSAP401stREGZ Quang Ngai| |
|QUANG Ngai VC 38th LFB| |
|HQ66th PAVN NGAIVC 38th LFB REGT DakTo| |
| |KONTUMN|
|LAOS LAOS HQ PAVN 174th REGT| |
|Kontum U/IB3FNT ASSOCHQ PAVN 3rd DIV| |
|SUSPARTY UNIT PAVN 1st DIV SUB| |
|Pleiku U/1B3FNT Assoc| |
|AnKhe HQ, MR FTE Qui Nhon| |
| |CAMBODIA|
|DARLAC U/IB3FNT ASSOC| |
|Ean Me Thuot PUC SUB Ban HQ Trnot Me MR SUB| |
|8EiAET 50Vlbl| |
---
# Doc ID: 6637225 Doc Ref ID: A6637224
QuangNam
Quang was Nam, a subordinate of pe probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit located in pe 13 February position of 15-52N 108-14E (BT 035536), 18km norpwest of its position. Oper elements in pe area reported a variety of difficulties on or near 15 February.
Quang Nam reported pat it was surrounded; Hq, Rear Services Group 44 reported peir intent to move on 13 February position. Oper elements reported a variety of difficulties, on or near 15 February.
Hq, Rear Services Group 44 reported pat it was located on time near 15-41N 107-57E (ZC 173368) and surrounded. The Hq, 2nd Division reported pat it was located on 15-39N 108-02E (AT 825310) on 14 February and under attack.
The Hq, Rear Services Group 44 informed pat PAVN intended to move on 17 February. An unidentified radio terminal had been located in pe vicinity of 107-52E on 16 February, two days earlier it had been located in pe vicinity of 15-54N 107-52E (ZC 062593).
On 17 February, an unidentified radio terminal had been located in pe vicinity of 15-44N 108-10E (AT 972406) and reported pat it was under attack. Hq, MR5 Main Force Unit informed pat it was under attack. Hq, MR5 Forward Tactical Control Element reported pat it was located on 17 February near 14-04N 109-10E during pe period 15-17 February.
This element, also reported by pe 3rd Division, was located near pe central portion of pe province on 15 February, last located near 14-09N 108-54E during pe period 15-17 February.
In Quang Ngai Province, on 14 February, pe suspected Hq, 38p Local Force Battalion, located near 14-57N 108-55E (BS 766521), reported pat it was in a difficult situation. The 401st Sapper Regiment also reported on 17 February pat it was in a difficult situation near 15-07N 108-34E (BS 389722) on 16 February and 18 February.
In Kontum Province, pe suspected Hq, PAVN 174p Regiment was located on 16 February proximate to 14-23N 107-31E (YA739915), 15km soup-soupeast of an unidentified associate of pe PAVN B3 Front on 11 February position. Also on pe same day, located near 14-17N 107-55E (ZA 155800), 15km soupwest of Kontum city, and 44km norp-norpeast of pe unit's 8 February position.
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# Doc ID: 6637225
# Doc Ref ID: A6637224
general area on
A subordinate of pe PAVN 1st Division was located in pat subordinate on 16 February, of its pe PAVN 1st Division was located 14-14N in proximity to Division was to located 14-14N in 107-56E same pat same general (ZA 171758), 40km norpeast (ZA pected artillery unit moved about 8 February location. area 16 norpeast of about 8 27 km February, in proximity sus 171758)', 40 km its 27 February near k soup-soupwest A location.
between suspected (YB 675068), in 1st Division, norpwest on 14-31N border. 9 and 17 February, artillery unit moved when it was located soup-soupwest 107-28E between 9 and 17 February, Cambodia it when Division, was Kontum Province near was pe located Province located near 14-31N border Hq, 107-28E PAVN 66p Regiment (YB 675068), in Cambodia near pe Konttun 17 February near PAVN 11km norpwest of its (YB 1st near 14-44N Hq, 66p 107-38E (YB 856302), 17 km Regiment, 15 February 17 was located of DakTo and on Dak February 17 14-44N 107-38E 856302), position norpwest of To and 11 km norpwest of its 15 February position.
In norp-central Pleiku Province 14-O9N an unidentified associate of pe B3 Front was located norp-central Pleiku near Province, 14-09N an 108-05E (AR 845641), unidentified associate 19km norp-norpwest of 19 February Front pe norp-norpwest of Pleiku B3 was located of Pleiku City and 15km norp of its near City 108-05E (AR 845641), 4 February position. km
ments In 16 February Darlac Province area, of pe B3 Front was located on In pe pe unidentified associate of Darlac Province area, pree units pree units accomplished move - accomplished move- ments. February near of its An unidentified An 12-25N 11 February location, and 38km located associate (ZU 134715), approximately 107-53E pe B3 Front was on 20 km soupwest of Ban Me Thuot. February at 18 k to 12-25N 11 Thuot. February (ZU B3 Front associate was 107-53E 134715), and 38 approximately soup- located nearby on Meits soupwest of Ban Me Thuot 20 soupwest km soupwest Ban Anoper location, Anoper 12-26N Front B3 107 -53E associate (ZU 133730) km was soup- having moved perefrom radio terminal 11 located moved having and Hq, 16 February. from a nearby pere 16 on A radio February point point at 18 12-26N km which to pe norpeast between 107-53E pe is subordinate to norpeast {ZU 133730), between of near Hq, 10 February position and 28 approximately subordinate Thuot pe and -16 near 11 its its 12-29N 12-29N 5 Provincial MR February. MR 5 108-07E Provincial 108-07E (AP 855806), A Unit Control Unit 855806), 28 approximately of Ban Me terminal was located on 17 February Control ksoupeast was which located 32 km soupeast is 32 on km Ban soupeast 17 February to of 10 February position and 28 approximately subordinate Thuot
1718582; 1723087; R515-68 (2/612/VCM/R518-68, R515-68, 1711132; 1716252; R5og-68, 1715502; 1721152; R512-68, 1804102; R517-68, 1802402; R513-68, 1801502; 180410Z; 1722002; R514-68 R517-68, 180240Z; R513-68, 180150Z; R516-68, R516-68, 172308Z; 172200Z; R514-68, 172115Z; R512-68, 1700302; R49g-68, R505-68, R498-68 R506-68, 171858Z; R506-68, R510-68, 1613072; 162050z; 1710192; R503-68, R508-68 RSl0-68, 171113Z; 1610002) 1612152; R490-68, R497-68, 1616352; 171625Z; RSOS-68, R509-68, 171019Z; 1617002; 1707432; 1714212; R503-68, 171550Z; R508-68, 170743Z; R502-68 R502-68, 171421Z; R493-68, 1610452; R486-68, R489-68, 170030Z; R499-68, 162050Z; R498-68, 161700Z; 1611302; R488-68, R497-68, 161635Z; R493-68, 161307Z; R489-68, 161215Z; R490-68, 161130·z; R488-68, 161045Z; R486-68, 161000Z) (8181\ii £0JTJN)
# TOP SECRET TRINE3 /0 / STY /R42-68
# 3/0/STY/R42-68
---
# Military Region 1
|Military Region 1|Military Region 1|
|---|---|
|of the On OnLiberationNews 16 Februarytheradio|(XT 393932) ,the Agency kmsouth oftheCambodia-north-16 February radio station servingthe Main station was locatedMain Office|
|106-16ELiberation ofthe Newsabout Agency2|(M)LNA) was located near 11-42N|
|central 106-16E TayNinhProvince|(XT 393932), aboutborderandapproximately52k east-2 km south of the Cambodia-north- northeastofits central Tay ofNinh 17 January location. approximately Province border and CO SVNwas locatedeast-52 km on 16 Februarynear SIG INThaslocatedthesetwo|
|firsttime 16 February that near M)LNA at 10-42N 106-16E|{XT entitiesin this387915), thethis area of TayNinhProvince|
|(2/c10/vcY/Ro5o-68SPOT REFORT ,1714292)|(2/GlO/VCY/ROS0-68 SPOT REPORT, 171429Z) (08BRiii SOITIN)|
# Military Region 2
Thounusually highvo lumeof122 messages an From 1through 10 February,the alternate through 10 February, messagesto theHq, the alternate Hq,suspectedMyM2 passed
an unusually Provincial high Unit(MTPU) volume of 122limitednumberof whichwere Myto the suspected also
be Tho ingpassedonone Provincial Unit laneofthe (MI'PU), a limited recently isolatedcommunicationsntm1ber of which were also
alternate headquarters thislaneis observedbeing passedframethe grouppassed on being locatedwithinMR located withinlane 2, one messagesDuring observed being MR2.of Duringthe comparabletimeframetherecently the comparable isolated communications time
in January,only22messageswere passed bythe vo lume
alternate headquarters to the suspectedMTPU _
The normal vo ltm1e of messages passedon this lane is 4 to 10 daily.
northernalternateHq, The The Chau Dc alternate Provincenear theCambo dianborder Hq, MR2waslocatedon MR 2 was located on 7 Februaryin10-54N
13 February229064) , 107-02E northern (WT Chau Doc Province andthe suspectedMTPUwas locatedonnear the Cambodian border at 10-54N
107-02E (wr incentral Dinh TuongProvinceat 10-27N 229064),and the suspected Ml'PU was located 106-08Eon 13 (XS 259545) _in February central Dinh Tuong Province at 10-27N 106-0BE {XS 259545).
# Military Region 4
firstApossible elementofCO SVN has time possible this entity has element hasbeen noted been of COSVN noted outside has been located near located CO SVNnearSaigon,thebaseareatheSaigon, innorthwestern Tay first time this TayNinh Province entity Ninh Province since been outside its first observance COSVN's base area in Gia northwestern 16 February,SIGINT located
June Dinh Province at 10-47N in 1963 _ 1963. On On 16 February, SIGINT 106-49E since located (XS 983924) radio its this radio this first approximately observance station in Gia Dinh Province at 10-47N 106-49E (XS 983924), approximately
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# Doc ID: 6637225 Doc Ref ID: A6637224
3 9 September1967 locationwipinpe 9kmeast km eastof Saigonandabut126km CO SVNbasearea
of Saigon and about 126 km soupeast of its
3 September 1967 location wipin pe COSVN base area.
(2/0 /vcY /R12-68 SPOT RERORT, in preparation)
(SFCPFTSAVIN)
2 _ 2. DRV ORV Communications
DMZ Area
ated wip pe PAVN 325C Division was instructed on In pe Khe Sanh area a probable forward observer associ-probable forward immediately 17 February observer associ- in intensify his to ated wip pe his observation and report PAVN 325C Division was instructed on 17 any changes February to Allied obstacles, fortifications
intensify observation and report emplacements and pe direc- immediately any changes
queried specifically fortifications, strip.
tion in
Allied of aircraft landing at pe presence from pe observer
of aircraft obstacles, landing about at pe air
Messages of "enemy air strip. emplacements The observer was
on Hill indi- pe was direc- 595
cated considerable difficulty due to fog from pe area_
(16-39N specifically queried
106-41E, XD 825425) about
pe presence
Messages by pe PAVN 27p impending action in Independent Battalion on
16 February indicate possible Messages by pe PAVN 27p Independent Battalion in pe one eastern DMZ
Companies 16 February 6 and indicate 7 were informed pat pe action possible impending Front would attach pe attach one eastern DMZ.
company of 6 pe battalion to Bach Dang pe
Companies and were informed pat (possible would 320p Divi- Front PAVN 320p one
company
sion) for one of one pe battle battalion The
time and location were unspecified_Bach Dang (possible PAVN Divi-
Anoper message on
sion) for battle. 16 February of 15 February at battalion detach-time disclosed pat were and location unspecified.
ment was but pat Comrade KIEU of
Anoper message ambushed on pe night on 16 February disclosed pat a battalion (un - pe Khe Can detach-
located)
ment was ambushed on pe night (a high ranking at individual 15 February individual (un-pe Khe Can of
Front)
located) was safe _ but pat Comrade KIEU (a high ranking of
Front) was safe.
On
16 and
16 Regiments elements communications tactical activity 803rd
and 17 February,
communication of bop pe PAVN 803rd of bop pe PAVN
and 812p Regiments reflected of bop intensified
near
Quang Tri 107-15E and 392543) _ of 803rd Regiment reported on 107-12E
and 812p Tri city wip reflected intensified bop regiments mentioning Ngo Xa tactical activity near
(16-46N
Quang of 321 an element of pe 5 km norpeast Bang pe city_ city wip YD elements
norpeast of pe regiments mentioning Ngo On Xa
16 February, men element
(16-46N 107-lSE, YD 392543), 5 km of city. Allied On
force
16 February, an and 10 M4l pe of tanks in 803rd Regiment reported it 803rd pe Bo Regiment
reported (16-5ON on Allied
YD 335627) area.
force of 321 men The 10 Ist Battalion, M41 tanks in pe - Bo Bang (16-SON 107-12E,
would attack an
YD 335627) area. an American The 1st company at Battalion, My Khe 803rd Khe
Regiment
(16-46N 107-15E reported it
YD 404555) if pat company remained My
YD 404555) attack 17p, if pe 3rd Battalion reported night pat American company company remained at pe night of not wish
pe 16 February make
16 wish to 107-15E, February.
On pe
On pe 17p, pe 3rd Battalion reported it "did not it "did to make
6 -
FFOPSEERET FRHNE-6- TOP SECRET TRINE
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# Doc ID: 6637225 Doc Ref ID: A6637224
further night attacks fighting thereprt of further night attacks the because the battlefield because battlefield problems could not problems could not be be resolved after resolved after the fighting. The 3rd Battalion later submitted a position with a detailed reconnaissance report an unspecified four fences of various types planted within the position 80 Allied sweep and collected reported blockhouses within the position. Americans The 812th Regiment and operation. In much reported three message of equipment 17 February its 6th Battalion had while resisting an Battalion resisting in which Ngo killed an Xa would strike mentioned, an element of the 812th 17 Xa was continuously to Hai Xuan, Hai Quy and Hai Trieu by sweep operation. In a annihilate of message the 812th Regiment stated it by Ngo of the "enemy" company Regiment February 11 enemy" stated in which it company would strike in the townships of continuously of to annihilate the company (all unlocated--probably near Quang Tri City) Military Region 4 275th On On 15 February, a message passed to AAA associated) the passed to from 66th Battalion, probable 3rd company disclosed that nine vehicles belonging to 275th Regiment (possibly AAA associated) from its subordinate "Regiment 3rd collateral 290" had arrived probable "Regiment company had arrived. disclosed The that 290th Regiment is carried nine Regiment vehicles the 367th Air in is belonging in carried to Defense Command 238B Regiment. Defense Regiment was as was possibly pass-subordinate to indicated that of an AAA On regiment, and its responsibility An subordinate 3rd company are believed the 4483) Battalion in of the Battalion. battalion headquarters located in to be 66th Nghe its Province, while 3rd the battalion company (18-5ON are believed headquarters to be is located located in the vicinity of Nam Thuong (18-SON 105-24E, WF 4483).
MR Northwest Cumulative SIGINT since Hq, PAVN since SIGINT 27 December 1967 suggests that an element of the 316th Division and its two division subordinates are no PAVN longer active 316th Division in North its and of Vietnamese MR deploy two division North- we subordinates st and may currently be are no longer in the active the process of operational in North Vietnamese MR North- ment and west may currently be are in the process operational deploy- ment. possible split of the division headquarters, lack of communications Indications of deployment by the division have included a possible split of the division headquarters, lack of communications.
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|INon - Non Responsive I|Responsive|
|FOP SEEREF FRTNETOP SECRET Tltf fcqp:|3/0 / STY /R42-68|
|betweenthe divisionandPAVNHigh Command|between use the of operational-typeme ssagesbetween division and PAVN High Command since the division since 6February February,|
|and the subordinatesfrom27Decemberto 31 January _|useof operational-type messages between the divisionAlthough Divisionis the and current not confirmed, 27 the current its subordinates status and location ofthePAVN 316th Infantry and from location SIG INT and collateralsuggestbothof December the to PAVN 31 January. 316th InfantryAlthough|
|at Division elementsofthe least is not confirmed,316th areboth are active SIGINT and inLao scollateral suggest|at least elements of the 316th active in Laos.|
|(2/0 /VCM/R92-68 ,16----2)|(2101vcM/R92-6s, 16----z) (2Jf!!c1&1 SAV INV) sxorm,|
|MR MR Viet_Bac sinceAlthough notedincommunicationswithits was activeincom-Althoughthe the Hq,|Hq, possiblePAVN 305th(Airborne) possible PAVN 305th (Airborne)subordinatesBrigade hasnot been possible headquartersthree has not late January,in been noted the communications with its three subordinates|
|communicationwithHq, since late January, MR Viet locatedinthe theVietBacas lateas vicinityof 21-26Nofpossible headquarters 12 February _ was active Twocom-in|the subordinatesHq,in theBac Giangarea of MRViet Bac ,whileof the 106-21E thirdwas believedtobeinBacThaiProvince (XJ with 2452)werethe 2452) were in MRlast lastBae located Bae Giang as late in theofvicinity as MR Viet 12 February. of Bae, explana -No 21-26NwhileTwo|
|tionfor the tionthird the silenceofthe was believed to be internalBrigaderadiogroup isin Bae Thai Province. No explana-|apparent _the apparent. for silence of the internal Brigade radio group is (2/0 /VCM/R94-68 , (2/0 /VCM/R94-68, 1622182) 162218Z) KSECRFTSALDL (SECRET SOE DJ) ~TOP SLEREF FRHNE8 - -8- TOP S~CltET TRI~,E|
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Doc ID: 6637225 Doc Ref ID: A6637224
INon - Re. sponsiveNonResponsive I ~TOPSECRET FRINE
..... TOP i~GR~ TRIW~3/0 / STY /R42-68
3/0/STY/R42-68
9 -
TOP SECREF FRINE-9-
TOP SEClt~T TRlt•E
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|Doc ID: 6637225|Doc Ref ID: A6637224|
|---|---|
|Non - Responsive|Non Responsive|
|TOP SECRET TRINETOP|GR T2IWi3/0 / STY[R42-68|
|TOP SECRET TRINET-10-|10-|
|TOP SECRET TRINET-10-|1OP 51!;CR.1!; I Tlll!~E:| | {
"Who": "National Security Agency (NSA)",
"What": "Vietnamese Communist activities, military movements, tactical indications, communications intercepts",
"When": "18 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Southeast Asia", "Quang Tri Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Kontum Province", "Darlac Province", "Pleiku Province", "Thua Thien-Hue Province", "Military Region 1", "Military Region 2", "Military Region 4", "Military Region 5"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |Doc ID|6636729|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6636728~SECRET S4VHN|
| |2/0/VCM/R65-68|
|FOLLOW-UPNR 25 TO| |
| |SPOT REPORT|
| |AVC ,AVM/OPER~G-HV23452|
| |SPOT' REPORT|
| |5 FEBRUARY 1968|
| |PLUS USM-604 9 GCU2J45Z|
|DIST: 5 DISTzFEBRUARY OSCAR/VICTOR AIFA OSCAR/VICTOR 1968 AUSTF 9 AfPA| |
| |WHITEUSM.,.604 9|
| |WHI'IE HOUSE|
|PLUS GCU l AUS'IF SJ| |
|HC HOUSE| |
| |HCF|
| |FOLLOw-UP NUMBER 25 TO|
|COORDINATEDVIETNAMESECOMMUNISTEQLLO\:~ ... up NUMBER 22 TO| |
|OFFENSIVE EVIDENCEDIN_SQUTH VIETNAM (2523322JAN OFFENSIVE EVIDENCED IN SOUTH VIETNAM (2223J2Z JAN)| |
|unitsRecent SIGINT evidence indicatesadditional deployment ofConunist wrl.tsRecentaround urban centers in South Vietnam from the SIGINT evidence indicates additional deployment northernmost provincetoof Co:mrm.mist around urban centers in South Vietnam from the northernmost province to theDeltao| |
|In Military Region ( R Tri-Thien-Hue 2 FebruaryTTH ) the possiblePAVN 9th Regimentwas located by SIGINTon In Military 167-16E SIGINT Region (YD 425491 ).Februaryin the vicinity asmaintains| |
|cityat 16-42N communications with three unidentified subordiratescurrently| |
|and its tentativeforward elemente| |
|unitsIn MR In MR 5, thereare 5, there of various citiesoare significart concentrations of| |
|subordinatewestern Dak Hq, In the western highlands| |
|in Kontum city areao| |
|probableHq, areao| |
|elements are currentlyRegiment.11near Kontum| |
|probable city Hq, PAVN 95B Regimert currently located nearPleiku unidentifiedsubordinate,95B TheHq, PAVN and other lilth other uidentifiedPAVN B3 Front-asscciated| |
|its| |
|PAVN BJ Front and its tentativeforward elemente| |
|unitsIn MR In the coastalarea , t he coastal the Hq Hq., PAVN 3cd Division,163 gubordinate| |
|citiesof Phu My and Phu My &rd Bong Sonin e::i:: t ~central the Hq~ Bong5 Son MR MR Forward023+,~central Bink: Dinh Tactical Element are')per3ti ng| |
|cities of My and i n Binh Province near the| |
|cities of My and i n Binh Province,, Inthe eastern Quarg Nam-Queng "in Froyincearsas ?| |
|ofCommunist main forceunitsincluding thePAVN 2n:i Hq ,Communist of PAVN 368B Regiment; the probable Y·:· ,: :, Cong (VC) 4(b2-i Sapper Battalion; andmain force U.Ylits inclu d.i ,· ,,,.. the PAVN Divi;c;icn; th e pr obabl e| |
|Hq, Rear Services Group 4L| |
|are accompanied by provincial units & varicus u:-:;id,,rr:.t,if'ied| |
|Hq, Rear Services byGr oup 4h i al ha3unik: been noted vas.inc c u idanti_iedelementso| |
|(1l-llNM 1, SICINT indicates contirved Conmunistinterest ir theBenCatIn MR In1d6-36E' _ XT 750360) andLai 3 nd l.P SIGINT indi~ates Message3 ofKhe (11-L0w ua ::·,y continued Crn1P'!u.rd.st Li t e ::"e !2 t, :in the Ben Cat| |
|of Binh Duong Province Du,ong 1y:16.:36E,ProvinceoXT 150360) sages Lai Mes and of Khe 3 and(11~.Ly\·I:;February Fseed to| |
|Comunist military intelligencecontrol authorityIr .'1 subordinatehavs| |
|targetso| |
|conjunctionEarlier| |
|targetso the with infantry elerentsof thePAv734 .:1 0 ,'l i nt.,t success messages of Comrrm,; rl.,st, had revealed ar·ti.llery pl,~nc,.firs- 11 r ,.---·J '' ' i'i W!determ:l:ted t,) BerCat i| |
|conjunction with infa ntr y elementi5 of the PAV1,J ·t~hLiwicion,~:iv,iiii o n.| |
|InMR 2 an elenent of theAlternate Hq ,MP ? 2 ani #n6 tentativeVC 261st Battalion have moved +0 pocitions `itni-; 15 k:!. t~ e 1~y tenta.tive| |
|locations in western Dinh Tucng Prcvincewith.: l.r, 2 J.S :. b : ·,1}n"y| |
|261st In Battalion MRan element have mo,:9d 'fuong of the t o po~itions AlternAt.s Hq 9 Q3 l''F Pobuay the €lement of the| |
|F~k ::i. :i,,ni'-\:' :KvTho city fromthet:-1~ m el«1ment f romcit'y VC| |
|THIS DOCUMET CONEA In; 21| |
---
Alternate Hq., Hq,MR Battalionwes locitedon l w48 located near 10-27N Febrary near 10-29N and 176,-2LE (XS 538571) and pe tentative 261st In addition (XS 5hl592 ).
Alternate tentative 261stMRBattalion w::>.s pa tentativa !J.:ing 2 was loeat,ed located ooar 10°27Non Febr·L-iary neiar 538571) IoneAn ProvincialUnit kas 1~6=2LE (XS 1¢=29N 106-25E 1(£"16~25Et..r:w repositioned 18 km to pe norpecorpeast from in proximityto peninsand is now located about 1f k soupestof (XS 541592 )o 18 km In addition$to pe nor'p=corpea.stp,:: tentativefrom its 1 February Saiegon in it:sAn lProvincial location and February Unit location has unidentified elements locatedon 2 is now located about 10 km concenbratedinan areanear 10-39N soutbmiest 2 Februery in peproximity of Saigon Cholcn areaope to Tkesenine unidenti unidentifie1 elements (xS 7878 )o unidentifiedelementsare {fied elements located are concentrated on February in pe near14-39Nin an area Cholon areao 1/6-38E106=38EThese (XS 7878)0 1o loo 3/0/STY/R31-68 3/0/STY/R30-68 J/O/STY/RJl0 68 2 02 J/O/STY/R30~68 ~23 ~ SECRE S4VHN | {
"Who": "Coordinated Vietnamese Communist Offensive",
"What": "Follow-up spot report detailing Communist unit deployments in South Vietnam and military activities in different regions",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "White House", "Kontum city area", "Phu My", "Bong Son", "Binh Province", "Ben Cat", "Saigon Cholon area"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # SECURITY
3/0/STY/R14-68
16 January 1968
DIST: SEA SIGSUM 14-68
16 January 1968
DIST: SEA SIGSUM 14-68
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-10-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6636715
# Doc Ref ID: A6636714
FOP SEERET FRHNETOP SECRET TRit~E 3/0/sTx/R14-68 3/0/STY/Rl4-68Jan 68 22042 16 DIST: 16 Jan 0 /uT68 2204Z DIST: O/UT SQUTHEAST NATIONALSECURITY AGENCY NATIONAL ASIASIGINT SUMARYSECURITYAGENCY SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SU:MMAR.Y AsiaThis report inNSA This report summarizes developments noted throughoutSoutheast All Asia informationin availabletoNSAat time available to this reportof publicationon onSIGINT1968.attime of ispublication based entirely16 January 1968entirely16 on onJanuary except where All information otherwise specificallyindicated this report is based SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|situation Summary|1|
# I. CommunistSoutheastAsia
A. Military
1. Vietnamese Communist Communications South Vietnam
2. DRV Communications communications
Non - Responsive THIS DOCUMENTCONTA INS 1/10 PAGE(s) Non Responsive THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS i/10 PAGE(S) ~TOP SECRET TRTNEI OP SECll~I Tllf!qq~
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# Doc ID: 6636715
# Doc Ref ID: A6636714
Communist In Military Region (MR) 5 Toarea
In Military Region interestin pe Dak To in area (MR) 5 in Soup Vietnam, Vietnamese Soup of Vietnam, western Vietnamese Kontum Province continues communist to be reflected in interest in pe communications serving military of Kontum Province intelligence continues to be reflected in elements of pe PAVN 1st Division communications terminals. PAVN 1st have relocated into pe Tomilitary To pe soup, two PAVN B3 Front-associated terminals have relocated in pe norpern Kontum concentration involving oper elements of pe Front in extreme norpern Province. In pe DMZ area SIGINT indicates pe possible Hq, regiments PAVN now Soup 325C Division and pe area near pe Laos / Quang Tri division's SIGINT indicates pree subordinate Province Border now Soup pe possible regiments Hq, PAVN are 325c concentrated in DMZ in pe Khe near Laos Sanh pe Laos / Quang Tri Province Border. In pe ment noted pe in Soup Vietnam approximately 10km norpwest regiment was pe was noted of DMZ passing messages area of Soup Vietnam, way infantry regiment is located of possible pe same general area 320p Division, passing pe Khe messages Sanh originated by a area originated indicating pat pe of Soup by Vietnam suspected infantry way station ECHO regiment is located in pe possible pe same 320p Division, indicating station ECHO was located on pat pe regiment 15 January in is located in pe general area. Station ECHO was located of Khe on Sanh 15 January in soup Vietnam approximately 10 km norpwest of Khe sanh.
Subject: Reference "Rear 3/0/STY/R09-68 Section 3/0/STY/R09-68 Services Cancel part B part this item. item A para 2
Non - Non Responsive
FOP SEEREF FRHNE-1 - TOP SECRET TRIPAJ~3/0 /sTY/R14-68
---
# DEMARCATION
|THAILAND|CONCENTRATIONS OF B3 FRONT ELEMENTS IN WESTERN HIGHLANDS|
|---|---|
|CAMBODIA|DAK SUT|
|CAMBODIA|DAK TO|
|LAOS|KONTUM|
|LAOS|KONTUM|
|CAMBODIA|PLEIKU|
|CAMBODIA|PLEIKU|
---
|Doc ID|6636715|Doc Ref ID|A6636714|
|---|---|---|---|
|FOPSEEREF FRAE|TOP SECRET|TRI~JE3/0 /STY/R14-68|3/0/STY/R14-68|
COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA
CO:MMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. MILITARY
1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - Southsouth Vietnam
Military Region 5
In the western highlands, 714126), January PAVN western Kon tum its 15 January PAVN western the Hq, 32nd Regiment, Province
lst Division, was located on near Division, 107-3OE 1st was located 714126) - on 15 in Kontum Province near 13-40N location 107-30£ (YB 15 km to km 7 km south-southeast of south-southeast the 32nd of its Regiment 14 January latest location
About is Kontum Province; PAVN 15 km clustering of PAVN units which to the northeast of the which now 32nd includes: Regiment's Hq latest PAVN B3 Front location is a clustering of Hq, 1st units Division; now the includes: Military Intelligence Section (MIS) - Hq, PAVN B3 Front, Kontum Province; 1st Division; Hq, 1st the Division; possible Hq the Ist Division Forward Tactical Military Intelligence Section Element; (MIS), subordinate of 66th Regiment; 1st Hq, PAVN the MIS, Division; the possible suspected Hq, 1st Division PAVN Forward 174th Regiment; Tactical Hq, PAVN 66th Regiment; lst Division; suspected Hq, subordinate of the PAVN 174th Regiment; Hq, B3 subordinate a B3 Front; and at least one 1st of the MIS, unidentified subordinate Division; a unit of the Hq, Front; and at least one unidentified unit
Indications of Communist interest on Allied forces Communist Dak To in the interest area were revealed in two order-of-battle information messages Allied tion on of 15 January exchanged between MI subordinate--located on forces in the Dak To were elements of the two revealed in 1st Division. of The MIS, messages 15 January lst exchanged the Division ordered (YB 663215)--to reconfirm between MI elements of the 1st 12 January in Division. the 852188) The Laos near Allied units MIS, 1st 14-39N Division 107-28E ordered a subordinate-~located on the designations 12 January in Laos of near 14-39N 107-28E on Hill 663215)--to (YB 823 (14-37N reconfirm 107-38E, YB designations The subordinate was also on of the Allied units instructed to make Hill 823 (14-37N 107-38E, terrain estimate of the YB 852188). The hill and to assess subordinate was also the instructed results of Communist terrain. to make a shelling of the estimate hill of the hill and to assess the results of Communist shelling of the hill.
The MIS directed another on The 14 January near 14-42N subordinate--located in the Dak To MIS directed another subordinate--located 107-39E YB 872277)--to forward the in the Dak To immediately area immediately on 14 had picked up text the the "original "original near 14-Li-2N of the address" on the envelope text The of American belonging to 107-39E the address" (YB 872277)--to on the envelope forward the subordinate name and address of an subordinate had picked up. The subordinate subsequently answered giving the of the and name the to 8th Infantry address of an According this subordinate 'perating this unit belonging collateral, the to 1st is P a.ttalionsubordina -e of 8th the Infantry. also U.S _ 4th Division and According to is collateral operating in the Dak this unit To area is subordina~e MIS also U.S. The to the notified Division 4th and is that the in Allies Oak the To area. The MIS notified this subordinate that the Allies
TOP SECRET TRI~JE3/0 /STY/R14-68
---
# Doc ID: 6636715
# Doc Ref ID: A6636714
hadwithdrawn had withdrawn identified) Hill from Hill823andthat from 823 Ngo Do Lan (14-37N and that the "82nd Battalion" ZB 4113) (not(not further was at Ngoc Do Lan (14-37N 107-53E, ZB 4113).
terminal the Kontum-Pleiku Province In In the tentatively associated with the Kontum-Pleiku Province on border B3 Front was 92km north-border area, an unidentified located east 14-13N 16 November location and 15 near terminal tentatively 108-12E (AR973730) on associated 973730) with 15 January, the B3 Front about was located km north-near of its 14-13N 108-12E (AR 25 January, km southeast about of Kontum 92 located Another City of Another terminal east its 16 November terminal associated with the southeast 14-14N location associated area on with January near and 16 January near its tenuously 25 km the Front was of Front was tenuously Kontum in the same general 108-11E (AR 961742) the located (AR 961742), in approximately approximately same general 24 km 24 area east-northeast of km on east-northeast 16 of its 14-14N 26 December 26 December 108-11E location following B3 Front location. Both of elements are presently located: Both of these entities are within an area in which the Hq following B3 Front the probable Gia Lai B3 Front Pleiku Province; elements are the possible Hq, B3 Front Forward presently located: an element of the Hq, B3 One; Pleiku probable Province; Gia Lai the Provincial Hq, Provincial possible Unit; Unit; B3 and at Forward Front least three unidentified B3 Front-associated radio entities.
To the east in PAVN 3rd Binh central Binh Dinh Province associated with the with the east in central 3rd Division Dinh was Province, initially located near radio station 14-associated 08n 108-54E (BR 721618) the PAVN Division was initially located near 14-0SN 108-54E (BR 721618).
In the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area, the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area, Quang Nam a communica- Province tions subordinate of the Rear Services subordinate which is suspected of the Rear to be either the services Headquarters reported 1st or south-central Headquarters, 3rd Battalion of Quang Nam of Province, the PAVN which 68th Artillery Regiment either January is suspected to be the that or 1st it 3rd Battalion about to move of the This PAVN subordinate was located 68th Artillery was Regiment, on 12 reported that in it was about to Quang Nam Province move. This Province near 15-43N subordinate located 107-59E (ZC 200400) on 12 January in south-central In the same general moved 15-41N 12 the probable Hq, Quang Nam area near 15-43N PAVN 2nd 107-59E Division Forward Element (ZC 200400). In the same general about 12 km area, the km northward Hq, probable be tween 10 PAVN 2nd and 15 January to Division Forward Element position near moved about 108-08E northward (ZT 922364) between 10 and 15 January to a position near 15-41N 108-0BE (ZT 922364).
was 57E located in station serving the on (ZC 171178) northern located 1967 location The radio northern Quang Tin on northwest The radio in station approximately 42 Do Xa base area approximately Tin km northwest serving Quang the Region Region 15 January near 15 January of its 15-31N 5 Committee 15-31N near (RC-5) 107 - viously indicated that Hq, in 16 November 1967 (ZC 171178), location in MR the had moved to area. the 5 42 Do km Xa base this general of its SIGINT had pre- SIGINT area pre- had durviously December 1967 ing indicated that Hq, MR 5 had moved to this general area during December 1967.
Quang The The Tin probable RC-5 secondary station probable by 15 January secondary RC-5 to a position near 15-32N station had also relocated into had also relocated 108-03E into Quang Tin by 15 January to position near 15-32N 108-03E.
---
|Doc ID|6636715|Doc Ref ID|A6636714|
|---|---|---|---|
|FOP SEERET TRINE|TOP CR T TRzlbli3/0 /STY/R14-68| | |
|(AT 832108) approximately|(AT 832108) approximately 24 km north of its location. These stations possibly of decreased message activity between 18 and 25 December period of location. These message stations activity possibly between relocated 18 and during 25 December. the R142-68 (3/0/sTY/R308-67; 151422; 1518472; R140-68 (3/0/STY/R308-67; 1511372) 1413902; 1514002; 1512452; T128-68 2/G12/VCM/R145-68, R139-68 1611252; R143-68 R137-68 161125Z; 1512552; 1508162; R143-68, 1604302; 160430Z; R142-68, R132-68 1518472; R140-68, T130-68 151400Z; R139-68, 1512552; R137-68, T127-68 151422; R132-68, 141330Z; T130-68, 1512452; T128-68, 1508162; T127-68, 1511372) (01!!0MT 8tllii1)| | |
|Military Region|Military Region 1 COSVNa directed In In 15 January message subordinate in message the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) the Military the Tay Intelligence Bureau (MIB) of COSVN Ninh Province-Cambodia border area comrades improve directed to a subordinate are organization, the in the Tay leadership and thinking Ninh Province-Cambodia of the border area to "improve So they the not organization, demoralized by the enemy" but rather leadership and thinking "valiantly fight and work to avenge for comrades of the comrades so they are not demoralized the "reconsolidating the under- by the who have enemy" been rather ' but been lost MIBCOSVN "valiantly further and fight stressed to work the need avenge the comrades who have lost,' ground shelters and combat trenches" to MIB COSVN further stressed the need for counter "reconsolidating the sweep operation _ the under- According to ground shelters collateral and combat Allied Operation YELLOWSTONE last located trenches" to counter the sweep is currently operation underway According in Tay Ninh Province underway 11 May in to Tay in northern Tay collateral, Ninh Province. This Operation This near subordinate 106-05E (XT 176996).| | |
|(2/G10/VCM/T100-68_|(2/G10/VCM/T100-68, 151600Z) (O~Ci<Li SAOIN)| | |
|Military Region_1Q|Military Region 10 Branch of the Liberation The VC radio station serving The VC radio station News serving Agency-first observed in the probable Quang Duc communications Branch in January 1962 -was of the Liberation News initially located observed Agency--first by SIGINT on in on communications in January the Province at 12-15N 1962--was initially located 107-43E SIGINT by (YU 944544) January 12 This location is near in central Quang Due Province at 12-15N 107-43E (YU 944544). Provincial This Committee is location at near 12-15N the 107-41E 26 December (Yu 938560) position of the Quang Due Provincial This Committee at 12-15N 107-41E (YU 938560).| | |
|( .@Jii! eru~ r JA , JJ; )| | | |
|Military Region_|Military Region 2 Party On 15 January, On 15 January, central central Dinh Tuong Province two a message passed be tween passed betweentwo unidentified VC unidentified VC Party elements in Province warned of an Allied| | |
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# Doc ID: 6636715 Doc Ref ID: A6636714
|operationscheduledto|warned operation that"the scheduled lst Battalion, to take placeon Regiment|
|---|---|
|along with in "the operation TanPhu(10-27) to "alertTan Hoi warnedwith artillery"elementswas scheduled to andMy Phuocthe vicinityofCai 12th Regiment,to conductan2250)| |
|along that artillery" 1st Battalion,elements CaiLay (10-23N was scheduled 106-06E. conduct XS Division,an2250)| |
|operation in the vicinity 106-06E of Lay XS(10-23N2159) _ The recipientof 106-06E, XS| |
|themessage and My Phuoc was Tay (10-27N 106-06E, XS XS2159).[10-26N recipient The 106-10Eof XS| |
|XS XS [10-27N the 2753] , 106-08E. 2753],messa ge wasTan Phu XS 2456 ]andMy Hanh Dong[10-HanhTrung| |
|directed[10 -21N [10-21Nto 106-18E Tan Hoi106-lSE,"alert XS 4243] 4243],[l0-26NMy Hanh 106-10E , My28N 106-lOE,Trung| |
|XS [l0-27 N2757]."106-08E, XS 2456] and My Hanh Dong [10-28N 106-lOE, XS 2757].| |
Collateralreports OperationCORONADOIXis currentlybeing conducted in Dinh Tuong Province.
volume messages14 61messages to Provincial M On Onof 14 JanuaryAlternateHq , January Alternate to4 of Hq,itsMRsubordina22 waswas noted sending a
thesuspected volume ofwere messagesto61 Giangto thetentativeVC and 16 4 of its subordinates.261st Battalion; Twenty-six19to Kien TuongandBenTre ProvincialUnit;
messages were An Giang Provincial passed the tentative VC 261st 16Battalion;to thetentative19 to the suspected An Unitsand Unit; Available to the informationtentative
indicates Kien Tuong that thatsuggestingthat ofthesemessages were and at Ben leastsome Tre Provincial Units. Availableweredatedas earlyinformation
as the8 January, indicates at least some that of portionof the traffic passedearlythese messages dated as by
as the8 Alternate January, suggesting MR2permay havebeen lly passedto thesesubordinatesa portion been backlogmaterial . of the traffic passed Atotalby
Alternate10messages 2 ,2 may Hq, MR per dayha v e norma backlog material total
of to is byAlternateHq , of3 to 10 messagesMR day is normally passed to these subordinates by Alternate Hq, MR 2.
(2/G10/VCJ /R14-68 ,1416002; (2/Gl0/VCJ/Rl4-68, 141600Z; VCM/T104-68 ,1600312) VCM/Tl04- 68, 160031Z) (GiGilii GOIHDI)
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# Doc ID: 6636715 Doc Ref ID: A6636714
2. DRV Communications
Group apparently serving a major headquarters has been observed in SIGINT. Since at least 8 January, a new communications watch at PAVN headquarters has been presently unidentified in SIGINT. Although the status of this group is presently unidentified, the subscribers noted include PAVN High Command; Hq, Military Region (MR) 4 (North Vietnam) Vinh; DMZ Front; Hq, the detached Military Region (MR) element of the DMZ Front; probable Hq, of the DMZ Front; 320th Division; and two unidentified entities associated with the 320th Division.
On 16 January, approximately 28km west-northwest of 16-41N 106-30E (XD 590458), a radio terminal serving Hq, PAVN 325C Division was located. This location marks the first time that this radio terminal, which serves the 325C headquarters and its detached element, has been located anywhere south of the general Dong Hoi city area in North Vietnam.
Since the division headquarters with its detached element has been virtually inactive since 16 January, the location of the detached element is imminent to the consolidation of the division headquarters.
Additionally, the Hq serving PAVN 101D Regiment was located in the vicinity of 16-39N 106-27E (XD 565435) on 16 January. A radio terminal serving Hq, PAVN 101D Regiment XD 565435, was located by SIGINT in the vicinity of Sanh. This was previously located north of 106-27E (XD 565435), northwest of Khe Sanh. With the relocation of the Hq of PAVN 29th Regiment to an area north of Khe Sanh, the SIGINT now indicates that the 101D Regimental subordinates of the Hq, PAVN 325C Division are located in the vicinity of 17-07N 106-23E (XD 471401) on 16-37.
The Hq of PAVN 29th Regiment was located in the vicinity of 106-23E (XD 471401) on 16-37.
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|Doc ID:|6636715|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6636714|
mentsmaintain13 January PAVI PAVl'' (xD 802579) 95C Regiment was located in 95c Regiment on was located At in the present the vicinity of all the vicinity time of 16-48N 16-48N three regi-106-35E 106-35E (XD 802579) on communications 13 January. At with the present possible time, Hq all 325C Division three regi- On 11 29th Regiment and High Command initial ments January SIGINT maintain SIGINT reflected with communications the communications possible Hq, 325C be tween the Division. On 11 January reflected initial Hanoi communications between the 29th Regiment and High Command, Hanoi. Regiment 16-44N approximately 15km north of Preliminary information locates of Khe Sanh, Preliminary information locates the 7th Battalion, 7th Battalion, in the vicinity PAWN PAVN 90th 90th of Regiment, approximately 827505) north 106-42E (XD 15 km on 15 January Khe Sanh, The The in 7th Battalion the vicinity has 16-44N of recently been engaged in the 106-42£ (XD 827505) the on transporting of supplies, may 15 January. 7th Battalion and tactical has recently ing communications have been engaged in indicated that transporting the of battalion may supplies, and be preparing tactical communications for combat. DMZ Front On On 15 January, 15 was January, located in a radio terminal central DMZ identified as identified area in as the vicinity serving Hq, of 16 - 551 DMZ November 106-47E (XD 918712) approximately 30 km the DMZ Front and Front was located in the area km south of central DMZ in vicinity its of November 106-l'.~7E 16-SSF position (XD The apparent its detached of 918712) relocation 30 of south of its position. The apparent relocation the DMZ Front and its possible reunification with element have been indicated in SIGINT its possible reunification early January _ since with its detached The element of above-noted location have been further indicated substantiates that at least in SIGJ..NT since early January. part The DMZ Front above-noted location has effected substantiates further this relocation and that at possible reunification. On 14 January a PATIN artillery-associated element located unidentified possible in the DMZ area reported the positions of On 14 January PAVN artillery-associated an element located in artillery battalion and its subordinate companies the DMZ area reported the positions subordinate the unidentified message of an possible indicated battalion that the units to would move artillery battalion units its and to companies. following positions: A message the indicated 17-02N command post to would move 106-53E company that the 17-02N 106-53E (YD 020875); one company to the following positions: the to battalion command 106-53E post (YD 011867); 17-02N second (YD 020875); to 17-02N 106-53E 106-53E one company (Y 014874); to 17-021'-"J 106-53E and possible third company company (YD 011867); a second to 17-02N to 17-02N 106-53£ (YD (YD 009872) _ post 15 January the 8th Battalion 014-874); and On of January a possible third same company communications revealed that to 17-02N 106-53E the (YD 009872). On 15 poss ible the same communications was located revealed 17-03N at that 106-59E the command YD 145874) a post of APoss ible 14th Company was located possible 8th Battalion was reported at located 17-03N at 106-59E 17-02N 17-02:N (YD 106-59E 145874). (x 134877), possible and 14th an Company was unidentified company located reported company at 17-03N at 107-O0E (YD 145881) _ 106-59E (YD 134877), and an unidentified at 17-03N 107-00E (YD 145881), (2/0 /VCM/Rl1-68 2/c11 /VCM/R83-68, 1521152; R09-68, 1520192; 3 /0 /STY/RL3-68 _ ~ Rll-68; (2/0/VCM/Rll-68, 152115z; 1514172) R09-68, 152019Z; 3/0/STY/Rl3-68 Rll-68; 2/Gll/VCM/R83-68, 151417Z) (JLCICET JJPfH~ ~7 - FFOP SEERET TRINE-7- TOP SEGR~T TRzlbLE
---
|Doc ID: 6636715|Doc Ref ID: A6636714|
|---|---|
|DONG HOI|QUANG BINH|
|QUANG BINH|VINH LINH Special Sector|
|He 320 DIV BRAVO|45 JAN QUANG TRI|
|INF REGT 320 DIV|15 JAN 17°|
|THUA THIEN DANANG|QUANG NAM|
|107|135|
---
Doc ID: 6636715 Doc Ref ID: A6636714
PAVNHigh Command / 320th Division PAVN High Command/320th Division On On 15 Januaryway station ECHOwas 15 January suspect station regiment is of way ECHO was noted passing messages originated indicating regiment has by a suspect infantry regiment of infantry regiment in the vicinity 320th probable Division, that this of station ECHO Division, indicating This that this regiment been located is in the same area as station ECHO since at least 27 December. ECHO. This regiment has been located On the in the same day same area SIGINT located as station ECHO station ECHO in the vicinity of since at least 27 December. On 16-42N the same 106-40E day 106-3OE (XD 608220), to on (xD 789469), SIGINT (XD 78 9469), located a move move station the to ECHO northeast of approximately 30km from the 7 northeast in the vicinity of approximately of 16-42N 16-28N from its its previous location previous location on 7 January in the January in the vicinity of 16-28N vicinity of 106-30E (XD 608220). Also on Also originated by Hq, on 15 January way probable be located in the indicating 15 January way station BRAVO was station BRAVO 320th Division noted was again noted passing of message headquarters that this a that message station headquarters station 106-48E Station BRAVO was this originated BRAVO (xD 923740) on was be last by continues to continues Hq, probable to last located 320th located Division, in in the the DMZ indicating general area at 16-56N of BRAVO. Station BRAVO 15 January. at least Message activity of located in the DMZ area area of station probable on this same type occurred 923740) at this 16-56N same type 106-48E occurred (XD on 7 January; January. January; on 15 at wa S least Message as as late late as activity of 21 December Hq, ECHO at 320th Division located in the general 21 December Hq, probable 16-28N Division 320th 106-30E (XD 608220) in was located the general area of station ECHO at 16-28N 106-30E (XD 608220). (2/G11/VCM/R82-68 (2/Gll/VCM/R82-68, 1509502;R85-68, 1518052;3 /0 /STY /R1O-68) 150950Z; R85-68, 151805Z; 3/0/STY/Rl0-68) 6 , .. ~LYS z "~'~ , Ji . _f:rrqz~ An vicinity of 16-43N High An unidentified PAVN High Command subordinate has relocated unidentified PAVN Command subordinate 15 January from has relocated to the to the vicinity of 16-LJ-3N 16-33N 106-08E (XD 233486) on 106-08E 106-15E 20km in a 15 on (XD 233486) (xD 350330) January on from This previous This subordinate was the previous location of 16-33N the represents location move of approximately noted active nor'thwesterly 106-lSE (XD 350330) on on 7 January January. direction This represents a move of approximately was first 20 km in northwesterly 21 November 1967 subordinate direction, 1967 and remains unidentified. unidentified _first noted active on 21 November 1967 and remains (2/G11 /VCM/R084-68, (2/Gll/VCM/R084-68, 1515112) 151511Z) Lerennm OOUHJ)(SFGPF'i Military Region 4 Military Region 4 from A possible PAVN regiment an possible unidentified battalion was PAVN regiment was to mentioned in mentioned in suspected referred a message passed message to passed be located From "Battalion 66, Province an in Nghe An unidentified E275"("E" 16 January battalion on to subordinate The message suspected to be to located in Nghe An Province ("E11 on 16 January. The PAVN designator PAVN designator message referred to a " :Battalion 66, E27511 is the standard -8 - ~TOP SEEREF FRINE _ TOt' SECRET TRil>Ii
---
Doc ID: 6636715
Non - Responsive
Doc Ref ID: A6636714
Non Responsive
LTOP SEEREF TRTNE
EGRET 'fllIN E3/0/sTY/R14-68
3/0/STY/R14-68
list regiment) . for Neiper SIGINT nor pe all-source Order-of-battle for regiment). Regiment messages unidentified"275 _11 Order-of-battle 275p Regiment11 messages in from pe 27p 11 275. Neiper active SIGINT in nor Norp Vietnam. Independent Battalion pe Vietnam _ all-source However , on 23 September 1967 two list a 275p active Norp However, on in pe DMZ area : in 23 September pe for pe latter"275" was DMZ area 1967 referred to an unidentified referred two to was not noted an from pe 27p Independent A unit A unit Battalion desig- nator nator for pe latter 27Y not noted. (2/G11/vcM/t043-67 _ (2/Gll{'/CM/TOL'i-3-67, 1606272) 160627z) ('il@P OiRRiiT ififlHE) TOP SECRET TKTNEE
---
Doc ID: 6636715..INon - Responsive I Doc Ref ID: A6636714
Non Responsive FOP SEEREF FRAIE
.... TOP ~~CR~T TRIP>I~3/0/STY /R14-68
3/0/STY/Rl4--68
~TOP SECKET TRTNE1OP 5~C1lI!:T -10- 'fltlf~E | {
"Who": "NSA, Southeast Asia SIGINT Division, Military Region COSVN",
"What": "Vietnamese Communist communications, Military activities in Southeast Asia, Communist interest in specific regions",
"When": "16 January 1968",
"Where": [
"South Vietnam",
"Western highlands",
"Kontum Province",
"DMZ area",
"Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area"
],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6636701 Doc Ref ID: A6636700
•• •
•••••
9 •• ••
••••••
•• ••
3/0/STY/ Ro7-68
3/0/STY/R07-68
SECUR DIST: 08JAN 68
os JAN 6821002 0/UT07-68210oz
SEASIGSUM DIST: O/UT
SEA SIGSUM 07-68
ITEDSTATESOFAMERI SOUTHEAST ASIA SigINT SUMMARY THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL Declassifiedand Approvedfor Release byNSA on 10-03-2018 pursuanttoE.0 1 0- 03 - 20 1 8 pu r suan t to E . O. 135261 3526
---
# TOP SECRET
# NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
# SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|Communist Southeast Asia| |
# Responsive Non-Responsive Military
I. Communist Southeast Asia
# Vietnamese Communist Communications
1. South Vietnam
# Vietnamese Communist Communications
2. DRV Communications
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/10 PAGE(s)
---
Doc ID: 6636701 Doc Ref ID: A6636700
SITUATION SUMMARY
Reflections of Allied activity continue to appear in communications serving Vietnamese Communist units in the Quang Nam-Quang Vietnam, South Tin Province border area. The relocation of Military units in the Region of (MR) radio terminal serving the Hq 55 in South Vietnam. The tentative PAVN B3 Front relocation into Laos Province of a radio terminal serving the Hq, B3 Front, Kontum in the Dak To Province, and area highlighted activity indications of continued Communist interest in the western highlands in the Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. Allied and Communist activities messages between MR Hq, exchanged by military intelligence subordinates on 4, 6, and 7 January. In MR 7 January reported a message passed responsive in "enemy" Province on the following day, two sweep operations were scheduled to begin in eastern Dinh Tuong Province. In the DMZ area, an element of the 27th Independent Battalion was ordered to plant mines and conduct small-scale ambushes along Route. It was revealed that large amounts of gasoline have been transshipped from Hong Ha to the movements of a "K200", possibly a transshipment point. In addition, services of communications boats from Hong to Vinh were also noted in rear communications.
---
# Doc ID: 6636701 Doc Ref ID: A6636700
|COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA|COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA|
|---|---|
|MILITARY|Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|
Military Region 5
Hq PAVN pe Quang Nam-Quang Tin area, communications serving pe PAVN forces
Main Force forces. On pe preceding day - it pis engaged in combat and been located in norp-central Quang Tin Province near 15-38N
108-CCE 108-CS'Esamea reanear by (AT S42295); 6 January, Hq, 2nd Division was located in pe division area near 15-37N
in pe division headquarters resame near 15-37N ported pat 108-08E (AT S35288). On to 7 January, pe division headquarters also reported pat it was about to relocate
and pe unspecified time re and combat January, reported combat, on pecified January Division Forward Element on and 8 January to about and location_ pat reported
a The division raid was Through at least division it was to be conducted at be conducted bombardment, 7 January also at
an pe possible Hq, time 2nd and location. Through at has continued least 7 January, to communicate on hourly radio schedules wip subordinates of
pe 2nd Division--pe possible on 6 January, subordinate of pe Rear Services Headquarters 15-54N quarters, 6 Quang Nam, was located in eastern Quang Nam near 108-15E (BT C54587)
On 7 January, pe Hq a 5MFUC Rear-associated was engaged in combat element and requested pe maintenance informed pe Hq, 5 MFUC pat of it close communications engaged in combat
A subordinate of pe subordinate requested Hq and pe MR maintenance 5MFUC was of initially located on close communications.
66 January in January in norpwestern Quang Tin near 15-33N norpwestern Quang Tin near 15-33N 107-58E (zc 175213).
Ngai Provincial To pe soup Unit--located near 15-05N in Quang Ngai Province, 15-05N pe probable Quang pe 108-41E probable (BS 528685) Quang Ngai Provincial Unit--located near 108-41E (BS 528685)
---
# Doc ID: 6636701
# Doc Ref ID: A6636700
on 3C December indicated on 7 January that it was about to relocate.
|Phu Yen Provincial Unit|located near 13-22N 108-S1E (BQ 654758)|
|---|---|
|PAVN 3rd Division|located in its 3 January position|
|Unidentified subordinate|located near 12-53N 109-04E (BQ 898247)|
|Phu Yen Province|located near 12-53N 109-04E (BQ 898247)|
|Laos in the vicinity of Kontum|located at 14-41N 107-21E (YB 537241)|
|PAVN Front|located approximately 21 km north-northwest of 14-41N 107-21E (YB 537241)|
|PAVN 174th Regiment|moved to a terminal near Kontum Province-Cambodia border at 14-30N 107-32E (YB 728041)|
|PAVN 174th Regiment|moved about 9 km southwest of its 14 December location in Kontum|
|Dak To Military Intelligence Section (MIS)|noted continued Communist activity in the area|
|PAVN 1st Division|reported burning and destroying forest areas on 4 and 5 January|
|PAVN 1st Division|reported to the collateral unit, Air Defense "K13," on 13 January|
|Subordinate unit|reported an attack on an undetermined location on 3 January|
|Subordinate unit|set up a recoilless rifle emplacement at 4350 meters southeast of Hill ONGUYNH|
|Subordinate unit|conducted an attack on an undetermined location at Hill 0815 (G) on 3 January|
---
# Military Region 1
|Doc ID|6636701|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6636700|
haditsIndetachmentshad"metwith difficulties" subordinate In a messageof message of 5 5 Januarythe January the subordinate reportedthat subordinate reported that oneone ofits of sufferedcasualties"met SIGINT difficulties"detachments had with and"possibly and "possibly had suffered inwestern Kontumnear located near14-35Nthis on 31December casualties." SIGINT located this107-44E subordinate(YB957149) on 31 December in western Kontum 14-35N 107-44E (YB 957149). subordinate In In a messageof message to ascertainwhich Allied of 7January ,theMIS instructedanother January, AlliedunitsatNgok anotherthe MIS instructed RinhRua (14-37N subordinate107-42E to ascertain YB8318 ) whichand PleiCan units (14-47NNgokat 107-3SERinh Rua YB (14-37N8525) equated 107-42E,to 7JanuarytheAllied "designatorsYB the 9318) and Plei Can (14-47N Thissubordinate107-35E, iocated locatedonAllied activity107-43E Oak YB8525) on equated to near 14-41N Allier! "designators." (YB 905223) = This subordinate,has beenreportingon Allied located on January near 14-41N inthe 107-43EDakToarea (YB 905223), Thehas MIS been was reporting 14-34Non 107-2CE activity 7Januaryinthe thein Laos-Kontum-Cambodiaborderthe To area. The areawas near14--34N onlocated 2/Gl2/VCM./R074-68,(YB 691107) _04091 92 ; 08080Cz ;RC72-68 = January in Laos-Kontum-Cambodia border 0715032 ;2/612 / VCM/ R074-68 _ (YB T046-68 RO73-68 (2/G12 /VCM/TC57-68107-29E area (2/G12/VCM/T057-68, near 0605152 ; 0808552 ; R071-68 060515Z; T046-68,691107). 040919Z; T071-68, C801452 ; 071503Z; RC6 9-68 Change1 , RC66-68 0800152 ; 0711102 ; 080855Z; R073-68, 0721352 ;Ro7o-68 0808002; R072-68, 0716302 ;RO68-68 0801452; 0706052 ;0714302 ; 0623352 ; R069-68, Change 1, 080015Z; R071-68,RC65-68 072135Z; 0706452 ;R070-68, R064-68 0716302; R068-68, RC62-68 0714302; R066-68, R041-68 , 0711102; 0411402 )R065-68, 070645z; R064-68, 0706052; R062-68, 0623352; R041-68, 0411402) (iiiOii\iHi StIUDI)
Light InfantryDivision (LID)indicates Preliminaryinformation indicatesthattheHq ,VC 9th cast facility and Light Infantry Division Thedivision (LID) headquarterswas is againactive noted is again active on its in briefbroad - broad- activity of extendedradio aperiodon cast facility.1 extendedJanuary (using a new 24October 1967 ,The 7 division headquarters signalplan) , new was noted in afterbrief activity on 1 and 7 January silence (using since signal plan), after 24 October 1967. Thelackofradiocommunications on onthisgroup may be attributedto theradio The lack of activationof communicationsnew communications groupthis group may be onattributed 20 October _the October. an Thisnew group possiblyrepresents communicato activation of a new communications group tions between PAVN and on 20 This unidentified new group control possibly authorityandtherepresents communica- possibleHq , tions between an unidentified 7th Division; controlthe tentative authority 7th Divisionand theprobable Forward 272ndRegiment_ unidentified possible Element Hq, PAVN 7th unidentified Division; the subordinate;7th tentative a ndDivisionthe Iq , ;_;'orwardVC stationsinthis northeastern Tayofthisnew groupareofElement, and The stations subordinate; and the probable currentlylocatedin communicationsgroup employedpart are the Hq, currently VC 272nd located Regiment.in northeastern The stationsTay Ninh of NinhProvince this Province.new group One Oneofof the the signal stations planassociatedwith the in this communications Hq , group Sth LID watchcom -employed part of munications priorto 24October.the munications the signal plan prior associated to 24 October.with Hq, 9th LID watch com-
# TOP SECRET TRTNE -4- TOP 5l!Cll1!: I Tllffrql!
---
# Doc ID: 6636701 Doc Ref ID: A6636700
|northeasternTay|2-3 January.|
|---|---|
|According to Ninh was attacked U.S. Communist forces on base area located in| |
|the MIS other developments, In other MR1 developments, from a subordinate in a message sent on Hoa-Long Khanh|7 January to|
|Province border area the MIS, MR 1, from subordinate reported that in "81 the delivered three tons Bien|Hoa-Long Khanh|
|Province border Dong area, reported According to collateral "81 delivered the re is three tons|Dong Nai|
|of goods to Dong Nai Regiment Nai." operating in the to According Bien Hoa - Binh Duong Province collateral, the re is a| |
|cover border designator for the|cover designator area. Collateral for Bien 274th Province|
|the also indicates Regiment and which that that is there is is currently a currently Nai" is| |
|operating Rear eastern rating in eastern Bien Hoa in|Hoa Province and there The ais|
|Group 81 Rear Services element subordinate to COSVN|what type of goods COSVN. The|
|subordinate stated that it wanted to go|we re involved and (not further stated that|
|were involved identified) to pick up the to and that it wanted go supplies the "3rd Battalion"|(not further identified) to pick up the supplies.|
|In the same message, the road because|the subordinate reported that it|
|had been unable|"the enemy on heavy artillery fired continuously was and because later|
|Highway "3rd Battalion|had artillery been 2 unable 2 fire fired fire. The|
|base subordinate bombed but|the cross subordinate reported that it|
|no "3rd casualties Battalion's base area" bombed but that there were|no casualties.|
|In Allied convoy 6 January, a message on convoy 6 at Cong Ba Mieng (10-57N on January, the subordinate reported|that an Allied|
|YT that 2911 was burned, an "fired on at by Cung our troops and two gasoline tank Ba Mieng (10-57N 107-06E,|was "fired on and our troops and two gasoline tank|
|seized were|burned," and this that subordinate on "eight compatriots" had been|
|trucks were|seized. YT 2911) located by that "eight compatriots" was "fired on and our troops and two gasoline tank|
|On 4 January the MIS|MR 1 instructed second subordinate|
|to investigate On 4 January the the|subordinate of "our raid" at an undetermined results MR MIS, 1, instructed|
|enemy situation on Route 15 and ordered Nuoc Trong Bridge|location. The results was "our|
|of raid to report daily on (not at an undetermined the|location. The subordinate was ordered at the to report daily on the|
|located)|enemy situation This subordinate was located Nuoc 5 Trong on Route 15 and at the on January near (not Bridge|
|T47-68, 0710252 ;(YS 071S002 ;|1C-42N (2/G10/VCM/ R1O-68|
|located).106-59E (YS 185836 ) in eastern|10-42N 106-59E This subordinate 185836) 2/G10/VCM/T54-68 Hoa|
|in eastern located Bien Hoa Province Bien on 5 January Province, near|0808202 ; (2/GlO/VCM/Rl0-68, T43-68 , 071900Z;0615302 ; 2/GlO/VCM/T54-68,|
|080820Z; T47-68, 071025Z; T43-68, 061530Z; 3/0/STY/R06-68) (BH8MT B!J7IH)| |
# FOP SEERET FRTNE-S- TOP SECRET TRI?~E
---
# Military Region 10
On 6 January, the probable subordinate C95 Reconnaissance Company, MIS 5th LID and one MIS, resumed reporting for the first time since 12 December. This subordinate was located near 11-3CN 106-34E (XT 700874), approximately 40km west of Hon Quan Special Forces Camp and about 40km southwest of Phuoc Long-Binh Long border.
The Hq, Phuoc Long-Binh Long border CS5 Reconnaissance Company was located near 11-56N 106-43E (XT 879204) on 9 December.
During late November and early December, elements of Bu Dop-Bo Duc VC 9th LID were attacked in the Phuoc Long area by Allied activity, as reported by MI elements during early December.
In the past, the resumption of reporting by MI elements and the reappearance of Vietnamese Communist elements involved in communications after extended periods of silence had indicated impending tactical activity (2/G1C/VC/M/RC08-68, 071332Z).
On 8 January, entities in central Dinh Tuong Province were forewarned of two message passes between two unidentified entities, with the first "enemy sweep" operation scheduled to take place on 8 January.
The first subsector operation force in Nhi Qui (10-24N 106-06E) was reported to conduct a sweep, followed by the second force in Phu Qui "subsector" of Chanh Gi Phu (10-20N 106-06E) XS 2949, and the Tan Hiep vicinity (10-27N 106-17E XS 4755) of the 7th ARVN Division.
---
|Doc ID: 6636701|Doc Ref ID: A6636700|
|---|---|
|YOP SEEREF TRTNETOP SECRET TRI!~~3/0/STY/RO7-68|3/0/STY/R07-68|
|Operation CORONADO IX is currently being conducted in Dinh Tuong Province.| |
|My Tho radio station tentatively identified as serving the Provincial Unit position in western Dinh Tuong near station tentatively relocated 16km southwestward, between the 1C-24N Provincial Hy 3 and Tho Unit position relocated in western 16 km southwestward, near Dinh Tuong between (2/G10/vcM/RO0?-68, 10-24N 106-ClE (xs 0715002; T052-68, 117517).| |
|(2/Gl0/VCM/R009-68, 071500Z; T052-68, 07193oz) (0IHHU!T 0AVIH)| |
|DRV Communications| |
|DMZ Area| |
|PAVN 812th Regiment tactical communications supplies continue and reflect the movement of considerable amounts to the Cam Lo River. However, references to the specific area of responsibility of the 812th Regiment are yet undetermined.| |
|In addition, the 6th Company, 27th Independent Battalion was ordered to plant mines and carry out small-scale ambushes on 8 utilizing B40 rockets along Route to Cam Lo and Route Lo (16-4CN from Dong Ha YD 1406C0) (16-49N 107-08E, YD 245605) probably to Cam 9, (16-49N 107-00E, YD 140600). (OBE!lM!IT 0JY±Dl~| |
---
Doc ID: 6636701INon - Responsive IDoc Ref ID: A6636700
Non Responsive
| | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| TOP SECRET FRFNE | TOP | SECRET |
| | | |
| TOP | SECRET | TRJNg |
---
Doc ID: 6636701Responsive IINon - Non Responsive.....C Doc Ref ID: A6636700TOP i~GR~T TRI~JE2oLCu Lpc7
9 -
~TOP SECRET FRINETOP S~Cft:ET TRI~iE
---
|Doc ID:|6636701|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6636700|
|FOP SECRET FRONTOP|SECRET|TRF rqE|
|---|---|---|
|3/ciSTY/ Rc7-63| | |
|3/ C/ STY / l(C7-63| | |
JCRREC-iC 70 %/0/STY{RC5-68 5 January, 1.4.1.,Jar.uary, l..A.l., Eilite yZegion_li .35Jecezcer19670to"30Septemceroffirstparagraph fronl • ' 1 ,....: J'.. cate in fo_rtksentence1557 _ "l S6 7. of first paragraph from CCRRZCZIC}10 3/0/3TY/ RCb-58 .:.:c? ?Z C:.: c; ,o 3/ 0/STY/ R.CC. -68, 6 Jenuary1.4.2. 6 January I.A.2., --... ' '! ~ t 3C+1k/22Cck_Divisicns refieczej .. ... .DRAVOardEcRoand 7;fla-ge Zatlors I! ::L.:.:... ,geifirst :L :::-st sentelce Se r, te uc e to to read"Contnunicationsbetween .::-ea d 2A VN High Conimanabet·deen,tCom:nunications were .• ctj :~ ta tlcLs BRAVO ard ECHO and PAVN High Cornm and \ie re :cef J.ec ;:eJ 127 Lecemle r ~'.- cirge Ch..:,.n ge1* "Jate el ateLo"24lesisefiterce second on on 1 -::-i. st Deceibar I isent enc e secondparagraphfrozparagraph from f •"> ··-:(:.:.. Decc:iu.bt to :: 24- DE:ceEco2 r. 10 - -1 0- TOP SECRET FRINETOt' SECRET TU.IbJE | {
"Who": "National Security Agency (NSA)",
"What": "Vietnamese Communist activity in Southeast Asia, military operations and communications",
"When": "08 January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area", "Laos", "Kontum Province", "Dak To Province", "Bien Hoa Province", "Long Khanh Provinces", "Phu Yen Province", "Quang Ngai Province", "Hon Quan Special Forces Camp", "Phuoc Long-Binh Long border", "Nhi Qui", "Phu Qui", "Chanh Gi Phu", "Tan Hiep", "Dinh Tuong Province", "My Tho", "Dong Nai", "Cam Lo River", "Cam Lo", "Dong Ha"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6636717 Doc Ref ID: A6636716
|3/0/STY/R1 9-68|3/0/STY/Ftl 9 -68|
|---|---|
|22 JANUARY 1968 20552|22 JANUARY 1968 2055Z|
SECUR DIST: 0/UT SEA DIST:SIGSUM 36-67O/UT SEA SIGSUM 36-67
UNITED STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-10-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6636717
# Doc Ref ID: A6636716
TOP SECRET TRTNETOP [5EClln' 'f1tII'4E
3/0/STY/RLS-68
22Jan 68
3/0/STY/R19-6868 20552
DIST: 22 Jan c/UT2055Z
DIST: O/UT
INon Responsive
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
NATIONAL ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY SECURITY AGENCY
Non Responsive
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia information in this report is based entirely on January to summarizes at time time developments of publication of publication noted on throughout on 22 January Southeast SIGINT except 1968.
All where information specifically indicated this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
# CONTENTS
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|Communist Southeast Asia| |
|A. Military|1|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications|2|
|South Vietnam| |
|DRV Communications|6|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/8 PAGE(s)
---
Doc ID: 6636717 Doc Ref ID: A6636716
# SITUATION SUMMARY
Non-Responsive entities relocation of three additional PAVN B3 Front-associated into the Laos-Cambodia-South Vietnam border area highlighted activity in Military Region (MR) in northeastern South Vietnam.
Darlac Province continue Communist elements highlighted in the south, Vietnamese Military Region (MR) in South Vietnam.
Dinh Tuong Province operations in MR border. Forewarnings of Allied sweep Vietnamese Communist elements near the Phu Bon Province were contained in several messages passed between Party-associated stations in that area.
---
|COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA|COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA|
|---|---|
|A MILITARY|A MILITARY|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|
|Military Region 5|Military Region 5|
|Military elements continue to be involved in what appears to be a general repositioning of units.|On 20 January 107-51E, a general repositioning of units involved elements continue to be located in the Hq, MR 5.|
|Provincial repositioning was units.|On 20 January 107-51E, a general repositioning of units involved elements continue to be located in the Hq, MR 5.|
|Unidentified subordinate unit located in southern Quang Tin Province near 15-26N of the probable Quang Nam Provincial location.|In other activity, an unidentified subordinate unit located in southern Quang Tin Province near 15-26N of the probable Quang Nam Provincial location.|
|Unit located in a difficult situation on 2 January reported on 21 January that with the western highlands, two more radio entities associated in the Laos-Cambodia-South Vietnam tri-border area where major units of the Front are located.|On 21 January, in the Laos-Cambodia-South Vietnam tri-border area where major units of the Front are located, one of these terminals moved about 14km north-northeast of its 19 January position.|
|The other entity was located near 14-47N, 107-39E (YB 866350) approximately 40 km northeast of its 28 December 1967 location.|A third B3 Front-associated terminal was also located in the tri-border area by 21 January when it was relocated at 14-36N, 107-25E, about 10 km north of its 17 January position.|
|Unit was located in southeastern Kontum Province on 20 January (AS 851090) in the tentatively identified Hq, near 14-32N.|As late as 8 January, the unit had operated approximately 45 km to the north-northwest of that province.|
---
# Vietnamese Communist radio terminals in northeastern Darlac Province
continue to concentrate near the Phu Bon radio terminals in northeastern Darlac Province 108-2SE (BQ 260375 were located on the border where they continue to concentrate near Phu Bon on 21 January near Phu Bon 12-5CN Province border where they located on 21 January near Phu Bon.
|Entities|Location|
|---|---|
|Two of these entities|are associated with the B3 Front 12-SSN 108-2SE (BQ 260375).|
|The other two entities|communicate with Hq, PAVN 5th Division.|
Moreover, delayed information indicates that one of the B3 Front-associated entities in this cluster relocated approximately 130 km due south between 17 December and 10 January from the border near Drang Valley to the Pleiku Province-Cambodia border near Quang Duc Province-Cambodia 12-22Na to 107-3CE position (Yu 722676) B3 Front in Cambodia. The communications suggest an association between the 5th Division and the B3 Front in Cambodia.
The coordination of the Vietnamese Communist activities of those elements currently operating in the southern MR 10 areas and the northern MR 5 areas.
Military Region 1 An unidentified Vietnamese Communist military communications elements located in the Khanh Province area has been active since at least 3 January in the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh link which serves Long Khanh.
|Location|Activity|
|---|---|
|Bien Hoa-Long Khanh link|Active since at least 3 January|
|Long Khanh|Active in western Long Khanh as early as 23 October until 3 January|
|Long Khanh|Active in western Long Khanh as early as 17 January|
The control authority border at 11-07N Province was located on 17 January 106-55E (YT 0c43c8) on the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh link.
Messages observed on the border at 11-07N associated with the Eq, B3 (LID) and later with the Hq, VC type Sth Light Infantry Division.
The involvement of the B3 Front and the B3 Rq, Front with MR 2 elements located within Nam Bo has increased recently, as reflected in the message volumes from the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN was recipient of high message volumes on 18 and 20 January.
---
|Doc ID: 6636717|Doc Ref ID: A6636716|
|---|---|
|by the activation of communications with the possible unidentified activity with MASCOSVN.| |
|Front Headquarters, in Binh Long and increased message relay of other activity, the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) In other Detached Element in northeastern Tay Ninh to its COSVN continued the activity, continued through at least 19 January to Province at least 19 January in Detached tactical information relay to its central Tay Ninh near on Allied air located 280544).| |
|The January 13 subordinate continues to report activity in Dau Tieng (11-17N near central Tay Ninh city XT 4846) and/or ground activity in the vicinity of Tay Ninh city XT 1952 (11-17N 106-05E, Detached Element Two XT 1952) was located in east-central reported to MIB Tay Bau Co east-central On 19 January, Ninh near 11-28N types of the COSVN a second subordinate--located on the second number subordinate--located that "all of artillery pieces and 106-12E American, enemy of (XT 316678)--9 January pieces at the Bau Co [11-27N 106-10E stated and XT 2867] that are "all of the enemy forces are American."| |
|Military Region 10 in Binh Long Province observed on 11 January--has activated watch communications. This facility--first in Binh Long Province has activated communications. This facility--first and possibly seven observed subscribers January--has to at on 11 attempting to contact least identified Headquarters. B3 One of the subscribers has been identified as located PAVN B3 One Front the of attempting subscribers has contact been scriber was as Hq, located on PAVN 13 January in Cambodia Hq, Front, while in Cambodia an unidentified Binh unidentified near the sub - Long Province scriber was border on 13 at 11-58N January 106-23E (xU 670243) The near Binh activation of watch communications Long Province border communications is at ll-58N 106-23E is in further indication (XU 670243). The that the Front watch 2111552; 2/0/VCM/ R17-68, 1723292) is expanding its role in a South Vietnam.| |
---
# Doc ID: 6636717 Doc Ref ID: A6636716
Military Region 2
Party-associated On On20 Janua rY , 20 January,stationsin a messagepassedbetween twounidentified
message Dinh TuongProvince warned passed between two warnedofunidentified
pree "enemy" sweepoperations
first pree sweepwa S to platoons" which wererecipient106-11Ealert
Battalionplus first sweep wastwo to be 3351 ) Duongby were "one company
of Nhi peBinh3rd Battalion 106-12E twoXS platoons" whichDiem (10-26N to sweep Nhi Binh
XS 3249)"soupof XSpe3351) an XS unidentified controllingauporitynorp
(10-24N 3249) 106-12E, "soup of pe highway" Duong Diemrecipientwas to
The The norpof "one (10-26N pe highway _ 106-llE, was to alert
Theunidentified an second sweepcontrolling was reportedlyscheduled for of aupority
of an unidentified "battalion and one second sweep was"battalion wouldbe company 106-1OE4pKhanh
Battalion,llp Regiment"and of an unidentified
(10-21N Battalion, 106-06ERegiment" 11p XS 2145) ,PhuQui and would (10-22N instructedto 2746)
be conducted at Long pe (10-21N 106-06E, XS 2145), Therecipientwas pemessagetope Phu Qui (10-22N instructedXS 106-lOE,
last "alert sweep operation willbe Binh (unlocated)." conductedbype According
to pe "Marines" message, whope will sweep "ThanhHoa (10-25N conducted by
(unlocated)" Thanh lastsweep sweep operation Hoa will (10-25N be 106-06E
106-06E, scuchXS 2152) . 9 soupof highway Binh XS pe 2152)"Marines"PhuBinhfourPhuwho
PhuNhuan (unlocated) Phu Nhuan (unlocated) of highway four."
On 21 January
On 21 21 Dinh Tuongmessage and passedto
a message originatedbyan unidentified
Party-associatedsubordinate ofan enemyto
in central for 22 January_ "sweep involvingtwo battalions aupority
and Binh scheduled
Phu of an enemy 106-OOE central for Dinh 22 Tuong January
warned warnedThe of message and mess.agean passed enemy alerted
alertedsweep operation
sweep ThanhHoaits control
operation Thanh Hoain aupority
bop Binh and pe Hua My (10-2ON Phu of an enemy sweep (10-31NXS 10S - 5 7Erinvolving XS105-5 7E (10-2ON (10-25N1041 )-Hoi two
battalions Cai in 106-O1E ,XS 1151)-MyThien XS 1945)-XuanSon
bop pe Hua My (10-20N 106-00E~ 1041)-HoiXSCai XS 0563 ) (10~2SNand
CamSon 106-0lE, (10-21N Cam 1942)-HaiSon 106 -O5E Son (10-21NXS 1151)-My 106-0SE,ThienXS (10-31N 1945)-Xuan
Son (10-20N0563),106-0SE 106-0SE,and
XS 1942)-Hai unlocated) areas
XS Son (unlocated) areas.
ProvincialJanuary A 20 January message passedfrcmpe ProbableMy Tho
Committeetoan passed message from pesubordinateMyprobable Tho
unidentified located
in central
and central
Provincial Dinh Tuongwarnedpat
Committee Dinh Tuong to warned an unidentifiedpat pe peat Cai Lay (10-24N"Marine0 s" o .combat
"Ma:r.ine sub o rdinate combatgrouplocatedgroup
106-07E ,Marine and pe peMarine artillery XS 2250) _artillery" were still
at Cai Lay (10-24N 106-07E, XS 2250).
Finally,an unidentified Party-assoc iatedstationwas
106-O8Eon 19 Januaryin central
located (xs 2644) ,26km
locatedunidentified Party-associatedofits Tuong on 19 January in soupwest station3hasbeennotedcentral in inDinh Tuongat 10-22NDinh 3 January position.at 10-22N
This 106-0BE (XS 2644), 26 km soupwest of its January position.
This unidentified Party-associated station has been noted
---
# Operation in similar movements in the past
Operation CORONADO IX is currently being conducted in Dinh Tuong Province.
|Province|Military Region|DMZ Area|
|---|---|---|
|Operation CORONADO IX is currently being conducted in Dinh Tuong Province.|Military Region 3|SIGINT has confirmed the location of the unidentified major PAVN Headquarters terminal (XD503554) northwest of Khe Sanh.|
|DRV Communications|DRV Communications|SIGINT has confirmed that the headquarters of the unidentified PAVN serving headquarters was located at 16-52N Khe Sanh on 16 January.|
| | |One radio terminal serving that headquarters and another terminal subsequently was located at 106-SE (XD 503654) on 21 January.|
| | |At least seven additional subscribers were noted at the headquarters located at 16-51N 106-57E (XD 537644) on the probable watch facility located on 21 January.|
| | |Recent SIGINT indicates a radio terminal serving the PAVN identified as the Gcv? from its location on 22 October 1967 to 17-04N 106-39E on January 18.|
| | |On January 11, the terminal initially located at 16-52N 106-56E was moved to 17-01N 106-56E.|
| | |The same terminal was located at 17-01N 106-50E (XD 926827).|
| | |At present, the Ky Anh Headquarters maintains communications with Hq, MR I (NVN) at Vinh, the DMZ Front, and three unidentified entities.|
---
|Doc ID: 6636717|Doc Ref ID: A6636716|
|---|---|
| |FOPSEEREF FRHNE|
|TOP SECRET TRl~•E3/0/STY/ RlS-68| |
|unidentified terminals- -one of which is a subordinate of the DMZ Front.| |
|(2 /0/VCM/ R15-68_ Front. 1721452; 2/G11 /VCM/ R1C7-58 ,1812102 )| |
|(838r (2/0/VCM/RlS-68, 172145Z; 2/Gll/VCM/Rl07-68, 181210Z)| |
|(i!HiMT i!NJHT)| |
|Overland Infiltration Shau Valley Rear 01 and 13 January, The high volume of message activity observed on the normal Shau Valley Between Rear Services complex has total of 101 messages apparently returned to were observed between the normal observed Unit 01 Between and 13 January, Shau Valley Rear Services Headquarters and Unit between however 32; the A Shau From 14 January to the present Valley Rear Services Head-quarters of only nine messages a total of 32; and only nine messages however "have been January have :crorn been observed lL:. observed to between these between the present these two entities (3/0/sTY/R13-68, two (3/0/STY/R13-68) entities. ~(SECRE ]SHv LN(SEGRE£ SA.Oil(| |
|Non - Non Responsive FOP SECREF TRINE-7- TOP SECRET TRI~~E| |
---
Doc ID: 6636717Responsive IINon - Non Responsive...... Doc Ref ID: A6636716~TOP SECRET TRINEI OP 51!:Cll~ Tltl!~E3/0/STY/R19-68
3/0/STY/Rl 9-68
-8 -
-8-
YOP SEEREF FRINETOP SECRET TRII<4~ | {
"Who": "National Security Agency, Southeast Asia SIGINT analysts",
"What": "Military movements and activities of Vietnamese Communist forces in Southeast Asia",
"When": "22 January 1968",
"Where": ["Laos-Cambodia-South Vietnam border area", "Darlac Province", "Phu Bon Province", "Military Region 5", "Khanh Province", "Bien Hoa-Long Khanh link", "Long Khanh", "Dinh Tuong Province", "Khe Sanh", "Shau Valley"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
3/0/STY /RO8-68
09 January1968
SECUR DIST :
SEASIGSUM 080/UT
SOUTHEAST ASIA Sigint SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-03-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6636703
# Doc Ref ID: A6636702
FOPSEEREF FRHNE
TOP SECRET TRipaJ~3/0/STY /RO8-68
09Jan 0/UT
3/0/STY/R08-6868 21002
DIST: 09 Jan 68 210oz
DIST: 0/UT
# SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
# NATIONAL ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY SECURITY AGENCY
# SOUTHEAST SIGINT SUMMARY Asia
This report summarizes developments entirely on SIGINT 1968. This report summarizes developments of publication throughout Southeast Asia noted throughout Southeast Asia.
All information in this report is available to NSA at this time, based entirely on SIGINT publication except where otherwise specifically indicated.
# CONTENTS
|Situation Summary|PAGE 1|
|---|---|
|Communist Southeast Asia| |
|Non-Responsive Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|PAGE 2|
|DRV Communications| |
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/9 PAGE(s)
FOP SEEREF FRHAE
TOP SECRET TRipaJ~
---
|Doc ID|6636703|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6636702|
SITUATION SUMMARY
Communist units in the Quang Division Infantry in the area of Military Region (MR) units in Vietnam, the alert posture continues to be maintained by Vietnamese forces. In the western highlands, the 174th Regiment established contact with military intelligence elements in the suspected Hq, PAVN communications. The 1st Division continues to report on Allied activity in the vicinity of Dak To. An unidentified battalion-echelon subordinate located in Hau Nghia Province and a radio station serving COSVN apparently moved into Cambodia from Tay Ninh Province on January 8. The relocation of an unidentified subordinate in Binh Long Province highlighted communications activity in MR 10.
---
Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
COMMUNIST_SOUTHEAST_ASIA
COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. MILITARY
Ao MILITARY
Vietnamese Communist Communications-Soup Vietnam
Military Region 5
Military Region 5 continues to reflect activity near pe Quang Nam-Quang Tin border
Communist units continue to reflect tactical posture on pe part of Vietnamese PAVN 2nd Division
Forward Element remains in control of pe Communist units in pe area
The possible Hq of 2nd Division Vietnamese Provincial Unit Control (PUC) located on 31 December near 15-39N 108-05E (AT 872323) - informed on 7 January pat it was in a difficult situation
PAVN in pe western highlands appeared in communications on 7 January
The possible Hq of PAVN 1st Division Forward Element appeared in communications for pe first time since 18 December 1967 and established contact wip pe suspected Hq for pe 174p Regiment, which had been located silent since 2 January
The possible forward element was near Cambodia adjacent to approximately 27 km west of Kontum Province on 8 January
The Hq of 174p Regiment was located in western Kontum near Cambodia on 7 January
B-52 strikes were the subject of two recent messages sent to the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) subordinate in the Dak To area at 1400(G) on 6 January
A message on 6 January stated that B-52's bombed the areas west of Ngoc Rinh [14-37N 107-37E, YB 815180]
A B-52 strike was reported on 5 January at approximately 1600(H) in the areas west and southwest of Ngoc Rinh [14-37N 107-37E, YB 815180]
A message of 8 January reported "continuous day and night" bombing by B-52's
FOPSEC REF FHNE TOP SECRET TRINE
---
Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
On 7 January pe MIS asked pe subordinate if pe "ground leveling assignment" had been completed. The subordinate replied pat it had finished leveling at pat time located at Hill (14-32N, 107-33E - YB 820076) and was hours norpeast of pe hill. On 8 January, pis subordinate was located soupwest of Dak To near 1436N (YB 760166).
In a 5 January message to Dak To area, pe MIS Hq mentioned a second subordinate in pe Communist unit identified as pe "Tiger Company" (YB 9214). The battalion was located at Ngoc Do (14-35N, 107-43E - YB 9214). The subordinate was instructed to go to pe battalion's location if it needed rice.
The MIS also instructed pe subordinate to inform pe battalion's location to receive two personnel if it needed a "new assignment."
On 6 January, pis subordinate reported to pe MIS on casualties in pe course of MIS, stating pat two comrades were slightly wounded by artillery fire. On 14-35N, 107-19E (YB 957149), pis subordinate was located soupwest of Dak To near 31 December. A pird subordinate, located on 7 January west from pe MIS, near 14-40N, 107-41E (YB 905233), received a message commending pe battalion for its communications work.
The message stated pat pe battalion sends its regards and on behalf of pe commander, commending pe battalion for its communications. This is pe first commendation Station 1 for its SIGINT indication in pe recent record.
A similar situation has been noted in pe communications structure of a battalion-sized unit in pe 9p Light Infantry Division (LID), in which pe MIS, 1st Division may be composed of at least includes pe probable situation has been noted in pe communications structure of pe VC unit of similar 9p Light Infantry Division.
The Hq VC C95 Reconnaissance Company 9p Light Infantry Division is responsible for tactical intelligence collection and reporting for pe division.
TOP SECRET TRINE-3
---
# Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
|InsouthernMR|5 ,an unidentified unidentifiedsubordinate oftheKhanh|
|---|---|
|HoaProvincialUnitwas anIn southern MR 5,|locatedon 8 Januaryin theof subordinate centralthe Khanh|
|15kmnorth ofofthe province coastal|Hoa Provincial regionUnit 13 Decemberlocation.was located near near8 12-19N on January 109-11E (CP 010620) =in the central coastal region icsthe of province 12-19N 109-llE (CP 010620),|
|15 km north of its 13 December location.|QuangDuc associated with associatedProvince-Cambodiaborder was locatedon 8January Tothe|
|To the with southintheMR Front was an unidentified entityinthe|south che thein PAVN B3 10 area, PAVN the MR B3 10 Frontarea, anlocated 12-25N Januaryunidentified on 8 107-35E entity in the area near|
|Quang Due (xu 807729) Province-Cambodiaabout 10km inSoutheastofitsrecently ava ilableborder area near3 January position12-25N 107-35E|within Cambodia.|
|(YU 807729), aboutAlsoir s0utheast Also that theMR 10of 10 km area its 3 January position|within informationindicates Cambodiao the the probableDarlac ProvincialUnitMR10 area~ recently available|
|movedinto northern QuangDucProvince indicates that107-54E probable byat least6 January the Darlac Provincial Unitto|moved positionnear into northern 26N near12-_ Quang Due Province(ZU 151761) _ by at least SubsequentSIGINT6 January to|
|locations obtainedon 12-26N and8 Januaryhave locatedon therelo=|107-54E and entityhadbeen confirmed (ZU 151761)9 Subsequent SIGINT|
|cation ofthisunit_ about|cation 46kmto thenortheast of this unito This entity insoutheasternDarlacProvincehad been located on 26 December near|
|near about12-29N 46 km to108-18E (BP 066811) .southeastern|the northeast(BP 066811)~ in of operationsinclude located AdditionalDarlac|
|Additional entities located in unidentifiedterminal inthe provincialunit8 s|the provincial unit assoc1acedwith operations newarea of the B3Front and aan include an|
|deployedelementof unidentified terminaltheHq incomunicationswiththe deployed|associated B3Front withPUC the B3 TheDarlac Front andProvincial|
|Unithasnot deployed element beenofobserved the Hq, B3 Front PUC., The Darlac Provincial|Hq theirrelocations Unit B3FrontPUC has not been elementsince communications observed in 2 January, possiblythe with as deployedresult|
|of Hq, B3 Front PUC element since 2 January, possibly as a result|of their relocationso (2/612 /VCM/RO081-68 . 0820502 ;Roo80-680813002; R0075-68 _ 0815042 ;R0078-680810382 ;|
|0814002 ;R0077-68 _ 0810312 ;T70-68 0714592 ;T[ ?]-68|081400Z;|
|2 /612 /VCM/T78-68 T63-68|(2/Gl2/VCM/R0081-68, R0077-68$ 0813152 ;R0076-68 0813152; 082050Z; R0076-68,R0080-68, 081300Z; 081504Z; R0075-68,R0078-68,0711252 ;081038Z;|
|T64-68|2/Gl2/VCM/T78-68,0702152; T63-689 0621352; T61-68, 0614312;T53-68|
|081031Z; T70~68, 071459Z; T[?j-68, 0711?5Z;|0512052) LencennQNTN|
|T64=68, 070215Z; 062135Z, T61-68, 061431Z; T53-68|051205Z) (SECRET S OUIDJ)|
# Military Region_1 Military Region 1
usedSIGINTof8January indicatedthatthe radioterminalbythe Military AffairsSection (MAs)
SIGINT of 8 January indicated that theof COSVNto 20kmradio terminalcommuni cate tothesoutheastto
used with VC Military cate with by the VC provincialunits Sectionprovincial Affairs positionhas moved approximately 20 units has in moved innorthern northernTay (MAS)approximatelyof COSVN NinhProvinceto communi-km to the southeast to a position Tay Ninh Province
24e FFOP SEERET TRINE=4= TOP SEGR~T TR.IbIE
---
Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
which11-42N generalarea ofotherMASCOSVN near near ll-42N 106-17E (XT 410934) . 106-17E (XT 410934)0 Thismove radioterminals This moveplacesthe stationplaces the station inthe same in thecommunicatewithal1 same general areaallof che :MR other MR headquarters; MASCOSVN radio theHq terminalsSthVC which LID elementoperaconnnunicate ting andwith in LongKhanh Province the headquarters;andits the Hq,subordi-VC 5th nateelement LID regiment ; operatingthe Hq =Long Khanhin VC9thLIDanditssubordinate Province~ and its subordi-re" giments_ nate regiment; and the Hq, VC 9th LID and its subordinate re- giments. On On 8Januaryat 02232 January at Tay 0223Z~Ninha Provincenear radio station servingCOSVNwa $ station 11-42N serving 106-05EwasCOSVN in KompongChamProvince Ninh at 07442 9 its previouslocation. locatedinnorthern (xT 174930)northern located in Tay Province near ll-42N 106-0SE (XT 174930)0 Subsequertly Subsequently~ at 0744Z thisstationwa 5 located this station 106-21Elocatedwas Cambodia near11-46N (xT 473991)Cham kmeast northeast in Kompong 30 km Province~ Cambodiaof near 11-46N 106 =21E (XT 473991L 30 east northeast of its previous locationo northernTay beganAccordingto collateral continues began According on on 8 December 1967and DecemberNinh_to collateral,continuesto be conductedin 1967 and Allied OperationYELLOWSTONE to be conducted in northern Tay Ninh. In other developments cn 7January the possibleHq , PAVN i01stIn 101stRegiment reappeared Regimentdevelopments~incommunicationswithan unidentified on January the possible Hq, PAVN reappeared in cormnuni.cations with northernHauan unidentified battalion-echelonsubordinatethatis located in NghiaProvince Nghia battalion-echelon Provinceoobserved Duringthis During be tweenthesetwo entitiessince subordinate communications activitye_theHauthiscommunications that islocatedactivity~-thein northern 0 first ccntact 28 November196725 0the first contact observedregiment previously four between receivedfourmessages establishthese two entities sincefromits subordinate 1967~-the 28 November The subordinate severaloccasions throughoutregiment received attempted messagesto from its contactwith subordinate. the regimenton The subordinate previously attempted to establish December with December. contact 101stRegiment attemptedto Additiona Additionally,the regiment between 4 lly betweenestablishcommunicationswith onseveral 4 and12December .and occasions12 Decemberthroughoutthe possible the possible Hq 9 anotherunidentifiedand unlocatedsubordinate , which Hq101st Regiment attempted to establish subordinate ~whichwaswithcommunications headquartersonPAVN Zthobserved firstnoted0n 14November 1967 first noted unidentified 14 Novemberand unlocatedThe possible regimental19670 The possible regimentalwas waslascobservedin communicationswiththe tentativeHq was headquarters lase 7thDivisioninForwardElement connnunications on 30 with 30 Septemberthe 1967tentative Hq, PAVN Division Forward Element on September 19670 Duong Province 13Decembernear 13 December The possibleHq subordinate(xT 560414) in The possible 11-14N near The ll-14NHq, 101st Regimentwas lastlocatedon 101st 106-26E 106~26ERegiment in Hau (XT Hau NghiaProvincewaswas 560414)last inwestern located westernonBinhBinh Duong Province. The subordinate in Nghia Province was
YOPSEEREF FRHNE=5 - 5 =, TOP SECRET TRIN~
---
# Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
located on 2 January near ll-06N 106-30E (XT 641258).
border by oper activity in pe Long MR MR area reported pat "pe enemy from Song Thao 1, In oper subordinate activity in a 6 January message pe January Khanh-Bien Hoa Long Khanh-Bien message passed to pe MIS Song Hoa passed Province MIS, Thao conducted Province to pe area reported road" but "pe pat enemy subordinate had suffered from an no ill effects. According to collateral, ambush on our road" but pat pe subordinate pe Song Thao River suffered runs from 11-00N 107-01E (YT 2117) to 10-57N 107-04E (YT 2612).
The subordinate furper reported damaged its base camp was not pat during "pe operation," The subordinate furper reported pat no property was damaged along an undetermined enemy sei 6 January pe In MIS In an earlier message on zed our rice and poured it an earlier message on January, pe subordinate reported to pe MIS pat "pe enemy road seized subordinate was located out" The our rice and border area poured it out" 8 January along January undetermined Hoa-Long Khanh Province border an in pe Bien Hoa-Long Khanh road do The subordinate was located on near 10-53N 107-06E (YT 299043) Province area near 10-53N 107-06E (YT 299043).
0821402; (2/610/VCM/T42-68, (2/Gl0/VCM/T42 - 682/G10/VCJ/RU8-68, 0615202 ='0816192) {ozers 061520Z; T40-68 T40 =68, 0612472; 2/C10/VCY/R09-68 061247Z; 2/Gl0/VCY/R09-68, 082140Z; 2/Gl0/VCJ/R08 ~·68, 0816192) (8~0MT 81#IU~
Military Region 1Q An unidentified subordinate of Hq PAVNB3 Front was located on 1 January An unidentified in western Binh subordinate Binh Long of Province near pe Cambodian Hq, PAVN B3 Front was located border on January at 11-45N western in 106-26E (xT 561996) in Phuoc Long Province Long Province approximately Cambodian near pe 75km soupwest of its border at 11-45N 14 December 14 December position in 106-26E (XT 561996):; approximately Province 75 km This element soupwest of continued its to communicate wip position Phuoc Long pe B3 Front prough began its soupward movement formerly located in pe to attempted unsuccessfully to unit was and subordinate and pe Front This subordinate formerly January ~ January element located January Kontum-Pleiku-Darlac Province contact and on on continued pe 5 January attempted reveals pat pis unit in movement Front pe Kontum-Pleiku-Darlac communicate SIGINT reveals unsuccessfully wip 1967 Province pat pe B3 pis Front to contact area areaprough was and pe pe in November began its soupward in November 1967,,
of pe probable Hq reported oper activity, Reconnaissance Company of pe In oper probable pat because of traffic on an unspecified activity, Hq~ C95 in C95 of artillery fire Company, Reconnaissance in a message of 6 January message. of 6 it wa S having January was having difficulty MIS MIS, a VC9p LID subordinate VC difficulty subordinate 9p LID counting Allied reported Allied vehicle pat because artillery fire, an unspecified highway it counting probably Route 13) in central vehicle central traffic Binh Long Province. o highway on This (probably Route 13) in Binh Long Province This
---
|Doc ID|Doc Ref ID|
|---|---|
|6636703|A6636702|
subordinate--locatedon the 8 JanuaryHon Quang(11-39NAllied11-39N 7487)throughatJanuarynear air and ground 106-34E (xT 700874)--continuesto reporton Allied subordinate--located on 7 January near 11-39N 106-34E activity(XT tothewest 700874) - -continues of Hon Quang to report on 106-36E_ air XT and ground activity least to west of (11-39N 106-, 36E, XT 7487) through at least 8 January.
(2/G10 /VCM/T45-68 (2/Gl0/VCM/T45-68, 0703002 ;2/G10/VCJ /RO8-68 070300Z; 2/Gl0/VCJ/R08-68,3/0 /STY /R299-67) (obente 0816192 ; 081619Z; 2 /0 /VCM/R272-67 , 2/0/VCM/R272-67, 2121562 DEC ; 212156Z DEC; 3/0/STY./R299-67) (Ol!t?Jll!H OAUIEt) Military Region2 Military Region 2 volumes 12messages 44messagesto the Kien volumesmessages44 On Onof January 7JanuaryAlternateHq of tomessages tthetentative Alternate to theKien Tuong Hq~tentative LongAn Provincial tentative MR MR TuongProvincial 2 2was noted was Long notedAnPassing highUnit passing ProvincialUnitandUnit,high 12 nessagevolume 12 messagesco to 12 messages to co the My thethese provincial he My tentativeThoProvincialUnit Tho Provincial units Unitis aboutfourperProv i ncial(MTPU) (MTPU)o The Unit normal The normaland Cambodian-northernunits moved fromunitswhichcommunicates with VC with day ,. VCmainforce Kien PhongProvinceborderto western message day Theelement The volume main elementforceto cfAlternate Hq these of units Alternateprovincial moved Hq 9 from MR MRits normalconununicates its 2 2 which normal is about baseareaon the base western Dinhfour area peron the TuongProvincenear Kien 22 Decemberand near Cambodian-northern Tuong Province 10-'25N 10- 2 5NPhong 105-58E (xS 058525) 105 =58E Province (XS border 058525)tobetweenbetween Dinh 22 December and 1January January~ relocated Recently Recently,towestern Dinh threeotherVietname seCommunist th:r:-ee Dirh Tuong: and other Vi etnamese thetentativeunits havea1s0Communist MTPU ; identified units anuniden- have also tified Party-associatedelement ; relocated to western Tuong: the the tentatively tentative MTPU; an uniden- VC263rd tified Party ~associated Battalion. ele ment ; and the tentatively identified VC 263rd Battali o n. VC Party-associatedProvince 106-02E locatedin InDinh In Dinh TuongProvinceon Tuong elementsonwereand 7and8 Januarytwo unidentified 8 January two unidentified location(xs 1151)the western (xswestern portion 14the provinceat of VC Party-associated 10-23N elements were located in theapproximatelyportion of 14km westthe west of province their10-23N at formerlocationnear 106-02E (XS 1151) )) 10-25N approximately106-08E 2654)on 31of km Decemberformerand their 1967 5 January . near 10 - 2SN 106-08E (XS 2654) on 31 December 1967 and 5 January. (2/0 /VCM/RO3-68 (2/0/VCM/R03-68, 0822032 ;2/610 /VCMiROII-68 082203Z ; 2/Gl0/VCM/R011=68) 0813342 ; . 081334Z; 2 /G10 /VCJ /ROO7-68 ,0716212; 3/0/STY /RO7-68) 2/Gl0/VCJ/R007-68, 071621Z; 3/0/STY/R07 - 68) (SEGRE£ sxern)
TOP SEEREF FRINE -7~ TOP i~CRET TRINE
---
# Military Region 3
|Military Region 3|(VLPC) On 8 January the Probable Vinh Long Provincial Committee subordinate to the Region 3 Long Probable Vinh 3 Committee Provincial was located by SIGINT in central Vinh Long Province at 10-05N 105-59E|
|---|---|
|Location|Approximately 16 km southeast of its previous location at 10-llN 105-51E (WS 949268) through November 1966|
|VLPC 6 December|Its previous location was approximately 6 km southeast of its previous location at 10-05N 105-59E|
|(8!88R!H BAO Ht)|DRV communications|
|---|---|
|PAVN High Command/304th|320th Divisions|
Entity indicating that in the DMZ BRAVO, associated with this entity, is passed originated by this entity on 7 January with MR 3 North was located by originated passed unidentified in the general Station area of indicating station BRAVO in this entity. Messages originated by this entity were passed on 29 December, same entity station and also passed by on 27 also watch group entity was noted and DMZ station BRAVO on 20 and by this message activity on the November and on 27 November the serving the DMZ Front.
Recent SIGINT activity has associated the watch this entity with the PAVN this group entity had been serving with been garrisoned the DMZ PAVN 320th Front. 320th in MR 3 North.
(3/0/STY/R283-67, R06-68) - (SECRET SOlfIDJ)
---
Doc ID: 6636703 Doc Ref ID: A6636702
INon - Responsive INon Responsive. FOP SECRET TRTNE
TOP SECll~'f 'fltffrqf£3/0/STY /R08-68
3/0/STY/R08-68
9-
FOPSEEREF FRHNE=9-
TOP SECRET TRINE | {
"Who": "NSA, Southeast Asia Sigint analysts",
"What": ["SOUTHEAST ASIA Sigint SUMMARY", "Communist units in Vietnam", "B-52 strikes", "Communications activities", "Allied activity reports", "VC unit communications", "SIGINT activity reports", "DMZ activities"],
"When": "09 January 1968",
"Where": ["Southeast Asia", "Vietnam", "Military Regions 1, 2, 3", "Quang Nam-Quang Tin border", "Western highlands", "Dak To", "Hau Nghia Province", "Tay Ninh Province", "Kontum Province", "Binh Long Province", "Phuoc Long Province", "Khanh-Bien Hoa Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637227
# Doc Ref ID: A6637226
3/0/SiY /R43-68
19 February 1968
3/0/S'1'Y /R43-68
SECUR DIST: 19 February 19680 /UT43-68
SEA DIST: SIGSUM 43-680/UT
SEA SIGSUM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Situation Summary
Communist Southeast Asia
|Military|Vietnamese Communist Communications|
|---|---|
|South Vietnam|DRV Communications|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 11/13 PAGE(s)
---
# Doc ID: 6637227INon - Responsive IDoc Ref ID: A6637226 Non Responsive TOP SECRET TRlt•E
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
---
# Doc ID: 6637227
# Doc Ref ID: A6637226
|INon Non - Responsive|Responsive|
|---|---|
|3/0/STY /R43-68|3/0/STY/R43-68|
# SITUATION SUMMARY
suggests Military Region attack in western Vietnam, Province In Military Region (MR) 5 of South Vietnam, SIG INT that mortar Pleiku Province conducted been planned in M that suggests has been that a mortar since attack MR early February may have jor in western Pleiku have been
Elsewhere planned since 5, early communications of February may of ma been PAVN elements conducted. Elsewhere in Quang in Quang Nam, Quang Tin 5, communications Tin and Binh Dinh major Provinces continued 1, to military intelligence communications PAVN elements in to reflect contact and Nam, Quang with Allied forces. Binh Dinh forces To Provinces the south in M continued 1 reflect contact with Allied reflected continued interest in MR military in Allied activity in Tay Ninh, intelligence communications Binh Duorg continued the suggestion tnat historically operated SIGINT strengthens Binh Duong, and Long interest Provinces sin Allied Finally, activity additional in Tay Ninh, Binh Long Province may have Saigon Front headquarters which has the suggestion has tnat the unidentified in possible Binh Long Province may have Saigon Front headquarters have relocated to southern Binh which historically operated Duong Province in Binh Long Province north of just north may relocated to southern Binh Duong Province, just of Saigon.
304th Division In In the Khe indicated the elements associated with the PAVN Sanh area reported use of gas agents by the with an unidentified PAVN 304th Division indicated the use of enemy masks Also because possible the of firedirection center the Khe Sanh area was noted the ported that artillery element in Sanh Airfi 2 ld. for fire on artillery on the Khe element in Sanh Airfield area the Khe Sanh In was addition calling reconnaissance target the of Khe Sanh Combat Base on a re PAVN 325C addition 325C Division the ported In 26 rounds fired element reconnaissance into the Khe the PAVN Combat Division 16 February that had rounds 812th Regiment suggested a from landed fired Regiment In the eastern DMZ Base Sanh area on 16 message February had landed the on target. In the eastern further DMZ area, southward move of message this unit to Hue.
---
|Doc ID:|6637227INon - Responsive|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637226|
|.Non|Responsive I YOP SEEREF FRTNETOP SECRET TRf1rq~ /R'43-6'83 /0 [STY [R43-68 3 /0 /STY -2 --2- 3 FOPSEERET FRINE TOP eEGREf 11lI1'J~|
---
# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5
|Hq, VC 1st Regiment|Probable VC 402nd Sapper Battalion|
|---|---|
|Hq, VC 1st Regiment|Probable VC 402nd Sapper Battalion Hoi An|
# QUANG NAM
|Hq, PAVN 2nd Division|Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment|
|---|---|
|Hq, PAVN 2nd Division|Possible PAVN 3rd Regiment Associate|
|Forward Element|Hq, PAVN 21st Regiment|
|Hq, PAVN 21st Regiment|QUANG TIN Probable Hq_401st Regiment|
# QUANG TIN
Hq, PAVN 83 Front
Probable Hq_PAVN 401st Sapper Regiment Quang Ngai
# KONTUM
Hq, PAVN 83 Front
Probable Hq_PAVN 401st Sapper Regiment Quang Ngai
# PLEIKU
B3 Front Authority
Probable Hq_PAVN 1st Division Element Long Binh
# QUANG NGAI
Hq, MR Tactical Forward Element
Hq, PAVN 3rd Division An Khe
# BINH DINH
Hq, MR Tactical Forward Element
Hq, PAVN 3rd Division An Khe
# Qui Nhon
---
# Doc ID: 6637227 Doc Ref ID: A6637226
|I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA|I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA|
|---|---|
|A. MILITARY|A. MILITARY|
|1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|Military Region 5 elements in attack being conducted on western Pleiku Province indicated that messages exchanged on 18 February between PAVN B3 Front and the mortar Hq in Lang Beng (13-53N 107-38E YA 8436) area may have indicated that the mortar attack planned on 19 February in that area since early February.|
|Messages exchanged on Pleiku 18 February between PAVN B3 Front and the mortar Hq, Lang Beng (13-53N 107-38E YA 8436) area, stated that "We are determined to go out to make a detailed assessment and celebrate the Spring."|Tonight's situation from later message of Comrade Ist Division stated that plans for the Celebrate-the-Spring mortar attack on Lang Beng.|
|"We are determined to go out to make a detailed assessment and celebrate the Spring." Front authority to the probable message of the 1st Division element from the probable Hq, Lang Beng stated that, "I approve of your authority to carry out the plans for the Celebrate-the-Spring mortar attack on Lang Beng."|Be sure to fire at the location of the weapons, doing this will be worthwhile. You only need to use your utmost to hit one enemy infantry or two vehicles. Encourage the teams to carry out the mission with the greatest determination. The platoon cadre in charge will be victorious.|
|The probable Hq authority was victorious, B3 Front platoon cadre in charge." The probable Hq located near 13-54N 107-36E (YA 803386) on 16 February, PAVN 1st Division element was last located on the same day near 13-54N 107-36E (YA 803386).|Elsewhere in the Laos-Kontum Province border area near 14-25N 107-22E (YA 558961), the element of Hq, B3 Front, Kontum was located on 18 February.|
|Intelligence (MI) control authority, possibly associated with PAVN B3 Front, instructed a subordinate to disarm on 17 February in southern Kontum Province near 14-28N 108-0SE (AS 860026).| |
---
|Doc ID|Doc Ref ID|
|---|---|
|6637227|A6637226|
Alliedmines Allied mines. Thecontrol The control authority authority, (AS 842038) located last located on last stated on stated that that 17 February near 14-29N108-04E "it February near 17 is necessary to move 108-04E 14-29N (AS in order to strike 842038), stated that the enemy" and instructed the mines "it is necessary to move the the mines subordinate to put a in order to strike pin in the the hole of the detonator enemy" and instructed the head of the mine So the mine subordinate to put pin would not explode in the not hole of the detonator The subordinate subordinate of was head the cautioned to be mine very careful would careful when picking up the mines very explode. when picking The up the mines. was cautioned to be authority second message of the same date authority ordered message In In a second [team] "subordinate to report to enemy the of the same date, report the "E-24\'s the control reconnaissance ordered [team] "subordinate the and to "reconnoiter to to "E-24's closely as usual reconnaissance 24th Regiment and is probable Hq reference "E-24" to "reconnoiter probably reference to the enemy the closely PAVN as 12 February near is probable usual." "E-24" The The 14-32N 108-0OE 24th Regiment was a probably to located on the PAVN on 24th Regiment. Hq, 24th (ZB 232082) _ Regiment was The subordinate 12 located if was was necessary _ 14-32N "return to wa S also instructed to February near 108-00E (ZB E-24 to 232082). to pick The up rice" subordinate it also instructed to "return to E-24 pick up rice" if it was necessary. this Additionally, on 17 Additionally, subordinate to on "maintain close 17 February the control authority ordered February the surveillance of the control authority ordered reactions this subordinate 5 ." of the enemy in to "maintain the township and in the in a the close surveillance of direction of Route reactions 11 Route 5. of According to in According the enemy to collateral, Route collateral, the township Route and 5 runs 5 The subordinate in runs the in direction of "107.8 mortars direction to determine the and the strength of northeasterly direction from Kontum city_ northeasterly from Kontum city. The subordinate was further instructed was further instructed artillerymen and tanks to determine the positions of Allied the positions strength of Allied enemy arriving at artillerymen enemy arriving mortars, at the airfield. the airfield." and tanks, and the the the continue northern :MR. In northern M In to maneuver 5, in eastern 5, in major and eastern Quang Nam the major elements Nam and northeastern Quang Tin to contact with Allied to reflect Provinces Quang PAVN continue reflect 2nd Division Main Tin Provinces, contact Main Force Unit maneuver with and Allied forces communications of the northeastern communications On Unit Control forces. Quang On reported that it of 18 February Hq 18 the February elements continue elements Hq, continue which 2nd difficult situation and under was PAVN in in has difficult a Division been moving generally northeastward situation Force and northeastward under attack_ Control attack. since 14 reported This headquarters This 14 February, that headquarters, it was which located on Hq = February has been 18 February near moving generally 15-43N 108-09E (AT 965405), since February, In the was same area located on 18 PAVN 21st Regiment near 15-43N 2nd Division 965405). 108-09E (AT was In located the same on south 18 February near area, Hq, PAVN near 21·st 15-43N 108-lOE Regiment, 108-10E (AT 968392). 2nd Division, was about 18 km south 18 south-southwest its 18 located km on of February February of its of 10 February location and approximately 26 km Hoi An 10 15-43N In northeastern Quang location and Quang Tin Province (AT approximately 968392), about km 26 a possible associate of the PAVN 3rd Regiment south-southwest of Hoi An. In northeastern 2nd Tin 2nd Division Province possible associate of the PAVN 3rd Regiment, Division, -4- -4-
TOP SECRET FHNETOP 8~GR~T TRI1'JE
---
# Doc ID: 6637227
# Doc Ref ID: A6637226
|18 February|15-41N 108-20E|
|---|---|
|12km southeast of its 14 February location| |
|14km north-northeast| |
|12 km southeast of Cam Y| |
|14 February|15-52N 108-10E (AT 984569)|
|10 February|15-52N 108-10E (AT 984569)|
|18 February|15-42N 108-09E (AT 956395)|
|14 February|15-51N 108-10E (AT 971540)|
|16 February|15-56N 108-01E (AT 807637)|
|13 km southeast of its 9 February location| |
|18 February|15-10N 108-40E (BS 504756)|
|16 February position and about 18 km northwest of Quang Ngai city| |
|15 February|14-09N 108-54E (BR733630)|
|33km northeast of An Khe| |
|17 February|14-09N 108-51E (BR 678641)|
|28 km northeast of An Khe| |
|18 February|14-09N 108-51E (BR 678641)|
|36 km west-northwest of its 17 February An Khe location| |
(2/612/VCM/T424-68, 181600Z RO521-68 R0528-68 T423-68 181225Z; T415-68, 172125Z; 181058Z; T408-68)
(2/612/VCM/T424-68, 181130Z; 171551Z 171800Z; R0522-68, T405-68, 171800Z; T405-68 181600Z; 171551Z; T423-68, R0528-68, 180735Z; 190418Z; 181225Z; 190418Z 180735Z; RO520-68 R0523-68 T415-68, R0523-68 162147Z 180715Z; 172125Z; R0519-68 18387 R0519-68, R0522-68, R0504-68, 170840Z; 181058Z; 180710Z; R0504-68, R0521-68, RO500-68 R0520-68, 181130Z; 170840Z; RO500-68, 162147Z 180715Z; (Bi16JRHT Bae !£4)
---
# Military Region 1
|Date|Location|Details|
|---|---|---|
|17 February|11-13N 106-45E (XT 907393)|An unidentified terminal tentatively associated with PAVN 7th Division located near Binh Duong Province.|
|18 February|11-11N 106-39E (XT 8137)|Another unidentified terminal located in the vicinity of Bong Trang and Highway 2A.|
|18 February|11-09N 106-46E|An unidentified terminal located about 20 km east-southeast of its position in Binh Duong Province.|
|18 February|11-07N 106-47E (XT 951288)|A subordinate control located in northern Bien Hoa Province.|
|13 February|Approximately 30 km southeast of its position in Binh Duong Province|Authority location.|
|16 February|11-11N 106-48E (XT 959359)|An unidentified station subordinate to a control authority located in Tay Ninh Province.|
|16 February|10-58N 107-05E (XT 287144)|VC 274th Regiment relocated to Long Khanh Airbase in Bien Hoa Province.|
|16 February|10-58N 107-05E (YT 287144)|VC 274th Regiment relocated to Long Khanh Airbase in Bien Hoa Province.|
|16 February|11-00N 107-03E (YT 244167)|New position approximately 25 km east-northeast of Bien Hoa.|
Additional SIGINT information suggests that the unidentified Front Headquarters may have operated in Binh Long Province, just north of Saigon.
On 15 February, in Binh Long Province, the Front Headquarters may have relocated to an area approximately 90 km south of Saigon.
---
# Doc ID: 6637227 Doc Ref ID: A6637226
15 February position_adquartersin pe generalarea ofits unidentifiedFrontHe
unidentified Front Headquarters in pe general area of its 15 February position.
inM1 Vietnamese Vietnamese continue Communist military intelligence (MI) communications Communist to reflect interest in Allied military intelligence in Allied activity in Tay(MI) communications
Ninh, in MR Binh Duong , and Long Khanh 1 continue to reflect Khanh Province s Long interest activity in Tay
Ninh, Binh Duong, and Provinces.
106-05E ,XT 1948) waS reported Bureau (MIB _ AVietnamese Communist attack on Tay Ninh city (11-18N
Vietnamese Communist attack in on message of 18 February Tay Ninh city (ll-18N
subordinate from pe 106-0SE, Military Intelligence Bureau
from 330698), located on tely January norpeast of Tay pe XT Military 1948) approxima 27 January near (MIB) was Intelligence reported in a message 11-29N of COSVN
of COSVN to of 106-13E to 18 February a
(xT330698) located subordinate on 27 23km norpeast near 11-29N 106-13E
Tay Ninh city.
MIB COSVN directed all "groups" of Allied MIB Allied reactions to pe attack. maintain of
(XT COSVN directed approximately all "groups" 23 km to to maintain close
According to close collateral Ninh
surveillance city.
16 February. attack on
of Communist reactions on Tay Ninh to pe Ninh city was conducted collateral attack. According to on
a Communist attack Tay city was conducted on
16 February.
subordinate itoriously MIB COSVN praised pe In In a congratulatory message of 17 congratulatory message of "victories" pat pe 17 February to pe same February and called "contributed to same
mer subordinate, MIB toward pe common pe COSVN MIB common victory praised "victories" called for pat "contributed
"greater victories pe bureau [COSVN ] "had directed pe
meritoriously toward pe MIB COSVN reported victory," pat "pe chief of pe and
for Party committee of "greater victories." COSVN reported pat directed chief comrades" pe of pe
"to sacrifice or Party endeavor to hardship. committee of
struggle wip even pe bureau even more had [COSVN]"
enpusiasm , being
pe comrades unafraid of of commendation from pe Chief of COSVN conveyed to pe subordinate
"to endeavor to struggle wip MIB COSVN more enpusiasm, being unafraid
pe Party committee conveyed to pe for pe subordinate
subordinate a commendation successes Chief from
pe of pe Party committee for pe
subordinate's successes.
pe previous night 106-39E
element
element In reported to it 18 February,
In a reported message of its
to of its 18 unidentified control
had fired on "five predetermined targets unid&ntified
February, a Vietnamese Communist MI
control aupority pat aupority Communist pat MI on
cn
at pe Lai Khe previous [I1-12N night 106-39E, f::i_red 7737] ."
it had XT on "five The element predetermined furper targets
stated pat "pe comrades" were 7737]."
on at
stated "new enemy activities.
Lai Khe [ll-12N" pe comrades" were XT
This element had reported to continuing to observe
continuing The to element observe and report furper and pe report
control aupority on 17 February pe
control
on "new enemy activities." on 17 Februa-ry This pat "eight artillery pieces element
pat hill at coordinates "eight had reported artillery topieces pe
XT
This subordinate has been
reporting on
XT 7 590036500 pe Lai [11-llN Khe -Ben Khe-Ben Cat (11-O9N 106-35E,
106-37E J." This subordinate XT 7433) has been
area since on
reporting early February, pe 7p Division_and had indicated an association Lai Cat (11-09N 106-35E, XT 7433)
wip pe PAVN
area since early February, and Bop had pe indicated subordinate and pe an
association
control aupority Division.
control pe aupority PAVN 7p were located in central Binh Duong Province were located ~7 -Bop in
pe subordinate
Binh Duong and Province pe
---
# Doc ID: 6637227 Doc Ref ID: A6637226
YOP SEEREF FRTNE TOP SECRET Tltf frqE /R43-683 /0 /STY /R43-68 3 /0 /STY.
at at 1l-1ON 106-37E (XT 753343)on11 Februaryand11-1SN 11-lON (xT 658437)on 753343) 106-37E (XT on 11 respectively11-lSN February and 106-37E 14 February, 106-37E (XT 658437) on 14 February, respectively.
atXuanLoc revealed(10-56N 107-15E_Allied Intensive interest series of message on in LongKhanhProvinceinAlliedair in YT 4609)and ground activities air and ground activities wasXuan Loe at (10-56N in 107-lSE, YT 4609) "(MIs) _17, in 16 16,Long Khanh 18 February175pand 18 from aProvince, was pe Military IntelligenceSection on to to pe revealed Military in a Intelligence series of message Section (MIS), Sp LID , andLID, fromFebruary subordinate subordinate.
In In construction and a message of 16 February, pe and transportation subordinate reported on 16 February, pe subordinate vicinity of Xuan reported Xuan on Allied in pe Loc Allied and construction mentioned troops transportation of pe ARVN 18p collateral According to Loc vicinity pe of 18p Division and in pe of ARVN and pese 52nd Ranger Loe mentioned Battalion troops of pe ARVN Division and bop pe of ARVN 52nd units Ranger maintain headquarters Battalion. According in Xuan Loe. to collateral bop pese units maintain headquarters in Xuan In In "80a to later message later 100 laborers of were widening 100 bulldozers g018 message of 18 February February, day to subordinate reported pe pat "80 indicated to pat laborers go were widening a down each day to dig trenches" and dig trenches" and pat field_ indicated pat bulldozers field.
central at and Khanhat 11-O6N TheMISandits subordinate were located on 17 February The MIS Long Khanh subordinate 107-15E (YT 452280) and soupern its were located on 17 February in in central Long 10-49N107-29E (YS107-lSE at 11-06N 729969) _(YT 452280) and soupern LongKhanh at 10-49N 107-29E (YS 729969), respectively_ respectively.
Finally, r'inally, ipasbecomeapparent pat MI elements of pe VC 275p Regiment pe regimental headquarters and 275p Regiment, VC SpLID 5p LID --namely, namely, subordinate MI pe (bop unlocated) element of reappeared in communications and being inactive pe regimental communications since at least pese elements have since resumed report however, in since headquarters October 1967; at since a subordinate least 2 February after 2 February (bop unlocated) after aFparently have not being inactive October 1967; ing however, pese elements aFparently not resumed reporting.
(2/G10 /VCM/T293-68 _ 1816572 ; 181657Z; T291-68 1815152 ; T290-68 1814032 T289-68 , 1813502 T288-68 1812492 ; T285-68 = 1707052 ; 1809142 ; T283-68 1805142 1711482 T289-68 T282-68 _ R96-68 ,161001Z ; 3 /0 /STY /R41-68) Kenen5 181350Z; 1804522 T288-68, T278-68 181249Z; T285-68, RIO1-68 180914Z; 1808592 ; T283-68j R97-68_ 180514Z; T282-68, 180452Z; T278-68, 170705Z; RlOl-68, 180859Z ; R97-68, 171148Z; R96-68, 161001Z; 3/0/STY/R41-68) (61i18Riff il#?iH)
Military Region 3 On 18 February pe radio station serving pe probable Agency was Provincial Branch (VLPB Vinh Long located at Branch 10-O5N(VLPB)105-56E (xS 058 158) in eastern of pe Liberation News
Agency was located at 10-0SN -8 -105-56E (XS 058 158) in FFOP SEEREF FRHNE -8- TOP SECRET TRI~,E
---
# Doc ID: 6637227 Doc Ref ID: A6637226
vicinityon The probablepe probableVinh LongProvincial Vinh Long Provincenear Committee Province Vinh Committee.Long station13 February_ PhongDinhProvincewas foundto beofThe probable near pe VLPBhadbeenlocatedinpesame VLPB Apreviously reportedin probable had been Vinh located reportedrelocationofLong Provincialpe same pisstationtowestern vicinity on 13 February. previously relocation invalid_ pis to western Phong Dinh Province was found to be invalid.
(3/o/STY/R37-68) ~ononarn svur? 2 _ 2. DRV_Communications DRV Communications DMZArea DMZ Area InpeKheSanharea PAVNtacticalvoice communications of 17 February reflectedpe pe In pe K.he Sanh area, PAVN use PAVNgas usetactical masks by elementsofgas voice communications tentativelyassoc iatedwip of17 February reflected pe of 304pDivision masks by elementsOn papate tentatively one ofpesewipassociated elementsPAVN pe directed 304p a 12p and14pDivision. On Battalion pat date,to distributegas ing one of pese elements masks directed to peir unitsand a 12p because14p 16 Februaryare reportedlybedirectioncenter associated wip Battalion gasagentstodistribute gas masks used by"peenemy" to peir units, becauseOn KheSanh unidentified unidentifiedare possiblefire elements 16 gas February agents was noted a PAVN artillery elements PAVN possible reportedly notedcallingfireon -- artilleryfirebeingdirection used onhelicopters landingby centerin in"pe pe vicinity of peassociatedofenemy". vicinityOnwip Khe peKhe at Sanh -- Sanh Airfield_ possiblereferenceto Additionally, was calling Itwa $ fire revealedpat 12 helicopters 12landinghelicopters andpe and "one big guest" at Khebig were pe targetsto bereferencepatfixed wing Sanh Airfield. It was revealed helicopters aircraft reconnaissanceelementofpePAVN "one guest" -- a possible firedon 325C Division to fixed wing possible aircraft -- were pe targets to be fired on. Additionally, a reportedreconnaissance pat26 roundshad reported on on 16 commandpost 16 Februaryelement February pat runway andhelicopterareas of26 of rounds pe had PAVNlandedon targetlanded 325C Divisionon target inperadar Khepe in SanhCombatBaseradar, command post, runway and helicopter areas of K.he Sanh Combat Base. InpecentralDMZ mentioned attacking 241 anelementofpe PAVN 164p Artillery Regimentpe 16-46N106-55E February75-mmstating Regiment In on on 19 19February central DMZ, mentioned an element attackingof pe PAVN 241 (CampArtillery164p Carroll (Camp Carroll, 16-46N 106-55E, YD 067543) YD 067543),75-mmhowitzer)"mountain stating a "mountain cannon"cannon" (probable probablereferenceto roundreference round to"createtotension _ howitzer) would would occasionallyfire one one to "create tension." reported achievements 18 February, In messageon pe27p IndenendentBattalion In a achievementsofpe claimed208 Allied troops from 19 JanuaryBattalionIndenendent toincluding 15 February reported Thebattalion of pe battalion from 19 January to 164 Americans 15 February. The and 25 possible governmentofficials killed;battalion claimed 208 Allied troops -- including 164 Americans -- and 25 possible government officials killed;
---
# Doc ID: 6637227 Doc Ref ID: A6637226
14 vehicles and 1 bridge destroyed on Route 9 and various
Company will possibly be pe company for an unspecified battle.
PAVN (possibly pe PAVN 320p Division) ordered pe 1st Battalion, 803rd Regiment, to have two reconnaissance missions.
The 1st Battalion is believed to be operating in pe general vicinity of Quang Tri city.
On 18 February, a message from pe PAVN 812p Regiment indicated furper soupward movement by pe regiment.
Possible subordinate Companies 14, 15, 16, and 17 "going to Hue," moving during pe day wipout stopping.
(2/G11/VCM/T1337-68, Change One, 181640Z, T1347-68, 182210Z)
PAVN High Command sent eight unusual messages of "very high" precedence on 15 February.
An unidentified station associated wip pe PAVN High Command complex received a significant increase in volume of pese unusual messages.
On 4 February, pe average volume of pese unusual messages resumed.
An unidentified subordinate of PAVN High Command on pe Vietnan has relocated in a soup-easterly direction to a new location.
---
|Doc ID|6637227|Doc Ref ID|A6637226|
|---|---|---|---|
|INon - Non Responsive I|Responsive|YOP SEERET TRTNETOP SECRef|'fllINP: /R4:3-fr83/0 /STY /R+3-68 3/0 /STY|
|noted on 18 the bruary _ 18kmfrom|noted on 18Feformerlocationinthe February, represents a move of approximately area of 16-14N106 - 58Eof approximately and055 979), also (Yckm 18 (ye Thua979), 055 from theals0 former inLaosnear in Laos South Vietnam location near theborderof Quang the theborder area of Quang Tri 16-14N Tri106-58E ThienProvinces and Thua Thien Provinces, South Vietnam.|(3/0/STY /R40-68 ;R26-68) _SFCRETSAILTN )|(3/0/STY/R40-68; R26-68) CSEGPET SAVIN}|
|DRV_Neval Activity|DRV Naval Activity|A6A-type aircraftinterestAn apparentinterest andthree inan in additionalaircraftcarriersanaircraftcarriertransportingaircraft carrier transporting|an undeterminedtypeofaircraftwa s 17 Februaryin A6A-type aircraft and three additional aircraft carriersexhibited Infragmentaryanundetermined~ype a Infragments3-ry the Bai ChayForwardArea anddelayed-action addition, North VietnameseNavalmessage was North Vietnamese toForward mines Command Naval of aircraft message of 17 ofPoston CacBaexhibitedFebruary.in addition, the Bai Chay Area Command Post on Cac Ba bombs Islandwarnedal1unitsto avoid mines Island andto warned take: precautions against enemydelayed-actionall units avoid and strikesat night _ bombs and to take· precautions against enemy strikes at night.|
|(2 /Q1 /VCN /To06-68|(2/Ql/VCN/T006-68, 1708242 )|(SLERLTSAV IN ) ~BECKEi SAviN)|Overland_Infiltration lementon Comunicationsof mentionedroad construction which Communications 18 February mentioned of a possible A Shau Valley possible Shau Valley engineerwouldconstructionwhichwouldengineer enable (16-18N 107-23E element GAZ-63trucksto travelfrom Route12to Ta Luong enable GAZ-63 on 18 trucks 5503 on 20 February. YD to travel from Route road 12 {SECKE I to Ta LuongDFY IL ( 16-18N 107-23E, YD 5503) on 20 February. (SEGRE I SAO 12')|
---
|Doc ID:|6637227INon -|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637226 Responsive|
|FOP SECRET FRINETOP SEClt~T Tltzqf:|/R43-683 /0 /szY /R43-683/0 /STY 2 -12- ~TOP SECRET TRTNE I OP 51!:CltET TltITzq~|
---
Doc ID: 6637227Responsive IINon - Non Re .sponsive.. Doc Ref ID: A6637226_TOP SECRET TRNE
... 3/0 /STY /R/3-68
3/0/STY /Rlt3-68
-13-
YOPSEEREFFRFNE-13-
TOP S~GRET TRl~•E | {
"Who": ["NSA", "Military Region 5", "PAVN 1st Division", "PAVN B3 Front", "Vietnamese Communist Forces"],
"What": ["Military activities in Vietnam", "Communist activities", "SIGINT information", "Troop movements", "Attack plans", "Location of bases and regiments"],
"When": "19 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Laos-Kontum Province border", "Khe Sanh area", "An Khe", "Binh Duong Province", "Tay Ninh city", "Xuan Loc", "Long Khanh Province", "Phong Dinh Province", "Quang Tri city", "Binh Long Province", "Quang Ngai city", "Hue", "Bong Trang and Highway 2A", "Bien Hoa Province", "Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces", "A Shau Valley", "Ta Luong"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: #
Doc ID: 6637233 Doc Ref ID: A6637232
3/0 / STY/R46-68
SECURITY 22 February 1968
DIST: 0 /UT SEA
DIST: SIG SUM 46-68 SEA SIGSUM 46-68
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Non - Non Responsive I Responsive
Doc ID: 6637233 Doc Ref ID: A6637232
FOP SEERET FRHAE TOP SECRET TRI~l~
3 /0 / STY /R46-68
22Feb 0 /UT
3/0/STY/R46-6868 21202
DIST : 22 Feb 68 2120Z
DIST: O/UT
NATIONALSECURITYAGENCY NATIONAL ASIA SIGINT_SUMMARYSECURITY AGENCY SOUTHEAST ASIA SIG INT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia information in NSA at report of publication on throughout This available to summarizes report time developments noted 22 February1968 Southeast All available to NSA this at report of time is publication based entirely on February except on 22 SIG INT 1968. where otherwise All where information specifically indicated in this is based entirely on SIGINT except otherwise specifically indicated.
# CONTENTS
|Situation Summary|1|
|---|---|
|Communist Southeast Asia|2|
|Communist Southeast Asia|Military|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications South Vietnam|2|
|DRV Communications|6|
FOPSEERET FRINE THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/9 PAGE(S) TOP SECRET TRINi
---
# Doc ID: 6637233
# Doc Ref ID: A6637232
|INon - Non Responsive I|Responsive SITUATIONSUMMARY|
|---|---|
|elements of the Recent messages exchanged between military intelligence|PAVN exchanged between PAVN B3 Front have military intelligence|
|1st Division and indi-|Indicated South Vietnam Communist Division in two areas of Kontum Province|
|highlighted 7th Division and the|Highlighted by the Military Region in (MR)|
|PAVN impending Vietnam's by the relocations of|Military Region the two 5. division the (MR) possible Hq,|
|while suspected forward ele -|Possible 5. areas Activity in MR|
|Activity of Hq, Kontum MR 1 was 165th Regi-|165th Regi-in Province 1 was|
|ment, in southern Binh Duong the|PAVN 7th Division and Province division's VC while suspected the probable forward ele-|
|ment Viet southern southward to Province,|Binh Duong 9th Light Infantry probable in MR 4,|
|in MR 4, the Hq, Viet has Cong (VC) 273rd Regiment|VC 9th Light Infantry Divi-Divi-|
|sion, has moved southward to a position near the city limits of|Saigon o|
|tinued In to be western pressure against DMZ helicopter landing zones at maintaining|In the western called DMZ area, Communist artillery fire Khe on area, Communist artillery fire the con-|
|airstrip. To be Tocalled the east east, helicopter 803rd Regiment is maintaining|On the PAVN landing zones at the Khe Sanh|
|its airstrip. To the Allied forces near Regiment|Allied the Cua Viet Quang Tri the PAVN 803rd Quang Tri city and its is|
|interdiction of shipping in its pressure against|Forces near channe 1 city SIGINT and indi-|
|Indi-cates that the Hq, shipping Regiment has remained in the same indi-812th Regiment in|The Cua Viet channele SIGINT same general|
|area|Cates since 12 February. That the Hq, 812th has remained in the general|
|area since 12 February.| |
---
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES|
|---|---|
|IN MILITARY REGION 5|IN MILITARY REGION 5|
|Tam Ky|Probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit|
|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|
|Possible Rear Services Element|Possible Rear Services Element|
|KONTUM|Probable 1st Division Element|
|CAMBODIA|Pleiku|
|CAMBODIA|Thanh|
|PLEIKU|DARLAC|
|Unidentified Subordinate HQ, MR5 Provincial Unit Central|Ban Me Thuot|
|83 Front Associate|CcdCT|
---
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. MILITARY
1. Vietnam
Vietnamese Communist Communications - Soup Vietnam
# Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue
Communications serving PAVN engineer elements in pe A Shau Valley indicate pe possible introduction of new engineer elements into pe area.
On 21 February, messages mentioned an unidentified Battalion wip two tons of explosives being sent to Ta Luong (16-18N 107-23E, YD 5503) and one company of an unidentified Battalion (16-18N 107-23E, YD 5503) being sent to assist in road construction at Lang Ngot (unlocated).
# Military Region 5
Provincial Unit in east-central Quang Tin Province informed an unidentified subordinate unit on 20 February pat it was in a difficult situation near 15-31N 108-22E (BT176163), 15 km soupwest of Tam Ky.
An element in central Quang Ngai Province was located near 15-02N 108-43E on 27 December, a possible rear services element 58 km soupeast of its city.
In Darlac Province, a PAVN B3 Front-Associated element was located norpeast of its position (ZU 181820) on 20 February, 25 km soupwest of Ban Me Thuot (12-30N 107-55E) and 12 km norp-norpeast of its Hq, MR5 position (BQ 072057) on 21 February.
---
Doc ID: 6637233 Doc Ref ID: A6637232
4FOP SEEREF FRHNE TOP SECRET TRl~•E
3/0 / STY/R46-68
military intelligence(MI)elementsofthePAVNIst betweenIn KontumProvince In Kontum Province, recentmessages recent messages exchangedbetween exchanged Division andMI elementsPossComunist attacks againstPAVN military intelligence ibly (MI) associated elements with thePAVNB3Fronthaveof the PAVN 1st Division indicated impending and MI elements possibly associated with the Allied positionsB3 Front have nearthe indicated DakTo impending areaCommunistand Kontum city. (MIS) attacks against In 21 FebruarymessageAllied positions to near the Military IntelligenceSection "nowtheopportunityto theOak To area and Kontum city. In a IstFebruary 21 1st Division, messagean unlocatedsubordinate reportedthat tothe Military Intelligence Section (MIS), Division, an strike unlocated is very goodbecauseat subordinate because PleiLangLo the enemyhasmoved"to theeast strikeeastis of "PL, very "PL," subordinatestatedthat (14-40N good possibly at present the enemy 107-41E has moved" to YB had902223). The The subordinate cbserving"chegro undsituation there possiblyPlei stated Lang thatLo (14-40Na reconnaissanceteam reconnaissance 107-41E, tea.qi andarrivedin"PL"andwas o bserving indicatedthattherewascne ofPL _ had cheenemy arrived in situationwe st of "PL" and was The "the subordinacefurtherground situation there and the enemy situation west Allied squadsubordinate PL~" The andone 81-mmortarfurther there -indicated that there was one Allied squad and one 81-l!lln morta r there. On On 22 Februarythe 22 of the politicalcommissar subordinate that"thefor February the MIStold this ofthe MIS told this subordinate that were "the directives thecomrades directives of to the fightforthe political commissarcompletion,theprobably of MISprobablyof thethatdivision were mission, mission,is "thetosooner, isthebetter • 11 and the comrades soonerfight for the completion,11 TheMISfurther stated of the "there "the muchthatis the favorable"andthatitwas better The further "good oppor -11 tunity.is tunity.11 alsodirectedthe "there The much subordinatewas instructedto it that favorable" that "guaranteevictory was a "good TheMIS subordinateto sendsomeone someonemedicine chemeet detachmentwhich had The MIS als o directed arrivedon theFebruary 21 February ,20 Februarybringing medicine.theInthesubordinate to send to In anothermessage detachment which of had arrived on 20 MISinstructed bringing secondsub- ordinatemessage reportlocated onon February:. detail21 15 Februarynear 14-39N ofon the MIS instructed107-42Esecond a (YB 921229)sub- to ordinate, in located 15 the February Allied positionatDak this Keng near 14-39N 107-42E Ro Keng (14-4lN(YB 921229), 107-42E , to report YB 920264) :1 onin detail approximatelyposition th the Allied 3km north of at Oak Ro subcrdinate(14-4 1N locationYB The MIS requestedinformationabcutthe numberof 107-42E location. The920264) MIS bunkers requested approximately infonnation metal 3 km no rabout house s ofthethisnumber subordinate'sof artillery pieces_ artillery pieces, bunkers,a5theAlliedsheet tents tents, sheet metal houses,Inan ea r lie ro fandrows of and earlierrows messagewirethe barbedwire the barbed of aswell as wellsame date j datethe thesubordinate Allied strength there strength reportedto ofDakRoonthere. In theMISon an Allied ground andair transportationin 874290or 14-42N message of same the subordinatethe vicinity reported to the MIS Kengand Hill Allied ground and 751 air (14-43N transportation YB 107-39E in the vicinity of Dak 107-40E ,Ro YB880273) . Keng and Hill 751 (14-43N 107-39E, YB 874290 or 14-42N 107-40E YB 880273). B3Front-associated elements discussedpl=ansfor appraising AlliedMessages Messages passed duringche pe ricd17to possiblePlansto passed during chehave period indicated 17 t o 21 Februarybecween 21 February between attack Konttnn B3 Front-associated andhave Kontu city and elements have indicated possible plans t o attack city have discussed plans for appraising Al l ied 3 - FOP SEERET FRHNE -3- TOP SECRET TRI~~E
---
|Doc ID|6637233|Doc Ref ID|A6637232|
|---|---|---|---|
|mortars, artillery reaction capability andcanks| |reactioncapabilityand determiningthelocationsof Alliedand|detennining Theattacks possibly will the locations of Alliedinvolve|
|elementso fthePAVN and mortars, artillery, 24thRegiment tanks.|The the headquartersofwhichwasattacks possibly will involve|located on elements on of 15 Februarynear Unit,locatedon the PAVN 24th Regiment14-28Nthe 108-O1E 18 Februaryneartheheadquarters (AS 794020)which wasof andthe| |
|probableKontumProvincial located 15 February near 14-28N 108-0lE (AS 794020) and 14-26N probable 108-08E Kontum Provincial (AR 901984) _Unit, located on 18 February near 14-26N 108-08E (AR 901984).|the probablesouth, To To the south, the probableHq, the probable 107-40EPAVN B3 Front to Hq, PAVN B3 Front AuthorityandAuthority|elementnot Amessage(13-50N Division elementreported thatPleikuOn Province to the attackLeThanh to Province.attack probable Le to day .| |
|1stDivision element Thanh 1st strikeof1stpositionDivisiontheany position where hadreported of 20 February wherethereare 20 February107-40E, cautionedthe westernhave cautioned YA 8930)inwe stern Pleiku YA continued8930) in theare1st people no discuss plans|the hadfollowing element not strike andthat everymeans Thanharea nothat any had been exploredorders|the been followingfollowed day, the 1st Division element to orders determine had determinefollowed,ofpenetracingcheLe been means and that every means been explored repcrtThis to| |
|alsc also suggestedthat villagerswe re to Le|suggested (0600Z)that 21 February,andmentioned at a means of villagers penetrating werethe to be urgedarea.enter be Thanh urged at "newLeThanh _11toenterLereport|ThisLe Thanh at 1300(0600z)on hours21 on February, B3 Front and Front Authority"new mentioned Le Thanh.| |
|orders Lessthantwo 1st Less Division element later, 1st Divisionthan twoelementforbeing"tooslowincarryingout yourhours andindicatedthatitwas later,for being the the B3"too toitslow nethepost Authority reprimandedthe|in cessaryto outcarrying reprimanded find yourwaythe to make contactwith thepeople • • " and indicated that to destroy the that was necessa ·ry indicated"weShortlyway.h -to find a|thereafter to make contact theIst DivisionwithDivision element the peopleelement reported thatdestroy po st. Shortlyare determined thereafter,to carryout| |
|the 1stinspectthe mission, reported"new out the mission," and and indicated chat "we thatThanh"detach-area detac|ment Thismessage Thanh" hadgone also reporcedthatiftheenemywere peopleto B3Front|for accuracyat the"\'newLe withdrawfro for accuracy at the to Le Thanh".| |
|authority determininghow the strike|and This "oldLe with heavyweapons O" and strikemessageLe on with Thanh",also 21 February the enemyis wuldbenecessary _|placedon authorityj on 21 February, requested that dealingwiththe situation,special emphasis be| |
|Divisionelementwas info rmedattacks 'INOuld move closerto The|and whether additionalhow placed ondetermining additional mortarenemy the is dealing with the situation,1st|and mortar thatitcould move be necessary. Le The Thanh1st| |
|to Division (YA524567)on thewaslocated bySIG INTnear facilitate element "leadership ofthe info rmed that it taska" could The probable , closer 107-20EHq,Thanhto Le B3|Front to FrontfacilitateAuthoritywas Authority 16 February the was"leadership located (YA 787363)the probablelst andSIGINT|by of the probable14-04NDivisionelement tasko nearII14-04N probableThe 107-20E Hq, B3| |
|near524567) (YA 13-53Non107-34E 16 February} and the on 21 February _ 1st Division element near 13-53N 107-34E (YA 787363) on 21 February.|Finally,in BinhDinh Province|a subordinateoftheMIS ,MR 5| |
---
# Doc ID: 6637233 Doc Ref ID: A6637232
|TOP SECRET|TOP SECRET|
|---|---|
|3/0/STY/R46-68|3/0/STY/R46-68|
was was(BR 453335) by located by SIG INT on located approximately 21 11 SIGINT on 21 February near An February position. Khe and about 15km south of near 13-52N 108-38E north of this element (BR 453335), 8 February 11 lan south of An Khe and about 15 lan north of this element's 8 February position. R546-68 (2/612/VCM/R549-68 (2/Gl2/VCM/R549-68,2115112; 2/012/VCM/T456-68, T444-68 2119222; R548-682121452; T451-68, 2109202; 211922Z; R548-68, 2119052; R547-68 211905Z; R547-68, 2117102; 2117102; T445-68, R546-68, 2110302; T437-68, 211511Z; 2120252; 2002382; T444-68, 2/Gl2/VCM/T456-68, 212145Z; 2107202; T459-68_T451-68, 2109202; 2206552; T454-68 2122142) T445-68 211030Z; T437-68, T447-68 200238Z; 2112352; T446-68, 2112372; 210720Z; T459-68, 2/0/VCM/RIOO-68 220655Z; T454-68, 212025Z; Kccarrm T447-68, 211235Z; T446-68, 211237Z; 2/0/VCM/Rl00-68, 212214Z) (iiQiiii 6 OIIItl)
Military Region 1
Between 165p Regiment 22 PAVN 7p Division moved about 21km soup-eastward to PAVN 165p Regiment, a position in soupern Binh Duong about PAVN 7p Division moved Province lan soup-21 near 11-18N eastward 106-40E to position (XT818499), approximately 14km west in soupern Binh Duong Province of Phuoc near Vinh.
ll-18N 106-40E (XT 818499), approximately 14 km west of Phuoc Vinh.
On 21 February the suspected 7th Division Forward Element was in the approximately 12km southeast 11-13N area 106-45E (XT906396) located in the same general area near 11-13N of its 4 February 106-45E and 14km east of Lai Khe position. This new location of places the possible forward element Ben Cat 106-34E (11-1ON (XT 720370) 106-36E, forward XT 750340) 4 February XT element 750340) and 14 km east of Lai Khe (11-llN 106-34E, XT 720370).
Recently associated with the messages passed on the 7th Division have discussed a communications group suspected to be associated with operations being conducted by elements of the 7th Division in the area.
Communist tactical activity since Military Intelligence in the vicinity of 2 February of Lai Khe have reported on mentioning coordinated operations with elements of the PAVN 7th Division.
SnenrT (SFGDilf Bab IN)
5 - FOPSECRET TRINE-S- TOP e~CR:iT TR INF
---
# Military Region 4
|Military Region|4|
|---|---|
|The probable Hq, has effected VC 273rd Regiment|VC 9th Light Infantry|
|Division, probable city limits of Saigon. The|major southward move to a position near Saigon.|
|The probable regimental headquarters was located on Airfield in the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut (XS 853962) about 2 km east of last firm SIGINT location 106-42E on 22 February.| |
|DRV Communications|DMZ Area|
|PAVN tactical Communist artillery fire|Helicopter landing in the Khe Sanh vicinity|
|Communist voice communications continue to reveal|Fire direction zones at the artillery position in Khe Sanh were hindering observation until 0600z.|
|Possible fire direction center in the helicopter landing area using 16 rounds.| |
|Battalion--recently noted in the communications--reported strikes on the|position held by the first platoon, including three personnel were killed, including the squad leader.|
|Reportedly, the PAVN regiment utilized since late January, SIGINT indicates that suspect infantry elements, communicated with both Hq regiment of the PAVN 304th Division into two identical signal plans.| |
|One element communicated with both Hq, KSAF and has remained in the suspect infantry same general area since mid-January.| |
|The other element was on the same general area on 20 February at 16-41N 106-30E (XD 600444).| |
---
Doc ID: 6637233 Doc Ref ID: A6637232
INon - Non Responsive I
Responsive FOP SEERET FRHNETOP SECRET TRI~*E·
3/0 / STY/R46-68
3 /O / STY /R46-68
initially observed in SIG INT on 16-36N initially 106-39E observed (XDin 770370) - SIGINT on This element when 7 February when it was located at February which communicates it was located at only with Hq, only 16-36N with 106-39E Hq, PAVN (XD 304th Division, 304th 770370). Division, This 16-31N subsequently was subsequently located element, was which communicates located at 16-34N 20 February, respectively, indicating continued south-eastward movement.
Communicationsofthe Communications The continuing 3rd Ccmpany 803rd Allied forces near Quang Tri of the PAVN 803rd Reg:iment on 21 February city_ a large boat transporting against Battalion reflected continuing pressure against Battalion re reflected The possible pressure 3rd Allied the ported forces near it had Tri Quang sunk city. possible 3rd Company, amunition on 3rd reported Cua Viet Viet itch anne 1 had near Thanh Xuan sunk large boat (16-51N transporting 107-08E ~ YD 287648) with B-41 an ununition on the (16-5ON rocket fire & Cua channel The near company reported its location as river at reported engaged in Thanh Xuan (16-SlN its (16-52N ammunition replenishment 107-08E 3rd 107-08E location YD Giao Liem as Giao 287648) Liem with (16-SON B-41 rocket 107-08E, fire. YD 286641) , and was subordinate reportedly 107-08E and Vinh Quang (16-52N was engaged in ammunition YD 268660) replenishment Another from across . Battalion the river at Vinh Quang struck an ARVN 107-0BE, YD ARVN unit 268660). at Another (GOLF) 1000 (GOLF) 3rd Battalion 20 February , subordinate 70 while suffering casualties of one indi-and . Battalion the river at Vinh Quang struck an ARVN 107-0BE, YD ARVN unit 268660). at Another (GOLF) 1000 (GOLF) 3rd Battalion 20 February , subordinate 70 while suffering casualties of one indi-and killing 70 reportedly struck an unit at 1000 dead and one February, 20 wounded have Companies at and killing while 1 and suffering 3rd Battalion were 2 of the casual ties of one dead cated to one wounded have withdrawn Companies (16-48N daybreak the daybreak after 2 of 3rd attacking an American Battalion were indi- . company cated to at Phu Luu withdrawn at 107-10E after YD 324588) the night of attacking an American . 20 February . company at Phu Luu (16-48N 107-lOE, YD 324588) the night of 20 February. SIG INT indicated the Hq, SIGINT indicated the 107-20E (YD 478437) , the located on Hq, 812th Regiment was 812th Regiment was located on 21 location of this February near unit location of near this 16-4ON unit 16-40N since 107-20E 12 February . 12 February. (YD 478437), the same general
TOP SECRET TRINE-7- TOP SECRET TRINE
---
Doc ID: 6637233 Doc Ref ID: A6637232
INon - Responsive INon Responsive...... ~FOP SEEREF FRHNE TOP SECRET TRI!~E3 /0 / STY /R46-68
3/0/STY/R46-68
~8-
-8-
TOP SECRET TRI?1tE
---
|Doc ID:|6637233|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637232|
INon - Responsive INon Responsive. FOP SEERETFRINE TOP S~GR~T TRIP>J~ 3/0 /STY/R46-68 3 /O / STY /R46- 68 9- 4FOP SEERET FRHAHE-9- TOP SECRET TRI~,E | {
"Who": "Military Intelligence Section",
"What": "Nature of Vietnamese Communist activities, Military operations, Communication intercepts",
"When": "22 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Saigon", "Quang Tri", "Khe Sanh", "Kontum Province", "Binh Duong Province", "Quang Tin Province", "Quang Ngai Province", "Darlac Province", "Ban Me Thuot", "Pleiku", "Thanh Xuan", "Giao Liem", "Vinh Quang", "Phu Luu"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6636689 Doc Ref ID: A6636688
# 3/0 /STY /RO1-68
01 3/0/STY/ROl-68January 1968 SECUR DIST 01 January 0 /UT1968 SEASIGSUM 01-68 DIST: O/UT01 -68 SEA SIGSUM UNITED STATES SouthgaST ASIA SIGiNt SUMMARY THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Declassifiedand Approvedfor Release byNSA Approved for Release by NSA on 10-03-2018 pursuanttoE. 0 _ 10 - 03 - 2018 pursuant to E . O. 13526 13526
---
# SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT AGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY SIGINT SUMMARY
Southeast Asia This report summarizes developments noted in communication available to NSA throughout the time of publication.
All information available to NSA at the time of this report is based entirely on 1968 SIGINT except where specifically indicated.
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
# Communist Southeast Asia
I. Military
1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam ... 2
2. DRV Communications ... 55
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/6 PAGE(s)
---
|Doc ID|Doc Ref ID|
|---|---|
|6636689|A6636688|
'serving Vietnamese Communist In Military Region (MR) units in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province Vietnamese serving border area continue units Communist to reflect Allied in the Allied tactical Quang Nam-Quang activity_Tin
SITUATION SUMMARY 'serving Vietnamese Communist In Military Region (MR) units in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province Vietnamese serving border area continue units Communist to reflect Allied in the Allied tactical Quang Nam-Quang activity_Tin
The relocations: Province border of the probable Gia Lai area continue to reflect Provincial Unit PAVN tactical in Pleiku activity.
Province Hoa Province were in Karh Hoa of the possible Hq 18B Regiment, the western highlands PAVN 5th Division.
Dak To area of impending attacks in indications Kar1h Province were attacks against Allied forces in the western Kontum Province have appeared.
Indications of impending attacks against Allied forces in the western Kontum Province have appeared in messages passed between elements of the PAVN 1st Division.
In the DMZ reports on increased ground activity near Khe Sanh were contained in communications possibly serving elements associated with the PAVN 29th Regiment.
---
# COMMUNISTS OUTHEAST ASIA
COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. MILITARY
Vietnamese Communist Communications South Vietnam
|Military Region|55|
|---|---|
|Military communications serving Vietnamese Communist Division Reflections of Allied activity continue units in the Quang area appear in Nam-Quang Tin Province serving Vietnamese Communist 2nd Division units located on Nam-Quang 31 December in southern Quang area. Hq, PAVN 2nd Division located near 15-41N 108-06E on 31 December indicated a difficult situation on 31 December and that it intended to move on 1 January. It was probable that Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element located on 28 December near 15-39N 108-07E (AT 912310) indicated an unidentified subordinate of Hq, MR 5 Provincial Control located in southern Quang on 25 December in a difficult situation.| |
|An unidentified subordinate of the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit located in northeastern Quang Tin near 108-25E (Grid 245466) informed the provincial unit on 13 December that it was in combat and requested that close communications be maintained. In west-central Quang MR (Grid 245466) about to move near 15-48N 108-25E on 31 December, Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit Control was located in other activity in west-central Quang near 15-27N 106-59E (Grid 135075) on 30 December approximately 17 km south of its 27 December position. In the western highlands near Gia Lai Provincial Pleiku Unit located near 14-11N 108-11E (AR 968694) in northern Gia Lai Provincial Pleiku Province on 30 December reported approximately 31 km southwest that it was about to move on 31 December.| |
---
# Doc ID: 6636689
# Doc Ref ID: A6636688
TOP SECRET TKINE1
TOP ~f:Clll!: I 1 llfi>ql!:3/c /STY /RO1-68 3/C / STY/R01 ~68
|18B Regiment ~ PAVNSth Finally,inKhanhHoa|Finally, i n Kha nh DivisicrTcvedapproximately Hoa Prcvincec: che|
|---|---|
|eastwardbetween 18B Regime nt PAVN 135t handDiv i si cn mb e r31Decemb-r mo v "J d toapproximat e lypositionnear20 12 -23N109-03E|e astward be tw ee n(BP 885686)De c e13 and 31 about 15t o kma west ofNha Trangpos i tion n e ar 12-23N 109-03E (BP 885686)~ about 15 km we st of Nha Trang,|
(2 /G12 /VCM/ROo01-68 , 311550;R1740-67 (2/G12/VCM/R0001 -68R1734-673115522 ;R1739-67 1 , 31141 52 ; 0103002 ;Ri742-67 Ol0300Z ; R1742 -67,3108352R1736-573119152 ; R1741-67 .5 311915Z ; Rl 741-67 3113232 Rl740-67, 311550; 31 1 552Z ; 3110452 Rl739 - 67R1733-67 31 1415Z; Rl736-67,R1732-67 3106502 311323Z; R1731-67 Rl 734 - 67 , 3105312 311045Z ; R1730-67 Rl733-67 3105252 31 08352; R1729-67 Rl732 - 67 , 3106452 DEC 310650Z; Rl73 1 -67,LRCd 310531 Z ; Rl730 - 675 31 052 5Z; Rl 729 - 67t 310645Z DEC) ( ..,FGliiliiT 0rt;EIH) DakTo PAVNB3inKontumProvinceby el e ments Dak ToIndications Indications in Front Kontumcf impendingattacks ofthe havebeennotedinSIGINT ssages passed andtwo of Pr o vinc e be e n discussedinIe ssag e s PAVN Decenber impe nding element s byat t acks cnAlliedforces 0£ since PAVN1st by Military on Alli e d th e 31 forc e sDivision1st Divisionnear near TheseB3 PAVN attackshave Front hav e been not e d in SIGINT sin ce 31 De c e rrb e r o Intelligence elementa Frcbably the The s e attacks (MI)elementscf hav e b ee n d i scuss e d PAVN in meist Division pass E: d by Military unidentified Int e llig e nce (MI) e l e ments of th ':~sssociated PAVN 1stwichthe Divisiondivisionand two unid e ntifi ed e l e me nt s pr c bably £ss o ciat e d with th e division. On 31 December oneofche unidentifiedelements the probableautkcrityofche On 31 Dec emb,;r , one o f enemy two o f tJu":! unid E. ntifi e d infcrmedel e me ntsitssubordinate- - the (unlocat e d) C2Wa S to ctherhillsin wiinforme d fron BaiLe unlocated)C2) wasfrom quicklystrike withdrawn addressed C2)that probabl e autr. o r i.ty "the ch e twohas- - its subordinat e (address e d andthat and from" t h e e r e ne my has the th drawnarea from "The Bai divisionLe order"for o th hills in "thear e a." th s ob jective ." "The division'sIt was furtherfor yourammunition ;"On2 January ,make ord_ r" estated:: C2 to quickly str i kernakE"i:h e effort:0conservean ob je ctiv e It was further stated on "On 3 32 January January~ ycumust an fire f::ffo rt met o methodically.cons e rve The withauthority The your authoritychen Thehour sandto wa $ ring crderedtc apparentlybe ammunition; firstth e noccursta te d a : 1700G onstatedthatthere Janu ar y,t ha t you th e r emus twere we r ef i r etobe thodically to ontwo January.twoattacksattacks, with subordinate cccur r ingthe cn 2 The first then a t:at t ac k t oapparently the 2area January . 1700 G, remain 05ooGon January.in for 12 subordinat e apparentlyattack ageinat was th e n or d ':!r ~d r'::' ma i n in th e area3 for The 12thatauthority then 107-535 Way 81 25) can °'t: atfindautborityto.and chenstated appa r,:: n t ly "ifJou ag.ai n find 0500G way toJanuaryon 3 attack that target The th e: n find s t at,.:d , "If tcyo ur.:. tac k actack Vio c.:sn (unidentified} anda w.a y to attack targ e t , th s n find a way to a. VlO un id e ntifi e d) and NgocHoi reconnaissancetean:stcdetermine (14-47N EB [When you] are finished _ send Ngoc in Hoi (14 - 47N 107 - 53 E, YB 8 12 5). [ Wh e n che resultsof theyou] ar e finish e d, attack send in r e connaissan ci:' Theunizis authorityalsoment ioned K9 tot ea ms rrerurn t o to de ts:·rmin,::the oldcommandpost oft h r:: r e sults ofth e ethe Division) , 66th Regimentuni t The the 66thRegiment : the attack. 66th 9thBattalionof the 9th Regiment." Battalion The Theofis to authority th,:; e: urn 66th Re gimentalso t o th 2 mE, nt ion e do ld subordinateto the sub o rdinat e c o mm a nd (probablythK9 probably1st post to of the 1st Division)
# TOPSEEREF FRNE -3 -
TOP ~~GR&r TRIP>J~
---
# Doc ID: 6636689
# Doc Ref ID: A6636688FOP SEERET FRHNE
Approximately one hour subordinate 31 6th Regiment) already later on 31 December, has already gone another message K8 At probably the 18th Battalion, stated "C2 out to El8. KB At the command post of the 166th sending message out El8 to possibly from (probably this time from the 8th sending THANG 1s E18 may represent a subordinate (Regiment) THANG stated 66th detachment out Regiment), detachment 11 C2 has then to out to gone Worksite 18 which has been under constant the command post of the 66th (Regiment) surveillance El8 may represent by MI elements of Worksite 18 the PAVN 1st has Ist been Division constant under surveillance by MI elements of the PAVN Division.
On 1 January the MI Section subordinate (mts) Hc 3rd apparently unit Ist Division passed activat the between 26 message December passed On the following message to January, following the: MI Section to a (MTS), subordinate, H.q, 1st apparently Division, activated and 29 December: "The 3rd Airborne assembled at the ed between airfield on 26 and 29 December securing positions prior January to return to "The Airborne Saigon unit Overcome every difficulty on assembl ed every Wait until at the difficulty the soldiers form up and, airfield in in January securing soldiers positions and to return prior to Saigon to to 0500GOSOOG on 3 January subordinate artillery attack and December near 14-361 when the C-130's land on 3 January. Wait ar. until the form annihilate them up when the This new (YB 957149), about C-130's land, MI subordinate was make ar artillery located attack on 31 of Dak Tone ar them." This new MI was located km southwest on 31 December 14.-36N 107-44E (YB 957149), about 9 km southwest of Dak To.
(2/Gl2/VCM/Rl738-67, 311410Z; 2/Gl2 IVCM/TOC04-67, 010721Z; T0006-67, 011300Z) Lanonnm (SFTPf'.i iAVIF)
---
|Doc ID|6636689|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A66366884FOP SEEREF FFRHNETOP SECRET|
|3/0/STY/RO1-68| |
|2 DRV Communications| |
|2, DRV Communications| |
|DMZ Area| |
|associated elements in the Khe Sanh Communications possibly serving the PAVN and Allied activity. Communications have elements are a have reflected increased ground possibly Are reported reflected clash with serving increased the PAVN ground 29th Regiment activity.| |
|reconnaissance in the Khe forces wounded, 30 December clash of equipment captured Sanh camcni area. Reported December resulted within an four Allied "enemy" killed and by PAVN and of Miet Xa 31 December quantity reconnaissance two wounded 30 tsam en with resulted in four "enemy" killed two On with a quantity an element of reconnoitering ported captured the PAVN by areas forces. On 31 (16-42N106-40E December an element XD 805478) reported Phu Can Ap reconnaissance (16-42N106-40E the areas of Miet XD Xa.798484) and Moc Bai Xa (16-42N106-40.E, XD 805478), (16-43N 106-421Ap778439) Phu Can XD 829498) (16-42N 106-40E, Reconnaissance of XD 79848L~) and Hill Moc 845 (16-4ON106-40E Bai Xa (16 - 1+3N 106-42E, XD was 829498). that also reported XD Reconnaissance On January an unidentified 106-40E, of Hill 845 (16-40N element reported XD 778439) was cadre three weapons and also reported. and four naps men wounded in another unspecified On 1 January had been lost had unidentified and that two an element reported cadre three that were missing weapons and two four other maps been lost, and that two battle were Terrain reconnaissance missing reconnaissance also been and completion of and two other by cadre mentioned men wounded in another unspecified unidentified preparations have battle. Terrain by cadre and completion further of indicating probable unidentified indicating probable preparations impending offensive impending have offensive also been actions in the Khe actions mentioned in the further Khe Sanh area CLITN (iiORliflf ii.I FUT) 5 - FFOP SEEREF FRHNE-5- Non Non - Responsive r Responsive TOP SECRET TRlt•E| |
---
# Doc ID: 6636689
Doc Ref ID: A66366884FOP SECRET FRHNE ~
Non - Non Responsive
Responsive
TOP SECRET TRftrqE3/0 /STY /RO1 -68
Changeto 3/0 /STY /R311-67
Change to 3/0/STY/R311-67
1. A 2 PAWN High Command [304th-320th Infantry Division:
2. A. Secondsentence Cornmand/304th-320th 2., PAVN High ofthis shouldInfantry "AreDivision:
Second ofthe sentence of this item should read item should read: "A re-evaluation "wayPAVN High Command-controlledcommunications group servingthe evaluation of "way stations"Command-controlled PAVN stations" ALFAthrough ECHOHigh ECHO indicatesthatcorrrrnunications stationBRAVOis possiblylocazedinthe group serving ALFA throughvicinityof 17-05NJ_ndicates that 106 -45E station BRAVO XD 8789)possibly is vice19-5ON 19-SON105-25E (WG 4394)2soflocated in thP vicinity 17-0SN previously reported 106-45E XD 8789 vice 105-25E WG 4394 as previously reported." FOPSEERET FRHNE-6- TOP 8EGRET TRI1>1JE | {
"Who": "National Security Agency (NSA)",
"What": "Summary of communication developments in Southeast Asia, Military activities of Vietnamese Communist forces, Impending attacks against Allied forces, Reconnaissance activities in various provinces",
"When": "January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Vietnamese border area", "Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province", "Kontum Province", "DMZ near Khe Sanh", "Gia Lai Provincial Pleiku Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6639380 Doc Ref ID: A6639379SSEERET S4VIN 2/0/VCM/R24l-67 SFOT REFORT 2/0/VCM/R241-67 AVC,AVN,ALS/OPER-G-HI. SPOT REPORT 30 NOVEMBER 1967 AVC~AVN 1 ALS/OPER-G-H/I.19072 DIST : 3¢ NOVEMBER 1967OSCAR VICTOR ALFA19¢7Z HCFPLUS WHTTE HOUSE DISTi OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA PLUS WHITE HOUSE HCF MAJORPAVN GROUND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS FROM MAJOR PAVN GROUND FORCE DEPIDYMENTS FROM MILTTARY REGION3 NORTH AND SOUTH MILITARY RmION 3 NORI'H AND SOUTH Mili SIGINTnow indicates a taryRegion (MR)and 320th Infantry Divisionsfrom MR 3 south and north, SIGINT now indicates major deployment byPAVN ground force unitsfrom deployment o by The Thetwo units involved arethe PAVN grom1d uni ts force and units from probable PAVN respectively.6(l\m) and is Military R.egion~th 3 is currently underway 3 currently underway two MR involved north,theare probable PAVNabdLth 32¢th Infantry Divisions from south respectively0 a threeSince with Since early November early these two divisions have been unobserveda DivisionactivityleastNcnrember, divisions almost all normal "internal"comunicationsatleast almost all have been"internal" normal unobserved.comrmmicationsat Meanwhile; associated with been observed~-two associatedcommunications three observed--two in connection withthe probable 3/hth Divisionandone in new communicationsentities with the firstenti3¢4th heard 12 November, vras connection suspect artillery regiuent andtwo unidentified regimental-echelonsubordinates been connection with the was found to be serving the probable a304th Headquarters and heard of five ofits connection five 12 its originalsix subordinates i eo, two suspect infantry regiments original the probable 32dth. in probable six found subordinates 329,tho to be serving The Thei.e.,theprobakie= wa tchgroup , firstafirst two entity, suspect infantry 3¢4th watch Headquarters andgroup, regiments!/ and one fi.rstin approximately the Abroadcast group,regiment Thedivision headquartersDivision. cations groups represent thebyfifthSubordinate onthesetwo communications ordinates in deploynent. suspect approximately cati.ons broadcast artillery groupsthegroup, Saine time by Hq, represent same which parallelsunidentified which parallelsMmeand Hq, probable 3d4th Division. of the Thedivision two the first group= probable the headquarters andfour ofthosefivesub - first 3¢!1.th group,regimental~echelon and wa8 also Thesetwo comuni- was four also activated at communications activated These those twosubordinateso five at communi-sub- groups had earlier deployed (July 1967)to MR 4ac Six subordinatesof the probable 304th Division hasbeen identified &sthe subordinate ofAAAofdeployed and to be Ofwhich has been and the southbcpetheThe ordinates groups had in earlier deployment. (July 3¢4th fifth 1967) Division subordinate to MR 4.conThe lastof the original hasThe in identifiedoriginal these last twoof the possible JthAAA Battalion and hag probablyremained in MR 3 south, as sinceThe4, along withthe suspect infantry regiment whichhasbeenin that areasinceMR division headquarterscontinues six division subordinate of the tentative MR3 southAir DefenseCommand Postsubordinates with unidentified at One unidentified regimental-echelon subordinate and headquarters the theBattalion suspect continues tentative the infantryprobable has be located in the general Vinh area) MRtosouth regiment probably remained located Air Defense in theCommandthat suspect ofMR 49 been general in the suspect artillery MR Post Vinh area area (ADCP)o as a as of regimentare unlocated atthistime Julyo Julyo One regimental~echelon subordinate suspect infantry reginent and an unidentified regimental-echelonsubordinate-- regiment infantry are unlocated this an locatedunidentified remainingtime. 0.fthe remainingtwosubordinates--a the two subordinates--a thefiratwas suspect tentatively located on 22November in the DMZ area at 16-57Nregiment and regimental~echelon subordinate-- 106-L6E (x 9777),dthe other in Iaosat 16-S0N 106-D8E (XD 225614 )on 1¢6-46E (XO 29 November_9777),d the first was tentatively Additionally, the watch group serving the DMZFront since 225644)Iaos hasthe other the regimental~echelon subordinate in Iaos22 on atNovember 1¢6-¢8E DMZ 16-5¢N in subordinate in Laos has the (ID area at 16--57N on beenobserved on 29 November.8 Additionally, the regimental~echelon since 18 Novemberandin continuing sporadically through 27 Novemberthe DMZFrontonly on Thesecommunications possibly indicate that the DMZ area is tentatively observedin comunications with continuing tentatively sporadically observed observed inon the watch group27 through comrru.nications serving November.the DMZ with ·the DMZ TheFront The other subordinatewasother Front 1s the ultimatesubordinate wasonly18on 22NovemberNovember 22 November.and of the probable 304th Division.followed destination Or the route to be followed during movement of the deploying units These destination comnronications probable the or route possibly to be indicate thatduring the movement DMZ areaof the the deploying ultimate units of the 3¢4th Division. Division and five unidentified subscribers the division. probable 32/th Infantry at leastas early and five subscribers,is als0 associated watchgroup consisting of a and least fiveThe third Comnications entity, a watch group Hq, The third subscribers 8 November . early as co:mnn.Ulications associated with out-of-country activitywas active8is alsoentity,This group one of which hasbeen firmlywith serves Hq 3out-of-country consisting activity was of control controlactive ingfour subscribersare unidentified, of Additional indications of' deployment bymessagedivision. equated to a suspect infantry regimentgroupone at theyfourto equated as and alsosuspect are five as unidentified infantry regiment message characteristics indicatethat November.subscribers, theserveswhich Although theremain-This ofwithcharacteristics 32¢th the of probable has Al though been32¢th firmlyremain-Infantry they are also subordinate to or associated with the probable32fth Division. ing are subscribersindications broadcast associated subordinateunidentified, to or serving this units the and replacement personnelprobable indicate onDivision. that infiltrating through IaosadeployEent High AdditionalConandmainline broadcastservingof by this division were notedon the PAVN unitsand replacement division were noted the High Command mainline through On 25 November Hanoirelayed ten messagesto one notedonOn 4 November ,four new subscriberswere noted PAVN infiltrating this broadcast net. Laos. On 4 November, relayed four new subscribers towereone of theseon THIS DCCUMENT CONTA TNS-2 - PAGES THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS -2- PAGES SEERET SAVTN Declassified and Declassified and ApprovedforRelease by NSA Approved for Release by NSA on on 10-31-2018 pursuanttoE.0 ._ 10 - 31 - 2018 pursuant to E . O . 1352613526
---
|Doc ID:|6639380|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6639379~SEERET SAVHNL8EGRET|
new subscribers using message characteristics unique to MR 3 north. 2/0/VCM/R241-67 messages were originated by an unidentified unlocated terminal which These 3 north.
subscribers using message characteristics unique to MR was These messages were subsequently observed on the watch group originated by an unidentified group serving the DMZ Front on terminal which was 27 November.
One message, also unique to units of MR3 north, was sent by this same unidentified terminal to the DMZ Front on 27 November.
Other technical characteristics displayed by the group serving the probable 32fth Division possibly indicate that this unit will or is presently serving infantry regiments in the Laotian panhandle for unknown points south.
The deploying subordinates of the 32@th Division probably include two suspect infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and an unidentified regimental-echelon subordinate.
SIGINT indicates that the other two subordinates of the unidentified regimental-division, another suspect infantry regiment, and the possible 14th AAA Battalion of the Headquarters are unlocated. All deploying subordinates and the 32/th Division will remain in MR3 north.
In summary, the SIGINT through 30 November indicates that at least eight subordinates of suspect artillery regiments, two of suspect infantry regiments, and three unidentified regimental-echelon subordinates. Evidence suggests the 32fth Division is heading for points in South Vietnam.
As noted, its deployment may possibly be through the Laotian panhandle or passing through the DMZ area. The 32fth Division's destination is unknown; its deployment may possibly be through the Laotian panhandle or to points in South Vietnam.
2/0/VCWR237-67.
2/0/VCM/R231-67, 2/0/VC?,v'R232-67o
3/0/STY/R171-67, 26 July 1967.
2/0/VCM/R237-67.
2/0/VCNR236-67.
3/0/STY/RJ.71-67, 20 July 1967.
2/611 /VCMR1221-67.
2/0/,VCM/R236-67.
2/Gll/VCM/RJ..221-670 | {
"Who": "AVC, AVN, ALS/OPER-G-H/I, HCF, MR 3 North and South, PAVN",
"What": "Deployment of PAVN ground force units, SIGINT indications, communications activities, movement of deploying units, technical characteristics, deployment plans",
"When": "30 November 1967",
"Where": ["DMZ area", "Laotian panhandle", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6639384 Doc Ref ID: A6639383SSEEREF SAVNI 2/0/VCM/R271-67 AVC ,ALS/ OPER-G-H/I _ 21 DECEMBER 1967 21382 2/o/vcM/R271-67 AVC,ALS/OPER-G-H/I. DIST 21 DECEMBER OSCAR1967 VICTOR KILO2138Z DIST:PLUS WHITEHOUSEKILOOSCAR/VICTOR PLUS WHITE 1967HOUSE PROBABLE PAVN 304TH AND PROBABLE PAVN3345TH_AND_320TH DIVISIONS--21DECEMER 1967320TH DIVISIONS--21 DECEMBER Vietnam,the probablePAVN 304th the SIGINT has continuedto provideevidence of the deployment of elements SIGINT has continued 304th and 32fth Infantry Divisions from Northto provide evidence of the deployment of elements of both ofboth the initiallyindicated by the disappearance these two divisiong probable PAVN and 320th Infantry in early November of allDi.vi.sions from North normal Vietnam, internal initially communicationsassociated with these indicated by disappearance in early November divisions.of Thisall reportsummarizestheactivity of thevarious nonnal"internal" communications two divisions_PAVN radiogroups which reflectassociated with two This the deploymentsouthward report summarizes southwardof theof the activity the divisions,PAVN of21various a5 of radio December _which groups reflect the deployment of the two as 21 December. Since earlyNovember the following communications developments have been associatedwith movements associated with the of the 30lthand 328th:following communications developments have been associated with the movements of the 304th and 320th: 1. Theappearanceon The appearance believedNovember on 9November of a of new HighCommand-controlled new High Command-controlled communicationsgroup believed Sionsaandthe communications later identification group temporarily service deployingsubordinatesdivi- to be of these HighCommand elementsof both divisions;bstations," fixed sionsa 'way stations fixed "way and the later identification which temporarilythese of service High deploying Command subordinates elements of the serving elements of the deploying divi-deploying as divisions;b Command-controlledbroadcast group2 . Anincreaseofseven subscribers An increase of sevengroup which subscribersserves groups and the receipt bythesewhichservessince early Novemberon the since groupsof replacement personnel NorthVietnan, subscribers ofunits infiltrating intoSouth Vietnam, Corrunand-controlled broadcast of messages encryptedinfiltrating in encrypted theDMZ areac(fiveofthesevennewby into system associated withPAVN unitsin South Vietnam, and the receipt these North Vietnam subscribersare believed and/or committedto s1-1bscri bers messages in a system associated with PAVN units in North Vietnam subscribers are believed and/or committed to be units units of thetwo divisions.); quartersThe appearanceof twonew possibly major Vietnamese quarters on 29 November &nd 16 Decemberon the radio 3. 3.The appearance of two new possiblymajor VietnameseCommunistheadwithgroup linking HighTheCommunist head- Command with major headquarters inor associated withSouthVietnamHighThe exact Command exactidentificationof thetwonew subscribers with major on 29 November and headquarters 16 December onin or associated 18 not presentlyknown .the radio group South Vietnam.d linking identification of the two new subscribers is not presently known. Novembercommunications Theconunications posture assumed by the probable 3 lth Divisionin early The posture assumed by the probable 304th Division in early watchnet remains unchanged.e November remainsunchanged has acquired since 14The probable Hq,PAVN 559th Transportation Group The December ,threenew 559th probable Hq, PAVN subscribers whichareTransportation Group usingnet watch signal plan unique communications associated with has acquired,unique to elements associatednewwith the 334th Divisionsince14 December, associatedwith the 32/thwhich three sμbscribers and/or theare 33lth DivisionsplanNormal usi.ng a on 12terminated continues subordinates.g ommunications groupthe 304th terminatedon11November Divisions.f signal Normal communications to elements associated with the whichwas Division320th and/ or 304th were The established were 304thNovember continues to be observed The division group on 11 November. The conununications and provides contactbetweenthe Hq,which was established 3g4thDivision tutedDivision on 12 November andfive on 13 November which parallels the other groupand broadcast and group five subordinates.gto be observed and The divisionheadquartersals0 insti- provides contact headquarters between alsothe insti-Hq, headquarters may be destinedfor thesame area of transited the area thattwo where Stationof headquarters that two subordinates may Station ECHO be destined theis located3g4th Division have transited SIGINT area east of for 304th the Division same areahave Laos. the indicateseast of Tchepone where ECHO located. The mostrecent The most in SIGINTare:recent locations of the deployingPAVN 3glth Divisionelements locations of the deploying PAVN 304th Division elements as reflected as reflected in SIGINT are: THIS DOCUMENT CONTATNS 3PAGES THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 3 PAGES Declassified and Approvedfor ReleasebyNSA Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA onon 10-31-2018pursuant 10 - 31 - 2018 pursuant toE. 0 to E . O. 13526 13526
---
# Suspect Infantry Regiment
Suspect
Infantry
Regiment
17-35N
17-35E (XE 6645)
12 December
Suspect
Infantry
Regiment
18-35N
105-35E (WF 6255)
16 December
# Unidentified Regimental-echelon subordinate
Unidentified
Regimental-echelon subordinate
16-28N
106-48E (XD 9222)
21 December
# Suspect Artillery Regiment
Suspect
Artillery Regiment
17-35N
106-05E (XE 1535)
15 December
Additionally, messages originated by an unidentified entity associated with the 34th Division have also been passed by Station ECHO as late as 15 December indicating that this entity was located in the area of 16-42N 106-19E (XD 425467).
Messages originated by Hq, 32fth Division have also been passed by Station ECHO indicating that at least an element of the division headquarters has been located east of Tchepone.
Laos SIGINT has been unable to contact its DRV communications between Hq, 320th Division since 8 November. Communications between the garrison and an element of Hq, the Military Region 3 headquarters, possibly left behind in the area, ceased to be observed on 18 November.
Messages from Hq, Military Region 3 North have indicated that suspect infantry regiment subordinates of the 320th Division are moving south. Messages from Hq, Military Region 3 North have also been passed by Station CHARLIE as late as 18 December.
In summary, the communications which have reflected the deploying elements of the 34th and 320th Divisions include: communications with its subordinates; the broadcast group controlled from High Command serving the Hq, PAVN 304th Division in communications with its subordinates; one group sporadically serving the Hq, PAVN 304th Division; the broadcast group controlled from High Command serving the Hq, PAVN 320th Division in communications with its subordinates; one group infiltrating into South Vietnam.
The locations of the deploying elements of the two divisions and the five way stations are depicted on a map included in the hard copy follow-up report.
# 2/0/VCM/R258-67
# 2/0/VCM/R250-67
# 2/0/VCM/R262-67
# 2/0/VCM/R252-67 and Supplements 1 and 2
# 2/0/VCM/R243-67, R263-67
# 2/0/VCM/R232-67
# 2/0/VCM/R264-67, R265-67, R266-67
# 2/0/VCM/R231-67
# 3/0/STX/R363-67
# 3/0/STY/R303-67
# 2/0/VCM/R241-67
---
# Doc ID: 6639384 Doc Ref ID: A6639383~ SECRET S4VTN
|NORTH VIETNAM|Hanoi|
|---|---|
|BRAVO Thanh Hoa|Inf Regt, 320|
|Inf Regt, 304|Delta Susp|
|LAOS|Susp Inf Regt 304|
|Hq, 301|EGHo 320 Div|
|Div Div|UTI Regt, 304|
|304 Assoc-element|SOUTH VIETNAM| | {
"Who": "Military Intelligence Personnel",
"What": "Deployment and movements of PAVN divisions, communications intercepts, signal plans, location of infantry and artillery regiments",
"When": "21 December 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Hanoi", "Thanh Hoa"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
3/0 /STY /R28-68 01 February1968 3/0/STY/R28-68 SECUR DIST : 01 February 0 /UT28-681968 SEASIGSUM 28-68 DIST: 0/UT SEA SIGSUM UNITED STATESOFAMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassifiedand Approved Declassified andApprovedforRelease byNSAon 10-16-2018 pursuantto E. 0 for Release by NSA on 10 - 16 - 2018 pursuant to E . O. 1352613526
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
NATIONAL ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at the time of publication on 01 February 1968, except SIGINT.
All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|Communist Southeast Asia|1|
|Military|1|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications|2|
|South Vietnam Communist Communications|2|
|DRV Communications|7|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 11/13 PAGE(s)
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
# CONTENTS
Non - Non Responsive Responsive
TOP SECRET TRTNETOP Cll E
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
# SITUATION SUMMARY
The eastern Quang Nam Province has been identified as serving in South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 5, a radio station.
In South Vietnam, contacts with Allied forces have been reflected in the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment PAVN 368B Artillery Regiment, while serving Communist units in Quang Tin Province.
Results of Communist attacks and preparations for further offensive activity were discussed by military intelligence elements from the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN in western Kontum Province on 28 January.
In MR 1, a message on 28 January discussed probable Allied units located in the Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border area.
In the area northwest of Khe Sanh in Laos, the major PAVN headquarters has been identified as the Khe Sanh Area Front headquarters, serving as the senior authority over PAVN Forces in the Laotian border area.
On 31 January, SIGINT indicated that Vinh Airfield probably would resume operational status within the next several days. Laborers were reportedly repairing the airfield and still had two craters to fill.
---
|THAI- LAND|LAOS|
|---|---|
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5| |
|368B ARTILLERY REGT|PROBABLE HQ, 2nd BATTALION|
|368B ARTILLERY REGT|PROBABLE HQ, 2nd BATTALION|
| |Da Nang|
|Probable 402nd SAPPER BATTALION| |
|HQ VC 1st REGT| |
|SERVICES GROUP 44|SUBORDINATE OF REAR HQ, VC 1st REGT|
|PROBABLE QUANG NAM PROVINCIAL UNIT| |
|QUANG TIN|PROVINCIAL UNIT|
|QUANG NGAI PU & POSSIBLE REAR SERVICES ELEMENT| |
| |KONTUM|
|MIS HQ: 1st DIVISION HQ 32d REGT, ODAK TO| |
|SUBORDINATE, MIS 1st DIVISION| |
|PROBABLE 1st DIVISION ELEMENT| |
|POSSIBLE 1st BATTALION, 958 REGT - CHU BA@PLEIKU| |
|POSSIBLE 1st BATTALION, 958 REGT - DUC CO| |
|SUBORDINATE MIS HQ PAVN B3 FRONT| |
|SUBORDINATE, MIS HQ, QUI NHON PAVN BJ FRONT| |
|DUCCO PLEIKU| |
| |DARLAC|
| |BAN ME THOUT|
|PAVN B3 FRONT ASSOCIATE|SUBORDINATE, MIS HQ, PAVN B3 FRONT|
|PAVN BJ FRONT ASSOCIATE|PAYN BJ FRONT|
|STEREO CA VIN.!!fRET &st. VIIJ| |
---
# COMMUNIST_SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. MILITARY
1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - Soup Vietnam
Hanoi Communications messages to Dong 28 January On 27 and 28 January, the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Party in Hanoi was noted passing possibly 19 messages. At least six of these passing possibly messages were relayed by the COSVN secondary station. In addition to the six messages from the CEC, messages passed from RC-5 to the CEC during the month of January.
Military Region 55
1st Regiment to move east, 2nd Division in pe eastern Quang Nam Province area indicated located on Hoi An area on pe possible 30 January pat VC Hq, VC 402nd Sapper Battalion reported on 31 January pat it was on pe move.
In this same general area, the Hq, VC 402nd Sapper Battalion has been identified as probably serving the Hq, VC 368B Artillery Regiment. This unit was located on 3 January near 15-56N 108-02E (AT 808619) and is currently believed to be operating with the probable 402nd Sapper Battalion.
In south-central Quang Nam, an unidentified subordinate of Hq, Rear Services Group 44 located on 29 January near 15-43N 107-57E reported that it was on the move.
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
difficult situation and under attack difficult situation and under attack. maradio station in SIGINT indicates that the Region 5 Committee (RC-5) station indicates SIGINT station maybe utilizing the split communications (RC-5) Region 5 Committee facilities main may serving RC-5 was located in east-central be utilizing split communications facilities. Quang Nam on A radio the vicinity serving near 15-5ON 108-1OE (AT 968523) in On station 29 January RC-5 was Forward Tactical Element located in east,-central in Quang Nam on 29 of the Hq January near M15-SON 5 Forward 108-lOE (AT 968523), (zc 121411) two other stations serving RC-5 were 15-43N 10754E 30 January in the vicinity of the Hq, MR 5 Tactical located Element. On south-central Quang secondary station near the vicinity of (AT 30 January two other Nam stations main station near the serving RC-5 were located in south-central and the Quang the stations location is in 15-44N 108-02E Nam, the main station near 15-43N 108-02E (AT107-54E 816419) Provincial Unit Control (zc 121411) The main and secondary station near 15-44-N Hq M 816419). The main stations location is in the vicinity of Hq MR 5 Provincial Unit Control. ma Provincial and requested an indicated on Provincial and maintaining close unidentified 30 January the probable Quang Nam on requested To To the south, the Unit Unit south, an indicated unidentified communications in eastern Quang Tin that it was in combat on 30 subordinate to pay attention subordinate January This unit was last located Tin the that to probable it pay was attention to in Quang combat Nam to 30 January near maintaining near close Tam 15-29N 108-25E communications. 108-25E (BT 230132), approximately 10 km This unit was last located kmon southwest 30 January of Tam Ky. 15-29N Ky - (BT 230132), approximately 10 southwest of Unit In central Quang Ngai Province In located on 31 January near engaged in combat and requested central Quang Ngai Province, it near 15-05N Quang 15-0SN 108-49E (BS 498676) the Quang Ngai Provincial the reported located January that Unit reported MR -- on 31 31 Provincial Unit Control January on 31 January that it was was engaged maintain combat communications 108-49E in (BS and 498676) requested -- Later Hq that that Hq, on the 5 same MR 5 Provincial day, situation and under bombardment this provincial maintain close Unit Control unit again indicated that close communications. it was on Later in the same day, this provincial unit again indicated this In the same it was area in a possible difficult rear services 485678) situation and element element bombardment. on In under located this 30 January a near 15-O5N 108-48E same 30 January area near possible 15-0SN in rear 108-48E services (BS (BS 485678) -- reported on -- reported located on on and engaged that combat 31 January that it was 31 January it was in a difficult situation difficult situation, under bombardment under bombardment and engaged in combat. In the In the western highlands western highlands, 31 January 32nd Regiment Hq Hq, PAVN PAVN 32nd Regiment, PAVN PAVN near Division, 107-42E 1st Division 14-38N 107-42E (YB 914208) was was located on located (YB southeast about 914208), January 10 km on 31 in western Kontum Province in km southwest of Province western Kontum Dak To Additionally and near approximately 9 and approximately 14-38N the Military Intelligence 29 January position 9 km southeast km of about of its 10 its Section (MIS), Ist 29 January southwest position. of Dak To Division on Additionally, 31 January instructed a the Military Intelligence subordinate Section in the Dak To (MIS), 1st area to Division "take advantage instructed to "take on 31 advantage January the opportunity opportunity and wasted." an The opportunity opportunity be wasted of the subordinate launch an and launch in the Dak To attack "So that attack" so that the would "not would "not be The 3 - FOP SECRET TRNE-3- TOP S~GR&r TRI1'J~
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
FFOP SECKET TKTNEI lllNE
TOP ~EClll!: I 3 /0 /STY /R28-68
3/0/STY/R28-68
hitting "friendly troops" after K5 enters the city. According subordinate was told to pay attention when firing to avoid subordinate was told to pay attention when The MIS indicated that communications firing avoid would not be maintained hitting "friendly troops." The MIS indicated city. Battalion that communications had attacked 32nd Regiment KS is 1st (both unlocated) MIS the Had reported to to 32nd attacked A1 and A5 (both of the radion station and the that collateral maintained Division collateral Regiment, not be KS PAVN 1st PAVN is a cover cover Division. "after designator for the designator MIS also reKS enters The The for and also ~ th ported that it the Eth Battalion," conducted a According it paralyzing raid on the area had Al and AS unlocated) and Had "conducted administrative paralyzing raid area the on of Kontum Province area of the radion According to collateral, station and the collateral, administrative Allied forces engaged an estimated two to 30 January Allied of 30 January Kontum City (14-21N108-02E area forces Konturn engaged Province." an estimated According 790890) Communist two Communist battalions in AR The MIS further reported that on battalions in Konturn City the night of and took control raided MIS (14-21N 108-02E, of 30 January "we AR 790890). The Tan Canh reported further [14-4ON 107-46E, the Allied forces January that on YB 999221] night 30 had possibly of Tan Canh control raided "we city Canh The MIS after having MIS Tan city." The [14-40N stated that Allied stated 107-46E, that YB 999221) forces and places possibly withdrawn took had of withdrawn Tan Canh reports that been "attacked at numerous after having on 30 January Tan Canh was been 30 "attacked Tan Canh was attacked the city was destroyed places." by mortar at numerous Collateral fire and two-thirds reports that on of the January attacked in the ensuing fires by mortar fire, and two-thirds of city was destroyed in the ensuing fires. new unlocated has The MIS has The MIS subordinates established mid-January, and the other recently established communications with two subordinates one in mid-January, Tan the January. detail to new 31 January_ detail concerning air and ground transport at on on 31 unlocated MIS in On 31 January the newest subordinate On 31 January -- one the newest in subordinate and reported reported the other Tan Canh to the MIS in concerning air and ground transport at Canh. has recently south, the probable Hq recently been exchanging messages with To the To the south, been preparations in western Pleiku B3 Front authority the probable Hq, Ist Division 1st Division B3 Front which Hq element which element discussing attack exchanging has discussing attack preparations messages in western with Pleiku Province authority a Hq, Province, was located on 31 January near 13-57N 107-28E YA 675432) in the Pleiku-Kontum-Cambodia near located on 31 January tri-border 107-28E 13-57N area In north-central approximately 13km (YA 675432) in the northwest of its Pleiku-Konturn-Cambodia 30 January location tri-border area, approximately 13 Pleiku, km the northwest possible of lst Battalion, its 30 January PAVN 95B Regiment location. In north-central was located on km Pleiku, 31 Jannary near of Pleiku City and about 12 approximately 12 its south-southwest 31 January near south-southwest location. Pleiku this same area another unidentified its of In City and about 12 km unidentified B3 Front 27 January associated element was In this located on same area 31 another January near 13-57N B3 107 -54E (ZA Front associated 140430) element about 12 located was km west on southwest of Pleiku City 31 January near 13-57N and approximately 13km northeast 107-54E (ZA 140430), about northeast west its 27 January Pleiku 12 km of southwest of location City Additiona and approximately lly, subordinate of the MIS 13 km of its Hq 27 B3 Front location. relocated between Additionally, 28 and a 30 January 14 km the 19 km southwest of Pleiku city. subordinate 14km northeast to of MIS, Hq, to B3 position near Front relocated 13-56N 107-56E (ZA 161419), about 19 between 28 30 January northeast a position near 13-56N 107-56E (ZA 161419), about km southwest of Pleiku city.
FFOPSEERET FHNE-4-
TOP 8ECREF TRIP>l~
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
assoc iatewa S locatedDarlac Tope To pe soupin DarlacProvince soup in on 30 January Provincenear unidentifiedB3Frontan an unidentified 12-36N108-02EB3 Front (AP 763940) associate wasapproximately12km ofits Hq ,January located on 30 Januarysoup-soupwestofBanMenear 12-36N 108-02E notedandabout subordinateofpeMIS -- near 12-39N 108-04E Thuot (AP 763940), approximately 31 km norpeast kmnorpeast 12 km soup-soupwest 23 Januaryof location_Ban Me Finally, Thuot and aboutnew 31 of its 23 was initiallyfirstB3 Front location. Finally,in communications a new subordinate on 25 January of pe MIS, Hq, B3 Front -- first (AQ 820000) 30 January in central Darlac located on noted locatedin on communications on 25 January was initially element (AQ 820000),10 about islocated4 aboutJanuary km inkmpevicinity of in soupeastofBanMe soupeast central DarlacofBannearThuot oper atleast 13 oper Me Thuot. ThisThisVietnamese Communist Communistis radioterminalsclusteredaroundBanMe ThuotVietnamese element radio located terminals in pe vicinity clustered of around at leastBan Me13 Thuot. messages was Atotal of messagesof24 messagesweresent FinaFinally,waS 1ly, observedbeingJanuary, by observed on on29and30 January, by RC-5to al1high 29 and being passed3129 Januaryall 30 passed an unusually high volumeof unusually to 48subordinatessubordinates.volume of ontotal 30 January,messages messages 24 were senton on 29 on January Since 15 January,48 messages messages on totalofabout 114630 January, and46 and messages on day havebeen observedon pese31 January . a total of about 11 messagesper messages per day have been observed on pese communications communications.
(2/G12 /vcY /R003-68 3018002 2 /G12 /VcJ /Ro029-68 _ 2916002 ; R030-68 , R0305-682 /G12 /VCM/R0307-682 /0 /VCM/R52-68 3015002 ; (2/Gl2/VCY/R003-68,R031-68 3116502 301800Z; 2/Gl2/VCJ/R029-68,3123042 291600Z; R49-68R030-68, 3117402 ; 301500Z; R031-68, 311650Z; 2/0/VCM/R52-68,3118452 ;R0306-68_ 3116352 ; 312304Z;3118462 ;R0301-68_R49-68, 311740Z; 2/Gl2/VCM/R0307-68, 3118482 R0303-68 3116502 ; 311845Z; R302-68 R0306-68, 311846Z; 3110182 3116322 ; R0299-68, R0305-68, R0299-68 , 310843Z ;R0292-68 311632Z;R0293-68 , T245-68 , 311848Z; R0303-68,Ro296-68 3114302 ; 311430Z; R0296-68,311650Z; 3103022 R302-68, 3112452 ; R0291-68 311245Z; R0294-68 ,R0301-68, R0294-68~ 311635Z; 3103002 ; T251-68 _ 311018Z; R0293-68, 3123052 ; T245-68,310843Z; 3113552) R0292-68, 310302Z;GAITN LR0291-68, 310300Z; T251-68, 312305Z; 311355Z) (szeRJ!ij) SOJUN).
Military Region1 Military Region 1 In (MIB) TayNinh Province In a message messageof 28 Januaryto the MilitaryIntelligenceofCOSVN 28 a January of to the Military Intelligence Bureau innorthern Tay Bureau of COSVN, subordinate subordinateat11-37Nlocatedon 21 January-- 106-05E (xT 183858)located on 21 January basecamp rereported in portedthatAllied forces northerncamp.manytimes"andthat "helicoptersthat helicoptersthat The AlliedNinh Provincestruckan also ran struck ported pecifiedCommunistat 11-37N 106-0SEuns unspecified (XTCommunist183858) "circlesmany district base The subordinate also reported that and artillerywerehelicopters activein the "circles the times" and thatAccordingto collateral "helicopters and artillery Alliedwere OperationYELLOWSTONEis currently active in district." According underway innorthern to collateral, Allied TayNinh Operation ProvinceYELLOWSTONE is currently under way in northern Tay Ninh Province.
---
# Doc ID: 6637197
# Doc Ref ID: A6637196
to the probable46th Re~onnaissance-Sapper In other Inother activity, activity,46thReconnaissance-SapperBattalion MIB a messageof28 Januaryfrom MIBCOSVN message Long in 3rd Battalion located of 28 January from COSVNon to January near 8 8 January the probable the near the Tay units TayNinh-Binh Ninh-Binh Long Provinceborder located Province Battalion,border, contained containedon designationsof Allied designations of Allied units located locatedthe the Tay Ninh-Binh Duongin the Tay Ninh-Binh Duong border area Themessage mentioned 22nd Regiment ; 2ndBattalion , Battalionofthe Regiment. borderarea.the possible2nd Battalion, The message mentioned the12th Regiment ; 3rd Bsttalion,and 22nd possible Regiment; the possible 2nd 22nd Artillery Regiment Battalion, 12th Regiment;Accordingand a thecollateralBattalion,Battalion to possible to collateral, 2ndBattalion 25th Infantry 2nd the ofthe12th Regimentare locatedat Dau3rdInf48t5} Division 22nd 22nd Artillery of the 22nd Regiment andthesubordinateand Regiment Accordingto 3rd Brigade the 2nd BattalionU.S of the 12th Regiment are subordinate to the Tieng (11-17N 106-21E. 2nd Battalion , 3rd Brigade, U.S. 25thXT 4846 _ Division,Collateralfurther located at indicates Dau Regimentalso that T~eng thereis locatedat that there (11-17N is 106-21E, anARWN an ARVN 2nd Dau Tieng _XT 4846). Battalion,Collateral 22nd Mechanized Infantry 22nd Mechanized further indicates Regiment also located at Dau Tieng. Additionally MIBCOSVNinstructed the probable46th MIB COSVN instructed the probable transportationon46th reference Battaliontomaintain close the Battalion airroutes fromthe air routestoPhu to maintain from Cuong the[10-58N106-40E closedirectionillanceof 8113] ,possibly directionofBinh Duong surve surveillance of Binh XTDuongof transportation (possiblythe capitala on ofBinh Duong Phu Cuong reference to Province)[10-58N 106-40E, XT 8113], the capital of Binh Duong Province). (2/G1O /VCM/T196-68 , (2/Gl0/VCM/Tl96-68, 310826 ;Tl94-68 , 310826; Tl94-68, 280556Z) (iiwiliilii' BOIIIDI) Military Region Military Region 2 S IGINTindicates that an unidentified Party-associated station stationlocatedincentralDinhTuongat 10-26N 106-12EThestation SIGINT Dinh TuongProvincecontinuestomove in Dinh Tuong in indicates Province that an unidentified continues to Party-associatedmove. The station was (xs 3053) unidentifiedin 15kmeast ofTuong approximately 15 was approximatelyterminal was of located terminalwas previously reported movingeastward central km eastDinh its locationon its location at 10-26N 29 January on 106-12E 29 January.(XS 3053),This This between unidentified 26and29January.previously reported moving eastward between 26 and 29 January. ((3/0 /STY /R26-68)-(sgORDTCATI ( 3/0/STY/R26-68) (SlSIOfliT SAYJN) LiberationNews_Agency Liberation News Agency (MOLNA ) On broadcastnews Main Officeofthe offensive On 31 Januarythe ofthecurrentVC 31 January the Main Office of the Liberation NewsAgency Liberation enumerating News Agency the victoriesof (MOLNA) broadcast the Communist forcesVCThe broadcast announced news of the current offensive, enumerating the victories of the Communist forces. The broadcast announced
FOPSECRTT TRINE TOP ~~CR.iT TB INF
---
|Doc ID: 6637197|Doc Ref ID: A6637196|
|---|---|
|FTOP SECRET FRHNE IOP|TRI~,E3/0 /STY /R28-68|
|3/0/STY/R28-68| |
reported Victories of the Communists throughout MR 's1 "killed many and victories that the of the Communists Liberation throughout Liberation Armed Forces had MR's 1, 2, 2, 3 and 4 and 3 and 4 and Americans' "annihilated" several reported that the Armed ARVN Regiments; had Forces had "killed many Corps Area; enemy were continuing "paralyzed Americans'" enemy communications" to ARVN "paralyzed and were ''annihilated" communications" between several between Saigon and ambush Allied convoys ARVN Regiments; Saigon and the ARVN IV had the IV attempting Corps Area; to reenforce Chau Doc to and continuing City in An ambush An Giang Province Allied convoys attempting to reenforce Chau Doc City in Giang Province.
accredited separate broadcast correspondent at in urgent In a In separate the special INA correspondent in Saigon, MOLNA broadcast transmitted at urgent precedence and transmitted precedence and reported on the attack on accredited to a battle special in the city of LNA city of Saigon Saigon, The broadcast MOLNA stated that reported on the battle Palace in Allied installations had destroyed the Saigon. The broadcast the Independence attack stated that the on the ARVN and "all the military and Allied ARVN General Staff had installations Staff Headquarters destroyed the Saigon English Radio Station Independence Palace, the General Headquarters, civilian agencies suburbs of Saigon were under Communist control the Saigon English of the Radio Saigon Puppet authorities Station and "all the military MOLNA and reported that agencies the of the Saigon Puppet authorities." MOLNA and that citizens reported citizens in the that the suburbs suburb were were of Saigon imploring on to ARVN under the ARVN Communist soldiers control to and join the Revolution that Revolution." suburb broadcast went in the The were imploring the say that soldiers the several posts the entire The at at to "join several Revolution. the posts the entire contingency contingency broadcast of ARVN troops of went ARVN on troopsto say "followed" followed that the Revolution."
(2 /0 /vcY /T18-68 ,Tl9-68 , in preparation) _cncnnn QAU !N)
( 2 /O /VCY /T18-68, Tl 9-68, in preparation) (SECiWilT
2 , DRV Communications
DMZ Area
Khe Sanh, has Sanh, major been The major PAVN Headquarters in Laos identified as a in front headquarters. Laos, just norpwest of
Communications serving pis entity have indicative of serving front organization, have pis entity arbitrarily designated evolved into a structure
pe Khe Sanh Area over indicative of Area Front a front organization, KSAF) and serving as Sanh and Laos arbitrarily pe designated immediate
senior aupority over pe Khe Sanh diately PAVN forces Front (KSAF) and in pe Khe serving as pe immediate
border are ime senior aupority immediately west forces PAVN of of area in Hoa Huong pe District, Quang Tri Khe Sanh and Laos
Province
304p and 325C Divisions
PAVN forces in pe area include elements of pe PAVN 304p and 325C Divisions.
communications wip its subscribers Most
Most recently, pe Hq, KSAF was for approximately 40 hours; recently, pe Hq, KSAF was unobserved in
it was communications last noted active on 29 January wip its subscribers for at 20182 and reappeared approximately 40 hours;
it was last noted active on 29 January at 2018Z and reappeared
LTQL SEERETFRTNETOP i~CRET TRI~~_e
---
Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
FOP SEEREF FRHNE TOP SECRET TRI~J~3 /0 /STY /R28-63 3/0/STY./R28-63
in communications at 12342 on 31 January During this requests PAVN High Command both directly and via relay period, the in communications at 1234Z almost continually tried to on 31 January. During this contact period, PAVN headquarters High Command almost continually tried to contact the to other units headquarters, both directly and via relay requests to other units. PAVN tactical voice communications continue to reflect PAVN Sanh area reconnoitering Allied positions in the general elements with possible unit reliefs also noted on 31 January. Khe Sanh area with possible unit reliefs also noted on 31 January. command post (CP) reported in A possible battalion in contact with the movement and suggested possible battalion on contact with a XD 813355) of 80 possible regimental command post (CP) Hill 423 (16-35N 106-42E the reported on 31 January movement of 80 Americanstoward Hill that Americans team team flank the "enemy" toward 423 (16-35N The possible regimental CP to 106-42E, XD 813355) and suggested directed the battalion to that a flank the "enemy". continue following regimental and The possible the enemy and CP maintain continuous directed continuous communications following the battalion to continue The on-line relief of the enemy to an 8th Battalion by communications. 2nd Battalion was The suggested in a non-line relief of exchange of information between on unidentified information indicated the possible battalion the possible regiment an exchange unidentified 8th Battalion of possible 2nd Battalion would by Battalion would a 2nd battalion between Battalion the 31 January. 8th Battalion on relieve the 31 was possible January. suggested regiment Messages Messages in and the and the Additionally companies, and that and indicated two companies that two the cadre from the 6th and 17th, 2nd the 6th the 8th and 8th Battalion would relieve would assist 17th, the 8th assist. Battalion remain with those of the 2nd Battalion to Additionally, cadre from the Battalion reportedly would to the 8th Battalion the jointly control reportedly would "situation_" remain "situation." to the 11 8th with those The "8th Battalion" may of the 2nd Battalion be jointly control the subordinate north 29th Regiment, PAVN 325C The Battalion'' may be the Division, 8th Battalion known to be subordinate active to north of the Regiment, The "2nd Battalion" may be the of Khe Sanh 29th PAVN 325C Division, known the be to 2nd Battalion active of Khe 101D Regiment Sanh. The "2nd Battalion" may be the 2nd Battalion of the 101D Regiment. aircraft element An element of the An had landed the of at PAVN 1OlD Regiment reported a C130 the PAVN Khe Sanh airfield, 101D Regiment reported that one forces Cl30 "OVLOA" were aircraft aircraft had circled overhead 595 (16-39N 106-41E, "OV10A" 825425) _ digging fortifications at carried out at reported still aircraft had landed had at circled the Khe overhead, Sanh airfield, and that Allied and that that Allied one forces XD were still digging An unidentified artillery/rocket unit reported fortifications at 595 (16-39N 106-41E, continuous XD 825425). supply activity was An unidentified was being carried artillery/rocket unit the out at the airfield continuous supply activity being out at the airfield. In the central DMZ area PAVN 9Oth Regiment element reported the according it was cont DMZ reported In it to plan, would be to finished was central inuing to transport ammunition and continuing area, a transport PAVN 90th Regiment 31 January and, finished on The according to plan, would be on 31 January. The ~8 - -8- FOP SEERET FRHNE TOP SECRET TRIP1tE
---
# Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
sameelementre
same element Counterbattery fire by PAVN 164p Artillery pereported ported pe instances of influenza wipin pe companies.giment elements continued fire Counterbattery by PAVN 164p Artillery
Re 106-55E Regiment YD elements 067543) artillery emplacements continued against Camp Carroll
forward observer 164p Regiment emplacements. on 106-55E, on 31 January YD 067543) a 164p pat on spotted firing "we on pe possible 241 artillery Regiment pe night of element 31 January when Hill informed
In a message possible (Camp Carroll) forward observer guns were pat on pe night of 31 January when norp Hill 241 bank (Camp [probably of pe Ben spotted
[probably Carroll) guns of pe An earlier message 544 (16-48N 106 -54E were Ben Hai River] and "we Hai River) firing and suggested an artillery our rockets will
fire on forward pe enemy may be observer. An located on earlier message on Hill suggested an artillery
YD 019592) forward observer may be located Hill 544 (16-48N 106-54E, YD 019592).
lying East ambush all night at ing pe enemy on Route pat pe Americans had utilized 16 vehicles to YD 155585) East in of Camp Carroll, at Tan Truc
27p Battalion element reported 27p Battalion (16-48N 107-01E element reported lying in 9 wipout ambush all encounter night Tan True (16-48N 107-01E, same unit YD 155585)
reported on Route 9 wipout encountering pe enemy. The same unit transport probable Americans
reported transport 106 - 58E pat probable pe local troops from pe
local troops Khe Sanh had utilized Cua area from pe 16 vehicles area (vicinity to
of 16-45N YD 0952) to K.he Sanh.
16-S61 107-05E, four probable Allied guns at Doc reported
coordinates of Elements of pe 164p Artillery Regiment a reported
Ky Lam 107-05E, four 215743) _ 247669)
coordinates of YD probable and pat peir range Mieu (Hill 46 Allied guns at Doc Mieu extended (Hill to 46,
16-56N (16-53N 107-06E, YD 247669) and Mai Xa
Ky Lam (16-53N 107-06E, YD 215743), YD and pat and peir Mai Xa range (16-52N 107-09E extended 107-09E, to
YD 280665) Elementsofpe PAVN 803rd Regiment were
informed on alleged pat 31 January of PAVN activities proughout pe country ing
31 January of pe Da activities PAVN Nang airfield had been struck during Messages
Nang and pat ARWN troops flee durtoward pe proughout pe country. Messages
Americans were Americans reported to have from entering troops strucking
pe night of
also was alleged
pe night pat were 30 prevented and
pe prevented January Da airfield from fled entering. pat during ARVN had pe The "THIEU-KY" group
The Saigon attack group "THIEU-KY" fleeing toward
A pe
Americans radio Quan Chang and seizure
later was radio reported pe seizure of Quang Tri ing
and Hue also
later message message reported gtations pe
reported to have fled pat ARVN troops had clashed during of Quang
pe troops Tri city. pe wip Saigon city. attack. pe Saigon A
Saigon Americans at and Hue stations, and unlocated) pat ARVN be fore flee had clashed wip
at Quan Chang (unlocated) before fleeing.
(2/0/VCM/R50-68, 3106452; 3119482 2/G11/VCM/R221-68, 311948Z; R228-68, 2/G11/VCM/R221-68_ 9ii0 u,)0103452) (93O) 3007342; 300734Z; R226-68 R226-68, 310645Z; R228-68, 010345Z) (8!18fl!IT
# FOPSTCRFT TRINETOP iiCRET TRINE
---
Doc ID: 6637197 Doc Ref ID: A6637196
# PAVN Rear Services
United States forces was noted the probable reflection of the halt to the Tet truce by an unidentified PAVN Rear Services element and Company 10 in 30 January. This message from an unidentified PAVN Rear Services element and Company 10 addressed to the PAVN 93th Transport Battalion Rear disclosed that "the enemy is cheating in regard to the order for a cease-fire." The message further revealed precautions against enemy airstrikes and any convoys whose operations would extend into air strikes.
In addition, in daylight hours were probably required to take precautions against enemy fog, rain, or cloud cover. Also on 30 January, a message was sent to warehouse/storage areas advising them to take positive steps to camouflage the roads leading to truck parks having cargo, as well as the warehouses.
---
|Non Responsive|YOPSECRET TRINE|
|---|---|
|Non - Responsive|TOP SECRET TRINE /R28-083/0 /STY /R28-683 / 0 /STY|
|··=------.....:.:......;-~|-l1-|
|~FOP SECRET FRINE-11-|TOP SECRET TRINE|
---
|Doc ID: 6637197|Responsive IINon - Non Responsive|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID: A6637196|3/0 /STY /R28-58|
| |3 /O /STY /R28-6,8|
| |-12 --12-|
|~FOP SEEREF FRHNETOP SECRET|TRit•E|
---
|Doc ID: 6637197|Doc Ref ID: A6637196|
|---|---|
|FOP SECRET FRTNE|Y0~ ~EClt~T TRI~~E3/0 /STY /R28-68 3/0/STY/R28-68|
..........
INon - Responsive INon Responsive
FOP SECRET FRTNE-13-
TOP 8ECRET TRIN~ | {
"Who": "National Security Agency (NSA), Southeast Asia Strategic Military Intelligence Bureau",
"What": "Summary of developments and intelligence activities in Southeast Asia, Vietnamese Communist activities in Military Region 5, PAVN movements and communications, information about Communist offensives and victories, ARVN activities, and unidentified PAVN Rear Services elements",
"When": "01 February 1968",
"Where": ["Southeast Asia", "South Vietnam", "Quang Nam Province", "Khe Sanh Area", "Laos", "Da Nang", "Tay Ninh Province", "Binh Long Province", "Kontum Province", "Hoa Huong District", "Quang Tri Province", "Phu Cuong Province", "Ban Me Thuot", "Pleiku", "Darlac Province", "Tan Canh", "Chau Doc City", "An Giang Province", "Saigon", "Hue", "Quan Chang"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6636699 Doc Ref ID: A6636698
3/0/STY/R06-68
07 January1968
SECUR DIST: SEASIGSUM 06-68 DIST: 07 January o/Ur1968 SEA SIGSUM
ITEDSTATESOFAMERIC SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGint SUMMARY THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Declassifiedand Approvedfor Release by NSA on Approved for Release by NSA on10 - 03 - 2018 10-03-2018 pursuanttoE.0 . pursuant to E . O. 13526 13526
---
# Situation Summary
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia information in NSA at time available to summarizes this report of publication on throughout developments entirely 07 January Southeast noted on SIGINT 1968.
All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
# Contents
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|Communist Southeast Asia| |
|A. Communist Military Southeast Asia| |
|1. Vietnamese Communist Communications South Vietnam|22|
|2. DRV Communications|4|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ii/9 PAGE(s)
---
# Doc ID: 6636699 Doc Ref ID: A6636698
# CONTENTS
# CONTENTS
NON - Responsive NON Responsive
FFOP SECRET FRINE TOP SECRET TRINE
---
# TOP SECRET
# SITUATION SUMMARY
In South Vietnam, the establishment of increased communications between the regimental subordinates of the PAVN 2nd Division and the division's regimental subordinates in Quang Tin Province border area. The Forward Element highlighted activity in the Quang Nam-Military Region (MR) 5.
In the same general area of Quang Tin Province border area, impending moves were reported by the probable Quang Nam Provincial Unit. Plans for a possible attack on 4 January were revealed in military intelligence passed between subordinates in the western Province. SIGINT indicates that the PAVN 1st Division radio station located in Konturn near the MR 1 Province. Cambodia-Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border may serve the probable Hq Viet Cong (VC) 272nd Regiment. In the DMZ area, the resupply of PAVN 325C Division continues, and reconnaissance by elements reflected in SIGINT of the possible 812th Regiment of the PAVN 304th Division located in Ha Tinh Province and Vietnam, deploying southward. Also, troops in Ha Tinh Province and North Vietnam were located in Laos in July 1967 and January 6.
Also, a probable movement of PAVN engineer regiment in Laos reported by an unidentified element of North Vietnamese engineer regiment located in Laos.
Non-Responsive
---
# COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA
|COMMUNIST|SOUTHEAST|ASIA|
|---|---|---|
|MILITARY| | |
|VietnameseCommunistCommunications| |SouthVietnam|
Military Region between the possible Hq establishment of hourly radio in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area, developments were highlighted by the establishment of hourly schedules between regiments subordinate PAVN 2nd Division Forward Element and the possible Hq PAVN 2nd Division, beginning Division Forward Element on January 6. In this same area, the unidentified Rear Services Division, located near 15-44N 107-59E, was informed on January 4 that it was in combat and requested the maintenance of close communications. Meanwhile, communications indicated on January 5 that the Main Force Unit Control was about to move; this unit was located on January 6 near 15-34N 107-57E. The Quang Nam-Quang Tin subordinate Unit reported on January 6 that it was about to move; the Quang Nam Provincial Unit reported on January 6 that it was about to relocate, possibly from its last SIGINT location in northeastern Quang Tin near 15-32N 108-22E. In Quang Ngai Province, on December 21, the Quang Ngai Provincial Unit located at 15-04N 108-40E informed the Provincial Unit Control that it was surrounded.
Farther south in Kontum Province, the Military Intelligence Section of the PAVN 1st Division was notified by subordinates that an implacement was proposed in the morning at the 82 airfield on January 4. The message was intercepted 19 minutes after 1700 on December 27 in western Kontum, located in the vicinity of 14-35N 107-40E.
---
# Doc ID: 6636699 Doc Ref ID: A6636698
|Regiment|the In the western In was western located highlands highlands, in eastern the probable Hq, PAVN 14-12N the Pleiku Province near probable Hq, PAVN 95B|
|---|---|
|Pleiku City and 10 km 108-18E|Regiment (BR 090690) km east of its 108-18E (BR was 090690) located on in 5 January, 5 8astern January, Pleiku 38 km northeast 3 January position 38 km Province northeast of near of 14-12N Later|
|on Pleiku 5 January, an 10 located|B3 Front was unidentified element associated with the City and east of its 3 January position. Later|
|PAVN on January, was unidentified east-central|an in element associated Pleiku with 14-13N Pleiku near the location (AR803720) 108-02E PAVN B3 Front located 12 km in southwest of its 29 December east-central near 14-13N 108-02E (AR and 803720) south-southeast 17 km south-southeast of Kontum City. 12 km southwest of its 29 City December location and 17 km of Kontum|
|Military Region 1|Military Region 1 since AVC radios ration which has been be serving communications active in communications Hq|
|---|---|
|The Province Cambodia border on 9th January in the Binh Long Hq since VC 31 VC VC December 1967 is 9th Light Infantry Division (LID) station was 31 272nd Regiment 272nd was located VC area January Infantry Binh December member radio Regiment, station 1967 VC suspected to is which suspected Light has been to be active serving Division - Tay Ninh in the probable the probable (LID).| |
|The station located 1 near 11-46N 106-28E (XT 599998) in the Long-Tay Ninh Province, - Cambodia border area near 11-46N 106-28E (XT 599998). This station is one of three subordinates of communications group This group whose control who Be of the station control is was subordinates active was one first noted active first of three enoted subordinates 20 October 1967 first observed on 1967, on 20 of October a communications| |
|The second near 11-37N 12 December 106-21E (XT 468839) January 12 December-~ second of the was three was located on located subordinates on 5 5 January in The third northeastern Tay Ninh-- first in northeastern subordinate Tay Ninh observed on which communicates 106-21E near 11=37N with an unidentified and unlocated station 468839). The third subordinate, was which located on 30 with communicates December an unidentified also in northeastern and unlocated Tay Ninh. PAVN was station, possible on located association exists between the 30 December also in northeastern possible Ninh. PAVN Tay Hq, A| |
|northeastern the tentative all Ninh Cambodia border area Division Tth Division possible association exists forward between element the possible of the 7th Division Hq, and Division, Tay Binh Long-Tay Ninh on element whose which also nored by stations 20 and 22 October the possible vicinity third subordinate , and vicinity cf northeastern 7th the the third of the Tay Ninh between r:;th e subordinat ,3 Binh Long~Tay 15 and another communications 15 of which of and which relocated Cambodia 27 December 27 December. re located border of the from the from Parallel 7th area Parallel the to to move s were group were moves group which also w8 S activated stations was activated by between on 20 in and another October and 22 area of communications and unidentified whose control Front Headquarters in northern area authority is located northern Binh Long Province.| |
---
# Doc ID: 6636699 Doc Ref ID: A6636698
The probableHq VC272nd Regimentwas VC Hq , detachedfrompedivisionsporadicnotedin communicationswip pe The probable Hq, 272nd VCRegiment during Novemberand9pLID duringwas noted in sporadic December
communications andmay mayhavebeen wip p e Hq, VC 9p LID Novemb e r and De cember he adquart e rsadquarters 271stRegiment and and for operational hav e be en detached purposes . from Collateral indicatespe division patpe VC for op e rational purposesbattalionof pe Collateral VC 272ndindicates Regimentwere Tay pat pe VC 271st involvedin Regime ntan and attackon a battalion a U.S of basearea pe VC 272ndin norpeastern Regiment we re involv e d Province near Ninh Provinceattack 11-36N106-23E inan on U.S. base (xT 499806) area in norp e ast e rn2 and we r eTay Ni nhCollateral movedfrom pe BoDucarea of 3 January. ne aralso11-36N states106 - 23Epatpe (XT elements499806) involvedwere reported on2 and 3 January. Collat e ralto have also stat e s pat p e el e ments Phuoc involve d Long Provincer e port e d to hav e mov e d from pe Bo Due ar e a of Phuoc Long Provinc e .
(2 /G10 /VCM/RO07-68_ 06201 52) Lanenz]DAV IN ) (2/G l 0/VCM/R007 - 68 06 201 5Z) (iiORBI SAOIN) 2 _ DRVCcmmunications 2. DRV Co mmun i cat i ons DMZArea DMZ Ar e a Unidentifiedreconnaissanceelementsassoc iated wippe PAVN 325C Divisioncontinuedto Unidentifi ed Divisionreconnaissanc e report el eme nts on Alliedactivity associated wip pe norpwest PAVN 325C of KheSanh 845 (16-4ONJanuary , XD 778439)and continue d 7 toa8 of r e por t onAlliedactivitywasAll ie d act i vity (16-39N 106-41E, XD reported norpweston Hills XD 825425) andAl r e ported onof HillsSanhKhe 845 as(16 - 40N of 7106 -4OE 106 =40E, January unlocated) XDAllied 778439) An artilleryactivity and 595 595was losseslocatedat duringpe piece (16~39N 106 - 41E, Al reportedly placedscatteredfire artill e ry 825425) and Al (unlocated). An onpe PAVN trooperea piec e located incurred report e dly and nightof5 Januarybut atAl day placed scattered fire on peno PAVN troop wereerea during p e day and night of 5 January but no loss e s we re incurr e d. Tactical Tac tical communications servingelements ofpe communic ations r e fl is ct6 considerable supply activityinserving rabl e el eme nts of p e i vity PAVN812ch PAVN 812 t h Regiment peDMZ regimental headquartersrevealedpatpebatcalionin Re gime ntarea continueto reflect message of to consid eJanuaryfromsupply act che4pBattalion to p e pe DMZ ar e a . A me ssag e o f 6 January from p e 4p Battal i on hadp e activityby 8instructionsto toreceived r e gime ntal he adquarters sincecompleteits transportationr e vealed pat pe battalion had r e ce iv ed8 instruct i ons January , to "on comple t e Januaryt ransportat i on January pere i t s isto be forbe movement ." of transportation activitywas activity byAn early me ssag e Januarymessagesince disc losedpat pe mov ementompletion of An e arly di sclosed 10 January pe de adlin eOnfor 4 January completionche 4p Battalion 3900 roundsofmortar ammunitiontedly received approximately 4 January p e 4p transportation repor- e dly wasBattalion r e portactivity received 10 January. approximately On 3900 rounds of mortar ammunition for transportation to sametransportation for to an undiscloseddestination possible812p Regiment 16 -SON 106-43ERegiment undisclosed possibl e 812p destination.soupofpeDMZ (xD 835629)andpepossible 4psoup Onpe On p e of pe same DMZday inpe vicinity day in 4p Battalion SIG INTlocated of SIGINT vicinityofpe Battalionlocated p e norp norp 16-SON ofpe DMZinpe vicinityof possible106-44E,of 106-43E p eDMZ (XD in 835629) p e vicinity and pe 4-of 16-58N 106-44E_ 16 - 58N (xD 856789)_ (XD 856 789).
YOP SEERET TRTNE-4 = TOP SECR~T Tlllf~E
---
# Doc ID: 6636699
# Doc Ref ID: A6636698
Company pat Companies of pe block pe enemy pat to meet On On be pat ing soup of 7 and Battalion informed 7 January, pe 27p Battalion informed its 5p January, pe 27p 8 and pe battalion headquarters its 5p would be mov
Company Companies and Ben Hai River pat night 8 and pe battalion headquarters
Company iving units at An Xa would 5 moving was instructed to (16-57N 107-02E and night soup pe block Hai Ben River
Company arr 5 was instructed to pe enemy and YD 175752) to meet pe arriving units at An Xa (16-57N 107-02E, YD 175752).
(2 /C11 /VCM/TO187-68
(2/Gll/VCM/T0187-68, 0707382)
PAWN High Command-304p/320p Divisions
reflected Communications between "way
Communications in SIGINT of located at 16-56N pis date, between January stations" BRAVO and ECHO were
BRAVO and ECHO were reflected in SIGINT of 7 On pis stations
16-28N and BRAVO 106-30E (XD 608220) respectively. pe probable Hq was and ECHO were located at 16-56N 106-52E Station BRAVO (YD BRAVO was 001742)
observed passing me ssages Hq 16-28N 106-30E (XD 608220) originated by respectively. Station 320p Division, indicating pat Hq observed passing messages originated 320 Division by pe was in pe area 320p probable Hqj
of BRAVO Division, on pe indicating 7p pat This division Hq was XD 9422) on vicinity 320 Division was last
in located in pe pe area vicinity of Station ECHO of BRAVO on pe 7p. This (16-28N 106-49E division Hq was located 21 in
Prior to vicinity 17-0SN of January (XD 8789) BRAVO 106-49E Station Station BRAVO was pe ECHO (16-28N located 9422) XD in pe location on Decembe r.
of 17-05N 7 106-4SE
Prior to January, Station however was located January raper pan in pe vicinity
is be lieved to be of 106-45E a refinement of pe previous one (XD 8789); however, pe 7 January location
an is believed to of movement _ be refinement of pe previous one raper pan an indication of movement.
304p Infantry Division suspect infantry regiment of pe PAVN On On 66 January, pe
January, pe suspect deployed to (XD 256950) inside in which infantry regiment Ha Tinh Province in of pe PAVN
July 1967, 304p 1967
Laos. as Conflicting SIGINT 17-06N 106-1OE Infantry located at locations since (XD was Division at which
deployed to Ha Tinh Province
regiment change sin 6 SIGINT
we 11
confirmed had sugge sted pe location _
Laos as Conflicting che communications patterns of pe inside
well July
changes was located in pe communications 17~06N
locations
soupward moves uspect regiment now 106-lOE since patterns pe regiment now mid-December
mid-December, of 256950) of pe suspect
suspect 45 as
regiment, 105 by pis on 7127) _ pe had pis suggested January
soupward move The of pe regiment
was last
confirmed located by 6 27 December in pe general vicinity of
January location. The suspect regiment of
18 -2ON 105-40E
was last located (WF on 27 December in pe general vicinity
18-20N =40E (WF 7127).
(2/G1l /VCM/RO28-67
(2/Gll/VCM/R028-67, 0618322
061832Z; 3/0 /STY /RO1
3/0/STY/ROl, R03-68, 3 /0 /STY /R311-67) R03-68, 3/0/STY/R311-67)
(srcfl:ii, an o1a,
5 -
FOP SEERET FRHNE
TOP SECRET TRINE
---
|Doc ID:|6636699|Doc Ref ID:|A6636698|
|---|---|---|---|
| |INon - Responsive|INonResponsive|FOP SEEREF FRINE|
| | | |TOP SECRET|TRl~•E3/0 /STY /R06-68|
| | | |3/0/STY/R06-68|
|6| | | |
| | | |=6~|
| | | |FOPSECRET FRINE|
| | | |TOP|8EGR~T|TRI~Ji|
---
|Doc ID:|6636699|Doc Ref ID:|A6636698|
|---|---|---|---|
| |INon - Responsive|INon Responsive|YOP SEEREF FRHNTE|
| | | |TOP|SECRET|TRIP1tE3/0/STY /RC6-68|
| | | |YOPSEEREF FRHNTETOP|SECRET|TRI:P>E|
---
Doc ID: 6636699 Doc Ref ID: A6636698
INon - Responsive INon ..........ResponsiveI ~FOP SEEREF FRHANHE TOP SECRET TRIP>JE3/0/STY /R06-68
3/0/STY/R06-68
~FOP SEEREF TRINE _'fOP SECRET TRibIE
---
|Doc ID:|6636699JNon - Responsive I~TOP SEERE FRHAE|Doc Ref ID:|A6636698|
|---|---|---|---|
|Non Responsive| | | |
|......|'f'Of SECRET TRI~J_g30LsTY /R06-68| | |
| |FOP SEEREF TFRHNE-9-| | |
|TOP SECRET TRI~~E| | | | | {
"Who": "United States of America, South Vietnam Military Intelligence Sections",
"What": "Summary of Communist military communications and movements in Southeast Asia",
"When": "07 January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Quang Tin Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Konturn", "Ha Tinh Province", "Laos", "Cambodia-Tay Ninh-Binh Long Province border", "DMZ area"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6637237 Doc Ref ID: A6637236
3/0/STY/R48-68
25 FEB68* 21002
3/0/STY/R4S-68
DIST: 25 FEB o/UT68 ,.. 2100Z
SECUR
DIST:SIGSUM 48-68
(SEA 0/UT
(SEA SIGSUM 4S-68)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E. O. 13526
---
# Situation Summary
# Communist Southeast Asia
|A. Military|1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|
|---|---|
| |2. DRV Communications|
---
# Doc ID: 6637237 Doc Ref ID: A6637236
INon Non - Responsive I Responsive ~FOP SEERFT TRINE'fOP SEGRiT TB INE3/0/STY/R48-68 3/0/STY/R48-68 SITUATIONSUMMARY SITUATION SUMMARY road presently under an attempt on 21A PAVN 21 February pat February under construction move Shau Valley down pe PAVN engineer element in pe engineer an element in to move artillery pe A Shau Valley reported reported
:on pat attempt to from A Shau artillery 25 Shau Valley Activity down to pe pe
:road area would be made on Hue presently construction 5 pe night of 25 February. from Valley to pe :Hue in Military Region made area would be (MR) on was pe highlighted by pe continued
:in movements of units Military pe of Region in Quang Nan and Quang Ngai Viet Cong (MR) 5 was highlighted by pe Provinces continued
:movements and in pe western 274p Regiment highlands Nam In MR Quang artillery elements units in Quang and 1 pe Ngai Hq pe arrival Provinces
:and (vc) in western highlands on 24 February mentioned In MR 1 pe Hq, Viet Cong
:(vc) of reinforcements 274p Regiment and preparations on 24 February for mentioned an pe arrival
:of mission. reinforcements VC Messages passed by Division indicate an 5p Light Infantry military intelligence attack in and preparations for an artillery
:mission of pe VC Messages passed by military intelligence elements
:of planned possibly against Bien Hoa pe 5p Light Infantry Division Hoa Airbase indicate and interest an attack in pe
:xuan Loc possibly Yuan Loe area in Long Khanh Province against Bien Province. Airbase, and interest pe
:on Allied lst Battalion, FAVN 101D Regiment continue to report
In pe Khe Sanh area, reconnaissance elements of pe
:probable 1st activities. Battalion~ To FAVN pe east Regiment 101D communications reflect continue to report
:activity on Allied of elements of pe interdict Allied PAVN 803rd activities. To pe 27p Independent Battalion east, communications reflect
:along Route 9; attempts to elements of pe by pe PAVN
:activity of elements of pe 27p Independent boat traffic Battalion
:along pe Route Viet Channel by elements 9; attempts to interdict Allied boat 803rd traffic
:on pe Cua
on 812p Regiment increased offensive
Regiment; Cua and Viet Channel by actions of pe PAVN
Regiment; and increased soup of Quang offensive Tri city actions by pe PAVN
812p Regiment soup of Quang Tri city. PAVN Rear Services of ammunition to on communications on 23 February
reflected pe PAVN Rear issuance Services communications pe unidentified
pe 23 PAVN 204p February Artillery Regiment element to handle reflected
Artillery Regiment, pe handle artillery and rocket issuance and of instructions and instructions ammunition to an to
to an munition an unidentified PAVN 204p
element shipments to wip absolute artillery priority. and rocket ammunition
Page 1 of 13 Page(s)
---
|Doc ID: 6637237|Doc Ref ID: A6637236|
|---|---|
|Responsive|YOPSECRFTTRINE|
|Non|TOP CR.KT TR TNE ..|
|Non-Responsive|3U,/O~l~S.!.1.£.TYl~RI~, f,~QI3/oLSTY [R48-68A-2 -|
|TOPSEERET TRTNETOP 8ECRrf T1lIN E| |
---
|HQ_PAVN 2nd DIVISION|PROVINCIAL UNIT CONTROL|HQ_PAVN 3rd REGIMENT|
|---|---|---|
| |FORWARD ELEMENT| |
|HQ_PAVN 83 FRONT|0 Kontum|BINH DINH|
|PROBABLE HQ PAVN 33rd REGIMENT|PROBABLE HQ PAVN 33rd REGIMENT|Oban Me Thuot|
|LAOS|KONTUM|QUANG NGAI|
|---|---|---|
|LAOS|KONTUM|QUANG NGAI|
|CAMBODIA|Pleiku|
|---|---|
|CAMBODIA|Pleiku|
|DARLAC|TuyHoa|
|---|---|
|DARLAC|PHU YEN|
---
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
|COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA|MILITARY|
|---|---|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue|
|Engineer element in the message of the night of 21 February, an unidentified possible attempt to send artillery down the road presently under construction from the A Shau Valley to the Hue area. The same message also mentioned that tracked vehicles, possibly prime movers, would be coming down. (2/G11/VCM/R344-68, 211514Z)|Military Region 5|
|In the Quang Nam Province area, both the Hq, PAVN 2nd Division and the provincial unit control indicated on 23 February that they were about to move, while the Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element indicated on 24 February a similar intention.|All of these headquarters elements are currently operating in southeastern Quang Nam Province: 108-102 Division, Hq (AT 965437); Hq, 2nd Division, last located on 20 February near 15-45N 108-10E (AT 860430); Hq, 2nd Division Provincial Unit Control, last located on 21 February near 15-45N 109-04E (AT 860430); Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element, last located on 21 February near 15-45N 109-04E (AT 860430).|
|Meanwhile, the Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment, 2nd Division was located in eastern Quang Nam Province near 15-42N 108-06E on 10 February.| |
---
# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGIONS
|TAY NINH|BINH LONG|
|---|---|
|PHUOC LONG| |
|BINH DUONG|Ben Cat|
|---|---|
|TAC CT AUTH|TENT|
|PHUOC VINH|LONG KHANH|
|HAU NGHIA|BIEN HOA|
|---|---|
|BIEN HOA|Xuan Loc|
|GIA DINH|BIEN HOA|
|---|---|
|PROB VC 2nd BN|PHUOC TUY|
---
# Doc ID: 6637237
# Doc Ref ID: A6637236
|FTOP SECRET TKTNETOP|51!Clll! I|R.INI!: /R4S- ''683/0/STY/R48-68|
|---|---|---|
|3 / 0 / STY| | |
In northern Quang Ngai Province, an unidentified subordinate located near 15-12N in northern Hq, M Quang Ngai Provincial Unit Control Province, an unidentified associate was subordinate of a Hq, 5, Provincial Unit Control on 23 February, approximately 12 km north of Quang Ngai city. It was located near 15-12N, 108-39E of its north (BS 488810) on 28 January position and about 18 km on 23 February, approximately 12 km northwest of its north of Quang Ngai city.
In the western highlands, Hq PAVN B3 Front was located gradually moving in 14-3ON February on 24 February in YA highlands, Province-Cambodian 107-24E in the western the Kontum Province-Cambodian has been gradually moving in 669959. This Hq, headquarters mid-February near PAVN B3 Front border area was located near 14-30N, 107-24E in Darlac southerly direction since 669959. This headquarters has been gradually moving Darlac Province direction in a southerly 1324 February near Hq, of the probable 12-48N since mid-February. PAVN 33rd Regiment was located on the south in Province, the probable Hq, PAVN 33rd Regiment was located about on 24 km north-northwest of February near 12-48N Ban Me Position. Thuot city and approximately 13 26 km north of its 26 km north-northwest 22 February north of its 22 February Ban Me position.
(2/G12 / VCM/ RO581-68 2410422 ;R0580-68 2411002 ;R0579-68, 2408292
(2/G12/VCM/R058J.-68,RO575-68 2315292; R0574-68, 2315272; R0572-68 ,241042Z; R0580-68, 241100Z; R0579-68, 2314072 240829Z; R0575-68, 231529Z; R0574-68, 231527Z; R0572-68, 231407Z) ( O!!@!Il.E!f OHO TU)
Military Region 1/4 in 274th Regiment passed a the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province area on 24 February, Hq, VC Battalion subordinate VC 274th Regiment passed a message concerning the arrival of reinforcements and preparations for a forthcoming artillery mission. On the same date the regimental headquarters was located in eastern Bien Hoa Province at 10-59N, 107-03E. The possible 1st Battalion was located in southwestern Bien Hoa Province at 10-59N, 107-03E (YT 249148), and the Khanh Province possible 1st Battalion 10-52N, 107-07E 24 February in eastern was located in southwestern YT 304016. The probable 2nd Battalion was located on 106-49E (xs 997972) Long Khanh Province at 10-52N, 107-07E (YT 304016). The Gia Dinh Province west Saigon probable Province of MR4 at 10-SON on 106-49E and south 2nd Battalion of south 4 of MR was at Bien Hoa located 10-SON km The Xuan 24 February location of (XS 997972), in eastern the possible 1st Battalion is within 15 km west of which had recent intelligence The Xuan Loe, km of the has and of Bien Hoa. The location which has Loc of been the subject of possible 1st Battalion is within 15 of reporting by which VC elements subject been the The probable 2nd Battalion is within for artillery of recent intelligence a target 15 by artillery reporting within VC of Bien Hoa in VC elements. The probable also 2nd Battalion for km 15 missions Bien Hoa, which 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) associated had also been cited as a target communications early in February.
FTOP SECRET TKTNETOP
TOP SECRET
TRI~~E
---
# Messages passed by military intelligence(MI) elements
Messages Bien Hoa Airbase military attack planned possibly LID passed indicated by intelligence (MI) elements of against Sp LID have interest Bien pe against in Hoa Xuan Loc and Airbase (10-53N and high level of Communist high 107-11E, of level YT Communist 400890) area of interest soupern Long Khanh Province an element identified as pe probable Military Intelligence of soupern in pe Xuan Loc Long Khanh (10-53N Province. 107-llE, 23 February On On 23 YT February 400890)
Section (MIS) element identified Sp LID informed as pe probable subordinate Military Intelligence of soupern pat 48 rounds of an undisclosed type of ammunition were informed ammunition were immediately a subordinate pat 48 rounds available for an of an undisclosed attack and pat five rounds were being type of immediately
forwarded from pe available for an attack 2nd "and possibly battalion) were pat five rounds The probable being MIS pen forwarded stated pat certain from pe "2nd" certain personalities were "on probable (possibly battalion). The "on peir
way back 106-53E in norpeastern Bien Hoa Province near MIS pen to pe stated command post personalities pat The subordinate was located were peir
way 22 February in on 22 back to pe command norpeastern post." Bien The 15 Hoa norp of subordinate Province was near located
Bien Hoa Airbase (YT ll-05N 106-53E (YT 056279) about 15km norp 056279) about km of Bien Hoa Airbase.
Meanwhile anoper subordinate of pe MIS Sp LID located on Meanwhile, on 22 February anoper in soupern subordinate Long Khanh near to report heavily 5p 10-5ON of pe MIS, LID, 107-15E installations continues and
Allied Loc Allied 107-lSE installations, continues and as it has (YS 475988), since mid-February. forces to activities around Xuan report
Loe as it has since mid-February.
The possible Hq possible Binh Duong-Binh Long Province area near
In pe In pe Binh PAVN 7p Division was 106-43E Duong-Binh Long Province located on 24 February area on 24 pe February,
Binh Long-Binh Duong pe Hq, PAVN border at 7p Division was 11-22N located (xT 884568) near pe
This Binh Long-Binh location is approximately 20km norp-norpwest of its Duong border at ll-22N 106-43E (XT 884568).
19 February position in eastern 20
This 19 February location position is approximately in eastern Binh Duong. pe possible
Binh km norp-norpwest Duong. A possible of its
accomplished tactical
tactical control aupority associated wip
aupority move associated located on 7p wip pe Tp Division pe Division
accomplished a parallel move and was
parallel (xT 843584) located and was on pe same same
date near 11-24N 106-42E
Atentative 7p Division date near associated element wa S at 11-15N ll-24N 106-42E Province located on 106-42E (XT 843584). tentative 23 February 7p
in norpern Binh Duong
Division associated Duong element was located on 23 February
(xT 867422) Binh in norpern approximately 18 km norp-norpeast of its Province at 11-lSN 106-42E
19 February position_ Vinh.
(XT 867422), approximately Al1 of km 18 pese units are now located norp-norpeast of its
to pe west 19 February of Phuoc position. All of watch facility serving pese units are now located
pe possible of
pe pe possible on pis facility include west Hq, Hq, Phuoc 7p Division has been pe possible unidentified
Subscribers on pis facility include: pe possible unidentified
---
# Doc ID: 6637237 Doc Ref ID: A6637236
Front Headquarters; pe tentative station associated pe Headquarters; tentative pe probable PAVN VC 272nd Regiment; Hq
wip The Hq, PAVN 141st Regiment; 141st Regiment;
and several facility which unidentified Front
a station associated unidentified pe possible includes 7p control suggests of wip stations pe probable
Hq, apparent scope VC 272nd Regiment;
pis several facility elements and
pis watch unidentified which stations includes
7p The Division and 9p LID Division apparent and scope 9p pat of LID
pe elements 7p Division is and
pe possible exerting tactical LID identified
Front, aupority pat
suggests in pe pe 7p Binh Duong Province area. Division
is exerting tactical control aupority
(2/G10/VCM/R122-68 Province 2407152; T331-68, 2318452; T329-68
(2/G10/VCM/R122-68; pe Binh Duong 2414212; R121-68
241421Z; area. R121-68, 2413247; R120-68
241324Z; R120-68, 240715Z; T331-68, 231845Z; T329-68, 2317052;
231705Z; T328-68, 2501402; 2316302; 2/G10/VCJ/R53-68
231630Z; 2/G10/VCJ/R53-68; 2316252;
231625Z; 2/0/VCM/R108-68, 2/0/VCM/R105-68, 250140Z;
250140Z; R107-68 2322292)
232229Z)
(iiiftlilT 0/NIH)
2 DRV Communications
DMZ Area Reconnaissance elements of
pe probable 1st Battalion, PAVN 101D Regiment in pe Khe
Allied activities PAVN 101D Regiment continued C130 Sanh area. had dropped 61 para-to
submit detailed On 24 February reports of
an element reported and 1200 (Golf) activities reported in pat pe C130 aircraft It was 24 Khe
Sanh area. On February
chutes an element between 0300 and pat
1500 (Golf) _of chutes pe period 0300 most aircraft activity was between 0800
between of 1200 (Golf). It was also reported
and pat 1500 pe period
(Golf), including landings
including most aircraft landings, activity take-offs between
take-offs was and parachute
and drops.
Communications of pe 27p Battalion reflect continued
activity by battalion elements
Communications local by forces battalion On elements
of 23 February an element in pe 27p along along Battalion an element reported killing Route reflect
Route 9 in coordination coordination continued
wip local
two wip Americans at Dinh forces.
element reported shooting reported and on
On Xa Xa 23 (16-48N February 107-03E YD 180595)
killing 24 February anoper two Americans at Dinh (16-48N 107-03E, YD at fighter 180595) and on
aircraft all anoper 24 February day, claiming element pe reported shoopown of one shooting
at and damage of fighter
anoper.
# TOP SECRET FRHNE
# TOP SECRET TRIP1JE /R4i3 - 683/0/STY /R48-68.. 3/O/STY
---
|Doc ID|6637237|Doc Ref ID|A6637236|
|---|---|---|---|
|to interdict Elementsofthe PAVN traffic on the Elements Allied boat of the PAVN traffic Regiment Cua Viet 3rd Regiment continue Channel| | | |
|On 23 February an unidentified personality boat on the Cua Viet Channel was praised for sinking two large boats at a range of 150 meters. Another message indicated sinking two large boats at a range of 150 meters. Another message from the other regiment supplying the Ban (17-00N 107-25E, YD 250798) to Dai Thuy Ban (16-41N 107-07E, YD 585455) increased offensive actions of the PAVN south of Quang Tri City. 812th Regiment reflect On 22 February the 6th Battalion, in counter sweep operations, reportedly killed 154 Americans near Cau Nhi (16-36N 107-19E YD 478365) and 30 Americans at My Xuyen (16-36N 107-19E YD 481369). Plans for an attack against Cau Ngang (16-36N 107-19E YD 481369) were discussed in a message which specified the amount of explosives needed (16-42N 107-14E YD 382489) on 25 February at this location. The destruction of the protective wire, bunkers and bridge needed for the 5th Battalion mentioned in a message to the regiment and the 90th Regiment on February 7 was difficult, and last is now possibly resupplying the 812th Regiment elements noted in tactical communications on 7 February south of Quang Tri City (2/G11/VCM/R361-68, 241435Z; R366-68, 251033Z) via the Ba Long Valley.| | | |
|PAVN Rear Services Some 500 rounds of 152-mm high explosive ammunition and 100 rounds of "concrete penetrating" ammunition were issued to the PAVN 204th Artillery Regiment according to a 23 February message. 130-mm ammunition was also issued to the PAVN 351st Artillery Division, possibly subordinate to the 204th. This regiment was last located by SIGINT in the eastern DMZ area in October 1961; no current location is available.| | | |
---
|Doc ID:|6637237|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637236|
Responsive Non-Responsive
JTQPSFCRET TRNE TOP SiCR1ti.T TRl~J;g3/0/STY/R48-68 3/0/STY/R48-68
instructed on "D74" absolute artillery and instructed on 23 February Also on Also (122-mm artillery) and "A12" (140-mm rocket) ammunition an unidentified recipient 23 unidentified February, an unidentified Rear Services element arr unidentified recipient to handle shipments of with "absolute ammunition was priority" "D74" (122-mm The amount "A12" (140-mm or destination of this rocket) ammunition with not disclosed in the messages priority. The amount with regard although of or destination one this message mentioned Relay Station 8 ammunition was not disclosed in the messages regard to priority although one ammunition message ammunition shipments mentioned Relay Relay Station 8 is unlocated but Station 8 with to priority suspected to be near shipments. rail Relay line Station Flares and 8 is unlocated slow burning but fuses were to suspected also mentioned as line. be near a rail included Flares in the "absolute and slow burning priority" fuses were shipments also mentioned as included in the "absolute priority" shipments.
TQPSECRET TRINE-8- TOP £~GRET TRif~~
---
# Doc ID: 6637237 Doc Ref ID: A6637236
|DRV Civil Communications|DRV Civil Communications|
|---|---|
|Crops and livestock in the North Vietnamese province|Crops and livestock in the North Vietnamese province|
|According Committee of Ha Tinh have been affected|According Ha Tinh have 21 February message from Secretariat of been affected by disease and cold weather by the Provincial the and cold weather|
|Executive Committee|Executive Committee|
|According 21 February to the Agricultural Duc Tho message from the Provincial|Office of the Prime Minister to the Agricultural Can Loc Due as the Cam Xuyen, Secretariat Cam of the Ky Anh, of Office and Huong Son Districts experiencing difficulties|
|In Ha Ky Anh, Tinh Province and Province Huong Son which were Districts were cited as the districts|With harmful insects which were Executive Committee stated experiencing difficulties|
|That 2812 hectares had been cattle had died in four districts numerous damaged by The Executive by blight. Committee blight. stated message The also 2,812 that disclosed hectares that had been damaged The message|Hamlet the cold rains where due 52 animals out of 150 also to the Cam Xuyen District and spread had the disease in one to disclosed of Cam of cold Xuyen that rains out District had contracted numerous and and that cholera that cattle and cholera spread had had broken out districts to Huong Son died to broken Son District Huong in four out District in one where 52 animals of 150 had contracted the disease.|
|Message of message the to the message Office This message was from TRAN HUU DUC|This of and February Prime Minister Sector was to protect the 7 February probably in response to an earlier from TRAN in HUU response DUC, which minister advised In sent to February a minister attached to an earlier attached all provinces and to the Office the the last year and concluded with|
|Five less cattle had died this message and new-born calves year request for by the the|Cattle message provinces cattle less last days cattle year and all Executive Committees all new-born calves against the cold on and any difficulties Vice Minister of the provinces Executive had any difficulties a encountered concluded the died Vinh Committees were this with year against Special than during the DUC protect that request than were the during advised cold. the DUC for areport every report to same same period added period every 7 February that the|
|On five 8 February NGUYEN CHUONG days on|Reminded the On 8 February executive committees that departments NGUYEN CHUONG, mentioned and departments of in the Vice Minister of Agriculture, agriculture to combat the reminded the executive cold. He committees and temperatures of agriculture|
|Mountain regions to combat regions had fallen very low. the cold. He mentioned low that temperatures in the mountain had fallen very|Also During this same time in 1967 crops in North Vietnam suffered from blight fifth month rice crop from insects affected the 1967 fifth 1966 until also suffered from blight and intense cold in 1967 December 1966 month rice the harvest in crop May the 1967 until the harvest in|
(2/G11/VcY/R09-68 22127; 2/0/VCY/R75-67) { Bnon]
(2/G11/VCY/R09-68, 22127; 2/0/VCY/R75-67) (B!!!e!lftl!T Bl\VIH)
TQP_SECREF FRINE-9- TOP SiGRET TRit~r:
---
Doc ID: 6637237 Doc Ref ID: A6637236
INon - Responsive INon Responsive...... TOP SEEREF FRHAE
TOP ~~GRET TRI?>,E3/0/STY/R48-68
3/0/STY/R48-68
~FOPSECREF FRNE-10-10 -
TOP SECRET TRIP.Ji
---
|Doc ID:|6637237|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637236|
|JNon -| |
|NonResponsive|Responsive|~FOPSEERET TRINETOP 8~GRgf TRzl:t>TE3/0/STY /R48-68|
| |3/0/STY/R48-68|
| |-l1-|
| |~TOP SECRET TRIAE-11-|
| |TOP|£iCRgf|TRIP>J~|
---
Doc ID: 6637237 Doc Ref ID: A6637236
.INon - Responsive INon Responsive FOP SEEREF FRTNL
.. TOP SECRET TRftrq~3/0/STY /R48-68
3/0/STY/R4-8-68
-12 -
~TQP_SFCRET TRNE-12-
TOP SiCJlziT TPuINi
---
Doc ID: 6637237JNon -
....... NonResponsive IDoc Ref ID: A6637236
Responsive
~OP SEERET FRINETOP 8EGRET TRfrrqf:3/0/STY/R48-68
3/0/STY/R.48-68
--13-- 1., ~..)
YOPSEEREF FRHAEETOP 8ECRET TRI?>JE | {
"Who": "United States of America, PAVN 2nd DIVISION, PAVN 3rd REGIMENT, NSA",
"What": "Communist Southeast Asia activities, Vietnamese Communist Communications, military movements, artillery missions, reinforcements, intelligence messages, military regions activities, artillery shipments, civil communications, livestock issues",
"When": "25 FEB68",
"Where": ["South Vietnam, Quang Nam Province, Quang Ngai Province, Kontum, Binh Dinh, Pleiku, TuyHoa, Phu Yen, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Xuan Loc, Phuoc Long, Ben Cat, Tac Ct Auth, Binh Duong, Ha Tinh, Cam Xuyen, Ky Anh, Huong Son, Darlac, Ban Me Thuot, Laos, Cambodia"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637223
# Doc Ref ID: A6637222
|SECUR|16 February 1968|
|---|---|
|SOUTHEAST ASIA|SIGINT SUMMARY|
|THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL| |
|Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526| |
---
# Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
FOP SEEREF FRTNE TOP SECRET Tltf IrqE
|INon - Non - Responsive|Responsive|3/0/STY /R41-68|
|---|---|---|
|16Feb 3/0/STY/R41-68|16 Feb68 20547|DIST: 0/UT68 2054Z|
|DIST: 0/UT|NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONAL ASIASIGINTSUMMARYSECURITY AGENCY SOUTHEAST SIGINT SUMMARY AsiaThis reportsummarizes developmentsnotedthroughoutSoutheast Asia informationinthisreport of publicationon throughout availabletoNSAattime of This report summarizes developments based entirely16 February1968_noted Southeast All informationto available inNSA at reportindicated.time ispublication entirely16 on onFebruary exceptSIGINT 1968. where All otherwise specificallyindicated. this is based on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically| |
Contents Page
# Situation Summary
Communist Southeast Asia Military A. Military 1 VietnemeseCommunistComunications South Vietnam. Vietnamese Comim.lnist Comimlnications South Vietnam DRVCommunications DRV Comim.lnications
THIS DOCUMNT CONTAINS ii/ 14 PAGE(S) FOP SEEREF FRINE 'fOP SECRET TRI~Ji
---
# Doc ID: 6637223
# Doc Ref ID: A6637222
INon - Responsive I Non Responsive. FOP SEERET FRTNETOP SECRel' 'fltl!~~3/0/STY /R4l-68 3/0/STY/R41-68
Contents (Cont.)
Page ii
FOPSEEREF FRHE ii TOP SECRET TRI?1JE
---
|Doc ID: 6637223|Doc Ref ID: A6637222|
|---|---|
|INon Responsive I|~TOP SEEREF FRFNETOt' 8ECRET TRl~•E|
|Non - Responsive|3/0/STY /R41-68|
|3/0/STY/R41-68|SITUATION SUMMARY|
|SITUATION SUMMARY|probable PAVN the probableHq , discussed by Preparationsforattacks PAVN B3Front Authority Province Preparations for attacks on Allied onAlliedforcescontinuetobeforces Authority and continue to thebe of SouthVietnan discussed PAVNlst Division probable Vietnam's DivisionHq,Regionbythe 1stprobable Military Region (MR) Militaryelementin westernPleikuProvince element PAVN B3 western Pleiku in Theidentificationand the ofSouth of terminalin northern QuangDucProvincea5 communications(MR)ProvinceThe Hq , PAVN33rdS. identification Regimentand of a terminal reflectionsofAlliedactivityin communicationsin northern Quang Due activity as Hq, PAVN 33rd servingPAVN 2nd thesouth,Hq , Viet Cong (vc)Sth Light Regiment and2nd Division. elementsin QuangNem Provincewere reflections of Allied in alsonoted_ serving PAVN To Division south,elements Vietin Quang (vc)Nam and possibleProvince were InfantryDivision andits subordinateVC274th and andnorth- also noted.To the Hq, Cong 274th5th Infantry Division and its subordinate VC possible east of east 275th of Bien Regiments Bien Hoa AirbaseinMR1.Hoaare Airbase currently in MRlocated 1. to the east north- Comunistinterestin aircraft Inwestern Quang In westernQuangTri Province_ anyaircraft activity there wouldbe fired upon.Tri Province, PAVN communications PAVNat theKhe Sanh Airfieldcommunicationsreflectedthe would Sanh Airfieldreflected andindicated Communist interest that14thaircraft lendingatany aircraftactivity The reference and referenceto indicated that 14thBattalionintactical landing there communicationsuponobe fired Also reflectedcapabilityinthe wa s PAVN concern suggests The AAAto a Battalion proximityoftheairfield_in tactical communications suggests a AAA incomunicationswas capability beingthe in proximity concern for of the airfieldoaprobable Alliedchemicalwarhead Also reflected in communicationsusedinthisareaPAVN for probable Allied chemical warhead being used in this area. Ineastern QuangTriProvinceelementsofthe PAVN 803rd In eastern Quang BattalionindicatedTacticalof attack Tri indicated a Tactical activityoftheProvince elements the PAVN Allied803rd , . and 812th Regimentshave city forcesinthe QuangTri 27th IndependentBattalion and forces 812th in the Quang havecity Tri indicated area area. possible attackon Aliied that possible activity onof the detachmentof the · · Sth company was 27th companywe S 5th Independent to have plantedmines , probably along Route to have planted indicated mines,thatprobably a detachment Route9 along of the9.|
|FOP SECREt FRINE|TOPPSe ~GR~T Page 1 %f14 Page( s1 of 14 Page~sJ|
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|Doc ID:|6637223|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637222|
The South Vietnamese Deputy Ambassador, NGOTON DAT, reportedly hes reportedly hes Foreign Minister and, according on submitted his resignation.
The South expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the lack Vietnamese Deputy Ambassador, NGO TON DAT, reportedly of any clear-cut foreign policy on SIGINT on 14 February, and, according to the part of the South Vietnamese Minister has expressed dissatisfaction with SIGINT on 14 February, has submitted his resignation.
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|Doc ID|6637223|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6637222|
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN HIGHLANDS| |
|Probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority| |
|Probable Hq, PAYN BJ Front Authority|PLEIKU|
|Probable Hq, PAVN - LANG BENG|LANG BENG|
|1st Division Element|Probable Hq, PAYN DIE THANH|
|1st Division Element|PLEIKU|
| |DARLAC|
|CAMBODIA| |
| |BAN ME THUOT|
| |Probable Hq PAVN 33rd Regiment|
| |QUANG DUC|
|SECRET SAVHIA| |
| |SiCAiT SA MlN|
---
# Doc ID: 6637223
Doc Ref ID: A6637222
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
# MILITARY
Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue
6p Regiment, On 15 February, in pe Hue would bring down ammunition during pe night.
Possible location of an unidentified 8p Battalion.
# Military Region 5
In the western highlands, PAVN B3 Front elements operating in the Pleiku Province area continue to discuss plans for attacks against Allied forces.
Located 15 February the probable Hq on February near probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority--Kontum Province-Cambodia border area--instructed that day near 14-05N 107-22E (YA 550584) in the B3 Front Authority--Kontum PAVN 1st Division element--located on 15 border area--instructed 15 February probable the near 13-52N 107-34E (YA 789357) in western Pleiku Province--that "You must strengthen your determination to bring the mortars into fire at the unlocated which are at two large buildings to Comrade range of determination to the southeast of Tam Dao [unidentified beled by a 5.6 km mortars in This task will to [unidentified be two unlocated] will at the and large buildings cadre. are the which to Comrade range at southeast a VU, of kmo This task led by men be satisfactory to go with ooo cadre. VU, Comrade LUOC. or Comrade MUON would with Comrade of Comrade CHUONG and the artillerymen precisely the upper you the upper echelon are carried out enemy artillery position. LUOC, CHUONG or and Comrade the artillery MUON would be to satisfactory to insure that the orders insure that to the go Once you the orders have entered Area echelon Area are fire at A carried the out enemy precisely Once have entered whichever location the A fire at artillery LIt [possibly position. Once you have entered whichever location the A fire at artillery LIt [possibly position.
Le Thanh at 13-50N 107-40E, its utmost to the to 107-38E, location seems best YA 8930] or seems or best to you, southeast.) [possibly you, L/T Comrade NGHIA's detachment is to do at 13-53N Lang Beng its to do utmost [13-53N to ambush vehicles YA 8436] coming from above down to Village 107-38E, YA 8436]
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# Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
AreaK andis orelseitisto fire or else it AreaB. to fireIfat aircraftin with spirit of Tam Dao, at thisisdone with aircraft in theareas of the areas of determination Tam Dao, itwillsucceed .B. Area Kand Area The message wenton Donot worry If this is done to spirit "If the wild state determination beasts approach, it will succeed." strike immediately. onDo The message went to state "If if we wildofwe draw out beasts allofthe allapproach, eneny, strike 80 immediately. so muchthe better. not Themore ifworry them thereare, out of the biggerour enemy the enemy, bigger the attack will not discusswithdrawalaSmuch thewillbe better. The moreSearchforof them everymeans the there are, means tostrike to strike our the attack enemy. Do Do not be discuss withdrawal Search for as didthe old C-4 [Cis a generic designatorforcompany]. did the old c-4 [C is a generic designator for company]. 500 .lst Division element K, to Hq, Inan apparent In Divisionelement reportedabove wildbeastsare active anapparentreplyto theabovemessage the probablereply the "themessage the probable during Ambusheswere setUP.BTodayVU wenttoNGHIAand active to organize Hq, 500. 1st the day Ambushes the day the wereinAreas K, reported Tam Dao, and Mountain Range in deployment againstVU Are~sset up. Bandand Tarn Today "the the went the vehicle NGHIA's position Dao, wild and to beasts Mountain Rangeroad and are positionthefire against aircraft deployment same timehe gave XUAN's to against of continuingto the messagetoprepare [vu]team organizeaircraft. The At Atthe reconnoiter Tam Dao. the sameagainst time he gave XUAN's road team the the fire mission of 1500[Golf] and received mission continuing to reconnoiter Tam Dao. [VU] the returnedat Tet artillery. returned at long building south-southeast of Tam DaoisVU. There[Golf] meeting There 1500 was a meetingsouth-southeast artillerypreparethe CHUONG will received the Tetmessage Tet artillery to into thearea in to thearea Tet ofthe of artillery. theg0 will when preparationsare arecompleted. of Tam Reported with Reportedis with zealousspirit Dao VU. CHUONG go and complete respect. when preparations completed. zealousspirit and complete respect. ableforwardelement Kontum Province, on 15 February the prob- able Division queried of the Military IntelligenceSection prob-the To Tothenorthin the north in Kontum Province, on 15 on 15 February (MIS) the Ist forward element artilleryfire. (YB 899125)--regardingtheintheofsubordinate--loceted the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), DakDivision queried Oak Toareanear 14-34N subordinate--located a 107-41E on 15 February in resultsarea recent 14-34N To of near 107-41E (YB Thesubordinatewas 899125)--regarding instructedthe month."up30 roundsofammunitionand to results pickof recent artillery fire. The "ricefortherest ofthesubordinate was instructed to pick upOn30 On 16 February rounds of the probableforward element reportedthe ammunition and "rice for the rest of that it month." had 39 roundsofamunition, 16 February the probable "five deysofrice, forward element reportedand no that other provisions .it had 39 rounds of ammunition, "five days of rice," and no other provisions. DakTo.MIS 14-39N about tionMeanwhile, between 23 kmeastward, lessthan 10 km oftheMIS movedabout of tionnear the Meanwhile, near 14-39Nmoved between107-42E 23 27 January and15 February (YB January eastward, 921229), and 15 from less FebruaryCambodia km west of than 10 a subordinate subordinate to a posi-posi-of Oak To.
# FFOP SEEREF FRHNE-4- TOP SECRET TRI~JE
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|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN|VIETNAMESE QUANG NAM PROVINCE|
|---|---|
|COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN|QUANG NAM PROVINCE|
|DA NANG| |
|HOI AN| |
|UNIDENTIFIED| |
|UNIDENTIFIED| |
|Hq, PAVN 2nd Division| |
|QUANG NAM| |
|Hq, PAVN 2nd Division| |
|Provincial Unit Control| |
|Hq, PAVN 2nd Division| |
|SECPEL SAVIN| |
|SFCRFI S4 l11 A1| |
---
# Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
Battalion, PAVN 33rd Regiment Aredioterminal previously identified as radio terminal previously and last located pe possible 3rd identified norpern Quang 14 February as pe on 14 possible 3rd
near 12-33N Battalion, 12-33N PAVN 107-53E (ZU 132697) in norpern Quang 33rd Regiment, 132697) and in last located on Duc Province, Due February has has near been identified 25 probably serving Hq, PAVN 33rd Regiment PAVN been Fronto identified 107-53E This as (ZU probably serving presently PAVN Hq, maintains Regiment, 33rd Province, PAVN 83 Front.
This radio station presently maintains communications wip Hq, B3 Front Kontum Province; wip an unidentified an unidentified B3 Front-associated terminal tions wip Hq, B3 Front, Kontum last located near 8 February, wip Province; wip near 8 12-32N 108-33E (BP 334870) on B3 Front-associated The 29 October; and since pe probable February, terminal last located least at least 12-32N 108-33E an unlocated on (BP 334870) terminal 29 October; identified as and since at 1Olst Battalion, wip B3 Front.
The terminal 33rd Regiment 18 also pe identified also suspected to communicate as probable to last located 101st communicate Battalion, wip a B3 Front deployed element of Hq, 33rd Regiment Hq, is B3 Front pat was suspected near wip pe Quang Duc-Derlac Province Front deployed Duc-Darlac element of Province border B3 border at 12-33N pat was last 107-58E located (zu 217898) on near (ZU yet been on 11 February; however, pe Quang pese at communications communications have 107-58E not yet 217898) been isolated_11 February; however, pese have not isolatedo
regiment was last During last September 1967 During associated wip pe September 1967, 33rd Regiment indicated communications messages exchanged on facilities associated probably comprised 33rd only wip 101st of only pe had been added pe pe Regiment 1st and 3rd Battalions. indicated pat First indications pat pe 101st of regiment was probably pat comprised message of Battalion 9 February pe had 1st been and added aS a 3rd Battalions. subordinate were First indications contained in a message pe Battalion of 9 radio terminal from sent as pe probable were subordinate Hq, 33rd Regiment to "KlOlo" "KlO1. 101st A February terminal from sent previously identified Regiment pe previously probable identified October 1967 when it communicated wip pe Hq, 33rd as as pe possible 1Olst Battalion was last radio was last probable during observed during late October Hq, PAVN 95B late 95B Regiment _1967 when it communicated wip pe probable Hq, PAVN indicated on 15 February Quang it waS in a difficult situation, To pe norp in pe Quang Nam Province To pe on norp 15 This headquarters was soupeastern Quang Nam Division in pe Nam Province, Hq Hq, PAVN 2nd Division pat under attack. 108-02E headquarters indicated February pat it was was soupeastern its 14 February last difficult in located on situation, location a approximately near Province under 15-39N Meanwhile (AT 34km soup-soupwest of its near Province, 15-39N attack o 108-02E approximately This (AT 825310) in pe 2nd Division Provincial (AT 933411), 34 km 825310) Division Provincial Unit soup-soupwest in last located Quang of Unit 10 Control, 10 February February last located on 13 February location o Meanwhile, 13 February 2nd pe pat it 15-44N near 15-44N 108-07E Control, indicated on 15 February last located an unidentified entity, near was it on was about to move. 108-07E (AT On pe same 933411), same day indicated an on 15 February on 15 February tnat last located on it about to 17 January near 15-47N move o On pe 107-56E (ZC 149482) day, unidentified indicated was to Finally, Force Battalion Quang in east-central Quang Ngai Province pe suspected east-central Battalion wa $ located Province Ngai on 14 February near pe suspected VC 38p Local Force was located on 14 February near
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# Doc ID: 6637223
# Doc Ref ID: A6637222
|14-57N|location108-55E|
|---|---|
|14-57N|108-55E|
(BS766521) about 11km south of its 10 February city.
(BS766521) 22km south-southeast of Quang Ngai about 11 km south of its 10 February city.
Approximately 22 km south-southeast of Quang Ngai city.
1515292; 1508102; R470-68, 1417202; T381-68
(2/612/VCM/R486-68, 1519152; T305-68, 1519302) 1513402; T382-68, 1603002; R485-68, 160300Z; R485-68, T381-68, 1601202; R483-68, 160120Z; R483-68, T382-68, 1513352; 151335Z; R478-68
R478-68, T384-68, 150810Z; R470-68, 141720Z; 151340Z; 151529Z; T384-68, 151915Z; T305-68, 151930Z) (8!88M!I JNUiN)
Military Region 1
The revision continues revision of communications SIGINT continues to reflect the repositioning of units and structures in the region.
Front early February since a radio station, which has been active in communications since Headquarters in Binh in southern active radio February station, and which has is associated with the possible been associated in communications early and which Binh Long is Long Province was located with the possible for the possible first time on Front Headquarters 15 February in southern Binh Duong Province at Province was located Province the for 10-58N time first 106-37E on 15 (xT 755128) = February of in approximately 90km southeast Binh Duong.
The 10-58N February position Long Province near not been Front (XT tion of 755128), the possible Front Headquarters in the approximately possible the Cambodian Headquarters 90 km of in western Binh.
Possible Front headquarters has not western Binh Long headquarters near Province the been observed in Cambodian border. The communications with any other units or possible Front or headquarters since has observed late January, in when it tions it was any with active with other units the Possible Hq, headquarters M since 10 and Hq, January, late B3 Front.
An unidentified its subordinates, unidentified possible tactical possible both of which are tactical control with two two of the its PAVN 7th Division, have relocated. tentatively associated both of which are tentatively The control associated authority was with located on 15 February.
The PAVN 7th Division in eastern Binh Duong near 11-12N February in have eastern relocated. Binh Duong The near controlll-12N its authority 106-44E (XT 899371), approximately 22km south-southeast of suspected 10 February Division-associated terminal was located of 106-44E (XT location in southeastern Binh was 899371), approximately 22 Binh Long. km south-southeast the One of 15 February of its.
Suspected 7th Binh Duong near its 10 February Division-associated location in southeastern Long One on the February sus- in eastern pected 7th 11-12N terminals 106-45E (XT 907393), approximately located on 15.
Approximately 21 km southeast of second terminal eastern km 742511); (xT 742511); the Binh Duong southeast near its of second 11-12N 9 February' position near 9 February position 11-09N had moved near 14 approxi- 106-45E (XT 907393), 11-19N by 14 February 11-19N into east-central km southeast near its 11-39N 106-41E (xT 843324), 106-36E (XT Binh Duong near its 13 January location in the terminal had moved by February approximately 70 km into east-central Binh Duong southeast of 11-09N 106-41E (XT 843324), northeastern Tay Ninh Province of northeastern approximately Tay Ninh 70 Province near near ll-39N 13 January 106-17E (XT 402872) 106-17E location 402872).
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# Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
|SECRET SAVIN|SECREJ 3AJ7fN|
|---|---|
|VC Sth LID ACtiviTY NEAR BIEN HOA AIRBASE|VC 5th LID ACTIVITY NEAR BIEN HOA AIRBASE|
|BINH DUONG|BINH DUONG|
|VC 275mRegt|VC 275th Regt13 Feb|
|BIEN HOA AIRBASE VC Sth LID|BIEN HOA AIRBASE • VC 5th LID2 Feb|
| |VC 274th Regt|
| |15 Fob|
|BIEN HOA| |
|BIEN c:;;>HOA| |
| |LONG KHANH|
|GIA DINH| |
| |8 Jan|
|SECRET SAVIN|SECRET SA Vf'>|
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|Doc ID|6637223|Doc Ref ID|A6637222|
|---|---|---|---|
|deployed other activity Hq , and possible 275th Regiments are and its deployed subordinate and its In subordinate In other to the east and activity east 274th northeast of 274th northeast Light 275th Hq, and 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) VC VC 5th possible Bien Hoa Air Base, according Infantry Regiments Division Base, are (LID) to the available SIGINT information. Hoa Bien Hoa Province and in northern On Air February, according to the latest -available SIGINT information. On 2 February, the division headquarters was located in northern 14km east at 11-00N headquarters 106-57E (YT 123174) , approximately located 32km was located Bien Hoa east of the Province east of The possible (YT 123174), base _ of the air base near communications with base. east 11-00N The the 106-57E possible air with base Hq , VC 11-07N Regiment Section (MAs) while The the Military Hq, near VC ll-07N Affairs 275th Regiment was 275th approximately 107-03E (YT 243304) while 107-03E Section resumed was (YT 14 located 243304) km 32 of COSVN km in of north-north- in the on communications 13 February. MAS on regimental headquarters had time since COSVN The the Military headquarters Affairs (MAS) of communications with the on 13 February. regimental 11 February for the first had resumed communica-late October tions with 1966 _ the By MAS 15 February on 11 February Hq , for VC 274th Regiment the first time had moved since late 31km north-northeast of its 8 January 274th Regiment had moved Hoa km October 31 to north-northeast February, 8 1966. By 15 of its east east of the location Hq, January location in southern Bien VC in southern Bien Bien Hoa-Long position 28km due Hoa to a Khanh Province position 28 this border has 10-58N air base, along the km border at been located in the general due at of 10-58N air the 107-0SE (YT 287144) . base, along the Bien It is believed Hoa-Long Khanh that this unit Province 107-0SE (YT 287144). area It is of its latest believed that position since at least 13 February. unit has been located February. general in the area of its latest pos:Ltion since at least 13 probable Hq , Preliminary information indicates that the MIS Preliminary C95 Reconnaissance Company that the subordinate of the information indicates of a subordinate Hq , VC instead of 9th the LID reappeared in previously reported_ least 24 messages . VC instead of 14 subordinate was as probable LID 14 February as communications Company reappeared February Hq, C95 in Reconnaissance observed servicing previously communications reported.ing at as early as early On as of as 13 February , On 13 February this 13 MIS, February February, Hq, this 9th subordinate was observed servicing at least 24 messages. (2/G10/VCM/R94-68, 1513492; R95-68, (2/Gl0/VCM/R94-68, 151349Z; R95-68, Change1, 1602052; 2/G10 /VCJ /R45-68 1517152 ; 2/0/VCM/R89-68 ,1720402 ; 3/0/STY /R40-68) 151715Z; DHV INT2/0/VCM/R89-68, 172040Z; 3/0/STY/R40-68). (SECREI (SECRL [ SAVIN) Military Region L1Q Military Region 1/10 communications with an PAVN 7th Division reappeared in radio The possible Hq The activity on 9 Hq, an 12 February , marking the first communica-possible PAVN unidentified control in northern Phuoc 7th Division reappeared in radio tions Province Long noted between these and February, two two headquarters since marking the first since Long, communica- 20 December 1967 tions noted The control euthority in norther Phuoc between control these control authority, Phuoc Long, headquarters arbitrarily termed the Phuoc Long 20 December 1967. The authority in norther is suspected to arbitrarily be serving a termed logistics function. the Phuoc Long control authority, DHV IN) is suspected to be serving logistics function. (8!eR!!t SAVIN) 7 - FOP SEEREF FRHNE TOP SECRET -7- TRI~~E| | | |
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Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
Military Region 2 Military Region 2 viously activity been used to viously VC in Dinh ' Tuong Province has not of AVC Party broadcast communications group which Party broadcast to pass foreknowledge reports which had pre-communications reports group of "enemy n" enemy "pre-had been used pass group. consisted been observed since foreknowledge of about 1 activity February in Dinh Tuong This Province has not been control, which observed since was about colocated with an (MTPC), 1 February. This an unidentified subordinate of the My Tho group consisted of a control, which Provincial communications links was Provincial Committee (MTPC), and four subordinates; however, colocated with unidentified subordinate of the My Tho individual Committee and between the control four subordinates; and its subordinates continue to individual communications be observed. links between the control and its subordinates continue to be observedo communications link reports Foreknowledge reports were also occasionally noted on which is colocated with communications link with the above control between MTPC and the unidentified subordinate MTPC and the unidentified On 29 January subordinate the MTPC which relocated from western above is colocated the to central Dinh Tuong to control On 29 January the the vicinity MTPC vicinity were this from relocated of this unidentified to subordinate unidentified western central Dinh Tuong communications between to the the two were the two 8hVIU) last of lest noted on 30 January. noted on 30 Januaryo subordinate, (3/0/STY /R32-68) (3/0/STY./R32-68) communications between (SECltf!!T COSVN Communications COSVN Communications of many as many as 161 as 10161 messages to its subordinates least 59 and possibly Between 3 and 9 as messages per messages February COSVN sent et in MR1. to aresubordinates normally passed MR sent at least in on 1. these 59 and these communica - An average An possibly average tions to of 7 o TOLONKI 10 messages ill) per day are normally passed on communica- tions (SECl&I SAU 2. 2. DRV Communications DRV Communications DMZ Area DMZ Area cated Communications between two support artillery function indi- believed to be Khe Sanh Airfield "must be dominated" continuously. Communications that to the serving a Airfield support be between direct two unidentified PAVN elements indi- believed that be serving direct artillery function Requests for exact noted, as well an unidentified cated for the were locations where as unidentified 14th Battalion Khe Sanh locations well "must Allied aircreft land and dominated" continuously. Requests take offfrom exact whereas orders to prepare Allied aircraft land to fire and reported from were On 15 February on the airfield take on the off airfield. that 74 rounds On 15 of unspecified ammunition had been noted, February as the possible ammunition 14th an orders to prepare Battalion to fire expended; that also rounds on reported expended; that day. day - it also reported unspecified the accepted designation it The 74 "14th Battalion" is reported of the possible shoot-down had shoot-down of an aircraft on that The u14th Battalion" is the accepted designation FOP SECRiT TRTNE8 - TOP SECitP:T Tllll~I!:
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Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
|for for|the anti-aircraft support battalion assigned to PAVN|
|---|---|
|the|anti-aircraft SIGINT indicates that the 14th Battalion's support battalion assigned to PAVN|
|divisions|However, SIGINT indicates that the 14th Battalions of all PAVN divisions located in the general DMZ area their remained in military region air-defense command posts. probably|
|of all PAVN divisions located in the general DMZ area their remained in military region air-defense command posts. probably|However, SIGINT indicates that the 14th Battalions of all PAVN North Vietnam and were resubordinated area their cannot divisions located in the general DMZ to probably respective military SIGINT if the battalion noted above is another|
|respective military SIGINT if the battalion noted above is another|generation of any from SIGINT|
|generation of any from SIGINT|It cannot be determined any from of those remaining in North Vietnam if the battalion noted above is another|
|generation of any of those remaining in North Vietnam|It cannot be determined from SIGINT|
|chemical warhead February, to in communications between two unidentified entities|Also on 15 February was noted the description of a possible Allied the description of possible Allied unidentified entities|
|chemical warhead believed was noted in communications associated with the PAVN between two 304th Division.|Reportedly, the diameter of the shell was 4.2 inches and it contained a white powder which caused coughing, sneezing and skin irritation when it exploded.|
|voice Mentions section of a lack of telephones 15 use the entity reported that "Now we and voice Mentions of communications on communications of wire were also reported as the bomb damage to of landline capabilities were when an unidentified landline on 13 capabilities 13 we and 15 February, February, were telephone system from also evidenced in also evidenced an unidentified in the entity sea." reported that "Now can use the can and the telephone damage system 12-km from|the sea." lack of telephones and aS obstacles to landline bomb to a 12-km communication.|
|The disposition of prisoners was the topic of an|The disposition of prisoners was the topic of the PAVN an exchange exchange on 304th Division. of 16-31N unidentified on 8 February between two unidentified elements of 8 February between Reportedly two prisoners elements be dispatched were to of the PAVN to the Division.|
|304th Division. of 16-31N unidentified on 8 February between two unidentified elements of 8 February between Reportedly two prisoners elements be dispatched were to of the PAVN to the Division.|Reportedly, 106-42E (xD 825283) where the prisoners were to be dispatched 2nd Regiment has to the vicinity of 16-31N 106-42E (XO 825283) where the "2nd Regiment has a place."|
|Artillery Regiment a was fire for one To the east, probable forward observer of the PAVN 164th Carroll|between 0600 and 1200 hours between counterbattery hours (GOLF) 15 hour after of watch Camp fired Artillery Carroll To counterbattery 0600 the Regiment east, and 1200 was probable for on 15 February to watch were ordered ordered fire (GOLF) forward on one on 16 February on hour observer February 16 after February to rockets were rocket the PAVN Camp 164th fired|
|communications activity Tactical activity reflected in 27th Independent Battalion|Tactical reflected in with generally only resupply 27th Independent Battalion and personnel communications has sharply declined with replacement noted has sharply declined On 15 February communications generally only resupply|
|of and the battalion indicated noted personnel replacement detachment of the On 15 February 9Sth Company would communications|plant and Dong Ha that night, probably along Route of the mines battalion indicated a detachment Route of the 9 between Cam Lo 5th Company would plant mines that Company night, 6 was ordered at the same between probably along time to Cam Loto provide and Dong Ha. Company 6 was ordered at the same time provide|
TOP SECRET FRTNE-9-
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# Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
cadre for receiving and guiding recruits down from pe 7p company.
812p Regiments Battalion, 812p Regiment revealed possible of pe possible 4p and In pe Quang Tri city area, elements of pe PAVN 803rd and Allied forces in pe area. On 16 February, impending attack a possible reconnoitering possible 4p on 107-14E, of Ngo Xe (16-46N
The area YD Ngo Battalion, of 812p Regiment The Americans closely in pe areas 16-45N would 107-13E pat YD reconnoitering it was or pe attack. 107-14E, YD 1st Battalion, and pat 803rd Regiment reported pat it was if pe permitted, pat Khe was it reconnoitering pe YD 404555) and Trieu Son (unlocated), attack. 1st Battalion, 803rd Regiment reported of My Khe it reconnoitering 107-14E pe Americans in pe areas of My and if pe Americans remained in pe (16-46N 107-14E, YD 404555) pe strike mentioned, areas Trieu Son (unlocated), pen pe 1st Battalion was to organize to strike. mentioned, areas pen pe 1st Battalion was to organize to (2/G11/VCM/R317-68, 1613007; R315-68, DRV Naval Activity appeared T-532, The which is believed to be an auxiliary vessel in Norp Vietnamese Naval communications for pe first time appeared on 16 February while in Norp Vietnamese being directed to transport batteries pe first time to an undisclosed destination. PAVN High Command type considered unlimited consecutive circular messages--pe On 14 February seven in distribution on internal network--were sent to Hq, MR from PAVN High Command Command. Two sent pe Two sent to Hq, sent of pe messages were messages to were also sent Hq, MR 3 Norp to Hq, high Norpwest, from Hq, PAVN High MR Norpwest, and two were Command. were of Hq, M attached to An unusually high prece-3 Soup. also all An sent to MR reason of "very urgent" we 8 dence and two unusual was of high-priority seven messages. An increase pis urgent" dence reason of for pis unusual for in pe penumber circular circular message activity messages. attached message to all activity circular messages is unknown. is messages unknown. The has increase An been noted since 10 January. has been noted since 10 January. (2/0/VCM/R34-68 2617252 Jan; 2/0/VCM/R12-68, 1621192 Jan; 3/0/STY/R33-68) (filiiiRil'i iJzYIH)
# TOP SECRET FRHNE TOP S~GRgf TRI~JE 3/0/STY /R41-68 3/0/STY/R41-68
# DRV Naval Activity
appeared T-532, The which is believed to be an auxiliary vessel in North Vietnamese Naval communications for the first time appeared on 16 February while being directed to transport batteries to an undisclosed destination.
# PAVN High Command
type considered unlimited consecutive circular messages--the On 14 February seven in distribution on internal network--were sent to Hq, MR from PAVN High Command Command. Two sent the Two sent to Hq, sent of the messages were messages to were also sent Hq, MR 3 North to Hq, high Northwest, from Hq, PAVN High MR Northwest, and two were Command. were of Hq, M attached to An unusually high prece-3 South. also all An sent to MR reason of "very urgent" we 8 dence and two unusual was of high-priority seven messages. An increase this urgent" dence reason of for this unusual for in the thenumber circular circular message activity messages. attached message to all activity circular messages is unknown. is messages unknown. The has increase An been noted since 10 January. has been noted since 10 January. (2/0/VCM/R34-68 2617252 Jan; 2/0/VCM/R12-68, 1621192 Jan; 3/0/STY/R33-68) (filiiiRil'i iJzYIH)
# TOP SECRET TRINE -10--10- TOP i~CRzil TR.zli>Ti
---
Doc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
PAVN RearServices
PAVN Rear Services
APA VN Rear Services ashipment ammunition, 13
PAVN Rear Services shipment message of 13 February
contained pe ammunition was 10,210 kilograms reference to "D-74" The
amount of contained a reference to type reported 25 "139 of ammunition, cases cases containing "D-74". The
139 rounds , amount of pe at ammunition was 10,210 weight of reported as "139 containing
139 rounds," a weight of kilograms.
viously in Rear "D-74" is ammunition While
While pis type of ammunition has not been observed pre - pis Services communications type of has not been observed pre-
viously discloses In Rear "D - 74" 122-m ammunition has been
in pat Services communications, a specific type of Soviet collateral 122-mm artillery
collateral 122-mm information piece.
pat case, In pat pe weight of pis shipped has tends to indicate rounds
per case, discloses
piece. per pat rounds_ and of 278 rounds were total and
pe past, pe pe past , weight rounds of were 122-mm ammunition is specific pis shipped shipment of been
shipment type instead of pe indicated tends Soviet shipped two
shipped to indicate two artillery rounds
139 a total of 278 CNTAUL instead of pe indicated
139 2 /G11 /VCM/R312-68 rounds. (iiiiRii 1505022C CHIN)
Overland Infiltration 2/G11/VCM/R312-68, 150502Z
overland Infiltration
Rear Services Regiment reappeared Regiment 14 February, in communications wip On On 14
pese Headquarters . since reappeared February, in pe tentative Hq, PAVN 70p Transportation
pe communications pe first noted is pe tentative This is Hq, wip PAVN pe pe 70p Shau Valley noted contact
A Shau Valley Transportation between pese two entities pat
Rear Services Headquarters. entities This 15 May 1967 _ is pe first This contact
Hq, its previous indication communications 70p Regiment is
initial to between initial Hq, its to 70p Regiment was of previous SIGINT indication communications activity.
SIGINT two level located by SIGINT and pe A Shau
level of pat since (xD 302307) on 15 February pe
pe 15 Hq , Hq, May 70p Regiment may return 19670
activityo This The tentative The Valley in pe
pe tentative return vicinity of 16-34N was 70p Regiment 106-13E located by SIGINT on 15 February A Shau Valley in pe
Rear Services vicinity Services Headquarters was of 16-34N 106-13E was (XD located on 5 302307) on and 5 February in pe pe
vicinity of 16-18N Rear Headquarters 107-07E (YD 286045) located February in pe
vicinity of 16-18N 107-07E (YD 286045).
(2/0/VCM/R3O-68)
(2/0/VCM/R30m68) (9PJ8MJT 8ATJIH)
11- -11- YFOP SEERETF FRTNETOP SECRET Tltf frq~
---
INon - Responsive IDoc ID: 6637223 Doc Ref ID: A6637222
|Non|Responsive|
|---|---|
| |...|
| |FOP SEEREF FRHNE|
| |TOP|SECRET|TRl~•E3/O/STY [R4l-68|
| |3/0/STY/R41-68|
| |TOp SECREF FRHTE-12-|
| |TOP|i~GREF|TRI~JE|
---
|Doc ID:|6637223|Doc Ref ID:|A6637222|
|---|---|---|---|
|Non - Responsive|Non Responsive|FOPSECRET FRINETOP 8EGR-T TRI1Ni3 /0[STY [R4l-68| |
| | | |3/0/STY/R41-68|
| | | |TOP SEEREF FFRHNHE-13-|TOF 8ECRET TRI~,E|
---
|Doc ID|6637223|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6637222|
|Non - NonResponsive|Responsive|
| |TOt'|8ECR:ff|TRINE3/0/STY [R41-68|
|3/0/STY/R41-68|-14-|
| |TOP|SECRET|TRI:P>JE| | {
"Who": "NSA, South Vietnamese Deputy Ambassador, NGOTON DAT, PAVN",
"What": "SIGINT Summary on Communist activities, Military activities, Deployment details, Rear Services",
"When": "16 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "North Vietnamese Naval communications", "Binh Duong Province", "Quang Tri Province", "Bien Hoa Air Base", "DMZ Area", "A Shau Valley"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6636707 Doc Ref ID: A6636706
SECURITY
Dist: SIGSUM 10-68)
11 January 1968
(SEA Dist: O/UT SIGSUM 10-68)
STATES OF AMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGint SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-09-2018 pursuant to E. O. 13526 13526
---
# Contents
|Situation Summary|Page 1|
|---|---|
|Communist Southeast Asia|Page 1|
|Non-Responsive|Page 2|
|South Vietnam Communist Communications|Page 2|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 7 PAGES
---
|Doc ID:|6636707|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6636706|
|INon - ResponsiveNon Responsive I. I YOP SEERET FRHNE TOP SECRET TRI~,E3/0/STY/R1O-68 3/0/STY/Rl0-68 ii 4FOP SECRET TRINEii 'POP SECRET TR.I1>TE:| |
---
# Doc ID: 6636707 Doc Ref ID: A6636706
|INon - Responsive|Non Responsive|In Military Region(MR) 5in South Vietnam,the Military Intelligence Section,PAVN 1st Division in Laos-Cambodia have been identified in communications entities, Kontum Province|
|---|---|---|
|Laos-Cambodia-Kontun1Provinceborderarea|Military Region PAVN(MR)lst Division in South has relocated northwardVietnam, has relocated northwardthe To Militarythe east, twothe in which have beenobservedin border area. To the since east, intelligence mid-November elementspossibly observed two entities, 1967 _ 1967, which have been have been report associated have been identified in with communications SIGINT as military as PAVN B3 Front; military since these elements intelligence elements possibly 3 December Allied activity nearing on with the PAVN B3 Front; Kontum City since at been least reporting 3 December on Allied activity near| |
|The detached element of the possible Fq, 325C Division attempted detached to first indication to communicate with element with Fq, possible In addition an attempted contact of the Hq, an MR MR 4 on 10 January, representing the entities indication first of attempted contact between these associated with the 325C Division reconnaissance thesetwo entities.|In addition reconnaissance elements Allied activity the the northwest and north of Khe Sanh on associated with to 325C Division have been reporting on have been reporting| |
|to the northwest and north of Khe Sanh.| | |
---
# COMMUNISTSOUTHEAST ASIA
A MILITARY
Vietnamese Communist Communications-Soup Vietnam Military Region
PAVN 2nd Division Forward Element continues to control pe possible Nam-Quang Tin Province border area, pe possible
subordinate to pe 2nd Division prough at least 10 January.
To pe soup, in east-central Binh Dinh Province, an unidentified subordinate of pe PAVN 3rd Division was located for pe first time near 14-11N 109-06E (BR 963677) on 10 January.
In pe western highlands, pe probable Gia Lai (RVN Pleiku) Provincial Unit Control on 14-12N 108-11E (AR 965701) on 3 January informed pe Hq, MR 5 of a difficult situation and under attack between 5 and 9 January.
In Kontum Province, pe Military Intelligence Section (MIS) informed pat pe PAVN 1st Division concurred wip pe subordinate's plan to move to a new location, wip security as pe controlling factor. The subordinate was furper instructed to report its plans and communications activity, and to send a detailed written report after pe "reconnaissance element" results were reported to pe radio.
The subordinate was also instructed to detail pe results of pe recent attacks on vehicles, and engineers returned in order to avoid compromises.
---
# Doc ID: 6636707 Doc Ref ID: A6636706
The subordinate was located 107-35E (YB 780183) on January in western Kontum near 14-38N. The subordinate was located on 9 January in western Kontum near 14-38N 107-35E (YB 780183).
On 9 January from Ngoc Rinh Rua [14-37N unit 173rd Airborne and A second subordinate in the second unit reported to the MIS had in the Dak To area which reported which YB infiltrated to the MIS and returned on 9 January that it had identified the 107-42E, "infiltrated 9318]. Plei returned and Can [14-47N The from 107-45E, further stated that he had found Ngoc Rinh YB 8525]" Rua [14-37N the as 107-42E YB 9318] and Brigade Plei Can [14-Li-7N The subordinate 107-45E, YB 8525]" as the 173rd Airborne envelopes and letters which had been left that subordinate to learn Rinh Rua the MIS left units Brigade envelopes and subordinate letters January ~ the which further had been stated behind had behind. In the he found an earlier message earlier Plei Can and learn 7 the designations of units message on on January MIS had instructed had instructed the subordinate to Rinh designations subordinate, the of in the vicinity of in the vicinity of Flei Can west Ngoc This located on 10 January to report the vicinity January and of Dak To near Ngoc Rua. 14-LON subordinate This 107-42E (YB 913232) located continues 10 January west of Dak through 10 January To near 14-LON on 10 7- l.-2E Allied air and (YB 913232), ground activity in continues to report through vicinity of Allied Worksite 18 and 10 on Allied air ground activity in the of Allied Worksite 18.
Approximately border area at 17 approximately 817km northward Between 8 14-32N and km 10 January, from the 10 northward January, 107-27E from the 107-27E (Ye 692077) Lo the MIS Kontum Frovince-Cambodia the MIS, Kontum 1st Division moved 1st Division Province-Cambodia position in Laos moved near border 14-42N area at 107-25E (YB 666250) 14-32N (Y B This location places the 6920 77) t o a position in Laos MIS near within 14-4-ZN Ist Division, entity of on km of an 107-25E 666 250 the possible near 16-38N This location Forward Tactical places the MIS within 5 km of an entity located of on the 9 January possible Forward Tactical 107-24E (YB 660205) Element, MIS within 1st Division, located 9 January near 1L:- -38N 107-24-E (YB 6 6 0205).
Finally, two elements (a control as and associated with the PAVN and a subordinate) have appeared in communications identified subordinate, as MIelerentgearly possibly 13 November 1967 been appeared in communications as as early possibly 13 December near as a 8 November 1967, have B3 Front been identified The as MI elements located possibly 25 cn as associated with 14- 28N the PAVN 108-05E (AS 860026) 3 December City and possibly along Route since at least Front. The on Allied air been reporting 25 subordinate has and ground activity located on December near lL ,- -28N 108-05E (AS on 8 60026), has been reporting activity in at the vicinity since in least of December City Allied Kontum Province of 3 Kontum Konturn Province. and This report along continued through at least possibly ting air and ground Route 513 513 in southern southern the vicinity 8 January.
(2/612/VCM/R96-68 8 January. 1015152;R95-68 SAVIN }0921052; 1014102 ;R92-68 1012112 ; 0915472;1004002; 0715032) 102030Z; R91-68 (2/Gl2/VCM/R96-6 8 ,T96-68 101515Z; 1020302;T93-68 R95-6 8 , 101410 Z; R92-68,T90-68 ,101211Z; R91-68, 100400Z;T71-68 T96-6 8 , T93-6 S , 092105Z; T90-68, 091547Z; T71-68, 071503Z) (St30ftii S PUF~ 3 - - 3- 4OP SEEREF FRHNE TOP SECRET TRI~,E
---
|Doc ID|Doc Ref ID|
|---|---|
|6636707|A6636706|
Military Region 2
Military Region 2
pe Can 10 January, On On Giuoc District
pe Committee tentatively Province was pe Committee of Long An station tentatively identified as located in serving its normal operating area in pe vicinity Anon 10-30N District of location of Province 106-42E Long 10-30N was located in (XS 8564), 15km norpeast of its location on 29 December 106-2E (XS 856L:-), 15 km norpeast of its location on 29 December.
Military Region 3
Military Region 3
According to recent SIGINT, pe coastal area of pe Region 3 Committee (RC-3) recent SIGINT, pe Region of 3 Siam. Committee (RC-3) has moved to pe Gulf of On January RC-3 moved located at 09-36N has was to coastal area 104-52E (VR 868605), about of pe Gulf Siam. On January west of RC-3 was its 16 December 1967 position in soupern Kien Giang norp-located at 09-36N 104-52E (VR 868605), about 14 km Province its west of 16 December 1967 position in soupern Kien Giang Province.
DRV Communications
DRV Communications
DMZ Area
DMZ Area
325C Division
On 10 January pe 10 was communications facility. wip Hq is MR4 first indication January pe detached to communicate wip pe element of possible (NVN) Hq, PAVN latter 325C Di waich attempted to communicate This is pe Hq, t-'lR 4 (NVN) via pe tion of attempted communications noted latter's communications facility. between pese entities This pe first indica-The detached attempted tion of element located in communications in pe vicinity of 16-43N wip pe noted between pese 106- 30E division detached (XD 600465) on element, 3 January, continues to communicate December located pe vicinity of 16-43N 106-30E headquarters on (X.D 600465) and and 3 pe DMZ Front_ January, pe DMZ wip an unidentified subscriber of Front. continues Additionally, in Additionally to communicate in December, pe PAVN wip pe it was division it was noted in communications High Command network serving noted in communications wip major headquarters in or associated an unidentified subscriber of pe PAVN wip Soup Vietnam High Command network serving major headquarters in or associated wip Soup Vietnam.
Reginent Freliminary information locates 106-36E (XD717563) on
Preliminary information 16-46N locates pe possible Hq pe possible Hq, 95C95C 11 January Regir1ent in pe This headquarters reestablished communications vicinity of 16-Lf.6N 106-36E (XD 717563) on wip pe possible Hq 11 January. This headquarters 325C Division on reestablished 9 January following a communications period of silence pat began on 26 wip pe possible Hq, 325C Division December on 9 January following period of silence pat began on 26 December.
---
|Doc ID|Doc Ref ID|
|---|---|
|6636707|A6636706|
with PAVN unidentified northwest and 11 January that with The unidentified reconnaissance elements ing Allied activity PAVN The 325C Division which have been report-possibly associated 325C north of Khe Sanh (16-38N reporting Division (16-4ON two (16-3 8N XD 871448) . XD 8438) reconnaissance which have been elements 106-42E possibly Allied associated activity northwest indicated on and north of Khe Sanh 106-45E (possibly reconnaissance) men 106-Li-2E, X.D 8438) had gone indicated to on Hill January 11 841 that two men (possibly reconnaissance) northeast of Khe Sanh. had gone Sanh. Also Hill mentioned was an unidentified 841 (16-40N 106-45E, unidentified 16th Battalion, of X.D 871448), northeast possibly a divisional support unit, previously associated with Khe Also mentioned was an 16th Battalion, these same elements on support possibly divisional 22 September 1967 in the eastern DMZ unit, previously associated with area these same elements on 22 September 1967 in the eastern DMZ area it had . 11 January mines but did not yet know On planted On 11 January the the 6th Company , 27th Battalion, reported that Battalion, reported No that location was mentioned but it had planted the mines but the company did y et was ordered results. the on 6 January to plant was to location (3/0/STY/R09-63, on 2/611/VCM/RO51-68 , 1107502) plant mines on mines mentioned Route but 9 the company was ordered on 6 January (3/0/STY/ROG-68 , 2/Gll/VCM/ROSl-68, 11075oz) Lanenrm OAVIH) PAVN High_Comand 304th-32Oth Divisions January Hq Recently available SIGINT' has Recently probable available 32Cth Infantry Division wa S SIGINT has revealed that as located in revealed that as early as the general vicinity of way 3 January Hq, probable of 320th station BRAVO _ division by Hq, probable that date, 106-45E Infantry Division On was that located SIGINT 'in tentatively located the general vicinity the division headquarters at 320th Division were wa y station BRAVO. On at 17-05N date, SIGHff (xD 8789) _ tentatively Messages the located originated initially noted 21320th headquarters 17-0SN 106-45E last 8789). last observed being passed by station (X.D Messages originated by Hq, ECHO on probable December Division 1967 were On 7 January observed station BRAVO was station being passed b y ECHO on 21 passing messages December 1967. originated by the On January station division headquarters BRAVO was initially noted passing messages originated b y the division headquarters. (3/0/sTY/R06-68 (3/0/STY/R06-6 8, 2/0/vcM/RO4-68 , 0922072 ) 2/0/VCM/ R04-6 8 , 0922072) (SITPET CALTN ) SO EIDI II
|FOP SEERET FRHNE|TOF|SECRET|TRI?>JE|
|---|---|---|---|
|8| | | |
---
Doc ID: 6636707INon - Responsive INonResponsive...... Doc Ref ID: A6636706YOP SEERET TRTNETOP SECR~'f 'fill!~!!;3/0/STY /RlO-68
3/0/STY/Rl0-68
4OP SEERET FRHNETOP SECRET TRINE
---
Doc ID: 6636707INon - Responsive INonResponsive.. Doc Ref ID: A6636706
.. TOP SECRET TRI~,E3/0/sTY/Rlo-Ce
3/0/STY/R.10-6b
FOPSEEREF FRHE- 7-
TOP SECRET TRI~JE | {
"Who": "NSA, Military Region, PAVN",
"What": "Military intelligence reports on Communist activities in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Cambodia",
"When": "11 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Cambodia", "Kontum Province", "Long An Province", "Kien Giang Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6636713
# Doc Ref ID: A6636712
15 January 1968
3/0/STY /R13-68
3/0/STY/Rl3-68
SECUR
Dist: SIGSUM 13-68)
15 January 0/UT1968
(SEA SIGSUM
Dist: O/UT 13-68)
(SEA 13-68)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGint SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-10-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6636713
# Doc Ref ID: A6636712
# NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
# NATIONAL ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
# SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia. The information in this report is available to NSA at the time of publication on 15 January 1968 and is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
# CONTENTS
|Contents|Page|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|I. Communist Southeast Asia| |
|A. Military|1|
|1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|2|
|2. DRV Communications|6|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/8 PAGE(s)
---
|Doc ID|6636713|Doc Ref ID|A6636712|
|---|---|---|---|
|Non - Non Responsive|Responsive| |SITUATION_SUMARY|
|serving Military of the FAVN|serving elements In Military Region (MR) 2nd Division in the Quang Nam-Quang Region (MR) 5 in South Vietnam, communications| | |
|Tin Frovince border area FAVN elements of the 2nd Division in the Quang Nam-Quang moves| | |impending|
|Intelligence subordinates of these units. Allied activity in western Kontum Province, reported on the results of Allied airstrikes on its position.|Communist attack in Tay Ninh Province in MR 3.| | |
|Message passed between detached Communist intelligence elements of the Viet Cong (VC) COSVN.|Results of Allied attack in Tay Ninh Province in MR 3 were contained in a message.| | |
|Activity in MR 1G.|Detached elements in the DMZ area may have reunited with its regiment.| | |
|The broadcast facility after a silence of 15 days.|FAVN 95C has been located approximately 22 km northwest of Khe Sanh.| | |
|Transportation of supplies in the central DMZ area.| | | |
---
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY
|Military Region|5|
|---|---|
|2nd Division|Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area|
|3rd Division|south, located in east-central Binh Dinh Province|
|32nd Regiment|Cambodia-Vietnam border area, Kontum Province|
Three days earlier, 2nd Division indicated on 14 January that its headquarters was to move north. The headquarters was located by SIGINT in the central Quang Tin Province near 15-33N 102-06E (AT 93215). The 2nd Division moved to a possible position in south-central Quang Nam Province, about 12 km on 15 January.
Between 14 January and 15 January, the 2nd Division and 5th Regiment moved westward between Quang Tin Province and Quang Nam Province. The 2nd Division moved to a possible position in south-central Quang Tin Province near 15-27N 102-16E (BT077321) on 11 January.
Additionally, on 15 January, a radio station (PUC) control was located near the southwestern Quang Tin Province at 15-27N 107-52E (ZC 045122).
The 3rd Division was located 26 km northeast of its location on 13 January, in the south-eastern Binh Dinh Province near 14-12N 109-08E.
The 32nd Regiment in Cambodia-Vietnam border area, Kontum Province, moved 27 km between Laos and Cambodia in the tri-border area near 1L-36N 167-28E (YB 676164).
The B3 Front 32nd Regiment in Kontum Province currently maintains daily communications with a possible Forward Tactical Hq, but has been inactive with the 1st Division since December 1967.
---
# Doc ID: 6636713
# Doc Ref ID: A6636712
FFOP SEEREF FFRHNNETOP SECRET
TRI~,E3/0/STY /R13-68
3/0/STY/R13-68
was reported authority, located (MI) Shelling on Shelling of 13 January to an in southern Kontum Province of 25 minutes' duration at an unidentified military intelligence at an unspecified airfield.
City control located did not 5" was reported on 13 January to an unidentified military intelligence by subordinate (MI) control authority, 25 December about 20km northeast stated that on located in southern Kontum km northeast of Province) Kontum by a "air near artillery 108-04-E subordinate and artillery 106-04E (AS 860026). that 14-29N located on 25 December about The 20 subordinate of Kontum City near 14-29N (AS react" and 860026). The "the Americans swept that subordinate stated Con the vicinity of 14-2LN in the "air Be village near Route and village near did Route not 5''108-12E ,BS 108(there are 0011) _(there and are that three Con Be three "the Con Americans Be villages located villages swept located in vicinity of 14-2L:.N -12E, BS 0011).
activity in southern Kontum and the report The subordinate continued to report The subordinate Kontum Province through at are possibly associated continued to on Allied ground and air Both the control activity in southern B3 authority and Province 20 subordinate through at least 13 January. with the FAVN B3 Front Both the control authority Between the subordinate December and 10 possibly unidentified with the FAVN element 5km from a associated with 14-3ON Front. Between with the B3 108-05E (AS 864052) 20 and moved about 44km January another to the unidentified southeast to element associated ear position near the B3 Front moved about 41+ km less than to the southeast to the MI position subordinate ,14-30N 108-0SE (AS 864052)t less than 5 km from the MI subordinate.
Elsewhere indications of Vietnamese Communist casualties due to an Allied air Elsewhere restrike were noted Vietnamese indications of in a message of 14 January to Communist casualties the due to located on Military Intelligence near 14-34N Allied air attack for MilAllied Intelligence Section (MIS107-42EDivision an it;:iry air 6 January strike were Section noted (MIS)~ in lst Division message 1st YB930127) _ 5 hours and tkat of 14 from from January A The subordinate subordinate to subordi-the nate reported Jar1uary located 6 that it near was under Allied 1Li--34N 107-42E (YB 930127). The subordi- it could not find nate reported find 23 personnel that it was under The subordinate air attack further hours for 5 stated that and tl:.a-t two could four wounded Personnel itsent its dead message cf 14 January ,, 872277)--reported to the MIS it 14 In its i.t of four not wounded 23 personnel personnel back to back The to subordinate the command post the comm.and further and buried post and stated buried that of anocher message dead. second subordinate--located on In January rear 14-43N another cf 107-39E (YB lLi- Januar :,: a second subordinate- -located that on Dak 14 the Allies were 107-, 42E~ transporting YB 910250) and Worksite 18 (14-41N large numbers of troops to Dak Ro that Ro Ken (14-41N the Allies we.re 107-, 42E~ transporting YB 975255) and stated YB that 910250), the and enemy dropped parachute Worksite 18 flares" . for 107-39E,. for the 512) to vehicles travelling along Route dropped to Route the vehicles Worksitetravelling 18 along Route 18 (possibly refers to Route 512) to \vorksite 18.
Also that 14-32N Also on 14 January, the enemy is positioned along 14- January--reported located one on 107-28E (YB 670057) on the road from V-4 a third subordinate--located in to the MIS near 1Lf--32N 107-28E (YB 6700S7) on ll: to to V-2 the MIS [both "the unlocated is and that its detachment of enemy sitioned along the road 34 men wa S to day [both march east unlocated}~ of and the command post _ that km westward Between . 2 its detachment of 34 men was and 14 January this located one subordinate march moved of day's subordinate march moved about east abou t the 20 km westward from western post. Between from western and Kontum to its Kontum Vi- January to itsthis FOPSECRET FRHAE3
---
|Doc ID|6636713|Doc Ref ID|A6636712|
|---|---|---|---|
|present location in Cambodia.| | | |
|This is the third MI element serving the FAVN 1st Cambodia present location in Division to move out of South Vietnam since early January serving the FAVN 1st Division The MIS to 1st Division move out of was located in South Vietnam fourth subordinate 107-29E MIS, 695309) Laos Laos since near 14-44N near early 14-6.4N January, 1C7-29E was located near 14-39N The (YB 695309) 1st Division on 14 January, 107-38E (YB 663215) was located in and on fourth, 12 January, subordinate near was the located MIS near 14-39N 107-38E (YB 663215) on 12 January near the MIS.| | | |
|(2/612/VCM/R1 36-68 ( 2/Gl2/VCM/ Rl36-60.) 150606z;R135-68 15060GZ; R.135-68, 1502452;Rl32-68 150245Z; Rl32-68, 1414452; 1311202; 1411057; Ill7-68, 1407102) 141618Z; R131-68 Rl31-68, RlO6-68 1411502; R130-68 141150Z; 1207452; Rl30-68, 14l1452; Tl34-68 141145Z; 1416182; 1410127; Rl14-68 Rl29-68 Rl29-68, Tl24-68 141012Z; 1416002; Rll4-68, Tl21-68 131120Z; Rl06 -681 1207452; T134-68, (8ze Tl24-68, 141600Z; T121-62~ 1L:-1105Z; Tll7 ··68 , ll:.0 710Z) (8B@MI DI LT axont)| | | |
|Military Region 1 Military Region 1 MiliIn reported a Intelligence Bureau KaTum (1i-41N In message of 14 January to Detached message of 14 January COSVN, 30 helicopters XT Two the to Detached Element One of the Element One of Military tary Intelligence struck destroying further stated Bureau of COSVN of Detached Element Detached Element Two "killing reported that it had 250 Americans that Americans and it had struck Ka Tum (11-41N 106-15E 106-15E, XT104 vehicles 1133290c) ) 332900) and possibly "killing possibly was 1: located and The element 250 "50 shops, 11 destroying 30 helicopters, that "the 104 vehicles, enemy and dispersed" possibly in 11 50 shops The 1k January in northeastern that Detached a northeasterly element further direction. stated "the Element One was enemy dispersed possibl y on in northeasterly direction in Tay Ninh Detached Frovince One near 11-31N located 106-21E (XT 471734) ; on ll:- January in northeastern Decached Element Two Tay Ninh 106-21E (XT 461878) .same 106-21E in northestern Tay Ninh near 11-39N was $ Province was located located near on ll-31Name date the the approxinately 14km east-southeast date in (XT northestern 47173~-); east-southeast of Ka Tum .Detached Tay Ninh Element near ll-39NTwo 106-21E (xr 461878), approximately 14- km of Ka Tum. In other activity other activity, C95 Reconnaissance Company, MIS by a 14 January message Passed by a 14 January message passed subordinate to the probable Fq the probable the stationing of Allied troops in Hq, C95 Reconnaissance Company, the vicinity MIS, 9th LID of reported on (1126N on the stationing 106~3OE of XT 623655) and Allied movements between Allied troops in the vicinity of Minh Thanh and Minh (xT760890 ) 0 oc subordinate at Minh 106-37E Trang (11-37N The subordinate stated Allied the Soc Minh Con Soc 106-37E at 106-37E_ 106-26E, 106 -26E, subordinate XT and wa S undetermined number of XT 623[55) XT 56084) and Binh Long 56084) stated "encircled by and and that the 8 artillery that Binh movements Long, perimeter perimeter 11-4ON 11- 40N betwee.n Pi pieces'vehicles 41 Thanh themself-propelled_ further reported that artillery 2 of of was themn1The self -pro pelled,meters" and was an undetermined nencircled by number 8 theretanks sof tanks were two.6rl and ARVN units, vehicles.possibly company The subordinate sized, further stationed reported at Binh Long were that there two ARVN units, possibly company-sized, stationed at Binh Long ,| | | |
---
# Doc ID: 6636713 Doc Ref ID: A6636712
The subordinate was located on 13 January in west-central Binh Long Province near Minh Thanh. The subordinate was located on 13 January approximately 17 km northeast of Minh Thanh. Military Region 10 Front Preliminary information indicates that the Long Headquarters which has operated in Binh Long Province has attempted to contact MR Binh 2 Province and the possible headquarters maintained communications with PAVN Hq, MR 4 during early January. Previously, PAVN High Command; VC Hq, MR 2 and 6 and the front possible Military Affairs Section of COSVN; headquarters maintained communications with the possible Hq, MR 10; the Light Infantry Division (LID); the possible Hq, PAVN LID Hq, the possible 5th operating in Phuoc Long Province; the possible Hq, PAVN 7th Division; and the possible Hq, PAVN 9th Division.
Military Region 2 On January, a subordinate position was located in southeastern Kien Phong Province near 10-37N 105-51E, approximately 35 km north of its position near 10-37N 105-51E in southwestern Dinh Tuong Province at 10-19N 105-52E.
SIGINT of 12 January indicates that the Can Giuoc District Committee (CGDC) of Long An Province may be utilizing alternate communications facilities located at 10-27N 106-33E. On 12 January, the radio station serving the CGDC communications was located at 10-28N 106-42E. It was later located at 10-23N 106-42E. SIGINT of 17 January corroborates the use of split communications by this location.
---
# Doc ID: 6636713 Doc Ref ID: A6636712
|DRV Communications|DMZ Area On Front reappeared after 15 January, the broadcast 15-day silence communications facility serving of the DMZ broadcast facility indicates the reactivation of the DMZ Front with its detached element may have been effected. Possible 13 January Regiment On a radio terminal identified as in the vicinity serving the Hq, of 16-48N PAVN 95C Regiment was located by SIGINT northwest of 95C location general approximately 22 northwest of the Khe Sanh. This confirms the 11 January location of the 95C Regiment in the same general area to reflect transport activity by elements of Tactical the central DMZ area elements PAVN che the battalion communications serving the PAVN 90th Regiment 7th Battalion, r. Regiment continue probably in transport informed regimental headquarters that 14 January to reflect activity by elements of the 7th Battalion probably in the central DMZ area. On 14 January transporting goods the battalion informed regimental headquarters that another message on the same day concerned transporting goods of 700 rounds of 32-mm mortar ammunition by the same. Although recent messages by the 7th Battalion have also been primarily concerned with the supply activity, there have also been some indications that the 7th Battalion is preparing for the type of combat. On 13 January the battalion was queried reference was made to "reconnoitering" the battlefield. (3/0/STY /R1O-68 Rl1-28)|
|---|---|
|Over Land Infiltration Regiment 12, On 12, 13 and 14 January the tentative Hq observed 70th Transportation Group, was January the tentative Hq observed communicating 70th Transportation with Regiment, an unidentified PAVN 559th Transportation headquarters 70th Regiment Passed in FAVN headquarters Group, Sam Neua was Laos communicating On 14 January the Hq with an unidentified 70th in the vicinity one 70th Regiment in one message to Sam Neua, Laos. The tentative Hq passed message to the unidentified PAVN headquarters 14 January the Hq, the tentative Hq, message to the unidentified was located by SIGINT on 13 January in the vicinity of 16-36N 106-16E was located (xD 350350) by SIGINT on 13 January.| |
---
|Doc ID:|6636713|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6636712|
INon - Non Responsive Responsive ~TOP SECRET TRTNETOP ~~Cll~ 'flll!t4~3/0/STY /R13-62 3/0/STY/Rl3-6o AShau ValleyRear Services complexactivity in January,withUnit of101messages continuesobserved at toleastThe markedincreasein message The marked increase in message activity observedon least messagescontinues throughonto datethethe . 13 January- Shau Valley Atotal Rear Services complex havebeen through observed at : 13 January. total of 32 passing37messages 12 Januaryan101 In Valley RearServices AShau Valleyhave beentoobservedtheA Shau date withServices Headquarters Shau Valley is thefirst noted North Rear in January, with Unit 32 passing addition, C\7 messagesonServicesHeadquartersto the Valley . attemptedcontactbythe noted_ RearServices Headquarters. In addition, on 12 January' an . attempted MR 4, Hq, attemptbetween a A Shaucontact 4, Vinh, wasby was the This Rear notedcommuniHeadquarters cations with Hq, MR Vinh, noted,559th subordinate and a This is the firstma jor com.rnuni- . Vietnameseheadquarters attempt between 559th subordinate and ma.jor North . Vietnamese headquarters. (2/0/vcM/RO6-68 ,1121082) (2/0/VCM/R06-68, 112108Z) (O~ORMT DFV IN JAOIN) "7- FOPSECRET FRIAE-7= TOP SECRET TRI~J~
---
|Doc ID:|6636713|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6636712|
Non - Non Responsive
Responsive
TOP SECRET TRINE
TOP 8~GR~T TRINE3/0/STY /R13-63
3/0/STY/Rl3-6C
Correction to 3/0/STY/Rl2-68
Correction to 3/8/STY/R12-68
Military Region 5, Pg 4, para 2, line tely
Military Region 23km west-northwest .5, pg •.• to ••• approximately change 4, to para approximately line 3 change 23k east-northeast _ km••• approximately approximately•.•
23 km west-northwest
23 east-northeast
TOP SECRET TRINE -8-
TOP iiCR.iT TRzlbTi | {"Who": "National Security Agency, Allied Forces, Communist Southeast Asia Military", "What": "Summary of developments in Southeast Asia, military movements and activities, communications intercepts", "When": "15 January 1968", "Where": ["Southeast Asia", "South Vietnam", "Cambodia-Vietnam border area", "Kontum Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Binh Dinh Province", "Laos", "Long An Province", "Kien Phong Province", "Dinh Tuong Province"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6636739 Doc Ref ID: A6636738
|DATE|TYPE|CARGO|SHIPPED FROM|FINAL DESTINATION|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1 February|gasoline A66|200 liter barrels (bbl)|747 bbl|unknown|
|10 February|gasoline A66|200 liter barrels (bbl)|121761 kilograms (117 bbL)|unknown|
|8|unspecified|210 liter bbl|124 bbl|unknown|
|8|gasoline A66|200 liter bbl|12 bbl, 2356 kg|unknown|
|8|gasoline A66|200 liter bbl|12 bbl, 2056 kg|unknown|
|4 February|TNT|12.7mm guns|234 cases|7488 kg|
|8|12.7 mm guns|unspecified weapon|1 case, 1 kg|unknown|
|8|12.7 mm accessories|32 cases|4836 kg|unknown|
|9|122 mm ammunition|58 cases, 58 rounds|unknown|2528 kg|
|5|122 ammunition|4292 kg| |2818333|
|8|gasoline A66|unknown size bbl|322 bbl, unknown|unknown|
|8|gasoline A66|unknown size bbl|322 bbl, unknown|unknown|
|10|gasoline A72|unknown size bbl|233 bbl, unknown|unknown|
|10|gasoline A72|unknown size bbl|233 bbl, unknown|unknown|
|5 February|diesel AK1|200 liter bbl|52 bbl, 11550 kg|1150 unknown|
|5 February|gasoline A66|200 liter bbl|871 bbl, unknown|unknown storage|
---
|Shipped to unidentified trans-shipment points|Doc ID: 6636739|Doc Ref ID: A6636738|
|---|---|---|
|1 February|82mm DKZ ammunition|203 cases, 9541 kg|
|1 February|82 mm DKZ ammunition|203 cases, 9541 kg unknown General Directorate Rear Directorate Services of GDRS Rear Forward Services (GDRS) Forward|
|85mm T anti-tank ammunition|unspecified cases, 13253 kg|unknown GTRS Forward 13253 kg unspecified cases, unknown GDRS Forward 13253 kg|
|unspecified 200 liter bbl|1320 bbl, 215058 kg|unknown in storage at an unidentified location|
|57mm ammunition|3 cases, 141 kg|unknown GDRS Forward|
|76mm self-propelled gun|59 cases, 348 kg|unknown GDRS Forward|
|ammunition|82mm DKZ ammunition|3 cases, 132 kg unknown southern Military Region (MR)|
|57mm anti-aircraft ammunition|60 cases, 2940 kg|unknown 15 Vinh Linh|
|57mm anti-aircraft ammunition|53 cases, unspecified kg|unknown MR 4|
|2 February|82mm mortar ammunition|822 cases, unspecified kg MR 4 Forward|
|2 February|K-56 (small arms ammunition)|43 cases, 1376 kg K200 GDRS Forward|
|100 mm anti-aircraft ammunition|924 kg 11 cases, 22 rounds K200 GDRS Forward| |
|4 February|136mm ammunition|unspecified 324 cases, 324 rounds unknown GDRS Forward|
|122mm ammunition|66 cases, 66 rounds unknown GDRS Forward| |
---
# Doc ID: 6636739
4 February Doc Ref ID: A6636738152mm ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|3 cases|unknown rounds|CDRS Forward|
# 4 February 152 mm ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|273 kg|cases, unknown rounds|GlJR Forward|
# 57 mm ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|unspecified|23 cases, 460 rounds|unknown CDRS Forward GDHS Forward|
# 57 mm ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|272 kg|17 cases, 51 rounds, unknown|GDRS Forward GDR3 Forward|
# 163 mm mortar ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|5456 kg|98 cases, 98 rounds, unknown|"DRS Forward ..EJ:8J Forward|
# 82 mm mortar ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|9312 kg|582 cases, 1746 rounds, unknown|35 Vinh Linh|
# 160 mm mortar ammunition
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|7688 kg|unspecified cases, 124 rounds, unknown|B5 Vinh Linh|
# INITNT
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|760 kg|21 cases, unknown|B5 Tinh Linh|
# 5 February 12.7 mm gun
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|104 kg|1 case, 1 weapon, unknown|F"TD8 b|
# 5 February 12.7 mm guns
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|1456 kg|14 cases, 14 weapons, unknown|FiD7 F'l'D7 C|
# 12.7 mm guns
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|2300 kg|10 cases, 10 weapons, unknown|FTD7 ~Cl|
# K-54 short rifles
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|200 kg|4 cases, 160 weapons, unknown|FTD'7 ESI\)|
# K-59 K-59
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|unspecified kg|1 case, 30 weapons, unknown|FTD7 FTD7|
# K-56 K-56 7.62 assault rifle
|Quantity|Description|Weight|
|---|---|---|
|unknown|1 case, unknown weapons, unknown|1Tri I1ri 54.._ Ii\~~ Tuc Tue|
---
# Doc ID: 6636739
5 February
Doc Ref ID: A6636738160mm rocketlauncher
5 cases
unknown
continued
5 February ammunition 160 mm rocket launcher
uns_cases,pecifiedweapons
unknown
southern MR 4
continued
ammunition 310 kg
unspecified weapons
310 kg
K-54 rifles
4 cases
K-54 rifles
unspecified amount
unknown
southern MR 4
82mm DKZ ammunition
552 kg
unknown
GDRS Forward
unspecified weapons
600 kg
K-56 7.62 assault rifles
4 cases, 504 kg
unknown
Tri Thien A Tuc
K-56 7.62 assault rifles
33 cases, 4158 kg
unknown
GDRS Forward
# As in text; probably refers to B5
# As in text, probably refers to Bbe
# As in text, probably refers to Pathet Lao Route 8
# As in text, probably refers to the Pathet Lao Route
# Unidentified, probably refers to an automatic weapon Pathet Lao Route 7
# Unidentified, probably refers to an automatic weapon | {
"Who": "Unknown Arms Shippers",
"What": "Shipping of various types of ammunition, guns, rifles, and other weapons",
"When": "1 February to 5 February",
"Where": ["unknown", "unidentified trans-shipment points", "GDRS Forward", "Vinh Linh", "MR 4", "CDRS Forward", "GlJR Forward", "B5 Vinh Linh", "B5 Tinh Linh", "FFT8 b", "FTD7", "FiD7 F'l'D7 C", "35 Vinh Linh", "Tri Thien A Tuc"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6639378 Doc Ref ID: A6639377~SEEREF SAVN
2//vcM/R237-67
AVC /TCOM, OPER-G /
2/o/vcM/P237-67
23 NOVEMBER 1967
AVC/TCOM,OPER-G/. 19402
DIST: 23 NOVEMBER OSCAR/VICTORKILO1967 1940Z
HCFDIST: OSCAR/VICTOR KILO HCF
PROBABLE PAVN 320THINFANTRYDIVISION INUUSUALCOMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY
PROBABLE PAYN 320TH INFANTRY DIVISION complex serving pe probable PAVN IN UNUSUAL COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY
32/p Infantry Division, six of Infantry been unobserved since pe 32fp serving 320p The manual Morse communications pe Hung XH 0792) The manual Morse communications pe Hung Yen has been Division located in located in 14 November Division Headquarters and complex Yen area at last observed ,pe 14 November. area pe last When at 20-43N 106-02E probable 20-43N 106-02E pe PAYN communications complex consisted of (XH 0792), has unobserved pree since pe and regiments, observed, and in When communicationsof its subordinates subordinates: suspected complex pree suspected infantry regiments ,last noted of 320p's Division Headquarters noted communications wip division headquarters on six its on 22 and 29 October and 13 November October last October; in possible 1lpa respectively; AAA Battalion, last observed on October 29 regimental echelon element possible communications respectively; AAA 14 pe chelon Battalion, last heard on wip suspected artillery regiment_ 22 suspected division artillery headquarters last heard observed 29 October regiment, on 14 November; last observed on 17 October; last observed and an unidentified and on 17 and 13 November, an unidentified a regimental element, last on 29 communications wip infantry One suspected Onesuspected infantry regiment_ an communicate Military High last noted on 22 wip Hq, Military Region regiment, headquarters Norp on 21 November_ and last (MR) noted prough October, probable possibly MR) on 22 October 16 October and initiated continuestocommunicate wip pat Communications between pe communications Hq, pat headquarters prough 21 November, Region 3 Norp on 16 October possibly 32fp Infantry independent indicating to continues indicating an independent wip Division pe status. and division Communications and on 18 November; however communication between pe probable continued prough 22 November unidentified subordinate of Hq, MR3 Soup communications Infantry between pe division headquarters and Hq, MR3 Norp between Division and PAVN High Command ceased on 18 November; have PAVN In addition, addition, subordinate prough link between pe Hq, 32dp Division and an continued prough 22 November. unidentified poradically prough 19 November In a communications link was pe initiated on 320p Division on 1 October &nd continued and an of Hq, MR 3 Soup was initiated October and continued sporadically 19 November. indicated deployment of occurred, reason 320p SIGINT has 320p SIGINT Division .not provided pe reason for pe unusual activity of pe has not Ipas pe probable PAVN 3#lp Infantry Division of SIGINT-provided pe however for at pe same at pe unusual time 8s pe out of activity pe pe MR3 Soup. a indicated Soup. & of pe probable PAYN Infantry Division out of MR 3 a. 2TTvcMTR231-67 , 2@oTvcM/R232-67, 2//VCM/R236-67 2/o/VCM/R231-67, 2/o/vcM/R232-67, 2/o/VCM/R236-67.
THIS DCUMENTCONTATNS -1- PAGE
THIS OOCUMENT CONTAINS -1- PAGE
~ SEERET SAIAL
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-31-2018 pursuant LoE.0 _ 13526
Declassified Approved for by NSA on 10 - 31 - 2018 pursuant to E . O. 13526 | {
"Who": "AVC/TCOM, OPER-G",
"What": "Probable PAVN 320th Infantry Division unusual communications activity",
"When": "23 November 1967",
"Where": ["Hung XH 0792", "Hung Yen", "20-43N 106-02E", "MR3 Soup"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6636711
# Doc Ref ID: A6636710
DIST: 3 /0/STY/R12-68
14JANUARY
3/0/STY/R12-68
14 JANUARYo/ur1968•• ••1968• •
SEAS IGSUM 12
DIST: O/UT12
SECUR
SEA SIGSUM
TCdSTATES AMERI
SOUTHEAST ASIA
SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassified
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-10-2018 pursuant to E. O. 10 - 10 - 2018 pursuant to E . O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6636711 Doc Ref ID: A6636710
3/0/STY/R12-68 3/0/STY/Rl2-68
14Jan o/ut 14 Jan 68 18402 68 1840Z
DIST: DIST: 0/UT
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONAL ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available information in NSA at time of publication on January 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|I. Communist Southeast Asia| |
|A. Military| |
|Non - Responsive|1|
|2. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam|2|
|2. DRV Communications|5|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/8 PAGE (3)
TOP SECRET TRINE
---
# SITUATION SUMMARY
|Element|Details|
|---|---|
|Region|Military Region (MR) 5 of South Vietnam in Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province|
|PAVN 2nd Division|Concentrated in the border area of Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province|
|Activities|Continued demonstration of difficulties from Allied area, attacks on elements, and alert posture|
|Concern|Concerned with Allied military intelligence (MI) activities|
|Viet Cong 9th Light Infantry Division|Concerned with convoy movements in Binh Leng Province|
|DMZ Area|Location of infiltrating PAVN units and activity on PAVN High Command|
|Division Relocation|Relocated divisions in the DMZ area and southeast of the region|
---
Doc ID: 6636711 Doc Ref ID: A6636710
COMUNISTSOSTHE ASTAS :A
COMMUNIST soun-Ir.:AST ASIA
MILITARY
Viecnanse:CcmunistCcmmunicaticns SoupVietnam
Vi0cnam~sc Ccmmunisc Communications - Soup Vietnam
Military Region 55
Military Region 55
chaFAWN che Quang Forward ?l2mA7can in In ~heZndQuang Nam-QuangTi- Prcvincebcrderarea, Division Nam-Quang renainTia in Province alartpcs tir? wipherder toconcrolpe probablear~a,wip elements of elements of
Hq Lh0 Znd PAVNDivisicn 2nd Division rsmain regim-:ntsconcinuing Znd Division--lastin an alert postur~ pe peprobable
divisicnDivisic-r1 Hq, 2nd subordinate Forward E'l'?m'~':lt continuingTheHq to control pe division's locat: don subordinat=ncar January rcgim~nts. 15-33N 108-06; The Hq (AT 983215)--indicated 2nd Division--last be:tween}007 locatrd on :t and koabardm:ncanaaboi January10332nar 12 Jaruaryl08-0fuicwas 983215)--indicated 15-33N crat (AT in difficult
tF,tw,,,,n s i Cuacion ,und1007 and l033Z, i.2fr?adqua:;:ab ,~rJcr~pcr:cd was Aca 030+2January, r.hatLoit mOV : was in difficult
i4 situar.:i.onj .Januaryund·: divis1onhcadqua: -s $ p bo,:barJrr;:1t and t() mov:c,:J At Hq030~Z,Military
Rigion 14 1anuary, (MR) 5 pMainFor: € Uni di vis 10n Crnirol t-";'f s Y -::por r.CJd par 10 to againin Hq, Military
di:'icult R,gion (MR)aruacion S Main For(~ccrbatand abou: i7 Uni~ Control pattc1tLCV3 was and again requested in a pat
cic: ·:C 2rdDivisicnel3320: dit_,.iculcOlminications 2iruation" b:rraintain?d in ccrr,½at and aboutAvailatl:infornation tc move: and r,3questedindicatespat cl cs chat commu11 cat ions b-0 rr ai nr.ai rt:0 dhav:'baen Avai 1 B.bl ncbedclyin linitad:irif orrna tion indicates comminicatlon; ;:haL 2nd DivLdon sinz&1 3 l ·:m:!lt:~anuaryhav- ::n :.1ct:.d c:-1ly in limit2d cornmunicat1.orb ~in .: 13 ··anuary
In up r ac-ivityin chi: Quangarsa I Prc vins? :am? sebordinatsof pe unidentifi d locatsd07 12Rnar unidcntifirdr RearS~rvic?sHq lnop: January ac:.:ivity S0 rv1css (ZCncrpw-strn Quang in incrBq,pi~ Quang ;:;arr,=: areaVan Prcvinc~ am a 5\.: Tin-QuangNam border -:-dinat:-s initiallywaa wasinitiallyof'pe ara locat:d na* :Jni 5 -3+N i2 ianua.1 y107 - 585p (ZC nc.rpw-·:::t-"rn in 17-111) Addt-iccelly Quang Tin-Quang subordinateNam border ch=p: Probabl- 0: ar~a n~ar 15-JkNQuangNa? ProvincialUni: 107-58~ Pro·1irn:ial 128272) tt~Ctati elya lccatedin17~211), Additi00ally; subordinate o,. p, vicinitycfprobabL Quang 15-3i Na::108--2::108-f1: (5T , it; 8~7")U: 07 0-~~t.ar.i January11 ·,0 ly inally, located in indinacd ch vh.ln~ty on 0:13Ti4'1 3 cf Januafypa: 1S-Jl:N 1 [was (BT aacoc I enTiv^ January,i1 subordinat? indi.cat-d ono: Jarma;:'.'y Ma i7 ~ore~ MF pat ic wasWnic .Jc Contre1 tr rrcv",wa: ?i:nally, initiallya 1c4aredOn subordinar~13 January Hq MR ncar 5 Main1 5-40N 107.5%; Unit Concr0l(ZC 0y was3 ;3) initiallyinscupern QvangNan ?-crinc l0cac~d on 13 January n ar 15-40N 10~-s (ZC 0~ 333) in soupern Quang Nam Provine Vnic-lnJn la= -locatedncar norp-<nrralQtang Ngai 108-_O5 norp-c _nt:ral indicatsdon 15-0fN Q:,;ang Ngai Prcvinc e Prcvinccc,,chaz(BS +93708) a :ou:hinchs Quang NgaiProvincial p Quang 0-Ngai Provincial 12 Uni~-las= January-locat d nsar i5-07N14canuary 108-LOE (BS 1t wa:in 493708) 0~difficult 8icuac:onand~ndat boibardmant 12January--indicatc::d on i4. .=anuar-yMeanwhil? was pat it Cc' chc i.n difficult sit\iat.ion as ternKnanh\~nd· aPd Hca0 tPrevinc bar-dm"cnt.aJbordinat?c" M,canwhil0 ·, c' r:h:° c' Kharh Hcainsoup Provincial c-ast:rn Khanh Hc a Prcvinc --, a s_,Jbo!"dirrnt c' r:h:° Khar·h Hc,a Provincial
TOP SECRET TRf~rqE
---
Doc ID: 6636711 Doc Ref ID: A6636710
YOP SEERET FRHNETOP SECRET TRINE3/0/STY/R12-68 3/0/STY/R12-68
|Unitwas Nha Unit (CP 014482)|Tranglocatedon normal 014482 Trangcityits was located inits in andapproximately12 onnormal12Januarynear 12-12N 12 January operatingarea operating kmsouthof 7kmsouthofnear 12-12N area about 109-1OE of 7 its km 8 south Januaryof position Nha city and approximately 12 km south its 8 January position.|
|---|---|
|continuethe Inthe western towes tern highland: maneuverhighlands, intheLaos-KontumProvinceborderarea_elementsof e leq1ents of thePAVN lstDivision Hq, (YBlst Division continue Divisicnwas to maneuver locatedon 11Januarynear 8 14-42Nin th e Laos-Kontum Province 14-42N border 107 -28Earea. and 658272)about 33kmwest-northwestofDakTo January107-28E 66thapproximawas locatedon 13Januaryin Dak Hq, (YB 1st 658272) Regimenttely14km north-northwest of aboutwas14 kmnorth-northwestof located on 11 January of its near its 8 January Hq,PAVNposition and approximately 33 km west-northwest this thisTo.s ame generalareaHq, PAVN near 14-43N 66th Regim i-::; nt 107-37E was located 839298 January (YB on 13 in same general area near 14-43N 107-37E (YB 839298).| |
|Additionally, in messages of 13 and 14 January, Ist Division continued January, a subordinate subordinate Dak report to to the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) 0f the Military the Intellig ence e d th e MIS on Allied air January Section 13 and ground activity in continued (MIS), 1st Division the that To area. ,:: my In reinforced Dak to report to In one MIS mlessage on Ro Keng pieces '' the enemy on Alli air and ground the activity subordinate reported in the Dak that To the encny seven message area. one on 13 on 13 January, [14-41N the 107-42E subordinate reported YB 920266] ri rt "the with reinforced 175-mm 17 5-mmartillery Dak Ro Keng [14-41N 107-42E, The subordinate ability to take then reported in Dak message of artillery then YB 920266] reported within s •::: vena YB Ro Keng of and use it along with m2ssag c 14 January that with Worksite 14 January pi~ces. that "the The enemy has 18 subordinate has the the (14-41N ability to 107-39E Dak take Ro 875255) Keng" as and use base it for expanding to 107-37E along Worksitetheeast. 18 This subordinate (14-41N 107-39E, was located on 13 January near 14-4SN YB 875255) as a base for expanding to the east. This (YB 850308) subordinate was located on 13 January near 14-45N 107-37E (YB 850308),, Meanwhile second subordinate received orders in message from Meanwhil e, the MIS on 12 January for a second subordinate detachment orders the detachment and the received in tation" a message from recipient of the return irrediately cO and 12 January associated in the assignment _imm e diately to from to assignm e nt. 11 return the MIS on Betwce 9 Be tw ee 11 message 12 12 the .January 9 to and the th e for "new headquarters to has been "n ew headquarters "the January a radio radio station with which and receive station to receive the with the Past moved station "a new new border area from recipi e nt 107-33E 14-37N 14-37N located 14-39N (YE711187) (YB 13 the to 107-33E of the mc~ ssage (YB 3107-27Etke in 663215) 107-27E ]Lll.87)(YB 13 January location of has in the Kontum b ,3en associated Kontum Province-Cambodia in Laos Province-Cambodia in This past station moved is now ar e a bord2r locat e d within (YB km of' to within 14-39N 663215) in location This the MIS Laos. station near 14-4ON is now 107-27E 3 km 647232) of the January of the MIS near 14-40N 107-27E (YB 647232).| |
FOPSEEREF FRHNTE TOP SECRET TRINE
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# Doc ID: 6636711 Doc Ref ID: A6636710
To the south in the Kontum-Pleiku Province border area, an unidentified station associated with 107-39E (YA 880639) about an unidentified station to the south in the associated with the PAVN B3 Front was located on 13 January near 14-07N station with the PAVN B3 Front was located km north-northeast near on 13 January of Plei Djereng and approximately about 107-39E (YA 880639) 25km southeast of its station associated January location. Another unidentified station associated with its 3 January location. B3 Front was located on 14 January near 14-04N 107-43E (YA 955569) about 12 km south-southeast of its 8 January position. Finally, the probable Darlac Provincial Unit was located in southwestern km west-northwest of its located the southwestern Darlac Province near was probable Darlac Provincial Unit 12-28N 108-04E on (AP 811795) 12 January approximately 23 km in Darlac Province near 12-28N January 108-04E location (AP 811795), approximately 23 west-northwest of its 7 January location.
|Time|Reference|
|---|---|
|14050021318072|RL21-68 R126-68|
|1403482|R125-68|
|1401452|R124-68|
|1320002|R122-68|
|1308052|1315352 R116-68|
|140500Z|131807Z R126-68 R121-68 140348Z 1318052 R115-68 1312302 1305002 1318052 R125-68 1401452 1312012 1316282 R119-68 R120-68 R120-68 R113-68 131628Z R119-68 R111-68 1315352 1303532 R110-68 R116-68 131230Z R115-68 R105-68 1312012 1206002 R113-68 1308052 1312552 R109-68 1219352 R111-68 1303532 R110-68 1305002 R105-68 120600Z R113-68 131255Z R109-68 121935Z|
Military Region 1 of to report on Hq the subordinate A subordinate of MIS Viet Cong probable C95 Reconnaissance continued of the 9th Light C95 the probable Infantry Division Company Reconnaissance Company of the MIS, Hq, Allied Viet activity in central Binh Long Province through Cong 9th Light Infantry Division continued at least 13 to report 13 January activity on Allied In message of in central 13 January, the subordinate Binh Long Province through reported on Allied convoy movements of reported at least on January. Allied XT convoy 7288 movements Le (11-44N between 13 January, Phu Binh Phu the subordinate (11-39N 106-34E XT 7288) and Cam Le (11-44N 106-34E XT 7297).
Probable C95 Reconnaissance Company A second subordinate-presently unlocated--reported to second subordinate--presently also on [unlocated] "13 January, unlocated--reported that to the there were "no enemy at probable C95 Reconnaissance Vung at Ba Vung Company, also on but indicated that 13 January, that "air and artillery" were Ba "air there and were artillery" "no enemy were active in the area active in [unlocated]" the area. but indicated that
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|Doc ID|6636711|
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|Doc Ref ID|A6636710|
reportdetailedAlliedsubordinateof Inother detailed 107-11E ccnvoy activitytheMIS MR activity to In other activity, a subordinate of th3 betweenMRMIS, Bien 1 Hoa andcontinued XuanLoc to report (10-59N Allied convoy YT 4019) activity Thisbetweensubordinate wasBienwas locatedHoa and on Xuan Loe12January 107-061 Bien Hoa-Long KhanhProvinceborderarea(10-59Ninthe (YI 312045) .107-llE, YT 4019). This subordinate located near on 12 10 - 53N January in the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province border area (2/G10 /vcM/T89-68 near 10- 53N 10 7-06E1320052 ; (YT 3120!+5)T85-68 1315082 ; T84-68 , 1314462 ; T82-68 _ (2/Gl0/VCM/T89-68,1314452) 132005Z; T85-68, 131508Z; T84-68, I31446Z; T82- 68, 131445Z) (SECiLI f!ltXUt) Military_Region2 Military Region 2 Cambodia-Hau NghiaPrc,vincial borderareato LongAn tentative tentativeA SIGINTSIG INT Lcnglocation Longlocationobtainedon (LAPU)hasmovedfromthenear AnProvincialUnit An Province obtained Uniton (LAPU) 11 11 Januarysuggests thatthe January has moved Province suggestsfrom that the the 10-34N Cambodia-Hau 106-34E Nghia (XSProvince706608) borderarea sinceat Anborder LAPU had The area hadbeenlocatedin to Long Provincethenear Cambodia-Hau Nghia Province 10-34N 106-34-E (XS Province 706608). The LAPUthismove atlocated latcthebeen least in September1967 Cambodia-Hau NghiaThcsignificance border of area since cannot yetbeleast late September determined_1967, The significance of this move cannot yet be (3/0/STY/R308-67) determined, (3/0/STY/R308-67) 1S-GW-T OrYe!iG) MilitaryRegion 10 Military Region 10 On13 January On 13 January, tha pczaibleHq, UnidentifiedFrontwas tha possible Hq, Unidentified CambodiawasFront locatedinnorthernBinh LongPrcvincenear located in northern (XU 674228) Province places theBinh Long approximately 14the possibleborderThis placesthe northof bordernear Cambodia at11-57N 106-322 initsnormal at 11-57N 106-322operating674228).(XU area This 14kmpossible the its front southeastfrom its 88 in Januarylccation, normalbasearea between23 December and January its normallocation,operating Thisheadquarters This areahr~adquartersapproximately apparentlynorth apparently movedofsouth- km moved south-its southeast January .from its normal base area betwee,n 23 December and 8 (2/610 / VCM/R18-68 ~ 1314082 Januaryc 3/0/STY/R08-68) TS1 (2/Gl0/VCM/Rl8-68 1314082; 3/0/STY/R08--68) (JEE!!M!T OtR:Sl) 2 DRV Communicaticns 2.. DRV Communications PAVN High Command/ 304th-320tn Divisions PAVN High Command/304th·-320th Divisions Command12 Januarymessage activityobservedon thePAVN HighOn Mainline Brcadcast On 12 January message servingPAVN units andreplacementactivity observed on the PAVN High personnel Command MainlineinfiltratingthroughLaos PAVNBroadcast s·~rving furthersubs tantiatedtheunits and replacement location personnelof Hq , probable320thInfantry Divisionandan associated location of infiltrating Hq, probable through 320th Laos Infantry further Division substantiated and an associatedthe 5 - YOPSEERET FRHNE-5- TOP SECRET TRINE
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|Doc ID: 6636711|Doc Ref ID: A6636710|
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|entity elementin element associatedwith in the DMZ area the DMZ area.the probable320thDivisionwere relayedMessages Messages originated bythe unidentified originated by the unidentified by High Commandto with entity by High associated Command were those normallyassociated with to Hq, probable320th Division.| |
|characteristics DMZcommunications characteristics were Priorto those normally this activity associated thecharacteristicswith MR 4 and of were Hq, probable320thDivisionare 320th DMZ all messages passedon North .| |
|of allcommunications.associatedwithMR3 messages passed Prior probable320thDivisioncommunications on probable Boththis to this activity,believedunidentified entityDivision the characteristicscommunications and Hq, were associated with MR 3 North. Both this unidentified to belocatedinentity the DMZ and DMZ area_ probable 320th Division are believed to be located in the area.| |
|Infantry Infantrykm southeastthevicinityof Alsoon Divisionin on 12 January,S IG INTlocated Hq,probable304th 12 January, SIGINT located16-23N Hq, probable 106-41E (XD 797128) some 25 km Division in of the its vicinity 29 December of 16-23N location (16-3ON106-41E (XD 797128), 106-30E some 25 XDsoutheast 600271) ofThepresent locationissome its 29 December location some (16-30Nwestof7km west theSouth XD 106-30E, Vietnamese border ,in Laos600271). The present location is 7 km of (2/611 /VCM/RO60-68 the South Vietnamese 1215002 ;R062-68 border, in Laos. 1302482 ;3/0/STY/RO8-68; RIO-68) (2/Gll/VCM/R060-68,Lencnnm 6 OIIiill)1215002; R062-68, 130248Z; 3/0/STY/R08-68; Rl0-68) (BliilGRiiT servingmajorPAVN Hq , theHigh Command inor associatedwith SouthVietnam . PAVNheadquartersCommandcommunications complex forthefirsttimeon for the On11 January Hq, On 11 first Januarytime on the PAVN29th PAVN High 29theither Infantry Regimentwas no-ted Infantry communications Regiment was complexnoted serving major Identifiedsubordinatesof orheadquarters either in this complexwithassociated include headquartersof South Vietnam. the Identified B3Front,MRPAVN 325C Division, subordinates Tri-Thien-Huecomplex of this 1 , which 2 ,3 ,4 , include 5 , previouslytheofthe Front, headquarters 6 and 10 and 10, the was DMZ DMZFront , and 106-2OE(XD471400)southwestof this complex.the On11 January,S IG INTlocated previously was the lowest echelon the regimental headquartersin subscriber on theMR's PAVNTri-Thien-Hue, 325C Division,1, which 2, 3, 4, 5, On11 January,S IG INTlocated the lowest echelon the regimental headquarters theDMZ in the area of On 11 of 16-4ON January, SIGINT located the regimental headquarters theDMZ in the area 16-40N 106-20E (XD 471400) southwest of the DMZ. (KiGRET SOBIN) Military Region5 Military Region 5 (RC-5)An broadcastnet hasbeenobserved the Anincreaseincommunicationson the Region increase in communications on Region 5Committee facility type operation, "watch" broadcast normally employs (RC-5) which normally employingas manyas precedureis Thisto net has been observedsince daily, changed 2 schedules 14 hourlyschedulessince 8 8 January_ January. This facility, which employs 2 schedules daily, changed to a Thereason indicatedthat "watch" typefor operation,this changeincommunications have recentlybeenemploying as many as 14 hourly schedules.unknown . endeavoringindicatedchange Communis telements S IG INT has SIGINT The reason has for to expediteoffens ive activityinMR this that Communist in communicationselementsin have 5 .precedure recently is unknown.been endeavoring to expedite offensive activity MR 5. 6 - ~FOP SECRET TRTNE-6- TOP SECtt~'f 'fltf!rql!:| |
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|Doc ID:|6636711|
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|Doc Ref ID:|A6636710|
|JNon - Responsive I| |
|Non Responsive 4FOP SEERET FRINETOP SECR~T Tttffrq~3/0/STY /RL2-68| |
| |3/0/STY/Rl2-68|
| |LTOP SECRET FRHE-7-|
|TOP ~~CRgf TRI~JE| |
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Doc ID: 6636711INon - ResponsiveNonResponsive I...... Doc Ref ID: A6636710FOPSEEREF FRHAETOP SECRET TRINE3/0/STY /R12-68
3/0/STYiR12-68
8 -
~TOP SEEREF TRTNETOP SECRET TttII~I! | {
"Who": "National Security Agency (NSA)",
"What": "Summary of developments in Southeast Asia, Communist activities, Military Region activities, SIGINT summaries, Communications details, possible enemy activities, convoy movements, reconnaissance activities, movement of unidentified stations, unit locations, communication characteristics, regimental headquarters",
"When": "14 January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province", "Cambodia-Hau Nghia Province border area", "Kontum-Pleiku Province border area", "Darlac Province", "Binh Long Province", "Laos-Kontum Province border area", "MR 5 region", "DMZ area", "MR 1 region", "MR 2 region", "MR 10 region"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637235
# Doc Ref ID: A6637234
|SECURITY|23 February 1968|
|---|---|
|3/0/STY /R47-68| |
|SOUTHEAST ASIA| |
|SIGINT SUMMARY| |
|THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL| |
|Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E. O. 13526| |
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# Doc ID: 6637235
# Doc Ref ID: A6637234
FOP SEEREF FRHNE
TOP SECRET TRl~•E3/0 /STY /R47-68
23FEB 0 /UT
3/0/STY/R47-6868 21132
DIST : 23 FEB 68 2113Z
DIST: 0/UT
# Non-Responsive This report SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
NATIONAL ASIA SIG INT SUMMARY SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST SIGINT SUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia at the time of publication on 23 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where specifically indicated.
|CONTENTS|PAGE|
|---|---|
|Situation Summary|1|
|Communist Southeast Asia| |
|A. Military|1|
|Vietnamese Communist Communications|2|
|South Vietnam|2|
|DRV Communications|4|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/7 PAGE(s)
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Doc ID: 6637235INon - Responsive Doc Ref ID: A6637234 Non Responsive FFOPSEERET TRINETOP s_gcR~T TRzIWi /R47'-fJ83/0/STY /R47-68 3 /O /STY SITUATIONSUMMARY SITUATION SUMMARY The possible completionof The possible completion communications servingPAVNof a portionofRoute portion of Route 547by 547 by 28 Februarywa S 28 February was indicatedin indicated AShau ValleyofSouth Vietnam'sin communications serving PAVN engineerelements MR)TriThien-Hue Military Region reportsofintenttomove Communisttroop engineer elements inthe in the Shau Valley ActivityinM of South Vietnam's5was highlighted by reports Military Region MR Tri-Thien-Hue. Activity byunits MRin in QuangNam5 was andBinh Dinh highlighted DinhbyProvinces of reflectionsof Province andrelocationsintent to move by units in Quang Nam conditionsintheDakToarea ofKontum Communist and byunitsin in by subordinateoftheMiDarlacProvinces Province conditions Binh PleikuDak PleikuandTo Provinces, the reflections area of Kontumof Tothe southinM 1 ,trooprelocations units in and litary IntelligenceSection Darlac Provinces. To the south Viet Cong Vietin Cong1,MR (vc)Sth Light Infantry Divisionappeared unidentifiedcontrol a subordinate of the Military Intelligence incommunicationsSection, for (vc) the 5th firsttimesince Division Light Infantry position1967 andan May appeared in communications authoritymovedto for the first time sinceposition about15km northwest ofcontrolMay 1967 and an unidentified ofBienHoa AirBase authority moved to a about 15 km northwest Bien Hoa Air Base wasrevealedSIGINT The The initialSIGINT reference initial inPAVNcommunicationson inreference to N-Dayin theKheSanh to N-Day the Khe SanhThe specificdate of N-Daywas communications area area was revealed in PAVN disclosed;on 22 February 22 February. The not however itwas revealed specific that subsequent activityincludetheuse dateof N-Day was not disclosed; however, of 140-mmit it was rockets revealed that subsequent activity include the use of 140-mm rockets. Farthereast Farther east, had recently receivedBattalion indicated the the 27th 27th IndependentBattalion Independent indicated thattheBattalion recruits Also cityPAVNindicatedthat the that PAVN 803rd Regimentrecently the the Battalion 803rd Regiment it had it-- hadreceived150 recruitsfromtheoperatoperatingreceived the ing in in therecruits,area of QuangTri of Also, Quang Tri 270th Regiment _ city -- indicated that had received 150 recruits from the 270th Regiment. "TOP SECRE FRFNETOP ~ECttET TRit~E
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# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5
|DA NANG|HOI AN|
|---|---|
|QUANG NAM|HOI AN|
|Hq PAVN 2nd Division|Hq, PAVN 2nd Division|
|BINH DINH|BINH DINH|
Suspected B3 Front Associate
Hq MR 5 Forward Tactical Element
|PLEIKU|QuI NHON|
|---|---|
|DARLAC|BAN ME THUOT|
Probable PAVN 33rd Regiment
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# COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA
I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
MILITARY
A. MILITARY
|1|Vietnamease Cormunist Communications - South Vietnam|
|---|---|
|1.|Vietname as e Communist Communications South Vietnam|
Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue
The A Shau Valley serving Communications serving unidentified indicate possible completion of Route unidentified PAVN engineer elements PAVN engineer elements in the 547 by in 28 February Valley 23 February an Shau On indicate possible unidentified element completion of Route instructed 547 by 28 February, 520 and Company 654 to an On 23 February to complete repairs of the road unidentified element instructed from Battalion Ngot and Lang Ngot 520 (possibly Lang Ngoi 16-17 v 107-22E Company Lang YD) 5503 by completion of 654 Ngoi complete 16-17. 107-22£ YD repairs of YD the 530253024th road to Ta Luong (16-18N107-236, 4th (16-18N 107-23 E i YD 5503) by 27 February, 27 February of the road The 4th Company from kilometers 22 Company, vicinity 4th Battalion was possibly in from Ta Battalion 23 was ordered road the completion upon of 16-17N the road 107-22E from kilometers YD of 5302) 16-22N to repair YD 6710) the 22 to 23 (possibly the in vicinity of vicinity Luong to 16-17N Dien Binh by 107-22E, YD 5302) 16-22N to 107-29E repair the road from completing the Ta Luong the to work Binh Dien 28 February (vicinity of 107-29E YD 6710), completing work by 28 February (SEORBT SAC IN)
Military Region 5 on was 23 In Quang Nam Province about to southeastern Quang Nam on 23 February Nam last In February Quang located that it F9b5437 in eastern that Province, 20 was it was about PAVN move Division reported Hq, PAVN to move. 2nd Division This headquarters was near last 15-4SN108-10E (AT February located on 20 in southeastern eastern Binh Dinh Province, Quang Nam Hq, near MR it 5 Forward Tactical Element also reported 15-45N 108-10E (AT 965437). In Binh on Dinh February 23 February Province that MR near 14-03N about Tactical Hq, 145 we $ 109-10E Forward to (CR 026518) This headquarters relocate Element also headquarters on was reported 23 located that it was about to relocate. on This 22 February was located near - 03N 109-10E (CR 02 6518) on 22 February.
station associated with the PAVN suspected Hq, In the western LOth Artillery Regiment, PAVN PAVN 40th highlands Artillery B3 Front while while Regiment was in communications with the in communications an unidentified unidentified in western with the Kontum Province This station near also communicated same same with Hq, has associated entity near with 14-39N107-32E 14-39N the 107-32E PAVN B3 (YB731202) Front (YB sporadically during 731202) was located on on 22 February. in western February Division. B3 Front, Kontun Province This entity has also communicated sporadically and with Hq during PAVN 1st February Division. B3 Moreover with Hq Front Kontum che signal plan employed Hq, this Province, and with by station PAVN 1st is identical Moreover, used coone used the by a B3 Front-associated signal plan employed by this entity currently operating station is identical to one in the by Binh Duong Province B3 Front-associated area of M 1. entity currently operating in the Binh Duong Province area of MR 1.
# TOP SECRET
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# Doc ID: 6637235 Doc Ref ID: A6637234
Intelligence Dak (YB element, In the Dak To area in the (MI) (MI) To element (YB921229) last area on last located on subordinate Military on 22 February on 3 15 February Military a subordinate 3km February near 14-39N 107-42E Dak Ro Keng (14-41N 107-42E approximately reported Intelligence located 15 km south of near Dak Ro 14-39N 107-42E 921229), YB 920264), reported to south the MI of Section Keng troops and 1st are 107-42E, (MIs) (14-41N Division that "There 1st are out of that 920264), is much fever the YB to among MI our Section (MIS), we Division medicine to complete The subordinate "There is much fever among requested our troops one and additional we out team to complete The of medicine." its assignment subordinate enemy and guard did not stat requested ing that one it additional have enough troops to team troops its reconnoiter the assignment stating that it the subordinate to report stating that it the subordinate did station the at the at enough same time detail to reconnoiter Earlier the MIS the had instructed enemy and guard this the station the report in same time. Earlier, the on the MIS area instructed had west of Dak To this To & long Highway subordinate to 512 between Plei Kan in detail on the (14-41N 107-35E area west of Dak YB 852256) and Dac Mot (14-39N 107-45E along Highway 512 between Plei Kan also mentioned Allied in YB (14-41N 960235) concentrat 107-35E, YB 852256) on Dak Dak Dae Keng. (14=39N and Ro Keng in the direction of Mot The same subordinate 107-45E YB 960235) concentrating Allied artillery firing on 320 for the PAVN 32nd to also the According to collateral, Division cover 32nd Regiment 320." for last PAVN mentioned According located by SIG INT 4km southwest 32nd Regiment on 12 February near 14-4ON107-4OE Regiment, collateral, artillery 1st 1st 320 is firing 320 is a "in cover The The designator direction designator 32nd Regiment of was was YB882215) last located approximately by SIGINT on 12 southwest of Dak Ro February near Dak Ro Keng 14-40N 107-40E (YB 882215) approximately 4 km of Keng. In northern Pleiku Province to be In associated northern with the B3 Front Pleiku Province, Front a wa S radio located on 22 February station suspected near days to be 14-11N 108-05E (AR841692) associated with the B3 14 was 14 km southwest located on of 22 its position February two near 14-llN earlier and 22 km 108-05E and (AR km north-northeast of Pleiku city. 841692) km southwest of its position To northeast was in located 10 km southwest of Ban Hq Pleiku the south Regiment two the Regiment was days south, earlier of its in located its position on southwest Darlac Province Darlac 10 Province, 22 km on 14 February Ban Me north-northeast the probable of the probable of Hq, Thuot and Me Thuot PAVN PAVN 33rd and 33rd 24 km 24 To km northeast of position 14 February. Region for Committee Fina Finally 5 Committee 5 lly on 20 February 33 messages were 20 (Rc-5) February to to 33 a 11 messages subordinates were passed by the passed bringing the by the This high the period 18 chrough 20 February to to cal (RC-S) r all 20 subordinates, 77 messages bringing the only high volume total three volume apparently terminated for the message 8 were noted _ period apparently 18 through terminated The normal 21 volume on on February on on 21 February, when to February, these 77 messages. when communications only three messages is approximately 10 messages per day on were noted. The normal volume these communications is approximately 10 messages per day.
R561-68 (2/Gl2/VCM/R569-68,2211302 ;T465-68 230450Z;2221202 R568-68,T463 , 230435Z;2216102 ;2 /G12 /VcJ /RO51-68)R563-68, 221305Z;
R561-68, 221130Z; T465~68, 22212oz, T463, 221610Z; 2/G12/VCJ/R051-68)
(SECi&IDDOI SAU !U)
"3 - -3- FOP SEERET FHNE TOP SECRET TRI~J~
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# Military Region 1
Infantry 22 February, On 22 February, a subordinate of the MIS appeared in communications for the first time since May 1967. This subordinate was located on Bien Hoa Province near 11-06N 106-53E approximately 15km northwest of Bien Hoa Air Base and approximately 75km northwest in central Phuoc Tuy Province.
To the west, possibly controlling tactical elements (XT 515233) on 22 February, an unidentified control authority was located in northern Hau Nghia Province possibly controlling tactical elements, was located in Binh Duong Province approximately 12 km south of its last known location in western 11-04N 106-24E (XT 515233), in Binh Duong Province and in the vicinity of the known location of one of the control authority.
The initial SIGINT reference in the Khe Sanh area was observed on 22 February in PAVN communications that mentioned the possible use of 140-mm rockets from "N-Day" message. No specific dates were mentioned.
Unidentified PAVN 325C Division-associated reconnaissance elements intensified their reporting of Khe Sanh activity on 22 February. One forward observer aircraft was instructed to maintain communications from 0900 to 1500 (GOLF) on 23 February to increase his observation and grasp of the situation at Khe Sanh and to spot and report Allied artillery and PAVN mortar emplacements.
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# Doc ID: 6637235 Doc Ref ID: A6637234
FOP SECRET TRTNEI R.INE
TOP Clll!: I 3/0 /STY /R4758 3/0/STY/R47 ·58
reportedthe reported Dai (16-48N 107-02E ,had killed twoAmericansnorthTotheeast that east,sniper7th Company,27thIndependentBattalion the the 7th teamhad Company, 27th Independent Battalion, ofVinh that a sniper team YD 178590)two killed on 21 February Americans north Battalioncommunicationsof considerableconcern 107-02E, 22 and 23 February reflected Battalion of Vinh Dai communications (16-48N becauseforweapons redistributionreflectedof 22 YD and178590) redistribution between23 February on 21 February. personnelfrom Quang the companiesconcernNinhProvincewere the companies because for of recently acquiredrecruits of recently 13 February_mentionedin 27thacquired recruits.betweenReplacement Battalioncommunications personnel from Quang Ninh on Province were mentioned in 27th Battalion communications on 13 February. fromCommunicationsofthe regimentwould receive 150FebruaryCommunications of of the PAVN PAVN 803rdRegimenton 22 February indicated elements indicated 270th Regimentheadquarterswas locatedtheHq elements of theOn 23 February locatedat ThuongTrachregiment would receive 150 recruits the a messagedisclosed thatthe frnm thE 3rdBattalion 270th Re giment c On 23 February message disclosed (16-47N that the107-14E 3rd BattalionYD 400577)andSIGINT headquarters was located at Thuong 803rdTrach Regiment107-14E~February Communicationsofthe Regiment (16-47N on on 22 Februaryat 812thRegimenton 22 YD 400577) 16-5ON 107-12E(Y 358626) _PAVN at16-50Nand SIGINT107-12E located (YD 22 Februarycontained358626).the Hq, 803rd detailedreconnaissancereports Communications of the PAVN 812th Regiment of Alliedforces around QuangTrion 22 February contained city.detailed reconnaissance reports of Allied forces around Quang Tri city. (2 /0 /VCM/R1o2-68 ,2218462 ; (2/0/VCM/Rl02-68, 221846Z; 3/0/STY/R39-68) (OBCICEI SAVIN ) - gXvIN) Military Region4 Military Region 4 Two companiesofthetentative Two companies of the containing strengthreportsontentative PAVN PAVN 66th Battalion ,275th 66th Battalion, 275th Regimentpassedmessages Regiment passed messages containing strength reports on 21 February. theFebruary. 21 The possible The possible thirdcompany atstatedunitare third companyat menreported"35Thesestated "present 45presentatat the unitare unit are 82men 82 unidentified probablecompany men. On assignmentand On assignment and the the unit are 45 men Another guard_1135with menon Another men." onare allbelievedto be sickcallcompanyAnassignment , unidentified 5menon probable 16men reported on units men assignment 5 men on WF 4483) in inthe onProvince sick locatedin NgheAn vicinityofThesecall, 16 guard." thebattalion units are all believed to be located Nghe Province, with Nam Thuong (18-50N 105-24E ,specificallyTDLORD Nam Thuong the battalion (18-SON headquarters l05-24E, WF 4483). (SECIU9Tin the vicinity 8tl#ID1) of PAW RearServices PAVN Rear Services RecentPAVNRear Servicesvoicecommunications havereflected Recent PAVN transportation Rear Services activityin the Laos panhandlevoice communications in have an reflectedareawe st transportationof ALuoi and A Tue, activity Tuc generallyLaos generallyboundedin the panhandle by XD 6513-XD8913-XC Luoi in an area west of 8990-XC 6590 (16-11Nto 16 -2 3Nand bounded 106 - 32Eto 106-47E), by XD 6513-XD 8913-XC 8990-XC 21 February(16-llN 6590 transmissionbetweento 16-23N, 106-32E to 106-47E). A 21 February transmission between
YOP SECRET TRTNE-5-
TOF 8ECll~T 'fllIMI!
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|Doc ID: 6637235|Doc Ref ID: A6637234|
|---|---|
|INon - Non Responsive I|Respons i ve ~TOP SECRET TRTNETOP 5~C1lEI IRINE3/0 /STY /R47-68 3/0/STY/R47-68 twounidentifiedPAVN elements madereferenceto themovement two vehicles unidentified night _ elements PAVN Themessage reference made mentionedto the 74 vehiclesmovement of of vehiclesto various 12"F4B2"various unlocatedpoints referredsomeas ofvehiclesthat night. The message mentioned some as74 "FLT" proceeding to unlocated points referred to to "F4T", "K5o" and"F4B" 0 Theunitsmentionedwere Companies 11 "K50", "F4B2" 13and14 of and of Battalion 51 ;Companies1 ofwhatwas"F4B" The units mentioned were and2 Companies Battalion 11, 12, 13 54and and 14a Company31 Battalion 51; No indication1of Companies and 2 of carriedon 54 Battalion the andvehicleswas 31.Company observed No indication with the exceptionwhat was offour carried vehiclescarrying rice of four vehicles on the vehicles carryingwas rice.observed, with the exception (2/G11 /VCM/T1467-68 2302432 ) _SFCRFTSAIZTA (2/Gll/VCM/Tl467=68, 230243Z) CSEGRET SAVIN) On On 22 February 22 Ordnance"concerning shipmentsFebruary, a PAVNRear shipments three vehicles with PAVN Rear Servicesmessage tothe Services of artillerymessage to the "Bureau of ammunitiontovarious concerning "Bureau referencehadunitsreportedthat ofOrdnance" of artillery 130 -mmammunition to various been units sent reported to the forthe204th Regimentthat204thRegiment three vehicles Anwith earlier 130·-mm ammunition to had 152-m ammunition been sent to the 204th Regiment. An wasnoted earlier reference Servicescommunicationson 6 February_ inRear to 152-mm ammunition for the 204th RegimentThe firstS IG INT Rear in reflectionofthe Services communications in204th Artillery Regiment wason 6 February.wa S notedThe in first 6 October SIGINT reflection 1962message theof PAVN 90th 204th 9oth RegimentcommunicationsArtillery Regiment noted indicatingthatthe 204thwas ina October 1967 messagewasin intheDMZareaPAVN Regiment communications indicating that the 204th in the DMZ area. Collateral sourcesindicatethat sources indicate that a 204th Artillery Regimentis subordinate Regiment is subordinate tothePAVN 351stArtilleryDivision to the PAVN 351st Artillery Division. (3/0 /sTY /R238-67 ;2 /C11 /VCM/T1464-68 (3/0/STY/R238=67; 2/Gll/VCM/Tl464-68 222119Z) (1i3ilOiR:i'i SOJHN)|
---
|Doc ID:|6637235|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637234|
|.INon - Responsive I| |
|. NonResponsive| |
| |FFOPSEERET TRINE_|
| |TOP|SEGR~|TRINE3/0 /STY /R47-68|
| |3/0/STY/R47-68|
| |7 _|
| |-7-|
| |FOP SEEREF FRHNE|
| |TOP|SECRET|TRI?1,E| | {
"Who": "National Security Agency",
"What": "Vietnamese Communist activities, military communications, troop movements, intelligence reports",
"When": "23 February 1968",
"Where": ["Southeast Asia", "South Vietnam", "Dak To area", "Quang Nam", "Bin Dinh", "Pleiku", "Da Nang", "Hoi An", "Ban Me Thuot"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
3 /0 /sTY/R4O-68 3/0/STY/R40-68
SECURITY 15 February1968 Dist: SIGSUM 40-68) 15 February 1968o/uT Dist:SEA O/UT (SEA SIGSUM 40-68)
# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
Declassifiedand Approvedfor Release Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA by NSA on 10-22-2018 pursuant to E. O 10 - 22 - 2018 pursuant to E . O . 1352613526
---
# INon - Responsive
15Feb 68 21152
3/0/STY/R40-68
Non Responsive
DIST: 15 Feb 68 0 /UT2115Z
DIST: O/UT
NATIONALSECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIANATIONAL ASIA SECURITY AGENCYSIGINTSUMMARY
This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia based entirely on 15 February 1968 except SIGINT.
# CONTENTS
|Situation Summary|PAGE 1|
|---|---|
|Communist Southeast Asia Summary|PAGE 1|
|A. Military|PAGE 3|
|1. Vietnamese Communist Communications South Vietnam|PAGE 3|
|2. DRV Communications|PAGE 8|
TOP SECRET TRINE THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ii/13 PAGE(S)
---
# CONTENTS
|CONTENTS.|PAGE|
|---|---|
|TOP SECRET|TRINE|
---
# Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
|INon - Non Responsive|Responsive FOP SEERET FHNE TOP SECRET TRIJE 3/0/sTY/R40-68 3/0/STY/R4-0-68 SITUATION_SUMMARY SITUATION SUMMARY|
|---|---|
|· ofingSIGINTcontinues to providereflectionsof offensive operations beSouthVietnambyMilitary Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue.in being SIGINT conductedby elements conducted continueselementsofthePAWN Tri-Thien-Hue to provide of the reflections PAVN 6th RegimentintheHuearea|6th Regiment of offensive In the the operationsHue area|
|· western highlands of South Vietnam's ofMR the . probable5 , of impendlocation, proba bly in the Military the probableHq, Region (MR) PAVNB3 Front AuthorityIn the|PAVN1stDivision 5,the probable DivisionelementB3in westernPleikuHq, PAVN inFront the vicinityAuthority|
|· instructed highlands MR PAVN1stDivision 5,the probable DivisionelementB3in westernPleikuHq, PAVN inFront the vicinityAuthority|Provinceto mortar instructed the mortar probable an unidentifiedunidentified ingattackswere also PAVN 1st element western Pleiku of Le Thanh. Province to Indications of an location, probably in noted invicinity messagesbetweenunidentified impending|
|messages Le Thanh.between Indications unidentified entities believed were attacks associated withinthe also with the PAVN PAVN 66th Regiment 66th Regiment,ting located1st that Hq, lstDivis ionin Kontum Province Division Viet Cong (Vc) 9th Light Infantryin Kontum Province. Tentative|information suggesting near the Hq, that northern Cong Viet Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Infantry(vc) 9th Light Division is border and is there appearance located near the in communications of two reconnaissance northern Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province Province elements border serving the division the reappearance division's Military Intelligence reconnaissance in communications of two Section high-lighted activity in MR|
|1. revealed however revealed PAVN elements PAVN that 193 combat-ready Sanh area of Quang Tri Province 289; the that status of elements combat-ready men 193 in the Khe|remaining 96 was remaining remained not Sanh remained men area of Quang from an from revealed _ Tri original Province In 289; In the|
|eastern however, DMZ area the statusthe of 1st Battalion, the PAVN 96 was 803rd Regiment reported not revealed. the|that it was constructing the ting combat fortifications Regiment Battalion, PAVN 803rd Tri The The Ist reported 1st Battalion was located at Vinh Lai, Quang Tri Province was reported to be located at Vinh Lai, Quang Province.|
---
Doc ID: 6637221INon - ResponsiveDoc Ref ID: A6637220
Non Responsive II FOP SECRET FRFNE
TOI" ~ECRET TRl~•E3/0/sTY/R4O-68
3/o/sTY/R40-68
~2 -
4TOP SEEREA TRTNE-2-
TOP SECRE;T TltINE
---
Doc ID: 6637221
Doc Ref ID: A6637220
# COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
# MILITARY
# MILITARY
1
Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam
# Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue
Combat in the Hue area continues to be reflected in communications serving in the PAWN 6th Regiment.
On 14 February, the Company reportedly crossed Route 6th with one detachment occupying the 9th Company attacked the 11th Company in the Nha Truong area.
It was possible that the citadel of Nha Truong later reported that An Hoa area moat north the Cuong De crossroads and with one detachment occupying YD730232.
The crossroads of Route 1 and coordination with the citadel had been occupied, and the 9th Company of Route 1 and coordination with the 3rd Company was instructed to strike and annihilate the Marines during this period.
One regimental element was instructed to communicate by voice radio with the PAVN 559th Transportation Group serving unidentified PAVN elements in the Shan Valley.
On 15 February, it was revealed an interest with the PAVN in the area southwest of Hue. PAVN elements in the Shan Valley have associated roads from the vicinity of the unidentified PAVN elements, believed to be constructing roads from Ta Luong to Binh Dien.
On 15 February, it was reported that A Shau YD believed to be constructing roads from Ta Luong to Binh Dien, and a detachment YC 5084 had gone to assess the situation of the enemy possibly from Lang Ngoi.
The same element called later for an order YD 5705 to Ta Luong where the assessment of the enemy road possibly results would be reported later in the same element called for an order YD 5705 to Ta Luong where the assessment of the enemy road possibly results would be reported later.
A later message mentioned no information was given.
(SECRET)
-3-
# TOP SECRET
# TRINE-3
# TOP SECRET
# TRINE-3
---
Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
|MilitaryRegion_5|Military Region 5|
|---|---|
|In the western highlands the probable Hq, element operating in western Pleiku Province was the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division| |
|14 February to authority--located in Cambodia near to the probable PAVN Province Front| |
|PAVN February B3 Front B3 border--gave the to authority--located mortar an "1_following Cambodia unidentified in instructions position near The probable Kontum-Pleiku Hq, 1st Province Division element: border--gave the following In accordance with the instructions the to specific situa- the probable| |
|tion, you are element: to 1st Division are urged 2. immediately mortar "1. In accordance with area A teams| |
|and unidentified] tion, you urged to immediately Although [you] mortar have sent out the area [unlocated to| |
|fire in fire unidentified]. your methods of investigation nrust| |
|and attitude Company then platoon grade every| |
|attitude. Company then methods at aircraft, Only your 2. can Although you of find every way [you] investigation to annihilate the have sent must be positive out teams| |
|enemy in 3 _ Only and can you find cadre way are to times when there to annihilate watch them the| |
|istinuously during normal times as we l1 as those| |
|again [tense] B situation_| |
|con continuously [tense ] 3. during normal| |
|and platoon 4 times You must have to a find out if the enemy grade as well have to plan to reconnoiter| |
|cadre as are those times watch when the men| |
|there is a area B [unidentified situation. 4. and unlocated] You must plan to reconnoiter| |
|has withdrawn and if there are again area [unidentified and any traces of artillery,| |
|unlocated] find artillery, if mortars, out the enemy| |
|etc." has withdrawn The probable and if Hq there lst are| |
|1st Division element was located mortars, any traces of on| |
|14 February near Thanh . the vicinity of Le| |
|etc." The probable 13-53N Hq, 107-33E Division 764369), was YA element approximately 12km located on| |
|northwest of Le 14 February near 13-53N The 107-33E target of 764369), (YA the abovementioned mortar approximately 12 km| |
|attack is northwest pro bably in of Le Thanh. The week. cussing the Thanh, reply to the target of above since the above| |
|mentioned mortar B3 Front attack Front is elements have the probably in beendis vicinity of Le an impending mortar above Thanh, since the attack| |
|in that area for B3 elements the past week. have been discussing In an apparent an impending mortar attack above| |
|message on tillery attack was not yet possible and gave various| |
|in that area 14 for February, the probable lst Division element the past In an apparent reply to stated above| |
|that message the on ar 14 February, the probable 1st Division element stated| |
|reasons that the for the delay artillery attack was not yet possible and gave various| |
|reasons for the delay.| |
|between other activity in the western In In unidentified entities believed highlands| |
|other activity in the western highlands, to be associated with the messages passed| |
|PAWN between 66th Regiment, unidentified Ist Division--located entities believed to be| |
|in western Kontum associated with the Province indicated that elements of that unit| |
|PAVN 66th Regiment, 1st Division--located in western Kontum for Province--indicated attacks in that area that elements ssage of "attack unit One me of that The 13 February 16 (cva l unit may be contained preparing| |
|00 hours) was last on unidentified unit| |
|instructions in for attacks for an that area. One message to of 13 February contained| |
|instructions [GOLF ]" an located on 11 date. for on unidentified date an unknown unit to The near 66th Regiment val "attack Hq , unit 16 (C lst| |
|Division, 00 hours) [GOLF]" an unknown February near Hq, 14-42N| |
|66th Regiment, 107-43E 1st Division, YB 928284) , was approximately 10km northwest last located on 11 northwest of Dak To| |
|February 14-42N 107-43E (YB 928284), approximately 10 km of Dak To.| |
|was located on Meanwhi| |
|Meanwhile, le, 14 February in northern Quang Duc 33rd Regiment 10 , the possible| |
|the possible 3rd Battalion, 3rd Battalion, PAVN Province 33rd Regiment, MR| |
|was located on 14 February in northern Quang Due Province, MR 10,| |
FOP SEERET TRINE-4- TOP SECRET TRIWK
---
# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY REGION 5
|QUANG NGAI|QUANG NGAI|
|---|---|
|eHq, PAVN 66th Regiment|DAK TO|
|KONTUM|KONTUM|
|AN KHE|Unidentified|
|Probable Hq, PAVN 1st Div Element|LE THANH BINH DINH|
|PLEIKU|DARLAC|
|BAN ME THUOT|Possible PAVN 3rd Bn, PAVN 33rd Regt|
# SECRET SA VN
---
# Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
|near Me Thuot and 12-23N 12-23N 107-53E(ZU 132697)|approximately 40km southwest of Ban and about 40 km southwest of its 11 February location|
|---|---|
|Ban Me Thuot 21 km southwest of its 11 February location| |
|Vietnamese Communist activity in Quang Nam Province continues| |
|On 14 February near Hq, the 15-39N 107-54E (ZC 102332) on the same day indicated unidentified subordinate to Hq, an unidentified 14--indicated subordinate that it was 15-53N Rear move (AT 853570)| |
|Services Group 44 located on 12 February near Hoi An and approximately 108-03E| |
|Additionally, in the central part of Services Group 44, located on 12 February in the 15-42N 107-57E (ZC 177384) possibly reported the province Hq, the Rear Services Group on 14 February that it was 15-42N in 107-57E difficult situation, possibly under bombardment and attack, surrounded.| |
|Elsewhere in Quang Nam Province, 26 December 1967 has been identified as a radio station observed in MR 205 communications since 31st Regiment 108-04E (AT 867660)| |
|Possibly serving Hq, PAVN 31st Regiment located on 5 February near 15-57N 108-04E about 29 km southwest of Da Nang, near the probable VC 402nd headquarters| |
|PAVN 368B Artillery Regiment and 368B Sapper Battalion sent by the PAVN and the probable 402nd Sapper Battalion to Hq, Rear Services Group 44, indicating an operational relationship between these units| |
|The possible relationship between 31st Regiment and 368B Regiments, with Hq, Rear Services Group 44, the probable Hq, unidentified regimental Hq, the probable Sapper Battalion and the headquarters Hq, probable Artillery 368B communicates with two unidentified terminals on 6 February near 15-25N 108-31E (BT 348049) in Quang Tin Province about 10 km south of Tam Ky, and the other in Thua Thien Province about 16-13N 23 km northwest of Da Nang.| |
|Services element, 13-51N subordinate to Hq, central Binh Dinh Province (BR 447310), about 11 km south on 14 February near services element, 108-37E Hq, to MR 5, was located on 14 February near 13-51N 108-37E (BR 447310), about 11 km south| |
---
|Doc ID|6637221|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6637220SEERET SVIN|
|SECRET|:1)1!( Ylff|
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES| |
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES| |
|IN MILITARY REGION 5| |
|IN MILITARY REGION 5| |
| |DA NANG|
|Possible Hq PAVN|®|
|Possible Hq PAVNRegiment|31st Regiment|
|QUANG NAM| |
|QUANG NAM| |
| |Unidentified|
| |Unidentified|
| |Hq RS, Group 44|
| |Hq RS, Group 44|
| |Hq MR 5 MainForce|
| |Unit Control|
| |Unit Control|
| |eTAM Ky TAM KY|
| |QUANG TIN|
| |QUANG TIN|
|SECRET SAVIN| |
|SECRET SA 'llAI| |
---
Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
FOP SEEREF FRTN
TOP SECRET TRI!~E3/0/sTY/R4O-68
3/0/STY/R40-68
of An Khe and approximately 70km south-southeast of its 26 December 1967 location.
(2/G12/VCM/R0477-68, 1420472; R0476-68, 1419342; R0475-68 142047z; 1408352; T380-68 R0476-68, 141934Z; R0475-68, 1415002; 14150oz; R0472-68, 1411452; R0471-68, 1504452; T378-68, 1415502)
R0472-68, 141145Z; (8Z8 R0471-68, 140835z; T380-68, 150445Z; T378-68, 14155oz) (1!1ii!8MT OAJ!It)
Military Region 1 Light Infantry Division (LID) 14 February suggests that Hq, vicinity firm location of this Hoa-Long may February at February general Tentative information of headquarters be Province border general The last of 14 may be located in the that suggests Hq, VC 9th of the northern Bien Light Infantry Division (LID) Khanh located 5 February area in the vicinity of the northern Bien Hoa-Long Khanh was Province on border area in the The Binh Long-Phuoc Long firm location of this Province border area headquarters was on 5 12-OON in Cambodia- (xU 895283) Binh Long-Phuoc Communications activity area Long Province border between 12-00N and the division head - at 106-44E Cambodia-last quar895283).
273rd Regiments 7-has been sporadic probable VC 271st, (XU ters and its communications subordinates activity the since probable since early February, with the VC 271st, 272nd, and last 273rd contact noted Regiments--has noted on been on 7 February. February. sporadic early February, with the On On 13 February 13 to establish February, the Military Affairs Section (MAs) of COSVN attempted establish contact with the probable 271st and 273rd Regiments attempted two messages Preliminary to contact information with the probable suggests Hq, that MAS COSVN 271st and 273rd Regiments sent to the Preliminary 271st Regiment without establishing information suggest establishing COSVN that MAS con- tact two sent On messages 14 February, to the MAS COSVN 271st COSVN attempted to establish Regiment without establishing con- tact with tact. the On 272nd and 273rd Regiments 14 February, MAS hing and sent nine messages to the attempted to contact 273rd Regiment without establis with the 272nd and 273rd Regiments and contact nine sent messages to the 273rd Regiment without establishing contact.
14 February the subordinate of information Meanwhile, preliminary information indicates that on Meanwhile, preliminary the probable Hq, (MIs), Hq, on 9th indicates that 14 February a subordinate of the probable Hq, C95 Reconnaissance Company of to the Military Intelligence Section attempted elementshad not been noted headquarters. to contact The company he The setwo reconnais- sance was not located noted been in communications since 23 January on 22 January near 11-29N 106-24E from northeastern Tay Ninh Province, (xT 526677) in The subordinate Binh Duong Province probable Hq, in Rinh was Tay Ninh Province following a noted in communications, the C95 Reconnaissance Company was in also Province. on 22 January following When last noted 20 km move south also 106-24E communications, the ing with a Hq, probable second subordinate located in northeastern C95 Reconnaissance Company was in northeastern Tay Ninh 1967 in northern communicating The with reconnaissance second subordinate company was located located in early December Tay Ninh. The in northern Phuoc Long Province reconnaissance company was located in early December 1967 Phuoc Long Province.
FOP SECRET FRINE-6-
TOt' 8ECR~ Tltlt*47E
---
# Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
FFOP SECRLT FRTNE TOfil 8ECltf:T Tltfirqf:3/0/sTx/R4O-68 3/0/STY/R4-0-68
9th LID were indicates that elements of some regiments of the Collateral VC Collateral involved indicates in recent Vietnamese that elements Vietnamese Communist tactical of some regiments of the activities in the VC 9th LID were involved Saigon-Bien Hoa in recent area Communist tactical activities in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area. unidentified initially observed February In other was other activity, activity, on on 14 February a new unidentified subscriber was unidentified initially authority located in northeastern an subscriber control observed in communications with an in communications in northeastern Tay Ninh with other subscricontrol bers on this watch Binh Long Province, 7th Division authority watch facility include MASCO SVN Ninh located Tay the possible Front Headquarters in Other subscribers on this facility Province MAS include and terminals COSVN, the associated with the 9th LID and the possible Front Headquarters in and Binh possible PAVN Long and terminals associated with the 9th LID the possible PAVN 7th Division. station new radio A new and radio group, consisting of an three group, subordinates consisting appeared unidentified control of an on control station station and three and one subordinates, subordinate were appeared located on 106-29E on 8 February February. 8 The in central Binh Duong Province control station and one subordinate at 11-12N were located (XT 615390) February and central employed by 106-36E (XT 746265), 7 January used in 11-O5N Binh Duong Province 746265, at respectively 11-12N 106-29E The signal plan employed by unidentified this group and 11-0S N 106-36E (XT is similar respectively. to that used by another another signal plan employed by this group, located in on group isolated on is similar to that The by control stations of unidentified both groups are group, isolated the 7 January. S am general The area control stations of both groups are located in the saIIE general area. (2/G10 /vCM/R090-68 (2/G10/VCM/R090-68,0606182) 1417102;R088-68, 1417102; R088-68, 1415252; R085-68, 141525Z; R085-68, 1316402; 13164oz; R06-68 R06-68, 060618Z) (GliiliiRiH OHUIN) Military Region 10 Military Region 10 northwestern Phuoc Long Province. moved be serving that headquarters have since radio stations Province The possible Hq, M Province The possible Hq, MR 10 has moved from Quang Duc Province into believed into to northwestern be serving that sector headquarters 0f Phuoc Long have been located 10 February. by SIGINT in the to believed northwestern sector of Phuoc Long since 10 February. position in western in communications had not (xU 950089), approximately 60km southwest of position been noted had not (XU 950089), western Quang Duc _ km 14 February at its MR 10 MAS station One station was located on One normally communicates contact with however, headquarters been noted in Quang located communications Due. 60 on Prior to 14 of 14 Prior since southwest February since to 14 9 February this 9 February, this station February, at February. its 11-5ON 11-SON 2 2 February February 106-47E 106-47E MAS COSVN, daily which normally observed on in 14 February, basis. 9 through through was not was 13 February; possible 13 not February; communicates contact with the These MAS COSVN passed observed on in 14 with the possible Hq, with February, the possible however, the MR headquarters a from MR Hq, MAS MR COSVN 10 on on passed from daily eight messages to the eight messages to the Headquarters in northern These activity involving the possible Hq, M 10 _ MR 10. messages messages appeared appeared the possible of to be relays of the type previously observed in the possible Front Front Headquarters in 7 _ Binh Long Province.
~TOP SEERET FRHE-7- TOP ~ECRET TRitJE
---
# Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
relocatedsecond
10 February, relocated
10 February, The second station, to norpwestern also to a position Phuoc Long between serving Hq, MR 10, believed to be 30 January (XU 976098).
position near 11-SON Phuoc Long near believed 11-5ON between to 106-48E (XU 976098).
Military Region 3
Province into The Region 3 Committee (RC-3) has moved from central An 3 Committee soupeastern area has moved soupeastern RC-3 was located in Province An Xuyen (RC-3) area of Phong Dinh central moved from (vc Can Xuyen Tho) 09-45N on 13 Province into and (WR 835786) approximately 103km norpeast of 13 and pe 14 February of Phong Dinh pe vicinity of Province (vc Can Tho). On 105-45E 14 February, RC-3 was located in pe vicinity its location 105-45E 09-45N on February pe Western Nam Bo (WR 835786) This recent relocation places RC-3 of 103 km norpeast in its pe vicinity location ty of Hqs, on 7 and an 3, February. MR This recent station associated pe Liberation relocation Bo Branch places Branch of Liberation RC-3 in pe News Agency, Hqs, vicinity of MR unidentified 3, pe Western Nam of pe MAS RC-3 News Agency, and an unidentified station associated wip MAS RC-3.
DMZ Area
Khe Sanh area PAVN element noted in tactical voice communications remain- PAVN element on 12 February reported noted in reported 193 combat-ready men tactical voice communications in pe in pe ing from an original February "all from Khe Sanh area an original on 12 289 289. The element also expressed The can element 193 also combat-ready expressed just a 330. mendesire for "all pe artillery rounds you can supply" and not just 330. On 13 February a PAVN artillery observer in PAVN artillery observer in pe Khe Sanh area pe Khe Sanh area was instructed instructed including to report pe coordinates in each to report agent personnel pe coordinates of possible allied emplace- of possible The allied emplace- ments ordered to ments including send pe number 38 was if requested to reinspect not down number of personnel pe an of if pis information was not available in each. The observer was observer was On for 14 February targets an On ordered for 14 unlocated February targets 13, to send pe pe down observer was observer 13, agent 38 and requested 42. pis information to reinspect was coordinates available.
Regiment unidentified personality associated wip pe An unidentified PAVN 101D reported on 14 February associated personality pat his team was located 101D wip pe located wip a PAVN squad of report aircraft February continue to fell near report rounds falling in Regiment squad continue artillery rounds of to pe PAVN 304p reported pe PAVN aircraft activity into 304p Division pat on 14 Division. activity pe area into Elements of pe regiment con - Elements Khe his pe team was pe Khe Two Sanh pe runway. head rounds reportedly of Sanh airstrip and pe regiment airstrip wip con- and PAVN artillery helicopter falling helicopter pad and in two near pe pe area. Two head of rounds reportedly fell near a pad and two 8 - near pe of pe runway.
---
Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
FTOP SECKET TRTNEI OP 51!Clll! I Till !rq~3/0 /sTY/R40-68 3/0/STY/R40-68
In pe eastern DMZ, it was on 14 February pe 1st Battalion PAVN indicated a Regiment in building one 14p 803rd Regiment reported pat it was constructing combat fortifications had cut down trees for use (16-51N 1st Battalion of pe 803rd Regiment was located in building one such fortification. It was also discussed pat pe 1st 107-11E Battalion YD 325635) 803rd of pe Regiment was located at Vinh Lai (16-51N 107-11E, YD 325635).
Messages YD 348534 activity between Quang 107-O1E continue pe To pe to reflect communications soup, communications of pe PAVN 812p Regiment continue to reflect activity between mission is to city YD 459402) Quang Tri city (16-45N 107-11E, 107-llE, and 348534) pe regiment indicated pe YD and My Chanh (16-38N 107-0lE, preaten Quang YD 459402). Tri Messages city reflected considerable interest in indicated interdict routes of regiment's communications "My is to preaten Quang On 14 February, messages reflected Tri city and interdict routes of communications. YD 382489) On Chanh post" pe 14 February, and messages pe Nhung Bridge (16-48N 107-13E interest in pe "My Chanh post" and pe Nhung Bridge (16-48N 107-13£, YD 382489).
(SECRET SAIIN CSf'GBET S4YW2 PAVN High Command 14 February five new subscribers were noted on pe High On 14 February group serving units personnel infiltrating into Soup Vietnam Command broadcast Neiper pe locations nor pe identities of group serving units/personnel infiltrating pe into new subscribers Neiper soup Vietnam. are known at locations pe pis time time. Nor All messages noted to pe identities of pe date subscribers new have contained characteristics which All are known at pis which suggest pat messages pat noted elements pe to involved are date have are eiper outside contained outside Norp Vietnam or characteristics suggest preparing to leave are pe elements involved eiper Norp Vietnam or are preparing to leave. One unidentified subscriber on One unidentified subscriber on pis group was first noted on pis not group vicinity Tri subscriber vicinity of noted Thua Thien Provinces located Laos 11 106-58E (yc 055979) in Vietnam. 11 February and located on 14 February in pe of Quang February and Laos, 14 near pe border on February border in pe of 16-14N and 16-14N 106-58E (YC 055979) Soup Vietnam. in near It is not known Quang pe of if pis Tri and Thua is one Provinces, Thi.en of pe five new subscribers Soup subscribers It mentioned above is known if subscriber is one of pe five new mentioned above.
(SLORL I (SEGRE£ SPtsIH) PAWN Rear Services PAVN Rear Services (possibly existence 13 February The existence The of a 106-36E, XE 7526), was disclosed in Services of warehouse in pe warehouse in pe area of Kien Giang River near 17-25N message passed 17-25N February by an 7526), message (possibly passed near on on 13 106-36E, by XE an 9 -unidentified unidentified PAVN Rear was disclosed PAVN Rear in a Services
---
# Doc ID: 6637221 Doc Ref ID: A6637220
|INon - Non Responsive|Responsive UFOP SEERET FRTNETOP SECRET TRf Irqf:3/0/sTY /R40-68 3/0/STY/R40-68|
|---|---|
|element fiedentities the element..unidentified gunemplaccementrevealedexchanged thefirstmessageOnthesame datetwo: messages exchangedbetween unidenti- On reflected same date air-strike activity two: messages In between unidenti - an fied entities reflected air-strike activity.that emplacement97had161the In bombshadbeenfirst message droppedinits an unidentified area gun and emplacement thatthefourguns revealed alsoat emplacement that 161 bombs had been expendedin dropped 2110G_ rounds 169 roundsof ammunition four 169 its area and of ammunition.withno reportofdamage_ from that the Itguns It also mentionedthat 97 atmentioned that fromhad 2100to message four B-57sstruck, 2110G, four B-57s an struck, with with a no report of ofanti-damage. The| |
|second message personnel hit100meters (cluster) disclosed disclosedbombsanand air-strike with air-strike10 probablefragmentationbombssalvo salvo of anti- emplacement) _100 Bombs of from One personnelbomb (cluster) bombs andBl 10 (unidentified, probable fragmentation areapossible gun bombs. One bomb hit The four gunsde fending meters from Bl (unidentified,10me ters implementsand 236 roundsthe fromexpendedgunpossible ofammunition_ emplacement), The four alsostruck 10 guns defending the area from the cookingroundsexpended 236 area resulof ammunition.the loss ofting in Bombs also numberof toolsstruck meters the cooking foodarea supplies resulting inThelandlinesoftwogun the loss a number ofemplacementsatposition96tools/implements and food were supplies,cut;however , The landlines therewas two of no damage gun emplacements to topersonnelor weapons.at position orweapons96 were cut; however , there was no damage personnel| |
# (SECldST e!AVIDI) Overland Infiltration
Overland Infiltration (GDRS) On 12 OnForward Forwardreappeared Hq , 12FebruarypeGenecommunications wip February pe GeneralDirectorateofRear Servicesin ral Directorate wip(KSAF)afterpe of RearterminalServices sus(GDRS)pectedof 30 days _ pePrior Khe pis ofservingpe reappeared in communicationsSanhArea Front a terminal suspected silence of serving Priorto Hq, Khepiscommunications silence Sanh Area Front (KSAF) after GDRS Forward a silence of hadmaintainedsporadic communicationswip Hq , 30 days. to communications silence, KSAFpe GDRS sinceForward21December1967 , had maintained ThesporadicGDRS Hq,Forward was locatedin HaForwardis locatedon 12Tinhconununications locatedwipHa FebruaryHq,TinhKSAF Province,December since 21 vicinityVietnam and 106-24E (XD 502684).Norp of 16-53N The pe 1967. GDRSHq, KSAF is located in inpe Province, Norp Vietnam and pe KSAF was on 12 February in pe vicinity of 16-53N 106-24E (XD 502684).
---
|Doc ID:|6637221|Doc Ref ID:|A6637220|
|---|---|---|---|
|INon - Responsive|INon .......Responsive|TOP SECRET TRTNE1| |
|TOP SECRET| | |1 ft.IN£3 /0/STY/R4O-68|3/0/STY/R4D-68|
|TOP SECRET| | |TRI?1,E|
---
|Doc ID:|6637221|Doc Ref ID:|A6637220|
|---|---|---|---|
|.INon - Responsive I NonResponsive|4FOP-SEEREF FRHNE TOP SECRET|TRI~J~3 /oLSTY[R4O-68_|3 /o / S'T'V /R4-0-68|
|-12 --12-|FFOP SEERET FRHINE| | |
|TOP SECRET|TRit~E| | |
---
|Doc ID:|6637221INon - ResponsiveNon Respons i ve|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637220FOP SEERET FRINE|
|Correction|Correction to 3/0/STY/R39-68 to 3/0/STY/R39-68, Section A IA2, section IA2, DMZ Area, Para 4 DMZ Area, Para 4 not been observed in tactical communications since Regiment Changeline one Change line one to read: "The PAVN 90th Regiment has not been observed in tactical communications since •••• " FOP SECRET FRHNE-13- TOP TRl})J~| | {
"Who": "United States of America SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONAL ASIA SECURITY AGENCY, VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES, MILITARY Region 5, COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA",
"What": "Summary of military activities, communications, troop movements, reconnaissance, artillery positions, and possible radio stations in Southeast Asia focusing on Vietnam",
"When": "15 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Laos", "Quang Tri Province", "Hue area", "Pleiku Province", "Kontum Province", "Phuoc Long Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Khe Sanh area", "Da Nang", "An Khe", "Binh Duong Province", "Quang Duc Province", "An Xuyen Province", "Phong Dinh Province", "Thua Thien Province", "Binh Long-Phuoc Long Province border", "MR 205 communications area", "Tay Ninh Province", "Binh Duong Province", "Kien Giang River area"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: #
Doc ID: 6637209 Doc Ref ID: A6637208
08 February1968
3/0/STY./R34-68 SECUR DIST: 08 February 0/UT1968 SEASIGSUM 34-68 DIST: O/UT34-68 SEA SIGSUM STATES AMERIC SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-17-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526 Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-17-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526
---
Doc ID: 6637209 Doc Ref ID: A6637208
# FTOP SECKET TRTNETOP ~ECllET 'flll!~E
3/0/STY /R34-68
08Feb 6820452
08 Feb 68 2045Z
DIST:
DIST: 0/UT0/UT
NON-Responsive NATIONALSECURITYAGENCY SOUTHEAST 1\SIA NATIONAL LSIA SICINTSUMMARYSECURITY AGENCY SOUTHEAST SIGUn SUMi'1ARY
Asian information to summarizes This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA in this report is at this time publication based entirely on 08 February 1968 except SIGINT.
All information otherwise specifically indicated in report based entirely SICINT except:
# CONTENTS
Situation Summary
Communist Southeast Asia
# I. Military Vietnamese Communist Communications
South Vietnam
DRV Communications
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1/10 PAGE(s)
FTOP SEERET TRTNE TOP SECRJS:T 1'1lII~~
---
# Doc ID: 6637209
# Doc Ref ID: A6637208
FOP SECRET FRTNETOP SECltE'f 'fltlf74~ 3/0/STY /R34-68 3/0/STY./R34-68
highlands of Soup Vietnam's identified as serving pe Hq, pe in pe vicinity elements of pe PAVN B3 Front continue To pe pe Main force
Main vicinity force of Kontum and Military Region (MR) 5 elements of Vietnam and Pleiku cities Kontum of pe Pleiku PAVN cities B3 Front in continue in pe western move to pe eastern highlands station tentatively of Soup Military Region (MR) 5. To
368B Artillery Regiment relocated away from Hoi An east, a station tentatively identified as serving An pe in Quang Hq, Nam Province.
368B Artillery In M 4 Regiment pe concentration of unidentified 4 relocated away from Hoi An in Quang Nam Province.
terminals located Nam Province. In soup of unidentified subordinate of pe MR soup of Saigon remains of pe concentration in unidentified pe area where where Ma in Region pe Region located pe terminals Office 4 of pe Liberation News Agency and pe tentative 4 Committee, an an unidentified Saigon remains subordinate in pe area of pe Long Office Main An Provincial Unit are also located.
Province pe In pe SIGINT reflected pe One reference was made to Tri pe norpwestern area Communist offensive against pe allied position at Lang Province SIGINT reflected Lang Vei pe Communist offensive against company being sent against Lang Vei allied position at Vei. One reference to in regiment of coordination wip a pe was made wip to 66p 304p Division. possibly re company Reg being iment, sent against ferring to in regiment Lang Vei coordination pe PAVN pe 66p Regiment, possibly In addition tactical referring tactical a communications revealed of pe PAVN pat 304p PAVN elements Division. In in pe General Khe addition communications revealed growing desertion deser PAVN problem and pat at least one battalion was pat tion elements problem and in pe pat General at least Khe one Sanh battalion area have was a under-under-growing
Non -N-on---R-e-sp_o_n_s_i_v_e .,.,strengp Responsivestrengp.•conducted on now February It has now been determined pat pe ORV transport activity It involved 7 February possibly pat pan AN-2 transport has been determined over pe DRV over norpern Soup Vietnam/activity Laos ionducted involved 7 IL-14 aircraft raper on possibly norpern AN-2 light Soup transports • Vietnam/ : Alpough Laos pe specific mission of pe aircraft was not disclosed IL-14 aircraft raper pan light transports
. "in available SIGINT , ."Alpough pe specific references were made activity. mission of pe aircraft to "dropping disclosed was not and
in target , available indicative SIGINT, of possible were references airmade drop to "dropping" and
FOP SEEREF FRNE TOP SECRET TRI~J~
---
|Doc ID:|6637209|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637208SSECRET SAVUJA|
|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN|VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY REGION 5ACTIVITIES|
|MILITARY REGION 5|Da Nang|
|QUANG Nam|Suspected Hq, 368B Artillery Regiment TamKy|
|QUANG TIN|Probable Quang Provincial Unit|
|QUANG TIN|Provincial Unit|
|QUANG NGAI|QUANG NGAI|
|LAOS|KONTUM|
|LAOS|KONTUM|
|Terminal Suspected to serve PAVN 32nd Regt|Suspected 32nd Regt to serve PAYN Dak To|
|Suspected Artillery Unit|Associated with PAVN B3 Front|
|Associated with PAVN B3 Front|Suspected PAVN 174th Regiment|
|BINH DINH|BINH DINH|
|2th Regiment|Suspected PAV Kontum|
|24th Regiment|Kontum|
|PAVN B3 Front|MisSUbord linate s|
|CAMBODIA|PLEIKU|
|CAMBODIA|Hq, PAVN 10th Division Qui Nhon|
|PLEIKU| |
---
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
# VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST COMMUNICATIONS - SOUTH VIETNAM
Military Region
Tri-Thien-Hue Area
Activity of the PAVN 6th Regiment near Hue continues. SIGINT messages indicated the location of the 11th Company Minh Huong (16-30N, 106-35E, YD 750262) attempting to cross the river to Lai Ha. Urgent requests for ammunition were noted for B-40 on the river vessels against Allied plans. The 10th Company also reported strong enemy reaction to advance troops into Hue city.
Military Region 5
In Kontum Province, main force elements of the PAVN B3 and Allied military installations continue to maneuver near Kontum city. The radio station tentatively identified near Kontum city on 7 February as serving the HQ, PAVN 24th Regiment was located at 14-25N, 108-04E (AR 833947). Another radio station tentatively identified near 14-29N, 107-53E (ZB 105230) was serving the HQ, PAVN 174th Regiment. An additional radio station approximately 24 km east-southeast of its location on 1 February was serving HQ, 32nd Regiment, 107-31E (YB 722261).
Another radio station approximately 20 km west-northwest of its location on 3 February was serving HQ, 32nd Regiment, 107-31E (YB 722261) near 14-40N, 107-31E.
---
# Doc ID: 6637209
# Doc Ref ID: A6637208
|the PAVN B3 Front was located on artillery unit tri-border area, an unidentified|22 February near associated with artillery unit|
|---|---|
|northeast of about 3 February location Oak Seang (YB 751250) about 6 km southwest of Dak Seang|the PAVN B3 Front 22 km southwest on 14-41N 107-33E|
|located on 22 February near and about 10 km northeast of its February location.|14-41N 107-33E 10 km|
On 1st February, the Military Intelligence Section Kontum Province, in military intelligence (MI) activity in Kontum Province, PAVN 1st Division directed Kontum Province near located February the Military subordinate--last located on Intelligence Section (MIS), PAVN 27 January in western Kontum to the 27 January (YB 716146)--to report back enemy exact strength of the enemy at section in western report back to Province the section in detail near 14-35N in detail 107-31E on "the to located all exact the strength enemy positions of the at the artillery position" queried located and addition, subordinate whether at 14-4ON the 2380 the There is enemy whether Allied to all positions. The MIS specifically Allied forces were on "Hill 742 at queried subordinate Hill 742 at forces 107-36E (YB 8122) 742 were on "Hill In at 2380." There the subordinate reported is a Hill 742 (14-41N to 14-40N the MIS on 920264) 107-36E (YB Allied 8122).
In addition, the subordinate Ro Keng reported to 107-37E, MIS YB on Allied Worksite 18 (14-41N ground traffic at Oak 107-37E, YB 875255) Keng (14-41N 107-37E, and Dak Mot and 751 YB Mot 920264), (14-39N 107-4SE Worksite YB 997220) YB 874290) 18 (14-41N and 107-37E, traffic air traffic YB 875255), to Hill Oak (14-43N (14-39N 107-39E, 107-45E, YB 997220), and second subordinate of the MIS A air to Hill 751 (14-43N MIS relocated within Kontum Province sometime subordinate 107-39E, YB 874290). A second between 28 December-7 February of the relocated This element was located on within Kontum Province sometime 7 February approximately ZA February between 28 December-7 22 km west-southwest of Kontum city near km east of location on This location west-southwest is approximately 20 km 107-37E this 844808).
This location on 28 December near 14-18N of approximately Kontum near city 14-18N 20 14-18N east 107-37E of 107-49E element (YA 844808) this (YA element's 041826) associated with To the To the with the PAVN B3 Front was located on south in Pleiku Province, in Pleiku Province, an unidentified entity 7 February entity Pleiku city Meanwhile, (AR 872537), near 14-02N associated 108-06E PAVN the B3 Front about was located 14 km northeast of on 7 February near 14-02N and approximately 10 km 108-06E (AR 108-25E 1Oth Division was the February 872537), km south of was located on about 14 of its 4 km northeast of Position. Pleiku city and 13-51N Hq, approximately border PAVN 10 (BR 206310) in the Pleiku-south its February position. 7 February Meanwhile, near Hq, PAVN 10th Division located on February Province near Pleiku city 108-25E approximately 47 km east-of 13-51N (BR 206310) in Pleiku-Binh Dinh southeast of Binh Dinh Province Pleiku border and about area approximately 25 km east-southeast of 47 km east- its southeast 5 February location of city and about 25 km east-southeast its 5 February location.
In tentatively identified the Quang Nam-Quang Tin as serving area, Hq, the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province area, Hq = Province the in the 368B the radio radio Artillery Regiment was station tentatively was located on 6 February identified as serving central 368B Quang Nam Province near located Artillery Quang Regiment Province near 15-56N on 6 15-56N 107-56E 107-56E February (zc 154622) (ZC 154622) in central
# TOP SECRET TRINF-3-
---
# Doc ID: 6637209
# Doc Ref ID: A6637208
|approximately kmwest west Hoi|and approximatelyabout42|20km westof|
|---|---|---|
|20 km of Ancity. Provincial|this unit' 8|this unit'sIn5 north-central QuangIn5 February locationFebruary location|
|Tin Province,km west|and|Province, 427 Februarynear 15-28NNamthe probable QuangNam|
|the probable of RoiQuang An city. Provincial north-centralUnitwas| | |
|locatedon 16km southeastofits near|located on 7 February|2February position.(BT 15-28N 108-23E (BT 203128)|
|16 km southeast of its February position.| | |
|0715102 ;R0387-68, 0715002; T313-68 ,|(2/G11/VCM/R389-68 _|
|---|---|
|(2/Gll/VCM/R389-68, 0722352; R0389-68,0719402 ;R0388-68|072235Z; R0383-68_ R0389-68, 0712452 ;B0382-68 ,071940Z; R0388-68,|
|0716002;| |
|071600Z; T316-68 , R0387-68, 0716502; 071500Z;|R0383-68,0712352) 071245Z; (SLeRE B0382-68,|
|071510Z; T316-68, 071650Z; T313-68, 071235Z)|(O!e?!R!T On.TH)|
# Military Region1
mes sagetoFebruary On On 6 Februarythe possibleHq the possiblepossible the Hq,PAVN Hq,7thMR MR4 4 (SV) passedone (SVN) passed The onlyone previousme3 Februarywhenthe message previousto ssageactivitybetweenthesetwo authoritiesthe possible Hq, PAVN 7thDivision. Division. The only message activity between these two authorities occurredon thedivision passed messagethe totheMR on occurred MRHeadquarterswhen 3 February Thisactivitymay berelatedto division passed a message maynorthern Binh Duong Province,the possible Hq, ofthe division relocationHeadquarters. to the in early February This of activity may be related Division7th to the tonorthernin relocation early February of the whereelements possible Hq, 7th Division to havebeen involved Binh Duong in tactical where activityin elementstheLaiKhe-Benof the division Catarea .been may have involved in tactical activity in the Lai Khe-Ben Cat area.
observedon Vietnamese A newVietnameseCommunist broadcast facility,first new 21Novenber Cormnunist1967_ hasbeenisolatedin broadcast facility, communicationsfirst Theunidentified initiallylocatedon 21 November 1967, has been isolated in communications. The unidentified control authority--which November northofhas at least 14 Tay 17January, 11-22N Cambodianear 649551) subscribers--was NinhProvincein initially located 11-47N on 21 November 106-07E (XU 222031) .north of On Tay Ninh Province theincontrolwas nearCambodia 106-31E (XT 649551)northern thelocatedin ll-47N 106-07E Binh Duong Provincenear On 17 January, the control was located in eastof northernthe MichelinBinh Duong Plantationandapproximately Province near 11-22N 106-31E 72km southeastofits (XT east of 21MichelinNovember position position.a militaryfunction.onMessages passed Messages and passed the facility suggest the km facility southeast suggestof itsthatitthat 21 Novemberit serves serves a military function. (2/G10 / VCM/RO70-68 _ (2/Gl0/VCM/R070-68, 0714252;2/0/VCM/R71-68 ,0721562 ; 071425Z; 2/0/VCM/R71-68, 072156Z; 3/0/STY /R30-68;R31-68) (AFeRz 3/0/STY/R30-68; R31-68) (0.8iR.8T BAVIH)
# TOP SECRET TRNE
---
# Military Region 2
Military Region 2 News
The probable Long An Agency (LNA) continues to move from pe border area to central Highway 4, Long An Provincial Branch of pe Liberation Province-Cambodia
On 7 February, pis entity was located near Binh Chanh at approximately 10-36N, 106-31E (XS 661719), approximately 10 km west and 3 km soupeast of Long An Province.
On 6 February, an unidentified subordinate of alternate Hq, MR 2 was located in norpwestern Dinh Tuong Province near 10-30N, 106-01E (XS 124615), approximately 19 km norp-norpeast of its position in soupeastern Kien Phong Province.
On 7 February, SIGINT indicated a move of an unidentified station, located at 10-20N, 106-31E (XS 650430), approximately 12 km soupwest from its previous location on 11 December 1967.
# Military Region 3
Military Region 3 Military Affairs Section
An unidentified entity, which may be associated wip pe Region 3 Committee (RC-3), was located on 6 February in soupern Phong Dinh Province at 105-42E, 09-47N (WR 778805), approximately 80 km norpeast of its location in soupern Kien Giang Province.
This entity has communicated wip its subordinate in soupern Kien Giang Province since at least 27 November 1967. Between mid-November and early February, MAS RC-3 effected a move in central Chuong Thien Province at 105-22E, 09-39N (WR 409688).
Recent SIGINT indicated pat pe Region 3 Committee (RC-3) was located at 09-03N on 7 February.
---
# Doc ID: 6637209
# Doc Ref ID: A6637208
105-02E (WR 048022)in 25 Januarylocation.
68kmsoupeastof
105-02E (WR 048022) its centralAn Xuyen Province in central An Xuyen Province, approximately 68 km soupeast of its 25 January location
(3/0/STY /R33-68)
Military Region4
Military Region 4
to pe On Onsoupof Saigon remained 7February, pe concentration of unidentified entities
106-38E (xS 7877), unidentified 7877), Provincial pe located also 7 located. 10-39Nan
two Saigon at 10-52N unidentified
to 106-38E tentative pe unidentified soup (XS Long subordinate of pe of subordinate An Saigon area where Main Office of LNA Provincial Unit are an
106-40E (XT 828038) and February Additionally, area of were located also 7 where in Unit Main pe Region 4
pe are Office located_ pe Region on vicinity 4 Comittee of Conunittee, pe LNA, of and
to pe norp pe an of two unidentified entities (XT which may Hq = 10-51N 101st pe 828038) on and February 106-40E norp
to (XT 815004) _ associated wip pe suspected of Saigon at 10-52N The latter entity, which 106-40E may be 10-51N station 106-40E
tentatively associated (XT 815004). The latter entity, may be PAVN 101st a station
Duong Province previously located on 23 January PAVN The tentative
Regiment, tentatively wa $ was previously near 11-16N near wa S last 106-30E (XT 644551) .in central Binh wip located pe suspected on 23 January Hq, in central Binh
106-26E (XT 560414) , also in central (XT 31 December at 11-14N
Duong Hq, 101st Regiment was ll-16N last located 106-30E on located on Binh Duong _31 644551). December The at tentative
11-14N 106-26E (XT 560414), also in central Binh Duong.
(3/0/STY /R33-68;R30-68; 2/0/VCM/RLO-68 ,1522292)
2 . 2. DRV_Comunications
DMZ Area PAVN tactical voice communications offensive against Lang Vei of 6 and 7 February
These reflected pe Communist offensive between Lang Vei e
and underway when, at 01502 on 6 February, These subordinate companies, first indicated pat
conununications, possibly passed between a battalion
was and subordinate companies, first indicated pat possibly an attack
was sized gained informed at pe possible 0150Z on 6 battalion pat February, a possibly an advantage company-
was sized gained to pe east" and pe camp would unit informed pe possible battalion be penetrated pat pat "an advantage
Eleven hours to later, pe east" pe possible camp would was penetrated. pat and
possible battalion was pe to sacrifice. informed be
"pe comrades have been informed On 7 February,
an apparent after-action informed revealed
pat one company in coordination wip pe "66p had to sacrifice." On February,
~FOP SECRET FRFNE-6- TOP SECRET TRl~•E
---
Doc ID: 6637209 Doc Ref ID: A6637208
|Regiment|Additionally, it was the Regiment (probably the 66th Regiment, PAVN 304th Division).|
|---|---|
| |Indicated that Royal Laotian troops were at Lang Vei.|
| |Further indicated that 81-mm mortar troops were used in direct support and that one company was necessary to support forces already at Lang Vei.|
| |Apparently, those Communist forces already at Lang Vei had the necessary support, and another mortar unit and a company were dispatched from Lao Bao (16-37N 106-35E) to support the attack.|
| |Another discussion at 0600Z on February 7 revealed the credentials of an unspecified American "warrant officer pilot" who was to transport supplies from Nha Trang via Da Nang to Lang Vei.|
| |In the same exchange, plans to attack Lang Vei if the enemy returned were being studied. Finally, the problem had been solved.|
| |Additionally, in PAVN tactical voice communications, an unidentified entity located in the general Khe Sanh area reported that the number of desertions was growing daily.|
| |Reportedly, on February 5, an unidentified entity located in the general Khe Sanh area reported that the number of desertions was growing daily, bringing the total number of deserters to 73.|
| |Included in this total were platoon commanders and five radio operators, along with 11 radios, as a consequence, the "battalion was understrength."|
| |PAVN artillery communications in the Khe Sanh vicinity continued to specify the location of unknown type targets.|
| |On February 7, at 0825Z, a probable forward observer reported often-impacted enemy emplacement, killing three men.|
| |An element associated with the 8th Battalion, PAVN 29th Regiment, reported on February 4 that it was continuing to construct.|
---
|Doc ID: 6637209|Doc Ref ID: A6637208|
|---|---|
|shelters but the next day assignment shelters but for "division.. " would the next day would carry out was Also reported was carry out a transportation| |
|transportation B-52 strike in assignment the area on for the night of area, neither of which caused "division Also 2 February and much artillery reported a B-52 artillery strike| |
|fire into the unit in the area on unit bivouac the night of February and much damage or casualties.| |
|fire into casualties the bivouac area, neither of which caused damage or| |
|Communications of the 27th Battalion on and 7 February Cam indicated Communications the battalion would cut Route continue to operate for one surround of the 27th Battalion Route 9 and 7 February Cam| |
|Loon indicated 8 February, continue to the battalion would cut 9 day surround withdraw and withdraw during 8 the night to prepare for cont infantry and tank Mission February, included antiaircraft, continuing activity. operate for one day and| |
|instructions during the night to prepare for continuing activity. Mission destruction 107-02E, YD 142528) and Prison instructions teams included with the antiaircraft, the road to be blocked between Nghia| |
|Hy (16-48N destruction teams, with road to blocked 7 (unlocated) while between Nghia| |
|north bank of in penetrated According small the (16-48N Hy 6th Company coordination with 107-02E, YD 142528) Quat Xa the and Prison (16-48N (unlocated) 106-58E, while YD| |
|100592) Company the 6th area penetrated the Quat Xa small detachment on (16-48N 106-58E, the YD| |
|100592) area of in the river coordination with a to the detachment plan, Company the on 7 was to bank north request the assistance possibly river. According from the PAVN 320th to the plan, 320th| |
|Company 7 Division was to request if its firepower was its assistance was found to be possibly found from the PAVN| |
|Division if firepower to weak. Cua Viet channel The PAVN The PAVN 803rd Regiment remained on the north bank of 803rd with communications Quan Ngang (16-53N prepa- Regiment remained reflecting further prepa on the north bank of| |
|Cua Viet channel possible attack against with communications| |
|107-05E for ration 107-0SE, YD YDa 222678), knowledge of Allied sweep operations and 222678), possible knowledge of Allied on the channel Quan Ngang sweep operations The (16-53N and| |
|plans for harassment of Allied plans for harassment of the enemy 3rd Company to coordinate Allied shipping on| |
|the area "from channel. The with 22 February and ordered the would sweep "the| |
|3rd 5 to Battalion reported the Battalion reported enemy would sweep coordinate area" from| |
|5 to local 22 February forces and in resisting the sweep ordered the 3rd Company The to 3rd Battalion| |
|later reported to regiment that had fired on| |
|with local forces in resisting that the 4th Battalion 3rd sweep. The (probably 4th Battalion| |
|Battal reported unspecified PAVN to 270th later ion, The type 270th Regiment) four fired regiment a 4th Battalion an sunk one (probably large 4th| |
|Battalion, PAVN of vessel with had Regiment) flame-throwers was recoilless gun large 75-mon also reflected in an| |
|rounds unspecified type presence of vessel with four 75-mm recoilless gun| |
|803rd Regiment communications on| |
|rounds. The presence of flame-throwers 7 February also was reflected in| |
|803rd Regiment communications on February| |
|(2/0/vcM/R70-68, 072115Z)| |
|(2/0/VCM/R70-68, 072115Z)| |
---
|Doc ID:|6637209|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6637208|
Non Responsive
Responsive FOPSEERET TRINETOP SEGR~T TRIN~3/0/STY /R34-68 3/0/STY./R34-68
PAW High Command PAVN High Command MRTri-Thien-Hue Tri-Thien-Hue the complex serving PAVN communications with Since as early as has been noted in early (TTH) 23 January an PAVN forces infiltrating into as 23 January an unidentified subordinate of unidentified subordinate PAVN of High Command on This subordinate has been active in MRTTH (TTH) has been noted in communications with PAVN South Command High Vietnam, on the complex serving forces infiltrating into communications since South Vietnam. since on August and has Since This subordinate 3 August 5 February. was been 30 January High last active located in at MR 16-11NTTH Command(Yc 498918) 107-20E communications 3 5 February. was M TTH on this facility and last located at 16-llN however, 2 February. only on Command 107-20E has been noted (ye 498918) been noted contacting Hq, Since on Hq contacting has MRTTH has Hq, been noted in MR TTH 30 on contacting Hanoi, January this facility High mentioned on daily contact with In addition, High Command had been noted in however, 2 on communications above February. only on mentioned above. In the Forward Element, addition, High Command TTH on the noted MR TTH had been facilities in serving major headquarters in daily contact with the Forward or associated with Element, MR on South Vietnam the facilities KSECRE major serving SHV LNN headquarters in or associated with South Vietnam. (§b!CREI SAVIN) 9 - -9- LTOPSFEREF FRTNETOP SECRET TRIT~~
---
|Non Responsive|UFOPSECRET TRINE|
|---|---|
|Non Responsive|TOP SECRET TBwlbTE3/0/STY/R34-68|
|UFOPSEEREF FRINE|TOP SECRET TRil>J~| | {
"Who": "National Security Agency (NSA)",
"What": "Vietnamese Communist activities, Military intelligence activities in Southeast Asia, PAVN military communications, Military Region reports",
"When": "08 February 1968",
"Where": ["Southeast Asia", "South Vietnam", "Kontum Province", "Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province", "Da Nang", "Lang Vei", "An Xuyen Province", "Saigon", "Long An Province", "Phong Dinh Province", "Chuong Thien Province", "Binh Duong Province", "Khe Sanh area", "Cambodia", "North Vietnam", "Laos"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Doc ID: 6622349 Doc Ref ID: A6622348
# Subject: Evaluation Of THE onthe TET OffensIve u. S. IntellAgonce
SUBJECT: EvaluationOf THE onthe TET OffensIve u. S. IntellAgonce
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL orthe Qualltyof INTBLLIGENCB
Subject: Hearing on the Evaluation of the TET Quality orrenaive, or Zanuary 1968.
Foreign Intelligence Advisory BoardJubmltted by the President ashe enclosed onc!ObedreportThe President hab approvedtherecomendatlonmade The Intelligencehaa thbub Ject aublll1tted President approved inthe under date ofJuno 7, inreco111111endation 111ade In on 1968, calling for a report of the foreign intelligence the Intelligence egenclesconcerned the It would beeppreciated 1fyceaxoendBubmlt an t~hoacsforatudy ta be made Board study on to beAdvisory the made In congultation With the headsaubJect consultationunder date by or with theJunePresident's1968, or agencies concerned.would submit an Inltial reportIt ber -5, 1968,on theresults of thedesired report :5,towould onto thle office and to the this be the office results appreciated the the and to 1r you wouldPresident's atudyBoard byinitial Board byBeptem- Septem- ber 1968, of degIredstudy.
Dromley Smtth i\ ...J,:}... .Jt.... D11omley Smith
Enclosure Enclosure. CC : The Chalrman President's"Xoretgn CC: Intelligence Advidory Board . The Prceldent '5 ForeignChairman, Intelligence Advisory Board. Declassified Dec l ass i f i ed and Approvedfor Release by NSA and Approved for Release by NSA on on 12-26-2018 pursuant 12 - 26 - 2018 pursuant to to E. 0 E . O. 1352613526
---
# PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
June 7, 1968
SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Tet Offensive
Background
TET holiday, your intelligence informed pat pe Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was looking into pe failure which allegedly occurred during pe attacks on Soup Vietnamese cities.
At pe time of pe attacks, pe Board was looking into pe possible warnings and indicators prior to pe attacks to determine pe adequacy of intelligence.
The Board consulted wip representatives responsible for intelligence relating to pe Vietnam peater and made requests for additional intelligence concerning pe post-mortem study of pe United States intelligence on pe offensive.
This study was conducted by the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, with the working group visiting South Vietnam in March.
The working group included observers from various military departments and conducted numerous interviews with relevant personnel.
---
# Doc ID: 6622349
# Doc Ref ID: A6622348
the vact 1'as1ng senta6!ve? vac: quantity Of~ccessmerit 3. Of ~he shc intclliCcrceon thc fIrdings of thcsereprc-itc information rccclvcd conccrningthc rcpr~-contunf-yandonor on t.~c fir.dines Baupling of these sentative:, the qu:mtitypre-TET pcriod, the Boardsubnite the or1ntc111ccnee or information eo~,:un!~y received and the Toilowing; vlewe concerning on a srunpl1n~ the cncriy oncr.yor recarding the Intclligencothe u-ingthe pre-Tl!."'!' period, 4u~ing "thethe eepect8or thc TEToffensIvc .Bo:ll:'d orsubmits followinr, vl~~c Endinge recarcli!"lll intclligenco aspects the TET o1"tens1ve.
flllod wIth indications on Bf findings{hronchoat_onquanzt 1968 encny was tillc~ withcoordinatedattackb Ji..b. Throughout January,larger ecalethanevcr ePRoratusc 't:lltlthat1968the Intelllgencc beforea attcteca tothescQJ.11 theclcareet advanceRcrics the enemyintelligencethe wos prepartheprepar~ngadvanccne for apparatunEcrics I'·' Considc-in;cach Corpoarca warning; directedCorpn tit Co~sido~in~ coordinated each Kontun-Plelkuarce? likelihood attncks ettcntlonlarger on a nrcn separately, I Corps than elcnrestever before at.tc,:r:,·~cc!. 0fSa!eo~ directed in ::!: recelved virtually no advance "-'"rn!ne,'J Corps Ccrps,1n III Corps. nonOBt of the Intell gencethe thc vicin:tJthe Kontu:n-Pleiku attentionIn Iv Corpeof the U.8, 'intciligenccappar-Inodvancc Indicetion8o:474 the to area:;,the Of cncll'.y nttnclcsencmyattacks in the of Ii" Corps,intelligence o.'!.d vJ.cj.n~tl' axtent Of the attacko wnich occurred. o: atus received virtually occurrcd IV Corps, indicationstbe Vith regard to the tiningU.S. of thenatureand of evaluatorsandnatureapp~r-of the eneny attackG Place during the TETOencro.13, concluded that the offengive nost 1ikely Youldoccur Jubt prior thc field, including Oencralthe1988. fron January 27to February to or January 27 OrfcnBLve, JDOst extent of concluded to rrom field, the the totheImediately followingthe TET holiday period which extcnded Orimmediately followinB of ener.i,y'a the that offensive, the Pebruary3nezTET holid&y period offensive Jl!IOStWich of 1968.WhlleA "the orrencive micht\' take Umoreland the likely would occur intelligence With fcw Of the few Included Intheirincludedevaluatorc otregard totheevaluatorc inevaluators which Just extendedthe timing prior in I,~ poyndbnoney Of specific est1".ates estirates thoEpeclfic possibility thet the report!: includill6 B1nultaneous attackbthatcertaln ercab tho Roerd Westmoreland,Inbonle reportc sucgectcd theo.tfenoive in llicht taketheir t, possibility thc degrca Of Bimultanetty achieved in · their duringot simultaneous TET holidays.attacks While insome certain attacksareas whichthe Bo~rdsuggected the occurredOr round none occurred In the Intelllgence avaflablein thopre-TET period,orpredicting the the degree or extent simultaneity or theachieved In tholrcxccltiun. actuallyexcc\:-i;inn. nany6; the cItice were mentloned asintelligence 5. In the a8 poosible andavailable Pobbible tergete . towne and Inatallatione actuRlly in the pre-TE'!'attackedactually ., thc pre-TET intcllicence euegesting thatthe many ofthe cities, towns inBtallationsTho Board finde 1Ittlc In . miehtconcentratc on the or that and foment the of the were _JRentioned tho pre-TET townsseemsinintcllicence or that the towns piehtgeck to en cxclus-on the cltieo and auggectin~roneny "pcitince) targets. andthattow8Board 1'1ndsThr. to thc virtual country-wideottacks country-wide exclub -little attncksin country-wide exclub -little attncksin Ion of Trontler tarcetb lodgmente In thece urbancitieoand tlonotconcentrate rethorwouldto havc bccn that thcthemortar aud the seek 11ight to to virtualestahlishto estahlish 1i... lon lodcmenta frontier thece tar&etsurban thnt arceb areas nnemy might Lhc citjcgond uprioin~s. The expccta- The expecta- town:vouldbc conr:t.ncdattacks tion B@CmB to have been attackb which actuallytook placc . than the Cround theconfincd larccly Lo morttU' be l11rcclywhich tho toharocamcnt orr<1ckct haTncsmcnteuid]rocket ettacko,d atbcka, tj tincl rather than In thc Vletnam theater the evaluation of the pre-TET cround actually took place. Intcllicencc Indicatoro_promptcd canccllation of tho TETtrucc in I6. action;on Januery 30in putting U.8evaluation or the fullJlert 1ntcllicencc Corps Corps onindicators In the Vietnam theater 25promptedthe and contributedto deneral Westmorclana1 s cancellation of the TET prr.-TE'rtruce throuchout allor South victnan Junt prior to thc main attacko_ in I on January o.nd puttinG junt prior include 0nWa8Tountcccontributed comnandero on to General Westmorclnnd Mlthouch thc Pro-TET intellicenca /id not Includc main attackc. action~ throu(')louttine and plnce on JanuarySouth Victna~ nll of in all of in c~chto when, attackluaicR-cc ecountcangU.S. co:nmanderoto the full nlert Ind:antingthecxactwhat 't cidthethe ~lthour,h ac ~t3t% in~~e1d 0€tothctimeto ~cTVc pre-TF.T ad a nor.xo.ct and place Ofcach major attack which thc IrcndincGcncral alcrt to Tiold commandersth<' r.cncrnlor Wncre w~"'t,a)crt intellicenco ma.Jor not conandcrs without ;lid tioldand how how Of precise warninawIthout waa r.ountce :-·,~·~;::-. -~;1t.tng S:.c,ific.-mt].y,8-61f1c n:ly ~he ~owovcr.whe!'e~ the ~o:ird th•i 11nd found no toundorno cn::c cazc <i~.1<'ndb~~-n
---
# Doc ID: 6622349
Doc Ref ID: A6622348 8657
Which United States forces appeared to have suffered defeat during pis period because of a lack of sufficient intelligence?
The Board agrees wip many Washington Intelligence reports pat convey pe same sense of urgency. Particularly pe Board agrees wip pe view pat "Washineton" proughout January became loud and insistent. To pe Board, pis conveyed pe name "Vietnam" not until January 28 pat pe warnings or actions might be expected. The President's Daily Brief of January 15-30 contains pe most important intelligence item on pe possible offensive actions. Thereafter, it is silent on pe subject until January 29 when a low-key item appeared on pe first battle preparations in pe Western Highlands.
The Board does not agree pat pis difference of tone in intelligence reporting in Washington probably contributed to pis confusion. The Board does not believe pat pis difference is beyond pe realm of intelligence reporting. Several Washington intelligence reports which called attention to warnings or reports failed to indicate pe seriousness of pe situation.
---
|Doc ID:|6622349|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6622348|
*0 Wac.h~.ngton !ron Wachincton ZcvelOfcf Intcl] iCcncc Tloiing
sh3 roworkingOf roporta
tncfloldon tho the th"Wn~hiru::,:ton on•l thoccniOr Wnr.h'rnr;to:1ccn!orWazhington Officlnlf;ana "Tia) 1n intemodiato corting0u* :.i.."ld off1clnlr:; pro~orJ:,· int~lligcncc 'Lnd' Propot =an•l8{':P.ncier.!cl) tn? th!.!
blcach thefrproce~aing otIntelligencc rcportamny not) Only9. Tne procergingi'icld.the Of fr.codo:'ltoTnc Roard 18under al8o delaythe arrivlll
a~dcs-ination 9. their Go8rbutMay also The noardthc cxtent thttdccIclon-makorr wIllnot wait co;J.or the but undcr the Umpresoionthat r.t·n~."r ffll\Y intelligence delny thAreports arrival Ofnot n:ny ot thc product theonlyprod1.?ctweft '~):
fecod wt";h we_ & tor perconal Etaff brou~t
beck07 raw ureent
"rablcto wa::.t
the initiative
btck initietlvcOf !';. raw intclliCcnce reportc broucht to thoirattention throwch
The intclliccnee for proccabed intclligencc and not infroquently {cl}requirements processed
is reportr.: 1ntclli6cnccto robot ~rean:..on as18tantsnot!':ml':e prompt andthattheir part not port of theo!teninfroquent'.!.y ~all att,mtion o!f.1r.it:iJ.r·,n.re
o-IIelal IntellLccnccorGonlzation . underetandablc to thle kindcf
Improviscd intoliicence upport 18 understandable.,to asextent
o!'1'ic,.al 1ntellir:cnce or pereonal a0 to support theasaistantsrosor.orcanization,BcrioubIntclliccnce containedstni'f unile qucctlonothis
While not~ thoof the 46extent Oftokind of
tothoc:f ...
timollne8bintollir,ence
it0 ucc improvised
itG ncc byBcnlor offIclalorelecb by senior ot1'ic1&1B to thevalue Of the theraises is serious intellicence queationn the the
In the routinc publications of the intclllgencecommunty48 woll the
timeliness10.routinewellas as value or contained \fI
in the Tho IntellAgenceebbebBNente ot cven wen publications ot intelligence of thie cpisodenade bycommunity,
dlfficulty of anticipating the unucual, evenspit!!of the majority Of Officlale assesements
Indicators POIntofficials
Gcnce indicatoroIn unubual directlons
ditticulty 10. mnjorityThe ot or 1ntell1sence anticipatingconccrned providean exa1?1J1le made thein unusual the unusual,concerned
acninstXcy point
moct Ualted Stnter and dovernmont 0fotfr.nsivc m~.r,ht
gcnc~ indicntorakey ccntcrs during thc TFT holidzyd,pact cxpcrIcncc Icdthat a
tho e#tacks bcforc or after (not during_
~r,ninst enemymost OffIcialbGovernment during) the holidoye . centers nnd atter pABt dur1nc
in thc paetTRT or the experience to cxpcctl~d
moat attacks Unite~ St~tes Or Victnnm officials tn Becausecxi>cct !J·
tnethe cnemy hadncvcr in bc1'orc vero(not Jaunched large-EcalcBlnu ttancou;
weresurprIced by thc ZarGc nunbcrOfthe holidays. :Because
theattacksthefr gcncrallygoodcoordination .large-scalenumber of
a~tacl:s.,whichveremounted., by tholr tlning, bythcir cimlteneltv,
atack:b, most were had neveriiyntooa by
o1'fic1nlsthe surprised launchedby the by tt1cir Jimu'.1.tancom:lar13c
end by their
and
attacks whichgenerally by coord.μiation.their timing., c:J.rm.tltPneity, p
Conclusions11. Based on Jta revlew,thcboard concludes =its review, the Donrd conclude~:I Corpathcto
dccision.!• On full Westmoreland ~5intelligence 8n Jahatrthes'tocancel thc TFT truce Just prior co;nm:indcrsthat the_intoll genceat hand contributedto tho
that the 9 actionon January at TF.Thand truce In I contributed U.S.toandto
Gencrnl Hostmoreland1 s decision alcrt throughout all of South Victn&lll
Gener:J.l on main ettack8;throughout full alert on Jnnuary to
action of Southall cancel on the 30 puttingprior just in Corpa conmandcre#0the
to nn~the main
resultthk;thc atnckson the attacks;that Intclllgcnce contrIbuted subctantially to theno
permanen
lodecrcn:8vc-e achieved; rcgult that~. the that nttncko intelligence onachieved;thc citicewcro bcatcn Off and that nocities
contributed beaten were aubctnntiall.y oft andto thntthe
per~~nent lodr,c~cnts that tho Intcll'renc? bearIncon theTT off~n~1vcwe~e
-,':"',:,"1'!~adcquath<rta ro04 a,lcqu1t:'~~ £• t~at ::rtho •.ha··,1ntcll!P,?n~? h~Arine 1* ttl~'!'';~,:t
comanders on the intis? ,..,,., in ti~n rri-,,.~~.. ":
zill c:··-r-T . ;=5 I I .•
---
Doc ID: 6622349 Doc Ref ID: A6622348
faiiurc;cr~:rry r.roundr.
pc t0 catryout pcir niccions pg
#crc"Cn':> ptllll pereto .re n? Groundsout pl'! ;ir Lo cupporl r.11cr:1onop~!11ucr.cr.r.fu:1Jy :, cnari; nnd, and , M;jo"3lnn1 '.r:•·:1~"perefor,~,C pcrcfore :• to ::upport. ch,ir,~~ or majo·· 1?1t."n fll.ilurc;attn3 Nachincto;tini&hed pat pc finichcd intelllGcnceasocbsmcntb ingat t~e ~- Waohincton pat p~ d1d_not convey intell1c;ence pe convcy pes0MC r-onsc asscamncntsscndc QrrJy,ort-andl ruport- an(\ .urccrcy or. ~he inc '\1Y'Ge!'.CY tlr.vc:'..on11fe' · mr11tar~ . aituntion tooJa: ? to level ~j_d..notBituntion25 o.rrivcdinforunt.tcm.rco.chinr<;:a.t:samepcze rcachint; pe:::.u to catisfy~ <l'.!C:!.~ion-~'\.~C'?'tr ccnior pcdcind:Of 1.~e dc~:in1-:- or ccnlor OffIclale for pronpi Inforiation. ~n :i:t:i.C,on officials and often for promr,:, too ]:r,~ IHltlCf'y Recorcncatzon . Rr.cor.u:ir.nt'!ation 11ccnce proccse is Your Roard 10 Increasinglyconcerned pat penortal Intel- You~ Board Furper,incrt:MinclY concern pat pe rc]lanceuponconcerned pat iG pe pe we3ennomn.1 int~l- adoquateprocccs lir;ence operpan' pat proces8 NIll continucuelyweakcnItcnorFurpcr, pcre 18circ~tonccc1ncritic:>.!. I crIticalcIrcunstanccs10nelpcr t:lmcly neiper ntlo~unte. sourccs oper Thcrefore your Board continuoualy pere processconcern 1s a pat reliance acarcful studyupon cffectlveneb8 _pa.n pnt by pe Dlrector Of Central Intelllgence sources will reconmends carefulit:: pc norial procceCentralyour heads0 part Of pcca be a.'ttcl'Mte !i\~ p~rt proco!ls inotitutional proccss_shc,uld dcter.oine ncads ot ci'!'cctivenesa. by pe o: pe several intclliccnzo ac;encics, Director pescvern.1 Therefore of' If notbeLprovcdto remedy "tliti ·defectsintolliccn:oaltcrnate mcans should bc' oought~'hcpcr Intelligence,Boo.rdrcco111111endsInconsultation wip pc in consultttion to to dcternine whcpcr pa" defcctowip rotedl st\'l.dype In pla rcport _ Tndenor,:131 po rc~ft. pe If'cnn not, improved mc:iris to be· nought r.l"ltP.t\and nn<l ~.ll.de a of in inot1tutionnl process. Maxwell D. TeylorChatrman ~5- -5- .wt ('.\r ·.n · • "T... | {
"Who": "Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Director of Central Intelligence, President",
"What": "Evaluation of THE onthe TET Offensive, intelligence reports on TET Offensive, intelligence processing and reporting, implications of intelligence failures, recommendations for improvement",
"When": "7th June 1968, January 1968, TET holiday period, 27th January to 5th February 1968",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6622299
# Doc Ref ID: A6622298
TOP SECRET
19JAN 68 21002
3/0/STY/R17-68
DIST : 19 JAN 0 /UT 0/UT210oz 68
DIST:
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGINT SUMMARY
AsiaThis report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia information in NSA at report of publication on throughout available This report to summarizes time developments based entirely 19 January 1968 noted Southeast All available to NSA this this at report is publication time of entirely on SIGINT except on 19 January 1968.
All information in is based on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.
# CONTENTS
|Situation Summary|1|
|---|---|
|I. Communist Southeast Asia| |
|A. Military Vietnamese Communist Communications|2|
|1. South Vietnam Communist Communications|Non-Responsive|
|2. DRV Communications|Non-Responsive|
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ii/9 PAGE(S)
TOP SECRET TRINE
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 06-13-2018 pursuant to E. O. 13526
---
# Doc ID: 6622299 Doc Ref ID: A6622298
# CONTENTS
D. South Vietnam
General MINH Trying Vietnam............ to Return
9
---
# SITUATION SUMMARY
morning of pe 20p were partially revealed in on Communist plans in Military Region (MR) in for an attack in western Kontum Province in Soup Vietnam, on "pe
plans for an attack in Kontum Province exchanged morning of between an unidentified PAVN B3 Front-associated entity and between a suspect artillery unit in pe Laos-Cambodia border area.
Additional evidence pat elements of Laos-Cambodia-PVN are effecting a general repositioning appeared on 18 January when pe PAVN 2nd Division, 1st Regiment, appeared in its probable Forward
Element, indicated pe possible Hq, 2nd Division, (VC) 1st Regiment are effecting a general repositioning in its probable Forward
Element, indicated pat pey were interest in to move. In Tay Ninh Province, Vietnamese Communist all indicated pat pey were interest in to move. In Tay Ninh Province,
continues to be reflected in communications in norpeastern Tay Ninh Province.
Intelligence elements of pe Hq, VC 9p Light Infantry Division.
---
# Doc ID: 6622299
Doc Ref ID: A6622298
# COMMUNISTSOUTHEASTASIA
# COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA
MILITARY
# Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam
|Military Region 5|In the western highlands, plans for an impending attack in Kontum Province were partially disclosed in an 18 January message from an unidentified PAVN B3 Front-associated entity to a suspect artillery unit company. The message stated, "Suggest the additional Front element (c val radio station) right away, since the station is going into combat on the morning of 18 January 20th." The originator of the message was located near the Laos-Cambodia-Kontum border at 14-42N 107-28E.|
|---|---|
|(YB 682264)|Also near the suspect artillery unit was positioned near 107-28E on 16 January.|
|(YB 670051)|The artillery unit communicates sporadically with the Hq PAVN 1st Division, the possible Ist Division unit communicates sporadically with the Hq B3 front; additionally, since 7 January, the unit has communicated with an unidentified station located near Pleiku at 14-30N 107-43E (YA 952552) on 16 January in northwestern Pleiku near 14-30N 107-43E (YA 952552).|
Information indicates that the two units in the western highlands have discussed attacks against specific targets in the west-central PAVN 1st Division, probable elements of the Hq Pleiku B3 Front and of the Hq PAVN 1st Division located at 13-51N 107-30E and 18 January, respectively. The probable location of the Hq, PAVN B3 Front authority has not been determined; however, on 17 January, the probable authority has informed the Ist Division element that this probable authority may be in northeastern Route 19 near Ha Ra Bridge, indicating that this probable authority may be in northeastern Mang Yang Pass.
---
|Doc ID|6622299|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6622298FOP SEERET FRTNE|
On 18 January Pleiku informed the probable Hq, B3 Front authority. On 18 January, the 1st Division element final informed the probable destination as the 1st Division's main body will halt. Remember messages. Another message passed including Comrade PHTEN B3 message from Comrade PHEN probable for Front authority stated in part "You must provide guidance for the men to firm up their artillery; and you must see that their anxiety concerning air and health is good. Pay special attention to fortifications and setting up defense and guard properly. If you encounter commandoes, the identification of the recipient of these messages rests upon the generic Vietnamese Communist cover term for Farmsite of Dak To referred to as "Farmsite 1." Additionally, on 16 January Hq, 1st Division was located due west of Laos near the common border of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
Convoy activity by elements possibly associated with the PAVN B3 Front in AR 780880 continued through at least 17 January. Elsewhere in MR 5, indications of Communist military units repositioning continue in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin probable Province Forward Element area. On 18 January, the possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment and Hq, PAVN 2nd Division Forward Element indicated that they were possible to move. Additionally, the probable contact informed the possible Hq, 1st Division on 19 December that it would not contact the 2nd Division until the probable Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element was last located on 19 December near 15-41N 108-06E (AT902369).
The 2nd Division was in contact with the 2nd Division southern Quang on 17 January near the probable regime nt last located until 19 December. The probable Hq, 2nd Division Forward Element was located on 17 January near 15-41N 108-06E. The VC 1st Regiment (AT 928359) and VC 1st Regiment (AT 993425) were located in this same area near 15-41N 108-11E (AT 993425) on 16 and 17 January, respectively.
---
# Recently available captured material
Recently available captured material has revealed that the unidentified Rear Services Headquarters, Quang Nam Province is Hq 18 January in the unidentified Rear Services Group 44 Rear Services Headquarters, Quang Nam Province. This headquarters was located near 108-10E 15-50N on 18 January (AT 975538); however, in the southern Quang Nam Province, at least one of its elements continued to operate in its normal base area as of 17 January.
Finally, the associate subordinate Rear Services Unit Control on 18 January, located near Hq, was approximately 15-20N 108-27E, about 40km north of its location on 4 December in Quang Ngai Province.
Military Region 1 Reflections of continued Vietnamese Communist interest in northeastern Tay Ninh Province: Reconnaissance Company subordinate Intelligence messages passed by Vietnamese Communist Military Intelligence Section to the probable Hq contained messages referencing a heavy weapons unit and a light weapons unit. The messages also referred to Allied activity in the vicinity of Bau Cham (11-33N 106-23E) and XT 4968, as well as the northeastern Chiem (11-29N) and Ba Tay area of northeastern Tay Ninh.
The messages also referred to Allied activity in the vicinity of Bau Cham (11-33N 106-23E, XT 5076) and the northeastern Chiem (11-29N) and Ba Tay area of northeastern Tay Ninh. The Hq also covered VC 46th Reconnaissance-Sapper Battalion in recent reports passed by the Ninh has probable C95 Reconnaissance Company subordinate Intelligence Reconnaissance-Sapper Hq, tentatively located near 11-38N 106-18E (XT 431862) on 13 January.
---
Military Region 1Q
Military Region 10
role Through 17 January, SIGINT has reflected being assumed by the unidentified possible Front On 17 January, the Headquarters located in northern Binh Long Province 2 the unidentified possible Front 16 and 17 January, the Headquarters located northern B3 Front and Hq, MR PAVN Binh Long Province. On attempted to contact also attempted contact and 16 and 17 January, MR6 the Front headquarters Hq, PAVN B3 Front and and on Hq, MR 2 15 January, Hq attempted to contact the Front headquarters On 14 and 15 January, 15 January Hq, MR the Front attempted to contact an unidentified 14 and 15 January, station possibly associated front and MR the Front attempted to with Hq contact MR an 5 _ headquarters) and Headquarters may (i.e Communications on unidentified station the possibly activity between the Front this level associated with Hq, MR 5. Communications and the lack of on the this level (i.e., front and MR Headquarters and strategic Front and former tactical be assuming a that this Front headquarters) Headquarters former the lack tactical of activity subordinates between suggests more the suggests Front that this role Headquarters may be assuming more strategic role.
(2 /0 /VCM/R17-68 (2/0/VCM/R17-68, 1723292; 172329Z; 2 /G10 /VCM/R22-68 2/G10/VCM/R22-68, 1810302) 181030Z) (8!10R!lf OitJ!H) 2 2. DRV Communications DRV Communications PAWN High Command PAVN High Command - 304th/32Oth Divisions Division 18 On 18 and 19 January On and 19 January, the the probable PAVN 304th Infantry The Division Division was observed in was Headquarters January, was the vicinity activity. observed in increased increased located communications activity in of 16-3ON 106-36E (XD 106-36E 715407) XD Headquarters, on 19 located in the noted in communications vicinity of 16-30N with an unidentified on 106-36E 715407) suspect infantry regiment 17 January; 19 January, was noted in located in communications the with vicinity of the unidentified 16-43N vicinity an unidentified of 16-43N 106-20E (XD 438 488) on suspect regimental 438 suspect 106-20E infantry (XD subordinate 17 regiment, 488) on located January; in an last heard on 18 December and (XD 1697) on and an 18 December unidentified, located located suspect in and in regimental the vicinity of 17-1ON 106-05E the vicinity subordinate of 17-lON last 106-05E heard on associated (XD 1697) 12 December; 12 December; and a new new, unidentified entity unidentified 17 January entity This latter entity was 718158) and on associated XD latter with this division and 17 January with entity 18 January at on first noted on 16-26N 106-36E this was division located and located on 16-28N 16-28N 106-42E (XD 822235) .first 17 January noted at at on 16-26N 17 January. 106-36E
Asignificant increase in message activity from pe 822235). significant to all 718158) .ind and broadcast serving activity was observed on of pe above January in pe message entities at 106-42E from (XD pe 19 January headquarters The all of above entities pis division was also was observed on 19 January. The broadcast serving pis division was also
---
|TYPE OF WEAPON|AMOUNT|
|---|---|
|K-56 (7.62 Assault rifle)|17 cases / 305 weapons / 2,142 kg|
|K-57 (7.62 heavy machine gun)|25 cases / 25 weapons / 3,220 kg|
|K-44 (unidentified)|4 cases / 72 weapons / 490 kg|
|Liberation mortar|40 cases / 160 weapons / 1,470 kg|
|K-59 (unidentified prob automatic weapon)|5 cases / 20 weapons / 275 kg|
|B6 (unlocated)|1 case / 1 weapon / 40 kg|
|Tri-Thien Tuc (possibly A Shau Valley Area 16-15N 106-59E, XC 102981)| |
|60-mm mortar|48 cases / 48 weapons / 1,876 kg|
|B5T8 Sappers (probable DMZ area)| |
|60-mm mortar|11 cases / 11 weapons / 407 kg|
---
|TYPE OF WEAPON|AMOUNT|
|---|---|
|K-53 (Soviet 7.62 carbine bolt action)|3 cases / 330 kg|
|60-mm mortar|21 cases / 777 kg|
|12.7 heavy machine gun|2 cases / 400 kg|
|BS Vinh Linh (DMZ Vinh Linh Area) Liberation mortar|20 cases / 640 kg|
|12.7 heavy machine guns|6 cases / 1,200 kg|
|K-56 (7.62 Assault rifle)|31 cases / 304 kg|
|K-59 (Unidentified, probable automatic weapon)|5 cases / 925 kg|
|Liberation mortar|25 cases / 925 kg|
|60-mm mortar|69 cases / 2,533 kg|
---
Doc ID: 6622299Responsive...INon - Responsive I
Non Doc Ref ID: A6622298
TOP SECRET TRI'.PAJ~
-£
~{ --
TOP SECREF FRHE
TOP £~CR~T TRI~,E
---
# Doc ID: 6622299
Doc Ref ID: A6622298FOP SEEREF FRTNE
TOP SECRET TRiti~E3/0 /STY /R1758 3/0/STY/Rli ·68
|D D. SOUTH VIETNAM|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|
|General MINH Trying to Return to Vietnam|Non - Non Responsive|
|General MINH Trying to Return to Vietnam according permission of President THIEU to (Big General DUONG VAN MINH) has requested return to Vietnam for Tet, according to 19 January diplomatic message.|Responsive|
|MINH has been in exile in Bangkok since unsuccessful coup early 1965 following his involvement in an attempt.| |
|Tet is celebrated this year at the end of January.| | | {
"Who": "NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY",
"What": "Summary of Communist military activities in Southeast Asia",
"When": "19 January 1968",
"Where": ["Southeast Asia", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "Cambodia", "Kontum Province", "Tay Ninh Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Pleiku", "Quang Ngai Province", "Bau Cham", "Chiem", "Ba Tay", "Binh Long Province", "DMZ Vinh Linh Area", "A Shau Valley Area", "Mang Yang Pass", "Ha Ra Bridge", "Route 19"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637253 Doc Ref ID: A6637252~SECRET S4VHN
2/o/vcM/R 18-68
Avc /OPER-&/L _
2/0/VCM/R 18-68
AVC/OPER-G/L.
18 JANUARY 1968 20552
DIST: 18 JANUARY OSCARIVICTOR KILO1968 2055Z
HCFDIST: OSCAR/VICTOR KILO
Possible New Division Echelon Unit in Ha Bac Province Province2 North Vietnam
The formation of a new unit of at least division echelon has been indicated by the North Vietnamese Letter Box Number (LBN) system since early 1967. The unit is served by LBNLBN's in the 16XXX series, which have been noted since February 1967. The unit is being addressed at Ha Bac block of LBN's in Bac Province, Military Region (MR) Viet Bac. The North Vietnamese system containing a digit above five in the second position.
Units currently isolated in the MR Viet Bac LBN system include: one division in Bac Thai Province tentatively identified as the 312th Division; three units of brigade echelon--two in Bac Thai and one tentatively identified as the 305th Brigade, in Ha Bac Province; four in Vinh Phuc (21-09N 105-35E, WJ 6038); and three units in Yen Bai (21-48N 104-52E, VJ 8799), Phu Tho (21-24N 105-13E, WJ 2366) and Vinh Phuc, all of unknown echelon. The MR Viet Bac LBN system is also used by Workcamp 4 in Yen Bai and at least two other units in Yen Bai which may be workcamps.
Although the unusual LBN block was not accepted as valid until recently, it is now believed that this new block has served a newly formed unit in Ha Bac Province since at least February 1967 rather than an established unit which had not formerly been isolated in the LBN system.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-24-2018 pursuant to E. O. 13526 | {
"Who": "NSA",
"What": "Possible new division echelon unit in Ha Bac Province, North Vietnam",
"When": "18 January 1968",
"Where": ["Ha Bac Province, Bac Thai Province, Vinh Phuc, Yen Bai, Phu Tho, Military Region Viet Bac (MR Viet Bac)"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637247
# Doc Ref ID: A6637246~SEERET SAIAL
2//vcM{R12-68
2/o/vcM/R12-63
# SUPPLEMENT 1
Avc /ZCOM, OPER-G-E/1.
SUPPLEMENT
25JANUARY 1968
AVC/r::'COM,OPER-G-E/1.20222
DIS: 23 JPJ\JUARY OSCAR/VICTOR KILO1968 2022Z
HCFD::'.:3<L': OSCAR/VICrL'OR KILO HCF
# SUPPLEMENT 1
St.JPPLEMENT TO
PAVN HIGH COMMAND INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK --
PAVN HIGH 31DECEMBER 1961 (1621192 JANUARY)COMMAND INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK--
In addition, subordinate headquarters have been identified on the PAVN High Command internal Manuel Morse network. They are:
|Air/Air Defense Eea c arters|20-591 105-51E (WJ 8721)|
|---|---|
|Bac Mai Airfield|20-59N Airfield(WJ .3721)|
|Probable Hq,M Viet Bac|21-30N 06-25E (xJ 47(8)(X,J 4T78)|
|Thai Nguyen area| |
Ten subordinates of the PAVN High Command internal network remain unidentified.
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-31-2018 pursuant to E.O. 13526 | {
"Who": "PAVN High Command, NSA",
"What": "Internal Communications Network, subordinate headquarters, unidentified subordinates",
"When": "25 January 1968, 31 December 1961",
"Where": ["Bac Mai Airfield", "Thai Nguyen area", "Manuel Morse network"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |Doc ID|6625859|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6625858|
|RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER|RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER|
|JOINT MESSAGE FORM| |
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATION|SECRET|
|TYPE MSG|BOOK|
|PRECEDENCE|FLASH|
|INFO|DTG 16/FEB/68|
|FROM|USA-32|
|TO|HOTEL THREE/HOTEL THREE/JULIETT DELTA|
|INFO|TO: PSA257 JULIET DELTA_68|
|SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS|AON THO|
|SECRET SAVIN TACREP|124212, 16 FEB 68, 207T SAVIN TACREP USA - SJ|
|AT|121, 16 FEB 68, VINH TO HANOI 68|
|REFLECTED|Vinh FOR HANOI OF PROBABLE 8-52|
|SKED FOR|THE KHE SANH AREA BETWEEN 21362 AND 22532VI 16 FEB 68|
|DATE|TIME|
|MONTH|YEAR|
|PAGE No.|No. Of PAGES|
|TYPED NAME AND TITLE|PHONE SIGNATURE|
|KSECRE TYPED NAME AND TITLE|SAVIN SIGNATURE (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE|
|OPS|REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS MAJOR USAF OFFICER|
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATION|SECRET SAVIN REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS|
|SEG RE T SAVIN| |
|DD FORM 63|NOV. 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED|
|GPO: 1965-0-774-777I| |
---
|Doc ID|6625859|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6625858|
|RESERVED FOR|COMMUNICATION CENTER|
|RESERVE|J FOR|
|JOINT MESSAGE FORM| |
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATION| |
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS E € R E TSAVIN| |
|SEC P.|ET SA VIN|
|TYPE MSG| |
|TYPE MSG|I BOOK Book I MULTI MULTI I SINGLE SECRET • SAVIN|
|PRECEDENCE| |
|ACTIoN| |
|ACTION|FLASH FL.,\SH 23/J4l 2 FEB 68|
|INFO| |
|INFO|MMEDLATE DTG|
|FROM|USA-32|
|FROM|USA =32|
|TO|HOTEL THREE/ JULTETT DELTA AON AON IHO|
|SECRET SAVIN TACREP USA-57| |
|INFO|HOTEL THREE/ JULTh"TT68PE l T/i|
|SEC 8161 ,27 INFO, REP USA~~)'Z-~- DoNGHoi| |
|At R E T ,)AVIN FE8 68,#anoi TAC ~#---~- 70 68| |
|FAC REFLECTED HanQ i| |
|8-52 PE FL| |
|FAC CTE P HAN QuaNG TRI 1| |
|ACTIVITY AT AT QUANG TRI T 5~ Z 161 ~Z| |
|19302 ,AND 22307 23 FEB 68.| |
|9:a.m., A,1 D 223ii'2 2 3 FEB 68.| |
|DATE 23| |
|DATE TIME| |
|MONTH 23| |
|FEB| |
|PAGE NO.| |
|PAGE NO. No OF NO PAGES PA GES1| |
|ISECRET TYPED NAME AND TITLE PHONE SIGNATURE| |
|SAVIN 41e| |
|OPS D EDJD I.NA YLOR| |
|TYPED or stamped NAME AND TITLE MAJOR USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER| |
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATION| |
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS| |
|SECRET SAVIN REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS| |
|DD FORM 63173 Nov REPLACE S EDITION 0F 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY 86 USED . REPLACES EDITION OF MAY WhICH MAY BE USED| |
|-(:(GPO 1963-0-774-777 G P O:1965 _0-774-777| |
---
# JOINT MESSAGE FORM
|Doc ID|6625859|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6625858|
RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SINGLE SECRET
TYPE MSG
FLASH
PRIORITY
25/4111 687 68
FROM: USA-32
INFO: USA-57
TO: HOTEL USA-57
LOCATION: North Vietnam, Southeast of Quang Tri
DATE: FEB 68
TIME: 2525
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: EE K. G. BRENAYLOR, MAJOR, OFFICER USAF
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
DD FORM Nov. 63 REPLACE EDITION OF MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED
GPO: 1965-0-774•77719850-774-777
---
# JOINT MESSAGE FORM
|SECURITY CLASSIFICATION|SAVING|TYPE|MSG|PRECEDENCE|ACTION|FLASH|28/0153|2 FEB 68|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|SINGLE SECRET|SAVING|BOOK|MULTI|SINGLE|TYPE MSG|PRECEDENCE|FLASH|28/0153|2 FEB 68|
|INFO|IMMEDIATE|DTG|28/0153|2 FEB 68|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|FROM: USA-32| | | | |
|TO: HOTEL THREE/JULIETT DELTA| | | | |
|INFO:| | | | |
|FROM: USA-57| | | | |
|TO: HOTEL USA-57THREE/JULIETT DELTA| | | | |
|SECURE SAVIN TACREP INFO:| | | | |
|USA-57 241 68| | | | |
|REFLECTED HANOI TERCEPT OF|AT 28/04052|
|---|---|
|REFLECTED ACTIVE01FROM 03302 TO 03582, POSS HA| |
|INFORMING VINH THAT| |
|THERE WERE SIX| |
|B-52'S ACTIVE FROM 03302 TO 03582| |
|B-52'S ACTIVE FROM 361@2 TO 36322 THE ABOVE| |
|IN THE SIX B-52'S SAME AREA. ILL| |
|DATE|TIME|MONTH|YEAR|PAGE NO|NO. OF PAGES|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|28|TIME|MONTH28|YEAR|PAGE NOFEB|NO68|
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
OPS D, SAVIN
PHONE
SIGNATURE
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
OPERATIONS NAYLOR
NAME AND TITLE OFFICER
OPERATION
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
FORM
REPLACES EDITION OF MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED
NOV. 63
REPLACES EDITION OF MAY WHICH MAY BE USED
A: GPO
GPo: 106-0-774-77 71965-0-774-777I
---
Doc ID: 6625859
Doc Ref ID: A6625858
FLASH
DTO , 22/ 2FEB 686
FV: USA-32A
To : Hotel Three / JULIET
DD I : AoIkO
GASVientifnneV
INFO : USA-57
SECRET -57SaVIN Soneb IRDTACREP
At Approximately 11152, on 15 FEB68, Speaker-ATHostileTHESAM site LOCATED at 20-52n 10s-25e Reported that AIRCRAFT HAD been Shot Down on the Evening of 14 FEB 63 in the Vicinity of ThaWH HOA (20-37n 105-47E), and that the Pilot HAD been Captured.
SWEENEY/oPs-Vp
For #JOSEPH F BohRe N Operations Officer MAJOR USAF
1 [PAGE 1 OF 11
SECRETSAVIN
---
# Doc ID: 6625859
# Doc Ref ID: A6625858
SECRET SAVIN
|FLash/ imedi Ate|OIAT|
|---|---|
|DTG:|EO3.3 (h) (2) USC3605|
|OT|2h/ t F' 68|
|FMa|USA-32|
|r 1 HOTEL.., -3 Three/JuliETT DDI : AonHo| |
|To;| |
|INFOt| |
|TOi US4-57r H T E /J J TT DOI| |
|f t A T7 TaCREP 238-68| |
|8 E € R E ' 13307 2kFE8 62 •pR ~..L I Savin .• ".I.I ,·-6.| |
|AT 1 AT ~ .,.PrELiMINARYANAL Ysi$ QFDRV 1·REFLECTedANUnIDSaM SiTEByVy ' LY, t S OF"| |
|ReportingThEBhootdownOF R-rL ONE ACFT tFATValid, tD At ~ 219252BY 12.IT| |
|R A ASectiOn.OOTO ShootdownCF'TIF f"0 52| |
|ThE AaA This Poss| |
|OCCURREDin ThE. AL PHAGOLF HE EC tO THI S OOTOO FourBLOCK .J, ALIO, P| |
|OCC RED t TH L A GOLF OUR BLOC.| |
|Ops-D FoR: JOSEPH F= Bbhren| |
|OP -0 MAJOR USAF OpNS OFF iCER| |
---
# Doc ID: 6625859 Doc Ref ID: A6625858
FLASHflA 29 I1zd
FM:: DTG :29 / r/1263¢? OT USA-32 ZFEB 68 FEB 68
FM: U A-32
To: HOTEL THREE (JULIETT A_ohIHOAoH
0 : HOT L TH / L IE TT A....OH I HO AOH
Ss0 /SOG EO3.3 (h) (2)
E03 . 3 ( h )( 2 )USC3605
CAS VieNT IANE0/ 0 PL86-36/50 USC
PL 86 - 36/50 3605
CAS VIE 24.7-68
S € € R E TSAVINSoNGB IRDTACREP
AV I FROM DRV ... _____[coO G I O TAC E A. 7 -68.
FRAGMENTARYDaTA comMSRE VEALED
FRAG TA Y DATA F O. VN0 VI(21-13N105-44£) DownONELEOR VE'
TheFolloinG . SITE 44-234V 05-44E )REPORTED
THE f'O LO I G. IT •23 (21•13 REPO T 0
F IRiNGTwO F-4.I NG F' I TWO.MISSILESAt 87552 ,ANDShooting DOW I IL ThESAMESITEREPORTEDTHECAPTUREAT fl755Z t AD HOOTI G 0
AT 29/08272 , r-4. AT 29 / 0827z,OFONE TH U.S. A Pilot, E IT But PO SAWTWOCHUTES..TEO THE C PTURE OF OE PILOT, BUT SA TO CU ES
OPs-CAWD OP - . /l FOR : MAJOR
FO: JOSEPH F.OFF ICERBOHREN
OPNSMAJOR OFFUSAF
0 IC E
PAGE 0F PAGES
SECRET SAVIN
---
# JOINT MESSAGE FORM
|TYPE MSG|PRECEDENCE|ACTION|INFO|
|---|---|---|---|
|MULTI|FLASH|IMMEDIATE|FROM: USA-32|
TO: HOTEL THREE/ JULIETT DELTA
SECRET SAVIN
TO: USA-57265 COMMAND 68
AT 00262, 07 MAR 68, HANOI ORVON ADRV OF POSSIBLE AIR COMMAND NET, DONG HOI
NOTED INFORMING TRI AT 01102, 07 MAR 68. HANOI OF POSSIBLE B-52 ALERT
POSSIBLY FOR QUANG TRI AT 01102, 07 MAR 68.
DATE: 07 MAR 68
PAGE No. MAR NO. 1 OF PAGES 68
|TYPED NAME AND TITLE|PHONE|SIGNATURE|
|---|---|---|
|KSECRE T SAVIN| |TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE|
OPS D
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SAVIN
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
MAJOR OFFICER USAF
DD FORM Nov. 63173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED
GPO: 1965-0-774-777
---
# Doc ID: 6625859 Doc Ref ID: A6625858
|DTG:|FlAsh31 / /5 ( 7 7SECRET SAVIN|
|---|---|
|IimveqiATE N .f;:'lfATE|Nar 68|
|FM; nfG:USA -32;1 f|15 (/J 7 '1 AR 6A|
|nJ: ti A-32Three /juliETTALPHA| |
|To: HoTFL|DDI :AONTHO|
|info: U8AP57| |
|TO: HOl~l THR IJUl fET'f ALPHA DI: AON IHO| |
|tNf'O: USA 57SaviNTacreP| |
|8 F €R E;tT MaR 68,AN UnidentifiEd Speaker,DRV SAMA|SAVI TACREP357-68~57.68 AT 1118231|
|Associateo,| |
|A l 11182 AR Tf\T~8t PROBABLEUvLOCA TfdAAAUvit, K4,AN UN-10£ T tJ;" f O 3.PfAKfR, ORV AM| |
|SkotoowinEO , A~ .. OClA Stated P~OBABLE OOv30 MAR '~H... OCAr-o AAA U!\ltT , K4, AN F.111A 68.| |
|SH TDOWN AN r-111A ON~¢ MAR 68.| |
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---
# Doc ID: 6625859 Doc Ref ID: A6625858
FLASH 13332 DTC : FL.ASH 14/5MAR 68/~iJ 2,AR 68 DTGt 'l4/!!f.{fl M FMa FMt US - 32 VS ,;., ... ,2THREE/ JULIET
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Page 1 OF ONE PACE/III
//// PAGE OF ONE PAGE//// SECRETSAVIN
---
# JOINT MESSAGE FORM
|Doc ID|6625859|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6625858|
RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TYPE MSG
PRECEDENCE
ACTION
INFO
IMMEDIATE
DTG
FROM: USA-32
To: HOTEL THREE (JULIETT)
INFO: USA-57
SECRET
SAVIN TACREP
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF FACILITIES INDICATES...
SHOT DOWN OF U.S. AIRCRAFT BY FIRE AT UNKNOWN LOCATION
FOX TROT (5) SERIES WAS USED DURING FIRING.
DATE TIME
MONTH YEAR
PAGE NO. NO OF PAGES
|TYPED NAME AND TITLE|PHONE|SIGNATURE|
|---|---|---|
|OPS-C MBM| | |
|TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE| |Joseph F. BORHEN MAJOR, USAF|
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
REPLACES EDITION OF MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
---
|Doc ID|6625859|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6625858|
|S 5& &WPASS-ONLOG W PASS• Ot.J|OG For 23 MARCH 1968|
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|BAKE RFLT|SMS CLARK|
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|SECIE- ZAVIN| |
---
# JOINT MESSAGE FORM
|Doc ID:|6625859|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6625858|
# SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY TYPE MSG BOOK
TYPE MSG PRECEDENCE
FLASH ARRIVED PRECEDENCE
DATE: 25/MAR 68
# ACTION
ACTION
INFO: FLASH
FROM: USA-32
TO: HOTEL THREE/JULIETT BRAVO
INFO: USA-57 THREE/JULIETT HOTEL BRAVO
SECRET INFO: USA-57 TACREP SAVIN
REF
# SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
FURTHER INTERCEPT FROM Urv
TAC Voice, TACREP
Drv Ano Chicom
This Reveals That Activity Was Which
BY Russian Pilot
Speeds NorthwesTErov Kanoi
AcetC 1440 Returned Over Reciprocal Northiest From Kanoi To
BtwY [3512 Ad 21....
DATED TIME
MONTH YEAR
PAGE No:
|TYPED NAME AND TITLE|PHONE|SIGNATURE|
|---|---|---|
|TYPED NAME AND TITLE|PHONE|SIGNATURE|
FOR OPERATIONS BOHREN, JOSEPH F. OFFICER MAJ, USAF
# SECRET SHOWN
SAVIN OF RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS
FORM Nov: 63173
REPLACES EDITION OP
MAY WHICH MAY BE USED
#apo1907-271.008
* GPO r 1987-271.089 | {
"Who": "US military personnel, communication centers, operations officers",
"What": "Military messages, operations, regrading instructions, interceptions, aircraft activities",
"When": "16th, 23rd, and 28th of February 1968, 7th and 15th of March 1968, 23rd and 25th of March 1968",
"Where": ["Vinh", "Hanoi", "Vinh to Hanoi area", "Quang Tri", "Khe Sanh"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6637291
# Doc Ref ID: A6637290~SEERET S4VTN
2/0/vcM/R46-68
AVC ,AVN / OPER-C , TCOM/I.
30 JANUARY 1968 , 22282
DIST: USM-626,GCU l 2220Z
PLUS HCF
DIST:
PLUS
30 JANUARY USM-626J OSCAR /VICTOR KILO
OSCAR/VICTOR 1968.
GCU KILOAUSTF
AUSTF
HCF
CONCENTRATION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY ENTITIES
IN THE MICHELIN PLANTATION AREA
The establishment of a military relocation of an 9th Light Infantry Division subordinate to the southwestern Binh Duong Province MI Section (MIS), the relocation of an unidentified element encompassing the Michelin Plantation in western Binh Duong, has produced the deployment of at least six unidentified elements in an area encompassing the concentration of Vietnamese Communist military entities in the vicinity of the Michelin Plantation.
Most of the Communist entities are currently unidentified; however, some have been associated with the Vietnamese Communist main force units. The six unidentified elements are currently located within groups of communications which first appeared in the Michelin Plantation area during November 1967.
Four of the six unidentified elements have moved into the Michelin Plantation area during December 1967.
ELEMENT A
12 October, last located at 11-32N 106-18E (XT 411745) on 27 November, relocated to 11-22N 106-31E (XT 644551) on 23 January.
This element may be associated with the tentative Hq, PAVN 1st Regiment since its movements parallel those of the regiment and the communications between the regiment and the unidentified control authority located in the Cambodia-Binh Long-Tay Ninh Province border area.
ELEMENT B
Between 5 and 20 December, Element B moved from 106-19E (XT 434686) in norpern Tay Ninh Province and located at 11-29N 106-32E (XT 674522) on 20 December, and most recently in pe Michelin Plantation area at 11-20N 106-32E (XT 674522) on 18 January.
On 20 January, Element B was located in northern Tay Ninh Province and communicated with an unidentified entity located in the Cambodia-Binh Long-Tay Ninh Province border area.
ELEMENT C
Located at 11-36N 106-14E (XT 358816) on 13 January and by 16 January moved to pe Michelin area at 11-20N 106-28E (XT 596525).
This element communicates with an unidentified control authority located in the Binh Duong-Bien Hoa Province border area.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 11 PAGES
Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-30-2018 pursuant to E. O. 13526
---
Doc ID: 6637291 Doc Ref ID: A6637290SEERET SAVHNL
2/o/vcM/R46-68
2/ 0 /VCM/R46-68
ELEMENT D
ELEMENT D
ElementD movedfrom northernPhuoc Element been106-31E D moved from XT 650545) between17Province northern Phuoc LongProvinceto the Long to theMichelinMichelin area at1l-21N area hesnot at ll-21Nbeen observedin 650545) 106-31E (XT between since the latter date17 December December and 1f Januaryand 10 January and has revealed parallel movements not observed in communications since the latter date.
PAVN 88th Regiment during Decemberby this element and the possible Hq, SIGINT revealed parallel movements by Between 20October 1967 andauthority this element and the possible Hq, whichmay be Elementduring December. withan unidentified control 10 January,ElementD communicated VC SthLID element 10 January, 88th Regiment associatedwith D communicated Hq, with Between 20 an unidentified ThiscontrolOctober 1967 control andauthority authority movedfrom northernto southern which may be associated with a Hq, VC 5th Phuoc Long Province controlLID element. This near 11-261 107-B5E authority YT 283712)between 21to 107-05E (YT moved from 283712) between northern 21 December December and southern and 12_Januaryandhasnot been Phuoc 12 1January Long Province and has near not ll-26N notedin communicationssince thelatter date noted in communications since the latter date.
ELEMENT €
ELEMENT E
appearedin communications the Michelin communications with an Binh Duong-Tay Ninh borderareanear the appeared in northern Tay Ninh, in early December Michelin area at 11-14N in 106-23E Element E was located in the Element in area was at located ll-14N with 106-23E the an unidentified control January Binh XT 502414 control euthority, first unidentified (XT Duong-Tay Ninh 502414) on on 28 28 January and near border authority, area and located first located in northern Tay Ninh in early December.
ELEMENT F
ELEMENT Michelinarea F, in earlyOctober control Element F, an unidentified controlauthority_ Element an unidentified 106-28E and was located on was been This control authority, was first first noted in communications at11-12N October, in early (XT 601372) and was located It on 29 been located in 29 January in January has this area area since it was ll-12N first observed in 106-28E (XT 601372). in communications It has located in this area since 'ommunicates with it was first an an unidentified entity in northern Tay Ninh observed communications. This control and with Elements authority communicates A and unidentified entity in northern Tay Ninh and with Elements and C. comprised ofthree unidentified elementshes In addition to the six new, unidentified elements, another group of the comprised Michelin Plantacion r probably since of three unidentified 11-J9N as follows mid-October elements has been The latest km within 20 locations for these elemnents are of the Michelin 29 29 January at 3 11-12N 66-29E (xT 615310); an and control Plant at:i.on"'1.t:::i probably since mid-October. an unidentified latest The authority on locations for 29 January at at 3 January at 11-10N 615310); these elements are as follows: an unidentified an unidentified control subordinate authority on on January at ll-09N 106-29E 106-23E (XT XT 602388); 106-30E (XT 636344) unidentified an un cotified subordinate subordinate un Lc~..).l'i:; ified on 29 January on ll-12N January 106-23E (XT 602388); (XT and 636344). an Identified elements operating in the M:i.chelin Michelin Plantation area 106-26E include (XT 560414) tentative Hq, 1flst Reginani % loated Plantation include: Identified the the tentative 13 December; elements Hq, operating an 101st an unidenti'' ( :mbordinatell-14N Re e; im 21rL% subordinate of the possible in the lu .:~tted at 1l-141 area at 106-26E Tay Ninh Provincial (XT 560414) Provincial Unitw_ocated at ll-22Hon 13 December; and the Military Affairs Section, 106-17E (XT 394554 possible unidentLi:' ., , ;(t11-221 of the on at 23 January; and Tay Ninh 23 11-22N January; 106-30E (XT 630552) on 13 January 2 Region the Unib!IJ,. located Military Affairs at Section, 2 Region 106-17E 4 Committee Located (XT Committee~ 39455Lr) on located at ll-22N 106-30E (XT 630552) on 13 January. The activation of a VCMI control authviiiy The 106-29E activation of a VC MI control o.t.ri:.hti ,· i. t ,\·#· 'hiei Vas •,1 "i ,; i1 11 oi,s located at located at 11-21N at least 106-29E ll-21N six other (XT MI XT 614540) on 16 January , audWijici1 , :,,i ,a,1mU. cates of'614540) e lements on previously sulrdinateto the MIS of 16 January, mt d ,..1.i..c !. %iicates with wHh emphasis in the pogsible unidentified at the least possible the Michelin Plantation 0,1. six unidentified MI elements Front previously c,r n -~ ;n.y front Headquart;r" # y i.1,t c Headquart sul ,orclirals 0 t o a1no indicate indicatethe MIS increased increase d emphasis in the Michelin Plantation Between 20 and 22 January, Company an MI element subordinateto about probable the probable Hq, C95 Reconnaissance January, southward &nd was locatcd on 22 January at VC Hq, c95 Between Reconnaissance 20 and 22 Company, an MI Hq, VC 9th LID, moved MIS MIS, and its superior 106-24E to XT 526677, elernc:nt Hq, 11-29N LID, 9th subordinate 106-24E moved about the 20km 20 km approximately was southward and km north km located of' the on 22 Michelin Plantation Michelin at January ll-29N Since about 17 526677, January, this MI in approximately this in northeastern Tay Ninh MI element 'Tay north element 5 has been reporting to has Ninh Province been of reporting the TeyL6th Feconnaissance-:Sapper Battalion, to and has superior its Plantation. on Allied activities been observed on Since Allied contact in about activities 17 January, apperently with the possible VC 46th northeastern Provj.nce, has been observed in contact also apparently located in northeastern with the possible VC Tay Ninh R[connaissance-Sapper Battalion, also Amap depicting the disposition of the units discussed in this report is ettached depicting is Tzto7 -68, hard attached Rl$ -68 _ map to the the hard copy the copy only disposition only. of the units discussed in this report 1i:--2i.07vcMi.m0:68~-----Fi7-68_ 2. .. 3 2_3/.0/.ST'f/.R02-68.R2i-68 SUPPLEMENT1. 3 4 2/.0/.VCM/.PJ. 3;0;ST'f;F21-68. SUPPLEMENT l.
---
# APPENDIX A
LIST OF IDENTIFICATIONS
Appendix A is keyed to lettered units in Appendix B.
Appendix B depicts each unit's disposition and date of their previous and current unidentified locations.
|Element|Description|
|---|---|
|A|Element A|
|B|Element B|
|C|Element C|
|D|Element D|
|E|Element E|
|F|Element F|
|GG|U/I control authority|
|HH|U/I subordinate of U/I control authority|
|I|U/I subordinate of U/I control authority|
|J|Tentative Hq, PAVN 101st Regiment|
|KK|U/I subordinate of possible Tay Ninh Provincial Unit|
|LL|Military Affairs Section, Region 4 Committee|
|MM|VC military intelligence control authority|
|NN|Military intelligence element, probable Hq, C95 Reconnaissance Company|
---
# APPEMDIX
# CONCENTRATION AND DISPOSITION OF VIETNAMESE PRISON CAMPS
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY FACILITIES
|Location|Province|Date|
|---|---|---|
|Ninh Ninb|AY NINH PROVINCE|12 OCT 67|
| | |26 DEC|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63|
| | |23 JAN 63| | {
"Who": "Vietnamese Communist military entities",
"What": "Concentration of Vietnamese Communist military entities in the Michelin Plantation area",
"When": "30 January 1968",
"Where": [
"Michelin Plantation",
"Binh Duong Province",
"Tay Ninh Province",
"Cambodia-Binh Long-Tay Ninh Province border area",
"Binh Duong-Bien Hoa Province border area"
],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Doc ID: 6635653
# Doc Ref ID: A6635652
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Declassifiedand Approvedfor Release Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on by NSA on 09-06-2018 pursuanttoE. 0 ._ 09 - 06 - 2018 pursuant to E . O. 13526 13526 | {
"Who": "",
"What": "Planning of military operations, communication instructions, location coordinates, declassified and approved for release information",
"When": "",
"Where": ["Cambodia", "Southern Vietnam", "Phien province", "Pleiku province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |Doc ID|6622313|
|---|---|
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Declassifiedand Approvedfor Release Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on by NSA on 06-19-2018 pursuanttoE.0 . 06 - 19 - 2018 pursuant to E . O. 1352613526 | {
"Who": "US Military/Intelligence Personnel",
"What": "Report on Vietnamese situation in 1968, military activities and casualties",
"When": "3 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |Doc ID: 6638559|Doc Ref ID: A6638558|
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|Declassified and Approvedfor Release by NSAon 10-31-2018 pursuanttoE.0 _| |
|Dec l assified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-31-2018 pursuant to E . O . 13526| | | {
"Who": "NSA",
"What": "Military communications and movements",
"When": "10-31-2018",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |Doc ID|6622311|
|---|---|
|IPL Doc Ref ID|A6622310PL86-36/50USC|
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---
|Doc ID:|6622311|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID:|A6622310|
CUANIUMV[ E T Ci}NG 2y 2 Y THe vlet T H f CI J i' JG AGA [A ST ~CRNING,ANO FEORUARY AG A I l\ S TNCRN [NG, ANo AkVNEA SES THF TH r::l$ L S Ak VN B AS E S AT AT ANu PLEIKUTFIS 1968 _ ~UANlUM 8 . ThISAtTAck SUCCESS AND PLEIKU CoNSTITUTES THIS AGENERAL UF l FEORUARYV[ET CcnG1968. FSYCHULCG[CAL 8 . THIS ATTACK COSTITLTES VlGUROLSIN VIET TFETFE G[NE~~LUf-AORThVIETAAMES E((EYES VIETTHE ) ) CCI\GWORLU. IME US PSYCH ULCG lCALA^TIC [ P TE $SUCC[SSVI GUROLS IN THE CCAs ( ( F.:YES4^D THE l l WORLU. lrlt: ActICN US ANTICIPATES S Av AT KHE AN L VIETDEM IL ITAR IZED2 OVE _ CCI\G Al\D !\ORTH VIETI\AMES~UNui IE MSACTICN AT KHE SA~ tN[ THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. UN~JUT E "'1 s C~J CEMB C fM BFEP••••0315Z 68 M315 2 XXHH3 TI FEB 68 57@XXHH ANNN 57 0 l\N~.,N | {
"Who": "Unknown",
"What": "Military operations in Vietnam, including attacks on bases and villages, casualties, psychological impact of the actions",
"When": "January and February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "Pleiku", "Khe Sanh", "Demilitarized Zone"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |Doc ID|6637251|
|---|---|
|Doc Ref ID|A6637250-SECREF S4MTN|
|2/0 NCM16-68| |
|AVC, AVN/OPER-G/| |
|2/0 /VCM/Rl6-68| |
|17 JANUARY 1968 23272| |
|AVC,AVN/OPER-G/.| |
|DIST 17 JANUARY OSCARNICTOR, KILO1968 23272| |
|PLUS USM-6/1,, USM-7,KILO| |
|DIST: USM-604, OSCAR/VICTOR. USN-4ly| |
|HCF PLUS USM-7, USN-414| |
|HCF| |
|HQPAVN HTH REGIMENT TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED HQ, PAVN 4TH REGIMENT TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED Provincial Unitstation formerly The radio station formerly identified as serving the possible Thua Thien Regiment Provinciaj: Unit has has been been reidentified as serving reidentified as the tentative Hq, serving the possible PAWN 4th Thua Thien Regiment. subordinate of Military Region The tentatively identified MR PAVN 4th Regiment i8 a communications with three subordinates subordinate subordinates Region of Military 8 January 1968) two of which were activated Municipal the Thua Thien of (MR) It also communicates with the tentative which were activated on 29 Tri-Thi en-Hue (TTH) 29 September 1967 with the other on of Hq,M TTH, and the possible Hue Municipal Unit. and the element of forward other and three on 8 January TTH, (two 1968). It the also Since October area communicates the Phu Loc with of Thua. has on September 1967 tentative The regimental headquarters was last located in forward element Hq, 107-57E (zC 1588 ) . MR and Regiment Since October, area possible Hue Unit. The Province near located station. near 16-J9N the PAVN 4th regimental headquarters was last (ZC located in in the Phu Loe collateral of Thien consistently located Province 16-09N 107-57E th Regiment in the vicinity of this radio 1588). collateral radio has consistently the PAVN the vicinity of the station. SIGINT in the vicinity and 16-15N the SIGINT The three subordinates of The in three vicinity of 16-18N 107-52E subordinates (ZC of ZC 1793) . the regimental headquarters are located 16-18N of the 107-33E(YD 7404 ) , 16-15N 107-33E regimental (YD 74¢u), 16-15N a.re1/7-L8E (YC 9998 ) , 107-48E located by (YC by 9998), and 16-1,N 107-52E 1793). 1. 1. 2 /0 NCM/R134-67 .• THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE| |
|THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE| |
|Declassified and and Approved for Release Release by NSA on 10-24-2018 pursuant to E . O. E.0 13526 Declassified App r oved f o r by NSA on 10 - 24 - 2018 p u rsua n t to 13526| | | {
"Who": "NSA",
"What": "Communication intercept information regarding PAVN 4th Regiment and related activities",
"When": "17 January 1968",
"Where": ["Thua Thien Province", "Hue Municipal Unit", "Phu Loc area"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |