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Ody, owner of Profitacre, executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Profitacre "to Leon for life, then to Ralph in fee simple." Leon, who is Ody's brother and Ralph's father, promptly began to manage Profitacre, which is valuable income-producing real estate. Leon collected all rents and paid all expenses, including real estate taxes. Ralph did not object, and this state of affairs continued for five years until 1987. In that year, Leon executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Profitacre to Mona. Ralph, no admirer of Mona, asserted his right to ownership of Profitacre. Mona asserted her ownership and said that if Ralph had any rights he was obligated to pay real estate taxes, even though Leon had been kind enough to pay them in the past. Income from Profitacre is ample to cover expenses, including real estate taxes. In an appropriate action to determine the rights of the parties, the court should decide | [
"Leon's purported deed forfeited his life estate, so Ralph owns Profitacre in fee simple. ",
"Mona owns an estate for her life, is entitled to all income, and must pay real estate taxes; Ralph owns the remainder interest. ",
"Mona owns an estate for the life of Leon, is entitled to all income, and must pay real estate taxes; Ralph owns the remainder interest. ",
"Mona owns an estate for the life of Leon and is entitled to all income; Ralph owns the remainder interest, and must pay real estate taxes. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Homer and Ethel were jointly in possession of Greenacre in fee simple as tenants in common. They joined in a mortgage of Greenacre to They joined in a mortgage of Greenacre to Fortunoff Bank. Homer erected a fence along what he considered to be the true boundary between Greenacre and the adjoining property, owned by Mitchell. Shortly thereafter, Homer had an argument with Ethel and gave up his possession to Greenacre. The debt secured by the mortgage had not been paid. Mitchell surveyed his land and found that the fence erected a year earlier by Homer did not follow the true boundary. Part of the fence was within Greenacre. Part of the fence encroached on Mitchell's land. Mitchell and Ethel executed an agreement fixing the boundary line in accordance with the fence constructed by Homer. The agreement, which met all the formalities required in the jurisdiction, was promptly and properly recorded. A year after the agreement was recorded, Homer temporarily reconciled his differences with Ethel and resumed joint possession of Greenacre. Thereafter, Homer repudiated the boundary line agreement and brought an appropriate action against Mitchell and Ethel to quiet title along the original true boundary. In such action, Homer will | [
"win, because Fortunoff Bank was not a party to the agreement. ",
"win, because one tenant in common cannot bind another tenant in common to a boundary line agreement. ",
"lose, because the agreement, as a matter of law, was mutually beneficial to Ethel and Homer. ",
"lose, because Ethel was in sole possession of said premises at the time the agreement was signed. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
At the trial of an action against Grandmother on behalf of Patrick, the following evidence has been introduced. Grandson and his friend, Patrick, both aged eight, were visiting at Grandmother's house when, while exploring Grandmother's house when, while exploring the premises, they discovered a hunting rifle in an unlocked gun cabinet. They removed it from the cabinet and were examining it when the rifle, while in Grandson's hands, somehow discharged. The bullet struck and injured Patrick. The gun cabinet was normally locked. Grandmother had opened it for dusting several days before the boys' visit, and had then forgotten to relock it. She was not aware that it was unlocked when the boys arrived. If the defendant moves for a directed verdict in her favor at the end of the plaintiff's case, that motion should be | [
"granted, because Grandmother is not legally responsible for the acts of Grandson. ",
"granted, because Grandmother did not recall that the gun cabinet was unlocked. ",
"denied, because a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality. ",
"denied, because a jury could find that Grandmother breached a duty of care she owed to Patrick. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
On November 15, Joiner in a signed writing contracted with Galley for an agreed price to personally remodel Galley's kitchen according to specifications provided by Galley, and to start work on December 1. Joiner agreed to provide all materials for the job in addition to all of the labor required. For this question only, assume that on November 26 Joiner without legal excuse repudiated the contract and that Galley, after a reasonable and prolonged effort, could not find anyone to remodel his kitchen for a price approximating the price agreed to by Joiner. If one year later Galley brings an action for specific performance against Joiner, which of the following will provide Joiner with the best defense? | [
"An action for equitable relief not brought within a reasonable time is barred by laches.",
"Specific performance is generally not available as a remedy to enforce a contractual duty to perform personal services.",
"Specific performance is generally not available as a remedy in the case of an anticipatory repudiation.",
"Specific performance is not available as a remedy where even nominal damages could have been recovered as a remedy at law."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
On November 15, Joiner in a signed writing contracted with Galley for an agreed price to personally remodel Galley's kitchen according to specifications provided by Galley, and to start work on December 1. Joiner agreed to provide all materials for the job in addition to all of the labor required. For this question only, assume the following facts. On November 26, Galley without legal excuse repudiated the contract. Notwithstanding Galley's repudiation, however, Joiner subsequently purchased for $5,000 materials that could only be used in remodeling Galley's kitchen, and promptly notified Galley, "I will hold you to our contract." If allowed to perform, Joiner would have made a profit of $3,000 on the job. If Galley refuses to retract his repudiation, and Joiner sues him for damages, what is the maximum that Joiner is entitled to recover? | [
"Nothing, because he failed to mitigate his damages. ",
"$3,000, his expectancy damages. ",
"$5,000, on a restitutionary theory. ",
"$5,000, his reliance damages, plus $3,000, his expectancy damages. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
The police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the jewelry. The court should | [
"deny the motion on the ground that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.",
"deny the motion on the ground that school searches are reasonable if conducted by school personnel on school grounds on the basis of reasonable suspicion.",
"grant the motion on the ground that the (C) grant the motion on the ground that the search was conducted with excessive force.",
"grant the motion on the ground that the search was conducted without probable cause or a warrant."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
The police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries. Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The best argument for excluding it would be that | [
"Yancey was in custody at the time the statement was recorded.",
"the police did not comply with Yancey's request for a lawyer.",
"once Yancey had invoked his right to counsel, it was improper for the police to listen to any of his private conversations. ",
"the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement. obtain an incriminating statement."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
A newly enacted federal statute appropriates $100 million in federal funds to support basic research by universities located in the United States. The statute provides that "the ten best universities in the United States" will each receive $10 million. It also provides that "the ten best universities" shall be "determined by a poll of the presidents of all the universities in the nation, to be conducted by the United States Department of Education." In responding to that poll, each university president is required to apply the wellrecognized and generally accepted standards of academic quality that are specified in the statute. The provisions of the statute are inseverable. Which of the following statements about this statute is correct? | [
"The statute is unconstitutional, because the reliance by Congress on a poll of individuals who are not federal officials to determine the recipients of its appropriated funds is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. ",
"The statute is unconstitutional, because the limitation on recipients to the ten best universities is arbitrary and capricious and denies other high quality universities the equal protection of the laws. ",
"The statute is constitutional, because Congress has plenary authority to determine the objects of its spending and the methods used to achieve them, so long as they may reasonably be deemed to serve the general welfare and do not violate any prohibitory language in the Constitution. ",
"The validity of the statute is nonjusticiable, because the use by Congress of its spending power necessarily involves political considerations that must be resolved considerations that must be resolved finally by those branches of the government that are closest to the political process. "
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Which of the following fact patterns most clearly suggests an implied-in-fact contract? | [
"A county tax assessor mistakenly bills Algernon for taxes on Bathsheba's property, which Algernon, in good faith, pays. ",
"Meddick, a physician, treated Ryder without Ryder's knowledge or consent, while Ryder was unconscious as the result of a fall from his horse. ",
"Asphalt, thinking that he was paving Customer's driveway, for which Asphalt had an express contract, mistakenly paved Nabor's driveway while Nabor looked on without saying anything or raising any objection. ",
"At her mother's request, Iris, an accountant, filled out and filed her mother's \"E-Z\" income-tax form (a simple, short form). "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Ashton owned Woodsedge, a tract used for commercial purposes, in fee simple and thereafter mortgaged it to First Bank. She signed a promissory note secured by a duly executed and recorded mortgage. There was no "due on sale" clause, that is, no provision that, upon sale, the whole balance then owing would become due and owing. Ashton conveyed Woodsedge to Beam "subject to a mortgage to First Bank, which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay." Beam conveyed Woodsedge to Carter "subject to an existing mortgage to First Bank." A copy of the note and the mortgage that secured it had been exhibited to each grantee. After Carter made three timely payments, no further payments were made by any party. In fact, the real estate had depreciated to a point where it was worth less than the debt. There is no applicable statute or regulation. In an appropriate foreclosure action, First Bank joined Ashton, Beam, and Carter as defendants. At the foreclosure sale, although the fair market value for Woodsedge in its depreciated state was obtained, a deficiency resulted. First Bank is entitled to collect a deficiency judgment against | [
"Ashton only.",
"Ashton and Beam only.",
"Beam and Carter only.",
"Ashton, Beam, and Carter. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Landco purchased a large tract of land intending to construct residential housing on it. Landco hired Poolco to build a large inground swimming pool on the tract. The contract provided that Poolco would carry out blasting operations that were necessary to create an excavation large enough for the pool. create an excavation large enough for the pool. The blasting caused cracks to form in the walls of Plaintiff's home in a nearby residential neighborhood. In Plaintiff's action for damages against Landco, Plaintiff should | [
"prevail, only if Landco retained the right to direct and control Poolco's construction of the pool. ",
"prevail, because the blasting that Poolco was hired to perform damaged Plaintiff's home. ",
"not prevail, if Poolco used reasonable care in conducting the blasting operations. ",
"not prevail, if Landco used reasonable care to hire a competent contractor. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
The state of Atlantica spends several million dollars a year on an oyster conservation program. As part of that program, the state limits, by statute, oyster fishing in its coastal waters to persons who have state oyster permits. In order to promote conservation, it issues only a limited number of oyster permits each year. The permits are effective for only one year from the date of their issuance and are awarded on the basis of a lottery, in which there is no differentiation between resident and nonresident applicants. However, each nonresident who obtains a permit is charged an annual permit fee that is $5 more than the fee charged residents. Fisher, Inc., is a large fishing company that operates from a port in another state and is incorporated in that other state. Each of the boats of Fisher, Inc., has a federal shipping license that permits it "to engage in all aspects of the coastal trade, to fish and to carry cargo from place to place along the coast, and to engage in other lawful activities along the coast of the United States." These shipping licenses are authorized by federal statute. Assume no other federal statutes or Assume no other federal statutes or administrative rules apply. Although it had previously held an Atlantica oyster permit, Fisher, Inc., did not obtain a permit in that state's lottery this year. Which of the following is the strongest argument that can be made in support of a continued right of Fisher, Inc., to fish for oysters this year in the coastal waters of Atlantica? | [
"Because the Atlantica law provides higher permit charges for nonresidents, it is an undue burden on interstate commerce. ",
"Because the Atlantica law provides higher permit charges for nonresidents, it denies Fisher, Inc., the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. ",
"Because it holds a federal shipping license, Fisher, Inc., has a right to fish for oysters in Atlantica waters despite the state law. ",
"Because Fisher, Inc., previously held an Atlantica oyster permit and Atlantica knows that company is engaged in a continuing business operation, the refusal to grant Fisher, Inc., a permit this year is a taking of its property without due process of law. "
] | 2 | international_law |
|
The United States Department of the Interior granted Concessionaire the food and drink concession in a federal park located in the state of New Senora. Concessionaire operated his concession out of federally owned facilities in the park. The federal statute authorizing the Interior Department to grant such concessions provided that the grantees would pay only a nominal rental for use of these federal facilities because of the great benefit their concessions would provide to the people of the United States. The legislature of the state of New Senora enacted a statute imposing an occupancy tax on the occupants of real estate within that state that is not subject to state real estate taxes. The statute was intended to equalize the state tax burden on such occupants with that on people occupying real estate that is subject to state real estate taxes. Pursuant to that statute, the New Senora Department of Revenue attempted to collect the state occupancy tax from Concessionaire because the federal facilities occupied by Concessionaire were not subject to state real estate taxes. Concessionaire sued to invalidate the state occupancy tax as applied to him. The strongest ground upon which Concessionaire could challenge the occupancy tax is that it violates the | [
"commerce clause by unduly burdening the interstate tourist trade.",
"privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the fundamental right to do business on federal property.",
"equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the tax treats him less favorably than federal concessionaires in other states who do not have to pay such occupancy taxes.",
"supremacy clause of Article VI and the federal statute authorizing such concessions."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Davis has a small trampoline in his backyard which, as he knows, is commonly used by neighbor children as well as his own. The trampoline is in good condition, is not defective in any way, and normally is surrounded by mats to prevent injury if a user should fall off. Prior to leaving with his family for the day, Davis leaned the trampoline up against the side of the house and placed the mats in the garage. While the Davis family was away, Philip, aged 11, a new boy in the neighborhood, wandered into Davis's yard and saw the trampoline. Philip had not previously been aware of its presence, but, having frequently used a trampoline before, he decided to set it up, and started to jump. He lost his balance on one jump and took a hard fall on the bare ground, jump and took a hard fall on the bare ground, suffering a serious injury that would have been prevented by the mats. An action has been brought against Davis on Philip's behalf to recover damages for the injuries Philip sustained from his fall. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence have been replaced by a pure comparative negligence rule. In his action against Davis, will Philip prevail? | [
"No, if children likely to be attracted by the trampoline would normally realize the risk of using it without mats. ",
"No, if Philip failed to exercise reasonable care commensurate with his age, intelligence, and experience. ",
"No, because Philip entered Davis's yard and used the trampoline without Davis's permission. ",
"No, because Philip did not know about the trampoline before entering Davis's yard and thus was not \"lured\" onto the premises. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Deben was charged with using a forged prescription from a Dr. Kohl to obtain Percodan® from Smith's Drugstore on May 1. At trial, Smith identified Deben as the customer, but Deben testified that he had not been in the store. In rebuttal, the prosecutor calls Wallman and Witler to testify that on May 1 a man they identified as Deben had presented prescriptions for Percodan® from a Dr. Kohl at, respectively, Wallman's Drugs and Witler's Drugstore. Wallman's and Witler's testimony is | [
"admissible, to prove a pertinent trait of Deben's character and Deben's action in conformity therewith. conformity therewith. ",
"admissible, to identify the man who presented the prescription at Smith's Drugstore. ",
"inadmissible, because it proves specific acts rather than reputation or opinion. ",
"inadmissible, because other crimes may not be used to show propensity. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
An ordinance of the city of Green requires that its mayor must have been continuously a resident of the city for at least five years at the time he or she takes office. Candidate, who is thinking about running for mayor in an election that will take place next year, will have been a resident of Green for only four and one-half years at the time the mayor elected then takes office. Before he decides whether to run for the position of mayor, Candidate wants to know whether he could lawfully assume that position if he were elected. As a result, Candidate files suit in the local federal district court for a declaratory judgment that the Green five-year-residence requirement is unconstitutional and that he is entitled to a place on his political party's primary election ballot for mayor. He names the chairman of his political party as the sole defendant but does not join any election official. The chairman responds by joining Candidate in requesting the court to declare the Green residence requirement invalid. In this case, the court should | [
"refuse to determine the merits of this suit, because there is no case or controversy. ",
"refuse to issue such a declaratory judgment, because an issue of this kind involving only a local election does not present a substantial federal constitutional question. ",
"issue the declaratory judgment, because a residency requirement of this type is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. ",
"issue the declaratory judgment, because Candidate will have substantially complied with the residency requirement. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Oliver, owner of Blackacre, needed money. Blackacre was fairly worth $100,000, so Oliver tried to borrow $60,000 from Len on the security of Blackacre. Len agreed, but only if Oliver would convey Blackacre to Len outright by warranty deed, with Len agreeing orally to reconvey to Oliver once the loan was paid according to its terms. Oliver agreed, conveyed Blackacre to Len by warranty deed, and Len paid Oliver $60,000 cash. Len promptly and properly recorded Oliver's deed. Now, Oliver has defaulted on repayment with $55,000 still due on the loan. Oliver is still in possession. Which of the following best states the parties' rights in Blackacre? | [
"Len's oral agreement to reconvey is invalid under the Statute of Frauds, so Len owns Blackacre outright. ",
"Oliver, having defaulted, has no further rights in Blackacre, so Len may obtain summary eviction. ",
"The attempted security arrangement is a creature unknown to the law, hence a nullity; Len has only a personal right to $55,000 from Oliver. ",
"Len may bring whatever foreclosure proceeding is appropriate under the laws of the jurisdiction."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Big City High School has had a very high rate of pregnancy among its students. In order to assist students who keep their babies to complete high school, Big City High School has established an infant day-care center for children of its students, and also offers classes in child-care. Because the child-care classes are always overcrowded, the school limits admission to those classes solely to Big City High School students who are the mothers of babies in the infant day-care center. Joe, a student at Big City High School, has legal custody of his infant son. The school provides care for his son in its infant day-care center, but will not allow Joe to enroll in the center, but will not allow Joe to enroll in the child-care classes. He brings suit against the school challenging, on constitutional grounds, his exclusion from the child-care classes. Which of the following best states the burden of persuasion in this case? | [
"Joe must demonstrate that the admission requirement is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.",
"Joe must demonstrate that the admission requirement is not as narrowly drawn as possible to achieve a substantial governmental interest.",
"The school must demonstrate that the admission policy is the least restrictive means by which to achieve a compelling governmental interest.",
"The school must demonstrate that the admission policy is substantially related to an important governmental interest."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Defendant was upset because he was going to have to close his liquor store due to competition from a discount store in a new shopping mall nearby. In desperation, he decided to set fire to his store to collect the insurance. While looking through the basement for flammable material, he lit a match to read the label on a can. The match burned his finger and, in a reflex action, he dropped the match. It fell into a barrel and ignited some paper. Defendant made no effort to put out the fire but instead left the building. The fire spread and the store was destroyed by fire. Defendant was eventually arrested and indicted for arson. Defendant is | [
"guilty, if he could have put out the fire before it spread and did not do so because he wanted the building destroyed. ",
"guilty, if he was negligent in starting the fire. ",
"not guilty, because even if he wanted to burn the building there was no concurrence between his mens rea and the act of starting the fire. ",
"not guilty, because his starting the fire was the result of a reflex action and not a voluntary act. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
In his employment, Grinder operates a grinding wheel. To protect his eyes, he wears glasses, sold under the trade name "Safety Glasses," manufactured by Glassco. The glasses were sold with a warning label stating that they would protect only against small, flying objects. One day, the grinding wheel Grinder was using disintegrated and fragments of the stone wheel were thrown off with great force. One large fragment hit Grinder, knocking his safety glasses up onto his forehead. Another fragment then hit and injured his eye. Grinder brought an action against Glassco for the injury to his eye. The jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rule pertaining to contributory negligence. In this action, will Grinder prevail? | [
"Yes, because the safety glasses were defective in that they did not protect him from the disintegrating wheel. ",
"Yes, because the glasses were sold under the trade name \"Safety Glasses.\" ",
"No, because the glasses were not designed or sold for protection against the kind of hazard Grinder encountered. ",
"No, if Grinder will be compensated under the workers' compensation law. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Oscar purchased a large bottle of No-Flake dandruff shampoo, manufactured by Shampoo Company. The box containing the bottle stated in part: "CAUTION--Use only 1 capful at most once a day. Greater use may cause severe damage to the scalp." Oscar read the writing on the box, removed the bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, Paul, asked to use the No-Flake, and Oscar said, "Be careful not to use too much." Paul thereafter used No-Flake twice a day, applying two or three capfuls each time, notwithstanding the label statement that read: "Use no more than one capful per day. See box instructions." The more he used No-Flake, the more inflamed his scalp became, the more it itched, and the more he used. After three weeks of such use, Paul finally consulted a doctor who diagnosed his problem as a serious and irreversible case of dermatitis caused by excessive exposure to the active ingredients in No-Flake. These ingredients are uniquely effective at controlling dandruff, but there is no way to remove a remote risk to a small percentage of persons who may contract dermatitis as the result of applying for prolonged periods of time amounts of No-Flake substantially in excess of the directions. This jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Based upon the foregoing facts, if Paul sues Shampoo Company to recover damages for his dermatitis, his most promising theory of liability will be that the No-Flake shampoo | [
"had an unreasonably dangerous manufacturing defect.",
"had an unreasonably dangerous design defect.",
"was inherently dangerous.",
"was inadequately labeled to warn of its dangers."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Oscar purchased a large bottle of No-Flake dandruff shampoo, manufactured by Shampoo Company. The box containing the bottle stated in part: "CAUTION--Use only 1 capful at most once a day. Greater use may cause severe damage to the scalp." Oscar read the writing on the box, removed the bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, Paul, asked to use the No-Flake, and Oscar said, "Be careful not to use too much." Paul thereafter used No-Flake twice a day, applying two or three capfuls each time, notwithstanding the label statement that read: "Use no more than one capful per day. See box instructions." The more he used No-Flake, the more inflamed his scalp became, the more it itched, and the more he used. After three weeks of such use, Paul finally consulted a doctor who diagnosed his problem as a serious and irreversible case of dermatitis caused by excessive exposure to the active ingredients in No-Flake. These ingredients are uniquely effective at controlling dandruff, but there is no way to remove a remote risk to a small percentage of persons who may contract dermatitis as the result of applying for prolonged periods of time amounts of No-Flake substantially in excess of the directions. This jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. If Paul asserts a claim for his injuries against Shampoo Company based on strict liability in tort, which of the following would constitute a defense? I. Paul misused the No-Flake shampoo. II. Paul was contributorily negligent in continuing to use No-Flake shampoo when his scalp began to hurt and itch. III. Paul was a remote user and not in privity with Shampoo Company. | [
"I only.",
"I and II only.",
"II and III only.",
"Neither I, nor II, nor III. (D) Neither I, nor II, nor III. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Oscar purchased a large bottle of No-Flake dandruff shampoo, manufactured by Shampoo Company. The box containing the bottle stated in part: "CAUTION--Use only 1 capful at most once a day. Greater use may cause severe damage to the scalp." Oscar read the writing on the box, removed the bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, Paul, asked to use the No-Flake, and Oscar said, "Be careful not to use too much." Paul thereafter used No-Flake twice a day, applying two or three capfuls each time, notwithstanding the label statement that read: "Use no more than one capful per day. See box instructions." The more he used No-Flake, the more inflamed his scalp became, the more it itched, and the more he used. After three weeks of such use, Paul finally consulted a doctor who diagnosed his problem as a serious and irreversible case of dermatitis caused by excessive exposure to the active ingredients in No-Flake. These ingredients are uniquely effective at controlling dandruff, but there is no way to remove a remote risk to a small percentage of persons who may contract dermatitis as the result of applying for prolonged periods of time amounts of No-Flake substantially in excess of the directions. This jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. If Paul asserts a claim against Oscar for his dermatitis injuries, Oscar's best defense will be that | [
"Paul was contributorily negligent.",
"Paul assumed the risk.",
"Oscar had no duty toward Paul, who was a gratuitous donee. ",
"Oscar had no duty toward Paul, because Shampoo Company created the risk and had a nondelegable duty to foreseeable users. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
A statute of the state of Wasminia prohibits the use of state-owned or state-operated facilities for the performance of abortions that are not "necessary to save the life of the mother." That statute also prohibits state employees from performing any such abortions during the hours they are employed by the state. Citizen was in her second month of pregnancy. She sought an abortion at the Wasminia State Hospital, a state-owned and state-operated facility. Citizen did not claim that the requested abortion was necessary to save her life. The officials in charge of the hospital refused to perform the requested abortion solely on the basis of the state statute. Citizen immediately filed suit against those officials in an appropriate federal district court. She challenged the constitutionality of the Wasminia statute and requested the court to order the hospital to perform the abortion she sought. In this case, the court will probably hold that the Wasminia statute is | [
"unconstitutional, because a limit on the availability of abortions performed by state employees or in state-owned or state-operated facilities to situations in which it is necessary to save the life of the mother impermissibly interferes with the fundamental right of Citizen to decide whether to have a child. ",
"unconstitutional, because it impermissibly discriminates against poor persons who cannot afford to pay for persons who cannot afford to pay for abortions in privately owned and operated facilities and against persons who live far away from privately owned and operated abortion clinics. ",
"constitutional, because it does not prohibit a woman from having an abortion or penalize her for doing so, it is rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal of encouraging childbirth, and it does not interfere with the voluntary performance of abortions by private physicians in private facilities. ",
"constitutional, because the use of stateowned or state-operated facilities and access to the services of state employees are privileges and not rights and, therefore, a state may condition them on any basis it chooses. "
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Oscar, owner of Greenacre, conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed as a gift to Ann, who did not then record her deed. Later, Oscar conveyed Greenacre by warranty deed to Belle, who paid valuable consideration, knew nothing of Ann's claim, and promptly and properly recorded. Next, Ann recorded her deed. Then Belle conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed to her son Cal as a gift. When the possible conflict with Ann was discovered, Cal recorded his deed. Greenacre at all relevant times has been vacant unoccupied land. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record." No other statute is applicable. Cal has sued Ann to establish who owns Greenacre. The court will hold for | [
"Cal, because Ann was a donee. ",
"Cal, because Belle's purchase cut off Ann's rights. ",
"Ann, because she recorded before Cal. ",
"Ann, because Cal was a subsequent donee. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
While Driver was taking a leisurely spring drive, he momentarily took his eyes off the road to look at some colorful trees in bloom. As a result, his car swerved a few feet off the roadway, directly toward Walker, who was standing on the shoulder of the road waiting for a chance to cross. When Walker saw the car bearing down on him, he jumped backwards, fell, and injured his knee. Walker sued Driver for damages, and Driver moved for summary judgment. The foregoing facts are undisputed. Driver's motion should be | [
"denied, because the record shows that Walker apprehended an imminent, harmful contact with Driver's car. ",
"denied, because a jury could find that Driver negligently caused Walker to suffer a legally compensable injury. ",
"granted, because the proximate cause of Walker's injury was his own voluntary act. ",
"granted, because it is not unreasonable for a person to be distracted momentarily. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
In which of the following situations is the defendant most likely to be convicted, even though he did not intend to bring about the harm that the statute defining the offense is designed to prevent? | [
"Defendant was the president of an aspirin manufacturing company. A federal inspector discovered that a large number of aspirin tablets randomly scattered of aspirin tablets randomly scattered through several bottles in a carton ready for shipment were laced with arsenic. Defendant is charged with attempted introduction of adulterated drugs into interstate commerce.",
"Defendant struck Victim in the face with a baseball bat, intending to inflict a serious injury. Victim died after being hospitalized for three days. Defendant is charged with murder. ",
"Defendant burglarized a jewelry store, intending to steal some diamonds. As he entered the store, he short-circuited the store's burglar alarm system, thereby preventing a warning of his entry to police. The smoldering wires eventually caused a fire that destroyed the store. Defendant is charged with arson. ",
"Defendant wanted to frighten Victim's friend by placing a plastic rattlesnake in his lunch box. When Victim mistakenly took the lunch box and opened it, believing it to be his own, the plastic rattlesnake popped out. As a result of the fright, Victim suffered a heart attack and died. Defendant is charged with manslaughter. manslaughter. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Happy-Time Beverages agreed in writing with Fizzy Cola Company to serve for three years as a distributor in a six-county area of Fizzy Cola, which contains a small amount of caffeine. Happy-Time promised in the contract to "promote in good faith the sale of Fizzy Cola" in that area; but the contract said nothing about restrictions on the products that Happy-Time could distribute. Six months later, Happy-Time agreed with the Cool Cola Company to distribute its caffeinefree cola beverages in the same six-county area. If Fizzy Cola Company sues Happy-Time for breach of their distribution contract, which of the following facts, if established, would most strengthen Fizzy's case? | [
"Cool Cola's national advertising campaign disparages the Fizzy Cola product by saying, \"You don't need caffeine and neither does your cola.\" ",
"Since Happy-Time began to distribute Cool Cola, the sales of Fizzy Cola have dropped 3% in the six-county area. ",
"Prior to signing the contract with Fizzy Cola Company, a representative of Happy-Time said that the deal with Fizzy would be \"an exclusive.\" ",
"For many years in the soft-drink industry, it has been uniform practice for distributors to handle only one brand of cola. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Dove is on trial for theft. At trial, the prosecutor called John and May Wong. They testified that, as they looked out their apartment window, they saw thieves across the street break the window of a jewelry store, take jewelry, and leave in a car. Mrs. Wong telephoned the police and relayed to them the license number of the thieves' car as Mr. Wong looked out the window with binoculars and read it to her. Neither of them has any present memory of the number. The prosecutor offers as evidence a properly authenticated police tape recording of May Wong's telephone call with her voice giving the license number, which is independently shown to belong to Dove's car. The tape recording of May Wong's stating the license number is | [
"admissible, under the hearsay exception for present sense impressions. ",
"admissible, as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence. ",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"inadmissible, because May Wong never had firsthand knowledge of the license number. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Diggers Construction Company was engaged in blasting operations to clear the way for a new road. Diggers had erected adequate barriers and posted adequate warning signs in the vicinity of the blasting. Although Paul read and understood the signs, he entered the area to walk his dog. As a result of the blasting, Paul was hit by a piece of rock and sustained Paul was hit by a piece of rock and sustained head injuries. The jurisdiction follows the traditional common-law rules governing the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear chance. In an action by Paul against Diggers to recover damages for his injuries, Paul will | [
"not prevail, if Diggers exercised reasonable care to protect the public from harm. ",
"not prevail, because Paul understood the signs and disregarded the warnings. ",
"prevail, because Paul was harmed by Diggers's abnormally dangerous activity. ",
"prevail, unless Paul failed to use reasonable care to protect himself from harm. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Pike sued Day City Community Church for damages he suffered when Pike crashed his motorcycle in an attempt to avoid a cow that had escaped from its corral. The cow and corral belonged to a farm that had recently been left by will to the church. At trial, Pike seeks to ask Defendant's witness, Winters, whether she is a member of that church. The question is | [
"improper, because evidence of a witness's religious beliefs is not admissible to impeach credibility. ",
"improper, because it violates First Amendment and privacy rights. ",
"proper, for the purpose of ascertaining partiality or bias. ",
"proper, for the purpose of showing capacity to appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath. "
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Radon is a harmful gas found in the soil of certain regions of the United States. A statute of the state of Magenta requires occupants of residences with basements susceptible to the intrusion of radon to have their residences tested for the presence of radon and to take specified remedial steps if the test indicates the presence of radon above specified levels. The statute also provides that the testing for radon may be done only by testers licensed by a state agency. According to the statute, a firm may be licensed to test for radon only if it meets specified rigorous standards relating to the accuracy of its testing. These standards may easily be achieved with current technology; but the technology required to meet them is 50% more expensive than the technology required to measure radon accumulations in a slightly less accurate manner. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not license radon testers. However, a federal statute authorizes the EPA to advise on the accuracy of various methods of radon testing and to provide to the general public a list of testers that use methods it believes to be reasonably accurate. WeTest, a recently established Magenta firm, uses a testing method that the EPA has stated uses a testing method that the EPA has stated is reasonably accurate. WeTest is also included by the EPA on the list of testers using methods of testing it believes to be reasonably accurate. WeTest applies for a Magenta radon testing license, but its application is denied because WeTest cannot demonstrate that the method of testing for radon it uses is sufficiently accurate to meet the rigorous Magenta statutory standards. WeTest sues appropriate Magenta officials in federal court claiming that Magenta may not constitutionally exclude WeTest from performing the required radon tests in Magenta. In this suit, the court will probably rule in favor of | [
"WeTest, because the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires Magenta to respect and give effect to the action of the EPA in including WeTest on its list of testers that use reasonably accurate methods. ",
"WeTest, because the supremacy clause of (B) WeTest, because the supremacy clause of the Constitution requires Magenta to respect and give effect to the action of the EPA in including WeTest on its list of testers that use reasonably accurate methods. ",
"Magenta, because the federal statute and the action of the EPA in including WeTest on its list of testers that use reasonably accurate methods are not inconsistent with the more rigorous Magenta licensing requirement, and that requirement is reasonably related to a legitimate public interest. ",
"Magenta, because radon exposure is limited to basement areas, which, by their very nature, cannot move in interstate commerce. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Bitz, an amateur computer whiz, agreed in writing to design for the Presskey Corporation, writing to design for the Presskey Corporation, a distributor of TV game systems, three new games a year for a five-year period. The writing provided, in a clause separately signed by Bitz, that "No modification shall be binding on Presskey unless made in writing and signed by Presskey's authorized representative." Because of family problems, Bitz delivered and Presskey accepted only two game-designs a year for the first three years; but the games were a commercial success and Presskey made no objection. Accordingly, Bitz spent substantial sums on new computer equipment that would aid in speeding up future design work. In the first quarter of the fourth year, however, Presskey terminated the contract on the ground that Bitz had breached the annualquantity term. In Bitz's suit against Presskey for damages, the jury found that the contract had been modified by conduct and the trial court awarded Bitz substantial compensatory damages. Is this result likely to be reversed on appeal? | [
"Yes, because the contract's no-oralmodification clause was not expressly waived by Presskey. ",
"Yes, because the contract's no-oralmodification clause was a material part of the agreed exchange and could not be avoided without new consideration. ",
"No, because the contract's no-oralmodification clause was unconscionable as against an amateur designer. ",
"No, because Presskey by its conduct waived the annual-quantity term and Bitz materially changed his position in reasonable reliance on that waiver. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Test owned Blackacre, a vacant one-acre tract of land in State. Five years ago, he executed a deed conveying Blackacre to "Church for the purpose of erecting a church building thereon." Three years ago, Test died leaving Sonny as his sole heir at law. His duly probated will left "all my Estate, both real and personal, to my friend Fanny." Church never constructed a church building on Blackacre and last month Church, for a valid consideration, conveyed Blackacre to Developer. Developer brought an appropriate action to quiet title against Sonny, Fanny, and Church, and joined the appropriate state official. Such official asserted that a charitable trust was created which has not terminated. In such action, the court should find that title is now in | [
"Developer.",
"Sonny.",
"Fanny.",
"the state official."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Mr. Denby was charged with the sale of narcotics. The federal prosecutor arranged with Mrs. Denby for her to testify against her husband in exchange for leniency in her case. At trial, the prosecution calls Mrs. Denby, who had been granted immunity from prosecution, to testify, among other things, that she saw her husband sell an ounce of heroin. Which of the following statements is most clearly correct in the federal courts? | [
"Mrs. Denby cannot be called as a witness over her husband's objection.",
"Mrs. Denby can be called as a witness but cannot testify, over Mr. Denby's objection, that she saw him sell heroin. ",
"Mrs. Denby can refuse to be a witness against her husband.",
"Mrs. Denby can be required to be a witness and to testify that she saw her husband sell heroin."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Freund, a U.S. west-coast manufacturer, gave Wrench, a hardware retailer who was relocating to the east coast, the following "letter of introduction" to Tuff, an east-coast hardware wholesaler. hardware wholesaler. This will introduce you to my good friend and former customer, Wrench, who will be seeking to arrange the purchase of hardware inventory from you on credit. If you will let him have the goods, I will make good any loss up to $25,000 in the event of his default. /Signed/ Freund Wrench presented the letter to Tuff, who then sold and delivered $20,000 worth of hardware to Wrench on credit. Tuff promptly notified Freund of this sale. Which of the following is NOT an accurate statement concerning the arrangement between Freund and Tuff? | [
"It was important to enforceability of Freund's promise to Tuff that it be embodied in a signed writing.",
"By extending the credit to Wrench, Tuff effectively accepted Freund's offer for a unilateral contract. ",
"Although Freund received no consideration from Wrench, Freund's promise is enforceable by Tuff. ",
"Freund's promise is enforceable by Tuff whether or not Tuff gave Freund seasonable notice of the extension of credit to Wrench."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
The legislature of the state of Gray recently enacted a statute forbidding public utilities regulated by the Gray Public Service Commission to increase their rates more than once every two years. Economy Electric Power Company, a public utility regulated by that commission, has just obtained approval of the commission for a general rate increase. Economy Electric has routinely filed for a rate increase every ten to 14 months during the last 20 years. Because of uncertainties about future fuel prices, the power company cannot ascertain with any certainty the date when it will need a further rate increase; but it thinks it may need such an increase sometime within the next 18 months. Economy Electric files an action in the federal district court in Gray requesting a declaratory judgment that this new statute of Gray forbidding public utility rate increases more often than once every two years is unconstitutional. Assume no federal statute is relevant. In this case, the court should | [
"hold the statute unconstitutional, because such a moratorium on rate increases deprives utilities of their property without due process of law. ",
"hold the statute constitutional, because the judgment of a legislature on a matter involving economic regulation is entitled to great deference. ",
"dismiss the complaint, because this action is not ripe for decision. ",
"dismiss the complaint, because controversies over state-regulated utility rates are outside of the jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by Article III of the Constitution. "
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Daniel is on trial for evading $100,000 in taxes. The prosecution offers in evidence an anonymous letter to the IRS, identified as being in Daniel's handwriting, saying, "I promised my mother on her deathbed I would try to pay my back taxes. Here is $10,000. I'll make other payments if you promise not to prosecute. Answer yes by personal ad saying, OK on tax deal.' " The letter is | [
"admissible, as a statement of present intention or plan. ",
"admissible, as an admission of a party opponent. ",
"inadmissible, because it is an effort to settle a claim. ",
"inadmissible, because the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Broker needed a certain rare coin to complete a set that he had contracted to assemble and sell to Collecta. On February 1, Broker obtained such a coin from Hoarda in exchange for $1,000 and Broker's signed, written promise to re-deliver to Hoarda "not later than December 31 this year" a comparable specimen of the same kind of coin without charge to Hoarda. On February 2, Broker consummated sale of the complete set to Collecta. On October 1, the market price of rare coins suddenly began a rapid, sustained rise; and on October 15 Hoarda wrote Broker for assurance that the latter would timely meet his coin-replacement commitment. Broker replied, "In view of the surprising market, it seems unfair that I should have to replace your coin within the next few weeks." 177. For this question only, assume the following facts. Having received Broker's message on October 17, Hoarda sued Broker on November 15 for the market value of a comparable replacement-coin as promised by Broker in February. The trial began on December 1. If Broker moves to dismiss Hoarda's complaint, which of the following is Broker's best argument in support of the motion? | [
"Broker did not repudiate the contract on October 17, and may still perform no later than the contract deadline of December 31. ",
"Even if Broker repudiated on October 17, Hoarda's only action would be for specific performance because the coin is a unique chattel. ",
"Under the doctrine of impossibility, which includes unusually burdensome and unforeseen impracticability, Broker is temporarily excused by the market conditions from timely performance of his coin-replacement obligation. ",
"Even if Broker repudiated on October 17, Hoarda has no remedy without first 17, Hoarda has no remedy without first demanding in writing that Broker retract his repudiation. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Broker needed a certain rare coin to complete a set that he had contracted to assemble and sell to Collecta. On February 1, Broker obtained such a coin from Hoarda in exchange for $1,000 and Broker's signed, written promise to re-deliver to Hoarda "not later than December 31 this year" a comparable specimen of the same kind of coin without charge to Hoarda. On February 2, Broker consummated sale of the complete set to Collecta. On October 1, the market price of rare coins suddenly began a rapid, sustained rise; and on October 15 Hoarda wrote Broker for assurance that the latter would timely meet his coin-replacement commitment. Broker replied, "In view of the surprising market, it seems unfair that I should have to replace your coin within the next few weeks." 177. For this question only, assume the following facts. Having received Broker's message on October 17, Hoarda sued Broker on November 15 for the market value of a comparable replacement-coin as promised by Broker in February. The trial began on December 1. If Broker moves to dismiss Hoarda's complaint, which of the following is Broker's best argument in support of the motion? For this question only, assume the following facts. After receiving Broker's message on October 17, Hoarda telephoned Broker, who said, "I absolutely will not replace your coin until the market drops far below its present level." Hoarda then sued Broker on November 15 for the market value of a comparable replacement-coin as promised by Broker in February. The trial began on December 1. If Broker moves to dismiss Hoarda's complaint, which of the following is Hoarda's best argument in opposing the motion? | [
"Hoarda's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in enforcement of the contract required her to mitigate her losses on the rising market by suing promptly, as she did, after becoming reasonably apprehensive of a prospective breach by Broker. ",
"Although the doctrine of anticipatory breach is not applicable under the prevailing view if, at the time of repudiation, the repudiatee owes the repudiator no remaining duty of performance, the doctrine applies in this case because Hoarda, the repudiatee, remains potentially liable under an implied warranty that the coin advanced to Broker was genuine. ",
"When either party to a sale-of-goods contract repudiates with respect to a performance not yet due, the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may in good faith resort to any appropriate remedy for breach. ",
"Anticipatory repudiation, as a deliberate disruption without legal excuse of an ongoing contractual relationship between the parties, may be treated by the repudiatee at her election as a present tort, actionable at once. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Alice owned a commercial property, Eastgate, consisting of a one-story building rented to various retail stores and a very large parking lot. Two years ago, Alice died and left Eastgate to her nephew, Paul, for life, with remainder to her godson, Richard, his heirs and assigns. Paul was 30 years old and Richard was 20 years old when Alice died. The devise of Eastgate was made subject to any mortgage on Eastgate in effect at the time of Alice's death. When Alice executed her will, the balance of the mortgage debt on Eastgate was less than $5,000. A year before her death, Alice suffered financial reverses; and in order to meet her debts, she had mortgaged Eastgate to secure a loan of $150,000. The entire principal of the mortgage remained outstanding when she died. As a result, the net annual income from Eastgate was reduced not only by real estate taxes and regular maintenance costs, but also by the substantial mortgage interest payments that were due each month. Paul was very dissatisfied with the limited benefit that he was receiving from the life estate. When, earlier this year, Acme, Inc., proposed to purchase Eastgate, demolish the building, pay off the mortgage, and construct a 30-story office building, Paul was willing to accept Acme's offer. However, Richard adamantly refused the offer, even though Richard, as the remainderman, paid the principal portion of each monthly mortgage amortization payment. Richard was independently wealthy and wanted to convert Eastgate into a public park when he became entitled to possession. When Acme realized that Richard would not change his mind, Acme modified its proposal to a purchase of the life estate of Paul. Acme was ready to go ahead with its building plans, relying upon a large life insurance policy on Paul's life to protect it against the economic risk of Paul's death. Paul's life expectancy was 45 years. When Richard learned that Paul had agreed to Acme's modified proposal, Richard brought an appropriate action against them to enjoin their carrying it out. carrying it out. There is no applicable statute. The best argument for Richard is that | [
"Acme cannot purchase Paul's life estate, because life estates are not assignable. ",
"the proposed demolition of the building constitutes waste.",
"Richard's payment of the mortgage principal has subrogated him to Paul's rights as a life tenant and bars Paul's assignment of the life estate without Richard's consent.",
"continued existence of the one-story building is more in harmony with the ultimate use as a park than the proposed change in use."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Doppler is charged with aggravated assault on Vezy, a game warden. Doppler testified that, when he was confronted by Vezy, who was armed and out of uniform, Doppler believed Vezy was a robber and shot in self-defense. The state calls Willy to testify that a year earlier, he had seen Doppler shoot a man without provocation and thereafter falsely claim self-defense. Willy's testimony is | [
"admissible, as evidence of Doppler's untruthfulness. ",
"admissible, as evidence that Doppler did not act in self-defense on this occasion. ",
"inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence. ",
"inadmissible, because it is irrelevant to the defense Doppler raised. "
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Eddie worked as the cashier in a restaurant. One night after the restaurant had closed, Eddie discovered that the amount of cash in Eddie discovered that the amount of cash in the cash register did not match the cash register receipt tapes. He took the cash and the tapes, put them in a bag, gave them to Rita, the manager of the restaurant, and reported the discrepancy. Rita immediately accused him of taking money from the register and threatened to fire him if he did not make up the difference. Rita placed the bag in the office safe. Angered by what he considered to be an unjust accusation, Eddie waited until Rita left the room and then reached into the still open safe, took the bag containing the cash, and left. Eddie is guilty of | [
"larceny.",
"embezzlement.",
"either larceny or embezzlement but not both.",
"neither larceny nor embezzlement."
] | 0 | business_ethics |
|
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Daniels with bank robbery, and when he could not make bond he was jailed pending trial. He had received Miranda warnings when arrested and had made no statement at that time. The prosecutor arranged to have Innis, an informant, placed as Daniels's cellmate and instructed Innis to find out about the bank robbery without asking any direct questions about it. Innis, once in the cell, constantly boasted about the crimes that he had committed. Not to be outdone, Daniels finally declared that he had committed the bank robbery with which he was charged. At Daniels's trial, his attorney moved to exclude any testimony from Innis concerning Daniels's boast. The motion should be | [
"granted, because Daniels's privilege against self-incrimination was violated. ",
"granted, because Daniels's right to counsel was violated. ",
"denied, because Daniels had received Miranda warnings. ",
"denied, because Daniels was not interrogated by Innis. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Pamela sued Driver for damages for the death of Pamela's husband Ronald, resulting from an automobile collision. At trial, Driver calls Ronald's doctor to testify that the day before his death, Ronald, in great pain, said, "It was my own fault; there's nobody to blame but me." The doctor's testimony should be admitted as | [
"a statement against interest.",
"a dying declaration.",
"a statement of Ronald's then existing state of mind.",
"an excited utterance."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Clerk is a clerical worker who has been employed for the past two years in a permanent position in the Wasmania County Public Records Office in the state of Orange. Clerk has been responsible for copying and filing records of real estate transactions in that office. Clerk works in a nonpublic part of the office and has no contact with members of the public. However, state law provides that all real estate records in that office are to be made available for public inspection. On the day an attempted assassination of the governor of Orange was reported on the radio, Clerk remarked to a coworker, "Our governor is such an evil man, I am sorry they did not get him." Clerk's coworker reported this remark to Clerk's employer, the county recorder. After Clerk admitted making the remark, the county recorder dismissed him stating that "there is no room in this office for a person who hates the governor so much." Clerk sued for reinstatement and back pay. His only claim is that the dismissal violated his constitutional rights. In this case, the court should hold that the county recorder's dismissal of Clerk was | [
"unconstitutional, because it constitutes a taking without just compensation of Clerk's property interest in his permanent position with the county. ",
"unconstitutional, because in light of Clerk's particular employment duties his right to express himself on a matter of public concern outweighed any legitimate interest the state might have had in discharging him. ",
"constitutional, because the compelling interest of the state in having loyal and supportive employees outweighs the interest of any state employee in his or her job or in free speech on a matter of public concern. ",
"nonjusticiable, because public employment is a privilege rather than a right and, therefore, Clerk lacked standing to bring this suit. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Slalome, a ski-shop operator, in a telephone conversation with Mitt, a glove manufacturer, ordered 12 pairs of vortex-lined ski gloves at Mitt's list price of $600 per dozen "for delivery in 30 days." Mitt orally accepted the offer, and immediately faxed to Slalome this signed memo: "Confirming our agreement today for your purchase of a dozen pairs of vortex-lined ski gloves for $600, the shipment will be delivered in 30 days." Although will be delivered in 30 days." Although Slalome received and read Mitt's message within minutes after its dispatch, she changed her mind three weeks later about the purchase and rejected the conforming shipment when it timely arrived. On learning of the rejection, does Mitt have a cause of action against Slalome for breach of contract? | [
"Yes, because the gloves were identified to the contract and tendered to Slalome. ",
"Yes, because Mitt's faxed memo to Slalome was sufficient to make the agreement enforceable. ",
"No, because the agreed price was $600 and Slalome never signed a writing evidencing a contract with Mitt. ",
"No, because Slalome neither paid for nor accepted any of the goods tendered. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
A burglar stole Collecta's impressionist painting valued at $400,000. Collecta, who had insured the painting for $300,000 with Artistic Insurance Co., promised to pay $25,000 to Snoop, a full-time investigator for Artistic, if he effected the return of the painting to her in good condition. By company rules, Artistic permits its investigators to accept and retain rewards from policyholders for the recovery of insured property. Snoop, by long and skillful detective work, recovered the picture and returned it undamaged to Collecta. If Collecta refuses to pay Snoop anything, and he sues her for $25,000, what is the probable result under the prevailing modern rule? | [
"Collecta wins, because Snoop owed Artistic a preexisting duty to recover the picture if possible. ",
"Collecta wins, because Artistic, Snoop's employer, had a preexisting duty to return the recovered painting to Collecta. ",
"Snoop wins, because Collecta will benefit more from return of the $400,000 benefit more from return of the $400,000 painting than from receiving the $300,000 policy proceeds. ",
"Snoop wins, because the preexisting duty rule does not apply if the promisee's (Snoop's) duty was owed to a third person. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Oren owned Purpleacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. By will duly admitted to probate after his death, Oren devised Purpleacre to "any wife who survives me with remainder to such of my children as are living at her death." Oren was survived by Wen, his wife, and by three children, Cynthia, Cam, and Camelia. Thereafter, Cam died and by will duly admitted to probate devised his entire estate to David. Cynthia and Camelia were Cam's heirs at law. Later Wen died. In appropriate lawsuit to which Cynthia, Camelia, and David are parties, title to Purpleacre is at issue. In such lawsuit, judgment should be that title to Purpleacre is in | [
"Cynthia, Camelia, and David, because the earliest vesting of remainders is favored and reference to Wen's death should be construed as relating to time of taking possession. ",
"Cynthia, Camelia, and David, because the provision requiring survival of children violates the Rule Against Perpetuities since the surviving wife might have been a person unborn at the time of writing of the will. ",
"Cynthia and Camelia, because Cam's remainder must descend by intestacy and is not devisable. ",
"Cynthia and Camelia, because the remainders were contingent upon surviving the life tenant. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Allen and Bradley were law school classmates who had competed for the position of editor of the law review. Allen had the higher grade point average, but Bradley was elected editor, largely in recognition of a long and important largely in recognition of a long and important note that had appeared in the review over her name. During the following placement interview season, Allen was interviewed by a representative of a nationally prominent law firm. In response to the interviewer's request for information about the authorship of the law review note, Allen said that he had heard that the note attributed to Bradley was largely the work of another student. The firm told Bradley that it would not interview her because of doubts about the authorship of the note. This greatly distressed Bradley. In fact the note had been prepared by Bradley without assistance from anyone else. If Bradley asserts a claim against Allen based on defamation, Bradley will | [
"recover, because Allen's statement was false. ",
"recover, if Allen had substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information he gave the interviewer. ",
"not recover, unless Bradley proves (C) not recover, unless Bradley proves pecuniary loss. ",
"not recover, because the statement was made by Allen only after the interviewer inquired about the authorship of the note. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Sue Starr, a minor both in fact and appearance, bought on credit and took delivery of a telescope from 30-year-old Paul Prism for an agreed price of $100. Upon reaching her majority soon thereafter, Starr encountered Prism and said, "I am sorry for not having paid you that $100 for the telescope when the money was due, but I found out it was only worth $75. So I now promise to pay you $75." Starr subsequently repudiated this promise and refused to pay Prism anything. In an action for breach of contract by Prism against Starr, Prism's probable recovery is | [
"nothing, because Starr was a minor at the time of the original transaction. ",
"nothing, because there was no consideration for the promise made by Starr after reaching majority. ",
"$75.00 ",
"$100.00 "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Sue Starr, a minor both in fact and appearance, bought on credit and took delivery of a telescope from 30-year-old Paul Prism for an agreed price of $100. Upon reaching her majority soon thereafter, Starr encountered Prism and said, "I am sorry for not having paid you that $100 for the telescope when the money was due, but I found out it was only worth $75. So I now promise to pay you $75." Starr subsequently repudiated this promise and refused to pay Prism anything. For this question only, assume that Starr bought the telescope from Prism after reaching her majority and promised to pay $100 "as soon as I am able." What effect does this quoted language have on enforceability of the promise? | [
"None.",
"It makes the promise illusory.",
"It requires Starr to prove her inability to pay.",
"It requires Prism to prove Starr's ability to pay."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Beach owned a tract of land called Blackacre. An old road ran through Blackacre from the abutting public highway. The road had been used to haul wood from Blackacre. Without Beach's permission and with no initial right, Daniel, the owner of Whiteacre, which adjoined Blackacre, traveled over the old road for a period of 15 years to obtain access to Whiteacre, although Whiteacre abutted another public road. Occasionally, Daniel made repairs to the old road. The period of time to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is ten years. After the expiration of 15 years, Beach conveyed a portion of Blackacre to Carrol. The deed included the following clause: "together with the right to pass and repass at all times and for all purposes over the old road." Carrol built a house fronting on the old road. The road was severely damaged by a spring flood, and Carrol made substantial repairs to the road. Carrol asked Daniel and Beach to contribute one-third each to the cost of repairing the flood damage. They both refused, and Carrol brought an appropriate action to compel contribution from Beach and Daniel. In this action, Carrol will | [
"lose as to both defendants.",
"win as to both defendants.",
"win as to Beach, but lose as to Daniel. ",
"win as to Daniel, but lose as to Beach. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Prine sued Dover for an assault that occurred March 5 in California. To support his defense that he was in Utah on that date, Dover identifies and seeks to introduce a letter he wrote to his sister a week before the assault in which he stated that he would see her in Utah on March 5. The letter is | [
"admissible, within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. ",
"admissible, as a prior consistent statement to support Dover's credibility as a witness. ",
"inadmissible, because it lacks sufficient probative value. ",
"inadmissible, because it is a statement of belief to prove the fact believed. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Maple City has an ordinance that prohibits the location of "adult theaters and bookstores" (theaters and bookstores presenting sexually explicit performances or materials) in residential or commercial zones within the city. The ordinance was intended to protect surrounding property from the likely adverse secondary effects of such establishments. "Adult theaters and bookstores" are freely permitted in the areas of the city zoned industrial, where those adverse secondary effects are not as likely. Storekeeper is denied a zoning permit to open an adult theater and bookstore in a building owned by him in an area zoned commercial. As a result, Storekeeper brings suit in an appropriate court challenging the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. Which of the following statements regarding the constitutionality of this Maple City ordinance is most accurate? | [
"The ordinance is valid, because a city may enforce zoning restrictions on speech-related businesses to ensure that the messages they disseminate are acceptable to the residents of adjacent property. ",
"The ordinance is valid, because a city may enforce this type of time, place, and manner regulation on speech-related businesses, so long as this type of regulation is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. ",
"The ordinance is invalid, because a city may not enforce zoning regulations that deprive potential operators of adult theaters and bookstores of their freedom to choose the location of their businesses. ",
"The ordinance is invalid, because a city may not zone property in a manner calculated to protect property from the likely adverse secondary effects of adult theaters and bookstores. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Kingsley was prosecuted for selling cocaine to an undercover police agent. At his trial, he testified that he only sold the drugs to the agent, whom Kingsley knew as "Speedy," because Speedy had told him that he (Speedy) would be killed by fellow gang members unless he supplied them with cocaine. The prosecution did not cross-examine Kingsley. As rebuttal evidence, however, the prosecutor introduced records, over Kingsley's objection, showing that Kingsley had two prior convictions for narcotics-related offenses. The court instructed the jury concerning the defense of entrapment and added, also over Kingsley's objection but in accord with state law, that it should acquit on the ground of entrapment only if it found that the defendant entrapment only if it found that the defendant had established the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Kingsley was convicted. On appeal, Kingsley's conviction should be | [
"reversed, because it was an error for the court to admit the evidence of his prior convictions as substantive evidence. ",
"reversed, because it was a violation of due process to impose on the defense a burden of persuasion concerning entrapment. ",
"reversed, for both of the above reasons. ",
"affirmed, because neither of the above reasons constitutes a ground for reversal. "
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Pat sustained personal injuries in a three-car collision caused by the concurrent negligence of the three drivers, Pat, Donald, and Drew. In Pat's action for damages against Donald and Drew, the jury apportioned the negligence 30% to Pat, 30% to Donald, and 40% to Drew. Pat's total damages were $100,000. Assume for this question only that a state statute provides for a system of pure comparative negligence, joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors, and contribution based upon proportionate fault. If Pat chooses to execute against Donald alone, she will be entitled to collect at most | [
"$70,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $40,000 from Drew. ",
"$30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $10,000 from Drew. ",
"$30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect nothing from Drew. ",
"nothing from Donald, because Donald's percentage of fault is not greater than that of Pat. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Pat sustained personal injuries in a three-car collision caused by the concurrent negligence of the three drivers, Pat, Donald, and Drew. In Pat's action for damages against Donald and Drew, the jury apportioned the negligence 30% to Pat, 30% to Donald, and 40% to Drew. Pat's total damages were $100,000. Assume for this question only that the state has retained the common-law rule pertaining to contribution and that the state's comparative negligence statute provides for a system of pure comparative negligence but abolishes joint and several liability. If Pat chooses to execute against Donald alone, she will be entitled to collect at most | [
"$70,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $40,000 from Drew. ",
"$30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $10,000 from Drew. ",
"$30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect nothing from Drew. ",
"nothing from Donald, because Donald's percentage of fault is not greater than that of Pat. "
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Tess Traviata owed Dr. Paula Pulmonary, a physician, $25,000 for professional services. Dr. Pulmonary orally assigned this claim to her adult daughter, Bridey, as a wedding gift. Shortly thereafter, on suffering sudden, severe losses in the stock market, Dr. Pulmonary assigned by a signed writing the same claim to her stockbroker, Margin, in partial satisfaction of advances legally made by Margin in Dr. Pulmonary's previous stock-market transactions. Subsequently, Traviata, without knowledge of either assignment, paid Dr. Pulmonary the $25,000 then due, which Dr. Pulmonary promptly lost at a horse track, although she remains solvent. Assuming that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does NOT apply to either of the assignments in this situation, which of the following is a correct statement of the parties' rights and liabilities? | [
"As the assignee prior in time, Bridey can recover $25,000 from Traviata, who acted at her peril in paying Dr. acted at her peril in paying Dr. Pulmonary. ",
"As the sole assignee for value, Margin can recover $25,000 from Traviata, who acted at her peril in paying Dr. Pulmonary. ",
"Neither Bridey nor Margin can recover from Traviata, but Bridey, though not Margin, can recover $25,000 from Dr. Pulmonary. ",
"Neither Bridey nor Margin can recover from Traviata, but Margin, though not Bridey, can recover $25,000 from Dr. Pulmonary. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Patten suffered from a serious, though not immediately life-threatening, impairment of his circulatory system. Patten's cardiologist recommended a cardiac bypass operation and referred Patten to Dr. Cutter. Cutter did not inform Patten of the 2% risk of death associated with this operation. Cutter defended his decision not to mention the risk statistics to Patten because "Patten was a worrier and it would significantly lessen his chances of would significantly lessen his chances of survival to be worried about the nonsurvival rate." Cutter successfully performed the bypass operation and Patten made a good recovery. However, when Patten learned of the 2% risk of death associated with the operation, he was furious that Cutter had failed to disclose this information to him. If Patten asserts a claim against Cutter based on negligence, will Patten prevail? | [
"No, if Cutter used his best personal judgment in shielding Patten from the risk statistic. ",
"No, because the operation was successful and Patten suffered no harm. ",
"Yes, if Patten would have refused the operation had he been informed of the risk. ",
"Yes, because a patient must be told the risk factor associated with a surgical procedure in order to give an informed consent. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
A statute of the state of Orrington provides that assessments of real property for tax purposes must represent the "actual value" of the property. The Blue County Tax Commission, in making its assessments, has uniformly and consistently determined the "actual value" of real property solely by reference to the price at which the particular property was last sold. In recent years, the market values of real property in Blue County have been rising at the rate of 15% per year. Owner is required to pay real estate taxes on her home in Blue County that are 200% to 300% higher than those paid by many other 200. owners of similar homes in similar neighborhoods in that county, even though the current market values of their respective homes and Owner's home are nearly identical. The reason the taxes on Owner's home are higher than those imposed on the other similar homes in similar neighborhoods is that she bought her home much more recently than the bought her home much more recently than the other owners and, therefore, it is assessed at a much higher "actual value" than their homes. Persistent efforts by Owner to have her assessment reduced or the assessments of the others raised by the Blue County Tax Commission have failed. Owner has now filed suit against the Blue County Tax Commission, charging only that the tax assessment on her property is unconstitutional. The strongest constitutional argument to support Owner's claim is that the comparative overvaluation of Owner's property by the Blue County Tax Commission in making tax assessments over time | [
"deprives Owner of the equal protection of the laws.",
"deprives Owner of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.",
"constitutes a taking of private property for public use without just compensation.",
"constitutes an ex post facto law."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Plaza Hotel sued Plaza House Hotel for infringement of its trade name. To establish a likelihood of name confusion, Plaintiff Plaza Hotel offers a series of memoranda which it had asked its employees to prepare at the end of each day listing instances during the day in which telephone callers, cab drivers, customers, and others had confused the two names. The memoranda should be | [
"excluded, because they are more unfairly prejudicial and confusing than probative. ",
"excluded, because they are hearsay not within any exception. ",
"admitted, because they are records of regularly conducted business activity. ",
"admitted, because they are past recollection recorded."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
Walter, a 16-year-old, purchased an educational chemistry set manufactured by Chemco. Walter invited his friend and classmate, Peter, to assist him in a chemistry project. Referring to a library chemistry book on explosives and finding that the chemistry set contained all of the necessary chemicals, Walter and Peter agreed to make a bomb. During the course of the project, Walter carelessly knocked a lighted Bunsen burner into a bowl of chemicals from the chemistry set. The chemicals burst into flames, injuring Peter. In a suit by Peter against Chemco, based on strict liability, Peter will | [
"prevail, if the chemistry set did not contain a warning that its contents could be combined to form dangerous explosives. ",
"prevail, because manufacturers of chemistry sets are engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. ",
"not prevail, because Walter's negligence was the cause in fact of Peter's injury. ",
"not prevail, if the chemistry set was as safe as possible, consistent with its educational purposes, and its benefits exceeded its risks. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
While walking home one evening, Harold, an off-duty police officer, was accosted by Jones, a stranger. Jones had been drinking and mistakenly thought Harold was a man who was having an affair with his wife. Intending to frighten Harold but not to harm him, Jones pulled out a knife, screamed obscenities, and told Harold he was going to kill him. Frightened and reasonably believing Jones was going to kill him and that using deadly force was his only salvation, Harold took out his service revolver and shot and killed Jones. Harold is charged with murder. Harold's claim of self-defense should be | [
"sustained, because Harold reasonably believed Jones was planning to kill him and that deadly force was required. ",
"sustained, because the killing was in hot blood upon sufficient provocation. ",
"denied, because Jones did not in fact intend to harm Harold and Harold was incorrect in believing that he did. ",
"denied, because Harold was not defending his home and had an obligation to retreat or to repel with less than deadly force. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Anna entered a hospital to undergo surgery and feared that she might not survive. She instructed her lawyer by telephone to prepare a deed conveying Blackacre, a large tract of undeveloped land, as a gift to her nephew, Bernard, who lived in a distant state. Her instructions were followed, and, prior to her surgery, she executed a document in a form sufficient to constitute a deed of conveyance. The deed was recorded by the lawyer promptly and properly as she instructed him to do. The recorded deed was returned to the lawyer by the land record office, Anna, in fact, recovered from her surgery and the lawyer returned the recorded deed to her. Before Anna or the lawyer thought to inform Bernard of the conveyance, Bernard was killed in an auto accident. Bernard's will left all of his estate to a satanic religious cult. Anna was very upset at the prospect of the cult's acquiring Blackacre. The local taxing authority assessed the next real property tax bill on Blackacre to Bernard's estate. Anna brought an appropriate action against Bernard's estate and the cult to set aside the conveyance to Bernard. If Anna loses, it will be because | [
"the gift of Blackacre was inter vivos rather than causa mortis.",
"the showing of Bernard's estate as the owner of Blackacre on the tax rolls supplied what otherwise would be a missing essential element for a valid conveyance.",
"disappointing Bernard's devisee would violate the religious freedom provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution.",
"delivery of the deed is presumed from the recording of the deed."
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
In a prosecution of Doris for murder, the government seeks to introduce a properly authenticated note written by the victim that reads: "Doris did it." In laying the foundation for admitting the note as a dying declaration, the prosecution offered an affidavit from the attending physician that the victim knew she was about to die when she wrote the note. The admissibility of the note as a dying declaration is | [
"a preliminary fact question for the judge, and the judge must not consider the affidavit. ",
"a preliminary fact question for the judge, and the judge may properly consider the affidavit. ",
"a question of weight and credibility for the jury, and the jury must not consider the affidavit. ",
"a question of weight and credibility for the jury, and the jury may properly consider the affidavit. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
As Paul, a bartender, was removing the restraining wire from a bottle of champagne produced and bottled by Winery, Inc., the plastic stopper suddenly shot out of the bottle. The stopper struck and injured Paul's eye. Paul had opened other bottles of champagne, and occasionally the stoppers had shot out with great force, but Paul had not been injured.Paul has brought an action against Winery, Inc., alleging that the bottle that caused his injury was defective and unreasonably dangerous because its label did not warn that the stopper might suddenly shoot out during opening. The state has merged contributory negligence and unreasonable assumption of risk into a pure comparative fault system that is applied in strict products liability actions. If the jury finds that the bottle was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a warning, will Paul recover a judgment in his favor? | [
"No, if the jury finds that a legally sufficient warning would not have prevented Paul's injury. ",
"No, if a reasonable bartender would have realized that a stopper could eject from the bottle and hit his eye. ",
"Yes, with damages reduced by the percentage of any contributory fault on Paul's part. ",
"Yes, with no reduction in damages, because foreseeable lack of caution is the reason for requiring a warning. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Swatter, a baseball star, contracted with the Municipal Symphony Orchestra, Inc., to perform for $5,000 at a children's concert as narrator of "Peter and the Wolf." Shortly before the concert, Swatter became embroiled in a highly publicized controversy over whether he had cursed and assaulted a baseball fan. The orchestra canceled the contract out of concern that attendance might be adversely affected by Swatter's appearance. Swatter sued the orchestra for breach of contract. His business agent testified without contradiction that the cancellation had resulted in Swatter's not getting other contracts for performances and endorsements. The trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: "If you find for the plaintiff, you may award damages for losses which at the time of contracting could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant as a probable result of its breach. However, the law does not permit recovery for the loss of prospective profits of a new business caused by breach of contract." On Swatter's appeal from a jury verdict for Swatter, and judgment thereon, awarding damages only for the $5,000 fee promised by the orchestra, the judgment will probably be | [
"affirmed, because the trial court stated the law correctly. ",
"affirmed, because the issue of damages for breach of contract was solely a jury question. ",
"reversed, because the test for limiting damages is what the breaching party could reasonably have foreseen at the time of the breach. ",
"reversed, because under the prevailing modern view, lost profits of a new business are recoverable if they are established with reasonable certainty. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Road Lines is an interstate bus company operating in a five-state area. A federal statute authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to permit interstate carriers to discontinue entirely any unprofitable route. Road Lines applied to the ICC for permission to drop a very unprofitable route through the sparsely populated Shaley Mountains. The ICC granted that permission even though Road Lines provided the only public transportation into the region. Foley is the owner of a mountain resort in the Shaley Mountains, whose customers usually arrived on vehicles operated by Road Lines. After exhausting all available federal administrative remedies, Foley filed suit against Road Lines in the trial court of the state in which the Shaley Mountains are located to enjoin the discontinuance by Road Lines of its service to that area. Foley alleged that the discontinuance of service by Road Lines would violate a statute of that state prohibiting common carriers of persons from abandoning service to communities having no alternate form of public transportation. The state court should | [
"dismiss the action, because Foley lacks standing to sue. ",
"direct the removal of the case to federal court, because this suit involves a substantial federal question. ",
"hear the case on its merits and decide for Foley because, on these facts, a federal agency is interfering with essential state functions. ",
"hear the case on its merits and decide for Road Lines, because a valid federal law preempts the state statute on which Foley relies. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state tax law, alleging that it violated the equal protection clauses of both the United States Constitution and the state constitution. The state supreme court agreed and held the tax law to be invalid. It said: "We hold that this state tax law violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and also the equal protection clause of the state constitution because we interpret that provision of the state constitution to contain exactly the same prohibition against discriminatory legislation as is contained in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." The state sought review of this decision in the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the state supreme court's determination of the federal constitutional issue was incorrect. How should the United States Supreme Court dispose of the case if it believes that this interpretation of the federal Constitution by the state supreme court raises an important federal question and is incorrect on the merits? | [
"Reverse the state supreme court decision, because the equal protection clause of a state constitution must be construed by the state supreme court in a manner that is congruent with the meaning of the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. ",
"Reverse the state supreme court decision with respect to the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution and remand the case to the state supreme court for further proceedings, because the state and federal constitutional issues are so intertwined that the federal issue must be decided so that this case may be disposed of properly. ",
"Refuse to review the decision of the state supreme court, because it is based on an adequate and independent ground of state law. ",
"Refuse to review the decision of the state supreme court, because a state government may not seek review of decisions of its own courts in the United States Supreme Court. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
A federal statute prohibits the construction of nuclear energy plants in this country without a license from the Federal Nuclear Plant Siting Commission. The statute provides that the Commission may issue a license authorizing the construction of a proposed nuclear energy plant 30 days after the Commission makes a finding that the plant will comply with specified standards of safety, technological and commercial feasibility, and public convenience. In a severable provision, the Commission's enabling statute also provides that the Congress, by simple majorities in each house, may veto the issuance of a particular license by the Commission if such a veto occurs within 30 days following the required Commission finding. Early last year, the Commission found that Safenuke, Inc., met all statutory requirements and, therefore, voted to issue Safenuke, Inc., a license authorizing it to construct a nuclear energy plant. Because they believed that the issuance of a license to Safenuke, Inc., was not in accord with the applicable statutory criteria, a majority of each of the two houses of Congress voted, within the specified 30-day period, to veto the license. On the basis of that veto, the Commission refused to issue the license. Subsequently, Safenuke, Inc., sued the Commission in an appropriate federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's refusal to issue the license. In this suit, the court should hold the congressional veto of the license of Safenuke, Inc., to be | [
"invalid, because any determination by Congress that particular agency action does not satisfy statutory criteria violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution because it constitutes the performance of a judicial function by the legislative branch. ",
"invalid, because Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has been interpreted to mean that any action of Congress purporting to alter the legal rights of persons outside of the legislative branch must be presented to the President for his signature or veto. ",
"valid, because Congress has authority under the commerce clause to regulate the construction of nuclear energy plants. ",
"valid, because there is a compelling national interest in the close congressional supervision of nuclear plant siting in light of the grave dangers to the public health and safety that are associated with the operation of such plants."
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
A jurisdiction has the following decisional law on questions of principal and accomplice liability: CASE A: Defendant, a hardware store owner, sold several customers an item known as a "SuperTrucker," which detects police radar and enables speeders to avoid detection. When one of the devices broke down and the speeder was arrested, he confessed that he often sped, secure in the knowledge that his "SuperTrucker" would warn him of police radar in the vicinity. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to speeding. CASE B: Defendant told Arnold that Defendant had stored some stereo equipment in a self-storage locker. He gave Arnold a key and asked Arnold to pick up the equipment and deliver it to Defendant's house. Arnold complied, and removed the equipment from the locker, using the key. In fact, the equipment belonged to Defendant's neighbor, whose locker key Defendant had found in the driveway. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to burglary. CASE C: Tooley, a city council member, accepted a bribe from Defendant in exchange for his vote on Defendant's application for a zoning variance. A statute prohibits the taking of bribes by public officials. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to Tooley's violation of the bribery statute. CASE D: Defendant, an innkeeper, sometimes let his rooms to prostitutes, whom he knew to be using the rooms to ply their trade. He charged the prostitutes the same price as other guests at his inn. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to prostitution. Lipsky, a college student, purchased narcotics from Speed, whom he believed to be a "street person" but who was in fact an undercover police agent. Lipsky has been charged as an accomplice to the sale of narcotics. He should be | [
"convicted on the authority of Case A.",
"convicted on the authority of Case B.",
"acquitted on the authority of Case C.",
"acquitted on the authority of Case D."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
A jurisdiction has the following decisional law on questions of principal and accomplice liability: CASE A: Defendant, a hardware store owner, sold several customers an item known as a "SuperTrucker," which detects police radar and enables speeders to avoid detection. When one of the devices broke down and the speeder was arrested, he confessed that he often sped, secure in the knowledge that his "SuperTrucker" would warn him of police radar in the vicinity. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to speeding. CASE B: Defendant told Arnold that Defendant had stored some stereo equipment in a self-storage locker. He gave Arnold a key and asked Arnold to pick up the equipment and deliver it to Defendant's house. Arnold complied, and removed the equipment from the locker, using the key. In fact, the equipment belonged to Defendant's neighbor, whose locker key Defendant had found in the driveway. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to burglary. CASE C: Tooley, a city council member, accepted a bribe from Defendant in exchange for his vote on Defendant's application for a zoning variance. A statute prohibits the taking of bribes by public officials. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to Tooley's violation of the bribery statute. CASE D: Defendant, an innkeeper, sometimes let his rooms to prostitutes, whom he knew to be using the rooms to ply their trade. He charged the prostitutes the same price as other guests at his inn. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to prostitution. In this jurisdiction, conviction for statutory rape requires proof of the defendant's knowledge that the victim is underage. Howard, who knew that Sarah was underage, encouraged George, who was unaware of Sarah's age, to have sex with Sarah. Howard has been charged as an accomplice to statutory rape. He should be | [
"convicted on the authority of Case A.",
"convicted on the authority of Case B.",
"acquitted on the authority of Case C.",
"acquitted on the authority of Case D."
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
A jurisdiction has the following decisional law on questions of principal and accomplice liability: CASE A: Defendant, a hardware store owner, sold several customers an item known as a "SuperTrucker," which detects police radar and enables speeders to avoid detection. When one of the devices broke down and the speeder was arrested, he confessed that he often sped, secure in the knowledge that his "SuperTrucker" would warn him of police radar in the vicinity. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to speeding. CASE B: Defendant told Arnold that Defendant had stored some stereo equipment in a self-storage locker. He gave Arnold a key and asked Arnold to pick up the equipment and deliver it to Defendant's house. Arnold complied, and removed the equipment from the locker, using the key. In fact, the equipment belonged to Defendant's neighbor, whose locker key Defendant had found in the driveway. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to burglary. CASE C: Tooley, a city council member, accepted a bribe from Defendant in exchange for his vote on Defendant's application for a zoning variance. A statute prohibits the taking of bribes by public officials. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to Tooley's violation of the bribery statute. CASE D: Defendant, an innkeeper, sometimes let his rooms to prostitutes, whom he knew to be using the rooms to ply their trade. He charged the prostitutes the same price as other guests at his inn. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to prostitution. Larson, a plastic surgeon, agreed to remove the fingerprints from the hands of "Fingers" Malloy, whom Larson knew to be a safecracker. Larson charged his usual hourly rate for the operation. Afterward, Malloy burglarized a bank safe and was convicted of burglary. Charged with burglary, Larson should be | [
"convicted on the authority of Case A.",
"convicted on the authority of Case B.",
"acquitted on the authority of Case C.",
"acquitted on the authority of Case D."
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Congressional hearings determined that the use of mechanical power hammers is very dangerous to the persons using them and to persons in the vicinity of the persons using them. As a result, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the use of mechanical power hammers on all construction projects in the United States. Subsequently, a study conducted by a private research firm concluded that nails driven by mechanical power hammers have longer-lasting joining power than hand-driven nails. After learning about this study, the city council of the city of Green enacted an amendment to its building safety code requiring the use of mechanical power hammers in the construction of all buildings intended for human habitation. This amendment to the city of Green's building safety code is | [
"unconstitutional, because it was enacted subsequent to the federal statute. ",
"unconstitutional, because it conflicts with the provisions of the federal statute. ",
"constitutional, because the federal statute does not expressly indicate that it supersedes inconsistent state or local laws. ",
"constitutional, because the long-term safety of human habitations justifies some additional risk to the people engaged in their construction. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Under a written agreement Superpastries, Inc., promised to sell its entire output of baked buns at a specified unit price to Bonnie's Buns, Inc., a retailer, for one year. Bonnie's Buns promised not to sell any other supplier's baked buns. For this question only, assume the following facts. Shortly after making the contract, and before Superpastries had tendered any buns, Bonnie's Buns decided that the contract had become undesirable because of a sudden, sharp decline in its customers' demand for baked buns. It renounced the agreement, and Superpastries sues for breach of contract. Which of the following will the court probably decide? | [
"Bonnie's Buns wins, because mutuality of obligation was lacking in that Bonnie's Buns made no express promise to buy any of Superpastries' baked buns. ",
"Bonnie's Buns wins, because the agreement was void for indefiniteness of quantity and total price for the year involved. ",
"Superpastries wins, because Bonnie's Buns' promise to sell at retail Superpastries' baked buns exclusively, if it sold any such buns at all, implied a promise to use its best efforts to sell Superpastries' one-year output of baked buns. ",
"Superpastries wins, because under the applicable law both parties to a sale-ofgoods contract impliedly assume the risk of price and demand fluctuations. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Under a written agreement Superpastries, Inc., promised to sell its entire output of baked buns at a specified unit price to Bonnie's Buns, Inc., a retailer, for one year. Bonnie's Buns promised not to sell any other supplier's baked buns. For this question only, assume the following facts. The parties' contract included a provision for termination by either party at any time upon reasonable notice. After six months of performance on both sides, Superpastries, claiming that its old bun-baker had become uneconomical and that it could not afford a new one, dismantled the bun-baker and began using the space for making dog biscuits. Superpastries' output of baked buns having ceased, Bonnie's Buns sued for breach of contract. Bonnie's Buns moves for summary judgment on liability, and Superpastries moves for summary judgment of dismissal. Which of the following should the court rule? | [
"Summary judgment for Bonnie's Buns, because as a matter of law Superpastries could not discontinue production of baked buns merely because it was losing money on that product. ",
"Summary judgment for Superpastries, because its cessation of baked-bun production and Bonnie's Buns' awareness thereof amounted as a matter of law to valid notice of termination as permitted by the contract. ",
"Both motions denied, because there are triable issues of fact as to whether Superpastries gave reasonable notice of termination or whether its losses from continued production of baked buns were sufficiently substantial to justify cessation of production. ",
"Both motions denied: Superpastries may legally cease production of baked buns, but under the circumstances it must share with Bonnie's Buns its profits from the manufacture of dog biscuits until the end of the first year. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Dirk is on trial for the brutal murder of Villas. Dirk's first witness, Wesley, testified that in her opinion Dirk is a peaceful and nonviolent person. The prosecution does not crossexamine Wesley, who is then excused from further attendance. Which one of the following is INADMISSIBLE during the prosecution's rebuttal? | [
"Testimony by Wesley's former employer that Wesley submitted a series of false expense vouchers two years ago.",
"Testimony by a police officer that Dirk has a long-standing reputation in the community as having a violent temper.",
"Testimony by a neighbor that Wesley has a long-standing reputation in the community as an untruthful person.",
"Testimony by Dirk's former cell mate that he overheard Wesley offer to provide favorable testimony if Dirk would pay her $5,000. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Amos owned Greenfield, a tract of land. His friend Bert wanted to buy Greenfield and offered $20,000 for it. Amos knew that Bert was insolvent, but replied, "As a favor to you as an old friend, I will sell Greenfield to you for $20,000, even though it is worth much more, if you can raise the money within one month." Bert wrote the following words, and no more, on a piece of paper: "I agree to sell Greenfield for $20,000." Amos then signed the piece of paper and gave it to Bert. Three days later, Amos received an offer of $40,000 for Greenfield. He asked Bert if he had raised the $20,000. When Bert answered, "Not yet," Amos told him that their deal was off and that he was going to accept the $40,000 offer. The next week, Bert secured a bank commitment to enable him to purchase Greenfield. Bert immediately brought an appropriate action against Amos to compel Amos to convey Greenfield to him. The following points will be raised during the course of the trial. I. The parol evidence rule. II. Construction of the contract as to time of performance. III. Bert's ability to perform. Which will be relevant to a decision in favor of Bert? | [
"I only.",
"I and II only.",
"II and III only.",
"I, II, and III. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Modality City has had a severe traffic problem on its streets. As a result, it enacted an ordinance prohibiting all sales to the public of food or other items by persons selling directly from trucks, cars, or other vehicles located on city streets. The ordinance included an inseverable grandfather provision exempting from its prohibition vendors who, for 20 years or more, have continuously sold food or other items from such vehicles located on the streets of Modality City. Northwind Ice Cream, a retail vendor of ice cream products, qualifies for this exemption and is the only food vendor that does. Yuppee Yogurt is a business similar to Northwind, but Yuppee has been selling to the public directly from trucks located on the streets of Modality City only for the past ten years. Yuppee filed suit in an appropriate federal district court to enjoin enforcement of this ordinance on the ground that it denies Yuppee the equal protection of the laws. In this case, the court will probably rule that the ordinance is | [
"constitutional, because it is narrowly tailored to implement the city's compelling interest in reducing traffic congestion and, therefore, satisfies the strict scrutiny test applicable to such cases. ",
"constitutional, because its validity is governed by the rational basis test, and the courts consistently defer to economic choices embodied in such legislation if they are even plausibly justifiable. ",
"unconstitutional, because the nexus between the legitimate purpose of the ordinance and the conduct it prohibits is so tenuous and its provisions are so underinclusive that the ordinance fails to satisfy the substantial relationship test applicable to such cases. ",
"unconstitutional, because economic benefits or burdens imposed by legislatures on the basis of grandfather provisions have consistently been declared invalid by courts as per se violations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Doe, the governor of State, signed a death warrant for Rend, a convicted murderer. Able and Baker are active opponents of the death penalty. At a demonstration protesting the execution of Rend, Able and Baker carried large signs that stated, "Governor Doe - Murderer." Television station XYZ broadcast news coverage of the demonstration, including pictures of the signs carried by Able and Baker. If Governor Doe asserts a defamation claim against XYZ, will Doe prevail? | [
"Yes, because the signs would cause persons to hold Doe in lower esteem. ",
"Yes, if Doe proves that XYZ showed the signs with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth that Doe had not committed homicide. ",
"No, unless Doe proves he suffered pecuniary loss resulting from harm to his reputation proximately caused by the defendants' signs. ",
"No, if the only reasonable interpretation of the signs was that the term \"murderer\" was intended as a characterization of one who would sign a death warrant. "
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Doe, the governor of State, signed a death warrant for Rend, a convicted murderer. Able and Baker are active opponents of the death penalty. At a demonstration protesting the execution of Rend, Able and Baker carried large signs that stated, "Governor Doe - Murderer." Television station XYZ broadcast news coverage of the demonstration, including pictures of the signs carried by Able and Baker. If Doe asserts against XYZ a claim for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, will Doe prevail? | [
"Yes, if the broadcast showing the signs caused Doe to suffer severe emotional distress. ",
"Yes, because the assertion on the signs was extreme and outrageous. ",
"No, unless Doe suffered physical harm as a consequence of the emotional distress caused by the signs. ",
"No, because XYZ did not publish a false statement of fact with \"actual malice.\" "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
On July 18, Snowco, a shovel manufacturer, received an order for the purchase of 500 snow shovels from Acme, Inc., a wholesaler. Acme had mailed the purchase order on July 15. The order required shipment of the shovels no earlier than September 15 and no later than October 15. Typed conspicuously across the front of the order form was the following: "Acme, Inc., reserves the right to cancel this order at any time before September 1." Snowco's mailed response, saying "We accept your order," was received by Acme on July 21. As of July 22, which of the following is an accurate statement as to whether a contract was formed? | [
"No contract was formed, because of Acme's reservation of the right to cancel. ",
"No contract was formed, because Acme's order was only a revocable offer. ",
"A contract was formed, but prior to September 1 it was terminable at the will of either party. ",
"A contract was formed, but prior to September 1 it was an option contract terminable only at the will of Acme. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
On July 18, Snowco, a shovel manufacturer, received an order for the purchase of 500 snow shovels from Acme, Inc., a wholesaler. Acme had mailed the purchase order on July 15. The order required shipment of the shovels no earlier than September 15 and no later than October 15. Typed conspicuously across the front of the order form was the following: "Acme, Inc., reserves the right to cancel this order at any time before September 1." Snowco's mailed response, saying "We accept your order," was received by Acme on July 21. For this question only, assume the following facts. Acme did not cancel the order, and Snowco shipped the shovels to Acme on September 15. When the shovels, conforming to the order in all respects, arrived on October 10, Acme refused to accept them. Which of the following is an accurate statement as of October 10 after Acme rejected the shovels? | [
"Acme's order for the shovels, even if initially illusory, became a binding promise to accept and pay for them. ",
"Acme's order was an offer that became an option after shipment by Snowco.",
"Acme's right to cancel was a condition subsequent, the failure of which resulted in an enforceable contract. ",
"In view of Acme's right to cancel its order prior to September 1, the shipment of the shovels on September 15 was only an offer by Snowco. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
At a country auction, Powell acquired an antique cabinet that he recognized as a "Morenci," an extremely rare and valuable collector's item. Unfortunately, Powell's cabinet had several coats of varnish and paint over the original finish. Its potential value could only be realized if these layers could be removed without damaging the original finish. Much of the value of Morenci furniture depends on the condition of a unique oil finish, the secret of which died with Morenci, its inventor. A professional restorer of antique furniture recommended that Powell use Restorall to remove the paint and varnish from the cabinet. Powell obtained and read a sales brochure published by Restorall, Inc., which contained the following statement: "This product will renew all antique furniture. Will not damage original oil finishes." Powell purchased some Restorall and used it on his cabinet, being very careful to follow the accompanying instructions exactly. Despite Powell's care, the original Morenci finish was irreparably damaged. When finally refinished, the cabinet was worth less than 20% of what it would have been worth if the Morenci finish had been preserved. If Powell sues Restorall, Inc., to recover the loss he has suffered as a result of the destruction of the Morenci finish, will Powell prevail? | [
"Yes, unless no other known removal technique would have preserved the Morenci finish. ",
"Yes, if the loss would not have occurred had the statement in the brochure been true. ",
"No, unless the product was defective when sold by Restorall, Inc. ",
"No, if the product was not dangerous to persons. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
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Two adjacent, two-story, commercial buildings were owned by Simon. The first floors of both buildings were occupied by various retail establishments. The second floors were rented to various other tenants. Access to the second floor of each building was reached by a common stairway located entirely in Building 1. While the buildings were being used in this manner, Simon sold Building 1 to Edward by warranty deed which made no mention of any rights concerning the stairway. About two years later Simon sold Building 2 to Dennis. The stairway continued to be used by the occupants of both buildings. The stairway became unsafe as a consequence of regular wear and tear. Dennis entered upon Edward's building and began the work of repairing the stairway. Edward demanded that Dennis discontinue the repair work and vacate Edward's building. When Dennis refused, Edward brought an action to enjoin Dennis from continuing the work. Judgment should be for | [
"Edward, because Dennis has no rights in the stairway. ",
"Edward, because Dennis's rights in the stairway do not extend beyond the normal life of the existing structure. ",
"Dennis, because Dennis has an easement in the stairway and an implied right to keep the stairway in repair. ",
"Dennis, because Dennis has a right to take whatever action is necessary to protect himself from possible tort liability to persons using the stairway. "
] | 2 | professional_law |
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Deeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, "The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?" She responded, "I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police." Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should | [
"grant the motion, because the question was leading. ",
"grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ",
"deny the motion, because it is proper rehabilitation of an impeached witness. ",
"deny the motion, because Deeb's attorney \"opened the door\" by asking the question. "
] | 1 | jurisprudence |
|
Park sued Officer Dinet for false arrest. Dinet's defense was that, based on a description he heard over the police radio, he reasonably believed Park was an armed robber. Police radio dispatcher Brigg, reading from a note, had broadcast the description of an armed robber on which Dinet claims to have relied. The defendant offers the following items of evidence: I. Dinet's testimony relating the description he heard. II. Brigg's testimony relating the description he read over the radio. III. The note containing the description Brigg testifies he read over the radio. Which of the following are admissible on the issue of what description Dinet heard? | [
"I and II only.",
"I and III only.",
"II and III only.",
"I, II, and III. "
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Aris was the owner in fee simple of adjoining lots known as Lot 1 and Lot 2. He built a house in which he took up residence on Lot 1. Thereafter, he built a house on Lot 2, which he sold, house and lot, to Baker. Consistent with the contract of sale and purchase, the deed conveying Lot 2 from Aris to Baker contained the following clause: In the event Baker, his heirs or assigns, decide to sell the property hereby conveyed and obtain a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase Lot 2 and the improvements thereon on terms and conditions acceptable to Baker, said Lot 2 and improvements shall be offered to Aris, his heirs or assigns, on the same terms and conditions. Aris, his heirs or assigns, as the case may be, shall have ten days from said offer to accept said offer and thereby to exercise said option. Three years after delivery and recording of the deed and payment of the purchase price, Baker became ill and moved to a climate more compatible with his health. Baker's daughter orally offered to purchase the premises from Baker at its then fair market value. Baker declined his daughter's offer but instead deeded Lot 2 to his daughter as a gift. Immediately thereafter, Baker's daughter sold Lot 2 to Charles at the then fair market value of Lot 2. The sale was completed by the delivery of deed and payment of the purchase price. At no time did Baker or his daughter offer to sell Lot 2 to Aris. Aris learned of the conveyance to Baker's daughter and the sale by Baker's daughter to Charles one week after the conveyance of Lot 2 from Baker's daughter to Charles. Aris promptly brought an appropriate action against Charles to enforce rights created in him by the deed of Aris to Baker. Aris tendered the amount paid by Charles into the court for whatever disposition the court deemed proper. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified by statute. Which of the following will determine whether Aris will prevail? I. The parol evidence rule. II. The Statute of Frauds. III. The type of recording statute of the jurisdiction in question. IV. The Rule Against Perpetuities. | [
"I only.",
"IV only.",
"I and IV only.",
"II and III only."
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
After waiting until all the customers had left, Max entered a small grocery store just before closing time. He went up to the lone clerk in the store and said, "Hand over all the money in the cash register or you will get hurt." The clerk fainted and struck his head on the edge of the counter. As Max went behind the counter to open the cash register, two customers entered the store. Max ran out before he was able to open the register drawer.On this evidence Max could be convicted of | [
"robbery.",
"assault and robbery.",
"attempted robbery.",
"assault and attempted robbery."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Palko is being treated by a physician for asbestosis, an abnormal chest condition that was caused by his on-the-job handling of materials containing asbestos. His physician has told him that the asbestosis is not presently cancerous, but that it considerably increases the risk that he will ultimately develop lung cancer. Palko brought an action for damages, based on strict product liability, against the supplier of the materials that contained asbestos. The court in this jurisdiction has ruled against recovery of damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress in the absence of physical harm. If the supplier is subject to liability to Palko for damages, should the award include damage for emotional distress he has suffered arising from his knowledge of the increased risk that he will develop lung cancer? | [
"No, because Palko's emotional distress did not cause his physical condition. ",
"No, unless the court in this jurisdiction recognizes a cause of action for an increased risk of cancer. ",
"Yes, because the supplier of a dangerous product is strictly liable for the harm it causes. ",
"Yes, because Palko's emotional distress arises from bodily harm caused by his exposure to asbestos. "
] | 3 | professional_law |
|
Police received information from an undercover police officer that she had just seen two men (whom she described) in a red pickup truck selling marijuana to schoolchildren near the city's largest high school. A few minutes later, two police officers saw a pickup truck fitting the description a half block from the high school. The driver of the truck matched the description of one of the men described by the undercover officer. The only passenger was a young woman who was in the back of the truck. The police saw her get out and stand at a nearby bus stop. They stopped the truck and searched the driver. In the pocket of the driver's jacket, the police found a small bottle of pills that they recognized as narcotics. They then broke open a locked toolbox attached to the flatbed of the truck and found a small sealed envelope inside. They opened it and found marijuana. They also found a quantity of cocaine in the glove compartment. After completing their search of the driver and the truck, the police went over to the young woman and searched her purse. In her purse, they found a small quantity of heroin. Both the driver and the young woman were arrested and charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. If the driver moves to suppress the use as evidence of the marijuana and cocaine found in the search of the truck, the court should | [
"grant the motion as to both the marijuana and the cocaine.",
"grant the motion as to the marijuana but deny it as to the cocaine.",
"deny the motion as to the marijuana but grant it as to the cocaine.",
"deny the motion as to both the marijuana and the cocaine."
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Police received information from an undercover police officer that she had just seen two men (whom she described) in a red pickup truck selling marijuana to schoolchildren near the city's largest high school. A few minutes later, two police officers saw a pickup truck fitting the description a half block from the high school. The driver of the truck matched the description of one of the men described by the undercover officer. The only passenger was a young woman who was in the back of the truck. The police saw her get out and stand at a nearby bus stop. They stopped the truck and searched the driver. In the pocket of the driver's jacket, the police found a small bottle of pills that they recognized as narcotics. They then broke open a locked toolbox attached to the flatbed of the truck and found a small sealed envelope inside. They opened it and found marijuana. They also found a quantity of cocaine in the glove compartment. After completing their search of the driver and the truck, the police went over to the young woman and searched her purse. In her purse, they found a small quantity of heroin. Both the driver and the young woman were arrested and charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. If the young woman moves to suppress the use as evidence of the heroin, the court should | [
"grant the motion, because she did not fit the description given by the informant and her mere presence does not justify the search. ",
"grant the motion, because the police should have seized her purse and then obtained a warrant to search it. ",
"deny the motion, because she had been a passenger in the truck and the police had probable cause to search the truck. ",
"deny the motion, because she was planning to leave the scene by bus and so exigent circumstances existed. "
] | 0 | jurisprudence |
|
Len owned two adjoining parcels known as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Both parcels fronted on Main Street and abutted a public alley in the rear. Lot 1 was improved with a commercial building that covered all of the Main Street frontage of Lot 1; there was a large parking lot on the rear of Lot 1 with access from the alley only. Fifteen years ago, Len leased Lot 1 to Tenny for 15 years. Tenny has continuously occupied Lot 1 since that time. Thirteen years ago, without Len's permission, Tenny began to use a driveway on Lot 2 as a better access between Main Street and the parking lot than the alley. Eight years ago, Len conveyed Lot 2 to Owen and, five years ago, Len conveyed Lot 1 to Tenny by a deed that recited "together with all the appurtenances." Until last week, Tenny continuously used the driveway over Lot 2 to Tenny's parking lot in the rear of Lot 1. Last week Owen commenced construction of a building on Lot 2 and blocked the driveway used by Tenny. Tenny has commenced an action against Owen to restrain him from blocking the driveway from Main Street to the parking lot at the rear of Lot 1. The period of time to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is ten years. If Tenny loses, it will be because | [
"Len owned both Lot 1 and Lot 2 until eight years ago.",
"Tenny has access to the parking lot from the alley.",
"mere use of an easement is not adverse possession.",
"no easement was mentioned in the deed from Len to Owen."
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
Dewar, a developer, needing a water well on one of his projects, met several times about the matter with Waterman, a well driller. Subsequently, Waterman sent Dewar an unsigned typewritten form captioned "WELL DRILLING PROPOSAL" and stating various terms the two had discussed but not agreed upon, including a "proposed price of $5,000." The form concluded, "This proposal will not become a contract until signed by you [Dewar] and then returned to and signed by me [Waterman]." Dewar signed the form and returned it to Waterman, who neglected to sign it but promptly began drilling the well at the proposed site on Dewar's project. After drilling for two days, Waterman told Dewar during one of Dewar's daily visits that he would not finish unless Dewar would agree to pay twice the price recited in the written proposal. Dewar refused, Waterman quit, and Dewar hired Subbo to drill the well to completion for a price of $7,500. In an action by Dewar against Waterman for damages, which of the following is the probable decision? | [
"Dewar wins, because his signing of Waterman's form constituted an acceptance of an offer by Waterman. ",
"Dewar wins, because Waterman's commencement of performance constituted an acceptance by Waterman of an offer by Dewar and an implied promise by Waterman to complete the well. ",
"Waterman wins, because he never signed the proposal as required by its terms. ",
"Waterman wins, because his commencement of performance merely prevented Dewar from revoking his offer, made on a form supplied by Waterman, and did not obligate Waterman to complete the well. "
] | 1 | professional_law |
|
In an action brought against Driver by Walker's legal representative, the only proofs that the legal representative offered on liability were that: (1) Walker, a pedestrian, was killed instantly while walking on the shoulder of the highway; (2) Driver was driving the car that struck Walker; and (3) there were no living witnesses to the accident other than Driver, who denied negligence. Assume the jurisdiction has adopted a rule of pure comparative negligence. If, at the end of the plaintiff's case, Driver moves for a directed verdict, the trial judge should | [
"grant the motion, because the legal representative has offered no specific evidence from which reasonable jurors may conclude that Driver was negligent. ",
"grant the motion, because it is just as likely that Walker was negligent as that Driver was negligent. ",
"deny the motion, unless Walker was walking with his back to traffic, in violation of the state highway code. ",
"deny the motion, because, in the circumstances, negligence on the part of Driver may be inferred. "
] | 3 | jurisprudence |
|
Smith joined a neighborhood gang. At a gang meeting, as part of the initiation process, the leader ordered Smith to kill Hardy, a member of a rival gang. Smith refused, saying he no longer wanted to be part of the group. The leader, with the approval of the other members, told Smith that he had become too involved with the gang to quit and that they would kill him if he did not accomplish the murder of Hardy. The next day Smith shot Hardy to death while Hardy was sitting on his motorcycle outside a restaurant. Smith is charged with first-degree murder. First-degree murder is defined in the jurisdiction as the intentional premeditated killing of another. Second-degree murder is all other murder at common law. If Smith killed Hardy because of the threat to his own life, Smith should be found | [
"not guilty, because of the defense of duress. ",
"not guilty, because of the defense of necessity. ",
"guilty of first-degree murder.",
"guilty of second-degree murder."
] | 2 | jurisprudence |
|
Ohner and Planner signed a detailed writing in which Planner, a landscape architect, agreed to landscape and replant Ohner's residential property in accordance with a design prepared by Planner and incorporated in the writing. Ohner agreed to pay $10,000 for the work upon its completion. Ohner's spouse was not a party to the agreement, and had no ownership interest in the premises. For this question only, assume the following facts. At Ohner's insistence, the written Ohner-Planner agreement contained a provision that neither party would be bound unless Ohner's law partner, an avid student of landscaping, should approve Planner's design. Before Planner commenced the work, Ohner's law partner, in the presence of both Ohner and Planner, expressly disapproved the landscaping design. Nevertheless, Ohner ordered Planner to proceed with the work, and Planner reluctantly did so. When Planner's performance was 40% complete, Ohner repudiated his duty, if any, to pay the contract price or any part thereof. If Planner now sues Ohner for damages for breach of contract, which of the following concepts best supports Planner's claim? | [
"Substantial performance.",
"Promissory estoppel.",
"Irrevocable waiver of condition.",
"Unjust enrichment."
] | 2 | professional_law |
|
Arnold and Beverly owned a large tract of land, Blackacre, in fee simple as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. While Beverly was on an extended safari in Kenya, Arnold learned that there were very valuable coal deposits within Blackacre, but he made no attempt to inform Beverly. Thereupon, Arnold conveyed his interest in Blackacre to his wife, Alice, who immediately reconveyed that interest to Arnold. The common-law joint tenancy is unmodified by statute. Shortly thereafter, Arnold was killed in an automobile accident. His will, which was duly probated, specifically devised his one-half interest in Blackacre to Alice. Beverly then returned from Kenya and learned what had happened. Beverly brought an appropriate action against Alice, who claimed a one-half interest in Blackacre, seeking a declaratory judgment that she, Beverly, was the sole owner of Blackacre. In this action, who should prevail? | [
"Alice, because Arnold and Beverly were tenants in common at the time of Arnold's death. ",
"Alice, because Arnold's will severed the joint tenancy. ",
"Beverly, because the joint tenancy was reestablished by Alice's reconveyance to Arnold. ",
"Beverly, because Arnold breached his fiduciary duty as her joint tenant. "
] | 0 | professional_law |
|
At the time of his death last week, Test owned Blackacre, a small farm. By his duly probated will, drawn five years ago, Test did the following: (1) devised Blackacre "to Arthur for the life of Baker, then to Casper"; (2) gave "all the rest, residue and remainder of my Estate, both real and personal, to my friend Fanny." At his death, Test was survived by Arthur, Casper, Sonny (Test's son and sole heir), and Fanny. Baker had died a week before Test. Title to Blackacre is now in | [
"Arthur for life, remainder to Casper. ",
"Casper, in fee simple. ",
"Sonny, in fee simple. ",
"Fanny, in fee simple."
] | 1 | professional_law |