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Evaluation datasets 33

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "25 F.3d 83, 83", "parenthetical": "holding that while witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for their actions in testifying they are not immune for extra-judicial actions such as an alleged conspiracy to present false testimony", "sentence": "Malachowski, 787 F.2d at 712; see also Dory, 25 F.3d at 83 (holding that while witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for their actions in testifying they are not immune for extra-judicial actions such as an alleged conspiracy to present false testimony)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "17 F.3d 1263, 1267", "parenthetical": "applying absolute immunity not only to allegations of perjury but to claims alleging a conspiracy to present perjured testimony", "sentence": "But see Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.1994) (applying absolute immunity not only to allegations of perjury but to claims alleging a conspiracy to present perjured testimony)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "489 F.2d 661, 662-63", "parenthetical": "conducting a de novo review in determining the enforceability of a foreign judgment", "sentence": "See Barrows v. Barrows, 489 F.2d 661, 662-63 (3d Cir.1974) (conducting a de novo review in determining the enforceability of a foreign judgment); see also Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2001) (collecting cases and noting that “domestic courts have not clearly articulated the standard of appellate review of the decision whether to enforce [a] foreign judgment, but appear to be applying a de novo standard”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "237 F.3d 133, 139", "parenthetical": "collecting cases and noting that \"domestic courts have not clearly articulated the standard of appellate review of the decision whether to enforce [a] foreign judgment, but appear to be applying a de novo standard\"", "sentence": "See Barrows v. Barrows, 489 F.2d 661, 662-63 (3d Cir.1974) (conducting a de novo review in determining the enforceability of a foreign judgment); see also Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2001) (collecting cases and noting that “domestic courts have not clearly articulated the standard of appellate review of the decision whether to enforce [a] foreign judgment, but appear to be applying a de novo standard”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "859 F.2d 842, 844", "parenthetical": "recognizing federal court's duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking", "sentence": "Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing federal court’s duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103 L.Ed.2d 839 (1989); see, e.g., In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879, 879-80 (5th Cir.1989) (same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) is questioned)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "884 F.2d 879, 879-80", "parenthetical": "same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 158(d", "sentence": "Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing federal court’s duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103 L.Ed.2d 839 (1989); see, e.g., In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879, 879-80 (5th Cir.1989) (same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) is questioned)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing federal court's duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking", "sentence": "Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing federal court’s duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103 L.Ed.2d 839 (1989); see, e.g., In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879, 879-80 (5th Cir.1989) (same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) is questioned)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "884 F.2d 879, 879-80", "parenthetical": "same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 158(d", "sentence": "Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing federal court’s duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103 L.Ed.2d 839 (1989); see, e.g., In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879, 879-80 (5th Cir.1989) (same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) is questioned)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing federal court's duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking", "sentence": "Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing federal court’s duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103 L.Ed.2d 839 (1989); see, e.g., In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879, 879-80 (5th Cir.1989) (same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) is questioned)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "884 F.2d 879, 879-80", "parenthetical": "same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 158(d", "sentence": "Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing federal court’s duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103 L.Ed.2d 839 (1989); see, e.g., In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879, 879-80 (5th Cir.1989) (same principle applied where bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) is questioned)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "317 U.S. 537, 544-45", "parenthetical": "construing earlier version of FCA to reach \"any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government\"", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "261 F.3d 827, 827", "parenthetical": "doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic's billing service to put false information on Medicare claims", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "261 F.3d 827, 827", "parenthetical": "doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic's billing service to put false information on Medicare claims", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "construing earlier version of FCA to reach \"any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government\"", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "construing earlier version of FCA to reach \"any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government\"", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "261 F.3d 827, 827", "parenthetical": "doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic's billing service to put false information on Medicare claims", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "317 U.S. 537, 544-45", "parenthetical": "construing earlier version of FCA to reach \"any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government\"", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "111 F.3d 943, 943", "parenthetical": "defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "construing earlier version of FCA to reach \"any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government\"", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "111 F.3d 943, 943", "parenthetical": "defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "construing earlier version of FCA to reach \"any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government\"", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "111 F.3d 943, 943", "parenthetical": "defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them", "sentence": "Mackby, 261 F.3d at 827 (doctor caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare where he instructed his clinic’s billing service to put false information on Medicare claims); Krizek, 111 F.3d at 943 (defendant liable where he delegated to his wife authority to submit claims on his .behalf and did not review them); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (construing earlier version of FCA to reach “any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "376 F.3d 577, 586", "parenthetical": "noting that \"detection of the odor of PCP emanating from [the defendant's] person gave the officers the authority to detain [him] temporarily to determine his identity\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir.1999) (“Deputy Justice had[ ] ... reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring based upon the PCP smell emanating from [the defendant’s] bag.”); see also United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that “detection of the odor of PCP emanating from [the defendant’s] person gave the officers the authority to detain [him] temporarily to determine his identity”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "199 F.3d 1143, 1148", "parenthetical": "\"Deputy Justice had[ ] ... reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring based upon the PCP smell emanating from [the defendant's] bag.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir.1999) (“Deputy Justice had[ ] ... reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring based upon the PCP smell emanating from [the defendant’s] bag.”); see also United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that “detection of the odor of PCP emanating from [the defendant’s] person gave the officers the authority to detain [him] temporarily to determine his identity”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff's arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant's erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff's arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant's erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff's arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant's erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff's arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant's erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings", "sentence": "See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 583 A.2d 1180 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in such an action, he/she would have to allege a duty owed, a breach of the duty, and a causal relationship between the negligence and the bringing of criminal proceedings); see also Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.Super. 8, 481 A.2d 1194 (1984) (upholding a verdict against defendant for negligently causing plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent five day incarceration after plaintiff had followed defendant’s erroneous instructions regarding local tax laws)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "548 U.S. 521, 528-30", "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-91", "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-91", "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "482 U.S. 78, 89-91", "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "548 U.S. 521, 528-30", "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "548 U.S. 521, 528-30", "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations", "sentence": "See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison regulations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "951 F.2d 739, 743", "parenthetical": "employer's failure to comply with ERISA's reporting procedures excused because no showing of bad faith or active concealment", "sentence": "See Govoni, 732 F.2d at 252 (collecting cases requiring reliance and prejudice to entitle employees to monetary relief for employer’s procedural violations of ERISA); see also Kreutzer v. A.O. Smith Corp., 951 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir.1991) (employer’s failure to comply with ERISA’s reporting procedures excused because no showing of bad faith or active concealment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "732 F.2d 252, 252", "parenthetical": "collecting cases requiring reliance and prejudice to entitle employees to monetary relief for employer's procedural violations of ERISA", "sentence": "See Govoni, 732 F.2d at 252 (collecting cases requiring reliance and prejudice to entitle employees to monetary relief for employer’s procedural violations of ERISA); see also Kreutzer v. A.O. Smith Corp., 951 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir.1991) (employer’s failure to comply with ERISA’s reporting procedures excused because no showing of bad faith or active concealment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "852 P.2d 1307, 1307", "parenthetical": "inclusion of an unnecessary instruction did not require reversal because it \"did not pose any barrier to the jury giving full consideration to the defendant's theory of defense\"", "sentence": "See Baca, 852 P.2d at 1307 (inclusion of an unnecessary instruction did not require reversal because it \"did not pose any barrier to the jury giving full consideration to the defendant's theory of defense\"); see also People v. Manzanares, 942 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Colo.App.1996) (where there was no evidence that the defendant initiated the fight and the prosecutor did not mention the instruction in closing argument, unwarranted initial aggressor instruction was harmless)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "942 P.2d 1235, 1241", "parenthetical": "where there was no evidence that the defendant initiated the fight and the prosecutor did not mention the instruction in closing argument, unwarranted initial aggressor instruction was harmless", "sentence": "See Baca, 852 P.2d at 1307 (inclusion of an unnecessary instruction did not require reversal because it \"did not pose any barrier to the jury giving full consideration to the defendant's theory of defense\"); see also People v. Manzanares, 942 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Colo.App.1996) (where there was no evidence that the defendant initiated the fight and the prosecutor did not mention the instruction in closing argument, unwarranted initial aggressor instruction was harmless)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "321 F.3d 429, 433", "parenthetical": "presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of SS 802(32", "sentence": "United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of § 802(32)(A)); United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Vickery, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); United States v. Clifford, 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20. (E.D.Va.2002) (same); United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "363 F.3d 118, 121", "parenthetical": "briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading", "sentence": "See also United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading), The only arguable exceptions are United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "321 F.3d 429, 433", "parenthetical": "presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of SS 802(32", "sentence": "United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of § 802(32)(A)); United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Vickery, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); United States v. Clifford, 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20. (E.D.Va.2002) (same); United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "289 F.3d 1329, 1338", "parenthetical": "briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading", "sentence": "See also United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading), The only arguable exceptions are United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "321 F.3d 429, 433", "parenthetical": "presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of SS 802(32", "sentence": "United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of § 802(32)(A)); United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Vickery, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); United States v. Clifford, 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20. (E.D.Va.2002) (same); United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "916 F.2d 1008, 1010", "parenthetical": "briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading", "sentence": "See also United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading), The only arguable exceptions are United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "363 F.3d 118, 121", "parenthetical": "briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading", "sentence": "See also United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading), The only arguable exceptions are United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "806 F.Supp. 232, 235", "parenthetical": "reviewing the Act's legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results", "sentence": "United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of § 802(32)(A)); United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Vickery, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); United States v. Clifford, 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20. (E.D.Va.2002) (same); United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "806 F.Supp. 232, 235", "parenthetical": "reviewing the Act's legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results", "sentence": "United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of § 802(32)(A)); United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Vickery, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); United States v. Clifford, 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20. (E.D.Va.2002) (same); United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "289 F.3d 1329, 1338", "parenthetical": "briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading", "sentence": "See also United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading), The only arguable exceptions are United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "806 F.Supp. 232, 235", "parenthetical": "reviewing the Act's legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results", "sentence": "United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of § 802(32)(A)); United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); United States v. Vickery, 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); United States v. Clifford, 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20. (E.D.Va.2002) (same); United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act’s legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "916 F.2d 1008, 1010", "parenthetical": "briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading", "sentence": "See also United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading), The only arguable exceptions are United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "628 F.2d 1208, 1211", "parenthetical": "Title VII \"contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation\" by a federal employee", "sentence": "Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.”); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1980) (Title VII “contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation” by a federal employee) (citing Brown)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "425 U.S. 820, 832", "parenthetical": "\"Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.\"", "sentence": "Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.”); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1980) (Title VII “contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation” by a federal employee) (citing Brown)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "96 S.Ct. 1961, 1961, 1965", "parenthetical": "\"Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.\"", "sentence": "Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.”); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1980) (Title VII “contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation” by a federal employee) (citing Brown)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "628 F.2d 1208, 1211", "parenthetical": "Title VII \"contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation\" by a federal employee", "sentence": "Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.”); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1980) (Title VII “contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation” by a federal employee) (citing Brown)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "628 F.2d 1208, 1211", "parenthetical": "Title VII \"contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation\" by a federal employee", "sentence": "Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.”); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1980) (Title VII “contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation” by a federal employee) (citing Brown)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.\"", "sentence": "Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him.”); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1980) (Title VII “contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation” by a federal employee) (citing Brown)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68", "parenthetical": "holding that an employee who used his company's credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant's Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims", "sentence": "See Xelo v. Mavros, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants); cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who used his company’s credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant’s Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims); Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs’ purchase of items at local stores using their employer’s credit card)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2005 WL 2385724, at *4", "parenthetical": "holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants", "sentence": "See Xelo v. Mavros, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants); cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who used his company’s credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant’s Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims); Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs’ purchase of items at local stores using their employer’s credit card)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2005 WL 2385724, at *4", "parenthetical": "holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants", "sentence": "See Xelo v. Mavros, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants); cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who used his company’s credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant’s Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims); Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs’ purchase of items at local stores using their employer’s credit card)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "2006 WL 1228863, at *3", "parenthetical": "holding that an employee who used his company's credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant's Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims", "sentence": "See Xelo v. Mavros, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants); cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who used his company’s credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant’s Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims); Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs’ purchase of items at local stores using their employer’s credit card)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293", "parenthetical": "holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs' purchase of items at local stores using their employer's credit card", "sentence": "See Xelo v. Mavros, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants); cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who used his company’s credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant’s Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims); Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs’ purchase of items at local stores using their employer’s credit card)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2005 WL 2385724, at *4", "parenthetical": "holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants", "sentence": "See Xelo v. Mavros, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that a waiter at a local restaurant was not engaged in commerce even though he made bank deposits for defendants); cf. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1267-68, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who used his company’s credit card failed to adduce enough evidence to avoid the defendant’s Rule 50 motion on his FLSA claims); Kitchings v. Florida United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the FLSA by virtue of the plaintiffs’ purchase of items at local stores using their employer’s credit card)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting an \"as applied\" challenge to Washington's civil commitment statute", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting an \"as applied\" challenge to Washington's civil commitment statute", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting an \"as applied\" challenge to Washington's civil commitment statute", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting an \"as applied\" challenge to Washington's civil commitment statute", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting an \"as applied\" challenge to Washington's civil commitment statute", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting an \"as applied\" challenge to Washington's civil commitment statute", "sentence": "Doe, 120 F.3d at 1279 (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment sanction against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge)); see also Seling v. Young, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to Washington’s civil commitment statute)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "388 F.3d 984, 988", "parenthetical": "employee put on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an internal investigation, who was restored to her position upon the termination of the investigation, suffered no adverse employment action", "sentence": "See, e.g., Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir.2004) (employee put on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an internal investigation, who was restored to her position upon the termination of the investigation, suffered no adverse employment action); O’Dell v. Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F.Supp.2d 378, 396 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (\"[A]n alleged deficiency in an employer’s internal complaint procedure or internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint'— even if the deficiency is little more than an attempt to strengthen an employer’s defense-is not a retaliatory adverse employment action.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "285 F.3d 705, 715", "parenthetical": "an internal investigation is no adverse employment action where employee \"suffered no material disadvantage in a term or condition of employment as a result of the investigations\" in First Amendment Retaliation context", "sentence": "Cf. Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 715 (8th Cir.2002) (an internal investigation is no adverse employment action where employee “suffered no material disadvantage in a term or condition of employment as a result of the investigations” in First Amendment Retaliation context); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Richards v. State of Connecticut Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.Supp.2d 278, 289-90 (D.Conn.2004) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "153 F.Supp.2d 378, 396", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n alleged deficiency in an employer's internal complaint procedure or internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint'-- even if the deficiency is little more than an attempt to strengthen an employer's defense-is not a retaliatory adverse employment action.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir.2004) (employee put on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an internal investigation, who was restored to her position upon the termination of the investigation, suffered no adverse employment action); O’Dell v. Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F.Supp.2d 378, 396 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (\"[A]n alleged deficiency in an employer’s internal complaint procedure or internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint'— even if the deficiency is little more than an attempt to strengthen an employer’s defense-is not a retaliatory adverse employment action.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "285 F.3d 705, 715", "parenthetical": "an internal investigation is no adverse employment action where employee \"suffered no material disadvantage in a term or condition of employment as a result of the investigations\" in First Amendment Retaliation context", "sentence": "Cf. Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 715 (8th Cir.2002) (an internal investigation is no adverse employment action where employee “suffered no material disadvantage in a term or condition of employment as a result of the investigations” in First Amendment Retaliation context); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Richards v. State of Connecticut Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.Supp.2d 278, 289-90 (D.Conn.2004) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "members of municipal council acting in legislative capacity are absolutely immune from damages suits under SS 1983", "sentence": "See, e.g., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir.1983) (members of municipal council acting in legislative capacity are absolutely immune from damages suits under § 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827 (11th Cir.1982) (city commissioners absolutely immune for legislative acts), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980) (council members, as individuals, have absolute immunity in passing ordinances); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.1980) (state and regional legislators have absolute federal common law immunity from liability for damages occasioned by their legislative acts)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts, but no such immunity protects the county", "sentence": "But see Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.1983) (municipal officers are absolutely immune when acting in legislative capacity; municipality itself is liable when agents act pursuant to established policy or custom); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1982) (members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts, but no such immunity protects the county); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.1981) (local legislators, including mayor, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for conduct in the furtherance of their duties; city itself, however, is not immune), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1251, 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "council members, as individuals, have absolute immunity in passing ordinances", "sentence": "See, e.g., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir.1983) (members of municipal council acting in legislative capacity are absolutely immune from damages suits under § 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827 (11th Cir.1982) (city commissioners absolutely immune for legislative acts), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980) (council members, as individuals, have absolute immunity in passing ordinances); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.1980) (state and regional legislators have absolute federal common law immunity from liability for damages occasioned by their legislative acts)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts, but no such immunity protects the county", "sentence": "But see Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.1983) (municipal officers are absolutely immune when acting in legislative capacity; municipality itself is liable when agents act pursuant to established policy or custom); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1982) (members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts, but no such immunity protects the county); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.1981) (local legislators, including mayor, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for conduct in the furtherance of their duties; city itself, however, is not immune), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1251, 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "state and regional legislators have absolute federal common law immunity from liability for damages occasioned by their legislative acts", "sentence": "See, e.g., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir.1983) (members of municipal council acting in legislative capacity are absolutely immune from damages suits under § 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827 (11th Cir.1982) (city commissioners absolutely immune for legislative acts), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980) (council members, as individuals, have absolute immunity in passing ordinances); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.1980) (state and regional legislators have absolute federal common law immunity from liability for damages occasioned by their legislative acts)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts, but no such immunity protects the county", "sentence": "But see Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.1983) (municipal officers are absolutely immune when acting in legislative capacity; municipality itself is liable when agents act pursuant to established policy or custom); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1982) (members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts, but no such immunity protects the county); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.1981) (local legislators, including mayor, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for conduct in the furtherance of their duties; city itself, however, is not immune), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1251, 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237", "parenthetical": "holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's instructions", "sentence": "See Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind.1991) (holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions); Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.1983) (holding that “[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction”); Barnes v. State, 435 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Ind.1982) (same); see also Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that “we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court’s erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel”). Consequently, this argument must fail." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "6 F.3d 265, 271", "parenthetical": "rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that \"we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court's erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel\"", "sentence": "See Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind.1991) (holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions); Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.1983) (holding that “[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction”); Barnes v. State, 435 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Ind.1982) (same); see also Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that “we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court’s erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel”). Consequently, this argument must fail." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction\"", "sentence": "See Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind.1991) (holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions); Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.1983) (holding that “[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction”); Barnes v. State, 435 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Ind.1982) (same); see also Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that “we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court’s erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel”). Consequently, this argument must fail." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "6 F.3d 265, 271", "parenthetical": "rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that \"we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court's erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel\"", "sentence": "See Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind.1991) (holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions); Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.1983) (holding that “[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction”); Barnes v. State, 435 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Ind.1982) (same); see also Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that “we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court’s erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel”). Consequently, this argument must fail." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "537 U.S. 475, 475", "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is \"actually administered]\" in trust", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is \"actually administered]\" in trust", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "537 U.S. 507, 507-13", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on \"virtually every aspect of forest management\"", "sentence": "Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. 2961; id. at 220, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding specific fiduciary duties of timber management in light of a statutory and regulatory'scheme creating obligations on “virtually every aspect of forest management”); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475, 123 S.Ct. 1126 (finding specific fiduciary duties to maintain and preserve property that is “actually administered]” in trust). But where the relevant statute cannot be fairly read as imposing the specific fiduciary duty alleged to be breached, the Court has refused to impose the obligation on the government." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "782 F.3d 668, 668-71", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "782 F.3d 668, 668-71", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "537 U.S. 507, 507-13", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "782 F.3d 668, 668-71", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "782 F.3d 668, 668-71", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "782 F.3d 668, 668-71", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "782 F.3d 668, 668-71", "parenthetical": "finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation", "sentence": "See Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 507-13, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (finding no specific fiduciary duties to ensure a specific rate of return on coal leases or to proscribe ex parte communications in an administrative appeal process); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2329-30, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (201-1) (finding no specific fiduciary duty to disclose, all information related to the administration of Indian trusts); see also Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668-71 (finding no specific fiduciary duty to ensure adequate water quality on the Hopi reservation)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "819 F.2d 12, 15", "parenthetical": "finding that prior state proceeding barred SS 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief", "sentence": "See id. at 282; see also Antonsen v. Ward, 943 F.2d 198, 203-04 (2d Cir.1991) (applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 29-30 (2d Cir.1986) (following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal § 1983 action); Koncelik v. East Hampton, 781 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding); cf. Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that prior state proceeding barred § 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "943 F.2d 198, 203-04", "parenthetical": "applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action", "sentence": "See id. at 282; see also Antonsen v. Ward, 943 F.2d 198, 203-04 (2d Cir.1991) (applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 29-30 (2d Cir.1986) (following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal § 1983 action); Koncelik v. East Hampton, 781 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding); cf. Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that prior state proceeding barred § 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "802 F.2d 21, 29-30", "parenthetical": "following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal SS 1983 action", "sentence": "See id. at 282; see also Antonsen v. Ward, 943 F.2d 198, 203-04 (2d Cir.1991) (applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 29-30 (2d Cir.1986) (following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal § 1983 action); Koncelik v. East Hampton, 781 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding); cf. Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that prior state proceeding barred § 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "819 F.2d 12, 15", "parenthetical": "finding that prior state proceeding barred SS 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief", "sentence": "See id. at 282; see also Antonsen v. Ward, 943 F.2d 198, 203-04 (2d Cir.1991) (applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 29-30 (2d Cir.1986) (following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal § 1983 action); Koncelik v. East Hampton, 781 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding); cf. Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that prior state proceeding barred § 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "819 F.2d 12, 15", "parenthetical": "finding that prior state proceeding barred SS 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief", "sentence": "See id. at 282; see also Antonsen v. Ward, 943 F.2d 198, 203-04 (2d Cir.1991) (applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 29-30 (2d Cir.1986) (following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal § 1983 action); Koncelik v. East Hampton, 781 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding); cf. Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that prior state proceeding barred § 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "781 F.Supp. 152, 156", "parenthetical": "following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding", "sentence": "See id. at 282; see also Antonsen v. Ward, 943 F.2d 198, 203-04 (2d Cir.1991) (applying analysis as' in Davidson, finding that plaintiff could not have pursued damages for pain and suffering in prior .state court action); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 29-30 (2d Cir.1986) (following Davidson, holding that prior Article 78 proceeding does not bar subsequent federal § 1983 action); Koncelik v. East Hampton, 781 F.Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (following Davidson, finding that res judicata does not apply where initial litigation was Article 78 proceeding); cf. Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that prior state proceeding barred § 1983 action under res judicata because prior state proceeding was not habeas corpus, but for declaratory relief)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "232 F.Supp.3d 587, 587-89", "parenthetical": "finding that relator's voluntary dismissal of his qui tarn suit precluded him from recovering, under \"alternate remedy\" theory, a portion of the proceeds the government ultimately obtained", "sentence": "See L-3 Commc’ns, 232 F.Supp.3d at 587-89, 2017 WL 464431, at *4-5 (finding that relator’s voluntary dismissal of his qui tarn suit precluded him from recovering, under “alternate remedy” theory, a portion of the proceeds the government ultimately obtained); see also N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 174 F.Supp.3d at 700 (finding relators’ motion for a share of proceeds recovered “premature” because a motion to dismiss the qui tarn action was pending and, thus, relators “may ultimately lack a valid qui tarn claim”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "174 F.Supp.3d 700, 700", "parenthetical": "finding relators' motion for a share of proceeds recovered \"premature\" because a motion to dismiss the qui tarn action was pending and, thus, relators \"may ultimately lack a valid qui tarn claim\"", "sentence": "See L-3 Commc’ns, 232 F.Supp.3d at 587-89, 2017 WL 464431, at *4-5 (finding that relator’s voluntary dismissal of his qui tarn suit precluded him from recovering, under “alternate remedy” theory, a portion of the proceeds the government ultimately obtained); see also N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 174 F.Supp.3d at 700 (finding relators’ motion for a share of proceeds recovered “premature” because a motion to dismiss the qui tarn action was pending and, thus, relators “may ultimately lack a valid qui tarn claim”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "174 F.Supp.3d 700, 700", "parenthetical": "finding relators' motion for a share of proceeds recovered \"premature\" because a motion to dismiss the qui tarn action was pending and, thus, relators \"may ultimately lack a valid qui tarn claim\"", "sentence": "See L-3 Commc’ns, 232 F.Supp.3d at 587-89, 2017 WL 464431, at *4-5 (finding that relator’s voluntary dismissal of his qui tarn suit precluded him from recovering, under “alternate remedy” theory, a portion of the proceeds the government ultimately obtained); see also N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 174 F.Supp.3d at 700 (finding relators’ motion for a share of proceeds recovered “premature” because a motion to dismiss the qui tarn action was pending and, thus, relators “may ultimately lack a valid qui tarn claim”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2017 WL 464431, at *4-5", "parenthetical": "finding that relator's voluntary dismissal of his qui tarn suit precluded him from recovering, under \"alternate remedy\" theory, a portion of the proceeds the government ultimately obtained", "sentence": "See L-3 Commc’ns, 232 F.Supp.3d at 587-89, 2017 WL 464431, at *4-5 (finding that relator’s voluntary dismissal of his qui tarn suit precluded him from recovering, under “alternate remedy” theory, a portion of the proceeds the government ultimately obtained); see also N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 174 F.Supp.3d at 700 (finding relators’ motion for a share of proceeds recovered “premature” because a motion to dismiss the qui tarn action was pending and, thus, relators “may ultimately lack a valid qui tarn claim”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "495 U.S. 711, 717", "parenthetical": "\"There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "837 F.2d 1249, 1261", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of SS 2291(c", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "837 F.2d 1249, 1261", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of SS 2291(c", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "837 F.2d 1249, 1261", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of SS 2291(c", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "448 F.3d 444, 444", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of SS 2291(c", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "495 U.S. 711, 717", "parenthetical": "\"There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "448 F.3d 444, 444", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of SS 2291(c", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "448 F.3d 444, 444", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of SS 2291(c", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.1988) (“Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of § 2291(c)(1).”), cited in Mejia, 448 F.3d at 444; United States v. Bridgewater, 175 F.Supp.2d 141, 146 (D.P.R.2001) (“The Mansfield Amendment regulates government action prescriptively; it does not provide repercussions for violations of the Amendment.”); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (“There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "667 F.2d 1046, 1046", "parenthetical": "\"The injury and attendant liability became predictable precisely because it was discovered that past occurrences were likely to have set in motion injurious processes for which Keene could be held liable.\"", "sentence": "Keene Corp., supra, 667 F.2d at 1046 (“The injury and attendant liability became predictable precisely because it was discovered that past occurrences were likely to have set in motion injurious processes for which Keene could be held liable.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "89 F.3d 995, 995-96", "parenthetical": "holding that insured's initial discharge of contaminated rinsewater began \"continuous indivisible process resulting in damage\"", "sentence": "See also Chemical Leaman, supra, 89 F.3d at 995-96 (holding that insured’s initial discharge of contaminated rinsewater began “continuous indivisible process resulting in damage”); New Castle County, supra, 725 F.Supp. at 812 (holding that “injurious process” was initiated before leachate contamination); DeYoung & Hickman, supra, 17 N. Ky. L.Rev. at 295 (concluding that dumping of waste in landfill is directly analogous to inhalation of asbestos); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 28 F.Supp.2d at 454 (recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "28 F.Supp.2d 454, 454", "parenthetical": "recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater", "sentence": "See also Chemical Leaman, supra, 89 F.3d at 995-96 (holding that insured’s initial discharge of contaminated rinsewater began “continuous indivisible process resulting in damage”); New Castle County, supra, 725 F.Supp. at 812 (holding that “injurious process” was initiated before leachate contamination); DeYoung & Hickman, supra, 17 N. Ky. L.Rev. at 295 (concluding that dumping of waste in landfill is directly analogous to inhalation of asbestos); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 28 F.Supp.2d at 454 (recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "667 F.2d 1046, 1046", "parenthetical": "\"The injury and attendant liability became predictable precisely because it was discovered that past occurrences were likely to have set in motion injurious processes for which Keene could be held liable.\"", "sentence": "Keene Corp., supra, 667 F.2d at 1046 (“The injury and attendant liability became predictable precisely because it was discovered that past occurrences were likely to have set in motion injurious processes for which Keene could be held liable.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "360 U.S. 423, 437-38", "parenthetical": "due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer", "sentence": "See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-38, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569-71, 85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (state could not punish individuals for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "745 F.2d 950, 951", "parenthetical": "where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures", "sentence": "Compare Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir.1984) (where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "745 F.2d 950, 951", "parenthetical": "where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures", "sentence": "Compare Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir.1984) (where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67", "parenthetical": "due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer", "sentence": "See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-38, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569-71, 85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (state could not punish individuals for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer", "sentence": "See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-38, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569-71, 85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (state could not punish individuals for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "745 F.2d 950, 951", "parenthetical": "where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures", "sentence": "Compare Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir.1984) (where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "379 U.S. 559, 569-71", "parenthetical": "state could not punish individuals for demonstrating \"near\" a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations \"near\" the courthouse", "sentence": "See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-38, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569-71, 85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (state could not punish individuals for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "745 F.2d 950, 951", "parenthetical": "where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures", "sentence": "Compare Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir.1984) (where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84", "parenthetical": "state could not punish individuals for demonstrating \"near\" a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations \"near\" the courthouse", "sentence": "See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-38, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569-71, 85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (state could not punish individuals for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "745 F.2d 950, 951", "parenthetical": "where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures", "sentence": "Compare Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir.1984) (where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "state could not punish individuals for demonstrating \"near\" a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations \"near\" the courthouse", "sentence": "See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-38, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (due process precluded conviction of individuals who refused to answer questions asked by a state investigating commission which itself had erroneously provided assurances that the defendants had a privilege under state law to refuse to answer); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569-71, 85 S.Ct. 476, 483-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (state could not punish individuals for demonstrating “near” a courthouse where police officials had advised the demonstrators that they could meet where they did without violating the statutory pro scription against demonstrations “near” the courthouse)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "745 F.2d 950, 951", "parenthetical": "where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures", "sentence": "Compare Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir.1984) (where INS notice procedure afforded illegal aliens only the minimum requirements of due process, there would be a denial of due process if the INS failed to follow its own procedures)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "295 Kan. 339, 354", "parenthetical": "\"We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga's invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), (“We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga’s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "284 Kan. 23, 23", "parenthetical": "upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences", "sentence": "See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), (“We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga’s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "284 Kan. 23, 23", "parenthetical": "upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences", "sentence": "See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), (“We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga’s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga's invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), (“We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga’s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga's invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), (“We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga’s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "284 Kan. 23, 23", "parenthetical": "upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences", "sentence": "See State v. Astorga, 295 Kan. 339, 354, 284 P.3d 279 (2012), (“We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the hard 40/hard 50 sentencing scheme in light of both Ring and Apprendi, and we decline Astorga’s invitation to reconsider our prior decisions.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Astorga v. Kansas, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013); State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (citing cases); State v Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 423-24, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (same); see also Johnson, 284 Kan. at 23 (upholding constitutionality of hard 50 scheme after noting McMillan had not been overruled despite several post -Apprendi decisions invalidating judicial factfinding exposing defendants to increased maximum sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "269 F.3d 439, 453", "parenthetical": "evidence is properly excluded when alternative theory of admissibility is not timely offered", "sentence": "See Jimenez v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 453 (4th Cir.2001) (evidence is properly excluded when alternative theory of admissibility is not timely offered); see also Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., 390 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir.2004) (issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered absent exceptional circumstances)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "390 F.3d 328, 334", "parenthetical": "issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered absent exceptional circumstances", "sentence": "See Jimenez v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 453 (4th Cir.2001) (evidence is properly excluded when alternative theory of admissibility is not timely offered); see also Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., 390 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir.2004) (issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered absent exceptional circumstances)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "716 F.2d 418, 423", "parenthetical": "government did not argue its failure to warn of dangerous diving conditions was discretionary", "sentence": "Berkovitz, 108 S.Ct. at 1964; see Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 127; see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir.1983) (“While the government’s decision to encourage recreation at Eldorado Canyon is the exercise of a discretionary function, the government’s duty to warn of or guard against hazards resulting from that decision may nonetheless be actionable”); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876-77 (10th Cir.1976) (government’s failure to warn about hazards of thermal heated pool not discretionary, even though decision to leave some park areas undeveloped and hazardous was discretionary); cf. Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir.1983) (government did not argue its failure to warn of dangerous diving conditions was discretionary)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "713 F.2d 504, 515", "parenthetical": "\"While the government's decision to encourage recreation at Eldorado Canyon is the exercise of a discretionary function, the government's duty to warn of or guard against hazards resulting from that decision may nonetheless be actionable\"", "sentence": "Berkovitz, 108 S.Ct. at 1964; see Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 127; see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir.1983) (“While the government’s decision to encourage recreation at Eldorado Canyon is the exercise of a discretionary function, the government’s duty to warn of or guard against hazards resulting from that decision may nonetheless be actionable”); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876-77 (10th Cir.1976) (government’s failure to warn about hazards of thermal heated pool not discretionary, even though decision to leave some park areas undeveloped and hazardous was discretionary); cf. Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir.1983) (government did not argue its failure to warn of dangerous diving conditions was discretionary)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "546 F.2d 872, 876-77", "parenthetical": "government's failure to warn about hazards of thermal heated pool not discretionary, even though decision to leave some park areas undeveloped and hazardous was discretionary", "sentence": "Berkovitz, 108 S.Ct. at 1964; see Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 127; see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir.1983) (“While the government’s decision to encourage recreation at Eldorado Canyon is the exercise of a discretionary function, the government’s duty to warn of or guard against hazards resulting from that decision may nonetheless be actionable”); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876-77 (10th Cir.1976) (government’s failure to warn about hazards of thermal heated pool not discretionary, even though decision to leave some park areas undeveloped and hazardous was discretionary); cf. Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir.1983) (government did not argue its failure to warn of dangerous diving conditions was discretionary)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "716 F.2d 418, 423", "parenthetical": "government did not argue its failure to warn of dangerous diving conditions was discretionary", "sentence": "Berkovitz, 108 S.Ct. at 1964; see Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 127; see also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir.1983) (“While the government’s decision to encourage recreation at Eldorado Canyon is the exercise of a discretionary function, the government’s duty to warn of or guard against hazards resulting from that decision may nonetheless be actionable”); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876-77 (10th Cir.1976) (government’s failure to warn about hazards of thermal heated pool not discretionary, even though decision to leave some park areas undeveloped and hazardous was discretionary); cf. Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir.1983) (government did not argue its failure to warn of dangerous diving conditions was discretionary)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63", "parenthetical": "holding that curative press releases containing a \"grain of truth\" did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "501 U.S. 1097, 1097", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow\"", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2760, 2760-61", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow\"", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63", "parenthetical": "holding that curative press releases containing a \"grain of truth\" did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63", "parenthetical": "holding that curative press releases containing a \"grain of truth\" did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "478 F.2d 1281, 1297", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts\"", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63", "parenthetical": "holding that curative press releases containing a \"grain of truth\" did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "489 F.2d 579, 603", "parenthetical": "noting that \"burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis\" in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of \"full and honest disclosure\"", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis\" in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of \"full and honest disclosure\"", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63", "parenthetical": "holding that curative press releases containing a \"grain of truth\" did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations", "sentence": "See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that curative press releases containing a “grain of truth” did not prevent deception of the market due to previous misrepresentations); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1097, 111 S.Ct. at 2760-61 (stating that “[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow”); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that “it is not sufficient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts”); cf. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974) (noting that “burying the facts, or giving them less than significant emphasis” in a proxy statement can deprive shareholders of “full and honest disclosure”)." }