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WSJ911031-0012 | Term Limits Are Constitutional ---- By William H. Mellor | State statutes that bar first-time candidates from running for Congress have been held to add to the qualifications set forth in the Constitution and have been invalidated. For example, the 1972 decision in Dillon v. Fiorina struck down a New Mexico law requiring candidates entering a congressional primary to have belonged to their party for a year and to pay a registration fee. But state statutes that simply limit the tenure of existing congressional officeholders have not yet been tested in court. The constitutionality of such state term limits may, however, be tested next month. Florida's attorney general has asked its state Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on a term-limit initiative that would limit the state's members of Congress to eight consecutive years in office. Three U.S. House members, led by Democrat Larry Smith, have filed briefs asking the court to rule state term limits unconstitutional. The court will hear arguments Friday, and may rule later this month. By 6 to 1, the California Supreme Court ruled this month that the state's new term-limit law was constitutional. The court said the "state's strong interests in protecting against an entrenched, dynastic legislative bureaucracy" outweighed objections that term limits restrict voter choice at the ballot box. But the court's decision affected only term limits on state officials; federal officeholders weren't included in California's limits. Nevertheless, the California decision demolished many of the legal arguments made by incumbents. They claimed there is a "fundamental right to be a candidate for public office," which they found among the "associational rights" in the First Amendment. They argued that voters were denied the right to be represented by the same legislator indefinitely, and that term limits discriminated against incumbents and denied them their right to equal protection of the laws. California's highest court rejected all of these arguments. Term limitations do not restrict the right to vote for a candidate because of his or her ideology or party. Therefore, they do not deprive voters of the freedom to associate with candidates based on their viewpoint or with any particular party. Rather, they prevent citizens from voting for a particular candidate after he has served in office a set number of years. They may vote for that candidate again after a "waiting period" has ended. The restriction is imposed in a non-discriminatory manner on all candidates regardless of viewpoint or party affiliation. In its 1972 decision Bullock v. Carter and again in its 1982 decision Clements v. Fashing, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a particular candidate has no "fundamental" right to ballot access or to run for office. Federal courts have upheld many state restrictions on who may qualify for ballot access. They have never held reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions on who may run a violation of the right to vote. Likewise, term limits do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court has found that clause violated only in those cases where ballot access restrictions discriminate against the poor and against new, small or independent party candidates. Unlike the age, residency and citizenship requirements, term limits do not prevent any non-incumbent from running for Congress. Nor do they prevent a House member who has reached a term limit from running for the U.S. Senate or vice versa. Nor do they limit an incumbent who leaves office for a period of time (six years in Washington state) from running again. Moreover, term limits do not in any way modify the age, residency or citizenship requirements in the Constitution. Consequently, the argument that term limits are "qualifications" just like those already in the Constitution -- and that therefore they can be added only by amending the Constitution -- isn't particularly convincing. Viewed in this way, term limits imposed by states would be constitutional. The Supreme Court has long held that the power to ensure a fair electoral system, truly responsive representation in Congress and a high degree of citizen participation in elections rests with the states. In its 1974 decision Storer v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld a California law that prohibited an independent candidate from running for Congress because he had changed his registration to Independent less than 11 months before the election. This law was found not to be an improper additional qualification because a valid state interest was pursued. In explaining that interest, the court recognized that "there must be a substantial regulation of elections {by the states} if they are to be fair and honest," and if some sort of order is to accompany the democratic process. As recently as June of this year, the Supreme Court again reiterated that the states have reserved to themselves, via the Tenth Amendment, "the power to regulate elections." Elsewhere, the court in 1988 ruled in South Carolina v. Baker, that certain "extraordinary defects in the national political process might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment." The court has not defined what it means by "extraordinary defects," but surely the fact that 98% of House incumbents are routinely re-elected and that one out of five incumbents ran with no major-party opposition in 1990 might qualify. Where the incumbent is almost the pre-ordained winner in an election, there is no effective competition of ideas or candidates and incumbents are less responsive to the will of the electorate. On this basis, term limits merely ensure a fair election system and the "republican form of government" guaranteed the states under the Constitution. Should the court rule against term limits by the states, numerous other ballot access restrictions will likely be passed that have many of the same effects as term limits. One option would limit an incumbents' access to the ballot. States could allow an incumbent who has served a set number of years in the same office to run again, but only as a "write-in" candidate. Presumably, if an incumbent were truly effective and popular he wouldn't find that a crushing obstacle. Two sitting U.S. House Members won their first terms as write-in candidates. Incumbents would certainly have the resources to educate voters in write-in procedures. Another option would require candidates to have "ballot statements" appear next to their names. Each candidate would have to answer the question: "Will you adhere to a -- year term limit?" The answer would appear on the ballot so voters would know a candidate's views on term limits. Many such ballot restrictions have been upheld by the courts. Incumbents should take heed. If they count only on the courts to safeguard their political castles, they may be in for a rude surprise. --- Mr. Mellor is president and general counsel of the Institute for Justice, a Washington, D.C., litigation and educational organization. | house incumbents;congressional regulation;term limitations;u.s. house members;fair election system;congressional officeholders;term limits;constitution;new term-limit law;supreme court |
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WSJ911106-0109 | Liberals for Term Limits ---- By John H. Fund | One reason is that term limits would open up politics to many people now excluded from office by career incumbents. These include blacks, other minorities, and women. Most of the authors of Washington state's term limit are liberal Democrats who want to break up "the old-boy network." One of the authors, Sherry Bockwinkel, says "You won't see white incumbents hanging on to districts that long ago became largely minority." "Incumbency is the glass ceiling of American politics," says Kay Slaughter, the Democratic candidate in a special U.S. House election in Virginia yesterday. She thinks term limits will give women more opportunities in politics; her GOP opponent refused to support federal term limits. Former Rep. Shirley Chisholm, who in 1972 was the first black to run for a majorparty presidential nomination, says "longterm incumbency is a big reason that Congress no longer works and isn't representative. We need a lot more turnover." Colorado Rep. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, the only American Indian in Congress, backed a term limit measure last year that restricted his own tenure. Term limits for Congress have been supported by some of history's most prominent Democrats. Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy both endorsed the idea while they were president. Today, former California Governor Jerry Brown says advocacy of term limits is a key element in his populist presidential campaign against a "constipated" political system. "Term limits are a castor oil that democracy needs to take," he says. Last year, as head of the California Democratic Party he refused to sign a party slate mailer against term limits. "I saw incumbents spend their time fund-raising and worrying about how to stay in office. It's time more candidates thought of politics as a calling instead of a career." Mr. Brown says arguments that legislative staff and the unelected bureaucracy would gain power under term limits are simply proof that "we must curb the excessive power of those political players as well." He notes both groups opposed term limits in his home state; the California initiative included budget cuts that retired more than 700 legislative staffers. Other former Democratic governors who favor term limits include Vermont's Madeleine Kunin and Colorado's RichardLamm. "Breaking the gridlock of incumbency could throw the doors open to new people and new ideas that would make politics rewarding, meaningful and fun," says Ms. Kunin. "The system needs a kick in the rear," says Mr. Lamm. "Term limits have flaws, but they will provide badly needed competition." While many prominent Democrats support term limits, party "apparatchiks" are dead set against them. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee has quietly put out the word that it will blacklist political consultants who advise candidates to back term limits and has told pollsters not to ask term-limit questions. Intimidation like that has slowed support for term limits among Democratic officeholders, but there are exceptions. In Massachusetts, the state's Democratic attorney general and secretary of state both favor term limits. In Texas, Gov. Ann Richards says she "would be glad" to sign a bill limiting congressional and legislative terms. Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock also leans in favor of term limits. Journalists are under fewer constraints than elected officials in expressing enthusiasm for term limits. Among those who have, and who will never be accused of being card-carrying Republicans, are: Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen, syndicated columnist Richard Reeves, the National Journal's Neal Peirce and Time magazine's Michael Kramer. Hendrik Hertzberg, a former speechwriter for Jimmy Carter who edited the New Republic until last month, agrees term limits would mean a loss of some distinguished legislators. However, he concludes "it would be a cost worth paying to be rid of the much larger number of time-servers who have learned nothing from longevity in office except cynicism, complacency and a sense of diminished possibility." Columnist Ellen Goodman says "We have to learn once again that ideal public service is, by definition, temporary." She thinks the current Congress proves "the politically privileged class has become more isolated than experienced." Such recent body-blows to Congress as Kitegate and the Clarence Thomas hearings have convinced some liberal media outlets to reevaluate term limits. The liberal Seattle Times, Washington state's largest newspaper, stunned its readers by endorsing term limits. WCVB-TV, the ABC affiliate in Boston, has often had its liberal editorials called "the Boston Globe of the airwaves." In April, it denounced term limits as "the latest anti-government fad to sweep the country." Last month, the station made a highly unusual about-face and endorsed term limits for Congress: "We're not going to get {leadership} till we have a massive infusion of new blood." Among Democratic Party activists, James Calaway of Texas is typical of those who now favor term limits. Currently the national treasurer for the American Civil Liberties Union, Mr. Calaway was also chairman of the national Democratic Party's $15 million "Victory Fund" in 1988. He says term limits would mean "we're governed by citizens who go home after their service and not permanent, elitist people who never leave office." Other Texas Democrats who have joined him include Frances "Sissy" Farenthold, who cochaired George McGovern's 1972 national campaign, and Leonel Castillo, Jimmy Carter's director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Neo-liberals, who believe that centralized bureaucracies are the biggest obstacle to reforming government, are also warming to term limits. David Osborne, who became sort of a guru for neo-liberals with his book "Laboratories of Democracy," speaks for many reform-minded liberals when he says, "Term limits are necessary to shake things up and disrupt the careerist mindset that leads to so much cowardice in elected officials." While Speaker Tom Foley reacts to term limits the way that Linus in the comic strip "Peanuts" would if his security blanket were taken away, some House Democrats think his concern that term limits would result in large GOP gains in Congress is a fantasy. "People who say term limits are a Republican plot to oust incumbents should know that a majority of open seats are won by Democrats," says Rep. Andy Jacobs of Indiana. Indeed, the Democratic Party could actually be helped by term limits, according to former Oklahoma state legislator Cleta Mitchell, a self-described "liberal feminist" who works with the Denver-based term limit group Americans Back in Charge. "Democrats must offer voters more than the simple powers of incumbency," she says. "So long as our party is dominated by cynical veterans it will turn off the young people who are our party's future." No one suggests the drive to enact term limits will be easy -- especially in states that ban voter initiatives. But there are already signs that business lobbies, labor unions and other term limit opponents are relying more on convincing judges -- starting with Florida's heavily politicized state Supreme Court -- to overturn state term limits than on trying to convince voters to reject the idea. The leading anti-term limit group, Let the People Decide, has closed its Washington, D.C., offices and been reduced to a skeleton staff. --- Mr. Fund is a Journal editorial writer. | california initiative;liberal democrats;american politics;democratic officeholders;career incumbents;political system;term limits;special u.s. house election;term limit measure |
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WSJ911121-0136 | Gun Control Sprouts From Racist Soil ---- By Roy Innis | When his owner died in 1846, Scott sued in the state courts of Missouri for his freedom, on the ground that he had lived in free territory. He won his case, but it was reversed in the Missouri Supreme Court. Scott appealed to the federal courts, since the person he was actually suing, John Sanford, the executor of the estate that owned Scott, lived in New York. It was in that setting that Chief Justice Taney made his infamous rulings: 1. That black people, whether free or slave, were not citizens of the U.S.; therefore, they had no standing in court. 2. Scott was denied freedom. 3. The Missouri Compromise was ruled unconstitutional. Well known to most students of race relations is the former attorney general and secretary of the Treasury's pre-civil war dictum that black people "being of an inferior order" had "no right which any white man was bound to respect." Much less known are his equally racist pronouncements denying black people, whether slave or free, specific constitutional protections enjoyed by whites. In Dred Scott Chief Justice Taney, writing for the court's majority, stated that if blacks were "entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, . . . {i}t would give persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one state of the union, the right . . . to keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the state. . . ." Although much of Justice Taney's overtly racist legal reasoning was repudiated by events that followed -- such as the Civil War and Reconstruction -- the subliminal effects were felt throughout that era. In the post-Reconstruction period, when the pendulum swung back to overt racism, Justice Taney's philosophy resurfaced. It was during this period that racial paranoia about black men with guns intensified. It was potent enough to cause the infringement on the Second Amendment to the Constitution's "right . . . to keep and bear arms." Under natural law, a freeman's right to obtain and maintain the implements of self-defense has always been sacred. This right was restricted or prohibited for serfs, peasants and slaves. Gun control was never an issue in America until after the Civil War when black slaves were freed. It was this change in the status of the black man, from slave to freeman, that caused racist elements in the country (North and South) to agitate for restrictions on guns -- ignoring long established customs and understanding of the Second Amendment. The specter of a black man with rights of a freeman, bearing arms, was too much for the early heirs of Roger Taney to bear. The 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, along with the various Reconstruction civil rights acts, prevented gun prohibitionists from making laws that were explicitly racist and that would overtly deny black people the right to bear arms. The end of Reconstruction signaled the return of Taneyism -- overtly among the masses and covertly on the Supreme Court. Gun-control legislation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, enacted at the state and local levels, were implicitly racist in conception. And in operation, those laws invidiously targeted blacks. With the influx of large numbers of Irish, Italian and Jewish immigrants into the country, gun laws now also targeted whites from the underprivileged classes of immigrants. Eventually these oppressive gun laws were extended to affect all but a privileged few. Throughout the history of New York state's Sullivan law, enacted at the start of the 20th century, mainly the rich and powerful have had easy access to licenses to carry handguns. Some of the notables who have received that privilege include Eleanor Roosevelt, John Lindsay, Donald Trump, Arthur Sulzberger, Joan Rivers and disk jockey Howard Stern. Of the 27,000 handgun carry permits in New York City, fewer than 2% are issued to blacks -- who live and work in high-crime areas and really are in need of protection. And what of the origins of the National Rifle Association, which is wrongly viewed as a racist organization by the black supporters of gun prohibition? It was inspired and organized by Union Army officers after the Civil War. --- Mr. Innis is national chairman of the New York-based Congress of Racial Equality. | dred scott;black people;racial paranoia;infamous rulings;gun control;second amendment |
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WSJ911212-0080 | Counterpoint: Gun Control Is Constitutional ---- By Robert A. Goldwin | The best clues to the meaning of the key words and phrases are in debates in the First Congress of the United States. The Members of that Congress were the authors of the Second Amendment. A constitutional amendment calling for the prohibition of standing armies in time of peace was proposed by six state ratifying conventions. Virginia's version, later copied by New York and North Carolina, brought together three elements in one article -- affirmation of a right to bear arms, reliance on state militia, and opposition to a standing army: "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state; that standing armies, in times of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided. . . ." The purpose was to limit the power of the new Congress to establish a standing army, and instead to rely on state militias under command of governors. The Constitution was ratified without adopting any of the scores of proposed amendments. But in several states ratification came only with solemn pledges that amendments would follow. Soon after the First Congress met, James Madison, elected as a congressman from Virginia on the basis of such a pledge, proposed a number of amendments resembling yet different from articles proposed by states. These eventually became the Bill of Rights. In the version of the arms amendment he presented, Madison dropped mention of a standing army and added a conscientious objector clause. "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country, but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." In this version, "bearing arms" must mean "to render military service," or why else would there have to be an exemption for religious reasons? What right must not be infringed? The right of the people to serve in the militia. This militia amendment was referred to a congressional committee, and came out of committee in this form: "A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Two significant changes had been made: first, the phrase "to render military service in person" was replaced by the phrase "to bear arms," again indicating that they are two ways to say the same thing; second, an explanation was added, that the "militia" is "composed of the body of the people." The House then debated this new version in committee of the whole and, surprisingly, considering the subsequent history of the provision, never once did any member mention the private uses of arms, for self-protection, or hunting, or any other personal purpose. The debate focused exclusively on the conscientious objector provision. Eventually the committee's version was narrowly approved. The Senate in turn gave it its final form, briefer, unfortunately more elliptical, and with the exemption for conscientious objectors deleted: "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." Certain explanations were lost or buried in this legislative process: that the right to bear arms meant the right to serve in the militia; that just about everybody was included in the militia; and that the amendment as a whole sought to minimize if not eliminate reliance on a standing army by emphasizing the role of the state militia, which would require that everyone be ready to be called to serve. But what about the private right "to keep and bear arms," to own a gun for self-defense and hunting? Isn't that clearly protected by the amendment? Didn't just about everyone own a gun in 1791? Wouldn't that right go without saying? Yes, of course, it would go without saying, especially then when there were no organized police forces and when hunting was essential to the food supply. But such facts tell us almost nothing relevant to our question. Almost everyone also owned a dog for the same purposes. The Constitution nevertheless says nothing about the undeniable right to own a dog. There are uncountable numbers of rights not enumerated in the Constitution. These rights are neither denied nor disparaged by not being raised to the explicit constitutional level. All of them are constitutionally subject to regulation. The right to bear arms protected in the Second Amendment has to do directly with "a well-regulated militia." More evidence of the connection can be found in the Militia Act of 1792. "Every free able-bodied white male citizen" (it was 1792, after all) was required by the act to "enroll" in the militia for training and active service in case of need. When reporting for service, every militiaman was required to provide a prescribed rifle or musket, and ammunition. Here we see the link of the private and public aspects of bearing arms. The expectation was that every man would have his own firearms. But the aspect that was raised to the level of constitutional concern was the public interest in those arms. What does this mean for the question of gun control today? Well, for example, it means that Congress has the constitutional power to enact a Militia Act of 1992, to require every person who owns a gun or aspires to own one to "enroll" in the militia. In plain 1990s English, if you want to own a gun, sign up with the National Guard. Requiring every gun owner to register with the National Guard (as we require 18-year-olds to register with the Selective Service) would provide the information about gun owners sought by the Brady and Staggers bills, and much more. Standards could be set for purchase or ownership of guns, and penalties could be established. Restoring a 200-year-old understanding of the Constitution may be difficult, but there isn't time to dawdle. Americans now own more than 200 million guns, and opinion polls show Americans want gun control. Why not avail ourselves of the Second Amendment remedy? Call in the militia, which is, after all, "composed of the body of the people." --- Mr. Goldwin is a resident scholar in constitutional studies at the American Enterprise Institute. | gun control;private right;constitutional amendment;arms;gun owners;second amendment;congress |
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WSJ911224-0085 | A Free Marketeer's Case Against Term Limits ---- By Robert J. Barro | Another argument is that a citizen Congress with its continuing flow of fresh faces into Washington would result in better government than that provided by representatives with lengthy tenure. The counter-argument is that experience is an important characteristic for legislators. Each viewpoint has some validity. Presumably the best solution is to let the market decide, that is, to allow the electorate to determine the proper balance between freshness and experience. Most of us would not want the government to determine whether a familiar or a new brand of toothpaste is preferable; why is a political representative different in this respect? Many commentators bemoan the high tendency for incumbents to be re-elected. But if the electoral control process is working, so that officeholders conform with the interests of the majority of their constituents, then the electorate rewards its representatives with re-election. If the public voted against satisfactory performers just to install a new face, then officeholders would have less incentive to behave and the system would work badly. Thus the main inference from a 95% re-election rate is that the political process is working and that officeholders are conforming to the wishes of their constituents. If we ever see a 50% re-election rate, then there really would be reason to worry. The threat not to re-elect works only if the incumbent is interested in another term, whether for his current or for another office. A problem with term limits is that it creates more lame ducks, who are less responsive to the desires of the electorate. Much has been made of Alexander Hamilton's reflections on this point in Federalist 72: "One ill effect of the exclusion {from re-election} would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior." (It is interesting to note, however, that Hamilton was not discussing term limits on the legislature, and was actually arguing against the term limits on the chief executive that are contained now in the 22nd Amendment.) The only respectable argument in favor of term limits that I know of refers to the legislature and involves the interaction with the seniority system. Representatives accumulate more power as they become more senior, partly because of better committee assignments and more staff and partly because of increased familiarity with government officials and institutions and with outside interest groups. Some aspects of this power, such as greater experience with governmental programs, are desirable; others, such as the increased ability to extract funds from interest groups, are not. Even if seniority is a net cost in the aggregate, however, each district has an incentive to re-elect its own incumbent (and would if possible vote against the incumbents from other districts) because the representative's relative seniority translates into a large share of governmental largess. The voters would be better off if they could reach a binding agreement that precluded the re-election of incumbents, that is, if term limits were instituted. As an example, the voters of Washington state recently rejected a proposal that would have limited the seniority of their congressional representatives relative to those of other states. Yet the same voters likely would have approved a proposal that limited the terms of all Congressional representatives, not just those from Washington. Changes in the seniority system may therefore be a superior alternative to term limits. If a representative's power to favor his or her district did not vary with seniority, then voters would not have an excessive incentive to re-elect incumbents. The seniority system could be changed only by getting Congress to alter its own rules (as it has at times in the past) or else by constitutional amendment, which would, from a practical standpoint, also have to initiate in Congress. Although the chances of success seem small, one way to proceed would be to call the proposal the Civil Rights Amendment -- recent experience shows that calling something a Civil Rights Act helps to get it passed. It does not seem to matter much -- it may even be detrimental -- if the content of a Civil Rights Act actually has something to do with civil rights. The weakening of the seniority system in Congress would, it must be conceded, sacrifice some genuine benefits. Greater experience may justify positions of more authority, and, the rewards from seniority give Congress an efficient method to motivate good behavior from junior members. These arguments parallel the benefits from worker seniority in firms (or, indeed, the usefulness of a parole system as a carrot to help control inmates in prisons). The formal system of seniority is also only a part of the story; members' increasing familiarity with interest groups is a kind of seniority that would not be eliminated by changes in the rules for committee assignments, staffing and so on. It is unrealistic as well as undesirable to try to remove completely the operation of a seniority system in any legislature. The various complexities about legislative term limits and their interaction with seniority do not arise for executive term limits. Voters do not have to worry that rejecting their incumbent puts them at a disadvantage relative to other voters' incumbents, so the electorate can properly weigh experience, fresh ideas, the value of rewarding satisfactory performance in office, and so on. The only defense for executive term limits is that the electorate needs to be protected against itself, an argument which, if true, would mean that democracy was seriously flawed and would work much less well than it seems to. Of course, since the passage of the 22nd Amendment in 1951, there is a two-term limit on the presidency, and 29 of the 50 states have some kind of term limit on the governor. (Seven of these limits have been introduced since 1960.) The origins of these limits may have more to do with competition between legislative and executive branches than with a desire to improve public policy. The 22nd Amendment reflected Congress's desire to shift the balance of power away from the executive, and notably the desire of a Republican-dominated House and Senate to prevent the rise of another powerful Democratic president like Franklin Roosevelt. To some extent, the current pressures for legislative term limits reflect the reverse desire to shift power away from Congress. From the standpoint of balance of power, it would surely be preferable to repeal the 22nd Amendment. | officeholders;executive term limits;civil rights amendment;re-election rate;political process;electoral control process;legislative term limits;citizen congress;constitutional amendment;political representative |
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WSJ920103-0037 | Letters to the Editor: `Culture of Ruling' Corrupts Politicians | There are two solid reasons for congressional term limitation that economists, at least those of the public-choice persuasion, should fully appreciate. First, the less time that a politician spends inside the Beltway the less his or her common sense will be corrupted by the "culture of ruling" that exists there. To have microphones pushed in your face every day and to be asked your opinion on everything under the sun is a corrupting influence. Soon you start thinking your opinion is more important than it really is and, worse, that perhaps you should codify your opinion on everything under the sun. Other than this corruption of common sense, for instance, what could explain Congress's attempt to repeal the laws of economics through federal deposit insurance? Second, term limits end the adverse pre-selection process that exists whereby most individuals seeking office today actually find the prospect of spending the rest of their lives in Washington, D.C., attractive. Such individuals are the last ones we should want passing laws governing the rest of us. What Congress needs is experience in living in the real world, not in passing legislation. Today, business people, teachers, computer programmers and other productive citizens look at the prospect of running for Congress and recognize that they must be willing to commit 10 or 15 years of their lives to being politicians if they expect to have any legislative influence. They opt not to run. With six-year limits in the House (which most term-limit initiatives are now proposing for state congressional delegations), such individuals would recognize that they would immediately be on a par with their colleagues in Congress and that they would not have to give up their productive careers in the private sector in order to serve. Indeed, a true citizen Congress would consist of legislators who view their time there as essentially a leave of absence from their real jobs. Certainly the composition of Congress under term limitation would reflect something other than 95% men and 46% lawyers, as it does now. Seventy-five percent of Americans support term limitation -- everyone from Ralph Nader to Milton Friedman -- because they recognize it as an opportunity for citizens to wrest control of government from an impervious Congress full of check-bouncing, power-lusting professional politicians. Edward H. Crane President Cato Institute Washington | congressional delegations;congressional term limitation;six-year limits;corrupting influence;power-lusting professional politicians;true citizen congress;term-limit initiatives;term limits;impervious congress;legislative influence |
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WSJ920114-0145 | Letters to the Editor: Smile When You Say Gun Control | Mr. Goldwin's mistake stems from his having confused a necessary with a sufficient condition. The Second Amendment, in its language and its history, makes plain that the need for a well-regulated militia is a sufficient condition for the right to keep and bear arms. Yet Mr. Goldwin treats it as a necessary condition, which enables him to conclude that Congress could deny an individual the right to own a gun if he did not join the National Guard. Mr. Goldwin makes this mistake, in turn, because he has misread Madison's original version of the Second Amendment, which exempted conscientious objectors from military service. Thus he says that "In this version, `bearing arms' must mean `to render military service,' or why else would there have to be an exemption for religious reasons? What right must not be infringed? The right of the people to serve in the militia." Plainly, any conscientious-objector provision would arise not from a right but from a duty to serve in the militia. Yet Mr. Goldwin believes the amendment means, as he later says, "that the right to bear arms meant the right to serve in the militia." Thus does he reduce the first of these rights to the second, when clearly it is much broader. Roger Pilon Senior Fellow and Director Center for Constitutional Studies CATO Institute Washington --- The militia is not the National Guard but rather the people of the original states. In Ohio, we have an Ohio militia that is not a part of the National Guard. The fear of standing armies and the control these armed men gave a central government was foremost in the Framers' minds when writing the Bill of Rights. Thomas Jefferson moved to prevent this type of power in a few people's hands by the Second Amendment. He stated, "No free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms." The addition in the early drafts of a conscientious-objector clause was added for the preservation of religious freedoms, which the Colonists had not had in England. It is unfortunate today's "scholars" seem to spend their time picking apart history and the great thoughts of the visionary men who formed this country. In my personal celebration of this 200-year-old document, I have pledged the following: I will give up my freedom of speech when they cut out my tongue; I will give up my right to worship when they have slain my God and myself; I will assemble with the people of my choice even when they are imprisoned, and I will give up my rifle when they pry my cold dead fingers from around it. Samuel R. Bush III Cincinnati --- Let those who want guns join the National Guard, says Mr. Goldwin. Ah, the sanctimonious arrogance of it. What gives Mr. Goldwin the right to deny mine when I abide by the laws? He stresses the differences between the world of 1791 and today to suit his prejudice. He studiously ignores other major differences between 1791 and today. In 1791, punishment was swifter and surer. Plea bargaining was not epidemic; judges did not provide revolving doors on prisons. There was no army of drug dealers and junkies preying on the public. If anything, the reasons for citizens to own weapons for self-defense are more compelling today than they were in 1791. Let Mr. Goldwin show us how he would make us safer in our homes and we might understand his wish to strip away our only sure defense. Carl Roessler San Francisco --- Mr. Goldwin's article is a casebook example of convoluted logic. Consider that George Mason (1725-1792), the great Virginia constitutionalist, defined quite clearly the meaning of the word "militia" during a debate in 1788. "I ask who are the militia?" he said, and then answered his own question with the words: "They consist now of the whole people" (emphasis added). Mason's credentials are reliable: He is the author of the first 10 amendments to our Constitution. {There is a debate about who actually drafted the amendments -- Mason or Madison}. Further, a 1903 U.S. law defined the militia as not only the National Guard, but all able-bodied males between 18 and 45. I, along with millions of other Americans, am not against sensible gun control, i.e., licensing, character searches, etc. What I resent is Mr. Goldwin's agenda, which is removal of all guns from American citizens through the implementation of total regulations; a direct violation of the Second Amendment through nefarious means. Edward F. Menninger Sterling Heights, Mich. --- Mr. Goldwin suggests gun control via enlistment in the National Guard. Swell idea. Updating the right to bear arms from 1791 to 1991, when I report for service I'll bring, as required, a few items consistent with the current infantryman's inventory: a Barett Light .50 semiautomatic sniper rifle, so I can reach out and touch people half a mile away; a Squad Automatic Weapon firing 5.56mm rounds at the rate of a whole lot per second out of 30-round clips or hundred-round belts; a 40mm grenade launcher . . . but you get the idea. Then, as a thoroughly modern, well-regulated militiaman, I'll take my weapons home, just as did Morgan's riflemen, and the musket bearers of Lexington and Concord, and the Colonial light artillerists. Andrew L. Isaac Canterbury, N.H. | right;national guard;bearing arms;gun control;mr. goldwin;second amendment |
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WSJ920211-0036 | Letters to the Editor: Regulating Guns Isn't A Denial of Any Right | That same correspondent accused me of calling for "removal of all guns from American citizens through the implementation of total regulations." I said nothing like that. I said that although the Second Amendment has nothing to do with private uses of arms, there is an unenumerated but undeniable right to own a gun. We have many rights not enumerated in the Constitution, such as the right to marry, drive a car or own a dog. These rights are not denied just because the Constitution doesn't mention them; and the rights are not disparaged by the fact that we must obtain a marriage license, driver's license or a dog license. In the same way, the right to own a gun is not disparaged by being licensed or otherwise regulated and controlled. One letter writer who also knows something about the Constitution, though disagreeing with me on another point, agreed on the central issue, that regulation of gun ownership and use does not violate the Constitution. All the letters missed entirely my point about requiring gun owners to "sign up" with (not "join") the National Guard. I likened it to the current law requiring 18-year-old men to register with the Selective Service. Registering is very different from enlisting for active service. Requiring gun owners to register with the National Guard would provide the kind of scrutiny the Brady and Staggers bills contemplated, and, if Congress dared, could provide an additional measure of control over who owns what kinds of weapons. But my main point was to show how far Congress can go in gun-control legislation without exceeding its constitutional powers, using as a model the legislation of the Second Congress, which included most of the authors of the Second Amendment. Another letter writer thinks I have confused the issue by calling the duty to serve in the militia a right to serve, but if he will look at the debates in the First Congress he will see that there is no confusion at all, that the authors of the Second Amendment were talking about the right to serve. Consistent with all of the Bill of Rights, its subject is rights, not duties. Elbridge Gerry opposed James Madison's clause exempting persons "religiously scrupulous," because of the danger that it might be abused to discriminate against members of certain sects, "to declare who are those who are religiously scrupulous," and then keep them out of the militia. The real issue is that the Second Amendment addressed a serious public concern, to protect the right of citizens to serve as defenders of the community in times of peril, not the personal uses of guns. And since the proliferation of guns in the hands of criminals has become a national calamity, as police officials all over the nation attest, it is essential that we recapture the true purpose of the Second Amendment. Plain and simple, it is no barrier to sensible gun control. Robert A. Goldwin Resident Scholar American Enterprise Institute Washington | gun-control legislation;gun ownership;national guard;gun control;american citizens;second amendment;undeniable right |