prompt
stringlengths 1.1k
3.78k
| chosen
stringlengths 26
783
|
---|---|
Consider the following statement:
Plaintiffs may have a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to require some form of prior notice, particularly if new york confers upon them the legal right to remain until they are afforded such notice. compare state v. dias, 62 haw. 52, 609 p.2d 637, 639-40 (1980) (landowner’s long-term acquiescence to a trespasser’s presence can give the trespasser a cognizable privacy interest) with amezquita, 518 f.2d at 11 (rejecting fourth amendment claim of squatters where “nothing in the record suggests that the squatters’ entry upon the land was sanctioned in any way by the commonwealth”). while the fourth amendment normally requires little more notice than a knock on the door prior to a forced entry, see wilson v. arkansas, — u.s. -, -, 115 s.ct. 1914, 1916, 131 l.ed.2d 976 (1995) (<holding>), the process required by the fourth amendment
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing principle
B. holding that the common law knockandannounce principle forms a part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry
C. holding that commonlaw knock and announce rule is part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry
D. holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure
E. holding that commonlaw knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the fourth amendment.
Answer: | B. holding that the common law knockandannounce principle forms a part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry |
Consider the following statement:
Unskilled labor to local companies for short-term assistance.” smith v. employers’ overload co., 314 n.w.2d 220, 222 (minn.1981). courts rely on contract principles to determine the nature of the employment relationship. id. at 222-23. the duration of employment depends on the parties’ intent. id. at 223. when addressing qualification for unemployment benefits, courts have applied these principles and distinguished between persons who complete assignments but do not seek new assignments and persons who accept but refuse to complete ongoing assignments. an employee who has completed an assignment but refuses to accept further assignments is not disqualified from unemployment benefits because the employment relationship has ended and the refusal does not constitute a quit. see id. (<holding>); mbong v. new horizons nursing, 608 n.w.2d
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding 1001 prosecution for false statements in unemployment benefits not precluded by unemployment benefits statute specifically addressing topic
B. holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits
C. holding that employees who completed four separate oneday assignments intended only oneday employment contracts and qualified for unemployment benefits
D. holding that an employers interest in presence at and participation in a hearing on her former employees claim for unemployment benefits did not render the employer a party to that proceeding
E. holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits.
Answer: | C. holding that employees who completed four separate oneday assignments intended only oneday employment contracts and qualified for unemployment benefits |
Consider the following statement:
Gillie. on february 19, 1987, mr. gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. the amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. the note recited that it was secured by the june 19, 1985 security agreement and table, chairs and entertainment center. it also recited “renew: 3245 1”, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. again, mr. gillie signed no security agreement or financing statement. the note of april 21, 1986 was stamped “paid by renewal.” the parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (<holding>); booker v. commercial credit corp. (in re
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a creditors refinancing by renewal does not destroy a pmsi to the extent that the balance remaining on the original loan is transferred to the renewal note
B. holding that under north dakota law consolidation of a note secured by a pmsi in farm machinery with other goods resulted in a novation destroying the creditors pmsi
C. holding that under michigan law when debtors paid off the initial loan with the proceeds of refinancing the creditors pmsi in stereo expired
D. holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral
E. holding that under colorado law refinancing of a purchase money loan whereby an old note and security agreement were canceled and replaced by a new note and security agreement did not automatically extinguish the creditors pmsi in the debtors furniture the parties did not intend the new note to extinguish the original debt and security interest in that identical collateral remained almost no new money was advanced and the document specifically stated an intent to continue the pmsi.
Answer: | C. holding that under michigan law when debtors paid off the initial loan with the proceeds of refinancing the creditors pmsi in stereo expired |
Consider the following statement:
Party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. a “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” fed. r.civ.p. 19(a). if a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” local 670, et al. v. int’l union, et al., 822 f.2d 613, 618 (6th cir.1987). the burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of rule 19(a). marshall v. navistar intern. transp. corp., 168 f.r.d. 606, 611 (e.d.mich.1996); 5c charles a. wright and arthur r. miller, federal practice and procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (<holding>). “the moving party may satisfy this burden
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties
B. holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction
C. recognizing burden
D. recognizing that the burden is on a party making a rule 12b7 motion to establish that missing parties are necessary or indispensable to the action
E. holding that the burden is on the plaintiff.
Answer: | D. recognizing that the burden is on a party making a rule 12b7 motion to establish that missing parties are necessary or indispensable to the action |
Consider the following statement:
V. county of suffolk, 316 f.3d 368, 382 (2d cir.2003) (quoting morris v. lindau, 196 f.3d 102, 110 (2d cir.1999)). if a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs first amendment value of the speech. mandell, 316 f.3d at 382-83; see also pickering v. bd. of educ., 391 u.s. 563, 568, 88 s.ct. 1731, 20 l.ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); cobb, 363 f.3d at 102. alterna 46 (2d cir.1983) (<holding>). because all the speech for which anemone
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern
B. holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern
C. holding that employees allegation of corrupt and wasteful practices at municipal hospital obviously involved matter of public concern
D. holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern
E. holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern.
Answer: | C. holding that employees allegation of corrupt and wasteful practices at municipal hospital obviously involved matter of public concern |
Consider the following statement:
Proceedings the petitioner [former wife] seeks to modify the same final judgment which was the subject of the 2 prior contempt proceedings in duval county and a 3rd was filed shortly after the petitioner’s petition for modification. the 3rd contempt motion is presently pending.” the former wife contends that the trial court erred by granting the former husband’s motion to dismiss where there were no proceedings pending in the duval circuit court when she filed her complaint in miami-dade county. we agree. the former husband acknowledges that the trial court erred by relying on his third motion for contempt when granting the motion to dismiss because this motion for contempt was filed after the former wife filed her complaint in the miami-dade circuit court. see amir, 896 so.2d at 794 (<holding>) (citations omitted). the former husband,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county
B. recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue
C. holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue
D. holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings
E. holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there.
Answer: | D. holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings |
Consider the following statement:
Jurisprudence in light of the supreme court’s recent decisions in highmark inc. v. allcare health management sys., inc., — u.s. -, 134 s.ct. 1744, 188 l.ed.2d 829 (2014) and octane fitness, llc v. icon health & fitness, inc., — u.s. -, 134 s.ct. 1749, 188 l.ed.2d 816 (2014). those decisions call into ques tion our two-part test for determining willfulness, in re seagate tech., llc, 497 f.3d 1360 (fed.cir.2007) (en banc), and our de novo standard for reviewing the district court’s willfulness determination, bard peripheral vascular, inc. v. w.l. gore & assocs., inc., 682 f.3d 1003, 1006-07 (fed.cir.2012) (bard ii). see halo elecs., inc. v. pulse elecs., inc., 769 f.3d 1371, 1383 (fed.cir.2014) (o’malley, j., concurring). this case demonstrates why de no t. 2541, 101 l.ed.2d 490 (1988) (<holding>). it would also be consistent with the standard
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding habeas corpus is not a civil action for purposes of the equal access to justice act provision for award of attorney fees to prevailing party
B. holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing determinations of whether a litigants position is substantially justified for purposes of feeshifting under the equal access to justice act although the determination frequently turns on a purely legal issue
C. holding that the standard of review under rule 60 is abuse of discretion
D. holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion
E. holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant.
Answer: | B. holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing determinations of whether a litigants position is substantially justified for purposes of feeshifting under the equal access to justice act although the determination frequently turns on a purely legal issue |
Consider the following statement:
Assumption is in error. on april 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against woodland without prejudice. in october of 1993, new charges were filed. during the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, woodland was confined in a mental institution. this period of confinement involved no formal charges. woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. this period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. see trafny, 799 p.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also johnson v. united states, 333 f.2d 371, 374 (10th cir.1964) (<holding>). the state filed new charges against woodland
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing
B. holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy
C. holding that ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a state mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment
D. holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial
E. holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds.
Answer: | C. holding that ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a state mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment |
Consider the following statement:
Commc’ns, inc. v. u.s. dept. of educ., 739 f.3d 374, 379 (8th cir.2013). “due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” id., citing mathews v. elridge, 424 u.s. 319, 332, 96 s.ct. 893, 47 l.ed.2d 18 (1976). due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” mathews, 424 u.s. at 334, 96 s.ct. 893. due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” id. at 333, 96 s.ct. 893. this is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” business commc’ns, 739 f.3d at 380 (<holding>). rather, to reach its conclusion, nigc relied
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony
B. holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness
C. holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination
D. recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required
E. holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination.
Answer: | A. holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony |
Consider the following statement:
Of captain davison’s efforts, chief forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with councilman benson, accusations about the plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like gallagher’s. evidence in the record also indicates that captain davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the union delayed implementation of chief forte’s plan. from all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that chief forte’s repeated decisions not to promote captain davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also campbell v. ark. dep’t of corr., 155 f.3d 950, 959-60 (8th cir.1998) (<holding>). in addition, temporal proximity between
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that evidence that the defendants believed that the plaintiffs general outspokenness on security and corruption encouraged media criticism of the defendants was sufficient for a jury to infer causation in the retaliation claim
B. holding that because evidence was sufficient to support defendants 1962c convictions and jury could infer from evidence that defendants each manifested an agreement to participate in enterprises affairs evidence was sufficient to support defendants 1962d convictions for rico conspiracy
C. recognizing that jury may infer from the evidence that defendants money came from drug sales
D. holding that the plaintiffs argument rebutting the defendants legitimate nondiscriminatory reason on the plaintiffs discrimination claim also rebutted the defendants reason on the plaintiffs retaliation claim because they were the same
E. holding that the plaintiffs claim that city encouraged private individuals to trespass on the plaintiffs land was properly a fourth amendment rather than a substantive due process claim.
Answer: | A. holding that evidence that the defendants believed that the plaintiffs general outspokenness on security and corruption encouraged media criticism of the defendants was sufficient for a jury to infer causation in the retaliation claim |
Consider the following statement:
(bankr.d.mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the code used the term "allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to "allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . in re harris, 16 b.r. 371 (bankr.e.d.tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); international harvester employee credit union, inc. v. daniel, 13 b.r. 555 (bankr.s.d.ohio 1981) . 357 (bankr.d.conn.1981) (<holding>); citizens and southern national bank v.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations
B. holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court
C. holding that a banks claim of irreparable harm through delay of postpetition interest payments was insufficient to lift the automatic stay under the provisions of section 1301 as the debtor proposed to pay 100 of the plan including postpetition interest
D. holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor
E. holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay.
Answer: | D. holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor |
Consider the following statement:
An objection during the hearing that her condition precluded her from accepting a settlement agreement orally. in an affidavit prepared more than a year after the october 26, 1994, administrative hearing, the plaintiff claims that her attorney withheld information from her during settlement negotiations and that he prompted her to accept. opponent’s amended, responsive submission in response to exhibit d of the court’s order, at 6. however, apart from her bare allegations she offers no substantive evidence that her attorney’s behavior prohibited her from knowingly and voluntarily entering into a settlement. the plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that she lacked the capacity to enter into a valid settlement agreement. see anderson, 477 u.s. at 254, 106 s.ct. at 2513 (<holding>). v. conclusion the defendant’s motion for
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage
B. holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage
C. holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury
D. holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff
E. holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff.
Answer: | E. holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff |
Consider the following statement:
Relief,” on breach of fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel theories for making affirmative misrepresentations with knowledge beneficiary would be misled thereby, and stating that to “succeed under this [equitable es- toppel] theory of relief, an erisa plaintiff must establish (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances.” the court of appeals concluded employer breached its fiduciary duties, affirmatively misled the beneficiary and her participating spouse, and awarded the beneficiary an additional $150,000 on a supplemental accidental death and dismemberment policy that the participant spouse would have opted to purchase had he known all of the material facts); bixler, 12 f.3d at 1301-03 (<holding>); gillis v. hoechst celanese corp., 4 f.3d
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa 502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan
B. recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect
C. recognizing the right of a creditor to sue a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty
D. holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties
E. recognizing that when a beneficiary requests information from an erisa fiduciary who is aware of the beneficiarys status and situation the fiduciary has an obligation to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiarys circumstance even if that requires conveying information about which the beneficiary did not specifically inquire.
Answer: | B. recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect |
Consider the following statement:
Trustees should not subsequently reopen the sale to receive additional bids on the property, even if it would result in a higher selling price. talbert, 210 md. at 45, 122 a.2d at 474 (asserting that “[o]nce having accepted a bid, the trustee should not reopen the sale merely to let in disappointed bidders” (citation omitted)); gilden, 197 md. at 42, 78 a.2d at 171. subject to the review of the court, trustees perform various functions in connection with judicial sales for which they exercise personal discretion and judgment. in general, “trustees have ‘discretion to outline the manner and terms of the sále[.]’ ” fagnani, 418 md. at 385, 15 a.3d at 290 (quoting simard, 383 md. at 312, 859 a.2d at 200). in jackson v. townshend, 249 md. 8, 238 a.2d 81 (1968), we noted: unless th t 446 (<holding>). a trustee is also entitled to exercise
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that the court has never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact contours of his or her argument to the agency
B. holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force
C. holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad
D. holding that there has not been a misdescription of the property if the advertisement accords substantially with the exact situation and condition
E. holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances.
Answer: | D. holding that there has not been a misdescription of the property if the advertisement accords substantially with the exact situation and condition |
Consider the following statement:
Of success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” new comm wireless servs., inc. 287 f.3d at 9. diaz does not argue that the legislature lacked the power to abolish his advocate position. instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate diaz’s advocate position and that law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. while perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very reorganization plan which created diaz’s job. in so doing, the legislature abolished the position of advocate. see lewis v. united states, 244 u.s. 134, 144, 37 s.ct. 570, 61 l.ed. 1039 (1917) (<holding>); brame v. united states, 10 cl.ct. 252, 255
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office
B. recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole
C. holding that congressional repeal of an act creating an office had the effect to abolish it
D. holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement
E. holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid.
Answer: | C. holding that congressional repeal of an act creating an office had the effect to abolish it |
Consider the following statement:
Title theory. in sum, the debtors describe the decision in atlantic savings as judicially unsound and at odds w the court, “guided by the language of the statutes and by decisions of the massachusetts supreme judicial court interpreting the homestead statutes, must predict what the supreme judicial court would do if confronted with the issue.” in re garran, 274 b.r. 570, 574-75 (bankr.d.mass.2002). though the sjc has not directly ruled on the issue at bar, this court is satisfied that there exist sufficient signposts to enable this court to fairly anticipate the outcome. the sjc has recently and repeatedly held massachusetts to be a title theory state under common law. see j &w wall systems, inc. v. shawmut first bank & trust company et al., 413 mass. 42, 44, 594 n.e.2d 859, 860 (1992) (<holding>); murphy v. charlestown sav. bank, 380 mass.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
B. holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims
C. holding that massachusetts is a title theory state
D. holding that the state police is a state agency
E. holding that such a theory is viable under title vii.
Answer: | C. holding that massachusetts is a title theory state |
Consider the following statement:
Shall not be held out or used by me in any manner nor for any purpose whatsoever. 3. i have destroyed the original of said document, and turned over all copies thereof for destruction. we therefore affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the appellees’ complaint as moot. as to the attorney’s fees and costs awarded to the appellees as the prevailing parties, we also affirm. section 709.08(11), florida statutes (2007), provides that the prevailing party in power of attorney litigation is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. the determination of the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees and costs is based on whether the party seeking fees succeeded on any significant issue(s) in the litigation. see moritz v. hoyt enters., inc., 604 so.2d 807, 810 (fla.1992) (<holding>); boxer max corp. v. cane a. sucre, inc., 905
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea
B. holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation
C. holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action
D. holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees
E. holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal.
Answer: | D. holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees |
Consider the following statement:
Mountain hosp. & med. services co., 754 p.2d 1180, 1182 (colo.app.1988); st. francis regional med. center v. blue cross blue shield of kansas, 810 f.supp. 1209 (d.kan.1992); institute of living v. blue cross & blue shield, no. cv-90-0382398s, 1991 wl 223871 (conn.super.ct. oct. 4, 1991); kent general hosp., inc. v. blue cross & blue shield of delaware, inc., 442 a.2d 1368 (del.1982); augusta medical complex, inc. v. blue cross of kansas, inc., 230 kan. 361, 634 p.2d 1123 (1981); obstetricians-gynecologists, p.c. v. blue cross & blue shield of nebraska, inc., 219 neb. 199, 361 n.w.2d 550 (1985); riddle memorial hosp. v. blue cross of greater philadelphia, 63 del.cty. rep. 361 (pa.common pleas 1976); cf. davidowitz v. delta dental plan of cal., inc., 946 f.2d 1476, 1478-81 (9th cir.1991) (<holding>); washington hosp. center corp. v. group
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan
B. holding that disability provision in comprehensive retirement plan constituted a welfare plan
C. holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan
D. holding that erisa welfare payments are not assignable in the face of a nonassignment clause in the health benefit plan
E. holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant.
Answer: | D. holding that erisa welfare payments are not assignable in the face of a nonassignment clause in the health benefit plan |
Consider the following statement:
“i guess so.” in light of the “high degree of deference” that we must give to the factual determinations of the ij, the inconsistencies in kostic’s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. see sterkaj v. gonzales, 439 f.3d 273, 278 (6th cir.2006) (upholding an ij’s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). because kostic cannot overcome the ij’s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. this also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. see ins v. cardoza-fonseca, 480 u.s. 421, 431-32, 107 s.ct. 1207, 94 l.ed.2d 434 (1987) (<holding>). d. changed country conditions the ij and the
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable
B. holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable
C. holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution
D. holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal
E. holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum.
Answer: | D. holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal |
Consider the following statement:
Appellant’s allegation, our supreme court has held that ‘‘[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a batson objection at trial because batson did not yet exist. see, e.g., [commonwealth v. gribble, 580 pa. 647, 863 a.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (‘counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.’)..” commonwealth v. sneed, 587 pa. 318, 899 a.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . then-district attorney rendell served as philadelphia county district attorney from 1978 through 1985. he subsequently served as governor of the commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as “governor rendell.” 11 . appellant’s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court’s decision in commonwealth v. grant, 572 pa. 48, 813 a.2d 726 (2002) (<holding>), therefore, at the time of appellant’s direct
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to pcra review trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon postverdict motions and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal
B. holding that as a general rule a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review
C. holding that a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review
D. holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo
E. holding that review of counsel ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review.
Answer: | E. holding that review of counsel ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review |
Consider the following statement:
Or unnecessary will not be counted____ that is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” (citations omitted)). the existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” id. therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. id. at 248-50, 106 s.ct. 2505. the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. see celotex corp. v. catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 325, 106 s.ct. 2548, 91 l.ed.2d 265 (1986) (<holding>); see also riley & ephriam constr. co., inc.,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding the moving party must meet its burden by showingthat is pointing out to the trial courtthat there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case
B. holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response
C. recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case
D. holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial citation omitted
E. recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial.
Answer: | A. holding the moving party must meet its burden by showingthat is pointing out to the trial courtthat there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case |
Consider the following statement:
Addition, while detaining a vehicle at a traffic safety checkpoint constitutes a “seizure,” where the checkpoint serves the public interest and does not impose an unreasonable restriction on one’s liberty, it does not violate fourth amendment proscriptions. mich. dep’t of state police v. sitz, 496 u.s. 444, 110 s.ct. 2481, 110 l.ed.2d 412 (1990); state v. vickery, 399 s.c. 507, 732 s.e.2d 218 (ct.app.2012). mcham did not challenge the propriety of his initial stop, so the sole focus of our inquiry is on the validity of the officer’s opening of the passenger’s side door of the vehicle mcham was driving. the parties agree that an officer may order the driver and any passengers to exit a detained vehicle without violating the fourth amendment. see mimms, 434 u.s. at 109-10, 98 s.ct. 330 (<holding>); maryland v. wilson, 519 u.s. 408, 414-15, 117
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that officer may order driver out of vehicle once lawfully detained for traffic violation
B. holding that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendments proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures
C. holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped an officer may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendment
D. holding once a driver has been lawfully detained the police may order the driver to exit the vehicle even in the absence of unusual or suspicious behavior without violating the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures the court stated we think it too plain for argument that the states proffered justificationthe safety of the officeris both legitimate and weighty and it specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile
E. holding that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle.
Answer: | D. holding once a driver has been lawfully detained the police may order the driver to exit the vehicle even in the absence of unusual or suspicious behavior without violating the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures the court stated we think it too plain for argument that the states proffered justificationthe safety of the officeris both legitimate and weighty and it specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile |
Consider the following statement:
Absolutely immune from damages liability under §1983 for this conduct. relying on its decision in salyer v. patrick, 874 f. 2d 374 (ca6 1989), the court of appeals affirmed. i would grant certiorari to address petitioner’s challenge to that ruling. in salyer, the sixth circuit held that, “due to their quasiprosecutorial function in the initiation of child abuse proceedings,” social workers are absolutely immune from liability for filing juvenile abuse petitions. id., at 378. other courts addressing the question have agreed that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 in some instances, depending on their conduct and the terms of the state laws pursuant to which they acted. see, e. g., meyers v. contra costa county dept. of social servs., 812 f. 2d 1154, 1157 (ca9) (<holding>), cert. denied, 484 u. s. 829 (1987); vosburg
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that social services attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity for actions related to the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency proceedings
B. holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions
C. holding that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution
D. holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasiprosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings
E. holding that child social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on behalf of the state in preparing for initiating and prosecuting dependency hearings as well as the formulation and presentation of recommendations to the court in the course of such proceedings.
Answer: | D. holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasiprosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings |
Consider the following statement:
Concern is more fundamental: we believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the “threat of death” must be “express.” the eleventh circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as judge easterbrook of the seventh circuit and judge arnold of the eighth circuit. see hunn, 24 f.3d at 999-1000 (easterbrook, j., dissenting); united states v. cadotte, 57 f.3d 661, 662 (8th cir.1995)(per curiam) (arnold, j., dissenting), cert. denied, — u.s. -, 116 s.ct. 783, 133 l.ed.2d 733 (1996). in united states v. tuck, 964 f.2d 1079 (11th cir.1992), the eleventh circuit observed that § 2b3.1(b)(2)(f) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. first, the threat must be express 1th cir.1993)(per curiam)(<holding>). similarly, judge easterbrook, dissenting in
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm
B. holding that the phrase i have a gun constitutes a threat of death under 2b31b2f
C. holding that threat i have a gun and nothing to lose was not an express threat of death because there was not express mention of death and could also be interpreted to mean that robber was desperate and willing to turn alleged gun on himself
D. holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death
E. holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death.
Answer: | E. holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death |
Consider the following statement:
Of sentencing would, in effect, permit the rule to read: “a determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.” we reject such a reading of the rule. ii we next address what the rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. we hold that such a technical violation of the rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. the technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. united states v. knockum, 881 f.2d 730, 732 (9th cir.1989) (<holding>); u.s. v. gattas, 862 f.2d 1432, 1435; (10
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition
B. holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition
C. holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error
D. holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record
E. holding that ministerial error of failing to append rule 32 findings or determinations will not permit habeas relief because the error may be remedied by ordering the district court to attach the sentencing transcript.
Answer: | E. holding that ministerial error of failing to append rule 32 findings or determinations will not permit habeas relief because the error may be remedied by ordering the district court to attach the sentencing transcript |
Consider the following statement:
Of the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, jones claims, amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. she argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. we review the permissibility of a traffic stop “under the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in terry v. ohio.” united states v. tibbetts, 396 f.3d 1132, 1136 (10th cir.2005) (citing 392 u.s. 1, 88 s.ct. 1868, 20 l.ed.2d 889 (1968)). that is, we first consider “whether the officer’s action was just 5 (10th cir.1995) (<holding>); united states v. rodriguez-pando, 841 f.2d
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence
B. holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop
C. holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence
D. holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence
E. holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane.
Answer: | C. holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence |
Consider the following statement:
For purposes of appeal. tobar v. united states, 639 f.3d 1191, 1194 (9th cir. 2011). the facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . the operative complaint makes clear that the chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . the parties use terms such as "tribal immunity,” “tribal sovereign immunity,” and "the tribe’s sovereign immunity” interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . the district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the health program because bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the tribe and the health board. that ruling has not been appealed. 5 . compare ingrassia v. chicken ranch bingo & casino, 676 f.supp.2d 953, 961 (e.d. cal. 2009) (<holding>), and sonoma falls developers, llc v. dry creek
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity
B. holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity
C. holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council
D. holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity
E. holding that the ats does not waive the united states sovereign immunity.
Answer: | A. holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity |
Consider the following statement:
The agreement as he had promised; instead, husband retained the document for nearly six months, during which time the parties were attempting to reconcile their marriage, and produced it for enforcement when wife finally sought a divorce. this evidence — the prolonged retention of the agreement that husband promised to destroy as soon as wife signed it, coupled with the subsequent attempt to enforce it — though slight, is sufficient to establish the existence of fraud, especially here, in light of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the agreement. ocga § 23-2-57 (“fraud may not be presumed but, being in itself subtle, slight circumstances may be sufficient to carry conviction of its existence.”). cf. horton v. johnson, 192 ga. 338, 346-347 (1) (15 se2d 605) (1941) (<holding>). based on the foregoing, the trial court did
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract
B. holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy
C. holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case
D. recognizing that slight evidence of fraud is sufficient to establish its existence particularly involving family transactions
E. holding that evidence must be sufficient to establish elements of professional negligence particularly causation and damages arising from attorneys claimed failure to properly defend plaintiff.
Answer: | D. recognizing that slight evidence of fraud is sufficient to establish its existence particularly involving family transactions |
Consider the following statement:
The burden to seek review, on which the employee evidently acted on a writ of certiorari. respondent suggests that the parties in this case should have similar powers and burdens. but the circumstances here are much different from those in boe, which had continued effect when the employer refuses to submit a matter for independent review. although respondent expressly declared to the employee that it was “reserving” the issue of jurisdiction for determination, it chose nevertheless to join with the employee in submitting the grievance question for independent review. under these circum stances, in spite of its assertion of reserved powers, the county elected the process for determining the dispute. see helmerichs v. bank of minneapolis & trust co., 349 n.w.2d 326, 327 (minn.app.1984) (<holding>), review denied (minn. dec. 20, 1984).
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a credit card company could not introduce an alternative dispute resolution provision through a bill stuffer where nothing in the original agreement mentioned dispute resolution
B. holding that voluntary participant in arbitration process is estopped from objecting to this resolution of dispute citing twomey v durkee 291 nw2d 696 minn1980
C. holding that judicial is review available in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution of a dispute
D. holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
E. holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause.
Answer: | B. holding that voluntary participant in arbitration process is estopped from objecting to this resolution of dispute citing twomey v durkee 291 nw2d 696 minn1980 |
Consider the following statement:
Co. v. united states, 222 u.s. 20, 26-27, 32 s.ct. 2, 56 l.ed. 72 (1911) (upholding amendment to safety appliance act, 27 stat. at l. 531, chap. 196, u.s. comp. stat.1901, p. 3174, 32 stat. at l. 943, chap. 976, u.s. comp. stat. supp.1909, p. 1143, which provided for all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railway engaged in interstate commerce to be equipped with certain designated safety appliances, regardless of whether the vehicles were used in moving intrastate or interstate traffic); perez v. united states, 402 u.s. 146, 155-156, 91 s.ct. 1357, 28 l.ed.2d 686 (1971) (“[f]or example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 u.s.c. § 32), or ... thefts from interstate shipments (18 u.s.c. § 659)”); see also united states v. cobb, 144 f.3d 319, 321 & n. 2 (4th cir.1998) (<holding>). this underlying purpose, however, is not
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute
B. holding that an amendment to a policy in existence prior to the effective date of a statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage which substituted insured automobiles did not incorporate the new statute because to do so would be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the contract
C. holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute
D. recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern
E. recognizing that the federal carjacking statute fell within lopez s second category because the statute regulated harm to automobiles.
Answer: | E. recognizing that the federal carjacking statute fell within lopez s second category because the statute regulated harm to automobiles |
Consider the following statement:
The consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” united states v. santa, 236 f.3d 662, 677 (11th cir.2000). “the proper inquiry is not simply whether [mr. scott’s] will was overborne by the agents’ illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” id. considering these factors, we conclude that mr. scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. to be sure, mr. scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. and we recognize that the fact that mr. scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. id. at 678 (<holding>). however, the officers’ conduct in this case,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint
B. holding that the reading of miranda warnings and the signing of a waiver of fourth and fifth amendment rights are not sufficient intervening factors sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry into a home
C. holding that consent to search did not purge the taint of an unlawful detention when no intervening circumstances sufficiently separated the consent from the unlawful detention
D. holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid
E. holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights.
Answer: | B. holding that the reading of miranda warnings and the signing of a waiver of fourth and fifth amendment rights are not sufficient intervening factors sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry into a home |
Consider the following statement:
When working a case. see united states v. ventresca, 380 u.s. 102, 111, 85 s.ct. 741, 13 l.ed.2d 684 (1965) ("observations of fellow officers of the government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number."). as such, "[where law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, ... the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all." illinois v. andreas, 463 u.s. 765, 77l n. 5, 103 s.ct. 3319, 77 led.2d 1003 (1983). in some situations, however, the police expand the scope of their investigation to include other officers not currently on seene. in those scenarios, the fellow officer rule operates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation. see arias, 159 p.8d at 189-40 (<holding>). 115 specifically, we have previously held
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing general rule
B. recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation
C. holding that a mayor although the executive officer may still have legislative functions
D. recognizing rule
E. recognizing this rule.
Answer: | B. recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation |
Consider the following statement:
The judgment and sentence ‘set[s] forth the statutory maximum and clearly indicated] that the term of community [custody] does not extend the total sentence beyond that maximum.’ ” id. at 566 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting state v. hibdon, 140 wn. app. 534, 538, 166 p.3d 826 (2007)). while the court did not address zavala-reynoso, it did rely in part on sloan to conclude that a remand to the trial court for clarification was the proper remedy. torngren, 147 wn. app. at 566. although the torngren court found that an amended sentence was the appropriate remedy in that case, division three has also indicated that either an amended sentence or a vacation and remand for resentencing are equally appropriate remedies in these circumstances. hibdon, 140 wn. app. at 538 (<holding>). does the sentence exceed the statutory
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile
B. holding remand order reviewable because crowded docket not ground for remand under 1447c
C. holding that in addition to a remand for clarification another option in these circumstances is to remand for resentencing
D. holding that on direct appeal appellate court may remand for resentencing of all counts
E. holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal.
Answer: | C. holding that in addition to a remand for clarification another option in these circumstances is to remand for resentencing |
Consider the following statement:
Work commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless the registration is made within three months after first publication of the work.” 17 u.s.c. § 412. on october 17, 2006, oxblue first published the oxblue specification. the ox-blue specification was not registered with the copyright office until march 13, 2012. oxblue is not entitled to statutory damages and attorneys’ fees because the ox-blue specification was not registered at the time the alleged infringement occurred, or within the 3-month safe harbor period between publication and registration. see m.g.b. homes, inc. v. ameron homes, inc., 903 f.2d 1486, 1493 (11th cir.1990) (<holding>). oxblue does not dispute that it is not
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that where the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim was without a reasonable legal basis an award of attorneys fees to the defendants was a proper exercise of judicial discretion
B. holding that attorneys fees and statutory damages were unavailable because the copyright was not registered at the time the alleged infringement occurred
C. holding that lanham act claim was not prohibited due to fact that author had not registered copyright
D. holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation
E. holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement.
Answer: | B. holding that attorneys fees and statutory damages were unavailable because the copyright was not registered at the time the alleged infringement occurred |
Consider the following statement:
Not contest alaimalo’s actual innocence. b. prior opportunities to raise actual innocence claim we turn to the question of whether alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. in making this determination, we consider “(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” harrison, 519 f.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). an intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. harrison, 519 f.3d at 960. see also in re davenport, 147 f.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th cir.1998) (<holding>); triestman v. united states, 124 f.3d 361 (2d
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc 924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review
B. holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used
C. holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
D. holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review
E. holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessibility of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm.
Answer: | E. holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessibility of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm |
Consider the following statement:
(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . none of the parties allege that hoffman’s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the secretary of state in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-a m.r.s. § 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: "the secretary of state shall determine the validity of the petition.” 8 . the second sentence of 21-a m.r.s. § 354(9) provides "if a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.” 9 . see also, citizens comm, for the d.c. video lottery terminal initiative v. d.c. bd. of elections & ethics, 860 a.2d 813, 816-17 (d.c.app.2004) (<holding>); montanans for justice v. state, 334 mont.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested
B. holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board
C. holding that actions of arbitrators in gathering evidence outside the scheduled hearings and without notice to the parties constituted misconduct sufficient to vacate the award
D. holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings
E. holding board had authority to exclude entire petitions where evidence showed pervasive pattern of fraud forgery and other improprieties permeated the circulation process that a particular group gathering signatures used.
Answer: | E. holding board had authority to exclude entire petitions where evidence showed pervasive pattern of fraud forgery and other improprieties permeated the circulation process that a particular group gathering signatures used |
Consider the following statement:
Predicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. while defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. the critical point from bewersdorf is that the ouil provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the sora provisions do in the present case. in fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a sora-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a sora violation. thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that mcl 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 e.g., people v eilola, 179 mich app 315, 325; 445 nw2d 490 (1989) (<holding>); people v brown, 186 mich app 350, 357; 463
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the habitualoffender provisions could be used to enhance a sentence for a conviction that constituted firstdegree retail fraud because of a prior conviction mcl 750356c2 as added by 1988 pa 20
B. holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense
C. holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes
D. holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac
E. holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Answer: | A. holding that the habitualoffender provisions could be used to enhance a sentence for a conviction that constituted firstdegree retail fraud because of a prior conviction mcl 750356c2 as added by 1988 pa 20 |
Consider the following statement:
For the writ of mandamus. c. violation of due process appellant next contends that the trial court erred in finding that his due process rights had not been violated. the trial court stated that " [procedural due process constrains government decisions which deprive an individual of some 'property' or 'liberty' interest. . .. petitioner has neither shown the existence of a property interest nor that his property has been taken." order den. mot. for recons, at 2 (trial div. aug. 25, 1993). appellant claims that his property interest lies in the 2% annual income tax he pays as an employee of the government. appellant's argument is wrongly constructed, however. he does not challenge the ability of the legislature to tax him and spend the money as part of the general fund. ra 1983) (<holding>). thus, the mere fact that appellant has
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims
B. holding that unilateral expectation of continued service at a particular stateoperated leprosy hospital did not give rise to a due process claim
C. holding that a property interest sufficient to support a due process claim requires a binding assurance and not a mere unilateral expectation
D. holding such service satisfies due process
E. holding that a state agencys violations of its own internal regulations did not establish a due process violation or otherwise give rise to a constitutional claim.
Answer: | B. holding that unilateral expectation of continued service at a particular stateoperated leprosy hospital did not give rise to a due process claim |
Consider the following statement:
Right to possession of real property either by an unlawful act or a lawful act performed in an unlawful manner.” n.y. state nat. org. for women v. terry, 886 f.2d 1339, 1361 (2d cir.), cert. denied 495 u.s. 947, 110 s.ct. 2206, 109 l.ed.2d 532 (1990) (finding summary judgment on a trespass claim to be appropriate against anti-abortion groups protesting on an abortion clinic’s property), citing ivancic v. olmstead, 66 n.y.2d 349, 352, 497 n.y.s.2d 326, 488 n.e.2d 72, cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1117, 106 s.ct. 1975, 90 l.ed.2d 658 (1986); see also phillips v. sun oil co., 307 n.y. 328, 331, 121 n.e.2d 249 (1954). to succeed in an action for trespass, plaintiff must prove that there was a wrongful or unjustifiable entry upon his land. scribner v. summers, 84 f.3d 554, 557 (2d cir.1996) (<holding>). as explained above, the barges at issue are
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that under new york law trespass is the intentional invasion of anothers property
B. holding that new york law applies to this matter
C. holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york
D. holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
E. holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership.
Answer: | A. holding that under new york law trespass is the intentional invasion of anothers property |
Consider the following statement:
And respect for the d.c. court of appeals.”). the supreme court held in salve regina college v. russell,. 499 u.s. 225, 111 s.ct. 1217,113 l.ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” id. 499 u.s. at 231, 111 s.ct. at 1221. the d.c. court of appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under d.c. law. the district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. compare geico, 769 f.supp. at 387 (“district of columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.”) with washington v. group hospitalization, inc., 585 f.supp. 517, 520 (d.d.c.1984) (<holding>). we find it unnecessary to divine whether the
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the district of columbia is among the many jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay
B. holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith
C. holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability
D. holding that a bad faith claim is a tort
E. holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim.
Answer: | A. holding that the district of columbia is among the many jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay |
Consider the following statement:
Act, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 wharton crim.law, § 397.” keller v. state, 380 so.2d 926, 935 (ala.cr.app.1979), cert. denied, 380 so.2d 938 (ala.1980). the capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see § 13a-5-40(a)(7), ala.code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. sockwell v. state, 675 so.2d 4, 24 (ala.cr.app.1993). we agree with the defendant that his intent that pope kill elmer woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of clemer woodall. cf. tomlin v. state, 591 so.2d 550 (ala.cr.app.1991) (<holding>). rather, in order to convict the defendant of
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that general verdicts failed to reveal whether defendant was convicted on accomplice liability theory and that evidence supported accomplice liability theory
B. holding that under the accomplice liability doctrine a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of double murder a capital offense under 13a540a10 alacode 1975 only if he had the particularized intent that both victims be killed
C. holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony
D. holding that in order to convict a defendant of firstdegree murder on a theory of accomplice liability proof of his own premeditation is required
E. holding that alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that to be convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill.
Answer: | B. holding that under the accomplice liability doctrine a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of double murder a capital offense under 13a540a10 alacode 1975 only if he had the particularized intent that both victims be killed |
Consider the following statement:
In context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. we agree with the trial court’s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. psychological mitigation evidence in spann v. state, this court held: mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. this requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (citation omitted.) the sentencing court must “expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 857 so.2d 845, 857 (fla.2003) (quoting rogers v. state, 783 so.2d 980, 995 (fla.2001)); see also eddings v. oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104, 102 s.ct. 869, 71 l.ed.2d 1 (1982) (<holding>) (emphasis in original). where a trial court
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence
B. holding that defendants relatively minor participation in the crime is a mitigating factor that sentencer must consider
C. holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death
D. holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors
E. holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence.
Answer: | E. holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence |
Consider the following statement:
Under rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, ■without seeking prior leave from the court of appeals. 601 f.2d 39, 41 (1st cir.1979). the district courts are required “to review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....” id. at 42. where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. id.; see also united states v. 6 fox st., 480 f.3d 38, 46 (1st cir.2007). otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. toscano v. chandris, s.a., 934 f.2d 383, 386-87 (1st cir.1991) (<holding>). in any event, rosaura’s attempt is likely
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within 1141a
B. recognizing such an exception
C. holding that plaintiff must present such evidence
D. holding that a litigant who receives ex parte assurances of success from a judge is a state actor under 1983
E. holding that a litigant must follow colocotroni in such scenarios.
Answer: | E. holding that a litigant must follow colocotroni in such scenarios |
Consider the following statement:
Is not successive merely because it follows an earlier application. in re cain, 137 f.3d 234, 235 (5th cir.1998); magwood v. patterson, — u.s. —, 130 s.ct. 2788, 2805, 177 l.ed.2d 592 (2010) (“second or successive [does] not refer to all § 2254 applications filed second or successively in time, but [is] rather a term-of-art that takes its full meaning from our case law, including decisions predating the enactment of aed-pa.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). a § 2254 application filed after an earlier application that was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies is not a second or successive application. slack v. mcdaniel, 529 u.s. 473, 487, 120 s.ct. 1595, 146 l.ed.2d 542 (2000); in re gasery, 116 f.3d 1051, 1052 (5th cir.1997) (<holding>). under lundy district courts should dismiss
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court
B. holding petitioner seeking to refile habeas application after prior dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is not required to comply with 2244b3a when he returns to federal court after exhausting those claims
C. holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice
D. holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief
E. holding that a prisoners failure to pursue an appeal in state court is a procedural bar to federal habeas relief unless the petitioner shows both cause for failing to bring the state claim and actual prejudice from the failure to consider his federal claims.
Answer: | B. holding petitioner seeking to refile habeas application after prior dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is not required to comply with 2244b3a when he returns to federal court after exhausting those claims |
Consider the following statement:
That when the government undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of specific legislation would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are performed negligently.”). in aviation cases, courts have held that an faa controller owes a duty of reasonable care to an aircraft, passengers, crews, and cargoes in the performance of the controller’s duties; these duties are concurrent with an airplane pilot’s duty of due care. davis v. united states, 824 f.2d 549, 550 (7th cir.1987) (“while general negligence law applies to airplane tort cases, ... the standard of due care is concurrent, resting upon both the airplane pilot and ground personnel.”) (quoting spaulding v. united states, 455 f.2d 222 (9th cir.1972)); see also freeman, 509 f.2d at 629 (<holding>); somlo v. united states, 416 f.2d 640, 647
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties
B. holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty
C. holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant
D. holding that certain fiduciary duty claims did not arise out of the underlying contractual provisions
E. holding that a controllers duty extended to parachutists jumping out of the plane.
Answer: | E. holding that a controllers duty extended to parachutists jumping out of the plane |
Consider the following statement:
Beatty next contends that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines by relying on the specific offense characteristic, “more than minimal planning,” as the basis for both a two level upward adjustment pursuant to u.s.s.g. § 2fl.l(b)(2)(a) and as one of its stated reasons for upward departure pursuant to u.s.s.g. § 5k2.0, p.s. beatty does not contend that “more than minimal planning” was not present in his offense conduct. he merely contends that the district court engaged in an improper form of “double-counting” when it used the same factor to increase his punishment under two separate and different provisions of the sentencing guidelines. we disagree. double-counting is permitted in some circumstances. compare united states v. burnett, 952 f.2d 187, 188-90 (8th cir.1991) (<holding>), and united states v. thomas, 930 f.2d 12,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both 2j16a and 4alla d when sentencing him for failure to appear to serve his sentence
B. holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless
C. holding that where a furlough and an enhanced sentence for failure to appear in court at a later time are part of the plea agreement a court is justified in imposing the enhanced sentence after the defendant fails to appear in court without giving him an opportunity to withdrawhis plea
D. holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both 2p11a1 and 4alld e when sentencing him for escape
E. holding that sentencing court is permitted to consider evidence of both uncharged acts and evidence underlying counts on which the defendant has been acquitted.
Answer: | A. holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both 2j16a and 4alla d when sentencing him for failure to appear to serve his sentence |
Consider the following statement:
Damage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. is this the damage which dr. brown says is essential to his opinion? what of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? if speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. no case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. however we find substantial support for the views here expressed in twidwell v. davidson, 54 wash.2d 75, 338 p.2d 326, 329-332; stephanofsky v. hill, 136 conn. 379, 71 a.2d 560, 561; kale v. douthitt, 4 cir., 274 f.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); levine v. remolif, 80 nev. 168, 390 p.2d 718, 719-721 (<holding>); anderson v. broome, tex.civ.app., 233 s.w.2d
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding trial court properly excluded testimony concerning speed of vehicle where witness observed vehicle travel on a diagonal for thirtyfive 35 feet on poorly lit road estimate of speed may not be predicated on such a slender data base
B. holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
C. holding that rules of evidence do not permit an expert to give opinion or state legal conclusions regarding a question of law
D. holding that a picture of a damaged vehicle was insufficient to permit an opinion of speed based on damage to the vehicles
E. recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed.
Answer: | D. holding that a picture of a damaged vehicle was insufficient to permit an opinion of speed based on damage to the vehicles |
Consider the following statement:
Presence did not mean the wife got a fraction of both the community and the husband’s separate-property portions of those benefits. we presume the trial judge knew of cearley and taggart and constructed his decree accordingly. see patino, 687 s.w.2d at 802. we find this intent clear from the language used, even if the judge did not also recite a “taggart-type” fraction for gloria’s 50 percent community-property interest. to conclude otherwise, we would have to find the trial judge intended to divide this asset contrary to four-year-old supreme court decisions and to violate the constitutional and statutory provisions already interpreted to prohibit awards of separate property and to allow division of community property only. see eggemeyer v. eggemeyer, 554 s.w.2d 137, 139-40 (tex.1977) (<holding>); see also tex. const, art. xvi, § 15
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing division of separate property to be contrary to statute and constitution
B. recognizing exception under state constitution
C. holding that reviewing court may not reverse trial courts judgment on property division unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion or has made inequitable division
D. holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement
E. holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division.
Answer: | A. recognizing division of separate property to be contrary to statute and constitution |
Consider the following statement:
Can be sufficient evidence that “tends to connect the accused to the alleged offense even if none of the circumstances would be sufficient individually.” brown, 159 s.w.3d at 708; cantelon, 85 s.w.3d at 460-61. “all the law requires is that there be some [corroborating] evidence from which rational jurors could conclude that this [other] evidence sufficiently tended to connect appellant to the offense.” jefferson, 99 s.w.3d at 793 (quoting hernandez v. state, 939 s.w.2d 173, 179 (tex.crim.app.1997)). when corroborating evidence required for a conviction is lacking, the defendant will be entitled to a verdict of acquittal. tex.code crim. proc. ann. art. 38.17 (vernon 2005); see ex parte reynolds, 588 s.w.2d 900, 902 (tex.crim.app.1979), cert. denied, 445 u.s. 920, 100 s.ct. 1284 (1980) (<holding>); fare v. state, 1 s.w.3d 928, 930
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding jury cannot return any verdict except acquittal when evidence is insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness
B. recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony
C. holding suspicion that some combination of individuals participated in five robberies was insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony
D. holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial
E. holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict.
Answer: | A. holding jury cannot return any verdict except acquittal when evidence is insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness |
Consider the following statement:
To establish its consideration of a legal issue”). like the eighth circuit, we do not believe that a district court errs when it fails “to explain a revocation sentence that is consistent with all applicable policy statements.” united states v. caves, 73 f.3d 823, 825 (8th cir.1996). iv. in addition to imposing eleven months confinement, the district court’s revocation order in cr-29 stated that the unpaid portions of johnson’s fine and reimbursement costs for his court appointed counsel “remain in effect.” johnson argues that the district court could not reimpose those obligations in the written judgment order revoking johnson’s supervised release when it failed to reimpose them in open court in the revocation hearing. see united states v. layman, 116 f.3d 105, 108 (4th cir.1997) (<holding>). we find that those obligations existed
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable
B. holding that sentence is imposed when the district court orally pronounces it
C. holding that a court is free to change an orally pronounced sentence until a written judgment is filed
D. recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed
E. recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard.
Answer: | B. holding that sentence is imposed when the district court orally pronounces it |
Consider the following statement:
Dismissing first amended petition without prejudice samuel p. king, district judge. i. introduction on january 7, 1999, petitioner michael kent poland (“petitioner” or “poland”) filed a first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 u.s.c. § 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- october 20, 1998. poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under ford v. wainwright, 477 u.s. 399, 410, 106 s.ct. 2595, 91 l.ed.2d 335 (1986) (<holding>). respondent terry stewart, director of the
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty
B. holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane
C. holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of death for a defendant convicting of raping a child
D. holding that the eighth amendment prohibits execution of persons whose mental illness prevents them from comprehending the reasons for the penalty and its implications
E. recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death.
Answer: | B. holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane |
Consider the following statement:
The state argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. "since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical." id. at 774. 4 . certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that morris intended to leave the j.c. penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving j.c. penney of the use and value of the merchandise. see, eg., johnson v. state, 413 n.e.2d 335, 336 (ind.ct.app.1980) (<holding>). therefore, the state is not barred by double
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that where store employee discovered defendant exiting fitting room with merchandise in her own tote bag evidence was sufficient to support inference that defendant had requisite intent to deprive store of merchandise
B. holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts
C. holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer
D. holding that where a defendant abandoned a vehicle in a subdivision near where the victims body was found there was sufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle
E. holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority.
Answer: | A. holding that where store employee discovered defendant exiting fitting room with merchandise in her own tote bag evidence was sufficient to support inference that defendant had requisite intent to deprive store of merchandise |
Consider the following statement:
Negative and conclude that merrill lynch’s disclosure of the reports to deloitte & touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. in a frequently cited case, in re pfizer, inc. sec. litig., judge buchwald held that pfizer’s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, kpmg peat marwick (“peat marwick”), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 wl 561125, at *6. judge buchwald’s decision was based on her observation that “pfizer and peat marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and peat marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.” id. other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. e.g., gutter v. e.i. dupont de nemours & co., no. 95 civ. 2152, 1998 wl 2017926, at *5 (s.d.fla. may 18, 1998) (<holding>); gramm v. horsehead indus., inc., no. 87 civ.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that accountants worksheets did not contain privileged communications
B. holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary
C. holding that when a party discloses an item to an adversary even in the context of settlement a waiver of the work product privilege is effected
D. recognizing that the duty has been applied to accountants
E. holding that the attorneyclient privilege applied to communications with accountants where defendants demonstrated the necessity of the accountants services by showing that the accountants provided services that were beyond counsels resources and abilities but were uniquely within the accountants qualifications.
Answer: | B. holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary |
Consider the following statement:
Construction would have the “anomalous effect” of undermining the purposes of firrea. specifically, motorcity’s interpretation seeks to take advantage of oral agreements, evading the statute and d’oench merely because motorcity has paid off its loan. such an interpretation would undermine the core purpose of both the d’oench doctrine and its statutory cousins, i.e., allowing the fdic to make its necessary decisions and evaluations, which sometimes must be made with lightning speed, by relying on the written bank records. for the foregoing reasons, we therefore hold that neither firrea, nor the federal deposit insurance act of 1950, preempted the federal common law d’oench doctrine. b. can motorcity avoid the d’oench doctrine if it repaid its loans to southeast prior to b cir.1995) (<holding>); john v. rtc, 39 f.3d 773, 776-77 (7th
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that ignorance by one prosecutor of promise made by another is irrelevant since the prosecutors office is an entity and a promise made by one attorney must be attributed for these purposes to the government
B. holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary
C. holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by 1823e because a promise is not an asset
D. recognizing that a unilateral contract can be formed when only one promise is illusory because the nonillusory promise can serve as an offer which the promisor who made the illusory promise can accept by performance
E. holding that the failure to carry out an oral promise to convey land standing by itself is not fraud.
Answer: | C. holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by 1823e because a promise is not an asset |
Consider the following statement:
Size of the burns in making the adverse credibility determination. sixth, the ij commented that it was “noteworthy” that suntharalinkam had testified during the hearing that he was hospitalized for some ten days following his release from detention, whereas his asylum application did not mention hospitalization and instead only referred to medical treatment that he received at that time. the ij’s concern is unfounded, as in fact there is no “discrepancy” between the application and suntharalinkam’s testimony that can legally form the basis of an adverse credibility decision. an adverse credibility finding cannot be based on petitioner providing testimony that is more detailed than the information presented in the asylum application. see singh v. ins, 292 f.3d 1017, 1021 (9th cir.2002) (<holding>). here, there is no contradiction between the
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination
B. holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum
C. holding that an adverse credibility finding can be based on materially different asylum claims in an airport interview and petitioners subsequent testimony before the ij
D. holding that an adverse credibility determination cannot be based on trial testimony that is more detailed than the applicants initial statements at the airport
E. holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true.
Answer: | D. holding that an adverse credibility determination cannot be based on trial testimony that is more detailed than the applicants initial statements at the airport |
Consider the following statement:
Ill.... “[cjaring for the mentally ill” requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (id.) in light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for cgs, when developing a program in 2002 designed to “deliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital’s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent” (act staff manual), to take steps to “ascertain what the act requires” at that time, wilamowsky, 833 f.2d at 19; see also snet, 121 f.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the act because it sought advice from the dol, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer “failed to ask the appropriate question” and did not compel a finding of good faith); debejian, 64 f.supp.2d at 91 (<holding>). defendant’s fourth and fifth arguments,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that burden of demonstrating coverage rests with the insured
B. holding that regardless of insurers good faith denial of coverage plaintiff is entitled to recover interest to put it in position it would have been in if coverage had not been denied
C. holding claimant has burden of demonstrating a good faith work search
D. holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith
E. holding that where employer did not show it furnished counsel with the specific information necessary to determine coverage it had not met its onerous burden of demonstrating good faith.
Answer: | E. holding that where employer did not show it furnished counsel with the specific information necessary to determine coverage it had not met its onerous burden of demonstrating good faith |
Consider the following statement:
Florida action the majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. in construing a statute, this court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. rhyne v. k-mart corp., 358 n.c. 160, 188, 594 s.e.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that “this court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.”); state v. tew, 326 n.c. 732, 739, 392 s.e.2d 603, 607 (1990) (<holding>). the second sentence of n.c. gen. stat. §
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that statutes dealing with same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system
B. holding the same
C. holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute
D. holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts
E. holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted.
Answer: | E. holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted |
Consider the following statement:
Matter — makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. traylor v. state, 596 so.2d 957, 961-63 (fla.1992). with this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the tonn-ochoa analysis. iv. discussion. it is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually “ ‘per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” schneckloth v. bustamonte, 412 u.s. 218, 219, 93 s.ct. 2041, 2043, 36 l.ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting katz v. united states, 389 u.s. 347, 357, 88 s.ct. 507, 514, 19 l.ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord state v. naujoks, 637 n.w.2d 101, 107 (iowa 2001). one recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. state v. reinier, 628 n.w.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (<holding>); state v. bollinger, 169 n.j.super. 553, 405
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that mailing element was satisfied where the defendants sent letters to fraud victims in an attempt to convince them that the promised services would be performed even though mailings were sent after victims money had been obtained
B. holding defendants agreement to consentsearch provision not coerced merely because it was one of two undesirable options
C. holding that consentsearch provision of a probation agreement was voluntary even though defendant would have been sent to prison if he rejected it
D. holding probationer voluntarily accepted consentsearch provision by accepting probation
E. holding consentsearch provision in parole agreement was coerced and involuntary.
Answer: | C. holding that consentsearch provision of a probation agreement was voluntary even though defendant would have been sent to prison if he rejected it |
Consider the following statement:
Equal, pro rata basis.” id. at 153. the court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee’s exclusive avoidance powers under section 522, which is intended to “give limited protection to a debtor’s exemptions.” id. the court examined specifically section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: the debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt “no specific statutory provision” authorizes chapter 13 debtors to “exercise trustees’ avoidance powers”); labarge v. benda (in re merrifield), 214 b.r. 362, 364 (8th cir. bap 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable chapter 13 debtors as 11 u.s.c. §§ 1107(a), 1203); pruitt v. gramatan investors corp. (in re pruitt), 72 b.r. 436, 439 (bankr.e.d.n.y.1987) (<holding>); montoya v. boyd (in re montoya), 285 b.r.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case
B. holding that section 1303 does not authorize the chapter 13 debtor to exercise the avoiding powers of a trustee
C. holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13
D. holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption
E. holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees avoidance power.
Answer: | B. holding that section 1303 does not authorize the chapter 13 debtor to exercise the avoiding powers of a trustee |
Consider the following statement:
B, 8 u. miami bus. l. rev. 215, 220 (2000) [hereinafter “dilorenzo article”] (stating the rationale behind not allowing regulation b as an affirmative defense). as a result, while these courts recognize a plaintiff can offensively assert an ecoa violation as a civil action to recover damages against a creditor, they refuse to recognize an ecoa violation asserted as an affirmative defense. 2. position #2: a debtor can assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense in the nature of recoupment. many federal and state jurisdictions have allowed a plaintiff to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense, even after the two-year statute of limitations has run for an offensive ecoa claim, by way of recoupment. see, e.g., bolduc v. beal bank, ssb, 167 f.3d 667, 672 (1st cir.1999) (<holding>); silverman v. eastrich multiple investor fund,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding the recoupment doctrine could allow a spouse to assert an ecoa affirmative defense against a creditor even after the statute of limitations had run
B. holding even though an affirmative action for damages is barred the debtor may assert an ecoa violation defensively in the nature of recoupment
C. holding defendant was entitled to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the ecoa
D. holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense
E. holding that ecoa violation cannot be asserted as affirmative defense.
Answer: | A. holding the recoupment doctrine could allow a spouse to assert an ecoa affirmative defense against a creditor even after the statute of limitations had run |
Consider the following statement:
From the ballot without reference to the candidates’ support in the electoral process. thornton, 514 u.s. at 835, 115 s.ct. 1842 (emphasis supplied). the state has not demonstrated that § l-4-802(l)(g) protects the integrity or regularity of the election process and, as demonstrated above, the statute does involve measures that unjustly exclude various segments of the population from the ballot. we hold that the statute imposes additional qualifications to the exclusive qualifications set forth in the constitution, and hence is impermissible. 3. procedural requirement the state, relying heavily on voter registration cases, also attempts to characterize voter registration as a simple procedure, or mechanical adjunct, that is authorized under thornton. id. at 832, .2d 484, 486 (1950) (<holding>). we agree with mr. campbell’s assertions. we
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy
B. holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy
C. holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed
D. holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges
E. holding that state cannot render person convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the government ineligible for congress.
Answer: | E. holding that state cannot render person convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the government ineligible for congress |
Consider the following statement:
District court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint is abuse of discretion. zenith radio corp. v. hazeltine research, inc., 401 u.s. 321, 330, 91 s.ct. 795, 802, 28 l.ed.2d 77 (1971); shipner v. eastern air lines, inc., 868 f.2d 401, 407 (11th cir.1989). after a responsive pleading has been filed, subsequent amendments are permissible only with leave of court, which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” fed.r.civ.p. 15(a). this liberal policy of allowing amendments under rule 15(a) “circumscribes the exercise of the district court’s discretion; thus, unless a substantial reason exists to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial.” shipner, 868 f.2d at 407; see also moore v. baker, 989 f.2d 1129, 1131 (11th cir.1993) (<holding>) (emphasis added). in this case, the district
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order
B. holding that denial of leave to amend is error in the absence of justifying reasons
C. holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights
D. holding that a justifying reason must be apparent for denial of a motion to amend
E. holding that though the court did not expressly state its reason for denying leave to amend it was apparent what delay and prejudice would be caused by plaintiffs motion which sought to add four new individual defendants as well as additional counts under two federal statutes and a statelaw claim.
Answer: | D. holding that a justifying reason must be apparent for denial of a motion to amend |
Consider the following statement:
Gesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. id. at 145-46, 767 a.2d 844. in heckstall v. state, 120 md.app. 621, 626, 707 a.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, “standing alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,” and we held that, because the evidence at heckstall’s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. appellants acknowledge that our holding in heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. they urge us nonetheless to recognize a “somewhat broader ‘buyer-seller’ doctrine[,]” and then find reversible error l.ed.2d 130 (1999); united states v. jones, 160 f.3d 473, 481-82 (8th cir.1998) (<holding>); united states v. starnes, 109 f.3d 648, 651
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction in drug conspiracy prosecution given evidence that defendant played numerous roles in the conspiracy and that massive amounts of cocaine were involved
B. holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction despite defendants contention that buyerseller transactions were the only contacts between defendant and alleged coconspirator because the government adduced far more evidence than the prior drug purchases to establish the conspiracy and instructions as a whole did not allow jury to convict on mere buyerseller theory
C. holding that defendant charged with conspiracy to manufacture marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute was not entitled to specific buyerseller instruction even though support for such instruction existed because court gave a complete instruction reciting all the elements of conspiracy
D. holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct
E. holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy.
Answer: | A. holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction in drug conspiracy prosecution given evidence that defendant played numerous roles in the conspiracy and that massive amounts of cocaine were involved |
Consider the following statement:
Accordingly, appellants have failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination as to all appellants. 2. appellants’ 42 u.s.c. § 1981 retaliation claims the district court granted summary judgment on appellants’ § 1981 retaliation claims for two reasons: 1) appellants failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to retaliation in their third amended complaint; and 2) appellants failed to advance competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating they had engaged in protected activity. appellants’ address the merits of this claim only in their reply brief. accordingly, any claimed error as to the grant of summary judgment on appellants’ § 1981 retaliation claims has been waived. see tharling v. city of port lavaca, 329 f.3d 422, 430 (5th cir.2003) (<holding>). 3. appellants’ hostile work environment and
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief
B. holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief
C. holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief
D. holding that a party abandoned an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief
E. holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue.
Answer: | C. holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief |
Consider the following statement:
Is controlling. 6 as noted above, knowledge of the "facts" comprising a cause of action for attorney malpractice is to be distinguished from knowledge that such conduct constitutes malpractice. as noted in gevaart, the discovery rule does not require that the plaintiff know of the negligent character of the conduct alleged as the cause of his or her injury. see gevaart, 111 wn.2d at 502. 7 we note that a limited number of jurisdictions have adopted the position that a judgment of a trial court does not become final and, hence, a party to such action does not incur any injury as a result of negligent representation at such proceeding, until a court of appeals affirms the decision of the trial court and/or the time to appeal has expired. see neylan v. moser, 400 n.w.2d 538 (iowa 1987) (<holding>). such an approach may be appropriate where the
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict
B. holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
C. holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective
D. holding that the date of injury for purposes of attorney malpractice does not occur until the last possible date when the attorneys negligence becomes irreversible
E. holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act.
Answer: | D. holding that the date of injury for purposes of attorney malpractice does not occur until the last possible date when the attorneys negligence becomes irreversible |
Consider the following statement:
John shannon, a nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment for the defendants in his 42 u.s.c. § 1983 action alleging prison officials violated his constitutional rights by, inter alia, withholding his personal property. we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291. we review de novo, wyatt v. terhune, 315 f.3d 1108, 1117 (9th cir.), cert. denied, 124 s.ct. 50,124 s.ct. 50, 157 l.ed.2d 23 (2003), and we affirm. the district court properly dismissed as untimely shannon’s claim concerning unlawful withholding of his magazines because he filed his action more than two years after the claim accrued. see fink v. shedler, 192 f.3d 911, 914 (9th cir.1999) (<holding>); perez v. seevers, 869 f.2d 425, 426 (9th
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983
B. holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc 1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations
C. holding that in actions brought under 42 usc 1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury
D. holding that the statute of limitations for 1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims
E. holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims.
Answer: | E. holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims |
Consider the following statement:
(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the “extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.” fed. r.bankr.p. 9006(b)(3). although rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under § 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. accordingly, the court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in § 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. see in re tucker, 263 b.r. 632, 636-637 (bankr.m.d.fla.2001). see also byrd v. alton, 837 f.2d 457, 459 (11th cir.1988) (<holding>). courts may nonetheless permit a late filed
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties
B. holding creditors actual notice of chapter 7 case in ample time to prepare and timely file the necessary request for determination of dischargeability bars them from challenging the dischargeability of their claim 15 months after bar date
C. holding that the district court cannot extend the time for filing a rule 59e motion by margin order
D. holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint
E. holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment.
Answer: | D. holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint |
Consider the following statement:
Judges system 21 (1995) ("the senate report [regarding the 1976 amendments to the federal magistrates act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 s.ct. 2237, 104 l.ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the federal magistrates act's "additional duties” clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that "the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. the legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (<holding>). yet the majority opinion gives this caselaw
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the ninth circuits decision exceeded the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 usc 2254d
B. holding that it is unconstitutional for a us magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc 636c over a 2255 motion
C. holding that referrals of civil matters to magistrates pursuant to 28 usc 636c are constitutional for essentially the reasons stated by our sister circuits
D. holding that equitable tolling is available for petitions filed pursuant to 28 usc 2255
E. holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry.
Answer: | C. holding that referrals of civil matters to magistrates pursuant to 28 usc 636c are constitutional for essentially the reasons stated by our sister circuits |
Consider the following statement:
(“new jersey courts have applied the cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,” including in cases “involving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.”). the cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: cf. whittle v. associated indem. corp., 130 n.j.l. 576, 33 a.2d 866, 868 (n.j.err. & app.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); ebert v. balter, 74 n.j.super. 466, 181 a.2d 532, 535 (n.j.super.ct.app.div.1962) (<holding>). state national argues that the county’s
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that an insurer can deny benefits based on late notice by the insured only when the insurer is prejudiced by the delay
B. holding that the insureds liability has been established by the settlement and the insurer may not later relitigate the issue
C. holding that a condition subsequent presupposes an existing obligation that is to be defeated or forfeited if the condition is not fulfilled
D. holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances
E. holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled.
Answer: | D. holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances |
Consider the following statement:
No connecticut court appears to have addressed the reach of conn. gen. reg. § 42-110b-18(g), that regulation, on its face, concerns conduct involving the advertising of products and services, not the settlement of claims. thus, the reasoning of webster bank regarding the scope of § 38a-816(2) would appear to apply to § 42-110b-l 8(g) with equal force, as it is undisputed that any alleged representations by allstate were not an attempt to induce hipsky into entering into a contract for insurance with allstate. 15 . see also fn. 14, supra. fore not subject to the holding of mead v. burns, 199 conn. 651, 663, 509 a.2d 11 (1986), that cutpa provides a private right of action for violations of cuipa. but see rivera v. pereira, no. cv010382813s, 2002 wl 377517, *3 (conn.super. jan. 25, 2002) (<holding>) (unpublished opinion). at any rate, the court
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing private right of action
B. recognizing cause of action
C. holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights
D. holding that cutpa provides private cause of action for violation of 83a832
E. recognizing the cause of action.
Answer: | D. holding that cutpa provides private cause of action for violation of 83a832 |
Consider the following statement:
Law does not occupy the field governing private corrections employees’ actions. the government contractor defense is not likely to apply because there is no indication that the united states directed the geo employees’ treatment of pollard. see malesko, 534 u.s. at 74 n. 6, 122 s.ct. 515 (noting that “[t]he record here would provide no basis for such a defense,” which is available when “the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim”). because the conduct at issu recognizing that a police officer fails to act with due care if the officer confines a prisoner in an unfit and unsanitary place); richardson, 176 p. at 208 (stating that the keeper of a jail has a common law duty to keep the jail warm and sanitary); dabney, 25 va. (4 rand.) 256 (<holding>); see generally m.l. schellenger, annotation,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that new mexico has adopted the common law unless otherwise abrogated by specific statutory provisions and that the power of a trial court to change venue on its own motion if necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial is part of that common law
B. holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest
C. holding that new york law has no common law right of privacy embracmg such claims as false light as any such privacy right is purely statutory
D. holding that under the common law a claim for personal injuries died with the victim
E. holding that under common law a jailor has a duty to provide a prisoner with necessary supplies such as fuel for heat and bed covering.
Answer: | E. holding that under common law a jailor has a duty to provide a prisoner with necessary supplies such as fuel for heat and bed covering |
Consider the following statement:
■wrists. doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; doc. 59 at ¶ 17. once anderson was in the sheriff officers’ custody, moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th cir. 1985) (same). “to ascertain when an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, the illinois supreme gourt has adopted § 228 of the restatement (second) of agency.” copeland v. cnty. of macon, 403 f.3d 929, 932 (7th cir. 2005) (citing pyne v. witmer, 129 ill.2d 351, 135 ill.dec. 557, 543 n.e.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). section 228 provides: conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (n.d. ill, mar. 25, 2014) (<holding>); coles v. city of chicago, 361 f.supp.2d 740,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment
B. holding that a suspended chicago police officer was not acting within his scope of employment when discharging his weapon in the neighboring municipality of cicero
C. holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant stopped in middle lane of traffic to exit his vehicle
D. holding that a reasonable jury could find that an offduty chicago police officer acted within the scope of his employment during a roadside altercation on interstate 55 near the damen street exit which is in chicago
E. holding that scope of employment was an issue for the jury where a chicago police officer was off duty but within the city limits when he shot the plaintiff.
Answer: | D. holding that a reasonable jury could find that an offduty chicago police officer acted within the scope of his employment during a roadside altercation on interstate 55 near the damen street exit which is in chicago |
Consider the following statement:
Offer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. sager v. rogers, 1987 wl 6718, at *2 (tenn.ct.app.1987) (emphasis added) (citing sports premiums, inc. v. kaemmer, 595 p.2d 696 (colo.app.1979); quigley v. capolongo, 53 a.d.2d 714, 383 n.y.s.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 n.y.2d 748, 401 n.y.s.2d 1009, 372 n.e.2d 797 (1977)). thus, tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. defendant bruno’s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. bradford v. crown-bremson indus., inc, 255 f.supp. 1009, 1012 (m.d.tenn.1964). see also pinney v. tarpley, 686 s.w.2d 574, 580 (tenn.ct.app.1984) (<holding>); jones v. horner, 36 tenn.app. 657, 260 s.w.2d
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms
B. holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
C. holding that acceptance of an option must be unqualified absolute unconditional unequivocal unambiguous positive without reservation and according to the terms of the option
D. holding that under oregon law an acceptance of an offer must be positive unconditional unequivocal and unambiguous
E. holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words.
Answer: | C. holding that acceptance of an option must be unqualified absolute unconditional unequivocal unambiguous positive without reservation and according to the terms of the option |
Consider the following statement:
Because the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce leal’s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in leal’s favor in cause no.2003-cvq-001720-d2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner’s decision. and, because dovalina established his qualified immunity from leal’s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of leal in cause no.2001-cvq-000765-d2 and render judgment in dovalina’s favor. however., we do not have jurisdiction over the city of laredo’s appeal in cause no.2001-cvq-000765~d2 and therefore dismiss the city’s appeal. see bexar county v. giroux-daniel, 956 s.w.2d 692, 695 (tex.app.-san antonio 1997, no pet.) (<holding>). leal’s substantive and procedural due process
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over statelaw tort claims on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity
B. holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits
C. holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit
D. holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
E. holding a local government sued under 1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal.
Answer: | E. holding a local government sued under 1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal |
Consider the following statement:
“[g]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language” regarding severance, the court held, “[u]se of the word ‘severed’ is insufficient, in itself, to establish a rule 21 severance.” id. at 625. because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. see id. at 626. as caldwell illustrates, “[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be ‘severed’ from claims against non-diverse defendants.” grefer v. travelers ins. co., no. civ.a. 03-0253, 2003 wl 22717716, at *4 (e.d.la. nov. 18, 2003.) (<holding>). in johnson v. snapper division of fuqua
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a statecourt order providing for severance and separate trials of claims against a diverse defendant and a nondiverse defendant did not permit removal of a plaintiffs claim against the diverse defendant where the claims had not been separately docketed in state court and the plaintiffs claim against the nondiverse defendant had been removed together with the claim against the diverse defendant
B. holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable
C. holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined
D. holding that plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined nondiverse defendants where the plaintiffs claims were based on respondeat superior if no cause of action can be stated against the nondiverse defendants for their alleged torts no case exists against defendant new england for example if a statute of limitation has run on a claim against a nondiverse defendant it necessarily has run for new england accordingly the arguments offered by new england to prove fraudulent joinder simultaneously show that no case can be made against the diverse defendant
E. holding that diversity jurisdiction was not established by a statecourt order that provided only that the plaintiffs claims against a nondiverse defendant be and hereby are severed from this action.
Answer: | E. holding that diversity jurisdiction was not established by a statecourt order that provided only that the plaintiffs claims against a nondiverse defendant be and hereby are severed from this action |
Consider the following statement:
In support of his argument, mattingly relies solely upon a statement in johnson that, generally, a taking involves "an actual interference with, or disturbance of property rights, which are not merely consequential, or incidental injuries to property or property rights...." id. at 804 (quoting school town of andrews v. heiney, 178 ind. 1, 7, 98 n.e. 628, 630 (1912)). johnson does not stand for the proposition that a taking occurs each time a party asserts its property rights. johnson dealt with the creation of a regulated drain, and we held that the establishment of such worked no additional taking of property "save that incidentally required by the county to enter upon the land to repair and maintain the drain." id.; see bemis v. guirl drainage co., 182 ind. 36, 105 n.e. 496 (1914) (<holding>). no unconstitutional taking occurred when the
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights
B. holding that a preexisting but nondisabling condition does not bar recovery of compensation if a jobrelated injury causes the condition to escalate to the level of disability
C. holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation
D. holding that practice which discourages exercise of fifth or sixth amendment rights by penalizing through enhanced sentencing the exercise of those rights is unconstitutional
E. holding that compensation need not be made as condition to exercise of drainage law rights.
Answer: | E. holding that compensation need not be made as condition to exercise of drainage law rights |
Consider the following statement:
It were armed and dangerous, the use of a shotgun to penetrate the iron gate or security door that was protecting the front entrance of the residence was not unreasonable. we further conclude that the nevada “knock and announce” statute, nrs 179.055, was not violated. several of the officers at the scene testified that they announced their presence by yelling something to the effect of “police officer. search warrant,” prior to penetrating the premises. immediately thereafter, shots were fired from the interior of the residence. we therefore hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the officers substantially complied with nrs 179.055 and properly entered the apartment under exigent circumstances to execute the warrant. see united states v. fox, 790 f. supp. 1487 (d. nev. 1992) (<holding>). 6. king contends that the state failed to
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient
B. holding fourth amendment not violated by failure to announce where compliance would have increased officers peril
C. holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable
D. holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable
E. holding that noncompliance with nrs 179055 was justified where compliance with statute would have placed officers in great physical peril.
Answer: | E. holding that noncompliance with nrs 179055 was justified where compliance with statute would have placed officers in great physical peril |
Consider the following statement:
If § 1141 were to take precedence over § 553, then set off would only be allowed if written into the plan and § 553 would be rendered meaningless. id. at 1277. if the court denied set off, the creditor would be required to fully pay its debt to the debtor while only receiving a fraction of the money it is owed. id. since the de laurentiis decision, a majority of courts considering the issue have extended its reasoning to the chapter 13 context and have held that a creditor’s right to set off is not extinguished by confirmation of the plan under § 1327. see in re whitaker, 173 b.r. 359, 362-63 (bankr.s.d.ohio 1994); in re womack, 188 b.r. 259, 261-62 (bankr.e.d.ark.1995); in re orlinski, 140 b.r. 600, 603-4 (bankr.s.d.ga.1991). see also, in re wiegand, 199 b.r. 639, 641 (w.d.mich.1996)(<holding>). as in the de laurentiis case, set off rights
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding a party who survives summary judgment should not be subject to sanctions for asserting frivolous claims
B. recognizing that a critical safeguard set forth in miranda is a persons right to cut off questioning
C. holding that the creditors right to equitable relief constituted a dischargeable claim
D. holding that a creditors right to set off survives a final discharge ofdebt
E. holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor.
Answer: | D. holding that a creditors right to set off survives a final discharge ofdebt |
Consider the following statement:
Of an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . for the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as "regularly issued process.” see widget, 2013 wl 1104273, at *8 (citing cook, 41 f.3d at 80; tadco constr. corp. v. dormitory auth. of n.y., 700 f.supp.2d 253, 272 (e.d.n.y.2010)). i also note that the fact that pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to pinter’s claim. cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. see cook, 41 f.3d at 80. 135 . see ketchuck v. boyer, no. 10 civ. 870, 2011 wl 5080404, at *8 (n.d.n.y. oct. 25, 2011) (<holding>). 136 . see def. mem. at 16, n. 3. 137 . n.y.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that an arrest based on probable cause cannot be the basis of a claim for false arrestimprisonment
B. holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest
C. holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim
D. holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest
E. holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Answer: | C. holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim |
Consider the following statement:
Is void. see zanger, 548 so.2d at 748. the information in this case did not contain the exact judicial circuits involved but stated that the crimes occurred in two or more judicial circuits and were part of a related conspiracy. in nuckolls the court considered a similar argument that the information failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court because it did not properly allege facts to show the jurisdiction of the osp to file the charges. the court rejected the challenge, finding that the information contained the general statutory language which was sufficient to fulfill the jurisdictional requirements. that language is identical to the language in the information in this case. see nuckolls, 677 so.2d at 15; see also winter v. state, 781 so.2d at 1116-17 (fla. 1st dca 2001) (<holding>). although in 2009 the legislature amended
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that allegation of cipa violation is sufficient to confer standing
B. holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language
C. holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation
D. holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer
E. holding that the language was intended as guidance for the attorney general.
Answer: | C. holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation |
Consider the following statement:
Viewpoint or race. it is important to examine the proffered justifications for a college’s selective denial of recognition to an organization. see healy v. james, 408 u.s. at 184-85, 92 s.ct. at 2347-48. mere disagreement with the group’s philosophy is not an adequate ground for denial of first amendment rights because a state college cannot “restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent.” id. at 187-88, 92 s.ct. at 2349. “ ‘[t]he freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the first amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.’ ” id. at 188, 92 s.ct. at 2349 (quoting communist party of the united stat 737 f.2d 1317, 1333 (5th cir.1984) (<holding>), cert. denied, 471 u.s. 1001, 105 s.ct. 1860,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that where university has opened its forum to other similar student groups its denial of recognition to homosexual student group was the sort of viewpoint based discrimination forbidden by perry and was invalid under the first amendment unless the university could support this discrimination by providing a compelling reason for its actions
B. holding that a university creates a public forum when it makes its facilities generally available to registered student groups
C. holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents
D. holding that public school violated homosexual students first amendment right to speech and expression when it banned him from bringing a samesex date to the prom notwithstanding that the student and another homosexual student had previously been assaulted by other students and that the school was forced to provide additional security and escorts
E. holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech.
Answer: | A. holding that where university has opened its forum to other similar student groups its denial of recognition to homosexual student group was the sort of viewpoint based discrimination forbidden by perry and was invalid under the first amendment unless the university could support this discrimination by providing a compelling reason for its actions |
Consider the following statement:
Expert witness, testified that the existence of an annual renewable employment agreement between the foundation and d’unger was consistent with generally accepted accounting practices and corporate governance standards regarding how corporate officers are employed and compensated. the foundation’s by-laws provide that “[ejection or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create contract rights.” in light of that evidence, d’un-ger’s testimony about his understanding of the one-year, renewable term of his employment with the foundation, standing alone, will not support a finding that the foundation agreed to an employment contract that limited its right to terminate d’unger. see williams v. first tenn. nat’l corp., 97 s.w.3d 798, 804 (tex.app.dallas 2003, no pet.) (<holding>). d’unger was required to present probative
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law
B. holding where employee handbook and employment offer letter disclaimed creation of employment contract that employees testimony of his understanding of terms of agreement did not raise fact issue of specific express and clear agreement contradicting the express provisions of the personnel manual and the employment offer letter
C. holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement
D. holding that under arkansas law employment is atwill unless personnel manual or employment agreement contains express provision that employee shall not be discharged except for cause
E. holding that whether a personnel policy manual modifies an employment contract is a question of fact.
Answer: | B. holding where employee handbook and employment offer letter disclaimed creation of employment contract that employees testimony of his understanding of terms of agreement did not raise fact issue of specific express and clear agreement contradicting the express provisions of the personnel manual and the employment offer letter |
Consider the following statement:
The violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. id. again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. see 172 wn.2d at 536, 538. ¶15 in cudney, our supreme court additionally held law enforcement action available under washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. id. at 536-38. there, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. id. at 527-28. but the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying korslund and cudney, and our supreme court denied review of that case despite piel. see weiss v. lonnquist, 173 wn. app. 344, 353-60, 293 p.3d 1264 (<holding>), review denied, 178 wn.2d 1025 (2013). ¶18 our
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures
B. holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures
C. holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures
D. holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process
E. holding the misconduct reporting and disciplinary process prescribed by the washington rules of professional conduct rpc 33 and 83 adequately promoted attorney candor toward the tribunal.
Answer: | E. holding the misconduct reporting and disciplinary process prescribed by the washington rules of professional conduct rpc 33 and 83 adequately promoted attorney candor toward the tribunal |
Consider the following statement:
Digiacinto also reviewed molina’s 1999 mri and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. her examining physician, jacobson, testified that molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. sosina, the most recent doctor to examine molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. the evidence of molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. see, e.g., friedman v. u-haul truck rental, 216 a.d.2d 266, 627 n.y.s.2d 765, 766 (app. div.2d dep’t 1995) (<holding>). in any event, even assuming the admissibility
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another
B. holding purposely inflicts serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other
C. holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim
D. holding unsworn declaration as opposed to an affidavit sworn to before a notary public admissible to prove serious injury under 28 usc 1746
E. holding unsworn mri report inadmissible to establish serious injury.
Answer: | E. holding unsworn mri report inadmissible to establish serious injury |
Consider the following statement:
Interlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . fed. r. civ. p. 41(a)(l)(a)(ii). 16 . id.-, see also 9 charles alan wright & arthur r. miller, federal practice & procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . first nat’l bank of toms river, n.j. v. marine city, inc., 411 f.2d 674, 677 (3d cir. 1969). 18 . e.g., anago franchising, inc. v. shaz, llc, 677 f.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th cir. 2012); de leon v. marcos, 659 f.3d 1276, 1283 (10th cir. 2011); smallbizpros, inc. v. macdonald, 618 f.3d 458, 461 (5th cir. 2010); jenkins v. vill. of maywood, 506 f.3d 622, 624 (7th cir. 2007); gardiner v. a.h. robins co., 747 f.2d 1180, 1189 (8th cir. 1984). 19 . smith v. phillips, 881 f.2d 902, 904 (10th cir. 1989). 20 . small ay int’l. co., 600 f.3d 878, 883-84 (7th cir. 2010) (<holding>). see also 15a charles alan wright & arthur r.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial the state claims should be dismissed as well
B. holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment
C. holding that the circuit courts order concluding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a complaint because the case had been dismissed without prejudice constituted a final order because all other claims either had been refiled or dismissed with prejudice
D. holding that because the claims were dismissed with prejudice there was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review
E. holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed.
Answer: | D. holding that because the claims were dismissed with prejudice there was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review |
Consider the following statement:
King corp. v. rudzewicz, 471 u.s. 462, 472-73, 105 s.ct. 2174, 85 l.ed.2d 528 (1985)). by contrast, "[g]eneral jurisdiction arises when a defendant maintains 'continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum state” and permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant “even when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts.” id. (quoting helicopteros nacionales de colombia, s.a. v. hall, 466 u.s. 408, 414-16, 104 s.ct. 1868, 80 l.ed.2d 404 (1984)). only specific jurisdiction over omsignal is alleged to exist in this case, and on the record before the court, it is apparent that omsignal’s contacts with georgia would not permit this court to exercise general jurisdiction over omsignal. 5 . see toys "r" us, inc. v. step two, s.a., 318 f.3d 446, 452 (3d cir.2003) (<holding>); revell v. lidov, 317 f.3d 467, 471 (5th
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing a split of authority
B. recognizing that takings cases are based on the proper exercise of statutory and regulatory authority
C. holding that the affiants statement based upon his belief did not demonstrate the personal knowledge required by fedrcivp 56e
D. holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted
E. recognizing zippo as a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an internet web site.
Answer: | E. recognizing zippo as a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an internet web site |
Consider the following statement:
999 s.w.2d 448, 451 (tex.app.—amarillo 1999, no pet.); clemons v. state farm fire and cas. co., 879 s.w.2d 385, 391 (tex.app.—houston [14th dist.] 1994, no writ). when the language of the insurance .policy is unambiguous, it is the court’s duty to give the words used their plain meaning. clemons, 879 s.w.2d at 391. here, the policy unambiguously required the insured, perrotta, to submit to an euo and sign and swear to it. perrotta relies on century ins. co. v. hogan, 135 s.w.2d 224 (tex.civ.app.— austin 1939, no writ) for the proposition that his failure to sign and return the euo was not a material breach of the policy. hogan, however, is distinguishable. in that case, the insured provided a reason for not signing the euo: the notary was unab 736 (tex.app.—eastland 1996, writ denied) (<holding>); pogo holding corp. v. new york property ins.
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car
B. holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed
C. holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted
D. holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach
E. holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages.
Answer: | A. holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car |
Consider the following statement:
Not illegal. she ignores that the administrative judge disbelieved her explanation that asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. in light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the administrative judge never reached. fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the board’s decision on liability. ii. whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. see gonzales v. def. logistics agency, 772 f.2d 887, 889 (fed.cir.1985) (<holding>). we agree with the board that the authorized
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that it is not
B. holding the court will not disturb the decision of the abcmr unless it was arbitrary capricious contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence
C. holding that the trial court has broad discretion in granting denying dissolving or modifying injunctions and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated appellate courts will not disturb the trial courts decision
D. holding that when plaintiffs argue an inconsistent jury verdict this court will not disturb the trial courts denial of a motion for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion
E. holding that the court will not disturb a penalty unless it exceeds the range of permissible punishment or is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion citation omitted.
Answer: | E. holding that the court will not disturb a penalty unless it exceeds the range of permissible punishment or is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion citation omitted |
Consider the following statement:
Damages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . i reject the commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituj tional claims in federal court. this is an action seeking injunctive relief against the commissioner in his official capacity. the longstanding doctrine of ex parte young, 209 u.s. 123, 28 s.ct. 441, 52 l.ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. see, e.g., burger king corp. v. rudzewicz, 471 u.s. 462, 478-79, 105 s.ct. 2174, 85 l.ed.2d 528 (1985) (<holding>); francosteel corp. v. m/v charm, 19 f.3d 624,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. recognizing that even entry into contract with citizen of state does not necessarily subject party to jurisdiction in state
B. holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen
C. holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract
D. recognizing that a citizen can sue the state in state court to attempt to obtain a discharge of a student loan and allowing the debtor to refile in state court
E. holding that state senator who was attorney for party to contract with state was in violation of 109.
Answer: | A. recognizing that even entry into contract with citizen of state does not necessarily subject party to jurisdiction in state |
Consider the following statement:
U.s.c. § 1252(a), congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the bia. moreover, section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 u.s.c. § 1252(b)(1). prior to the enactment of the real id act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the bia’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the bia’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 u.s.c. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. see luya liu v. ins, 293 f.3d 36, 41 (2d cir.2002) (<holding>). on may 11, 2005, congress enacted the real id
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a 2241 petition
B. holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review
C. holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law
D. holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time
E. holding that review under 2241 still available notwithstanding express language in iirira barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review.
Answer: | A. holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a 2241 petition |
Consider the following statement:
Advanced by justice corrigan— limiting mcr 3.501(f) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of mcr 3.501. further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that justice corrigan would place on mcr 3.501(f). for example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, american pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. see, e.g., birmingham steel corp v tennessee valley auth, 353 f3d 1331, 1333 (ca 11, 2003) (<holding>); lynch v baxley, 651 f2d 387 (ca 5, 1981)
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory
B. holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint
C. holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification
D. holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity
E. holding that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying the class without permitting class counsel reasonable time to determine whether a new class representative could be substituted.
Answer: | E. holding that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying the class without permitting class counsel reasonable time to determine whether a new class representative could be substituted |
Consider the following statement:
1301-02 (1978)); see also maniscaclo v. kenworthy, no. 03-p-626, 815 n.e.2d 656 (table), 2004 wl 2185422, at *3 (mass.app.ct. sept.28, 2004) (per curiam) (“where, as here, [the] affidavit is uncontradicted other than by the deputy’s return, the affidavit controls.”). similarly, federal courts have held that an affidavit denying agency, standing alone, may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of proper service created by the return of service. see hornick v. s. & m. trucking co., 208 f.supp. 950, 952 (m.d.pa.1962); metropolitan theatre co. v. warner bros. pictures, 16 f.r.d. 391, 392-93 (s.d.n.y.1954); puett elec. starting gate corp. v. thistle down co., 2 f.r.d. 550, 551 (n.d.ohio 1942); see also ellibee v. leonard, 226 fed.appx. 351, 356 (5th cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<holding>); gottlieb v. sandia am. corp., 452 f.2d 510,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a 16 month relationship was not of sufficient length
B. holding that agreements established agency relationship
C. holding averments of defendants sufficient to refute agency relationship
D. holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective
E. recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact.
Answer: | C. holding averments of defendants sufficient to refute agency relationship |
Consider the following statement:
Argues that the trial court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because under these facts the search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest where the police had a preplanned intention to arrest him and search the car for investigation of other crimes. he also contends that the search was illegal because the items removed from the car (videotapes, computer disks, and a briefcase) were taken to a remote site (the police department) and “searched” at a later time. pugh is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claims unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient nt v. state, 765 so.2d 903 (fla. 5th dca 2000) (<holding>). it is not clear from this record why pugh’s
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle
B. holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not
C. recognizing that a search incident to a lawful arrest permits a law enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search of a container located in the area of the arrestees immediate control
D. holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle
E. holding that search of golf bag was not legal as search incident to arrest because it was not in passenger compartment of vehicle or otherwise within arrestees immediate control.
Answer: | E. holding that search of golf bag was not legal as search incident to arrest because it was not in passenger compartment of vehicle or otherwise within arrestees immediate control |
Consider the following statement:
Different phone calls between alvarez and grabe— without specifying the date or the content of those calls—is not enough to satisfy rule 9(b)’s requirement to “specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent ... state where and when the statements were made, and ... explain why the statements were fraudulent.” anatian, 193 f.3d at 88; see also colony at holbrook, 928 f.supp. at 1231; mcgee, 2009 wl 2132439,. at *5. also, the calls were between alvarez and grabe, not alvarez and the town. indeed, the complaint does not allege that alvarez made any fraudulent communication with the town that could provide a basis for fraud liability. as for carillo, pacheco, and casasola, the town allege ltd., no. 12 civ. 8248 lls, 2013 wl 5882928, at *3 (s.d.n.y. oct. 25, 2013) (<holding>). in any event, the complaint fails to plead
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes
B. holding that charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees
C. holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent
D. holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable
E. holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes but no such fees or taxes were due.
Answer: | E. holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes but no such fees or taxes were due |
Consider the following statement:
342 n.c. 813, 823, 467 s.e.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting miranda, 384 u.s. at 473-74, 16 l. ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). however, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” state v. forte, 360 n.c. 427, 438, 629 s.e.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 u.s. 1021, 166 l. ed. 2d 413 (2006). defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. at most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. see davis v. united states, 512 u.s. 452, 459, 129 l. ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (<holding>). finally, defendant contends that he was
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel
B. holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request
C. holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel
D. holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously
E. holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview.
Answer: | C. holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel |
Consider the following statement:
An injunction ordering issuance of a permit is a proper remedy for a violation of the sitting provisions of the facilities sitting subsection of the tca); new york smsa, l.p. v. town of clarkstown, 99 f.supp.2d 381, 389-90 (s.d.n.y.2000) (recognizing an injunction is the proper remedy for a violation of the sitting provisions of the facilities sitting subsection of the tca, but declining to grant an injunction on the facts of the case); group emf, inc. v. coweta county, 50 f.supp.2d. 1338, 1350-51 (n.d.ga.1999) (granting mandamus relief to plaintiff by ordering board of commissioners to grant a permit and concluding remand would frustrate intent of tca to provide relief on an expedited basis); 360 communications co. v. bd. of supervisors, 50 f.supp.2d 551, 564 (w.d.va.1999) (<holding>); iowa wireless servs., l.p. v. city of moline,
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding enforcement of the tcas substantive provisions through 1983 would distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies created by the tcas remedial provisions after identifying the express private remedy in the tca 332c7 the court concluded that congress did not intend this remedy to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a 1983 action
B. holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy
C. holding injunctive relief ordering issuance of a permit is the remedy that best serves the tcas goal of expediting resolution of actions and granting such an injunction
D. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction
E. recognizing a permanent injunction as a means of ordering specific performance.
Answer: | C. holding injunctive relief ordering issuance of a permit is the remedy that best serves the tcas goal of expediting resolution of actions and granting such an injunction |
Consider the following statement:
Appeal waiver. 14 f.supp.2d 816, 819 (e.d.va.1998). the court concluded that the defendant could still file a petition under § 2255 if his claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or challenged the voluntariness of the guilty plea. id. in sum, a § 2255 waiver should not bar ineffective assistance of counsel claims or claims that a guilty plea was involuntary, just as direct appeal waivers do not bar those claims. general enforcement of § 2255 waivers, subject to the same exceptions as direct appeal waivers, aligns with precedent from other district courts in this circuit that have indicated a defendant’s waiver of the right to file a § 2255 motion is as valid as a waiver of the right to a direct appeal. see, e.g., united states v. smith, 113 f.supp.2d 879, 898 (e.d.va.1999) (<holding>); united states v. tayman, 885 f.supp. 832, 834
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
B. holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a defendants waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement
C. holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver
D. holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so
E. holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable.
Answer: | D. holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so |
Consider the following statement:
Arrest matched an exemplar print of haward’s left index finger. haward cross-examined officer knapp but did not offer a fingerprint expert of his own. the jury ultimately found haward guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. in this court haward first argues that the district court did not properly conduct its daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of fingerprint evidence under rule 702, a determination that we review de novo. see united states v. cruz-velasco, 224 f.3d 654, 659 (7th cir.2000). specifically, he contends that fingerprint evidence is inadmissible under daubert because it is not “scientifically” based. the standards of daubert, however, are not limited in application to “scientific” testimony alone. see kumho, 526 u.s. at 147, 119 s.ct. 1167 (<holding>). therefore, the idea that fingerprint
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records
B. holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge
C. holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony
D. holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge
E. holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony.
Answer: | E. holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony |
Consider the following statement:
Alleged forced sterilization. in re j-s- 24 i. & n. dec. 520, 523 (a.g. 2008). instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own “other resistance” to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such “resistance.” id. even assuming that chen-xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the bia the ij’s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. thus, we decline to review as unexhausted chen xu’s argument in his brief to this court that his two day detention and 12,000 rmb fíne amounted to persecution. see lin zhong v. u.s. dep’t of justice, 480 f.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d cir.2007) (<holding>). in any event, the agency reasonably found
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement
B. holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional
C. holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional
D. holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
E. recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Answer: | A. holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement |
Consider the following statement:
Stating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making white eligible for any bop treatment program. furthermore, according to the government, tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 s.ct. at 2392. finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(d) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” see united states v. collins, 461 fed-appx. 807, 810 (10th cir.2012) (<holding>). the government’s arguments as to the absence
Question: From the provided statement, which includes an excerpt from a court decision that references a specific case, the holding (short summaries of legal rulings) relevant to the current case is masked out. Select the correct answer that corresponds to the <HOLDING> mask from the options given.
A. holding a sentencing court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in 3553a
B. holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances
C. holding in similar circumstances that a formulaic recitation of the sentencing factor set out in 3553a2d supplies little indication that a court lengthened a sentence for rehabilitative purposes
D. holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances
E. holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor.
Answer: | C. holding in similar circumstances that a formulaic recitation of the sentencing factor set out in 3553a2d supplies little indication that a court lengthened a sentence for rehabilitative purposes |