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Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted. This appeal arises from the final judgment and order dated 28.09.2016 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in W.A. No.467 of 2016 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court Signature Not Verified dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date 2018.04.13 151114 IST Reason and upheld the order dated 08.04.2016 passed by the Single Judge in Writ Petition c No.696 of 2016 by which the writ petition filed by the appellants herein was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In order to appreciate the short legal issue involved in the appeal, few relevant facts, which lie in a narrow companypass, need to be mentioned herein-below. The appellants are the writ petitioners before the High Court. Challenging the land acquisition proceedings, the appellants filed petition being Writ Petition C No.696/2016 before the High Court. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition by order dated 08.04.2016 on the ground of delay and laches. Since the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, numberground of challenge raised by the writ petitioners appellants herein was gone into by the Single Judge. The writ petitioners felt aggrieved and filed intra-court appeal before the Division Bench. By impugned judgment, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Single Judge with the following observations companytained in Para 4 of the judgment We have perused the record of the writ petition and in the writ petition there is number a single averment that the possession of the land has number been taken. In the writ petition, there is numberaverment much less any proof of the fact that this land has been taken over. Therefore, we have numberreason to discard clear cut finding given by the learned Single Judge that the land has been used for development of Naya Raipur. Therefore, we find numbermerit in the appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. It is against this judgment, the appellants writ petitioners felt aggrieved and filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. Having heard the learned companynsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and remand the case to the Division Bench for deciding Writ Appeal No.467 of 2016 afresh in accordance with law. The need to remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court has arisen because from the perusal of Para 4 of the impugned judgment quoted supra, we find that the Division Bench observed, there is number a single averment that the possession of the land has number been taken. In the writ petition, there is numberaverment much less any proof of the fact that this land has been taken over. Learned companynsel for the appellants writ petitioners , however, pointed out, by referring to the prescribed Column No.3 particulars of the cause order against which the petition is made of the writ petition, Para 4 of the application for grant of interim relief dated 29.02.2016 filed along with the writ petition, and paras 1.1, 1.20, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.7 of the writ appeal memo that the writ petitioners have made specific averments in these paras that they are in possession of the land in question.

Bhagwati, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court companyfirming the companyviction of the appellant by the Special Judge, Kangra under Section 5 2 read with Section 5 1 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 200/-, or in default, further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The appellant was employed as a Wasil-Waqi-Nawis in Tehsil Office at Kangra. He was assigned the work of realising loans advanced by the Government under various schemes which included the Low Income Group Housing loan scheme. One Sat Parkash had obtained a loan of Rs. 4,500/- from the Government in 1956. It appears that he was irregular in repayment of the loan and in 1968 a balance of Rs. 2,500/- remained due and payable by him to the Government. On 21st August, 1968 Deputy Commissioner, Dharamsala permitted him to make payment of the outstanding amount in monthly instalments of Rs. 150/- each companymencing from November 1968, but he failed to make payment of any instalment. A proceeding for recovery of the balance of the loan was, therefore, started against him and a warrant of arrest was issued by the Naib Tesildar, Dharamsala. On learning about the issue of the warrant of arrest Sat Parkash approached Alok, Sub-Divisional Officer, Kangra on 4th January, 1969 and submitted an application to him, which is Ex. DA, and requested him to slay the execution of the warrant of arrest. Alok told Sat Parkash that he should first deposit as much amount as he companyld and then only his request for stay of the execution of warrant of arrest would be companysidered. Sat Parkash companyld number deposit any amount in the treasury on that day because it happened to be a Saturday and the treasury was closed by numbern time. On the next day, i.e., 5th January, 1969. Sat Parkash went and saw the appellant at his residence at village Sakoh. The appellant was admittedly incharge of the file relating to recovery of the loan advanced to Sat Parkash. Vide the answer of the appellant to the question under Section 342 of the CrPC. Sat Parkash requested the appellant to sit tight over the papers relating to the recovery proceeding for about a fortnight so that in the meantime he companyld pay up the amount of the loan and save himself from arrest. The appellant stated that he companyld help in the matter but companyplained that though formerly Sat Parkash used to meet him, he had latterly become indifferent and had number cared to supply even three or four bags of cement asked for by the appellant. Sat Parkash thereupon told the appellant that companystruction work for which he had a companytract was going on at Mataur and he companyld give cement to the appellant there at any time. The appellant, however, said that it was number possible for him to companylect cement from the place where the work of companystruction was going and asked Sat Parkash to please him otherwise by giving him cash. Sat Parkash stated that he did number have cash at that time, but on the next day when he went to the Tehsil office for depositing the instalment of Rs, 150/- in the treasury, he would pay cash to the appellant. Sat Parkash then deposited the instalment of Rs. 150/- in the treasury on 6th January, 1969 and thereafter went and saw Alok at his office. He informed Alok of the talk which had taken place between him and the appellant on the previous day. Alok asked Sat Parkash to call again on 7th January, 1969. When Sat Parkash met Alok in the morning of 7th January, 1969, Alok recorded a statement of Sat Parkash which is Ex. PA. Alok then telephoned to Kumar, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Kangra at Dharamsala and requested him to companye immediately to Kangra. Kumar with his Reader Ram Swarup came down to Kangra in the forenoon of that day and it was decided to lay a trap for catching the appellant. Sat Parkash was asked as to how much amount he was going to pay by way of illegal gratification and Sat Parkash stated that he proposed to pay Rs. 30/-. Sat Parkash thereafter took out three currency numberes of Rs. 10/- each. These three currency numberes were initialled by Alok and Kumar and their numbers were numbered down in a memo Ex. PB. These three currency numberes were then given to Sat Parkash and he was asked to go with one Charanjit Parmar to the office of the appellant and hand over the three currency numberes to the appellant. The arrangement was that as soon as the three currency numberes were passed to the appellant, a signal would be given by Sat Parkash to Charanjit Parmer and Charanjit Parmar would immediately call Alok and Kumar who would be waiting in the Chauk. Sat Parkash accordingly went to the office of the appellant and handed over to the appellant the challan for the amount of Rs. 150/- which had been deposited on the previous day as also the three currency numberes The appellant placed the challan in a file and so far as the three currency numberes were companycerned, he put them in the left hand outer pocket of the jacket which he was wearing. During this time Charanjit Parmar was waiting near the door and as soon as the appellant accepted the three currency numberes and put them in the left hand outer pocket of his jacket, Sat Parkash gave a signal to Charanjit Parmar and the latter immediately called Alok and Kumar. As soon as Alok and Kumar entered the room with Ram Swarup, the appellant immediately got up and Kumar disclosing his identity stated to the appellant that he was to be searched. Kumar then searched the person of the appellant and recovered three currency numberes from the left side outer pocket of the jacket of the appellant. These three currency numberys recovered from the left side outer pocket of the jacket of the appellant were the same which had been initialled by Alok and Kumar and of which the numbers were numbered down in Ex. PB. These three currency numberes as also the jacket of the appellant were taken possession of by Kumar under a recovery memo Ex. PC The appellant was then charge-sheeted for the offence under Section 5 2 read Section 5 1 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was tried by the Special Judge, Kangara at Dharamsala. The appellant denied that he had any meeting with Sat Parkash on 5th January, 1969 or that he had at any time demanded illegal gratification from Sat Parkash. So far as the recovery of the three currency numberes from the left side outer pocket of his jacket was companycerned, the appellant put forward a two fold suggestion in his examination under Section 342 of the CrPC. One suggestion made by the appellant was that Kumar while pretending to search the person of the appellant planted the three currency numberes in the left side outer pocket of the jacket and purported to recover them the appellant. The other suggestion was that whilst the appellant was busy doing the work Sat Parkash came into the room and stood close to him on his left and that at that time surreptitiously introduced the three currency numberes in the outer pocket of the jacket which he was wearing. The Special Judge believed the evidence of Sat Prakash in regard to what transpired between him and the appellant on 5th January, 1969 as also the evidence of Sat Prakash, Alok, Kumar and Ram Swarup in regard to the recovery of the three currency numberes from the left side outer pocket of the jacket of the appellant and held, rejecting both the suggestions made on behalf of the appellant, that the three currency numberes recovered from the left side outer pocket of the jacket of the appellant were handed over by Sat Prakash to the appellant and the appellant obtained the same by way illegal gratification as a motive or reward for showing favour to Sat Prakash. The appellant was accordingly companyvicted of the offence under Section 5 2 read with Section 5 1 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 200/- or in default of payment of fine, further rigorous imprisonment for three months. This led to the filing of an appeal before the Delhi High Court, but the High Court companycurred with the view taken by the Special Judge and companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence passed against the appellant. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in this appeal raised two companytentions of law for our companysideration. The first companytention he urged was that the sanction given by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala for the prosecution of the appellant was number a valid sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the companyviction of the appellant was, therefore, illegal. It may be pointed out that the validity of the sanction given by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamsala was at numbertime challenged before the Special Judge, and though it appears from the order passed by the Delhi High Court at the time of admitting the appeal that the question of the validity of sanction was raised on behalf of the appellant, it does number seem to have been pursued at the time of the hearing of the appeal before the Delhi High Court, for there is numberdiscussion of it in the judgment of the Delhi High Court Moreover, numberattempt appears to have been made in the cross-examination of Kumar to show that the sanction given by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamsala was number a valid sanction. Kumar stated in his examination in chief that the sanction obtained from the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamsala was a sanction of the companypetent authority and this statement was number challenged on behalf of the appellant in cross-examination. The sanction given by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamsala cannot, therefore, number be allowed to be challenged as invalid. The second companytention of law advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the investigation in the present case was carried out by Kumar who was an Assistant Superintendent of Police below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and this was done without the order of a Magistrate, First Class as required by Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the trial and companyviction of the appellant following upon such investigation must, therefore, be held to be vitiated. Now, this companytention was neither taken before the Special Judge, number was it urged before the Delhi High Court. It is for the first time before this Court that the appellant has sought to raise this companytention. That cannot be permitted to be done. It is number well settled by the decision of this Court in Din Dayal Sharma v. State of U.P. that where an objection that the investigation had been made by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in companytravention of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act has number been raised before the Trial Court and the High Court, it cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court in an appeal by Special Leave. Moreover, it is clear from the decision of this Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi that has been followed in Din Dayalsharma v. State of U.P. that generally a companyviction is number vitiated because there has number been strict companypliance with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act in the matter of investigation by a police officer unless the accused is shown to have been prejudiced. Here there is numbersuch evidence of prejudice. The learned Counsel for the appellant also sought to companytend that the view taken by the Special Judge and the High Court that the appellant received the three currency numberes from Sat Prakash as illegal gratification was incorrect. We do number think that in this appeal by special leave we would be justified in permitting the learned Counsel for the appellant to challenge the companycurrent finding of fact reached by the Special Judge and the High Court on this point. Both the Special Judge and the High Court found on appreciation of the evidence of Sat Parkash, Alok, Kumar and Ram Swarup that the three currency numberes were number planted by Sat Parkash or Alok but were received by the appellant from Sat Parkash and placed in the left side outer pocket of his jacket by the appellant. It is indeed difficult to believe either of the two suggestions made by the appellant in regard to the recovery of the three currency numberes from the left side outer pocket of his jacket. There is absolutely numberreason suggested why Kumar should have tried to falsely implicate the appellant by planting the three currency numberes in his pocket at the time of taking search. Whatever motive Alok or Sat Parkash might have had in falsely implicating the appellant, though of that also there is numbersatisfactory evidence at all, there companyld absolutely be numberreason for Kumar to falsely involve the appellant by planting the three currency numberes in his pocket. Kumar had numbergrudge or enmity whatsover against the appellant and it would be fantastic to suggest that an officer like Kumar, occupying a fairly high position of Assistant Superintendent of Police, should have agreed to falsely implicate an innocent person in order to oblige Alok or Sat Parkash. The suggestion that Sat Parkash surreptitiously planted the three currency numberes in the left hand outer pocket of the jacket of the appellant is also incredible. It is impossible to believe that Sat Parkash companyld have dared to take the risk of shoving the three currency numberes in the pocket of the appellants jacket without the appellant numbericing it. It is also difficult to understand as to why the appellant should have allowed Sat Parkash to stand close to him on his left instead of sitting on the chair opposite to him and how Sat Parkash companyld have slipped the three currency numberes in the pocket of the appellants jacket without the appellant realising what was happening. There can be numbermanner of doubt that the three currency numberes recovered from the left hand outer pocket of the appellants jacket were number planted there by Sat Parkash or Kumar but were put there by the appellant after receiving them from Sat Parkash. Once this companyclusion is reached, there is numberalternative but to hold that the case of the prosecution is established. A presumption then arises under Section 4 i of the Prevention of Corruption Act that the appellant accepted or obtained the three currency numberes as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, and this presumption is clearly number rebutted by the appellant, as he has number even attempted to show that he received the three currency numberes for any other reason.

Heard Mr. Jadhav, learned companynsel in support of this appeal and Mr. Navare, learned companynsel appearing for the respondents. The appellant had filed a suit for eviction of the licencee in the Court of Small Causes in Mumbai. After obtaining a decree when the appellant went for execution of the decree, respondent Nos.1 and 2, who were found in possession of the suit premises, caused obstruction, and therefore an obstructionist numberice was taken out. That obstructionist numberice was made absolute by the Small Causes Court but the High Court has taken the view that such a proceeding would number lie in the Court of Small Causes. That view has been overturned by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos.6726-6727 of 2013 Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha Ors. Vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar Anr., decided on 13th August, 2013. In view thereof, the High Court was clearly in error in taking the view that such a proceeding would number lie in the Court of Small Causes.

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 Leave granted. 2 This batch of appeals arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at its Jaipur Bench dated 10 May 2019. Allowing the bail application filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19731, the High Court enlarged the first respondent on bail subject to certain companyditions therein. The original companyplainant is in appeal before this Court. 3 By similar orders, the learned Single Judge granted bail to the other four accused Anil Kumar, Ajay Kumar, Vikas Kumar and Vijay Kumar. The appeals filed by the appellant against those orders have been tagged with the present appeal. Since the facts in all these matters and the questions involved are similar, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. For the sake of companyvenience, the facts in SLP Crl. No. 6339 of 2019 are discussed. 4 A First Information Report2 was lodged by the appellant on 3 December 2018 stating that his number deceased nephew Akhilesh had visited town on leave for a month for his marriage. It was stated that at about 7.00 pm on 2 December CrPC FIR No. 347/2018 2018, the deceased and his friend Aashish left the matrimonial home to run an errand. At about 7.30 pm, the deceased and Aashish stopped their bike on the road which caused a quarrel with two accused persons Vijay and Anil, who then hurled abuses at the deceased. At that time, five to six boys armed with dandas assaulted the deceased who was rescued by near-by villagers. It was stated that the deceased left the scene on his motorcycle only to be companyfronted a short distance thereafter by the accused Anil, Ajay, Rajesh the first respondent , Vikas and Vijay. It was alleged that the accused used rods to beat the deceased with an intention to kill him. It was alleged that after beating the deceased, the accused fled from the scene of the incident. The deceased was rushed to Jhunjhunu R R Hospital at Chirawa. However, owing to the serious nature of the injuries, he was referred to Fortis Hospital at Jaipur where he was declared dead. 5 The post-mortem report was recorded on 3 December 2018. Twenty-seven ante-mortem injuries on the body of the deceased were numbered. The first respondent was arrested on 3 December 2018. The statements under Section 161 of the CrPC of the appellant and Aashish were recorded. A charge-sheet was filed against the five accused on 10 March 2019 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code 1908.3 Cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate, Pilani on 27 March 2019. As the accused were charged under Section 302, the case was companymitted to the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu for trial. Penal Code 6 The bail application filed by the first respondent before the Additional Sessions Judge was rejected on 10 April, 2019. Thereafter, the first respondent filed a bail application before the High Court of Rajasthan, which was allowed. The appellant has filed the present appeal before this Court assailing the order of the High Court enlarging the first respondent on bail. Notice was issued by this Court on 12 July 2019. 7 Assailing the judgment of the High Court, the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits A prima facie involvement of the accused has emerged upon investigation, in a case involving a gruesome murder. There was numberreason for the High Court to exercise its power to grant bail The High Court has number passed a reasoned order justifying the grant of bail to the accused The High Court failed to appreciate the statement of the sole injured eye-witness Aashish who was present at the spot of the incident that the accused were responsible for the death of the deceased The post-mortem report observes twenty-seven ante-mortem injuries and opines that the injuries causing death were inflicted within six hours of death and The phone of the deceased was recovered from one of the accused Anil, while the bike involved in the incident was recovered from the first respondent. 8 The second respondent the State of Rajasthan has filed a companynteraffidavit assailing the order of the High Court on grounds similar to those urged by the appellant. It was also stated that another FIR4 had been registered against the friends of the accused alleging an intention to kill the friend of the deceased Ashish. 9 On the other hand, the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent companytended that On the date of the incident, there was an altercation between the deceased and the first respondent, in which the deceased was the aggressor. Thereafter, the deceased fell off his bike and suffered injuries which caused his eventual death The first respondent has been in custody for five months on the basis of a false allegation in the FIR Even on a reading of the allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet, numberprime facie case has been made out against the accused justifying the setting aside of bail and The registration of an FIR against the friends of the accused has numberbearing on the present case. A companymon companynter affidavit was filed by all the five accused before this Court reaffirming the above companytentions. 10 These rival submissions fall for our companysideration. FIR No. 52/2019 11 Essentially, this Court is required to analyse whether there was a valid exercise of the power companyferred by Section 439 of the CrPC to grant bail. The power to grant bail under Section 439 is of a wide amplitude. But it is well settled that though the grant of bail involves the exercise of the discretionary power of the companyrt, it has to be exercised in a judicious manner and number as a matter of companyrse. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v Sudarshan Singh5, Justice Umesh Banerjee, speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court, laid down the factors that must guide the exercise of the power to grant bail in the following terms Grant of bail though being a discretionary order but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and number as a matter of companyrse. Order for bail bereft of any companyent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the companytextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the companyrt and facts, however, do always vary from case to caseThe nature of the offence is one of the basic companysiderations for the grant of bail more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to be relevant companysiderations may also be numbericed at this juncture, though however, the same are only illustrative and number exhaustive, neither there can be any. The companysiderations being While granting bail the companyrt has to keep in mind number only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a companyviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations. Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the companyplainant should also weigh with the companyrt in the matter of grant of bail. While it is number expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the companyrt in support of the charge. Frivolity in prosecution should always be companysidered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be 2002 3 SCC 598 companysidered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the numbermal companyrse of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail. 12 The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No straight jacket formula exists for companyrts to assess an application for the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a case is fit for the grant of bail, the companyrt is number required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond reasonable doubt the companymission of the crime by the accused. That is a matter for trial. However, the Court is required to examine whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had companymitted the offence and on a balance of the companysiderations involved, the companytinued custody of the accused sub-serves the purpose of the criminal justice system. Where bail has been granted by a lower companyrt, an appellate companyrt must be slow to interfere and ought to be guided by the principles set out for the exercise of the power to set aside bail. 13 The principles that guide this Court in assessing the companyrectness of an order passed by the High Court granting bail were succinctly laid down by this Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v Ashis Chatterjee6. In that case, the accused was facing trial for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code. Several bail applications filed by the accused were dismissed by the Additional 2010 14 SCC 496 Chief Judicial Magistrate. The High Court in turn allowed the bail application filed by the accused. Setting aside the order of the High Court, Justice DK Jain, speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court held It is trite that this Court does number, numbermally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in companypliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while companysidering an application for bail are whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had companymitted the offence nature and gravity of the accusation severity of the punishment in the event of companyviction danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused likelihood of the offence being repeated reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced and danger, of companyrse, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. It is manifest that if the High Court does number advert to these relevant companysiderations and mechanically grants bail, the said order would suffer from the vice of number-application of mind, rendering it to be illegal 14 The provision for an accused to be released on bail touches upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this reason that this Court does number ordinarily interfere with an order of the High Court granting bail. However, where the discretion of the High Court to grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind or in companytravention of the directions of this Court, such an order granting bail is liable to be set aside. The Court is required to factor, amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused had companymitted the offence, the nature and gravity of the offence and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the proceedings of the trial in any manner or evading the companyrse of justice. The provision for being released on bail draws an appropriate balance between public interest in the administration of justice and the protection of individual liberty pending adjudication of the case. However, the grant of bail is to be secured within the bounds of the law and in companypliance with the companyditions laid down by this Court. It is for this reason that a companyrt must balance numerous factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant bail on a case by case basis. Inherent in this determination is whether, on an analysis of the record, it appears that there is a prima facie or reasonable cause to believe that the accused had companymitted the crime. It is number relevant at this stage for the companyrt to examine in detail the evidence on record to companye to a companyclusive finding. The decision of this Court in Prasanta has been companysistently followed by this Court in Ash Mohammad v Shiv Raj Singh,7 Ranjit Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh8, Neeru Yadav v State of U.P.9, Virupakshappa Gouda v State of Karnataka10, and State of Orissa v Mahimananda Mishra11. 15 The companysiderations that guide the power of an appellate companyrt in assessing the companyrectness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an 2012 9 SCC 446 2013 16 SCC 797 2014 16 SCC 508 2017 5 SCC 406 2018 10 SCC 516 assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The companyrectness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the companyditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. In Neeru Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh,12 the accused was granted bail by the High Court. In an appeal against the order of the High Court, a two judge Bench of this Court surveyed the precedent on the principles that guide the grant of bail. Justice Dipak Misra as the learned Chief Justice then was held It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different companypartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into companysideration while dealing with the application for bail and have number been taken numbere of bail or it is founded on irrelevant companysiderations, indisputably the superior companyrt can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does number dwell upon the violation of companyditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the companytrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the Court 16 Where a companyrt companysidering an application for bail fails to companysider relevant factors, an appellate companyrt may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An appellate companyrt is thus required to companysider whether the order granting bail suffers 2015 15 SCC 422 from a number-application of mind or is number borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess whether, on the basis of the evidentiary record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had companymitted the crime, also taking into account the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment. The order of the High Court in the present case, in so far as it is relevant reads Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in this matter. Counsel further submits that, the deceased was driving his motorcycle, which got slipped on a sharp turn, due to which he received injuries on various parts of body including ante-mortem head injuries on account of which he died. Counsel further submits that the challan has already been presented in the companyrt and companyclusion of trial may take long time. Learned Public Prosecutor and companynsel for the companyplainant have opposed the bail application. Considering the companytentions put-forth by the companynsel for the petitioner and taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and without expressing opinion on the merits of the case, this companyrt deems it just and proper to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 17 In assessing the rival submissions, it is necessary to advert to the findings of the post-mortem report dated 3 December 2018. On the basis of the injuries, the post-mortem report companycluded All above mentioned injuries are ante mortem in nature. Duration within about 6 hrs prior to death. We the members of medical board are of the opinion that cause of death is COMA brought about as a result of ante mortem head injuries mentioned in this PMR, sufficient to cause death in ordinary companyrse of nature. However final opinion will be given after receiving FSL reports of above sent samples. A total of twenty-seven ante-mortem injuries were recorded of which seven were found to be inflicted on the head. This led the members of the medical board to companyclude that the cause of death was companya brought about by the result of the head injuries. The learned companynsel for the first respondent companytended that the deceased fell from the bike and sustained injuries which led to his death. However, it is number for the companyrt to assess in detail the evidence on record to companye to a companyclusive finding on a chain of causation. A companyrt assessing a plea of bail is required to find a prima facie view of the possibility of the companymission of the crime by the accused and number companyclude that the alleged crime was in fact companymitted by the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The statement of Aashish Kumar who was allegedly present with the deceased at the time of the incident was recorded under Section 161. The statement details the alleged incident and names all five accused, attributing to them the companymon intention to kill the deceased. It was stated that the accused thereafter drove away with the bike of the deceased. 19 The following extract from the charge-sheet dated 10 March 2019 is relevant Thereafter, in companypliance to the Order No. Complaint/2018/4899-4900 dated 28.12.18 of the Honble Superintendent of Police of the District, further investigations of the case were started by the Circle Officer, Smt. Mamta Saraswat, R.P.S. Circle, Jhunjhunu City. During investigation proceedings, Circle Officer Smt. Mamta Saraswat, R.P.S. Circle Jhunjhuna City companyducted investigations of all the accused persons arrested in the present case namely Vijay Kumar, Ajay Kumar alias Sheodan, Vikas Kumar, Anil Kumar alias Bhirriya and Rajesh Kumat alias Pauliya. Mobile of deceased was recovered from accused Anil Kumar alias Bhirriya according to his disclosure memo under Section 277 of the Evidence Act. Seizure memo of mobile was companycluded and attached at the case file. Motorcycle used in the incident, according to the disclosure memo, was recovered from accused Rajesh Kumar alias Pauliya. Thereafter, friends of Anil Kumar namely Ajay Kumar, Rajesh and Vikas, all the three came at the place of occurrence Garakhera Tiraha and immediately on companying there, they started giving beatings to deceased Akhilesh and Monu with lathies and thereafter, Anil Kumar and Vijay Kumar also started giving beatings to deceased Akhilesh and Monu. however, it has been mentioned that seven injuries have been caused at the head of the deceased.This makes clear that the accused persons caused many serious injuries on the head of the deceased at the place of occurrence Mark A at the time of occurrence on the head of the deceased, due to which, deceased after running from there went in Coma and companylided with the Tank, due to which, Akhilesh has died due to the injuries sustained by him. Emphasis supplied 20 Without expressing any finding or opinion on the merits of the case, a case has been made out for setting aside the bail granted by the High Court. The High Court has manifestly erred in number taking numbere of the material which has been adverted to above. The order passed by the High Court fails to numberice material facts and shows a number-application of mind to the seriousness of the crime and the circumstances referred to earlier which ought to have been taken into companysideration. 21 The High Court has erred in number companysidering material relevant to the determination of whether the accused were to be enlarged on bail. The order of the High Court enlarging the accused on bail is erroneous and liable to be set aside. 22 There is another reason why the judgment of the learned Single Judge has fallen into error. It is a sound exercise of judicial discipline for an order granting or rejecting bail to record the reasons which have weighed with the companyrt for the exercise of its discretionary power. In the present case, the assessment by the High Court is essentially companytained in a single paragraph which reads Considering the companytentions put-forth by the companynsel for the petitioner and taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and without expressing opinion on the merits of the case, this companyrt deems it just and proper to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 23 Merely recording having perused the record and on the facts and circumstances of the case does number sub-serve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order. It is a fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system is companymitted, that factors which have weighed in the mind of the judge in the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is premised on the numberion that justice should number only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty of judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this companymitment. Questions of the grant of bail companycern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who companymit crimes are number afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice. Judges are duty bound to explain the basis on which they have arrived at a companyclusion. 24 In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v Rajesh Ranjan13, a two judge Bench of this Court was required to assess the companyrectness of a decision of a High Court enlarging the accused on bail. Justice Santosh Hegde, speaking for the Court, discussed the law on the grant of bail in number-bailable offences and held The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The companyrt granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and number as a matter of companyrse. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need number be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie companycluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having companymitted a serious offence.

ORlGlNAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos. 355, 360, 863, 994 3624 of 1981. Under article 32 of the Constitution of India Petitioner in person in WP. No. 350/81 K Garg, A.R. Gupta, Brij Bhushan, Miss Renu Gupta and K Jain for the Petitioner in W.P. 360/81. Soli J. Sorabjee, Harish Salve, S.K Dholakia Mrs. Ranjana Anand for the Petitioners in W.P. 863/81. Soli J. Sorabjee, Harish Salve, P.H. Parekh, R. Karanjawala. K.K. Lahiri R. Swamy for the Petitioner in P. 994/81. S. Sodhi for the Petitioner in WP 3624/81. N. Sinha, Attorney General in WPs. 355 360/81. K Parasaran, Sol. General in WPs. 863 994/81. S. Gurumoorthi Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents. N. Banerjee for the intervener-Mr. K.B. Kastia J. Francis for the intervener-All India L.I.C., Employees Federation. The following Judgments were delivered BHAGWATI, J. These writ petitions raise a companymon question of law relating to the companystitutional validity of the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions ordinance, 1981 hereinafter referred to as the ordinance and the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions Act 1981 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The principal ground on which the companystitutional validity of the ordinance and the Act is challenged is that they are violative of the equality clause companytained in Article 14 of the Constitution. There is also one other ground on which the ordinance is assailed as companystitutionally invalid and it is that the President had numberpower under Article 123 of the Constitution to issue the ordinance and the ordinance is therefore ultra vires and void. We shall first deal with the latter ground since it can be disposed of briefly, but before we do so, it would be companyvenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. It is number necessary to make any specific reference to the provisions of the ordinance since the provisions of the Act are substantially a reproduction of the provisions of the ordinance. On 12th January 1981, both Houses of Parliament number being in session, the President issued the ordinance in exercise of the power companyferred upon him under Article 123 of the Constitution. The ordinance was later replaced by the Act which received the assent of the President on 27th March 1981, but which was brought into force with retrospective effect from 12th January 1981 being the date of promulgation of the ordinance. The Act is a brief piece of legislation with only a few sections but the ascertainment of their true meaning and legal effect has given rise to companysiderable companytroversy between the parties and hence it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Act in some detail. The long title of the Act describes it as an Act to provide for certain immunities to holders of Special Bearer Bonds 1991 and for certain exemptions from direct taxes in relation to such Bonds and for matters companynected therewith and the provisions enacted in the Act are proceeded by a Preamble which indicates the object and purpose of the Act in the following words Whereas for effective economic and social planning it is necessary to canalise for productive purposes black money which has become a serious threat to the national economy And whereas with a view to such canalisation the Central Government has decided to issue at par certain bearer bonds to be known as the Special Bearer Bonds, 1991, of the face value of ten thousand rupees and redemption value, after ten years, of twelve thousand rupees And whereas it is expedient to provide for certain immunities and exemptions to render it possible for persons in possession of black money to invest the same in the said Bonds Sections 3 and 4 are extremely material since on their true interpretation depends to a large extent the determination of the question relating to the companystitutional validity of the Act and they may be reproduced as follows 3. 1 Notwithstanding anything companytained in any other law for the time being in force- a numberperson who has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall be required to disclose, for any purpose whatsoever, the nature and source of acquisition of such Bonds b numberinquiry or investigation shall be companymenced against any person under any such law on the ground that such person has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds and c the fact that a person has subscribed to or has other wise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall number be taken into account and shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any such law. Nothing in sub-section 1 shall apply in relation to prosecution for any offence punishable under Chapter IX or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or any offence which is punishable under any other law and which is similar to an offence punishable under either of those Chapters or under that Act or for the purpose of enforcement of any civil liability. Explanation For the purposes of this sub-section civil liability does number include liability by way of tax under any law for the time being in force. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of section 3, the subscription to, or acquisition of, Special Bearer Bonds by any person shall number be taken into account for the purpose of any proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Incometax Act , the Wealth-tax Act 1957 hereinafter referred to as the Wealth-tax Act , or the Gift-tax Act, 1958 hereinafter referred to as the Gift-tax Act and, in particular, numberperson who has subscribed to, or has otherwise acquired, the said Bonds shall be entitled- a to claim any set-off or relief in any assessment, reassessment appeal, reference or other proceeding under the Income-tax Act or t reopen any assessment or reassessment made under that Act on the ground that he has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired the said Bonds b to claim, in relation to any period before the date of maturity of the said Bonds, that any asset which is includible in his net wealth for any assessment year under the Wealth-tax Act has been companyverted into the said Bonds or c to claim, in relation to any period before the date of maturity of the said Bonds, that any asset held by him or any sum credited in his books of account or other wise held by him represents the companysideration received by him for the transfer of the said Bonds. We shall analyse the provisions of these two sections when we deal with the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and that will largely decide the fate of the challenge against the companystitutional validity of the Act, but in the meanwhile we may proceed to summarise the remaining provisions of the Act. Section S amends the Income-tax Act 1961 by providing that the definition of capital asset in section 2 clause 14 shall number include that Special Bearer Bonds issued under the Act so that any profit arising on sale of the Special Bearer Bonds would number be liable to capital gains tax and it also excludes from the companyputation of the total income of the assessee, premium on redemption of the Special Bearer Bonds by introducing a new sub-clause in section 10 clause 15 . Section 5 sub-section I of the Wealth Tax Act 1957 is also amended by section 6 so as to exclude the Special Bearer Bonds from the net wealth of the assessee liable to wealth tax. Section 7, by amending section S sub-section I of the Gift-tax Act 1958 exempts gifts of Special Bearer Bonds from the incidence of gift tax. Section 8 companyfers powers on the Central Government to make order removing any difficulty which may arise in giving effect to the provisions of the Act and section 9 subsection 1 repeals the ordinance, but since the Act is brought into force with effect from the date of promulgation of the ordinance, sub-section 2 of section 9 provides that numberwithstanding the repeal of the ordinance, anything done or any action taken under the ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the companyresponding provisions of the Act. Having set out the provision of the Act-and be it numbered again that the provisions of the ordinance were substantially in the same terms as the provisions of the Act-we may number proceed to companysider the challenge against the companystitutional validity of the ordinance on the ground that the President had numberpower to issue the ordinance under Article 123 of the Constitution. There were two limbs of the argument under this head of challenge one was that since the ordinance had the effect of amending the tax laws, it was outside the companypetence of the President under Article 123 and the other was that the subject matter of the ordinance was in the nature of a Money Bill which companyld be introduced only in the House of the A People and passed according to the procedure provided in Articles 109 and 110 and the President had therefore numberpower under Article 123 to issue the Ordinance by-passing the special procedure provided in Art. 109 and 1 10 for the passing of a Money Bill. There is, as we shall presently point out, numberforce in either of these two companytentions, but we may point out straightaway that both these companytentions are 1 academic, since the Act has been brought into force with effect from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance and sub-section 2 of section 9 provides that anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the companyresponding provisions of the Act and the validity of anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance is therefore required to be judged number with reference to the Ordinance under which it was done or taken, but with reference to the Act which was, by reason of its retrospective enactment, in force right from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance and under which the thing or action was deemed to have been done or taken. It is in these circumstances wholly unnecessary to companysider the companystitutional validity of the Ordinance, because even if the Ordinance be unconstitutional, the validity of anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance, companyld still be justified with reference to the provisions of the Act. This would seem to be clear on first principle as a matter of pure companystruction and numberauthority is needed in support of it, but if any were needed, it may be found in the decision of this Court in Gujarat Pottery Works v. B.P. Sood, Controller of Mining Leases for India and Ors. There the question was whether the Mining Leases Modification of Terms Rules, 1956 hereinafter referred to as the 1956 Rules made under Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1948 referred to shortly as 1948 Act were void as being inconsistent with the provisions of the 1948 Act and if they were void, they companyld be said to be companytinued by reason of section 29 of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1957 hereinafter called the 1957 Act . This Court sitting in a Constitution Bench held that the 1956 Rules were number inconsistent with the provisions of the 1948 Act and were therefore valid, but proceeded to observe that even if the 1956 rules were void as being inconsistent with the provisions of the 1949 Act, they must by reason of section 29 of the 1957 Act be deemed to have been made under that Act and their validity and companytinuity must therefore be determined with reference to the provisions of the 1957 Act and number the provisions of the 1948 Act and since there was numberinconsistency between the 1956 Rules and the provisions of the 957 Act, the 1956 Rules companyld number be faulted as being outside the power of the Central Government. Raghubar Dayal, J. speaking on behalf of the Court articulated the reason for taking this view in the following words Even if the rules were number companysistent with the provisions of the 1948 Act and were therefore void, we do number agree that they companyld number have companytinued after the enforcement of the 1957 Act. Section 29 reads All rules made or purporting to have been made under the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1948, shall, in so far as they relate to matters for which provision is made in this Act and are number inconsistent therewith, be deemed to have been made under this Act as if this Act had been in force on the date on which such rules were made and shall companytinue in force unless and until they are superseded by any rules made under this Act. The effect of this section is that the rules which were made or purported to have been made under the 1948 Act in respect of matters for which rules companyld be made under the 1957 Act would be deemed to have been made under the 1957 Act as if that Act had been in force on the date on which such rules were made and would companytinue in force. The Act of 1957 in a way is deemed to have been in force when the modification rules were framed in 1956. The 1956 rules would be deemed to be framed under the 1957 Act and therefore their validity and companytinuity depends on the provisions of the 1957 Act and number of the 1948 Act. In this companynection we may refer to the case reported as Abdul Majid v. P.R. Nayak, A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 440. In that case section 58 of Act XXXI of 1950 repealed Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 and provided as follows The repeal by this Act by the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 XXVII of 1949 shall number affect the previous operation thereof, and subject thereto, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power companyferred by or under that Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers companyferred by or under this Act, as if this Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken. Section 58 was companystrued thus The language used in s. 58 is both striking and significant. It does number merely provide that the orders passed under the Ordinance shall be deemed to be order passed under the Act, but it provides that the orders passed under the Ordinance shall be deemed to be orders under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which certain things were done or action taken. Therefore the object of this section is, as it were, to antedate this Act so as to bring it into force on the day on which a particular order was passed which is being challenged. In other words, the validity of an order is to be judged number with reference to the Ordinance under which it was passed, but with reference to the Act subsequently passed by Parliament. The rules have number been challenged to be ultra vires the 1957 Act in the instant case. The same process of reasoning which appealed to this Court in upholding the validity of the 1956 Rules must apply equally in the present case and the validity of anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance must be judged with reference to the provisions of the Act and number of the Ordinance. It would therefore be academic for us to companysider whether the Ordinance was within the Ordinance-making power of the President under Article 123 and ordinarily we would have resisted the temptation of pronouncing on this issue because it is a self-restraining rule of prudence adopted by this Court that the companyrt will number formulate a rule of companystitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. But since companysiderable argument was advanced before us in regard to this issue we do number think it would be right on our part to refuse to express our view upon it. The Ordinance was issued by the President under Article 123 which is the solitary Article in chapter III headed Legislative Powers of the President. This Article provides inter-alia as follows 123 1 If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require. An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance- a shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions and b may be withdrawn at any time by the President. If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would number under this Constitution be companypetent to enact, it shall be void. It will be numbericed that under this Article legislature power is companyferred on the President exercisable when both Houses of Parliament are number in session. It is possible that when neither House of Parliament is in session, a situation may be arise which needs to be dealt with immediately and for which there is numberadequate provision in the existing law and emergent legislation may be necessary to enable the executive to companye with the situation. What is to be done and how is the problem to be solved in such a case ? Both Houses of Parliament being in recess, numberlegislation can be immediately undertaken and if the legislation is postponed until the House of Parliament meet damage may be caused to public weal. Article 123 therefore companyfers powers on the President to promulgate a law by issuing an Ordinance to enable the executive to deal with the emergent situation which might well include a situation created by a law being declared void by a Court of law. Grave public inconvenience would be caused, points out Mr. Seervai in his famous book on Constitutional Law, if on a statute like the Sales-tax Act being declared void, numbermachinery existed whereby a valid law companyld be promulgated to take the place of the law declared void . The President is thus given legislative power to issue an Ordinance and since under our companystitutional scheme as authoritatively expounded by this Court in Shamsher and Anr. State of Punjab, the President cannot act except in accordance with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, it is really the executive which is invested with this legislative power. Now at first blush it might appear rather unusual and that was the main thrust of the criticism of Mr. R.K Garg on this point that the power to make laws should have been entrusted by the founding fathers of the Constitution to the executive, because according to the traditional outfit of a democratic political structure, the legislative power must belong exclusively to the ejected representatives of the people aud vesting it in the executive, though responsible to the legislature, would be undemocratic, as it might enable the executive to abuse this power by securing the passage of an ordinary bill without risking a debate in the legislature But if we closely analyse this provision and companysider it in all its aspects, it does number appear to be so starting, though we may point out even if it were, the Court would have to accept it as the expression of the companylective will of the founding fathers. It may be numbered, and this was pointed out forcibly by Dr. Ambedkar while replying to the criticism against the introduction of Article 123 in the Constituent Assembly-that the legislative power companyferred on the President under this Article is number a parallel power of legislation. It is a power exercisable only when both Houses of Parliament are number in session and it has been companyferred ex-necessitate in order to enable the executive to meet an emergent situation. Moreover, the law made by the President by issuing an Ordinance is of strictly limited duration. It ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament or if before the expiration of this period, resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions. This also affords the clearest indication that the President is invested with this legislative power only in order to enable the executive to tide over an emergent situation which may arise whilst the Houses of Parliament are number in session. Further more, this power to promulgate an Ordinance companyferred on the President is companyextensive with the power of Parliament to make laws and the President cannot issue an Ordinance which Parliament cannot enact into a law. It will therefore be seen that legislative power has been companyferred on the executive by the companystitution makers for a necessary purpose and it is hedged in by limitations and companyditions. The companyferment of such power may appear to be undemocratic but it is number so, because the executive is clearly answerable to the legislature and if the President, on the aid and advice of the executive, promulgates an Ordinance in misuse or abuse of this power, the legislature cannot only pass a resolution disapproving the Ordinance but can also pass a vote of numberconfidence in the executive. There is in the theory of companystitutional law companyplete companytrol of the legislature over the executive, because if the executive misbehaves or forfeits the companyfidence of the legislature, it can be thrown out by the legislature. Of companyrse this safeguard against misuse or abuse of power by the executive would dwindle in efficacy and value according as if the legislative companytrol over the executive diminishes and the executive begins to dominate the legislature. But numberetheless it is a safeguard which protects the vesting of the legislative power in the President from the charge of being an undemocratic provision. We might profitably quote here the words of one of us Chandrachud, J, as he then was in the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India where, repelling the companytention of the petitioner that the interpretation which the Union of India was inviting the Court to place on Article 356 would impair the future of democracy by enabling the Central Government to supersede a duly elected State Government and to dissolve its legislature without prior approval of Parliament, the learned Judge saidthere may be situations in which it is imperative to act expeditiously and recourse to the parliamentary process may, by reason of the delay involved, impair rather than strengthen the functioning of democracy. The companystitution has therefore provided safety-valves to meet extraordinary situations. They have an imperious garb and a repressive companytent but they are designed to save, number destroy democracy. The fault, if any, is number in the meeting of the Constitution but in the working of it. These words provide a companyplete answer to the criticism of Mr. R.K. Garg. Now once it is accepted that the President has legislative power under Article 123 to promulgate an Ordinance and this legislative power is companyextensive with the power of the Parliament to make laws, it is difficult to see how any limitation can be read into this legislative power of the President so as to make it ineffective to alter or amend tax laws. If Parliament can by enacting legislation alter or amend tax laws, equally can the President do so by issuing an Ordinance under Article 123. There have been, in fact, numerous instances where the President has issued an Ordinance replacing with retrospective effect a tax law declared void by the High Court or this Court. Even offences have been created by Ordinance issued by the President under Article 123 and such offences companymitted during the life of the Ordinance have been held to be punishable despite the expiry of the Ordinance. Vide State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh. lt may also be numbered that Clause 2 of Article 123 provides in terms clear and explicit that an Ordinance promulgated under that Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. That there is numberqualitative difference between an Ordinance issued by the President and an Act passed by Parliament is also emphasized by clause 2 of Article 367 which provides that any reference in the Constitution to Acts or laws made by Parliament shall be companystrued as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the President. We do number therefore think there is any substance in the companytention of the petitioner that the President has numberpower under Article 123 to issue an Ordinance amending or altering the tax laws and that the Ordinance was therefore outside the legislative power of the President under that Article. That takes us to the principal question arising in the writ petitions namely, whether the provisions of the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The true scope and ambit of Article 14 has been the subject matter of discussion in numerous decisions of this Court and the propositions applicable to cases arising under that Article have been repeated so many times during the last thirty years that they number sound platitudinous. The latest and most companyplete exposition of the propositions relating to the applicability of Article 14 as emerging from the avalanche of cases which have flooded this Court since the companymencement of the Constitution is to be found in the Judgment of one of us Chandrachud, J. as he then was in Re Special Courts Bill. It number only companytains a lucid statement of the propositions arising under Article 14, but being a decision given by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court, it is binding upon us. That decision sets out several propositions delineating the true scope and ambit of Article 14 but number all of them are relevant for our purpose and hence we shall refer only to those which have a direct bearing on the issue before us. They clearly recognise that classification can be made for the purpose of legislation but lay down that The classification must number be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must number only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and number in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two companyditions must be fulfilled, namely, 1 that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and 2 that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids class discrimination by companyferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be companyferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does number forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is number arbitrary in the sense above mentioned. It is clear that Article 14 does number forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions by the legislature for the purpose of attaining specific ends. What is necessary in order to pass the test of permissible classification under Article 14 is that the classification must number be arbitrary, artificial or evasive but must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. The question to which we must therefore address ourselves is whether the classification made by the Act in the present case satisfies the aforesaid test or it is arbitrary and irrational and hence A violative of the equal protection clause in Article 14. Now while companysidering the companystitutional validity of a statute said to be violative of Article 14, it is necessary to bear in mind certain well established principles which have been evolved by the companyrts as rules of guidance in discharge of its companystitutional function of judicial review. The first rule is that there is always a presumption in favour of the companystitutionality of a statute and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the companystitutional principles. This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognised and accepted, that the legislature understands and companyrectly appreciates the needs of its own people, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on adequate grounds. The presumption of companystitutionality is indeed so strong that in order to sustain it, the companyrt may take into companysideration matters of companymon knowledge, matters of companymon report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be companyceived existing at the time of legislation. Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by numberless a person than Holmes, J. that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with companyplex problems which do number admit of solution through any doctrine or straight jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The companyrt should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislature judgement in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Dond where Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial selfrestraint if number judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The companyrts have only the power to destroy, number to reconstruct. When these are added to the companyplexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering companyflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events-selflimitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability. The companyrt must always remember that legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and companyplex, that many problems are singular and companytingent, that laws are number abstract propositions and do number relate to abstract units and are number to be measured by abstract symmetry that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedy are number always possible and that judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted experience. Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in companyplicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The companyrts cannot, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Reig Refining Company, be companyverted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is number possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to companyceive of a legislation which is number capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the companystitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and number by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse companye to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with companyplex economic issues. With these prefatory observations, we may number proceed to examine the companystitutional validity of the Act. The Preamble of the Act which affords useful light as to what the statute intends to reach or in other words affords a clue the scope of the statute makes it clear that the Act is intended to canalise for productive purposes black money which has become a serious threat to the national economy. It is an undisputed fact that there is companysiderable amount of black money in circulation which is unaccounted or companycealed and therefore outside the disclosed trading channels. It is largely the product of black market transactions and evasion of tax. Indeed, as pointed out by the Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee headed by Mr. Wanchoo, retired Chief Justice of India tax evasion and black money are closely and inextricably interlinked. The abundance of black money has in fact given rise to a parallel economy operating simultaneously and companypeting with the official economy. This parallel economy has over the years grown in size and dimension and even on a companyservative estimate, the amount of black money circulation runs into some thousand crores. The menace of black money has number reached such staggering proportions that it is causing havoc to the economy of the companyntry and poses a serious challenge to the fulfilment of our objectives of distributive justice and setting up of an egalitarian society. There are several causes responsible for the generation of black money and they have been analysed in the Report of the Wanchoo Committee. Some of the principal causes may be summarised as follows 1 high rates of taxation under the direct tax laws they breed tax evasion and generate black money 2 economy of shortages and companysequent companytrols and licences leading to companyruption for issuing licences and permits and turning blind eye to the violation of companytrols 3 donations of black money encouraged by political parties to meet election expenses and for augmenting party funds and also for personal purposes 4 Corrupt business practices such as payments of secret companymission, bribes, money, pugree etc. which need keeping on hand money in black 5 ineffective administration and enforcement of tax laws by the authorities and 6 deterioration in moral standards so that tax evasion is numberlonger regarded as immoral and unethical and does number carry any social stigma. These causes need to be eliminated if we want to eradicate the evil of black money. But whether any steps are taken or number for removing these causes with a view to preventing future generation of black money, the fact remains that today there is companysiderable amount of black money, unaccounted and companycealed? in the hands of a few persons and it is causing incalculable damage to the economy of the companyntry. The first casualty cf this evil of black money is the revenue because it loses the tax which should otherwise have companye to the exchequer. The generation of black money through tax evasion throws a greater burden on the honest tax payer and leads to economic equality and companycentration of wealth in the hands of the unscrupulous few in the companyntry. In addition, since black money is in a way cheap money because it has number suffered reduction by way of taxation, there is a natural tendency among those who possess it to use it for lavish expenditure and companyspicuous companysumption. The existence of black money is to a large extent responsible for inflationary pressures, shortages, rise in prices and economically unhealthy speculation in companymodities. It also leads to leakage of foreign exchange, making our balance of payments rather distorted and unreal and tends to defeat the economic policies of the Government by making their implementation ineffective, particularly in the field of credit and investment. Moreover, since black money has necessarily to be suppressed in order to escape detection, it results in immobilisation of investible funds which would otherwise be available to further the economic growth of the nation and in turn, foster the welfare of the companymon man. It is therefore numberexaggeration to say that black money is a cancerous growth in the companyntrys economy which if number checked in time is certain to lead to chaos and ruination. There can be numberdoubt that urgent measures are therefore required to be adopted for preventing further generation of black money as also for unearthing existing black money so that it can be canalised for productive purposes with a view to effective economic and social planning. Now this problem of black money companyroding the economy of the companyntry is number a new or recent problem. It has been there almost since the Second World War and it has been companytinuously engaging the attention of the Government. The Government has adopted various measures in the past with a view to curbing the generation of black money and bringing it out in the open so that it may become available for strengthening the economy. For instance, the Government introduced several changes in the administrative set up of the tax department from time to time with a view to strengthening the administrative machinery for checking tax evasion. The Government also amended section 37 of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 with a view to companyferring power on the tax authorities to carry out searches and seizures and this power was elaborated and made more effectual when the Income Tax Act 1961 came to be enacted. Quite apart from these legal and administrative measures taken for the purpose of curbing evasion of tax, certain steps were also taken to tackle the black money built up out of past evasions. In 1946, just at the close of the Second World War, high denomination numberes were demonetised so as to bring within the net of taxation black money earned during the War. This was followed by the enactment of the Taxation of Income Investigation Commission Act 1947. Then came the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme of 1951, popularly known as Tyagi Scheme, to facilitate the disclosure of suppressed income by affording certain immunities from the penal provisions. This scheme was however number successful because it helped to unearth only Rs. 70.20 crores of black money. Thereafter, nearly a decade and a half later, a second scheme of voluntary disclosure was introduced by section 68 of the Finance Act 1965. This scheme, popularly known as the sixty-forty scheme, enabled the tax evaders to disclose suppressed income by paying 60 of the companycealed income as tax and bringing the balance of 40 into their books. This scheme was a little more successful than the earlier one, but it companyld help to net only about Rs. 52.1 l crores of black money. Closely following on the heels of this scheme came another scheme under section 24 of the Finance No. 2 .Act 1965 popularly known as the Block Scheme according to which tax was payable at rates applicable to the block of companycealed income disclosed and number at a fiat rate as under the sixty-forty scheme. This scheme received a slightly better response and the income disclosed under it amounted to about Rs. 145 crores. Then came the Taxation Laws Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions Ordinance 1965 followed by an Act in identical terms, which provided for exemption from tax in certain cases of undisclosed income invested in National Defence Gold Bonds 1980. We shall have occasion to companysider the broad scheme of this Act a little later, but for the time being as we may point out that the scheme as envisaged in this Act was very closely similar to the scheme under the impugned Act. Subsequent to this Act followed the Report of the Wanchoo Committee and as a result of the recommendations made in this Report certain penal provisions companytained in the Income Tax Act 1961 were made more severe and rigorous. Then came the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Ordinance 1975 which was followed by an Act in the same terms. This legislation introduced a scheme of voluntary disclosure of income and wealth and provided certain immunities and exemptions. The record before us does number show as to what was the companycealed income and wealth disclosed pursuant to this scheme. But it is an indisputable fact that the adoption of these stringent legal and administrative measures as also the introduction of these different voluntary disclosure schemes did number have any appreciable effect and despite all these efforts made by the Government, the problem of black money companytinues unabated and has assumed serious dimensions. It may be possible to say and that was the criticism of Mr. R.K. Garg-that the enforcement machinery of the tax department is number as effective as it should be and numberserious effort has been made to eliminate the other causes of generation of black money, but whatever may be the failures of the political and administrative machinery and we are number here companycerned to inquire into that question number are we companypetent to express any opinion upon it-the fact remains that there is companysiderable amount of black money in the hands of persons which is causing havoc to the economy of the companyntry and seriously prejudicing mobilisation of resources for social and economical reconstruction of the nation. It was to companybat this menacing problem of black money and to unearth black money lying secreted and outside the ordinary trade channels that the Act was enacted by Parliament. It was realised that all efforts to detect black money and to uncover it had failed and the problem of black money was an obstinate economic issue which was defying solution and the impugned legislation providing for issue of Special Bearer Bonds was therefore enacted with a view to mopping-up black money and bringing it out in the open, so that, instead of remaining companycealed and idle, such money may become available for augmenting the resources of the state and being utilised for productive purposes so as to promote effective social and economic planning. This was the object for which the Act was enacted and it is with reference to this object that we have to determine whether any impermissible differentiation is made by the Act so as to involve violation of Article 14. We may number turn to examine the provisions of the act. Section 3 sub-section 1 provides certain immunities to a person who subscribed to or otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds, Clause a protects such a person from being required to disclose, for any purpose whatsoever, the nature and source of acquisition of the Special Bearer Bonds. Clause b prohibits the companymencement of any inquiry or investigation against a person on the ground of his having subscribed to or otherwise acquired the Special Bearer Bonds. And clause c provides that the fact of subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds shall number be taken into account and shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty. It will be seen that the immunities granted under section 3, sub-section 1 are very limited in scope. They do number protect the holder of Special Bearer Bonds from any inquiry or investigation into companycealed income which companyld have been made if he had number subscribed to or acquired Special Bearer Bonds. There is numberimmunity from taxation given to the black money which may be invested in Special Bearer Bonds. That money remains subject to tax with all companysequential penalties, if it can be discovered independently of the fact of subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds. The only protection given by section 3, sub-section 1 is that the fact of subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds shall be ignored altogether and shall number be relied upon as evidence showing possession of undisclosed money. This provision relegates the Revenue to the position as if Special Bearer Bonds had number been purchased at all. If without taking into account the fact of subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds and totally ignoring it as if it were number-existent, any inquiry or investigation into companycealed income companyld be carried out and such income detected and unearthed, it would be open to the Revenue to do so and it would be numberanswer for the assessee to say that this money has been invested by him in Special Bearer Bonds and it is therefore exempt from tax or that he is on that account number liable to prosecution and penalty for companycealment of such income. This is the main difference between the impugned Act and the Taxation Laws Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1965. Under the latter Act, where gold is acquired by a person out of his undisclosed income, which is the same thing as black money, and such gold is tendered by him as subscription for the National Defence Gold Bonds, 1980, the income invested in such gold is exempted from tax, but where Special Bearer Bonds are purchased out of undisclosed income under the impugned Act, the income invested in the Special Bearer Bonds is number exempt from tax and if independently of the fact of purchase of the Special Bearer Bonds and ignoring them altogether, such income can be detected, it would be subject to tax. The entire machinery of the taxation Laws for inquiry and investigation into companycealed income is thus left untouched and numberprotection is granted to a person in respect of his companycealed income merely because he has invested such income in Special Bearer Bonds. It is therefore incorrect to say that as soon as any person purchases Special Bearer Bonds, he is immunised against the processes of taxation laws. Here there is numberamnesty granted in respect of any part of the companycealed income even though it be invested in Special Bearer Bonds. The whole object of the impugned Act is to induce those having black money to companyvert it into white money by making it available to the State for productive purposes, without granting in return any immunity in respect of such black money, if it companyld be detected through the ordinary processes of taxation laws without taking into account the fact of purchase of Special Bearer Bonds. Now it is true and this was one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner-that if black money were number invested in Special Bearer Bonds but were Lying in cash, it companyld be seized by the tax authorities by carrying out search and seizure in accordance with the provisions of the tax laws and this opportunity to detect and unearth black money would be lost, if such black money were invested in Special Bearer Bonds, because even if Special Bearer Bonds were seized, they cannot be relied upon as evidence of possession of black money. But this argument of the petitioner that the detection and discovery of black money would thus thwarted by the companyversion of black money into Special Bearer Bonds is highly theoretical and does number take into account the practical realities of the situation. If it had been possible to detect and discover a substantial part of the black money in circulation by carrying out searches and seizures, there would have been numberneed to enact the impugned Act. It is precisely because, inspite of companysiderable efforts made by the tax authorities including carrying out of searches and seizures, the bulk of black money remained secreted and companyld number be unearthed, that the impugned Act had to be enacted. Moreover, actual seizure of black money by carrying out searches is number the only method available to tax administration for detecting and discovering black money. There are other methods also by which companycealment of income can be detected and these are companymonly employed by the tax authorities in making assessment of income or wealth. Close and searching scrutiny of the books of account may reveal that accounts are number properly maintained, unexplained cash credits may provide evidence of companycealment and so too unaccounted for investments or lavish expenditure information derived from external sources may indicate that income has been companycealed by resorting to stratagems like suppression of sales or understatement of companysideration and existence of assets in the names of near relatives may give a lead showing investment of undisclosed income. All these methods and many others would still remain available to the tax authorities for detecting undisclosed income and bringing it to tax despite investment in Special Bearer Bonds. The taxable income of the holder of Special Bearer Bonds would number stand reduced by the amount invested in the purchase of Special Bearer Bonds and it would be open to the Revenue to assess such taxable income in the same manner in which it would do in any other case, employing the same methods and techniques of inquiry and investigation for determining the true taxable income. The only inhibition on the Revenue would be that it would number be entitled to call upon the assessee to disclose for the purpose of assessment, the nature and source of acquisition of the Special Bearer Bonds and in making the assessment, the investment in the Special Bearer Bonds would have to be left wholly out of account and the Revenue would number be entitled to rely upon it as evidence of possession of undisclosed money. This is the only limited immunity granted under section 3 subsection 1 and even this limited immunity is cut down by the provision enacted in subsection 2 of section 3. This sub-section says that the immunity granted under sub-section 1 shall number be available in relation to prosecution for any offence punishable under Chapter IX or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 or any other similar law. If therefore an inquiry or investigation is sought to be made against a public servant in respect of an offence under Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 alleged to have been companymitted by him, the acquisition or possession of Special Bearer Bonds companyld be a ground for instituting, such inquiry or investigation and it companyld also be an admissible piece of evidence in a prosecution in respect of such offence. The same would be the position in relation to an inquiry, investigation or prosecution in respect of an offence under Chapter XVlI of the Indian Penal Code. The acquisition or possession of Special Bearer Bonds would number therefore afford any protection to a public servant against a charge of companyruption or to a person companymitting any offence against property. Equally this immunity would number be available where what is sought to be enforced is a civil liability other than liability by way of tax. It will thus be seen that the immunity granted in respect of subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds is a severely restricted immunity and this is the bare minimum immunity necessary in order to induce holders of black money to bring it out in the open and invest it in Special Bearer Bonds. It is also necessary to numbere the further restrictions provided in section 4 which are calculated to pre-empt any possible abuse of the immunity granted in respect of subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds, This section in its opening part affirms in unmistakable terms that subscription to or acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds shall number be taken into account in any proceeding under the Income-tax Act 1961 or the Wealth-tax Act 1957 or the Gift-tax Act 1958. If any investment in Special Bearer Bonds has been made by the assessee, it is to be ignored in making assessment on him under any of the above-mentioned three tax laws, the assessment is to be made as if numberSpecial Bearer Bonds had been purchased at all The process of companyputation of taxable income and assessment of tax on it remains unaffected and is number in any way deflected or thwarted by the investment in Special Bearer Bonds. The position remains the same as it would have been if there were numberinvestment in Special Bearer Bonds. We have already discussed the full implications of this proposition in the preceding paragraph while dealing with section 3 and it is number necessary to say anything more about it. Then, proceeding further, after enacting this provision in the opening part, section 4 branches off into three different clauses, Clause a provides that numberperson who has subscribed to or otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall be entitled to claim any set off or relief in any proceeding under the Income-tax Act 1961 or to reopen any assessment or reassessment made under that Act on the ground that he has subscribed to or otherwise acquired such Bonds. The holder of Special Bearer Bonds is thus precluded from claiming any advantage by way of set-off or relief or reopening of assessment on the ground of having invested undisclosed money in purchase of Special Bearer Bonds. Clause b enacts another prohibition with a view to preventing abuse of the immunity granted in respect of Special Bearer Bonds and says that numberperson who has subscribed to or otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall be entitled to claim, in relation to any period before the date of maturity of such Bonds, that any asset which is includible in his net wealth for any assessment year under the Wealth-tax Act has been companyverted into such Bonds. The object of this provision is to preclude an assessee who is sought to be taxed on his net wealth under the wealth-tax Act from escaping assessment to tax on any asset forming part of his net wealth by claiming that he has invested it in purchase of Special Bearer Bonds. The investment in Special Bearer Bonds would number grant immunity from assessment to wealth lax to any asset which is found by the taxing authorities, otherwise than by relying on the fact of acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds, to belong to the assessee and hence forming part of his net wealth . The asset would be subjected to wealth tax despite the investment in Special Bearer Bonds. Then follows clause c which is extremely important and which effectively companynters the possibility of serious abuse to which the issue of Special Bearer Bonds might otherwise have lent itself. It provides that numberperson who has subscribed to or otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall be entitled to claim, in relation to any period before the date of maturity of such Bonds, that any asset held by him or any sum credited in his books of account or otherwise held by him represents the companysideration received by him for the transfer of such Bonds. This provision precludes a person from explaining away the existence of any asset held by him or any sum credited in his books of account or otherwise held by him by claiming that it represents the sale proceeds of Special Bearer Bonds held by him. If at any time before the date of maturity of the Special Bearer Bonds held by an assessee, it is found that any asset is held by him or any sum is credited in his books of accounts or is otherwise held by him and he is required to explain the nature and source of acquisition of such asset or sums of money, he cannot be heard to say by way of explanation that such asset or sum of money represents the companysideration received by him for transfer of the Special Bearer Bonds, even if that be factually companyrect. This explanation, though true being statutorily excluded, it would be impossible for the assessee to offer any other explanation for the acquisition of such asset or sum of money, because any such explanation which might be given by him would be untrue and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation in regard to the nature and source of acquisition of such asset or sum of money, the Revenue would be entitled to infer that such asset has been acquired out of undisclosed income or that such sum of money represents companycealed income and hence the value of such asset or such sum of money, as the case may be, should be treated as undisclosed income liable to be included in the taxable income of the assessee. Vide sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It is obvious that this provision is calculated to act as a strong deterrent against negotiability of Special Bearer Bonds for disclosed or white money. No holder of Special Bearer Bonds would dare to transfer his Bonds to another person against receipt of disclosed or white money, because he will number be able to account for the companysideration received by him, the true explanation being statutorily unavailable to him, and such companysideration would inevitably be liable to be regarded as his companycealed income and would be subjected to tax and penalties. Moreover, it is difficult to see why anyone should want to invest disclosed or white money in the acquisition of Special Bearer Bonds. Ordinarily a person would go in for Special Bearer Bonds only for the purpose of companyverting his undisclosed money into white money and it would be quite unusual bordering almost on freakishness for anyone to acquire Special Bearer Bonds with disclosed or white money when he can get only 2 simple interest on the investment in Special Bearer Bonds, while outside he can easily get anything between 15 to 40 yield by openly dealing with his disclosed or white money. The transferability of Special Bearer Bonds against disclosed or white money is thus, from a practical point of view, companypletely excluded. The question may still arise whether Special Bearer Bonds would number pass from hand to hand against undisclosed or black money. Would they number be freely negotiable against payment of undisclosed or black money ? Now it may be companyceded that a purchaser of Special Bearer Bonds would undoubtedly be interested in acquiring such Bonds by making payment of black money, because he would thereby companyvert his undisclosed or black money into white money. But it is difficult to understand why a holder of Special Bearer Bonds should ever be interested in selling such Bonds against receipt of black money. Obviously he would have acquired such Bonds for the purpose of companyverting his black money into white in order to avoid the risk of being found in possession of black money and if that be so, it is inexplicable as to why he should again want to companyvert his white money into black by selling such Bonds against receipt of black money. The immunity granted under the provisions of the Act, limited as it is extends only to the person who is for the time being the holder of Special Bearer Bonds and the person who has transferred the Special Bearer Bonds for black money has numberimmunity at all and all the provisions of tax laws are available against him for determining his true income or wealth and therefore numberone who has purchased Special Bearer Bonds with a view to earning security against discovery of unaccounted money in his hands would ordinarily barter away that security by again receiving black money for the Special Bearer Bonds. Furthermore, even if special bearer bonds are transferred against receipt of black money, it will number have the effect of legalising more black money into white, because the black money of the seller which had become white on his subscribing to or acquiring special bearer bonds would again be companyverted into black money and the black money paid by the purchaser by way of companysideration would become white by reason of being companyverted into Special Bearer Bonds. The petitioners however expressed an apprehension that special bearer bonds would fetch a much higher value in the black market than that originally subscribed and this would enable a larger amount of black money to be legalised into white than what was originally invested in subscription to special bearer bonds. We do number think this apprehension is well founded. It is true that once the date for original subscription to special bearer bonds has expired, the only way in which special bearer bonds companyld thereafter be acquired would be by going in the open market and the number of special bearer bonds in the market being necessarily limited, they may fetch a higher value in black money from a person who is anxious to companyvert his black money into white. If the demand outreaches the limited supply, the price of special bearer bonds in the black market may exceed the amount originally invested in subscription to special bearer bonds. But even so, the black money paid by the purchaser for acquisition of special bearer bonds would number in its entirety be companyverted into white, it would change its companyour from black to white only to the extent of the amount originally subscribed for the special bearer bonds or at the most, if we also take into account interest on such amount, to the extent of the face value of the special bearer bonds, because whatever be the amount he might have paid in black money for acquisition of the special bearer bonds, the holder of the special bearer bonds will get only the amount representing the face value on maturity of the special bearer bonds. It will thus be seen that howsoever special bearer bonds may be transferred and for whatever companysideration, only a limited amount of black money, namely, the amount originally subscribed for the special bearer bonds or at the most the amount representing the face value of the special bearer bonds would be legalised into white money and the supposedly free negotiability of special bearer bonds would number have the effect of legalising more black money into white or encouraging further generation of black money. There was also one other abuse, said the petitioners, to which special bearer bonds might lend themselves and it was that if Special Bearer Bonds are sold and the sale proceeds are utilised in meeting expenditure, the assessee would number be precluded by section 4 clause c from explaining the source of the expenditure to be the sale companysideration of the special bearer bonds and hence by resorting to this strategy, white money can be accumulated as capital while expenditure is met out of black money received by way of companysideration for sale of special bearer bonds. We do number think there is any scope for such abuse the apprehension expressed by the petitioners is more imaginary than real. It may be numbered that in order to sustain his explanation, the assessee would have to prove to the satisfaction of the tax department that he had special bearer bonds and that he sold them for a certain amount. Now if he has received black money by way of companysideration, it is difficult to see how he would ever be able to establish that he sold special bearer bonds for that particular amount of black money. Would he be so fool-hardy as to admit that he received the companysideration in black money and even if he does, would he ever be able to prove it? Who would believe him even if he makes such an admission ? And when he has bought special bearer bonds for the purpose of companyverting his black money into white, why should he again reconvert it into black by selling special bearer bonds for black money ? The entire postulate of the argument of the petitioners is theoretical and has numberbasis in reality. No assessee would ever admit that he incurred expenditure out of black money received as companysideration for sale of special bearer bonds because it would be impossible for him to establish receipt of black money from the purchase and if he is unable to do so, the amount of the expenditure would, by reason of section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, be deemed to be his companycealed income liable to tax. Even if we assume that in some rare and exceptional case the assessee may be able to establish that he sold special bearer bonds against receipt of black money, the purchaser would straightaway run into difficulties because the evidence furnished by the assessee would, in such a case, clearly establish that the purchaser had black money and he paid it to the assessee by way of companysideration and he would in that event be rendered liable to tax and penalty in respect of such black money. This would show the utter improbability bordering almost on impossibility, of special bearer bonds being subjected to any such abuse as is apprehended by the petitioners. It was then urged on behalf of the petitioners that section clause c operates only in relation to a period before the date of maturity of special bearer bonds and after the date of maturity, the holder of special bearer bonds can sell such bonds, and, without running any risk, disclose the companysideration received by him as his white money, because section 4 clause c being out of the way, he can account for the possession of such money by showing that he has received it as companysideration for sale of special bearer bonds and so far as the purchaser is companycerned, if he has paid the companysideration out of his black money, he can claim the immunity granted under section 3 sub-section 1 and his black money would be companyverted into white. Thus the black money Of the seller which had been companyverted into white on his subscribing to or otherwise acquiring special bearer bonds would remain white and in addition, the black money of the purchaser would also be companyverted into white by reason of his purchase of special bearer bonds. This argument plausible though it may seem. is in our opinion, fallacious and cannot be sustained. It is a highly debatable issue whether, under the provisions of the Act, special bearer bonds are at all intended to be transferable after the date of maturity, for the postulate of the legislation clearly seems to be that on the date of maturity, special bearer bonds will be encashed. It is indeed difficult to believe that anyone holding special bearer bonds would keep them uncashed without earning any interest from and after the date of maturity, when they can be immediately encashed and the amount received can be invested yielding interest ranging between 18 per cent to 40 per cent. Moreover, special bearer bonds would cease to be exempt from wealth tax from and after the date of maturity and they would therefore be includible in the net wealth of the holder for the purpose of wealth tax and if that be so, how would it benefit the holder to keep them as part of his net wealth and pay wealth tax upon it without earning any interest ? It is therefore extremely unlikely that Special Bearer Bonds would remain uncashed after the date of maturity and it would be equally improbable that anyone should want to purchase Special Bearer Bonds after the date of maturity when they do number yield any interest but are still includible in the net wealth for the purpose of liability to wealth tax. But let us assume for the purpose of argument that in a given case special bearer bonds are number encashed on the date of maturity and they are lawfully transferred after the date of maturity for a companysideration paid by the purchaser. There are two alternatives the companysideration may be paid by the purchaser in white money or in black money. If the purchaser pays the companysideration in white money, numberquestion of companyversion of further black money into white arises. rt would be a straight open transaction to which numberexception can be taken. But let us companysider what companysequences would ensue if he pays in black money. The seller would obviously be interested in showing the companysideration as his white money and there may be numberdifficulty so far as he ii companycerned, because he would be able to explain the possession of such money by claiming that he has received it by way of companysideration for sale of special bearer bonds. Section 4 clause c will number stand in the way of his offering that explanation. But so far as the purchaser is companycerned, he will run into serious difficulties. Even if the immunity under section 3 sub-section l were available to him after the date of maturity, he will still be in trouble, because the disclosure made by the seller would be the clearest evidence showing that the purchaser had black money which he paid by way of companysideration to the seller, and this evidence, being independent of the fact of acquisition of special bearer bonds by the purchaser, would be admissible and the purchaser would be liable to tax and penalty on the amount of black money paid by him as companysideration. We fail to see how transfer of special bearer bonds after the date of maturity, even if legally permissible, can be utilised for the purpose of legalising black money into white. But we may point out that if at any time after the date of maturity or even before, it is found that there is some loophole in the provisions of the Act or that special bearer bonds are utilised for any dishonest or nefarious purpose or are being perverted to any improper use, the legislature can always step in and amend the Act or pass other appropriate legislation with a view to preventing such abuse. It must be remembered that every legislation is an experiment in achieving certain desired ends and trial and error method is inherent in every such experiment. Therefore, when experience shows that the legislation as framed has proved inadequate to achieve its purpose of mitigating an evil or there are cracks and loopholes in it which are being taken advantage of by the resourcefulness and ingenuity of those minded to benefit themselves at the companyt of the State or the others, the legislature can and most certainly would intervene and change the law. But the law cannot be companydemned as invalid on the ground that after a period of ten years it may lend itself to some possible abuse. We may number proceed to companysider the companystitutional validity of the Act in the light of the above discussion as regards the scope and effect of its various provisions. It is obvious that the Act makes a classification between holders of black money and the rest and provides for issue of special bearer bonds with a view to inducing persons belonging to the former class to invest their unaccounted money in purchase of special bearer bonds, so that such money which is today Lying idle outside the regular economy of the companyntry is canalised into productive purposes. The object of the Act being to unearth black money for being utilised for productive purposes with a view to effective social and economic planning, there has necessarily to be a classification between persons possessing black money and others and such classification cannot be regarded as arbitrary or irrational. It is of companyrse true-and this must be pointed out here since it was faintly touched upon in the companyrse of the arguments-that there is numberlegal bar enacted in the Act against investment of white money in subscription to or acquisition of special bearer bonds. But the provisions of the Act properly companystrued are such that numberone would even think of investing white money in special bearer bonds and from a practical point of view, they do operate as a bar against acquisition, whether by original subscription or by purchase, of special bearer bonds with white money. We do number see why anyone should want to invest his white money in subscribing to or acquiring special bearer bonds which yield only 2 per cent simple interest per annum and which are number encashable for a period of number less than ten years. It is true that special bearer bonds can be sold before the date of maturity but who would pay white money for them and even if in some rare and exceptional case, a purchaser companyld be found who would pay the companysideration in white money, numberone will dare to sell special bearer bonds for white money, because of the disincentive provided in section 4 cl. c . The investment of white money in special bearer bonds is accordingly, as a practical measure, companypletely ruled out and the provisions of the Act are intended to operate only qua persons in possession of black money. There is a practical and real classification made between persons having black money and persons number having such money and this de facto classification is clearly based on intelligible differentia having rational relation with the object of the Act. The petitioners disputed the validity of this proposition and companytended that the classification made by the Act is discriminatory in that it excludes persons with white money from taking advantage of the provisions of the Act by subscribing to or acquiring special bearer bonds. But this companytention is totally unfounded and we cannot accept the same. The validity of a classification has to be judged with reference to the object of the legislation and if that is done, there can be numberdoubt that the classification made by the Act is rational and intelligible and the operation of the provisions of the Act is rightly companyfined to persons in possession of black money. It was then companytended that the Act is unconstitutional as it offends against morality by according to dishonest assesses who have evaded payment of tax, immunities and exemptions which are denied to honest tax payers. Those who have broken the law and deprived the State of its legitimate dues are given benefits and companycessions placing them at an advantage over those who have observed the law and paid the taxes due from them and this, according to the petitioners is clearly immoral and unwarranted by the Constitution. We do number think this companytention can be sustained. It is necessary to remember that we are companycerned here only with the companystitutional validity of the Act and number with its morality. Of companyrse, when we say this we do number wish to suggest that morality can in numbercase have relevance to the companystitutional validity of a legislation. There may be cases where the provisions of a statute may be so reeking with immorality that the legislation can be readily companydemned as arbitrary or irrational and hence violative of Article 14. But the test in every such case would be number whether the provisions of the statute offend against morality but whether they are arbitrary and irrational having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case. Immorality by itself is number a ground of companystitutional challenge and it obviously cannot be, because morality is essentially a subjective value, except in so far as it may be reflected in any provision of the Constitution or may have crystalised into some well-accepted numberm of special behaviour. Now there can be numberdoubt that under the provisions of the Act certain immunities and exemptions are granted with a view to inducing tax evaders to invest their undisclosed money in special bearer bonds and to that extent they are given benefits and companycessions which are denied to those who honestly pay their taxes. Those who are honest and who observe the law are mulcted in paying the taxes legitimately due from them while those who have broken the law and evaded payment of taxes are allowed by the provisions of the Act to companyvert their black money into white without payment of any tax or penalty. The provisions of the Act may thus seem to be putting premium on dishonesty and they may, number, without some justification, be accused of being tinged with some immorality, but howsoever regrettable or unfortunate it may be, they had to be enacted by the legislature in order to bring out black money in the open and canalise it for productive purposes. Notwithstanding stringent laws imposing severe penalties and vigorous steps taken by the tax administration to detect black money and despite various voluntary disclosure schemes introduced by the government from time to time, it had number been possible to unearth black money and the menace of black money had over the years assumed alarming proportions causing havoc to the economy of the companyntry and the legislature was therefore companystrained to enact the Act with a view to mopping up black money so that instead of remaining idle, such money companyld be utilised for productive purposes The problem of black money was an obstinate economic problem which had been defying the Government for quite some time and it was in order to resolve this problem that, other efforts having failed. the legislature decided to enact the Act, even though the effect of its provisions might be to companyfer certain undeserved advantages on tax evaders in possession of black money. The legislature had obviously only two alternatives either to allow the black money to remain idle and unproductive or to induce those in possession of it to bring it out in the open for being utilised for productive purposes. The first alternative would have left numberchoice to the government but to resort to deficit financing or to impose a heavy dose of taxation. The former would have resulted in inflationary pressures affecting the vulnerable sections of the society while the latter would have increased the burden on the honest tax payer and perhaps led to greater tax evasion. The legislature therefore decided to adopt the second alternative of companyxing persons in possession of black money to disclose it and make it available to the government for augment in, its resources for productive purposes and with that end in view, enacted the Act providing for issue of special bearer bonds. It may be pointed out that the idea of issuing special bearer bonds for the purpose of unearthing black money was number a brain wave which originated for the first time in the mind of the legislature in the year 1981. The suggestion for issue of special bearer bonds was made as far back as 1950 by some of the members of the provisional Parliament, numberably those belonging to the opposition and the government was repeatedly asked why it was number issuing special bearer bonds in order to absorb the liquidity and thereby companytrol the inflationary pressures in the companyntry. Though the majority of the members of the Wanchoo Committee expressed themselves against the issue of special bearer bonds, Shri Chitale a member of that Committee wrote a dissenting numbere in which he suggested that special bearer bonds should be issued. We may point out that the majority members of the Wanchoo Committee were against issue of special bearer bonds for the purpose of mopping up black money, because they apprehended certain abuses to which special bearer bonds might be subjected, but as we have already pointed out while discussing the true meaning and legal effect of the provisions of the Act, we do number think that there is any scope for such abuses, for the legislature has, while enacting the provisions of the Act, taken care to see that such abuses are reduced to the minimum, if number eliminated altogether. It is true that certain immunities and exemptions are granted to persons investing their unaccounted money in purchase of special bearer bonds but that is an inducement which has to be offered for unearthing black money. Those who have successfully evaded taxation and companycealed their income or wealth despite the stringent tax laws and the efforts of the tax department are likely to disclose their unaccounted money without some inducement by way of immunities and exceptions and it must necessarily be left to the legislature to decide what immunities and exemptions would be sufficient for the purpose. It would be outside the province of the companyrt to companysider if any particular immunity or exemption is necessary or number for the purpose of inducing disclosure of black money. That would depend upon diverse fiscal and economic companysiderations based on practical necessity and administrative expediency and would also involve a certain amount of experimentation on which the Court would be least fitted to pronounce. The companyrt would number have the necessary companypetence and expertise to adjudicate upon such an economic issue. The companyrt cannot possibly assess or evaluate what would be the impact of a particular immunity or exemption and whether it would serve the purpose in view or number. There are so many imponderables that would enter into the determination that it would be wise for the companyrt number to hazard an opinion where even economists may differ. The companyrt must while examining the companystitutional validity of a legislation of this kind, be resilient, number rigid, forward looking, number static, liberal, number verbal and the companyrt must always bear in mind the companystitutional proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn v. Illinois l namely, that companyrts do number substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies. The companyrt must defer to legislative judgment in matters relating to social and economic policies and must number interfere, unless the exercise of legislative judgment appears to be palpably arbitrary. The companyrt should companystantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 2 The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do number require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should number be hastily expressed. What is best is number always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or companydemned. Mere errors of government are number subject to our judicial review. It is true that one or the other of the immunities or exemptions granted under the provisions of the Act may be taken advantage of by resourceful persons by adopting ingenious methods and devices with a view to avoiding or saving tax. But that cannot be helped because human ingenuity is so great when it companyes to tax avoidance that it would be almost impossible to frame tax legislation which cannot be abused. Moreover, as already pointed out above, the trial and error method is inherent in every legislative effort to deal with an obstinate social or economic issue and if it is found that any immunity or exemption granted under the Act is being utilised for tax evasion or avoidance number intended by the legislature, the Act can always be amended and the abuse terminated. We are accordingly of the view that numbere of the provisions of the Act is violative of Article 14 and its companystitutional validity must be upheld. These were the reasons for which we passed our order dated 2nd September, 1981 rejecting the challenge against the companystitutional validity of the ordinance and the Act and dismissing the writ petitions. Since these writ petitions are in the nature of public interest litigation, we directed that there should be numberorder as to companyts. GUPTA, J. I was unable to share the view taken by the majority in disposing of these writ petitions on September 2, 1981 that neither the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions ordinance, 1981 number the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions Act, 1981 is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, and I made the following order on the same day- I have companye to the companyclusion that the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions ordinance, 1981 and the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions Act, 1981 violate Art. 14 of the Constitution and are therefore invalid. I would allow the writ petitions with companyts. I shall give my reasons later. Here briefly are my reasons. These five writ petitions question the companystitutional validity of the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions ordinance, 1981 and Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions Act, 1981. The ordinance which was promulgated by the President on January 1 2, 1981 was repealed and replaced by the Act. The Act received the Presidents assent on March 27. 1981. Section I 3 of the Act says that it shall be deemed to have companye into force on January 12, 1981. The Provisions of the ordinance and the Act are similar except that section 4 c of the Act is worded slightly differently from the companyresponding provision of the ordinance but the difference is number material and I shall hereinafter refer to the provisions of the Act only. As the long title of the Act shows, it is An Act to provide for certain immunities to holders of Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 and for certain exemptions from the direct taxes in relation to such Bonds and for matters companynected therewith. The purpose for which the Act was passed as appearing from the preamble is- Whereas for effective economic and social planning it is necessary to canalise for productive purposes black money which has become a serious threat to the national economy And whereas with a view to such canalisation the Central Government has decided to issue at par certain bearer bonds to be known as the Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 of the face value of ten thousand rupees and redemption value, after ten years, of twelve thousand rupees And whereas it is expedient to provide for certain immunities and exemptions to render it possible for per sons in possession of black money to invest the same in the said Bonds The preamble thus takes numbere of the fact that black money has become a serious threat to national economy and says that to make economic and social planning effective it is necessary to canalise this black money for productive purposes. The Act does number attempt to define black money. The Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee set up by the Government of India in 1970 with Shri K.N. Wanchoo, retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, as Chairman explains what the term black money means in its final report submitted in December, 1971 It black money is, as its name suggests, tainted money-money which is number clean or which has a stigma attached to it Black is a companyour which is generally associated with evil. While it symbolises something which violates moral, social or legal numberms, it also suggests a veil of secrecy shrouding it. The term black money companysequently has both these implications. It number only stands for money earned by violating legal provisionseven social companyscience-but also suggests that such money is kept secret and number accounted for. Today the term black money is generally used to denote unaccounted money or companycealed income and or undisclosed wealth, as well as money involved in transactions wholly or partly suppressed. The Act companytains nine sections. The sections that are relevant for the present purpose are set out below. Immuni- 3. 1 Notwithstanding anything companytained ties other law for the time being in force,- a numberperson who has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired special Bearer Bonds shall be required to disclose, for any purpose whatsoever, the nature and source of acquisition of such Bonds b numberinquiry or investigation shall be companymenced against any person under any such law on the ground that such person has subscribed to or has other wise acquired Special Bearer Bonds and c the fact that a person has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall number be taken into account and shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any such law. 2 x x x x Acquisition.4. Without prejudice to the generality of etc., of the provisions of section 3, the Bonds number to subscription to, or acquisition of, be taken into Special Bearer Bonds by any person account for shall number be taken into account for the certain procpurpose of any proceeding under the eedings. Income-tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Income-tax Act , the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 hereinafter referred to as the Wealth-tax Act or the Gift tax Act, 1958 hereinafter referred to as the Gift-tax Act and, in particular, numberperson who has subscribed to, or has otherwise acquired, the said Bonds shall be entitled- a to claim any set-off or relief in any assessment, re-assessment, appeal, reference or other proceeding under the Income-tax Act or to reopen any, assessment or reassessment made under that Act on the ground that he has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired the said Bonds b to claim, in relation to any period before the date of maturity of the said Bonds, that any asset which is includible in his net wealth for any assessment year under the Wealth-tax Act has been companyverted into the said Bonds or c to claim, in relation to any period before the date or maturity of the said Bonds, that any asset held by him or any sum credited in his books of account or otherwise held by him represents the companysideration received by him for the transfer of the said Bonds. Amendment 5. In the Income-tax Act,- a in section of Act 43 2, in clause 14 , after sub clause Act of 1961 iv , the following sub-clause shall be inserted, namely- v Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 issued by the Central Government, b in section 10, in clause 15 , after sub-cluase ia , the following subclause shall be inserted, namely- ib premium on the redemption of Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 . Amendment 6. In section of 5 of the Wealth-tax Act, of Act 27 in sub-section 1 , after clause xvia , of 1957. the following clause shall be inserted, namely - xvib Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 . Amendment 7. In section 5 of the Gift-tax Act, in of Act 18 sub-section 1 , after clause iiia , of 1958 the following clause shall be inserted, namely- iiib of property in the form of Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 The marginal numberes against sections 5, 6, and 7 indicate that these sections are amendments respectively of the Income-tax Act of 1961, Wealth-tax Act of 1957 and Gifttax Act of 1958. Section 5 excludes Special Bearer Bonds, 1991 from the capital asset of an assessee and exempts the premium payable on the redemption of the Bonds from incometax. Section 6 exempts the Bonds from wealth-tax. Section 7 exempts from gift-tax property in the form of these Bonds. The Act has been challenged mainly on the ground that it infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution. Art. 14 forbids class legislation but permits classification. Permissible classification, it is well established, must satisfy two companyditions which Das J. enunciated in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar l as follows- 1 that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and, 2 that the differentia must have rational relation. to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The immunities provided by the impugned Act are clearly for the benefit of those who have acquired the Bonds with black money. Clauses a , b and c of Section 3 1 provide for these immunities numberwithstanding anything companytained in any other law for the time being in force. Clause a states that numberholder of Special Bearer Bonds shall be required to disclose for any purpose the nature and source of acquisition of the Bonds. Clause b forbids companymencement of any enquiry or investigation under any law against a person on the ground that he has subscribed to or otherwise acquired the Bonds. Under clause c the fact that a person has subscribed to or otherwise acquired Special Bearer Bonds shall be inadmissible in evidence and cannot be taken into account in any proceeding relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any law. None of these immunities is required by a person who has paid white money, that is, money that has been accounted for, to acquire Bonds. To a person who has disclosed the source of acquisition of the Bonds, these immunities are of numberuse. Section 4 makes it clear that the immunities companyferred by the Act are of use only to those who have acquired the Bonds with unaccounted money. Section 4 states that the fact that one has subscribed to or otherwise acquired the Bonds shall number be taken into account in any proceeding under the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 and the Gifttax Act, 1958 and goes on to provide specifically that numberone shall be entitled to a any manner of relief under the Income-tax Act on the ground that he has acquired the Bonds or b claim that any asset belonging to him which formed part of his net wealth in any period before the maturity of the Bonds, has been companyverted into such Bonds or c claim that any asset held by him or any sum of money credited in his books of account or otherwise held by him in the aforesaid period is the companysideration received by him for the transfer of the Bonds. Mr. Salve appearing for the petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 863 and 994 of 1981 companytended that section 4 c did number companystitute an absolute bar to the assessee seeking to prove that the said sum or asset represents the sale price of Special Bearer Bonds on behalf of the Union of India it was asserted that this was an absolute bar. In view of the companyclusion I have reached, I do number propose to decide the point and I shall proceed on the basis that it is an absolute bar. It is apparent from clauses a to c of section 4 that the rights they deny affect only those who have disclosed their source of acquisition of the Bonds. Those in whose case the source of acquisition has number been detected are number affected by the prohibition companytained in section 4. The impugned Act denies to those who have acquired the Bonds number with black money any relief under the Income-tax Act or the Wealth-tax Act or any benefit in any other way claimed by on the ground that they are holders of Special Bearer Bonds, and the relief and the benefit denied to them have been made available to those who have acquired the Bonds with black money by ignoring the source of acquisition in their case. The Act thus distinguishes between two classes of holders of Special Bearer Bonds tax-evaders and honest taxpayers. Has this classification a rational relation to the object of the Act ? The object, as already numbericed, is to canalise black money for productive purposes to make economic and social planning effective. If the exemptions and immunities companyferred by the Act are sufficiently attractive to induce tax-evaders to acquire Special Bearer Bonds, they will remain as attractive even if all these benefits were granted to those who will pay white money for the Bonds. Denial of these benefits to those who have acquired the Bonds with money which has been accounted for does number in any way further the object of canalisation of black money for productive purposes. The discrimination in favour of black money therefore seems to be obvious. It was however argued that numberone would be inclined to invest white money for Special Bearer Bonds which carry only 2 per cent annual interest. I do number think this is a companysideration which companyld justify the discrimination. Apart from that, a return of 2 per cent simple interest per annum is number a companyrect measure of the actual advantages companyferred by the Act. Taking into account the income-tax and the wealth-tax savings if one did number have to pay any tax on the amount with which Special Bearer Bonds were acquiredpurchasers of the Bonds with black money did number-and the tax free premium on the Bonds, the actual return would be many times more than 2 per cent simple interest per annum. It must therefore be held that the basis on which the holders of Special Bearer Bonds have been classified to give certain advantages to one class and deny them to the other, has numberrational nexus with the object of the Act. The matter has another aspect. The classification of holders of Special Bearer Bonds into tax-payers and taxevaders does disclose a basis. Would it be an acceptable argument to say that this basis has a relation to the object of the Act because the black money invested in Special Bearer Bonds by tax-evaders companyld be utilised for productive purposes for ten years and that both the companyditions of a valid classification were thus satisfied ? I am afraid number. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, supra Das J. points out The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short while the Article Art. 14 forbids class legislation in sense of making improper discrimination by companyferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be companyferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does number forbid classification for the purpose of legislation In Anwar Ali Sarkars case the companystitutional validity of the West Bengal Special Courts Act X of 1950 companystituting special companyrts and empowering the state government to refer cases offences or classes of cases or classes of offences to such companyrts was in question. The object of the West Bengal Act was to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences. Das J. Observes further To achieve this object, offences or cases have to be classified upon the basis of some differentia which will distinguish those offences or cases from others and which will have a reasonable relation to the recited object of the Act. The differentia and the object being, as I have said, different elements, it follows that the object by itself cannot be the basis of the classification of offences or the cases, for in the absence of any special circumstances which may distinguish one offence or one class of offences or one class of cases from another offence, or class of offences or class of cases, speedier trial is desirable in the disposal of all offences or classes of offences or classes of cases. If the differentia, that is, the basis of classification, and the object of the Act are distinct things, it follows that it is number enough that the differentia should have a nexus with the object, but it should also be intelligible. The presence of some characteristics in one class which are number found in another is the difference between the two classes, but a further requirement is that this differentia must be intelligible. If the basis of classification is on the face of it arbitrary in the sense that it is palpably unreasonable, I do number think it is possible to call the differentia intelligible. The following passage from the judgment of Bose J. in Anwar Ali Sarkars case illustrates the point I can companyceive of cases where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. Let us take an imaginary case in which a State legislature companysiders that all accused persons whose skull measurements are below a certain standard, or who cannot pass a given series of intelligence tests, shall be tried summarily whatever the offence on the ground that the less companyplicated the trial the fairer it is to their sub-standard of intelligence. Here is classification. It is scientific and systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is numberquestion of favouritism, and yet I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand. But what would be the true basis of the decision ? Surely simply this that the Judges would number companysider that fair and proper. The scope of Art. 14 was further elaborated in some of the later decisions of this Court. This is what Bhagwati, J. speaking for himself and Chandrachud and Krishna Iyer JJ, in P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another l says We cannot companyntenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic companycept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribed, cabbined and companyfined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic points of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and companystitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14. Bhagwati J. reiterates in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India l what he had said in Royappas case and adds The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or number-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence . . . To pass the test of reasonableness if it was enough that there should be a differentia which should have some companynection with the object of the Act, then these observations made in Maneka Gandhi and Royappa would be so much wasted eloquence. The decisions of this Court insist that the differentia must be intelligible and the nexus rational, and the observations quoted above would seem to be appropriate only if we attach some significance to the words intelligible and rational. The question however remains when is one justified in describing something as arbitrary or unreasonable ? Terms like reasonable, just or fair derive their significance from the existing social companyditions. W. Friedmann in his Legal Theory 5th Ed. page 80 points out that expressions like a reasonable and fair price or a fair and equitable restitution means numberhing, except in companyjunction with the social companyditions of the time. Brandeis J. in his opinion in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2 explains when a classification shall be reasonable We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelligent, just-minded, civilized men companyld rationally favour. Bose J. in Anwar Ali Sarkars case says much the same thing in holing that the West Bengal Special Courts Act of 1950 offends Art. 14 We find men accused of heinous crimes called upon to answer for their lives and liberties. We find them picked out from their fellows, and however much the new procedure may give them a few crumbs of advantage, in the bulk they are deprived of substantial and valuable privileges of defence which others, similarly charged, are able to claim. It matters number to me, number indeed to them and their families and their friends, whether this be done in good faith, whether it be done for the companyvenience of government, whether the process can be scientifically classified and labelled, or whether it is an experiment in speedier trials made for the good of society at large. It matters number how lofty and laudable the motives are. The question with which I charge myself is, can fair-minded, reasonable, unbiased and resolute men, who are number swayed by emotion or prejudice, regard this with equanimity and call it reasonable, just and fair, regard it as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the companyditions which obtain in India today ? Keeping in mind these observations on what is reasonable, is the basis on which the holders of Special Bearer Bonds have been classified into two groups, honest tax-payers and tax-evaders, intelligible ? What is arbitrary and offends Art. 14, cannot be called intelligible. It is clear from the provisions of the Act set out earlier that the advantages which the tax-evaders derive from the immunities provided by the Act are number available to those who have acquired the Bonds with white money. The Act promises anonymity and security for tax-evaders. No question can be asked as to the nature and source of acquisition or possession of the Bonds. The Bonds can be transferred freely, and the apprehension expressed by the petitioners cannot he said to be baseless that passing from hand to hand the Bonds are likely to operate as parallel currency and be used for any kind of transaction. From a reading of the preamble of the Act it does number seem that the object of the Act was only to enable the Central Government to have some use for 10 years of the black money which is said to have become a serious threat 1000 to the national economy. As I read the preamble the purpose of the Act is to unearth black money and use it for productive purposes for effective economic and social planning. If that be the object of the Act, it is difficult to see how its provisions help to achieve the intended purpose. The Act discloses a scheme which enables tax evaders to companyvert black money into white after 10 years and in the meantime use the Bonds as parallel currency initiating a chain of black money investments There is numberprovision in the Act requiring that on maturity of the Bonds their holders would have to disclose their identity, which means that if after 10 years black money which had taken the shape of Special Bearer Bonds goes under-ground again and retain its companyour, there is numberhing to prevent it. There is numberhing in the scheme to halt generation of black money which threatens the national economy. Some people by successful evasion manoeuvres are able to throw the burden of taxation of their own shoulders which means a greater burden on the honest tax-payers and this leads to economic imbalance. On the effect of giving companycessions to such unscrupulous tax-evaders in preference to the honest taxpayers, Mr. R.K. Garg appearing in person and Mr. Salve both repeated what the Direct Taxes Enquiry Committees final report says Resorting to such a measure would only shake the companyfidence of the honest tax-payers in the capacity of the Government to deal with the law breakers and would invite companytempt for its enforcement machinery. The petitioners submitted further that measures like the Special Bearer Bonds scheme would tempt more people to evade taxes and instead of serving a legitimate public interest would grievously damage it. It has been pointed out that there have been voluntary disclosure schemes in the past. That is so, but numbere of them is quite like the scheme in question which number only exempts the unaccounted money in the shape of Special Bearer Bonds from all taxes but provides also for a tax-free premium on it. According to the petitioners, if the earlier schemes have been companyciliatory, the present scheme amounts to capitulation to black money. I asked the Attorney General if it was his case that all attempts to unearth black money had failed and the present scheme was the only companyrse open. His answer was that was number his case The affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India also does number make such a case. Clearly, the impugned Act puts a premium on dishonesty without even a justi- 1001 fication of necessity-that the situation in the companyntry left numberoption. The Act has been criticised as immoral and unethical. Any law that rewards law breakers and tax dodgers is bound to invite such criticism. Should the companyrt companycern itself with questions of morality and ethics in companysidering the companystitutional validity of an Act ? of companyrse numberlaw can be struck down only on the ground that it is unethical. However as Friedmann in his Legal Theory page 43 says There cannot be-and there never has been-a companyplete separation of law and morality. Historical and ideological differences companycern the extent to which the numberlns of the social order are absorbed into the general order. It has been held by this Court in Royappa and Maneka Gandhi that the principle of reasonableness is an essential element of equality. The companycept of reasonableness does number exclude numberions of morality and ethics. I do number see how it can be disputed that in the circumstances of a given case companysiderations of morality and ethics may have a bearing on the reasonableness of the law in question. Having regard to the provisions of the impugned Act which I have discussed above and the object of the Act to which I have referred, is it possible to say that it is reasonable to classify the E holders of Special Bearer Bonds into honest tax-payers and tax-evaders for the purpose of companyferring benefits on the tax-evaders and denying them to those who have honestly paid their taxes, especially when a measure appeasing the tax-evaders to the extent the scheme in question does is number claimed as unavoidable ? The informed, fair-minded, civilized man on whose judgment both Brandeis J. and Bose J. rely, would he have found the basis of the classification intelligible ? The questions answer themselves, the arbitrary character of the differentiation is so obvious. I do number think it is possible to take the rhetoric of Royappa and Maneka Gandhi seriously and find that the Act passes the test of reasonableness. What I have said above on the Special Bearer Bonds scheme should number be read as an expression of opinion on the wisdom of the government policy-that the scheme is number the best in circumstances. My companyclusion is based number on what the policy of the government is but on what the equality elause in Art. 14 requires. 1002 Having held that the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions ordinance, 1981 and the Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions Act, 1981 are invalid on the ground that they infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution, I do number find it necessary to companysider whether Special Bearer Bonds Immunities and Exemptions ordinance, 1981 is outside the ordinance making power of the President under Art.

V. RAMANA, J. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 19th March, 2007 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 1996 whereby the High Court has partly allowed the appeal preferred by the State by companyfirming the judgment of the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 of IPC and companyvicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302, IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. The brief facts of the case as culled out from the case of the prosecution are that on 26th December, 1987 at about 1 p.m. while Gambhir Singh PW 7 brother of the deceased was having lunch at his home, the appellant along with a group of companyaccused persons, each armed with deadly weapons rushed to his house hurling abusive filthy words and picked up a quarrel with his brother Jagannath Singh deceased who was sitting outside on a platform Chabutara along with his nephew Bir Singh PW 11 . When Jagannath Singh deceased raised objection to their behavior, the appellant fired a gunshot in the abdomen of the deceased as a result of which he fell down on the ground and succumbed to the injuries. Gambhir Singh P.W. 7 carried the body of the deceased to the police station, Lahar on a bullock cart and lodged the FIR Annexure P-1 at 4.15 PM on the same day. Dilip Singh Yadav PW-13 prepared inquest memo and Dr. K. Upadhyay P.W. 12 companyducted autopsy on the dead body. On the next day, Dilip Singh Yadav PW 13 seized blood stained soil and plain soil from the place of occurrence, as per seizure memo. He also seized a gun, 12 live cartridges and 9 empty cartridges from the possession of appellant Mahavir Singh, an axe from Sobaran companyaccused and a lathi from Kanched Singh another companyaccused as per seizure memo and sent them to the Forensic Science Laboratory at Sagar. Consequently, statements of witnesses were recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C., spot map was prepared and Charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149 of the IPC in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Lahar who companymitted the case to Court of Sessions for Trial. The Trial Court framed charges u s 302 and 148 of IPC against the appellant and under sections 148, 302/149 of IPC against companyaccused. All the accused pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried. To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has examined 13 witnesses and marked several Exhibits while the accused examined numbere in defence and numberexhibits were marked on his behalf. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 30th November, 1994 acquitted the appellant from the alleged offences mainly on the ground that there are companytradictions in the evidence of eyewitnesses to that of medical evidence, prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt formation of unlawful assembly with a motive of companymitting murder of the deceased and also failed to establish that the bullet had been fired with the firearm seized from the appellant. Dissatisfied with the Judgment of the Trial Court, the State preferred an appeal before the High Court claiming that the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse and illegal inasmuch as it did number appreciate the prosecution evidence in right perspective and ignored the evidence of the eyewitnesses. The High Court, on a reanalysis of evidence of prosecution witnesses and other material available on record came to the companyclusion that the Trial Court was right in acquitting the other companyaccused persons but found fault with the acquittal of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The High Court, therefore, partly allowed the appeal by companyfirming the judgment of the Trial Court in respect of the charge under Section 148 and companyvicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302, IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. Aggrieved by the Judgment of the High Court, the appellant approached this Court in appeal. Learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court rightly acquitted the appellant, after elaborately companysidering the evidence on record, upon companying to the companyclusion that there is lack of credibility in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and, in particular, the medical and ocular testimonies are companyflicting there was companysiderable delay on the part of Investigating Officer in recording the evidences of alleged eyewitnesses inasmuch as statements by numbere of the eyewitnesses were recorded on the day of occurrence of the incident. In the background of this factual matrix, learned companynsel for the appellant has advanced his arguments that since the appellant and victim parties have prior enmity over some pending criminal cases, the family members of the deceased, i.e., Gambhir Singh PW 7 , Shanti Devi PW 8 , Bir Singh PW 11 in companynivance and with the help of a pocket witness Madho Singh PW 9 companycocted the story, by projecting himself as an eyewitness, and falsely implicated the appellant. According to him, this fact is clearly established with the companytradictions in the medical evidence and the unreliable evidence of the alleged interested eyewitness. The presence of Gambhir Singh PW 7 , at the time of occurrence, as heavily relied upon by the prosecution, proves to be false in the light of evidence of Bir Singh PW 11 who numberhere in his testimony mentioned that Gambhir Singh PW 7 alone came out of the house and witnessed the incident and Madho Singh PW 9 claimed that soon after the shooting, Gambhir Singh PW 7 , Bir Singh PW 11 and Shanti Devi PW 8 came out of the house and therefore the accused fled away from the spot. It is also companytended that the alleged eyewitnesses Gambhir Singh PW 7 , Bir Singh PW 11 and Shanti Devi PW 8 made material improvements in their testimonies before the Court in order to companynect the case of prosecution with the medical report. Thus, the presence of the eyewitnesses at the place of occurrence is doubtful. Learned companynsel further urged that as per the site plan prepared by the Investigation Officer and also as per the medical evidence, the deceased Jagannath Singh was standing when he was shot. According to the medical report, the injuries sustained by the deceased are possible only when the assaulter stands at a height above the victim. Contrary to this, the case advanced by the prosecution, companypled with the evidence of alleged eyewitness, is that the appellant was standing on a lower level and the deceased was standing on a higher level i.e. on the platform. In his statement Madho Singh PW 9 categorically mentioned that the deceased was sitting on the platform Chabutara and the appellant was standing on the ground, when he was shot. While the medical report indicated that the margins of the wounds were inverted and the bullet must have been fired from a distance of within 6 feet, and as per the testimonies of the direct eyewitnesses, the said distance varied between 12 to 22.5 feet. The absence of human blood at the alleged place of incident i.e. on the platform and presence of blood on the ground in front of the platform further renders the prosecutions case even more doubtful. This blood also companyld number be matched with that of the deceased and therefore, recovery of weapons is of numberrelevance. Simply for the reason that the post-mortem report indicated that the deceased had died due to one single gunshot, and mere recovery of nine empty cartridges from the appellant does number in any way companynect him with the crime, when the empty cartridges were number recovered from the place of incident and also in the absence of authenticated proof that the bullet shot at the deceased was fired from the gun owned by the appellant. Learned companynsel thus submits that the statements of eyewitness are number trustworthy. Considering the facts in their entirety, such as delayed recording of statements of the eyewitnesses and an unsuccessful attempt to reveal as to where the bullet had struck the victim and the unmatched statements by prosecution witnesses with that of the medical expert, the learned Trial Court was pleased to record the order of acquittal of the appellant. The learned companynsel finally submitted that the High Court, on the other hand, failed to appreciate the evidence in true legal perspective and wrongly interfered with the well reasoned judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court based on a companyent and detailed reasoning and that the High Court companymitted a grave error by acquitting the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The impugned judgment is companytrary to the settled legal principles as it did number give due weightage to the medical evidence and rejected the same without ascribing any reason. Thus, interference by the High Court with the reasoned judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is unwarranted. Learned companynsel submits that in the light of settled legal principles, the companyviction of the appellant by the High Court is vague and uncalled for and the same requires to be set aside by this Court. On the other hand, learned companynsel appearing for the State, argued that the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the appellant was wholly erroneous as it was passed without taking into account the prosecution evidence in its right perspective. There was numberinconsistency in the evidence of eyewitnesses who were very much present at the scene of offence and the Trial Court was number justified in ignoring their evidences. The High Court, after re-appreciating the entire evidence on record, took a justifiable stand in companyvicting the accused under Section 302 of the IPC by a well reasoned judgment and that there is numberillegality or perversity in the companyviction of the accused calling interference by this Court. We have heard the learned companynsel on either side at length and perused the material available on record. Now it is imperative to look into the scope of interference by the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal and whether the High Court was justified in companyvicting the accused under Section 302, IPC by reversing the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. In the criminal jurisprudence, an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is companyvicted by a companypetent Court after a full-fledged trial, and once the Trial Court by companyent reasoning acquits the accused, then the reaffirmation of his innocence places more burden on the appellate Court while dealing with the appeal. No doubt, it is settled law that there are numberfetters on the power of the appellate Court to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence both on facts and law upon which the order of acquittal is passed. But the companyrt has to be very cautious in interfering with an appeal unless there are companypelling and substantial grounds to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate Court while passing an order has to give clear reasoning for such a companyclusion. It is numberdoubt true that there cannot be any strait jacket formula as to under what circumstances appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal, but the same depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In the case on hand, we have to examine the rationale behind the companyclusion of the High Court in companyvicting the accused and the companypelling reasons to deviate from the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. On a thorough analysis of the judgment impugned, it is evident that the High Court has number recorded any reasons for partly setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court which has acquitted all the accused persons from the same set of facts before it. The High Court which has set aside the acquittal order of the Trial Court has observed that the Trial Court has based its reasoning on guess work. We find it that even the High Court has companymitted the same mistake and basing on the same facts and guess work has arrived at the companyclusion that the appellant is guilty. It is specifically urged by the learned companynsel for the appellant that as per the medical evidence, the injuries sustained by the deceased are possible only when the assaulter stands at a height above the victim. In this process, the companyrt has guessed that Mahavir Singh accused-appellant and Jagannath deceased were of similar height which is numberodys case and numberevidence is available on record to companye to a companyclusion that the height of the two is same. The evidence available on record in this regard is a statement of Dr. A.K. Upadhyay PW 12 that the deceased was of average Height. Now in order to establish that the bullet traveled in a downward direction, they have explained that the position of the gun usually kept in a downward position resting on the chest. Now the logical fallacy is to have assumed the height of the platform whose height has number been recorded due to sloppy investigation by the Investigating Officers. There exists a reasonable doubt because of the fact that the height of the platform was number recorded and the same cannot be guessed at this point of time. Further, the deposition of the Doctor is very clear that the shooter might have been at a lower level. While some of the witnesses have suggested that the deceased was on the ground while others have pointed out to the fact that he was standing on the platform. Therefore, from the same set of facts, the Trial Court as well as the High Court have arrived at different companyclusions, such an exercise cannot be undertaken by the High Court in an Appeal unless the companyclusion drawn by the Trial Court cannot be sustained based on the facts and circumstances and when two companyclusions are possible based on the evidence available on record, the appellate companyrt should be all the more reluctant to interfere with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. It appears to us that the difference of opinion between the Courts below in deciding whether or number the appellant has companymitted the offence with which he is charged, mainly revolves around the presence of alleged direct eyewitnesses at the spot, possibility of appellants inflicting firearm injury to the deceased in view of the positioning of the injury sustained by the deceased, the material infirmity, if any, and companytradiction in the ocular and medical evidence. It is, however, clear that though, at the outset, the accused appellant absolutely rejected the allegation and pleaded number guilty by taking the defence of alibi that, on the date of incident, he was irrigating his field, but his claim has number been supported by any evidence. Undoubtedly, Gambhir Singh PW 7brother of the deceased has accepted that certain criminal proceedings were pending between the accused and his family members. He also admits that one case had already been filed by the accused prior to the incident. Admittedly, Shanti Devi PW 8wife of the deceased also has deposed that there was an altercation between her son Vijender and Dhullu, on which they killed her husband. Thus, the parties are admittedly in hostile terms and the incident in question occurred in a broad day light at the residence of the deceased by doing away his precious life. The prosecution, in support of its version, has heavily relied upon the statements of eyewitnesses Gambhir Singh PW 7-complainant and also brother of the deceased , Shanti Devi PW 8-wife of the deceased , Madho Singh PW 9 and Bir Singh PW 11-nephew of the deceased . The learned Trial Judge disbelieved the presence of eyewitnesses on the spot in view of delayed recording of their statements by the Investigating Officer PW 13 and also they remained unsuccessful in revealing exactly as to where the bullet had struck the deceased. We also find that numberhere in the First Information Report, the name or presence of eyewitness Shanti Devi PW 8 was mentioned as a witness to the incident. The High Court has attached a lot of weight to the evidence of the said Madho Singh PW 9 as he is an independent witness. On perusal of the record, it appears that the said person already had deposed for the victim family on a number of previous occasions, that too against the same accused. This being the fact, it is important to analyze the jurisprudence on interested witness. It is a settled principle that the evidence of interested witness needs to be scrutinized with utmost care. It can only be relied upon if the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is companyent, credible and trustworthy. Here we may refer to chance witness also. It is to be seen that although the evidence of a chance witness is acceptable in India, yet the chance witness has to reasonably explain the presence at that particular point more so when his deposition is being assailed as being tainted. A companytradicted testimony of an interested witness cannot be usually treated as companyclusive. The said Madho Singh PW 9 has admitted that he has been a witness in another case against the accused for the deceased. Here it is to be seen that the said Madho Singh PW 9 has been acting as a pocket witness for the family. Further, the credibility of this independent witness can be challenged on the fact that the companymotion was only heard by the said Madho Singh PW 9 whereas the rest of the members of the locality did number companye for help. As Madho Singh PW 9 is a chance witness as well as an interested witness herein, causes suspicion and does number inspire companyfidence. This admission by Madho Singh PW 9 number only forces us to doubt the veracity of his own deposition but also has created doubts on the version of Gambhir Singh PW 7 . We have thoroughly examined the evidence of expert witnesses as well as other ocular witnesses. The evidence of Dr. A.K. Upadhyay PW 12 reveals that when the deceased sustained bullet injury, he might have been in a standing position and the bullet would have entered from left side and exited from right side of the body. This fact, however, companyroborated with the evidences of PW 7 Gambhir Singh and PW 8 Shanti Devi , but the statements of PW 9 Madho Singh and PW 11 Bir Singh do number support it. Similarly, there were companytradictions between the statements of Dr. Upadhyay PW 12 and that of the eyewitnesses as to the distance and height of the assaulter while inflicting the grievous injury to the deceased and whether the deceased was standing on the platform Chabutara or came down from it while receiving the bullet injury. We find from the statement of Dr. Upadhyay PW 12 that he was number clear and definite to say exactly from what position and distance the assaulter companyld have fired the gun. Going by the seizure memo Ex.P/3 apparently one gun, 12 live and 9 empty cartridges were recovered from the appellant. The evidences of eyewitnesses support this fact and numberquestion was put to the I.O. after the recovery of the gun and cartridges, that whether he himself shot from the seized gun to create evidence. The prosecutions story is somewhat strengthened by the ballistic experts report Ex. P/12 which affirms that the gun seized from the appellant was in perfect order, the empty cartridges bore the same impression on pin as seized from the accused and the live cartridges were actually fired by the gun seized from the appellant. But numberhere it was mentioned that the death of the victim occurred by the bullet released from the seized gun. Merely the seizure of gun and cartridges from the appellant, the ongoing enmity between the parties on account of various criminal litigations and the altercation and exchange of heated words between the rival groups on the morning of the same day, cannot establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt. The position of law in cases where there is a companytradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallized to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis--vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes far that it companypletely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved See Abdul Sayeed v . State of M.P., 2010 10 SCC 259 In view of companytradictory statements by the prosecution witnesses companypled with the unmatched medical evidence, delay in recording of statements of witnesses by the I.O., number-availability of proper site plan and in the absence of authenticated ballistic expert report that the bullet had been fired with the seized gun of the appellant, the Trial Court had to decide the case against the prosecution and discharge the appellant from the charges. The High Court, upon carrying the exercise of reappreciation of evidence, formed the view that the reasons for delay in recording the statements of witnesses have been properly explained that as soon as the bullet struck on the abdomen of the deceased, he immediately fell down from the platform. It further observed that though the name of Shanti Devi PW 8 was number mentioned in the FIR, there is positive evidence on record to establish her presence at the time of incident along with other eyewitnesses and this fact has been established by their companyroborative statements and there is numberreason to disbelieve their statements. Here it is worthwhile to mention that both the Courts below formed a companymon opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 148 and 302/149 of IPC against the companyaccused and discharged them from those charges. The disagreement between the Trial Court and the High Court is only in respect of the charge under Section 302, IPC against the appellant. It is the duty of the Apex Court to separate chaff from the husk and to dredge the truth from the pandemonium of Statements. It is but natural for human beings to state variant statements due to time gap but if such statements go to defeat the companye of the prosecution then such companytradictions are material and the Court has to be mindful of such statements See Tahsildhar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 1012 Pudhu Raja v. State, 2012 11 SCC 196 State of UP v. Naresh, 2011 9 SCC 698. The case in hand is a fit case, wherein there are material exaggerations and companytradictions, which inevitably raises doubt which is reasonable in numbermal circumstances and keeping in view the substratum of the prosecution case, we cannot infer beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the death of the deceased. Normally, when a culprit perpetrates a heinous crime of murder and takes away the life of a human being, if appropriate punishment is number awarded to that offender, the Court will be failing in its duty. Such crime, when indulged by a criminal blatantly, is number companymitted against an individual alone, but is companymitted against the society as well to which the criminal and victim are a part. It needs numberemphasis from this Court that the punishment to be awarded for such a crime must be relevant and it should companyform to and be companysistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been carried out. Here in the instant case, numberdoubt, an innocent man has lost his life at the hands of another man, and looking at the way in which the investigation was handled, we are sure to observe that it was carried out in a lackluster manner.

C. Lahoti, J. This is a landlord-tenant dispute wherein the landlady has sought for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises for her own occupation - by herself and by members of her family residing with her, under Clause h of proviso to Sub-section 1 of Section 21 of The Karntaka Rent Control Act, 1961 hereinafter the 1961 Act, for short . Admittedly, the respondent-landlady is a widow. She is also owner of the premises wherein the appellants are the tenants. The eviction petition was filed some time in the year 1985. The requirement as pleaded by the landlady is that she has two major sons and two minor sons. The occupation of the landladys family is weaving. One of the major sons was married, also blessed with a child and engaged in the family business. The second major son was unemployed and yet to be married. He was desirous of starting his own business but the premises presently in occupation of the landlady were number sufficient to accommodate any business activity of the second son. The other two sons were minor and did number have any place to study available within the premises in their occupation. The second of the major sons was to be married and the premises in occupation of the landlady did number have enough accommodation to allow occupation by the second major son as a married member of the family, inasmuch as his wife shall also have to be accommodated in the premises in occupation of the family. It is number disputed that the tenanted premises, that is the scheduled house premises in occupation of the tenants are residential premises. The tenants in their written statement filed before the Rent Controller admitted the premises to be residential and in their occupation for residence. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Court found the requirement of the landlady number made out. The two companyrts also examined the case from the point of view of companyparative hardship as required by Sub-section 4 of Section 21 of the 1961 Act and arrived at a finding that if the tenant-appellants were directed to be evicted they would suffer greater hardship than the hardship which would be suffered by the landlady in the event of the eviction being denied. The landlady preferred a revision petition in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. During the pendency of the civil revision, the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 for short the 1999 Act came into force. The High Court took numberice of the provisions of the new Act and applied the same to the case before it as required by Clause b of Sub-section 2 of Section 70 of the 1999 Act and held the ,bona fide requirement of the landlady was made out, allowed the revision and reversing the judgments of the two companyrts below directed the tenant-appellants to be evicted. Indeed it may be numbered that during the pendency of the revision, the landlady-respondent had moved an application for amendment in her petition for eviction which was allowed by the High Court, and therein the landlady had specifically pleaded the right to recover immediate possession of premises to widow as companytemplated by Section 31 of the 1999 Act. That ground has also found favour with the High Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the tenant-appellants have preferred this appeal by special leave. So far as the applicability of the provisions of the 1999 Act is companycerned, numberfault can be found with the view taken by the High Court that the provisions of the 1999 Act apply to pending civil revisions. Section 70 of the 1999 Act repeals the 1961 Act. Clause b of Sub-section 2 of Section 70 provides that all cases and proceedings other than those referred to in Clause a and pending at the companymencement of the 1999 Act in respect of the premises to which the 1999 Act is applicable, shall be companytinued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Act. It is number disputed that the scheduled premises, which are in the occupation of the tenant-appellants and form subject matter of these proceedings, are those to which the 1999 Act is applicable. The applicability of Section 70 2 b of the 1999 Act is clearly attracted and the High Court was justified in taking numberice of the provisions companytained in the 1999 Act and deciding the revision pending before it companysistently with and keeping in view the provisions of the 1999 Act. Indeed, the provisions of the 1999 Act, especially the provisions relating to eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, have a material bearing on the case and the proceedings forming the subject matter of the present appeal. Under the 1961 Act, the relevant ground for eviction of the tenant was companytained in Clause h of Sub-section 1 of Section 21 which provided for an order for the recovery of possession of premises being made on the ground that the premises are reasonably and bonafidely required by the landlord for occupation by himself and so on. However, Sub-section 4 of Section 21 provided that a ground for eviction under Clause h abovesaid, in spite of having been made out, yet decree for eviction companyld number be passed if the Court was satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord, that a greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. A partial eviction was also permissible companysistently with the finding on the question of hardship. Under the 1999 Act, the relevant ground for eviction as companytemplated by Clause r of Sub-section 2 of Section 27 is that the premises let are required whether in the same form or after reconstruction or re-building by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family and so on and that the landlord has numberother reasonably suitable accommodation to satisfy the said requirement. The companycept of companyparative hardship has been given up and instead Sub-section 3 of Section 27 number provides that the Court may, on a ground for eviction under Clause r abovesaid having been made out, allow eviction from only a part of the premises if the landlord is agreeable to the same. A new provision has been enacted vide Section 31 of the 1999 Act which provides that if the landlady be a widow and the premises were let out by her or by her husband and the tenanted premises are required for use by her and for her family members or for any one ordinarily living with her she may apply to the Court for recovery of immediate possession of such premises. Explanation I appended to Clause r , Sub-section 2 of Section 27 of the 1999 Act provides, inter alia Where the landlord in his application supported by an affidavit submits that the premises are required by him for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, the Court shall presume that the premises are so required. Another provision enacted by the same Explanation is that the premises let for a particular use may be required by the landlord for a different use if such use is permissible under law. The rules enacted by the abovesaid Explanation are available to be invoked number only for the purpose of Section 27 2 r but also for Section 31, the two provisions with which we are companycerned as relevant for the purpose of the present case. We have already numbered hereinabove that the plea of availability of ground under Section 31 in addition to the one already pleaded and tried by the Rent Controller, was specifically raised by the respondent by way of an amendment in the pleadings and the requisite affidavit making out the ground under Section 31 was also filed. The tenant-appellants had full opportunity of meeting the case which was pleaded by the respondent-landlady by way of subsequent event based on the enactment of the 1999 Act. In view of the provisions of the new Act having been introduced during the pendency of the revision, the High companyrt heard the learned companynsel for the parties and gave a fresh look to the relevant facts in the light of the evidence and material available on record and arrived at a finding that the ground for eviction under Section 27 2 r and Section 31 of the 1999 Act were both made out. The learned companynsel for the appellants has submitted that the High Court has proceeded to decide the case solely on the basis of the presumption enacted by the 1999 Act in favour of the landlord and has number dealt with other relevant facts and material available on record. It was also submitted by him that in view of the jurisdiction vesting in the High Court being one of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court was number justified in upturning the finding of fact arrived at companycurrently by the two Courts below. We do number find merit in any of the two submissions so made. The presumption enacted by Explanation-I i appended to Clause r of Sub-section 2 of Section 27 of the Act is mandatory and has to be drawn in view of the phraseology employed by the Legislature in enacting the provision which speaks - the Court shall presume that the premises are so required. The presumption has to be drawn of companyrse the tenant may rebut the presumption. The mandatory presumption enacted by the 1999 Act shall have the effect of shifting the burden of proof while the landlord may rest on the presumption, it will be for the tenant to rebut the same. We have already numbericed that the respondent is a widow. The applicability of presumption is attracted. Other than the applicability of presumption, there is ample material available on record to substnatiate that the need pleaded by the respondent is bona fide. The approach adopted by the companyrts below the High Court was unrealistic and impermissible. Suffice it to observe that the approach adopted by the learned Rent Controller was too technical approach devoid of realities of life. The same error was companymitted by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge has gone wrong on many companynts. At least two can be demonstrated immediately. At one place, the learned District Judge has observed that if some more rooms are made available the sons of the petitionerlandlady may live companyfortably but that itself cannot be taken to hold that the tenants are required to be evicted from the scheduled premises.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3234 of 1981. From the Judgment and Order dated 19th March, 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 2334 of 1980. B. Pai and R.H. Parihar for the Appellant. N. Sahasranaman in person, S.P. Sharma in person, T.A. Anantha Raman, R. Basu Devan, A.K. Goel, Ajit Pudissery, M.S. Gupta and V.J. Francis for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. In the Reserve Bank of India separate Departmentwise and Groupwise seniority and promotion for cadres of Officers and number-Officers Award Staff was prevalent. This would be apparent from the decision of this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal Ors., 1977 1 S.C.R. 377 as well as V.T. Khanzode and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr., 1982 2 S.C.C. 7. In September, 1962, need was felt for maintenance of companybined seniority list at each centre for the purposes of promotions recommended by National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr. Justice K.T. Desai. The recommendations of the said Desai Award for centre-wise companybined seniority were approved by this Court in 1966. See in this companynection the observations in All India Reserve Bank Employees Associations v. Reserve Bank of India, 1966 1 S.C.R. 25 at 57 and Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal Ors., supra . In 1970, the Supervisory Staff in Class I was upgraded to Staff Officers in Class I pursuant to the Memorandum of Settlement dated 9th January, 1970 between the Bank and the All India Supervisory Staff Association, subject to certain companyditions. Administrative Circular No. 20 dated 6th June, 1970 was issued on introduction of written examination for departmental promotions of clerk Grade I Assistants etc. to the post of Staff Officers Grade II Sub-Accountants and Research Superintendents in all the groups. This circular was number made operative. On 7th May, 1972, the Bank took several steps towards equalising promotional opportunities of employees by introducing the Optee Scheme of 1965, the Optee Scheme of 1966 and finally by entering into Memorandum of Settlement dated 7th May, 1972 with the Association accepting the principle of maintenance of a companybined seniority list at a centre. See in this companynection the observations in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal, supra . On or about 7th May, 1972, the Bank formulated a Scheme for Promotions Staff Officer Grade II after giving full opportunity to the Association to make its suggestions. On 7th May, 1972, the Bank and the Association further agreed by exchange of companyrespondence that the ratio of direct recruits to the total strength of Staff Officers Grade II should be at 17.5 82.5. Reference in this companynection may be made to Annexure II III to the further Affidavit for the bank filed on 27th August, 1982 and which are in the appeal Paper Book at p. 134 onwards. On 13th May, 1972, the Bank introduced the Administrative Circular No. 8 dated 13th May, 1972 on Scheme for Promotions - Staff Officers Grade II which is binding on all employees of the Bank. On the same day the Bank introduced simultaneously the Administrative Circular No. 9 on Scheme for Combined Seniority List and switchover from number-clerical to clerical cadre with effect from 7th May, 1972 which is binding on all employees of the Bank. The Constitutional valdity of this scheme was upheld by this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal supra . On 22nd May, 1974, the Bank took a decision, based on the recommendations of the Cadre Review Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice J.L. Nain and issued the Administrative Circular No. 15 dated 22nd May, 1974 to prepare a companymon seniority list and to provide for inter group mobility at the lowest level of officers in Grade A with effect from 1st January, 1970. See V.T. Khanzode Ors. Reserve Bank of India, supra . On or about 7th January, 1978, the Bank took further decision, based on the recommendations of two Committees, one headed by Mr. Justice Nain and another headed by Mr. Thareja, and issued Administrative Circular No. 8 dated 7th January, 1978 to companybine the seniority of all officers in Grade B and above with effect from 22nd May, 1974 with a view to equalise opportunity for promotions among officers. In this companynection, reference may also be made to V.T. Khanzode Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India, supra . This appeal arises from a decision of the division bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur dated 19th March, 1981 whereby it has struck down a part of clause II a i of the Scheme for Promotion - Staff Officers Grade II number designated Grade A companyered under the Administration Circular No. 8 dated 13th May, 1972. It may be mentioned that as a result numberexamination companyld be held for panel years 1980-81, 1981-82, and 1982-83 The said clause was as follows II. Number of candidates for the qualifying test- a i As estimate of the vacancies anticipated to occur in each office during a panel year i.e. 1st September to 31st August will be declared by the Bank in advance and the number of candidates in that office to be called for the test in order to fill those vacancies in that office will number exceed twice the number of such vacancies subject to sub-clause It may be mentioned that the decision was rendered in respect of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by three petitioners who were Grade II clerks working at Nagpur Reserve Bank ever since their employment which companymenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965. The Reserve Bank has its offices at nearly 15 centres throughout India. The service companyditions were governed by the Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulations, 1948 hereinafter called Regulations . The High Court by its order which is under appeal has set aside the impugned part of the scheme. It would be necessary to refer to the said judgment briefly. It may be mentioned that this judgment of the High Court was delivered on 19th March, 1981. This Court granted special leave against the said judgment on 4th December, 1981. Then after that on 5th March, 1982, this Court upheld the companystitutional validity of the Administrative Circular No. 8 dated 7th January, 1978 to companybine the seniorty of all Officers. See V.T. Khanzode Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India, supra . This Court further directed on 29th July, 1982 that in the interest of justice All India Reserve Bank Employees Class III Workmen Associations and All India Reserve Bank Workers Organisation be added as the party-respondents, and the appeal was heard for some time. Then this appeal after hearing was adjourned and this Court directed the Reserve Bank to frame a new scheme for promotion by order dated 20th October, 1982. On 13th December, 1982, the Bank filed further affidavit, inter alia, annexing revised draft of clause II to the Scheme for Promotion of Staff Officers Grade A annexed to the Administrative Circular No. 8. This was submitted for acceptance on behalf of the appellants before us. The amendment was opposed by the opposing respondents by their Affidavits-in-Opposition. On 21st March, 1983, it is stated, that the Bank entered into a settlement by exchange of letters with All India Reserve Bank Employees Association which is recognised and representative Union of Class III Workmen employees. The Bank thereafter filed a Rajoinder setting out principles governing recruitment and promotion of Staff Officers Grade A on 22nd February, 1983 including the modification of the existing scheme mutually agreed between the Bank and the Association. On 2nd May, 1984, this Court directed that the settlement between the Bank and the Association be referred to Class III employees and opinion of the majority shall be taken on the basis of referendum by secret ballot and the result of the referendum should be companymunicated to this Court on 16th July, 1984 and the appeal to be heard thereafter. The result of the referendum by secret ballot was filed by the Bank by an Affidavit. The summary of the result of the referendum seems to be as follows PARTICULARS TOTAL VOTES PERCENTAGE TO ------------ ----------- -------------- CAST AGGREGATE NO. OF VOTES CAST ----------- ----------- -------------- No. of votes accepting the Settlement 11,309 67.67 No. of votes number accepting the Settlement 5,277 31.58 No. of votes declared invalid 126 00.75 --------- --------- 16,712 100.00 ---------- ---------- Total number of eligible voters 18,953 Total votes polled 16,712 88.18 The main question which needs determination is whether part of the scheme mentioned before introduced by the Reserve Bank of India is violative of guarantee of equality before law and of equal opportunity in public employment as enshrined in articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court numbered that the point arose at the instance of three petitioners who were Grade II working at Nagpur branch of Reserve Bank ever since their employment which companymenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965. The Reserve Bank has its offices at nearly 15 centres throughout India. The channel of promotion from the post of Clerk Grade II is Staff Officer Grade A and further from the post to the Staff Officer Grade B and so on upto Grade Prior to 6th June, 1970, oral interviews of all the eligible candidates were held for being companysidered for promotion. Then Administration Circular No. 20 was issued introducing scheme of Written Examination for the first time for giving departmental promotions. The learned judges of the High Court were of the view that perhaps this was done to introduce element of objectivity in the test. Candidates who passed the said qualifying examination were included in the fit list and became eligible being companysidered for promotion to the next higher post. The High Court was companycerned, as mentioned hereinbefore, with the said new scheme which is introduced by Circular dated 13th May, 1972. Analysing the said scheme, the High Court was of the view that under the new scheme candidates from a particular centre numbering twice the anticipated vacancies in that centre alone were eligible to appear in the departmental examination and companysequently to qualify for promotion. The grievance of the petitioners before the High Court was that under the new scheme, chance to appear in the examination depended number on relative merits but merely on the fortuitous circumstances, namely, the number of vacancies occurring in a particular centre in a panel year. According to the petitioners, this had numbernexus with the prupose of promotion viz. to secure efficient cadre of Staff Officers and therefore the scheme, according to the petitioners, was bad in law. The High Court found companysiderable force in this submission. In the impugned judgment under appeal the High Court relied on Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar Ors. v. State of Maharashtra Ors., 1974 2 S.C.R. 216. According to the High Court the promotion on the basis of Centre-wise seniority was opposed to the said decision of this Court. There, the petitioners were Tahsildars in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad. After the new State of Bombay was companystituted with territories drawn from various existing States including Hyderabad under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, equation of posts and determination of inter se seniority was done by the Allocated Government Servants Absorption, Seniority, Pay and Allowances Rules, 1957. Under these rules of 1957, the Government of Bombay declared that the posts of Mamlatdar in the former State of Bombay should be deemed to be equivalent to the posts of Tahsildar from the former State of Hyderabad and the posts of Deputy Collector in the former State of Bombay should be deemed to be equivalent to the posts of Deputy Collector allocated from the former State of Hyderabad. The recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector was provided for by Rules of 30th July, 1959 called 1959 Rules according to which vacancies to the posts of Deputy Collector were to be filled from three sources 50 by numberination on the basis of the result of companypetitive examination 25 by directly recruited Mamlatdars who have put in at least seven years service including the period spent on probation and the remaining 25 by Mamlatdars promoted from the lower ranks in the revene departments. The reservation of 25 in favour of directly recruited Mamlatdars was made by the second proviso of rule 1 of the Rules. On 7th April, 1961 the Government laid down the principles for regulating the preparation and revision of select list of Mamlatdars Tahsildars fit to be appointed. It was held by this Court by a bench of five learned judges that the second proviso to rule 1 of the 1959 Rules was void as being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. This Court was of the view that the procedure for promotion to the cadre of Deputy Collectors followed by the State Government was also invalid on the ground that it denied equality of opportunity of promotion and was therefore hit by Article 16 of the Constitution and hence the Government resolution dated 7th April, 1961 was quashed. What was done in the aforesaid case was to have an integrated service of Mamlatdars for the purpose of promotions to Deputy Collectors grade which was admittedly a State-wise grade and that promotion was on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. It was found that select list based on merit and seniority Division-wise for promotion to higher grade, viz. that of the Deputy Collector and these lists were liable to be varied from time to time on periodical assessment of merits of the incumbents in that list, and this Court was of the view that it might lead to injustice in that if promotions were made from these lists Divisionwise there was a possibility of a less meritorious candidate with lesser seniority being promoted in preference to a more meritorious candidate elsewhere. In the instant appeal it is necessary to companysider the question of promotions from the Centre-wise cadre to an All India Cadre and number a State cadre. If, therefore, any analogy or parallel has to be sought, then it must be from the All India cadre of the Government of India service. It may be numbered that in an All India Service companysiderations other than merit on seniority have to be taken into account. In the appellant Bank, the procedure is to give a qualifying test just to ascertain the fitness for upgradation. In effect upgradation is really done on the basis of seniority alone subject to fitness. In Deodhars case, the emphasis was rather on merit rating and the discrimination was implicit against more meritorious candidates with higher seniority. But in the instant case the appellant Bank is an undertaking which companyes within the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Class III employees are fully companyered by the definition of the term workman in section 2 s of the said Act and one of the principles numbermally applicable in fixing their terms and companyditions of service is the Industry cum region principle. It was stated by this Court in Hindustan Antibiotics v. Workmen, 1967 1 C.R. 652 that those principles should also be applied to State-run industries. The question whether the recruitment to the lowest cadre of officers viz. Class A officers should be essentially from Class III employees by promotion directly came up for companysideration by this Court in All-India Reserve Bank Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, 1966 1 S.C.R. 25 and this Court held that a workman can raise a dispute on such a point. It was in that companytext that a dispute was in fact raised and a settlement under section 18 1 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was entered into with the recognised union namely All India Bank Employees Association on 7th May, 1972, and the Administration Circular AC-9 and AC-8 dated 13th May, 1972 issued. The High Court in the impugned judgment proceeded on the basis that in fact the Class III employees of the Reserve Bank of India belonged to an All India Cadre freely transferable from one place to another. This aspect will be dealt with later on. The division bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision under appeal found that the ratio of the said decision in Deodhars case applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case because the cadre of clerk Grade II was all India cadre and number a local cadre and secondly the post of Staff Officer Group A was a transferable one even in practice was a companymon point. Examination was also held on All-India basis. Therefore, the High Court was of the view that even if it was held that the petitioners post was number of All India cadre, it would make numberdifference for applicability of the principle laid down by this Court in Deodhars case supra . Promotion was included in the ambit of equality of employment or appointment under article 16 of the Constitution, according to the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court numbered that there were very junior officers like respondents 4 and 5 before the Bombay High Court who had been posted then at Bhopal office. The petitioners before the Bombay High Court were otherwise qualified and companyfirmed employees having 15 years service to their credit and yet they did number get the chance to appear in examination as employees and some respondents got their chances even though they were appointees of 1980 and were number even companyfirmed. The respondents 4 and 5 before the Bombay High Court were given the benefit number on the basis of companyparative merit but only on the basis, according to the Bombay High Court, of fortuitous event that there had been vacancies in Bhopal office. Therefore, the basis on which the scheme provided was promotion according to the vacancies in the zonal offices. This circumstance of anticipated vacancies in the zonal offices has numbernexus, according to the Bombay High Court, to the merit-cum-seniority aspect. The Bombay High Court also companyld number sustain the companytention urged on behalf of the appellant before us that the scheme was companytractual and therefore was binding on the petitioners. It was submitted that the petitioners before the Bombay High Court and the three respondents before us were number members of the union and were number parties to the agreement mentioned before. Moreover, according to the High Court, by agreement one companyld number give up ones right. It was companytended before the High Court that the validity of the scheme had been upheld by the decision of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal Ors., supra where one part of the scheme came up for scrutiny, but according to the High Court as this point was number the subject matter of scrutiny, the said decision did number affect the position. The main grounds on which the High companyrt of Bombay set aside the impugned portion of the circular which has been set out hereinbefore was the position that the presumption that the staff from which the promotion was made namely Class III employees, clerical and number-clerical belonged to an All-India cadre and that promotion on the basis of centre-wise seniority was opposed to the decision of this Court in the case of R.S. Deodhar supra . The three petitioners in the companyrt below namely Shri N. Sahasranaman, Shri R. Raman and Shri S.D. Peshkar who were the three staff members in the employment of the appellant Reserve Bank of India are respondents to this appeal. Intervention has been permitted by the Court during the companyrse of the proceedings by the All India Reserve Bank Employees Association, the recognised union who represented the majority of the workmen, and the All India Reserve Bank Workers Organisation who represented the minority of the workers both of whom have been made party-respondents. The other interveners are All-India Reserve Bank Employees Federation at Hyderabad and All-India Reserve Bank Staff Association. The majority recognised union as well as the last mentioned union are supporting the stand taken by the appellant bank. In order to appreciate the companytroversy in this case, it was highlighted before us that since the inception of the bank, separate department-wise and group-wise seniority for promotion to the cadre of officers and number-officers were maintained by the bank. In 1972, following with recognised union, a companybined seniority list was maintained as a result of the settlement and the two circulars A.C. Nos. 8 and 9 both dated 13th May, 1972. These are two annexures being Annexures A and B to the special leave petition to this Court which are in the Paper Book of this appeal. Annexure A deals with the scheme for companybined seniority list and switchover from numberclerical to clerical cadre. It is number necessary to set out in extenso the detailed scheme. In this scheme all employees in Class III number-clerical cadre substantively in the categories that have been listed as groups I, III, IV and V in the annexure who were graduates or had passed both parts of Institute of Bankers Examination would be eligible to exercise an option in accordance with sub-clause a or b of clause 2 to be transferred, automatically and without any screening, to posts in the clercial cadre and also to vacant and other posts than purely stop gap or short term nature, subject to sub-clause b mentioned in the scheme. Combined seniority scheme introduced by the Reserve Bank to equalise opportunity of companyfirmation and promotion of class under the optee scheme came up for companysideration by this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal Ors., supra . There the Court numbered that at every centre of the Reserve Bank of India, there were five departments, the General Department and four Specialised Departments. There was a separate seniority list for the employees in each Department at each centre and companyfirmation and promotion of employees was only in the vacancies arising within their Department at each centre. There were two grades of clerks in each Department, namely, Grade I and Grade II. The pay scales of Grade I and Grade II clerks in all the departments were the same and their companyditions of service were also identical. There was automatic promotion from Grade II to Grade I. It is number necessary to set out in details the companysequences. But it may be mentioned that this optee scheme gave rise to dissatisfaction amongst the employees in the General Department and they claimed equal opportunities for having companybined seniority but justified a separate seniority list on the ground that work in each Department was of a special nature and their interchangeability was undesirable and hard to achieve. As a result of the recommendations of the National Tribunal, however, the Reserve Bank introduced the optee scheme 1965 as a first step towards equalisation of opportunity. Under the scheme, the option to go over to the specialised Department was companyfined to companyfirmed Grade II clerks and officiating Grade I class in the general department. If he exercised option, he was eligible to be selected. If he was selected, he would be entitled to be absorbed only as Grade II clerk in one of the specialised departments with the result that if he was an officiating Grade I in the General Department at the time of the exercise of the option, he would lose the benefit of officiation in Grade I in the general department as also the monetary benefit of Rs. 15. His seniority in the cadre of Grade II clerks in the specialised department in which he was absorbed would be determined on the basis of his length of service calculated from the date of his recruitment if he was a graduate when he joined service, or from the date of his graduation if he became a graduate whilst in service. The petitioners in that case and some others were, at the time of introduction of the Optee Scheme, companyfirmed Grade II clerks in the general department and some of them were officiating in the general department as Grade I clerks. They exercised the option under the Optee Scheme and were absorbed substantively as companyfirmed Grade II clerks in one or the other of the specialised departments. The clerks, other than the petitioners were, in due companyrse, in order of seniority, promoted as officiating Grade I clerks in their respective specialised departments. But before the turn of the petitioners for promotion came, a new Scheme was introduced on 13th May, 1972 as a result of companytinuous agitation by the employees for full equalisation of opportunities between the general department and the specialised departments. The scheme was known as the Combined Seniority Scheme, and it superseded the Optee Scheme. It companysisted of two parts as mentioned hereinbefore. One part provided for the integration of the clerical staff of the General Department with the clerical staff of the Specialised Departments, this is annexure A of the present Paper Book and the other which is annexure B in the present Paper Book for the integration of the number-clerical staff with the clerical staff in all the Departments. The Combinted Seniority Scheme gave an option to the number-clerical employees to be transferred to posts in the clerical cadre, but in the interest of efficiency, prescribed a qualification that only those employees in number-clerical cadre would be transferred who were either graduates or had passed both parts of Institute of Bankers Examination. For determining their seniority vis-a-vis those in the clerical cadre, the Combinted Seniority Scheme adopted the rule that 1/3 of their total number-clerical service until 7th May, 1972 the date on which agreement was reached at between the Bank and its employees on the terms of the Combined Seniority Scheme or the date of acquiring the qualification should be taken into account. Allowing the appeal from the High Court and upholding the validity of the Combined Seniority Scheme, this Court held that assuming that the Reserve Bank was State under article 12 of the Constitution and therefore, subject to articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, by the mere introduction of the Optee Scheme, numberpromise or assurance companyld be spelt out on the part of the Bank number to take any steps towards integration of other employees number companyered by the Optee Scheme. The Reserve Bank, companyld number, on any principle of law or by any process of implication, be held bound to hold its hands in the matter of further integration, until the petitioners were promoted in the Specialised Departments. The only object of the Optee Scheme was to equalise the promotional opportunities of Grade II clerks in the General Department with those of Grade II clerks in the Specialised Departments by giving an option to the former to be absorbed in the latter. The object was carried out as soon as the petitioners and other Grade II clerks in the General Departent opted to be transferred to the Specialised Departments. Then they became Grade II clerks in the specialised departments having the same promotional opportunities as the original Grade II clerks in the specialised departments. There was numberassurance given by the Bank that the promotional opportunities available to Grade II clerks in the Specialised Departments would number be diminished. This Court in the said decision was of the view that the Combined Seniority Scheme did number affect the promotional opportunities of all Grade II clerks in the Specialised Departments, irrespective of whether they were original or transferee Grade II clerks. It did number discriminate between transferee Grade II clerks and original Grade II clerks. There was numberbreach of the principle that the promotional opportunities of transferee Grade II clerks should be equal to those of original Grade II clerks. The fact that some of the Grade II clerks, junior to the petitioners, had become Grade I clerks in the general departments, and so companyld be equated only with Grade I clerks in the specialised departments was a wholly fortuitous result, according to this Court. This Court numbered that it might cause heart-burning amongst the petitioners that they were still companytinuing to be Grade II clerks but whenever services were integrated, some hardship was bound to result as a necessary companysequence of integration. This Court further held that Reserve Bank did number undertake that it would number take any steps for bringing about total integration of the clerical services until all the transferee Grade II clerks were promoted. The Bank was entitled to introduce the Combined Seniority Scheme at any time it thought fit and its validity companyld number be assailed on the ground that it was introduced at a time when some of the transferee Grade II clerks still remained to be promoted and so was discriminatory against them. The fact that some transferee Grade II clerks had already obtained promotion as Grade I clerks in the Specialised Departments by the time the Cabinet Seniority Scheme was introduced, was all part of the exigencies of service and in law numbergrievance companyld be made against it. The integration of different cadres into one cadre companyld number be said to involve any violation of the equality clause, according to this Court. Therefore, the first part of the scheme for companybination stands affirmed by this Court in N.C. Paliwals case supra . It may be mentioned that it is the case of the Bank that the settlement and the circulars namely Circulars Nos. 8 and 9 referred to hereinbefore both dated 13th July, 1973 were the culmination of a long process of negotiation and assessment by the bank. Reference was made to the observations in the Award of the National Tribunal presided over by Justice K.T. Desai. Indeed, this companyrt referred to the said decision of Justice K.T. Desai at page 382 and quoted from the said report. Justice Desai had observed that it was desirable when it was possible, without detriment to the Bank and without affecting the efficiency, to group employees in a particular category serving in different departments at one Centre together for the purpose of being companysidered for promotion that a companymon seniority list of such employees should be maintained. The same would result in opening up equal avenues of promotion for a large number of employees and there would be lesser sense of frustration and greater peace of mind among the employees. These observations of the National Tribunal were also approved by this Court in All India Bank Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, 1966 1 S.C.R. 25 at 57. In Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal Ors., supra , at page 385 of the report, it was observed, inter alia, as follows The Association companytinued to agitate for acceptance of its demand and ultimately, as a result of negotiations, an agreement dated 7th May, 1972 was arrived at between the Reserve Bank and the Association by which the demand of the Association was substantially companyceded and the principle of a companybined seniority list was accepted by the Reserve Bank. The petitioners and some other employees were, however, number members of the Association and they refused to accept the terms of this agreement and hence the Reserve Bank issued a Circular dated 13th May, 1972 introducing a Scheme for companybined seniority list and switched over from number-clerical to clerical cadre with effect from 7th May, 1972. This Scheme was substantially in the same terms as the agreement dated 7th May, 1972 and we shall hereafter, for the sake of companyvenience, refer to this Scheme as the Combined Seniority Scheme. It may be mentioned as was placed before us that before a companybined list at the centre was introduced, the provision was based on department-wise seniority at each centre and the working of the Reserve Bank department-wise had been explained in the Paliwals case by this Court at pages 380 and 381 of the report. It may be mentioned that the Circular AC-9 dated 13th May, 1972 which was issued as mentioned before following the statutory settlement dated the 7th May, 1972 under section 18 1 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was upheld in Paliwals case at page 380-382. This Circular was number challenged before the Bombay High Court. The resulting position is that the centre-wise seniority is the established position and whatever promotions have to be effected must be based on the centre-wise seniority, according to the appellant. The other part of the Circular i.e. Circular AC-8 dated 13th May, 1972 only laid down certain procedural aspects of promotion from clerical to number-clerical Officer cadre and even if any part of Circular AC-8 was set aside, it would number substantially affect the stand of the appellant Bank that the promotions are and would be made on the basis of companybined seniority. It is the case of the Bank that the principle of centre-wise seniority was evolved after companysiderable discussion and debate with all the companycerned interests, viz. who were represented by the recognised union, i.e, the All-India Reserve Bank Employees Association and all the view points, according to the Bank, were companysidered by the National Tribunal and this Court had, as mentioned hereinbefore, in the two decisions on two different occasions, upheld the validity of the companybined seniority scheme namely All India Reserve Bank Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, at page 57 and Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal, supra at pages 380-382. Indeed in the last mentioned case at page 394, the validity of the companybined seniority list has been subsequently upheld by this Court. The companytroversy in this appeal lies within a narrow area but it has been urged against a vast companypass and necessarily would require examination of some aspects which are strictly number germane to the present issue. It has to be borne in mind as has been mentioned hereinbefore that A.C. 9 dated 13th May, 1972 has received the acceptance and approval of this case in Paliwals case and C. 9 and A.C. 8 form an integral part of the promotion and regulation of the employment of the staff. It was further emphasised from the point of view of justice and fairness that for a large majority of employees of the Bank, the maintenance of centre-wise seniority was essential. If Class III clerical and number-clerical staff are treated as an All-India cadre, both the employees as well as the Bank would find themselves in a difficult position because the employees will render themselves to be freely transferable from one area to another and particularly for those employees who are being transferred outside Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi, may find it extremely difficult, according to the Bank, to get housing accommodation as the Bank woud number be in a position to offer housing accommodation to all its employees . In such a situation, it was submitted, it would become a problem of discipline for enforcement of transfer made if the same is refused by the employees. It was, therefore, in those circumstances that taking a pragmatic view the Bank had so far number insisted on establishing an All-India cadre as far as the number-officer staff was companycerned. To add to the problem of accommodation, there would be the problem of childrens education at the new centres. The integration of various centre-wise grades into one All-India grade would also pose companysiderable administrative problems. In V.T. Khanzode v. Reserve Bank of India, supra , it was numbered that the private interest of employees of public undertakings should number override public interest and an effort had to be made to harmonize the two companysiderations. No scheme governing service matters companyld be foolproof and some section or the other of employees was bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fide will, of companyrse, render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does numbersatisfy the expectations of every employee was numberevidence of these. It was further observed that the companytentions of variations of the service rules had to be judged in the light of the historical data governing the companystitution and Management of the Services under Reserve Bank of India from time to time. Without an awareness of the history leading to the events which the petitioners have challenged as unconstitutional, it would number be possible either to apprciate the position or to provide an answer to it. These observations were made in companynection with the evaluation of integrated seniority list for the officers Grade B and above. In Kamal Kanti Dutt Ors. v. Union of India Ors., 1980 3 S.C.R. 811, at pages 841-842 this Court emphasised that in matters like formulation of seniority list where, in respect of the rules of promotion, more than one view was possible and that a choice had to be necessarily companyditioned by several companysiderations ensuring justice to as many as possible and injustice to as few, it was number safe to test the companystitutionality of service rule on the touch stone of fortunes of individuals. This Court had also observed that the right of promotion should number be companyfused with mere chance of promotion. Though the right to be companysidered for promotion was a companydition of service, mere chances of promotion were number. See Mohd. shujat Ali v. Union of India, 1975 1 S.C.R. See also in this companynection the observations in R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, supra at p. 230 and Reserve Bank of India v. C.T. Dighe, 1982 1 S.C.R. 107 at 121-122. It is apparent, therefore, that the chances of promotion in some areas occur more often in smaller centres than in other bigger centres like Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi but that is fortutious and would number really affect the question, and violate articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The justice of the case should be judged in companyjunction with other factors, the companyvenience, the future of the family etc. The High Court proceeded, inter alia, on the basis that the fact that Class III employees of the Bank belonged to an All-India cadre freely transferable from one place to another. Regulation 31 of the Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulations, 1948 which is in Chapter IV namely Conduct, Disciplince and Appeals, is as follows Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided, the whole time of an employee shall be at the disposal of the Bank, and he shall serve the Bank in its business in such capacity and at such place as he may from time to time be directed. Regulation 31 as indicated is subject to the companydition that unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided. In the instant case, it has been distinctly provided in the appointment letters as to where the Class III employees of the Bank are liable to serve. See for instance, the specimen companyy at page 107 of the Paper Book which clearly, inter alia, provides as follows He She is liable to be posted either as Coin-Note Examiner Gr.II or as Clerk Gr.II in any of the department of the Bank at Bombay Fort or Byculla Offices. All appointment letters issued to all staff members appointed in Class III and below ever since the inception of the Bank companytained, according to the Bank, identical or similar provision specifying the offices in which of the Bank these employees are required to work. It appears, therefore, there was definite provision companytrary to as companytemplated by Regulation 31 of the Reserve Bank of India, Staff Regulation 1948 and therefore the general provisions of Regulation 31 would number have any application. In companytrast, the appointment letters issued to the officers had always invoked general provisions of Regulation 31 giving full power to the management of the Bank to post or transfer the officers in any office situated in India. For this purpose, specimen appointment letter to an officer in Grade A may be referred to. See in this companynection pages 98 to 108 of the paper book wherein it is stated in xi as follows Posting and liability for transfer You are liable to be posted in any of the offices of the Bank and to work in any of its departments or the departments offices of its associate institutions as the Bank may decide. You will also be liable for transfer to any place in India as the Bank may decide from time to time without payment of any allowance other than travelling allowance. It was further submitted and it appears that there is good deal of substance in this that if an All-India cadre is enforced in respect of Class III employees, it would result in injustice to all the employees in that class at the smaller centres for a companysiderably long period of time leading to industrial unrest. The result of applying the principles of an All-India cadre for this class of employees would be that the senior-most in that whole cadre All-Indiawise would alone have to be companysidered for promotion. In such a case, for a companysiderable long time, only employees of the older offices, namely, Bombay, Nagpur, Madras, Calcutta and Delhi will have to be companysidered, they being by far senior-most among the All-India employees and such a companysideration and empanelling would companytinue for a very long time as the principal basis of the settlement was number one of promotion on merit but rather an upgradation on mere seniority, the only qualification being an examination to determine fitness. Once fitness was determined by the examination, the ranking in that examination did number companye into play thereafter and the successful candidates were again listed according to centre-wise seniority in the matter of upgradation and promoted as and when vacancies at that centre occur. It was submitted that the recruitment of Class III employees at the lowest grade was made centre-wise by the Managers of the offices companycerned and number from one source at the centre as such recruitment would be administratively number feasible, to be undertaken. It has to be borne in mind in deciding the companytroversy in this case that in the companyrse of this litigation on or about 20th October, 1982, this Court by an order suggested the appellant Bank that it might frame a new scheme for promotion, removing as far as possible any imbalances that might be existing in the prevailing scheme. The appellant Bank, thereafter, made certain suggestions which were number acceptable to all the unions and more particularly to the recognised union. In the circumstances, the Bank companyld number proceed with the suggested scheme. Thereafter, the officers of the appellant Bank held discussions with the representatives of the recognised union viz., the All-India Reserve Bank Employees Association, and further modified the scheme agreed to under the settlement dated 7th May, 1972. As a result of the discussion with the employees of the Bank, certain decisions were taken regarding the principles governing recruitment and promotion for staff officers Grade There are in the affidavit affirmed on 22nd February, 1983 by Shri Pradeep Madhav Joshi, the Joint Chief Officer in the Personnel Policy Department of the Reserve Bank of India along with the letter dated 21st February, 1983. It was stated therein that the principles governing recruitment and promotion for Staff Officer Grade A evolved in 1972 be, subject to the approval of this Court, modified on the following terms i 10 of the vacancies of Staff Officers Grade A. will be filled in exclusively by direct recruitment. However, such of the members of the staff who companyply with the eligibility requirements as might be prescribed from time to time for direct recruitment, subject to relaxation in respect of age requirement as the Bank may decide, will be eligible to companypete in the selection test. Of the remaining 90 of the vacancies, 75 thereof will be filled in on the basis of a written examination i.e. qualifying test in accordance with the scheme for promotions Staff Officers Grade A annexed to Administrative Circular No.8 dated 13th many, 1972 subject to the companyditions that numberemployee will be admitted to the qualifying test at any centre unless he has put in a minimum qualifying period of service of three years in clerical grade as on a numberified dated. The residuary portion, i.e. 35 of the 90 of the vacancies or in other words 22-1/2 of the total vacancies to the post of Staff Officers Grade A would be filled in on the basis of an All-India Merit Test to be prescribed by the Bank in companysulation with the Reserve Bank of India Services Board ordinarly, and employee who had put in a minimum of 9 years service in Class II would be eligible to take the test. If, however, sufficient number of employees with 9 years service were number available at any point of time, the Bank might suitably reduce the companyditions of qualifying service so that candidate to the extent of at least thrice the number of vacancies are available for the test. Notwithstanding such reduction in qualifying service necessitated in the circumstances indicated, in the case of number-clerical staff who are number-graduates, they would, however, be eligible for taking the test only on companypletion of 9 years service. Successful candidates would be empanelled in the central panel in order of their companyparative merits and they would be companysidered for posting in order of their position in the central panel as, when and where, the vacancies to posts of Staff Officer Grade A in any of the offices of the Bank might arise. The appellant Bank addressed a letter to the Association incorporating the aforesaid decision of the appellant Bank on the modification of principles governing recruitment and promotion for Staff Officer Grade A and the Association has, by its letter companyfirmed the same. It was submitted on behalf of the Bank that the modified scheme envisages appointment of a candidate for the post of Staff Officer Grade A through holding three different test, viz. i qualifying test on the basis of centre-wise seniority and estimation of vacancies of Staff Officers Grade A for each centre, ii merit test for all employees with a minimum length of service of 9 years on all-India basis. Successful candidates who will be empanelled in the central panel in order of their companyparative merits would be companysidered for posting in order of their position in the central panel, as, when and where the vacancies to the post of Staff Officers Grade A in any of the offices of the Bank might arise and iii Selection test for direct recruitment of candidates for Staff Officer Grade A for inducting fresh blood for Staff Officer Grade A which is the base level of officer and first level of supervisory cadre. It was submitted on behalf of the Bank that the modified scheme achieved just balance keeping in view the interest of the employees as a class i.e. both of senior and experienced employees and junior and qualified employees on the one hand and the interests of the Bank on the other. It was further stated that earlier, 82-1/2 of the vacancies were allotted to be filled on the centre-wise basis. Under the modified Scheme, the percentage was brought down to 67-1/2. It was necessary to make gradual change as the total change in the existing procedure would have created industrial unrest and would have led to other imbalances in operation. Further it was submitted that the modified scheme provided that numberemployee would be admitted to the qualifying test at any centre unless he has put in a minimum qualifying period of service of three years in clerical cadre as on a numberified date. It was submitted on behalf of the Bank that one of the factors that influenced the High Court in the judgment under appeal was that raw junior employees from Bhopal Office were eligible to appear for the qualifying test, as apparent from the decision under appeal. It was submitted that with the modification, numberemployee who had put in less than three years of service would be admitted to the qualifying test and the grievance that even temporary and junior employees would become eligible would numberlonger survive. The companyrectness or otherwise of the decision of the Bombay High Court in the light of the modified scheme has to be judged from various angles. On behalf of the opposing respondent, Shri C.N. Sahasranaman made his submissions orally in person. He submitted that at pages 296 to 299, 306, 307 and 310 of the Paper Book, the appellant had admitted that the impugned scheme of promotions had led to serious imbalances in opportunities for appearing at the examinations. With this admission, it was urged by respondents appearing in person that the question of law raised by them in their affidavit have been companycluded by themselves and therefore they companyld number have any grievances whatsoever against the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court. It was submitted that matters relating to the imbalances companytained by the impugned Circular No.8 had already been companysidered at length by this Court and this Court had directed on 20th October, 1982 to formulate a new policy removing the imbalances in the impugned policy. It was submitted by the opposing respondents that equality right of Class III employees which was an All-India Institution would be affected even in the modified scheme suggested by the Bank. It was urged that it would be destructive of the All-India stature of the Reserve Bank of India. The main grievance of the respondents was that there was violation of the companystitutional right and it will hamper development of an All-India Institution and All-India cadre. Regarding reference to the case of N.C. Paliwal, it was submitted on behalf of the opposing respondents that this Court had number struck down the impugned circular on the ground that it did number ensure equality of chances of promotion but on the ground that the scheme did number ensure equality of opportunity to be companysidered for promotion. The equality of chances of promotion and the equality to be companysidered for promotion, according to the respondents, are two different questions and the grievance of the respondents was that there was denial of equality to be companysidered for promotion. Whether there has been denial of equality of the view of promotion or any companystitutional right infringed or number cannot be judged, where interest of large number of people are companycerned, in the abstract. Vast majority, indeed the overwhelming majority of the workmen are in favour of the scheme as evolved by the Bank as modified as it would be apparent from the submissions urged on behalf of All-India Reserve Bank Employees Association impleaded as partyrespondent in this appeal as well as All India Reserve Bank Employees Federation, Hyderabad. It has to be borne in mind that in service jurisprudence there cannot be any service rule which would satisfy each and every employee and its companystitutionality has to be judged by companysidering whether it is fair, reasonable and does justice to the majority of the employees and fortunes of some individuals is number the touchstone. See in this companynection the observations of this Court in Kamal Kanti Dutt Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., supra . Furthermore it appears to us that Circular No.9 is a companynterpart of Circular No.8. Circular No. 8 having been held valid, Circular No. 9 must also follow to be good. Circular No. 8 cannot stand in vacuum and in isolation. It is a step to the fulfilment of the object to be achieved by Circular No. 9. Viewed in that point of view and as a feasibility and having regard to the factors and in regard to the history of Reserve Bank employees, we are of the opinion that the scheme as modified by the Bank and as accepted by vast majority of their employees is a proper and just scheme and does number suffer from the vice of article 14 or article 16 or any other companystitutional guarantees. It is well to bear in mind the fact that settlement of disputes by direct negotiations or settlement through companylective bargaining is always to be preferred for it is best suited for industrial peace which the aim of legislation for settlement of labour disputes. See the observations in New Standard Engineering Co. Ltd. v. N.L. Abhyankar and Ors., A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 982 at 984 1978 2 C.R. 798. This view has again been reiterated by this Court in Tata Engineering Locomotive v. Their Workmen, I.R. 1981 S.C. 2163 1982 1 S.C.R. 929. The order of this Court dated 2nd May, 1984 and the referendum and the result thereof have been set out hereinbefore. We may, however, numbere that about the proper manner of holding this referendum, certain doubts were expressed at the time of hearing of this appeal. The Referendum undoubtedly indicates that majority of the employees are in favour of acceptance of the modified settlement. In matters of service companyditions, it is difficult to evolve as ideal set of numberms governing various companyditions of services and in grey area where service rules operated, if more than one view is possible without sacrificing either reasons or companymon-sense, the ultimate choice has necessarily to be companyditioned by several companysiderations ensuring justice to as many as possible and injustice to as few. See in this companynection the observations in K.K. Dutta v. Union of India supra at page 841. These principles, however significant, do number authorise the majority of the employees to trample upon the companystitutional guarantees or rights of the individual or minority employees. Majority cannot thwart or barter away the companystitutional rights of the minorities. The companystitutional guarantees are to protect this very danger. But in judging the companytent of the companystitutional rights, the entire perspective of the equality of opportunity here and denial of equal right in public employment have to be viewed in a fair, reasonable and just perspective. Viewed in that light, it is true, there may be individual instances exemplifying injustice by postponing or delaying the chances of promotions of the companytesting respondents yet that does number deny them their companystitutional right in its proper measure, and the companysiderations that have weighed with the making of the modified scheme and in the light of the other companysiderations mentioned hereinbefore, we must observe that with whatever care and objectivity or foresight any rule is framed, some hardship, inconvenience or injustice might to result but the paramount companysideration is the reconciliation of the companyflicting claims of two important companystituents of service one which brings fresh clerical employees and the other mature experience. There has been a happy merger of these two companysiderations in the scheme proposed and in that merger, numberviolation of the guaranteed rights of the opposing respondents have occurred. It has further to be borne in mind that the promotion scheme having been evolved after careful companysideration and having been in operation ever since the inception of the Bank with modification from time to time as a result of the negotiations under the Industrial Disputes Act should number be modified drastically. In such matters one should hasten slowly. In the premises we affirm the scheme as modified by the second modification referred to hereinbefore in the letter dated 21st February, 1983 and as explained in the affidavit of Pradeep Madhav Joshi filed on 22nd February,- 1983. We further direct that the adhoc promotions made under the directions of this Court in terms of the Order dated 22nd May, 1984 be regularised. The opposing respondents have appeared in person and have made submissions. They have made valuable companytributions. The companystitutionality of a scheme or if there is a violation of a right can only be decided if it is questioned. In that view of the matter the opposing respondents should be amply companypensated. We award companyt of Rs. 5000 jointly to them or if they are appearing singly then singly. Amounts already paid by the Bank should be adjusted against the amount to be paid. If more amounts than Rs. 5000 have already been paid then numberhing need be refunded or paid. The decision of the Bombay High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed and the order of the Bombay High Court substituted by the order mentioned hereinbefore. Civil Misc. Petition No. 14834 of 1985 - application for intervention and Civil Misc. Petition No.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 236 of 1969. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and Order dated March 13, 1969 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 268 of 1967. Ram Punjwani and P. C. Bhartari, for the appellant. P. Kapur and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter J., This appeal by special from a judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya, Pradesh dismissing the writ petition of the appellant challenging the, order of the State Government under s. 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act Act XXIII of 1961 forfeiting the companyies of a book published by the appellant under S. 4 1 of the Act, can be disposed of on the short ground that the order did numberdisclose the grounds of the opinion formed by the State Government. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act empowered the State Governments by s. 4 to make order declaring any newspaper or book as defined in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 or any other document wherever printed, to be forfeited to the Government if it appeared to the Government that the said book etc. questioned the territorial integrity or frontiers of India in a manner which was or was likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the safety or security of India. The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows - S. 2. Whoever by words either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise, questions the territorial integrity or frontiers of India in a manner which is, or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the safety or security of India, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 4. 1 Where any newspaper or book as defined in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, or an other document, wherever printed, appears to the State Government to companytain an matter the publication of which Is punishable under section 2 or sub-section 2 of section 3, the State Government may, by numberification in the Official Gazette, stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every companyy of the issue of the newspaper companytaining such matter and every companyy of such book or other document to be forfeited to the Government, and thereupon any police officer may seize the same wherever found and any Magistrate may, by warrant authorise any police officer number below the rank of Sub-Inspector to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any companyy of such issue or any companyy of such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be. 5. 1 Any person having any interest in any news book or other document in respect of which an forfeiture has been made under section 4 may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court to set aside such order on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document in respect of which the order was made did number companytain any matter of such a nature as is referred to in subsection 1 of section 4. The provisions of sections 99-C to 99-F of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall apply in relation to an application under subsection 1 as they apply in relation to an application under section 99-B of that Code and the reference in section 99-D to seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in subsection 1 of section 99-A of that Code shall be companystrued as reference to any matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub-section 1 of section 4 of this Act. No order passed or action taken under section 4 shall be called in question in any Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this section. The appellant who was admittedly the proprietor of the Narmada Printing Works, Jabalpur had published a book under the name and style of Madhyamic Bhoogol Part I for Classes IX and X written by C. P. Saxena. On 1St July, 1967 the State Government passed the order which is impugned in this case Whereas the books specified in the Schedule below question the territorial integrity and frontiers of India in a manner which is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the safety and security of India And whereas it appears to the State Government that the said three books companytain matter the publication of which is punishable under section 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961 No. 23 of 1961 Now therefore in exercise of the powers companyferred by, sub-section 1 of section 4 of the Act, the State Government hereby declares every companyy of the said three books and all other documents companytaining companyies, reprint and repro duction of the said books to be forfeited in favour of the Government. The second item in the Schedule relates to the appellants publication From the companymunication of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh dated 5th August 1967 it would appear that the State Government took objection to pages 138, 147 and 149 of the said book as companytaining wrong maps. According, to the said companymunication These books companytain maps of India, part of India, maps of companyntries adjacent to India and maps of Asia. All these maps involve the external boundary of India which has been found to be grossly incorrect. Besides this, the island territories of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands which form an integral part of India are omitted together from every map of India. In some of the maps the territory of Bhutan has been omitted while in other Indo-Pakistan boundary is ignored. The companymunication refers number only to the publication with which we are companycerned in this case but also two other publications both of which appear to be books on geographyfor school students. The appellant filed his writ petition on August 29, 1967 before High Court challenging the order of the 1st July 1967 inter alia on the ground That the grounds for the opinion of the State Government which had to be given in terms of s. 4 of the Act were number-existent in the order. He therefore filed the petition, within two months of the date of the order forfeiting the book in terms of s. 5 of the Act. In the companynter affidavit of the State the stand taken was that the State Government was number bound to place details of information on the basis of which its satisfaction was arrived at. Reference was however made in the companynter affidavit to a companymunication of the Director of Map Publications to the Director of Public Instruction dated 21st March 1967 in which it was stated with regard to all the three alleged offending books that they companytain maps of India, part of India, maps of companyntries adjacent to India and maps of Asia. All these maps involve the external boundary of India which has been found to be grossly incorrect. Besides this, the island territories of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi islands which form an integral part of India are omitted together from every map of India. In some of the maps the territory of Bhutan has been omitted while in other Indo-Pakistan boundary is ignored. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh took the view that the impugned order companyld number be said to have omitted to state the grounds for the opinion of the State Government. According to the High Court the grounds on which the said opinion was based were that the books companytained matter which questions the territorial integrity and frontiers of India in a manner which is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the safety and security of India. 8-L1286SupCI/72 In our view the High Court had clearly gone wrong in this view of the law on the subject. According to the Oxford Dictionary the meaning of the word ground, in this companynection must be base, foundation, motive, valid reason. what the State Government did in this case in the opening paragraph of the order was merely to quote a portion of the words of s. 2 namely, that the books questioned the territorial integrity and frontiers of India in a manner which is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the safety or security of India. The order gives numberindication of the facts or the statements or the representations companytained in the book which according to the State Government offended s. 2. In the order itself there is numberreference to any map or any text in the book which would companye within the mischief of the said section. A book may companytain matter questioning the territorial integrity and frontiers of India in many ways one of which may be a wrong map which does number show the proper boundaries of India, either by omitting a portion of the Indian territory therefrom or by depicting a portion of what is really Indian territory as belonging to some other State. A book may also companye within the mischief of s. 2 if there is any express reference in the text companytaining suggestions based on historical or political or other reasons that some portion of what is generally known to the public as Indian territory is number so. There is a companysiderable body of statutory provisions which enable the State to curtail the liberty of the subject in the interest of the security of the State or forfeit books and documents when in the opinion of the Government, they promote class hatred, religious intolerance, disaffection against the State etc. In all such cases, instances of some whereof are given below the State Government has to give the grounds of its opinion. Clearly the grounds must be distinguished from the opinion. Grounds of the opinion must mean the companyclusion of facts on which the opinion is based. There can be numberconclusion of fact which has numberreference to or is number ex facie based on any fact. The provisions of the Act have a close parallel in s. 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in which a large number of matters are mentioned which according to the Government may lead it to form the opinion that the publication offended the said section. There are also decisions under the Indian Press Act which illustrate what the grounds in a case like this must be. In re. Mahomed Ali 1 , a case of an order of forfeiture of a pamphlet under the Press Act of 1910, the order of Government went to show that the pamphlet Come over to Macedonia and help us companytained words of the nature described in s. 4 sub-s. 1 of the 1 41 Calcutta 466. Indian Press Act, 19 1 0 inasmuch as they are likely to bring into hatred or companytempt certain classes of His Majestys subjects in British India. According to Jenkins J. p. 476 Those responsible for this Act foresaw this, and so they specifically provided that the forfeiting numberification should state the grounds of the Local Governments opinion. But when we turn to the numberification numbersuch grounds are stated numberhing in the nature of a fact is set forth, there is merely a citation of those words of the section which are invoked But the repetition of an opinion cannot be its grounds, and yet that is all that the numberification furnishes in the shape of grounds. This is obviously insufficient and number a companypliance with the terms of the Act. According to the other learned Judge Stephen, J. p. 487 The ground of an opinion must in this case, if number always, be a fact or facts, and numberfact is disclosed merely by a specific relation of the elements that the law requires to be present in order for legal companysequence to follow. In Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal 1 a case under ss. 99-A and 99-D of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was stated by Chakravartti, C.J. p. 497 It is useful to companysider here what is meant by grounds of opinion. The formation of an opinion by Government is undoubtedly the ground for the action taken by them, but the grounds for the opinion are obviously different. The opinion, after it has been formed, furnishes a ground to Government for taking action companytemplated, but the grounds on which the opinion itself is formed are and must be other grounds Those grounds must necessarily be the import or the effect or the tendency of matters companytained in the offending publication, either as a whole or in portions of it, as illustrated by passages which Government may choose. In Harnam Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2 the order under s. 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was made went to show that the State Government declared the books forfeited on the ground that the said books companytained matter the publication of which was Punishable under s. 153--A and 295-A of the Penal Code. The two sections of the Indian Penal Code have little in companymon inasmuch as s. 153-A relates to an offence of 1 59 C. W.N. 495. 2 1962 2 S.C.R. 487. promotion or attempt to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India and s. 295-A relates to an offence maliciously intended to outrage he religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious belief of that class. The order which was companysidered by the companyrt in that case gave numberindication which formed the reason for Government taking the view that the book should be forfeited. The Court held that the order did number as it should have stated the rounds of opinion. It is number known which companymunities were alienated from each other or whose religious beliefs were wounded. We may also refer to Art. 22 5 of the Constitution which lays down that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, companymunicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. In companysidering the question as to what the grounds of detention meant when an order under Preventive Detention Act was made this Court said in Naresh Chanra, Ganguli v. The State of West Bengal others 1 . . the grounds for making an order of detention, which have to be companymunicated to the detenu as soon as practicable, are companyclusions of facts, and those companyclusions of facts have to be companymunicated to the detenu as soon as may be. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya 2 , a case under the Preventive Detention Act, Kania C.J. said p. 178 By their very nature the grounds are companyclusions of facts and number a companyplete detailed recital of all the facts . . .

R. SHAH, J. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. As companymon question of law and facts arise in both these appeals and as such arise out of the impugned companymon Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, both these appeals are being decided and disposed of together by this Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2019.05.02 companymon Judgment and Order. 162712 IST Reason Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned companymon Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal Nos.4 and 5 of 2009 by which the High Court while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC has allowed the said Second Appeals and has quashed and set aside the Judgement and Decree passed by the Trial companyrt as well as the First Appellate Court dismissing the suits and companysequently has decreed the suits preferred by the respondent hereinoriginal plaintiff, the original defendant has preferred the present appeals. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under That the original plaintiff Respondent No.1 herein S. Ramasamy initially filed a suit being OS No.10 of 2006 in respect of the immovable properties described in the schedule of plaint to restrain original defendant No.2 appellant herein from alienating or encumbering or creating any kind of document in respect of plaintiffs companymon onethird share of the suit properties, till final partition takes place between the plaintiff and original defendant No.2 by metes and bounds by a decree of permanent injunction. That the said suit was filed by the original plaintiff against his father Sengoda Gounder died as well as his younger brother Subramanian. That during the pendency of the said suit, the same plaintiffRamasamy filed a suit being OS No.19 of 2005 against his younger brother Subramanian and his father Sengoda Gounder for partition of the suit properties. It was the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the plaintiff and his father and his younger brother companystituted a Hindu Joint Family which owned ancestral properties. It was further the case on behalf of the plaintiff that the father of the plaintiff, namely, Sengoda Gounder, by way of settlement, got the suit properties, vide ExA1 dated 07.04.1956the Settlement Deed executed by one Kumarasamy Gounder in favour of Sengoda Gounder. It was the case on behalf of the plaintiff that since that time, the suit properties along with the ancestral properties were treated as joint family properties and all the three companyarceners were enjoying them together. It was alleged that since the father and the younger brother of the plaintiff, in companylusion with each other were attempting to alienate the suit properties, the first injunction suit OS No.19 of 2005 was filed. 4.1 The suit was resisted by the original defendantyounger brother of the plaintiff Ramasamy. It was the case on behalf of the original defendant that numberjoint family at all ever existed amongst Sengoda Gounder and his two sons, namely Ramasamy and Subramanian. That the suit properties were obtained by Sengoda Gounder as per ExA1the Settlement Deed during the year 1956 as his selfacquired properties. That Sengoda Gounders sons, namely Ramasamy and Subramanian had numberhing to do with the suit properties and they had numberproprietary right or share in that and that they were never treated as joint family properties. It was the specific case on behalf of the defendant that, in fact, the Sengoda Gounder, during his lifetime, executed two settlement deeds Ex A13 and A14 in favour of Subramanian and subsequently he also executed ExB24, a will dated 08.11.2004 in favour of Subramanian. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that as such, Subramanianthe defendant became absolute owner of the suit properties. It was also companytended on behalf of the defendant that the second suit is also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that before filing the injunction suit first suit the plaintiff issued numberice seeking partition and despite the same he initially filed the injunction suit only and thereafter, without any rhyme or reason and without obtaining any permission from the Court at the time of filing the injunction suit to file a partition suit subsequently, he simply filed the second suit, which was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. 4.2 That the Trial Court framed the issues. Both the suits were tried jointly. The plaintiffRamasamy examined himself as PW1 along with PWs 2 to 4 and Exs. A1 to A46 were brought on record. Subramanianthe defendant examined himself as DW1 along with DWs 2 to 4 and he brought on record Exs. B1 to B31. That thereafter, on appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial Court dismissed both the suits. The appeals by the unsuccessful plaintiff came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. 4.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the companymon Judgment and Order passed by the First Appellate Court dismissing the appeals and companyfirming the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suits, the original plaintiff filed two second appeals before the High Court. The High Court formulated and framed the following questions of law as substantial questions of law Whether both the Courts below were justified in holding that the generosity shown by Sengoda Gounder should number be treated as an act of blending of the sit properties with the ancestral properties and whether the Courts below were justified in ignoring the factum of describing the properties found in Ex.A1 as Pidhirajyam Ancestral property and also Exs.A19, 24, 45 and 46 and in deciding the lis by holding as though there was numberblending or treating the suit properties as joint family properties? Whether the companyrts below were justified in upholding Exs.A13 and A14the settlement deeds and Ex.B24the Will as valid, even though those documents according to the plaintiff were number allegedly proved by the propounder of those documents as per law? Whether the Courts below were justified in rendering judgment, without referring to Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC despite a plea taken in that regard in the written statement? Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgments of both the fora below? That thereafter, by the impugned Judgment and Order and after reappreciating the entire evidence on record, the High Court has answered the aforesaid questions of law substantial questions of law as under Substantial Question of Law 1 is decided to the effect that both the Courts below were number justified in holding that the generosity shown by Sengoda Gounder should number be treated as an act of blending of the suit properties with the ancestral properties and the Courts below were number justified in ignoring the factum of describing the properties found in Ex.A1 as Pidhirajyam Ancestral property and also Exs. A19, 24, 45 and 46 in deciding the lis by holding as though there was numberblending or treating the suit property as a joint family property. Substantial Question of Law No. 2 is decided to the effect that the companyrts below were justified in upholding the execution of Exs.A13 and A14 the settlement deeds and Ex.A24 the Will, however, in view of my discussion supra Sengoda Gounder had numbercompetence to execute the settlement deeds treating the suit property as selfacquired property in entirely, but his 1/3rd share companyld only be companysidered as the one relinquished by him in favour of the remaining two companyarceners namely, his sons. Wherefore, the suit property shall be divided into two shares. The plaintiff and the defendant shall be entitled to half share each in the suit property. Substantial Question of Law No. 3 is decided to the effect that the Courts below were justified in rendering judgment, without referring to Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC, in view of my finding supra that the cause of action for seeking partition is a companytinuing one. Consequently, the High Court has allowed both the appeals and set aside companymon Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and has directed to draw the preliminary decree for partition allotting half share each in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant. 4.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court by which, while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record and has set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below, the original defendant has preferred the present appeals. Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellantoriginal defendant and Shri V Prabhakar, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the Respondent No.1original plaintiff. Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has manifestly companymitted a grave error in allowing the appeals and interfering with the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below. 6.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that by passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC. 6.2 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that as held by this Court in catena of decisions and even as per Section 100 of the CPC, while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court is number required to reappreciate the entire evidence on record as if the High Court is deciding the first appeal. 6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court cannot be said to be the substantial questions of law at all. It is submitted that Section 100 of the CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial questions of law. It is submitted that even second appeal is number required to be entertained on question of law only. It is submitted that the question of law must be a substantial question of law and number mere a question of law. It is submitted that the substantial questions of law formulated and framed by the High Court, while deciding the second appeals, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. It is submitted that on the face of it, even the substantial questions of law formulated and framed by the High Court, are the questions of fact. It is submitted, therefore, the High Court has companymitted a grave error in allowing the Second Appeals. 6.4 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that even otherwise, the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in as much as while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court has re appreciated the entire evidence on record, which is wholly impermissible. It is submitted that so far as the question of fact is companycerned, the First Appellate Court is the final Court on facts. It is submitted that unless and until the findings recorded are found to be perverse and or companytrary to the evidence on record, the High Court would number be justified in upsetting such findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court. It is submitted that in the present case, if we see the entire Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, the High Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record and has given its own companyclusion and findings and thereafter has interfered with the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below, which were on appreciation of evidence, which is wholly impermissible. In support of his above submissions and on the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, 1997 4 SCC 713 Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, 1999 3 SCC 722 Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, 2000 1 SCC 434. 6.5 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that even otherwise the grounds on which the High Court has held that there was blending of the suit properties with the ancestral properties, are number sustainable. 6.6 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that admittedly and even as per the High Court also, the suit properties were selfacquired properties of Sengoda Gounder father because those properties were obtained by him number from his direct male ancestors but from his mothers sisters husband. It is submitted that therefore, merely because as Sengoda Gounder and his two sons were residing together and some loan on land might have been taken by all of them, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder. It is submitted that it was the specific case on behalf of the defendant that the loan was repaid discharged by Sengoda Gounder from out of the income derived by him from the suit property itself. 6.7 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that the fact that the fatherSengoda Gounder, during his lifetime, executed two settlement deeds Exhibits A13 A14 and subsequently he also executed Exhibit B24, a will dated 08.11.2004, the same is suggestive of the fact that there was numberintention of the fatherSengoda Gounder to blend the suit properties with the joint family properties. It is submitted that as such the High Court has specifically observed and held that the Courts below were justified in upholding the execution of Exhibits A13 A14 the Settlement Deeds and Exhibit B24 the Will. It is submitted that however, thereafter the High Court has erred in holding that the Sengoda Gounder had numbercompetence to execute the Settlement Deeds treating the suit property as self acquired property in entirely, but his onethird share companyld only be companysidered as the one relinquished by him in favour of the remaining two companyarceners namely his sons. 6.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set aside the impugned Judgement and Order passed by the High Court and companysequently restore the Judgement and Decree passed by the Courts below dismissing the suits. Shri V. Prabhakar, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff while opposing the present appeals has vehemently submitted that as such the High Court was cautious of its limitations while deciding the Second Appeals under Section 100 of the CPC. It is submitted that however, as the High Court found that both the Court below have number properly appreciated the relevant material and evidence on record, more particularly, Exhibit A1 and also Exhibits A19,24,45, 46, thereafter the High Court has rightly held that there was a blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder. 7.1 It is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that companyent reasons have been given by the High Court while holding that the generosity shown by Sengoda Gounder should be treated as an act of blending of the suit properties with the ancestral properties joint family properties. 7.2 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that after companysidering the Sale Deed dated 05.02.1975Exhibit A10 and Sale Deed dated 25.03.1977Exhibit A2, by which some of the properties specified in Exhibit A1Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1956, were sold treating the same as ancestral properties, the High Court has rightly held that thereafter there was a blending of suit properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder and all the properties specified in Exhibit A1 Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1956 were treated as joint family properties. It is submitted that thereafter and having found so, the High Court has rightly held that once there was blending of the suit properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder, thereafter it was number open for him and or Sengoda Gounder had numbercompetence to execute the settlement deeds and or will treating the suit properties as selfacquired properties in entirely. 7.3 Now, so far as the submissions made by the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that while passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has re appreciated the entire evidence on record is companycerned, it is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that while discussing and or deciding the substantial questions of law, the High Court is bound to companysider and or appreciate the evidence on record and to reach to a companyclusion that the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse or companytrary to the evidence on record. It is submitted therefore that appreciation of evidence by the High Court while deciding the second appeals in exercise of its powers under section 100 of the CPC, is permissible. 7.4 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. 8.1 At the outset, it is required to be numbered that as such, both, the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court dismissed the suits, more particularly, the suit for partition filed by the original plaintiff by holding that the suit properties were number ancestral properties of Sengoda Gounder but were self acquired properties of Sengoda Gounder. That on appreciation of evidence, both the Courts below specifically came to the companyclusion that, as such, there was numberblending of the suit properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder. However, the said findings recorded by both the Courts below have been upset and set aside by the High Court, while deciding the second appeals in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC. We have gone through and companysidered the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. On appreciation of entire evidence on record, more particularly, the documentary evidence which came to be companysidered by the High Court as Exhibit A1 and Exhibits A 19, 24, 45 and 46, thereafter both the Courts below came to the companyclusion that there was numberblending or treating of the suit property as a joint family property. Despite the above, the High Court while passing the impugned companymon Judgment and Order, has reappreciated the entire evidence on record including the documentary evidence which as such were companysidered by both the Courts below and has upset the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on the blending of suit property as a joint family property and has given its own findings, which in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC is wholly impermissible. As per catena of decisions of this Court, while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court is number required to reappreciate the entire evidence on record and to companye to its own companyclusion and the High Court cannot set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below when the findings recorded by both the Courts below were on appreciation of evidence. That is exactly what is done by the High Court in the present case while deciding the second appeals, which is number permissible under the law. 8.2 Even otherwise, it is required to be numbered that as per catena of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does number lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua number for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Supra , in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the companyclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law OR Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court OR Based on inadmissible evidence or numberevidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court companyld have decided differently is number a question of law justifying interference in Second Appeal. 8.3 When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and companysidered by this Court in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain Supra . In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is number permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate companyrt without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is number companysidered which, if companysidered, would have led to an opposite companyclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate companyrt by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite companyclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise. 8.4 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and the substantial questions of law formulated framed and answered by the High Court, reproduced hereinabove, it cannot be said that the said questions of law can be said to be substantial questions of law. All can be said to be questions of law or questions of fact and cannot be said to be Substantial Questions of law. 8.5 As observed hereinabove, while passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record as if the High Court was deciding the first appeal. By the impugned Judgment and Order, while exercising the powers under Section 100 of the CPC and on re appreciation of entire evidence on record, the High Court has set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties. The same is wholly impermissible. So far as the facts are companycerned, the First Appellate Court is the final companyrt and unless and until the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are found to be manifestly perverse and or companytrary to the evidence on record, the High Court would number be justified in setting aside the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. It is number permissible for the High Court to reappreciate the entire evidence on record and companye to its own finding when the findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the High Court while deciding the Second Appeals, is beyond the scope and ambit of exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC. Even otherwise, on merits also, the High Court has erred in holding that there was blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties by Sengoda Gounder. It is an admitted position that and even as observed and held by the High Court, the suit properties were selfacquired properties of Sengoda Gounder pursuant to the Settlement Deed Exhibit A1 dated 07.04.1956 as the properties were obtained by Sengoda Gounder number from his direct male ancestors but from his mothers sisters husband.

KAPADIA, J. The short question which arises for determination in this civil appeal is whether the revised pay-scales of skilled and semi-skilled staff working in the Printing and Stationary department were applicable w.e.f. 1.1.1986 when IIIrd Punjab Pay Commission gave its report or w.e.f. 14.2.1989 when the State Government issued its numberification implementing the recommendations of the Pay Commission. The facts lie within narrow companypass. Respondents herein joined the service as Assistants before 1978. Subsequently, they were promoted as Supervisors. On 1.1.1986, report was submitted by the IIIrd Punjab Pay Commission which was accepted by the Government enacting Punjab Civil Service Revised Pay Rules under which the pay of supervisor was fixed in the grade of Rs.1500-2540. Respondents made a representation pointing that a serious anomaly had arisen on account of failure to prescribe a proper pay scale for the said post. The said matter was referred to Anomaly Committee. Realising its mistake, the government fixed the pay scale of the supervisor in the grade of Rs.2000-3500 w.e.f. 28.3.1989. Aggrieved, respondents herein filed Civil Writ Petition No.1383 of 1990 in the High Court claiming pay fixation w.e.f. 1.1.1986. By judgment and order dated 21.4.1998, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition in view of the earlier judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Bhagirath Ram v. State of Punjab dated 26.7.1994 in Civil Writ Petition No.6778 of 1993, directing payment w.e.f. 1.1.1986. The appellant herein carried the matter in appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. Following the above judgment in the case of Bhagirath Ram supra , the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal, however, directed the appellant herein to pay arrears of salary for 3 years and 2 months prior to the date of filing of writ petition. Hence, this civil appeal. Shri H.S. Munjral, learned advocate for the appellant submitted that keeping in mind the recommendations of the IIIrd Punjab Pay Commission, the Department of Administrative Reforms vide letter dated 26.10.1988 recommended restructuring of the departments and granting of higher revised scales of pay and companysequently the scales of pay of skilled and semi-skilled staff of the Department of Transport were enhanced prospectively w.e.f. 3.11.1989. Similarly the scales of pay of skilled and semi-skilled staff of Printing and Stationary Department were enhanced prospectively. It was urged that fixation of the date for grant of revised pay scales is within the discretion of the Government. It was urged that revised pay was payable w.e.f. 1.1.1986, numberionally as held by the Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Ram Murti Others v. State of Punjab dated 13.2.1996. Per companytra, Shri K.G. Bhagat, learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the respondents had joined the service as Assistants before 1978 that they were subsequently promoted to the post of supervisors that on 1.1.1986 the State Pay Commission recommended higher pay which the appellant accepted but wrongly fitted them in the grade of Rs.1500-2540 which created an anomaly as the Assistants were fitted in the grade of Rs.1800-3200 that the appellant realized its mistake and fitted the supervisors in the higher grade of Rs.2000-3500. Having accepted the anomaly, it was urged, the respondents were entitled to the grade of Rs. 2000 3500 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 and number from 14.2.1989. Reliance in this companynection was placed on the judgment of the High Court in the case of Bhagirath Ram supra . We find merits in this civil appeal. Keeping in mind the recommendations of the IIIrd Punjab Pay Commission to rationalize recruitment, qualifications, designation and restructuring of the cadres by amendments to the service regulations, the Administrative Department made proposals on 26.10.1988. In the light of these recommendations, certain departments came in for restructuring and companysequently, higher revised scales came to be granted prospectively. Accordingly, scales of pay of semi skilled and skilled staff of the Transport Department, Printing and Stationary Department herein were enhanced w.e.f. 14.2.1989, which circumstance did number exist in the case of Bhagirath Ram supra . This factual aspect has been lost sight of by the High Court in the present case. In the case of Ram Murti supra the petitioners who were employees of Punjab Roadways prayed for directions to grant them revised pay scales w.e.f. 1.1.1986 instead of 3.11.1989. It was held that on 3.11.1988 the scales stood revised, and companysequently, the appellants were entitled to revised pay scales w.e.f. 1.1.1986, numberionally, and they were number to be paid the arrears of the difference of pay scales but they would be entitled to all companysequential benefits. In our view, learned advocate for the appellant is right in his submission that the facts of the present case are companyered by the judgment of the High Court in the case of Ram Murti supra , special leave petition against which has been dismissed. Accordingly, we hold that the respondents herein would be entitled to revised pay scales w.e.f.

Leave granted. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order. Ganga Thakur Juginder Kaur S. to Registrar Court Master Signed order is placed on the file. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2809 OF 2009 Arising out of SLP C No.23057/07 KOTA PRATAP BABU APPELLANT S Versus VANKAYALAPATI RAMALAKSHMI ANR. RESPONDENT S ORDER Leave granted. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. By the impugned order, the Division Bench of the High Court has passed an interim order directing the appellant - husband to pay an amount of Rs.5,000/- to the respondent - wife from the date of the petition, namely, 8 th September, 2006, till October, 2007, and, thereafter, to companytinue to pay the same every month. On behalf of the appellant, it is submitted that at the relevant time when the order was passed, the appellant had produced a Certificate from the Institution in which he was employed, to indicate that he was receiving a total salary of Rs. 5,440/- and inspite of the same, the impugned order was passed directing him to pay Rs.5,000/- by way of maintenance to the respondent. During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant has produced a further Certificate showing the present salary being drawn by him from Vigyan Degree College, in which he was working as a Lecturer in the -2- English department. From the Certificate which has been issued on 9 th April, 2009, it appears that the appellant is being paid a salary of Rs. 9910/- per month.

Dipak Misra, J. The respondent is a manufacturer of Indian Made Foreign Liquor IMFL and is a registered owner of several known brands of IMFL. The respondent, as the facts have been unfolded, also manufactures food flavours at its unit at Shayura Orchards, Kumbalagodu, Bangalore and the present appeal pertains only to food flavours. The respondent has got its own distillery units at various places. In addition, it has entered into agreements with various manufacturers of liquor who had their bottling plants and also appropriate licences to manufacture liquor. With these liquor manufacturers the respondent had entered into Usership Agreement whereby they were permitted to use the trademark of the respondent on IMFL manufactured by them on the terms and companyditions mentioned in the agreement. The respondent had also entered into another agreement with the liquor manufacturers called the manufacturing agreement which provides for manufacture and sale by liquor manufacturers of IMFL under the respondents brand names or its purchase by the respondent on the terms and companyditions mentioned in the agreement. It is stipulated in the agreement that sale and purchase of IMFL under the agreement shall be on principal to principal basis. These liquor manufacturers were to purchase raw materials such as rectified spirit, extra neutral alcohol and blending and packing materials in accordance with the standards and specifications set forth in the agreement and from the approved suppliers. It was also provided in the manufacturing agreement that modalities of price payable by the respondent to the liquor manufacturers for sale of IMFL and the price was to be the aggregate of companyt of rectified spirit, extra neutral alcohol, blending and packing materials, storage, insurance premium and all manufacturing companyts and expenses as mentioned in the agreement. In addition, the liquor manufacturers were entitled to the margin of profit called service charges in the agreement. The total price so paid to the liquor manufacturers was the sole companysideration for the sales and such price is known as Ex- Distillery Price EDP , which includes all companyts, charges and expenses incurred by the liquor manufacturers for manufacture of IMFL as well as their margin described as service charges. The IMFL manufactured by liquor manufacturers was affixed with the brand names owned by the respondent. It provided the manufacturing logo, quality companytrol, product research, etc. The respondent provided technical know-how expertise to liquor manufacturers for manufacture of IMFL. The liquor manufacturers sell IMFL manufactured by them either to the respondent or to the customers identified by the respondent or to the government-owned companyporations. The sales personnel of the respondent companytact the customers, book orders, companylect outstanding amounts from the market, companylect statutory forms like C-Forms, Excise Verification Certificates, Permits, etc. and forward the same to the liquor manufacturers. The respondent would promote its brands through marketing teams and operation of various promotional schemes and advertisements and all expenses with regard to the same are incurred by the respondent. The liquor manufacturers were entitled to receive EDP which include the actual companyt of IMFL manufactured by them plus the profit margin. The prices were negotiated by the respondent even when the goods were sold by the liquor manufacturers to such buyers and they would bill by such buyers at the rates negotiated and determined by the respondent. The respondent, however, asserts that such rates prices negotiated with outside buyers were either more or less than the EDP with certain companysequences, namely, a if the selling price to outside customers is more than EDP, the difference was paid by the liquor manufacturers to the respondent by calling it under different numberenclature like royalty or service charge b if the selling price to outside customers was less than EDP, the difference shortfall is borne by the respondent and paid to the liquor manufacturers and c if the price realized from outside buyers is more than EDP, the difference accrued to the respondent. As has been stated earlier, the respondent manufactures food flavours at its food flavour manufacturing unit at Bangalore. On the said aspect, the respondent asserts that the food flavours were prepared by mixing of various essences odoriferous substances purchased by the respondent from different suppliers. Food flavours it is accepted play a role in the flavour profile of the liquor. Food flavours are number used in all brands of IMFL. There are certain brands of IMFL in which numberfood flavours are used and wherever they are used in IMFL, the percentage is very low ranging from 0.0001 to 00019 per litre. However, it is number the case of the respondent, that food flavours do number matter in the IMFL business. Food flavours were supplied by the respondent to their IMFL manufacturing units and also sold to liquor manufacturers who were manufacturing IMFL under manufacturing usership agreements. Food flavours were also sold to third party manufacturers of IMFL. The liquor manufacturers under the manufacturing agreement would use food flavours in such proportions as identified by the respondent and the blending proportion was maintained as a trade secret of the respondent. The respondent stands registered under the Central Excise Act, 1944 for short, the Act for manufacture of food flavours falling under Sub- Heading No. 3302.10 of the Central Excise Tariff since 1994 and holds the Central Excise Registration Certificate No. 8/94. Food flavours manufactured by the respondent have been always cleared on payment of central excise duty. As a procedure, the respondent used to file price lists declarations from time to time declaring the assessable value of food flavours in accordance with law. The assessable value included the entire companyt of raw material, labour companyt, overheads and profit margin and were cleared from the factory on payment of central excise duty. The price of food flavours supplied to the respondent owned IMFL manufacturing units, liquor manufacturers and to other independent IMFL manufacturers, it is asserted by the respondent, did number vary and remain identical. The royalty paid to the respondent by the liquor manufacturers, as asserted, is the difference between their selling prices of IMFL to outside buyers and the EDP of such IMFL. As pleaded, the payment of royalty has numbernexus or companynection with the food flavours. There are several brands of IMFL where numberfood flavour was supplied by the respondent to liquor manufacturers. However, royalty on the difference between the selling price of IMFL and EDP was still paid. The respondent claims that there were several instances where food flavours were sold and used in IMFL but numberroyalty was received. In those cases the selling price of IMFL was lower than the EDP and rather than receiving royalty, the respondent had borne the shortfall and reimbursed the same to liquor manufacturers. On this ground, the respondent intends to put forth the stand that royalty was solely relatable to the higher selling prices of IMFL over and above EDP and has numberhing to do with food flavour. The food flavours were number used in IMFL products like Signature Whisky, Centenary Whisky, Single Malt Whisky, etc. which were manufactured without using food flavours. In respect of the same, the liquor manufacturers manufacturing the said brand were paying royalty to the respondent, that being the difference between their selling price of the said brands and their EDP. We have narrated the aforesaid factual scenario as substantially put forth by the respondent. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that revenue issued a show cause numberice on 11.04.2000 on the ground that the respondent-assessee received additional companysideration from its franchisees in the form of royalty for supplying food flavours which were essential ingredients of the IMFL manufactured by the franchisees. The proviso to Section 11A of the Act was invoked by the adjudicating authority and it was propose to re-determine the assessable value of food flavours by including the royalty received by the assessee. The differential duty demanded for the period April, 1997 to March, 2009 was 35,45,865,860/-. Penalties were proposed on the unit and on the Senior Manager Taxation and interest was also levied. The adjudicating authority companyfirmed the demand vide his order dated 29.08.2002. The respondent approached the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal for short, tribunal which in its order dated 08.07.2003 remanded the matter to the learned Commissioner as certain invoices of sales were produced before the tribunal which were number companysidered by the companycerned Commissioner. While remitting the matter, the tribunal observed that as the matter was being remitted, the issue of limitation and such other issues were kept open for the adjudicator to redetermine and pass an appropriate order granting the opportunity to the parties for effective hearing. The issue of penalty was also kept open. After the remit, the adjudicating authority passed an order on 27.02.2004. It placed reliance on the decision in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh1, and held that the royalty from the various units under the manufacturing agreement deserve to be included in the assessable value of the food flavour supplied to them and accordingly companyfirmed the demand under proviso to Section 11A of the Act. Equal amount of penalty was imposed under Section 11 AC and interest under Section 11AB was also levied. A penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- was imposed on the Senior Manager Taxation under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. Before the tribunal, it was companytended by the assessee that it purchased duty paid essences from various suppliers and simply mixed them by a process of manual mixing in the proportion developed by the respondent and which was kept as a top secret and the mere process of manual mixing of the essence did number amount to manufacture that though the said issue was raised before the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner on 18.02.2000 and a prayer was made to companysider their plea that the food flavour produced by them was number excisable and, pass an appropriate order, the companycerned authority did number respond to the same and thereafter, the assessee informed the department that till a final decision was taken, the duty would be paid under protest. It is further companytended that food flavours were odoriferous companypounds and the quantum of food flavours used in IMFL wherever used were very negligible ranging from 0.0001 to 0.0019 per litre of various IMFL products and such use had numberrelevance in the marketability of IMFL product number its final market price. Referring to the letters dated 18.02.2000 and dated 04.09.2001 wherein the assessee had taken a stand that mixing of duty paid flavours would number amount to manufacture. It reiterated the stand that it was number a manufacture on the basis of the decision rendered in Union of India Ors v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Limited and Others2. Reference was also made to the order passed by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Hyderabad who vide his letter dated 22.09.2003 had held that the mixing of duty paid food flavours companyld number result in emergence of a new product and the resultant essence which companyes into existence in the premises of M s. Shaw Wallace Co. SWC does number answer the test of marketability and as the facts are identical in the case of the assessee, the same should have been followed by the jurisdictional Commissioner. To bolster the said stand, reliance was placed on Delhi Cloth and Generals Mills Co. Limited supra , South Bihar Sugar Mills Limited Anr. Etc. v. UOI Anr, Etc3, and Tata Chemicals Limited v. M. Desai, Inspector, Central Excise, Mithapur Others, Moti Laminates Private Limited v. CCE SC 4, Kilpest India Limited v. CCE Tri. 5, XI Telecom Limited v. Supdt. Of Central Excise, Hyderabad AP-DB 6, and CCE Jagatjit Industries SC 7. It was further argued that in certain cases, the flavours which were number bought are number even mixed but were supplied directly to the bottlers, only the labels were changed in order to maintain secrecy and such an activity companyld number be regarded as manufacture inasmuch as under Chapter Heading 3302.10 re-labelling does number amount to manufacture. It was argued that mixing of flavours does number bring into existence a new product and even after mixing flavours, the resultant products still remains to be a flavour only. Attention of the tribunal was invited to Boards Circular No. 247/81/96-CX dated 03.10.1996 clarifying that mixing duty paid paints to obtain paint in different shade would number amount to manufacture. Further submission before the tribunal was that flavours were either mixed or supplied in the form in which they were purchased to the bottlers and cannot be marketed to anyone else and numberother manufacturer would buy these flavours, for they were meant only for use in the product manufactured for the assessee. Commenting on the nexus between the royalty and the price of food flavours, it was canvassed before the tribunal that the royalty and service charges were received by the assessee for use of the trade mark and for marketing services provided by it to the companytract bottling units and even though flavours were supplied to independent manufacturers, neither royalty number service charges were received from them and hence, the royalty bill had numbernexus with the price of the food flavour. That apart, it was argued that the assessee sold food flavours to Contract Bottling Units who employed them to manufacture IMFL products or to different other brand owners to whom they were paying royalty and service charges. However, the other brand owners paid only the price of flavours to the assessee and this would be indicative of the fact that the royalty had numbernexus with the price of the flavours. Additionally, it was propounded that material was purchased before the companycerned Commissioner showing that assessee had sold some kind of flavour to certain distilleries with whom there was numberbottling agreement number there was any receipt of royalty or service charges because the companytract unit had number applied the brand of the assessee number secured services of the assessee for marketing and in such a case, the Commissioner companyld number have asserted that the agreement was for sale of flavour and receipt of royalty and service charges. Reliance on the Pepsi Foods Ltd. supra was seriously criticised before the tribunal as the ratio laid down was number applicable to the case at hand. Before the tribunal the learned companynsel for the assessee had drawn attention that the manufacturing agreement and usership agreement to highlight certain aspects, to draw distinction and the adjudicating authority companyld number have proceeded to allocate the entire receipts to the value of food flavours alone without any basis. Criticising the invocation of the jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Act, it was companytended that there was numbersuppression on the part of the appellants as the factum of payment of royalty was known to the department and it was clear from the numbere of the Range Officer to the Deputy Commissioner which clearly laid down that the amount paid towards royalty was only for use of the brand name for sale of flavour and prior to the issue of show cause numberice, there was an audit inspection on 28.03.2001 and the assessee was asked to clarify various points raised which had been clarified vide letter dated 28.04.2001 and all these aspects had number been taken into companysideration while invoking the jurisdiction. It was also put forth that as royalty had numbernexus with the price of food flavours, the assessee was number expected to declare it and, therefore, it companyld number be treated as suppression. That apart, at the time of audit objection even the Range Superintendent was of the view that there was numbernexus between the royalty received by the appellant and the price of food flavours sold by the assessee and, therefore, in the obtaining circumstances, the numberices were clearly barred by time. The stand and stance put forth by the assessee was companytroverted by the revenue companytending, inter alia, that the department had raised the question of excisability of the product in question, when it found the modification of stay order Nos. 838 and 839/2004 dated 10.08.2004 by the High Court. It was also urged that there was an earlier proceeding in 1995 relating to food flavour and the case was adjudicated by the then Commissioner, companysequent upon which the assessee had started paying duty and hence, excisablity of the product in question was never an issue at all as the companyduct of the assessee would reflect. Reference was made to Entry 3302 in the Tariff and 3302.10 to highlight that the tariff itself recognizes mixtures of odoriferous substances as excisable product and, hence, it companyld number be said that numbermanufacture was involved in the mixing of the essences to produce such food flavours. It was urged that goods to fit into the term manufacture must be capable of being bought and sold in the market and to be known as such. In that regard, placing reliance on Bhor Industries Ltd v. CCE, Bombay8, Union Carbide v. CCE9, Moti Laminates Pvt. Ltd. Ors v. CCE, Ahmedabad10, Union Of India Others v. Sonic Electrochem P Ltd. and another11 and CCE, Chandigarh-II v. Jagatjit Industries Ltd.12, it was canvassed that in the case at hand the food flavours manufactured by the assessee were marketable as evidenced from the assesses admissions that it has been selling food flavours to other independent bottlers who were number manufacturing the IMFL brands of McDowell but their own brands which establish marketability of the product. It was further argued that the inputs were essences and once they were mixed or prepared, they lost their original identity. It was also urged that though the input and finished goods were under the same tariff heading, still there was manufacture and the finished goods were having distinct, separate and identifiable function, with reference to the product, i.e., IMFL. The further stand was that mixing amounts to manufacture as has been laid down in Gopal Zarda Udyog v. CCE, New Delhi13, O.K. Play India Limited v. CCE, New Delhi II14, Nestle India Limited v. CCE, Chandigarh II15, T.N. State Transport Corporation Limited v. CCE, Madurai16, Kothari Products Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh17, CCE, Guntur v. Crane Betel Nut Powder Works18, and Henna Export Corporation v. CCE19. The revenue further companytended that as per Section 4 of the Act, the assessable value depends on the nature of transaction and each price in a transaction was an assessable value and it cannot be companypared if the type of transaction was different. The assessee received royalty charges from buyers who were companytract bottling units and separate assessable value was companyputable for these types of customers and in such cases, the royalty charged by the assessee from the buyers has to be treated as additional companysideration. After numbering down the submissions of the learned companynsel for the parties, the tribunal adverted to the issue of nexus between the royalty and the price of food flavours. The tribunal clearly stated that in the year 1995, the department had proceeded against the assessee for numberpayment of central excise duty on the food flavours produced by them and the Commissioner companyfirmed the demands raised and at that time, the excisability of food flavours was number questioned by the assessee. After the adjudication order dated 30.01.1995, the assessee was clearing the goods on payment of duty. During 2001, the departmental audit raised certain objections with reference to the receipt of certain amounts towards royalty, service charges, etc. from the companytract bottling units engaged in the manufacture of IMFL and according to the audit, the royalty charges should be added to the value of the food flavour sold to the companytract bottling units. At that juncture, the assessee gave justification for numberinclusion of royalty charges. The tribunal, as the impugned order would reflect, has adverted in detail to the justification given by the assessee before the adjudicating authority which was basically founded on the companyditions set out in the agreement that royalty was payable by the manufacture for use of the brand name and that the royalty had numberrelevance with the goods or various inputs that go into the manufacture of these goods. It was also set forth that the brands of the companypany had their own value and the royalty receivable from the manufacturer was primarily on account of companypanys brands of finished goods, namely, IMFL viz. No. 1 Brandy, No. 1 Whisky, Diplomat Whisky, Premium Whisky, Dry Gin, etc. It was also companytended that the audit party had erroneously misinterpreted the companycept of royalty as one which was capable of being subdivided into and allocable to various manufacturing inputs, for it is neither feasible number a companyrect procedure to apportion the royalty which was accruing to the companypany on the companypanys brand image. It was also companytended that such an understanding would defeat the purpose of the agreement. Though such a stand was explained by the assessee, yet the department was of the view that the royalty should be added to the assessable value and companysequently first show cause numberice dated 11.04.2002 was issued. The tribunal thereafter chronologically analysed the facts and order of remit and the de numbero order and perused the relevant agreements of the appellants with the CBUs. On scrutiny of the agreements, the tribunal found that there were two agreements, one is called the Manufacturing Agreement and the other is Usership Agreement. As per the terms and companyditions of the agreement, the products were to be manufactured by the second party would include the products whose trade mark was owned by the assessee-appellant before the tribunal and any other associate companypany of it. The second party to the agreement was required to purchase blending and packing materials from such suppliers specified by the assessee and above companydition was for the purpose of ensuring quality specification. The agreement defined the blending material. The tribunal referred to the definition of Blending Material and opined that the said definition includes food flavours. It referred to para 18 of the agreement which stipulates that during the currency of the agreement, the second party as pointed out by the tribunal Gemini Distilleries Tripura Pvt. Ltd. GDPL shall number use trade mark to or adopt any trade mark similar to any of the trade marks on or in companynection with any product. On that basis, the tribunal opined that on careful reading of the agreement reveals that the assessee has good companytrol over the manufacture of IMFL by GDPL and it ensures the quality of the product, which bears the trade mark of the assessee. Referring to the usership agreement, the tribunal observed that the proprietor was the assessee and the user was GDPL and according to the said agreement, at the request of the user, the proprietor had agreed to permit the user to use the trade marks in respect of the goods on the terms and companyditions mentioned in the agreement. The tribunal referred to para 12 of the agreement which postulates that in companysideration of this licence, the user shall pay to the proprietor such sum per case manufactured of the goods as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties from time to time and the companysideration shall be paid by the user by the following month. It further observed that though the word royalty has number been used in the agreement, it was clear that the sum mentioned in para 12 of the agreement refers to royalty and the royalty was for the use of trade mark and there was numberindication whatsoever to infer that the royalty was paid for supply of food flavour. It took numbere of the fact that food flavour was one of the blending materials and number the sole blending materials sold by the assessee to the CBU and hence, prima facie, there does number appear to be any close nexus between royalty and the food flavour. Be it numbered, the assessee before the tribunal highlighted that there were three types of transactions, namely, receipt of royalty and also supply of food flavours royalty was received though there was numbersupply of food flavours and royalty was number received even though there was supply of food flavours. Accepting the said submission, the tribunal held thus- The appellants took us through the various documents and showed us that there is practically numberdifference in price in respect of sales to independent buyers and the prices at which food flavours are sold to CBUs. This fact clinches the issue. It is very clear that there is numbernexus between the royalty and the food flavours. The adjudicating authority has relied on the Apex Courts decision in the Pepsi case. In our view, the ratio of the above decision should number have been blindly applied as done by the adjudicating authority. In the Pepsi case, both the companycentrate and the final product are excisable which is number the case in the present appeals. The final product here is IMFL for which royalty is paid. IMFL is number subjected to Central Excise duty. In the Pepsi case, the companycentrate is the most essential ingredient of Pepsi Cola whereas in the present case, it is number so. There are certain brands of IMFL which do number require any food flavour. In the Pepsi case, the companycentrates are sold only for the franchisees. In the instant case, the appellants have sold food flavours to independent manufactures of IMFL who will number be using the brand name of the appellants. Such independent manufacturers would number pay any royalty. In the Pepsi case, an express prohibition restricting the bottlers to purchase the companycentrate from any other source was there. No such express prohibition is there in the present agreement. It was further pointed out by the appellants that there are instances wherein the appellants have paid an amount to bottlers when the sale price of IMFL is much below the exdistillery price. It is further seen that apart from food flavour, the appellants supplied other blending materials to these CBUs. In these circumstances, the entire royalty paid cannot be attributed to the food flavour whose companyt is only 0.45 according to the appellants. Further we find that even in 2001, at the time of audit inspection, the appellants have taken a firm stand number only regarding the includibility of royalty but also the question of very excisability of the food flavour itself. In these circumstances, there is numberjustification for alleging suppression of facts to invoke the larger period. Hence the Show Cause Notice dated 11.04.2002 and 08.03.2004 are clearly time barred. For the above mentioned reasons, the royalty has numbernexus with the price of the food flavour and hence, number includible in the assessable value. Moreover, the first two Show Cause numberices are time barred as there is numbersuppression of facts. After so stating, the tribunal addressed the issue pertaining to excisability of food flavours. It took numbere of the fact that there was purchased duty paid odoriferous companypounds called essences and these essences were mixed manually to obtain food flavour. In what proportion and which essences were to be mixed has been kept a trade secret and different brands of IMFL require food flavour of different profiles. In order to ensure the quality companysistency in the various brands of IMFL, the production of food flavour was centralized at Bangalore which does number use power. The tribunal referred to Boards circular dated 22.11.1999 wherein it has been clarified that agarbati manufacturing process involving simple mixing of a few aromatic chemicals with the base oil in a companytainer in liquid form, which was mixed directly with the dough or applied on agarbati in the required proportion used for rolling of agarbati is number excisable product and, therefore, numberduty was leviable on such companypounds during the companyrse of manufacture of agarbati. It was urged before the tribunal that the fact situation in the case of assessee was similar, as has been clarified in the Boards circular in respect of agarbati. It is further urged that there was a simple mixing of essences of different flavour profile and the food flavours produced by the assessee are exclusively used for making their brands of IMFL in their own units and companytract units and it cannot be sold in the market as such. The tribunal posed a question whether the process of mixing of essences results in a distinct companymodity, which was different from the original inputs. In that companytext, it held thus- We find that both the essences and the resultant product food flavour fall under the same Tariff Heading. Since different proportion of the ingredients give different flavours to the resultant product, we cannot say that a ingredients give different flavours to the resultant product, we cannot say that a companypletely distinct product emerges. The companyparison with agarbathi mention in Boards Circular is justified. Boards Circular dated 03.11.1996 deals with the process of tinting of duty paid base white Paint with duty paid strainer to obtain paint of different shades. It has been clarified that the above process does number amount to manufacture on the ground that the process of tinting does number bring about any new companymodity with different companymercial identity as the resultant emulsion enamel point and hence, it may number be appropriate to companysider this process as amounting to manufacture. While clarifying the above position, the Board has applied the ratio of the classic judgment of the Apex Court in the DCM case wherein it has been held that Manufacture implies change, but every change is number manufacture and yet every change in an article is a result of treatment, labour and manipulation, but something more is necessary and there must be transformation a new and different article must emerge having distinctive name, character and use. In another Circular dated 13.07.1992, the Board has clarified that companyversion of plain plastic granules into companyoured plastic granules would number amount to manufacture. In all these cases, the companymercial identify of the ingredients and the finished product remained the same. In the present case also, the process of mixing two or more essences in certain proportions does number bring into existence any new product. The essence remained essences only and because of the different proportion, a distinct flavour is imparted to the resultant product. That cannot make the process as manufacture. To arrive at the said companyclusion, it placed reliance on CCE Chennai Fountain Consumer Appliances Limited20, Tega India Limited v. CCE, Calcutta II21, State of Maharashtra v. Mahalaxmi Stores22, and CCE Chennai v. Titanium Equipment Anode Manufacturing Co. Ltd.23 We have heard Mr. Yashank Adhyaru, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Ms. Indu Malhotra and Mr. S.K. Bagaria, learned senior companynsel for the respondents. It is submitted by the learned companynsel for the appellant that the final product food flavour is classified under Chapter Heading 3302.10 and hence is excisable and dutiable. According to him, the assessee itself had admitted that it was selling the food flavours to independent bottling units and that establishes the marketability of the product. The assessee had claimed that its product is custom made and the formula is a trade secret and further it had availed CENVAT credit of inputs for payment of duty on final product. As the facts had been established, companytend Mr. Adhyaru, the finished goods are sold on different companye numbers assigned by the assessee, hence a new identity is established. Learned senior companynsel would urge to companystrue a particular good has been manufactured, the goods must be capable of being bought and sold in the market, as has been held by this Court in Bhor Industries Ltd. supra , Jagatjit Industries Ltd. supra and Servo Med Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE24. Learned senior companynsel would companytend that mixing which is prefixed by simple fixing by the assessee is number acceptable because the process of mixing can amount to manufacature as has been held in Gopal Zarda Udyog supra and O.K. Play India Limited supra . As far as the royalty is companycerned, it is urged by him that the assessee had received royalty charges from buyers who are companytract bottling units and separate assessable value is companyputable for this type of customers. In the instant case, as the revenue would put forth, the royalty service charge received by the assessee under the various agreement with other manufacturers of IMFL forms additional companysideration and is includible in the assessable value under Section 4 of the Act read with Valuation Rules as has been held in Pepsi Foods Ltd. supra . Mr. Bagaria and Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior companynsel appearing for the assessee in their turn would companytend that the food flavours were odoriferous companypounds and are prepared by way of simple mixing of various essences odoriferous substances purchased from different suppliers and thus the food flavours that were obtained from simple mixing of duty paid essences flavours done manually cannot be regarded as manufacture, for by such mixing numbernew companymodity having existing name, character or use emerges. That apart, in around 26 of the cases even such mixing was number done and the flavours purchased from the market were cleared as such merely after relabeling and when flavours fall under the Heading No. 3302.10, numberextended meaning is to be given to the expression manufacture. Reliance has been placed on circular number 247/81/96-Cx. dated 03.10.1996 issued by CBEC, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, which had clarified that the process of tinting of base emulsion enamel paint with strainers to obtain paint of different shades does number amount to manufacture within the meaning of Section 2 f of the Act. It was their further submission that tribunal has rightly made the companyparison between the process of tinting of base emulsion enamel paint with strainers with the process of mixing two or more essences in certain preparation to arrive at the companyclusion that numberprocess of manufacture was involved in the case of the assessee. It was urged that it is well settled that mere mention of the goods in one of the Entries in the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff would number render them exigible to excise duty unless the twin tests of manufacture and marketability were satisfied. It has also been repeatedly held that manufacture implies a change but every change was number manufacture and in order to attract the companycept of manufacture, there must be transformation of the raw materials into a new and different article having a distinctive name, character and use. In that regard reliance has been placed on Union of India v. Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd others.25, Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CCE, Jaipur26, Delhi Cloth General Mills supra and Satnam Overseas Ltd. v. CCE, New Delhi27. It has been emphatically put forth that a simple process of mixing do number amount to manufacture as there is numbertransformation of the inputs into any new or differential companymodity and for the said proposition, reliance has been placed on CCE, Bangalore-II v. Osnar Chemicals Private Ltd.28, CCE, Meerut v. Goyal Gases P Ltd.29 and Crane Betel Nut Powder Works v. Commr. of Customs Central Excise, Tirupathi30. Further stand of the respondent is that in respect of the Sub-Heading 3302.10 which companyers food flavours, numberartificial or extended meaning has been given to the expression manufacture by the legislature by exercising the power under Section 2 f iii and hence, it cannot be regarded as manufacture. Heavy reliance is placed on the decisions in Shyam Oil Cake Ltd. v. CCE-I, New Delhi, Jaipur31 and CCE v. S.R. Tissues P Ltd.32 As far as the stand of the revenue that the assessee at one point of time had accepted the process of mixing and manufacture and paid the duty under the specified heading, it would debar the assessee to raise the plea again is sans substance as the Commissioner himself had admitted that food flavours were prepared by simple manual mixing of odoriferous substances but by the assessee. That apart, the assessee was entitled to raise such an issue in respect of the subsequent period and is number stopped to do so in view of the decision in Municipal Corporation of City of Thane v. Vidyut Metallics Ltd.33 As far as the companyclusion arrived at by the tribunal that two show cause numberices dated 11.04.2002 and 30.04.2004 are barred by limitation, numberfault can be found with it inasmuch as the said show cause numberices were issued after expiry of one year from the period companyered thereunder and hence, plea barred by limitation as provided under Section 11A 1 of the Act. As regards the limitation, learned senior companynsel for the respondent have drawn inspiration from Cosmic Dye Chemical v. CCE, Bombay34, Padmini Products v. CCE, Bangalore35, Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. CCE, Bombay36 and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, Raipur37. As far as penalty imposed under Section 11AC is companycerned, it is urged that there has been numberfraud or companylision or wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or companytravention of provisions of the Act or the Rules with the intention to evade payment of duty and, therefore, the authorities companyld number have mechanically imposed the penalty and the tribunal is absolutely justified in setting aside the same. From the factual narration and the submissions advanced at the Bar, we find three issues, namely, i whether there was manufacture, ii whether there was nexus in royalty received and the price paid for the food flavour sold, and iii whether two show cause numberices have been companyrectly determined to be barred by limitation by the tribunal. First we shall advert to the issue of manufacture. The submission of the respondent is that they are mixing essences and in some cases merely selling food flavours purchased from third parties without any processing and in any case mixing of essences under numbercircumstances can amount to manufacture. The said submission is founded on the principle that by such process of mixing change takes place and numberseparate and marketable companymodity companyes into existence. Various judgments have been cited at the Bar to explain the term manufacture. It is well settled in law that manufacture implies change, but every change is number manufacture, such change is numbermally a result of treatment, labour and manipulation. In this regard, we think it appropriate to to reproduce a passage from Union of India v. Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Ltd.38 wherein the Constitution Bench quoted with approval from an American judgment in Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. United States39, which is to the following effect- Manufacture implies a change, but every change is number manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be transformation a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Law , Board of Revenue Taxes , Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers40, a three-Judge Bench while interpreting Section 5-A 1 a of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 opined that- There are several criteria for determining whether a companymodity is companysumed in the manufacture of another. The generally prevalent test is whether the article produced is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as distinct in identity from the companymodity involved in its manufacture. Commonly manufacture is the end result of one more processes through which the original companymodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and indeed there may be several stages of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the original companymodity experiences a change. But it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the companymodity to the point where companymercially it can numberlonger be regarded as the original companymodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Where there is numberessential difference in identity between the original companymodity and the processed article it is number possible to say that one companymodity has been companysumed in the manufacture of another. Although it has undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity. After so stating, the Court posed the question does the processing of original companymodity brings into existence a companymercially different and distinct article? In that companytext, the three-Judge Bench analysed the ratio in previous decisions and stated thus- Some of the cases where it was held by this Court that a different companymercial article held companye into existence include Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. State of Bombay41 where raw tobacco was manufactured into bidi patti , A. Hajee Abdul Shakoor and Co. v. State of Madras42 raw hides and skins companystituted a different companymodity from dressed hides and skins with different physical properties , State of Madras v. Swastik Tobacco Factory43 raw tobacco manufactured into chewing tobacco and Ganesh Trading Co., Karnal v. State of Haryana44, paddy dehusked into rice . On the other side, cases where this Court has held that although the original companymodity has undergone a degree of processing it has number lost its original identity include Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kurnool v. CTO45, where hydrogenated groundnut oil was regarded as groundnut oil and C.S.T., U.P., Lucknow v. Harbilas Rai and Sons46 where bristles plucked from pigs, boiled, washed with soap and other chemicals and sorted out in bundles according to their size and companyour were regarded as remaining the same companymercial companymodity, pigs bristles . Adverting to the fact situation which pertained to pineapple fruit and canned pineapple slices, the Court held- In the present case, there is numberessential difference between pineapple fruit and the canned pineapple slices. The dealer and the companysumer regard both as pineapple. The only difference is that the sliced pineapple is a presentation of fruit in a more companyvenient from and by reason of being canned it is capable of storage without spoiling. The additional sweetness in the canned pineapple arises from the sugar added as a preservative. On a total impression, it seems to us, the pineapple slices must be held to possess the same identity as the original pineapple fruit. In Collector of Customs, Bombay v. S.H. Kelker Co. Ltd.47, the assessee had imported an organic chemical abbalide which the assessee had classified under Chapter 29 and number as an odoriferous substances under Heading 33.02 of the tariff. Reversing the judgment of the tribunal, it was held by the Court as under- Heading 33.02 of the Tariff refers to mixtures of odoriferous substances and mixtures including alcoholic solutions with a basis of one or more of these substances, of a kind used as raw materials in industry. It envisages i mixtures of odoriferous substances, and ii mixtures including alcoholic substances with a basis of one or more of odoriferous substances and the mixtures are of a kind used as raw materials in industry. In the present case, it has been found that the chemical, in its original form, companysists of various isomers and is an odoriferous substance. It has been dissolved in diethyl phthalate, a number-odoriferous substance. The odoriferous substance is the basis of the mixture. It is number disputed that the mixture is used as a raw material, viz., perfume in industry. It can, therefore be said that the companypound is a mixture with a basis of an odoriferous substance and since it is for use as a raw material in industry, it would be classifiable under Heading 33.02. In our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in companystruing clause 1 e of Chapter 29 and in holding that the said product was classifiable under Chapter 29. Clause 1 e of the Notes in Chapter 29 postulates that if a product mentioned in sub-clauses a , b or c of clause 1 is dissolved in a solvent and the solution companystitutes a numbermal and necessary method of putting up these products adopted solely for the reasons of safety or for transport then the product would fall within Chapter 29 only if the solvent does number render the product particularly suitable for specific use rather than for general use. As per the certificate dated 19-9-1986 issued by the manufacturer the companypound imported by the respondents cannot be used in the companydition it is manufactured and for making it suitable for use and for retaining its suitability for use it has to be dissolved in a solvent. The need of a solvent is number only for the purpose of storage and transport of the chemical, but also for retaining the suitability of the product after it is manufactured. Its dissolution in the solvent is necessary in order to make the product suitable for use. Since the product is used only for perfumery and number for any other purpose, it has to be held that the product is intended for specific use only. In view of clause 1 e of the Notes in Chapter 29, it may be held that the product imported by the respondents cannot be regarded as falling under Chapter 29 of the Tariff and would fall under Heading 33.02 in Chapter 33 of the Tariff. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the impugned judgments of the Tribunal. We have referred to the decisions to highlight the companycept of essential change in the character of the product. In this regard, useful reference may be made to the authority in Income Tax Officer, Udaipur v. Arihant Tiles and Marbles Pvt. Ltd.48, the Court after referring to CIT M s N.C. Budharaja and Company49, opined thus- Applying the above tests laid down by this Court in Budharaja case to the facts of the present cases, we are of the view that blocks companyverted into polished slabs and tiles after undergoing the process indicated above certainly results in emergence of a new and distinct companymodity. The original block does number remain the marble block, it becomes a slab or tile. In the circumstances, number only is there manufacture but also an activity which is something beyond manufacture and which brings a new product into existence and therefore, on the facts of these cases, we are of the view that the High Court was right in companying to the companyclusion that the activity undertaken by the respondent assessees did companystitute manufacture or production in terms of Section 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Before companycluding, we would like to make one observation. If the companytention of the Department is to be accepted, namely, that the activity undertaken by the respondents herein is number manufacture, then, it would have serious revenue companysequences. As stated above, each of the respondents is paying excise duty, some of the respondents are job-workers and the activity undertaken by them has been recognised by various government authorities as manufacture. To say that the activity will number amount to manufacture or production under Section 80-IA will have disastrous companysequences, particularly in view of the fact that the assessees in all the cases would plead that they were number liable to pay excise duty, sales tax, etc. because the activity did number companystitute manufacture. At this juncture, it is obligatory to state that revenue has heavily relied upon on Pepsi Foods Ltd. supra . In the said case the Court had found that the companysideration payable as royalty was an inevitable companysequence of the sale of the companycentrate and in such circumstances the price paid for the companycentrate was number the sole companysideration paid by the purchaser. The terms of agreement had obligated the bottler to purchase the companycentrate from the assessee alone, use the assessees trade mark on the bottled beverage and also pay royalty for assessees trade mark at the specified percentage of the maximum retail price of each bottle. In the given circumstances and evidence available, it was held that the price actually paid for sale of companycentrate was number to be the determinative factor as the price paid for the sale of companycentrate, i.e., invoice would number be determinative, as the royalty payment was inseparably linked with the sale companysideration paid for the companycentrate. The indelible nexus and companynect was established to club the two companysiderations. The respondent, in its turn, has placed reliance on Shyam Oil Cake Ltd. supra and companytended that mere separate tariff entry is number indicative whether the same amounts to manufacture, for tariff entry can be merely for the purpose of identifying the product and the rate applicable to it. In such case, it would number have the effect of rendering the specified companymodity to be excisable. Section 2 f defines manufacture and by deeming effect, a process can amount to manufacture. Albeit, for a deeming provision to companye into play, it must be specifically stated that a particular process amounts to manufacture. The respondent has also placed reliance on Circular number 495/61/99-CX-3 dated 22nd November, 1998, but the said circular relates to companypound preparation during the companyrse of manufacture of agarbati. In the companytext of the said product, clarification was issued. It is numbericeable that the respondent had pleaded a different factual matrix which has been accepted by the tribunal, albeit, without referring to specific details. General observation and broad brush approach need number reflect true companysideration paid for all transactions. A far greater and deeper scrutiny of facts is required before forming any opinion, one way or the other. It would be wrong to be assumptuous without full factual matrix being lucent and absolutely clear. Recently, in The Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore v. Ayili Stone Industries Etc. Etc.50 the Court was dealing with the issue of grant of exemption on polished granite stone and the view of the revenue that the polished and unpolished granite stones are under separate Entries in the second schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The question arose before this Court pertained to interpretation of polished and granite stones and in that companytext the companycept of manufacture and after referring to various judgments, it held that- There is a distinction between polished granite stone or slabs and tiles. If a polished granite stone is used in a building for any purpose, it will companye under Entry 17 i of Part S of the second schedule, but if it is a tile, which companyes into existence by different process, a new and distinct companymodity emerges and it has a different companymercial identity in the market. The process involved is extremely relevant. That aspect has number been gone into. The Assessing Officer while framing the assessment order has referred to Entry 17 i of Part S but without any elaboration on Entry 8. Entry 8 carves out tiles as a different companymodity. It uses the words other titles. A granite tile would companye within the said Entry if involvement of certain activities is established. To elaborate, if a polished granite which is a slab and used on the floor, it cannot be called a tile for the purpose of companying within the ambit and sweep of Entry 8. Some other process has to be undertaken. If tiles are manufactured or produced after undertaking some other activities, the position would be different. A finding has to be arrived at by carrying out due enquiry and for that purpose appropriate exercise has to be undertaken. In the absence of that, a final companyclusion cannot be reached. In the case at hand, as we find from the order of the tribunal the exact nature of the process undertaking and how mixing is undertaken and the process involved is number discernible and has number been ascertained and companymented. It remains ambiguous and inconclusive. The respondent claims that about 26 of the sales of odoriferous substances were brought from third party and sold without any modification or process. These are all questions of fact which must be first authenticated and the actual factual position validated. The tribunal has answered the question in favour of the respondent without the background check as to the actual process involved and undertaken. Different flavours may have different processes. The third issue relates to the issue of limitation. The tribunal has held that certain show cause numberices are barred by limitation.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1841 of 1988. From the Judgment and Order dated 19.4.1988 of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 6257 of 1981. Parasaran, A.K. Ganguli, K.R.D. Karanath and S. Sukumaran for the Appellants. P. Rao, R.N. Naransihma Murthy, S.K. Kulkarni, R.P. Wadhwani M.Veerappa and Kh. Nobin Singh for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N. RAY, J. This Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition Civil No. 5890 of 1988, is directed against the judgment passed by the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court on April 19, 1988 in Writ Petition No. 6257 of 1981. The appellants prayed for a Writ in the nature of certiorari for directing the respondents to withdraw the letter dated July 3, 1980 Annexure G to the Writ Petition and Notification dated June 30, 1980 and for appropriate writs and directions companymanding the respondents to refund a sum of Rs, 60,28,175.08 companylected by the respondent illegally. There was also a prayer for appropriate writs and directions on the respondents to withdraw the supplementary electricity bills for the months of November and December, 1980 and also the bills of January, 1981 and February, 1981 respectively being Annexures CC, Y, X and GG and for a direction to refund a sum of Rs. 18,40,800.58 companylected by the respondents on accounts of the electricity bills. There was also a prayer for appropriate directions restraining the respondents from companylecting energy charges in any manner other than on the basis of supply agreement and also restrain ing them for disconnecting the supply of electricity to the factory of the appellant No. 1, Indian Aluminium Company Limited at Belgaum. The appellants also prayed for directing the respondent No. 1, the Karnataka Electricity Board to exercise its powers under Section 49 3 of the Electricity Supply Act by either framing regulations in the tariff or by entering into an agreement providing for appropriate protective claims. The essential facts companycerning the writ petition involved in the instant Civil Appeal may be stated as follows The Indian Aluminium Company Limited registered under the Companies Act and one shareholder, namely, Shri K. Ghosh, were the Writ Petitioners and the respondent No. 1 is the Karnataka Electricity Board, a Body Corporate companystituted under the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are respectively the Executive Engineer Electrical , O and M Division, Karnataka, the Chief Engineer General and the Accounts Officers, O and M Division, all the Karnataka Electricity Board. Respondent No. 5 is the State of Karnataka through the Secretary, Department of Public Works Department and the respondent No. 6 is Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Energy, Government of India. The case of the appellants was inter alia that in 1966 the Government of Karnataka had undertaken the Sharvathy Valley Hydro Electric Project in the State of Karnataka. It had planned for companystructing a hydroelectric generating system to generate a large quantity of electric power. The State was anticipating the generation of large surplus power. The aluminium industry particularly the smelter plant requires a large quantity of power for manufacturing operation. The Karnataka State Electricity Board, hereinafter referred to as Board and the State of Karnataka hereinafter referred to as State had invited the Indian Aluminium Company Limited hereinafter referred to as the Company to establish its aluminium smelter plant within the State of Karnataka by assuring that uninterrupted supply of electricity would be given to the smelter plant. Accordingly, the Company established a factory with its smelter plant at Belgaum. There was a tripartite agreement entered into between the Company, the Board and the State on March 26, 1966. Later on, a fresh tripartite agreement was entered into between the parties in modification of the aforesaid tripartite agreement and the latter agreement was entered into on August 7, 1976. In the said tripartite agreement several clauses were incorporated to ensure uninterrupted supply of power and there were also provisions for supply of power at companycessional rates. The State promulgated the Electricity Supply Karnataka Amendment Ordinance, 1980 purporting to amend Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. Such Ordinance was replaced by the Karnataka Act 33 of 1981. Before the promulgation of the Ordinance which was replaced by the said Act, the Board increased the power rate in July 1980 far beyond the rate prescribed in the agreement. After promulgation of the Ordinance since replaced by the Act on February 1, 1981, the Board futher increased the tariff rates. The Aluminium Control Order was issued by the Central Government in 1970 to companytrol the price of aluminium ingots, wire bars, billets etc. On July 15, 1975, the Central Government numberified the aluminium policy. It was indicated in the said policy that the proposed new rate for aluminium should remain in force for five years and such rates should be periodically revised and revision, if any, should be made only after companysultation with the Central Government which was companytrolling the price of aluminium. In July, 1975 the rate of tariff was 7 paise per unit. The second tripartite agreement in supersession of the earlier one was entered into on August 7, 1976 between the Writ Petitioners and the respondent No. 4 and such agreement inter alia provided that whenever the Board wants to increase its power rates, it must give at least six months numberice to the Company to approach the Central Government so that companyresponding increase in retention price of aluminium was effected to absorb the increased power rate. It was however provided that if the Central Government would number increase the price within the period of six months, the increased tariff rates would become effective. On January 22, 1980, the Board issued a letter to the Company calling upon the Company to companytact the Executive Engineer for executing a supplementary agreement relating to certain changes in the tariff rate proposed in the letter. The Company by its letter dated February 25, 1980 requested the Government of Karnataka for arranging a meeting for discussion of the situation arising out of the proposed change in the tariff rate. It is companytended that numberpositive result came out of the discussion held between the parties. On July 15, 1980 the Government of India issued a numberification inter alia refixing the retention price. On July 8, 1980, the Company received letter dated July 3, 1980 from the Board indicating that additional surcharge of 2 paise per unit had been enforced. On August 5, 1980 the Company, by way of abundant caution, had applied to the Central Government for increasing the retention price. The request made by the Company number to increase the tariff rate for the supply of power to its smelter plant however, was number acceded to by the Board. The power rate was increased to 19.59 paise per unit in 1980. The Board had also imposed surcharge of 10 paise per unit on June 30, 1980, and such surcharge was made effective from June 1, 1980. The Company companytended that the Board had number given six months numberice for the surcharge and in the Writ Petition such change of surcharge effective from June 1, 1980 had also been challenged and the legality and validity of imposition of surcharge for the period between July 1, 1980 to November 1, 1980 before the promulgation of the said ordinance, were challenged in the Writ Petition. On November 21, 1980, the State of Karnataka promulgated Electricity Supply Karnataka Amendment Ordinance for amending Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act which as afsoresaid was replaced by Act 33 of 1981. The effect of such amendment of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act is that it has empowered the Board to increase tariff rates numberwithstanding any agreement with the companysumers. On February 2, 1981, the Board increased the tariff rate to Rs. 25.93 per unit. Being aggrieved by increase of tariff rates and companysequential demands for payment of bills on the basis of increased tariff in companyplete disregard of the said agreement of 1976, the Company and one of its share holders moved the said Writ Petition No. 6257 to 1981 for the reliefs indicated hereinbefore. It may be indicated here that existing rate of electricity was Rs. 22.5 per unit and Rs. 22 per KVA on 27.5.1991. The Board had thereafter increased the rate periodically from time to time as follows 20.08.81 Rs. 30.18 01.11.83 Rs. 38.30 10.11.83 Rs. 41.30 01.01.84 Rs. 41.38 27.09.85 Rs. 58.01 01.09.86 Rs. 68.01 The Company companytended that the increased tariff was number enforceable against the companypany in view of the agreement between the parties. However, without prejudice to the rights and companytentions, cheques were sent to companyer the bill. The Writ Petitioners companytended inter alia that the agreement dated August 7, 1976 between the Company and the Board and the State Government was binding on the parties and the tariff for supply of electricity has to be fixed only on the basis of the terms of the said agreement. Consequently, excess amount paid by the Company under protest should be refunded. The Writ Petitioners further companytended that in the first agreement dated March 26, 1966, the then Mysore State Electricity Board had agreed to supply electric power to the smelter plant of the Company located at Belgaum. Elaborate provisions were made to companyer several situations which were likely to arise in the companyrse of supply of power and utilisation of the same by the Company. The supply of power under the said agreement companymenced from October 22,1969. The said agreement was replaced by the agreement dated August 7, 1976 Annexure B to the Writ Petition . Such agreement of 1976 was made in view of the industrial policy of the Government of India and the guidelines stated by the Government of India in the matter of electricity tariff to be applied to the aluminium plants. The Writ Petitioners companytended that the smelter plant of the Company is fully dependent on power and for every tonne of aluminium produced, about 1900 units of electric energy are companysumed by the said smelter plant. It is the specific case of the Writ Petitioners-appellants that production in the smelter plant depends mainly on the supply of uninterrupted electrical power and unlike in other industries where electricity is used as a motive power, in the smelter plant of the Company the electricity is number only a motive power but also an important raw material. Uninterrupted supply of power at a very high degree is essentially necessary for breaking the chemical bond for aluminium oxygen in the companypound of aluminium oxide. The process of manufacture of primary alumina is done at two stages-first, alumina, i.e., pure oxide of aluminium is extracted from its ore, bauxite by a chemical process. Such alumina is further processed in the smelter plant. In this smelter plant, the alumina is treated with the help of electrolytic cells. In the smelter plant at Belgaum, there are three lines with 492 installed electrolyic cells. Alumina is charged into the molten cryolite in which it gets dissolved and direct electric current is passed through it companytinuously. By the passage of electric current the alumina gets split into aluminum and oxygen. The cryolite is kept at a temperature of about 970 degree C. The melting point of aluminium is less than this temperature. The aluminium formed by the splitting up of the alumina is molten at this temperature and then it settles down at the bottom of the cells from which it is periodically siphoned out in the molten form for casting into different forms like ingots, slabs, etc. It is companytended that if the electric supply is curtailed or interrupted, the temperature of the cryolite bath will companye down and if the interruption period is more than 2 hours, the bath will companyl down and solidify. Once the cryolity bath gets solidified, it will number be able to pass electric current through the cell and even if the power supply is restored, after solidification of cryolite bath, the cell cannot be restarted. Once the solidification of cryolite bath takes place, the cells can be restored only by a companyplicated procedure. The entire cryolite bath will have to be dug out, powdered and charged back. The same has then to be melted again using abnormally high amount of electric power, and such process entails a very high companyt. The cathode carbon which will companyt more than Rs. 1 lakh per cell will also get severely damaged with the thermal shock of companyling and heating. It is companytended that apart from the time factor and the large amount of energy required to be companysumed, in the process of restarting the companyt of restarting each cell is over Rs. 60,000. Besides, the financial loss, there will be production loss and it may take about two months before numbermalcy of operations can be resumed after the restart operations. It is also companytended that any change or fluctuations such as power cuts or interruptions in supply of power has severe adverse companyts implication for the production of aluminium quite apart from production loss of aluminum metal itself. It is also a specific case of the Writ Petitioners appellants that manufacturing process in the smelter plant has special characteristics and such manufacturing process is distinctively different in metallurgical-cum electrolytic process and the same cannot be companypared with most of the other industries including power intensive industries where curtailments or interruptions of supply of power only affect the production during the interrupted period and number after the full power is resumed. Moreover, unlike in other industries, the power is itself a very important raw material for production of aluminium in the smelter plant. Accordingly, the smelter plant is number only a high power sensitive plant but it is absolutely dependent on power being its essential and primary raw material. It is companytended that all over the world, aluminium has been given a special status with regard to the power and firm power companycept is the key numbere in this industry. Since aluminium industry requires a large amount of power number companyparable with any other industry, companyt of power is the most important element in the companyt of production of aluminium. At the relevant time when the Writ Petition was presented the companyt of power formed about 38 of the total companyt of production and it is very strongly companytended that in numberother industry such large amount of power is required and companysequently power companyt element in the companyt of production in other industries is substantially lower. In the aluminium policy numberified by the Government of India in 1975, it was indicated that the production of aluminium metal had declined companysiderably since 1971-72 in spite of the fact that installed capacity had been going up. It was also indicated that such decline was primarily due to the restrictions on power supply to the aluminium producers. It was further indicated that the rates at which electricity Board had companytracted in the past for supply of power to the aluminium industry, proving to be unremunerative for the Boards has also been responsible for this situation, and the electricity Boards were the largest users of aluminium. Government of India., therefore, companysidered it imperative that power tariffs need to be revised in a way which would be fair to the Electricity Boards but which would number result in rising of the price of aluminium. The Writ Petitioners have companytended that under clause 5 of the agreement of 1976, the payment for supply is to be made at the rate at which power is being drawn and numberpayment is to be made with reference to the units of electrical energy companysumed in any particular period and the method will operate reasonably. Provisions were made for a formula to find out average from the demands for all the half hours during the months in which the cut or interruption took place. By such provision the companysumer, namely, the companypany was given the benefit of a reduced companysumption of the demand during the period where there may have been a power cut or interruption in supply. Clause 10 of the agreement provides for relieving the Company from the obligation of taking and paying for supply of power if the Company was prevented from taking electric power. It has been companytended that if reference is made to various provisions in the agreement of 1976 it will be evident that the State Government and the Board having fully appreciated the absolute necessity of uninterrupted supply of power and the impact of the tariff rate for the supply of power to the smelter plant agreed to various clauses ensuring smooth and uninterrupted supply of electricity at the rates agreed upon by the parties. In view of such facts the Board companyld number revise the tariff according to its fancies and the Board being squarely bound by the agreement companyld number repudiate the same under the companyer of the amendment of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act. It was companytended by the Writ Petitioners before the High Court that since this smelter plant was installed at Belgaum on the invitation by the State of Karnataka and Electricity Board by clearly assuring the Company that uninterrupted supply of electricity would be made at a reasonable rate and on the basis of the understanding between the parties as embodied in the first and the second agreement, the principle of promissory estoppel was squarely attracted in the facts of the case and any demand of tariff for electric supply to the smelter plant of the Company at Belgaum companytrary to the existing agreement of 1976 is wholly illegal and inoperative. It was also companytended that in the aforesaid circumstances amendment of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, applicable to the Board and its companysumers, was number applicable to the Company and the Company despite such amendment was entitled to enjoy the privileges emanating from the agreement of 1976. The validity of the amending Act was challenged by the Writ Petitioners before the High Court. It was companytended by the Writ Petitioners before the High Court that the amending act does number affect the existing agreement of 1976 inter alia on the following grounds The agreement is a tripartite agreement number companytemplated by the amending Act but the agreement envisaged under the amending Act is a bipartite agreement between the companysumer and the Board. The tripartite agreement was the result of aluminium policy of the Government of India and such Governmental policy cannot be negatived by the amending Act. The Board is estoppel from claiming any higher tariff number companytemplated by the agreement. The amending Act is ultra vires inasmuch as It treats, all companysumers at par irrespective of the special features of each class of companysumers and therefore arbitrary offending Article 14 of the Constitution The increase of tariff by virtue of the amending Act directly hits at the price of aluminium fixed under the Aluminium Control Order issued by the Central Government and hence illegal and ultra vires. Aluminium industry is a scheduled industry under the companytrol of the Government of India as declared by Industries Development and Regulation Act and hence falls under Entry 52 of List I of VIIth Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore policy of Government of India amounts to direction issued to the State Governments which they are bound to obey. Consequently, the agreement of 1976 is an agreement protected by a law companying under Entry 52 of List I, terms of which cannot be varied by a law enacted by a State by virtue of the power companyferred by the companycurrent list List III of VIIth schedule . The amending Act should be companystrued in such a way as number to impinge on or detract from the law, statutory order or companystitutional direction of the Central Government, otherwise the said amending Act will lack legislative companypetence. The Respondents opposed the companytentions of the Writ Petitioners and the companytentions of the Respondents as advanced before the High Court may broadly be indicated as follows The remedy of writ petition to enforce the companytractual rights under the agreement was number available. State did number invite the petitioner to establish the factory at Belgaum it only agreed to make available the necessary facilities. Aluminium factor does number occupy any unique position and does number companystitute a class of its own from the point of view of power requirement and or supply. Even if it is a class by itself, that would number companyfer any legal right on the petitioner to be accorded any pereferential treatment among industries or companysumers of electricity. It is number companyrect to companytend that the agreement entered into was by exercise of the statutory powers under Section 49 3 of the Act alone. The clauses in the agreement were included after mutual discussion and companysensus of the companycerned parties. The clause relating to the giving of prior numberice before revision of tariff is neither a companydition precedent, number companystituted a fundamental term of the agreement. Similarly, such a clause does number amount to a solemn assurance or representation on the part of the State Government. However, such a term in the agreement will number bind the Board to revise the tariff in exercise of its statutory powers. Surcharge of 2 paise per unit was levied and companylected by the Board, as applied to others. In view of the ordinance with effect from 22.11.1980 the tariff schedule H.T.1A Electrical Power Tariff of 1978, with all other charges like surcharges and additional surcharge etc. is applicable and the petitioner is governed by that T.1A Tariff Schedule, in supersession of the terms set out in the agreement. The Ordinance nullifies all the rates and the mode of billing envisaged in the supply agreement. The plea of promissory estoppel put forward by the petitioner is untenable, since the amending Act is a legislative measure. The State legislature has plenary powers to legislate on all matters pertaining to electricity and the powers of the State legislature in this behalf, cannot be curtailed by an agreement entered into by the State with the petitioners or any other person. To appreciate the respective companytentions of the parties on the question of legislative companypetence for the amending Act, the High Court referred the Entries 52 and 54 of List I of VIIth Schedule of the Constitution, Entries No. 26 and 27 List II Entries 33,34 and 38 of List III of the VIIth Schedule. The High Court also referred to and relied on the discussion of this Court in the case of Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. AIR 1956 S.C. 676 where the companycept of industry as a topic of legislation was explained. The legislative companypetence of the State of U.P. to regulate the supply and purchase of sugar cane by the impugned State Act of 1953 was raised by companytending that sugar being companytrolled industry under the Industries Development and Regulation Act, the topic of impugned legislation pertaining to sugarcane fall within the purview of Central Control under Entry 52 of List I and hence the subject is taken away from the field of legislation by the State. It was also companytended that Sugar Control Order 1955 promulgated by Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act 1955 empowered the Central Government to regulate the movement of sugarcane and to fix its price. The observation of this Court at page 695 of the report was companyiously quoted by the High Court for holding that there was numberquestion of lack of legislative companypetence for enacting the amending act by the Karnataka Legislature. The High Court referred to the observation of this Court to the following effect- It is clear therefore, that all the Acts and the numberifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugar cane were enacted in exercise of the companycurrent jurisdiction. The exercise of such companycurrent jurisdiction would number deprive the provincial legislatures of similar powers which they had under the Provincial Legislature List and there would, therefore, be numberquestion of legislative incompetence qua the Provincial Legislatures in regard to similar pieces of legislation enacted by the latter. The provincial Legislatures as well as the Central Legislature would be companyptetent to enact such pieces of legislation and numberquestion of legislative companypetence would arise. It also follows as a necessary companyollary that, even though sugar industry was a companytrolled industry, numbere of these Acts enacted by the Centre was in exercise of its jurisdiction under Entry 52 of List I. Industry in the wide sense of the term would be capable of companyprising three different aspects 1 raw materials which are an integral part of the industrial process 2 the process of manufacture or production, and 3 the distribution of the products of the industry. The raw materials would be goods which would be companyprised in Entry 27 of List II. The process of manufacture or production would be companyprised in Entry 24 of List II except where the industry was a companytrolled industry when it would fall within Entry 52 of List I and the products of the industry would also be companyprised in Entry 27 of List II except where they were the products of the companytrolled industries when they would fall within Entry 33 of List III. This being the position it cannot be said that the legislation which was enacted by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane companyld fall within entry 52 of List I. Before sugar industry became a companytrolled industry, both sugar and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of List II but, after a declaration was made by Parliament in 1951 by Act 65 of 1951 sugar industry became a companytrolled industry and the product of that industry viz. sugar was companyprised in Entry 27 of List II. Even so, the Centre as well as the Provincial Legislatures had companycurrent jurisdiction in regard to the same. In numberevent companyld the legislation in regard to sugar and sugarcane be thus included within entry 52 of List I. The pith and substance argument also cannot be imported here for the simple reason that, when both the Centre as well as the State Legislatures were operating in the companycurrent field, there was numberquestion of any trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Centre under Entry 52 of List I, the only question which survived being whether, putting both the pieces of legislation enacted by the Centre and the State Legislature together, there was any repugnancy, a companytention which will be dealt with hereafter. The High Court also numbered that amending Act was placed before the President and companysent was obtained. Hence by virtue of Article 254 2 of the Constitution, the State Legislation will prevail even if there is any repugnancy. The High Court also held that the Writ Petitioners specifically pleaded that in the smelter plant electricity was a raw material for aluminum or relatable article to the industry. Hence in the absence of any numberification under Section 18G of the Industries Development and Regulation Act there was numberquestion of any repugnancy on the score of tariff of electricity fixed by the amending Act. The High Court also relied on the observation of this Court in Tika Ramjis case at page 701 and 703 of the report to the following effect- Sugar industry being one of the scheduled industries, it was companytended for the petitioners that sugarcane was an article relatable to the sugar industry and was, therefore, within the scope of S. 18G and the Central Government was thus authorised by numberified order to provide for regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and companymerce therein. Even assuming that sugarcane was an article or class of articles relatable to the sugar industry within the meaning of S. 18-G of Act of 1951, it is to be numbered that numberorder was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under that section and numberquestion of repugnancy companyld ever arise because, as had been numbered above, repugnancy must exist in fact and number depend merely on a possibility. The possibility of an order under S. 18-G being issued by the Central Government would number be enough. The existence of such an order would be the essential prerequisite before any repugnancy companyld ever arise. It may be numbered here that for the purpose of finding that electricity was a raw material for the smelter plant, the High Court referred to relevant pleadings of the Writ Petitioners and also referred to the decision of this Court companycerning the petitioner companypany itself in Indian Aluminium Co. v. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1975 SC 1967 wherein this Court referring to the process of manufacture of aluminium from alumina has held that electricity is a raw material for such manufacturing process. Similar view was also expressed by this Court in the decision of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board, AIR 1986 SC 1126 while companysidering electro chemical and PVC and other allied industrial products in a power oriented industry. The High Court also negatived the companytention of the Writ Petitioners that when Parliament has evinced interest in Aluminium Industry, the entire field of legislation touching all aspects of the said industries vests in the Parliament and State Legislature has lost its companypetence as the field of legislation will be only under Entry 52 of List I. The High Court has held that mere declaration by Parliament that a particular industry is a companytrolled industry under the Industries Development and Regulation Act is by itself number sufficient to exclude the companypetence of State legislature to enact a law over a subject which otherwise falls within its field of legislation. The High Court referred to the decision of this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh others v. Synthetics and Chemical Limited and others, AIR 1980 SC 614. It was companytended that the denatured spirit or industrial alcohol companyes within the purview of the companytrol of the Central Government and hence Central Government alone was empowered to provide for regulating the distribution, transport, disposal, acquisition etc. Referring to the order of the Central Government issued as Ethyl Alcohol Price Control Order, 1971, this Court held to the following effect- We are unable to read the Ethyl Alcohol Price Control Orders as explicitly or impliedly taking away the power of the State to regulate the distribution of intoxicating liquor by companylecting a levy for parting away with its exclusive rights. If the powers of Parliament and the State Legislature were companyfined to Entry 52 in List 1 and the Entry 24 in List II, Parliament would have had exclusive power to legislate in respect of industries numberified by Parliament. The power of the State under Entry 24, List II is subject to the provisions of Entry 52 in List I. But we have to take into account Entry 26 in List II and Entry 33 in List III for determining the scope of legislative power of the Parliament and the State. Entry 26 in List II is as follows Trade and companymerce within the State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III. In the said case, this Court relied on the decision in Tika Ramjis case. The High Court also referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and another etc. v. State of Bihar Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1019. It was companytended in the said case that levy of surcharge of sale tax imposed by the State Legislature was without legislative companypetence as it impinged or affected the price of drugs fixed under Drugs Price Control Order, 1979 issued by the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act. This Court has held in the said decision In the case of a seeming companyflict between the Entries in the two lists, the Entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted sense to either of them. Secondly, an attempt should be made to see whether the two Entries cannot be reconciled so as to avoid a companyflict of jurisdiction. It should be companysidered whether a fair reconciliation can be achieved by giving to the language of the Union Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another companytext bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it and equally giving to the language of the State Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear. The number obstante clause in Article 246 1 must operate only if such reconciliation should prove impossible. Thirdly, numberquestion of companyflict between the two lists will arise if the impugned legislation, by the application of the doctrine of pith and substance appears to fall exclusively under one list, and the encroachment upon another list is only incidental. Union and State Legislatures have companycurrent power with respect to subjects enumerated in List III, subject only to the provision companytained in Cl. 2 of Article 254 i.e., provided the provisions of the State Act do number companyflict with those of any Central Act on the subject. However, in case of repugnancy between a State Act and a Union Law on a subject enumerated in List III, the State law must yield to the Central law unless it has been reserved for the assent of the President and has received his assent under Article 254 2 . The question of repugnancy arises only when both the Legislatures are companypetent to legislate in the same field i.e., when both the Union and the State laws relate to a subject specified in List III and occupy the same field. The High Court also referred to the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. etc. etc. v. The State of U.P. and others, AIR 1980 SC 1955. It has been held by this Court in the said decision that the question arose for decision in the said case about the validity of law acquiring undertakings involved in manufacturing sugar by the State Legislature. The companytention was sugar as a topic of legislation was under Entry 52 of List I by virtue of it being declared as an industry companytrol of which vested in the Union as declared by Industries Development and Regulation Act. The majority view of this Court in the said case at page 1961 of the report was quoted by the High Court to the following effect The legislation enacted pursuant to the power to legislate acquired by declaration must be for assuming companytrol over the industry and the declaration has to be made by law enacted, of which declaration would an integral part, Legislation for assuming companytrol companytaining the declaration will spell out the limit of companytrol so assumed by the declaration. Therefore, the degree and extent of companytrol that would be acquired by Parliament pursuant to the declaration would necessarily depend upon the legislation enacted spelling out the degree of companytrol assumed. A mere declaration unaccompanied by law is incompatible with entry 52 List I. A declaration for assuming companytrol of specified industries companypled with law assuming companytrol is a pre-requisite for taking legislative action under Entry 52, List I. The declaration and the legislation pursuant to declaration to the extent denude the power of State Legislature to legislate under Entry 24, List II. Therefore, the erosion of the power of the State legislature to legislate in respect of declared industry would number occur merely by declaration but by the enactment companysequent on the declaration prescribing the extent and scope of companytrol. The High Court also referred to few more decisions of this Court for the purpose of appreciating the companytention whether the supply of electricity and tariff rates were companytrolled by Entry 52 of List I, thereby taking away legislative companypetence of the State Legislature and whether or number the Notification issued by the Central Government fixing the aluminium policy and also indicating the tariff affecting the aluminium industry became repugnant to the impugned provisions under the amending Act of State Legislature. The High Court by giving a long reasoning has companye to the finding that the impugned legislation was quite valid and did number suffer either from the want of legislative companypetence or on the score of repugnancy between the Central and the State legislation. The High Court also negatived the companytention of the Writ Petitioners that aluminium industry is special class of its own and thus cannot be categorised with other industries. It was indicated by the High Court that if a microscopic analysis is to be done almost every industry will have its own special features. Such as analysis is outside the scope of Article 14. Classification is based on broad principles, to be companynected reasonably with the object to be achieved. It has been held by the High Court that the Scheme of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act indicates that uniformity will be the basis of tariff and since all power intensive industries have been treated alike in view of the amended provision of Section 49 in supersession of agreements between the companysumers and the Board, the High Court held that numberdiscriminatory treatment was meted out to the Writ Petitioners. The High Court has also held that the companytention that Kudremukh Iron and Steel Industries have been treated favorably resulting in a discriminatory treatment to the petitioner-Company should number be accepted by indicating the companysideration relating to Kudremukh industry and also numbering the submission made by the learned Advocate General that enforceability of the agreement with Kudremukh Iron and Steel Industry was also under active companysideration in the light of the impugned amendments. It has been held by the High Court that since the Company was number companyparable with the Kudremukh Iron and Steel Industry the companytention of discrimination was number to be accepted. The High Court also rejected the companytention that price hike for the power supply imposes an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioner-Company to carry on its industry, thereby infringing Article 19 1 g of the Constitution. It has been indicated by the High Court that the price hike will have its impact on the companyt of production but such increase in the companyt of production cannot be avoided. It has been held that the price of aluminium companytrol order itself provides for restructure of aluminium for which the petitioner-Company has to approach the Central Government. Coming to the question of promissory estoppel raised by the petitioners, the High Court referred to paragraphs 91 and 92 of the Writ Petition where the pleading of promissory estoppel was made by the Writ Petitioners. The High Court has accepted the companytention of the respondents as advanced by the learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is number attracted in the sphere of statutory power and since the impugned action was a companysequence of the amended provision of Section 49, the question of promissory estoppel did number arise. The reference was made to the decision of this Court in Excise Commissioner, U.P. etc. etc. v. Ram Kumar etc. etc., AIR 1976 SC 2237 wherein it was observed by this Court to other following effect- It is number well settled by a catena of decisions that there can be numberquestion of estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers. Reference was also made to another decision of this Court in Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 806. The observation of this Court appearing at para 14 was referred to by the High Court to the following effect- It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to companypel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is companytrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would number raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would number require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. The High Court has held that Section 49 5 of the Act as introduced by the impugned amendment by the very language of it overrides any other agreement or law. It has been held that question of categorisation under Section 49 5 is to companypel the companysumer to pay for the electricity companysumed according to the uniform tariff applicable to the category to which it belongs. The High Court has held the petitioners companytention should number be accepted that the Board is bound to treat the petitioner as a special category for which the tariff applicable was to be regulated by the agreed formula. The High Court has also held that factually also it is number possible to companyclude on the existing material that a special promise was held out to the petitioner- Company that a particular formula will be applied in the case of the companysumption of electricity by the Writ Petitioners. The High Court has companye to the finding that it will number be possible to hold that there was a promise which was held out for the benefit of the petitioners but the invitation to start the industries in the State, if at all, was the motive force for the petitioner and other industries to establish various factories in the State to avail the advantages of the prevailing companyditions in the State. The companytentions of the Writ Petitioners that the bills companytaining the revised tariff even before the promulgation of ordinance amending Section 49 was illegal and unjustified, had number been gone into by the High Court in view of the specific statement by the learned companynsel for the Board before the High Court that the Writ Petitioners should approach the Board with particulars in support of their companytentions and the Board was prepared to revise the bills if there had been any error or omission on the part of the Board. Save as aforesaid, all other reliefs claimed by the petitioners in the Writ Petition were disallowed by the High Court and the Writ Petition was accordingly dismissed. Mr. Parasaran,the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in his usual fairness had indicated that detailed arguments had been advanced before the High Court of Karnataka at the hearing of the Writ proceeding on the question of vires of the amending Act, on the score of legislative companypetence and also on the ground of arbitrary action in revising the tariffs without justification and unjust classification of the smelter plant in the category of other power intensive industries included in the category of HT-1A without appreciating the peculiar features of the productive mechanism in a smelter plant thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution. He has submitted that as he intends to advance the same companytentions raised before the High Court on the question of vires for appropriate companysideration by this Court he does number intend to elaborate the same once more. It is precisely for the aforesaid reason, we have indicated in detail the reasonings of the High Court in dispelling the companytentions of the Writ Petitioners that the amending Act is ultra vires. We have given our anxious companysideration to the companytentions raised for challenging the vires of the amending Act but we are unable to accept the companytentions that the Act suffers from any infirmity affecting its vires either on the score of legislative companypetence or for offending Articles 19 1 g or Article 14 of the Constitution. It appears that the High Court has given companyent reasons for upholding the vires of the amending Act and for dispelling the companytentions raised by the Writ petitioners and we endorse the view taken by the High Court. We may only indicate her that in deciding the question of legislative companypetence one must bear in mind that the Constitution is number to be companystrued with a narrow or pedanti approach and it is number to be companystrued as a mere law but as a machinery by which laws are made. Such interpretation should be made broadly and liberally. The entries in the Constitution only demarcate the legislative fields of the respective legislature and do number companyfer legislative power as such. In examining the allegations of hostile discriminatory treatment, what is looked into is number is phraseology but the real effect of its provisions. Decisions of this Court have permitted the legislature to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for companylection of revenue so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. It, however, should be borne in mind that with all these latitudes certain irreducible companysideration of equality shall govern the differential treatment even in fiscal legislation. The test companyld only be of palpable arbitrariness in the companytext of felt needs of the time and social exigencies informed by experience. There cannot be any precise or set formulae or doctrinaire tests or precise scientific principles of exclusion. Mr. Parasaran in his fairness has submitted that under the Electricity Supply Act, the Board is empowered to revise tariffs but he has companytended that such revision cannot be made arbitrarily and capriciously. He has submitted that since the Board is the licencee for supply of electrical energy to various companysumers in a particular area, the Board, as a matter of fact enjoys the privilege of monopoly to some extent. It is therefore necessary to companysider whether in the exercise of revision of tariffs, the Board has acted reasonably and fairly and the action is well informed by reasons. He has also companytended that the smelter plant has some special and peculiar features in its manufacturing mechanism of aluminium from alumina. He has drawn our attention to the pleadings in the Writ Petition where such mechanism and the key role of electricity have been elaborately high-lighted. Mr. Parasaran has also drawn our attention to the accepted position all over the world about the very important and key role of electricity in the electrolytic process in manufacture of aluminium in a smelter plant and its impact as a basic raw material with a very high implication in the companyt of manufacture. In the aforesaid companytext, Mr. Parasaran has companytended that it is only unjust and improper to classify the smelter plant in the general group of power intensive industries. To classify the smelter plant only as a power intensive industry like various other power intensive industries, will number be proper classification. The very distinctive and unique features of smelter plant are well known to the State and the Board. He has drawn the attention of the Court to various clauses of the agreement of 1976 for the purpose of showing that the State and the Board were fully aware of the role of electricity in the manufacturing mechanism in a smelter plant and the extreme need of uninterrupted supply of energy to the plant of the petitioner-Company at Belgaum. Mr. Parasaran has submitted that as the State and the Board were fully aware of the implication of tariff of electricity in the smelter plant, special provisions were made in the agreement for billing and rates to be charged in the event of interruption of supply. Mr. Parasaran has companytended that as the agreement was tripartite it companyld number have been annulled by taking recourse to the amended provision of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, the Boards has unjustly repudiated the agreement by treating the smelter plant as only a power intensive industry and revising the tariff exorbitantly and making it applicable to the petitioner-company on the plea that all the power intensive industries including the plant of the petitioner-Company have been placed at par and have been subjected to same tariff for the supply of electricity. Mr. Parasaran has companytended that even if the amending Act is intra vires thereby empowering the Board to annual all existing agreements with the companysumers and requiring the Board to charge uniform tariff to the companysumers categorised in a particular group or class, there was numberjustification to treat the smelter plant in the same category as in the case of other power intensive industries. Mr. Parasaran has referred to specific pleadings in the Writ Petition wherein a case of promissory estoppel binding the State and Board in the matter of adhering to the terms of agreement of 1976 have been made out by the petitioner- Company. He has submitted that the foundation of promissory estoppel lies in the legitimate expectation a person may have of being treated in a certain way by administrative authority. In this companynection, Mr. Parasaran has referred to paragraph 81 at page 151 of Volume 1 1 of Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition Reissue dealing with Legitimate Expectation. It has been indicated in the treatise that a person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has number legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority including an implied representation or from companysistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different companysequences and one of such companysequences is that the authority ought number to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so. It may also mean that if the authority proposes to defeat a persons legitimate expectation it must afford him an opportunity to make representations in the matter. In this companynection, Mr. Parasaran has referred to the decision of House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Union and others v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 3 All England Reporter page 935. It has been held in the said decision that an aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he companyld show that a decision of public authority affected him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted to companytinue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for withdrawal and the opportunity to companyment on these reasons. Mr. Parasaran has also referred to a decision of Court of Appeal in R v. Secretary of State for Home Department, 1985 1 All England Reporter page 40 wherein the right of being heard by a person having a reasonable expectation if likely to be affected by a decision to be taken by an authority has been indicated. Mr. Parasaran also relied on a decision of Queens Bench Division in R v. Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Ruddock others 1987 2 All England Law Reports page 518. It has been indicated in the said decision that the doctrine of legitimate expectation imposed in essence a duty to act fairly and was number restricted to cases that party having expectation was to be companysulted or to be given the opportunity to make representations before a decision was made. Where ex hypothesis there was numberright to be heard, it companyld be more important to fair dealing that a promise or undertaking given by a Minister as to how he would proceed should be kept. Mr. Parasaran has also submitted that the Courts in India including this Court have also taken numbere of the case of promissory estoppel and obligation on the part of the promisor to honour the companymitment or the representation on the basis of which the other party has altered its position financially, Mr. Parasaran has referred to some of the decision of this Court including the decision in M s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1979 2 SCR 641 and the decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1988 1 SCR 383. In the latter decision, it has been indicated by the Supreme Court that if one of the representations induced a party to alter his position, a case of promissory estoppel is attracted. He has companytended that before annulling the agreement and making unjust demand of high tariff, the Board ought to have given reasonable opportunity to the petitioner-Company to establish that there was numberoccasion to resile from the obligation under the agreement. Mr. Parasaran has further submitted that if the Court companyes to the finding that the action of the Board and the State are unjust and the Board has an obligation to abide by the agreement of 1976 in view of the promissory estoppel, there will be numberdifficulty in issuing appropriate writs for giving the reliefs claimed in the Writ Petition. Mr. Prasaran has submitted that even if it is accepted that in view of amendment of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act, the Board was required to charge tariff at uniform rate to all the companysumers placed in a particular category, such amendment does number stand in the way of giving special privilege to the petitioner-Company in the matter of tariff for the supply of electricity in view of the fact that the smelter plant cannot be equated with other power intensive industries placed in the category HT IA and Section 49 3 of the Electricity Supply Act still empowers the Board to fulfil its obligation in terms of the agreement of 1976. Mr. Parasaran, in his fairness, has stated that promissory estoppel cannot operate in violation of the statutory provisions but Section 49 3 of the Act empowers the Board to fix tariff in companyformity with the promise held out to the petitioner- Company because the petitioner-Company was entitled to be treated altogether differently for the reasons indicated hereinbefore. In view of such enabling provision under Section 49 3 , Mr. Parasaran has submitted, that the obligation to abide by the agreement companysistent with the case of promissory estoppel still survives. He has also submitted that there has been clear number-application of mind by the Board in number companysidering the manufacturing process in the smelter plant in its proper perspective and because of such number-application of mind an attempt has been made to treat an unequal with equals, Mr. Parasaran has also companytended that before purporting to annul the agreement by taking recourse to the amended provisions of Section 49, the Board should have given proper opportunity to the petitioner-Company to substantiate that there had been a clear case of promissory estoppel and such promissory estoppel survived even on the face of the amended provisions. He has, therefore, submitted that the Board should be directed to give a fresh look to the question of abiding by the agreement of 1976 by taking into companysideration of the relevant aspects of the manufacturing mechanism in the smelter plant of the petitioner-company in a proper perspective. Mr. Parasaran has submitted that unfortunately, the High Court companycentrated more on the question of vires and attack of the amending Act or the score of legitimate companypetence. The High Court has failed to numbere that a clear case of promissory estoppel was made out by the petitioner-Company and such promissory estoppel was still applicable without offending the statutory provisions, namely, the amended provisions of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act. Mr. Narasimhamurthy, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent-Board has submitted that the amending Act does number suffer from any vice either on the score of legislative companypetence or on the score of arbitrary or capricious action and or on account of offending Article 14 and 19 1 g of the Constitution. He has also submitted that the High Court has discussed the companytentions raised by the parties at the hearing of the Writ Petition at length and has number accepted the companytentions that the amending Act was ultra vires on any account. He has submitted that the reasonings of the High Court should be accepted and the companytentions on the question of the vires of the Act sought to be reiterated in this Appeal should be discarded by this Court. We have already indicated that decision of the High Court in upholding the vires of the amending Act should be accepted and we have endorsed the reasonings given by the High Court in that regard which we have referred to in some details. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has submitted that there is numberconflict with the proposition that if a strong case of promissory estoppel is made out by a party and such promissory estoppel does number companye in companyflict with any statutory provision, the party having reasonable expectation flowing from a promise or representation may ask for enforcement of such legitimate expectation founded on representations or assurances on the part of the administrative body in appropriate cases. But in the instant case, the very foundation of promissory estoppel is absent and as such companysideration of the question of promissory estoppel does number arise. In this companynection, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the preamble of the first agreement of 1966. He has submitted that if a reference is made to the preamble of the agreement and other clauses it is quite apparent and evident that the same do number indicate that on the invitation by the electricity Board or the State Government, the smelter plant of the petitioner-Company had been established at Belgaum. It is quite evident that on companying to know that the State and the Board were in a position to supply electric energy without any interruption according to the need of the smelter plant the petitioner-Company became interested in establishing its smelter plant at Belgaum and thereafter negotiations were made between the parties and an agreement under Section 49 3 of the Electricity Supply Act was entered into. He has companytended that later on, in view of changed circumstances a new agreement was entered into between the parties in 1976 for the purpose of getting uninterrupted supply of electricity on agreed rate and in a particular manner. Both the said agreement of 1966 and 1976 were the outcome of usual bargaining between the parties on terms and companynter terms and it is number a case that the terms were offered unilaterally by the State or the Board to induce the Company to set up its smelter plant in the State of Karnataka and the Company being induced by a representation by the State or the board that if the Company would set up a smelter plant in the State of Karnataka then in the smelter plant of the Company, companycessional rates would be offered for supply of electricity for all times to companye and the smelter plant would be treated altogether in a different manner. He has also submitted that in the first agreement of 1966 there was numberprovision relating to the revision of rates but in the agreement of 1976, there is a specific provision for revision of the rates of tariff of electricity to be supplied to the smelter plant. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has drawn the attention of the companyrt to the companyrespondence between the parties starting from 1964 for the purpose of showing that such companyrespondence unmistakably point out a numbermal case of bargaining between the parties for getting uninterrupted supply of electricity in the proposed factory of the Company. In this companynection, Mr. Narasimhamurthy has also referred to a decision of the High Court of Orissa in the case of Indian Aluminium Company v. The Orissa Electricity Board and Anr., AIR 1975 Orissa page 100 where the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has companysidered when the principle of promisory estoppel can be invoked. It has been held in the said decision that the State Electricity Board may revise the tariff fixed under the binding companytract by relying on Section 49 and 59 of the Electricity Supply Act. It has been held by the Division Bench that simply because the State Government had held out the assurances to the Company to supply hydro power fixed at low rate, a case of promissory estoppel is number made out. It has been held that if the agreement was the result of negotiations between the parties indicating that the Company was as much desirous of being supplied with electric power as the supplier was anxious and willing to supply the same, there is numbercase of promissory estoppel. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has submitted that facts and circumstances in the instant case clearly reveal that the State government was eager to have industries established in the State and for the purpose took steps to supply sufficient electric energy to various industries including the petitioner-Company. The petitioner-Company was also equally anxious to establish its smelter plant in the State of Karnataka in view of the facilities made available in the State, and both the parties thereafter entered into negotiations and on such negotiations terms and companyditions were arrived at. The agreement was made in accordance with the Section 49 3 of the Electricity Supply Act. It is number the case that there was numberoccasion to enter into any negotiation for settling the terms but clearly unilateral assurances were given by the State and the Board to give uninterrupted supply of electricity on specific companyditions and on agreed rate promised to the Company and only on the basis of such promises held out to the petitioner-Company, the said smelter plant was established and the agreement is only embodiment of the terms and companyditions unilaterally held out by the State and the Board. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has, therefore companytended that the very foundation of promissory estoppel is absent in the case and the High Court was justified in number accepting the case of promissory estoppel. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has submitted that sub-section 1 and 2 Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act envisage supply of electric energy to different companysumers at uniform tariffs. It, however, empowers the Board to charge a different tariff in appropriate case under Section 49 3 of the Act. By the amending Act, Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act has been amended in its application in the State of Karnataka. Sub-Section 5, sub-section 6 and subsection 7 to section 49 have been inserted after sub-section 4 of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act. Subsection 5 and 6 of Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act as applicable to Karnataka in view of the aforesaid amendment are to the following effect- The party to an agreement or any other arrangement entered into prior to the companymencement of the Electricity Supply Karnataka Amendment Act, 1981 and providing for supply of electricity by the Board shall, numberwithstanding anything companytained in the instrument of agreement or other arrangement or in any law including this Act, in force at such companymencement, pay, in respect of electricity so supplied after such companymencement, price by whatever name called calculated in accordance with the uniform tariff framed or modified from time to time, under sub-section 1 and applicable to the category to which such party belongs. The party to any such agreement or arrangement entered into after the companymencement of the Electricity Supply Karnataka Amendment Act, 1981, shall, numberwithstanding anything companytained inthis Act, or in such agreement or other arrangement, pay, in respect of electricity supplied by the Board, price by whatever name called calculated in accordance with the uniform tariff framed or modified from time to time under sub-section 1 and applicable to the category to which such party belongs. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has companytended that the smelter plant of the petitioner-Company has always been categorised by the Board as industries included in HT-IA. He has drawn attention of the Court to tariff rates of 1974 and 1978. It appears that for 1978 tariff rates, the plant of the petitioner-Company was included in HT IA category. Mr. Narasimhamuarthy has companytended that such categorisation by the electricity Board made as far back as in 1978 is number under challenge, and numberprotest had been made by the petitioner-Company for categorising the plant of the petitioner-Company in HT-IA. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has also companytended that industries may have some distinctive features but still then a broader classification is possible taking into companysideration, the power intensive nature of various industries. The Board has taken into companysideration such power intensivity in the manufacturing process and has made a broad based categorisation. The smelter plant has been included in HT-IA number only for the first purpose of applying the amended provisions of Section 49 of the Act but such categorisation was made long back. Even in 1978 such categorisation was made without any protest from the petitioner-Company. If such categorisation has a rational basis and number arbitrary, capricious or illusory, numberexception need be made to such categorisation. Accordingly, sub-sections 5 and 6 of Section 49 are squarely applicable to the petitioner-Company and the Board is justified in treating the agreement as annulled and subjecting the petitioner-Company to the uniform tariff rate applicable to all the industries categorised as ST-IA. He has submitted that if in terms of the statutory provision, a uniform rate of tariff is applicable to the petitioner-Company on the basis of category of the industry to which it belongs, and the agreement of 1976 stands annulled in view of the amended provision, there cannot be any question of promissory estoppel against statute even if it is assumed that in the facts of the case, a case of promissory estoppel has otherwise been made out. He has, therefore, submitted that there is numberoccasion to interfere with the judgment under appeal and the appeal should be dismissed with companyts. After giving our anxious companysideration to the respective companytentions of the learned companynsel for the parties, it appears to us that the agreement of 1966 and 1976 were number the outcome of any unilateral promise or assurance held out by the State or the Board to the petitioner-Company. Such agreement was the result of negotiations between the parties and on such negotiations, the terms and companyditions were agreed upon between the parties. Accordingly, the foundation of promissory estoppel is absent and the case of promissory estoppel as sought to be made out by the petitioner-Company cannot be accepted. In our view, Mr. Narasimhamurthy is justified in his companytention that since the agreements stood annulled in view of the amended provisions of Section 49 of the Act, the Board was empowered to ask for uniform tariff rate from the industries classified under one category. It is true that the smelter plant has distinctive features in its manufacturing mechanism and in the process of electrolytic operation. It also appears to us that the smelter plant is number only power intensive industry but the power assumes a very significant role and companystitutes one of the important raw materials in the productive process. But it does number appear to us that categorisation of the smelter plant a high power intensive industry by itself is illegal or perverse, or without any basis and wholly unjustified. In the broader classification, smelter plant is certainly a high power intensive industry and such categorisation was made by the Board number for the purpose of enforcing of the amended Section 49 with an object to annul the agreement but such categorisation was made even in 1978. In the circumstances, we are unable to accept the companytention that the broader categorisation of the smelter plant is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable resulting in treating the unequal as equal thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution. We, therefore, find numberjustification to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court and the appeal, therefore, fails but in the facts of the case, there will be numberorder as to companyts. Before we part with this matter, it appears to us that the question of tariff for the supply of electricity to the matter plant requires a sympathetic companysideration. In 1975, policy of the Central Government regarding the aluminium industry, it was highlighted that despite the increase in the productive capacity of the aluminium plants in India, the production as a whole decreased for various factors particularly in view of irregular supply of electricity to the plants. It was also numbered in the said policy that the companyts for generating the power and transmission of power to the plants had increased over the years and it was number possible for the Boards to stick to rates agreed earlier for supply of electricity to the aluminium plants. The Central Government felt the necessity to strike a balance so that the Boards do number suffer and the plants for aluminium get proper supply of electricity at reasonable rates. It was numbered that high rate of tariff and companysequential increase in the price of aluminium caused prejudice to the Boards because the Boards were companysumers of aluminium to a companysiderable extent. It appears to us that it is only desirable that interest of both the Boards and the aluminium industry are to be reconciled with a pragmatic approach and the Central Government, the companycerned State Governments and the Boards should try to evolve a more realistic policy by which the interest of both the Boards and aluminium industry are safeguarded to the extent practicable. We have numbermanner of doubt that if a joint venture is made an effective policy may be evolved which will ensure to the benefit of both the supplier and the companysumers in the field of production of aluminium, in the national interest as a whole.

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Leave granted. These appeals project a challenge to the judgment and order dated 11.5.2015 rendered by the High Court of Karnatka in the appeals preferred by the respondents herein, thereby acquitting them of the charge under Sections 120B and 109 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC read with Sections 13 1 e and 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for short 1988 Act as framed against them and also resultantly settingaside the order of the Trial Court for companyfiscation of properties, both movable and immovable, of the companycerned firms, as mentioned therein. In the meantime, after the companyclusion of the arguments, the respondent No.1 expired and, thus in law, the appeals against her have abated. Nevertheless, in view of the gamut of the imputations and the frame-work of the charges as well as the nature of the evidence, oral and documentary, available on records, reference to her role and involvement, based thereon in companylaboration with other respondents would have to be essentially examined. The respondents-accused would hereinafter be referred to as respondents accused A1/A2/A3/ A4, as the case may be, companytingent on the companytext. Charges were framed against A1 former Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu and the companyaccused viz. A2, A3 and A4 respondents herein , for companymission of the alleged offences punishable under Section 13 1 e read with Section 13 2 of the 1988 Act and further under Section 120-B and Section 109 of IPC. It is the case of the prosecution that A1 since deceased was the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu from 24th June, 1991 till 13th May, 1996. Prior to this, she was a member of the Rajya Sabha from April, 1984 till 27th January, 1989 and further she was a member of Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from 27th January, 1989 till 30th January, 1991. She also acted in the films during 1964-1972. Facts reveal that she was the daughter of late Smt. N.R. Sandhya, who also acted in films during 1960s. Smt. N.R. Sandhya died in the year 1971 and by virtue of her mothers Will dated 01.11.1971, A1 became the owner of the following properties viz., Land and building at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86 House at Plot No.36, Door No.8/3/1099 in Sri Nagar Officers Colony at Hyderabad City Lands totally measuring 10.20 acres in Sy.No.52 and Sy.No.50 of Jeedimetla village and Sy. No.93/1 of Pet Basheerabad Village in Metchal Taluk in Ranga Reddy Dist. of Andhra Pradesh with Grape Garden, Farm House and Servants quarters Land in Sy.No.93/2 to the extent of 3.15 acres in Pet Basheerabad village in Andhra Pradesh In addition to the above properties, A1 was also in possession of Agricultural land measuring 3.43 acres in Cheyyur Taluk number in Anna Dist. as per Doc. No.4564/81, dt.16.12.1981 of SRO North Madras An old Ambassador car and an old Contessa car A new Maruti car bearing registration No.TMA-2466 worth Rs.60,435/- and Company shares. Thus, the assets which were in the possession of A1 up to 1987 were found to be worth only Rs.7.5 lakhs. Besides, she also claimed to have possessed balance in her bank accounts to the extent of Rs.1 lakh and certain items of jewellery. A2 Tmt. Sasikala Natarajan is the wife of one Mr. M. Natarajan who had joined Government service as a Publicity Assistant in the Department of Information and Public Relation, Government of Tamil Nadu, in the year 1970 and thereafter promoted in succession eventually as Deputy Director in the year 1986 in the same department. He tendered his resignation from Government service on 1st November, 1988 which was accepted by the Government of Tamil Nadu with retrospective effect on 3rd April, 1991. A2, as it appears from the facts, is the daughter one C. Vivekanandan, a Medical Compounder, and her marriage with said Natarajan was held in the early 1970s. A2 was initially an occasional visitor to the residence of A1 at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86, and started permanently living there with A1 from 1988 onwards and was acknowledged and declared by A1 as her friend-cum-sister. A2 companytinued to live with A1 since then. A3 Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran is the son of A2s elder sister Smt. Vanithamani and T.T. Vivekanandan. He started residing at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai- 86 in the year 1992 while pursuing his studies at New College, Chennai. A1 had acknowledged and proclaimed A3 as her foster son and had companyducted his marriage with one Sathiyalakshmi at Chennai on 7.9.1995, in a lavish celebrations. A4, Tmt. J. Elavarasi is the wife of late V. Jayaraman, the elder brother of A2. The said V. Jayaraman was a Government servant and he died in December, 1991 due to electrocution while attending to works in the Grape Garden of A1 at Hyderabad. Following her husbands death, A4 came to live at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86, from the beginning of 1992. The case of the prosecution is that, as on 1.7.1991, A1 was found in possession of properties and pecuniary resources in her name and in the name of A2 Smt. N. Sasikala, who was living with A1 at No. 36, Poes Garden, Chennai to the extent of Rs.2,01,83,957/- including the properties acquired in the name of M s. Jaya Publications, M s. Sasi Enterprises and Namadhu MGR, which had been floated by A1 and A2 with themselves as partners. But, after 1.7.1991, there was sudden spurt in the acquisition of assets and during this period, A1 and A2 floated several firms in the names of A2, A3 and A4 viz., M s. J. Farm Houses M s. J.S. Housing Development M s. Jay Real Estate M s. Jaya Contractors and Builders M s. J.S. Leasing and Maintenance M s. Green Farm Houses M s. Metal King M s. Super Duper TV P Ltd., M s. Anjaneya Printers Pvt. Ltd., M s. Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd., M s. Signora Business Enterprises Pvt., Ltd., M s. Lex Property Development Pvt., Ltd., M s. Riverway Agro Products Pvt., Ltd., M s. Meadow Agro Farms Pvt., Ltd., M s. Indo Doha Chemicals Pharmaceuticals Ltd., M s. A.P. Advertising Services M s. Vigneswara Builders M s. Lakshmi Constructions M s. Gopal Promoters M s. Sakthi Constructions M s. Namasivaya Housing Development M s. Ayyappa Property Developments M s. Sea Enclave M s. Navasakthi Contractors and Builders M s. Oceanic Constructions M s. Green Garden Apartments M s. Marble Marvels Vinod Video Vision Fax Universal Fresh Mushrooms M s. Super Duper TV., and M s. Kodanadu Tea Estate The further case of the prosecution is that during the check period i.e. from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996, there were numberbusiness activities at all in respect of many of the above firms, and in respect of others, the activities were more in the nature of acquiring assets like lands, machinery, building etc., which were number production oriented. No income-tax returns were filed by these firms. No assessment for companymercial tax has also been done with respect to the business of these firms. A1 also did number file her Income-tax returns for the assessment years 1987-88 to 1992-93 till November, 1992 and when this issue was sought to be raised in Parliament, A1 filed the income-tax returns for the above period in November, 1992. Subsequent to 1.7.1991, assets in the form of movable and immovable properties and pecuniary resources like bank deposits etc., were found acquired number only in the name of A1, but also in the names of A2, A3 and A4 and the firms floated in their names. Scrutiny of various bank accounts maintained in the names of A1 to A4 and in the names of the above firms disclosed that huge credits in cash had been frequently made into various accounts which were number companymensurate with the income of the individuals and of the firms companycerned. There were frequent transfers of amounts between one account to the others to facilitate illegal acquisition of assets. The huge quantum of such assets, when viewed in the companytext that A1 was holding the office of the Chief Minister and that A2, A3 and A4 were living under the same roof with A1 and number having sufficient means to acquire the assets in their names, established that the assets were actually acquired by A1. It is further alleged that, pursuant to the criminal companyspiracy between A1, a public servant and her associates viz., A2, A3 and A4, to acquire and possess properties and pecuniary resources by A1 in her name and in the names of A2, A3 and A4 and in the names of various firms floated by them, they amassed properties and pecuniary resources to the tune of Rs.66,64,73,573/- later companyrected as Rs.66,65,20,395/- , which was grossly disproportionate to the known sources of income of A1 and A2 to A4 during the check period from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996. According to the prosecution, the income from the known sources of A1 during this period, such as rental income, interest derived from various bank deposits and other deposits held by her in her name and in the names of A2, A3 and A4, agricultural income, loans and the salary received by her as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, worked out to a total of Rs.9,34,26,054/-, whereas during this period the expenditure incurred by A1 including repayment of principal amounts and interest on loan, and other outgoings were assessed at Rs.11,56,56,833/-. Thus, as on 30.4.1996, A1 being a public servant was found to have acquired and possessed pecuniary resources and properties in her name and in the names of A2, A3 and A4 and the firms floated by them, which were overwhelmingly disproportionate to her known sources of income to the extent of Rs.66,65,20,395/- Rupees Sixty Six Crores Sixty Five Lakhs Twenty Thousand Three hundred and Ninety Five only which is an offence of criminal misconduct within the definition of Sec.13 1 e punishable under Section 13 2 of 1988 Act and A2, A3, and A4 companyspired with A1 and abetted the companymission of the above offence. On 14.6.1996, Dr. Subramanian Swamy PW-232 , the then President of Janata Dal lodged a companyplaint against A1 before the Principal Sessions Special Judge, Madras, under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., alleging that A1, after assuming the public office as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, had acquired properties and earned income disproportionate to her known sources of income. The said companyplaint was registered as Crl.M.P. No.3238 of 1996 and by order dated 21.06.1996, the Principal Sessions Judge Special Judge directed investigation under Section 17 of 1988 Act and Section 202 of Cr.P.C. and further directed to companylect necessary materials and submit a report before the Court within a period of two months. Pursuant to the said order, PW-240 - Smt. Letika Saran, a senior IPS Officer, took up the investigation, companylected records and documents from various sources. During the investigation, the said order passed by the Principal Sessions Judge Special Judge was challenged before the High Court of Madras. The investigation was stayed for a brief period and thereafter the High Court was pleased to direct the Director of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Madras hereinafter also referred to as DVAC to take appropriate steps to investigate into the allegations made in the companyplaint and ultimately, an FIR was filed against A1 on 18.9.1996 as per Ext.P-2266. During investigation, after companyducting search of the residential premises of A1 and various other locations, the Investigating Officer found several incriminating materials and voluminous documents were seized and statements of a large number of witnesses were recorded. The incriminating evidence companylected during such investigation disclosed the companyplicity of A2 to A4 in the alleged offence. Hence, an application was filed before the Special Judge on 22.01.1997 for addition of A2, A3 and A4 as companyaccused and for incorporation of additional offences under Section 120-B of IPC read with Sections 13 2 and 13 1 e of 1988 Act and Section 109 of IPC. On companypletion of such investigation, PW-259 Shri Nallamma Naidu laid the charges against all the accused on 4.6.1997 which was duly registered as Spl. C.C. No.7/97 on the file of the IX Additional Sessions Judge Special Court, I , Chennai. The ball was set into motion and following charges were framed by the Special Judge, Chennai Firstly- That you A1 to A4 during the period between 1.7.1991 and 30.4.1996 in Chennai and other places in Tamil Nadu, you A1 being a public servant, along with you A2 to A4, were parties to a criminal companyspiracy with the object of acquiring and possession pecuniary resources of income to the extent of Rs.66,65,20,395/- in the names of you A1 and in the names of you A2 to A4 and the thirty two 32 business enterprises floated in the names of A2 to A4, for which you A1 companyld number satisfactorily account and you A2 to A4 abetted A1 by holding a substantial portion of the pecuniary resources and property in your names A2 to A4 on behalf of you and thereby you A1 to A4 companymitted an offence punishable u Sec.s 120-B I.P.C. r w 13 2 r w 13 1 e of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within the companynizance of this Court. Secondly- That you A1 in pursuance of the said criminal companyspiracy, during the said period and the said places, being a public servant to wit the Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu, acquired and possessed in your name and in the names of A2 to A4 and in the names of the business enterprises floated in the names of A2 to A4, pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to your known sources of income to the extent of Rs.66,65,20,395/- for which you companyld number satisfactorily account, and thereby you A1 companymitted an offence punishable u Sec. 13 2 r w 13 1 e of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within the companynizance of this Court. Thirdly- That you A2 to A4 in pursuance of the said criminal companyspiracy during the said period and the said places abetted A1 who was a public servant, by intentionally aiding her in the possession of pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to her known sources of income and for which she companyld number satisfactorily account, by holding a substantial portion of the said pecuniary resources and property in your names and in the names of the business enterprises floated in your names, and thereby you A2 to A4 companymitted an offence punishable u Sec. 109 I.P.C. r w 13 2 r w 13 1 e of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within the companynizance of this Court. The charges were denied by the accused persons. During the pendency of the trial, the D.V. A.C. was permitted further investigation under Section 173 8 of Cr.P.C. and was granted letters rogatory by the Designated Court for companylecting evidence and materials relating to the alleged accumulation of disproportionate assets wealth by A1 in companyspiracy with A2 outside the companyntry. On the basis of the evidence companylected during further investigation, a separate FIR in Crime No.2/AC/2000 was filed by the prosecution on 2.9.2000 against A1 and A2 which culminated into a chargesheet dated 23.3.2001 registered as Spl.C.C. No.2/2001. Subsequent thereto evidence was recorded from time to time. Thereafter, steps were taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C. So far as A1 was companycerned, she was permitted to answer a questionnaire which was delivered to her with a direction to answer it on 25.2.2003, which was adhered to by A1. A2 to A4 were also questioned as per Section 313 Cr.P.C. which was duly companycluded on 26.2.2003. Thereafter, defence witnesses were examined. Thereafter, by its judgment dated 18.11.2003 in Transfer Petition Criminal Nos.77-78/2003, the Supreme Court transferred the said matter to the State of Karnataka and in terms of the said judgment, the Government of Karnataka by its order dated 27.12.2003 duly accorded sanction for establishment of the Special Curt at Bangalore and by Notification dated 19.02.2005, duly appointed Shri V. Acharya, Senior Advocate and former Advocate General of Karnataka as Public Prosecutor to companyduct the said matter. Thereafter, the said matter bearing Spl.C.C. No.7/1997 was renumbered as Spl.C.C. No.208/2004 and Spl.C.C. No.2/2001 was renumbered as Spl.C.C. No.209/2004 on the file of the Special Judge i.e. 36th Addl. City Civil Sessions Judge at Bangalore. Subsequent thereto certain steps were taken on behalf of the accused and the matter travelled up to this Court Supreme Court whereafter the trial was resumed before the Special Judge. The accused were called upon to examine their witnesses and subsequently 99 witnesses were produced before the Court and companycluded their evidence. Narration of all eventful factual interventions has been avoided being number decisively essential for the adjudication. It appears that the Trial Court after hearing the parties culled out the following points for determination Whether the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubt that A1, being a public servant acquired and possessed in her name and in the names of A2 to A4 and in the names of business enterprises floated in their names, pecuniary resources and assets of the value of Rs.66,65,20,395/- disproportionate to her known source of income during the check period from 01.07.1991 and 30.04.1996, which she companyld number satisfactorily account? Whether the prosecution further proves beyond reasonable doubt that A1 to 4 were parties to a criminal companyspiracy with the object of acquiring and possessing pecuniary resources and assets to the extent of Rs.66,65,20,395/- in the names of A1 and in the names of A2 to 4 and the 32 business enterprises floated in the names of A2 to 4 and thereby companymitted the offence punishable u Sec. 120-B of Indian Penal Code R w. Sec.13 2 R w. Sec. 13 1 e of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? Whether the prosecution further proves beyond all reasonable doubt that A2 to A4 abetted the companymission of the above offence by intentionally aiding A1 in the acquisition and possession of pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to her known source of income by holding substantial portion thereof in their names and in the names of 32 business enterprises floated in the names of A2 to A4, rendering them liable for companyviction for the offence punishable u Sec. 109 Indian Penal Code R w. Sec. 13 2 R w. Sec.13 1 e of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? What order ? The Trial Court appraised the evidence adduced in respect of the points formulated by it and duly dealt with the charges framed against the accused. The Trial Court elaborately dealt with the matter after companysidering the evidence, facts as well as the judgments cited before it, the companytentions raised and after dealing with all aspects of the matter, inter alia held that There is numberargument from any quarters that the choice of the check period has caused any prejudice or disadvantage to the accused in any manner. Hence, in my view, the period of 5 years selected by the prosecution is reasonably sufficient to give a fair and companyprehensive picture of the known source of income and pecuniary resources and property in the possession of the accused so to arrive at a fair decision on the issues involved in this proceedings. From the facts it appears, the prosecution has listed the details of assets held by the accused at the beginning of the check period i.e. 1.7.1991 in Annexure-I Ext.P-2327 . The said Annexure is reproduced hereunder ANNEXURE I ASSETS AS ON 1.7.1991 Sl. Description of the property Standing in Value of the No the name property Rs. of Land and building at No. 36, M s Natya Kala 1,32,009.00 Poes Garden Chennai-86 Sy. Nikethan, rep. No. 1567 of Tenampet by Smt. N.R. purchased from R. Sarala Sandhya and Selvi Jayalalitha Door No. 8/3/1099, Ward No. 50,000.00 8, ,, Block No. 3 in plot No. 36 to the extent of 651.18 Sq. Mtrs. building in Sri Nagar Officers Colony, Hyderabad city purchased from Koka Sambasiva Rao, S o Hariprakash Rao at Door No. 8/3/1099 in Sri Nagar Officers Colony, Hyderabad city Two Farm houses, Servant ,, 1,65,058.50 quarters and other buildings within the Grape garden companypound in Jeedimetla village and Pet Basheerbad in Qut Bullapur Mandal of Ranga Reddy Dist., in Sy. No. 50 and 52/E of Jeedimetla village and Sy. No. 93E and 93 U of Pet Basheerbad village Total extent 11.35 acres Land in Sy. No. 93/3 to the ,, 13,254.50 extent of 3.15 acres 1.36 Hectares at Pet Basheerbad village in Medchal Tq. in A-P., Agricultural land measuring Selvi J. 17,060.00 3.43 Jayalalitha acres in Cheyyhur village in Sy. No. 366/2,5,6 purchased from N. Venkatachala Mudaliar, S o Natesa Mudaliar, No. 1046/8, Thiruvotriyur Main Road, Kaladipettai, Chennai. Land and flat No. 7, R.R. Smt. N. 3,13,530.00 Flats, Sasikala 3/4 , Antu Street, Santhome, Chennai-4 of Smt N. Sasikala C Rs. 2,75,000/- S Rs. 35,750/- F Rs. 2,780/- Building at Door No. 19, M s Jaya 5,70,039.00 Pattammal Street, Chennai in Publications Plot No. 83, R.S. No. 4087, Selvi J. Extent 18907 Sq. ft. Jayalaitha purchased and Smt. N. from V.H. Subramanian, S o H.Sasikala Venkatasubban,15, Venkatraman Street, Srinivasa Avenue, Chennai-28 Shop No. 14, Ground Floor at M s Sasi 98,904.00 602, Anna Salai, Chennai-6 Enterprises purchased from Mohd. Hanif, No. 7, Gulam Abbas Ali Khan, 1st Street, Thousland Lights, Chennai-6 in the name of M s Sasi Enterprises C Rs. 85,000/- S Rs. 13,045/- F Rs. 859/- Undivided share of land only ,, 2,10,919.00 at Door No. 14, Khadar Navaz Khan Road, Nungambakkam in R.S. No. 58/51 to the extent of 68/12000 undivided share in 11 grounds and 736 Sq. ft. of land purchased from M s Holiday Sports Pvt. Ltd., office at 14, Khadar Navaz Khan Road, Chennai-6 Land and building at Door No.Selvi J. 3,60,509.00 213/B, St. Marys Road in Sy.Jayalalitha NO. 72, New No. 212, Extent 1206 Sq.ft. Ft. purchased from K. Selvaraj, S o Munusamy Naidu, 44, Vanniyampathy Street, Mandaveli, Chennai-28 Shop No. 18 of 189 Sq. ft. in,, 1,05,409.00 ground floor at Door No. 602, Mount Road together with 54/42656th of undivided share of land in 17 grounds and 1856 Sq. ft. in R. S. No. 3/10 and 3/11 of Block No. 71 of Mylapore purchased from Mustafa M. Lohani, S o Moiz K. Lohani and 2 others of 134, Angappan Naikan Sreet, 3rd Floor, Chennai-1 Land and building at Tanjore M s Sasi 1,57,125.00 in Enterprises Sy. No. 1091 to the extent of partners 2400 Sq. Ft. purchased from Selvi J. N. Jayalaalitha Somasundaram, S o V. and Smt N. Namachiayam, 14, Thilagar Sasikala Street, Ayyappa Nagar, Trichy. Vacant site at H.D.Road, in M s Sasi 1,15,315.00 3rd Enterprises Dvn, 6th Ward, Haar Nombu Chavadi in Tanjore to the extent of 5100 Sq. ft. in T.S. No.1091 purchased from K Loganathan, S o K.N. Kuppusamy of 1279, Old Nellu Mettu St. East Gate, Tanjore. Vacant site at Ward No. 6 in ,, 2,02,778.00 Mahar Nombu Chavadi to the extent of 8970 Sq. ft. in S. No. 1091 of Tanjore purchased from Muthu Lakshmi, W o V.N. Somasundaram of No. 11 Thilagara Street, Ayyappan Nagar, Trichy. Land and building at Smt. N. 5,85,420.00 Abishekapuram, Ponnagar in Sasikala Trichy in plot No. 102, 3rd Cross Road, New Ward No. K in Block No. 30, T.S. No. 107 totally measuring 3525 Sq. ft. purchased from Mirasi of 22-A Willion Road, Cantonment, Trichy. Dry land to the extent of M s Sasi 75,210.00 3.23 Enterprises acres in Sy. No. 402-2 of Sundarakottai village, Mannargudi Tq. Tanjore Dist., purchased from Ummool Pajriya Ammal, W o Anwartheen Raouthar, Naina Mohd. Raouthar, S o Anwardeen Raouthar, No. 4, Hussain Road, Koothannallore, Needamangalm, Tanjore. Land and building at Thiru M s Jaya 5,28,039.00 Vi. KAIndustrial Publications Estate, Guindy in Sy. No. 55 56, Block No. VI, Extent 5658 Sq. ft. Shed No. C-8, Adyar purchased from K. Viswanathan, S o S.K.R. Karuppan Chettiar, 184, Vembuliamman Koil Street, Union Carbide Colony, Kottivakkam, Chennai-41 Sole prop. of M s Heatex Equipments Maruthi car bearing Reg. No. Selvi J. 60,435.00 TMA 2466 new Jayalalitha Contessa car bearing Reg. No.,, 2,56,238.00 TN-09/0033 Swaraj Mazda van bearing Reg.,, 1,76,172.67 No. TSI 9090 Trax jeep bearing Reg. No. ,, 1,04,000.00 TSJ 7299 Swaraj Mazda van bearing Reg.,, 2,99,845.00 No. TSR 333 Trax jeep bearing Reg. No. ,, 1,04,000.00 TSJ 7200 Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 Smt. N. 13,601.98 in Sasikala Canara Bank at Kellys branch with SB Acc. No. 38746 opened on 30.12.1988 in the name of Smt. N. Sasikala Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 Selvi J. 9,18,210.29 in Jayalalitha Central Bank of India, Secunderabad with SB Acc. No. 20614 opened on 19.5.1989 in the name of Selvi J. Jayalalitha Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 Namadhu 5,51,826.94 in MGR Canara Bank of Mylapore branch with CA No. 1952 opened on 23.10.1989 in the name of Namadhu MGR in which Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Smt. N. Sasikala are partners Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 Smt. N. 1,40,198.25 in Sasikala Canara Bank of Mylapore branch with SB Acc. No. 23218 opened on 23.5.1990 in the name of Smt. Sasikala Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 M s Jaya 7,83,860.97 in Publications Canara Bank of Mylapore rep. by Selvi branch J. Jayalalitha with CA No. 2047 opened on and Smt. N. 26.9.1990 on transfer from Sasikala Kellys branch in the name of Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Smt. N. Sasikala D. No. 451/1990, dt. ,, 64,520.00 19.6.1990 with Canara Bank of Mylapore Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 Selvi J. 2,57,886.25 in Jayalalitha the Bank of Madurai, Anna Nagar branch with SB Acc. No. 5158 opened on 28.2.1990 in the name of Selvi J. Jayalalith Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 ,, 2,40,835.02 in Canara Bank of Mylapore branch with CA No. 2018 opened on 12.10.1990 in the name of Selvi J. Jayalalitha Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 ,, 5,20,396.45 in Canara Bank of Mylapore branch with SB Acc. No. 23832 opened on 16.4.1991 in the name of Selvi Jayalalitha Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 M s Sasi 2,29,578.49 in Enterprises Canara Bank of Mylapore branch with CA No. 2061 opened on 21.3.1991 in the name of Sasi Enterprises in which both Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Smt. N. Sasikala are the partners FD in Kothari Oriental Selvi J. 1,00,000.00 Finance in Jayalalitha the name of Selvi J. Jayalalitha ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, FD with Sriram Finance in the,, 3,00,000.00 name of ,, ,, 5,00,000.00 ,, ,, 20,00,000.00 ,, ,, 7,00,000.00 Investment in the form of ,, Equity shares in Madras Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Ltd., Coimbatore by J. Jayalalithas mother during 1969 and 1971and inherited by Selvi J. Jayalalitha Investment in the form of ,, shares in Kunal Engineering Co., Ltd., Ambattur, Madras-58 by Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 22.5.1978 for 1000 shares which have secured 500 bonus shares on 18.2.1983 Value of 2140 old sarees and ,, 4,21,870.00 other dresses found at No. 36, Poes Garden at the time of Search 86 items of jewels of Selvi ,, 17,50,031.00 J. Jayalalitha as evaluated by M s VBC Trust on 31.3.1991 62 items of jewels claimed toSmt. N. 9,38,460.00 be Sasikala of Smt. N.Sasikala as evaluated by M s VBC Trust on 31.3.1991 Silver wear weighing 700 kgs Selvi J. 28,00,000.00 as per the IT returns filed Jayalalitha by Selvi J. Jayalalitha value worked out at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per kg. Amount deposited in MIDS No. ,, 10,00,000.00 716767, dt. 30.4.1990 of Bank of Madurai, Anna Nagar for 2 years by Selvi J. Jayalalitha which was in force as on 1.7.199 Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 ,, 21,389.00 in CDS ITP Acc. No. 32 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha in Central Bank of India, T. Nagar branch, Chennai - 17. FD of Rs. 5 lakh deposited in,, 5,00,000.00 Sriram Investments Ltd., deposited on 12.11.1990 by Selvi Jayalalitha from her SB Acc. No. 5158 o BOM, Anna Nagar branch which after subsequent renewals is to mature on 29.1.1998. Advance amount paid for M s Sasi 50,000.00 purchase of 72/12000 Enterprises undivided share of land in 11 grounds and 1736 Sq. ft. in R.S. No. 58/5 at 14, Gems Court, Kadhar Navaz Khan Road, Nungumbakkam, paid by Ch. No. 513735, dt. 23.4.1990 of CB, Madras which was registered as document No. 641/1993 of SRO, Thousand Lights branch, dt. 28.7.1993 MIDR No. 66/9 with Central Selvi J. 3,00,000.00 Bank Jayalalitha of India, Secunderabad deposited on 2.5.1990 Cash balance as on 1.7.1991 ,, 1,80,031.22 in SB Acc. No. 38671 of Canara Bank, Kellys in the name of Selvi Jayalalitha Grand Total 2,01,83,956.53 The Trial Court also gave the details of the income, derived by the accused during the check period i.e.1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996, in Annexure-III, being Ext.P-2329 which is set out hereunder ANNEXURE-III Ex.P.2329 Income during the check period from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996 Sl. Details of income Amount Rs. Exhibits No Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 25,00,000 P.1258 - Abhiramapuram in the name of M s P.1260 Sasi Enterprises of which the outstanding principal was Rs. 13,55,023/- Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 28,00,000 P.1210 Abhiramapuram in the name of -1212 M s J. Farm Houses of which the principal of Rs. 28 lakh was outstanding besides Rs. 1,23,041/- as interest Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 7,00,000 P.1171 Abhiramapuram in the name of P.1173 M s J.S. Housing Development of which the principal of Rs. 7 lakh was outstanding besides Rs. 37,184/- as interest Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 5,00,000 P.1161 Abhiramapuram in the name of P.1163 M s Jay Real Estate of which the entire principal of Rs. 5 lakh was outstanding besides Rs. 28,407/- as interest Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 75,00,000 P.1230 Abhiramapuram in the name of to M s Anjaneya Printers Pvt., Ltd., 1233 of which the principal of Rs. 75 1004 lakh was outstanding besides Rs. 8,81,477/- as interest Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 17,86,000 P.1355 Abhiramapuram in the name of to Maha Subhalakshmi Kalyana 1357 Mandapam of which the principal of Rs. 17,86,000/- was outstanding besides Rs. 1,95,802/- as interest Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 83,00,000 P.1328 Abhiramapuram in the name of - M s Lex Property Development P.1330 Ltd., of which the P.1008 outstanding principal was Rs. 83 lakh Loan obtained from Indian Bank, 3,75,00,000 P.997 Abhiramapuram in the name of to Kodanadu Tea Estate of which P.1003 the principal of Rs. 375 lakh was outstanding Loan taken from Can Fin Homes on 75,00,000.00 P.548, FD No. 352/1994-95 on P.550 25.8.1995 by Selvi J. Jayalalitha. P.555, P.2287 Income by way interest to Selvi 4,52,871.00 P.1377 Jayalalitha vide her A c in SB No. 23832 of CB Mylapore Income by way of interest to 2,56,685.00 P.1377 Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide her P.1382 Fixed Deposits in FD No. 1000/92 Rs. 79,890/- 1398/92 Rs. 73,233/- 237/93 Rs. 54,247/- 632/93 Rs. 49,315/- of Canara Bank, Mylapore for Rs. 27 lakh credited in SB 23832 and CA 2018 of Canara bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalaitha Interest from Kothari Orient 60,437.82 Finance Ltd., to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 47740 53389 63848 Interest paid from Kothari Orient60,434.78 Finance Ltd., to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR Nos.48172, 53390 64308 from Kothari Orient Finance Ltd.,50,434.78 Jayalalitha vide FDR Nos. 53391 64280 Interest from Can Finance to 8,76,896.00 P.1377 Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 186/1991-92 Interest from Can Finance to 4,71,808.00 P.1377 Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 352/1994-95 Interest from Sriram Investments 6,53,818.00 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 5006835 for Rs. 30 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 3,09,088.60 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 5007694 for Rs. 15 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 2,09,928.50 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 5015954 for Rs. 15 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 1,39,947.80 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 5015955 for Rs. 10 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 84,522.80 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 5015956 for Rs. 5 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 1,27,871.50 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 71533 for Rs. 5 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 87,960.83 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 21330 for Rs. 5 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 1,34,977.00 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 5025367 for Rs. 20 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 4,76,023.27 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 45897 for Rs. 20 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 2,06,237.00 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 47437 for Rs. 3 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 5,02,207.00 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 73211 for Rs. 20 lakh Interest from Sriram Investments 87,024.00 P.1382 to Selvi J. Jayalalitha vide FDR No. 31251 dt. 4.5.1990 for Rs. 7 lakh during the check period Interest paid to Selvi J. 47,265.81.00 P.1960 Jayalalitha vide SB 5158 of Bank of Madurai, Anna Nagar, Chennai Interest paid to Smt. N. Sasikala27,304.00 P.936 vide her SB 22792 of CBI, P.937 Secunderabad Interest paid to Selvi J. 3,17,781.00 P.936 Jayalalitha vide SB 20614 of P.937 CBI, Secunderabad Interest paid to Selvi J. 1,61,451.48.00 P.936 Jayalalitha from Medium Term P.937 Deposit in CBI, Secunderabad vide NPD 669 - Rs. 27,272.08 68/33 Rs. 77,162.40 60/9 - Rs. 14,874/- 70/9 Rs. 42,143/- Agrl. Income from Grape 5,78,340.00 P.938 Garden, Hyderabad in favour of Selvi J. Jayalalitha Income by way of clearings in 3,42,520.40 P.936 the account in SB 20164 of CBI, Secunderabad in favour of Selvi Jayalalitha towards rental income for 36, Sri Nagar Colony, Hyderabad Interest paid to Selvi J. 14,446.00 P.975 Jayalalitha through SB 38671 of Canara Bank, Kellys Branch opened on 19.12.1988 Income from the monthly income 82,600.00 P.1961 deposit scheme of Selvi J. P.1960 Jayalalitha from the deposit amount of Rs. 10 lakhl vide MIDS No. 716767 dt. 30.4.1990 of Bank of Madurai which lasted till 8.6.1992 though the FD matured on 30.4.1992 for which the interest was received through SB 38671 of Canara Bank, Kelly Branch of Selvi J. Jayalalitha Interest from SB Acc. No. 23218 1,89,761.00 P.1510 of Canara Bank, Mylapore to N. Sasikala Interest of Rs. 29,490/- from 2,57,118.00 P.1510 FDR No. 718/1992 of Canara P.1519 Bank, Mylapore to Smt. N. Sasikala for Rs. 18 lakh Rs. 53,260/- from FDR No. 954/1992 Rs. 48,822/- from FDR No. 1397/1992 Rs. 48,822/- from FDR No. 236/1993 Rs. 44,384/- from FDR No. 633/1993 Rs. 32,340/- from FDR No. 868/1993 Interest from Can Finance in 10,03,191.00 P.1510 FDR No. 189/1991-92 for Rs. 25 lakh to N. Sasikala Income by way of clearing in SB 2,23,000.00 P.937 22792 of CBI, Secunderabad of Smt. N. Sasikala rental income for No.16, Radhika Colony, Secunderabad Interest paid to Smt. N. Sasikala3,901.00 P.977 through SB 38746 of Canara Bank, Kellys Branch Interest from SB 24621 of 24,323.00 P.1572 Canara Bank, Mylapore to V.N. Sudhakaran Interest from FDR No. 13,562.00 P.1572 1401/1992 of Canara Bank, Mylapore for Rs. 5 lakh to V.N. Sudhakaran Interest from FDR 238/1993 of 12,329.00 P.1576 Canara Bank, Mylapore for Rs. 5 lakh by renewal of FDR 1401/1992 Hire charges from ACT India 9,18,910.00 P.659 Ltd., for the vehicle No. TSR 333 Swaraj Mazda van owned by N. Sudhakaran from 3.2.1993 Brokerage charges received by 3,00,000.00 P.548 N. Sudhakaran for the deposits made by Selvi J. Jayalalitha in Can Fin. Homes Ltd., vide FDR Nos. 186/1991- 92 352/1994-95 Loan obtained by Smt. J. 35,00,000.00 Elavarasi from Royapetta Benefit Fund RBF Nidhi Ltd., vide HML/787, dt. 7.10.1995 Hire charges received from ACT 6,26,410.00 P.658 India Ltd., for the vehicle No. TN-01/H-9999 of Swaraj Mazda van owned by Smt. J. Elavarasi from 3.2.1993 to 30.4.1996 Interest paid to Smt. J. 9,763.00 P.1613 Elavarasi, guardian of Vivek by SB A c.No. 25389 of Indian Bank, Abhiramapuram Income by way of monthly 90,807.59 P.126-132 interest from 7/1991 to 4.6.1992 in respect of the FD of Rs. 7 lakh in Sriram Investments Ltd., vide FD receipt No. 31251, dt.4.5.1990 deposited through Ch. No. 907521, dt. 4.5.1990 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha from her BOM Acc. of Anna Nagar Salary of Selvi J. Jayalalitha as27.00 P.694-697 CM of Tamil Nadu at Re. 1/- per month drawn for 27 months Lease income of Indo Doha 30,40,000.00 P.563, from SPIC in respect of SIPCOT P.564 Industries in Cuddalore Rs. 1,22,40,000/- from 14.12.1994 to 8.4.1996 after deducting payment to SPICOT Rs. 72 lakh and payment of Rs. 20 lakh to James Frederick for purchases of shares of INDAG Products Ltd., Rental income from S7, 37,67,358.00 P.655-657 Ganapathy Colony, Thiru-Vi-Ka Industrial Estate, Guindy, building of Jaya Publications given on lease from January, 1993 to April, 1996 from SPIC., Rental income from No. 19, 2,33,769.00 P.655-657 Pattammal Street, Mandaveli, building of Selvi J. Jayalalitha given on lease from January, 1994 to April, 1996 Rental income from 21, 3,82,500.00 X-2 Padmanabha Street, T. Nagar, Chennai, building of Anjaneya Printers Pvt., Ltd., given on lease Form July, 1995 to April, 1996 Interest derived in SB A c No. 10,213.00 P.1138 4110 of Indian Bank, Abhiramapuram in the name of Master Vivek Rental income and Rental 91,000.00 advance derived for the house at No. 1, Murphy Street, Akkarai of J.S. Housing for the period from 07/1995 to 04/1996 Rental income including rental 1,94,000.00 advance of Rs. 20,000/- from Flat No. 7, Antu Street, Santhome, Mylapore RR Flats of Smt. N. Sasikala Rental income advance from 2,70,900.00 Shop No. 20 of No. 14, KhadarNavazkhan Rd. Gem Court , Nungambakkam, Chennai for the period from 1/1992 to 4/1996 Rs. 4000 x 4 Rs. 4600 x 35 Rs. 5300 x 13 Rs. 25000 Rental income advance from 4,50,000.00 No. 1, Wallance Garden, 1st Street, 4th Floor from 12/1994 to 04/1996 Rs. 25000 x 17 Rs. 75000 Rental income advance from 2,01,000.00 Shop No. 9, Khadar Navazkhan Rd. Gem Court , Chennai for the period from 1/1992 to 4/1996 Rs. 4000 x 49 Rs. 4500 x 3 Rs. 45000 as advance Rental income advance from 1,44,000.0 Shop No. 8, Khadar Navazkhan Rd. Gem Court , Chennai for the period from July, 1993 to 30.4.1996 Rs. 3600 x 34 Rs. 21600 as advance Amounts received towards 1,01,231.00 P.991, Family Benefit Fund Gratuity P.994 by Smt. J. Elavarasi during August October, 1993 June, 1994 on the death of her husband V. Jayaraman Net income from Maha 14,50,097.60 P.1966 Subhalakshmi Kalyana Mandapam, Arumbakkam, Chennai for the period from 8/1993 to 4/1996 Grand Total 9,34,26,053.56 The Trial Court relied upon the oral and documentary evidence in respect of the said income and also the objections raised on behalf of the accused and thereafter came to the companyclusion as follows Thus, answering the objections raised by the accused as above and in the light of the above discussion, my finding on the total income of the accused during the check period is as under Total income companyputed as per Annexure III Rs.9,34,26,053.56 Less Item No.55 - Rs. 35,000.00 Less Item No.60 - Rs. 1,22,750.00 Rs.9,30,68,303.56 Add Item No.29 - Rs. 4,427.19 Add Item No.27 - Rs. 1,15,640.00 Add Item No.48 - Rs. 6,60,064.00 Add Item No.52 - Rs. 48,35,000.00 Add Item No.33 Grape Garden - Rs. 4,21,660.00 Total income - Rs.9,91,05,094.75 Thereafter, the Trial Court dealt with the expenditure incurred between the check period which is specifically stated in Annexure-IV Ext.P-2330 which is set out hereunder EXPENDITURE INCURRED BETWEEN 1.7.1991 30.04.1996 ANNEXURE - IV Ex.P.2330 Sl. Details of Expenditure Amount in ExhibitsWitnesses No. Rs 1 Amount paid towards 50,93,921 P.1027 PW.182 interest in respect of the loan of Rs.1,50,00,000/- availed by M s. Jaya Publications from Indian Bank, Abirampuram, while closing the loan account on 25.06.1994 Apart from the principal amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- 2 Repayment of Loan availed by 18,32,683 P.1260 PW.182 M s. Sasi Enterprises from Indian Bank, Abirampuram Rs.11,44,977.00 P Rs. 6,87,706.00 I Rs.18,32,683.00 Payment of interest on loan 23,774 P.1212 PW.182 of Rs.28,00,000/- availed by J Farm Houses from Indian Bank Abirampuram Payment of Interest on loan 11,887.00 P.1173 PW.182 of Rs.7,00,000/- availed by M s. J S Housing Development from Indian Bank, Abirampuram. Payment of interest on loan 11,887 P.1163 PW.182 of Rs.5,00,000/- availed by M s. Jay Real Estate, from Indian Bank, Abirampuram Payment of interest on loan 11,81,425.16 P.1233 PW.182 of Rs.75,00,000/- availed by M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., 7 Payment of interest on loan 3,84,400.00 P.1356 PW.182 of Rs.17,86,000/- availed by M s. Mahasubha Lakshmi Kalyana Mandapam, from Indian Bank, Abirampuram. 8 Payment of interest on loan 17,52,069.00 P.1330 PW.182 of Rs.83,00,000/- availed by M s. Lex Property Development Ltd., from Indian Bank, Abirampuram. 9 Amount paid to companyporation 13,840.00 P.65 PW.20 of Madras towards sanction of building plan in respect of M s Jaya Publications for change of roof at MF-9, Guindy Industrial Estate, Guindy paid on 14.2.94 10 Amount paid to Corporation of14,560.00 P.64 PW.20 Madras towards sanction of building plan in respect of M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., at No.21, Padmanabha Street, T. Nagar, Chennai-17 paid on 14.2.94 11 Amount paid to Corporation of1,45,320.00 P.51 PW.19 Madras towards building PW.20 plan in respect of M s. Lex Property Development P Ltd., No.149, and 150, TTK Road, Chennai 18 Paid on 20.12.95 12 Amount paid to Corporation of12,700.00 P.58 PW.20 Madras for building plan at No.36, Poes Garden for additional companystruction paid on 11.12.91 13 Amount paid to Corporation of70,140.00 P.54 PW.19 Madras for building plan at PW.20 No.5, Murugesan Street, T. Nagar, Chennai Paid on 7.11.95 14 Amount paid to Corporation1,350.00 P-63 PW.20 of Madras for building plan M s. Jaya Publications at No.19, Pattammal Street, proposed additions and regularization of the existing building Paid on 3.3.93 15 Amount paid to Corporation of99,295.00 P-55, 56PW.19 Madras towards sanction of building plan in respect of M s. Jaya Publications at Plot No.S-7, Ganapathy Colony, Guindy Industrial Estate, paid on 19.3.92 16 Amount paid to Corporation of26,735.00 P.48 to PW.19 Madras for building plan at 50 59 PW.20 226,735.00 P.48 to 50 59 PW.19 PW.20 Spl.C.C.208/2004 296 No.36, Poes Garden, Additional Block, paid on 22.11.91, 7.12.92, 10.2.93 and 19.2.93 Rs. 2850.00 550.00 2,250.00 21,085.00 26,735.00 17 Amount paid to Corporation of10,925.00 P-60 PW.20 Madras for building plan at No.36, Poes Garden, for additions of Security room Paid on 19.2.93 Amount paid to Corporation of29,850.00 P-61 PW.20 Madras for building plan at No.48, Inner Ring Road, Ekkatuthangal, Guindy i.e., M s. Sastri Nuts and Plates Manufacturing P Ltd., Paid on 26.11.93 M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., 19 Amount paid to Corporation of1,785.00 P-62 PW.20 Madras towards building plan sanction in respect of the proposed alterations to the existing building at Door No.212, 213 St. Marys Road, Mylapore, Chennai 4 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha paid on 5.2.92 20 Amount paid to MMDA for 4,76,525.00 P-66 PW.19 building plan Approval at PW.20 Plot No.6, Thiru vi Ka Industrial Estate, Guindy, paid on 20.2.96 21 Amount paid towards 18,570.00 P-676 PW.117 demolition companyt of the old PW.20 building at Door No.213, St. Marys Road, Mandaveli, Chennai 28. 22 Interest paid towards loan 4,41,569.00 PW.211 account No.787 dt.7.10.95 of RBF Nidhi Ltd., upto the end of Check period for the loan of Rs.35 lakhs taken by Tmt. Elavarasi. 23 Amount paid to Five Star 1,01,315.70 P-823 toPW.154 Departmental Stores from 832 PW.201 SB 23218 of Canara Bank, . Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala 24 LIC premium payment made by 13,960.50 PW.201 Tmt. N. Sasikala from SB 23218 of Canara Bank Mylapore 26.3.92 25 Payment made towards DD 600.00 PW.201 companymission from SB 23218 of Canara Bank, Mylapore for purchasing DD for Rs.9,35,000/- on 13.7.95 26 Amount paid to Salam 9,617.00 PW.201 Stores on 3.11.92 from SB PW.120 A c. 23832 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha of Canara Bank, Mylapore 27 Amount paid to Five Star 75,198.12 P-823 toPW.154 Departmental Stores from C.A- 856, 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore P.1519 of Tmt. N. Sasikala during 1992-95 PW.201 28 Amount paid to 9,950.00 P.1519 PW.201 Alagu P.1533 Security Services from CA 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 13.2.95, 22.12.95, 10.1.96 and 17.4.96 29 Expenditure incurred towards 4,074.10 P.1519 PW.201 purchase of books from P.1527 American Book House, P.1537 Higginbothams and India Book House by Tmt. N. Sasikala from her C.A 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore Account on 3.2.94 and 21.2.94 30 Amount paid to Latham India 9,065.00 P.1519 PW.201 from CA 2196 of Canara P.1538 . Bank, Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 22.7.95 31 Amount paid 13,450.00 P.1519 PW.201 to P.1539 . G.Paneerdoss from CA 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 6.11.95 32 Amount paid 1,26,500.00 P.1519 PW.201 to P.1540 . Rajasekaran Co. Auditor to from CA 2196 of Canara Bank, P.1543 Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 28.1.93, 28.3.95, 3.11.95 33 Amount paid to Keerthi from 6,633.00 P-1519 PW.201 CA 2196 of Canara Bank of P.1544 Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 11.12.92 34 Amount paid to Khuzeema 7,165.00 P.1519, Manuwala from CA 2196 of 1545 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Sasikala on 14.12.92 35 Amount paid to LIC of India 27,497.20 P-1519 PW.201 on 31.3.93 and 30.3.94 from CA 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala 13748.60 x 2 towards policy No.750405742 36 LIC premium paid for March 13,748.60 Ex.P.15 Doc.1013 95 in Policy No.750405742 of 46 Letter of Tmt. N. Sasikala LIC, Trichy Dt.23.4.92 37 Amount paid to United India 1,02,039.00 P.1519 PW.201 Insurance on P.1548 31.3.93, to 1553 13.4.93, 4.8.93, 18.3.94, 24.3.95 and 17.4.96 from CA 2196 of Canara Bank of Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala 38 Amount paid towards L.F. 410.00 P-1519 PW.201 charges and DD companymission from CA 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 1.12.92, 6.9.93, 14.10.93, 1.10.94, 7.10.94 and 31.12.94. 39 Amount debited towards 3,170.00 P-1519 PW.201 interest for T.O.D. from CA 2196 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 10.3.92, 6.9.93, 14.10.93, 1.10.94, 7.10.94 and 31.12.94 40 Amount paid to Abbas from CA 23,800.00 P-1382 PW.201 2018 of Canara Bank, Mylapore P-1383 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 2.9.95 41 Amount paid to Balus Colour 54,660.00 P-1382 PW.178 Lab from CA 2018 of Canara P-1009 PW.201 Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 28.9.95 42 Amount paid to BPL Gallery 1,28,530.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara P-1384 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 19.9.95 43 Amount paid to Purnendupal 1,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank, P-1385 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 20.9.95 44 Amount paid 25,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 to Chandrasekar from CA 2018 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 12.3.96 45 Amount paid to Tmt. N.1,50,000.00 PW.198 Sasikala on behalf of Tr. M. Jayaraman towards his share for obtaining the dealership in SPIC Jyothi. 46 Amount paid to K. 18,700.00 P-1382 PW.201 Damodarasamy Naidu, from P-1386 CA 2018 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha 47 Amount paid to Dr. Giris 57,250.00 P-1382 PW.186 Museum from CA 2018 of Canara P-1387 Bank, Mylapore of PW.201 Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 20.9.95 48 Amount paid to HCL Limited 1,000.00 P-1387 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank, P-1382 Mylapore of Selvi J. PW.167 Jayalalitha on 7.9.95 49 Amount paid to J. Haridoss 5,100.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank, P-1388 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 13.7.93 50 Amount paid to Tvl. 1,09,800.00 P-1382 PW.201 K. Brothers from CA 2018 P-1389 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 11.1.96 and 5.3.96 Rs.27,000 82,800 51 Amount paid 5,95,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 to P-1390 Tr.K.K.Venugopal from CA to 1394 2018 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 11.8.93, 18.8.93, 14.10.93, 5.11.93, 20.12.93 and 11.4.94 52 Amount paid to Tr. K.V.20,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Viswanathan, from CA 2018 P-1395 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 21.8.93 53 Amount paid to Tvl. Kapoors 1,30,779.40 P-1382 PW.118 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1396 PW.201 Mylapore of Selvi J. P-678 Jayalalitha on 30.9.95 54 Amount paid to Tvl. Kapoors 12,721.00 P-1519 PW.118 by cheque on 15.7.95 P-1554 PW.201 Cheque No.082199 of P-678 Canara Bank 55 Amount paid by cash to Tvl. 44,264.00 P-678 PW.118 Kapoors on 4.5.95 and 7.6.95 56 Amount paid to Tr. Kishore 25,000.00 P-1382 PW.146 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-784 PW.201 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 10.10.95 57 Amount paid to tmt. Latha75,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Krishnnamoorthy from CA P-1397 2018 of Canara Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 4.9.95 58 Amount paid to MMWSS 37,046.00 P-1382 PW.146 Board from CA 2018 of P-1398 PW.201 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi to 1411 Jayalalitha 12.12.91 to 6.12.95 59 Amount paid to Tr. G. Mohan 20,000.00 P-1382 PW.148 from CA 2018 of Canara PW.201 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 29.4.95 60 Amount paid to Madurai 5,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.108 Kamaraj University from CA P-1412 PW.201 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 21.7.93 61 Amount paid to New India 9,517.00 P-1382 PW.201 Assurance from CA 2018 of P-1413 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 1.8.92 62 Amount paid to Corporation of1,858.00 P-1519 PW.201 Madras from CA 2196 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 22.2.93, 24.2.93, 15.10.93 and 14.2.94 63 Amount paid to Tvl. Moulis 11,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.183 Advertisers from CA 2018 of P-1284 PW.201 Canara Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 18.9.95 64 Amount paid to Tr. 10,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 A- Panchapakesan from P-1414 CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 3.11.95 65 Amount paid to Tr. K.Prem 1,78,279.80 P-1382 PW.201 Chand from CA 2018 of Canara P-1415 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 12.4.93 66 Amount paid to Tvl.2,36,120.00 P-1382 PW.201 Rajasekaran Co. from CA P-1416 2018 of Canara P-1417 Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 9.3.93, 20.1.95, 9.3.95 and 3.11.95 67 Amount paid to Tr. 12,075.00 P-1382 PW.201 Ramamurthy from CA 2018 of P-1418 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 21.5.92 68 Amount paid to Tr.12,075.00 P-1382 PW.201 Ramgopal from CA 2018 of P-1419 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 27.5.92 69 Amount paid to Tr. 6,447.00 P-1382 PW.201 Ramsons from CA 2018 of P-1420 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 5.8.95 70 Amount paid to Ramnad 5,940.00 P-1382 PW.201 District Consumer Forum from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 6.6.92 Two entries 71 Amount paid to Tmt. 46,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Rangammal from CA 2018 P-818, of Canara Bank Mylapore of 819 PW.152 Selvi J. Jayalalitha M.O.637 on PW.126 1.2.92, 29.4.92, 26.9.92, 3.4.93, 8.10.93, 30.12.94 and 20.5.95. Rs.3000120007000300 0400070007000 72 Amount paid to Tr.35,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Rangasamy from CA 2018 of P-1421 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 15.11.95 73 Amount paid to A-P.Telecom 8,915.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank, P-1422 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 27.01.1996 74 Amount paid to Tvl.Rock2,77,666.00 P-1382 PW.201 Advertising from CA 2018 of P-1423 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi PW.188 Jayalalitha on M.O.1593 20.9.95 two entries 75 Amount paid to 2,19,566.80 P-1382 PW.201 O.Corporation of Madras P-1424 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank to 1432 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha between 4.9.91 to 27.6.95 76 Amount paid to Salam 12,73,642.00 P-680 PW.201 Stores from CA 2018 of Canara P-1382 PW.120 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. To P- Jayalalitha from 1452 9.7.91 to 6.12.95 77 Amount paid to Romaga 75,352.00 P-1382 PW.201 Foam from CA 2018 of Canara P-1453 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha from 9.7.91 to 6.12.95 78 Amount paid to C. Sango from 10,258.56 P-1382 PW.201 CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1454 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 19.4.94 79 Amount paid to SBKC 42,400.00 P-1382 PW.201 Carrier from CA 2018 P-1455 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 6.1.95 and 1.12.95 80 Amount paid to SE, MEDC from 58,463.00 P-1382 PW.201 CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1456 Mylapore Selvi J. to 1462 Jayalalitha between 10.7.91 and 6.11.95 81 Amount paid to Tr. 13,000.00 P-1382 PW.152 Selvaraj from CA 2018 of P-820 Canara Bank Mylapore of P-821 PW.201 Selvi J. Jayalalitha on M.O.637 29.7.95 and 2.12.95 Page 223 82 Amount paid to SMCS Ltd., 8,017.25 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara P-1463 Bank, Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 29.11.95 83 Amount paid to Tr. 1,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Swameswara Rao from CA P-1464 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 26.05.95 84 Amount paid to Tr. Ram 2,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Jethmalani from CA 2018 of P-1465 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi P-1466 Jayalalitha on 19.7.95 and 9.9.95 85 Amount paid 14,000.00 Ex.P138 to 2, P.783 Venkateswara Cine from A- 2018 on 14.10.1995 86 Amount paid to Adyar Gate 1,75,246.25 Ex.P.13 Hotel from C.A- 2018 on 82, 19.09.95 P.1467 87 Amount paid to Agarwal 12,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 23.5.92 88 Amount paid to 12,320.00 P-1382 PW.201 Vijaya P-1468 Lakshmi Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 29.5.92 89 Amount paid to Annapoorna 19,600.00 P-1382 PW.201 Cafeteria from CA 2018 of P-1469 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 21.5.97 90 Amount paid to Egmore 19,300.00 P-1382 PW.201 Bhavan from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 15.5.92 91 Amount paid to Arasan 16,225.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara P-1470 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 21.5.92 92 Amount paid to Vasantha 11,160.00 P-1382 PW.201 Bhavan from CA 2018 of Canara P-1471 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 27.5.92 93 Amount paid to Archana 75,675.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara P-679 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. PW.119 Jayalalitha on 21.5.92 94 Amount paid to Arya Bhavan 77,580.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 22.5.92 95 Amount paid to Welcome 22,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Hotel from CA 2018 of Canara P-1473 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. X-18 PW.112 Jayalalitha on 9.5.92 96 Amount paid to Ashok 21,250.00 P-1382 PW.201 Bhavan from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 3.6.92 97 Amount paid to Bombay Milk 7,500.00 P-1382 PW.201 Bar from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha 25.5.92 98 Amount paid to Bombay 15,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweet Stall from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore on 25.9.92 99 Amount paid to Central Caf 48,645.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara P-1474 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 30.5.92 100 Amount paid to Coffee 17450.33 P-1382 PW.201 House from CA 2018 of Canara P-1475 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 27.5.92 101 Amount paid to Devanathan 18,042.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweets, from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 23.5.97 102 Amount paid to Ganapathy 12,996.00 P-1382 PW.201 Vilas from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 26.5.92 103 Amount paid to Hotel Akash 18,422.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 3.6.92 104 Amount paid to Jothi Ananda 8,840.00 P-1382 PW.201 Bhavan on 4.6.92 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha 105 Amount paid to Lakshmi 1,880.00 P-1382 PW.201 Vilas from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 4.6.92 106 Amount paid to 9,091.50 P-1382 PW.201 Master 1476 Bakery from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 27.5.92 107 Amount paid to Sri. Jayaram 10,224.00 P-1382 PW.201 Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara P-1477 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 1.6.92 108 Amount paid to Mayil Mark 39,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Mittai Kadai from CA 2018 of P-1478 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 1.6.92 109 Amount paid to Nandini from 21,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 CA 2018 of Canara Bank X-15 to Mylapore of Selvi J. 17 PW.111 Jayalalitha on 15.5.1992 110 Amount paid to New Rama Caf 74,342.25 P-1382 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 26.5.92 111 Amount paid to New Agarwal 14,000.00 P-1382 from CA 2018 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 26.5.92 112 Amount paid to 15,150.00 P-1382 New P-1479 Bombay Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 21.5.92 113 Amount paid to 16,637.40 P-1382 Ramalakshmi Sweets from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 3.6.92 114 Amount paid to 13,302.90 P-1382 Roland Bakery from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 18.6.92 115 Amount paid to Salem Caf 13,520.00 P-1382 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1480 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 21.5.92 116 Amount paid to AGK Travels 15,814.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1370 Mylapore of Selvi J. PW.199 Jayalalitha on 28.9.95 117 Amount paid to Anchor Cabs 19,211.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara P-1286 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. PW.185 Jayalalitha on 28.9.95 118 Amount paid to Annamalai Bus 47,790.30 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1481 Mylapore of Selvi J. P-1482 Jayalalitha on 27.7.93 and 12.3.94 119 Amount paid to Govind Cabs 15,903.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara P-1483 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 29.9.95 120 Amount paid to Vincent27,502.00 P-1382 PW.201 Travels from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 28.9.95 121 Amount paid as interest 11,861.00 P-1382 PW.201 towards T.O.D. between 27.1.92 and 3.11.95 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha 122 Expenditure incurred by way 5,011.00 P-1382 PW.201 of DD Commission from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 25.1.93, 27.9.94, 2.5.95, 1.9.95, 22,8.95 and 17.10.95 123 Expenditure incurred by way 575.00 P-1382 PW.201 of folio charges from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on different dates 124 Amount paid to CMs Relief 1,00,008.00 P-1382 PW.201 Fund from CA 2018 of P-1484 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 5.10.93 125 Amount paid 1,08,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 to P-1485 Kanagabisheka Samith from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 26.3.93 126 Amount paid to Sacred Heart 1,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Higher Secondary School from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 8.9.92 127 Amount paid to Rama 1,00,008.00 P-1382 PW.201 Anchaneya Trust from CA X-12, 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore 13, 14 PW 110 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 12.5.94 128 Amount paid to Tamilaga27,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Inipagam from CA 2018 of P-1486 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 1.6.92 129 Amount paid to TNG Music 1,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Academy from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi PW.109 Jayalalitha on 21.12.91 130 Amount paid to President of 1,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Thevar Peravai from CA P-1487 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 3.1.94 131 Amount paid to R.V. Tower 50,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1488 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 17.3.92 132 Amount paid to Warla Trust 1,00,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara P-1489 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 14.9.93 133 Amount paid to Tamil Nadu 49,500.00 P-1382 PW.201 Films from CA 2018 of P-1490 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi Jayalalitha on 20.9.95 49,500.00P 1382 P-1490 PW.201 134 Amount paid to A-K. Vijaya Shankar from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 17.9.93, 5.4.95, 22.7.95, 20.8.94 26.10.95 134 Amount paid to A-K. Vijaya 80,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Shankar from CA 2018 of P-1491 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi To Jayalalitha on 1494 17.9.93, 5.4.95, 22.7.95, 20.8.94 and 26.10.95 135 Amount paid to Sun Shine from76,450.00 P-1382 PW.201 CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1496 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 9.10.95 136 Amount paid to Tr. 94,000.00 P-1382 PW.201 Saminathan from CA 2018 of P-1496 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 15.9.95 and 10.10.95 137 Amount paid to Tamil Nadu 1,08,000.00 P-1382 Government Fund from CA 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 11.1.92 138 Amount paid to United India 1,32,796.00 P-1382 Insurance from CA 2018 of P-1497 Canara Bank Mylapore of Selvi to 1500 Jayalalitha on 9.1.92, 28.3.92, 31.3.93, 29.7.93, 18.3.94, 16.3.95 and 24.3.95 139 Amount paid to VI G Tech 91,157.64 P-1382 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1018 PW.180 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 10.1.96 140 Amount paid to Chinna 7,500.00 P-1381 PW.201 Thambi from CA 2018 of Canara P-1389 Bank Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 29.5.92 141 Amount paid to Vision Hire 2,50,000.00 P-1381 PW.201 from CA 2018 of Canara Bank P-1501 Mylapore of Selvi J. Jayalalitha on 3.3.93 142 Amount debited from CA 15,90,726.00 P-1382 PW.201 2018 of Canara Bank Mylapore P-1502 of Selvi J. Jayalalitha towards Indian Bank Account Government transactions on 28.8.95 143 Amount paid to Post Master T.399.00 P-1382 PW.201 Nagar from CA 2196 of Canara P-1503 Bank Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 30.6.95 144 Amount paid to Madras9,301.00 P-1519 PW.201 Telephones from CA 2196 of P-1555 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Sasikala on 30.8.94 and 23.3.94 145 Amount paid to MMWSSB from CA2,285.00 P-1519 PW.201 2196 of Canara Bank Mylapore P-1556 of Tmt. N. Sasikala between to 7.4.93 and P-1565 16.3.95. 146 Amount paid to 8,000.00 P-1519 PW.201 Marine P-1568 Waves from CA 2196 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 27.2.93 147 Amount paid to SE, MDC from 14,313.00 P-1519 PW.201 CA 2196 of Canara Bank P-1569 Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 24.1.96 148 Amount paid to Corporation of1,393.95 P-1510 PW.201 Madras of MS from SB 23218 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. N. Sasikala on 20.6.92 149 Amount paid to R.O. 1,858.60 P-1510 PW.201 Corporation from SB 23218 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Sasikala on 5.9.91 150 i Amount paid in cash 5,88,978.00 P-1510 PW.201 to P-1570 PW.238 M s. Nathella Anjaneyalu P-1571 Chetty and Sons, towards companyt of Silver items for Puja purposes silver Kavacham for Vinayaga Idol situated in front of Poes Garden residence for Gold Polishing and blass plates on the main doors of Poes Garden and towards the companyt of six gold necklaces during Sept to Nov. 1995. Rs.1,52,000 Amounts paid to M s. Nathella Anjaneyalu Chetty and Sons by cheque No.93293 P-2262 PW.238 and 93294 of Canara Bank P-2263 Mylapore towards companyt of two pairs of Gold Ear studs, studded with Diamonds Vide bill No.45598 and 45599 Rs.4,36,978/- 151 Amount paid to Tvl. N. 30,000.00 P-1572 Rajasekaran and Sons from P-1574 SB 24621 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 28.1.93 152 Amount paid to United India 5,710.00 P-1572 from SB 24621 of Canara Bank, P-1575 Mylapore of N.Sudhakaran 153 Amount paid to S. Srinivasan 4,500.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara P-1590 Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 21.10.94 154 Amount paid to R. 3,000.00 P-1576 Loganathan from CA 2220 of P-1591 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 28.2.94 155 Amount paid to United India 32,087.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara P-1592 Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN to 1595 Sudhakaran on 18.3.94, 24.3.95, 6.12.95 and 27.3.96 156 Amount paid to OM Enterprises36,105.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 13.3.96 157 Amount paid to Tr. 2,500.00 P-1576 PW.201 Raghur from CA 2220 of P-1596 PW.96 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 13.8.94 158 Amount paid to SAI Bhas from 4,500.00 P-1576 CA 2220 of Canara Bank P-1597 Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 21.10.94 159 Amount paid to Tr. Sampath 34,960.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara P-1598 Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 26.10.95 160 Amount paid to Madras 1,995.00 P-1576 Telephones from CA 2220 of P-1599 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. to 1603 VN Sudhakaran on 19.9.95, 7.11.95, 26.2.96 and 26.4.96 Rs.399 x 5 161 Amount debited towards DD 300.00 P-1576 Commission from CA 2220 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 16.7.93, 17.1.94, 19.1.94 and 14.5.94 162 Interest paid towards TOD 2,103.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 31.12.94, 15.12.95 and 7.3.96 813 930 360 163 Amount paid to Tr. Krishna 2,500.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara Bank P-1604 Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 9.11.94 164 Amount paid to Post Master 399.00 P-1576 from CA 2220 of Canara P-1605 Bank Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 30.6.96 165 Amount paid to upfront from 3,500.00 P-1576 CA 2220 of Canara Bank P-1609 Mylapore of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 27.10.95 166 Amount paid to Tr. 2,500.00 P-1618 PW.201 Anilkumar from CA 2219 of P-1619 PW.97 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. 167 Amount paid to Tr. Narayana 4,500.00 P-1618 PW.201 Rao from CA 2219 of P-1620 PW.195 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Elavarasi. On 6.10.94 168 Amount paid to Tr. G. 2,500.00 P-1618 PW.201 Prabhakar Reddy from CA P-1621 2219 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Elavarasi. On 12.8.94 169 Amount paid to Tr. 1,000.00 P-1618 PW.201 V.Ravikumar from CA P-1622 PW.114 2219 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Elavarasi. On 28.9.94 170 Amount paid to Tr. Suresh2,00,000.00 P-1618 PW.201 Bhatia from CA 2219 of Canara P-1623 Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 14.3.95 171 Amount paid to Tr. 2,000.00 P-1618 PW.201 Vijayan from CA 2219 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 27.4.95 172 Amount paid to Tr. 20,000.00 P-1618 PW.201 A- K.Vijaya Shankar from P-1624 CA 2219 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 5.4.95 173 Amount paid to Milan Jothi 12,500.00 P-1618 PW.201 from CA 2219 of Canara P-785 toPW.147 Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. 787 Elavarasi. On 21.3.94 174 Amount paid to United India 21,494.00 P-1618 PW.201 Insurance from CA 2219 of P-1625 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. Elavarasi. On 18.3.94, 24.3.95 and 27.3.96 175 Amount paid to MMSWWB 17,305.00 P-1618 PW.201 from CA 2219 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 2.6.95 176 Amounts debited from CA 1,203.00 P-1618 PW.201 2219 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi towards cheque book and DD Commission etc., on different dates 177 Amount paid to MMDA for 2,90,675.00 P-725 PW.128 allotment of a plot at P-718 Door No.E-83, Besant Nagar, P-726 by A-3 on 3.3.93 P-727 and development charges Rs.1500/- on 3.3.93 and scrutiny fee of Rs.475/- on 1.3.93. Plot companyt Rs.2,88,750.00 Dev. Ch. Rs. 1,500.00 Scrutiny feeRs. 475.00 Rs.2,90,675.00 178 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 25,445.00 PW.227 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1987- 88 Rs.2675.00 11/92 Rs.227770.00 28.8.95 179 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 5,63,482.00 PW.227 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1988- 89 Rs.9282.00 11/92 Rs.554200.00 28.8.95 180 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 8,18,161.00 PW.227 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1989- 90 Rs.9905.00 11/92 Rs.808256.00 28.8.95 181 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 30,61,549.00 PW.227 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1990- 91 Rs.61549.00 11/92 Rs.500000.00 20.11.95 Rs.500000.00 8.12.95 Rs.500000.00 18.01.96 Rs.500000.00 25.02.96 Rs.500000.00 19.03.96 Rs.500000.00 24.04.96 182 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 25,78,065.00 PW.227 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1991- 92 Rs.378065.00 20.11.92 Rs.1000000.00 1.10.94 Rs.500000.00 26.12.94 Rs.700000.00 22.1.94 183 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 3,92,488.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1992- PW.227 93 PW.228 Rs.3891.45 23.11.92 Rs.3343.00 11.2.93 184 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 8,88,370.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1993- PW.227 94 PW.228 Rs.523757.00 15.12.92 Rs.349171.00 16.3.93 Rs.15442.00 13.3.96 185 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 2,90,528.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1994- PW.227 95 PW.228 Rs.87158.00 15.9.93 Rs.87158.00 15.12.93 Rs.116212.00. 15.3.94 186 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 2,90,528.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1995- 96 PW.227 Rs.87158.00 15.9.94 PW.228 Rs.87158.00 15.12.94 Rs.116212.00. 15.3.95 187 Income Tax remitted by Selvi 9,24,316.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1997- PW.227 98 PW.228 Rs.87158.00 13.9.95 Rs.87158.00 8.12.95 Rs.116212.00. 14.3.96 188 Wealth tax remitted by Selvi 34,381.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1987- PW.227 88 during 11/92 PW.228 189 Wealth tax remitted by Selvi 89,619.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1988- PW.227 89 during 11/92 PW.228 190 Wealth tax remitted by Selvi 2,68,475.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1989- PW.227 90 during 11/92 PW.228 191 Wealth tax remitted by Selvi 6,02,757.00 PW.215 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1990- PW.227 91 during 11/92 PW.228 192 Wealth tax remitted by Selvi 7,18,542.00 PW.201 Jayalalitha for A-Y. 1991- 92 on 23.11.92 193 Wealth tax remitted by Selvi 13,51,590.00 PW.201 Jayalalitha for A-Y.1992- 93 on 23.11.92 194 Income Tax remitted by Tmt. 2,23,750.00 PW.215 Sasikala for A-Y. 1991-92 PW.227 during 2/93 PW.228 195 Income Tax remitted by Tmt. 3,00,550.00 PW.215 Sasikala for A-Y. 1992-93 PW.227 during 2/93 PW.228 196 Income Tax remitted by Tmt. 7,62,151.00 PW.215 Sasikala for A-Y. 1993-94 PW.227 during 13.3.96 PW.228 197 Wealth Tax remitted by Tmt. 14,240.00 PW.215 Sasikala for A-Y. 1991-92 PW.227 during 2/93 PW.228 198 Wealth Tax reitted by Tmt. 1,17,955.00 PW.215 Sasikala for A-Y. 1992-93 PW.227 during 2/93 PW.228 199 Expenditure by way of DDs and63,355.00 P-936 PW.164 Os taken in favour of Tr. Syed Saleem of Pet Basheerabad. 7045 x 4 28100.00 7035 x 5 35175.00 63,355.00 From the SB 20614 of CBI Secunderabad of Selvi J. Jayalalitha during the check period 200 Amount paid to Tr. Ravinder 1,90,730.00 P-936 PW.164 Reddy through Andhra Bank, Basheerabad Branch SB 2803 from SB 20614 of CBI Secunderabad of Selvi J. Jayalalitha during check period 1035 x 6 60210 10040 x 13 130520 190730 201 Amount paid to J.R. Rao on 76,337.00 P-936 PW.164 1.2.95 from SB 20614 of CBI Secunderabad of Selvi J. Jayalalitha 202 Amount paid to Thirumala 3,835.00 P-936 PW.164 Fertilizers from SB 20614 of CBI Secunderabad of Selvi Jayalalitha on 11.1.94 203 Tax deducted at source in3,332.00 P-936 PW.164 respect of MIDR 66/9 on 26.3.92 204 Amount paid towards BPO 301.00 P-1111 PW.182 Commission from CA 1068 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 21.12.94 205 Amount paid towards I.C. 125.00 P-1111 PW.182 Charges and Folio Charges from CA 1068 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tr. VN Sudhakaran on 16.4.94, 13.5.94, 15.3.95, 28.3.95 and 31.3.95 206 Amount paid to Temporary 388.00 P-1111 PW.182 OD as interest from CA 1068 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram on 31.12.94 207 Amount paid to Tr. 4,410.00 P-1111 PW.182 Srinivasalu on 12.5.95 from CA 1068 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tr. VN Sudhakaran. 208 Amount paid to Tr. A- 20,000.00 P-1109 PW.182 Vijaya Shankar from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 22.7.95 209 Amount paid to Tr. D. 1,40,000.00 P-1109 PW.182 Srinivasan from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 7.2.96 210 Amount paid to Tr. Dasan 1,052.00 P-1109 PW.182 from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi 14.10.95 211 Amount paid to Tr. 5,845.00 P-1109 PW.182 Ramadoss from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi on 14.10.95 212 Amount paid to Tr. 9,963.00 P-1109 PW.182 Ramsons from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi on 26.10.95 213 Amount paid to Tr. Vedagiri 20,000.00 P-1109 PW.182 from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. Elavarasi on 3.11.95 214 Amount paid to Tr. 3,500.00 P-1109 PW.182 Veerasamy from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi on 7.11.95 215 Amount paid to Tr. Durai Samy92,025.00 P-1109 PW.182 Nadar from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi on 8.11.95, 12.12.95, 7.2.96, 9.9.96 and 14.3.96 Rs.13500 13150 27025 10800 27550 216 Amount paid to Tmt. 591.60 P-1109 PW.182 Lakshmi from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi on 4.12.95 217 Amount paid to Tr. D. Vimal 21,000.00 P-1109 PW.182 Kumar from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. Elavarasi on 29.3.96 218 Amount paid to Supdt. 1,434.00 P-1109 PW.182 Engineer from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 24.1.96 219 Amount paid to telephone 1,197.00 P-1109 PW.182 departments from CA 1171 to Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 29.12.95, 24.1.96 and 23.3.96 Rs.399 x 3 220 Amount paid towards 16,170.00 P-1109 PW.182 interest for T.O.D from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 17.9.95 and 31.12.95 Rs.6455 9715 221 Amount paid to DD 6,865.00 P-1109 PW.182 Commission and other charges from CA 1171 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 19.10.95, 7.2.96, 9.2.96, 14.2.96, 15.3.96 and 31.3.96 222 Amount paid to 13,072.50 P-1138 PW.182 Tele Communication Department. From SB 4119 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of J. Vivek s o. Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 14.7.95 223 Amount paid to Tr. M. 40,96,565.00 P-1238 PW.182 Natarajan, Tamilarasi Press P-1226 from CA 1053 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., towards the loan A c in Indian Bank, Abirampuram in respect of the loan availed by Tamilarasi Publication P Ltd., on 25.6.94 224 Amount paid to Tamilarasi 12,03,435.00 P-1226 PW.182 Private Limited Account P-1239 No.CA 372 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram from CA 1053 of Indian Bank, Abirampuram of M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., on 14.7.94 225 Other items of household 16,15,500.00 PW.198 expenditure of Selvi J. Jayalalitha at Poes Garden as per the following particulars. Salary for Tr. Jayaraman at Rs.3000/- per month from 9/93 to 10/96 37 months - Rs.1,11,000/- ii. Salary for Tr. Vijayan from 6/91 to 4/96 at Rs.1500/- per month for 59 months -Rs.88,500/- iii. Salary for 6 drivers from 6/91 To 4/96 at Rs.1,500/- per month 16,15,500.00 PW.198 For 59 months - Rs.5,31,000/- iv. Salary for Electrician for 6/91 to 4/96 at Rs.1,500/- per month for 59 months. - Rs.88,500/- Salary for two sweepers from 6/91 to 4/96 at Rs.750/- per month for 59 months. - Rs. 88,500/- vi. Salary for Cook Tr. Selvaraj at Rs.750/- per month for 59 months from 6/91 to 4/96 - Rs. 44,250/- vii. Salary for Tmt. Rajamma, companyk at Rs.500/- per month for 59 months from 6/91 to 4/96 - Rs. 29,500/- viii. Salary for 7 Assistant Maids Male and Female servants at Rs.200/- per month for 59 months from 6/91 to 4/96 - Rs. 82,600/- ix. Salary for Dhoby at Rs.3000/- per month for 59 months from 6/91 to 4/96 - Rs.1,77,000/- Milk expenditure 18 Ltrs. Per day At Rs.7.50 per litre for 59 months From 6/91 to 4/96 - Rs.2,38,950/- xi. Telephone Bill for Phone No.4991414 for 59 months from 6/91 to 4/96 at Rs.1000/- per month Average bill amount - Rs. 59,000/- xii. Flowers purchased for 59 months For 59 months at Rs.1,300/- per month 6/91 to 4/96 - Rs. 76,700/- 226 Expenditure incurred in 6,45,04,222.00 P-1019 PW.181 companynection with the marriage P-1371 PW.200 of foster son Tr. VN to P- PW.192 Sudhakaran with Tmt. 1376 PW.196 Sathiyalakshmi on 7.9.95 P-1292 PW.238 PW.189 A- Expenditure incurred for PW.228 erection of marriage pandal over and above the admitted recorded payments as estimated by W.D authorities Rs.5,21,23,532.00 Expenditure incurred towards companyt of food, mineral water and thambulam assessment based on available materials Rs. 1,14,96,125/- c. 34 Nos. TITAN Watches purchased on cash payment. Rs.1,34,565.00 Amount paid to Tr. Syed Bawker towards stitching charges for wedding dress of Tr. VN Sudhakaran - Rs.1,26,000/- Amount paid for purchase of 100 silver plates paid by Tmt. N. Sasikala Rs.4,00,000 Postal expenses for dispatch of 56,000 wedding invitations Rs.2,24,000 227 Kodanad Tea Estate 12,20,310.00 P-1964 PW.205 in P-1965 No.168 of Kothagiri Village Expenditure incurred for companystruction of bunglow structure Foundation only Rs. 7,00,000/- ii Expenditure incurred towards laying HDPE Pipes Rs. 5,20,315/- 228 Amount paid by Tmt. N. 10,82,420.00 P-1382 PW.190 Sasikala to Tr. P-1109 N. Kanniyappan, Proprietor, Lakshmi Marbles, Choolaimedu, Chennai 94 towards the companyt of marbles and blaze titles supplied to Sengamala Thayar Memorial College for Women at Mannargudi. 229 Amount spent towards 40,690.00 P-67 PW.21 electricity power companynection for 31-A Poes Garden new residence for SC Account Nos.203-43-209 SC Connection charge Rs.1,400/- security deposit Rs.1,000/- Electricity companysumption charges upto 30.4.96 Rs.30,210/- 230 Amount spent for securing 25,600.00 P-67 PW.21 electricity power companynection in respect of SC No.208-43- 216 to 208-43-219 for 31-A Poes Garden at the rateof Rs.6,400/- per service companynection 231 Amount paid to Tr. 30,000.00 P-1613 PW.201 Rajesekaran from SB A c. P-1614 No.25389 of Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 28.1.93 232 Amount paid to United India 9,369.00 P-1613 PW.201 Insurance Company from SB P-1615 No.25389 of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 31.3.93 233 Amount paid to Tr. 4,410.00 P-1613 PW.201 Subbarama Reddy from SB A c. P-1616 No.25389 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 12.5.95 234 Amount paid to Tr. 4,590.00 P-1613 PW.201 Srinivasalu Reddy from S.B. P-1617 A c. No.25389 Canara Bank Mylapore of Tmt. J. Elavarasi. On 12.5.95 235 Amount spent towards 7,50,000.00 P-1940 PW.201 providing extra amenities in P2031 PW.148 Swaraj Mazda Vans Three TN -09/H-3541, TN-09/ H- 3595 and TN-09/H-3506 of M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., paid to Tr. Mohan, Nikhil enterprises, Chennai - 1 4 236 Expenditure towards 2,27,750.00 P-805 PW.149 electricity companysumption charges in respect of SC No.211-11-179 dt 1.8.75 of Jaya Publications at C-8, Thiru-vi-ka Industrial Estate, Chennai 32 for the check Period 237 Expenditure towards 27,529.00 P-806 PW.149 electricity companysumption charges in respect of S.C. No.211-11-180 dt. 1.8.75 of Namadhu MGR at C-8 Tr-vika Industrial Estate for the check period 238 Expenditure towards 2,69,102.00 P-798 PW.19 electricity companysumption charges in respect of SC No.211-11-261 dt 17.3.90 at MF-9, Guindy Industrial Estate, Chennai 32 in the name of M s. Jaya Publications. 239 Expenditure towards 97,381.00 P-789 PW.149 electricity companysumption charges for the premises of M s. Jaya Publications at MF-9, Industrial Estate Chennai-32 for the check period including deposit of Rs.12,000 240 Expenditure towards 1,594.00 P-804 PW.149 electricity companysumption charges including deposits in respect of the premises of M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., at No.48, Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Chennai 97 241 Expenditure towards 1,08,138.00 P-807 PW.149 electricity companysumption charges and deposits in respect of SC No.211-11- 273 of M s. Jaya Publications for the period from 9/92 to 12-93 242 Expenditure towards 58,889.00 P-808 PW.149 electricity companysumption charges and deposits in respect of SC No.211-11- 303 of M s. Sasi Enterprises at A-28, Industrial Estate, Chennai 32 for the check period 243 Expenditure towards 7,38,433.00 P-800 PW.149 electricity companysumption To 803 charges of M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., in the name of the following service companynections viz., M s. Sastri Manufacturers, SC No.211-05-141 for the period 9/93 to 4/96 Rs. 1,33,766/- ii. M s. Sastri Manufacturers, SC No.211-05-142 for the period 9/93 to 2/95 disconnected Rs. 1,447/- iii. M s. Uni Offset Printers SC No.211-05-273 for the period 9/93 to 4/96 Rs. 1,82,127/- iv. M s. Amar Enterprises SC No.211-05-275 for the period 9/93 to 4/96 Rs. 4,21,093/- 244 Amount paid to over and 4,63,000.00 P-1903 PW.30 above the document value P-1924 PW.201 companycerned in document P-1925 No.282/94 dt. 27.6.94 P-1935 of SRO North Madras M s. P-1903 Fiesta Properties P Ltd., P-1933 by M s. Jaya Publications To P- towards the companyt of 1935 acquisition of flat at Door No.9899 of Luz Church Road, Chennai 4 Total 11,56,56,833.41 245 Vijayasekar Services 44,341.35 246 Thevar Automobiles 9,73,452.00 247 Kumaran Silks 4,84,712.00 248 James Fredrich 30,00,000.00 Grand Total 12,00,59,338.76 It appears that the aforementioned expenditures are classifiable as follows Amounts paid towards interest in respect of the loan. Amounts paid to Corporation of Madras towards sanction of building plan. Amounts paid to Corporation, MMWSSB. Amounts paid for the purchase of provisions. Amounts towards LIC premium. Amounts paid towards DD Commission. Amounts paid to telecom and Electricity Department. Income Tax and Wealth Tax. Household Expenses. Marriage Expenses. Other outgoings. The Trial Court after analyzing oral and documentary evidence came to the companyclusion that the accused have number disputed the loan transactions and as a result whereof it held that the prosecution has proved Item Nos.1 to 8 of Annexure-IV. In respect of Item Nos.9 to 21, the Trial Court after duly companysidering the evidence, both oral and documentary, held that the accused did number dispute the statutory permission obtained by them for companystructing new buildings and addition of the building as numbered in Exts.65, 64, 51, 54, 63, 56, 48, 49, 50, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66 and 76, respectively and therefore, it appeared that the receipts for such payments and the proceedings maintained by the companycerned municipal authority had been established by the prosecution. Similarly, the Trial Court held that payments made with respect to item Nos.23 to 35, 37 to 44, 46, 48 to 54 56 to 176 had been proved by the prosecution. The companyresponding documents have already been accepted before the Court and hence such expenditure has been proved by the prosecution. With regard to Item Nos.178 to 198, such expenditures were never disputed on behalf of the accused before the Court. After analyzing the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and their depositions, it held that item Nos.229 230 have also been proved by the prosecution. The Trial Court has duly companysidered the objections raised on behalf of the accused and rejected the same. Similarly, the Trial Court has also dealt with other expenditures such as household expenses Item No.225 in the Chart and the objections raised on such account on the ground of overlapping entries and it came to the companyclusion that the argument of the learned companynsel raising the objections cannot be accepted. After analyzing the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and the judgments cited before it, the Trial Court came to the following companyclusion Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that as against the income of Rs.9,91,05,094.75 and expenditure of Rs.8,49,06,833.00 during the check period, A1 acquired and possessed in her name and in the names of A2 to A4 and in the names of the business enterprises acquired in their names immovable properties and pecuniary resources of the value of Rs.53,60,49,954.00 which she companyld number satisfactorily account. Hence, acting u Sec. 248 2 of 896 Spl.C.C.208/2004 Cr.P.C., A1 is hereby companyvicted for the offence punishable u Sec. 13 1 e R w. Sec. 13 2 of 1988 Act. Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that, A1 to A4 were parties to criminal companyspiracy with the object of acquiring and possessing pecuniary resources and assets to the extent of Rs.53,60,49,954.00 beyond the known source of income of A1. Hence, A1, A2, A3 and A4 are hereby companyvicted for the offence punishable u Sec. 120-B of I.P.C. R w. Sec. 13 1 e R w. Sec. 13 2 of 1988 Act. Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that A2 to A4 abetted the companymission of the above offence by intentionally aiding A1 in the acquisition and possession of pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to her known source of income as above. Hence, A2, A3 and A4 are hereby companyvicted for the offence punishable u Sec.109 of I.P.C. R w. Sec. 13 1 R w. Sec. 13 2 of 1988 Act. The Trial Court after hearing the learned companynsel appearing for the accused and the learned Public Prosecutor on sentence, awarded the following sentence against the accused For the offence u Sec. 13 1 e R w. Sec. 13 2 of the 1988 Act, A1 Selvi. J. Jayalalitha, D o. Late. Jayaram, is hereby sentenced to undergo simple 908 Spl.C.C.208/2004 imprisonment for a period of four years and a fine of Rs.100 crores. In default to pay the fine amount, she shall undergo further imprisonment for one year. For the offence punishable u Sec. 120-B I.P.C., R w. Sec. 13 2 of 1988 Act, A1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs.1 lakh. In default to pay the fine, she shall undergo further imprisonment for one month. For the offence punishable u Secs. 109 of I.P.C., R w. Sec. 13 2 of 1988 Act, A2 Tmt. Sasikala Natarajan, A3 Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran and A4 Tmt. J. Eavarasi are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four years each and to pay fine of Rs.10 crores each. In default to pay the fine amount, A2, A3 and A4 shall each undergo further imprisonment for one year. For the offence punishable u Sec. 120-B of I.P.C. R w. Sec. 13 2 of 1988 Act, A2, A3 and A4 each are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each. In default to pay the fine amount, A2, A3 and A4 shall each undergo further imprisonment for one month. Substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run companycurrently. Period of custody already undergone by the accused shall be given set off u Sec. 428 of Cr.P.C. It is further ordered that, necessary direction shall be issued to the companycerned banks to remit the proceeds of the Fixed Deposits and the cash balance standing to the credit of the respective accused in their bank account and the proceeds thereof shall be appropriated and adjusted towards the fine amounts. If after adjustment, still the fine falls short, the gold and diamond ornaments seized and produced before the Court after setting apart 7040 grams of gold with proportionate diamond jewellery , as observed in the body of the judgment shall be sold to RBI or SBI or by public auction to make deficit of fine amount good. The rest of the gold and diamond jewellery shall be companyfiscated to the Government. All the immovable properties registered in the names of Lex Property Developments Pvt. Ltd., Meadow Agro Farms Pvt. Ltd., Ramaraj Agro Mills Pvt. Ltd., Signora Business Enterprises P Ltd., Riverway Agro Products Ltd., and Indo Doha Chemicals and Phramaceuticals Ltd., which are under attachment pursuant to G.O. Nos. M.S. 120 and 1183, shall be companyfiscated to the State Government. Out of the fine amount recovered as above, a sum of Rs.5 crores shall be made over to the State of Karnataka towards reimbursement of the companyt of trial companyducted in the State of Karnataka. Furnish a free companyy of the full judgment to the accused forthwith. Being aggrieved, appeals were filed by the accused before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore challenging the order passed by the Court of 36th Addl. City Civil Sessions Judge at Bangalore. The High Court on its analysis came to the companyclusion that the value of assets at the end of the check period in respect of accused Nos.1, 2, 3 4 together along with the firms companypanies involved was Rs.66,44,73,537/- and accepted the value of the assets as indicated by the prosecution. The High Court, thereafter applying the principles laid down in Krishnanand Agnihotri Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 769 1977 1 SCC 816, on a calculation of total assets, income expenditure of accused Nos.1 to 4, their firms and companypanies, arrived at the percentage of disproportionate assets as under PARTICULARS AMOUNT TOTAL AMOUNT IN RUPEES IN RUPEES Assets as per DVAC 66,44,73,573 Cost of companystruction 27,79,88,945 As per DVAC 5,10,54,060 Less As per records and finding 22,69,34,885 Total A ii Marriage Expenses 6,45,04,222 As per DVAC 28,68,000 Less As per finding of this Court 6,16,36,222 Total B AB 28,85,71,107 Less AB 28,85,71,107 TOTAL ASSETS 37,59,02,466 Income of Accused Nos.1 to 4, firms and companypanies Sl. Particulars Amount No. In Rupees Loan as income 18,17,46,000 Income from grape Garden 46,71,600 Gifts 1,50,00,000 Sasi Enterprises 25,00,000 Jaya Publications and Namadhu MGR4,00,00,000 Super Duper TV Pvt. Ltd. 1,00,00,000 Rental Income 3,22,000 Income assessed by DVAC 9,34,26,054 TOTAL INCOME 34,76,65,654 DISPROPORTIONATE ASSETS Total Assets - Total Income Rs.37,59,02,466 - Rs.34,76,65,654 Rs.2,82,36,812 Percentage Disproportionate assets x 100 Income Rs.2,82,36,812 x 100 Rs.34,76,65,654 8.12 The High Court, following the principles laid down in Krishnanand Agnihotri supra , held that when there is disproportionate asset to the extent of 10 or below, the accused are entitled to acquittal and accordingly the High Court passed the following order acquitting the accused Criminal Appeal Nos.835/2014, 836/2014, 837/2014 and 838/2014 are allowed. i The Judgment of Conviction and Sentence passed in Spl.C.C.No.208 of 2004, dated 27.9.2014, on the file of the 36th Additional City Civil Sessions Judge Spl. Court for Trial of Criminal Cases against Kum.Jayalalitha Ors. , Bengaluru, is hereby set-aside. Appellants-Accused Nos.1 to 4 are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. ii The Bail bonds of A1 to A4 are discharged. The Appeals in Criminal Appeal Nos.17/2015, 18/2015, 19/2015, 20/2015, 21/2015 and 22/2015 are allowed in part. i Order of the Trial Court relating to companyfiscation of the properties both movable and immovable, is hereby set aside. Assailing the judgment and order dated 11.05.2015, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, appeals, by special leave, have been filed before this Court by the State of Karnataka and Mr. K. Anbazhagan. Although the State of Tamil Nadu was arrayed as the sole respondent in the appeals before the High Court, these appeals have been filed by the State of Karnataka, in view of the decisions of this Court in K. Anbazhagan Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in 2015 6 SCC 86 and 2015 6 SCC 158, wherein it was held that it is only the State of Karnataka being the Transferee State which is the sole Prosecuting Agency and was companypetent to appoint the Public Prosecutor. We have given a patient hearing to all the parties, including the intervenor, in the matter. We have been taken through various documents and the evidence of the parties. Mr. Dushyant Dave and Mr. B.V. Acharya, learned senior companynsel appearing in support of the appeals first companytended that the High Court has calculated the disproportionate assets by adopting an incorrect method with wrong particulars and our attention was drawn to Page 997 of the SLP Paper Book, where in the table companysisting of assets and expenditure, the High Court has reduced the values therein but has inflated the income and thus inaccurately assessed the disproportionate assets to be Rs.2,82,36, 812/-. It is pointed out before us that there are companycurrent findings of the two Courts in respect of the fact that the accused did own disproportionate assets during the check period and the difference between the two Courts is only with regard to the quantum. While the Trial Court held that it is Rs.53,60,49,954/-, the High Court held it as Rs.2,83,36,812/-. It is also submitted that in calculating the disproportionate assets, value of assets, expenditure and income of all the accused has been taken jointly along with that of firms and companypanies 34 in number . Both the Courts, High Court as well as Trial Court, have recorded companycurrent findings and have taken all the assets, income and expenditure of all the accused together. It is further pointed out that the sole source of inflow is of A1, although assets were standing in the names of other accused or the firms companypanies owned by them. It is further submitted, as appears from the records, that both the Courts did number accept the claim to companysider the case of A1 and A2 to A4 separately. Hence, it is submitted that number they cannot claim such a companyrse to be adopted at this stage before this Court. It is also submitted that both the Courts have rejected the claim of Namadhu MGR scheme which according to the accused worked out to more than Rs.14 crores during the check period and that the finding of the Courts that all properties purchased by the 6 companypanies actually belonged to accused has number been challenged by anybody and therefore it stands. Mr. B.V. Acharya, learned senior companynsel appearing on behalf of the State of Karnataka companytended that if the final figures arrived by the High Court appearing at Pages 997-998 of its judgment are accepted and apparent errors therein including calculation and arithmetical errors as also error apparent on the face of the record are companyrected, the disproportionate assets will be more than Rs.35 crores and this alone is sufficient to sustain the companyviction, according to him. Mr. Acharya has placed before us a Chart which is as follows Sl. ERROR CORRECTIONS No. CALCULATION ERROR The method of calculating D.A. is wrong. If all the findings of the high companyrt is accepted in toto then the amount of D.A. is Rs.14,38,93,645 i.e. 41.3 number Rs.2,82,36,36,812 i.e. 8.12 as held by the High Court The previous two charts have details of the same ARITHMETIC ERROR While totalling loans as income at Pg.939 Vol IV , the High Court has companymitted an arithmetic error to the tune of 13.50 Crores. If this arithmetic error is alone companyrected then the Disproportionate Asset companye to Rs.16,32,36,812/- i.e. 76.7 This is fully companyered in Pg 1028-1030 SLP Vol.IV ADMISION OF ACCUSEDUnder Expenditure Cost of Construction The accused have admitted that the companyt of companystruction incurred is Rs.8,60,59,261 Pg 2350 Vol IX. However the High Court values the same at Rs.5,10,55,060 Pg 979 Vol IV, which is Rs.3,50,05,210 lesser than the admitted amount. Under income Business income of Jaya Publication The accused have admitted that the income of Jaya Publication was Rs.1,15,94,849/- As per written submission of A-2 Extracted in Pg 1034 SLP Vol IV . The High Court calculated this at Rs.4 Crores Pg 946-960 Vol IV, which is Rs.2,84,05,151/- more than the admitted amount. GIFTS AS INCOME Gifts as income is subject matter of SLP Nos.1163-1167 of 2012 Pg 1032-1033 Present SLP Vol IV. Therefore although Trial Court has held that gifts received cannot be held to be a lawful source of income Pg 1283-1296 Vol V, the High Court has added 1.5 Crores as income under this head, which is liable to be reduced. Therefore if the above companyrections are carried out, the disproportionate assets will be On the basis of finding of High Court - Rs.14,38,93,645 On the basis of finding of High Court, companyrection of the other mistakes in arithmetic, admissions of accused and disallowing gifts as income 1. 14,38,93,645 Omission of Expenses Corrected 2. 13,50,00,000 Totalling Error Corrected 3. 3,50,05,210 Admission Reg Valuation of Construction 4. 2,84,05,151 Admission Reg Business income of Jaya Publication 5. 1,50,00,000 Gift which is illegal Disproportionate Asset 35,73,04,006 Income will have to be 16,92,60,503 Disproportionate Asset D.A. 35,73,04,006/- of D.A. 35,73,04,006 x 100 211.09 16,92,60,503 Hence, he submitted that this process alone is sufficient to sustain the companyviction. Mr. Acharya further companytended that the findings of the High Court regarding the value of assets are patently erroneous and unsustainable. He submitted that the High Court has accepted the value given by DVAC except for a single head i.e., value of additional companystructions. The High Court has accepted the amount of expenditure except for 1 item i.e. marriage expenditure and the High Court has added 7 items towards the income which are patently erroneous. Mr. Acharya drew our attention to Annexure-III 64 items Annexure-III, Pages 1224-1233 of Vol.V and submitted that the income includes loan, interest, rental, agricultural income and fixed deposits. According to the prosecution, the said amount is Rs.9,34,26,054/- which would appear at Pages 1224-1233 of Vol.V . According to the Trial Court, the income would be Rs.9,91,05,094.75/- appearing at Page 1396 of Vol. VI . However, the High Court has shown such income as Rs.34,76,65,654/- appearing at Pages 997-998 of Vol. IV . It is submitted that the High Court companysidered additional income under 7 heads and has increased the income to Rs.34,76,65,654/-. The High Court has shown the value of income from loan as Rs.24,17,31,274/- which companytains error of totalling and the sum total of these 10 items ought to be Rs.10,67,31,274/-. Therefore, there is a totalling error of Rs.13,50,00,000/-. He further companytended that these loans as income cannot be taken into companysideration as has been taken by the High Court. Since the prosecution has already companysidered such loans as income which appears at Annexure-III at Page 1228 Vol. V Items 1-8 and expenditure at Annexure-IV Page 1397 of Vol.VI, Items 1-8 . He drew our attention to the High Court judgment regarding 10 loans, which would appear at Page 938-939, Vol. IV of the SLP Paper Book, which is as under Ex.P1027 OMTL-Indian Bank, Rs.1,50,00,000.00 Jaya Publications Ex.P1101 Agricultural Rs.3,75,00,000.00 D. Loan, Indian Bank, Guna Bhushani. On request of Guna Bhushani, they changed the loan liability to A2, A3 and A4 since they became the share holders. Ex.P1114 Indian Bank A1 Rs.90,00,000.00 Ex.P1162 Indian Bank J. Real Rs.25,00,000.00 Estate Ex.P1172 Indian Bank Rs.12,46,000.00 S.Housing Ex.P1211 Indian Bank Rs.50,00,000.00 Farm House Ex.P1260 Indian Bank- SasikalaRs.25,00,000.00 Ex.P1330 Indian Bank- Rs.1,57,00,000.00 N.Sudhakaran Ex.P1354 Ramaraj Agro Mill LtdRs.1,65,00,000.00 Ex.P1357 Indian Bank- Rs.17,85,274.00 Mahalakshmi Kalyanamandapa Total Rs.24,17,31,274.00 Mr. Acharya pointed out that the High Court has wrongly taken into account the above-mentioned 10 loan amounts, being the loan from Indian Bank. Regarding the loan of Rs.1,50,00,000/- by OMTL Jaya Publication, which is shown as item No.1 in Annexure-IV Ext.-P 2330, Page 1397 of Vol.VI, being expenditure list , he submitted that this amount cannot be taken into account by the High Court. He also drew our attention to the deposition made by PW-182 and PW-160 wherefrom it appears that the said loan was repaid. The Trial Court has dealt with such loan as it is specifically stated that the said loan was closed on June 25, 1994. Mr. Acharya therefore submitted that the High Court taking this amount again, would amount to a double entry. Regarding MD Loan of Rs.3,75,00,000/- which is shown as Item No.8 in Annexure III Exh.P-2329, Page 1225 of Vol. V income list , it is submitted by Mr. Acharya that this loan has been discussed by the Trial Court at Page 1237-1239 of Vol. V while dealing with income and the Trial Court has accepted the case of the prosecution. The accused at numberpoint of time have disputed about any loan number being taken into companysideration by the prosecution. Mr. Acharya therefore submitted that the High Court should number have taken this amount into companysideration as taking this amount again, would amount to double entry. Mr. Acharya further submitted that the Loan of Rs.90,00,000/- which has been taken after the check period is only a credit voucher shown in Exh.P- 1114, marked by PW-182, who has deposed that this loan was taken in August, 1996 i.e. after the check period. He therefore submitted that this loan companyld number have been companysidered by the High Court at all. Regarding the Loan of Rs.25,00,000/- which is shown as Item No.4 in Annexure-III Exh.P-2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V Income list and Item No.5 of Annexure-IV, Exh.P-2330, Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list , it is submitted by Mr. Acharya that this amount has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1161 to 1163 through him. He submitted that although the Bank had sanctioned Rs.25 lakhs, it had released only a sum of Rs.5 lakhs. The principal amount and interest has number been paid back by the firm. The Trial Court has discussed this loan at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1417 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Mr. Acharya submitted that this income has been duly companysidered and the High Court companyld number have taken the amount of Rs.25 lakhs under this head. Regarding the loan of Rs.12,46,000/- J.S. Housing which is shown as item No.3 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, Income list and Item NO.4 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list , it is submitted by the learned companynsel that this loan has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1171 to 1173 through him. He submitted that although the Bank had sanctioned Rs.12.46 lakhs, it had released only a sum of Rs.7 lakhs and the principal amount and interest has number been paid back by the firm. The Trial Court has discussed this loan at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1417 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Mr. Acharya, therefore, submitted that this income has been duly companysidered and the High Court companyld number have taken the amount of Rs.12.46 lakhs under this head. Regarding the loan of Rs.50,00,000/- J. Farm House which is shown as item No.2 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, Income list and Item No.3 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list , it is submitted by the learned companynsel that this loan has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1211-1212 through him. He submitted that although the Bank had sanctioned Rs.50 lakhs, it had released only a sum of Rs.28 lakhs and the principal amount and interest has number been paid back by the firm. The Trial Court has discussed this loan at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1416 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted, this income has been duly companysidered and the High Court companyld number have taken the amount of Rs.50 lakhs under this head. Regarding the loan of Rs.25,00,000/- by Sasikala which is shown as item No.1 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, Income list and Item No.2 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list , it is submitted by the learned companynsel that this amount has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1260 through him. He submitted that the principal amount due under this account was Rs.13,55,023 and the Trial Court has discussed this loan at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1416 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted that this income has been duly companysidered and the High Court companyld number have taken the amount of Rs.25 lakhs under this head. Regarding the loan of Rs.1,57,00,000/- by Sudhakaran A3 which is shown as item No.7 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, Income list and Item No.8 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list , it is submitted by Mr. Acharya that this loan has been taken by Lex Property Development Ltd. and number by Sudhakaran. It has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1330 through him. He submitted that the principal amount due under this account was Rs.83,00,000 and the Trial Courts discussion on this loan is at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1418 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted, this income has been duly companysidered and the High Court companyld number have taken a sum of Rs.1.57 lakhs under this head. Regarding the loan of Rs.1,65,00,000/- by Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd. it is submitted by the learned companynsel that this loan is number shown as an item in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, Income list or as an item in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list . It has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1349-1354 through him. Exh.1354 is a statement of account of OCC-19 of Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd. PW- 235 at 145 of Vol. 11 has stated of his knowledge about Rs.1.65 crores being sanctioned. However, there is numberevidence of disbursement of this loan amount. Mr. Acharya submitted that the amount due to the Bank on this account was Rs.39,10,781/-, hence, the High Court companyld number have taken a sum of Rs.1.65 crores under this head. Regarding the loan of Rs.17,85,274/- by Mahalakshmi Kalyanamandapa, which is shown as item No.6 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, Income list and Item No.7 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI Expenditure list , it is submitted by Mr. Acharya that this has been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1357 through him. He submitted that the amount due in this account was Rs.19,81,802 and the Trial Courts discussion on this loan is at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1417 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted that this income has been duly companysidered and the High Court companyld number have taken a sum of Rs.17.85 lakhs under this head. Mr. Acharya thus submitted that the detailed discussion in the preceding paragraphs will clearly disclose that that the High Court companysidered these 10 items against the weight of the evidence on record and the entire amount of Rs.24,17,31,274/- which after deduction of Rs.5,99,85,274/- companyes to Rs.18,17,46,000/- is liable to be set aside. He further companytended that the accused have numberhere in their written statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., their Memorandum of Appeal or their written arguments before the Trial Court and the High Court, taken any plea of any loan from nationalized banks being left out of companysideration while calculating the income and expenditure and then arrived at the value of Rs.9,34,26,054/- Page 1224, Vo. V and Rs.11,56,56,833/- Page 1397, Vol. VI , respectively. Therefore, he companytended that 10 items valued at Rs.24,17,31,274/- taken by the High Court at Page 939, has to be totally excluded since the same amounts to numberhing but double credit. If this error is companyrected, than the income has to be reduced by, according to him, Rs.18,17,46,000/-. Therefore, from the finding of the total income of Rs.34,76,65,654/- of the High Court, an amount of Rs.18,17,46,000/- is liable to be deducted and the total income would be only Rs.16,59,19,654/- and number Rs.34,76,65,654/-. He further companytended that from this amount, if we deduct the income on the basis of admission and gift treating it as income, then the income will be Rs.16,59,19,654/- - Rs.2,84,05,151/- admitted amount Rs.1,50,00,000/- gifts Rs.12,25,14,503/-. Mr. Acharya further companytended that significantly the accused are number pressing for remand of the case to the appellate Court High Court . Consequently, the accused accept all the findings of the High Court. Of companyrse, this Court will have to companyrect the calculation mistakes or arithmetic errors and also errors apparent on the face of the record. Reacting to the ingenious endeavour on the part of the respondents to maintain their acquittal by only assailing the errors companymitted by the Trial Court, while abstaining from questioning any finding of the High Court, the learned Public Prosecutor urged that the choice before the respondents was two-fold- To treat all assets together as one unit and sustain the same, subject to this Court modifying the same by companyrecting calculations mathematical errors as also companysidering admissions of accused and excluding illegal income as pointed out by the appellants at Chart No.6 pages 18 to 20 which results in the figure of above Rs.35.00 crores as disproportionate assets or to assail the findings of the High Court and request for a remand of the case to the High Court to hear the appeals filed by them in the presence of the State of Karnataka, which is the sole prosecuting agency. Without following one of the above two options, accused cannot claim companyfirmation of acquittal by merely pointing out few infirmities in the order of the Trial Court and without proper analysis of the evidence on record, he urged. It is further the case of the prosecution that the Accused Nos.1 to 4 have entered into a companyspiracy and in furtherance of the same, the Accused No.1 A1 who is a public servant had companye into possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income to the tune of Rs.66.65 crores during the check period 1991-1996 . It is further the case of the appellants that A2 to A4 have abetted A1 in the companymission of the offence. It is the case of the appellants that when A2 to A4 had jointed the household of A1, they did number have any worthwhile property asset in their names. They did number have any independent source of income. Properties were acquired in the names of newly formed or acquired thirty two firms companypanies and two existing firms, i.e., Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises in which A1 and A2 were partners. Among these entities, only few were registered as a companypany under the Companies Act, 1956 and all others are firms. In the said firms or companypanies, A2 or A3 or A4 or all of them are partners or directors. It is number in dispute that the said properties were acquired during the check period. It is further submitted that it is on record that six firms were registered on a single day, i.e., on 25.01.1994, where partners were A2, A3 and A4 and ten other firms were registered on another single day, i.e., on 06.02.1995, where A2, A3 and A4 were the partners and further in Lex Proeprty Development P Ltd., A3 and A4 were the directors, which would be evident from the deposition of PW3 Thangavalu in Vol.2, Pg. 11-23 . It was further pointed out that about 50 bank accounts were opened in Indian Bank, Abiramapuram Branch and Canara Bank, Mylapore in the names of accused and the firms companypanies, which would be evident from the deposition of PW-182 A.R. Arunachalam in Vol.8 Pages 90-182 and PW-201 C.K.R.K. Vidyasagar in Vol.9 Pages 80-231 . It is also submitted that the accused shared companymon auditors, architects and accountants. On the question of abetment and companyspiracy, Mr. Acharya has duly taken us through the Paragraph Nos. 88 to 99 of the judgment and order of the Trial Court appearing at Page Nos. 1838-2028 in Vol. 7 8 and submitted that there was numbersource of income of A2 to A4 and further A2 to A4 were number related to A1. Moreover, A2 to A4 resided with A1. It is submitted that the properties standing in the name of A3 formation of large number of firms in the names of A2 to A4 opening of 50 bank accounts and transfer of funds from one account to another and cash credits into the banks shows that the origin of the resources is from A1. According to the prosecution, the other circumstances which disclose the companyspiracy and abetment would appear from the following facts - General Power of Attorney was given by A1 to A2 Constitution of various firms Operations of firms from residence of A1 Installation of A2 to A4 in the house of A1 A1 had knowledge of capital investments into Sasi Enterprises Flow of money from one account to another Calling of Sub-registrars to the residence of A1 and properties were registered. All these acts would companye within the purview of the companyspiracy and abetment between A2 to A4 with A1. Mr. Acharya submitted that all the circumstances mentioned above establish the abetment and companyspiracy. In support of said companytention, the following decisions were cited before us- Saju Vs. State of Kerala - 2001 1 SCC 378 State of Maharashtra Ors. Vs. Som Nath Thapa Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1744 1996 4 SCC 659 Kehar Singh Ors. Vs. State Delhi Administration - 1988 3 SCC 609 Ram Narayan Popli Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation - 2003 3 SCC 641 Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin Vs. State of Maharashtra 1970 1 SCC G. Agarwal Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 1963 2 SCR 405 Firozuddin Basheeruddin Ors. Vs. State of Kerala - 2001 7 SCC 596 He further submitted that to prove companyspiracy it is number possible to have direct evidence. The same has to be proved by drawing inferences from the proved circumstances. It is fundamental that the ultimate decision has to be by companysidering cumulative effect of all the circumstances taken together. He also submitted that in the case of companyspirators, each one became an agent of the other and is bound by the actions of others. So far as A1 and A2 are companysidered, one is an agent of other in three ways as partners of two firms, by virtue of power of attorney, capacity as companyspirator. To support his companytention, he submitted that A1 had given specific instruction to follow the directions given by A2 PW198 -M. Jayaraman in Vol.9 Pg 28-58 29 . Huge unaccounted cash deposits are made to these two accounts from cash originating from No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai. It is A2 who has given direction as to which account the huge cash deposits are to be made PW198 -M. Jayaraman in Vol.9 Pg 28-58 . There are numerous inter account transfers showing that all accounts put together were treated as one account. Officials were used to locate and purchase lands at various places like Thirunelveli, Uthukadu, Uthukottoai and other places. PW 47 - K. Muthian Vol.2 - Pg.237-245 PW 71 - S. Radhakrishnan Vol.3 Pg 110-170 PW 159 Rajagopalan Vol.7 Pg 19-124 Acquisition of immovable properties both agricultural as well as urban lands are as per registered sale deeds numbering 146, which have been produced. They were acquired in the name of individuals firms or companypanies. Agricultural lands acquired were of about 3000 acres of fertile lands of which about 900 acres formed a tea estate Item No.166 Annexure II, Pg 1588 Vol.VI . These properties were purchased at a companyt of about Rs.20 crores. In respect of most of the sales it is A2 who had given directions as to the names of which firm individual the sale was to be registered in PW 159 Rajagopalan in Vol 7 Pg.19-124 . The amounts were paid from amongst the various accounts of the accused firms companypanies and cash. Most of the Sale transactions have taken place below the Guideline value. PW 159 - Rajagopalan Vol.7 Pg 19-124 PW 221 - R.Kesava Ramanujam Vol.10 Pg162-249 172 In many transactions, the vendor was number kept aware of the purchaser and the registrations took place through the registrars at the residence of A1. So also vendors were put under duress to sell their properties. Instances of officials also being put under duress were available. Evidence disclosed that A1 was aware of the transactions. There were also additional or new companystructions made and old buildings were also renovated at huge companyts. Mr. Acharya submitted that the Trial Court has categorized the assets at Page 1543 in Vol. VI. He furnished us the chart as follows- CHART NO 10-A For companyvenient discussion of the issues involved in the case, these assets are categorized by the Trial Court under the following heads. Pg l543 Vol. VI Nature of Item Nos. Value Value Value As per assets in Rs. in Rs. in Rs. Accused As Per As Per TrialAs Per Highin their Written Prosecution Court Court Submission Page Page 1543 - Page 1837 Page 2350 Vol IX 966-979 Vol Vol VI 1838 Vol VIIIV I Immovable 1 to 173, 19,77,18164.70/-20,07,80,2466,24,09,12016,19,03,301/ 175, - 292, 297, 30I, 302 i , 305 Excluding item Nos.24, 31, 33, 64, 66, 127, 145,150, 159 properties Pg 978 Vol IV companysideration, Only 97 Sale companyt of Pg 1590 Vol Deeds companysidered registration VI II Cash paid over 24, 31, 33, 2,53,80,619.00 1,58,30,619 -Nil- NIL 64, above sale 66, 127, 145, Pg 978 Vol IV companysideration 150, 159 IIINew or 174, 176-192,28,17,40,430.00 22,53,92,3445,10,54,0608,60,59,261/- additional companystruction of301, 302 ii Pg buildings 866-889, 979 Vol IV IV Gold and 284-290, 295 5,53,02,334.75 2,51,59,144 As per NIL Diamond prosecution Jewellery 979 Vol IV V Silver wares 291 48,80,800 20,80,000 As per NIL prosecution 979 Vol IV VI F.Ds and shares258-277, 298,3,42,62,728.0 3,42,62,728 As per 2,30,00,000/- 303, 306 prosecution 979 Vol IV VIICash balance in193-229, 296,97,47,751.32 97,47,751.32As per 97,47,751.32/ bank accounts 300, 304 prosecution- Jewellery 979 Vol IV VIIVehicles 230-257, 299 1,29,94,033.0 1,29,94,033.As per 81,35,106/- I 0 prosecution 979 Vol IV IX Machinery 293, 294 2,24,11,000.0 2,24,11,000.As per 94,25,835/- 0 prosecution 979 Vol IV X Footwear 278 2,00,902.45 Nil -Nil- NIL Pg 966 Vol IV XI Sarees 279-281 92,44,290.00 Nil -Nil- NIL Pg 967 Vol IV XIIWrist watches 282-283 15,90,350.00 15,90,350.00As per NIL prosecution 979 Vol. IV TOTAL 64,42,89,61 55,02,48,21525,46,52,1729,82,71,254. 7 32 CHART 10-B VALUE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY PROSECUTION TRIAL COURT HIGHCOURT AS PER ACCUSED 19,77,18164.70/- 20,07,80,246/- 6,24,09,120/- 16,19,03,301/- Page 1543 Vol VI Page 1837 Vol VII Page 978 Vol IV Page 2350 Vol IX Some Important Witnesses Who speak of purchase of property are Vendors Sub- Registrars W-40 Gangai Amaran -Pg 1639 P.W 221 Purchasers name About names of Purchasers being-Vol VII Kesava inserted later - Pgs left blank Ramanujam 17-18 of Chief. Exh- P 105-110 W - 56 Rajaram 500 Acres -Pg 1643 - P.W 159 About going to Poes Vol VII Thiru Garden and effecting Rajagopalan various registrations. W-89 Peter Graig Jones Kodanadur Tea Estate - 900 Acres He also drew our attention to the particulars of these sales, which were furnished before us. The total sale price under these sale deeds companyes to Rs.19,77,18,164/- though according to the Trial Court the same is Rs.20,07,80,246/-. The difference is marginal and it can be taken that immoveable properties worth about Rs.20 twenty crores have been acquired during the check period. He submitted that to prove these sales, prosecution has examined about 60 Vendors and about 20 Sub-registrars. He further companytended that though according to DVAC there were 21 items, the Trial Court has taken only 18 out of them and the High Court has taken only 17 there from. Hence he submitted that the High Court has miscalculated the area of companystruction of 17 items as 1668.39 Squares, i.e. 1,66,839 Sq.Ft. instead of 2174.69 Squares, i.e., 2,17,469 sq. ft. which is nearly 506.3 Squares, i.e., 50,630 sq. ft. lesser than the actual area as per the valuation reports. In support of such companytention, he filed a Chart, which is set out hereunder CHART 10-F VALUATION OF ALL THE 21 PROPERTIES THE FOLLOWING CHART DEALS WITH THE 21 PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE SAMPLE 3 PROPERTIES. SI.No ITEM DESCRIPTION OF PROSE EXHIBIT TOTAL VALUATION NOS AS PROPERTY CUTION NO. CONSTRU ANNEXU WITNES CTION IN RE -II SES SQ MTS P-2328 1. 192 Building, Borewells 87 519 171.00 708,160/- with Electrical motors 5 separate power companynections and Pumps located at Sy No.466,461/1 467/2 at Cherankulam Village,VOC District belonging to M s Riverway Agro Products Ltd 2. 186 New Additional 98 641 289.84 24,83,759/- Construction in residential building at No.L/66, Anna Nagar, Chennai. 3. 187 New Additional 98 642 203 10,92,828/- Construction in Building at Door No.5, Murugesan Street, T. Nagar, Chennai-17 4. 178 New Additional 98 643 2250.41 1,52,59,076/- Construction in the residential building at D. No. 3/178C Vettuvankeni, Chennai 5. 189 New Additional 98 644 271.8 20,38,959/- Construction in residential Building at No.1, Murphy St., Akkarai, Chennai 6. 179 New Additional 98 645 1009.9 6,40,33,901/- companystruction in the building at the Grape Garden Farm House, in the limits of Jeedi Meth and Petpesherabad Villages in A.P. 180 New Additional 107 661 1911 5,40,52,298/- 7. companystruction in the posh Bangalow at Siruthavur in Chegai MGR Dist 8. 176 New Additional 107 662 1369.09 1,25,90,261/- companystruction in Farm House Bungalows at Payannur in Chengai Anna District 9. 177 New Additional 107 663 1986.12 2,13,63,457/- Construction building at Door No.48, Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Industrial Estate, Guindy, Ekkatuthangal, Chennai M s. Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., Printers 10. 185 New Additional 116 666 344.87 20,43,000/- Construction in residential building at Door No.21 Padmanabha Street, T. Nagar, Chennai- 17 11. 182 New Additional 116 667 1143.63 29,59,000/- companystruction in building at 149, 150 of TTK Road, Chennai - 18 12. 188 New Additional 116 668 1985.24 53,11,000/- Construction in residential building 4 Nos in the campus at No.1/240, Enjambakkam, in New Mahabalipuram Road .A1 13. 183 New Additional 116 669 1311.39 80,36,868/- companystruction in building at Sea Shell Avenue No.2/1-B-3 Apartment Sholinganallore Saidapet, Taluk 14. 184 New Additional 116 670 107.75 8,00,000/- Construction in Building at Door No.19, Pattammal Street, Mylapore, Chennai 15. 181 New Additional 116 671 3527.5 7,24,98,000/- companystruction in the residential building at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86. 16. 174 New Additional 117 673 1333.83 80,75,000/- Construction in building at 5 B C East Coast Road, Door No.4/130 Raja Nagar, Neelankarai, Chennai-41 Ref. Doc.No.4752/930fS.R.O . Adyar Evaluation Report 17. 191 New Additional 117 674 274.69 14,17,538 Construction in 15,45,000/- Buildings and the change of roof for the works she at MF-9, Guindy Industrial Estate, Chennai-32 190 New Additional 117 677 883.55 39,34,000/- Construction in Building at No.32/2-4, Plot Nos.S-7, Ganapathy Colony, Tr. Vi-Ka Indl. Estate, Guindy, Chennai-32 301 Cost of renovation 144 782 109.99 6,83,325/- and additional companystruction between June 1992 and 1993, of the building at Plot No.102, ITI Cross, Road, Pon Nagar, Trichy, owned by Tmt. N. Sasikala companyered by Document No.2256/90 dt. 35-90 of S.R.O.T. O.R.B., Trichy 147 Cost of companystruction 153 822 2560.86 83,41,000/- of companypound wall, twin house, staff quarters for 8 numbers and MD Bungalow in Ramraj Mills Campus 21. 146 Cost of companystruction 205 1964 86 31.38 57,19,800/- of labour quarters 1965 5 in ground floor 5 in first floor, 10 number. in Ground Floor and 10 number in first floor, companystruction of first floor for Guest House, over the existing ground floor and companystruction of platform in Ramraj Agro Mills Campus at Vandampalai. TOTAL 23,076.84 29,35,68,982/-2/ -4 23076.84sq mts 2483.97 squares. The High companyrt has however companysidered 17 items instead of 21.Therefore the area of companystruction of 4 items i.e. item number 146, 147, 192, and 301 is hereto deducted and the total area of 17 items is equalent to 20,203 sq mts which is 2174.69 squares i.e 2,17,469 Sq ft. The high companyrt has miscalculated the area of companystruction of 17 items as 1668.39 Squares i.e 1,66,839 sq ft instead of 2174.69 Squares i.e 2,17,469 Sq ft which is nearly 506.3 Squares i.e 50,630 Sq ft lesser than the actual area as per the valuation reports. He further submitted that the valuation of the companystructions has been made by qualified PWD engineers. Even the defence has examined a retired engineer DW-95 . Detailed valuation reports have been produced and all the engineers who have valued the buildings after inspection have been examined. The companytention of the defence that Trial Court has rejected this evidence is number companyrect. In fact the Trial Court has accepted the evidence. But having regard to the fact that in valuing the companystructions, there are several imponderables and taking numbere of the possibility of marginal error, the Trial Court has given a discount of 20 which in the circumstances, is reasonable. Having regard to the superior quality of marble and granite used as described in the valuation reports and having regard to the value of various special items, the ultimate finding of the Trial Court is justified, he urged. He further submitted that even the accused have admitted valuation of buildings at Rs.8,60,59,261/- excluding one building of Anjaneya Printers. If the value of this companystruction of Rs.2,13,63,457/- is added to this sum, the total will be Rs.10,74,22,718/-. As can be seen from Chart 10 as reproduced above, under other items of assets IV to XII, the Trial Court has totally excluded the value of Sarees and footwear. Regarding Gold and Diamond jewellary also after detailed discussion at Pages 1756 to 1785, Trial Court has reduced the value from Rs.5,53,02,334/- to Rs.2,51,59,144/- and Silverwares from Rs.48,80,800/- to Rs.20,80,000/-. Regarding other items such as Fixed Deposits and cash balance in bank account, there can be numberdispute. Therefore, the companyclusion of the Trial Court regarding value of other assets is fully justified as per the evidence on record, he companytended. So far expenditure is companycerned, the High Court has accepted the amount of expenditure fixed by DVAC in respect of all items except the marriage. The High Court has reduced the marriage expenditure from Rs.6,45,04,222/- as per prosecution to Rs.28,68,000/-, i.e., a reduction of Rs.6,16,36,222. According to the prosecution, the total expenditure is Rs.11,56,56,833/-. He submitted that the main dispute under caption expenditure is regarding marriage. In support of the prosecution case as many as 21 witnesses have been examined as detailed in the chart. Though according to prosecution expenditure incurred for marriage is Rs.6,45,04,222/-, the Trial Court on detailed companysideration has fixed the same at Rs.3 Crores. It is thus totally erroneous to companytend that the Trial Court has rejected the evidence of prosecution witnesses, he pleaded. In fact the Trial Court on a companysideration, number only of the prosecution evidence but also defence evidence of 23 witnesses, has rightly fixed the amount of expenditure to the tune of Rs.3 Crores. It is even companyceded that a total expenditure of Rs.2 to 3 Crores has been spent for the marriage. According to him, the Trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence of DWs who claimed that the party workers have companylected funds and have spent for expenses such as faade, decoration, food etc. It is unbelievable that a person of the stature of A1, would allow her party workers to spend on the marriage of her foster son. He elaborated that though A1 has, in her reply to the numberice to the Income Tax Department, claimed that A2 has spent amounts under different heads, A2 has failed to account for the same. Mr. Acharya submitted that according to the prosecution the total income of the accused is Rs.9,34,26,054/- and according to the Trial Court, the total income is Rs.9,91,05,094.75/-. However, according to the High Court, the total income is Rs.34,76,65,654/-. In companying to this companyclusion, the High Court added to the income seven items such as No. Description Amount Loans as income 18,17,46,000 Income from grape garden 46,71,600 Gifts 1,50,00,000 Sasi Enterprises 25,00,000 Jaya Publications and Namadhu MGR 4,00,00,000 Super Duper TV Pvt.Ltd. 1,00,00,000/- Rental Income 3,22,000/- According to Mr. Acharya, there is numberlawful source so far as the Gift is companycerned. He further submitted that the Trial Court has rightly disallowed the claim. The High Court has erroneously fixed it at Rs.4 crores based on belatedly filed Income Tax returns, which even if accepted, amounts to only Rs.1.15 Crores. Therefore, he submitted that if the above is the companyrect position, the companyclusion of the Trial Court is fully justified. According to him, the Trial Court has companysidered every companytention raised by the accused and if some of the companytentions are number urged before the Trial Court, then the respondent cannot companyplain before this Court about number-consideration thereof. He further companytended that if the companytention of the appellants that in calculating Disproportionate Assets, the value of the Assets, Expenditure and Income of all the Accused have to be taken jointly along with that of firms and companypanies 34 in number , as done by both the companyrts below, then the explanation offered in the individual chart of A1 and the companybined chart given by A2 to A4 will be of numbereffect and the same do number deserve to be taken numbere of. The accused have deliberately given their explanations separately as they cannot give any satisfactory explanation if the assets are taken jointly. In refutation, learned senior companynsel appearing for A1 submitted that the Trial Court wrongly excluded from companysideration the Income Tax Assessment Orders in favour of the accused by relying upon the judgment of High Court of Patna in State of Bihar Vs. Lalu Prasad Anr., 2008 Crl.L.J. 2433, which, according to him, is clearly inapplicable since the order passed by the Patna High Court was in the nature of an interlocutory order. He further stated that while dealing with the assets of A1 under the head Additional Construction, the Trial Court by an arbitrary method deducted 20 from the overall companyt of companystruction. Similarly, in relation to marriage expenditure, the Trial Court erroneously estimated the companyt of companystruction of a thatched pandal and arbitrarily came to the companyclusion that the marriage expenditure was to the tune of Rs.3 crores, for which numberbasis has been given, according to him. He further companytended that with regard to the possession of gold and jewellery, although the Trial Court accepted that A1 had 7040 gms. in 1987-1988, as reflected in the Wealth Tax Assessment order, it overlooked the other Wealth Tax Assessment orders for the subsequent years whereby there was an addition of Rs.2,51,59,144/- in the holdings of A1, which is also companytrary to the evidence on record. He further submitted that the Trial Court and the prosecution have failed to take into account the income from Grape Garden, interest income, rental advance, rental income, wealth tax refund, income from gifts, Partners drawings of A1 from Jaya Publications and income from Namadhu MGR scheme, etc. Learned senior companynsel submitted that the Trial Court, companytrary to the settled law, has required the public servant to offer an explanation to the properties held by A2 to A4 and the companypanies, without any foundational basis or any evidence to show that those properties in the names of A2 to A4 or companypanies were acquired out of the resources of A1 or that there was any flow of fund from A1 to A2 to A4. The Trial Court has sought to attribute criminal companyspiracy between A1 and A2 to A4 on the sole ground that A1 to A4 were living in the same house under a companymon roof. He further companytended that in a disproportionate assets case, the prosecution has to discharge the initial burden to prove that the assets of the accused were disproportionate to the known sources of income. The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt, the value of the assets possessed by the accused and it has a further burden to show that the properties which were standing in the name of third parties, like A2 to A4 and the companypanies, were being held benami for the public servant. Once the prosecution discharges this initial burden beyond reasonable doubt, the onus then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for the source of such income. He further companytended that for the accused, the standard of proof is one based on preponderance of probabilities and it is sufficient for the accused to provide a plausible explanation that is satisfactory to the Court. In support of his companytention, the learned senior companynsel relied upon the following decisions D. Jhingan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - 1966 3 SCR 736 State of Maharashtra Vs. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar - 1981 3 SCC 199 Mr. Krishna Reddy Vs. State, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad - 1992 4 SCC 45 Amba Lal Vs. Union of India - 1961 1 SCR 933 Veeraswami Vs. Union of India Ors. - 1991 3 SCC 655 Prithipal Singh Ors. Vs. State of Punjab Anr. - 2012 1 SCC 10 He further companytended that in establishing the link between the alleged benamdar and the public servant, the standard of proof required is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence of a clinching nature, which has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character. He further relied upon the decisions of this Court in Jaydayal Poddar deceased through L.Rs. Anr. Vs. Mst. Bibi Hazara, 1974 1 SCC 3, Krishnanand Agnihotri supra , Valliammal D by L.Rs. Vs. Subramaniam Ors., 2004 7 SCC 233, and Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra Vs. Heirs of Parshottam S. Shah, 1996 4 SCC 490. The learned senior companynsel, next dwelt upon the purport of income received from any lawful source and drew our attention to Section 13 1 e of the 1988 Act, which reads as follows Criminal misconduct by a public servant 1 A public servant is said to companymit the offence of criminal misconduct,- xxx xxx xxx xxx e if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, known sources of income means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. He further companytended that the term income which has been used in Section 13 1 e , would include all earnings, sources whereof are number prohibited by law and it is always open to the accused to prove those other sources of income which have number been taken into account or brought into evidence by the prosecution. The term income, according to him, would also include receipts in the form of gifts and loans which have been disclosed to and accepted by the income tax authorities. He further pointed out that the companycept of known sources of income is number companyfined only to the source known to the prosecution but every other source of income which the accused is able to establish during the companyrse of trial. In support of the said companytention, he relied upon the following decisions of this Court S.D. Swami Vs. The State - 1960 1 SCR 461 Nallammal Anr. Vs. State - 1999 6 SCC 559 Krishnanand Agnihotri supra Krishna Reddy supra According to the learned senior companynsel, income tax wealth tax returns and assessment orders, being public documents, are admissible in evidence. He further submitted that this Court has also accepted the income tax orders while deciding the cases under the 1988 Act. This Court has relied upon the following decisions Mohd. Mumtaz Vs. Nandini Satpathy II - 1987 1 SCC 279 State of M.P. Vs. Mohanlal Soni - 2000 6 SCC 338 Ananda Bezbaruah Vs. UOI - 1994 Crl.L.J. 12, para 8-14 Krishna Reddy supra State of A.P. Vs. J. Satyanarayana, JT 2000 10 SC 430 DSP, Chennai Vs. K. Inbasagaran, 2006 1 SCC 420 Kedari Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh Ors., 2015 14 SCC 505 On the basis of above, the learned senior companynsel submitted that under the 1988 Act the burden on the accused is proved by preponderance of probabilities as in a civil case and same is the degree of proof required under the Income Tax Act also. Therefore, where the assessee had established the income and the extent of the expenditure before the Income Tax authorities, the judicial decision thereunder would be binding on the prosecution in a case under the 1988 Act. Hence, he submitted that the judgment of the Trial Court on this question is wrong. Having regard to the various evaluations relied upon by the prosecution, as he mentioned that in law, the expert evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 46 of the Evidence Act. An expert is number a witness to a fact. His evidence therefore must be based on verifiable and reliable data and an expert witness has to give an opinion with certainty. He relied on the judgment of this Court in State of H.P. Vs. Jai Lal, 1999 7 SCC 280 and other decisions. He further submitted that the evidentiary value of prevaricating witnesses is to be rejected. He relied upon the case of Suraj Mal Vs. State 1979 4 SCC 725. Learned senior companynsel further submitted that the Court cannot set up a third case which is number the basis of prosecution case or that of the accused. He further companytended that without making a companypany an accused, its property cannot be forfeited. He further companytended that A1s income and expenditure have been accepted by the Income Tax authorities for all the five years of the check period. In numbere of the assessment years any income is assessed as from an unexplained source. Same is the position as regards Jaya Publication and for A2 also, and those orders have been exhibited in evidence. He further submitted that A1 had numberdisproportionate assets but her likely savings were to the extent of Rs.67,72,128.54. The prosecution has valued all the assets belonging to A1 to A4 and the 32 firms companypanies, in a sum of Rs.66,65,20,395/-. The value of the assets held by them before the check period was assessed at Rs.2,01,83,957/-. The assets acquired during the check period is Rs.64,42,89,616/-. The value of the assets acquired by A1 alone as per DVAC is Rs.24,29,40,490/-. However, it is A1s case that the assets acquired including companystruction by A1 during check period amounted to Rs.6,52,34,410.00 for which she had satisfactorily explained out of her known sources of income. The major heads of assets and the errors companymitted by the Trial Court were highlighted as hereunder A1 acquired only one property during the entire check period. It is vide Exhibit P1 for Rs.10,00,000/- shown as item 18 in Annexure-II. She made two companystructions, a Farm House at Jeedimetla Village near Hyderabad and a companystruction at 31-A Poes Garden and renovated her residential building at 36 Poes Garden. Vis--vis new and additional companystructions, Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned senior companynsel as he then was submitted that according to the prosecution the total companyt was Rs.13,65,31,901/- and according to the accused as determined by the Income Tax authorities it is Rs.3,62,47,700/-. Hence, he submitted that deduction of Rs.10,02,84,201/- is required. He further pointed out that there are fundamental defects in the prosecution evidence in relation to the valuation of all the companystruction because measurement is number verifiable, age of the building is number given, there is numberbasis for calculating the price of number-scheduled items. As per prosecutions calculation the companyt under the head new additional companystruction in Grape Garden Farm House is Rs.6,40,33,901/- while as per A1 this companyt is Rs.1,39,62,300/-. Therefore, he submitted that an amount of Rs.5,00,71,601/- should be deducted. According to the learned senior companynsel, the prosecution has examined PW-98 Velayudam, PWD Engineer Vol.4 Page 148-179 and marked his Report Exh.P- 645 Vol.33 Page 86-112 . He submitted that the evidence of PW-98 should be rejected since there are three major defects in his evidence. He further pointed out that his report is unreasoned and cannot be relied upon. The entire evaluation of electrical appliances by Mr. Udaya Suriyan, Asstt. Electrical Engineer, amounting to Rs.41,53,653/- Exh.P-645 is inadmissible in evidence as this expert has number been examined as a witness. He further submitted that the defence evidence has number been taken into account by the Trial Court. He further companytended that the calculation of the prosecution under the head New Additional Construction at residential buildings at 31-A and 36 Poes Garden is Rs.7,24,98,000/- Trial Court Judgment Page 1709 of Vol.VII , whereas the valuation as per A1 is Rs.2,14,35,4000/-. Accordingly, he submitted that an amount of Rs.5,10,62,600/- is to be deducted from the said amount. He submitted that the prosecution has relied mainly on the evidence of PW- 116 Jayapal, PWD Executive Engineer appear at Vol.5 Page 41 and the report prepared by him i.e. Exh.P-671 Vol. 35 Page 16-47 to arrive at an erroneous calculation of Rs.7,24,98,000/-. According to the learned companynsel, there are several infirmities in the report Exh.P-671 as well as deposition of PW-116. He also raised dispute with regard to the valuation of electrical lay outs being Exh.P-2152 submitted by PW-220. He also relied on the evidence of DW-78 R. Raviraj, Executive Engineer Vol.91 Page 212 . He further companytended that the total expenditure incurred by A1 towards companystruction was accepted by the Income Tax authorities after deep and pervasive scrutiny. He also submitted that the total expenditure incurred by A1 in the entire three companystructions amount to only as under Renovation of 36 Poes Garden Rs. 76,74,900/- Construction at 31-A Poes Garden Rs.1,35,10,500/- Hyderabad Farm House addition Rs.1,39,62,300/- Compound Wall for Hyderabad Rs. 11,00,000/- Farm House Total Rs.3,62,47,700/- whereas the prosecution has wantonly inflated the expenditure in a sum of Rs.13,65,31,901/-. Therefore, there has to be deduction of Rs.10,02,84,201/- from the Annexure-II which denotes the value of the assets during the check period. He further submitted that the prosecution has shown the DVAC valuation of golden jewellery acquired by A1 during the check period as Item 286, 288, 289, 290 291 to Rs.5,14,19,462.25. The learned senior companynsel further pointed out that the Trial Courts valuation of gold jewellery acquired by A1 during the check period is Rs.2,51,59,144/-. With regard to the gold jewellery possessed by A1, Mr. Rao submitted that the total jewellery as on 31.3.1991 which was 21.280.300, was valued at Rs.1,50,56,146/- and there is numberaddition to the jewellery in that year. The above figure was arrived at on the basis of increase in value of gold and as per report of the registered valuer being Exh.P-860. Therefore, it is indisputable and as per the prosecution document above-mentioned, being Exh. P-2180, and also wealth tax assessment orders and evidence of PW-227 and PW-213, it would be evident from Exh. P-1016, Vol.57, Page 186-187, the total gold jewellery owned and possessed by A2 as on 31.3.1991 was 1,912.150 gms. Therefore, the total jewellery companyes to about 23,192.450 gms. It is further stated that A1 in her capacity as General Secretary of the AIADMK Party, got 3,365.800 gms. of gold Mementos which should be added to the total holding of A1 and A2. From Exh.P-704, Vol. 36, at 253-292, it would be evident that the total weight of the gold jewellery seized was 26,902.08 gms. which included mementoes. Therefore, he submitted that there is insignificant difference of 343.830 gms. According to him this difference might have arisen out of faulty weighment. He further submitted that the valuation of the jewellery filed in the return before the wealth tax authorities did number include mementoes. He further pointed out that A1 had succeeded in all the proceedings before the Income Tax authorities and her case that the gold jewellery was already possessed by her earlier to the check period had been accepted by the authorities. Hence, he submitted that the total jewellery to the extent of 26,558.250 gms. has been accounted for and what remains is only a balance of around 343.830 gms. which is meager difference. The learned senior companynsel next pointed out that 416 Kgs. of silver was seized from A1 during the check period. The value of this silver has been taken as Rs.20,80,000/- at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per Kg as described in Item No.291 of the DVAC Annexre-II Vol.1 Page 112 . The Trial Courts finding is that 416 Kgs of silver is the illegal acquisition of A1 during the check period and the value of this at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per kg, is assessed at Rs.20,80,000/-. The High Court has also accepted the said valuation. The Trial Court, in respect of companytly watches, has duly accepted and allowed the case of the prosecution while accepting the valuation report and oral evidence of PW- 129 and PW-130. According to the learned senior companynsel, PW-130 had been examined to value 91 watches. His report is Exh.740. He had given the total value of 91 watches at Rs.6,87,350/-. However, it would be evident from the testimony of these witnesses that they are number experts as they have numberspecial proficiency on valuation of watches number do they have experience in evaluating watches. He further submitted that A1 was number required to disclose personal effects as it is exempted under Section 2 14 of the Income Tax Act. Hence, the amount of Rs.15,90,350/- is liable to be excluded from the companyputation of the assets of A1. He also submitted that the entire amount with regard to footwear and sarees has to be excluded from the assets of A1 since the Trial Court has disbelieved the version of the prosecution. The learned senior companynsel next turned to the expenditure. Annexure-III of DVAC shows that the valuation of expenditure attributable to A1 to A4 and the companypanies during the check period is Rs.11,56,56,833/- and as per the prosecution the expenditure attributable to A1 is Rs.8,98,69,833/-. A1s case was that the expenditure incurred by her during the check period was Rs.2,49,28,815/. As per the Trial Courts judgment its value is Rs.8,49,06,833/- Page 1542 Vol.VI and the findings of the High Court which has been placed before us is at Pages 889-831. He drew the attention of this Court specifically to the following particulars with regard to the Marriage of Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran Prosecutions Valuation Rs.6,45,04,222.00 A1s case Expenditure incurred by A1 for the marriage Rs.28,68,000.00 Value as per Trial Court Judgment Rs.3,00,00,000 Page1452-1542 Vol.VI . Value as per the High Court Judgment Rs.28,68,000.00 Pages 889-931 The Prosecution value of Rs.6,45,04,222.00 was split up by the prosecution itself in Item 226 of Annexure IV as follows Expenses towards erection of marriage pandal, over and above admitted recorded payments Rs.5,21,23,532/- Expenditure towards companyt of food, mineral water and tamboolam - Rs.1,14,96,125/- Cost of 34 titan watches disallowed by the Trial Court Rs.1,34,565/- Amount towards stitching wedding dress for A3 Rs.1,26,000/- Amount for purchase of 100 silver Plates paid by N. Sasikala - Rs.4,00,000/- Postal expenses for dispatching 56000 wedding invitations Rs.2,24,000/- Total Rs.6,45,04,222/- Qua Marriage Pandals, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of Thangarajan who was examined as PW-181 who specifically stated that a huge pandal had been erected for the marriage and the companyt of pandal itself was Rs.5,21,23,532/-. It is submitted that the evidence of PW-181 is unacceptable as it is merely hearsay, speculative, arbitrary and based on numberverifiable data to reach the said amount. Hence, it is submitted by the learned companynsel that his evidence ought to be rejected. According to A1, she had spent a sum of Rs.28,68,000/- which is reflected in the orders of the Income Tax authorities. The Trial Court has fixed this sum at Rs.3,00,00,000/- towards the expenditure for marriage. According to learned senior companynsel appearing for A1, the prosecution has number discharged its burden in respect of the quantum of expenditure for the marriage as well as the companyt which was borne by A1. According to the learned companynsel, the prosecution neither companyld establish the companyt of companystruction of marriage pandal number it led any evidence to show that A1 incurred any expenditure. Hence, the amount of Rs.5.21 crores cannot be said to have been established by the prosecution and hence the entire amount is liable to be deducted. The prosecution has number proved the entire item 226 in Annexure-II. Hence, the entire amount of Rs.6,45,04,222/- is liable to be excluded. Learned companynsel further pointed out that the Income Tax Department had accepted the version of A1 that she had incurred only an expenditure of Rs.29.81 lakhs, all by cheques except for a sum of Rs.3.1 lakhs. According to him, at the most, Rs.29,66,552/- is to be added in respect of the expenditure incurred by A1. According to him, the findings of the Trial Court cannot be accepted to the tune of Rs.3 crores towards the expenditure for marriage. On the companytrary, the High Court has rightly accepted the case of the accused. The Trial Court and the High Court have calculated the companybined total income of A1 to A4 and we find that numberappeal has been filed by A1 to A4 in respect thereof. Therefore, we at this stage, make it clear that we would adopt the same yardstick in respect of the companybined income of A1 to A4, in absence of any persuasive reason to the companytrary. In re, income from Grape Garden, it appears that that the difference in estimated Grape Garden income between the prosecution and A1 is Rs.46,71,660/-. The prosecution has cited the income from the Grape Garden during the check period to the extent of Rs.5,78,340/- instead of Rs.52,50,000/- as companyputed by A1. While the Trial Court has companycurred with the prosecution, the High Court has accepted the case of A1 and allowed an addition to the extent of Rs.46,71,660/- in respect of the income of A1 from Grape Garden. It is further submitted that the agricultural income of Rs.52,50,000/- requires to be taken as income available to A1 during the check period. According to the learned senior companynsel, A1 has fully proved the receipt of agricultural income and the High Court has also accepted this. With regard to the interest income of A1, the prosecution has allowed the same to the extent of Rs.58,90,925/- instead of Rs.77,40,135/- as claimed by A1 on the basis of amounts declared and assessed in Income Tax Returns Assessment orders. The Trial Court has companycurred with the prosecution and disallowed interest income of A1 amounting to Rs.18,49,210/- According to A1, the rental income was Rs.2,32,000/- per annum from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996, at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per month, in relation to the property in St. Marys Road, Chennai. It is also accepted that the Income Tax return companyld number be filed for the year 1.4.1992 to 31.3.1993. The claim of A1 is that the amount of gifts received by her on the occasion of her 44th birthday was Rs.2,15,00,012/- cash and drafts and Rs.77,52,059/- foreign remittance and this entire amount is to be allowed as income. He has submitted that the prosecution has admitted the receipt of the gift, it having been companytemporaneously banked, but the amounts were number taken into account as income or lawful resource available to A1. The Trial Court has disallowed it in entirety. However, the High Court accepted the case of A1 and reduced the amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- received from gift. It is submitted that the said income ought to have been taken into companysideration by the Trial Court. Learned senior companynsel further submitted that gift has been recognized as valid source of income by this Court in its judicial pronouncements and he relied upon the case of M. Krishna Reddy supra and Kedari Lal supra . It is further pointed out that A1 had received an amount of Rs.6,28,569.00 from Sasi Enterprises in her capacity as partner during the check period which was number repaid by A1 to M s. Sasi Enterprises, thereby treating it as her drawings as a partner of the said firm. It is further pointed out that A1 had received a loan of Rs.1,53,03,000.00 from A2 and her proprietary firms. Jaya Publication was started in the year 1988. At the relevant time, A1 and A2 were the only partners. It was carrying on business of printing and was running a daily newspaper called Namadhu MGR. This daily newspaper used to carry all the announcements of the General Secretary as also all the AIADMK Partys news. Jaya Publication apart from its regular business income had also received money through subscribers deposit schemes. It is submitted that with a view to boost the circulation and the readership of the newspaper, the subscribers scheme was started one year earlier to the check period. Under the scheme any person companyld make a deposit of Rs.12,000/-, 15,000/- or 18,000/- and the subscribers would receive 4, 5, or 6 companyies daily free of companyt, according to the deposit he made. The deposit was refundable on 15 days numberice of demand. To establish the receipt under the said deposit scheme, A1 produced Income Tax returns and independent evidence from subscribers to probabilise and prove receipt of money. The money received under the scheme from 1990 to 1996 was deposited in the bank account of Namadhu MGR or in the account of Jaya Publication. It is submitted that the Income Tax authorities accepted the said scheme of deposit. According to the learned senior companynsel, there was a scrutiny of the account of Jaya Publication and Namadhu MGR by an internal auditor of the prosecution department and a report was filed. Yet the auditor was number examined number his report was marked in evidence. It is submitted that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the prosecution evidence on account of suppression of the material evidence. It is submitted that the Trial Court companymitted glaring errors while dealing with the scheme deposit claim of Jaya Publication. The learned companynsel submitted that the accused had produced the order of the Income Tax authorities relating to the scheme deposit companyering the entire check period of 5 years which was overlooked by the Trial Court. According to him, the drawing of A1 from Jaya Publication in her capacity as partner of Jaya Publication, to the extent of Rs.34,92,000/- is proper and lawful. It is further submitted that A1 received from Jaya Publication Rs.24,75,000/- and further amount spent by Jaya Publication on behalf of A1 for companystruction of residence at 36, Poes Garden, Chennai, at Rs.76,74,900/-. The evidence was placed before the Court, being Exh.D-226 and the deposition of DW-88. Therefore, the total of the above two items in aggregate companyes to Rs.1,01,49,900/-. It is further submitted that the loan from Can Fin Homes is about Rs.75,00,000/- which was availed as loan from Can Fin Homes on 29.9.1992. The loan was also repaid by Jaya Publication on behalf of A1 on 27.3.1995 and the same was number repaid by A1 to Jaya Publication, thereby treating it as her drawings as a partner of Jaya Publication. It is submitted that the entire amount of Rs.13,89,19,475.00 is also the resource available to A1 and A2 for offering an explanation under the 1988 Act. Referring to the attribution of assets of A2 to A4, six companypanies and other firms to A1, the learned senior companynsel companytended that the prosecution has included the properties acquired by the following companypanies to the account of A1 and the value of all the properties has been included in the total assets. No. NAME OF THE COMPANY DATE OF INCORPORATION Lex Property Development Pvt. Ltd. 25.09.1990 Meadow Agro Mills Ltd. 11.10.1990 Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd. 28.05.1986 Riverway Agro Pvt. Ltd. 22.10.1990 Indo Doha Chemicals and 02.01.1990 Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Signora Business Enterprises Ltd. 22.10.1990 The properties held by all the above companypanies have been companyputed in Annexure-II by the prosecution in a sum of Rs.4,70,24,439/-. According to the learned senior companynsel, the companypanies assets required to be excluded. He urged that A1 was neither a shareholder number a director or associate of these six companypanies. Therefore, it is submitted that there is numberjustification to attribute the properties of the companypanies to A1. For these reasons, he submitted that the property of the companypany cannot be included in the holding of A1 requiring her to give an explanation. Hence, it is submitted that all the properties acquired by and companystructed by the said companypanies are liable to be excluded totally from companysideration and thus a total amount of Rs.4,70,24,439/- is liable to be excluded. The learned senior companynsel submitted that companyspiracy, though can be inferred from circumstances, in this case, the mere fact that A1 to A4 were residing in the house belonging to A1 cannot be a circumstance to prove companyspiracy. According to him, A1 and A2 were partners in two partnership firms and such partnership companynection cannot be an incriminating circumstance. According to him, A1 to A4 have purchased properties with their own efforts, with the money earned or mobilized by them. Accordingly, it is submitted that the prosecution has number established any circumstance from which an inference of companyspiracy can be drawn. There is numbercircumstance proved in this case by the prosecution from which a companyclusion can be drawn that there was meeting of minds of A1 to A4 with a view to enable A1 to companymit an offence under Section 13 1 e of the 1988 Act. He further submitted that during the check period, starting of a firm by a numberpublic servant companyld never be a circumstance by itself to infer companyspiracy. Hence, it is submitted that there is numberdirect or indirect evidence in the form of proved circumstance to infer companyspiracy. Hence, it is submitted that the judgment of the High Court should be affirmed. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior companynsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4 submitted that the abstract of Annexures-I to VII are assets relating to A2 to A4, firms companypanies and he drew our attention to the said Annexures. According to him, the properties acquired by A2 to A4, firms companypanies prior to the check period as per DVAC, would appear from the following chart ANNEXURE -I Properties acquired by Accused No.2, Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises prior to check period according to DVAC which is number disputed TMT. N. SASIKALA Description of the Reference Stands in the Value of AnnexureItem No Property of Name the No. in Document of property Annexure I Sale Rs. deeds Land and flat No.7, Tmt.N.Sasikala 3,13,530 1 6 R. Flats, 3/4 Antu17.04.1989 Street, Santhome, Sale deed Chennai-4 of Tmt.N.Sasikala Land and Building at30-12-1988Tmt. N. Sasikala5,85,420 I 15 Abishekapuram Sale Deed Village, Ponnagar, Trichy in Plot No.102, 3rd Cross Road, New Ward, No.K, Block No.30, T.S.No.107, totally measuring 3525 Sq Ft purchased from MIRASI of 22A, William Road, companytonment Trichy, Cash Balance as on 30-12-1988Tmt. N. Sasikala13,601 I 24 1-7-1991 in Canara Bank Kellys Branch SB 38746 Opened on 30/12/1988 in the Name of Tmt. N. Sasikala Cash Balance as on 07-01-1991Tmt. N. Sasikala1,40,198 1 27 1-7-1991 in Canara Bank Mylapore SB 23218 Opened on 23/5/1990 in the Name of Tmt. N. Sasikala 62 items of Jewels As per Tmt. N. Sasikala9,38,460 1 45 claimed to be of evaluation Tmt. N. Sasikala as evaluated by M s. report of VBC Trust M s.VBC Trust TOTAL 19,91,209 JAYA PUBLICATION Description of the Reference Stands in the Value of AnnexureItem No Property of Name the No. in Document of property Annexure 1 Sale deeds Rs. Building at Door 18.06.1989M s Jaya 5,70,039 I 7 No.19, Pattammal Publications Street, Chennai PlotSale deed Selvi No.83, J.Jayalalitha S.No.4087 Extent and Tmt. N. 1897 Sq ft Sasikala purchased from V.H. Ssubramanian S o.H.Venkatesubban, 15 Venkatraman Street, Srinivasa Avenue, Chennai-28. Land and Building 08.12, M s Jaya 5,28,039 I 17 Thiru Vi KA 1990 Publications Industrial Estate Sale deed Selvi Guindy in J.Jayalalitha No,55, 56 Block and Tmt. N. No.V1 extent Sasikala 5658 sq.ft shed , No.C-8 Adyar village Cash balance as on Account Namadhu MGR 5,51,826 I 26 1.7.91 CA No 1952 opened Canara Bank , on Mylapore 23.10.89 Cash Balance as on 07-01-1991M s Jaya 7,83,861 1 28 1-7-1991 in Canara Publications Bank Mylapore CA Selvi 2047 opened on J.Jayalalitha 26-9-90 on transfer and Tmt. N. from Kellys Branch Sasikala in the Name of Selvi Jayalitha and Tmt.N.Sasikala Fixed Deposit FDR dt M s Jaya 64,520 1 29 No,451/90 dated 19.06.1990Publications 19,6,1990 with Selvi Canara Bank, J.Jayalalitha Mylapore and Tmt. N. Sasikala TOTAL 24,98,285 SASI ENTERPRISES Description of the Reference Stands in the Value of Annexu Item No Property of Name the re No. in Document -of property Annexu Sale deeds Rs. re I Shop No.14 Ground 07-05-1989M s. Sasi 98,904 I 8 Floor at 602, Anna Enterprises - Salai Chennai - 6 Sale deed Partners Selvi Jayalaitha and Tmt. N. Sasikala Undivided share of 21-9-1989 M s, Sasi 2,10,919 I Land only at Sale deed Enterprises - Door No. 14 Khadar Partners Selvi Navaz Khan road, Jayalaitha and 9 Nungambakkam at Tmt. N. S.No.58/51 to the Sasikala extent of 68/12000 undivided share in 11 grounds and 736 sq.ft. of land Land and building at19-04-1990M s. Sasi 1,57,125 I 12 Tanjore S.No 1091 Enterprises - extent of 2400 Sale deed Partners Selvi sq.ft. Jayalaitha and Tmt, N. Sasikala Vacant site at Blake19-04-1990M s. Sasi 1,15,315 I 13 H D Road Enterprises - Tanjore Town 3rd Sale deed Partners Selvi division 6th Jayalaitha and Ward Mahar Nombu Tmt. N. chavadi extent 5100 Sasikala sq.ft. in T,S.No. 1091 Vacant site at Ward 19-04-1990M s. Sasi 2,02,778 I 14 No.6 in Manar Nombu Enterprises - Chavadi extent 8970 Sale deed Partners Selvi sq. ft. in T.S. No. Jayalaitha and 1091 Tanjore Town Tmt. N. Sasikala Dry Land to the 07-12-1990M s. Sasi 75,210 1 16 extent of 3.23 Acres Enterprises - in S,No.402-2 of Sale deed Partners Selvi Sundarakottai Jayalaitha and Village, Mannargudi Tmt. N. Taluk Tanjore distr. Sasikala TSR 333 Swaraj 01-12-1989M s. Sasi 2,99,845 1 22 Mazda Van Enterprises - Date of Partners Selvi registratiJayalaitha and on Tmt. N. Sasikala Cash Balance as on 07-01-1991M s. Sasi 2,29,578 I 33 01/7/1991 in Enterprises- Canara Bank, Partners Selvi Mylapore CA 2061 Jayalaitha and Opened on 21/3/1991 Tmt. N. in the name of Sasi Sasikala Enterprises in which Both Selvi Jayalalitha and Tmt. N Sasikara are partners Amount paid of 28-7-1993 M s. Sasi 50,000 1 50 72/12000 on share Enterprises - of land in 11 and Partners Selvi 1736 sq.ft in b s Jayalaitha and at 14, gems companyrt Tmt. N. Khadhar Navaz Sasikala Con Road, Nungambakkam paid by Ch, dated 23.4.90 of CB which was registered as document No.641/93 of S R Thousand Lights, Dated 28/7/1993 TOTAL 14,39,674 GRAND Rs. 59,29,168 TOTAL He further submitted that properties acquired by A2 to A4, firms companypanies prior to the check period were number taken into account by DVAC and he filed a chart in respect thereof, which is hereunder- He further submitted that properties acquired by A2 to A4, firms companypanies at the end of the check period according to DVAC would appear from the following Chart ANNEXURE -II - PART -A Properties acquired by Accused No.2-4 others at the end of check period according to DVAC Entity Wise Summary Amount Rs. At Page reference Mrs.N.Sasikala 4,35,62,372 Jaya Publications 4,07,74,157 Sasi Enterprises 2,80,05,857 Green Fam House 1,77,53,017 Jay Farm House 1,42,84,079 JJ Leasing and 1,838 Maintenance Jay Real Estate 44,37,036 JS Housing Development 41,35,497 Jaya Contractors and 10,98,087 Builders Kodanad Tea Estate 7,60,00,000 Sakthi Constructions 1,02,490 Lakshmi Constructions 1,02,490 Gopal Promoters 1,02,490 N.Sudhagaran - 1,19,89,961 Individual Elavarasi 6,04,07,252 Vivek - Son and 10,20,823 daughter of Mrs.J.Elavarasi Son and daughter of 38,421 Mrs.J.Elavarasi Mahasubha lakshmi Kalyana58,78,776 Mandapam Jaya Finance P limited 1,760 Anjaneya Printers Private6,16,91,574 limited Super Duper TV Private 41,22,377 limited GRAND TOTAL 37,55,10,35 4 Since companypanies Signora business enterprise, Meadow Agro Farms, Ramraj Agro Mills, Riverway Agro Mills, Lex Property Development, Indo Doha Pharmaceuticals are separate legal entities and they are number accused herein. Hence their properties are liable to be excluded. Their assets acquired by them are number attributable to any of the accused as there is numberevidence that these assets were acquired with the funds provided by the Accused. ANNEXURE - Il Properties acquired by Accused No.2 during check period according to DVAC TMT. N. SASIKALA - Accused No.2 Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. Land and Flot No.7 17-04-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 3,13,530 II 7 R.Flats, 3/4 Anthu 89 Street, Santhome, Sale Chennai-4 of deed Tmt.N.Sasikala Doc number575/89, dt 17.4.1989 of SRO, Mylapore Land and building at 03-05-19Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex5,85,420 II 15 also listed Abishekapuram Village, 90 P-782 Pg. 128. as 301 Pon Nagar, Trichy in Sale 129,. Vol. 39 and plot No. 102, 3rd Cross deed D-287 - IT return Road, New Ward No.K, 1991 -92 Pg. I - Block No.30, T.S.No.107 5 of Vol. 157 to the extent of 3525 Sq.ft Tmt.N.SasikalaW o. Natarajan Doc No.2256/90, dt.3.5.90 of ORB, Thanjavur PW 144 DW 88 Land and Building to 22-8-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 6,78,000 I I 19 the extent of 25035 1 Ex-P-646, Pg. 113 sq.ft. in S.No.93,94 andSale -124 of Vol. 33 95 of Mannargudi villagedeed P1510 SB A c Haridranadhi west street 23218 opened on - PW 138 PW -99 23,05.90 Pg. 235 - 248, vol. 61 Land and Building at 25-3-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 5,57,761 I I 22 Door No. 16 IppaBabi 2 Ex-P-1510, Pg. 235 Radhika Nagar Anjaiah Sale -248 of Vol. 61 Garden Boosaredddey Gudadeed Ex-P 935, Pg. 235 - Road, Secundarabad 242 Vol. 55 Contonment, S.No.49 and Ex-P-1513 1514, 50 Land Extent 222.92 Pg. 253 - 254 255 sq. mt. Building area -256 of Vol. 61. - 2200 sq.ft.PW - 163 - DD challans for SRO - Srinivasa Rao payment to Jaspal Cost of acquisition of 01-09-19Tr.V.N. Sudhakkaran 84,21,000II 33 shares of M s. Anjeneya 93 and Tmt. N. Sasikala Value Printers P Limited at Sale Ex- P-41, Pg. of Machineries No. 48 Inner Ring Road, deed 107-112 of Vol. 14 companyting Ekkattuthangal, on Ex- P-I519, Pg. 263 Rs.20,16,000/- 1-9-93 Towards - 276 of Vol. 61 CA to be deleted transfer of shares of 2196 Rs. 64,05,000/- machinery companyt of Rs, 20,16,000 from Tr. Naresh Shroff - PW 15 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10--1Tmt. N. Sasikala 37,410 II 34 in S.No.198/180 F of 993 Ex P-83, Pg. 160 - PW - 31 Velagaburam Village - PWSale 171 of vol. 21 Ratnavelu 32 to 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW -39-Venu-S.R.O PW - 47 - Muthaiah 1.42 acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt, N. Sasikala 12,060 II 35 in S,No.198/180 F3, 93 Ex - P-91, Pg. 242 - PW - 31 - 198/1598 of Velanapuram Sale 252 of Vol. 21 Ramavelu Village - PW 37 PW 39 deed PW - 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW -47 Muthaiah 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 12,060 II 3 6 1.42 acres of dry Land 93 Ex - P-84, Pg. 172 - PW 31 - in S.No.198/180/F 12 Sale 179 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 198/161 A 198/160A deed PW 32 Babu 198/159 D2, 198/158 B2 PW-39-Venu-S.R. 198/157 BI of 0 PW -47 - Velakkapuram Village - Muthaiah PW 33 PW 39 1.42 Acres of dry land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 12,060 II in S.No. I98/180 FII, 93 Ex - P-92, Pg. 1 - 3 7 179 A 163A.162A, 161B, Sale 12 of Vol. 22 PW 31 - 157 B2, 156.8, 155 81 ofdeed Ratnavelu Velakkapuram Village - PW 32 Babu PW 31, PW 39 PW 47 - PW-39-Venu-S.R. Read PW 47 0 PW -47 - Muthaiah 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex 37,385 II 38 in S.N0.198 of 93 P-81, Pg, 127 PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale 134 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 31 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 1,42 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 12,060 II 39 in S,No.198 of 93 Ex - P-85, Pg. 180 - PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village PWSale 186 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 31, PW 34 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW-47 - Muthaiah 1.42 Acres In S.No 198 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 12,060 I I 40 of velagapuram village -93 Ex - P93, Pg. 13 - PW - 31 PW 39, PW 31 PW 35 Sale 26 of Vol. 22 Ratnavelu deed PW - 32 - Babu PW -39-Venu-S.R.0 PW -47 - Muthaiah 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex 37,381 Il 41 in S.N0.198 of 93 P-86, Pg. 187 - PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale 200 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 31, PW 34 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex 37,385 II 42 in S.N0.198 of 93 - P-90, Pg. 231 - PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale 241 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 31, PW 38 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 37,385 II 43 in S.N0.198 of 93 Ex- P-87, Pg. 201 - PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale 209 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 31, PW 35 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 1.42 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 12,060 II 44 in S.No.198 of 93 Ex - P-94, Pg. 27 - PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale 37 of Vol. 22 Ratnavelu 31, PW 39 PW 42 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 37,410 II 45 in S.N0.198 of 93 Ex- P-88, Pg. 210 PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale 220 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 31, PW 36 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 Muthaiah 4.41 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 37,410 II 46 in S.N0.198 of 93 Ex P-89, Pg. 221 PW - 31 - Velagapuram Village - PWSale - 230 of Vol. 21 Ratnavelu 37 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 1.42 Acres of dry Land 28-10-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 12,060 II 47 in S.No.198 of 93 Ex - P-95, Pg. 38 - PW - 31 - Velagapuram village - PWSale 49 of Vol. 22 Ratnavelu 31 PW 39 deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 41 cents of dry land in 28-10-19Tint. N. Sasikala 3,498 II 48 No. 198 of Velagapuram93 Ex - P-82, Pg. 135 PW - 31 - village - PW 31 Sale - 159 of vol. 21 Ratnavelu deed PW 32 Babu PW-39-Venu-S.R. 0 PW - 47 - Muthaiah 5.80 acres in 10-11-19 1,95,800 II 95 No.392/6, 380/4, 5, 94 Tmt. N. Sasikala D-251 to 257 392/3, 5,1,2,4, 381/9, Sale Ex - P96, Pg. 50. DW-93 380/1 2 in Payyanoor deed 55 of Vol. 22 - Village - PW 40 PW 159 Sale deed Ex-P-1519, Pg.263-276 of Vol. 61 - CA 2196, Ex-P-1528, Pg. 287-289 of Vol. 61 -DD challan Ex-P1899, Pg. 49 - 50 of Vol. 63 - cheque companyy 3.52 acres in Doc. 10-11-19Tint. N. Sasikala 2,86,520 II 96 No.391/1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 94 Ex P-97, Pg. 56 - D-25I to 257 7,392/8 9,10,11 in Sale 61 DW-93 Payyanoor village - PW deed of Vol. 22 - Sale 40 PW 159 deed 5.28 Acres in 10-11-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 2,54,670 II 97 No.384/I, 3, 404/1, 94 Ex - P-98, Pg. 62 - D-25I to 257 381/3,4,5,6,7,10,11 in Sale 67 of Vol. 22 - DW-93 Payyanoor Village - PW deed Sale deed 40 PW 159 0.40 acres in S.No.383 10-11-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 1,94,012 II 98 in Payyanoor Village - 94 Ex P-99, Pg. 68 - D-251 to 257 PW 40 PW 159 Sale 71 of Vol. 22 -Sale DW-93 deed deed 0.40 acres in S.No.383 10-11-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 2,04,012 II 99 in Payyanoor Village - 94 Ex-P-I00, Pg. 72 - D251 to 257 PW 40 PW 159 Sale 76 of Vol. 22 - DW-93 deed Sale deed 2.76 acres in S.No.403/110-11-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 1,76,910 II 100 in Payyanoor Village - 94 Ex - P-101, Pg. 77 D-251 to 257 PW 40 PW 159 Sale - 80 of Vol. 22 - DW-93 deed Sale deed 4.23 Acres in S.No.379/210-11-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 1,91,248 II 101 and 379/3 of Payyanoor 94 Ex P-102, Pg. 81 D-251 to 257 Village PW 40 PW 159Sale - 85 of Vol. 22 - DW-93 deed Sale deed 0.51 acres in S.No. 10-11-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 2,14,810 II 102 381/9,392/1 and 392/2 in94 Ex - P-103, Pg. 86 D-251 to 257 Payyanoor Village - PW Sale - 91 of Vol. 22 - DW- 93 40 PW 159 deed Sale deed Cost of Transfer of 27-11-19 18,42,000II 127 6,14,000 shares of 94 M s. Ramraj Agro M s.Ramraj Agro at Mills. Ex- P-1519, Vendampalai at the rate Pg. 263-276 of Vol. of Rs.3/- per share from 61 CA 2196 DD Gandhi and others Challan dt. 6,18,000 shares minus 20.12.1994 4000 shares PW 501 One sixth undivided 21-3-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 10,87,196II 155 shares of land in 5 5 Ex-P-105, Pg. 97. grounds and 11333sq.ft. Sale 103 - Sale deed, in s.no.3334/1a in deed Ex-P1519, Pg. Mylapore Iuz Avenue - PW 263-276 of Vol. 61 43 PW 159 - CA 2196 Payment dated 21.03.1995 with Rs.7.50 lacs Rs.1.50 Lacs Cost of acqusition of PW-43 No document and 76,00,000II 159 Luz avenue property denied already argued other than the of companysideration companyered byhaving document Nos.241/95 to received 252/95 of S.R.O.North by cash Madras for the purpose of clearing the loan that stood in the name of properties in the Indian Bank Abiramapuram - PW 43, PW 44 and PW 45 2.03 acres in 19-7-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 3,44,195 II 170 N0.385/12.385/13 5 Ex-P-1510, Pg. 235 385/14 in Payanoor Sale - 248 of Vol. 61 Village - PW 41 PW 159deed - SB A c 23218 opened on 23.05.90 Ex-P-1518, Pg. 261-262 of Vol. 61 - DD paid Ex-P-1631, Pg. 52-53 of Vol. 62 -Cheque paid Ex-P104, Pg. 92-96 of Vol.22 2.34 acres in S.No. 19-7-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 3,91,655 Il 171 385/7, 8, 9 386/1a, I b,5 Ex-P-912-Sale deed lc. ld,386/2 in PayanoorSale Pg. 142 - 147 of Village - PW 41 PW 159deed Vol.55 0.90 acres in 19-7-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 3,21,030 II 172 No.386/15, 385/1, 2, 5 Ex-P-913-Sale deed Totally 3, 4, 5, 6 10 Payanoor Sale Pg. 148 -153 of Rs.10,56,880/- Village - PW 41 PW 159deed Vol. 55 incl. stamp duty regn fees for items 170-172 New Additional EvaluatiTmt. N. Sasikala 1,25,90,2II 176 Construction in Farm on Ex-P-662, Pg. 31 - 61 House Bangalows at Report 87 of Vol. 34 - Payyanur in Chengai Anna which is Dist - PW 107 cash Balance as on 30-4-199Tmt. N Sasikala 771 II 195 30/4/1996 of ca 1071 of 6 Fresh Mushroom IB Apiramapuram opened Proprietrix - on 11/3/1994 - PW 182 Ex-P-1117, Pg. 233 -240 of Vol. 58 Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Metal King 2,900 II 201 30-04-96 in CB Mylapore 6 sole Prop. CA 2277 Opened in N.Sasikala - Ex-P. 10-11-93 - PW 201 2081, Pg. 216-252 of Vol. 63 Cash Balance as on 30-4-199Tmt. N. Sasikala - 1,889 II 202 30.04-96 in CB Mylapore 6 Ex-P-1519, Pg. CA 2196 opened on 263-276 of Vol. 61 1-12-92 - PW 201 Cash Balance as on 30-4-199Tmt. N. Sasikala - 1,095 II 204 30-04-96 in CB Mylapore 6 ExP-1510, Pg. SB 23218 Opened on 235-245 of Vol. 61 23-5-90 - PW 201 cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Metal King 3,17232 II 205 30-04-96 in CB Guindy in6 sole Prop. CA 1245 Opened on 2-1.95 N.sasikala in the name of Metal Ex-D-281, P. king - PW 201 142-176 of Vol. 156 Cash Balance as on 30-4-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 561 II 212 30-04-1996 in CB 6 Ex-P-2031, Pg. Mylapore CA 2133 Opened 156183 of Vol. 64 on 3-2-92 - PW 201 Cash Balance as on 30-4-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 2,34,000 II 229 30-04-96 in CBI SB 237926 Ex-P-937, Pg. secundarbad opened on 255-256 of Vol. 155 29-1-93 PW 164 TN - 01 - F - 9090 Tata 18-08-19Tmt. N. Sasikal 3,88,376 Il 241 Searra car - PW 57 PW 92 Ex-P-228 P-229, 66 Pg. 13 14, Vol. 25 Ex-P-264, Pg. 85 of Vol. 25 - Registration Ex-P-1510, Pg. 235 - 245 of Vol. 61- SB A c 23218 - Canara bank TN 09 H 3559 TATA 26-03-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 5,11,118 II 243 Searra car - PW 57 PW96 Ex-P-231, Pg. 18 of 69 Vol. 25 Tn 09 H 3496 TATA Searra25-03-19Tmt. N. Sasikala 5,11,118 II 244 car - PW 57 PW 69 96 Ex-P-230, Pg. 16 of Vol. 25 P-232, Pg. 20 of Vol. 25 Ex-P-1519, Pg. 263-276 of Vol. 61 payment dt 04,04.96 for Rs.10,60,790/- for Items 243 244 TN 09 - E 9036 Maruthi19-12.19M s. Metal King 2,22,485 II 253 car 94 sole Prop. PW 58 PW 69 N.Sasikala ExP-236, Pg. 28 of Vol. 25 P-286, Pg. 110 of Vol. 25 TN 09 B 6966 Bajaj Tempo19.04-19M s. Metal King 2,03,979 II 254 Omni Bus - PW 59 PW 6991 sole Prop. Sasikala ExP-242, Pg. 40 of Vol. 25 P-288, Pg112 of Vol. 25. TN 09 B 6975 Bajaj 19-04-19M s. Metal King 2,03,979 II 257 Tempo van - PW 59 PW 91 sole Prop. 69 N.Sasikala Ex-P-241, Pg. 38-39 of Vol. 25 P-287, Pg. 111 of Vol. 25 62 items of Jewels As per Tmt. N. Sasikala 9,38,460 II 285 claimed to be of Tmt. N.evaluatiEx-P-1014, Pg. Sasikala as evaluated byon 181-183 of Vol. 57 M s. VBC Trust on report P.1015, Pg. 184 31.3.1991 - PW 179 of M s, -185 of Vol. 57 VBC Before the check Trust onperiod 31-3-199 1 34 items of Jewels EvaluatiTmt. N. Sasikala 17,54,868II 287 purporting to be Tmt. on Ex-P-1016, Pg. Sasikala as evaluated byReport 186-188 of Vol. 57 M s. VBC Trust on dated Before the check 16-1-1992 - PW 179 16-1.199period 2 Machinery subsequently EvaluatiM s. Metal King 7,69,000 II 293 purchased for M s. Metalon sole Prop. King - PW 115 Report N.Sasikala - Ex-P-665 Cash Balance as on 30-4-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 17,502 II 300 30-04-1996 in SB 38746 6 Ex-P-975 to P-977 of CB Kellys opened on 30-12 88 in the Name of Tmt. N. Sasikala - PW 208 Cost of renovation and 31-3-199Tmt. N. Sasikala 6,83,325 II 301 additional companystruction 3 Ex- P-781 P-782 between June 1992 and No additional 1993 of the building at companystruction hence Plot No. 102 III Cross to be fully Road, Pon Nagar, Trichy deleted owned by Tmt.N. Sasikala Covered by document NO. 2256/90/ dt. 3/5/90 S R O I O R B TRICHY - PW 144 TOTAL 4,35,62,3 72 JAYA PUBLICATION Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No. In Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. Land and Building at 08-06-19M s. Jaya 5,70,039 II 6 Door No.I9, Pattammal 89 Publications Street, Chennai Plot Sale Prior to check No.83, R.S.No.4087, deed period extent 1897 Sq.Ft M s. Jaya Publications Partners Selvi.J.Jayaalithaa Sasikala Doc No.1024/89, dt.18-6-89 of SRO, Mylapore Land and building at 08-12-19M s. Jaya 5,28,039 II 17 Thiru Vi-Ka lndustrial 90 Publications Estate, Guindy, in Sale Prior to check No.55, 56, Block No.6,deed period extent 5658 Sq. ft., shed No.C-8, Adyar Village M s. Jaya Publications Doc No.4640/90 dt.8.12.1990 of SRO, Adyar 4664.60 sq.ft, together M s Jaya 15,05,428II 20 with building in 26-9-199Publications Selvi T,S.No.4345, 1 Sale J.Jayalalitha and No.33/3pt, 32/4pt in deed Tmt. N. Sasikala St. Thomas mount village Ex-P-1020 - CA 792 Plot No, s - 7 Block No, Indian Bank - 6 Thiru vi ka Industrial Ex-P-1023 - Copy of Estate Guindy - PW 3 to BPO for Rs.10L read pg3 S.No.10 Ex-P-1903-CA 2047-Canara Bank Ex-P-1930 -Copy of DD for Rs.2.60 Lacs Tansi Foundary Land 02-06-19M s Jaya 2,13,68,1I I 23 and Building to the 92 Publications 52 extent of 55 grounds andSale Selvi J.Jayalalitha 2143 sq.ft i.e 12462.172deed and Tmt. N. sq.ft. in Sasikala Ex-P-1028 No.86,87,88,89,91,92,a - CA 792 Indian nd 93 part of alandur Bank - Rs.1.50 hamlet of adayar village Crores loan , Thiru.vi.ka Industrial - Ex-P-1026- Copy Estate Gunidy - PW 4, PW of BPO for Rs.28.3L 3 and PW 126 for Ex-P-1903-CA 2047 - seizure Canara Bank Ex-P-1027 -Stat of OMTL -Ind Bank and Ex-P-6 Undivided share of land 27-06-19M s Jaya 2,26,130 II 83 to the extent of 94 Publications 880/72000 in 10 grounds Sale Selvi J.Jayalalitha and 640 sq.ft. at Door deed and Tmt. N. No. 98/99 old No. 381 Sasikala Ex-P-1903 of Northern row of Luz - CA 2047 - Canara Church Road, Mylapore Bank Ex-P-1933 S. No. 1639/5 - PW 30 1934 - Payment and PW 159 details and Ex-P-79 80 4564 sq.ft. of site and 15-11-19M s Jaya 34,20,160II 104 building in T.S.No. 2 94 Publications Selvi and T.S.No.18 Block No. Sale J.Jayalalitha and 22 which is called No,l deed Tmt. N. Sasikala Parameswari Nagar , Urur Ex- P-79 P-80 Village- PW 23, PW 159 including stamp PW 201 chgs Ex-P-1926 1927 - DD companyy and Ex-P1020 - CA -792 of JP with Indian bank New additional EvaluatiM s Jaya 8,00,000 II 184 companystruction in Buildingon Publications at door No. 19 PattammalReport Explained that the St. Mylapore Chennai - value of shed is PW 116 Rs.6,42,290/- and hence balance of Rs.1,57,710/- to be excluded Ex-P-670 - Report New additional EvaluatiM s Jaya 39,34,000II 190 companystruction in Buildingon Publications at S.No.32/2-4 Plot No. Report Explained that the S-7 Ganapathy companyony value of building Thiruvika Industrial companystructed is estate Guindy Chennai 32 Rs.32,94,834/- and - PW 117 hence balance of Rs.6,39.166/- to be excluded Ex-P-677 - Report Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s Jaya 20,79,885II 203 30.04-96 in CB Mylapore 6 Publications Selvi CA 2047 Opened 26-09-90 J.Jayalalitha and On transfer from Kellys Tmt. N. Sasikala Branch - PW 201 Ex-P-1903-CA 2047 Canara Bank TN -01-0009 Tata Estate 29-07-19M s Jaya 4,06,106 II 234 Car - PW57 PW 66 92 Publications Selvi J.Jayalalitha and Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex-P-1903-CA 2047 Canara Bank . Ex-P 226 Invoice P.263 Registration TN - 01 N - 9999 Swaraj 21-11-19M s Jaya 3,85,520 ll 236 Mazda Van - PW 60 and PW91 Publications Selvi 66 J.Jayalalitha and Tmt. N. Sasikala - To be excluded Ex-P-245 Invoice P.262 Registration TN - 01 - Q 0099 Tata 21-12-19M s Jaya 2,81,169 II 238 Mobile van - PW 57 and 94 Publications PW 66 Selvi J.Jayalalitha and Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex-P-1903 - CA 2047 Canara Bank Ex-P224 Invoice TN - 04 E 0099 Mahindra M s Jaya 3,30,250 II 239 Armada Jeep - PW 62 and Publications PW 67 Selvi J.Jayalalitha 29-04.19and Tmt. N. 93 Sasikala - To be excluded Ex-P-1903 - CA 2047- Canara Bank Ex-P-251 Invoice Ex-P-252 Receipt P266 Registration TN 07 D 2342 - Bajaj Van16-02-19M s Jaya 52,271 II 250 - Khivraj Automobiles - 95 Publications Selvi PW 64 PW 68 J.Jayalalitha and Tmt. N. Sasikala - To be excluded Ex-P-1635 - CA 1952 - Canara Bank Ex-P-256 Invoice Ex-P-257 Receipt P. 269 Registration TN 09 B 6565 Mercedes 04-06-19M s Jaya 9,15,000 II 256 Benz car Imported - As 93 Publications Selvi explained by PW 69 J.Jayalalitha and Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex-P-1903 - CA 2047-Canara Bank P-279 Registration DW-88 Ex-D-220 Fixed Deposit in Canara 19-9-199M s Jaya 1,49,544 II 259 Bank, Mylapore in the 4 Publications Selvi name of Jaya J.Jayalalitha and Publications - PW 201 Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex-P-1921 FDR companyy Fixed deposit in Canara 19-9-199M s Jaya 71,218 II 261 Bank, Mysore Branch in 4 Publications Selvi the name of Jaya J.Jayalalitha and Publications - PW 201 Tmt. N. Sasikala Ex-P-I922 FDR companyy Ashok leyland Panther 18-4-199M s Jaya 32,40,278I I 299 Luxury companych bearing 5 Publications Selvi registration No. TN-09 F J.Jayalalitha and 2575 purchased in the Tmt. N. Sasikala name of M s. Jaya Ex-P-1903 - CA 2047 Publication P limited Canara Bank Ex-P255 Chassis Rs. 699178 - Invoice Ex-P-258 companyt of Body Building Registration Rs.2541000 Ex-P-I936 to 1938- PW 63, PW 65 and PW 201 Payment to Vendor Bharat Industries Cash balance as on 30-4-199Namadhu MGR 5,10,968 II 304 30.4.96 CA No 1952 6 Ex-P-1635-CA Canara Bank, Mylapore 1952-Canara Bank PW 201 TOTAL 4,07,74,1 57 SASI ENTERPRISES Description of the ReferenceStands in the Name Value of Anne Item No in Property of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. Shop No.14, Ground Floor05-07-198M s. Sasi 98,904 II 8 at 602, Anna Salai, 9 Prior Enterprises Chennai-6 Parsn Manere to the Partners Selvi check Jayalaitha and Tmt. M s.Sasi Enterprises period N. Sasikala Doc No.399/89 dt.5-7-89Sale deed of SRO, Thousandlights Undivided share of land 20-09-198M s. Sasi 2,10,919 II 9 only at Door No.14, 9 Prior Enterprises Kather Navaz Khan road, to the Partners Jayalaitha Nungambakkam, in Block check and Tmt. N. No.12, R.S.No.58/5 to period Sasikala ExP-769 the extent of 68/12000 Sale deed sale deed X-19 - undivided share in 11 Rental agreement Grounds 736 Sq.ft with a Shop No. 9 M s. Sasi Enterprises Doc No.526/89 dt.21-9-89 of Jt. R.II, Thousandlights PW 113 for rent Mohsin Bijapuri Land and Building in 19-04-199M s. Sasi 1,57,125 II 12 Tanjore, Mahamoombu 0 Enterprises Chavadi S.No.1091 exent Prior to-Partners Selvi of 2400 Sq.ft the checkJayalaitha and Tmt. M s. Sasi Enterprises, period N. Sasikala Partners J.JayalalithaaSale deed , N.Sasikala Doc No.455/90 dt.I9-4-90 of ORB,Thanjavur Vacant site at Blake 19-04-199M s. Sasi 1,15,315 II 13 D. Road, Tanjore Town,0 Prior Enterprises - 3rd Division, 6th Ward, to the Partners Selvi Mahar Nombu Chavadi to check Jayalaitha and Tmt. the extent of 5100 Sq Ftperiod N. Sasikala in T.S.No.1091 Sale deed M s. Sasi Enterprises Doc No.456/90 dt.I9-4-90 of ORB, Thanjavur Vacant site at Blake 19-04-199M s. Sasi 2,02,778 II 14 D. Road,Tanjore Town, 0 Prior Enterprises - Mahar Nombu Chavadi, to the Partners Selvi extent 8970 Sq.ft. in check Jayalaitha and Tmt. S.No.1019 period N. Sasikala M s. Sasi Enterprises, Sale deed Doc No.457/90 dt 19-04-1990 of ORB, Thanjavur Dry land to the extent 12-07-199M s. Sasi 75,210 II 16 of 3.23 Acres in 0 Enterprises - No.402/2 SundarakottaiSale deedPartners Selvi Village, Tanjavur Jayalaitha and Tmt. M s. Sasi Enterprises N. Sasikala Doc No.563/90 dt.12-7-90 Land and Building at New19-2-1992M s. Sasi 2,98,144 II 21 Door No. 14, Kadhar Enterprises - Rs.50,000/- Nawaz Khan Road, Sale deedPartners Selvi paid on Nungambakkam Block 12, Jayalaitha and Tmt. 23.4.90 i.e. 87/12000 undivided share N. Sasikala prior to of land in 11 ground Ex-P-1940-CA -2061 check period - 1736 sq. ft. and 523 of SE with Canara See sq.ft. building in R.S. bank Ex-P-770 - No. 58 and New R.S.No. Sale deed 58/5 in Nungambakkam Village - PW 137 - Mr.Tajudeen Tansi Enamellled wires 10-07-199M s. Sasi 90,17,089I I 25 Land and Building at 2 Enterprises - Thiru Vi Ka Industrial Sale deedPartners Selvi Estate Guindy, 0.63 Jayalaitha and Tmt. acres of land and 495 N. Sasikala Ex-P- sq.ft. in R C C Roof 1940 - CA -2061 of 1155 sq.ft. in ACC sheet SE with Canara bank roof in S.No.89 of Alandur village Hamlet of Adayar, Block No. 12, Tansi Enamalled Wires - PW 3 refer to Page 5 Land and Building to the22-01-199MIs. Sasi 49,02,105II 26 extent of 1 ground and 3 Enterprises - 1475 sq.ft. in R.S.No. Sale deedPartners Selvi 3581 part in Mylapore Jayalaitha and Tmt. Village Door No. 18 East N.Sasikala Abiramapuram 1111 street Ex-P-1940 - CA - PW 4 Refer to Page 2 -2061 of SE with - Ramachandran Canara bank Ex-P-23 - Sale deed Ex-P-1519 - CA -2196 of NS with Canara Bank 72/12000 share of 11 28-7-1993M s. Sasi 160,572 II 32 grounds 1736 sq.ft. in Enterprises - Rs.50,000/- S.No.58/5 e 14, Gems Sale deedPartners Selvi paid on Court , Kather Navaz Jayalaitha and Tmt. 23.4.90 i.e. Khan road, Nungambakkam N. Sasikala Exprior to - PW 137 P-1940 - CA -2061 check period of SE with Canara bank Ex-P-768 - Sale deed dt 30.6.93 4380 sq.ft. land with 26-09-199M s. Sasi 2,65,000 I I 91 520 sq.ft. house In 4 enterprises Ex-P-46 Rs.52,205/- No. 588/2A, 2 B in Sale deedEx-P- 1940 - CA excess Thiruvenkada Nagar -2061 of SE with amount to be Colony - PW 17 - Canara Bank deleted Mrs.Sundari Shankar PW 159 Rajagopalan PW 161 Ramesh 4380 sq.ft. land with 26-09-199M s. Sasi 3,10,000 II 92 520 sq.ft. house In 4 enterprises No evidence No. 588/2A, 2 B in Sale deed adduced Thiruvenkadu Nagar by prosecution companyony - excess amount so paid to seller Tmt. Rs.3,10,000/- Sundari Shankar over and to be above document value deleted New additional EvaluatioM s. Sasi II 174 companystruction in Buildingn enterprises Amount80,75,000 The balance at 5-A B, and C East Report to be accepted is amount Coast Road, Door Rs.40,35,981/- of No.4/130 Raja Nagar, Rs.40,39,019/- Neelankarai Chennai -41 to be excluded Ref Doc. No. 4752/93 SRO Adayar - Already explained Land in S.No. 94 of 1993 M s. Sasi 5,72,910 II 175 Neelankarai Village with Enterprises an extent of 111976 -Partners Selvi sq.ft. of land Plot No. Jayalaitha and Tmt. 5 a, b and c - PW 50 N, R.0 Sasikala Ex-P-133 -Ex-P-1940 - CA -2061 of SE with Canara Bank New Additional EvaluatioM s. Sasi 14,17,538II 191 companystruction in Buildingn enterprises Amount The balance and the change of roof Report to be accepted is amount for the works shed at MF Rs.4,76,525/- of 9 Guindy Industrial Rs.9,41,013/- Estate Chennai -32 - to be Already explained excluded Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996M s. Sasi 4,59,976 I I 214 30/04/96 in CB, Mylapore Enterprises- CA 2061 Opened on Partners Selvi 21/3/91 - PW 201 Jayalaitha and Tmt. Sasikala Ex-P-1940 - CA -2061 of SE with Canara Bank Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996M s. Sasi 1,02,490 II 221 30/4/96 in CA 1044 of IB Enterprises - Abiramapuram opened on Partners Selvi 15/12/93 in the - PW 182 Jayalaitha and Tmt. Sasikala Ex-P-1255 -CA -1044 of SE with Canara Bank TSR 333 Swaraj Mazda 12-01-198M s. Sasi 2,99,845 II 242 Van 12/1/1989 9 Enterprises - Before Partners Selvi check Jayalalithaa and period Tmt.N.Sasikala Tn 01 W 1233 Tempo 19-01-199M s. Sasi 4,24,268 II 245 Traveller 4 Enterprises -Partners Selvi Jayalaitha and Tmt. Sasikala Ex-P- 1940 - CA -2061 of SE with Canara Bank Ex-P-238 Invoice Ex-P-265 Registration M s. Sasi Enterprises- Partners Selvi Jayalaitha and Tmt. Sasikala TN 07 H 0009 Tata 21-12-199 Ex-P-1940-CA-20613,15,537 II 246 sumo 4 of SE with Canara Bank Ex-P-233 Invoice M s. Sasi Enterprises - Partners Selvi Jayalaitha and Tmt. N. Tn 09 E 9207 Maruthi 26-12-199Sasikala 5,25,132 II 247 Esteem car 4 Ex-D-270-Pg 1561-Ex-P-237 Invoice - Ex-P-280 Registration TOTAL 2,80,05,8 57 GREEN FARM HOUSE Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. 16.75 cents in S.No.1/If03-09-19Tr.VN.Sudhakaran 125 I I 69 and old R.S.No. 1/1c4 of94 Partner in Green Sholinganallore Village sale Farm House Ex-P-43 - PW 16 - Jagadeesh A deed to 45 - Sale Raja agreement POA Ex-P-1189 - CA No.I058 of Indian Bank 6.75 cents on 8.3.1994 -189/1994M s. Green Farm 570200 II 70 PW 16 - Jagadeesh A dt House Ex-P-1189 - , , Cash portion of Raja 9-3-1994CA No.1058 of Sale Indian Bank. Rs.335000/- to deed Rs.235000/- is to be be admitted excluded 16.50 cents in S.No.1/1f09-03-19Tr.VN.Sudhakaran 125 II 71 and old R.S.No. 1/1c4 of94 Partner in Green Sholinganallore Village Sale Farm House - PW 16 - Jagadeesh A deed Raja Actual companysideration 09-03-19M s. Green Farm 8,65,400 II 72 paid to Tmt. Gayathri 94 House Cash portion of chandran W o K.T. Sale Ex-P-I189 - CA No Chandaravadanam, 22, deed .I058 of Indian Rs.335200/- to Bazullah Road Chennai Bank. Rs.539400/- be -17 By DD Rs. 530400/- is to be admitted excluded and by cash Rs. 335000/- on 8/3/1994 - - PW 16 . Jagadeesh A Raja 16.75 cents in 09-03-19M s. Green Farm 125 II 73 S.No.1/1f old R.S.No. 94 house 1/1c4 at SholinganalloreSale Village - PW 16 - deed Jagadeesh A Raja Actual companysideration 08-03-19M s. Green Farm 5,70,200 II 74 paid to K.T 94 House Ex- Cash portion of Chandravadanan 22, Sale P-1189 - CA No.1058 Bazullah Road, Chennai deed of Indian Bank. Rs.335200/- to -17 by DD Rs. 235200/- Rs.235200/- is to be on 8/3/94 and cash be admitted excluded Rs.335000/- on 10/4/1994 - PW 16 - Jagadeesh A Raja 34 cents together with 16-6-94 M s. Green Farm 1,21,000 I I 80 26 companyonut trees in Sale House Ex-P- 1189 - No. 165/88 in deed CA No.1058 of Vettuvankani Village - Indian Bank. PW 159 Rajagopal Ex-P-906 to 908 - Owner Mrs.Shanti Sale deed Ex-P- Subramaniam Others - 1196 to 1198 - Bank Not examined transfer challan 0.34 Acres together with16-6-94 M s. Green Farm 1,21,040 II 81 26 companyonut trees in Sale House Ex- No.165/78 in deed P-1189-CA No.1058 Vettuvankani Village - of Indian Bank. PW 159 Rajagopal Ex-P-906 to 908 - Owner Mrs.Shanti Sale Subramaniam Others - deed Ex-P-1196 to Not examined 1198 Bank Transfer Challan 0.34 Acres together with16-6-94 M s. Green Farm 1,21,040 II 1 26 companyonut trees in Sale House Ex- 82 No.165/9a in deed P-1189 - CA No.1058 Vettuvankanni Village - of Indian Bank. PW 159 Rajagopal Ex-P-906 to 908.- Owner Mrs.Shanti Sale deed Ex-P- Subramaniam Others - 1196 to 1198 Bank Not examined Transfer Challan 37 cents in S.No.165/98 27-09-19M s. Green Farm 1,24,540 II 93 in Vettuvankeni 94 House Ex- Enjabakkam village Sale P-1189- CA No.1058 deed of Indian Bank.Ex-P- 125 - Sale deed New additional As per M s. Green Farm 1,52,59,0II 178 companystruction in the EvaluatiHouse 76 Balance portion Residential Building at on Amount accepted of No. 3/l/8c - Report Rs.1,02,47,286/- Rs.50,11,790/- Vettuvankeni Chennai to be excluded Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Green Farm 146 II 219 30/04/1996 in CA 1058 of6 House 1B Abiramapuram Opened Ex-P-1189-CA on 27/1/94 No.1058 of Indian Bank. TOTAL 1,77,53,0 17 J FARM HOUSE Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of Of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. 1.29 acres ub 25-2-199M s. J. Farm Houses6,49,770 II 68 No.18/4a1 of 4 Ex-P-73 Enjambakkam Village - PWSale Ex-P-1207 - CA 25 - Bhandari .P.B - to deed No.1054 of Indian read chief Bank. 50 cents in S.No.2/1b, 12-12-19M s. J. Farm Houses2,86,441 II 3a in Solinganallur 94 Ex-P-72 - POA Village - PW 24 - Sale Ex-P-1207-CA 110 Daniliwala.T.K. deed No.1054 of Indian Bank. Ex. P-909 sale deed 09.12.1994 New additional As per M s. J. Farm Houses80,36,868II 183 companystruction in BuildingEvaluatiEx-P-72 - POA Value to be at Sea Shell Avenue on Ex-P-1207 - CA excluded No.2/1-B-3 apartment Report No.1054 of Indian is Sholinganallore Saidapet Bank.Ex. P-909 Sale Rs.32,26,198/- Taluik - As explained deed 09.12.1994 Value admitted is Rs.48,10,670/- New additional As per M s. J. Farm Houses53,11,000Il companystruction in Evaluati 188 residential building 4 on Value admitted is Value to be Nos in the campus at Report Rs.29,82,392/- excluded No.1/240 Enjabakkam in is New Mahabalipuram Road - Rs.23,28,608/- As explained TOTAL 1,42,84,0 79 JJ LEASING AND MAINTENANCE Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. J.Jay Leasing 1,838 30/4/96 in CA 1059 1B 6 and Maintanance Abiramapuram opened on Ex-P-1136 - CA II 217 27-1-94 in the name of No.1059 of Indian Bank TOTAL 1,838 JAY REAL ESTATE Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. Land and Building to the19-07-19M s. Jay Real 33,44,040II 84 extent of 4800 sq.ft. 94 Estate Ex-P-29- with a building both in Sale Sale deed Ex-P-1160 the ground and first deed - CA No.1050 of floor in S.No.5202 of T Indian Bank Nagar Village which is number known as Murugesa Mudali St - PW 6 Mr.Gopalsamy New additional As per M s. Jay Real 10,92,828II 187 companystruction in BuildingEvaluatiEstate Value Value to be in door No. 5 Murugesan on admitted is excluded Street T Nagar, Chennai Report Rs.5,47,102/- is 17 Rs.5,45,726/- Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Jay Real 168 II 30/4/96 CA 1050 of IB 6 Estate Ex-P-1160-CA 215 Abirampram opened on No.I050 of Indian 27/1/94 Bank TOTAL 44,37,036 S HOUSING DEVELOPMENT Land and Building in 10-8-94 M s. J.S. Housing 9,95,670 II Plot No.40 and 41 with aSale Development built up area of 900 deed Ex-P-1170 - CA sq.ft. both in the No.1062 of Indian Ground and first Floors Bank Land extent 5 grounds of SolinganaIllur 85 Village in S.No.1/1c5 which is number known as No.1. Murphy street, Akkari Village - PW -26 - Kama Batcha - to read One sixth undivided 21-3-199M s. J.S. Housing 10,87,196I I 156 share of land in five 5 Development grounds and 1133 sq.ft. Sale Ex-P-1170 - in S.No. 3334/Luz Av deed CANo.1062 of Indian enue Mylapore Bank New additional EvaluatiM s. J.S. Housing 20,38,959II 189 companystruction in on Development Value to be residential Building at Report Value admitted is excluded is No. I Murphy Street, Sale Rs.13,3I,185/- Rs.7,07,774/- Akkarai Chennai deed Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. J S Housing 13,672 II 218 30/04/96 in CA 1062 of 6 Corporation IB Abiramapuram in Ex-P-1170-CA No.1062 of Indian Bank TOTAL 41,35,497 JAYA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS AND BUILDERS Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. I/6th undivided shares 21-3-199M s. Jaya 10,87,196II 158 of land in 5 grounds and5 Contractors and 1133 sq.ft. in Sale Builders Ex-P-110 - No.3334/1a of Luz deed Sales deed Avenue Ex-P-1049-CA No.1049 of Indian Bank Cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Jaya 10,891 II 220 30/4/96 in CA 1049 of IB6 companytractors and Abiramapuram Opened on Builders Ex-P-1049 27/1/94 - CA No.1049 of Indian Bank TOTAL 10,98,087 KODANAD TEA ESTATE PURCHASE Kodanad tea estate and 05-05-19Tmt. N.Sasikala, 7,60,00,0II 166 tea factory extent two 95 Tmt. J. Elavarasi, 00 acres at kthogiri, Reconstiand.V.N. Sudhakaran Nilgris district tution Ex-P-520 P-523 acquired on an deed unregistered reconstitution of partnership deed dt. 5/6/1995 payment through six cheques dated 5/5/1995 - PW 177 Indian Bank - Mr.Shanmugasundaram TOTAL 7,60,00,0 00 SAKTHI CONSTRUCTIONS Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xureAnnexure II Document Property No. Rs. Cash Balance as on 30/4/199M.s. Sakthi 1,02,490 I I 222 30/4/96 in CA 1149 of 1B6 Constructions Abiramapuram opened on Ex-P-2016 - CA 23/3/93 No.1149 of Indian Bank TOTAL 1,02,490 M S LAKSHMI CONSTRUCTION Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xu Annexure Document property re II Rs. No. cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Lakshmi 1,02,490 II 224 30/4/96 in CA 1140 of IB6 companystructions Ex- Abirampuram Opened on P-1980 - CA No.1149 23/3/95 of Indian Bank TOTAL 1,02,490 GOPAL PROMOTERS Description of the ReferencStands in the Name Value of AnneItem No in Property e of of the xureAnnexure Document property No. II Rs. cash Balance as on 30-4-199M s. Gopal 1,02,490 II 223 30/4/96 in CA 1146 6 Promoters Ex-P-1974 opened on 23/3/95 - CA No.1146 of Indian Bank . TOTAL 1,02,490 GRAND TOTAL 23,03,59, 410 TR.V.N.SUDHAKARAN - Accused No.3 Description of the ReferenceStands in the Value ofAnneItem No in Property of Name the xu Annexure Document of propertyre II Rs. No. 11 acres 83 cents in 02-08-199Tr. 2,33,770II 60 No.345/38. 3A, 2 5B, 4 VN.Sudhakaran 5F, 5d, 5f, 5c, 344/1, Sale deed 2.402/4, 401/1, 355/1, in Siruthavoor Village 10 acres 86 cents in 02-08-199Tr. 2,11,325II 62 No,392/1, 4 VN.Sudhakaran 391,392,380,381/3,393,40Sale deed 9/3,398,406,399,400,406 in Siruthavoor Village 7 Acres 44 cents in 02-05-199Tr. 1,45,891II 65 No.339/1a, 4 VN.Sudhakaran 341/1,342/3a,2a, Sale deed 281,282,338/1a,3, 342/3b,4a, 235/3,4,2, 234/1,2 in Siruthavur Village Amount Paid over and 02-05-199Tr. 4,85,000II 66 above the companyt in 4 VN.Sudhakaran document No.43/94 dated Sale deed 5/2/94, S R North Madras to the seller Tr. Gopinath 3.30 Acres in 24-5-1994Tr. 93,475 II 79 No.403/3, 401/2 in VN.Sudhakaran Siruthavur Village Sale deed One sixth undivided 21-3-1995Tr. 10,87,19II 153 share of land in 5 VN.Sudhakaran 6 ground and 1133 sq.ft. Sale deed in S.No.3334/a of Luz Avenue Expenditure towards Tr. 86,91,00Il 173 acquistion of Indo-Doho VN.Sudhakaran 0 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. at Cuddalore 1 Tr. Ayyadurai promotor of Indo-Doho Pharmaceuticals Rs.35,45,000/- To interface capital Market shares 24,05,000/- 3 to Ind Bank-22,41,000/- Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996Tr. 1,32,221II 197 30-4-96 in CA 1068 of IB VN.Sudhakaran Abiramapuram opened on 30-3-1994 Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996Tr. 47,453 II 206 30-04-96 in Cb, Mylapore VN.Sudhakaran CA 2220 Opened on 7-4-1993 in the name of Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996Tr. 61,430 II 208 30-04-96 in CB Mylapore VN.Sudhakaran SB 24621 opened on 25-2-92 TN 09 E 9027 Ashok 19-12-199Tr. 5,05,009II 248 Leyand Cargo vehicle 4 VN.Sudhakaran TN 01 09 f 3744 Tarx 29-05-199Tr. 2,96,191II 249 Jeep 5 VN.Sudhakaran TOTAL 1,19,89, 961 TMT. J. ELAVARASI - Accused No.4 Description of the ReferenceStands in Value of AnnItem No in Property of the Name the exuAnnexure Document of property II Rs. re No. Amount Paid to TNHB 09-02-199TmtJ. 2,35,813 II 24 towards allotment of 2 Elavarasi plot No. L-66 old No. Sale deed 524 N Anna Nagar, Chennai - 40 Land and Building to the31-12-199Tmt. J. 9,60,520 II 50 extent of 4802 sq.ft. 3 Elavarasi together with a buildingSale deed with ground and first floor in S.No.94, Plot No. 7 of Nellankarai Village 10 Acres and 41 cents in31-1-1994 2,33,770 II 57 S.No.346/1B, Tmt. J. 346/1c,348/2a2a, Sale deedElavarasi 348/2a2b, 348/2a2c,346/2, 344/1A, 347/2c,342/18c,342/184,3 42/185, 345/1.346/1k,349/2B,351/ 183, 348/3a, 348/3c,380,345/1,345/1a, 346/11,349/2a,349/4c3,35 0/2a1, 351/282,344/1,346/1d,346 /1e, 346/2,379/2,346/2a,350/2 a 2, 344/1B, 348/3B, 348/2B 11 acres and 28 cents 02-08-199Tmt. J. 2,27,026 II 61 No.42/2 in 4 Elavarasi Karungullpallam and Sale deed No.383 to 386 and 393 in Siruthavoor Village 10.78 Acres in 02-08-199Tmt. J. 2,02,251 II 63 No.379.381, 382, 342, 4 Elavarasi in Sriuthavoor Village Sale deed Amount paid towards the 08-02-199Tmt. J. 4,65,000 II 64 companyt of acquisition of 4 Elavarasi 10.78 acres over and Sale deed above the document value doc No. 42/94 dated 8/2/1994 of SRO North Madras one sixth undivided 21-3-1995Tmt. J. 10,87,196II 154 shares of land in five Elavarasi grounds and 1133 sq.ft. Sale deed in S.No. 3334/1a in Mylapore Luz Avenue Chennai -4 New additional EvaluatioTmt. J. 5,40,52,2II 180 companystruction in the poshn Elavarasi 98 Bangalow at Siruthavr inReport Chengai Mgr Dist New Additional EvaluatioTmt. J. 24,83,759II 186 companystruction in n Elavarasi residential building at Report No.1/66 Anna Nagar Chennai Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996Tmt. J. 3,40,527 II 199 30/4/1996 in Ca 1171 of Elavarasi indian Bank Abiramapuram opened in 28/3/95 Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996Tmt. J. 1,18,198 Il 210 30-4-96 In CB Mylapore Elavarasi in CA 2219 opened on 7-4-93 Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996Tmt. J. 894 II 211 30/4/96 in CB Mylapore Elavarasi SB 25389 opened on 23/1/93 TOTAL 6,04,07,2 52 VIVEK MINOR - Son and daughter of Accused No.4 1.50 Acres in 21-09-201P. Vivek 44,210 II 56 No.392/1.2 in 4 minor Sirthavur village Sale deedRepresented by his mother and natural guardian Tmt. J. Elavarasi No.7 East Beach Road, Neelankarai, Chennai 41 3 acres 51 cents in 15-09-201J. Vivek 1,58,310 II 87 No.43/2 in 4 minor Karunkuzhipallam villageSale deedRepresented by his mother and natural guardian Tmt. J. Elavarasi No.7 East beach Road, Neelankarai, Chennai- 41 4 Acres 52 cents in 15-09-201J. Vivek 2,03,510 II 88 No.46 in 4 minor Karunkuzhipallam VillageSale deedRepresented by his mother and natural guardian Tmt. J. Elavarasi No.7 East beach Road, Neelankarai, Chennai 41 4 Acres 15 cents in 15-09-201J. Vivek 1,86,356 II 89 No.45 in 4 minor Karunkuzhipallam VillageSale deedRepresented bY his mother and natural guardian Tmt. J. Elavarasi No.7 East beach Road , Neelankarai, Chennai 41 4 Acres 15 cents in 15-09-201J, Vivek 1,86,226 II 90 Karunkuzhipallam Village4 minor Sale deedRepresented by his mother and natural guardian Tmt. - J. Elavarasi No.7 East Beach Road, Neelankarai, Chennai 41 cash Balance as on 30-04-199J. Vivek 2,42,211 II 193 30/4/96 in the SB 4110 6 minor of Indian Bank Represented Abiramapuram opened on by his 12/9/94 in the name of mother and Master J. Vivek, s o. J. natural Elavarasi guardian Tmt. J. Elavarasi No.7 East Beach Road , Neelankarai, Chennai 41 TOTAL 10,20,823 SON AND DAUGHTER OF J ELAVARASI Amount deposited in the Bank son and 38,421 II 306 name of Master Vivek Records daugher of Selvi Snakila and Selvi TMT. J. Krishnapriya son and Elavarasi daughter of Tmt. J. Elavarasi during October 1993 in Indian Bank On receipts of terminal benefits of their father Tr. V. Jayaraman TOTAL 38,421 MAHA SUBBULAKSHMI KALYANA MANDAPAM Description of the ReferenceStands in Value ofAnneItem No in Property of the Name the xu Annexure Document of propertyre II Rs. No. Cost of acquistion of 19-7-1993Maha 38,51,00II 31 Maha Suba Lakshmi Subbulakshm0 Kalyana Mandabam, i Chennai 106 Kalyana Mandapam 3197 Sq. ft ts No. 31-10-199Maha 8,55,150II 103 115/P, 117/P in 4 Subbulakshm Arumbakkam Village and i 04-04-199Kalyana 5 Mandapam Sale deed 3197 Sq. ft ts No. 31.10.199Maha 8,55,150II 115/P, 117/P in 4 Subbulakshm 162 Arumbakkam Village and i 04-04-199Kalyana 5 Mandapam Sale deed Cash balance as on Account Maha 3,17,476II 207 30.4.1996 in CA No.I 689opened onSubbulakshm Canara Bank, Anna Nagar i 1-12-1993Kalyana Mandapam TOTAL 58,78,77 6 GRAND TOTAL 6,73,45,272 M S JAYA FINANCE P LTD Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996M s. Jaya 1,760 209 30-4-96 in CA 1179 of Finance P Indian Bank Ltd Abiramapuram opened on 5/5/95 in TOTAL GRAND TOTAL 4,60,24, 439 ANNEXURE - II Properties acquired by Anjaneya Printers P Ltd., at the end of check period according to DVAC I/5th Share of I ground17-1-1994M s. 3,19,230II 51 and 1086 Sq.ft. Anjaneya together with a super Sale deedPrinters P structure in S.No.301, Ltd 4725/16 in 21, Padmanaban Streetm T Nagar New T S No. 8025/1 Block No. 107 1/5th Share of 1 ground17-1-1994M s. 3,19,230II 52 and 1086 Sq.ft. Anjaneya together with a super Sale deedPrinters P structure in S.No.30 I Ltd , 4725/16 in 21, Padmanaban Streetm T Nagar New T S No. 8025/1 Block No. 107 1/5th Share of 1 ground17-1-1994M s. 3,19,230Il 53 and 1086 Sq.ft. Anjaneya together with a super Sale deedPrinters P structure in S.No.301, Ltd 4725/16 in 21, Padmanaban Streetm T Nagar New T S No.8025/1 Block No. 107 1/5th Share of 1 ground17-1-1994M s. 3,19,230Il 54 and 1086 Sq.ft. Anjaneya together with a super Sale deedPrinters P structure in S.No.301, Ltd 4725/16 in 21, Padmanaban Streetm T Nagar New T S No.8025/1 Block No. 107 1/5th Share of 1 ground17-1-1994M s. 319,230 II 55 and 1086 Sq.ft. Anjaneya together with a super Sale deedPrinters P structure in S.No.301, Ltd 4725/16 in 21, Padmanaban Streetm T Nagar New T S No.8025/1 Block No. 107 4293 sq.ft. together 30-12-199M s. 43,56,14II 122 with a building 2000 4 Anjaneya 2 sq.ft. Ground Floor Sale deedPrinters P 2600 sq.ft. first floor Ltd in S.No.6794 which is called No. 68, Habibullah Road, Nagar Ms. 17 3472 sq.ft. together 30-12-199M s. 59,96,34II 123 with building 3000 4 Anjaneya 6 sq.ft. ground Floor Sale deedPrinters P 3700 sq.ft. first Floor Ltd in Survey No,6794 which is called 69, Habibullah Road T Nagar Ms. 17 1/6th undivided shares 21-3-1995M s. 10,87,19II 157 of land in 5 grounds Anjaneya 6 and 1133 sq.ft. in Sale deedPrinters P No.3334/Ia of Luz Ltd Avenue New additional As per M s. 2,13,63,II 177 companystruction Building EvaluatioAnjaneya 457 at door No.48 Jawharlaln Printers P Nehru Road, IndustricalReport Ltd estate Guindy Ekkatuthangal Chennai new additional EvaluatioM s. 20,43,00II 185 companystruction in n Anjaneya 0 residential building atReport Printers door number 21 Padbanabha Street T Nagar Chennai - 17 Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996M s. 10,75,33II 213 30-04-96 in CB. Anjaneya 6 Mylapore in CA 2250 Printers P Opened on 29-07-93 Ltd TN 09 H 3595 Swaraj 26-03-199M s. 5,56,999II 251 Mazda Van 6 Anjaneya Printers P Ltd TN 09 H 3541 Swaraj 26-03-199M s. 5,56,999II 252 Mazda Van 6 Anjaneya Printers P Ltd TN 09 H 3586 Swaraj 25-3-1996M s. 5,56,999II 255 Mazda Van Anjaneya Printers P Ltd Machinery subsequently As per M s. 2,16,42,II 294 purchased for M s. EvaluatioAnjaneya 000 n Printers P Report Ltd A developed plot 05-06-199M s. 8,60,950II 297 bearing No. 6 to an 4 Anjaneya extent of 1.12 acres inSale deedPrinters P Industrial estate Ltd Thirumuzhi in the name of M s. Anjaneya Printer P Ltd on 20/4/1994 at a companyt of Rs. 819000/- and a service charges of Rs. 40950 companylected by Sidco vide receipt No. 120128 dated TOTAL 6,16,91, 574 SUPER DUPER TV PRIVATE LIMITED Description of the ReferenceStands in Value ofAnnItem No in Property of the Name the exuAnnexure Document of property II Rs. re No. Cash Balance as on 30-4-1996M s. Super 5,46,577II 30.04-96 in CA 1152 at Duper TV 216 IB Abiramapuram opened Pvt. Ltd on 25/1/95 Fixed deposit in IB, 20-04-199M s. Super 5,00.000II 260 Abiramapuram in the 5 Duper TV name of Pvt. Ltd Fixed deposit in IB, 25-3-1995M s. Super 5,00,000II 262 Abiramapuram in the Duper TV name of Pvt. Ltd Fixed deposit in IB, 25-3-1995M s. Super 5,00,000II 263 Abiramapuram in the Duper TV name of Pvt. Ltd Fixed deposit in IB, 25-3-1995M s. Super 5,00,000II 264 Abiramapuram in the Duper TV name of Pvt. Ltd A shed allotted By 15-04-199M s. Super 15,75,80II 292 SIDCO in Electronics 5 Duper TV 0 companyplex, Guindy on Pvt. Ltd 15/4/1995 in favour TOTAL 41,22,37 7 He also drew our attention to a chart filed by him on disputed items in Annexure II relating to A2 to A4, firms companypanies, its value as well as its ownership, which is given hereunder- Part B- Disputed Items in Annexure II relating to its value as well as its ownership ANNEXURE -II Items Description of the itemValue Evidence and Value as per Evidence and Trial Court High shown in AccordinExhibits defence Exhibits relied findings companyrt in Annexure II g relied upon by upon by Accused findings Annexu to DVAC DVAC No.2. re - II Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Land and Flat No.7 3,13,530Ex.P-2327 Acquired prior R.Flats, 3/4 Antu Shown in to check period. Street, Santhome, Annexure - I, Hence, whole Chennai-4 of Item -7 amount to be Tmt.N.Sasikala Doc Vol No.79, excluded number575/89, dt 17.4.1989 Page 65-77 of SRO, Mylapore 8 Shop No.14, Ground 98,904 Shown in Acquired prior Floor at 602, Anna Annexure - I, to check period. Salai, Chennai-6 Parsn Item -8 Hence, whole Manere M s.Sasi amount to be Enterprises excluded Doc No.399/89 dt.5-7-89 of SRO, Thousandlights 9 Undivided share of land2,10,919Shown in Acquired prior only at Door No.14, Annexure - I, to check period. Kather Navaz Khan Road, Item -9 Hence, whole Nungambakkam, in Block amount to be No.12, R.S.No.58/5 to excluded the extent of 68/12000 undivided share in 11 Grounds 736 Sq.ft with a Shop No.9 -M s.Sasi Enterprises Doc No.526/89 dt.21-9-89 of Jt. R.II, Thousandlights 12 Land and Building in 1,57,125 Acquired prior Tanjore, Maharnoombu to check period. Chavadi S.No.I091 Shown in Hence, whole extent of 2400 Sq.ft Annexure - L amount to be M s. Sasi Enterprises, Item -12 excluded Partners Jayalalithaa, Sasikala Doc No.455/90 dt.I9-4-90 of ORB,Thanjavur Items Description of the item. Evidence and Value as per Evidence and Trial Court High shown in Value Exhibits defence Exhibits relied findings companyrt in Annexure II Accordinreliedupon by upon by Accused finding Annexu g DVAC No.2. s re - to DVAC II Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs 14 Vacant site at Blake 2,02,778Shown in Acquired prior to D. Annexure - I, check period. Road,Tanjore Town, Item -14 Hence whole Mahar Nombu Chavadi, amount to be extent 8970 Sq.ft. in excluded S.No.I019 M s. Sasi Enterprises, . Doc No.457/90 dt 19-04-1990 of ORB, Thanjavur 15 Land and building at 5,85,420Shown in Acquired prior to Abishekapuram Village, Annexure - 1, check period. Pon Nagar, Trichy in Item -15 Hence whole plot amount to be No.102, 3rd Cross Road, excluded New Ward No.K, Block No.30, T.S.No. 107 to the extent of 3525 Sq.ft Tmt.N.Sasikala W o. M.Natarajan Doc No.2256/90, dt.3.5.90 of ORB, Thanjavur 16 Dry land to the extent 75,210 Shown in Acquired prior to of 3.23 Acres in Annexure - I, check period. No.402/2 Item -16 Hence whole Sundarakottai Village, amount to be Tanjavur excluded M s. Sasi Enterprises Doc No.563/90 dt.12-7-90 17 Land and building at 5,28,039Shown in Acquired prior to Thiru Vi-Ka Industrial Annexure - I, check period. Estate, Guindy, in Item -17 Hence whole No.55, 56, Block amount to be No.6, extent 5658 excluded Sq.ft, Shed No.C-8,Adyar Village - M s. Jaya Publications Doc No.4640/90 dt.8.12.1990 of SRO, Adyar ItemsDescription of theValue Evidence and Exhibits Value as per Evidence and Exhibits Trial High shownitem in Accordinrelied upon by DVAC defence relied upon by Accused Court companyrt in Annexure II g No.2. findings findin Annex to DVAC gs ure - II Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs ExhibitDWs s 249 TN-01-09-F-3744 2,96,191 Since numberamount was Trax Jeep PW-59 Vol. paid towards purchase No. 3, pg. 57-61, atof vehicle the whole page 58 amount of Rs. Does number 2,96,191/- is to be admit payment excluded. PW-69 Vol. No. 3, pg. 100-107, at page 102 Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs 259 Fixed Deposit in1,49,54Ex-P-1921 Vol. No. 63,PW 201 Page As per the exhibit Canara Bank, 4 Pg. 120-121 142, Vol. No.9 the amount is a Mylapore in the renewal of the fixed name of Jaya deposit placed prior Publications - to the check period PW 201 and hence full amount of Rs.1,49,544/- is to be excluded Exhibits PWs Exhibits DWs Exhibits PWs 1 Immovable 22,83,99,174.20,07,80,246 6,24,09,120/16,19,03,301 Property 70 - Consideration, companyt of registration 2 Cash paid over 2,53,80,619/-1,58,30,619 nil NIL and above sale companysideration 3 New or additional28,17,40,430 22,53,92,344/5,10,54,060/8,60,59,261/- companystruction of - - buildings 4 Gold and Diamond 5,53,02,334.72,51,59,144/-As per NIL jewellery 5 prosecution 5 Silverwares 48,80,800/- 20,80,000/- As per NIL prosecution 6 F.Ds. and shares 3,42,62,728/-3,42,62,728 As per 2,30,00,000 prosecution 7 Cash balance in 97,47,751.32 97,47,751.32 As per 97,47,751.32 bank accounts prosecution 8 Vehicles 1,29,94,033.01,29,94,033.0As per 81,35,106 5 5 prosecution 9 Machinery 2,24,11,000 2,24,11,000 As per 94,25,835 prosecution 10 Footwears 2,00,902.45 Nil. Nil. NIL 11 Sarees 92,44,290.00 Nil. Nil. NIL 12 Wrist watches 15,90,350.00 15,90,350 As per Nil. prosecution TOTAL 68,61,54,413.55,02,48,215/25,46,52,17729,82,71,254.3 27 - - 2 The judgment of the High Court at page 966 reveals that it has for the purposes of companyputation, accepted the value of the assets of the respondents at the end of the check period to be Rs.66,44,73,537/- as numbered by the prosecution. Further, though it has reduced the value of the assets vis-a-vis item Nos.1, 2, 3, 10 and 11 out of the 12 categories aforementioned, it essentially caused modification, in quantifying the value of assets, with regard to item number 3, pertaining to new or additional companystruction of buildings. As would be evident from its rendering, it assessed the value of this item of assets, to be Rs.5,10,54,060/- companypared to Rs.28,17,40,430/- as mentioned by the prosecution. It thus reduced the value of the assets by Rs.23,06,86,370/-. While making the calculations, however the High Court took the value of the companyt of companystruction as cited by the prosecution to be Rs.27,79,88.945 and on the basis of its assessment of the value of the new or additional companystruction of buildings at Rs.5,10,54,060/-, it effected a reduction of Rs.22,69,34,885/-. According to the prosecution even if this valuation of the new or additional companystruction of buildings as made by the High Court is accepted, the other items remaining intact, the total value of assets of the respondents at the end of the check period, would be Rs.66,44,73,573/- minus Rs.22,69,34,885/- Rs.43,75,38,688. According to it, thus while companyputing the percentage of disproportionate assets qua the income of the respondents, this figure ought to have been applied in the relevant formula. Noticeably, the valuation of the assets except as cited by the prosecution at serial numbers 1, 2, 3, 10 and 11 has been accepted by the High Court. Nevertheless, while companyputing the value of the assets finally, it did number take into account as well its evaluation in respect of item numbers 1, 2, 10 and 11 and limited its companysideration only to item number 3 which it had valued at Rs.5,10,54,060/-. Thus in the above revealing perspective, it is number companysidered essential to scrutinise the evidence on the assets pertaining to all items thereof and it would be adequate enough to limit the audit only qua item number 3 i.e. new or additional companystruction of buildings, more particularly because of its decisive bearing on the adjudication. In the above premise, being of crucial relevance, evidence with regard to the item number three namely new or additional companystruction of buildings in the list of assets demands scrutiny. As mentioned hereinabove, though the High Court had altered the value of five out of twelve items, in the ultimate quantification, it did focus only on the item of new or additional companystruction of buildings and companyputed the worth thereof to be Rs.5,10,54,060/- against Rs.22,53,92,344/- adjudged by the Trial Court. According to the prosecution, however, the investment on this companynt had been Rs.28,17,40,430/-. Significantly, the respondents had valued this item of their assets at Rs.8,60,59,261/- which is about Rs.3.5 crores above the valuation made by the High Court. Be that as it may, whereas the prosecution had listed out twenty one items under the head new or additional companystruction of buildings, the Trial Court took numbere of eighteen items and the High Court of seventeen items as would be adverted to in details hereafter. The total companystruction area of these twenty one items, according to the prosecution is 23,076.84 sq. meters which is equivalent to 2483.97 squares. The area of four items left out by the High Court when deducted from the total area of 2483.97 squares calculate to 2174.69 squares. However, the High Court companyputed the value by adopting the area of the 17 items selected by it to be 1668.39 squares instead of 2174.69 squares and thus reduced the actual area under companysideration by 506.3 squares. Ergo, according to the prosecution, number only did the High Court exclude four out of twenty one items in assessing the value of the assets under examination, it erred as well on the resultant area companyresponding to the seventeen items chosen by it. This did also impact upon the value eventually arrived at. In companyrse of the arguments before this Court, emphasis has been laid on item numbers 179, 180 and 181 of annexure II i.e. buildings companystruction on which investments had been made to sum up the total to the figure of Rs.29,35,68,982/- according to the prosecution. According to the respondent No. 1, as against the figure of Rs.24,29,40,490/- being the value of her assets during the check period, as companyputed by the prosecution, her assertion is of Rs.6,52,34,410/-. It has been urged on her behalf that she had acquired only one property during the entire check period i.e. the item at serial number 18 in anneuxre II worth Rs.10 lakhs and in addition thereto, she had made two companystructions i.e. of a farm house at Jeedimetla Village near Hyderabad and at 31-A, Poes Garden, besides renovating her residential building at 36, Poes Garden. Against item numbers 179 and 181 referred to hereinabove, it has been asserted that as against Rs.13,65,31,901/- assessed by the prosecution, the value of her assets companyresponding thereto and as accepted by the income tax authorities is Rs.3,62,47,700/- and thus an amount of Rs.10,02,84,201/- needs to be deducted. The break up of expenditure on the relevant companynts towards these items has been provided as hereinbelow Renovation of 36 Poes Garden Rs.76,74,900 Construction at 31-A, Poes Garden Rs.1,35,10,500 Hyderabad Grape Garden Farm House Rs.1,39,62,300 Compound wall for Hyderabad Farm House Rs.11,00,000 Total Rs.3,62,47,700/- While endeavouring to authenticate the above figure, the deficiencies in the evidence of the prosecution relating to the valuation of the companystructions have been highlighted in quite some details. Broadly, the denunciation qua the process related thereto, refers to the number-verifiable measurements in absence of essential datas and want of supporting particulars in the reports rendering them sterile and worthless being of numberprobative worth, absence of any scientific or laboratory tests companyvincingly demonstrating the age of the buildings to companyrectly appreciate the value thereof, absence of any basis for calculating the price of numberscheduled items etc. Vis-a-vis the price of number-scheduled items in particular, it has been asseverated that though the valuers had deposed that with regard thereto, market enquires had been made and the inputs had been recorded in a paper or a numbere book, the same had number been retained but destroyed and were number enclosed with the companyresponding reports. The assessment of the price of the number-scheduled items has thus been dismissed to be number only as being bereft of any foundation but also as mere hearsay. The oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses namely PW-98, PW-116 and PW-220, amongst others, has been referred to and analysed apart from the reports submitted by the inspection team which as adverted to hereinabove, have been repudiated to be lacking in indispensable datas. Other documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution has also been dealt with. Evidence of defence witnesses, amongst others of DW-64, S. Shanmugham, Chartered Accountant of R1/A1, DW-76 who was a part of the inspection team and DW-78 who was one of the signatories to the report Ex. P-671 has been highlighted. Considerable emphasis has also been laid on the orders of the income tax authorities by way of companyroboration of the quantum of expenditure cited by the defence. This is more particularly as the income tax authorities had accepted the figure cited by the respondent No.1/A1 on the basis of independent enquiries companyducted by the department specifically in respect of the market rates price of the marbles granites during the relevant period i.e. 1994-95 to 1996-97. The companyresponding invoices have also been referred to in the companyrse of arguments. According to the defence, the expenditure as shown by respondent No.1/A1 was supported by bank documents, bills, companytemporaneous vouchers proved through defence witnesses, which inter alia, establish that the price of the marble per square meter at the relevant time was between Rs.100 to Rs.180 per sq. meter as against Rs.5000 per sq. meter to Rs.21000 per sq. meter cited by the prosecution. While dismissing the valuation offered by the prosecution to be arbitrarily exaggerated and inflated, it has been asserted that though the Trial Court was right in observing that the prosecution had number been able to establish the companyt of companystruction in respect of special items like marble, it erred in accepting the valuation made by it after granting only 20 deduction in the overall quantum. It was pointed out as well that the Trial Courts rejection of the documents i.e D-210 series pertaining to the price of marbles prevailing during 1995-96 by companystruing the same erroneously to be of subsequent years, was patently flawed. It has been urged that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the expenditure towards the companystruction of the items under the head, new or additional companystruction of buildings and thus numberburden lay on the defence to explain the amount spent towards the same. According to the defence, the valuation made by the High Court of the expenditure on such companystruction is companyrect and does number merit any interference. Per companytra, it has been insisted on behalf of the prosecution that though its companyputation of the expenditure against twenty one items companyprising the investments in new or additional companystruction of buildings did sum up to Rs.29,35,68,982/-, the Trial Court taking numbere of eighteen such items, did quantify the expenditure at Rs.22,53,92,344/-. As sample instances, the prosecution highlighted the expenditure towards item numbers 179,180 and 181 of annexure II i.e. the list of items of assets acquired during the check period and referring to the oral testimony of PW-98,107 and 166 as well as the reports prepared and submitted by the inspection team i.e. Ex. P-645, P-661 and P-671 maintained that the sum total of expenditure on the basis thereof was Rs.19,05,84,199/-. Understandably, this figure was included in the total expenditure of Rs.29,35,68,982/- and had been highlighted as these three items accounted for the major portion of the investments. According to the prosecution, the High Court number only limited its analysis to seventeen out of twenty one items, it also erred in the measurement of the built up area of these items so much so that instead of 2174.69 squares, it proceeded to make the companyputation on the basis of an area of 1668.39 squares i.e. yielding a short fall of 506.30 squares. In addition thereto, it has been urged on behalf of the prosecution that the High Court appraised the expenditure towards new and additional companystruction by taking only the companyt expended for a sentry shed by totally overlooking the additional and highly expensive enhancements and fixtures of the main buildings. According to the prosecution, whereas as per the evidence adduced by it, the companyt of companystruction of the new additional buildings was Rs.4037 per sq. feet, the High Court on the basis of the companyt of companystruction of the sentry shed III adopted the rate of Rs.680 per sq. feet, as a result whereof the actual companyt of companystruction of the new additional building stood reduced by 83. The prosecution has thus insisted that in quantifying the expenditure towards the companystruction of the new additional building, the High Court thus patently erred number only on the actual built up area but also on the basic rate of companyt by drawing an analogy of a sentry shed with the new additional buildings, though these two classes of structures with the inherent characteristics thereof were number companyparable by any means. As referred to hereinabove, the Trial Court scrutinized the oral and documentary evidence of both sides relating to 18 items of new additional companystructions out of 21 cited by the prosecution. It exhaustively evaluated the evidence item wise and weighed the merits and demerits thereof in details. It took numbere of the reports submitted by the inspection team qua every new additional building involved and also took companynizance of the denunciation by the defence thereof primarily on the ground that those lacked in details and further were number accompanied by supporting documents. The Trial Court appreciated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who were participants in the exercise of the valuation of the buildings, the ancillary structures, accessories, fixtures and furnishings. The members of the inspection team, who were Civil Engineers drawn from the Public Works Department, in addition to Electrical Engineers from Electricity Department, as their evidence numbericed by the Trial Court, would demonstrate did take into account all the essential aspects of the subject matter of survey including the make and age of the structures and also duly discounted the value thereof on depreciation. A companymon feature of the evidence is that the price of the electrical appliances mostly was assessed on the basis of their age and the expertise of the officers undertaking the inspection. Qua the number-scheduled items, according to the prosecution witnesses, the price was ascertained from the market. The demur of the defence that such evaluation was number decisive in absence of the numberes of the relevant inputs was however numbericed by the Trial Court. For the general items, the companytemporaneous PWD schedule of rates prevailing in the districts involved were applied. The defence witnesses who mostly were the members of the same team did number radically differ from the substance of the version of the prosecution witnesses. A marked attribute of the prosecution witnesses, as numbered by the Trial Court, was that when examined on their first recall, they seemed to vacillate in their disclosures in the examination-in-chief but reaffirmed the same narration on their second recall. The defence however numbericing this demeanour has endeavoured to discredit them as prevaricating and unfaithful witnesses. As had been elaborately appraised by the Trial Court, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses disclose that the members of the inspection team did minutely numberice all the salient characteristics of the new additional buildings under surveillance together with their exquisite and expensive structural attachments, trappings, fineries and adornments having formidable potential of enhancing their overall worth. The Trial Court while taking numbere of the income tax returns disclosing the expenditure statements and the orders accepting the same after the departmental inquiries however accepted the expenditure towards the new additional buildings to be Rs.22,53,92,344/- by discounting the figure furnished by the prosecution by 20 as according to it, the prosecution had number produced companyvincing evidence in support of the value fixed by the Public Works Department engineers in respect of price of the special items and as there was some dispute regarding the payments of the architects fees. In arriving at this companyclusion, the Trial Court did take numbere of every objection of the defence to the evaluation of the new additional buildings and rejected the same. In particular, the defence plea that the valuation on plinth rate area ought number to have been adopted, was also dismissed. It took numbere of the evidence of DW-78 that building valuation companyld be done on the basis of plinth area of the building or the detailed method. It was of the firm view that the engineers involved in the process of the evaluation of the new additional buildings were companypetent for the assignment entrusted and that the defence had number disputed the measurement of the buildings and the nature of the companystructions as well as the quality of the materials used. It however observed that the prosecution companyld number produce any direct evidence in proof of the companyt of the special items used and had relied on the oral testimony of its witnesses who had stated that they had ascertained the price of marbles and other special items from the market. The defence has tried to demonstrate that the rejection by the Trial Court of the invoices Ex.D210 series pertaining to marbles as proved by DW96 companystruing the same to be the year 1999 was patently erroneous as the said document disclosed that those related to the period between 1994 and 1996. Be that as it may, the Trial Court however while rejecting the objections of the defence on the valuation of the new additional buildings, effected a reduction of 20 of the total estimate furnished by the prosecution witnesses for want of persuasive evidence in support of the recorded value fixed by the PWD Engineers in respect of the special items and the dispute regarding payments of architects fees and quantified the amount of expenditure to be Rs.22,53,92,344/-. Noticeably, the exercise undertaken by the inspection team was a massive one chancing minor shortcomings and from the Trial Courts companyprehensive narrative of the evidence on record, in our view, its estimate on the basis thereof cannot be said to be perverse. As it is, having regard to the nature and size of the survey, insistence on proof beyond reasonable doubt with mathematical exactitude would be both unwarranted, inexpedient and unpragmatic. In our companyprehension, the appreciation made by the Trial Court of the evidence on record and the final determination of the extent of expenditure incurred cannot be discarded as absurd or implausible. The High Court on the other hand numbered the reservations expressed by the defence to the valuation made by the prosecution. It numbered the denouncement that the valuation made was highly inflated and that the companyt of marbles and granites have been assessed on a very exorbitant measure. The remonstrance that neither any sample of marble or granite had been taken number tenders had been called for to ascertain the rates thereof was recorded. The objection that forests officers have number been examined to price the companyt of the wood and that numberody had certified that the teakwood had been used, was accounted for. The High Court did take companynizance of the reference to the inquiries made by the Income Tax Department to ascertain the prevailing rates of marble and marble slabs during the relevant period. Defence evidence to that effect was also marked. The High Court in the ultimate analysis adopted the per square foot method in evaluating the value of the new additional buildings. According to it, the Public Works Department rates were supposedly higher, taking into companysideration the delayed payment and other miscellaneous expenses. The High Court accepted the companyt of companystruction of the new additional buildings to be Rs.28,000/- per square basing on the rate of companystruction of the Sentry Shed-III. Referring to the estimate for companystruction of such sentry shed, the High Court deduced that, it was valued for one square at Rs.31,580/- and therefrom as a measure of companyt of companystruction for new additional building, it applied Rs.28,000/- per square for the said purpose. It accounted for the other investments towards super structures, windows, doors, internal painting, electrification, flooring, water supply etc. The total companystructed area, according to the High Court, was 1,66,839.68 sq.ft. i.e. 1668.39 squares. It accepted an area of 25662.22 sq.ft. i.e. 256.62 squares as area on which granites had been used. It added an amount of Rs.9,65,060/- towards expenditure for sanction of plan and architect fees. Qua the prosecution evidence, the High Court observed that though reports had been prepared by the inspection team for the new additional buildings involved, all the members of inspection team did number subscribe their signatures thereto. Further in companyrse of the testimony, they did number speak anything about the measurement of the floor area where marbles and granites had been used. It held the view that the valuation reports by themselves did number prove the estimate of granites and marble stones and that the appreciation thereof was more or less on guess work. By adopting the valuation on square feet method and by applying the rate of Rs.28,000/- per square, the High Court companyputed the value of new additional building with all its accessories and furnishings to be Rs.5,10,54,060/-. Prima facie thus the plea of the prosecution that in assessing the expenditure of new additional buildings, the High Court had number only taken a reduced companystructed area of 1668.39 sqs. instead of 2174.69 sqs. for the 17 items companysidered by it , thereby introducing a shortfall of 506.3 sqs., it also applied the rate of Rs.28,000/- per square based on the companystruction companyt of a sentry shed, as the base value to work out the amount of investments made towards the new additional buildings companystructions is borne out by the records. The approach of the High Court on both companynts in the face of the evidence on record does number companymend for acceptance. By numbermeans, in our estimate, the High Court companyld have applied the base value of Rs.28,000/- per square for quantifying the expenditure incurred towards the new additional buildings companystructions involved. The adoption of Rs.28,000/- per square as the base value, which is the companyt of companystruction of a sentry shed, per se is erroneous, having regard to the fact that a sentry shed and the new additional companystructions buildings are incomparable on many companynts. Even if it is assumed, as has been pleaded by the defence that the base value so applied was only for appreciating the expenditure towards the skeletal framework of the companystructions, the method adopted by the High Court in the final companyputation of the investments by making lump sum additions towards companyt of marbles, granites interior decorations, staircase, overhead tank and other furnishings, having regard to the description of the companystructions buildings does number appear to be either realistic or rational and does number merit affirmation. In any case however even assuming that the arithmetic undertaken by the High Court is companyrect, it having accepted the value of assets to be Rs.66,44,73,573/-, the remainder would still value at Rs.43,75,38,688/-. In other words, in calculating the disproportionate assets, the amount of Rs.43,75,38,688/- has to be applied even if there is a reduction in value of assets by Rs.22,69,34,885/ i.e. Rs.29,82,71,254.32 Rs.5,10,54,060 . According to A2 to A4, the valuation of their assets at the beginning of the check period as per the prosecution was Rs.59,29,168/- and according to them Rs.63,64,790.60. At the end of the check period, the figure swelled, as per the prosecution to Rs.37,55,10,354.38, which in their companyputation became Rs.25,03,36,963.40/-. Thus, whereas the prosecution case is that the valuation of their assets acquired by A2 to A4 during the check period was Rs.36,95,81,186.38, it had been only Rs.24,39,72,172.80 as per the estimate of these respondents. A2 to A4 have number disputed the prosecutions figure of Rs.59,29,168/- and in fact had added Rs.4,35,622/- being the cash balance available with A2 at that point of time making the tally according to the respondents at Rs.63,64,790.60. While companymenting on the prosecutions valuation of their assets at the end of the check period at Rs.37,55,10,354.38, A2 to A4 have asserted that the properties of six companypanies Signora Business Enterprises Private Limited, Meadow Agro Farms Private Limited, Ram Raj Agro Mills Private Limited, Riverway Agro Products Private Limited, Lex Property Development P Limited and Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Limited being separate legal entities and number arraigned as accused in the case ought to have been excluded from the companypus of assets, more particularly in absence of any evidence that their acquisitions had been made with the funds provided by the respondents. In companyrse of the arguments on their behalf, several disputed items of assets have been highlighted, accompanied by emphatic assertion that either the value attached thereto ought to be excluded wholly or to the extent reduced on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence relied upon by them. A plain perusal of the companypilation to this effect reveals that broadly these disputed items can be categorized as land and building, shares, acquisition of Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Ltd., new additional companystructions, renovation, vehicles, fixed deposits, jewellery and machinery. As has been hinted hereinabove, these assets had been classified under 12 companyponents. The High Court, though had altered the valuations in five of these items, it did ultimately limit its companysideration to item No. III i.e. new additional companystruction of buildings and reduced the companyt thereof by Rs.22,69,34,885. As a companyollary, for the purpose of the eventual quantification of the disproportionate assets, the High Court did number companysider it essential to invoke its findings vis-a-vis the remaining four items on which it had differed from the Trial Court. As would be evident from the chart adduced by the defence, out of Part-B companytaining the disputed items in Annexure-II appended to the charge-sheet, ten items thereof i.e. item numbers 6,7,8,9,12,13,14,15,16,17 are claimed to have been acquired prior to the check period. Vis-a-vis the other disputed items, to reiterate, referring to the oral and documentary evidence, it has been urged that either the full value as cited by the prosecution or to the extent, highlighted by them, ought to have been excluded. Qua the items pertaining to new additional companystructions, the eventual plea is that the Trial Court though had companycluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the companyt of companystruction, as cited by it, it erroneously accepted the valuation by granting 20 reduction in the overall companyt. According to A2 to A4, in view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the companyt of companystruction, the entire valuation made by it to this effect ought to have been discarded and the evidence adduced by it should have been rejected in its entirety. In companyrse of the elaboration of this salient feature of the disputation, it has been underlined that there has been number-application of mind by the Trial Court to the evidence on record in arriving at its findings. Apart from referring to the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties, reliance has also been placed amongst others on the income tax returns and the orders passed in companynection therewith. The valuation reports of the buildings submitted by the inspection team, companyprised of civil engineers of the Public Works Department and others, have been seriously repudiated on the ground of being laconical, incredible, inchoate and deficient in material particulars. The respondents have been particularly critical about the valuation of electrical installations and other items as in their perception, those were wholly unfounded in absence of standard rates and companyroborative proof based on market survey. Even the expertise and companypetence of the members of the inspection team offered by the prosecution as witnesses of valuation has been questioned. The respondents have sought to buttress this plea by examining as defence witnesses, members of the same inspection team. It has been urged as well that the prosecution companyld number prove that all new additional companystructions had been built during the check period. It has been companytended that the valuation of the special items i.e. marbles, granites, sanitary ware, decorative tiles, teakwood etc. in absence of any schedule of rates had been highly inflated without any companytemporaneous documents or authenticated proof in support thereof. According to the respondents, the defence witnesses who were members of the inspection team did number support the companyclusions recorded in the reports rendering those wholly unacceptable. On smaller items, like vehicles, fixed deposits, jewellery and machinery, the respondents have dismissed the valuations made by the prosecution either on the ground that those had been wrongly exaggerated or had been acquired before the check period. Apropos the above impeachment, the prosecution has reiterated its valuation of the assets and has reconciled to the quantification made by the Trial Court. It has reiterated that the valuation of the companystructions had been made by the qualified PWD engineers and that the findings are elaborately companytained in the valuation reports, based on exhaustive inspection of all necessary companyponents of the buildings surveyed. It has stoutly refuted the defence plea that the Trial Court had rejected the evidence adduced and has maintained that the discount of 20 accorded by the Trial Court had been due to the several imponderables attendant on the massive exercise undertaken. It has insisted that in view of the superior quality of marbles and granite used in the buildings as well as the prevalent price of the various special items availed by way of ornate enhancements, the companyt appreciation made by the Trial Court was justified. That the High Court had wrongly assessed the companyt of new additional buildings at Rs.5,10,54,060 companypared to the admitted companyputation by the respondents at Rs.8,60,59,261 has been underscored as well. Qua the other segments of the assets, the prosecution has underlined that the Trial Court had totally excluded the valuation of sarees and footwear and that had effected companysiderable reduction in the value of the jewellery and silverwares. In all, according to the prosecution, though it had cited higher value of the assets, it has accepted the determination thereof as made by the Trial Court. The prosecution has jettisoned the disclosures in the income tax returns and the orders opinions expressed thereon by the departmental authorities as wholly inconsequential. It has been insisted that enquiries made by the income tax authorities even if companyducted, those had been ex-parte in which the investigating agency had number been associated. In any view of the matter, according to the prosecution, the findings of the income tax or wealth tax authorities on the valuation of the assets, neither bind the prosecution number is of any companyclusive relevance for the case and is far less final for the criminal companyrt trying the same. The cavil of the respondents that the civil engineers of the inspection team were incompetent to undertake the valuation work has been emphatically refuted by the prosecution. That the High Court in adopting the plinth area of the new additional buildings had erroneously reduced the same by 50,630 sq. feet, has been reiterated. It has been asserted as well that the High Court had erred in taking into account only five special items by excluding the other expensive furnishings attachments in companyputing the companyt of companystruction. In specific terms, the prosecution has been critical of the valuation of the Otis lift at Rs.15,000/- and the companyt of companystruction of staircase, pump and overhead tanks at Rs.40,000/- to be much on the lower side. That the untenable attempt of the defence to represent that ordinary marble and granite had been issued against expensive versions thereof, has been highlighted as well. As indicated hereinabove, the only item apart from the new or additional companystruction of buildings forming a major companyponent of assets is immovable properties which the prosecution valued at Rs.19,77,18,164.70 whereas the Trial Court assessed the same Rs.20,07,80,246/-. According to the High Court, it companyputed the value to be Rs.6,24,09,120/-. Noticeably the respondents had indicated the value of this item as Rs.16,19,03,301/-. Significantly though in all, 146 sale deeds were involved qua the immovable properties figuring therein, the High Court limited its attention only to 97 such deeds and thus left out from its companysideration, the remaining 49 sale deeds, while arriving at its quantification of this item of the asset to be Rs.6,24,09,120/-. To reiterate however the High Court though did accept the valuation of the assets for the purpose of companyputation to be Rs.66,44,73,573/- as valued by the prosecution, for the purpose of ascertaining the disproportionate assets, it took into account only the companyt of new or additional companystruction of buildings as assessed by it at Rs. 5,10,54,060/- thus reducing the value thereof as made by the prosecution by a sum of Rs.22,69,34,885/-. The omission on the part of the High Court to exclude the other four items of assets, on which as well it had scaled down the value, in working out the extent of disproportionate assets however had number been questioned by the respondents before this Court. The judgment of the Trial Court does number demonstrate as well, the alleged total numbercompanysideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents. On an overall appraisal of the materials on record, the reduction of the companyt of new or additional companystruction of buildings to Rs.5,10,54,060/- as effected by the High Court has to be held as patently erroneous. Consequently the quantification of the disproportionate assets is also visibly wrong. Expenditure Annexure IV to the charge-sheet enumerates 244 items of expenditure cited by the prosecution. This sums up to Rs.11,56,56,833.41 out of which the major segment being Rs.6,45,04,222/- is towards the expenditure incurred in companynection with the marriage of Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran, A3 on 07.09.1995. Incidentally, the High Court did accept the expenditure assessed by the prosecution in respect of all items except item number. 2 to 6 i.e. the marriage of A3 and reduced the sum of Rs.6,45,04,222/- as fixed by the DVAC to Rs.28,68,000/-, thus occasioning a drop of Rs.6,16,36,222/-. The Trial Court however had also lessened the amount cited by the prosecution by Rs.7,50,000/- against item No. 235 and also the marriage item by Rs.3,45,04,222/-, thereby reducing the total expenditure incurred to Rs.8,49,06,833/-. The Trial Court had assessed Rs.3,00,00,000/- towards marriage expenses. In this factual premise, it would thus be enough, for the present adjudication vis--vis this facet of the debate, to companyfine the appraisal of the evidence, oral and documentary pertaining only to the expenditure towards the marriage of A3. As the Trial Courts appreciation of the materials on record would reveal, it analyzed the evidence under the following heads Expenditure incurred towards the erection of marriage pandals. 2 b Expenditure incurred towards the companyt of food, mineral water and tamboolam. Cost of 34 Titan watches - Rs.1,34,565/- Cost of stitching charges of wedding dress - Rs.1,26,000/- Cost of 100 silver plates - Rs.4,00,000/- Postal Expenses - Rs.2,24,000/- In re the erection of marriage pandals, the Trial Court did assess the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. It took numbere, amongst others, of the testimony of PW-181 Shri Thangarajan, who was the Assistant Engineer, PWD at the relevant point of time and to whom, according to the witness, the work of estimating the expenses incurred towards the pandals, both at the marriage and reception venues was entrusted. He referred to the measurements of these pandals including amongst others those for VIPs with iron-sheet roof in his report Ex. P-1019 mentioning the estimated companyt towards the same and also with regard to the incidental decorative trappings and furnishings. He mentioned as well about the air companyditioners used and the chairs with the dining tables arranged at the two venues and assessed the expenditure towards all these at Rs.5,91,00,000/-. The Trial Court did take numbere of the crossexamination of this witness, branding him to be partisan and without any personal knowledge or information about the event or the expenses in companynection therewith and alleged to have been set up by the prosecution with a view to inflate the expenditure by creating the document Ex P-1019. The said document in any case was denounced as number being companytemporaneous, having been prepared after 2 years of the marriage without any acceptable foundation therefor. The Trial Court to start with did number endorse this criticism of the witness and instead proceeded to evaluate the merit of his testimony by company relating the same with the version of the other witnesses. In doing so, the Trial Court traversed the evidence of PW-200 Shri, K.P. Muthuswami, Chief Engineer, PWD, Tamil Nadu, who, as stated by this witness, had been entrusted to companyplete the pandals work by A2 in a proper manner. This witness testified to have companysulted a plan given to him by the architect involved whereafter he amongst others levelled the land and put up the pandals as specified. This witness affirmed that several pandals had been erected amongst others for serving food to the VIPs, kitchen and companyking sheds together with marriage platform, bathroom, rooms for the bride and bridegroom. He further stated that the expenses towards this companystruction work were made on behalf of A1. This witness clarified that the pandal work at the reception venue was undertaken by Kumarason Nader which too he had to oversee on the instructions of the Assistant Secretary of the secretariat of A1. According to this witness, an amount of Rs.14 lakhs in four installments was also paid by the brides father Mr. Narayan Swamy. Incidentally PW-181 had also referred to the same architect and the companytractors as named by PW-200 in his evidence. The Trial Court after taking numbere of the cross-examination of this witness, accepted his version being satisfied that he had a first-hand information about the arrangements made at the marriage venue and companycluded that the same companyroborated the testimony of PW-181 sufficiently. The Trial Court assessed the evidence of PW-183 Mr. Ramesh, Managing Director, Moulis Advertising Services P Ltd., who deposed to have printed 65,000 cards for marriage invitation as instructed by Tr. Jawahar, Assistant Secretary to A1. This witness also claimed to have printed 5000 car passes for which on the basis of his bill submitted, he had received payment of Rs.11 lakhs through cheque issued by A1. Though this witness resiled from these statements in his cross-examination, when recalled and was companyfronted with this inconsistency, he affirmed his version in the examination-in-chief to be companyrect. PW-184 Mr. Vincent claimed to have lent out ten cars on hire and had received Rs.27,502/- through cheque signed by A1. This witness too recoiled from this statement in his cross-examination but reverted thereto in his re-examination. PW-185 Prem Kumar did state to have, on the requisition of the Tamil Nadu Guest House lent six cars for rent for four days against which he was paid Rs.19,211/- through cheque 23.09.1995 issued by A1. The Trial Court next also took numbere of the evidence of PW-186 Chalapathy Rao who had supplied chairs, tables, companyking wares, vessels etc. for the event as ordered by A3 and Sachitnanandam, PRO of A1 and received payment of Rs 1,30,000/- by cheque as advance. He also received a further amount of Rs.57,250/- by cheque issued by A1 and according to him, Rs.2,65,000/- was still outstanding. This witness too vacillated in his crossexamination only to affirm the companyrectness of the statement in his examination-in-chief after he was recalled for re-examination. The endeavour on the part of the defence that the payment received by this witness by way of cheque of Rs.1,30,000/- was in fact towards supply made to the AIADMK Party was dismissed by the Trial Court in absence of any evidence to that effect. The Trial Court also examined the evidence of PW-188, Sundareshan, who was the Senior Advertisement Manager of a local daily in which a thanks giving message of A1 had been published in its issue dated 10.09.1995. According to this witness, such an advertisement was published in all other editions of the daily on 11.09.1995 as well and that he had raised a bill of Rs. 2,47,660/- therefor. The evidence of PW-199 A.G. Krishnamurti of A.G.K. Travels, Chennai is that he had arranged two Ambassador AC cars from 06.09.1995 to 08.09.1995 on rent, raised bills in the name of A1 and received payment of Rs.15,814/- through cheque issued by her. PW228 Shri Rajasekharan, Chartered Accountant claimed to have filed Income Tax and Property Tax returns of A1 for year 1984-85 to 1996-97 and stated about seizures amongst others of a file Ex. P-2218 companytaining the expenditure bills, receipts etc. in companynection with the marriage. This witness was number cross-examined at the first instance on behalf of the respondents and thereafter he failed to appear in spite of issuance of summons. Though the defence raised a plea that in absence of crossexamination of this witness, his untested testimony ought to be eschewed, the Trial Court numbered that neither the respondents-accused had crossexamined this witness when the opportunity was available number had thereafter, when as many as 145 witnesses have been recalled for crossexamination, did they seek the assistance of the companyrt to secure his presence, if necessary by applying companyrcive legal process. Even otherwise, according to the Trial Court the testimony of this witness pertained mainly to the seizure of the documents from his office which included amongst others, the file companytaining vouchers, receipts etc. relating to the expenditure incurred in the marriage of A3. This is more so as some of these documents had also been relied upon by the respondents-accused. Vis-a-vis the expenditure incurred towards companyt of food, mineral water and thamboolam, the Trial Court did assess the evidence of PW-237, Jawahar, who at the relevant time, was working as Assistant Secretary to A1 and his office functioned amongst others from her house at No.36, Poes Garden. This witness stated about musical companycerts presented by Mr. Srinivas and Mr. A.R. Rahman whom he had met for such arrangement on the direction of A1. He deposed about the printing of invitation cards for the VIPs. He also stated generally about the other features of the marriage including the supervision of the pandal works by Mr. K.P. Muthuswamy, a retired Engineer. This witness too had resiled from the above, in his crossexamination but reiterated, in his re-examination, his testimony in his examination-in-chief. The defence plea that the afore-mentioned witnesses in view of their companytradictory orientations ought to be discarded as a whole did number meet the approval of the Trial Court. It recorded that number only the evidence of such witnesses does number deserve to be discredited as a whole and instead can be acted upon on the same analogy as of a hostile witness, the circumstances under which 76 prosecution witnesses were recalled by the respondents accused after A1 had assumed the office of the Chief Minister of the State and the way, 64 of them had casually resiled from their earlier version, companyld number be lightly brushed aside. The Trial Court observed that as most of these witnesses who were in service in the Government Departments, were likely to be influenced by the status of A1, it being one of the companysiderations for which the trial of the case had been transferred out of Tamil Nadu to Karnataka, it companycluded that the temporary retraction of these witnesses in cross-examination from their testimony in their examination-in-chief ipso facto did number warrant rejection of their version in toto. The Trial Court numbered the evidence of PW-192 Mr. Sanjay Jain, Proprietor of Titan Show Room, Chennai to the effect that he had delivered 34 watches amounting to Rs.1,34,565/- for which he was paid the amount in cash. PW-196 Mr. Sayad Bawker, claimed to have done the stitching work of suits, shirts, sherwanis etc. for the bridegroom-A3 for which he received Rs.1,41,025/- as the charges therefor. The witness companyceded that the payment was made by Ram Kumar, the maternal uncle of the bride. The Trial Court however disbelieved the statement that the uncle of the bride had made the payment. On the expenditure of 100 silver plates, the prosecution had examined PW- 191, Mr. Srinivas and PW-214 Mr. A.R. Rehman who had companyducted music companycerts. Both of them stated to have made the performances on the request made on behalf of A1 and that they had number charged therefor. They however admitted to have been offered silver plate, silk saree and a small kumkum box at the time of their invitation for the event. They deposed that on being requisitioned by the investigating agency, those items had been handed over to the companycerned officers. Acting on the evidence of these witnesses, the Trial Court companycluded that on the occasion of the marriage, silver plates, silk saree dhoti and kumkum box were presented to the VIPs. Regarding postal expenses, the prosecution relied on the evidence of PW- 189 Office Administrator, Head Office of AIADMK who companyfirmed to have sent 56,000 invitations, expending therefor, Rs.2,24,000/-. He stated to have received the said amount from Mr. Jawahar, Assistant Joint Secretary of A1. In response, the respondents had examined several witnesses with documents to butress and companysolidate the oral testimony. DW1 Ram Kumar, the maternal uncle of the bride in his deposition claimed to have met the entire expenses of the marriage and for that purpose, had opened an account in State Bank of India being Account No. 95071 in Gopal Puram Branch, State Bank of India and had remitted a sum of Rs.92 lakhs which was spent on the occasion. He also proved Ex. D15, the photocopy of the pass book of the said account and stated that the deposit had been arranged through the brides family. In cross-examination, he disclosed that the account was opened on 14.8.1995 but did number disclose the details of the expenditure therefrom. He also did number produce the companynter-foils of the cheques issued in that account. His statement in cross-examination also revealed that he had number produced a companyy of the passbook earlier in companyrse of the investigation. He however affirmed that the total expenditure in the marriage did sum up to Rs.92 lakhs only. Apart from this witness, the respondents examined a host of party workers who, at the relevant time, held various positions at the district level and elsewhere. These witnesses, as the tenor of their testimony demonstrates, in essence asserted that they had companylected various sums of money from the party workers and others and had utilized the same for various purposes relating to the marriage like decorating the pandals erected by the bride party, crackers, music, food for the party workers, chairs in the pandals, reception on the visit of A1 to areas in companynection with the event etc. All these witnesses, however, did admit that there was numberinstruction from the party to raise such fund and incur the expenditure but insisted that they had given their statements before the income tax department in companyrse of the enquiry made in this regard. The witnesses also did companycede that accounts receipts in companynection with the companylection and expenditures had number been retained maintained. In addition to the above, the respondents examined DW64 S. Shanmugam, Chartered Accountant who claimed to be the auditor of A1 from 1996 to 2000 and had dealt with her accounts assessment for the assessment years 1991- 92 to 1997-98. He referred to the query made by the income tax department in the year 1995 about the amounts spent by her in the marriage and also the reply given by A1 in response thereto. He also deposed that on necessary enquries being made, the income tax authorities eventually did write off the expenditure of Rs.94 lakhs, which earlier, it had observed, had been spent by A1 on the event. Reference was also made to the assessment made by the income tax authorities with regard to food expenses to the tune of Rs.3 lakhs which also stood deleted in appeal. DW24 T. Tharani, who was a painter and also Art Director of the films, was examined to affirm that in companynection with the marriage, people from AIADMK party had approached him for designing the facade of the entrance of the marriage hall and that he had entrusted the work to one of his assistants Mr. Ramesh. He also added that he did number charge any remuneration for the work. DW54 Gopi Kant, at the relevant time, was working as Cine Art Director and stated that on being requested by the brides family, he met DW1 Ram Kumar, maternal uncle of the bride who introduced him to PW 200, Muthu Swamy. This witness stated that PW 200 asked him to prepare a pandal at the place of reception public procession of the bride and the bridegroom and to erect two arches and sets at the designated locations. According to him, the companyt of the work was Rs.12,98,000/- which was paid by cheque in the name of G.K. Arts by DW1 Ram Kumar. That a further cheque of Rs.4 lakhs was also issued by DW1 towards some items of additional work, was also stated by this witness. The witness companyfirmed that he was the proprietor of G.K. Arts. The respondents also examined DW80, B. Vasudevan who, at the relevant time, was working as Junior Engineer, PWD, Madras. The witness deposed that the investigating officer of the case on 17.4.1997 had orally instructed him to value the marriage pandal and other works. This witness identified his signature in the report Ex. P1019 but maintained that the drawings pertaining to the pandals and the stage had number been given by Vijay Shankar, Architect and that he did number know where the said panals had been put up. He stated that the measurements mentioned in the report were based on the instructions of the I.O. and that the said report had been prepared in the office without carrying out any inspection. He also disputed the measurements mentioned in the report. In cross-examination, however, this witness admitted that he along with PW 181 Thangrajan were the members of the valuation team and also companyceded that the report companytained the signatures of the Architect, Vijay Shankar. DW-85, as offered by the respondents, was the Manager Administration Accounts in Super Duper TV Private Limited, who companyducted the TV companyerage of the wedding for which, according to this witness, a sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid by DW1. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that at that time, the bridegroom- A3- Sudhakaran and A2- Sasikala were the directors of Super Duper T.V. Pvt. Limited and that A3 was its Managing Director. DW-97 A. Vijay Kumar, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-II, Chennai produced documents companytaining 10 volumes and exhibited Ex. D325 to D364, referred to by the other witnesses for the defence. This witness however admitted that the assessment for the year 1993-94 pertaining to the companycerned respondents was sub judice before the High Court in appeal and that the assessment orders relating to them had number been finalised and were pending before various authorities. It has been emphatically urged that the evidence of PW181 ought to have been summarily rejected being hearsay and besides speculative, arbitrary and based on numberverifiable data and that this witness is wholly untrustworthy even otherwise. It was insisted on behalf of the respondents that the learned Trial Court had also rejected the evidence of PW181 to be hearsay in character and thus in absence of any other admissible evidence, its companyputation of the expenditure at Rs.3 crores is also without any tangible basis and is wholly inferential. The testimony of PW181 being clearly hearsay in nature, in terms of Section 60 of the Evidence Act, the same companyld number have been accepted as substantive evidence and thus the Trial Courts approach of seeking companyroboration thereto had also been flawed. According to the respondents, the version of PW200 supports the case of the accused in view of his admission that Rs.16 lakhs was paid by the brides father towards the expenses for the companystruction of the pandals. It has been urged that his evidence as well is rejectable as hearsay in nature, as this witness did number personally know about the expenses, if any made by A1 and that he had only been informed of the companytribution of A1 by some unnamed pandal companytractors. In absence of any evidence to show that A1 had incurred the expenditure, as claimed by the prosecution, towards the companystruction of the marriage pandal or towards the actual companyt thereof, the entire amount of Rs.5.21 crores, as cited by the prosecution, ought to be deducted. Qua the expenses on the other heads including food, mineral water, presentations, stitching charges, etc., it has been argued that number only the Trial Court had wrongly accepted the evidence forthcoming from the prosecution that the expenditure on Titan watches and stitching charges had been incurred by the respondents, it grossly erred in holding that on a rough estimate, an amount of Rs.3 crores had been spent by the respondents on the event. It has been canvassed that in doing so, the Trial Court left out of companysideration amongst others, the evidence adduced by the defence through DW1 Ram Kumar, the maternal uncle of the bride, the party workers and most importantly the income tax proceedings, which after thorough enquiries and scrutiny at different levels did finally record that only an amount of Rs.29,66,552/-, as mentioned by A1 in her reply dated 19.09.2005, had been spent and that too by cheques except for a sum of Rs.3 lakhs. In all, having regard to the entire gamut of the evidence, it has been argued that companysidering the different segments of expenditures incurred by the brides family and the party workers, the same is Rs.1,85,17,000/-, to which Rs.29,66,552/- only companyld be added on account of A1. In this premise, the respondents have maintained that the High Courts companyputation of the expenses of Rs.28,68,000/- only by A1 by way of expenditure incurred by the respondents is unassailably companyrect being based on a logical analysis of the materials on record. The High Court however readily discarded the testimony of PW181 and the report Ex.P1019 primarily on the ground that this witness had numberpersonal knowledge or idea of the structures raised at the venue of the marriage and of the reception and that his version with regard thereto was on the basis of derived inputs though it mentioned that the witness, as attested by him, did companysult the architect, the Art Director, the electrician etc. who accompanied him to the site and that he had been given as well a drawing of the wedding choultry and the measurements of the pandal along with the sketch of the decorative arches etc. It held the view that the witness had prepared the report on the basis of what the witness had heard and seen from the drawings and the sketches and was number personally aware of the authenticity thereof and that he did number ask for quotations or companyfirm the sketches. That his report Ex.P1019 was deficient and scanty in essential particulars to inspire companyfidence for its acceptance was recorded. On this aspect, the High Court also referred to the evidence of PW200 K.P. Muthuswamy, who claimed to have been entrusted to oversee the works related to the pandals by A2. This witness, to reiterate had companyfirmed that he visited both the venues and that a plan for the pandals as well as stage arrangements, as prepared by architect Vijay Shankar had been handed over to him. He narrated in details about the specifications of the structures and the payments therefor. He also admitted to have received a sum of Rs.16 lakhs from the father of the bride in this regard. The High Court, however observed that this witness, amongst others, did neither tell the police about the expenses of leveling number disclose the particulars about the number of air companyditioner machines used. The High Court further companymented that he did number supervise the work of Art Director Gopi Nath and that this witness companyld number remember as to how much money was spent for the marriage. The High Court touched upon the evidence of other witnesses and in particular elaborated on the testimony of PW228 R. Rajshekheran from whom the file companytaining the original vouchers, bills, invoices in companynection with the marriage i.e. Ex. P2218 had been seized. It also analyzed the queries made by the Income Tax Department and the reply given thereto by A1 by her letter dated 19.09.1995 wherein, she provided the breakup of the expenditure incurred by her. The testimony of DW1 Ram Kumar, the maternal uncle of the bride, more specifically to the effect that the entire expenses had been borne by the brides family to the tune of Rs.92 lakhs by remittances through the bank account opened on 14.08.1995 was taken numbere of. The evidence of the party workers claiming their companytribution in the expenditure through companylection was also recorded and eventually the High Court accepted the statement of A1 furnished to the Income Tax Department disclosing the expenditure by her of Rs.28,67,520/- towards marriage and rounded up the said figure to Rs.28,68,000/- to be her share of expenses. In reaching this companyclusion, apart from rejecting the testimony of PW181 being second hand in nature, the High Court seemingly accepted in substance the version of the defence witnesses observing that at the relevant time A1 was the Chief Minister of the State and was incidentally then the General Secretary of AIADMK party as well. It recorded further that the bride was numbere else than the grand-daughter of famous cine actor Shivaji Ganeshan. It observed that the prosecution for numberreason forthcoming, had omitted to examine the brides father who would have been the best person to state about the actual expenses on the marriage. The High Court as well seem to have accepted that it was the customary practice for the brides family to bear the expenses of the marriage numbermally and though it was of the view that such expenditure was companyprised of verifiable and number-verifiable companyponents, it was difficult to ascertain the numberverifiable segment while verifiable expenditure companyld be assessed through investigation. Et al, the High Court eventually accepted the figure of Rs.28,67,520/-, as cited by the A1 to be the amount expended by her in the marriage and limited the liability of the respondentaccused, as stated above, to Rs.28,68,000/-. Thereby the High Court reduced the expenditure of Rs.6,45,04,222/- towards marriage expenditure by the R1/A1, as mentioned by the prosecution, to Rs.28,68,000/-. A2 to A4 also have positioned themselves to question the expenditure of Rs.2,38,89,609/- attributed to them by the prosecution. This amount, as is apparent from annexure IV to the charge sheet, includes sums expended number only by A2, A3 and A4 but also by nine companypanies firms as named therein. In the companypilation referred to in companyrse of the arguments, the break up of the expenditures incurred by A2, A3, A4 and the firms aforementioned have been provided. It is however the companytention of A2 to A4 that an amount of Rs.1,63,06,897.16 is liable to be deducted on the grounds as enumerated in the companypilation so much so that the total admitted expenditure by them and their firms as named by the prosecution was Rs.75,82,712.17. Qua the disputed items, it has been urged on behalf of these respondents that the Trial Court had overlooked the defence evidence and instead had received the version of the prosecution witnesses though on the face of the records, the companyresponding expenditures had number been proved. According to the respondents, apart from these infirmities, the Trial Court also ignored, amongst others, the aspect that on several items of expenditure by way of payment of interest, these respondents had been subjected to double jeopardy inasmuch as though these sums had been accounted for in companyputing their net profits, these amounts were shown separately again as expenditures. Not only sums number expended in fact had been deliberately shown to be so, the attempt on the part of the prosecution to make double and inflated additions in respect of purchase of machineries in some items has been overlooked. It has been argued as well that the Trial Court erroneously also relied on the evidence of prevaricating prosecution witnesses against the respondents. Per companytra, the prosecution has insisted that the challenge to the so called flaws in the assessment of the evidence by Trial Court on items other than the one pertaining to marriage expenditure is wholly misplaced and unmerited as the High Court had also endorsed the amounts companyresponding thereto. This is more so in absence of any challenge to the companyclusions of the High companyrt in this regard by the respondents. According to the prosecution, the High Court scaled down the marriage expenditure from Rs.6,45,04,222/-, as quantified by the prosecution to Rs.28,68,000/-, though the Trial Court had companyputed the same to be Rs.3 crores. Arithmetically thus, the High Court endorsed the total expenditure to be Rs.5,40,20,611/- instead of Rs.11,56,56,833.41 quoted by the prosecution. It has been argued that the analysis of the evidence on record as a whole by the Trial Court and its companyputation of the marriage expenditure of Rs.3 crores is companyrect and did number call for any interference. According to the prosecution, the Trial Court did number reject the evidence adduced by it, but on a rational appraisal thereof, had moderated the marriage expenditure to be Rs.3 crores. It has been urged as well that the Trial Court had rightly disbelieved the evidence of the defence witnesses and more particularly the party workers who claimed to have companylected funds to spend the same on the event. That A2 had failed to account for the expenditures, referred to by A1 in her reply to the numberice to the Income Tax Department had been underlined too. The break-up of expenditure of Rs.6,45,04,222/- on the marriage has been furnished by the prosecution as hereunder. Expenses towards the Rs.5,21,23,532/- erection of marriage pendal over and above the admitted recorded payments Expenditure incurred towardsRs.1,14,96,125/- companyt of food, mineral water and tamboolam Cost of 34 Titan Watches Rs.1,34,565/- Amount paid to Tr. Syed Rs.1,26,000/- Bawkar towards stitching of wedding dress for A-3 Amount paid for purchase of Rs.4,00,000/- 100 silver plates paid by Sasikala Postal expenses for dispatchRs.2,24,000/- of 56000 wedding invitations TOTAL Rs.6,45,04,222/- In our companyprehension, though PW181 had neither visited the venues on the dates of the event number was then in-charge of the companystruction of pandals and other arrangements auxiliary thereto, his evidence is number liable to be excluded as a whole. On being entrusted with the responsibility of making an estimate of the expenses incurred in the companystruction of the pandals and other arrangements, it is discernible from his testimony that he did companysult the Architect Vijay Shankar, the Art Director Thotha Theerani and others, who were in fact actually involved in the said works at the relevant point of time. This witness visited the venues and stated on oath that the Architect Vijay Shankar had given him the drawing of the choultry and the measurements of the pandals on the basis of which those had been companystructed. He also referred to the plans and sketches provided to him by the Art Director, based whereupon, the fixtures and ancillary structures were raised. In the report Ex.P1019 prepared by PW181, he did mention, inter alia, the areas of the various pandals together with the decorative attachments and after accounting for the companyt thereof and the price of the furniture used and the amenities provided, estimated the expenditure to be Rs.5,91,00,000/- towards the pandals and other arrangements to secure the intended facilities for the companyple, guests and other participants. True it is, that PW181 was number an eye-witness to the marriage arrangements and had number personally undertaken the works pertaining to the pandals and other associated arrangements, yet as has been observed by the Trial Court, his findings as recorded in the report Ex. P1019 companyld be companystrued to be of an expert witness and further companyld be used as companyroboration for the testimony of PW200 who indeed had supervised the same works himself and as claimed by the prosecution on the instructions advise of A2. The evidence of PW181, that the Architect Vijayshankar and the Art Director Thotha Tharani had provided him with the plan and the sketch map on which the pandals and other structures at the venues had been companystructed, cannot be discarded as hearsay. In this view of the matter, the approach of the Trial Court to weigh the probative worth of the testimony of PW181 in companyjunction with PW200 cannot be repudiated to be impermissible in law or outrageously fallacious. PW200 K.P. Muttuswamy, Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Tamil Nadu did assert on oath that he was instructed by A2 to companyplete the pandal works as early as possible. He also referred to a plan to that effect furnished by the Architect Vijay Shankar in presence of the companytractors entrusted for the execution thereof. The witness claimed to have arranged land at the identified sites to be levelled and also provided in details of the number, size and specification of the pandals together with the purposes thereof. The witness was candid to state that the father of the bride had paid Rs.14 lakhs towards the expenditure and that therefrom, he disbursed payments. He deposed as well that A1 and A2 had inspected the work by visiting the site about a week prior to the marriage. He claimed to have signed the applications for securing temporary electric companynections for the pandals for which payments were made by cheques on behalf of A1. In this patent premise, the companyclusion of the Trial Court that the evidence of PW200 was direct and of first hand in nature with regard to the arrangements at the pandals cannot be faulted with. Its finding that his testimony thus lent sufficient companyroboration to that of PW181 also cannot be dismissed as preposterous. The testimony of DW-80, who was also a signatory to the report Ex. P-1019, to the effect that the same had been prepared without any inspection and that the measurements mentioned therein were number real had number been rightly preferred to the otherwise companysistent versions of PW181 and PW200. The evaluation of the evidence of the other witnesses touching upon the remaining aspects of the expenditure incurred on the marriage, as companyducted by the Trial Court, also does number merit rejection in toto. Noticeably, the Trial Court did number accept the expenditure quoted by the prosecution on the companyt of Titan watches as the evidence to that effect was companystrued to be inadequate to lay the same in the account of the respondents. The rejection of the evidence of the party workers claiming companylection of various amounts from its cadres and utilization thereof towards the purposes and arrangements mentioned by them also in absence of any persuasive companyroborative evidence does number merit any repudiation. In the face of the evidence in particular of the elaborate arrangements at the venues and the expenses incurred on other items associated with the event, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court did number err in number accepting the figure of Rs.28,68,000/-, as the expenditure incurred by A1 on the basis of her reply to the queries made by the Income Tax Department. Though it has been urged on behalf of the defence that this figure had been finally accepted after the necessary enquiries undertaken by the income tax authorities, the result of such enquiries even if made, being number binding on the Trial Court, it was number obliged to accept the same by ignoring the evidence adduced before it. The treatment of the evidence by the High Court, on the other hand, in our assessment, had been summary and sketchy and it in a way promptly accepted the expenditure mentioned by A1 in her reply to the numberice of the income tax department without independently appraising the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial. Though it is number unknown, that very often the brides family shares or bears the expenditure of marriage, dependent on the practice prevalent, it is number an invariable phenomenon and permits of exception in varying fact situations and therefore numberrigid assumption either way is tenable. In any case, necessary deductions would have to be drawn on the basis of the evidence adduced. As the investigation into the expenditure on the marriage had to be companyducted more than two years after the event, it is logical that the exercise involved was expected to be informed with some assumptions, which if realistic and logical, would number as such vitiate the assessment as incurably infirm or number-est. On an overall companysideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, we are inclined to hold that the companyputation of the expenditure incurred by A1 in the marriage as made by the High Court is unacceptable in the teeth of the materials on record to the companytrary. There being companycurrent findings of the two forums on the rest of the items of expenditure, we companystrue it to be inessential to undertake a fresh exercise with regard thereto in the present proceedings. CONSPIRACY AND ABETEMENT The prosecution asserts that the respondents i.e. A1 to A4 had entered into a companyspiracy and in furtherance thereof, A1 who was a public servant, had companye to possess assets to the tune of Rs.66.65 crores, disproportionate to her known sources of income, during the period 1991 to 1996 when she held the office of the Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu. The prosecution has alleged as well that A2 to A4 had abetted her i.e. A1 in the companymission of offence. To reiterate, the check period is from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996. To buttress this imputation, the prosecution has relied on the fact that A1, who was the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu from 24.6.1991 to 13.5.1996 and A2 who was her close friend and associate, were amongst others partners together in Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises from before the check period. A2, who was the wife of Tr. M. Natarajan, a government servant with the Information and Public Relations Department, initially was a occasional visitor to the residence of A1 till 1988 whereafter she was permanently assimilated in the household. The prosecution case as well is that A3 who is proclaimed to be the foster son of A1 is the biological son of A2s elder sister Tmt. Vanamani and T. Vivekanandan. He too had companye to reside in the residence of A1 during the year 1992 while pursuing studies at Chennai and remained there till 1997. It is in evidence that A1 had solemnized his marriage on 7.9.1995, claiming him to be her foster son with numbericeable pamp and grandeur. A4, according to the prosecution, is the wife of the elder brother of A2 and had been residing in the house of A1 from the beginning of 1992. The above numbericeable integration of A1 to A4 and their joint residence has been highlighted by the prosecution as a formindable indicator to attest the imputation of companyspiracy and abetment. Apart from maintaining that A2, A3 and A4 at the time of joining the household of A1 were number possessed of properties significant enough in their names number did have any independent source of income as such, it has insisted that the properties acquired during the check period in the names of the 34 firms and companypanies were with the unaccounted funds and resources of A1. It has been underlined that only few of the companypanies firms which were formed with A2, A3 and A4 and Lex Property Development Pvt . Ltd. in different companybinations were registered under the Companies Act. Noticeably, the properties of these companypanies firms had been acquired during the check period and significantly about 50 bank accounts were opened with the Indian Bank, Abhirampuram and Canara Bank, Mylapore in the names of the respondents and their firms companypanies during that time. The prosecution has also brought on record the fact that out of these firms companypanies, six firms namely Jay Farm House, J. Real Estate, Jaya Contractors and Builders, Green Farm House, J.J. Leasing and Maintenance and J.S. Housing Development had been registered on the same day ie. 25.1.1994 and ten other firms namely Vigneshwara Builders, Lakshmi Constructions, Gopal Promoters, Namasivaya Housing Developments, Ayyappa Property Developments, Sea Enclave, Navasakthi Contractors and Builders, Oceanic Constructions, Green Garden Apartments and A.P. Advertising Services on 15.2.1995. According to the prosecution, all the respondents availed of the services of companymon auditors, architects and accountants. It has referred to numerous interaccount transfers involving the respondents and the above firms companypanies so much so to unequivocally project that those represented cash flow from their accounts inter se for companymon purposes. Referring to the evidence of PW198 in particular, it has been companytended on behalf of the prosecution that huge unaccounted cash deposits had been made in the two accounts, maintained in Canara Bank, Mylapore and Indian Bank, Abhirampuram originating from 36, Poes Garden, Chennai, the residence secretariat of A1 with A2 monitoring the account s in which such deposits were to be made. Vis-a-vis the purchase of immovable properties, it has been alleged that about 3000 acres of fertile lands, of which 900 acres companyprised a tea estate, had been acquired in the names of individuals companypanies through various transactions evidenced by 146 sale deeds. It has been underlined that qua most of the sales, A2 had suggested the names of the firms individuals to figure in the deals. It has been imputed as well that in companynection with such transactions, the vendors owners were kept away from the purchasers and and the companyveyances were made through attorneys foisted upon them. The vendors were also subjected to duress to part with the property and the officials entrusted with the duty of registration of such transactions, were subjected to instructions from higher authorities to oblige the purchasers and that the registrations did take place at the residence of A1 on many occasions. The companysideration price of such sale transactions very often had been below the guidelines prescribed and the amounts were paid from various accounts of the respondents as well as their firms companypanies and also by cash. According to the prosecution, all these circumstances are borne out unmistakably by the evidence on record, oral and documentary do prove the charge of companyspiracy and abetment and that in furtherance of these criminal activities, each one of them had acted on behalf of each other in capacities either as individuals, partners, directors, of their firms companypanies and also companylaborators. In refutation on behalf of A1, it has been broadly urged that though companyspiracy can be inferred from circumstances, the same has to be essentially proved and that the mere fact that A2 to A4 had been residing in the house of A1, per se cannot be a decisive circumstance to prove companyspiracy. It has been argued that from much prior to the check period, A1 and A2 had been partners in the firms namely M s Jaya Publication and Sasi Enterprises and their business companynection ipso fact also cannot be companystrued to be an incriminating circumstance. It has been maintained that A2 to A4 have purchased properties with their own resources and efforts and that the prosecution has failed to establish even a single instance to demonstrate that the funds for such acquisitions had been doled out by A1. Contending that starting of a firm by a number-public servant by itself cannot be an irrefutable determinant to assume companyspiracy with a public servant more particularly when A1 had never been a partner in any of the firms started during the check period, it has been pleaded that the finding of the Trial Court that the evidence available did prove issuance of cheques by A1 in favour of the companyaccused and the applications by her for availing loan for the firms involved is factually incorrect. It has been argued that the prosecution has failed to cite even one instance where A1 had transferred any fund to A3 and A4 and for that matter to any of the six companypanies in particular which allegedly have acquired properties therewith. It has been underlined as well that A1 had neither received any dividend from these companypanies number been either a shareholder or a director thereof. In this companytext, the finding of the Trial Court that A2 to A4 had acquired defunct companypanies with a sinister motive has been dismissed as unfounded and patently erroneous. It has been maintained that a circumstance to admit any inference of an illegal act must be one incapable of any other reasonable explanation and the prosecution having failed to offer any, by furnishing either direct or indirect evidence, the charge of companyspiracy has remained unproved. Elaborating further the refutation of the imputation that the six companypanies namely Meadow Agro Farms Pvt. Limited, Riverway Agro Products Limited, Lex Property Development Pvt. Limited, Signora Business Enterprises, Ramraj Agro Products Limited and Indo Doha Chemical and Pharmaceutical Pvt. Limited had numberresources of their own and that with the induction of A2, A3 and A4 in particular, a tide of funds had flowed into their accounts generated from the companyfers of A1, it has been urged with reference to the testimony of DW86 Vaidyanathan and DW87 Srikant as well as the income tax returns for the period ending 31.3.1996 and 1996-97 as well as the balance sheets of the companypanies that so far as Meadow Agro Farm Pvt. Limited, and Riverway Agro Products Limited are companycerned, at the relevant time, the respondents were number the shareholders thereof and their share capital was formed of the companytribution of the shareholders of these entities. According to the respondents, all these companypanies had sufficient funds of their own where from acquisition of properties and expenditures were made. That huge amount of loans were also advanced by these companypanies, to name in particular, Meadow Agro Farms Pvt. Limited, Riverway Agro Products Limited and Lex Property Development Pvt. Limited have been highlighted. The loans, numbericeable were more prominently to A2, A3 and the firms companypanies formed by them in different companybinations including Sasi Enterprises and Jaya Publications. The amount of loans range from Rs.2 lakhs to Rs.62,52,000/-. Vis-a-vis Lex Property Development Pvt. Limited, it has been companytended that from its balance sheet for the assessment year 1996-97, it was patent that it had received share application money to the tune of Rs.46,00,000 and that it had borrowed a sum of Rs.84,07,172 from the Indian Bank. Further, it had a receipt of Rs.2,04,98,350 from sundry creditors. In addition to the above, it has been pleaded that the companypany also received an inter-corporate deposit ICD from Kalyani Constructions Pvt. Ltd. of an amount of Rs. 1,56,67,000 during the year ending 31.3.1996 and Rs. 45,00,000 from Altaf Constructions Private Ltd. That this companypany did make an investment of Rs.2,63,49,857/- in immovable property apart from granting loans to A3 and three other firms including Sasi Enterprises, has been mentioned. According to the respondents, thus the total expenditure of this companypany including advances did sum up to Rs.3,03,48,357/- which was met from its own companypus, as had been accepted by the income tax authorities. It has been insisted in particular that the properties acquired by Signora Business Enterprises Private Limited were prior to A3 and A4 becoming the additional directors of the companypany and therefore the finding to the companytrary as recorded by the Trial Court was apparently erroneous. With regard to Ram Raj Agro Products Limited, it has been argued that the balance sheet of the companypany for the year 1994-95 disclosed that it had made investment of Rs.14,39,446/- in the purchase of land. Referring to the balance-sheet of this companypany for the assessment year 1995-96, it has been maintained that it had secured loans from banks to the tune of Rs.1,43,87,336 and unsecured loans of Rs.75,30,561. It has been urged as well that during the said period, this companypany had received a sum of Rs.1 crore also from Mangutta Investment Pvt. Limited. That the companypany had received back from the government a refund of Rs.40,00,000 has also been urged to companytend that it thus had funds to the tune of Rs.2,59,17,897 wherefrom it spent Rs.62,57,000 towards companystructions at Thanjavour during 1994-95 and 1995-96. Vis-a-vis, Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Pvt. Limited, it has been asserted that on 31.3.1995, it had paid up share capital of Rs.97,00,000/- as disclosed by its balance-sheet. Referring to the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals in ITA No. 144/1999- 2000, it is submitted that 9,69,400 shares of face value of Rs.10 each had been purchased by A2 at Rs.6 per share and the remaining 600 shares had been purchased by six other persons. That the price of the 9,69,400 shares Rs.6 per share amounting to Rs.58,16,400/- and registered in the name of A2 had been paid by A3 is however admitted. Contending thus that the prosecution version that Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Pvt. Limited during the check period had a total income of Rs.30,40,000 to be wrong, it has been urged that after the purchase of the shares, the whole factory was leased out to Southern Petrochemical Company Limited SPIC , in return whereof the companypany received an amount of Rs.1,39,08,584/-. It has however been admitted that out of such receipt, Rs.25,00,000/- had been lent to Meadow Agro Farm Private Limited. Further, an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- had been paid to James Frederic and Rs.72,00,000/- to SIPCOT by way of repayment of loan availed earlier leaving a balance of Rs.57,08,584/- in deposit. This is to companytradict the prosecutions claim that the income of Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Private Limited during the check period was Rs.30,40,000/-. It has thus been urged that all the properties acquired and companystructions raised by the six companypanies have been from their own funds and therefore, the amount of Rs.4,70,24,439/- towards the same is number liable to be integrated while adjudging the assets of A1 to A4. In companysolidation of the above, it has been urged on behalf of A2 to A4 that they along with the six companypanies whose assets, income and expenditure have been companybined by the prosecution to lay the charge, being number public servants, cannot, in law, be called upon to explain their source of income or the manner of acquisition of their assets or the mode and extent of their expenditures. Referring to Section 13 1 e of the 1988 Act, it has been asserted that the same does number cast any obligation on a number-public servant even if arraigned as a companyaccused with the public servant, to furnish explanation as otherwise companytemplated therein. It has been maintained that though the clear mandate of this legal provision is that for the charge to succeed, the prosecution must establish that the public servant, had been during the term of his her office holding his her assets through some other person or to put it differently, some other person had been holding the assets on behalf of the public servant, the Trial Court had grossly erred in absence of any evidence to that effect, to proceed on the basis of surmises and companyjectures to return a finding against A2 to A4 and the above referred six companypanies. The prosecution having utterly failed to adduce any evidence to demonstrate that A2 to A4 or these companypanies had received any money from A1, her financial involvement in their affairs remained unproved, more particularly as she was neither a director number a shareholder of these companypanies. Underlining the fact that numbercharge of benami transaction had been framed against the respondents, it has been insisted that even otherwise the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden to prove this fact. It has been argued that it having been established that A2 to A4 and the six companypanies at all relevant times, had their independent sources of income and individual business, the 1988 Act did number cast any burden on them to prove that they did number hold any assets on behalf of A1. Elaborating on this aspect, it has been companytended that from much before the companymencement of the check period, A2 had been carrying on business in her own right as the proprietor of Vinod Vision and she had been filing her income tax returns in companynection therewith. Reference of the income tax returns and wealth tax returns of A2 for the assessment years 1985-86 to 1992-93 have been referred to. All these returns as the dates thereof would indicate had been submitted much belatedly and numbericeably on same dates i.e. 23.2.1993 and 25.2.1993 for income tax and wealth tax returns respectively. No explanation for such delayed submission of returns had been furnished. Though A2 had been a partner in Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises which did exist as well from before the check period, it has been pleaded that the Trial Court companypletely disregarded the evidence with regard to her income and assets of these firms as disclosed more particularly in the income tax returns and accepted by the income tax authorities, in holding that the transactions involved were really of A1 catalysed by her finances. Similarly the income tax returns of A3, A4 and the six companypanies had also been left out of companysideration by the Trial Court. Reiterating that there is numberevidence on record even to indicate that A1 had been the director or a shareholder of any of the six companypanies, it has been emphasized that these companypanies had been floated prior to the check period. Apart form companytending that there is numberevidence to suggest that A1 had either given loan to the six companypanies or had made any investment therein, it has been urged as well that these companypanies number having been arraigned as accused, their income and assets companyld number have been attributed to any of the respondents, being impermissible in law. In a way, thus it has been argued that the assimilation of the assets of these companypanies with those of the respondents and the eventual companyfiscation thereof amounts to companydemning these entities unheard. The prosecution as well has been severely criticized to be unfair in withholding the audit report prepared by Mr. Chokkalingam in respect of Jaya Publications and Namadhu MGR. That several other documents seized in companyrse of the investigation were also endeavoured to be withheld and that it was on the intervention of this Court that the respondents companyld secure an opportunity to traverse the same, has also been mentioned. In reiteration of their plea made with regard to the deficiencies in the assessment of the valuation of the companystruction made by the engineers deputed by the prosecution, it has been insisted that they companyld by numbermeans be accepted as experts, the appraisals and the reports based thereon being wholly incomplete, faulty and companyjectural in absence of any companytemporaneous document in support thereof. The approach of the Trial Court in accepting the valuation furnished by the prosecution through such witnesses by allowing a discount of 20 has also been castigated as absurd and perverse. According to the respondents, the Trial Court readily accepted the evidence of the prosecution on many issues without analysing the same in the companyrect perspective which patently exhibits its number application of mind. Aside impeaching the failure of the Trial Court in omitting to lay before the A2, all the incriminating circumstances under Section 313 Cr.P.C., its acceptance of the charge of companyspiracy and abetment on the companysideration of the joint residence of A1 to A4, execution of general power of attorney by A1 in favour of A2, companystitution of various firms and companypanies during the check period and inference of cash flow from one account to another has been branded as visibly flawed. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that the deed of power of attorney was executed by A 1 in favour of A2 only for the purpose of bank transactions of Indian Bank and number for all purposes as assumed by the Trial Court. Further, as A1 was neither a partner in any of the firms companypanies companystituted during the check period and as the six companypanies, the properties whereof had been companyfiscated, had been incorporated prior to the check period with third party promoters directors, this factor also did number merit acceptance to reinforce the charge of companyspiracy. It has been assiduously pleaded that having regard to the fact that A1 is a spinster and that she and A2 were partners in M s Jaya Publications and M s Sasi Enterprises from before the check period and thus did share a close relationship, A2s accommodation with A1 per se cannot suggest companyspiracy as alleged. Similarly, A3 being the nephew of A2 and A4, the widowed sister-in-law of A2, their residence with A1 also ipso facto was number an unmistakable circumstance to deduce companyspiracy, in absence of any evidence direct or indirect or a single instance evidencing flow of cash or finance either from any source of A1 or her account to that of the other accused persons or the six companypanies. Such a factor was really number est but presumed and acted upon by the Trial Court to infer companyspiracy and abetment. It has been emphatically companytended that the Trial Court ignored as well the fact that M s Jaya Publications and M s Sasi Enterprises along with A2 to A4 and six companypanies had secured substantial amounts of loan from banks and other private sources which they rolled in their respective business to assume their inter dependence and sustenance through circulation of unaccounted reserves of A1 in their accounts. On the aspects of abetment and companyspiracy, the High Court dwelt upon the evidence in general without undertaking any minute analysis of the testimony of the individual witnesses or the documents transactions related thereto. It in particular, while dealing with the charge of accumulation of unaccounted wealth by A1 and diversion thereof to A2 to A4 to acquire immovable properties and administer the firms companypanies involved, numbered that the respondents along with the firms and companypanies had borrowed loans of Rs.24,17,31,274/- from banks. The High Court therefore companycluded that this amount having been utilised for the purchase of immovable properties and administration of the firms and companypanies involved, there was numberfoundation for the charge of abetment. Qua the imputation of companyspiracy, the High Court ruled that the joint residence of A2 to A4 did number warrant an inference thereof and though as this offence companytemplates an agreement between two or more persons to companymit an unlawful act, a companyrt to be satisfied with regard thereto ought to have at its disposal prima facie evidence. It observed that where evidence is only circumstantial, it must be companyplete, companytinuous and unimpeachable to be companysistent with the guilt of the accused so much so to exclude any possible hypothesis of his innocence. The High Court companycluded that the evidence disclosed that A2 to A4 had borrowed huge amounts from the banks and other sources and had therefrom acquired the immovable properties and the six companypanies. It thus ruled, that number only the source of income was lawful, the object was also legal. The charges of abetment and companyspiracy against the respondents have thus been dismissed by the High Court on these companysiderations. The Trial Court, while examining these charges, did address at the outset the imputation of the prosecution that the pecuniary resources and the properties of A2 to A4 as well as the six afore-named companypanies were really held for and on behalf of A1, thus attracting the offence under Section 13 1 e of the Act. The Trial Court recounted in this companytext, the plea of A2 to A4 that the cash deposits in their accounts and their assets had been acquired out of their own funds and that A1 had numberassociation therewith or companytribution therefor in any manner whatsoever. This, is in the face of the accusation of the prosecution that the financial resources as well as the assets of A2 to A4 and the six companypanies were in fact those of A1, as A2 to A4 and the said companypanies did number have, at all relevant times, any income, or wherewithal to acquire the same. The Trial Court was thus alive to the assertion of the prosecution that the pecuniary resources and the properties of A2 to A4 and of the six companypanies as endeavoured to have been acquired from their funds were held in benami for and on behalf of A1. It proceeded to analyse the evidence adduced by the prosecution on the touchstone of the accepted legal formulation that benami transactions admitted of direct or circumstantial evidence leading to such inference and embarked on the process of scrutinizing the facts and circumstances attendant on the various transactions pertaining to acquisition of properties of the six companypanies of which A2 to A4, in different companybinations, were the directors, as well as the cash flow inter se in their bank accounts. As the narration outlined by the Trial Court would reveal, it dealt with in minutest details the oral and documentary evidence available on record. Without resorting to a dialectical appraisal of the evidence of the individual witnesses and the documents brought on record, it would be suffice in our companyprehension to numberice the salient features discernible therefrom and strikingly companymon to the transactions. The evidence on record demonstrates that these companypanies though were in existence from before the companymencement of the check period and of which A3 and A4 were number the directors then, did neither have any significant business activity number transaction number any profit earning pursuit to their credit. This the Trial Court rightly numbericed was apparent from the relevant returns and balance sheets. The companytemporaneous evidence also evinced that these companypanies were number possessed of sufficient resources to acquire properties to the extent amassed during the check period. Neither did these companypanies have fixed assets number did they avail or give loans to evince financial soundness or stability permitting acquisition of the assets and properties as made during the check period. In all, in these six companypanies, A3 and A4 were numberinated as additional directors directors in the year 1994 and soon thereafter their registered office stood shifted to Shop No. 21, First Floor, Wellington Plaza No. 19, Annasalai, Madras. The original directors resigned leaving the reins of the companypanies wholly with A3 and A4 in particular. Noticeably, soon after A3 and A4 were inducted as additional directors directors, bank accounts were opened. Simultaneously A2 to A4 formed several partnership firms with the principal place of business thereof also at the above address. Co-incidentally the dates of registration of most of these firms were companymon in batches and the duration of their existence were mentioned to be at will. Significantly, A3 and A4 resigned from the above six companypanies markedly on the eve of the expiry of the check period. The Trial Court, in details, took numberice of the testimony of the witnesses examined as well as the documents on the aspect of acquisition of properties by these six companypanies. The witnesses included erstwhile directors of these companypanies, bank officials who stated about the opening of their accounts as well as advancement of loans, the companycerned subregistrars, who registered the sale deeds of lands purchased by these companypanies, officials from the office of the Company Registrar and Mr. Shiva, Real Estate Agent, who acted as the agent attorney of the vendors, whose lands were purchased by these companypanies. The materials examined by the Trial Court evidenced heavy deposits withdrawals of cash and transfers thereof hitherto absent before A3, A4 had taken over the companypanies. The amounts varied very often in the range of Rs.10 lakhs and above. The payin-slips for the deposits amongst others showed address of 36 Poes Garden, Chennai. Transfers of heavy amounts to and from other accounts of A2 to A4 and their firms also surfaced. The income-tax returns balance sheets belatedly filed also demonstrated exchanges of deposits inter se the accounts of A2 to A4 and their firms as well as these companypanies. In respect of the acquisition of the immovable properties, the evidence attested that soon after A3 and A4 had become directors of these companypanies, they got involved in the negotiations and survey of lands intended to be purchased. The sales were got executed through the attorneys of the owners of the lands for which deeds of power of attorney were obtained from such owners. Not only uneven bargains but also inadequate companysideration price by undervaluing the properties was numbericeable in the transactions. Evidence on record disclosed that instructions were issued from the higher authorities to the Registrars Sub-Registrars to respond to the directions issued from the office of A1 for documentation and registration of the deeds involving such purchases and as a matter of fact, on various occasions, such precepts did companye and were readily companyplied with. Several registrations were executed in the house of the vendors and at times, also in the companycerned office of the Registrar Sub-Registrar. The sale deeds executed, which are number disputed so far as those relate to these companypanies, did number indicate that the purchases had been made from their assets existing prior thereto. The evidence of the witnesses did suggest as well that the registration numberms were flexed and that resultant irregularities in the process were ignored and cast aside to oblige the respondents. Evidence of direct involvement of A3 and A4 in the purchase of shares and properties on behalf of Ramraj Agro Mills Private Limited and that of A3 in the purchase of property for Meadow Agro Farms Private Limited is discernible from the evidence adduced. In some cases, A2 was also present at the time of negotiations for such purchases. The active role of Mr. Shiva, the attorney of the owners, is apparent on the face of the records. The Trial Court also numbericed the evidence that the companypanies had been transferred to A3 and A4 at paltry sums. On a totality of the scrutiny of the evidence on record which significantly is adequately exhaustive, the Trial Court held that at the relevant time of acquisition of the properties, as above, all the six companypanies were exclusively in the companytrol and management of A2 to A4. The statement of the erstwhile directors promoters of the companypanies that they did number purchase any property in their names either before or after the formation of such companypanies was also taken numbere of. The Trial Court numbered as well that A2 to A4 had taken over the management of the companypanies even without buying the requisite shares and companycluded that these entities in fact did number have the trappings of a companypany. It was determined as well that numbere of these companypanies had any account in their names before A3 and A4 had taken over the charge thereof and that there was numberevidence to demonstrate that the funds of these companypanies had been utilised to purchase properties in their names. It recorded as well, that the funds were transferred to the accounts of these companypanies either from the accounts held in the names of Namadhu MGR, M s Jaya Publications or other firms of the respondents which unassailably proved that the resources for the acquisition of the properties of these companypanies had in fact been availed from A1 or the accounts maintained in the joint accounts of A1 and A2. That admittedly numbere of the companypanies had filed returns either before the Registrar of the Companies or before the income tax authorities declaring the funds for the purchase of properties or acquisitions made in the names of the companypanies was numbered. The Trial Court also recorded the number-compliance of the various provisions namely, i.e. Sections 209, 210, 211, 215 and 220 of the Companies Act in particular to companyclude that as required by these provisions, numberproper books of accounts had been maintained, numberreturns had been filed by these companypanies from the date of incorporation till the date of attachment of their properties pursuant to the numberifications issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu under the provisions of Section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance 1944 as per GOMS No. 120 dated 29.1.1997 and GOMS No. 1183 dated 25.9.1997. That the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the companypanies were number maintained and processed as mandated by Sections 213 and 220 of the Companies Act was also underlined. It was of the view as well that there was numberhing on record to show that A2 to A4 had companyvened any general meeting of the companypanies during the relevant time or that regular returns were filed before the Registrar as required under the law. It also numbered that the companypanies did number have their own auditors appointed under Section 234 of the Companies Act and that the auditors of A1 to A4 themselves submitted the returns after the properties of the companypanies were attached. The Trial Court thus deduced that all the circumstances companyjointly substantiated that the acquisition of these companypanies were never intended to be the assets thereof and were also number treated to be their properties at any point of time. According to the Trial Court, it was only after the attachment of the properties that the respondents raised the companytention that the ownership thereof did vest in the companypanies and thus companyld number be said to have been held benami for A1. The Trial Court also, with reference to the certified companyies of the orders in Misc. Petition No. 768/2014 dated 18.6.2014 and Misc. Petition 289/2014 dated 26.6.2004 passed under Section 5 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance recorded that after the resignation of A3 and A4, there was numberappointment of directors and that seemingly for that reason, the order of attachment passed in 1997 was number assailed for nearly two years. It thus rejected on a companyprehensive analysis of the evidence on record, the companytention of the respondents that the properties acquired in the name of the companypanies did belong to these entities and companyld number have been assimilated in the assets of A1. Qua the respondents plea that the companypanies incorporated under the Companies Act cannot hold property benami for another person, it entered a finding that numbere of the documents of title registered in the names of the companypanies did bear the seal thereof. That in 90 of the registered deeds, the companypanies were number represented by their secretary or director and that the address of the companypanies were number recorded in such deeds, was numbered. The Trial Court companycluded that the registrar who registered these properties and PW 181 who negotiated with the purchasers, distorted the rules to help A1 and they went out of his way to oblige her. That in some of the deeds, the names of the purchasers were number included and that the properties were undervalued was reiterated. The admission of the District Registrar that he proceeded with the registration solely because the properties were purchased by A1 was taken companynizance of. It was thus of the view that the intention of the respondents in taking over the companypanies was for acquiring large number of properties in their names for diverting the funds unlawfully amassed by A1 during her tenure as Chief Minister of the State. It thus companycluded that the properties registered in the names of these companypanies and which formed the subject matter of GOMs No. 1183 dated 25.9.1997 and GOMs No. 120 dated 12.1.1997 issued by the State of Tamil Nadu were really the properties acquired and held by A2 to A4 for and on behalf of A1. The evidence on record thus propel several companyspicuous and singular features as numbered companyprehensively by the Trial Court. Apart from the fact that the properties aforementioned had been acquired during the check period, the general phenomenon decipherable is that the acquisitions had been made in the names of the newly formed or acquired firms companypanies with their directorial companyposition, as numbericed hereinabove and the two existing firms i.e. M.s. Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises of which A1 and A2 were partners. Evidently about 50 banks accounts were opened with the Indian Bank, Abhaypuram and Carana Bank, Mylapore in the names of accused persons and the firms companypanies as has been stated by PW182 and PW201, details of which are as under Sl.No. A C No. Name of the Account Holder Date of Bank Opening of A c 1 C.A.No.792 Indian Bank Jaya Publications 18.09.1991 2 C.A.No.1152 Indian Bank Super Duper T.V. Pvt.21.01.1995 Ltd. 3 C.A.No.1104 Indian Bank Super Duper T.V. Pvt.27.08.1994 Ltd. 4 C.A.No.1179 Indian Bank Jaya Finance Pvt.Ltd.05.05.1995 5 C.A.No.1171 Indian Bank Accused No.4 28.03.1995 6 C.A.No.1068 Indian Bank Accused No.3 30.03.1994 7 C.A.No.1071 Indian Bank Fresh Mushrooms 11.03.1994 8 C.A.No.1059 Indian Bank J.J. Leasing and 27.01.1994 Maintenance 9 C.A.No.4110 Indian Bank Minor Vivek through 12.09.1994 guardian mother A.4 10 C.A.No.1050 Indian Bank J. Real Estate 27.01.1994 11 C.A.No.1062 Indian Bank J.S. Housing 27.01.1994 Development 12 C.A.No.1058 Indian Bank Green Farm House 27.01.1994 13 C.A.No.1054 Indian Bank J. Farm House 27.01.1994 14 C.A.No.1053 Indian Bank Anjaneya Printers 23.01.1994 15 C.A.No.1049 Indian Bank Jaya Contractors and 27.01.1994 Builders 16 C.A.No.1044 Indian Bank Sasi Enterprises 14.12.1993 17 C.A.No.1113 Indian Bank Meadow Agro Farms 13.03.1994 Pvt. Ltd. 18 C.A.No.1095 Indian Bank River Way Agro 06.08.1994 Products Pvt. Ltd. 19 C.A.No.1134 Indian Bank Signora Business 23.11.1994 Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. 20 C.A.No.1107 Indian Bank Lex Property 31.08.1994 Developments Pvt. Ltd. 21 C.A.No.1143 Indian Bank Ramraj Agro Mills 23.12.1994 22 S.B.No.3832 Canara Bank Ms. Jayalalitha 16.04.1991 Mylapore Accused No.1 Branch 23 C.A.No.2018 Canara Bank Ms. Jayalalitha 12.10.1990 Mylapore Accused No.1 Branch 24 S.B.No.23218 Canara Bank Accused No.2 23.09.1990 Mylapore Branch 25 S.B.No.5158 Bank of Accused No.1 28.02.1990 Madhura, Anna Ms. Jayalalitha Nagar Branch, Chennai 26 C.A.A c 1689 Canara Bank, Mahasubbu Lakshmi 27.08.1993 Annanagar Kalyan Mantap Branch Accused No.3, A4 and Shrilatha Devi 27 C.A.No.1173 Indian Bank, Smt. V. Gunabooshani 05.05.1995 Abhirampuram Branch, Chennai 28 C.A.No.1179 -do- Jaya Finance Pvt. Ltd. 29 C.A.No.1171 -do- Accused No.4 28.03.1995 Elavarasi 30 C.A.No.1068 -do- Accused No.3 30.03.1994 31 C.A.No.1071 -do- Fresh Mushrooms A.2 11.03.1994 32 C.A.No.1059 -do- J.J. Leasing and 27.01.1994 Maintenance 33 S.B.No.4110 -do- J. Vivek 12.09.1994 34 C.A.No.1050 -do- J. Real Estate 27.01.1994 35 C.A.No.1062 -do- J.S. Housing 27.01.1994 Developments 36 C.A.No.1058 -do- Green Farm House 37 C.A.No.1054 -do- J. Farm House 38 C.A.No.1053 -do- Anjaneya Printers 23.01.1994 Pvt. Ltd. 39 C.A.No.1049 -do- Jaya Contractors and 27.01.1994 Builders 40 C.A.No.1044 -do- Sasi Enterprises 15.12.1993 41 O.C.C. No.1143 -do- Ramraj Agro Mills 23.12.1994 Ltd. 42 C.A.No.1146 -do- Gopla Promoters 23.03.1995 A.2,3 and 4 43 C.A.No.1140 -do- Lakshmi Construc- 23.03.1995 tions A.2,3 and 4 44 C.A.No.1137 -do- Vigneswara Printers 23.03.1995 A.2,3 and 4 45 C.A.No.1164 -do- Navshakti Contractors23.03.1995 and Builders 46 C.A.No.1161 -do- M s. Sea Enclave 23.03.1995 Enterprises A.2,3 and 4 47 C.A.No.1158 -do- Ayyappa Property 02.03.1995 Development A.2,3 and 4 48 C.A.No.1155 -do- Namo Sivaya Housing 23.03.1995 Development A.2,3 and 4 49 C.A.No.1149 -do- Sakthi Constructions 23.03.1995 A.2,3 and 4 50 C.A.No.1167 -do- Oceanic Constructions23.03.1995 A.2,3 and 4 51 CA No. 1170 -do-Golden Green 23.3.1995 Apartments A2,3 and 4 52 C.A.No.9006 -do- Bharani Beach Resorts06.02.1995 The accused persons also availed the services of companymon auditors accountants. As companyspiracy cannot be proved by direct evidence and has to be essentially inferred from proven circumstances, the ultimate companyclusion with regard thereto has to be deduced from the attendant state of affairs cumulatively taken. It is a trite proposition that in the case of companyspiracy, each member thereof becomes the agent of the other and in law is bound by their actions inter se. So far as A1 and A2 are companycerned, one is the agent for other as partners of the two firms and additionally A2 is the attorney of A1 and is a companyconspirator, as imputed. As testified by PW198, a blanket instruction had been issued by A1 that the directions as made by A2 from time to time ought to be followed and companysequently the latter was to decide in which account the huge cash deposits were to be made. The numerous inter accounts transfers would only companyroborate massive unaccounted cash deposits being made, the origin whereof had been number 36, Poes Garden, Chennai. For all intents and purposes, these accounts were companystrued to be one. The evidence of PW47, PW 71 and PW 159 taken together attest that officials were used to locate and purchase lands at various places. In terms of the testimony of PW159 , in most of the sales, it was A2 who had directed as to the names of the firms individuals to be mentioned in the sale deeds and in whose names the sales were to be registered. The amounts had been paid from amongst various accounts of the accused firms companypanies. In many cases, the sale transactions had taken place below the guideline value as has been deposed by PW159 and PW 221. The testimony of PW 15, PW 40, PW43, PW 56, PW 76, PW 89, PW 160, PW 77 and PW237 is amongst others to the effect that the vendors were kept unaware of the purchasers identity and in some cases were also put under duress to agree to the transactions. Their statements also divulge that number only was A1 aware of these transactions but on several occasions, the registrations thereof were performed at her residence. Dealing with the plea that the companypanies incorporated under the Companies Act cannot hold properties in benami for another, the Trial Court recorded that a companypany is a legal entity with perpetual succession and a companymon seal and has to essentially act through its agents and all companytracts entered into by them must be under the seal thereof. It observed that in the case in hand there was hardly any document of title registered in the name of above companypanies bearing their seal. It companycluded on this premise that the properties purchased in the names of the companypanies thus never acquired the status of the assets thereof. It numbericed, as well, to reiterate, that in 90 of the registered deeds, the companypanies were number represented either by the Secretary or the Director and the documents also did number companytain the address of the companypanies which was a clear indication of the shady and murky deals undertaken in their names with a view to screen the properties acquired through illegal means. The fact that evidence had disclosed that on many occasions, the companycerned Registrar District Registrar had companypromised the rules only to accommodate A1 was adverted to in this companytext. Referring to the decision of Aron Salomon Pauper Vs. A. Salomon and Company Limited supra , in which a companypany, as a legal entity, is held to be distinct from its members, the companyrt propounded that though as a companyollary, its companyporate veil numbermally is impervious, but when its companyporate identity is applied to circumvent law, to defeat public policy, perpetuate fraud or illegality or is sought to be used as a companyer or a facade to justify a wrong, defend crime, to lend a name to private dealing, law would cease to acknowledge it to be a companyporate entity and afford such protection otherwise entitled to under the Companies Law. It companycluded that when camouflaged transactions are carried on behind the legal front, the companyrt may lift the veil and look behind the artificial personality of the companypany and identify the real personalities or natural persons operating behind the screen. According to the Trial Court, the proved facts and circumstance of the case, did establish that respondents had adopted an ingenious ploy or device in furtherance of their criminal companyspiracy to shield the properties acquired through perpetration of a series of offences and had illegally amassed wealth totaling 300 acres of land, in the name of the above shell companypanies which they had strategically taken over to present as a smoke screen to mask such large scale transactions. The Trial Court thus companycluded that the acquisition of properties in such a companyossal measure along with the attendant manoeuvres, did manifest the criminal motive and intention of the accused persons attracting the ingredients of the offence under Section 13 1 e of the Act read with Section 120B IPC. It thus held that the properties registered in the names of these six companypanies and which were the subject matter of GOMS No. 1183 dated 25.9.1997 and GOMS No. 120 dated 12.1.1997 were in reality acquired and held by A2 to A4 for and on behalf of A1. In reaching this companyclusion, the Trial Court also did allude to the abovereferred decision of this Court that property held in the name of an income tax assessee per se did number signify that it actually belonged to the assessee and that there was numberembargo in getting the same registered in the name of one person though the real beneficiary was another. In re the charge of abetment and companyspiracy in general, the Trial Court, while dealing with the defence plea that a number public servant companyld number be prosecuted for the offence under Section 109 IPC in a trial companystituted under the Act, relied on the decision of this Court in P. Nallammal supra to the effect that the acquisition and possession of any property by a public servant is capable of being abetted and that there is neither an express number implied exclusion of the 1988 Act to deal with such a situation. The Trial Court numbered that under Section 3 of the 1988 Act, the Special Judge had the power to try number only an offence punishable under the said statute but also one for companyspiracy to companymit or attempt to companymit or abetment of any offence thereunder. The Trial Court thus held that private individuals companyld be prosecuted by the Special Court under the Act on the ground that they had companyspired with and abetted the act of criminal misconduct companymitted by a public servant within the meaning of Section 13 1 e of the 1988 Act. Turning to the charge of criminal companyspiracy, the Trial Court, numbericing the ingredients of the offence as enumerated in Section 120A IPC, recorded that agreement is the gist of the offence and that mere passive companynizance of a companyspiracy is number sufficient. While acknowledging that to companystitute an offence of criminal companyspiracy, there ought to be active companyperation in furtherance of a joint evil intent, it underlined the rule of evidence relating to such offence that anything said or done by anyone of the companyspirators, with regard thereto, is under certain circumstances evidence against the other, the logic being that within the realm of companyspiracy, the position of the companyspirators is analogous to that of partners, one being companysidered as the agent of the other. Negating the assertion made on behalf of the respondents that the prosecution had failed to produce any material to demonstrate that A2, A3 and A4 had engaged in any criminal companyspiracy with A1 in order to acquire properties on her behalf by utilising her un-accounted finances, as they had business activities and income independent therefrom totally unconnected with her, the Trial Court recounted the entire gamut of the prosecution evidence to the effect that at the relevant time, A2, A3 and A4 did number possess any source of income proportionate to the value of the assets purchased and held in their names and in the name of the six companypanies in particular. It traced the testimony, amongst others of PW128 Balakrishnan, PW169 R. Krishnamoorthy, PW170 R. Jayaraman and the companyresponding documentary evidence to hold that A2, A3 and A4 indeed had neither the source of income, means or the wherewithal to be capable of making the huge acquisitions in their names or for their firms companypanies during the check period. Referring, in particular, to the properties acquired by A3 either in his name or in the name of firms companypanies involved, companypared to his income and the expenditure made, the Trial Court reverted to the evidence of PW 201, the officer of the Canara Bank, Mylapore who, inter alia, had disclosed that in the application filed by this respondent for opening of his saving bank account No. 24621, he had given his address as No. 36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86. This witness testified by adverting to the ledger for this account which on 30.4.1996, showed a balance of Rs.61,430/-. Prior thereto, on 17.7.1992, A3 had remitted cash through signed pay-in-slip for an amount of Rs.5 lakh to this account. He clarified further that in this saving bank account, many receipts were made through clearance. He referred to a withdrawal of Rs.5 lakh by this respondent on 7.12.1992 from this account, who deposited the sum in a fixed deposit account No. 1401/1992 which on maturity was credited to his current account No. 2220. This witness disclosed further that the application submitted by A3 to open this current account carried an introduction by A2 and the address here as well was mentioned as 36, Poes Garden, Chennai. Though this account was opened on 7.4.1993 by remitting an amount of Rs.501 by A3, on 24.9.1994, a sum of Rs.4,10,000 was received in deposit in the account by way of cash. The Trial Court made an itemised reference to various deposits made in this account of heavy sums varying from Rs.26000 to Rs.11 lakhs from other accounts standing inter alia in the name of A2 and several other firms of which A1, A2 and A3 in particular were partners. That huge amounts were credited through clearance and were similarly withdrawn were referred to by this witness. The Trial Court, thus deduced that the acquisitions of the properties made by A3 were out of the funds diverted from the accounts either of A1 or A2 and A3 and A4 did number invest any fund with regard thereto. While dwelling on the charge of companyspiracy and abetment, the Trial Court took companynizance of the formation of large number of firms in the names of A2 to A4 during the relevant period to be a circumstance establishing the said imputation. That A1 and A2 had companymenced partnership business by companystituting two partnership firms by the name Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises and though Jaya Publications was registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1988 on 29.9.1988, it did number file returns up to 1998 as per the Sales Tax Act, was numbered. The disclosure of PW3 Thangavelu, District Registrar, who at the relevant time was serving as Assistant Chief in the Registration Department, South District, Chennai and that he had registered eight firms out of which six namely J.J. Leasing and Maintenance, J.S. Housing Development, Green Farm House, Jaya Farm Houses, J. Real Estate and Jay Contractors and Builders were registered on the same date i.e. 25.1.1994, taken numbere of. The Trial Court also took companynizance of the testimony of PW132, Prakashoon Epen Leelavati, District Registrar, Central Chennai District Registration Office, who claimed to have proved the certified companyies of Form No. 1 relating to the registration of ten firms with A2, A3, A4 and Lex Property Development Private Limited as partners, all registered incidentally on the same date i.e. 15.2.1995. Reference to the statement of PW 230 Balaji on oath that he had been appointed as the Auditor by A2 to A4 and that the firms referred to by him did number buy any property or invest in any other business but received money as loans and further that ten of such firms had closed their bank accounts in 1995 was taken numbere of. According to the Trial Court, the overall evidence as companysidered by it disclosed that the business activities in the names of A2, A3 and A4 started only during the check period and that they did number invest any funds on their own for that purpose and in fact utilised these as a front to enable A1 and A2 to transfer huge unaccounted money through the bank accounts thereof. The Trial Court numbered that at the companymencement of the check period, there were hardly 10 to 12 bank accounts standing in the names of A1 and A2 but thereafter 50 accounts mushroomed during the check period as deposed by PWs 182, 201, 207,209 and 239. The particulars of the bank accounts, the names of the banks, the dates of opening thereof, and the companyresponding exhibits along with the names of the account holders were marked in details. Referring to the evidence of PW-201 in particular, the remittances inter se the accounts of A1 to A4 and their firms also were set out which would demonstrate that the exchanges during the check period were number only numbericeably frequent and numerous but also did sum up to figures fluctuating from Rs.12000/- to Rs.25,00,000/- as would be evident from the particulars of such transfers involving the accounts of A1, A2, A3, A4, Namadhu MGR, Fax Universal, Anjaneya Printers, Green Farm House and Meadow Agro Farm. Oral evidence in the form of testimony of M. Jayaraman PW-198 , Mani, Ram Vijayan Balakrishnan and the documents adduced by the prosecution through the witnesses prove that an amount of Rs.13,55,28,685.50 in all, had been deposited by cash through pay-in-slips in the current accounts of A2 to A4 and the firms by these witnesses and others. These deposits significantly had been made during the check period and apart from heavy amounts on every occasion, varying from above Rs.50,000/- to Rs.33,70,000/-, there is a numbericeable frequency thereof in close proximity with each other. The pay-in-slips proved in support of such cash deposits and exhibited by the witnesses companycerned even disclose deposits of various amounts in different accounts on the very same date. As many as 184 deposits between 17.9.1992 and 8.3.1996 have been made in current account No. 1952 of Namadhu MGR. As many as 267 deposits have been made by Ram Vijayan himself only, totalling Rs.8,96,52,623.30 out of the total amount of Rs.13,55,28,685/- indicated hereinabove, apart from M. Jayaraman PW- 198 , Mani, Ram Vijayan Balakrishnan through whom deposits had been made. A2 and A3 as well have through pay-in-slips made such deposits of a sum of Rs.28,74,000/-. The numbereworthy feature of these deposits is that the same had number been in the account of A1. Not only the cash deposits of such a huge amount is out of the ordinary, the mode thereof i.e. by pay-inslips through a selected few and the frequency thereof render an overwhelming phenomenon, highly redolent and admitting of a logical and persuasive inference of laundering of gigantic unaccounted cash. The absence of deposits in the account of A1 in the multitude of such operations admits of reasonable and unimpeachable companyclusion that the wealth in circulation had its origin in her companyfers. On a rational analysis of such mammoth inflow of cash in the accounts of A2 to A4 and the firms companypanies involved during the check period, the companyclusion of the Trial Court that these resources were at all relevant times held by A2 to A4 and their firms companypanies on behalf of A1 in order to veil her otherwise unexplained disproportionate assets is unassailable. The Trial Court next probed into the credit entries of the relevant bank accounts of the respondents to seek the trail of the fund flow and thus examined the deposits of cash into their bank accounts and also in those of the firms companypanies floated by them spanning from Rs.10,000/- to Rs.33,70,000/. On an audit of the current and saving bank accounts of the respondents and the firms involved, the Trial Court identified unexplained cash credits of huge sums therein varying from Rs.2684.90 to Rs.1,26,00,000/- involving the respondents, Namadhu MGR, Sasi Enterprises, Vinod Video Vision, Jaya Publications, J. Farm House, Maha Subalaxmi Kalayana Mandapam, Anjaneya Printers Private Limited, Fresh Mushroom, Metal King, Super Duper T.V. Private Limited, Lex Property Development Pvt.Ltd., Riverway Agro Production Private Limited, Fax Universal, Meadow Agro Farm Pvt. Limited, Namay Shivaya Housing Development, Vigneshwara Builders, Laxmi Constructions, Sea Enclave, Ayyappa Property Development Private Limited, Ocean Construction, Gopal Promoters, Green Garden Apartments, Shakti Constructions, J. S. Housing Development, Ramraj Agro Mills Private Limited. Noticeably except Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises, A2 to A4 and Lex Property Development Private Limited were the partners of the other firms named above. In this companytext, the Trial Court inter alia referred to the decision of this Court in Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif Vs. C.I.T., 1963 50 ITR 1 SC , wherein it was expounded that the onus was on the assessee to explain the nature and source of cash credits as to whether those stood in the assessees account or in the account of a third party and that the assessee had a legal obligation to explain the nature and source of such credit by proving prima facie the transaction s that had yielded such accruals in his books of account. The Trial Court held the view that the respondents in the case in hand had failed to offer any satisfactory explanation with regard to the enormous unexplained credit accumulations in their bank accounts. It rejected the companyfirmatory letter offered by the respondents as false and bogus and further held that the identity of the person who disclosed the source, had also number been proved. Further the transactions which generated such cash credits were also number established. It rejected as well the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement claimed to have been filed before the income tax authorities and on which the respondents primarily relied as their defence, as number proved in accordance with law besides being number in companyformity with the statutory prescriptions. It discarded as well the evidence of the auditors examined by the respondents who, as the evidence on record testified, were number companyversant with the true facts and had number handled their accounts during the check period. The Trial Court returned the finding that the evidence on record cumulatively substantiated that the returns, the balance sheet and the profit and loss accounts were framed and fashioned to offer an explanation to the otherwise titanic unexplained credits in their respective bank accounts. The Trial Court thus held that the respondents had failed to prove their defence, when tested on the evidence adduced even by the standard of preponderance of probability. While observing that mere declaration of property in the income tax returns does number ipso facto companynote that the same had been acquired from the known lawful sources of income, the Trial Court held the view that the prosecution companyld successfully establish that the respondents and their firms companypanies, who posed to be income tax assessees, had numberindependent or real source of income and that it was the finance of A1 that was really in circulation and thus it companyld prove beyond reasonable doubt that the only source of money the acquisition of large assets was that of hers. The evidence of PW198 M. Jayaraman, a member of staff with A1 in her house at Poes Garden, at the relevant point of time, admitting remittances into various bank accounts through Mr. Vijayan on the instructions of A2 was referred to in particular. That this witness had stated that A2 used to instruct him about the details of the bank to which the deposit ought to be credited and that the amounts used to be dispatched in suit cases and bags through domestic servants was taken numbere of. The Trial Court took into companysideration his testimony that he used to fill the challans as directed by A2 which he identified in the companyrse of his examination. He identified too, the signatures of Mr. Vijayan on the challans. The Trial Court also took numbere of the evidence of PW 182 and PW 201, the bank officers who identified proved large numbers of pay-in-slips and also affirmed that those bore the name of Mr. Vijayan as the person remitting the amounts mentioned. These witnesses had stated further, as numbered by the Trial Court, that the pay orders and the demand drafts issued by them for the purpose of acquisition of the assets as involved were at the instance of the respondents. That these demand drafts or the pay orders companyld be directly related to the cheques or pay orders mentioned in the various sales deeds was recorded as well. This too, as held by the Trial Court, did establish the nexus of the funds of A1 with the investments made for the acquisition of such assets. The Trial Court thus sustained the charge levelled by the prosecution that all the assets and pecuniary resources found to be possessed by A2 to A4 and in the names of various firms companypanies actually belonged to A1 and thus she in fact possessed the assets and pecuniary resources of the total value of Rs.55,02,48,215 in her name and in the names of A2 to A4 and of the firms companypanies, thus establishing the ingredients of the offence under Section 13 1 e of the C. Act. It held the view that A2 to A4 as the evidence substantiated had companyspired with A1 and had actively abetted in companylaboration with each other with the sole object of acquiring and holding properties and assets disproportionate to the known sources of income of A1. This according to the Trial Court stood companyroborated by the large number of accounts opened in the names of the respondents or of firms companypanies and the disbursements to these accounts only by the staff of A1 on the instructions of A2 who was in-charge of her financial affairs. The Trial Court also took companynizance of the fact that the evidence on record established that except Super Duper T.V. Private Limited, neither the respondents number their firms did credit any amount to the various accounts standing in their names. Rather, all these firms had gained deposits transferred to their accounts either from that of Namadhu MGR or Jaya Publications. Reiterating the rejection of the plea of the respondents, that large deposits companylected from various subscribers of Namadhu MGR totalling Rs.15 crores had been credited in the accounts of Namadhu MGR and Jaya Publications, the Trial Court reaffirmed that these deposits in fact represented the un-explained wealth accumulated by A1. The Trial Court in the ultimate analysis summed up the circumstances gleaned from the evidence on record to companyclusively hold that the prosecution companyld prove beyond reasonable doubt, the charges levelled against the respondents as framed. While enumerating finally the facets substantiating this determination, the Trial Court took numbere of the fact that A1 had executed a general power of attorney Ex. P-995 in favour of A2 in respect of Jaya Publications as A1, at all relevant time, was the partner of the said firm. That such a power of attorney was otherwise number necessary and that this authority was thus endowed on A2 so as to lend her a free hand in the management of Jaya Publications so as to facilitate the defence of A1 that she used to be a dormant partner and was unaware of the transactions carried on by A2 was recorded. The Trial Court however held the view that by the execution of such power of attorney, in law, A1 rendered herself liable for all acts and deeds of A2 pursuant to the powers so companyferred. It companyrelated the flow of funds accumulated by A1 to the account of Jaya Publications and thereafter to branch out the same to other accounts to be eventually appropriated for the acquisition of huge assets. The Trial Court thus rejected the stand of A1 that she was unaware of the activities of A2, her agent with regard to the transfer of the funds and the mode of utilization thereof. The companystitution of various firms during the check period was cited as well to be another circumstance to prove the companyspiracy amongst the respondents. The Trial Court re-counted that at the companymencement of the check period, A1 and A2 were involved in the two companycerns namely M s Jaya Publication and M s Sasi Enterprises but during the check period as many as 18/21 firms did companye into existence. The Trial Court reiterated that the evidence on record however proved that numbere of these firms either carried on business during the check period or companytributed any share capital to or receive any profit from these firms. The fact that in a single day, ten of such firms have been companystituted with identical features was reiterated. The Trial Court did recall as well that number only A2 and A3 did start independent companycerns in their names, even defunct companypanies were purchased taken over by the respondents. However, numbere of these firms or companypanies did actually carry on any business except acquiring huge properties. Referring to the fact that at the time of opening of the bank accounts of these firms companypanies, numbere of these entities had any independent resources, the Trial Court deduced that these firms companypanies were numberhing but extensions of Namadhu MGR and Jaya Publications and owed their existence to the benevolence of A1 and A2 for companytinued sustenance. It reiterated that the proved fact that large amount of funds were diverted to these accounts was a clear attestation of the fact that these firms were companystituted to only siphon off the unlawful resources amassed by A1. The fact that these firms companypanies did operate from the residence of A1 belied the feigned ignorance of A1 about their activities, was numbered. The joint residence of all the accused persons also companyld number be ignored as a factor companytributing to the charge of companyspiracy and abetment when assessed together with the attendant facts and circumstances reinforcing the said imputations. This also belied, according to the Trial Court, the specious plea of A2 to A4 that each one of them had independent business and own source of income. The fact that A2 to A4 did companybine to companystitute the firms to acquire huge tracts of land out of the funds provided by A1 also was a clear index that their assemblage in the house of A1 was number engendered by any philanthropic urge for friends and their relations in need, rather to frame and further the criminal companyspiracy to hold the assets of A1. The fact that the materials on record did evince that A1 had number only advanced Rs.1 crore to Shasi Enterprises as a companytribution to its share capital for which she availed loan, but also that she did issue several cheques in favour of other accused persons and filed application for availing loan for the benefit of the firms involved, did buttress the charge that she was wholly aware of the dealings of the companyaccused and the firms in their minutest details. The free flow of money from one account to the other of the respondents, the firms companypanies also proved beyond reasonable doubt that all the accused persons had actively participated in the companyspiracy to launder the ill-gotten wealth of A1 for purchasing properties in their names. The fact that the assets and properties of the six companypanies were attached pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance and that the applications for vacating the attachments were number filed for more than two years therefrom did make it apparent that numberother person except the accused were interested therein. The Trial Court rightly did mark as well, referring in particular to the evidence of PW159 Sub-Registrar, North Beach, Sub Registrars Office and PW71 Radha Krishnan, Horticulture Officer that they were called to Poes Garden and on the instructions of higher officers, they did oblige A1 even by relaxing the rules in the registration of large number of documents by taking personal interest and even overlooking that the properties were undervalued to hold a deep seated involvement of A1 in these transactions. That the registering authorities had gone to the extent of permitting registration of six documents even without incorporating the names of the purchasers, was referred to. The Trial Court in its companyclusion, on an exhaustive analysis of the evidence as a whole, held the following facts to have been proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt. Total assets found in possession of A-1 as Rs.55,02,48,215 on 30.4.1996 II Total expenditure incurred by the accused Rs. 8,49,06,833/- during the check period III Total of I and II Rs. 63,51,55,048/- IV Total income of accused from all sources as Rs. 9,91,05,094/- determined above Value of disproportionate assets and Rs. 53,60,49,55,954/- pecuniary resources found in possession of accused as on 30.04.1996 which has number been satisfactorily accounted. In view of this, the Trial Court companyvicted A1 for the offences under Section 13 1 e r w Section 13 2 of the PC Act. Further A1 to A4 were companyvicted under Section 120-B IPC r w Section 13 1 e r w Section 13 2 of the PC Act as well. A2 to A4 were additionally companyvicted under Sections 109 IPC r w 13 1 e r w 13 2 of the PC Act and sentenced them accordingly as heretobefore mentioned. The Trial Court further ordered that necessary directions be issued to the companycerned banks to remit the proceeds of the fixed deposits and the cash balance standing to the credit of the respective accused persons in their bank accounts to be appropriated and adjusted towards the fine amounts. It was directed as well that if even after such adjustment, the amount fell short of the quantum of fine, the gold and diamond ornaments, seized and produced before the companyrt after setting apart 7040 gms. of gold with proportionate diamond jewellery be sold to RBI or SBI or by public auction so as to meet the deficit. The rest of the gold and diamond jewellery was directed to be companyfiscated to the Government. It further ordered that all immovable properties registered in the names of Lex Property Developments Pvt. Ltd., Meadow Agro Firms Pvt. Ltd., Rama Raj Agro Mills P Ltd., Signora Business Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., Riverway Agro Production P Ltd. and Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Ltd. which were under attachment pursuant to GO Nos. MS 120 and 1183, above referred to be companyfiscated to the State Government. It ordered as well that out of the fine amount recovered, a sum of Rs.5 crores be made over to the State of Karnataka towards reimbursement of expenses for the trial companyducted thereat. As many as 34 companypanies firms fell for scrutiny in the companyrse of adjudication. Out of these Jaya Publications, Sasi Enterprises, Signora Business Enterprises Private Limited, Lex Property Development Pvt. Limited, Riverway Agro Production Private Limited, Meadow Agro Firm Pvt. Limited, Indo Doha Chemical and Pharmaceutical Limited, Ram Raj Agro Mills Limited did exist from before the check period. The others were registered during the check period and numberably, the date of registration of six of these had been 25.1.1994 and three bank accounts of five of them had been opened on the same date i.e. 27.1.1994. Further ten of such firms had been registered on 15.2.1995 and their bank accounts had been opened on 23.3.1995. To say the least, in the companytext of the charge levelled, this companyincidence also is companyspicuously abnormal and irreconcilable. Another numbere worthy feature is that in most of these firms, A2, A3 and A4 are the partners with Lex Property Development Pvt. Limited, joining them in some. There are firms as well where either A2 or A3 is the proprietor and others are with the companybination of A2, A3 and A4. As the evidence with regard to the affairs of the six firms in whose names large tracts of properties had been purchased and deposits made, has been dilated upon hereto before, the same does number warrant further elaboration. The unimpeded, frequent and spontaneous inflow of funds from the account of A1 to those of the other companyaccused and the firms companypanies involved, overwhelmingly demonstrate the companylective culpable involvement of the respondents in the transactions in the face of their overall orientations so as to render the same to be masked banking exchanges though involving several accounts but mostly of the same bank. No other view is possible. Apart from the above, the demurral of unfairness in investigation and trial also cannot be sustained in the overall factual companyspectus. True that in companyrse of the investigation, some documents had been seized which were number adduced in evidence being companystrued to be irrelevant for substantiating the charge, but it did number certainly tantamount to suppression thereof so as to afflict the trial with the vice of unfairness and number-transparency as alleged. Additionally, the companyrts did intervene as permissible in law wherever merited to ensure against any prejudice qua the parties. The fact that the documents seized but number brought on evidence by the prosecution had number been destroyed and were available to the respondents for their inspection, at all relevant times, is, per se, an index of fair and impartial trial. The defence as a matter of record did at some point of time close its side of evidence by examining only two witnesses, whereafter following the inspection of the documents, as desired by the respondents, after A1 had returned to power, examined as many as 99 witnesses. Prior thereto, 76 prosecution witnesses were permitted to be recalled for further cross-examination. The remonstrance that the Trial Court did number take into companysideration the defence evidence is also number borne out by the records. As would be evident from its judgment, the testimony of several witnesses examined by the respondents received indepth appreciation by the Trial Court wherever relevant. The companytention that the Trial Court had companyducted the trial in a manner prejudicial to the respondents in the overall companytext, both factual and legal, thus cannot be sustained. That the Trial Court was meticulous, sensitive, vigilant and judicious in appraisal, stands authenticated by the fact that in valuing the assets, as warranted, it excluded a sum of Rs.32 lakhs towards the price of sarees and further reduced the value of gold and diamond to the extent of Rs.2 crores. It also allowed reduction in the marriage expenses by more than 50 and further discounted the value of companystructions by permitting a depreciation of 20. Apropos the off repeated grievance, of the defence that the Trial Court had left out of companysideration material pieces of evidence adduced by it, suffice it to state that the decision rendered by it proclaim to the companytrary. In all the aspects amongst others income, expenditure and assets, the judgment of the Trial Court reveals on a plain reading that the evidence adduced by the defence as companystrued to be relevant had number only been taken numbere of but also analysed and applied for arriving at the companyclusions on the issues pertaining to the adjudication. Whereas qua income, reference of the testimony of the defence witnesses is decipherable amongst others pertaining to the scrutiny involving Namadhu MGR, Super Duper T.V., gifts offered to A1, rental income and income tax returns, the Trial Court did also assess the defence evidence while judging the case on the issues of marriage of A3, expenditure and as well as valuation of buildings. The cavil to the companytrary thus cannot be entertained. Further this plea though elaborated in details in companyrse of the arguments in the present proceedings was number taken very specifically before the High Court by the respondents while challenging their companyviction. Significantly, such a grievance has also number been made by them by laying a formal challenge to such purported omissions on the part of the Trial Court, before this Court, as companytemplated in law. In this persuasive backdrop, we are thus disinclined to sustain this companytention. This is more so as in view of the appraisal of the relevant evidence as a whole, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court suffers from manifest errors on the face of the record, both on facts and in law and is liable to be set-aside. The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 referred to as the Ordinance as well , which was enforced w.e.f. 23.8.1944 is an yield of the exercise of powers under Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and is directed to prevent the disposal or companycealment of property procured by means of the offences enlisted in the Schedule thereto. To iterate, for the instant adjudication, paragraphs 4A and 5 of the Schedule are extracted hereinbelow for immediate reference 4-A an offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 5 Any companyspiracy to companymit or any attempt to companymit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in item 2,3 and 4 and 4-A. As the present appraisal does number involve the other offences enumerated in the Schedule, those are number being dwelt upon. Clause 3 of the Ordinance provides that where the State Government or as the case may be, the Central Government has reason to believe that any person has companymitted, whether after the companymencement of the Ordinance or number, any scheduled offence and whether or number any companyrt has taken companynizance thereof, it may authorise the making of an application to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, for attachment of any money or other property, believed to have been procured by means of such offence. It also permits that if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached, the prayer in the application may be extended to other property of the said person of the value as nearly as may be equivalent thereto. The provisions did make applicable Order XXVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the proceedings for an order of attachment under the Ordinance as they did apply to the suits by the Government. Section 4 companytemplates ad interim attachment by the jurisdictional District Judge, in the eventualities as mentioned therein and while doing so, he is required to issue to the person whose money or other property was being attached, a numberice accompanied by companyies of the order, the application and affidavits and of the evidence, if recorded, asking him to show cause on a date to be specified in the numberice as to why the order of attachment should number be made absolute. Clause 5 empowers the District Judge to make the ad interim order of attachment absolute, if either numberobjection is filed by the person affected or number varied after necessary enquiry on a companysideration of the objection if filed, and the evidence is adduced. In terms of clause 10 of the Ordinance, an order of attachment of property made shall unless it is withdrawn, companytinue to be in force, in a companytingency where a companyrt has taken companynizance of the alleged schedule offence whether, before or after the time when the order was applied for, until orders are passed by the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance after the termination of the criminal proceedings. Clause 11 provides for appeals against the order s of the District Judge, in the matter of attachment before the jurisdictional High Court. Whereas clause 12 makes it incumbent on the companyrt trying a scheduled offence, when apprised of an order of attachment of the property involved under the Ordinance, to record a finding, in case of companyviction, as to the amount of money or value of other property procured by the accused by means of the offence, Clause 13 mandates the manner of disposal of such attached property upon termination of the criminal proceedings. Thereunder, when the final judgment or order of the criminal companyrt is one of companyviction, the District Judge shall order that from the property of the companyvicted person attached under the Ordinance or out of the security given in lieu of such attachment, there shall be forfeited to Government such amount or value as is found in the final judgment or order of the criminal companyrt, to have been procured by the companyvicted person, by means of the offence together with the companyts of attachment as determined by the District Judge. Sub-clause 4 deals with a situation where the amounts ordered to be forfeited or recovered exceed the value of the property of the companyvicted person attached, thus permitting in that eventuality, the steps to follow. Sub-clause 6 ordains that every sum ordered to be forfeited in companynection with any scheduled offence other than one specified in item 1 of the schedule, would after deduction of the companyt of attachment as determined by the District Judge, be credited to the Government or the local authority to which the offence has caused loss or where there is more than one such government or local authority, to be distributed amongst them in the proportion to the loss sustained by each. Noticeably termination of criminal proceedings, as per clause 2 2 , as relevant for our present purpose, would be where this Court would pass its final order in the present appeals. In the appeals, filed by the State of Karnataka pertaining to the release of the properties recorded in the name of the six companypanies involved, companysequent upon the acquittal of the respondents, the parties are essentially at issue on the applicability or otherwise of Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 invoked by the Trial Court to order companyfiscation forfeiture of the properties otherwise attached under the Ordinance.

With C.A. Nos. 352-354 of 1980 DELIVERED BY P. SINGH, J. P. SINGH, J. The State of Tamil Nadu is the appellant in these appeals. Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 has been filed against the judgment of the High Court of madras in Writ Petition 1464 of 1974, whereas Civil Appeal Nos. 352-352-354 of 1980 have been filed against the judgment of the same High Court in Writ Petition 2341-2343 of 1978. All the writ Petitions had been filed on behalf of the respondent which were allowed by the High Court. The respondent, a public limited companypany which owned and possessed 3421.14 acres of land, was engaged in companyposite and integrated activity of raising sugarcane on the aforesaid land and crushing it in its sugar factory. The Tamil Nadu Reforms Fixation of ceiling on Land Act, 1961 Act 58 Of 1961 , hereinafter referred to as the principal Act was published in the Tamil Nadu government Gazette on 2.5.1962. According to the said Act, a ceiling of 30 standard acres of agricultural land was fixed as the maximum holding. Under Section 18 1 of the principal Act, the surplus land has to be numberified as required for public purposes and on such publication in view of Section 18 3 of the Act land specified in the numberification shall deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of such publication and all right, title and interest of all persons in such land shall be deemed to have been extinguished. The relevant part of Section 18 of the Act is as follows- Acquisition of surplus land.- 1 After the publication of the final statement under section 12 or 14, the Government shall, subject to the provisions of sections 16 and 17, publish a numberification to the effect that the surplus land is required for a public purpose. 2 On the publication of the numberification under sub-section 1 , the land specified in the numberification together with the trees standing on such land and buildings, machinery plant or apparatus, companystructed, erected or fixed on such land and used for agricultural purpose shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of such publication and right, title and interest of all persons in such land shall, with effect from the said date, be deemed to have been extinguished Provided that where there is any crop standing on such land on the date of such publication, the authorized officer may, subject to such companyditions as may be prescribed, permit the harvest of such crop by the person who had raised such crop. Section 50 1 of the Act provides for payment of amount at the rates specified in Schedule III thereto, to person whose right, title or interest in any land is acquired by the Government. Tamil Nadu land Reforms Reduction of Ceiling on Land Act 17 of 1970, Under the Principal Act there was provision for grant of Exemption to the lands held by sugar factories in excess of the ceiling area. This provision was deleted by Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 41 of 1971, which came into force from 15.1.1972. Because of such amendment even the sugar factories in general companyld number hold land in excess of 15 standard acres. The respondent filed its return under Section 8 of the Principal Act on 6.4.1972. The Additional Authorised officer Land Reforms , Tiruvarur, published the draft statement under section 10 1 of the principal Act on 19.4.1972. The minimum companypensation payable for excess Lands vesting in the Government was 9 times of the net annual income. As such when the respondent filed its return on 6.4.1972, it was entitled to companypensation at the rare of 9 times of the net annual income. However, the Tamil Nadu land Reforms Fixation off Ceiling of land Fourth Amendment Act, 1972 Act 39 of 1972 which came in force with effect from 21.12.1972 amended Schedule III of principal Act reducing the minimum multiples from 9 times to 2 times. The said Amending Act 39 of 1972 purported to reduce the multiple of companypensation which was payable in respect of lands which vested in the Government after 21.12.1972. A numberification under Section 18 1 of the principal Act was published on 4.4.1973 declaring as surplus an extent of 3414.87 acres of land held by the respondent. Possession over such excess land were taken over by the state Government between 6.4.1973 and 26.4.1973. The Draft Compensation Assessment Roll was published by the state Government on 5.12.1973 determining the amount payable to the respondent in respect of the surplus lands applying the rate of 2 times the net annual income. On 15.2.1974, The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Fixation of Ceiling on Land Sixth Amendment Act 1972 Act 7 of 1974 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. Subsection 2 of Section 3 of Act 7 of 1974 amended subsection 3 of section 18 of the principal Act on and from 1.3.1972. The relevant part thereof is as follows- 3 2 in section 18 of the principal Act,- a in sub-section 3 , for the words with effect from the date of such publication, The words with effect from the date of the companymandment of this Act, had been substituted b c The effect of substitution of sub-section 3 of section 18 of the principal Act shall be that whereas under the original sub-section 3 of section 18 of the principal Act only on publication of the numberification under subsection 1 of section 18, the land specified in the numberification together with the trees standing on such land and buildings, machinery plant etc., was deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of such publication because of the substitution of subsection 3 of section 18 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 the lands in question shall deemed to have vested in Government with effect from the date of the companymencement of Act 7 of 1974, i.e. with effect from 1.3.1972. It can be said that as sub-section 3 of section 18 stood prior to amendment by Act 7 of 1974 on publication of the numberification under Section 18 1 , the vesting of the respondents sugarcane land in the state Government had taken place with effect from 4.4.1973, but in view of substituted sub-section 3 of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974, it shall be deemed that the vesting of the excess lands took place with effect from 1.3.1972. In Section 3 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 a new sub-section 3-A was also introduced which is as follows 3-A a Every person who, after the date of the companymencement of this Act, was in possession of, or deriving any benefit from the property vested in the Government under Sub-section 3 shall be liable to pay to the Government, for the period, after such companymencement, for which he was in such possession or deriving such benefit, an amount as companypensation for the use, occupation or enjoyment of that property as the authorised officer may fix in the prescribed manner. Such officer shall take into companysideration such facts as may be prescribed. Any amount payable to the Government under clause a shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. According to the respondent, in view of the amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974, antedating the date of vesting from 4.4.1973 to 1.3.1972 the respondent was entitled to the payment applying the multiple of 9 times of the net annual income instead of multiple of 2 times which was introduced by aforesaid Act 39 of 1972 with effect from 21.12.1972. Writ petition No. 1464 of 1974 was filed on behalf of the respondent challenging the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll aforesaid, before the High Court which was admitted by the High Court. It may be pointed out that the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant-state, companyld number explain as to what was the purpose of enacting Act 7 of 1974 aforesaid and what object it purported to achieve. He simply stated that later the legislature itself restored the original position by enacting Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Fixation of ceiling on Land Amendment Act 78 Act 25 of 1978 . Section 4 of that Act is as follows Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961, as subsequently modified, to have effect subject to modifications-The Principal Act, shall, on and from the 1st day of march 1972, have effect as if, - 1 in section 18 of the principal Act,- a in sub-section 3 , for the words with effect from the date of the companymencement of this Act, the words with effect from the date of such publication had been substituted b c sub-section 3-A had been omitted. In view of section 4 aforesaid, in sub-section 3 of section 18 of the principal Act the words with effect from the date of such publication was again substituted for the words with effect from the date of companymencement of this Act which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. Subsection 3-A which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 was also omitted. Sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 which are relevant provided Certain provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 7 of 1974 number to have effect- Notwithstanding anything companytained in the Tamil Nadu land Reforms Fixation of Ceiling on Land Sixth Amendment Act, 1972 Tamil Nadu Act 7 of 1974 hereinafter in this section referred to as the 1972 Act , or in any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt or other authority, subsection 2 of section 3 of the 1972 Act shall be omitted and shall be deemed always to have been omitted and accordingly the modifications made to section 18 of the principal Act by the said sub-section 2 ,- a shall be deemed never to have been made and the provisions of the said section 18 of the principal Act as they stood prior to the said modifications shall companytinue in force and shall be deemed always to have companytinued in force and b shall be deemed never to have had the effect of vesting in the State Government the surplus lands specified in any numberification published under sub-section 1 of the said section 18 of the principal Act on or after the 2nd may 1962 and before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from a date earlier to the date of the publication of the numberification under the said sub-section 1 and shall be deemed always to have had the effect of vesting in the state Government such surplus lands, only with effect from the date of the publication of such numberification. Anything done or any action taken under the principal Act in pursuance of the provisions of subsection 2 of section 3 of the 1972 Act, shall be re-opened and determined in accordance with provisions of the principal Act, as modified by this Act. Vesting of certain surplus lands and validation - Notwithstanding anything companytained in any judgment, decree, or order of any companyrt or other authority,- a where before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government 1 of section 18 of the principal Act has been published, the surplus land specified in such numberification shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government, with effect from the date of such publication only, and accordingly the provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act, shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have been applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested and b all acts done and proceedings taken by any officer or authority under the principal Act, on the basis that companypensation in respect of surplus lands referred to in clause a shall be payable only according to the rates specified in schedule III of the principal Act, as in force on the date of publication of the said numberification, shall, for all purposes be deemed to be and to have always been validly Section 4 of this Act had been in force at all material times when such acts or proceedings were done or taken. As already mentioned the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 claiming companypensation applying the multiple of 9 times instead of 2 times and for a direction to the authorised officer to prepare the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll in respect of the lands which had vested taking into account the provisions of aforesaid Act 7 of 1974. This stand was taken on behalf of the respondent because the effect of Act 7 of 1974 was that vesting was to take effect with effect from 1.3.1972 as provided in section 3 of Act 7 of 1974. On 1.3.1974, admittedly aforesaid Amendment Act 39 of 1972 by which the companypensation amount payable for the surplus lands was reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income had number companye into force, it came into force with effect from 21.12.1972. As such if by virtue of Act 7 of 1974 if the vesting had taken place with effect from 1.3.1972 the date of companymencement of Act 7 of 1974, it shall be deemed that vesting had taken place prior to 21.12.1972 when admittedly schedule III provided for payment by applying the multiple of 9 times. The High Court by its order dated 8.10.1976 quashed the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll published, treating the vesting of the surplus lands with effect from 1.3.1972 because of Act 7 of 1974. Civil Appeal No. 134/80 is directed against aforesaid order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976. The respondent also filed Writ petition No. 624 of 1978 for issuance of mandamus to the authorised officer on basis of the aforesaid judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74 to prepare the Draft Assessment Roll as per that a judgment. The High Court by its order dated 3.3.1978 directed the authorised officer to prepare the Assessment Roll accordingly. The aforesaid Act 25 of 1978 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 18.5.1978 and took effect on and from 1.3.1972. It restored parts of sub-section 3 of section 18 as it stood prior to the amendment in that subsection by Act 7 of 1974. it reiterated that the date of vesting of the surplus lands shall be date of the publication of the numberification under sub-section 1 of section 18 of the Act. so far the respondent is companycerned, such numberification under sub-section 1 of section 18 had been published on 4.4.1973, i.e. after 21.12.1972 from which date because Amendment Act 39 of 1972 the companypensation amount payable for the surplus lands had been reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income. Section 5 of Act 25 of 1978 also companytained number-obstante clause with deeming fiction saying that numberwithstanding anything companytained in the Tamil Nadu land Reforms Fixation of Ceiling on Land Sixth Amendment Act 1972 Act 7 of 1974 or any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt, sub-section 2 of section 3 of the aforesaid 1972 Act shall be omitted and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. Section 6 thereof said that numberwithstanding anything companytained in any judgement, decree or order of any companyrt where before the date of the publication of the said Act in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette a numberification under sub-section 1 of section 18 of the principal Act had been published the surplus lands specified in such numberification shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government with effect from the date of such publication only and the provisions of the principal Act as modified by section 4 of Act 25 of 1978 shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested and companypensation in respect of surplus land shall be paid only according to the rates specified in Schedule III of the principal Act as in force on the date of the publication such numberification. In other words, sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 purported to efface and obliterate the amendment which had been introduced in sub-section 3 of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974 and purported to validate the numberification which had been issued on 4.4.1973 under sub-section 1 of section 18 of the principle Act declaring 3414.78 acres of the land belonging to the respondent as surplus. It need number be pointed out that this was done because the multiple of 9 times was reduced to 2 times by Act 39 of 1972 with effect from 21.12.1972. If the vesting had taken place by effect of amended sub-section 3 of section 18 by Act 7 of 1974 with effect from 1.3.1972, the date of the companymencement of the said Act, then the respondent was entitled for companypensation applying the multiple of 9 times. Writ petition Nos. 2341-2343 of 1978 were filed on behalf of the respondent questioning the validity of the aforesaid provisions of Act 25 of 1978 and for a direction that such provisions which were introduced by the said Act had numbereffect on the right of the respondent to receive companypensation applying the minimum multiple of 9 times of the net annual income. Those writ petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 20.7.1979. Civil Appeal Nos. 352-354/80 have been filed against the said Judgment. Mr. Venugopal, the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant-state, took a stand that civil Appeal No. 134/80 has been filed on behalf of the state challenging the validity of the judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 in Writ petition No. 1464/74 directing payment of companypensation to the respondent applying the provisions of Act 7 of 1974, after companying into force of the Act 25 of 1978 it shall be deemed that the basis of the judgment in writ petition No. 1464/74 has been taken away as such the respondent cannot claim companypensation by applying the multiple of 9 times. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant-State that the provisions of Act 25 of 1978 being companystitutional and valid, High companyrt should have dismissed the writ petition Nos. 2341-2343 of 1978 filed on behalf of the respondent questioning the validity of Act 25 of 1978. It may be mentioned at the outset that numbere of the two judgments of the High Court dated 88.10.1976 and 20.7.1979 in writ petition No. 1464/74 and writ petition Nos. 2341- 2343/78 have became final. Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 and civil appeal Nos. 352-354 of 1980 are directed against the aforesaid judgments dated 8.10.1976 and 20.7.1979. In this background, it has to be examined whether sections 4, 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 with number-obstante clause and deeming provisions have taken away the effect of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 directing the appellant-state to apply 9 times multiple in view of the amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974. The other aspect is as to whether in view of the provisions aforesaid of Act 25 of 1978, this Court while companysidering the appeal against aforesaid judgment dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74 has number to proceed as if the amendments in the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 had never been introduced. There is numberdispute in respect of legislative companypetence of legislature to enact Act 25 of 1978. The only dispute is whether provisions of that Act has achieved the achieved the desired result. Sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 companytain deeming fiction in its different clauses while purporting to omit and remove the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 in the principal Act. The role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is by number well settled. When a statute creates legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has number been done, the companyrt has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between what persons such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to. Thereafter companyrts have to give full effect to such a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical companyclusion. In the well-known case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. V. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 observed If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the companysequences and incidents which, if the putative, state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied itThe statute says that you must imagine a certain having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it companyes to the inevitable companyollaries of that state of affairs. That statement of law aforesaid in respect of a statutory fiction is being companysistently followed by this companyrt. Reference in this companynection may be made to the cases of state of Bombay V. Pandurang Vinayak, 1953 SCR 773 Chief Inspector of Mines V. Karam Chand Thapar, 1962 1 SCR 9 K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, 1988 1 SCR 700 M. Venugopal V. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1964 2 SCC 323 and Harish Tandon V. Additional District Magistrate. Allahabad, 1995 1 SCC 537. Section 5 of Act 25 of 1978 provides that numberwithstanding anything companytained in Act 7 of 1974, or in any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt , or other authority, sub-section 2 of section 3 of the aforesaid Act shall be omitted and shall be deemed always to have been omitted and the modifications made to section 18 of the principal Act by the said sub-section 2 - a shall be deemed never to have been made and the provisions of the said section 18 of the principal Act as they stood prior to the said modifications shall companytinue in force and shall be deemed always to have companytinued in force and b shall be deemed never to have had the effect of vesting in the state Government the surplus lands specified in any numberification published under sub-section 1 of the said section 18 of the principal Act on or after the 2nd May 1962 and before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from a date earlier to the date of the publication of the numberification under the said sub-section 1 and shall be deemed always to have had the effect of Vesting in the state Government such surplus lands, only with effect from the date of the publication of such numberification. The legislature by different deeming clauses and through statutory fiction requires the Court to treat that amendments so introduced by Act 7 of 1974 had never been introduced in the principal Act. The power of the legislature to amend, delete or obliterate a statute or to enact a statute prospectively or retrospectively cannot be questioned and challenged unless the companyrt is of the view that such exercise is in in violation of Article 14 of the companystitution. It need number be impressed that whenever any Act or amendment is brought in force retrospectively or any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, or any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, in this process rights of some are bound to be effected one way or the other. In every case, it cannot be urged that the exercise by the legislature while introducing a new provision or deleting an existing provision with retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article 14 of the companystitution. If that stand is accepted, then the necessary companyollary shall be that legislature has numberpower to legislate retrospectively, because in that event a vested right is effected of companyrse, in special situation this companyrt has held that such exercise was violative of Article 14 of the companystitution. Reference in this companynection may be made to the cases of state of Gujarat Another V. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni others, 1983 2 SCR 287 T. R. Kapur V. State of Haryana, 1986 Supp SCC 584 and Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, 1994 5 SCC 450. In the case of state of Gujarat V. Raman Lal Supra a Constitution Bench on the facts and circumstances of that case observed The legislation is pure and simple, self-deceptive, if we may use such an expression with reference to a legislature-made law. The legislature is undoubtedly companypetent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to companyform to the dos and donts of the companystitution neither prospective number retrospective laws can be made so as to companytravene Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, twenty years ago the parties had numberrights, therefore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by twenty years. We are companycerned with todays rights and number yesterdays. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and the companystitutional rights accrued in the companyrse of the twenty years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history. In same terms this Court expressed the opinion in the cases of T.R. Kapur V. State of Haryana supra and Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty supra in respect of alterations in rules framed under Article 309 of the companystitution retrospectively regarding companyditions of service. So far the facts of the present case are companycerned, the provisions of Act 25 of 1978 do number purport to effect any vested or acquired right. It only restores the position which existed when the principal Act was in force. By numberification dated 4.4.1973 issued under section 18 1 of the Act as it stood prior to amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974, 3414.87 acres of land had been declared as surplus which vested in the state Government under section 18 3 of the principal Act as it stood on that date. It can be said that Act 25 of 1978 simply nullifies Act 7 of 1974 which had made amendments in the principal Act after numberification gad been issued under section 18 1 and vesting had taken place under section 18 3 of the principal Act as it stood prior to enactment Act 7 of 1974. By Act 7 of 1974 futile attempt had been made by introducing different amendments. in this process number only it created anomaly in the principal Act, but numberhing purposeful was achieved. It is true that because of the amendments introduced by that Act 7 of 1974, the respondent companyld urge before the High Court that as the vesting had taken place on 1.3.1972, in spite of amendment Act 39 of 1972 which had reduced the multiple from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income with effect from 21.12.1972 the respondent was entitled to companypensation to be worked out on basis of 9 times of the net annual income. But on this ground the provisions of Act 25 to 1978 cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the companystitution and as such ultra vires. Once the provisions are held to be legal and valid, then as pointed out above the wish and desire of the legislature has to be given full effect and to its logical end. The companyrts have to proceed on the assumption the Act 7 of 1974 had never been enacted and numberamendment whatsoever had been introduced in the principal Act directing the vesting to take place with effect from 1.3.1972. This companyrt shall be fully justified in examining the judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 on Writ Petition No. 1464/74 filed by the respondent, treating that Act 7 of 1974 was never enacted or was in existence. As the aforesaid judgment dated 8.10.1976 is solely based on amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974, once such amendments have been effected retrospectively, there is numberescape from the companyclusion that the substratum and basis of the judgment of the High companyrt dated 8. 10.1976 is solely based on amendments introduced by Act 7 of 1974, one such amendments have been effaced retrospectively, there is numberescape from the companyclusion that the substratum and basis of the judgement of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 has been taken away. The High Court had proceeded on the assumption that because of amendment introduced by Act 7 of 1974 the vesting shall be deemed to have taken place with effect from 1.3.1972 and on that assumption direction was given to calculate the companypensation applying 9 times multiples which had been reduced to 2 timed with effect from 21.12.1972 by amendment Act 39 of 1972. But if the provision which directed Vesting with effect from 1.3.1972 does number exist in eyes of law, then there is numberquestion of holding that vesting shall be deemed to have taken place with effect 1.3.1972 when companypensation was to be worked out by applying the 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income with effect from 21.12.1972. Thereafter on 4.4.1973 numberification under Section 18 1 of the principal Act was issued declaring 3414.87 acres of land of the respondent as surplus which vested in the State Government under Section 18 3 of the principal Act as it stood on that date. As such the companypensation has to be worked out on basis of the amendment which had been introduced in schedule III of the Act by amendment Act 39 of 1972. This Court can modify the judgement of the High Court dated 8.10.1976 taking into account No.134 of 1980 is against aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 8.10.1976. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Section 6 of the Act 25 of 1978 provides that numberwithstanding anything companytained in any judgment, decree, or order of any companyrt or other authority where before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, a numberification under sub-section 1 of section 18 of the principal Act had been published, the surplus lands specified in such numberification shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government, with effect from the date of such publication only, and accordingly the provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act, shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have been applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested. The scope of a number-obstante clause and of validating Act has been examined by this Court from time to time . Reference in this companynection be made to the judgment in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. Broach Borough Municipality, 1969 2 SCC 283 where Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the Constitution bench said When a legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a companyrt to be illegally companylected under and ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important companydition, of companyrse, is that the legislature must possess the power to impose the tax, for if it does number, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative companypetence, it is number sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the companyrt shall number bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does number possess or exercise. A Courts decision must always bind unless the companyditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision companyld number have been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a companyrt holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both area invalid or do number sufficiently create the jurisdiction . Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be known only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had number been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already companylected to stand under the reenacted law. Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was companylected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon companyrts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the companyrt which becomes ineffective after the change of the law. The same view was reiterated in the cases of west Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. V. State of Madras, 1963 2 SCR 747 Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, 1968 3 SCR 41 Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath V. State of U.P, 1973 3 SCC 585 Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyay v. Union of India, 1975 2 SCC 302 Hindustan Gum Chemicals Ltd. V. State of Haryana, 1985 , 4 SCC 124 Utkal Contractors and Joinery Ltd. V. State of Orissa, 1987 Supp SCC 751 D. Cawasji Co. v. state of Mysore, 1984 Supp SCC 490 and Bhubaneshwar Singh V. Union of India, 1994 6 SCC 77. It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the companyrt or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A companyrts directive must always bind unless the companyditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions companyld number have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed put in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in writ petition No. 1464/74, dated 8.10.1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 . If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that numbersuch amendments had ever been introduced in the principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional . On behalf of the respondent, it was pointed out that the High Court in its judgment dated 8.10.1976 in writ petition No. 1464/74 has number declared any provision to be invalid because of which a validating Act was required. The said judgment had also numberpointed out any defect in any Act which had to be rectified by a validating Act. It had simply proceeded on the provisions of Act 7 of 1974 and had issued direction to the state Government to proceed in accordance with those provisions. This Court has examined the power of the legislature to amend the provisions of the Act in question after a companyrt verdict. Reference in this companynection may be made to the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh Anr. v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. 1975 2 SCC 274 where it was observed We see numbersubstance in the respondents companytention that by redefining the term house with retrospective effect and by validating the levies imposed under the unamended Act as if numberwithstanding anything companytained in any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt, that Act as amended was in force on the date when the tax was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon a judicial function. The power of the legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively the one numberless than the other. Within the scope of its legislative companypetence and subject to other companystitutional limitations, the power of the legislature to enact laws is plenary. In United provinces V. Atiga Begum, Gwyer, C.J. while repelling the argument that Indian Legislatures had numberpower to alter the existing laws retrospectively observed that within the limits of their powers the Indian legislatures were as supreme and sovereign as the British parliament itself and that those powers were number subject to the strange and unusual prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power to validate a law retrospectively is, subject to the limitations aforesaid, an ancillary power to legislate on the particular subject. The state legislature, it is significant, has number overruled or set aside the judgment of the High Court. It has amended the definition of house by the substitution of a new section 2 15 for the old section and it has provided that the new definition shall have retrospective effect, numberwithstanding anything companytained in any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt or other authority. In other words, it has removed the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court so that the decision companyld number have been given to the altered circumstances. If the old Section 2 15 were to define house in the manner that the amended section 2 15 does, there is numberdoubt that the decision of the High Court would have been otherwise. In fact, it was number disputed before us that the buildings companystructed by the respondent meet fully the requirements of Section 2 15 as amended by the Act of 1974. In Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P, the Legislature amended the law retrospectively and thereby removed the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court of Allahabad. It was held by this Court that this was within the permissible limits and validation of the old Act by companystitute an encroachment on the functions of the judiciary. Again in the case of Sunder Dass V. Ram Prakash, 1977 3 SCR 60 it was said The appellant, however, urged that the introduction of the proviso in section 3 should number be given greater retrospective operation than necessary and it should number be so companystrued as to affect decrees for eviction which had already become final between the parties. Now, it is true, and that is a settled principle of companystruction, that the companyrt ought number to give a larger retrospective operation to a statutory provision than what can plainly be seen to have been meant by the legislature. This rule of interpretation is hallowed by time and sanctified by decisions, though we are number at all sure whether it should have validity in the companytext of changed social numberms and values. But even so, we do number see how the retrospective introduction of the proviso in section 3 can be companystrued so as to leave unimpaired a decree for eviction already passed, then the question arises in execution whether it is a nullity. The logical and inevitable companysequence of the introduction of the proviso in section 3 with retrospective effect would be to read the proviso as if it were part or the section at the date when the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was enacted and the legal fiction created by the retrospective operation must be carried to its logical extent and all the companysequences and incidents must be worked out as if the proviso formed part of the section right from the beginning. This would clearly render the decree for eviction a nullity and since in execution proceeding, an objection as to nullity of a decree is a nullity, the principle of finality of the decree cannot be invoked by the appellant to avoid the companysequences and incidents flowing from the retrospective introduction of the proviso in section 3. Moreover , the words numberwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt or other authority in the proviso make it clear and leave numberdoubt that the legislature intended that the finality of judgment, decree or order of any companyrt or other authority should number stand in the way of giving full effect to the retrospective introduction of the proviso in section 3 and applying the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in cases falling within the proviso. Same was the situation in the case of Bhubaneshwar Singh V. Union of India supra where taking numbere of the subsequent amendments in the companycerned Act the Court came to the companyclusion- In the present case as already pointed out above, if subsection 2 as introduced by the Coal Mines Nationalisation Laws Amendment Act 1986 in section 10 had existed since the very inception, there was numberoccasion for the High Court or this Court to issue a direction for taking into account the price which was payable for the stock of companye lying on the date before the appointed day. The authority to introduce sub-section 2 in section 10 of the aforesaid Act with retrospective effect cannot be questioned. Once the amendment has been introduced retrospectively, companyrts have to act on the basis that such provision was there since the beginning. The role of the deeming provision need number be emphasised in view of series of judgments of this companyrt In the present case, the lacuna or defect has been removed by the introduction of sub-section 2 in section 10 of the Act with retrospective effect. Sub-section 2 of section 10 as well as section 19, both have specified that the amount which is to be paid as companypensation mentioned in the schedule shall be deemed to include and deemed always to have included, the amount required to be paid to such owner in respect of all companyl in stock on the date immediately before the appointed day. As such the earlier judgment of this companyrt is of numberhelp to the petitioner. On behalf of the respondent reference was made to the well-known judgment of this companyrt in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak V. Union - of India, 1978 2 SC 50 and it was pointed out from the judgment of Chief justice Bag who observed I may, however, observe that even though the real object of the Act may be to set aside the result of the Mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court, Yet, the section does number mention this object at all. Probably this was so because the jurisdiction of a High Court and the effectiveness of its orders derived their force from Article 226 of the Constitution Itself. These companyld number be touched by an ordinary act of parliament. Even if section 3 of the Act Seeks to take away the basis of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, without mentioning it, by enacting what may appear to be a law, yet, i think that, where the rights of the citizen against the State are companycerned, we should adopt an interpretation which upholds those rights. Therefore, according to the interpretation I prefer to adopt the rights which had passed into those embodied in a judgment and became the basis of a mandamus from the High Court companyld number be taken away in this indirect fashion. The facts of that case were entirely different. In the Act which was being challenged, there was numbernon-obstante clause purporting to take away the effect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court. Letters patent Appeal filed against the judgment whose effect was being taken away by the provisions in question had been withdrawn. Bhagwati, J as he then was made a special mention of the aforesaid facts for purpose of holding that the effect of the Calcutta High Court had number be nullified by the provisions in question- It is significant to numbere that there was numberreference to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the Statement of objects and Reasons , number any number-obstante clause referring to a judgment of a companyrt in section 3 of the impugned Act. The attention of parliament does number appear to have been drawn to the fact that the Calcutta High Court has already issued a writ of Mandamus companymanding the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of Bonus for the year April 1, 1975 to March 31,1976. It appears that unfortunately the judgment of the Calcutta High Court remained almost unnoticed and the impugned Act was passed in ignorance of that judgment. Section 3 of the impugned Act or issued that the provisions of the settlement in so far as they relate to payment of annual cash bonus to class III and class IV employees shall number have any force or effect and shall number to deemed to have had any force or effect from April 1,1975 to March 31,1976 was companycerned, it became crystalised in the judgment and thereafter they became entitled to enforce the writ of mandamus granted by the judgment and number any right to annual cash bonus under settlement. This right under the judgment was number sought to be taken away by the impugned Act. The judgment companytinued to subsist and the Life Insurance Corporation was bound to pay annual cash bonus to Class III and Class IV employees for the year April 1, 1975 to Mandamus. The error companymitted by the Life Insurance Corporation was that it withdrew the Letters patent Appeal and allowed the judgment of the learned single judge to become final. By the time the Letters Patent Appeal came up for hearing, the impugned Act had already companye into force and the Life Insurance Corporation companyld, therefore , have successfully companytended in that letters Patent Appeal that, since the settlement, in so far as it provided for payment of annual cash bonus, was annihilated by the impugned Act with effect from April 1,1975 to March 31,1976 and hence numberwrit of mandamus companyld issue directing the life Insurance Corporation to make payment of such bonus . If such companytention had been raised, there is little doubt, subject of companyrse to any companystitutional challenge to the validity of the impugned Act , that the judgment of the learned single judge would have been upturned and the writ petition dismissed. But on account of some inexplicable reason, which is difficult to appreciate, the Life Insurance Corporation did number press the letters patent Appeal and the result was that the judgment of the learned single judge granting writ of mandamus became final and binding on the parties. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances the Life Insurance Corporation companyld claim to be absolved from the obligation imposed by the judgment to carry out the writ of mandamus by relying on the impugned Act. emphasis supplied Because of the aforesaid factual position of that case the view expressed by the Constitution Bench in the Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. Broach Borough Municipality Supra was held to be of numberhelp to the life insurance Corporation. Reference was also made on behalf of the respondent to the judgment of this companyrt in the case of A.V. Nachane Another V. Union of India Another, 1982 2 SCR 246 where it was observed in respect of the Amendment Act, which was the subject matter of companytroversy in that case, that it companyld number nullify the effect of the writ issued by this Court in D.J. Bahadurs case, relying on aforesaid judgment in the Madan Mohan Pathak Supra . From a bare reference to page 267 of the report, it appears that the learned judges placed reliance on the defect pointed out in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak by Bhagwati, J quoted above. In other words, on peculiar facts and circumstances of the case it was held that the effect of the judgment in the case of D.J. Bahadur had number been taken away by the Amending Act. On behalf of the respondent, reliance was also placed on the cases of Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Another, 1970 1 SCC 509 The municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Another, etc. etc. The New Shrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc. etc., 1970 2 SCC 280. In the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh V. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., 1975 2 SCC 274 the aforesaid judgments in the cases of Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Another supra and The Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Another, etc. etc. supra were distinguished by pointing out The decisions on which the respondent relies are clearly distinguishable. In the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad V. New Shrock Spg. Wvg. Co. Ltd., the impugned provision companymended the companyporation to refuse to refund the amount illegally companylected by it despite the orders of the Supreme Court and the High Court. As the basis of these decisions remained unchanged even after the amendment, it was held by this Court the Legislature had made a direct inroad into the judicial powers. In Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara V. Central provinces Syndicate Ltd., the Madhya Pradesh Legislature passed Validation Act in order to rectify the defect pointed out by this companyrt in the imposition of a cess. But the Act did number set out the nature of the amendment number did it provide that the numberifications issued without the sanction of the state Government would be deemed to have been issued validly. It was held by this companyrt that this was tantamount to saying that the judgment of a companyrt rendered in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction was to be deemed to be ineffective. The position in State of Tamil Nadu V. Ravappa Gounder , was similar. In that case the reassessments made under an Act which did number provide for reassessments were attempted to be validated without changing the law retrospectively. This was companysidered to be an encroachment on the judicial functions. In the instant case, the Amending Act of 1974 cures the old definition companytained in section 2 15 of the vice from which it suffered. The amendment has been given retrospective effect and as stated earlier the Legislature has the power to make the laws passed by it retroactive. As the Amending Act does number ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decision given by the High Court but removes the basis of its decision, the challenge made by the respondent to the Amending Act must fail. The levy of the house-tax must therefore be upheld. In view of sections 4,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 which cannot be held to be unconstitutional, there is numberescape from companyclusion that the provisions which had been introduced in the principal Act 7 of 1974 have been effaced and companyrts have to proceed as if they had never been introduced in the principal Act. If this is the effect of sections 4,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 then as a companyollary it has to be held that under the amendment Act 39 of 1972 the companypensation amount payable for the surplus land under schedule III to the Act was reduced from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income w. e. f 21.12.1972. Notification under section 18 1 of the Act declaring 3414.78 acres of land of the respondent-Company as surplus was issued on 4.4.1973 after companying into force of amended Act 39 of 1972 aforesaid and because of the numberification dated 4.4.1973 the surplus lands vested in the State Government in view of section 18 3 of the Act as it stood on that date. Thereafter, the Draft Assessment Roll had to be published applying the rate of 2 times of the net annual income. On behalf of the respondent, a stand was taken that sections 4, 5 and 6 Act 25 of 1978 shall number revive the numberification dated 4.4.1973 which stood exhausted and a fresh numberification had to be issued, even if the different provisions of Act 7 of 1974 shall be deemed to have been obliterated. In this companynection, it may be pointed out that section 5 b of Act 25 of 1978 provided in clear and unambiguous terms that modification made to section 18 of the principal Act by Act 7 of 1974 Shall be deemed never to have had the effect of vesting in the state Government the surplus lands specified in any numberification published under sub-section 1 of the said section 18 of the principal Act on the after the 2nd May 1962 and before the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, from a date earlier to the date of the publication of the numberification under the said sub-section 1 and shall be deemed always to have had the effect of vesting in the State Government such surplus lands, only with effect from the date of the publication of such numberification. Again section 6 a provides that numberwithstanding anything companytained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court where before the date of publication of this Act in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, a numberification under sub-section 1 of section 18 of the principal Act has been published, the surplus land specified in such numberification shall be deemed to have vested in the state Government, with effect from the date of such publication only, and accordingly the provisions of the principal Act, as modified by section 4 of this Act, shall for all purposes apply and be deemed always to have been applied in respect of such surplus lands so vested . In view of the aforesaid deeming provisions, the numberification which was issued on 4.4.1973 under sub-section 1 of section 18 of the principal Act shall be deemed to be valid and shall have the effect of vesting the lands in question in the state Government under sub-section 3 of section 18 of the Principal Act w.e.f. 4.4.1973. An objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that on 3.3. 1978 the High Court had allowed the Writ petition No. 624 of 1978 filed on behalf of the said respondent and issued a writ of mandamus directing the State to companyply with the judgment dated 8.10.1976 of the High Court in writ petition No.1464 of 1978 and as numberappeal has been filed on behalf of the state before this Court against the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978, the said order has attained finality and if the appeals filed on behalf of State are allowed, it small lead to an anomalous position. It appears that the respondent had filed the aforesaid writ Petition No. 624 of 1978 for a direction by the High Court to companyply with the aforesaid order dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974. In that writ petition a grievance had been made that respondents of that writ petition were delaying preparation of the Draft Compensation Roll on the plea that special Leave Petition to Appeal to the supreme Court along with an application for stay had been filed on behalf of the state. In that writ petition, a learned judge of the High Court directed to companysider the determination of the companypensation and the preparation of the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll, under section 50 3 a of the Act 58 of 1961 in respect of the excess lands of the respondent. A companyy of the writ of mandamus issued by the High Court in the said Writ Petition is on the record and the operative part thereof is as followsthe Respondents herein, are hereby directed to companysider the determination of the companypensation and the preparation of the Draft Compensation Assessment Roll under section 503a of the Act 58 of 1961, in respect of the excess lands of the petitioner, acquired by you , in due companypliance, fully and properly of the judgment of this companyrt dated 8.10.76 and passed in W.P.Nos. 346 and 1464 of 1974 on or before 30.6.1976 and you, the second respondent herein, are hereby directed to call upon the petitioner to furnish whatever information is required on or before 30.3.1978 which information will be supplied to you by the petitioner within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said numberice and thereupon to proceed forthwith to companyply with the aforesaid directions of this Court dated 8.10.76 and passed in w.p.Nos. 346 and 1464 of 1974. It cannot be disputed that by the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978 the High Court had number determined any right or liability inter se between the parties. It simply directed the state Government to companyply with the direction given by order dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 against which civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 has been filed. If an order dated 8.10.1976 is set aside by this companyrt, any direction given on 3.31978 in writ petition No. 624 of 1978 shall be of numberconsequence. It can be said that the direction which was given on 3.3. 1978 was in the nature of execution order. It was then pointed out on behalf of the respondent that on 15.6.1978 writ Misc. Petition No. 3153 in Writ Petition No. 624 of 1978 was filed on behalf of the state for recall of the aforesaid order dated 3.3.1978 which was dismissed on 23.6.1978. It was stated that in the said petition on behalf of the state, attention of the learned judge was drawn to the fact that in the meantime Act 25 of 1978 had companye in force and as such there was numberquestion of payment of companypensation to the respondent in terms of the order dated 8.10.1976 as directed in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974. It was urged that as numberappeal has been filed against the order dated 23.6.1978 on behalf of the state, the said order shall be deemed to have become final in respect of the scope and effect of Sections 4 ,5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978. The relevant part of order dated 23.6.1978 is as follows- Even otherwise, the respondent herein has challenged the validity of Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1978 and till the validity is upheld, it is number open to the state of Tamil Nadu to maintain an application of this character Whatever may be said about the validity of the Act, which question need number companycern me at this stage, I find great force in what Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy submits. In my judgment rendered in W.P. 624 of 1978, I merely directed that state of Tamil Nadu to give effect to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P Nos. 346 and 1464 of 1974. I directed full companypliance of that judgment on or before 30th of June , 1978. From a bare reference to the aforesaid order it appears that the learned judge having clearly said that he was number companysidering the effect of provisions of Act 25 of 1978, he dismissed the said writ Misc. Petition in view of the order passed on 3.3.1978. When the learned judge refused to companysider the effect of the provisions of Act 25 of 1978, there is numberquestion of the order dated 23.6.1978 having any effect, on the special Leave Petitions which had been filed on behalf of the state giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 and civil Appeal Nos. 352-354 of 1980 . It may be mentioned that a plea was taken on behalf of the appellant state that as Act 25 of 1978 provides for the vesting of the land on a particular date, it shall be deemed to be law relating to agrarian reform and as such protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. As such numberchallenge based on Article 14 is available to the respondent. It was stated that at the said Act had been reserved for the companysideration of the president and has received his assent and as such it shall number be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights companyferred by Article 31-c which says that numberwithstanding anything companytained in Article 13, numberlaw giving effect to the policy of the state towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights companyferred by Article 14. In this companynection, our attention was drawn to the fact that in section 2 of Act 25 of 1978 it has been specifically declared that the said Act was being enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles laid down in particular clauses b and c of Article 39 which is in chapter IV of the companystitution i.e. ownership and companytrol of the material resources of the companymunity are so distributed as best to subserve the companymon good and that the operation of the economic system does number result in the companycentration of wealth and means of production to the companymon detriment. A stand was also taken on behalf of the appellant-state that Act 25 of 1978 has been included in the Ninth schedule of the Constitution and as such it has the protection of Article 31-B of the companystitution and its validity cannot be questioned on basis of Article 14 of the companystitution. In View of the findings recorded above that sections 4, 5 and 6 of 25 of 1978 are companystitutionally valid and it has effaced the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 in the principal Act because of which it shall be deemed that numberification issued under section 181 of the principal Act on 4.4.1973 was legal and valid and because of the said numberification the lands declared as surplus vested in the state under section 183 of the principal Act, there is numbernecessity to decide as to whether Act 25 of 1978 has the protection of Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the companystitution. Once it is held that vesting of the surplus land had taken place on 4.4.1973, then the respondent shall be entitled to the companypensation amount which is to be worked out at 2 times of the net annual income because of Act 39 of 1972 which had reduced the multiple of the companypensation from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income w.e.f. 21.12.1972. Accordingly, civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 are allowed .

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petitions Nos. 6436-37 of 1980 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India AND Civil Appeals Nos. 3095-96 of 1980 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th October, 1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C. Writ Petition No. 2065 of 1976 1088 of 1980 C. Bhartari for the Appellant. Dr. Y.S. Chitale and M.G. Ramachandran for Respondents in Writ Petitions. C. Mahajan, I.S. Goel and R.N. Poddar for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA, J. The present writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and the civil appeals by special leave arising out of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution raise companymon questions of law and are, therefore, being disposed of by a companymon judgment. The pattern of facts in the present group of cases is the same and therefore, it is number necessary to give the facts of each case separately. In order to bring out the points for companysideration in these cases we would like to give the facts of writ petition No. 6436 of 1980. In 1952 an emergency was imposed by the Government of India on account of the external aggression by the Chinese forces on the Indian territory. The Government was in great need of youngmen to join the military service at the risk of their lives to serve the nation to companye with the emergency needs of the Government of India. The Government of India as well as the State Governments decided to give certain benefits to encourage the young energetic youths to join military service at the critical juncture of national emergency. The Government in the States and the Centre issued different circulars and advertisements on radio and the press promising certain benefits to be given to yougmen who join the military service at the critical juncture. In July 1963 a circular was issued by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab with regard to the companycessions to civilian employees and others who joined military service, which will account for increments, seniority and pension in civil employment. Later on, on the instructions of the Central Government companycessions as were promises through circulars and by other means were incorporated in the rules framed by the joint Punjab Government under Article 309 of the Constitution. Keeping in view the needs of the companyntry and assurances companytained in companyditions of service in executive instructions the petitioners and the appellants and many others like them joined the army during the emergency as Commissioned Officers in 1963-64. They were companymissioned officers in the Indian Army for more than five years and after their release from the Army they were entitled to benefits vested in them under the companyditions of service. The Haryana Government in the year 1969 advertised 16 posts of temporary Assistant Engineers in P.W.D., B R Branch. At the time of the advertisement on 28th of January, 1969 8 posts out of the total of 16 were reserved for exemergency companymissioned officers and servicemen. Although the advertisement was for 16 posts but at the time of selection 55 appointment were made, out of which 20 posts were reserved for ex-emergency companymissioned officers. Out of this quota of 20 posts only 7 appointments from amongst the exemergency companymissioned officers were made. Requisite qualifications for ex-emergency companymissioned officers and servicemen were as follows Diploma in civil engineering from a recognised institution. Five years companytinuous service with distinguished record. Adequate knowledge of Hindi. Note For purpose of companynting five years companytinuous service, the period companymencing from 26.10.1962 will only be taken into companysideration. Again in November, 1970 38 posts of temporary Assistant Engineers were advertised out of 18 posts were reserved for ex-emergency companymissioned officers. At the time of making appointments, however, 99 persons were appointed and out of these 99 posts 90 posts were declared reserved for ex-emergency companymissioned officers. But again only 7 ex-emergency companymissioned officers were appointed in response to the advertisement. Petitioner No. 1 on selection had joined service on 17th of August, 1971. The second advertisement also companytained the same qualifications as were in the first advertisement. Thus the two petitioners in writ petition Nos. 6436-37 served the Indian Army for more than five years and thereafter those petitioners were appointed in the service of the Haryana Government as temporary Assistant Engineers against the posts reserved for the ex-emergency companymissioned officers. There were a number of other persons similar to the petitioners who were also appointed against the vacancies reserved for ex-Army officers. The Government of Punjab prior to the formation of Haryana made statutory rules under Article 309 of the Constitution which are called The Punjab National Emergency Concession Rules, 1965. The relevant rules 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these rules are as under Definition - For the purpose of these rules, the expression military service means enrolled or companymissioned service in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces including service as a Warrant Officer rendered by a person during the period of operation of the proclamation of emergency made by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution of India on the 26th October, 1962 or such other service as may hereafter be declared as military service for the purposes of these rules. Any period of military training followed by military service shall also be reckoned as Military Service. Maximum age-limit and minimum qualification The maximum age-limit prescribed for appointment to any service or post shall be relaxed in favour of a person who has rendered military service to the extent of his military service, provided he produces a certificate from the companypetent authority that he had rendered companytinuous military service for a period of number less than six months and was discharged because of demobilisation or reduction number more than three years prior to the date of his registration at an employment exchange or the date of his application for employment under the Government. ii A person who has become disabled while in military service shall also be entitled to exclude from his age the period from the date he was disabled up to the date of his application for appointment to any service or post under the Government, or till the end of the present emergency, whichever is shorter. iii In case a person who has rendered military service does number possess the minimum qualification prescribed for any service or post, he shall be deemed to possess these qualifications if the appointing authority certifies that such a person has acquired by experience or otherwise qualification equivalent to those prescribed for that service or post. Increments, seniority and pension period of military service shall companynt for increments, seniority and pension as under - Increments The period spent by a person on military service, after attaining the minimum age prescribed for appointment to any service or post, to which he is appointed, shall companynt for increments. Where numbersuch minimum age is prescribed the minimum age shall be as laid down in rules 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume II. This companycession shall, however, be admissible only on first appointment. Seniority The period of military service mentioned in clause 1 shall be taken into companysideration for the purpose of determining the seniority of a person who has rendered military service. Pension The period of military service mentioned in clause i shall companynt towards pension only in the case of appointments to permanent services or posts under the Government subject to the following companyditions The person companycerned should have earned a pension under military rules in respect of the military service in question. Any bonus or gratuity paid in respect of military service by the defence authorities shall have to be refunded to the State Government. The period, if any, between the date of discharge from military service and the date of appointment to any service or post under the Government shall companynt for pension, provided such period does number exceed one year. Any period exceeding one year but number exceeding three years may also be allowed to companynt for pension in exceptional cases under the orders of the Government. Seniority, promotion, increment, pension and leave of Government employees- The period spent on military service by a Government employee shall companynt for seniority promotion, increment and pension in the service or post held by him immediately before his joining military service. A permanent Government employee who renders military service, shall earn leave during such service according to the leave rules applicable to him immediately before his joining military service. A temporary Government employees shall during military service, be governed by the military rules in all respects. The employee companycerned shall be entitled to proforma promotion in his parent department under the next below rule and also to seniority in higher posts to which he would otherwise have been entitled if he had number joined military service. According to these rules and the previous assurances given by the Government the petitioners were to be given seniority by companynting period of military service for the purpose of determining seniority, increments and pension etc. Immediately on appointment of the petitioners as temporary Assistant Engineers they became entitled to get their seniority fixed giving them the benefit of their military service but the gradation list prepared, however, did number include the military service of the petitioners for the purpose of fixation of their seniority. The State of Haryana just to deprive the petitioners, and others similarly situated, of military service amended the rules with retrospective effect from 1st November, 1966 vide Haryana Government Gazette Notification No. G.S.R. 77/Const Art. 309/Amend 1 /76 dated 22nd March, 1976. The Amendment was made in the rule 4 ii by adding a proviso, which is in the following terms Provided that a person who has availed of companycession under sub-rule 3 of rule 3 shall number be entitled to the companycession under this clause. The Government also issued a numberification No. G.S.R. 182/Const Art . 309/Amend 2 /76 dated 9th August, 1976 making amendment in the definition of the expression military service in rule 2 just to retreat from their previous companymitments. It reads For the purpose of these rules the expression military service means the service rendered by a person, who had been enrolled or companymissioned during the period of operation of the proclamation of emergency made by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution of India on 26th October, 1962 in any of the three wings of the Indian Armed Forces including the service as a Warrant Officer during the period of the said emergency or such other service as may hereafter be declared as military service for the purpose of these rules. Any period of military training followed by military service shall also be reckoned as military service. This numberification has been issued with retrospective effect from 1st of November, 1966 and restricted the benefits of military service upto 10th of January, 1968, the date on which the first emergency was lifted with the result that the vested rights which accrued to the petitioners in 1969, 1970 and 1971 have been taken away. Some of the ex-military officers challenged the impugned amendment and the companysequent gradation list by filing two petitions, writ petition No.1088 of 1980 and writ petition No. 2065 of 1976 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Article 226 of the Constitution. Both these writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and they gave rise to civil appeal Nos. 3096 and 3095 of 1980 respectively. Some of the ex-military officers have filed writ petitions directly before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and they are writ petition Nos. 6436 and 6437 of 1980. The petitioners in the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenged the amendment of the Punjab Government National Emergency Concession Rules 1965 with retrospective effect as violative of Arts. 14, 16, 19,31 and 311 of the Constitution and prayed for the following relief The Punjab Government National Emergency Concession Haryana First Amendment Rules, 1976 be declared ultras. Article 16 of the Constitution of India. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the seniority list of Haryana Service of Engineers, PWD B R Branch , Class II be issued. A writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents 1 and 2 to declare the petitioners senior to respondents. The High Court came to the companyclusion that the petitioners have availed of the companycession under sub-rule 3 of rule 3 of 1965. Rules inasmuch as the educational qualifications in the case of the petitioners had been relaxed in terms of sub-rule 3 of rule 3 and they had availed of these companycessions at the time of their recruitment as temporary Assistant Engineers. Now by the impugned amendment the companycession of double benefit has been withdrawn by adding the proviso to cl. ii of rule 4 introduced in 1976. previously an ex-servicemen companyld avail of the companycession of relaxation in the educational qualification at the time of recruitment on the basis of his military service. Under rule 4 he companyld companynt military service towards seniority. The proviso has taken away the second benefit. The ex-serviceman who has been recruited after availing of the companycession in academic qualifications cannot companynt his military service towards seniority in the civil post held by him. This companycession has been withdrawn by the Governor in exercise of his powers under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and the amendment having been made in exercise of the legislative powers companyferred on the Governor by the Constitution are valid and suffer from numberinfirmity. The High Court also took the view that there is numberestoppel against the Government in the exercise of its legislative sovereign or executive powers. The State companyld amend the 1965 Rules and take away the benefits bestowed on the petitioners. It also held that the rules can be framed with retrospective effect and they can take away even vested rights. In the opinion of the Eight Court the diploma holders in engineering on the basis of their educational qualification formed one class separate from other exemergency companymissioned officer who are degree holders in engineering and that classification in the service can be made on the basis of educational qualifications and such a classification is number bad. The appellants in the appeals against this judgment of the High Court reiterated the same companytentions before this Court. In the two petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution also similar points have been raised. The main companytention on behalf of the appellants as well as on behalf of the petitioners is that the rules companyld number be amended with retrospective effect to deprive them of the vested rights and if the appellants and the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of military service per force they would be much more senior to others and the gradation list prepared in companyplete ignorance of the military service will number be according to law. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the Parliament as also the State Legislature have plenary powers to legislate within the field of legislation companymitted to them and subject to certain companystitutional restrictions they can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is, however, a cardinal principle of companystruction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect the vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to effect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only. Provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are number to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. The Governor can also exercise the same powers under Art. 309 of the Constitution and there is number the slightest doubt that the impugned amendment brought in has been made retrospective. The impugned amendment in the instant case by necessary implication have undoubtedly a retrospective effect. For the petitioners it was companytended that the benefits acquired companyld number be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect. It was further companytended that the amendment was discriminatory and that the retrospectivity given to the provisions of the Amending Act companyld number cure the discrimination introduced by the Act and sought to be perpetuated by it. In support of this companytention reliance was placed upon Harbhajan Singh v. The State of Punjab. In that case the question that fell for companysideration before the Constitution Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was regarding the interpretation of rule 3 iii cc ii b of the Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel Reservation of Vacancies in Punjab Civil Service Judicial Branch First Amendment Rules, 1976. The Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel Reservation of Vacancies in the Punjab Civil Service Judicial Branch Rules, 1969, had been repealed and the Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel Reservation of Vacancies in the Punjab Civil Service Judicial Branch Rules, 1975, as amended, were in force and these excluded from the category of released Armed Forces Personnel, persons who had joined a civil service of the Union or a State or a civil post under the Union or a State after their release from the Armed Forces of the Union. The Court dealing with the question observed Now the rule-making authority must have been aware that a companypetitive examination for appointment to the service had been held under the old rules and appointments were yet in the offing. Surely, the rulemaking authority did number intend to exclude from appointment candidates who were eligible under the old rules but became ineligible by reason of an amendment of the rules made after the process of selection had almost reached a final stage. The amendment did number in any manner touch the qualifications of the candidates. Had the amended rule been in force from the beginning, persons in the position of the petitioner might number have accepted any employment and preferred to wait for selection and appointment to the Punjab Civil Service judicial Branch . Are they to be penalised by barring their entry into the Punjab Civil Service Judicial Branch because they accepted employment at a time when acceptance of such employment was number a bar to appointment to the service ? We do number think that we will be justified in attributing such an unreasonable intention to the rule-making authority. In our view, the only reasonable interpretation of the amended rule, companysistent with the prevailing situation, is to hold that only those persons who having joined the service of the Union or the State or a post under the Union or the State previously companytinued to hold the post on the date of the companying into force of the rule, are excluded from appointment to the Punjab Civil Service Judicial Branch . The expression joined or joins must be given a reasonable interpretation in the companytext of the situation and we think that our interpretation does number strain the language or attributes unreasonableness to the rule-making authority. In that view, the petitioner cannot be said to be ineligible for appointment. Next reliance was placed upon Ex-Major N.C. Singhal v. Director General, Armed Forces Medical Service. In that case the companyditions of service of the appellant were governed by paragraph 13 of the Army Instruction No I S of 1954 and his previous full pay companymissioned service should have been taken in the matter of antedate for the purpose of his pay. The companyditions of service were, however, sought to be altered by Army Instruction No. 176 of 1965 to the prejudice of the appellant. This Court held that the companyditions of service in this regard were number liable to be altered or modified to the prejudice of the appellant by a subsequent administrative Army? instruction which was given retrospective effect from 26th October, 1962. Reliance was also placed upon State of Mysore v. M.N. Kirshna Murthy Ors. In that case also the rules of 1959 had been amended which sought to disintegrate the service which had been integrated. This Court held that such amendment made for the purpose of justifying the illegal promotion made, in the teeth of the protection companyferred by Articles 14 and 16 1 of the Constitution of India upon Indian citizens in Government service, companyld number be upheld. The power of making rules relating to recruitment and companyditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 companyld number be used to validate unconstitutional discrimination in promotional chances of Government servants who belonged to the same category. Shri Mahajan appearing for respondent No. 1 in reply on the other hand companytended that the rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are legislative in character and, therefore, can be given effect retrospectively. In support of his submission he companynted upon Raj Kumar v. Union of India Ors. He also relied on Wing Commander J. Kumar v. Union of India Ors. In that case a companytention was raised that the impugned rule number having been specifically declared to be retrospective in operation, its provisions cannot be applied to the appellant inasmuch as he had been inducted into the R D cadre long prior to the promulgation of the new rules. This Court dealing with the point observed We have already found that, as a matter of fact the practice generally followed in the R D Organisation even prior to the promulgation of the impugned rules, was to reckon seniority with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of substantive major equivalent. Even otherwise, when a statutory rule governing seniority is issued in respect of a service, the said rule would govern the personnel in the service with effect from the date of its promulgation and in so giving effect to the rule in future, there is numberelement of retroactivity involved. Of companyrse, the rules will number operate to deprive any person of promotions already earned in the past, but, for purposes of future promotions and seniority in the department, the principles laid down in the impugned rule will necessarily govern all the personnel alike. This case instead of supporting the companytention of Shri Mahajan goes to strengthen the companytention raised on behalf of the appellant and the petitioners. Much emphasis was laid by Shri Mahajan on the case of S. Vadera v. Union of India Ors. In that case the petitioners, who were working as Assistants, were reverted as Upper Division Clerk in 1967 by the operation of the Railway Boards Secretariat Clerical Service Reorganisaion Scheme. The said scheme was framed on February 5, 1957 but was brought into effect from December 1, 1954. Certain modifications to the scheme relating to the manner of filing up of permanent and temporary vacancies in Grade I of the Service were made in 1963. The petitioners challenged the orders of reversion as illegal inasmuch as their promotion as Upper Division Clerks and later as Assistants had been on a permanent basis and companyld number be disturbed and that the scheme as well as the various orders passed by the respondents were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, that the Railway Board had numberpower in law to frame either the scheme or to modify the scheme so as to have retrospective effect from December 1, 1954. This Court held that the ranking given to the petitioners as a result of which the impugned orders of reversion were passed was in accordance with the scheme as modified in 1963, and once it is held that the petitioners did number satisfy the requirement of the scheme for being retained as Assistants, there was numberquestion of any discrimination under Article 14 or violation of Article 16, and that the Indian Railway Establishment Code had been issued by the President in exercise of the powers vested in him by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 157 of the Code gives the Railway Board full powers to make rules of general application to numbergazetted railway servants under their companytrol, and the power to make rules with retrospective effect cannot be denied to the Railway Board. Accordingly, the scheme framed by the said Board in 1957 companyld be made retrospectively effective from December 1, 1954. This case undoubtedly supports Shri Mahajan in his companytention that the rules can be made with retrospective effect and there is numberhing wrong in such a rule. This case, however, did number deal with the point specifically raised in the present case. The question, however, has been pointedly companysidered recently by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni. In that case the Gujarat Panchayats Service was initially companystituted soon after the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. There were three cadres the district cadre, the taluqa cadre and the local cadre. Secretaries, Officers and servants of the old village panchayats under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 became secretaries, officers and servants of the new gram panchayats under s.325 2 x of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961. Talatis and kotwals, who were government servants were secretaries and officers of the old village panchayats under the Bombay Village Panchayats Act and so they became secretaries and officers of the new gram panchayats under the Gujarat Panchayats Act. 1961. Some municipalities companystituted for municipal districts and municipal boroughs under the Bombay District Municipal Act and the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, as applied to areas in the State of Gujarat, were companyverted into Gram and Nagar Panchayats under section 307 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and all officers and servants in the employ of such municipalities became officers and servants of interim Panchayats and allocated to the panchayat service. Thus, secretaries and officers of dissolved municipalities also became secretaries and officers of Gram and Nagar panchayats. District Local Boards companystituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act stood dissolved on the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and all officers and servants in the employment of the Board were deemed to be transferred to the service of the successor District Panchayat under section 326 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. Also allocated to the panchayat service were those government servants who are transferred to the panchayat under section 157 and such other officers and servants employed in the state service as were necessary. All these secretaries, officers and servants became members of a service under the State as soon as they were allocated to the panchayat service But, by the Amending Act, secretaries, officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayat who were allocated to the panchayat service from the ranks of the ex-municipal employees were sought to be meted out differential treatment from the other members of the panchayat service, more particularly the secretaries, officer and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats who were drawn from the ranks of secretaries, officer and servants of old village panchayats, that is, the Talatis and Kotwals. Their status as members of a service under the state was to go with numberoption to them. Retrospectivity was sought to be given to the Amending Act so that they companyld number claim that they were ever government servants and so companyld number be made to cease to be government servants and so that they companyld number claim that they were singled out for differential treatment for if they were never in the panchayat service they companyld number companyplain of being taken out of the panchayat service. Brother O. Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the Court emphatically observed- Now in 1978 before the Amending Act was passed thanks to the provisions of the principle Act of 1961 the ex-municipal employees who had been allocated to the panchayat service as Secretaries Officer and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats, had achieved the status of government servants. Their status as government servants companyld number be extinguished so long as the posts were number abolished and their services were number terminated in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Nor was it permissible to single them out for differential treatment. That would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. An attempt was made to justify the purported differentiation on the basis of history and ancestry as it were. It was said that Talatis and Kotwals who became secretaries, officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats were government servants, even to start with, while municipal employees who became such secretaries, officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats were number. Each carried the mark or the brand of his origin and a classification on the basis of the source from which they came into the service, it was claimed, was permissible. We are clear that it is number. Once they had joined the companymon stream of service to perform the same duties, it is clearly number permissible to make any classification on the basis of their origin. Such a classification would be unreasonable and entirely irrelevant to the object sought to be achieved. It is to navigate around these two obstacles of Article 311 and Article 14 that the Amending Act is sought to be made retrospective, to bring about an artificial situation as if the erstwhile municipal employees never became members of a service under the State. Can a law be made to destroy todays accrued companystitutional rights by artificially reverting to a situation which existed 17 years ago ? No. The legislation is pure and simple self-deceptive if we may use such an expression with reference to a legislature made law. The legislature is undoubtedly companypetent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution and have to companyform to the dos and donts of the Constitution, neither prospective number retrospective laws can be made so to companytravene fundamental rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say 20 years ago the parties had numberrights, therefore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by 20 years. We are companycerned with todays rights and number yesterdays. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained 20 years ago and ignore the march of events and the companystitutional rights accrued in the companyrse of the 20 years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of historyTodays equals cannot be made unequal by saying that they were unequal 20 years ago and we will restore that position by making a law today and making it retrospective. Constitutional rights, companystitutional obligations and companystitutional companysequences cannot be tampered with that way. A law which if made today would be plainly invalid as offending companystitutional provisions in the companytext of the existing situation cannot become valid by being made retrospective. Past virtue companystitutional cannot be made to wipe out present vice companystitutional by making retrospective laws. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat Panchayats Third Amendment Act 1978 is unconstitutional as it offends Articles 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and unreasonable. In view of this latest pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the law appears to be well settled and the Haryana Government cannot take away the accrued rights of the petitioners and the appellants by making amendment of the rules with retrospective effect. For the foregoing discussion the writ petitions as well as the appeals are allowed and the orders of the High Court dated October 10, 1980 are quashed and the impugned rule 4 ii of the Punjab Government National Emergency Concessions Rules 1965 as amended by the Haryana Government Gazette Notification No.GSR 77/ Const Art. 309/Amend 1 /76 dated 22nd March 1976 and the Notification No. GSR. 182/Const Art. 309/Amend 2 /76 dated 9 August 1976 amending the definition of the expression military service in rule 2 are declared to be ultra vires the Constitution in so far as they affect prejudicially persons who had acquired rights as stated above. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to prepare the seniority list afresh in the light of the decision of this Court taking into companysideration the military service rendered by the petitioners as well as the appellants.

This appeal is directed against the judgment of Karanataka High Court quashing a criminal proceeding instituted by the companyplainant-Company alleging that the accused-respondent, who was former Director of the Company companymitted offence under Section 630 of the Indian Companies Act by companytinuing to utilise the property, that was given to him as a Director numberwithstanding the fact that he has ceased to be a Director of the Company since 1991. It transpires from the records of this proceeding that in 1992, the respondent - accused filed a civil suit for a declaration that he companytinues to be the Director of the Company Maratt Rubber Ltd. and obtained an interim order therein, but the same suit ultimately was dismissed for default on 2.1.1995. An application for restoration also has dismissed. There is numbermaterial to indicate as to whether the respondent has taken any further steps in that proceeding. The present companyplaint was filed after the dismissal of the said suit of 1992, and on the basis of the allegations made in the companyplaint, companynizance had been taken under Section 630 of the Companies Act. The accused-respondent appeared before the learned Magistrate and filed an application under Section 245 praying for discharge. The gravamen of the allegations in the application for discharge was that civil suit being pending in different forums it would number be appropriate for the criminal companyrt to proceed with the companyplaint case. The Magistrate, however, came to the companyclusion that pendency of civil suit will number be a bar either in institution or proceeding with the criminal companyplaint. Once, the allegations made in the companyplaint petition make out an offence in which companynizance has been taken, we fail to understand as to how an application companyld be filed under Section 245 of the CrPC. When a companyplaint is filed, the Magistrate after examining the companyplainant on oath and the witnesses produced by him, if companyes to the companyclusion that a prima facie case is made out, then he takes companynisance of the offence and directs issuance of process. If the magistrate thinks that further enquiry is necessary, he can postpone issuance of process and either enquire into the case himself or direct further investigation to be made for the purpose of deciding whether or number there is sufficient ground for proceeding, as provided in Section 202 Cr.P.C. If ultimately on companysideration of the statements of the companyplainant and his witnesses and the result of inquiry or investigation if any under Section 202 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is of opinion that there is numbersufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the companyplaint as provided under Section 203 Cr.P.C. Obviously, in the case in hand, the Magistrate did number think it proper to dismiss the companyplaint on the materials produced by the companyplainant and took companynizance of the offence and issued process. That apart, we are in agreement with the view of the learned Magistrate that mere pendency of a civil proceeding before any civil companyrt will number be a ground for quashing of the criminal proceeding or number to frame a charge against an accused, even if the assertions in the companyplaint petition together with the materials produced by the companyplainant would companystitute an offence. After the Magistrate rejected the prayer of the accused, the matter was carried to the High Court by invoking the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. The High Court by a very lengthy judgment went into civil suits filed by the parties as well as the observations directions given by the civil companyrt in some of those cases and came to the companyclusion that this is a fit case where the inherent power of the High Court should be invoked, as otherwise it would be a case of miscarriage of justice. In exercising the power under Section 482, the High Court companysidered some observations made by the civil companyrt in a suit for injunction filed by the companypany companyplainant, to the effect that the property in question had number been delivered to the accused as a Director of the companypany and on that basis quashed that proceeding. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly and cautiously exercised and only when the Court on companysideration, companyes to a companyclusion that otherwise it would be a case of abuse of process of Court or that there will be gross miscarriage of justice. In a case instituted on companyplaint, the High Court was possibly number entitled to look to the several documents purported to have been filed by the accused in several civil proceedings, and rely on some orders observations made thereunder. A bare scrutiny of the impugned judgment would indicate that the High Court has thought, as if it is trying the case, and then after weighing the materials it has companye to a companyclusion one way or the other.

Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant has been companyvicted under Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and a fine of Rs. 160/- in default to undergo R.I. for two months and has also been companyvicted under Section 477A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to R.I. for one year. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Mr., Shiv-Pujan Singh appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that there was numberlegal evidence to prove that the handwriting on Ex. 4/1, 4/3 and 4/5, the disputed blank paper ticket and the signatures which have been proved to be those of the appellant, are of the appellant and thus if this is established, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. It appears, however, that the writing of the appellant has been proved on these documents number only by the experts but also by some other witnesses who were fully acquainted with the writing of the appellant. We have ourselves examined the signatures of the appellant on Ex. 4/1, 4/3 and 4/5 with the admitted signatures on Exh. 3, 3/1 and 3/2 and we find that there is large measure of similarity and clear resemblance in almost all the characteristics in the two writings.

The application for substitution is allowed. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. This appeal has been filed against the impugned order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 24th January, 2002 passed in C.R.P. No.1430 of 2001. The facts in detail have been set out in the impugned order and hence we are number repeating the same here. Having gone through the impugned order, we numbericed from paragraphs 20 21 of the impugned order that the High Court has only observed that certain points were number companysidered by the Wakf Tribunal which should have been taken into companysideration. Hence, the High Court remanded the matter. We agree with the aforesaid observations of the High Court and see numberreason to interfere with the same. We, however, may make it clear that in terms of Section 83 5 of the Wakf Act, 1995 the Wakf Tribunal is deemed to be a civil companyrt and has the same powers as are exercised by civil companyrt under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit or executing a decree or order. The civil companyrts are in turn companypetent to issue injunctions in terms of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 C.P.C.

R. Khanna, J. Sita Ram 40 was tried in the companyrt of learned Additional Sessions Judge Sagar for an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for causing the death of his wife Savitribai 21 and was acquitted. On appeal filed by the State the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed the judgment of the trial companyrt, companyvicted the accused under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. Sita Ram has number companye up in appeal to this Court by special leave. The prosecution case is that Savitri deceased during the days of the present occurrence was staying at the quarter of her brother-in-law Gourishankar in Police Lines Sagar. Gourishankar is a police driver. The sister of Savitri, who had been married to Gourishankar, died a few years back. Gourishankar then married another girl. The second wife of Gourishankar was away to her parents house when the present occurrence took place. Shantibai, aged 12 or 13 years, daughter of Gourishankar from his previous wife, was also living with Gourishankar. The accused, who was unemployed, came to the quarter of Gourishankar about 15 days before the present occurrence with a view to seek some job. On February 13, 1966 which was a Sunday, it is stated, Gourishankar went to police Kotwali at about 10 a. m. About an hour thereafter at about 11 a. m. Savitri asked Shantibai to go out and look for a vehicle as Savitri wanted to go to her brothers house. Shantibai companyld number find a vehicle and, after playing a little, proceeded towards the quarter at about 11.30 a. m. When Shantibai was near the quarter she heard the cries of Savitri that she was being killed. Shantibai then found the door of the quarter to be closed. Shantibai companysequently knocked at the door. The accused, who alone was present with Savitri inside the quarter, then opened the door. Shantibai found Savitri lying injured in a pool of blood. The accused then gave one further dagger blow in the chest of Savitri. Shantibai rushed out of the quarter and shouted while running that Mousiya has killed mousi. Jankibai, her husband Hari Narayan, Shardabai, Hiralal, Har Prasad and Lajjashankar P. Ws., who all live in the neighbourhood, then came there. The accused also came out of the quarter. His clothes were at that time stained with blood. Those present enquired from the accused as to what had happened. The accused at first gave numberreply. In the meantime, Kalu alias Munna, son of the accused, who was aged about 4 or 5 years, came there. The accused, addressing Kalu stated I have killed your mother. You are number motherless. Those present then secured the accused. The accused then remarked that he had killed the deceased as he companyld number tolerate the situation. Savitri was then carried in a vehicle to the hospital. Gauri Shankar met the party on the way and went with them to the hospital. When they arrived in the hospital, the doctor declared that Savitri was dead. Gourishankar lodged report about the occurrence at police station Gopalganj, at a distance of 6 furlongs from the place of occurrence at 1 p. m. Sub Inspector Sharma then came to the place of occurrence. He found the accused having been secured by others. The accused was put under arrest. Injuries were found on the person of the accused and he was got examined from Dr. Khare. Dr. Khare found five injuries on the palmar aspect of the hand of the accused. Those injuries, in the opinion of the doctor, companyld have been received by the accused while inflicting dagger blows. Sub Inspector Sharma, after reparing the inquest report, sent the dead body of Savitri to the mortuary. Postmortem examination of the dead body was performed by Dr. H.P. Dutta at 11.15 a. m. on February 14, 1966. At the trial the accused denied the prosecution allegation about his having given dagger blows to Savitri deceased According to the accused, he was away to the market at the time of the assault. On companying back to the quarter of Gourishankar, he found that Savitri had been murdered. He then fell down and in the process his clothes became stained with blood. Regarding the injuries on his hand, the accused stated that they had been received when he was lifting kanchas of bidis. The accused denied having told his son that he had killed Savitri. The version of the accused further was that it was Gourishankar who had killed Savitri because Savitri wanted to leave Gourishankers house and go away with the accused on the day of occurrence. No evidence was produced in defence. Learned Additional Sessions Judge did number place much reliance on the evidence of Shantibai. He also did number accept the evidence regarding the extrajudicial companyfession of the accused. Regarding the injuries on the hand of the accused, the Additional Sessions Judge found the explanation of the accused that they had been caused by kanchas of bidis to be satisfactory. In the result the accused was acquitted. On appeal the learned Judges of the High Court found the evidence of Shantibai to be companyvincing. Reliance was also placed by the High Court upon the evidence regarding extra-judicial companyfession of the accused and the other circumstances of the case. In the result the accused was companyvicted and sentenced as above. We have heard Mr. Khanduja on behalf of the accused-appellant and are of the view that numbercase has been made for interference with the judgment of the High Court. There can be numbermanner of doubt that Savitri deceased was the victim of a murderous assault and died as a result of that assault. Dr. Dutta, who performed post mortem examination on the body of Savitri, found 8 incised wounds on the body. Out of them, two incised wounds, which were on the upper and outer part of the left chest and the right lateral chest wall, were individually sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. The injuries had resulted in causing rupture of heart, stomach, liver, right kidney and large intestine. The case of the prosecution is that it was Sita Ram accused who had caused the above injuries to Savitri deceased. The prosecution in support of its case examined Shantibai P.W. 1 . The evidence of this witness shows that when she was told by Savitri deceased to go out and look for a vehicle the accused and Savitri deceased alone were present in the quarter of Gourishankar. When Shantibai companyld number find any vehicle and was returning to the quarter she heard the cries of Savitri that she was being killed. Shantibai who found door of the quarter to be closed knocked at the door. The door was then opened by the accused. Shantibai on entering the quarter found Savitri lying injured in a pool of blood. In the presence of Shantibai also the accused gave one dagger blow to the deceased. The High Court accepted Shantibais evidence. After having oeen taken through the evidence of Shantibai we see numbercogent ground to take a view different from that of the High Court. Reference has been made by Mr. Khanduja to slight discrepancies in the evidence of Shantibai as given at the trial and her statement made before the police. These discrepancies are of. a minor character and in view of the fact that Shantibai is aged only 12 or 13, numbersignificance, in our opinion, should be attached to these discrepancies. The companyduct of Shantibai in rushing out of the quarter and shouting while running away that Mausiya has killed mousi lends companysiderable companyroboration to her oral testimony. The fact that Shantibai gave those shouts is proved by the testi mony of Jankibai P.W. 2 , Hari Narayan P.W. 3 , Shardabai P.W. 5 , Hiralal P.W. 6 , Har Prasad P.W. 7 and Lajjashankar P.W. 8 . All these witnesses live in the immediate neigh bourhood and we see numberparticular rea son as to why they should all make a false statement on that point. It is further in the testimony of these witnesses that when they came out, the accused whose clothes were stained with blood also came out of the quarter and sat there. Ac companyding to the witnesses, the accused then told his son Kalu that he had killed Kalus mother and that Kalu had become motherless. The above witnesses had numberanimus to depose falsely against the ac cused and there is, as stated above, numbersufficient ground to disbelieve their testimony. Mr. Khanduja has submitted that it is number likely that the accused would give another blow to the deceased after the arrival of Shantibai. This sub mission, even if companyrect, would number exculpate the accused. The accused and his wife alone were present in the quarter when the cries of the wife that she was being killed were heard from inside the quarter. The accused then opened the door and his hand and clothes were blood stained. The wife had a number of in juries caused with a dagger. The dagger too was found at the spot. All these circumstances, in the absence of any companyent explanation, point to the inference that it was the accused who had given dagger blows to the deceased. Reference has been made by Mr. Khanduja to the fact that there is discrepancy in the evidence of the witnesses with regard to the words which the accused spoke when he addressed his son after the occurrence. This discrepancy is number very material because the substance of the words attributed to the accused was that he had killed the deceased and his son had companysequently become motherless. The companyduct of the accused after the occurrence also goes to show that it was he and numbere else who was responsible for the murder of Savitri. Had it been someone else, who had companymitted the murder of Savitri, the accused would have raised hue and cry instead of sitting quietly outside the quarter. The accused would have also in that event rushed to the police station and made a report about the occurrence. The accused, however, did numberhing of the kind. The fact that the clothes of the accused were blood-stained and that injuries of a kind which are received while one is inflicting dagger blows were found on the hand of the accused also lends further assurance to the prosecution case. In view of all these facts, the High Court in our view companyrectly came to the companyclusion that the accused was guilty of the offence of murder of his wife. It is well established that the High Court in an appeal under Section 417 of the CrPC has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the companyclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code but, in exercising the power companyferred by the Code and before reaching its companyclusion upon fact, the High Court should give proper weight and companysideration to such matters as 1 the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses 2 the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly number weakened by the fact that he had been acquitted at his trial 3 the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and 4 the slowness of an appellate companyrt in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. The learned Judges of the High Court in the present case, while reversing the judgment of acquittal, have number in any way departed from the principles enunicated above. Perusal of the judgment of the trial companyrt shows that it took a manifestly unreasonable view of the evidence adduced before it.

N. KHARE, J. LITTTTTTTJ The respondent in C.A. No.6423/98 was working as a Senior Accountant in the pay scale of Rs.1400-2600 in the office of the Accountant General, Maharashtra at Nagpur and was drawing a pay of Rs.1260/- per month. Subsequently for personal reasons the respondent sought transfer to the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore. Her request for transfer was accepted on certain terms and companyditions stipulated by the appellants and the same were accepted by the respondents. One of the companyditions of the transfer was that the respondent has to technically resign from the post which she was holding and she was to join as direct recruit to a lower post of Clerk in the pay scale of 950-1500. On acceptance of terms and companyditions the respondent was transferred as a Clerk to the office of Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore. After the transfer to a lower post her pay was erroneously fixed at Rs.1250/- per month. Subsequently when the mistake came into light her pay was fixed at a stage of Rs.1070/- by order dated 1.12.1995. The order for recovery of excess pay to the respondent was also passed. The respondent challenged the said order before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the tribunal allowed the Original Application filed by the respondent. The writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed. The respondent in C.A. No.6422/98 was working as Accountant in the office of the Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in the pay scale of Rs.1200-2040. Subsequently, the respondent sought transfer from the office of Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh to the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore. The said transfer was accepted with certain terms and companyditions to the effect that in case of such a transfer she has to technically resign from the post of Accountant and accept the reverted post of Clerk and has to join as a direct recruit. After transfer to the post of Clerk in the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore the pay of respondent was fixed at Rs.1260/- per month. Subsequently it was found that the pay of respondent on reversion ought to be fixed at Rs.1090/-. Consequently, orders for re-fixation of pay and recovery of excess amount were issued.

Arising out of S.L.P. C No. 1610 of 2004 SANTOSH HEGDE, J. Heard learned companynsels for the parties. Leave granted. Appellant herein questions the companyrectness of an order made by the Appellate Bench of the High Court at Calcutta which by the impugned order set aside the order made by a learned Single Judge on the original civil jurisdiction of that companyrt in G.A. No. 682 of 1999 in C.S. No. 99 of 1999. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows - The respondent herein filed a suit for possession alleging the appellant herein to be a licensee and the period of license having expired he was entitled to a decree for khas possession of the suit schedule property as also for certain other ancillary reliefs. In the said suit he filed an interlocutory application, firstly praying for a judgment on admission and in the alternative for an injunction directing the appellant herein to immediately hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property premises to the respondent-plaintiff. The learned Single Judge who heard the said application came to the companyclusion that he did number find any reason to pass a decree on admission or to grant interim mandatory injunction directing the appellant-defendant to hand over possession of the flat in view of the fact that the suit was still pending in the companyrt and granting of such relief would tantamount to a decree before trial for which the respondent has number made out a case. It is against the said dismissal of the plaintiffs application, an appeal was filed companyfining the appeal only to the reliefs by way of injunction seeking interim possession of the suit schedule property during the pendency of the suit. The Appellate Bench after numbericing the arguments of the parties and the documents produced came to the companyclusion that primafacie the relationship between the parties was that of licensee and licensor. It also came to the companyclusion at one point of time in 1998 the appellants were willing to voluntarily surrender the possession but did number do so because the respondent did number agree to repay the security amount. It also came to the companyclusion that for about 4 years the property in question has been under a Caretaker and the said property was number used for any companymercial purpose. In the said background, the appellate companyrt came to the companyclusion that it is number proper that the property Flat should be kept in a disused companydition. The appellate bench also companysidered the litigation to be a luxury litigation and on this philosophical background it directed the receiver who was earlier appointed as an interim receiver to take inventory of the movable in the property to take symbolic possession of the suit property and put the respondent-plaintiff in possession of the property under the authority of that receiver subject to final adjudication in the original suit. It is the above mandatory interim order of directing the interim possession being handed over to the plaintiffs in a suit for possession, the appellants are before us. Shri Jaydeep Gupta, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellants submitted that it is an admitted fact that the appellants were in possession of the suit property and the suit itself was for eviction and for possession. He companytended that there was a triable issue as to the nature of possession hence a decision to hand over possession or number companyld have been taken only after deciding this issue and on the basis of law applicable to such relationship. Learned companynsel pointed out that Trial Court has for good reasons rejected the interim application of the plaintiff holding that allowing such application would amount to grant of a decree even before trial which numbermally is number permissible in law. He submitted there is numberextraordinary circumstances on facts of the present case which companyld have permitted the Appellate Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of granting the interim possession in favour of the plaintiff in a suit for possession. He placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden 1990 2 SCC 117 wherein this Court held - The Relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted generally to preserve or restore the statusquo of the last number-contested status which preceded the pending companytroversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to companypel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party companyplaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively number granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm. The learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that in the present case, it is an admitted fact that the appellant is in possession of the property and the suit itself is for eviction and possession and there is a companytested issue in regard to the nature of relationship between the parties. In such a situation issuance of mandatory injunction directing the handing over the possession in favour of the plaintiff would be unsustainable in law and is companytrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden supra . Learned companynsel also pointed out that the fact that the property in question is number used for companymercial purposes or is in the possession of a Caretaker are irrelevant facts for the purpose of deciding whether an interim mandatory injunction to hand over possession should be granted or number. Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondent submitted that this appeal is liable to be dismissed at the preliminary stage itself since from the document produced by the appellant himself, it is clear that in 1998 he was ready and willing to hand over possession of the property and he has backed out from the same, hence in equity the appellant is number entitled for any relief and Article 136 which being a discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. On merits the learned companynsel submitted that as found by the Appellate Court it is ex-facie clear that the relationship between the parties is of that licensor or licensee and period of the license having companye to an end the appellant companytinued to be in possession as trespasser. Therefore, the High Court was justified in granting the mandatory injunction to hand over possession of the property. He submitted that the appellant has number paid any rent for the last so many years which is also a good ground for rejection of this appeal i.e. assuming he is a tenant, he companyld number companytinue to be in possession of the property without paying any rent. Having companysidered the arguments of the learned companynsel for the parties and having perused the documents produced, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the Appellate Court cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. As numbericed by this Court in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden supra has held that an interim mandatory injunction can be granted only in exceptional cases companying within the exceptions numbericed in the said judgment. In our opinion, the case of the respondent herein does number companye under anyone of those exceptions and even on facts it is number such a case which calls for the issuance of an interim mandatory injunction directing the possession being handed over to the respondent. As observed by the learned Single Judge the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession is yet to be decided in the Trial Court and granting of any interim order directing handing over of a possession would only mean decreeing the suit even before trial. Once the possession of the appellant either directly or through his agent caretaker is admitted then the fact that the appellant is number using the said property for companymercial purpose or number using the same for any beneficial purpose or the appellant has to pay huge amount by way of damages in the event of he loosing the case or the fact that the litigation between the parties is a luxury litigation are all facts which are irrelevant for changing the status-quo in regard to possession during the pendency of the suit.

REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO.1713 OF 2007 B. Sinha, J. Short question arising in the appeal is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner renders any services so as to incur the liability to pay service tax. The factual background leading to the said question may briefly be numbericed. Appellants herein entered into an agreement with Gas Authority of India Ltd. GAIL titled Consignment Stockistship Agreement. Inter alia, on the premise as to why they should number be asked to pay services taxes, a show cause numberice was issued on the appellant on 20.10.2003. Cause was shown by it saying that numberservice is being provided by it as a clearing and forwarding agent of GAIL. An order in original was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise on 17.3.2004 directing payment of service tax with interest as also penalties as demanded under the show cause numberice. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed by the appellate authority by a judgment and order dated 15.2.2005. A further appeal preferred by the appellant before the Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has also been dismissed. Mr. P.K. Sahu, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, drawing our attention to the impugned order, would submit that from a bare perusal thereof, it would be evident that the appellant merely accepts offer on behalf of its principal and its activities being number extended to the job of a clearing and forwarding agent, the impugned order cannot be sustained. It was urged that the authorities under the Act in determining the liabilities of the appellant had proceeded only on the premise that a processing agent would be a clearing and forwarding agent as was held in the case of Prabhat Zarda Factor Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Patna 2002 145 ELT 222 which having subsequently been overruled by the larger Bench of the Tribunal, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Respondent, on the other hand, would companytend that a document must be read as a whole. So read, it would appear that the appellant number only receives orders on behalf of GAIL but also gets the insurance companyer for the goods and sale of the goods which would clearly companye within the purview of clearing and forwarding activities. Such activities on the part of the appellant, it was urged, being number incidental to the main purpose for which it was appointed as a stockist agent, the impugned judgment cannot be faulted. Before we embark upon the rival companytentions of the parties, we may numberice the definition of clearing and forwarding agent as also business auxiliary service as companytained in Section 65 19 and Section 65 25 of the Act, which read as under 65 19 business auxiliary service means any service in relation to promotion or marketing or sale of goods produced or provided by or belonging to the client or promotion or marketing of service provided by the client or any customer care service provided on behalf of the client or procurement of goods or services, which are inputs for the client or production or processing of goods for, or on behalf of, the client provision of service on behalf of the client or a service incidental or auxiliary to any activity specified in sub-clauses i to vi , such as billing, issue or companylection or recovery of cheques, payments, maintenance of accounts and remittance, inventory management, evaluation or development of prospective customer or vendor, public relation services, management or supervision, and includes services as a companymission agent, but does number include any information technology service and any activity that amounts to manufacture within the meaning of clause f of section 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 1 of 1944 . 25 clearing and forwarding agent means any person who is engaged in providing any service, either directly or indirectly, companynected with the clearing and forwarding operations in any manner to any other person and includes a companysignment agent There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a document has to be read as a whole. The purport and object with which the parties thereto entered into a companytract ought to be ascertained only from the terms and companyditions thereof. Neither the numberenclature of the document number any particular activity undertaken by the parties to the companytract would be decisive. In V. Lakshmanan v. B.R. Mangalagiri and Ors. 1995 Supp. 2 SCC 33 , the Supreme Court in regard to interpretation of the clause stipulating the payment of money as advance and number earnest money provided for in the Sale Deed opined The numberenclature or label given in the agreement as advance is number cither decisive or immutable. In Assam Small Scale Ind. Dev. Corp. Ltd. and Ors. v. J.D. Pharmaceuticals and Anr. 2005 8 SCALE 298 2005 13 SCC 19, on the decisiveness of the numberenclature of the agreement entered into between the state companyporation and small scale industrial unit, opined The expressions principal and agent used in a document are number decisive. The nature of transaction is required to be determined on the basis of the substance there and number by the numberenclature used. Documents are to be companystrued having regard to the companytexts thereof wherefor labels may number be of much relevance. For the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the appellant in effect and substance was a clearing and forwarding agent or it was merely accepting orders for and on behalf of GAIL, the same must be ascertained from the terms of the agreement itself. Section 68 of the Act envisages every person providing taxable service to any person shall pay the service tax at the rate specified in Section 66 thereof in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed. Section 70 of the Act provides for furnishing of returns to the Superintendent of the Central Excise by every person liable to pay service tax. Rule 7 of the Finance Rules, 1994 provides for submitting a halfyearly return by the assessee in the prescribed form. Section 77 provides for penalty for companytravention of any provision for which numberother penalty is provided. Unfortunately, the appellant did number appear before the assessing authority. He also did number appear before the appellate authority. The appellate authority in its order dated 15.2.2005, inter alia, numbericed During the appeal numberone appeared for personal hearing fixed on 12.7.2004 and 20.7.2004. Therefore, I am going to decide the case on the basis of evidence available on records. I have carefully gone through the facts and records of the case and observe that the issue involved is numberpayment of Service Tax by the appellant. The appellant has companytended that levying of Service Tax on amount received as companymission for procuring orders for another person is number legal. Under Section 65 25 CF Agent has been defined as any person who is engaged in the providing any service, directly or indirectly companynected with clearing and forwarding operation in any manner to any other person and CF agent includes companysignment agent. The appellant has themselves admitted that they were procuring orders for M s. GAIL. Since during the relevant period appellant was providing services to M s. GAIL so service tax has been companyrectly demanded from them. The High Court, however, relying on clauses 4, 5, 11, 14 and 15 of the Agreement opined The agent were number at all companycerned with the handling or movement of goods unlike in the present case where the companysignment agent is required to lift the goods from the factory of the principal and distribute the same either directly to the buyers or bring them to his godown for future sale and delivery. From the agreement under our scanner, it also appears that the liability for delays in delivery in transit through the air, road or water ways solely rested on the appellant. There is a more explicit indication of the fact that the appellant was required by his agency terms to lift the goods for delivery and arrange for distributing them to the buyers, by making necessary transit arrangements. Therefore, the activities of lifting, receiving, stocking and delivering the goods to the buyers, clearly make a clear chain of activities, involving clearing and forwarding operations. The High Court also, while distinguishing the judgment of the larger Bench of the Tribunal, in Larsen Tourbo Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai 2006 3 STR 321 T-LB and Medpro Pharma Pvt. Ltd. CCE, Chennai 2006 3 STR 355 T-LB , opined In this companytext, a plain reading of Section 65 105 j , would reveal that Taxable Service should mean any service provided to a client by a clearing and forwarding agent including a companysignment agent Emphasis supplied in relation to clearing and forwarding operations, in any manner. In the present case, the appellant is admittedly a companysignment stockist, who is actively involved in Clearing Forwarding Operation by taking responsibilities for the movement of goods right from the factory warehouse of the principal upto the stage of delivery to the buyers in one or many ways. There is, therefore, numberdoubt, that the appellant is fully companyered within the tax framework, being a Clearing Forwarding Agent engaged in relation to Clearing Forwarding Operations. The agreement is titled as Consignment Stockistship Agreement. Appellant has various jobs to perform thereunder. It does number arrange for any transport. It, however, provides for godowns. It gets the insurance companypany to companyduct a survey. It has to furnish dates as regards stock in its custody. It has to furnish guarantee to recover full value of the stocks which it holds for the companypany or sell on behalf of the companypany or for such a sum as would be determined by the companypany in its discretion. The companypany, however, has to indicate the recommended list prices for the sale of the product whereto the appellant is entitled to at octroi duty, terminal tax, sales tax or other local taxes or levies in forced in the local area and recover the same from their customers and maintain proper accounts for the same. Clauses 13 and 14 of the said agreement empower to sell the goods as also to issue Form F to the Company. It is also responsible for companylection of tax. What is necessary for determining the question is as to whether the purported job of the appellant as a clearing and forwarding agent was incidental to its main activity, namely, getting orders from the clients and selling the products to various customers of the companypany or number. The numberice to show cause companytained the following elements Service charges of Rs.500/- PMT shall be paid by M s GAIL to the companysignment stockist i.e. numbericee for the quantity sold by them. Rs.400/- PMT shall be paid to the companysignment stockist for getting booking orders for the product of M s. GAIL. Rs.100/- PMT shall be paid to the companysignment stockist for release clearance of product locally from their stock on the orders booked by M s. GAIL directly. The period in question is from 1.9.1999 to 31.7.2002. The numberice to show cause had referred only to paragraph 20.1 and 20.3 of the agreement. Its activities are said to be sale and or getting booking orders for the product. Whether in the aforementioned situation, the appellant has incurred any liability to pay service tax or number has number been determined. Its principal activities, as indicated hereinbefore, have number been determined. It is true that the appellant has number appeared before the assessing authority or the appellate authority. However, keeping this in view, we are of the opinion, that the interest of justice would be subserved if the matter is remitted to the assessing authority with liberty to the parties to adduce such evidence as may be found necessary for determining the issue s . Appellant, however, shall number take any adjournment before the assessing authority and shall render all companyperation with it in the matter of determination of the question.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos. 41, 106 etc. etc. of 1973. Under Art. 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas companypus. K. Maheshwari, for the petitioner in W.P. 41 . K. Gupta, for the petitioner in W.P. Nos. 106 113 . S. Gupta, for the petitioner in W.P. Nos. 441 214 . S. Arora, for the petitioner in W.P. 621 . Niren De, Attorney General of India and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent in W.P. 106 . Dilip Sinha, for the respondents in W.P. Nos. 113, 441 . M. Kshatriya, for the respondents in W.P. 214 . K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent in W.P. 41 . Nire De, Attorney General of India and R. N. Sachthey, for Attorney General of India. Ramamurthy, for intervener No. 1 and for intervener No. 2. The Judgment of Ray CJ, Mathew Chandrachud JJ. was delivered by Mathew J. Alagiriswami, J. and Bhagwati, J. gave partly dissenting Opinions. MATHEW, J. In these writ petitions filed under article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners question the legality of their detente and pray for issue of writs in the nature of habeas companypus. These petitions raise a companymon companystitutional question, namely, whether Parliament is bound to prescribe the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b of the Constitution in order that the proviso to article 22 4 e might operate, and, whether, by s. 13 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 Act 26 of 1971 , hereinafter referred to as the Act, after it was amended by s. 6 d of the Defence of India Act, 1971, the Parliament has prescribed the maximum period. The orders passed by the Government of West Bengal under s.12 1 of the Act in these cases provide that the Governor is-pleased to companyfirm the orders of detention and to companytinue the detention of the detenues till the expiration of 12 months from the dates of their detention of until the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1971, whichever is later. The material part of s. 13 of the Act as it originally stood ran as follows The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been companyfirmed under s. 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. After it was amended by s. 6 d of the Defence of India Act, 1971, the material part of s. 13 of the Act reads The maximum period for which any person may be detained it pursuance of any detention order which has been companyfirmed under s. 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention or until the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1971, whichever is later. The Defence of India Act, 1971, came into force on December 4, 1971. Section 1 3 of that Act provides that the Act shall companye into force at once and shall remain in force during the period of operation of the Proclamation of Emergency and for a period of six months thereafter. Section 2 g of that Act defines Proclamation of Emergency as the proclamation issued under clause 1 of article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd day of December, 1971. The President issued the Proclamation of Emergency under article 352 of the Constitution on December 3, 1971. Article 22 4 a of the Constitution says that numberlaw providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer then three months unless an Advisory Board has reported before the expiry of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. The proviso to the article provides that numberhing in sub-clause a shall authorize, the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause b of clause 7 of article 22. By reason of article 22 4 b , a person can be detained for a longer period than three months without the necessity of companysulting an Advisory Board if such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses a and b of clause 7 of article 22. And, article 22 7 says Parliament may by law prescribe- a the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of subclause a of clause 4 b the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention and c the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause a of clause 4 . The companytentions of the petitioners were that the Parliament was bound to prescribe the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b of the Constitution in order that the, proviso to article 22 4 a might operate and, as S. 13 of the Act as amended did number prescribe the maximum period of detention, the companyfirmation of the detention orders in terms of s. 13 of the Act was bad. The learned Attorney General, who appeared for the respondent in these petitions, submitted that in s. 13 of the Act the parliament has prescribed the maximum period of detention. And in the alternative, he said that the Parliament was number. bound to prescribe the maximum period of detention for the proviso to article 22 4 a to operate. in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras 1 Kania, C. J. said that article 22 7 b is permissive, it being number obligatory on Parliament to prescribe the maximum period and that if this companystruction resulted in a Parliamentary law enabling the detention of a person for an indefinite period without trial, that unfortunate companysequence is the result of the words of article 22 7 itself and that the Court companyld do numberhing about it. In Krishnan v. The State of Madras 2 , s. 11 of the Preventive Detention Amendment Act, 1951, was impugned as violative of article 22 4 a on the ground that S. 11 did number fix a maximum period of detention, but on the companytrary, empowered the Government in express terms to order that the detenu was to companytinue in detention for such period as it thought fit. The Court, by a majority, held that s.11 was number invalid on the ground that it did number fix the maximum period of detention inasmuch as the Act was to be in force only for a period of one year and numberdetention under that Act companyld be companytinued after the expiry of the Act. Mahajan, J. pointed out that the point was companycluded by the decision in Gopalans case 1 where Kania, C.J. had observed that it was number obligatory on Parliament to prescribe any maximum period. On the other hand, Bose, J. who wrote a dissenting judgment, held that though it was number obligatory on Parliament to fix the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b , if it wanted to detain a person for a period longer than three months, it companyld only do so by providing in the Act the maximum period of detention. In the State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey and Others 3 the central issue was whether a State Legislature has power to pass a law providing for preventive detention of a person for a period longer than three months even after obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for detention, unless the Parliament has prescribed the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b . The companytention was that there was numbersuch power. The Court negatived the companytention and said that article 22 7 is companyched in, a permissive way, that there is numberhing mandatory about it and that the majority decision in Krishnans case 2 following the observation of Kania, C.J. in Gopalans case 3 was binding on the, Court. The Court also said that under entry 3 of list III of the Seventh Schedule, both Parliament and State legislatures have companycurrent power to make laws in respect of preventive detention for reasons companynected with the security of a State, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity persons subject to such detention, and that as the State legislatures have plenary power to makelaw providing for preventive, detention within the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the power must necessarily extend to all 1 1950 S.C.R. 88, 2 1951 S.C.R. 621 3 1972 1 S.C.C. 199. matters incidental to preventive detention as companytemplated by this entry subject only to the companydition that the law made by the State should number companye into companyflict with a law made by Parliament with respect to the same matter. The Court came to the companyclusion that there was numberlimitation on the power of a State legislature to make a law providing for detention for a period beyond three months for the reason that Parliament has number made a law prescribing the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b . Great reliance was placed by the petitioners on the reasoning companytained in the dissenting judgment of Bose, J. in Krishnans case supra for the proposition that the fixation by law of the maximum period of detention is obligatory upon Parliament in order that the proviso to article 22 4 a may operate. According to Bose, J., a law providing for detention of a person beyond a period of three months must satisfy either clause 4 a or clause 4 b of article 22. The learned judge was number, however, prepared to read the word may in clause 7 of article 22 as meaning must as that would change the usual meaning of the word. He was of the view that Parliament is free to prescribe or number to prescribe the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b and that neither Parliament number State legislature can be companypelled to pass a law authorising preventive detention beyond three months but, if, however, either wishes to do so, then it is bound to companyform to the provisions of either sub-clause a or b of article 22 4 or both, and that, in the case, of sub-clause a , the proviso is as much a part of the sub-clause as its main provision. The learned judge then said that if numbermaximum limit is prescribed under subclause b of article 22 7 , the proviso to article 22 4 a cannot operate, and, if it cannot operate, numberlegislative action can be taken under clause 4 a , and resorted to reasoning from analogies to fortify his companyclusion. He observed If A is told by B that he may go to a bank and withdraw a sum of money number exceeding such limit as may be fixed by C, it is evident that until C fixes the limit numbermoney can be withdrawn. Equally, if A is told that he may withdraw money number exceeding a limit which he himself may fix, there can, in my opinion, be numberright of withdrawal until he fixes the limit. He companycluded his judgment by saying that the majority judgment amounted to the Constitution telling all persons resident in the land that though we authorise Parliament to prescribe a maximum limit of detention if it so chooses, we place numbercompulsion on it to do so and we authorise it to pass legislation which will empower any person or authority Parliament chooses to name, right down to, a police companystable, to arrest you and detain you as long as he pleases, for the duration of your life if he wants, so that you may linger and rot in jail. till you die, as did men in the Bastille. We think the analogies which the learned judge referred to are, In fact, misleading and his seasonings from them number companyvincing. Under entry 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, both Parliament and State legislatures have plenary power to pass laws for preventive detention as respects the subjects mentioned therein. As ancillary to that power, or, as an inseparable part of it. Parliament and State legislatures have power to fix the period of detention also. One cannot imagine a power to pass a law for detention unless that power carries with it the incidental power to provide for the period of such detention. Therefore, both Parliament and State legislatures have power under the entry to provide for detention of a person for a specified period. the purpose of article 22 4 a is to put a curb on that power by providing that numberlaw shall authorize the detention,of a person for a period exceeding three months unless an Advisory board has reported within the period of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention. And, what the proviso means is that even if the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention, the period of detention beyond three months shall number exceed the maximum period that might be fixed by any law made by Parliament under article 22 7 b . The proviso cannot mean that even if Parliament does number pass a law fixing the maximum period under article 22 7 b , the State legislatures, for example, cannot pass a law which provides for detention of a person beyond three months. The period of such detention,, viz., detention beyond the period of three months, would then be a matter within the plenary power of Parliament or State legislatures, as the case may be, as such a power is incidental to the power to pass a law with respect to the topics companyered by entry 3 of List III. It is therefore clear that, but for the proviso to clause 4 a of article 22, the Act, as it provides for the opinion of the Advisory Board, can authorize detention of a person for any period, by virtue of the plenary character of the legislative power companyferred by the entry. Whether such a law is liable to be struck down on the ground that it imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the fundamental rights under article 19 is an altogether different question. The proviso says in effect that if Parliament fixes the maximum period under article 22 7 b , the power of Parliament and State legislatures to fix the period of detention in a law passed under the entry would be curtailed to that extent. Seeing, therefore, that the power to pass a law providing for detention of a person after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board includes the power to fix any reasonable period beyond three months by virtue of the plenary character of the legislative power companyferred by the entry, the proper analogy would be A has authority from B to draw any amount from a bank but he is told that if C fixes a limit upon that authority then be can only draw the amount as fixed by C, in such a case. if C does number fix the amount the power of A to draw is plenary. Or, if A is told that he may withdraw money number exceeding a limit which he himself may fix. A has power to draw any amount, nay, the whole amount in the Bank, if only he fixes the limit at that amount. The companydition-precedent, namely. the fixation of the amount by A in such a case, would be wholly illusory, for whatever be chooses to draw would be the limit of his authority. To put it differently, as Parliament and State legislatures have power under the entry to pass a law enabling the detention of a person for a period longer than three months in case the law provides for the opinion of the Advisory Board, there companyld be numberlimit to that period, except in the companytext of its reasonableness, as the power to fix the period of detention is incidental to the plenary power to legislate on the topic of preventive detention. The proviso merely enables Parliament to put a curb on that power by prescribing the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b . The proviso does number, proprio vigore, companypel the Parliament to fix the maximum period. Nor does article 22 7 . On the other hand, it expressly says otherwise. Whence then arises the obligation of Parliament to fix the maximum period under article 22 7 b ? We see numberprovision which either expressly or by necessary implication companypels Parliament to do so. Personal liberty is a cherished freedom, more cherished perhaps than all other freedoms, and we are deeply companycerned that numberman may linger and rot in detention. As judges and citizens., personal liberty is as dear to us as to anyone else and we may respectfully venture to make the same assumption in regard to those judges who were parties to the decisions in Gopalans case 1 , Krishnans case 2 and Ashok Deys case 3 . But the problem here is one of dispassionate interpretation of the article in question and we cannot import an obligation that Parliament shall by law prescribe the maximum period of detention. Such an obligation companyld only arise from an invisible, radiation proceeding from a vague and speculative companycept of personal liberty. The language of article 22 4 b is in marked companytrast with that of article 22 4 a read with the proviso. Article 22 4 b makes it obligatory upon Parliament, if it wants to pass a law for detaining a person for a period of more than three months without making a provision in that law for obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board within three months. to companyply with subclauses a and b of article 22 7 . We, therefore, see numbersufficient reason for departing from the view taken in the decisions of this Court referred to earlier as regards the power of Parliament under article 22 7 b . The question whether, when Parliament passes a law under article 22 7 b fixing the maximum period of detention in any class of cases, it is exercising an independent power of fixing the maximum period of detention derived from clause 7 of article 22 or a power traceable to the entries on the subject of preventive detention, does number arise for companysideration here. If the exercise of the power under article 22 7 is independent of the power companyferred by the entries relating to preventive detention, the question whether a law passed by virtue of any of the entries fixing a period of detention in excess of the maximum period fixed by a law passed under article 22 7 b would, sub-silentio repeal the provision in regard to the maximum period in the law passed under article 22 7 , and make that period the maximum period for the purpose of article, 22 7 b does number also strictly arise for companysideration. But this much we think is certain, namely, that the prescription of a maximum period by a law made under article 22 7 b has numberparticular sanctity so far as Parliament is companycerned, as it companyld pass a law for detention the 1 1950 S.C.R. 88. 2 1951 S.C.R. 621. 3 1972 1 S.C.C. 199. next day providing for a higher maximum period and justify that law as a law passed both under the relevant entry relating to preventive detention and under article 22 7 b . To put it differently, the, view that the prescription of the maximum period under article 22 7 b is a guarantee that the Parliament cannot pass a law providing for longer period of detention than the maximum period fixed under article 22 7 b has numbersolid foundation, as the law of detention fixing the longer period would sub silentio repeal the law under article 22 7 b fixing the maximum period. As Parliament has power to repeal a law fixing the maximum period under article 22 7 b , the longer period fixed under the later law of detention would become the maximum period. Detention without trial is a serious matter. It is only natural that it should companyjure up lurid pictures of men pining in Bastille. But malignant diseases call for drastic remedies. And it was this realization that made the Constitution-makers-all lovers of liberty-to reconcile themselves to the idea of detention without trial. Even if it is granted that Parliament is bound to fix the maximum period of detention, as we said, such a fixation cannot be immutable. what then is the great guarantee of personal liberty in the fixation of the maximum period of detention by Parliament, if that fixation can fluctuate with the mood of Parliament ? The learned Attorney General companytended in the alternative that if S. 13 as amended is regarded as fixing the maximum period of detention under article 22 7 b , it does number suffer from any infirmity on the score that the period fixed is indefinite as companytended by the petitioners. The petitioners bad companytended that the expression the maximum period occurring in article 22 7 b companynotes a definite period reckoned in terms of years, months or days and that numberperiod can be said to be a maximum period unless it is possible to predicate its beginning and end in terms of years, months or days. In other words, the argument was that since the determination of the period of detention, namely, the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1971, is dependent upon the revocation of the Proclamation of Emergency, the period fixed in S. 13 is number the maximum period as visualized by article 22 7 b . The meaning of the word maximum is, the highest attainable magnitude or quantity of some thing , a superior limit Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p. 1221, 1953 , 3rd ed. . The meaning of the word period is A companyrse or extent of time Time of duration Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p. 1474 . Therefore, the words maximum period mean the highest or greatest companyrse or extent or stretch of time. The highest or greatest companyrse or extent or stretch of time may be measured in terms of years, months or days, as well as in terms of the occurrence of an event or the companytinuous of a state of affairs. In Juggilal Kamlapat v. Collector, Bombay 1 , the High Court of Bombay was companycerned with the question whether a requisition A.I.R. 1946 Bombay 280. der which stated that the requisition of the immovable property in question was to companytinue during the period of the, present war and x months thereafter was vague and indefinite. Bhagwati, J. said The period of the present war through indefinite in duration was definite in itself in so far as the petitioners were given in as clear terms as it companyld be an indication of the period for which their property was sought to be requisitioned by respondent 1 viz., the duration of the present war. The user of this term was as definite as the user of the expression the life time of A which is used when settling or bequeathing a remainder in favour of B. B companyld number be heard to say that the life time of A which was the period prescribed as the one which was to companye to an end before the remainder would vest in possession in his favour was a term which was vague or indefinite. It was as clear and definite as it companyld be, having regard to the fact that the period of the life time of an individual is indeterminate, though that life is of necessity going to companye to an end some time or other. We do number think it necessary that Parliament should have fixed a period in terms of years, months or days in order that it might be the maximum period for the purpose of article 2Z 7 b . Seeing that the object of the law of preventive detention is to prevent persons from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of internal security, or of public order, or of supplies and services essential to the companymunity or other objects specified in entry 9 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, we see great force in the companytention of the learned Attorney General that the maximum period in article 22 7 b can be fixed with reference to the duration of an emergency. In other words, as the object of preventive detention is to prevent persons from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of internal security, public order or supplies or services essential to the companymunity or other objects specified in entry 9 of List I, the power to detain must be adequate in point of duration to achieve the object. And, how can the power be adequate in point of duration, if it is insufficient to companye with an emergency created by war or public disorder or shortage of supplies essential to the companymunity, the duration of which might be incapable of being predicted in terms of years, months or days even by those gifted with great prophetic vision ? If the maximum period can be fixed only in terms of years, months or days, certainly it would have been open to Parliament to fix a long period in S. 13 and justify it as the maximum period. It would be straining the gnat and swallowing the camel if anybody is shocked by the fixation of the maximum period of detention with reference to the duration of an emergency but companyld stomach with companyplacency the fixation of maximum period, say, at fifteen or twenty years. Whether the fixation of a maximum period in terms of years or in terms of events is reasonable in a particular circumstance, is a totally different matter. it was argued on behalf of one of the interveners on the basis of the decision of this Court in B. Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry 1 that the Parliament has abdicated its power al. duty to fix maximum period to the executive as the determination the duration of the Proclamation of the Emergency is a matter with the discretion of the President and he is, therefore, the authority to determine the retirement age of the Defence of India Act. We do number think that the Parliament, in fixing the duration of the maximum period of detention with reference to an event like the cessation of the period of emergency, has, in any way, abdicated its power or function to fix the maximum period or delegated it to the President. There can be numberdoubt that it is Parliament that has fixed the maximum period in S. 13 of the Act. The only question is whether, because the duration of the period is dependent upon the volition of the President, it ceases to be the maximum period. We cannot presume that the President will act unreasonably and companytinue the Proclamation of Emergency even after the emergency has ceased to exist. The petitioners argued that s. 13 of the Act is bad for the reason that it is violative of their fundamental right under article 19 of the Constitution. This challenge is number open to them as it is precluded by the Proclamation of Emergency. Although it was argued that s. 13 of the Act is violative of article 14 of the Constitution for the reason that it has companyferred unlimited discretion on the detaining authority to fix the period of detention, we do number think that there is any substance in that companytention. The authority which passes the initial order of detention is number expected to fix the period of detention see Krishnans case supra , nay, it may be illegal if it were to do so. Nor is the Government bound, when companyfirming the order of detention, under s. 12 1 of the Act, to fix the period of detention see Suna Ullah v. State of J N K 2 . Even if a period is fixed in companyfirming the detention order under S. 12 1 , the period can be revoked or modified see s. 13 . The maximum period of detention has been fixed by s. 13 and the discretion to fix the duration within the maximum has been given to the Government after companysidering all the relevant circumstances. Seeing that the maximum period of detention has been fixed by S. 13 and that the discretion to fix the period of detention in a particular case has to be exercised after taking into account a number of imponderable circumstances, we do number think that there is any substance in the argument that the power of Government to determine the period of detention is discriminatory or arbitrary. In the result, we overrule the companytention of the petitioners and direct the writ petitions to be listed for disposal. ALAGIRISWAMI, J. I have read the judgment of our learned brother Mathew, J. and with respect I differ from him on the question whether it is obligatory on Parliament to fix the maximum period of detention. I shall analyse the relevant provisions later but I shall first deal with three decisions which have dealt with this question. 1 1967 2 S.C.R. 650. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2431. In A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras 1 the six learned Judges companyprising the Bench delivered separate judgments. Kania C. J. was the only Judge who dealt with this point in these words It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely. If that companystruction is companyrect, it springs out of the words of subclause 7 itself and the Court cannot help in the matter. It would be numbericed that there is numberdiscussion at all here as to whether the learned Chief Justice came to the companyclusion that the companytention was companyrect or number or how it springs out of the words of subclause 7 that it was number obligatory on Parliament to prescribe any maximum period. In the next case of S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras 2 Patanjali Sastri, J. with whom Kania, C.J. agreed, did number deal with this question at all. Mahajan, J., with whom S. R. Das, J. agreed substantially on the grounds stated by Mahajan, J. did, of companyrse, deal with this question in these words The next point canvassed before us was that the Constitution does number envisage detention for an indefinite period and that it is obligatory on Parliament to provide a maximum period for detention of a person under a law of preventive detention. In my opinion, this argument again is number sound. Emphasis was laid on the proviso to article 22 4 a which enacts that numberhing in the sub-clause shall authorize the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause b of clause 7 and it was urged that the, word may in article 22 7 must be read in the sense of must and as having a companypulsory force inasmuch as the enactment authorizes Parliament to prescribe by law a maximum period for detention, for the advancement of justice and for public good, or for the benefit of persons subjected to preventive detention. Reference was made to Maxwell on Interpretation of the Statutes 9th End., page 246 and to the well-known case of Julius v. Bishop of Oxford 3 Lord Cairns in that case observed as follows - Where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons that power ought to be exercised. In my opinion, clause 7 of article 22, as already pointed out, in its true companycept to a certain degree restricts the measure of the fundamental right companytained in clause 4 a and in this companytext the rule referred to by Maxwell has numberapplication whatever. Moreover, the provision in the Constitution is merely an enabling one and it is well settled 1 1950 S.C.R. 88. 2 1951 S.C.R. 621. 3 5 App. cas. 214. that in an enabling Act words of a permissive nature cannot be given a companypulsory meaning. Vide Caries on Statute Law, p. 254 . Be that as it may, the point is numberlonger open as it has been companycluded by the majority decision in Gopalans case. The learned Chief Justice at p. 119 of the report observed as follows - Sub-clause b is permissive. It is number obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe any maximum period. It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely. If that companystruction is companyrect, it springs out of the words of subclause 7 itself and the companyrt cannot help in the matter. Nothing said by Mr. Nambiar is sufficient to persuade me to take a different view of the matter than was taken in Gopalans case. It may be pointed out that Parliament may well have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any maximum period of detention in the statute which was of a temporary nature and whose own tenure of life was limited to one, year. Such temporary statutes cease to have any effect after they expire, they automatically companye to an end at the expiry of the period for which they have been enacted and numberhing further can be done under them. The detention of the petitioners therefore is bound to companye to an end automatically with the life of the statute and in these circumstances Parliament may well have thought that it would be wholly unnecessary to legislate and provide a maximum period of detention for those detained tinder this law. It would be numbericed that while he did discuss this question he thought that the point was companycluded by the decision in Gopalans case. As I have pointed out earlier that was number a majority decision but only a passing observation by Kania, C.J. Both these cases mainly proceed on the basis that the Act itself being a temporary Act to be in force for a year the question of maximum period did number arise for serious companysideration. Bose, J. however was of the view that it was obligatory on Parliament to fix the maximum period of detention. In the latest case of State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey 1 , which was a judgment by four learned Judges, Dua, J. speaking for the Court said Now, the argument raised in the High Court and accepted by it and repeated before us by Shri S. N. Chatterji on behalf of the respondents is that clause 7 b of Article 22 makes it obligatory for the Parliament to prescribe by law the maximum period for which a person may be detained as also the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board in holding the enquiry under clause 4 a of this Article. According to the submission, in the absence of such a law by Parliament numberorder of detention can authorise detention of any person for a period longer than three months and at the 1 1972 1 S.C.C. 199. expiry of three months all persons detained under the Act must be released. We are unable to accept this companystruction of clause 7 of Article 22. It is numbereworthy that Shri Chatterji, learned companynsel for the respondents, expressly companyceded before us that Article 22 7 is only an enabling or a permissive provision and it does number impose a mandatory obligation on the Parliament to make a law prescribing the circumstances under which a person may be detained for more than three months as stated therein. But according to him sub-clause b and c of clause 7 do companytain a mandate to the Parliament which is obligatory. In our view, clause 7 of this Article on its plain reading merely authorises or enables the Parliament to make a law prescribing i the circumstances under which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months, ii the maximum period for which a person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention, and iii the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board in an enquiry under clause 4 a of this Article. The respondents companytention that may in the opening part of this Article must be read as shall in respect of sub-clauses b and c though it retains its numbermal permissive character in so far as clause a is companycerned, in the absence of special companypelling reasons can be supported neither on principle number by precedent of which we are aware. On the other hand this Court has in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras agreeing with the observations of Kania, C.J. in Gopalan v. State of Madras held sub-clause b of clause 7 to be permissive. This opinion is number only binding on us but we are also in respectful agreement with it. This decision does directly deal with the point but number by detailed analysis of the relevant provisions as done by Mathew, J. and Bhagwati, J. and as I have tried to do later on. The decision, however, war. mainly companycerned with the power of the State Legislature to make a law with regard to preventive detention and the whole approach is companyoured by this companysideration rather than the question whether the prescription of the maximum is obligatory. The power of Parliament to legislate with regard to preventive detention arises under Entry 9, List 1 of the Seventh Schedule as well as Entry 3, List 3 of the Seventh Schedule. The State Legislature has the power to legislate with regard to preventive detention under Entry 3 in List 3 of the Seventh Schedule. This, of companyrse, is subject to the provisions of Article 254 2 of the Constitution. Article 22 is found in Part III of the Constitution regarding fundamental rights. According to Article 1 3 2 the State shall number make any law which takes away or abridges the, rights companyferred by that Part. Therefore, Article 22 is an article restricting the powers of Parliament and State Legislatures in regard to preventive detention in the manner laid down therein. Of the learned Judges who dealt with Gopalans case. Kania, C.J., Patanjali Sastri and Dass JJ. took the view that Article 22 does number 4-L748SuP. CI/74 form a companyplete companye of companystitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention. While Mahajan, J, thought that it companytains a self companytained companye of companystitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention, Das, J. thought that Article 22 lays down the minimum rules of procedure that even the Parliament cannot abrogate or overlook. Mukherjea, J. proceeded to state his companyclusions on the assumption that Art. 22 is number a self-contained companye relating to preventive detention. Fazl Ali, J. took the view that Art. 22 does number form an exhaustive companye by its,-If relating to preventive detention. All this goes to show that all the learned Judges more or less took the view that Art. 22 obtained certain companystitutional safeguards regarding the preventive detention. Now let us took at Article 22 in so far as it is necessary for purpose of this discussion Art. 22 4 No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless-- a an Advisory Board companysisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court, has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention Provided that numberhing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause b of clause 7 or b such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses a and b of clause 7 . Parliament may by law prescribea the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause a of clause 4 b the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention and c I shall number place the various parts of the above provisions separately so as to make matters clear No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless the Advisory Board, companysisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be the appointed as Judges of the High Court, has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. This does number authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause b of clause No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than three months unless such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament prescribing a the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause a of clause 4 and b the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention. The 1st proposition means that a law providing for preventive detention can authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months only if an Advisory Board has reported that there is sufficient cause for such detention. Proposition 2 means that even with the advice of an Advisory Board the detention cannot exceed the maximum period prescribed by law made by Parliament under sub-clause b of clause 7 . I shall deal with the question whether it is obligatory on Parliament to make such a law a little later. Proposition 3 means that if a person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses a and b of clause 7 the detention can be for a period longer than three months. It should be numbericed that the law companytemplated under this proposition is one made under sub-clauses a and b of clause 7 . Therefore a Parliamentary statute can provide for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board by laying down the circumstances under which and class or classes of cases on which it can be done. In that case the maximum period for which a person can be detained should also be specified by the parliamentary law i.e. a person cannot be detained for a period exceeding three months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board unless tile companycerned provision of law also provides for the maximum period for which such a person is to be detained. The Constitution makers have Contemplated that if the Advisory Boards opinion is to be dispensed with, the maximum period of detention should be laid down. it is obvious, therefore, that the word may in Art. 22 7 amounts to shall. It is also obvious that the power to dispense with the opinion of an Advisory Board is given only to Parliament. When it makes a law under clause 7 a b of Art. 22 that also would bind the State Legislatures in so far as they enact any legislation with regard to preventive detention. This is number, of companyrse, to say that State Legislatures have numberpower with regard to preventive detention. But they do number have the power to prescribe the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than 3 months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board. That power is companypletely that of Parliament and any State legislation will also be subject to the maximum period prescribed by Parliament under a legislation made under Art. 22 7 a and b . The only question that number remains to be companysidered is whether if an Advisory Board is provided for in a law providing for preventive detention under Article 22 4 a maximum period of detention should be prescribed or number. In companysidering this question one thing would be obvious that if Parliament does prescribe a maximum period under proposition 2 i.e. the proviso to Art. 22 4 a , that would apply to all laws relating to preventive detention whether made by Parliament or by a State Legislature. Apparently the power to prescribe, a maximum period given to Parliament referred to in this proviso is to prevent the State Legislatures making laws with regard to preventive detention without any maximum limit. This is another limitation on the powers of the State Legislature to legislate with regard to preventive detention. The Constitution makers apparently did number want the State Legislatures to have an unfettered power with regard to preventive detention even in the field allotted to them under Entry 3 of List 3 of Seventh Schedule. This provision can be usefully companypared with the provision of Art. 31 3 which provides for a legislation made under the provisions of clause, 2 of Art. 31 being reserved for companysideration of the President and receiving his assent in order that it may have effect. This was intended to act as a fetter on the power of the State Legislatures to legislate under the provisions of Art. 31 2 . The only difference between Art. 31 3 and the proviso to Art. 22 4 a is that in the one case the power is given to the President and in the other case the power is given to the Parliament. Now if under subclauses a and b of clause 7 , read together, Parliament has to prescribe the maximum period of detention, does the fact that the proviso to Art. 22 4 a mentions only sub-clause b of clause 7 but number also sub-clause a , makes any difference ? If, as I have already pointed out, this proviso at least companytemplates Parliament making a law providing for the maximum period of detention which cannot be exceeded by any State law regarding preventive detention the reasonable companystruction would be to hold that it is obligatory on Parliament to legislate under sub-clause b fettering the hands of the State Legislature in regard to the maximum period of detention. It is true that Parliament cannot fetter its own hands in the matters of legislating with regard to the maximum period of detention. If the Parliament can fix the maximum period it can also alter it. But if the maximum period so fixed is unreasonably long Art. 19 1 would be attracted. An harmonious companystruction of the whole of Articles 22 4 and 22 7 would thus necessitate that Parliament should provide a maximum period of detention number merely in respect of laws relating to preventive detention made by State Legislatures but also its own laws regarding preventive detention. If legislation with regard to the provision of a maximum period is merely optional there was numberneed for the proviso at all. The fact that only subclause b of clause 7 is mentioned in the proviso to Article 22 4 a does number make any difference to the obligatory character of having a maximum period for preventive detention because, as we have already seen, fixing of maximum period of detention is obligatory under Article 22 7 a and b . It can also be said that where Parliament has prescribed the maximum period of detention under sub-clauses a and b of clause 7 such a maximum would be automatically attracted to the proviso under Article 22 4 a . Furthermore, sub-clause a of clause 7 is number mentioned in the, proviso to sub-clause 4 a because Article 22 4 does number deal with detention without the opinion of an Advisory Board. That is why clause b alone is mentioned. It is clear that the companycept of a maximum period of detention runs through the whole of Article 22 4 and 7 . This is because while Parliament and State Legislatures make laws it is the executive that makes orders of detention and if numbermaximum period of detention is specified by law it would be open to the executive to keep persons in detention indefinitely. It is number reason-able to hold that the Constitution makers while providing that if a person is to be detained without the opinion of an Advisory Board being taken there should be a maximum period of detention, thought that numbermaximum period of detention need be fixed if the Advisory Boards opinion is taken. It should be numbericed that the opinion of the Advisory Board is only as regards the sufficiency of the cause for such detention and number as regards the period for which such detention can be made. Therefore, taking an overall view and analysing the provisions of clauses 4 and 7 of Article 22 it is clear that a maximum period of detention should be laid down by Parliament whether it is a case of detention after obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board or without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board. I am fortified in this view by the debates in the Constituent Assembly to which Bhagwati J. has referred. I agree, however, with Mathew J. that the law under companysideration has prescribed the maximum period and therefore the companytention of the petitioners should be overruled and the writ petitions be listed for disposal. BHAGWATI, J. The question which arises in these petitions is of the highest importance. It affects personal liberty which is one of our most cherished freedoms. How far shall we permit it to be abridged by judicial companystruction ? Shall we by interpretation vest large and unlimited power in the legislature to detain a person without trial as long as it pleases or shall we read companystitutional limitations on the exercise of that power ? That is the real issue before the Court. The law is number well-settled by the decision of this Court in K, Gopalan v. State of Madras 1 that the, legislative power to enact a law providing for preventive detention is derived from Entry 9, List I and Entry 3, List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The 1 1950 S.C.R. 88. Parliament alone has the power to make law for preventive detention for reasons companynected with the subjects enumerated in entry 9 List 1, while the Parliament and the State Legislature both can make law for preventive detention for reasons companynected with the subjects specified in entry 3, List Ill. The legislative power of the Parliament and the State Legislature to make law for preventive detention within their allotted fields is plenary, subject only to companystitutional limitations, and this legislative power necessarily carries with it as incidental or ancillary to it the power to fix the period for which a person may be detained under such law. Now, if there were numberlimitations on the exercise of this power, the Parliament or the State Legislature, particularly the latter,. companyld fix any period of detention it liked and indefinitely detain a person without trial. That would be a large and fearful power destructive of personal liberty and Art. 21 would number afford any protection against it, because the only guarantee that article provides is that numberperson shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The companystitution-makers, therefore, introduced Art. 22 with a view to placing limitations on the Dower of Parliament and the State Legislature to make law for preventive detention, so is to safeguard personal liberty of the individual against excessive inroads by legislative incursions in the area of personal liberty. Clause 3 to 7 of Art. 22 impose these limitations. We are companycerned only with cls. 4 to 7 which run as follows No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless- a an Advisory Board companysisting of persons who are or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention Provided that numberhing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by parliament under sub-clause b of clause 7 or b such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses a and b of clause 7 . When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, companymunicate to such person the grounds on which the order his been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Nothing in clause 5 shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority companysiders to be against the public interest to disclose. Parliament may by law prescribe- a the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause a of clause 4 b the maximum period for which any person may in any class of classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention and C the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause a of clause 4 . It is clear on a companybined reading of cls. 4 and 7 that if a law made by Parliament or the State Legislature authorises the detention of a person for a period number exceeding three months, it does number have to satisfy any other companystitutional requirement except that it must be, within the legislative companypetence of the Parliament or the State legislature, as the case may be. The Constitution permits the Parliament and the State Legislature to make law providing for detention upto a period of three months without any limitation, presumably because detention for such a relatively short period of time without any further safeguard may be justifiable on practical and administrative grounds. But when the law seeks to provide for detention for a longer period than three months, it must companyply with certain companystitutional safeguards. These safeguards are to be found in sub-cls. a and b of cl. 4 . Sub-cl. a of cl. 4 lays down that numberlaw shall provide for detention for a period longer than three months unless an Advisory Board companysisting of persons with the qualifications there mentioned has reported before the expiration of the period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. The law must, therefore, provide for reference to an Advisory Board and its report within a period of three months, if the detention is to last longer than three months. If the Advisory Board opines that there is numbersufficient cause for detention, the person companycerned cannot be detained beyond a period of three months. It is only if the opinion of the Advisory Board is in favour of detention that the person companycerned can be detained for a longer period than three months, but in such a case what shall be the period of detention is entirely a matter for the detaining authority to decide. Vide Puranlal Lakhanpal Union of India. 1 There is, however, an outside limit to the period of detention laid down by the proviso which says that numberhing in sub-cl. a of cl. 4 shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b . It will, therefore, be seen that under cl. 4 , sub-cl. a there is a double safeguard. One is that there can be numberdetention beyond the period of three months without the intercession of the Advisory Board and the other is that even where the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for the detention, the person companycerned cannot be detained beyond the, maximum period prescribed by Parliamentary law made under cl. 7 , 1 1958 S.C.R. 460. sub-cl. b . Clause 4 , sub-cl. b lays down an alternative situation where a person may be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board and that is where the detention is in accordance, with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-cls. a and b of cl. 7 . Sub-cl. a of cl. 7 empowers the Parliament to make a law prescribing the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board and sub-cl. b of el. 7 provides that Parliament may by law prescribe the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law of preventive detention. When the Parliament has made a law under sub-cls. a and b of cl. 7 , a person can be detained in accordance with such law for a period longer than three months without the intercession of the Advisory Board. Now we are number companycerned in these petitions with the question as to what is the scope and ambit of sub-cl. a of cl. 7 and what kind of law is companytemplated by this companystitutional provision. That question arose for decision before this Court in Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal 1 and there is an authorative pronouncement of seven judges of this Court on that point. But that need number detain me. Our companycern is with sub-cl. b of cl. 7 . The question that we are called upon to companysider is whether it is obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe the maximum period of detention under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b , if the, detention is to be made for a longer period than three months under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 . Now one thing is clear that the Parliament is under numberobligation to make a law under sub-cl. a of cl. 7 . it is only if the requirement of obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board is intended to be dispensed with that the Parliament must make a law under sub-cl. a of cl. 7 . If the Parliament does number make such a law, cl. 4 , sub-cl. b will number companye into operation and detention for a period longer than three months, whether under Parliamentary law or under State law, would be impermissible without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board. It was number disputed on behalf of the respondents law a enacts Parliament the where that be number companyld it indeed and under sub-cl, a of cl. 7 , it must be accompanied by a law made by the Parliament under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 . Mere enactment of a law under sub-cl. a of cl. 7 would be futile without a law under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 , because what sub-cl. b of cl. 4 requires is that the detention must be in accordance with the law made by Parliament under sub-cls. a and b of cl. 7 . The language, of cl. 4 , sub-cl. b posits clearly and in numberuncertain terms that there must be law both under sub-cls. a and b of cl. 7 in order that cl. 4 , subcl. b may operate. If there is a law only under sub-cl. a of cl. 7 and numberlaw under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 , a person cannot be detained longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board as companytemplated under cl. 4 , sub-cl. a . The making of a law by the Parliament under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 is therefore obligatory if the detention, is to be 1 1973 1 S.C.C. 856. for a longer period than three months without the intercession of the Advisory Board. The object of the companystitution makers in insisting on this requirement clearly was that though in exceptional circumstances and exceptional classes of cases the Parliament may by law authorise detention for a period more than three months without reference to the Advisory Board, such detention should be, a maximum period specified by the Parliament beyond which it should number extend. There should be an outside limit to the detention by the specification of the maximum period by the Parliament. This was the safeguard provided by the companystitution makers in protection of personal liberty. The maximum period specified by the Parliament must obviously be a reasonable one, because otherwise the Parliamentary law would be bad as offending cls. a and d of Art. 19 1 . So much is clear and beyond dispute. But the question is does the same requirement of specification of the maximum period by the Parliament also apply where the detention is sought to be made for a longer period than three months under sub-cl. a of el. 4 ? The answer to this question depends on the true interpretation of the Proviso to sub-cl. a of el. 4 read in the companytext of el. 4 , sub-cl. b and el. 7 , sub-cls. a and b . Since the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the real meaning of a companystitutional provision, it is evident that numberhing that is logically relevant to this process should be excluded from companysideration. It was at one time thought that the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the companyrse of the debates on the Draft Constitution were wholly inadmissible as extraneous aids to the interpretation of a companystitutional provision, but of late there has been a shift in this position and following the recent trends in juristic thought in some of the Western companyntries and the United States, the rule of exclusion rigidly followed in Anglo-American jurisprudence has been companysiderably diluted. Crawford in his book on Statutory Construction points out at page 388 The judicial opinion on this point is certainly number quite uniform and there are American decisions to the effect that the general history of a statute and the various steps leading up to an enactment including amendments or modifications of the original bill and reports of Legislative Committees can be looked at for ascertaining the intention of the legislature where it is in doubt, but they hold definitely that the legislative history is inadmissible when there is numberobscurity in the meaning of the statute. This Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J., has also numbered this change in the methodology of interpretation and recognized its validity in State of Mysore v. R. V. Bidan 1 where, after referring to the rule laid down in earlier decisions excluding reference to legislative proceedings for the purpose of interpretation, the learned Judge said This rule of exclusion has been criticised by jurists as artificial. The trend of academic opinion and the Practice C.A. No. 992 of 1972, dec. on 3-9-1973. in the European system suggest that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. Re Recently, an ambit Indian Jurist has reviewed the legal position and expressed his agreement with Julius Stone and Justice Frankfurter. Of companyrse, numberody suggests that such extrinsic materials should be decisive but they must be admissible. Authorship and interpretation must mutually illuminance and interact. There is authority for the proposition that resort may be had to these sources with great caution and only when incongruities and ambiguities are to be resolved. There is strong case for wattling down the rule of Exclusion followed in the British companyrts and for less sapologitic reference to legislative proceedings and like materials to read the meaning of the words of a statute. Where it is plain, the language prevails, but where there is obscurity or lack of harmony with other provisions and in other special circumstances, it may be legitimate to take external assistance such as the object of the provisions, the mischief sought to be remedied, the social companytext, the words of the authors and other allied matters. We may, therefore, legitimately refer to the Constituent Assembly debates for are purpose of ascertaining what was the object which the companystitution makers had in view and what was the purpose which they intended to achieve when they enacted cls. 4 and 7 in their present form. When cl. 15 of the Draft Constitution, companyresponding to Art. 21, was adopted by the Constituent Assembly,there was numberclause in the Draft Constitution companyresponding to Art. 22. A large section of the Constituent Assembly, including Dr. Ambedkar, was greatly dissatisfied with the wordings of cl. 16 and it was felt that cl. 15 as adopted gave to the legislature a carte blanche to provide for the arrest, and detention of any person under any circumstances and for any period it deemed fit. Dr. Ambedkar, therefore, introduced a new cl. 15A providing certain safeguards, but in the companyrse of a long and spirited debate which followed, it was found that these safeguards were number adequate. In view of the discussion which took place, Dr. Ambedkar amended cl. 15A so as Lo incorporate some of the suggestions and the amended cl. 15A was then further revised by the Drafting Committee. In the companyrse of revision, the Drafting Committee renumbered cls. 15 and 15A as Arts. 21 and 22 respectively. Thereafter when the revised Draft Constitution came up for companysideration before the Constituent Assembly, on behalf of the Drafting Committee itself Mr. Krishnamchari moved two amendments which sought further to redraft clauses 4 and 7 so as to indicate clearly that there would be a maximum period laid down by Parliament for which any person or any class or classes of persons companyld be detained by any law providing for such detention even in cases where the Advisory Board approved of detention beyond three months. numberauthority in India companyld in any circumstances order the detention of a person beyond the maximum limit so laid down by Parliament. Certain apprehensions as to the truer effect of these amendments were voiced by some members but Dr.Ambedkar while replying to the debate clarified the position and explained the scope of the amended article as follows First, every case of preventivedetention must be authorised by law. It cannot be it the will of the executive. Secondly, every case of preventive detention for a period longer than three months must be placed before a judicial board, unless it is one of those cases in which Parliament, acting under clause 7 , sub-clause a , has by law prescribed that it need number be placed before a judicial board for authority to detain beyond three months. Thirdly, in every case, whether it is a case which is required to be placed before the judicial board or number, Parliament shall prescribe the maximum period of detention so, that numberperson who is detained under any law relating to preventive detention can be detained indefinitely. There shall always be a maximum period of detention which Parliament is required to prescribe by law. Fourthly, in cases which are required by article 22 to go before the judicial board, the procedure to be followed by the Board shall be laid down by Parliament. The amendments were then adopted by the Constituent Assembly and Art. 22 emerged in its present form. There can, therefore, be numberdoubt that according to the companystitution makers, it was clearly intended that if detention is to be for a longer period than three months,, whether under subcl. a or under sub-cl. b of cl. 4 , the Parliament must prescribe the maximum period of detention and to use the words of Dr. Ambedkar, there shall always be a maximum period. of detention which Parliament is required to prescribe by law. The problem before us therefore resolves itself into a very narrow one, namely, are we going to accept an interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the companystitution makers, or are we going to defeat their intention by a highly literal interpretation ? Are we going to preserve the safeguard which the companystitution makers in their overweening anxiety to protect personal liberty intended to fashion or are we going to dilute it by a process of companystruction ? Fortunately the language of the Proviso to sub-cl. a of cl. 4 is number so intractable that it cannot be interpreted so as to effectuate the intention of the companystitution makers a id protect the citizen from indefinite incarceration without trial. I shall presently examine the language, but before that. let me once again look at the object of the provision in cl. 7 , sub-cl. b . This provision, as I have pointed out in relation to cl. 4 sub-cl. b , is Intended to provide a safeguard or insulation against indefinite detention in cases where detention for a longer period than three months without reference, to the Advisory Board is authorised by Parliamentary legislation under subcl. a of cl. 7 .- Now, if this protection or safeguard is necessary where the detention may be for a longer period than three months under a law made by Parliament under sub-cl. a of cl. 7 , a fortiorari it should equally be necessary where the detention is under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 because under that provision too the detention would be. for a period longer than three months. It can hardly be supposed that the companystitution-makers should have thought that in one case detention for an indefinite period should be impermissible as grave encroachment of personal liberty while in the other it should be allowed without any inhibition. The provision for reference, to the Advisory Board would certainly ensure that there is sufficient cause for the detention, but, as held by this Court in Puranlal Lakhan pal v. Union of India 1 the Advisory Board would have numbersay in the matter of determination of the period of detention and how long to detain would be solely within the power of the detaining authority. There would thus be numbercheck or companytrol of the Advisory Board so far as the period of detention is companycerned. The power of the detaining authority in regard to the period of detention would, therefore, be as large and unlimited in a case falling under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 as it would be in a case falling within a law made by Parliament under sub-cl. a of cl. 7 . Equally in both cases, this power companyld lend itself to abuse by detention for indefinite duration and render the guarantee of personal freedom illusory and meaningless. It was to company,interact this menace and safeguard personal liberty from attenuation by excessive inroads that the companystitution-makers enacted sub-cl. b of cl. 7 providing for fixation of maximum period by the Parliament beyond which numberperson can be detained whether under parliamentary law or under State law. The companypelling reasons which necessitated the enactment of the safeguard in sub-cl. b of cl. 7 apply equally whether the detention for a period longer than three months is authorised under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 or sub-cl. a of cl. 7 . It therefore stands to reason that where the detention is to be for a longer period than three months under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 , the safeguard of the maximum period to be prescribed by Parliament under cl. 7 , subcl. b must be there so that there can be numberdetention for indefinite duration. If there is numbermaximum period prescribed by Parliament under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b , detention cannot be authorised for a period longer than three months under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 . To take a different view would mean that where the Parliament itself authorises detention for a longer period than three months under cl. 7 , sub-cl. a , the Parliament is required to prescribe a maximum period but where the State Legislature authorises detention for a period longer than three months under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 , numbermaximum period need be prescribed and once the Advisory Board gives a favourable opinion, the State Legislature can authorise detention for an indefinite period. hat would indeed be a highly regrettable result. It would free the State Legislature from any restraint as to the period for which it may authorise, detention under sub-cl. a of cl. 4 and open the flood gates for cessive invasion of personal liberty. I do number think such is the meaning of the companystitutional provision. 1 1958 S.C.R. 460. The Proviso to sub-cl. a of el. 4 says that though a person may be detained for a longer period than three, months after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory. Board, such detention shall number extend beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-cl. b of el. 7 . It is clear on a companybined reading of the Proviso and the main provision in sub-cl. a of el. 4 that the Proviso is an integral part of the main provision. It is intended to cut down the large amplitude of the power of detention companyferred under the main provision. The scope and boundary of the power of detention under el. 4 , sub- Cl. a can, therefore, be defined only by reading the Proviso and the main provision as one single enactment. Both together represent the will of the companystitution makers One cannot be disjoined from the other and given effect to though the other is number operative. If the Proviso does number operate, the main provision also would number, for the main provision is intended to operate only with the limitation imposed by the Proviso. It is difficult to believe, for reasons already discussed, that the companystitution, makers should have intended that the power to detain for a longer period than three months should be exercisable, even if the limitation imposed by the Proviso were number-existent. The Proviso and the main provision form part of one integral scheme and either both operate together or numbere. Here the Proviso is number used in its traditional orthodox sense. It is intended to enact a substantive provision laying down an outside limit to the period of detention. If there is numberoutside limit by reason of Parliament number having prescribed the maximum period under sub-cl. b of el. 7 , the provision enacted in el. 4 , sub-cl. a cannot operate and in that event detention cannot be companytinued beyond three months, even though the opinion of the Advisory Board may be obtained. The Proviso clearly posits the existence of a law made by Parliament under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 and makes it an essential element in the operation of el. 4 , sub-cl. ,a . The companystitution makers have, by enacting the Proviso in el. 4 , sub-cl. a , achieved the same legislative end as they have in el. 4 , sub-cl. b by u sing the words and subcl. b . The legislative device has been different because of the differing structural arrangements of the two subclauses. This is in my, opinion the companyrect companystruction of el. 4 , sub-cl. a read with el. 7 , sub-cl. b . In any event, it is highly possible companystruction and if it carries out the intention of the companystitution makers and inhibits the power of the legislature to authorise detention for indefinite duration, there is numberreason why we should number prefer it. We must remember that it is a companystitution we are expounding a companystitution which gives us a democratic republican form of government and which recognize the right of personal liberty as the most prized possession of an individual. Shall we number then lean in favour of freedom and liberty when we find that it can be done without any violence to the language of the companystitutional provision ? Shall we number respond freely and fearlessly to the intention of the founding father and interpret the Constitutional provision in the broad and liberal spirit in which they companyceived it, instead of adopting a rather mechanical and literal companystruction which defeats their intention ? It may be argued what is the vale of this safeguard, how does it strengthen the guarantee of personal liberty, when the fixation of the maximum period is number immutable, but can fluctuate according to the pleasure of the Parliament. I do number think this argument is valid. It fails to take into account two important companysiderations. In the first place, cl. 4 , sub-cl. b clearly shows that even though the fixation of maximum period is within the discretion of Parliament, the companystitution makers regarded it as a valuable safeguard, for otherwise they would number have insisted upon prescription of maximum period as a companydition of detention for a period longer than three months under a law made by Parliament under cl 7 , sub-cl. a . Even where Parliament itself makes a law under cl. 7 , sub-cl. a authorising detention for a period longer than three months, the Constitution says that in order that such law may operate, Parliament should prescribe the maximum period. That shows the great importance attached by the companystitution makers to this safeguard, even though the maximum period is to be fixed by the Parliament and a fortiorari, theoretically at least, it may be varied from time to time according to the pleasure of the Parliament. Now if the prescription of maximum period is regarded by the Constitution makers as a valuable safeguard necessary to be companyplied with even where Parliament makes a law under cl. 7 , sub-cl. a authorising detention for a longer period than three months, how much more necessary and valuable it would be where instead of a parliamentary law, a State law authorises detention for a period longer than three months under cl. 4 , sub-cl. a . Secondly, if the maximum period is required to be prescribed, Parliament would necessarily have to apply its mind to the question and when it does so, it can safely be presumed that, being a highly responsible body that it is, it would fix a maximum period which is reasonable and that would provide a check against indefinite detention by the Government. It is true that theoretically it may be possible to say that the fixation of the maximum period can be varied by Parliament arbitrarily according to its sweet-will, but in practice such an eventuality would be highly remote having regard to the pressure of democratic forces and sanction of public opinion. Moreover, if the maximum period fixed is unreasonable, it can always be struck down by the companyrt as violative of cls. a and d . of Art. 19. It would number, therefore, be companyrect to say that the prescription of maximum period by Parliament is an illusory safeguard. At least the companystitution makers did number think it to be-so. These reasons companypel me to differ from the view taken in the leading judgment of my learned brother Mathew, J. In my opinion Parliament is free to prescribe or number to prescribe have maximum period under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b . It is under numberobligation to do so But if numbermaximum period is prescribed, neither the Parliament number the State Legislature can authorise detention for a longer period than three months either under sub cl. a or sub-cl. b of cl. 4 . If the Parliament or the State Legislature wishes to authorise detention for a period longer than three months, it must companyform to the, provisions of either sub-cl. a or sub-cl. b of cl. 4 and that requires that maximum period must be prescribed by Parliament by law made under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b . There would thus always be a maximum period of detention either the initial period of three months or the maximum period prescribed by Parliament under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b . There can be numberdetention for a period longer than three months unless the maximum period of detention is prescribed by Parliament under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b . I know it is number customary to refer to opinions expressed in the text book of a living author but I cannot help mentioning that Mr. Seervai in his book on Constitutional Law also echoes the same line of thought. Constitutional Law of India, p. 450, para 12.52 . This is the view which I am taking on companystruction but I must companysider whether there is anything in the earlier decisions of this Court which precludes me from doing so. Three decisions were cited before us and I must number refer to them. The first is Gopalans case supra Where six learned judges companyprising the companystitution bench delivered separate judgments in regard to the validity of certain provisions of the Preventive, Detention Act, 1950. None of the learned judges, except Kania, C.J., dealt with the present point or expressed any opinion upon it. Kania, C.J., alone had something to say and he observed Sub-clause b is permissive. It is number obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe any maximum period. It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely. If that companystruction is companyrect, it springs out of the words of sub-clause 7 itself and the companyrt cannot help in the matter. It will be seen that these, observations merely express the inse dixit of the learned Chief Justice. There is numberdiscussion of the point and numberreasons are given in support of it. That cannot bind us. The next decision is that of the companystitution Bench is S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras 1 . There were three main judgments in this case. The first was by Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was , with whom Kania, C.J., agreed. Patanjali Sastri, J., did number deal with this question at all and his judgment does number throw any light on it. The second judgment was by Mahajan, J., as he then was , with whom S. R. Das, J. as he then was substantially agreed. Mahajan, J., certainly dealt with this question but it is evident from the relevant portion from his judgment extracted by brother Alagiriswami, J., that the question was number raised before the Court in that case in the form in which it has been presented before us. The argument which was advanced in that case was that the word may in cl. 7 of Art. 22 must be read in the sense of must and it must, therefore-, be held to be obligatory on the part of Parliament to make a law under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 of Art. 22. This argument was rejected by Mahajan, J. That does number help us because the argument before us is quite different. Moreover, Mahajan, J., regarded this point as companycluded by the majority decision in Gopalans case supra and relied on the observations of Kania, C.J., which I have quoted above. But this was obviously under some misapprehension because, as pointed out Above. the other learned Judges did number express themselves on this point and 1 1951 S.C.R. 621. the observations of Kania, C.J., did number represent the majority decision. in any event, this view.expressed by Mahajan, J. was shared only by S. R. Das, J. and Bose, J,. emphatically dissented from the, view. Bose J., in a strong and powerful judgment held that though it is number obligatory on Parliament to fix a maximum period of detention under sub-cl. b of el. 7 of Art. 22, if a person is to be detained for a period longer than three months, a maximum period must be prescribed by Parliament. This is the same view which has found favour With me This decision does number therefore companypel me to hold otherwise. The last decision to which I must refer is that in State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dev 1 . It cannot be disputed that the question in the form in which it has been presented before us was raised before the Court in that case. But, if we look at the judgment of Du a, J., and particularly the portion extracted in the judgment of brother Alagiriswami, J., it will, be clear that the argument advanced before the Court in that case Was the same as that in Krishnans case supra , namely, that may in the opening part of el. 7 of Art. 22.must be read is Shall in respect of subclauses b and c though it retains its numbermal permissive character in so far as clause this argument which was a is companycerned. and it was this argument which was rejected by precedent. the Court by saying that in the absence of special companypelling reason it can be supported neither on principle number by precedent. The argument here is quite different it is number companytended that may must be read as shall. it is an argument from a different angle and approach and that does number appear to have been canvassed before the Court number has it been discussed. Moreover this decision is by a Bench of four judges. It cannot therefore deflect me from the view I am taking. Now in the present case s. 13 of the Maintenance of internal Security Ac 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Act as it originally stood, provided that the maximum period for Which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention which any person may under s. 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. It was companymon ground between the parties that the period of twelve months prescribed by the unamended s.13 as the maximum period for which a person companyld be detained under the provisions of the ACt was maximum period. as companytemplated under sub-cl. b of cl. 7 of Art.22. But by s.6 d of the Defence of India Act, 1971, which came into force on 4th December, 1971, s.13 was amended so as to provided that the maximum period of detention shall be twelve months from the date of detention or until the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1971 whichever is latter. Sec 1 3 of the Defence of India Act, 1971 laid down the duration of that ACt and said that Act shall remain in force for the duration of the proclamation of emergency and a period of six months thereafter. SEc 13 as amended thus provided that the maximum period of detention under the Act shall be twelve months from teh date detention or until the expiry of a period of six-months 10 1972 10 S.C.C. 199 . after the cessation of the proclamation of emergency whichever is latter. The question is whether this period prescribed by the amended s. 13 companyld be said to be maximum period within the meaning of that expression as used in sub-cl. b of cl. 7 of Art. 22. The argument of the petitioners was that the period specified in the amended s. 13 was indefinite inasmuch as it companyld number be predicated as LO When the proclamation of emergency would companye to an end and it companyld number therefore be regarded as maximum period so as to satisfy the mandate of sub-cl. b of cl. 7 of Art. 22. The. petitioners companytended that since numbermaximum period was prescribed by Parliament the amended S. 13 being inadequate for that purpose-the petitioners companyld number be detained beyond a period of three months and they were therefore entitled to be freed. This argument requires serious companysideration. The question is what is the meaning of the expression maximum period in sub-cl. b of cl. 7 ? When a period is fixed with reference to the happening of an event, which is bound to happen, but of which it cannot be predicated with any definiteness as to when it would happen, as for example, cessation of emergency or death of an individual, can it be said that the period fixed is maximum period within the meaning of sub-cl. b of cl. 7 ? The word maximum according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary means highest attainable magnitude or quantity of something a superior limit and the word period means a companyrse of extent of time time of duration. Therefore, as a matter of plain grammatical English, the words maximum period mean the highest or greatest extent or stretch of time Which fixes an outside limit. Now this highest or greatest-extent or stretch of time may be determined by means of a fixed date or in terms of years, months or days or by reference to the occurrence of an event But whatever be the mode of determination, maximum period, must be a definite period. Ile measure of the period must number be un certain.The outside limit must be definite and known. The period fixing the outside limit may be prescribed by reference to art event but the date of occurrence of the event must number be uncertain. It should be possible to predicate that the event Will happen at a definite ascertained point of time. It is number enough to say that the event is certain and bound to happen. What is necessary is that the point of time at which the event would happen must be definite. Then only it can be said to fix the maximum period, of detention. It Is indeed difficult to see how maximum period, can be Said to be prescribed, when numberone knows how long it will be. It may be five years, or ten years or more. That would be uncertain. How can such a period be regarded as maximum period fixed by law? The very numberion of maximum period carries with it a sense of definiteness. When maximum period is prescribed, there must be definite qualification of the length or duration of the period. if the length of duration is uncertain in that it depends on when a particular event would happen, the prescription of such a period would hardly act as a check against indefinite detention, for there would be numberguarantee that the detention would number companytinue beyond a determinate point of time. The period of detention which companyld be authorised by the 15 748SCI/74 Legislature would in such a case be indefinite, because it would be uncertain as to when the event, by reference to which the, period is to be measured, would happen. That would fail to effectuate the object and purpose of the requirement of prescription of maximum period enacted in sub-cl. b of cl. 7 . I may at this stage pause, to companysider what would be the, companysequences if a companystruction companytrary to that I have discussed above were accepted. It is true that the companysequences of a suggested companystruction do number alter the meaning of a statute but they certainly help to fix its meaning. If I accept the companystruction that maximum period can be prescribed with reference to an event, even though the event is such that though certain, it cannot be predicated of it with any definiteness as to when it would occur-and it is only on the, basis of this companystruction that the fixation of maximum period with reference to theduration of an emergency can be upheld and number otherwise logically it would mean that maximum period can be, fixed with reference to the life of the person detained and if such maximum period is fixed, it would be open to the legislature to authorise detention of a person for the duration of his life. That would be a most starting and devastating result. It is impossible to believe that the companystitution makers who had themselves suffered long periods of in carceration at the hands of the British rulers should have become so obvious of the need to safe guard personal liberty that they , should have given carte blanche to the Parliament to permit detention of a person for life without trial. The power to detail without trial is itself a drastic power justified only in the interest of public security and order. It is tolerated in a free society as a necessary evil. But the power to detain a person for life without trail is something unthinkable in a democracy governed by the rule It is a draconic power subversive of freedom and liberty and can have number place in our companystitutional arrangements To grant,.such a power would be to destroy the democratic way of life, to annihilate one of the most cherished. values of a free society and to vest in the State authoritarian power which is the anti thesis of the rule of law. It would rob the fundamental guarantee of personal liberty of all meaning and companytent and reduce it to a mere husk. It would amount to the Constitution felling all persons residents in ,the land, in the words of Bose J. Here is th full extent of your liberty so far as the length of detention is companycerned. We guarantee that you will number be detained beyond three months unless Parliament otherwise directs, either generally of in your particular class of case but we empower Parliament to smash the guarantee absolutely if it so chooses without let or hindrance , with out restriction. Though we authorise Parliament to prescribe a maximum limit of detention if it so chooses, we place numbercompulsion on it to do so and we authorise it to pass legislation which will empower any person or authority Parliament chooses to name right down to a police companystable, to arrest you and detain you as long he pleases for the duration of your life if he wants, so that you may linger and rot in jail till you die, as did men in the Bastille. 1.shedder to accept such a companystruction. I think the, maximum period, jurist be prescribed either by reference to a fixed date or in terms of years, months or days or by reference to some event of which it can be predicated with certainty that it would happen at a determinate point of time, so that there is companyplete ascertainment of what the period is meant to be and it is number indefinite. Of companyrse, the maximum period which, is so prescribed must be reasonable, for otherwise it would be violative of cls. a and d of Art. 19, This companystruction ensures two safeguards against detention for a longer period than three months. one under cl. 7 , sub-cl. b of Art. 22 and the other under cls. a and d of Art. 19. I am companyscious that the power to detain a person without trial is a necessary power for preservation of the State and maintenance of public security and order and therefore when there is an emergency, it may be thought expedient that the State should have the power to detain a person without trial for the duration of the emergency and the companyferment of such a power may number be regarded as unreasonable. But this companysideration cannot persuade me to accept a meaning of the words maximum period which would render the fundamental guarantee of personal liberty precarious. It must be remembered that the Constitution is meant to provide number only for times of emergency but also for numbermal times, and it would number, therefore.-be right to companystrue a companystitutional provision such as sub-cl. b of cl. 7 , as if it were an emergency provision. The law of preventive detention is number necessarily a product of emergency. Indeed it has been there in our companyntry-in one form or another since the companying into force of the Constitution. Sub-cl. b of cl. 7 should number, therefore be interpreted according to the cannon of companystruction which is sometimes adopted in interpreting war time or emergency legislation. It must be companystrued like any other companystitutional provision having regard to its object and intentment. The fact that we are living today in an emergency should number companyour our interpretation of the companystitutional provision. The companystitutional provision must speak the same voice, whether it be in times of emergency or in numbermal times. We must number forget what Mr. Justice Brande is said in Whitney case 1 Those who won our independence by revolution were number companyards. They did number fear political change. They did number exalt older at the companyt of liberty. We may also recall the words of Mr. Justice Murphy in Bridges case 2 where he said The strength of this nation is weakened more by those who suppress the freedom of others than those who are allowed freely to think and act as their companysciences dictate. Moreover, I may point out that the interpretation which I am accepting does number in any way whittle down or affect the power of the State to detain with a view to meeting a situation arising out of the emergency. Parliament can always prescribe a, suitable maximum period as interpreted by me and authorise detention for the 1 274 U.S. 380 2 326 U.S. 376 duration of such maximum period. If at the end of such maximum period when the person detained is released, it is found that, having regard to the relevant circumstances then existing, it is still necessary to detain him, the detaining authority can once again place him under detention provided of companyrse-and that would be an important safeguardthat if the case falls within. cl. 4 sub-cl. a , the Advisory Board gives an opinion that there is sufficient cause for such further. detention. I am, therefore, of the view that since it cannot be predicated, with any, definiteness in the present case as to when the emergency would companye to an end, the period prescribed by s. 13 of the Act cannot be said to be maximum period within the meaning of sub-cl. b of cl.

The short question which arises in these two appeals is in regard to the jurisdiction of the civil companyrt to entertain the suit challenging the imposition of penalty of withholding of certain increments on the delinquent having been found guilty of misconduct under the relevant Civil SerVices Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1952. The trial companyrt dismissed the suit holding that it had numberjurisdiction since according to it the case was companyered by Section 2 a of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Item No. 11 of Schedule III thereof. In appeal the learned Additional District Judge, Rohtak reversed this order of the trial companyrt holding that the delinquent-plaintiffs had number companytended breach of any standing orders but had merely companytended that the impugned orders were governed under the 1952 Rules referred to earlier and, therefore, the right or liability arose under companymon law and hence attracted Principle No. 2 laid down in the judgment of this Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke1. The High Court refused to interfere with the view taken by the appellate companyrt. The averments in the plaint would primarily govern the question of jurisdiction. Although the plaint is number before us it is clear from paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Rohtak that the delinquent-plaintiffs had number challenged the orders on the ground that they violated any standing orders but had based the challenge in 1 1976 1 SCC 496 1976 SCC LS 70 AIR 1975 SC 2238 companymon law companytending that their case was governed under the Civil Services Punishment and Appeals Rules, 1952. The learned Additional District Judge has, therefore, recorded a finding that the case set out in the plaint was number based on Section 2 a of the Industrial Disputes Act or on the language of the standing orders but was essentially based on the provisions companytained in the 1952 Rules and, therefore, the rights and liabilities arose under companymon law and would attract Principle No. 2 of the Premier Automobiles1 judgment.

With Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1998, Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1998, Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1998 Criminal Appeal No. 396 of 1998 BHAN, J. The instant criminal appeals arising from a companymon judgment relating to the same incident, depict a rare, unfortunate and companydemnable act of the police officials who companytrary to the duty enjoined upon them to protect and maintain law and order, indulged in the act of attacking in a pre-planned and calculated manner Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, in his companyrt room and Chambers on 18th November, 1997 at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar. Facts of the present case In Sessions trial No. 592 of 1992, the Investigating Officer Jokhu Singh was examined as a witness on 7th May, 1997 in the Court of Shri N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur. As the cross-examination companyld number be companycluded the case was adjourned to 26th May, 1997. Thereafter the case was adjourned to several dates but this witness did number appear for the cross-examination. A show cause numberice was issued against Jokhu Singh through Superintendent of Police, Madhepura, requiring him to appear on 11th June, 1997. In spite of that Jokhu Singh did number appear. On 14th July, 1997, a wireless message was sent to him through Superintendent of Police to appear in the companyrt on 5th August, 1997. Once again the witness did number turn up. The Court, therefore, having numberother option issued a numberice to Jokhu Singh to show cause why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act hereinafter referred to as the Act be number initiated against him. Ultimately, on 27th August, 1997 the case was adjourned to 20th September, 1997 and to procure his presence, number-bailable warrant was issued. On this date also the witness did number turn up. He did number file reply to the show cause numberice either. On 17th November, 1997, Jokhu Singh appeared in the companyrt in the afternoon. Having regard to the previous order of number-bailable warrant of arrest, he was remanded to judicial custody. A petition for bail was filed on his behalf after the companyrt hours. It was directed that the same be placed for hearing on the next date. Shri K.D. Choudhary, one of the appellants who was an office bearer of the Policemens Association at District Level and was posted as SHO of the Police Station in the evening of the same day went to the Chambers of Shri Barai for release of Shri Jokhu Singh on execution of a personal bond. Shri Barai did number agree. Thereafter he approached the District Magistrate and on the basis of his advice he met the District Judge and renewed his demand for release of Jokhu Singh, which was declined. On 18th November, 1997, when the bail petition of Jokhu Singh was taken up, the learned companynsel appearing on his behalf made a prayer seeking withdrawal of the bail application. Accordingly, the bail application was dismissed as withdrawn. Soon thereater, a large number of police officers without uniform , armed with lathis and other weapons and shouting slogans against Shri Barai, barged into his companyrt room. The companyrt peon Shri Bishundeo Sharma who tried to shut the door was brutally assaulted. Shri Barai apprehending danger to his life, rushed to his Chambers and managed to bolt the door. Unruly mob forcibly broke open the door, overpowered the bodyguard and assaulted Shri Barai. They reiterated their demand for unconditional release of Jokhu Singh. Due to the manhandling Shri Barai felt dizziness and became unconscious. It was due to timely arrival of a team of doctors that his life was saved. The police personnel after assaulting Shri Barai and his companyrt staff, took away certain records and damaged the doors and grills of the gate. They also assaulted some of the lawyers and damaged their furniture and motor vehicles parked inside the companyrt companypound. Since at the relevant time the District Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur had gone to Banka for holding camp companyrt and Shri Barai was number in a position to send any report, the 5th Additional District Sessions Judge sent a report to the High Court narrating the incident. On the next day, on return from Banka, District Sessions Judge also enquired into the matter and submitted a detailed report. In the report the names of police officials who were identified by the companyrt staff, Shri Barai and the lawyers were also disclosed. They are i A. Natarajan, the then Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur ii Harihar Prasad Choudhary, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur, iii K.D. Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S., iv Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., v Daroga singh, the then S.I. vi P.K. Singh, the then I., vii Rajib Rajan Dayal alias Bhagat, the then S.I., viii Gurubachan Singh, the then S.I., ix Krishna Ram, the then Inspector of Police, x C.D. Jha, the then A.S.I., xi K.N. Singh, the then Officer Incharge of Harijan S. Bhagalpur and xii Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeant Major, Police Line, Bhagalpur. On 19th November, 1997, on the basis of the report sent by the 5th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur dated 18th November, 1997, Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 24 of 1997 was registered and placed before a Bench of the High Court for admission. Along with the said case Civil Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 10625 of 1997 filed on behalf of the Young Lawyers Association was also listed. On perusal of the report and after hearing the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the Advocate General, the Court arrived at the companyclusion that a prima facie case of criminal companytempt was made out against the companytemners. Accordingly proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act were initiated and a direction was issued to the Registry to issue numberices to the above referred persons along with a companyy of the report, companytaining allegations against the companycerned persons, calling upon them to show cause as to why suitable action be number taken against them for the alleged misconduct. The show cause was made returnable by 25th November, 1997. The Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police were directed to affirm on affidavits regarding the steps taken by the State Government in the matter relating to the incident. On 25th November, 1997, all the companytemners appeared through their respective advocates. On a request made the hearing was postponed to 10th December, 1997 to enable them to file their detailed replies to the show cause numberice. Chief Secretary filed his affidavit indicating that the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police after holding a detailed inquiry, had in his report, disclosed names of nine police officials namely i K.D. Choudhary, the then Officer Incharge, Kotwali, ii Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeant Major, Bhagalpur, iii Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., iv B. Singh, the then Thana Incharge, Harijan P.S. Bhagalpur, v Gurubachan singh, the then S.I., vi Daroga Singh, the then S.I., vii Prem Kumar Singh, the then S.I. Officer Incharge Kajraili , viii Rajeev Ranjan Bhagar, the then S.I., and ix C.D. Jha, the then ASI Bhagalpur. The Director General of Police found the officers, named above, guilty for the alleged incident and companydemned the police officials for their act. It was also mentioned in the affidavit that the State Government, acting on the basis of the report of the Director General of Police, had issued different orders, suspending all such officials from service. Keeping in view the gravity of the situation, a Commission of Inquiry was also set up under the provisions of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952. Besides the departmental proceedings, different criminal cases were also lodged against them. On behalf of some of the companytemners a request was made to keep the companytempt matter in abeyance until the companyclusion of the proceedings initiated under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the departmental proceedings and the report of the Commission companystituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act. The request was declined by the High Court. It was held that the pendency of a criminal case or judicial inquiry companyld number companystitute a bar to the companytinuation of the companytempt proceedings. But before adjourning the proceedings to the next date and having numbericed that all the companytemners and their advocates were present and every body was companydemning the occurrence, the Court expressed the desire that some of the responsible officers like Superintendent of Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Inspector of Police Kotwali Shri K.D. Choudhary and Sub-Inspector of Police Ms. Shashi Lata Singh and Sergeant Major of Police Line Ranjit Pandey should disclose details of the occurrence which had taken place in the companyrt premises on 18th November, 1997 and if possible, identify more names of such persons, who, according to them, had taken part at the time of occurrence. On the adjourned date of hearing, the Court recorded the statement of i A. Natarajan, the then S.P., ii Harihar Choudhary, the then DSP, iii K.D. Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S., iv Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., and v Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeat Major, Bhagalpur. The Superintendent of Police in his statement fairly narrated a part of the incident and identified certain more names, like Awadhesh Singh, Subodh Kumar Yadav and Aswan, Vice-President of the Association who, according to him, had also taken part in the alleged assault. The companyrt issued numberices to these three persons also calling upon them to show cause why they be also number proceeded for the criminal companytempt. The officials whose statements had been recorded were directed to file their additional or supplementary replies to the show cause on the next date of hearing. On 10th December, 1997, all the companytemners appeared and filed additional or supplementary replies to show cause numberice. The Superintendent of Police in his supplementary reply disclosed names of 14 more police officials and companystables, who, as per his inquiry, had also taken part along with the main persons named earlier. They are i Ram suresh Singh Nirala, SI, ii Sriram Singh, ASI, iii Ram Rekha Pandey, SI, iv Shivji Singh, SI, v B.N. Singh, ASI, Kotwali, vi Sukh Narain Sharma, SI, D.D. Singh Officer Incharge, Tatarpur P.S., viii Gopalji Prasad, SI, Madhusudhan Sharma O c Sultanganj P.S., x Awadesh Singh, Constable, xi Subodh Kumar Yadav, Constable, xii Ram Prakash Paswan, Constable, xiii Dilip Ojha, Treasure, Policemens Association, Bhagalpur, and xiv Anil Kumar Soren, General Secretary, Policemens Association. Notices were issued to the above-named persons as well along with companyies of the report calling upon them to show cause by 8th January, 1998 as to why they be also number proceeded with the criminal companytempt. On 9th January, 1998 all the companytemners including those fourteen against whom numberices were issued on 10th December, 1997 appeared and filed their replies to the show cause numberice. At the same time, affidavits were also filed on behalf of Shri Barai, Ist Additional District Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur and his staff namely R. Das and B.Sharma and some of the lawyers of the Bhagalpur Court namely Shri M.P.Singh, President Bar Association, Bhagalpur, Shri Y.K. Rai, Secretary, Advocate Assiciation and S Shri N.K. Choudhary, J.K.,Gupta Secretary, Bar Association , B.N. Mishra and S.C.Pandey, Advocates. Copies of the affidavits filed were served on their opposites on 16th January, 1998 all the learned advocates appearing for different parties fairly accepted that companyies of all the material brought on the record so far was properly served on the advocates appearing for the companytemners and those who were appearing in support of the companytempt proceedings. In response to the show cause all the companytemners in their affidavits companydemned the incident of assault on Shri Barai and the lawlessness created in the civil companyrt campus, Bhagalpur. It would be relevant to numberice that some of the companytemners like Harihar Choudhary, DSP, K.D. Choudhary, Inspector of Police and few others have tried to justify the act by saying that there was a resentment amongst the police personnels for the arrest of Jokhu Singh and removal of stars from his uniform in the companyrt. The reply of the Superintendent of Police also indicated that because of such steps taken by Shri Barai the Police Officers Association led by Shri K.D. Choudhary on 17th December, 1997 met the Inspector General Prosecution and the Zonal G. and protested against the arrest of Jokhu Singh and the removal of stars. After showing their resentment these companytemners also criticised the unfortunate incident and assault on Shri Barai, and his staff but they denied their presence at the time of incident in the companyrt premises on 18th November, 1997. Show cause numberice had been issued to 26 persons. Except for one or two the remaining asserted that they were number involved in the incident and were on duty elsewhere at the relevant time. In proof of such defence they attached their duty chart etc. After companysidering the relevant evidence on the record, and after taking due care and caution to see that innocent persons are number punished the High Court dropped the proceedings against the companytemners other than Shri K.D. Choudhary, Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh, Rajib Ranjan Bhagat Dayal , Gurubachan Singh, C.D. Jha, K.N. Singh and Ranjit Pandey. Shri K.D. Choudhary was found to be the ring leader of the companytemners and was imposed with the punishment of undergoing simple imprisonment for a period of three months and the remaining eight to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. It was made clear that the discharge of rule of companytempt numberice of the proceedings against the other seventeen would number absolve them of their misconduct and guilt for their respective offences, if any. In other words, the departmental proceedings initiated by the State Government and the criminal cases registered against them would number be affected by the disposal of the proceedings in the criminal companytempt. Learned companynsel appearing for the State of Bihar, has fairly stated that neither the departmental proceedings number the criminal cases number the Commission of Inquiry have been companycluded so far. The plea taken is that they are awaiting the result of the present appeals. Appellants who were companyvicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and visited with the punishment of simple imprisonment have filed five different appeals. S Shri Daroga Singh, Chakradhar Jha, Shashi Lata Singh and P.K. Singh have filed Criminal Appeal No. 316 of 1998, Shri K.D. Choudhary has filed Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1998, Shri Kedar Nath Singh has filed Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1998, Shri Ranjeet Pandey has filed Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1998 and Shri Gurbachan Singh and Rajib Ranjan Dayal have filed Criminal Appeal No. 396 of 1998. Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh, D. Jha have already retired from service. The remaining are still in service and posted at different places. Learned companynsels appearing for the appellants in different appeals, apart from the merits in individual appeals, which we shall deal with later, have raised some companymon points challenging the companyrectness of the impugned judgment. The same are the alleged companytempt is that of a companyrt subordinate to the High Court and the allegations made companystitute an offence under Section 228 IPC, and therefore the jurisdiction of the High Court to take companynizance of such a case is expressly barred under proviso to Section 10 of the Act that the High Court cannot take suo motu numberice of the companytempt of a companyrt subordinate to it. The procedure given in the High Court Rules and Orders for initiation of proceedings for companytempt of subordinate companyrt having number been followed the entire proceedings are vitiated and liable to be quashed the standard of proof required in the criminal companytempt is the same as in a criminal charge and therefore the charge of criminal companytempt has to be proved by holding a trial as in a criminal case. The appellants companyld number be companyvicted on the basis of evidence by way of affidavits only. The witnesses should have been examined in Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an opportunity to crossexamine the persons who had deposed against them on affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according to them there were companyflicting versions of the incident reasonable and adequate opportunity was number afforded to the appellants either to defend themselves or put forward their case and affidavits of independent witnesses which were on record have number been dealt with by the High Court. Answer to the first point would depend upon the interpretation to be put on Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 which deals with the power of the High Court to punish for the companytempt of subordinate companyrts reads Power of High Court to punish companytempts of subordinate companyrts.- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of companytempts of companyrts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of companytempts of itself Provided that numberHigh Court shall take companynizance of a companytempt alleged to have been companymitted in respect of a companyrt subordinate to it where such companytempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 . According to the learned companynsels appearing for the appellants the proviso to Section 10 means that if the act by which a party is alleged to have companymitted companytempt of a subordinate companyrt companystitutes offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is precluded from taking companynizance of it. According to them in the present case the allegations made amounts to an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and companysequently the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred. We do number find any force in this submission. The point raised is companycluded against the appellants by a judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras, 1952 SCR 425. In that case, sub-section 3 of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 which is similar to proviso to Section 10 of the Act was under companysideration. Section 2 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 provided that numberHigh Court shall take companynizance of a companytempt alleged to have been companymitted in respect of a companyrt subordinate to it where such companytempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Interpreting this Section, it was held that sub-section 3 excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court to take companynizance of a companytempt alleged to have been companymitted in respect of a companyrt subordinate to it only in cases where the acts alleged to companystitute companytempt are punishable as companytempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but number where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided in the Indian Penal Code. This judgment was analyzed and followed by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Revashankar, 1959 SCR 1367. In this case as well the point arose regarding the interpretation to be put to a similar provision and it was held The sub-section was companysidered in two decisions of this Court, Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras 1952 S.C.R. 425 and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1953 S.C.R. 1169 . In the earlier case of Ramakrishna Reddy 1952 S.C.R. 425 the appellant was the publisher and managing editor of a Telugu Weekly known as Praja Rajyam. In an issue of the said paper dated February 10, 1949, an article appeared which companytained defamatory statements about the stationary Sub- Magistrate, Kovvur, and the point for companysideration was if the jurisdiction of the High Court to take companynisance of such a case was expressly barred under section 2 3 of the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, when the allegations made in the article in question companystituted an offence under section 499, Indian Penal Code. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that what the sub-section meant was that if the act by which the party was alleged to have companymitted companytempt of a subordinate companyrt companystituted offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court was precluded from taking companynizance of it. This argument was repelled and this Court said at page 429 - In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases where the acts alleged to companystitute companytempt of a subordinate companyrt are punishable as companytempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but number where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of the sub-section which uses the words where such companytempt is an offence and does number say where the act alleged to companystitute such companytempt is an offence. On an examination of the decisions of several High Courts in India it was laid down that the High Court had the right to protect subordinate companyrts against companytempt but subject to this restriction, that cases of companytempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should number be taken companynizance of by the High Court. This, it was stated, was the principle underlying section 2 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This Court then observed that it was number necessary to determine exhaustively what were the cases of companytempt which had been already provided for in the Indian Penal Code it was pointed out, however, that some light was thrown on the matter by the provision of section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers any civil, criminal or revenue companyrt to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of companymitting any offence under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the companyrt. The later decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma 1953 S.C.R. 1169 explained the true object of companytempt proceedings. Mukherjea J. who delivered the judgment of the Court said at page 1176 It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various Judges that the object of companytempt proceedings is number to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or companyduct of any party, the authority of the companyrt is lowered and the sense of companyfidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened. It was also pointed out that there were innumerable ways by which attempts companyld be made to hinder or obstruct the due administration of justice in companyrts and one type of such interference was found in cases where there was an act which amounted to scandalising the companyrt itself this scandalising might manifest itself in various ways but in substance it was an attack on individual Judges or the companyrt as a whole with or without reference to particular cases, causing unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character and ability of the Judges. Such companyduct is punished as companytempt for the reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the companyfidence of the people in the companyrts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. These two judgments have been followed recently in Arun Paswan, I. vs. State of Bihar Others 2003 10 SCALE 658. We respectfully agree with the reasoning and the companyclusions arrived at in these cases. Criminal companytempt is defined in Section 2 c of the Act, to mean c criminal companytempt means the publication whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which - scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any companyrt or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due companyrse of any judicial proceeding or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.- Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. What is made publishable under Section 228, IPC is the offence of intentional insult to a Judge or interruption of companyrt proceedings but number as a companytempt of Court. The definition of criminal companytempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would either scandalize the companyrt or which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice. It would also include any act which lowers the authority of the Court or prejudices or interferes with the due companyrse of any judicial proceedings. It is number limited to the offering of intentional insult to the Judge or interruption of the judicial proceedings. This Court observed in Delhi Judicial Service Association Vs. State of Gujarat Ors. , 1991 4 SCC 406 The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the companymunity in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to companymit for companytempt of companyrt, number to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is number perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. The power to punish for companytempt is thus for the protection of public justice, whose interest requires that decency and decorum is preserved in Courts of Justice. Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of Justice are protected by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their duties. Any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in companyrt or outside the companyrt by attacking the presiding officers of the companyrt, would amount to criminal companytempt and the companyrts must take serious companynizance of such companyduct. In the present case, a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge was attacked in a pre-planned and calculated manner in his companyrt room and when he tried to protect himself from physical harm by retiring to his chambers, by chasing him there and causing injuries to him. The raising of slogans and demanding unconditional bail for Jokhu Singh further companypounded the offence. The Courts cannot be companypelled to give companymand orders. The act companymitted amounts to deliberate interference with the discharge of duty of a judicial officer by intimidation apart from scandalizing and lowering the dignity of the Court and interference with the administration of justice.The effect of such an act is number companyfined to a particular companyrt or a district, or the State, it has the tendency to effect the entire judiciary in the companyntry. It is a dangerous trend. Such a trend has to be curbed. If for passing judicial orders to the annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the Courts are to be assaulted and humiliated the judicial system in the companyntry would companylapse. The second companytention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court cannot on its own motion take action of a criminal companytempt of a subordinate companyrt. According to the learned companynsels the High Court can take companynizance of a criminal companytempt under Section 15 2 of the Act of a subordinate companyrt only on a reference made to it by the subordinate companyrt or on a motion made by the Advocate General. Since the procedure as laid down in the High Court Rules and Orders had number been followed the very initiation of proceedings for companytempt was vitiated and therefore liable to be quashed. We do number find any force in this submission as well. This point also stands companycluded against the appellants by a decision of this Court in K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow, Vs. Vinay Chandra Misra, 1981 1 SCC 436. In this case an advocate filed a petition before the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the appellant therein as a Member of Revenue Board made certain companytemptuous remarks, viz., nalayak gadhe saale ko jail bhijwa dunga kis idiot ne advocate bana diya hai and acted in a manner which amounted to criminal companytempt of the Court of Revenue Board, in which he the advocate was the companynsel for one of the parties. The advocate requested the High Court to take suo motu action under the Contempt of Court Act against the member of the Revenue Board or pass such orders as it deemed fit. The question for determination was whether the High Court was companypetent to take companynizance of companytempt of a subordinate companyrt when it was moved by a private petitioner and number in accordance with either of the two motions mentioned in Section 15 2 . Analyzing Section 15 2 of the Act and in reading it in harmony with Section 10 of the Act it was held Section 2 c of the Act defines criminal companytempt. Section 9 emphasizes that numberhing companytained in this Act shall be companystrued as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as companytempt of companyrt which would number be so punishable apart from this Act. Section 10 runs as under Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of companytempts of companyrts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of companytempts of itself Then, there is a proviso which is number material for our purpose. The provision in Section 10 is but a replica of Section 3 of the 1952 Act. The phrase companyrts subordinate to it used in Section 10 is wide enough to include all companyrts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even though administrative companytrol over them under Article 235 of the Constitution does number vest in the High Court. Under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court has the power of superintendence over all companyrts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant case, is a companyrt subordinate to the High Court within the companytemplation of Section 10 of the Act. Section 14 provides for the procedure where companytempts is companymitted in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 is very material for our purpose. It provides in regard to companynizance of criminal companytempt in cases other than those falling under Section 14. The material portion of Section 15 reads thus 15. 1 In the case of a criminal companytempt, other than a companytempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by - a the Advocate General, or b any other person, with the companysent in writing of the Advocate General. In the case of any criminal companytempt of a subordinate companyrt, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate companyrt or on a motion made by the Advocate General or, in relation to a union territory, by such law officer as the Central Government may, by numberification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf The operation of sub-section 1 appears to be companyfined to cases of criminal companytempt of the Supreme Court or the High Court, itself. Criminal companytempt of a subordinate companyrt is dealt with in sub-section 2 . A companyparison between the two sub-sections would show that whereas in sub-section 1 one of the three alternative modes for taking companynizance, mentioned is on its own motion, numbersuch mode is expressly provided in sub-section 2 . The only two modes of taking companynizance by the High Court mentioned in sub-section 2 are i on a reference made to it by a subordinate companyrt or ii on a motion made by the Advocate General, or in relation to a union territory by the numberified Law Officer. Does the omission in Section 15 2 of the mode of taking suo motu companynizance indicate a legislative intention to debar the High Court from taking companygnizance in that mode of any criminal companytempt of a subordinate companyrt ? If this question is answered in the affirmative, then, such a companystruction of sub-section 2 will be inconsistent with Section 10 which makes the powers of the High companyrt to punish for companytempt of a subordinate companyrt, companyxtensive and companygruent with its power to punish for its own companytempt number only in regard to quantum or prerequisites for punishment, but also in the matter of procedure and practice. Such a companystruction which will bring Section 15 2 in companyflict with Section 10, has to be avoided, and the other interpretation which will be in harmony with Section 10 is to be accepted. Harmoniously companystrued, sub-section 2 of Section 15 does number deprive the High Court of the power of taking companynizance of criminal companytempt of a subordinate companyrt, on its own motion, also. If the intention of the legislature was to take away the power of the High Court to take suo motu companynizance of such companytempt, there was numberdifficulty in saying so in unequivocal language, or by wording the subsection in a negative form. We have, therefore, numberhesitation in holding in agreement with the High Court, that sub-section 2 of Section 15, properly companystrued, does number restrict the power of the High Court to take companynizance of and punish companytempt of a subordinate companyrt, on its own motion. Emphasis supplied We respectfully agree with the view taken in this judgment and hold that the High Court companyld initiate proceedings on its own motion under the Contempt of Courts Act against the appellants. On the facts of this case apart from the report sent by the 5th Additional District Sessions Judge of the incident, Young Lawyers Association had also filed a writ petition. The Presidents of the three Bar Associations and the Advocate General were present and heard before initiating the proceedings for the criminal companytempt. It has been numbered by the High Court that all the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the Advocate General arrived at the companyclusion that a prima facie case of criminal companytempt was made out against the companytemners. This shows that the Advocate General of the State was also of the opinion that prima facie a case for initiation of proceedings for criminal companytempt was made out and he was a companysenting party to the initiation of the proceedings. The third companytention raised by the learned companynsel for the appellants is that the standard of proof required in the criminal companytempt is the same as in a criminal charge and therefore the charge of criminal companytempt has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That the appellants companyld number be companyvicted on the basis of the affidavits filed. That the witnesses should have been examined in Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had deposed against them on affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according to them there were companyflicting versions of the incident. It was emphasized that justice must number only be done, but must be seen to be done by all companycerned to establish companyfidence that the companytemners will receive a fair, just and impartial trial. We do number find any substance in this submission as well. High Court in its order has numbered that the learned companynsels appearing for both the parties have taken a stand that all possible fair and proper opportunities were extended to them. In view of the statements made by the companynsels for the parties it will number be open to the companynsels for the parties at this stage to take the stand that in the absence of cross-examination of the companycerned persons, reliance companyld number be placed on the statements which were made on oath. Learned companynsel who had appeared for the companytemners before the High Court did number claim the right of cross-examination. Only at the stage of arguments a submission was made that opportunity to crossexamine the companycerned persons was number given which vitiated the trial. High Court rejected this companytention by holding that such a stand companyld number be taken at that stage of the proceedings. It has been held in Arun Paswan case supra that a party which fails to avail of the opportunity to crossexamine at the appropriate stage is precluded from taking the plea of numberobservance of principles of natural justice at a later stage. Such a plea would number be tenable. It has repeatedly been held by this Court Ref 1995 2 SCC 584 that the procedure prescribed either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Evidence Act is number attracted to the proceedings initiated under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court can deal with such matters summarily and adopt its own procedure. The only caution that has to be observed by the Court in exercising this inherent power of summary procedure is that the procedure followed must be fair and the companytemners are made aware of the charges levelled against them and given a fair and reasonable opportunity. Having regard to the fact that companytempt proceedings are to be decided expeditiously in a summary manner the companyvictions have been recorded without extending the opportunity to the companytemners to cross examine those who had deposed against them on affidavits. Though the procedure adopted in this case was summary but adequate safeguards were taken to protect the companytemners interest. The companytemners were issued numberices apprising them of the specific allegations made against them. They were given an opportunity to companynter the allegations by filing their companynter affidavits and additional companynter supplementary affidavits as per their request. They were also given opportunity to file affidavits of any other persons which they did. They were given opportunities to produce any other material in their defence which they did number do. Most of the companytemners had taken the plea that at the relevant time they were on duty in their respective Police Stations though in the same town. They also attached companyies of station diaries and duty chart in support of their alibi. The High Court did number accept the plea of alibi as all these papers had been prepared by the companytemners themselves and numbere of the superior officer had supported such a plea. The evidence produced by the respondents was rejected in the face of the reports made by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Director General of Police companypled with affidavits of Mr. Barasi, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, two companyrts officials and affidavits of some of the lawyers who had witnessed the occurrence. The companytempt proceedings have to be decided in a summary manner. The Judge has to remain in full companytrol of the hearing of the case and immediate action is required to be taken to make it effective and deterrent. Immediate steps are required to be taken to restore order as early and quickly as possible. Dragging the proceedings unnecessarily would impede the speed and efficiency with which justice has to be administered. This Court while companysidering all these aspects held in In re Vinay Chandra Mishra the alleged companytemner , 1995 2 SCC 584, that the criminal companytempt numberdoubt amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under the companymon law and the statute law in the companyntry has always been summary. It was observed that the need was for taking speedy action and to put the Judge in full companytrol of the hearing. It was emphasised that immediate steps were required to be taken to restore order in the companyrt proceedings as quickly as possible. To quote from the above-referred to case However, the fact that the process is summary does number mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied to the companytemner. The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or otherwise the companytemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is number always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The companysensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection that the Judge deals with the companytempt himself and the companytemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where number only it is justifiable to punish on the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure does number offend against the principle of natural justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is number aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full companytrol of the hearing of the case and he must be able to take steps to restore order as early and quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the companytempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses the companyrt for a time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be companypletely satisfactory yet it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive companyduct in companyrt. So long as the companytemners interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of companytempt in the face of the companyrt is companymended and number faulted. In the present case the High Court had decided to proceed with the companytempt proceedings in a summary manner. Due opportunity was afforded to all the companytemners and after verifying and cross checking the material available before it, companying from different reliable sources the High Court companyvicted only nine persons out of twenty six persons arrayed as companytemners before it. The High Court took due care to ascertain the identity of the companytemners by cross-checking with the affidavits filed by the different persons. It is also based on the independent reports submitted by the Director General of Police and Superintendent of Police. We do number find any fault in the procedure adopted by the High Court in companyducting the proceedings in the present case. For the survival of the rule of law the orders of the companyrts have to be obeyed and companytinue to be obeyed unless overturned, modified or stayed by the appellate or revisional companyrts. The companyrt does number have any agency of its own to enforce its orders. The executive authority of the State has to companye to the aid of the party seeking implementation of the companyrt orders. The might of the State must stand behind the Court orders for the survival of the rule of the companyrt in the companyntry. Incidents which undermine the dignity of the companyrts should be companydemned and dealt with swiftly. When a judge is attacked and assaulted in his companyrt room and chambers by persons on whose shoulders lay the obligation of maintaining law and order and protecting the citizen against any unlawful act needs to be companydemned in the severest of terms. If judiciary has to perform its duties and functions in a fair and free manner, the dignity and the authority of the companyrts has to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all companycerned failing which the very companystitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being lost. It was urged with some vehemence that principles of natural justice were number observed in as much as opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who had deposed on affidavits is companycerned it may be stated that numbersuch opportunity was asked for in the High Court at trial stage. It was for them to ask for such an opportunity to cross examine the parties who had deposed against them on affidavit. Since the companytemners did number avail of the opportunity at the trial stage the plea of number-observations of principles of natural justice is number tenable. Appellants were made aware of the procedure which was adopted by the High Court. They were given full opportunity to put forth their point of view. Each of them filed detailed affidavits along with evidence in support thereof. They had attached their duty charts showing that they companyld number have been present at the place of occurrence as they were on duty somewhere else. High Court has companysidered and discussed the entire evidence present on the record before recording the companyviction. The companytention that the affidavits of independent witnesses were number companysidered cannot be accepted. Only those were companyvicted against whom companyroboration of the fact of their presence and participation in the incident was companyfirmed from more than one source. Plea that reasonable and adequate opportunity was number afforded to the appellants is equally untenable. We find from the record that all the material affidavits, show cause numberice etc. which were brought on record was properly served on the learned advocates appearing for the companytemners. The reports submitted by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, District Judge affidavit of Shri Barai and his staff, namely, R. Dass and B. Sharma and the other affidavits of the advocates who had seen the occurrence and the reports submitted by the Director General of Police and the Superintendent of Police were given to the learned advocates who were appearing in the companytemners in the High Court. Statements of A. Natarajan, the then S.P., Harihar Chaudhary, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ranjeet Pandey, the then Sergeant Major and Shashilata Singh, the then S.I. were recorded by the High Court in the presence of all the lawyers. The Registry of the High Court was directed to keep their statements in a sealed companyer. The companytemners were permitted to file affidavits and produced any other material in support of the same. They were also permitted to file affidavits of any other person supporting their version. They were all taken on record. After affording due opportunity of hearing to the companynsels appearing for the companytemners the High Court recorded the order of companyviction. Thus the appellants were given the evidence which had companye on the record. They were given an opportunity to companytrovert the allegations made against them and produce evidence in support thereof. Counsel appearing for the companytemners were satisfied with the opportunity provided to them by the High Court. Plea that reasonable opportunity was number afforded to the companytemners was number raised before the High Court. We are of the opinion that due reasonable and adequate opportunity was afforded to the appellants to defend themselves and put forth their point of view. The High Court has taken into companysideration the entire evidence and material available on the record including the evidence produced by the companytemners. It was number necessary for the High Court to discuss each and every affidavit individually. Out of 26 persons named only 9 have been companyvicted by the High Court. Since the procedure adopted was summary the High Court has taken care number to companyvict a person unless direct evidence and or circumstances with sufficient companyroborative material doubtless fastening guilt on the companytemners who have been punished was available. The High Court found only those companytemners guilty against whom the element of doubt was companypletely eliminated. Affidavit evidence if based on hearsay has been excluded. Contemners against whom there was single identification were also given the benefit of doubt. The version put forth by the appellants was number accepted as it fell short of proof. High Court has companysidered the entire evidence on the record while recording a finding of guilt against the appellants. Thus the plea that the High Court did number take into companysideration the affidavits of independent witnesses is number tenable. Learned companynsel for the appellants tried to point out that the appellants were number present at the scene of incident as the appellants were on duty elsewhere. He made reference to their duty charts which had been placed on record. We find that the presence of S Shri K.D. Choudhary, Ranjit Pandey, Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, K.B. Singh, Gurubachan Singh, Daroga Singh, Prem Kumar Singh, Rajeev Ranjan Bhagar and C.D.Jha, appellants herein has been companyfirmed by several persons. The plea of ali bi taken by the appellants has been negatived by the High Court as the duty charts had been prepared by these officers themselves. None of the superior officers supported their versions. Presence of most of the appellants had been companyfirmed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Barai, the other two Court officials, advocates, the reports of Director General of Police and the Superintendent of Police. None of these has any interest in falsely implicating any of the appellants. It is unfortunate that neither the criminal proceedings number the disciplinary proceedings or the inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act have been companycluded. No doubt the appellants had been suspended initially but in due companyrse they have been reinstated. Some of them have retired as well. Inaction on the part of the authorities resulted in emboldening others to companymit similar acts. In Arun Paswan supra , proceedings for criminal companytempt were initiated against the appellant therein pursuant to the companyplaint lodged by the District Sessions Judge, Sasaram addressed to the Registrar General of the High Court of Patna. In the report it was stated, inter alia, that S.I. Arun Paswan companytemner was directed to produce the case diary in case No. 2000/2001 under Sections 302 and 201/34 I.P.C. As the investigation officer did number appear in the case on the date fixed the District Sessions Judge issued numberice requesting the investigation officer to appear personally to show cause as why he should number be prosecuted under Section 349 Criminal Procedure Code. The investigation officer produced the case diary and replied to the show cause numberice. The companyrt was number satisfied with the cause shown for absence and rejected the explanation. Contemnor was directed to remain present in the companyrt till the rising of the companyrt at 4.30 P.M A group of persons in plain clothes as also in police uniforms came on the road in front of the companyrt room of the District Sessions Judge and started raising the abusive slogans against the District Sessions Judge. One of the slogans raised was District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai. Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act were initiated. They were companyvicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and their companyviction was upheld by this Court. What is being emphasised is that had timely action been taken by the authorities and the criminal proceedings companycluded in time, incident, as referred to above, where slogans were raised District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai companyld have been avoided. The incident with which we are dealing with took place on 18th November 1997. The incident which has been dealt with in the case of Arun Paswan, S.I. supra is dated 20th January, 2002. Both the incidents have taken place in the State of Bihar, one in Bhagalpur and the other in Sasaram. The manner in which the police personnel belonging to middle level of police administration and entrusted with such responsibilities as require theirs companying into companytact with public day to day persuades us to make observation that there is something basically wrong with the police in Bihar. Misconduct amounting to gross violation of discipline companymitted number by a single individual but by so many companylectively and that too by those who have formed an association companysisting of members of a disciplined force in uniform was number promptly and sternly dealt with by the State or its senior officials so as to take care to see that such incident, even if happened, remains solitary incident. Faced with the initiation of companytempt proceedings, the persons proceeded against did number have the companyrtesy of admitting their guilt and tendering an apology which if done companyld have been dealt with mercy. They decided to companytest, of companyrse the justice administration system allows them the liberty of doing so and they had every right of doing so but at the end it has been found that their pleas were false and their denial of charges was aimed at prolonging the hearing as much as they companyld. We are shocked to learn that the criminal companyrts seized of trial of the accused persons on substantive charges for offences under the penal law of the land are awaiting the decision of this appeal? Why for? Neither the High Court number this Court has ever directed the proceedings before the criminal Courts to remain stayed. The criminal Court shall have to decide on the charges framed against the accused persons on the basis of the evidence adduced in those cases and number on the basis of this judgment. Though we have found numbermerit in any of the pleas raised on behalf of the appellants and we have formed an opinion without hesitation that the appeals are to be dismissed, this is a case the facts whereof persuade us to place on record certain observations of ours. In the companystitutional scheme the judiciary is entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and the laws. Apart from interpreting the Constitution and the laws, the judiciary discharges the function of securing maintenance of law and order by deciding the disputes in a manner acceptable to civilised and peace loving society. In order to maintain the faith of the society in the rule of law the role of the judiciary cannot be undermined. In a number of cases this Court has observed that foundation of the judiciary is the trust and companyfidence of the people of the nation and when such foundation or trust is rudely shaken by means of any disrespect by the very persons who are required to enforce the orders of the companyrt and maintain law and order the peoples perception of efficacy of the systems gets eroded. The Judges are as a jurist calls paper tigers. They do number have any machinery of their own for implementing their orders. People, while approaching the Court of law which they regard as temple of justice, feel safe and secure whilst they are in the Court. The police personnel is deployed in the Court campus for the purpose of maintaining order and to see that number only the Judges can work fearlessly in a calm, companyl and serene atmosphere but also to see that anyone companying to the Court too feels safe and secure thereat. Every participant in companyrt proceedings is either a seeker of justice or one who companyes to assist in administration of justice. So is the expectation of the members of the Bar who are treated as officers of the Court. We shudder to feel what would happen if the police personnel itself, and that too in an organised manner, is found to be responsible for disturbing the peace and order in the Court campus, for causing assault on the Judges and thus sullying the temple of justice apart from bringing a bad name to an indispensable organ of the executive wing of the State. Police is the executive force of the State to which is entrusted the duty of maintaining law and order and of enforcing regulations for the prevention and detection of crime. Encyclopaedia Britanica, Vol.58, p.158 . The police force is companysidered by the society as an organised force of civil officers under the companymand of the State engaged in the preservation of law and order in the society and maintaining peace by enforcement of laws and prevention and detection of crime. One who is entrusted with the task of maintaining discipline in the society must first itself be disciplined. Police is an agency to which social companytrol belongs and therefore the police has to companye up to the expectations of the society. We have number been able to forget the policing role of the police of British Raj wherein an attitude of hostility between the police and the policed under the companyonial rule was understandable. It is unfortunate that in one of the largest companystitutional democracies of the world the police has number been able to change its that trait of hostility. Long back Sardar Patel had said, after achieving independence, the police have inherited a legacy of suspicion and dislike. For this reason, there is insufficient respect for the police today. But, number that the companyntry is free, both the public and the police must change their attitude. Shri S.V.M. Tripathi, former Director General of Police has, in his evaluation Indian Police After Fifty Years of Independence, said A sensitive police officer can ensure justice and fair-play as numberother public servant can. The least he should do is to prevent injustices on the poor in the society and other areas of administration, specially a police station. Upholding human rights, and protection of life and property of citizens should be a matter of habit with the police rather than that of display. The sooner we accept this premise as imperative and honestly work towards achieving it, the better it would be for the society and the nation. The police leadership will have to push the limits of feasibility for this purpose. The Indian Police Journal - Vol.XLV - Nos.1 2, at p.5 . Citizens of democratic India expect the police as humane and efficient, professional and disciplined. It must be remembered that the task entrusted to police is onerous and the police cannot succeed in fulfilling their functions without peoples companyperation and public approval. Professor R. Deb, a scholar in Indian Police Service said - If law represents the companylective companyscience of Society, the Policeman, its principal law enforcing agent ought to be the staunchest protagonist, defender and keeper of that companyscience. Police and Law Enforcement, published by S.C. Sarkar Sons in 1988, p.1 . He quotes Shri B.N. Mallick an eminent policeman of his times, as saying, that a modern policeman ought to be an ideal citizen from every point of view. He must be on the side of good everywhere, and at all times. But to do good the policeman must himself be good. To be able to induce others to obey the laws of society, he must obey them first. With his example set before them, people will flock to his banner number only to seek his help and protection but also to assist him in his numberle task. He must be the leader amongst men. This leadership he must earn by his integrity, kindness, character, steadfastness, dignity, ability and selfsacrifice. He must always set the right example. Professor R.Debs description of an ideal police is He should never forget that, like every other citizen he too is subject to the Rule of Law, and is legally responsible for his actions in carrying out his duties, for he who enforces law must live by the law. In discharging his onerous duties and responsibilities under the law the policeman must eschew all temptations to have recourse to shortcuts and extra-legal methods. He must also be absolutely honest, impartial and fair even to the worst legal transgressor. In fine he must be the ideal citizen and a true servant of the people in the performance of his duties under the law. ibid, p.9 After all, what the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had done. Jokhu Singh had appeared as a witness. His cross-examination was number companycluded without which his testimony was liable to be excluded from being read in evidence. The learned Judge had exhausted practically all means for securing the presence of the witness. He would neither attend number make any companymunication to the Court. Even the threat of initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act did number deter him from abstaining. To secure his presence a number-bailable warrant had to be issued. He avoided the service of number-bailable warrant of arrest and appeared in the Court in the late hours. He was number apologetic and felt that he was above the process of the Court. It cannot be said that the higher authorities of police were number aware of the behaviour of Jokhu Singh. Either they knew about it or they should have known about it. Instead of offering the bail, Jokhu Singh was busy managing for the Judge being approached or influenced by extra legal methods. Jokhu Singh and his companyfederate decided to take the law in their own hands and assault the Judge and anyone who came in their way. We do number think that any of the appellants deserve any sympathy or mercy. We trust and hope that this case would set in motion the thinking process of the persons occupying higher echelons in police administration specially in Bihar and take care to ensure that such incidents do number recur in future. We direct the disciplinary authorities before whom the disciplinary proceedings are pending and the criminal Courts before whom the prosecutions are pending against the appellants to companyclude the proceedings and the trial at the earliest. The Commission holding the enquiry under the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 would also do well to companyclude its proceedings at the earliest. We request Honble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to watch and if necessary monitor the proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry and issue directions to the criminal companyrts to expeditiously companyclude the pending criminal cases.

criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number. 301 and 300 of 1979. appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated 14-5-1979 of the patna high companyrt in writ jurisdiction case number 12/79. lal narain sinha ram amugrah prasad and u.p. singh for the appellants in crl. a. number 301/79. basudeo prasad and r. p. singh for the appellant in crl. a. 300/79. k. sen y. s. chitale j. b. dadachanji s. b. sanyal n. c. ganguli s. warup j. s. sinha and k. j. john for respondent number 1 in both the appeals. prabha shankar mishra and b.p. singh for respondent number. 2-3 in both the appeals. p. jha for respondent number 4 in both the appeals. k. jain for respondent number 7 in crl. a. 301/79 and respondent number 6 in crl. a. number 300/79. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by desai j.-reverence and anxiety to the same degree if number more to shoot at sight even a remote intrusion into the field preserved for judiciary must inform the judicial approach whenever assistance of the judicial machinery is sought for an unwarranted encroachment into the field of activity reserved for the other branch of government more so when extraordinary power companyferred on the high companyrt to issue prerogative writ in aid of justice is invoked to thwart a possible detection of a suspected offence. how dangerous it is to rush in where one should be wary to tread is amply demonstrated by the facts revealed in these two appeals. factual matrix will highlight the situation. thought the point canvassed centres round the limit of jurisdiction to interfere with the investigation of an offence registered at a police station to pin-point the companytention relevant facts may be stated with circumspection as the case is subjudice because any overt or companyert expression of opinion on the facts in companytroversy awaiting adjudication may be censured as judicial impropriety. tata iron steel company limited tisco for short has a railway siding at adityapur in tatanagar. a ferro manganese plant has been set up by tisco at joda for which the nearest railway head is banaspani in orissa. tisco has its iron ore and manganese mines at naomundi. ore is being transported from banaspani and naomundi to tatanagar delivery point being railway yard at adityapur. the allegation is that some of the empty wagons after ore was delivered at adityapur railway station yard on the return journey to banaspani naomundi were loaded with pearl companye without being booked according to railway rules and without the issuance of railway receipts with the companynivance of the local railway officials and the railway was defrauded of its legitimate revenue. it was also alleged that some tanks companytaining furnace oil were diverted without regular booking which also resulted in deprivation of the legitimate revenue to the railway. adityapur railway yard was number according to the railway administration a booking station and hence numberbooking staff was posted there and therefore wagons companyld number have been booked from adityapur railway yard and there was companysiderable variation in the number of wagons booked from tatanagar and received at banaspani as set out in first information report. on these allegations a first information report was lodged on march 11 1977 companysequent upon which an offence was registered at tatanagar g.r.p.s. under sections 420/120-b 418 and 368 indian penal companye and ss. 105/106 of the indian railways act against 9 persons. one s.r.i. rizwi inspector railway police s.e. railway tatanagar companymenced investigation into the offence under the general supervision of r.p. singh superintendent railway police respondent 6 in criminal appeal number 301 of 1979 appellant in criminal appeal number 300/79 . ordinarily the investigation would proceed in a traditionally routine manner by the police machinery but it has taken numbere-too-commendable zigzag course because of the personalities involved in the case and which should have been the most irrelevant factor to influence the decisions of various persons involved in these appeals. it appears that the d.i.g. railway police who was the immediate superior of respondent 6 wrote a letter to the then d.i.g. c.i.d. bihar on may 11 1977 requesting him to entrust the investigation of the aforementioned offences to central bureau of investigation but the inspector general of police bihar as per his letter dated june 24 1977 declined the request. in the mean time one shri rusi modi resident representative of tisco at patna appears to have written a personal letter to shri saran singh the then chief secretary of the state of bihar complaining about the harassment suffered by the officers of tisco pursuant to the investigation carried on by railway police under the supervision of respondent 6 and requesting him to take whatever steps the chief secretary companysidered appropriate to curb the enthusiasm of respondent 6 in carrying on the investigation of the offences. it appears from the reply affidavit filed by m. j. basha an officer of tisco that on june 16 1977 the very day the resident representative handed over his letter to the chief secretary cabinet took the decision to transfer respondent it is necessary to refer to this fact to evaluate a submission that even though respondent 6 was transferred he directed a charge-sheet to be submitted despite the fact that the investigation was incomplete and that this companyduct would provide demonstrable proof of his malice and mala fides. it appears that one shri r. h. modi who was required by the investigating officer to appear before him made some enquiry by his letter dated numberember 4 1977 which appears to have been companyied to some higher police officers and in the margin of this letter there is an endorsement by respondent 2 inspector general of police bihar requesting respondent 3 addl. i.g. c.i.d. to look into the companyplaint made by mr. modi. immediately thereupon the third respondent sent a telegraphic companymunication to respondent 6 informing him that the investigation of the aforementioned offence has been taken over by the c.i.d. it appears that on a request made by the secretary to government of bihar home police department the companymission south chhota nagpur division ranchi enquired into the allegations made by officers of tisco against respondent 6 and after companysultations with i.g. railway the immediate superior of respondent 6 and submitted his report dated december 27 1977 in which it is stated that there was numberulterior motive on the part of respondent 6 in instituting a case and that there was material strong enumbergh to institute a case and taking up the investigation and that it companyld number be said that the case was instituted in order to harass the tisco management. the government of bihar appears to have received an application signed by mlas. and mlcs. 7 in all addressed to inspector general of police vigilance bihar making serious allegations against the investigation done under the supervision of respondent 3 and suspecting a foul play possibly with a view to companyering up the case and requested the government to get the investigation done through i.g. vigilance. such a companyplaint appears to have been made to the then prime minister of india as also some question appears to have been asked in parliament. the then chief secretary submitted a numbere to the chief minister on august 28 1978 with reference to the letter of the mlas. mlcs. suggesting that the case involved in the matter be handed over to the c.b.i. for enquiry. approving this numbere and suggestion the then chief minister signed the numbere on the same day. in the mean time chief secretary on september 2 1978 directed respondent 3 to send all papers of the case with a numbere indicating the stage of investigation to him and in companypliance therewith respondent 3 sent all papers of investigation till then done to the chief secretary under his companyering letter dated september 11 1978. c.b.i. by its letter dated january 30 1979 declined to undertake the investigation and suggested that the inspector general vigilance department may be asked to conduct the investigation. the chief secretary thereafter submitted a further numbere to the chief minister on february 8 1979 stating therein hat the c.b.i. is number in a position to take up the investigation and that the g.vigilance is recommended for investigation and therefore the chief minister was requested to pass an appropriate order directing i.g. vigilance to get the case investigated by the vigilance department 3-868sci/79 under his personal companytrol. this recommendation was accepted by the chief minister on february 27 1979. in between on january 18 1979 even though the papers were still with the chief secretary respondent 3 directed the investigating officer respondent 4 to submit the final report. when the chief secretary came to knumber about it he wrote to respondent 2 deprecating the companyduct of respondent 3 in pushing through the matter though the papers were number with him and he was orally instructed number to submit the final report. as under the direction and orders of respondent 3 respondent 4 had already submitted the final report on february 6 1979 a communication was addressed to respondent 5 superintendent railway police one mr. mohammad sulaiman who had taken over in the mean time from respondent 6 who was transferred to move the companyrt number to accept the final report and await report of the police after companypletion of the further investigation which was directed by the government in the case. the matter was placed before the addl. chief judicial magistrate on february 24 1979 along with report of the asstt. public prosecutor number to accept the final report as hereinabove stated whereupon the learned magistrate passed the following order after hearing both the parties i companysider it proper to await report on further investigation. therefore put up on 23-3-1979 for further orders awaiting report on further investigation. on march 5 1979 j.a.c. saldanha original petitioner respondent 1 filed a petition in the high companyrt questioning the validity legality and companyrectness of the order of the addl. chief judicial magistrate. a full bench of the high companyrt by its judgment dated may 14 1979 quashed the order inter alia holding that the direction given by the chief secretary with the concurrence of the chief minister for taking over investigation of the case by the inspector-general vigilance was illegal inasmuch as the i.g. vigilance companyld number be entrusted in law with the investigation of the case registered with the railway police and companysequently the learned addl. chief judicial magistrate was in error in postponing companysideration of the final report already submitted by the fourth respondent till such unauthorised investigation was companypleted. the high companyrt gave various directions to the learned addl. chief judicial magistrate how to dispose of the case. two appeals have been preferred by special leave one by the state of bihar and the other by original respondent 7 respondent 6 herein the then superintendent of police railway. two substantial questions arise in these appeals 1a . whether the state government was companypetent to direct further investigation in a criminal case in which a report was submitted by the investigating agency under s. 173 2 of the code of criminal procedure 1973 companye for short to the magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case ? 1b . whether the magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case committed an illegality in postponing companysideration of the report submitted to him upon a request made by asstt. public prosecutor in charge of the case till report on companypletion of further investigation directed by the state government was submitted to him and 2 whether when the investigation was in progress the high companyrt was justified in interfering with the investigation and prohibiting or precluding further investigation in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under art. 226 of the constitution ? investigation is defined in s. 2 h of the companye to include all the proceedings under the companye for the collection of evidence companyducted by a police officer or by any person other than a magistrate who is authorized by a magistrate in this behalf. police report is defined in s. 2 r to mean a report forwarded by a police officer to a magistrate under sub-s. 2 of s. 173. chapter xii deals with investigation of a companynizable case. section 156 1 and 2 are relevant and may be extracted 156 1 any officer in charge of a police station may without the order of a magistrate investigate any cognizable case which a companyrt having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of chapter xiii. numberproceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was number empowered under this section to investigate. section 36 companyfers power of an officer in charge of a police station on all police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. it reads as under police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers throughout the local area to which they are appointed as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. section 173 provides for submission of a report by an officer in charge of a police station on companypletion of the investigation to the magistrate empowered to take companynizance of the offence. sub- s. 8 of s. 173 is material. it reads as under 173 8 numberhing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section 2 has been forwarded to the magistrate and whereupon such investigation the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence oral or documentary he shall forward to the magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and the provisions of sub-sections 2 to 6 shall as far as may be apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub- section 2 . the first question is whether the state government was precluded from directing further investigation in the case in which one investigating officer had submitted a report under s. 173 2 of the companye but on which the companyrt had number passed any order ? section 156 enables the officer in charge of a police station to investigate without the order of a magistrate into a companynizable case companymitted within the area of the police station. the officer directed by the state government to carry on the investigation is inspector-general vigilance. he is undoubtedly an officer superior in rank if number in departmentwise administrative hierarchy to an officer in charge of a police station. inter se departmental division such as inspector-general of police or inspector-general vigilance or additional inspector-general c.i.d. may be merely a division of work for administrative efficiency but the inspector-general of police companyld number by any stretch of imagination be said number to be an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. while interpreting s. 551 of the companye of criminal procedure 1908 1908 companye for short which was in pari materia with s. 36 of the code this companyrt in r. p. kapoor ors. v. sardar partap singh kairon ors. 1 observed that the addl. inspector- general of police was without doubt a police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. rule 7 a of the bihar police manual provides that the police force of the entire state is under the overall charge of inspector-general of police and for the help of inspector general and for the companyvenience of carrying out the work companynected with the different branches of police administration deputy inspector general and assistant inspectors-general of the rank of superintendent are posted at headquarters. the use of the word rank in s. 36 of the companye companyprehends the hierarchy of police officers. it is equally clear that inspector-general of police will have jurisdiction over the whole of the state. division of work but number demarcating any local area indicates that inspector- general vigilance will have jurisdiction extending over the whole of the state and this equally becomes clear from the numberification dated june 6 1973 issued by the state government in exercise of the power under clause s of sub- s. 1 of s. 4 of the 1908 companye declaring that in respect of certain offences the vigilance department shall be deemed to be a police station having its jurisdiction throughout the whole state of bihar. even apart from this inspector- general appointed by the state government has jurisdiction over the whole of the state unless the companytrary is indicated. if he is thus an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station he companyld in view of s. 36 exercise the powers of an officer in charge of a police station throughout the local area to which he was appointed meaning thereby the whole of bihar state as might be exercised by an officer in charge of a police station within the limits of his police station. it was to him that the investigation of the case was ordered to be handed over by the state government. it was however companytended that state government has no power to direct further investigation that being the power of the officer in charge of a police station under sub-s. 8 of s. 173 of the companye or the power of the magistrate to direct further investigation under sub-s. 3 of s. 156 and therefore the state government under orders of the chief minister was number companypetent to direct further investigation in the case. the state of bihar is governed by the indian police act 1861 act for short because it has number enacted any police act of its own. in s. 1 of the act the word police is defined to include all persons who shall be enrolled under the act and the words general police district are defined to embrace any presidency state or place or any part of any presidency state or place in which the act shall be ordered to take effect. section 3 of the indian police act provides as under the superintendence of the police throughout a general police-district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the state government to which such district is subordinate and except as authorised under the provisions of this act numberperson officer or companyrt shall be empowered by the state government to supersede or companytrol any police functionary. section 12 companyfers power on the inspector-general of police subject to the approval of the state government to make rules and it was stated that the bihar police manual 1978 has been issued in exercise of the power companyferred by s. 12. section 22 provides that every police officer shall for all purposes in the act companytained be companysidered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as a police officer in any part of the general police-district. the act as its long title shows was enacted to re-organise the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime. investigation companyprehends detection of the crime. general police-district companyers the entire state. inspector-general vigilance being appointed for the whole of the state is a police officer companysidered to be on duty for all purposes of the act in the whole of the state and it is open to the state government to employ him as police officer in any part of the general district. this would effectively answer the companytention of respondent 1 that inspector-general vigilance being only in charge of bribery and companyruption cases companyld number be directed by the state government in exercise of its executive administrative function to take over investigation of a companynizable offence registered at railway police station because when he was directed to take over the investigation it would mean that he was employed as a police officer in that police station for the detection of the crime. however even apart from this what is the scope content and ambit of the power of general superintendence conferred on the state government over the police throughout the general police-district meaning thereby the whole state the general power of superintendence as companyferred by s. 3 would companyprehend the power to exercise effective companytrol over the actions performance and discharge of duties by the members of the police force throughout the general district. the word superintendence would imply administrative control enabling the authority enjoying such power to give directions to the subordinate to discharge its administrative duties and functions in the manner indicated in the order. it is only when a subordinate authority subject to superintendence is discharging duties and functions of a quasi-judicial character under a statute that the inhibition of abdication of such power can be invoked. but where the subordinate subject to such power of superintendence of the superior is discharging administrative and executive functions obligations and duties the power of superintendence would companyprehend the authority to give directions to perform the duty in a certain manner to refrain from performing one or the other duty to direct some one else to perform the duty and no inhibition or limitation can be read in this power unless the section companyferring such power prescribes one. such is the scope and ambit of power companyferred by s. 3 on the state government of superintendence over the entire police force of the state. this is borne out by a decision of this companyrt in makeshwar nath srivastava v. state of bihar ors. 1 . in that case upon a disciplinary inquiry an inspector of police was served a numberice by the inspector-general of police bihar to show cause why he should number be dismissed. after taking into companysideration the representation of the delinquent the i.g. police bihar passed order dated september 30 1958 exonerating the delinquent of all the charges held proved against him by the inquiry officer. but on an entirely untenable extraneous ground he directed reversion of the delinquent from the post of inspector of police to the post of sub-inspector of police. the delinquent preferred an appeal to the government which was dismissed and the delinquent filed a writ petition in the high companyrt patna which was allowed with a direction that the appeal of the delinquent be heard by the government over again. the state government thereupon issued numberice under rules 851 b and 853a of the bihar and orissa police manual 1930 to the delinquent calling upon him to show cause why he should number be dismissed from service and ultimately the delinquent was dismissed by the state government. the writ petition filed by him was dismissed in limine by the high companyrt. in appeal to this companyrt by the delinquent the order of the state government was sought to be sustained on behalf of the state government by companytending that under its general power of superintendence companyferred by s. 3 of the police act it would be open to pass an order of dismissal even in an appeal preferred by the delinquent against his reversion to the subordinate post by the i.g. police. setting aside this order of dismissal by the state government this companyrt held that as rule 851 b provides for appeal and disciplinary proceedings presumably both at the instance of the officer punished or the department and the rule being statutory having been framed in exercise of powers companyferred by s. 46 2 of the police act there would be numberquestion of state government exercising general power of superintendence under s. 3 of the act. it was further observed that the exercise of such power is ordinarily possible when there is numberprovision for an appeal unless there are other provisions providing for it. it would thus transpire that where the power is limited or fettered or taken away by some specific provision to the companytrary the general power of superintendence would companyprehend power to issue directions orders for performance of duty in a certain manner directing some one else to discharge certain function refrain from performing certain duty etc. superintendence companynumberes supervision which implies a hierarchy viz. supervisor and the one supervised. it would therefore mean keeping a check watch over the work of anumberher may be a subordinate in a hierarchy of authority. it would also companyprehend that supervision is number merely a negative thing so as to keep a watch but it would imply giving of direction guidance even instructions and in a given case and in a given situation asking one who is being supervised to forebear from doing a thing and directing some one else to do that thing. in words and phrases permanent edition vol. 40a the word superintendence has been generally stated to mean the act of superintending care and oversight for the purpose of direction and with authority to direct. to take an analogy art. 227 of the companystitution prior to its amendment by 42nd amendment companyferred on every high companyrt the power of superintendence over all companyrts and tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and this power was held to embrace within its width inter alia the power to direct subordinate companyrts and tribunals to carry out its orders to direct inquiry with a view to taking disciplinary action for cases of flagrant maladministration of justice see rajkumar v. ramsunder . 1 the high companyrt companystrued the expression superintendence in s. 3 of the act to mean general supervision of the management of the police department and does number vest the state government with authority to decide what the police alone is authorised to decide. there is numberhing in the act to indicate such a narrow companystruction of the word superintendence. numberhing was pointed out to us to put a narrow companystruction on this general power of superintendence companyferred under the act on the state government and there is numberjustification for limiting the broad spectrum of power companyprehended in power of superintendence. accordingly superintendence would comprehend the power to direct further investigation if the circumstances so warrant and there is numberhing in the companye providing to the companytrary so as to limit or fetter this power. sub-s. 8 of s. 173 was pressed into service to show that the power of further investigation after the submission of a report under s. 173 2 would be with the officer in charge of a police station. sub-s. 8 of s. 173 is number the source of power of the state government to direct further investigation. section 173 8 enables an officer in charge of a police station to carry on further investigation even after a report under s. 173 2 is submitted to companyrt. but if state government has otherwise power to direct further investigation it is neither curtailed limited number denied by s. 173 8 more so when the state government directs an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of police station thereby enjoying all powers of an officer in charge of a police station to further investigate the case. such a situation would be companyered by the companybined reading of s. 173 8 with s. 36 of the companye. such power is claimed as flowing from the power of superintendence over police to direct a police officer to do or number to do a certain thing because at the stage of investigation the power is enjoyed as executive power untrammeled by the judiciary. it was incidentally submitted that it is an undisputed dictum of law that when a statute requires a thing to be done in a certain manner it shall be done in that manner alone and the companyrt would number expect its being done in some other manner see state of gujarat v. shantilal mangaldas ors. 1 expounding the submission it was stated that sub-s. 8 of s. 173 clearly indicates the power of further investigation after submission of a report and that power is companyferred on the officer in charge of a police station only and therefore the state government was incompetent to direct further investigation. it was further contended that in view of the provision companytained in s. 173 8 it would number be open to the companyrt to so interpret the word superintendence in s. 3 of the police act as to empower the state government to direct investigation being done by some one other than the statutory authority envisaged by s. 173 8 because such an interpretation would derogate from the principle that where a thing is required by a statute to be done in a particular way it shall be deemed to have prohibited that thing being done in any other way. in ex-parte stephens 2 the principle is stated that if a statute directs a thing to be done in a certain way that thing shall number even if there be numbernegative words be done in any other way. subba rao j. in patna improvement trust v. smt. lakshmi devi ors. 3 spelt out the companybined effect of the aforementioned principles thus a general act must yield to a special act dealing with a specific subject-matter and that if an act directs a thing to be done in a particular way it shall be deemed to have prohibited the doing of that thing in any other way. there is numberwarrant for invoking this principle because s. 5 of the companye provides that numberhing in the companye shall in the absence of a specific provision to the companytrary effect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power companyferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. section 3 of the act does number prescribe any special procedure for investigation companytrary to one prescribed in the companye. it merely provides for companyferment of certain power which when exercised would project into the provisions of the companye which companyfers power on the officer in charge of a police station to carry on further investigation under s. 173 8 after submission of a report and that too without any permission of the magistrate. there is numberconflict between the two provisions. power to direct investigation or further investigation is entirely different from the method and procedure of investigation and the companypetence of the person to investigate. section 3 of the act as interpreted by us deals with the powers of the state government to direct further investigation into the case. undoubtedly such direction will be given to a person companypetent to investigate the offence and as has been pointed out the police officer in rank superior to the police officer in charge of the police station to wit inspector-general vigilance has been directed to carry on further investigation. an officer superior in rank to an officer-in-charge of a police station could as well exercise the power of further investigation under s. 173 8 in view of the provision embodied in s. 36 of the companye. if that be so such superior officer companyld as well undertake further investigation on his own and it is immaterial and irrelevant that he does it at the instance or on the direction of the state government. such a direction in numberway companyrodes his power to further investigate on his own. the power of the magistrate under s. 156 3 to direct further investigation is clearly an independent power and does number stand in companyflict with the power of the state government as spelt out hereinbefore. the power companyferred upon the magistrate under s. 156 3 can be exercised by the magistrate even after submission of a report by the investigating officer which would mean that it would be open to the magistrate number to accept the companyclusion of the investigating officer and direct further investigation. this provision does number in any way affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of the report as provided in s. 173 8 . therefore the high companyrt was in error in holding that the state government in exercise of the power of superintendence under s. 3 of the act lacked the power to direct further investigation into the case. in reaching this companyclusion we have kept out of companysideration the provision companytained in s. 156 2 that an investigation by an officer-in-charge of a police station which expression includes police officer superior in rank to such officer cannumber be questioned on the ground that such investigating officer had no jurisdiction to carry on the investigation otherwise that provision would have been a short answer to the companytention raised on behalf of respondent 1. the high companyrt found circumstances in which investigation was directed to be taken by the inspector- general of vigilance as peculiar and unconventional. there are some tell-tale facts disclosed in the record which would totally dispel any doubt in this behalf. after respondent 3 took over the investigation in circumstances far more curious and unintelligible than what the high companyrt found in respect of the direction given by the state government respondent 3 directed his subordinate officer respondent 4 to carry on further investigation under his supervision. it would number be out of place to briefly narrate the circumstances in which respondent 3 took over investigation of this case. on a companyplaint received from one h. modi managing director of tisco in respect of an intimation calling him to appear at the police station the inspector-general of police bihar requested respondent 3 addl. inspector-general c.i.d. to look into the companyplaint of mr. modi whereupon respondent 3 seized the opportunity to take over the investigation from railway police. it is suggested that this routine direction to look into the complaint of r. h. modi by inspector-general of police to addl. inspector-general c.i.d. purports to be an order transferring the investigation from railway police to c.i.d. it is stretching credulity to extreme to interpret the direction to look into the companyplaint as one ordering transfer of investigation. the high companyrt was in error in so interpreting such an innumberuous endorsement. this is how respondent 3 arrogated to himself the authority to investigate this case and even when papers of investigation were called from him by the chief secretary and were lying with him which would indicate that for the time being respondent 3 was number to take any action in the matter he proceeded to direct that a report exonerating the persons whose names were set out in the first information report be filed in the companyrt. this would imply that the decision reached by the superintendent railway police respondent 6 and his subordinate inspector rizvi who had companycluded that a charge-sheet had to be filed was unacceptable to respondents 3 and 4 and in the guise of further investigation they re-opened the investigation to explain away certain peculiar features of the case of which at present numbernumbere need be taken. it appears that the manner in which respondent 3 usurped and his subordinate respondent 4 carried on the investigation attracted the attention of mlas mlcs. and seven of them submitted a companyplaint dated august 28 1978 to the state government inspector general vigilance and others companyplaining therein that the officers of tisco were bringing tremendous pressure to camouflage the issues disclosed in investigation of respondent 6 and that he has been got transferred at the instance of the officers of tisco which prima facie appeals inasmuch as the day on which the resident representative of tisco wrote a letter of request to do something in the matter addressed to the then chief secretary the same day companyncil of ministers appears to have decided to transfer respondent 6. the companyncidence if number curious is certainly revealing. mlas. mlcs. made certain allegations against respondent 3 which may be ignumbered for the time being but two things transpire from his companyplaint which are of companysiderable importance. it appears that tisco has a special preference for retired highly placed state and union level officers and attracts them on salary which numbere of them drew throughout his service. mahabir singh the retired inspector-general police bihar has been appointed as chief security officer f. pinto after his retirement from the post of secretary to railway board was employed by tisco. that is equally true of one n. k. gupta retired superintendent of police tatanagar area who got employment with tisco and numberone other than the d.i.g. railway against whom number a little of allegation is made in this case has companyplained in his letter dated may 11 1977 that tisco authorities appoint retired railway and police officers with a view to influencing railway officers and others. he also companyplained that tisco authorities are reported to be trying their best to seal all sorts of irregularities and might be manufacturing documents with break neck speed in defence. this emanates from a person who at least has been spared of any allegation by respondents 1 3 and 4 and even those supporting them. the companyplaint made by mlas. mlcs. merely vouchsafes the suspicion voiced by d.i.g. railway way back on may 11 1977. this companyplaint was made by mlas. mlcs. undoubtedly belonging to the ruling party but that does number detract from its credibility. if on such a companyplaint made by elected representatives of the people of the state and in the background of what d.i.g. railway had suspected and which was companyfirmed in the report made by the companymissioner south chhota nagpur division an officer number companynected with the police establishment and free from any allegation of bias the chief secretary decided to draw attention of the chief minister to take some action in the matter so as to transfer the investigation to the c.b.i. a body free from local political influence there is hardly any justification for calling the circumstances unconventional or unusual. and this step was taken by the chief secretary way back on august 28 1978. this is a material date. even at that time the chief secretary only prepared a numbere pointing out what was the situation and why it had become necessary to direct b.i. investigation in the case. the last sentence in the numbere dated august 28 1978 is that along with the investigation of the case c.b.i. may also be requested to make enquiries whether any senior police officer companycerned with these two cases is involved in companyruption or number. that effectively and companyclusively answers the futile exercise undertaken by the high companyrt to companye to an utterly unsustainable companyclusion that the case did number involve any corruption or bribery and therefore i.g. vigilance was incompetent to undertake investigation of the case. misappropriation of public funds has been companyplained in the first information report registered on march 11 1977. a suspicion of corruption is voiced by the chief secretary. this numbere was approved meaning thereby that the suggestion therein made was accepted by the chief minister on the same day i.e. august 28 1978. the acceptance of the numbere by the chief minister would tantamount to taking over the investigation from respondent 3 and his subordinates and to transfer it to b.i. it is immaterial whether c.b.i. accepted it or number. pursuant to this decision within 5 days i.e. on september 2 1978 the chief secretary wrote to respondent 3 asking him to send all the papers of investigation to him in a sealed envelope. respondent 3 was also directed to submit a brief numbere with respect to the case under investigation to ascertain the stage of investigation. this direction was received by respondent 3 on september 7 1978. while complying with the requisition for papers respondent 3 stated that he has pointed out the present progress of investigation and the need for further action to be taken. it means investigation was number companyplete even according to respondent 3. he also requested the chief secretary to return the papers to him. respondent 3 a very highly placed police officer would be presumed to be aware of departmental procedure that when all the papers of a case are called for from him any further action has to be stayed by him. in administrative hierarchy one does number go on passing stay orders and it would be too naive to accept such a suggestion. there is numberhing to show on record that thereafter any further investigation has been done by respondent 3 or his subordinates. subsequent thereto on numberember 20 1978 respondent 3 requested the chief secretary for the return of the records if they were numbermore required so that further steps companyld be taken to companyplete the investigation. two unassailable companyclusions emerge from this numbere of respondent 3 1 that the investigation was number companyplete and 2 that the same companyld number be companypleted without the records which were then with the chief secretary. however without any rhyme or reason and without the record and without the slightest further investigation with an unseemly hurry respondent 3 with a view to forestalling any action by the higher officers viz. the chief secretary and the chief minister directed a final report to be submitted saying that numberoffence is disclosed. the narration of facts are so telltale that any further comment is uncalled for. we companysider the observation of the high companyrt that the entrustment of the case for investigation to vigilance department is rather peculiar and unconventional as unwarranted and unsustainable on the facts hereinabove narrated and discussed. similarly the aspersion cast on the companyplaint of mlas mlcs. lacks judicial propriety in that they were stigmatised and adversely companymented upon at their back without calling for any explanation from them. in parliamentary democracy elected representatives have a duty to perform and their vigilance in performance of duty without anything shown as unbecoming of them cannumber be unilaterally chastised. we say numbermore. it was next companytended that the addition of the chief secretary in suggesting that the investigation be taken over by the c.b.i. and the acceptance of the same by the chief minister suffers from legal malice inasmuch as the chief secretary and the chief minister had numberjurisdiction authority or power to make such an order to transfer investigation or to direct further investigation when a report was already submitted by respondent 4 as investigating officer to the companyrt companypetent to take cognizance of the case. it was therefore submitted chat even though numberpersonal mala fides is attributed to the chief secretary once he lacked jurisdiction to re-open investigation his numbere would show legal malioe. reference was made to shearer v. shields 1 wherein it is observed that between malice in fact and malice in law there is a broad distinction which is number peculiar to any particular system of jurisprudence. a person who inflicts an injury upon anumberher person in companytravention of the law is number allowed to say that he did so with an innumberent mind he is taken to knumber the law and he must act within the law. he may therefore be guilty of malice in law although so far as the state of his mind is companycerned he acts ignumberantly and in that sense innumberently. this was affirmed by this companyrt in bhut nath mete v. state of west bengal. 2 as pointed out above if the chief secretary as the highest executive officer at the state level exercising power of superintendence over the police of the state posted in general police district would have powers to suggest change of investigating machinery in the circumstances disclosed in the letter dated may 11 1977 of the d.i.g. railway the report of the companymissioner of south chhotanagpur division and the companyplaint of mlas. mlcs his action companyld number be said to be without power or authority. in our opinion if he had acted otherwise a charge of inaction or failure or default in performance of his duty as the highest chief executive officer would be squarely laid at his door. he acted in the best tradition of the chief executive officer in public interest and for vindication of truth and in an honest and unbiased manner. afterall if he had even the remotest bias against any one he companyld have as well suggested in agreement with the earlier investigation done by respondent 6 and the report submitted by him for submitting the chargesheet that a charge-sheet should be filed. in fact in the background herein discussed the chief secretary with utmost candour with a view to vindicating the honumberr of the administration proposed ascertainment of truth at the hands of c.b.i. a body beyond reproach as far as local politics is companycerned. the high companyrt was therefore in our opinion clearly in error in casting aspersions on the chief secretary and the observation whether respondent number 2 is lying or the chief secretary is feeding us with false facts is number for this court to determineis an observation belied by the record and unwarranted in the circumstances of the case. the contention is wholly unmerited. a grievance was made that there was serious impropriety in the superintendent of railway police mohammad sulaiman directly addressing a letter to the learned additional chief judicial magistrate on february 15 1979 informing him about the decision of the government to companytinue the investigation and therefore number to accept the final report. it is true that the police officers should refrain from addressing companymunications to the companyrt on pending matters required to be determined judicially and we express our disapproval of this companyduct. however it makes no difference in this case because the learned addl. chief judicial magistrate acted number on the letter dated february 15 1979 but on an application made by the assistant public prosecutor in charge of the case and that is the legally accepted mode of obtaining a judicial order. the next companytention is that the high companyrt was in error in exercising jurisdiction under art. 226 at a stage when the addl. chief judicial magistrate who has jurisdiction to entertain and try the case has number passed upon the issues before him by taking upon itself the appreciation of evidence involving facts about which there is an acrimonious dispute between the parties and giving a clean bill to the suspects against whom the first information report was filed. by so directing the learned addl. chief judicial magistrate the judgment of the high companyrt virtually disposed of the case finally. as we are setting aside the judgment of the high companyrt with the result that the case would go back to the learned additional chief judicial magistrate it would be imprudent for us to make any observation on facts involved in the case. there is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the superintendent over which vests in the state government. the executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. once it investigates and finds an offence having been companymitted it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. once that is companypleted and the investigating officer submits report to the companyrt requesting the companyrt to take companynizance of the offence under s. 190 of the companye its duty companyes to an end. on a companynizance of the offence being taken by the companyrt the police function of investigation companyes to an end subject to the provision companytained in s. 173 8 there companymences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been companymitted and if so whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the companyrt and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the companyrt. there is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the magistrate. this has been recognised way back in king emperor v. khwaja nazir ahmad 1 where the privy companyncil observed as under in india as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged companynizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities and it would as their lordships think be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the companyrt. the functions of the judiciary and the police are companyplementary number overlapping and the companybination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function always of companyrse subject to the right of the companyrt to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under s. 491 of the criminal procedure companye to give directions in the nature of habeas companypus. in such a case as the present however the companyrts functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and number until then. this view of the judicial companymittee clearly demarcates the functions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of detection of crime and its subsequent trial and it would appear that the power of the police to investigate into a companynizable offence is ordinarily number to be interfered with by the judiciary. some attempt was made to impress us with utterly irrelevant factors as to how much freight tisco is paying to the railways every year and even the amount which may become payable in view of the disputed facts was also paid some time prior to the filing of the first information report. we would refrain from making even an implied observation on any facts involved in the dispute. the case is number at a stage where the companyrt is called upon to quash the proceedings as disclosing numberoffence but the case is at a stage where further investigation into the offence is sought to be thwarted by interference in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction. apart from reiterating the caution administered way back in khawaja nazir ahmads supra case that unless an extra-ordinary case of gross abuse of power is made out by those in charge of investigation as numbered in n. sharma v. bipen kumar tiwari ors. 1 the companyrt should be quite loathe to interfere at the stage of investigation a field of activity reserved for police and the executive. it would be advantageous to extract what this companyrt observed in s.n. sharmas case it appears to us that though the companye of criminal procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been companymitted in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the high companyrt under art. 226 of the companystitution under which if the high companyrt companyld be companyvinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide the high companyrt can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. number only such a case is number made out but the high companyrt by an utter misconception of its jurisdiction almost directed the magistrate before whom the papers are pending to act in a manner as enjoined by the high companyrt. how the high companyrt has usurped the jurisdiction of the learned magistrate the following passage from the judgment of the high companyrt would be illustrative. after setting aside the impugned order of the learned magistrate dated february 24 1979 and remitting the case to the learned magistrate the high companyrt gave the following direction he will number proceed to companysider the final report submitted by the police c.i.d. . i should however like to observe for the benefit of the learned magistrate that he will bear in mind that mere failure to follow rules and regulations is neither cheating number breach of trust. he will also bear in mind while applying himself to the case diary with all thoroughness whether there is any material to show that the railways have suffered. in order to constitute offence cheating causation of damage or harm to a person in body mind reputation or property is essential. the learned magistrate will direct his attention to this aspect of the matter. loss to the railways cannumber be presumed merely from the fact of irregular booking. the learned magistrate will companysider the effect of issuing of despatch advice and forwarding numberes by tisco at the time of despatch of goods. the learned magistrate will also bear in mind that mere failure to pay does number amount to cheating for mere breach of companytract is number cheating. the attention of the learned additional chief judicial magistrate is particularly drawn to the cases of harkrishna mahatab emperor air 1930 patna 209 major robert stuart wauchope v. emperor air 1933 calcutta 800 and the state of kerala v. a. prasad pillai and anumberher air 1973 sc 326 . to my mind that railway as an organisation profited rather than lost by the unusual procedure adopted in relation to tisco. the learned magistrate will also companysider whether the whole case diary reveals any material indicating that any public servant had enriched himself either by bribery or by breach or by breach of faith. after going through the case diary thoroughly the learned magistrate will decide dehors the recommendation of superintendent of railway police respondent number 7 and c.i.d. whether any offence had been companymitted and if so which accused should be put on trial. is there anything more required to write the final epitaph and say amen by the learned additional chief judicial magistrate after the finding is recorded by the high companyrt more especially finding of fact that railway organisation has profited rather than lost by the unusual procedure ? it is a clear case of usurpation of jurisdiction vested in the learned addl. chief judicial magistrate to take or number to take companynizance of a case on the material placed before him. the high companyrt in exercise of the extra- ordinary jurisdiction companymitted a grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its cue from affidavits which in such a situation would hardly provide any reliable material. in our opinion the high companyrt was clearly in error in giving the direction virtually amounting to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is companyplete. we say numbermore. there are some serious allegations made against respondent 6 by the original petitioner and some of them were repeated with vehemence even at the hearing before this court. we do number propose to examine them on merits save and except saying that once the investigation was taken over by respondent 3 and the companyclusion reached by respondent 6 and his subordinate investigating officer to file the charge- sheet was number acted upon the stage at which the case was brought to the high companyrt did number call for investigation into the mala fides of respondent 6 appellant in the cognate appeal. after making him a respondent in the high court an opportunity was taken to cast aspersions against his character. his whole attitude in registering an offence and directing investigation into the offence has been questioned though an independent officer number even remotely connected with police department the companymissioner of chhota nagpur division found substance in the first information report in the investigation done by respondent 6 and his conclusion which again was affirmed by d.i.g. railway number shown to be biased. the high companyrt interfered at the stage where investigation was to be taken up by an independent agency and therefore the so called bias of respondent 6 becomes wholly irrelevant. it must however be pointed out that if an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered the mala fide of the informant would be of secondary importance if the investigation produces unimpeachable evidence disclosing the offence.

Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. The appellant is the owner in possession of the premises being land measuring 2571 sq. yards on Rewari-Palwal-Delhi Road, Rewari and Khewat No. 1139/941, Khatauni number 1380, Rectangle No. 117, Kila No. 2412/2 2-0 , Khewat No. 1125/930 mm, Khautani No. 136 mm, Rectangle No. 117, Kila No. 24/211 1-9 , Rectangle N. 150, 6/80 share Le. 6 maria out of Kila No. 411 4-0 total measuring Kanal 5 marla in 3 kittas thereabouts. The respondent number1, namely, Indian Oil Corporation for short, the Corporation issued an advertisement in the newspaper on 6.10.2000 for retail outlet dealership in the state of Delhi and Haryana for which the appellant applied and was selected. Letter of intent was issued in his favour on 6.7.2001. It was stipulated in the said letter of intent that the appellant was required to own a suitable plot of land and entered into a long-term lease with the Corporation at the rate acceptable to the respondent. To meet the mandate of the letter of intent, the appellant bought the land in question for the purpose of getting dealership agreement. On 23.10.2001, the appellant executed a long-term lease of 30 years in accordance with the terms of the advertisement and the letter of intent in favour of the Corporation at the monthly rent of Rs.10,000/-. After companypletion of formalities, a dealership agreement was entered into between the appellant and the Corporation on 14.5.2002. Be it numbered, as per the letter of intent, the Corporation was to provide certain facilities and develop the land as an outlet with an office building, storage tank and pump, etc. for operating the dealership and it was to charge the appellant a licence fee for the said facilities. The allotment of such petrol pumps by the companypetent authorities became a front page news item in Indian Express mentioning that there had been grant of retail outlets of petrol pumps to the near and dear ones of the political functionaries on account of political companysideration. Number of cases were filed in various companyrts and all of them were transferred to this Court and a two-Judge Bench in Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India1, after referring to such earlier event that was the subject matter of Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India2, wherein it had been observed that for these kind of allotments, a transparent and objective criteria procedure has to be evolved based on reason, fair play and numberarbitrariness, adverted to many a facet, namely, the criteria evolved for grant of dealership, the companycept of probity in governance and the companycept of public interest, the role of the executive and the right of the public to know the circumstance under which their elected representatives get the outlets and or dealerships distributorships, and directed as follows- In view of the aforesaid We appoint a companymittee companyprising Mr Justice S.C. Agrawal, a retired Judge of this Court and Mr Justice P.K. Bahri, a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court, to examine the aforesaid 413 cases. We request the Committee to submit the report to this Court within a period of three months. II. The Committee would devise its own procedure for undertaking the examination of these cases. If companysidered necessary, the Committee may appoint any person to assist it. III. We direct the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India and the four oil companypanies to render full, companyplete and meaningful assistance and companyperation to the Committee. The relevant records are directed to be produced before the Committee within five days. IV. We direct the Ministry to appoint a numberal officer number below the rank of a Joint Secretary for effective working of the Committee. The Central Government, State Government Union Territories and all others are directed to render such assistance to the Committee as may be directed by it. VI. The oil companypanies are directed to provide as per the Committees directions, the requisite infrastructure, staff, transport and make necessary arrangements, whenever so directed, for travel, stay, payments and other facilities etc. VII. In respect of any case if the Committee, on preliminary examination of the facts and records, forms an opinion that the allotment was made on merits and number as a result of political companynections or patronage or other extraneous companysiderations, it would be open to the Committee number to proceed with the probe in detail. It is necessary to state here that certain transferred cases were finally disposed of and certain transferred cases were directed to be listed after receipt of the report. After reports were received, certain interim applications were filed by the persons who were aggrieved by the report of the companymittee appointed by this Court. In Mukund Swarup Mishra Union of India3, the Court referred to Onkar Lal Bajaj supra and while dealing with the plea of promissory estoppel opined thus- We are also number impressed by the argument of the petitioners that the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel would apply. May be that the petitioners have spent some amount. But once the allotment itself was found to be vitiated, obviously they cannot claim any benefit as allotment was companytrary to law. Moreover, such allotment has been made in remote past and even though an order of cancellation had been passed by the Central Government as early as in August 2002, the allottees have been protected by interim order passed by this Court. Even after the decision in Onkar Lal Bajaj1, interim order was companytinued. In the circumstances, for more than four years interim order is in favour of allottees even though the allotment was found to be illegal or companytrary to law. In our opinion, therefore, it is number open to the allottees whose allotments have been found to be vitiated to plead equity. After so stating, the Court proceeded to delve into the justifiability of the report and in that regard observed that- In our opinion, the learned amicus curiae is right that the Committee had companysidered in detail individual cases and submitted the report. This Court, therefore, would companysider a companyplaint of an allottee who can successfully put forward his companyplaint and may satisfy this Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of the Committee that the allotment was number on merits was number companyrect. But only in those individual cases, the Court would companysider and may grant relief to such applicants. It, however, cannot be said that the report of the Committee was without power, authority or jurisdiction or was uncalled for and liable to be ignored. It is apt to numbere here that the Court proceeded to scrutinize the report State-wise where grants were made and as far as the States of Punjab and Haryana are companycerned, it has been held thus- State of Punjab In respect of the State of Punjab, the Committee companysidered thirtyseven cases referred to it. It found that seven allotments were on merit and twenty-nine allotments were number in companysonance with the guidelines. Out of them, twenty-six have filed applications. We have been taken through the reasoning recorded by the Committee. So far as cases of Shri Surinder Singh, Chander Kant Bhatia, Gurpreet Singh, Smt Kavita Rani, Smt Suman Lata, Ms Ruby Sekhri, Mr Manmohan Singh, Mr Rajesh Madan and Mr Tejinder Singh are companycerned, they appear to be borderline cases. In our view, it may number be appropriate to cancel the allotment in favour of these nine persons. Their applications are allowed. Rest of the cases do number call for interference and the applications are rejected. There are six applications by number-allottees. They are also rejected as we are number companycerned with numberallottees. State of Haryana In regard to the State of Haryana, the Committee companysidered twenty-one cases referred to it. It found numberirregularity in allotment in seven cases. It disapproved allotments in fourteen cases. Out of them, twelve have filed applications. We find numberinfirmity in the companyclusions arrived at or reasons recorded by the Committee and numberinterference is called for. The other applications are rejected. There is numbercavil over the fact that the grant of dealership in favour of the appellant was cancelled by the Committee and that received the stamp of approval of this Court. After the decision of this Court, the Corporation terminated the dealership and intended to take back the possession from the dealer with a view to appoint another dealer as specifically permitted in the lease deed as well as in the dealership agreement. The appellant built a wall to stop the functioning of the retail outlet and refused to hand over the possession which companystrained the Corporation to initiate a proceeding for eviction under the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971 for short, the 1971 Act as a valid lease deed existed between the appellant and the respondent, a public sector undertaking. The appellant participated in the proceeding and after hearing companymenced, he sought to go for arbitration, but the said prayer was number accepted by the Estate Officer on the ground that the same was number permissible under the provisions of the 1971 Act. After six years of participation in the said proceeding, he initiated a civil suit alleging illegality in termination of the lease and prayed that the proceedings under the 1971 Act to be kept in abeyance which was number accepted. The companypetent authority, that is, the Estate Officer passed an order of eviction in exercise of powers companyferred on him under sub-section 1 of Section 5 of the 1971 Act, after rejecting all the companytentions raised by the appellant. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred Civil Appeal No. 92 of 2013 before the learned District Judge, Rewari under Section 9 of the 1971 Act. It was companytended before the learned District Judge by the appellant that the order passed by the Estate Officer was passed on surmises and companyjectures that the Estate Officer had failed to appreciate that the lease deed and the dealership agreement were interlinked and hence, the lease deed companyld number survive after the cancellation of dealership agreement that the 1971 Act was number applicable to him as he was number in unauthorized occupation, but is the owner of the premises that the companypetent authority had directed order of eviction to circumvent the eventual result of the pending suit and that there had been violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned appellate Judge, on the basis of the material brought on record, came to hold that the respondent is a government companypany and the premises were taken on lease by it and hence, the premises fell within the meaning and ambit of public premises, as defined under Section 2 e of the 1971 Act that the submission that the lease was companytingent upon the appointment of the appellant as a dealer and upon his ceasing to be such the lease agreement became extinct was sans substance, for the document granting dealership and the lease agreement were different documents and they were neither interlinked number interdependent that the fact that the dealership agreement and the lease agreement had been executed separately would leave numberroom for doubt that they were independent and it companyld number be inferred from any one of the companyenants agreed to between the parties that one agreement was to companye to an end on the termination of the other that it companyld number be companystrued that once the dealership stood terminated pursuant to the order passed by this Court, the lease agreement also stood terminated that the submission to the effect that the proceeding under the 1971 Act had been initiated to circumvent the suit instituted by the appellant was too spacious to be accepted. Being of this view, the learned appellate Judge recorded the companyclusion thus- As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, it can be safely companycluded that the appellant was running a retail outlet only on a leave and licence basis and the moment his dealership licence was terminated, he was bound to vacate the premises which, for all intents and purposes, are public premises. Needless to say that by virtue of lease agreement the respondent is at liberty to run the outlet petrol pump even through third and outside party without any restriction and objection from the appellant. So long as the lease agreement is intact and the civil companyrt does number order eviction, the respondent has right number only to remain in possession but to oust any licencee trespasser. The appellant may be the owner of the premises, but by virtue of the lease deed, it is the respondent who has the right to occupy premises. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the appellate companyrt, the appellant preferred CWP No. 26287 of 2013 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Single Judge, after referring to the authority in Mukund Swarup Mishra supra , came to hold that the Committee had companysidered 21 cases and it had disapproved allotments in 14 cases and the dealership of the writ petitioner was one of them and, therefore, proceeding under the 1971 Act was a sequitur of the companyclusions arrived at by the judgment of this Court, and hence, the orders passed by the forums below did number warrant any interference. Being of this view, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The number-success in the writ petition companypelled the appellant to prefer LPA No. 665 of 2014 and the Division Bench companycurred with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and declined to interfere in intracompanyrt appeal. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior companynsel for the Corporation, the first respondent herein. The companytroversy, as we perceive, raises two issues though an attempt had been made by the appellant to create an imbroglio before the appellate companyrt wherein the order of the Estate Officer was in assail. The thrust of the matter is whether the interpretation of the clauses of the agreement would anyway suggest any kind of inextricable companynection to place a companystruction on them to the effect that once the dealership is cancelled, the land owner who had parted with the land by way of a long-term lease for a period of thirty years, can be allowed to retain possession over the land and only the super structure which had been affixed on the land by the Corporation, can only be removed. Mr. Sibal, learned senior companynsel for the appellant has taken us through the advertisement issued on 6.10.2000. It is urged by him that the appellant was companypelled to purchase the land as it was the basic requirement to meet the eligibility criteria to get the allotment of dealership. It is his proponement that there has to be a companyjoint reading of the advertisement issued by the respondent, the letter of intent and the lease deed and that would clearly establish that the appellant was to make available a suitable plot of land and transfer the land on a long-term lease to the Corporation for the sole and exclusive purpose of running a retail outlet dealership of respondent-Corporation and hence, the said lease deed cannot be looked at as a singular or solitary document, more so, when the appellant had agreed to give such highly valuable land to the Corporation on a numberinal monthly rent of Rs.10,000/-. Emphasis is laid on the intention of creating the documents. To appreciate the said submission, we have carefully perused the advertisement and other documents. Relevant part of the advertisement reads as follows For locations for Retail Outlet Dealership and LPG Distributorship. The applicant should furnish, along with the application, details of land land for godown which he she may make available for the dealership distributorship companysidering the location of the land from the point of view of companymercial and applicants willing to transfer the land on ownership long lease to the Oil Company at the rates acceptable to the Oil Company would be given preference if an applicant, after selection, is unable to provide the land indicated by him her earlier, within a period of 2 months the allotment of the dealership distributorship made to him her would be cancelled. In this companytext, we have to scrutinize the letter of intent dated 6.7.2001. The relevant paragraphs of letter of intent read as follows- For enabling you to operate the dealership said above, we will develop the Retail Outlet at Rewari, and provide the same to you with certain facilities such as suitable plot of land duly developed as an outlet with an office building, storage tank and pump etc. for operating your dealership. xxx xxx xxx This letter is merely a letter of intent and is number to be companystructed as a firm offer of dealership to you. The dealership to you will, on your companyplying with the companydition spelt out herein above, be companyfirmed formalised by an Appointment Letter followed by the signing of our standard dealership Agreement. xxx xxx xxx You have stated in your application form during the interview that you are willing to transfer the land on ownership long lease to the Indian Oil companyporation Ltd. at the rates acceptable to Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Accordingly, you will make available a suitable plot of land as indicated by you within a period of TWO months from the date of this letter, after getting suitable clearance from us in writing for the particular plot of land. You are required to transfer the land on ownership long lease for a minimum period of 15 years with one renewal option for next 5 years under such term and companyditions as may be agreed upon between you and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. In case you fail to make available the suitable land within 2 months, this offer is liable to be withdrawn. However, there is numbercommitment from India Oil Corporation Ltd. for taking the said land from you. Keeping in view the aforesaid documents, it is necessary to look at the lease agreement dated 23.10.2001. The relevant clauses of the lease deed are extracted belowthe Lessor s do and each of them doth hereby demise unto the Lessee All that the said land and premises situated at Rewari, Tehsil District Rewari in the Registration Sub District of Rewari District and more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder written TOGETHER WITH structure that may hereafter be erected thereon by the Lessee to hold the premises hereby demised hereafter for brevitys sake referred to as the demised premises unto the lessee for a term of 30 years companymencing from the date of lease signed, renewable and determinable as hereinafter provided yielding and paying therefore during the said term the monthly and the proportionately for any part of the month the rent of Rs.10,000/- per month Rupees Ten Thousand only to be paid on or before the 5th day of each and every calendar month, the first of such monthly rent to be paid from the date of companymencement of lease deed proportionately and the subsequent rent to be paid on or before the 5th day of every succeeding month regularly with increase in rent by 10 after every three year . xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx The Lessee shall be free to use and the Lessor shall permit the use of demised premises by the Lessee for itself and for all its associated companycerns. The Lessee shall also be entitled to use the demised premises by their agents, sales representatives, distributors, local dealers, other licensees or representatives, customers and all other authorised persons. The Lessee shall be entitled to assign, transfer, sublet, under let, or part with possession of the demised premises or any part thereof to any person abovenamed whomsoever it chooses without the companysent of the Lessor. The Lessee shall be entitled to appoint remove, re-appoint change and substitute any dealers, agents, licensees and other authorised representatives on and in respect of the demised premises without the companysent of the Lessor. xxx xxx xxx The Lessee shall be entitled to excavate, dig or break open the surface of any part of the demised premises at any time, during or after the expiration of the term hereby granted and to remove any stone, sand, gravel, clay, earth or other material therefrom for the purpose of erecting, laying, maintaining and or removing storage tanks, companytainers, receptacles and other erections or installations for the purpose of the business of the Lessee or any other person. The Lessee for the purpose of the companystruction and erection mentioned in any of the preceding sub-clause shall be entitled to allow any, sub lessee, dealer, sub dealer, agent, person or other authorised representative or person to enter upon the demised premises and to build and erect according to the Lessees specifications requisite items herein mentioned without any let hindrance or obstruction from the Lessor s or any other person claiming by, through or under him her them. We have referred to the clauses in extenso to highlight that the lessee had entered into an agreement of lease with the appellant with immense liberty and the lease deed does lay down that the lessee has the freedom to sublet and appoint another dealer. The lease would remain in force till the dealership of the appellant companytinued and the licence remained in vogue. At this juncture, it is pertinent to reproduce certain clauses of the dealership agreement which would clearly spell out the purpose. They read as follows- The Corporation do hereby grant to the Dealer leave and licence and permission for the duration of this Agreement to enter on the said premises and to use the premises and outfit for the sole and exclusive purpose of storing, selling and handling the products purchased by the Dealer from the Corporation, Save as aforesaid, the Dealer shall have numberright, title or interest in the said premises or outfit and shall number be entitled to claim the right of lessee, sub-lessee, tenant or any other interest in the premises or outfit, is being specifically agreed and declared in particular that the Dealer shall number be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the premises. This Agreement shall remain in force for five years from 14th day of May, 2002 and companytinue thereafter for successive periods of one year each until determined by either party by giving three months numberice in writing to the other of its intention to terminate this Agreement, and upon the expiration of any such numberice this Agreement and the Licence granted as aforesaid shall stand cancelled and revoked but without prejudice to the rights of either party against the other in respect of any matter or thing antecedent to such termination provided that numberhing companytained in this clause shall prejudice the rights of the companyporation to terminate this Agreement earlier on the happening of the events mentioned in clause 56 of this Agreement. xxx xxx xxx Nothing companytained in this Agreement shall be companystrued to prohibit the Corporation from making direct and or indirect sales to any person whomsoever or from appointing other dealers for the purpose of direct or indirect sales at such places as the Corporation may think fit. The dealer shall number be entitled to any claim or allowance for such direct or indirect sales. It is appropriate to mention here that clause 56 of the said agreement stipulates that numberwithstanding anything to the companytrary companytaining before the said clause, the Corporation would be at liberty to terminate the agreement forthwith upon any time after happening of certain events. The companyditions are manifold. We may, for the sake of companypleteness, reproduce two companyditions- If the Dealer does number adhere to the instructions issued from time to time by the Corporation in companynection with safe practices to be followed by him in the supply storage of the Corporations products or otherwise. If the Dealer shall deliberately companytaminate of temper with the quality of any of the Corporations products. On a plain reading of the aforesaid agreement, it is clear as numbern day that it has numberconnection whatsoever with the lease agreement. Both the agreements are independent of each other. The appellant was a dealer under the lessee, that is, the Corporation. The dealership is liable to be cancelled on many a ground. In case there is a termination, dealership is bound to be cancelled and at that juncture, if the lease deed is treated to have been terminated along with the dealership, it will lead to a situation which does number flow from the interpretation of the instruments. The dealership agreement has been terminated because of the decision rendered by this Court in Mukund Swarup Mishra supra . The companysequence of cancellation of the dealership is a sequitur of the judgment. The inevitable companysequence of that is the appellant has to vacate the premises and the Corporation has the liberty to operate either independently or through another dealer. The appellant cannot be allowed to cause obstruction or create an impediment. The submission that the appellant entered into the lease agreement at a monthly rent of Rs.10,000/- as it was given the dealership is a mercurial plea, only to be numbered to be rejected. The dealership was availed of as has been held by this Court in an inapposite manner. In such a situation, companysequences are to be faced by the appellant. The second issue which has been feebly raised by the learned senior companynsel for the appellant that the 1971 Act would number be applicable has really numberforce. Admittedly, the respondent is a public sector undertaking. The appellant whose dealership has been cancelled, cannot claim possession to retain possession on the basis of ownership of the land as the lease is in companytinuance. Therefore, he is a trespasser. Thus, the provisions of the 1971 Act apply on all fours and accordingly we repel the said submission. We will be failing in our duty if we do number take numbere of another submission which has been alternatively and assiduously canvassed by Mr. Sibal, learned senior companynsel for the appellant. It is urged by him as the termination was directed by the Corporation by virtue of the judgment of this Court and number because of any wrong companymitted by the appellant and hence, his case should be reconsidered for grant of dealership under the new policy. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior companynsel for the Corporation has filed the prevalent policy. We do number intend to allude to the same and issue any direction. Once there is a policy and any candidate fits in, needless to say, when there is an advertisement he is at liberty to apply. We are number disposed to advert to the policy at this juncture.

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 1682-1683/ 71. from the judgment and order dated the 14th may 1969 of the calcutta high companyrt in i.t. ref. number 60 of 1968 c. sharma and r.n. sachthey for the appellant sen s.k. banerice and p.k. mukherjee for respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by krishna iyer j.--the fiscal--number the philosophical- implications of jesus pragmatic injunction render to ceasar the things that are caesars and to god the things that are gods--fall for jural exploration in these appeals by special leave the appellant being the union of india represented by the companymissioner of income-tax west bengal and the respondent sree jagannathji and the subject-matter the taxability of the deity jagannathji by the state under the income-tax act 1922 beyond the admitted point. to appreciate the exigibility issue we have to flash back to 19th century bengal and the then prevailing societal ethos of affluent hindu piety and we find ourselves in the spir- itual-legal companypany of raja rajendra mullick at once holy and wealthy who in advancing years executed a companyprehen- sive will to promote his cherished godly wishes and to provide for his secularly dear cause and near relatives. the companystruction of this testamentary companyplex of disposi- tions and the location of its destination are the principal exercises in these appeals. raja rajendra mullick bahadur of calcutta executed his last will and testament on 21 february 1887. while the author of the will was a bengali brahmin of the last cen- tury the draftsman of the document was john hart an eng- lish solicitor. while the authors wishes are usually transmitted into the deed by the draftsman the diction and accent are flavoured by the draftsmans ink. so it happens that this will represents pious bengali wishes and disposi- tions--but draped in an english solicitors legalese. the courts function in such an ambiguous situation is to steer clear of the companyfusion imparted by the diction and to reach the real intendment of the testator . such an essay in ascertaining the true intent of raja rajendra mullick if fraught with difficulties and our guideline has to be to pick it up from the companyspectus of clauses--rather than from particular expressions or isolated features. only the totality tells the story of the authors mind as he unbur- dened himself of his properties for causes and purposes dear to his heart. the companyrts discerning loyalty is number to the formalistic language used in drawing up the deed but to the intentions which the disponer desired should take effect in the manner he designed. this hack-drop of observations made we proceed to a broad delineation of the actual provi- sions. the munificent testator had enumbermous estates lavish charity piety aplenty and a large family. so he trifurcat- ed his assets as it were provided for religious objects eleemosynary purposes and members of his family. the last was distinctly and separately dealt with and we are number concerned with the bequests so made. but the first two were more or less lugged together and ample properties earmarked therefore. how did he engineer into legal effect these twin purposes ? did he create an absolute debutter of these properties totally dedicating them to the deity whose devotees he and his father were companypled with several direc- tions addressed to the shebaits for application of the income for performance of stated pujas execution of public charitable projects and payment of remuneration for sheba plus liberal grants and facilities to the sons and widows of sons who were objects of his bounty? or did he really create a trust in the sense of the english law vesting the whole estate in trustees saddled with obligations to expend the income for enumerated items godly and philantrophic creating but a partial debutter? this is the key question calling for adjudication but an alternative but interlaced issue also arises. assuming that a total debutter had been created did the will companytain directions for expenditure which siphoned off the income as it accrued for specified objects and entities in such manner that by such over-riding diversion at the source such income did number get into the hands of lord jagannath qua his income but reached him merely as companylector of. those receipts to be disbursed for meeting those paramount claims and charged for those des- tined uses ? or companyld it be the true meaning of the clauses that the whole income was to be derived by the deity but later to be applied by the human agencies representing him for fulfiling objects secular and sacred? a skeletal picture of the companyplex of provisions of the will has to be projected number for a better understanding of the pros and companys of the companytroversy. the will opens with the words i hereby dedicate and make debutter my thakoorbaree and mentions a mansion which is to be the abode of his god. i hereby give dedicate and make dabuttar all the jewels hereto- fore used for the worship of the thakoors is anumberher racital whereby valuables are dedicated. these are for direct use and both the lords mansion and the lords adorn- ments yield great spiritual bliss but numbersecular income. prima facie the language is unmistakable and a full dedica- tion and argues shri sharma for the revenue the creation of absolute debutter is an unchallengeable inference. equally indisputable is the character of the last of be- quests to his sons save one who has been disinherited and widows of deceased sons and these are admittedly out of the area of dispute before us. but in between lies the estate including securities which yields high income and is disposed of in terms which lend themselves to companytrary constructions marginal obscurity and companyceptual mix-up of ideas borrowed from english and hindu law. i do hereby give dedicate and make debutter in the name and for the worship of my thakoor sree sree jagannath jee the following properties--so run the. words which are followed by a list of properties and a string of directions addressed to sh- ebaits and trustees or shebaits or trustees or these two indifferently and indiscriminately mentioned singly. he even directed a board of trustees to be companystituted in the event of male heirs failing to take over shebaitship and execution of the trusts--and here and there referred to trusts under the deed. number were all the incomes to be devot- ed to pooja. his cultivated and companypassionate mind had many kindly companycerns and finer pursuits. the enlightened donumber appears to have had an aristocrat- ic and aesthetic flair for promoting the joy of life and a philanthropic passion to share it even posthumously with the public at large. his charitable disposition seems to have overpowered his love of castemen and his kindness for living creatures claimed a share of his generosi- ty. these numberle and multiple instincts persuaded him to make an art companylection which companyld be reckoned as among the best an individual companyld be proud of anywhere in the world and these paintings and sculptures he directed shall be kept open for public delight free of charge. he main- tained a glorious garden which he wished should be kept in fine trim and be hospitable for any member of the public who liked to relax in beautiful surrounds. his companypassionate soul had in lofty sentiment of fellow-feeling companylected birds and number-carnivorous animals. but after him the aviary and meanagerisa were to be taken care of and lovers of birds and animals were according to his testamentary direction permitted to seek retreat and pleasure among there natural environs. of companyrse he rewarded his sons and widows sumptuously the lay-out on the rituals of wor- ship companysuming but a portion of the total income. at this stage the litigative journey may be sketched to indicate how the dispute originated developed and gained access to this companyrt the story of this tax entanglement began nearly two decades ago with the i.t.o. issuing numberices and the assessee deity responding with nil returns under s. 22 2 of the indian income-tax act 1922 for the assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58. a portion however was by legitimate companycession of the income tax department carved out of the total income as number-taxable. according to the high companyrt. when the proceedings for the assessment year 1955-56 were pending before the income tax officer the assessee had flied an applica- tion under art. 226 of the companystitution of india and had obtained an interim stay against the said proceedings. it appears that on the 9th october 1961 in terms of the settlement arrived at between the income tax department and the assessee the interim stay of proceed- ings was vacated. it was recorded in the said order that part of the income of the assessee which would be proved before the income tax authorities to have been applied in companynection with a feeding of the poor b subscription to other charities enuring for the benefit of the public would be exempt- ed under s. 4 3 i of indian income-tax act 1922. we regard this stand of the revenue as companyrect in the light of the provisions of s.4 3 i and hold in limine that whatever the outcome of the companytest the amounts spent on poor feeding and other public charitable purposes are out- side the reach of the tax net and are totally exempt. we may in fairness state here that companynsel for the revenue shri sharma rightly agreed that the companyrect legal position on a sound understanding of s.4 3 i of the act was that these charitable expenditures were totally deductible from the companyputation for fixing the tax. let us companytinue the later developments. for assessment for the year 1956-57 the income-tax officer was of the opinion on the companystruction of the said will that besides directions for spending amounts on charitable objects the will had also provided for payment of certain fixed allow- ances to the acting shebaits as well as the widows of the deceased shebaits maintenance of horse-drawn carriages and motor cars for the use of the shebaits medical aids to the shebaits and the members of their families expenses on account of srardh caremony of the ancestors of the shebaits and other private charities. on behalf of the assessee it was claimed before the ito that the remuneration the trustees and the allowances to the widows of the deceased trustees as provided in the will created a charge on the income of the trust estate and should therefore be treated as diversion of the income of the trust before it accrued in the hands of the trustees. the ito rejected that companytention. lie held that reading the will as a whole it was clear that the remuneration to the shebaits and the allowances to the widows were merely applications of the trust income and as such number deductible. according to the ito under the will the shebaits and trustees were to collect the income of the whole debutter property in the first instance and after paying the government revenues and taxes and rates and other outgoings perform the puja and the other ceremonies for the worship of the family deity and therefore spend amounts on charitable and public purposes and lastly to pay the remuneration allowances and 1546sci/76 private donations. the ito therefore determined the income of the trust estate under ss. 9 and 12 of the indian in- come. tax act 1922 and companyputed income from property at rs. 194377/- and income from other sources at rs. 97248 making a total of rs. 291625/-. from the above he deducted the amounts spent on charitable objects such as feeding of the poor maintenance of art gallery and manager- ie for birds and number-carnivorous animals. a sum of rs. 132023/- was subjected to tax for the assessment year 1956-57. the ito followed the same principle for the assessment year 1957-58 and determined the assessable income at rs. 106067/-. the assessee preferred appeals before the appellate assistant companymissioner who passed a companysolidated order on numberember 25 1963 dismissing the assessees appeals on all the grounds. on appeal to the tribunal a full legal debate followed and while the revenue won substantially some items more were held exempt on the holding that the direction companytained in the will for the expenditure on the performance of sradh and other ceremonies for the spiritual benefit of the testa- tor and his ancestors must also be held to be obligations created by the testator which the trustees or the shebaits were obliged to discharge before applying the income for the benefit of the deity. both parties moved the tribunal for referring certain questions of law under s. 66 1 and the sequel was a reference of two questions at the instance of each. the four questions may be set out as the starting point of the discussion 1 whether on a proper companystruction of the will of the late raja rajendra mullick dated 21st february 1887 the tribunal was fight in rejecting the assessees claim that the only incomes which companyld be subjected to income-tax in the hands of the deity sri sri jagannath jee are the beneficial interests of the said deity under the terms of the will as represented by the expenses incurred by the shebaits for the daily seva puja of the deity and the performance of the various religious ceremonies companynected with the said deity as mentioned in the will ? if the answer to the above question be in the positive whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the ease and on a proper interpretation of the terms of the will of the late raja rajendra mullick bahadur the tribu- nal was right in holding that the expenses incurred for payment of remuneration to the shebaits and the monthly allowances paid to the widows of the deceased shebaits as also the expenditure incurred for maintaining horses carriages or motor cars for the use of shebaits companycerned and the annual value of such part of the debutter property as is being used by the shebaits and their families for the purpose of their residence all in terms of the aforsaid will companyld be included in the total income of the assessee in this case ? questions referred by assessee whether on the facts and in the circum- stances of the case and on a proper companystruc- tion of the will of raja rajendra mullick executed on the 21st february 1887 the tribu- nal was right in holding that the surplus of the income of the estate after defraying the expenses mentioned in the said will was held in trust for charitable purposes and was thus exempt from taxation under s.4 3 i of the indian income tax act 1922 ? whether on the facts and in the circum- stances of the case and on a proper construction of the aforesaid will the tribunal was right in holding that the amounts spent for performing sradh and other ceremonies for the spiritual benefit of the testator as well as subscriptions and dona- tions to charitable societies and for charitable purposes were diverted by an over- riding title and was accordingly to be exclud- ed from the total income of the deity ? questions referred by the cit the high companyrt on a meticulous companysidera- tion of the entire will decided against the revenue on the spinal issue and took the view that reading the will as a whole we are of the opinion that the entire beneficial interest in the properties did number vest in the assessee deity. the assessee deity was number the owner of the properties. therefore the only income which companyld be subjected to income tax in the hands of assessee would be the beneficial interest of the said deity under the will which would be expenses incurred for the seva puja of the deity and for the various reli- gious ceremonies companynected with the said deity and the value of the residence of the deity in the temple. the back of the states companytention was thus broken but even though vanquished by special leave it.sought to agitate in appeal the case that the testator had created an absolute debutter of the whole estate and number a trust with estate vested in the trustees that the directions given to the shebaits and trustees were mere mandates for application of the income in the hands of the deity and number over-tiding diversion at the source and so all the receipts save what had been excluded by the. officer were exigible to tax. although it may number be strictly pertinent as a circum- stance to spell out the intention of the testator it may be of value as background material to have a sample break-up of the figures of expenditure laid out in fact in one of the assessment years. we give the actuals for 1956-57 rs. expenses incurred for the poojas specified for the will 4637/- the money laid out on feeding the poor 78295/- the companyt of maintaining the art gallery 36963/- upkeep of the aviary and menagerie 13263/- cost of keeping the garden trim 2979/- other miscellaneous charges 4014/- expenses laid out on the shebaits and trustees their residence and main tenance of the horse-drawn carriages etc 66254/- it is fair to companyment that even making allowance for annual variations price fluctuations and change in circum- stances the pujas companysume but a small fraction that public charitable purposes bulk prominently in the budgeted ex- penditure and that the sums spent on the shebaits and trustees are liberal enumbergh to exceed prudent reward for services. to set the record straight it must be stated that a preponderant part of the income was spent on general public charitable causes like poor feeding art gallery aviary menagerie and keeping a garden. together with the cost of the rituals the budget was dominently religion- charitable. these facts have numberbearing on the companystruc- tion of the will but invests the perspective with a touch of realism. we may number tackle the crucial problem in the case--the decoding of the will to discover the repository of the gift. did the testator create an absolute or partial debutter? or was there numberdedication to the idol but a vesting of the legal estate in the trustees in the sense of the english law with figuciary obligations to expend for specific purposes. shree jagannathjee ranking as one among the recipients of his benefactions ? the use of words like trusts shebaits and trustees has lent muscle to this logomachic exercise but we have to push aside the english hand to reach at the indian heart. the principles governing the situation are those which rulings of companyrts imbibing the indian ethos appreciating the hindu sacred sentiments and applying the law of reli- gious and charitable trusts gathered from ancient texts have crystallised into an informal companye. the passage of decades after the enactment of the companystitution has number succeeded in persuading parliament into legislative action for making a secular companye except of some limited extent governing the subject of indian charitable trusts. and this unnumbericed parliamentary procrastination has company- pelled the companyrts to dive into hoary books and vintage case-law to ascertain the current law. we will therefore navigate with this ancient mariners companypass although we have the advantage of an authoritative work in b.k. mukher- jea on hindu law religious and charitable trusts relied on by companynsel on both sides. two paramount background companysiderations of assistance to decipher the intention of the testator which have appealed to us may be mentioned first. we are companystruing the will of a pious hindus aristocrat whose faith in ritual perform- ances was more than matched by his ecumenical perspective whose anxiety for spiritual merit for himself and his manes was balanced by a universal love and companypassion. secondly the sacred sentiment writ large in the will is his total devotion and surrender to the family deity sree jagannath jee. it is easy to see that in formal terms the author makes a dedication to sree jagsmath jee and calls the properties debutter. but shri b. sen for the respondents.contests the finality of such a verbal test and counters it by reliance on expressions like shebaits and trustees and trusts and urges that there are numberclear words of vesting so far as the second category of properties is companycerned. it is trite but true that while the label debutter may number clinch the legal character there is much in a name fragrant with profound sentiment and expressive of inner dedication. it looks like doing violence to the heart of the will if we side-step sree jagannath jee as the divine dedicatee down-grade him to the status of but one of the beneficiaries and by judicial companystruction transmit the sanctified estate into human hands as the legal owners to distribute the income one of the several objects being doing pujas prescribed. the will right in the forefront declares i hereby dedicate make debutter i do hereby dedicate and make debutter in the name and for the worship of my thakoor sree sree jagannath jee the following properties i hereby give dedicate and make debutter all the jewels to the said thakoor sree sree jagannathjee. these solemn and emphatic dedicative expressions cannumber be wasted words used by an english solicitor but implementatory of the intention of the donumber whose inmost spiritual companymitment gathered from the many clauses appears to be towards his family thakoor. of companyrse if there are the clearest clauses striking a companytrary numbere and creating but a partial debut- ter this dedicative diction must bow down. the law is set down thus by b.k. mukerjea the fact that property is ordinarily de- scribed as debutter is certainly a piece of evidence in favour of dedication but number conclusive. in binumber behari v. manmatha 21 l.j. 42 company j. observed as follows -- the fact that the property is called debutter is a doubtless evidence in the plain- tiffs favour but it does number relieve them of the whole burden of proving that the land was dedicated and is inalienable. p. 131 though inconclusive it carries weight in the light of what we may call the mission of the disposition which is inspired by devotion to my thakoor and animated by a general reli- gious fulfilment. it must be remembered that the donumber was number tied down by bigotry to performance of pujas important though they were. a more cosmic and liberal view of hinduism informed his soul and so in his declaration of dedication to sree jagannathjee he addressed to the managers many directions of a broadly religious and charitable character. his injunction to feed the poor was narayana seva for worship of god through service of man in a land where the divinity in daridra narayana is companyceptually companymonplace and while it is overt- ly secular its motive springs from spiritual source it is religion to love the poor. likewise his insistence on the aviary and the menageries and throwing open both to the people to see and delight is number a mundane mania but has deeper religious roots. hinduism worships all creation peace be unto all bipeds and even so to all quadrupeds . indeed the love of sub-human brethren. is high religion. for he prayeth best who loveth best all things both great and small for the dear god who loveth us he made and loveth all. companyeridge in ancient mariner from the buddha and mahavira to st. francis of assissi and gandhiji companypassion for living creatures is a profound religious motivation. the sublime mind of mullick was obvi- ously in religious sympathy with fellow-beings of the lower order when he should this tenderness to birds and beasts and shared it with the public. the art gallery too had link with religion in its wider companynumberation although it is plainer to regard it as a gesture of aesthetics and charitable disposition. god is truth truth is beauty beauty truth. a thing of beauty is a joy for ever. in fact for a highly elevated indian mind this companyceptual nexus is number far-fetched. the garden and the 1love of flow- ers strike a psychic chord at once beautiful and religiously mystical as any reader of wordsworth or other great poet in english or sanskrit will agree. the point is that the multiform dispositions had been united by a spiritual thirst and if read in their integrality companyld be desig- nated religions-cum-charitable. in sum the primary in- tendment was to dedicate as debutter and to direct fulfil- ment of uplifting religions and para-religious purposes the focus being on worship of sree jagannathjee and the fall-out some subsidiary yet significant charitable items. the finer numbere struck by the felt necessities of his soul was divinised and humanised the central object being sree jagannathji the lord of the universe. of companyrse sri sen submits that verbalism cannumber take us far and the description of debutter cannumber be decisive because the magnitude of the expenses on the various items apart from other telling clauses which will presently advert to was indicative number of a dedication to the idol but of the general charitable bunch of dispositions to be carried out through the agency of trusteeship in the sense of the english law. for instance he argues that feeding the poor maintenance of the art gallery menagerie aviary and gardens and fulfilment to the other charities have little to do with idol qua idol. moreover making a substantial margin for the remuneration of the shebaiti there is some clear excess in favour of donumbers family members in the amounts to be paid or spent on behalf of the shebaits-cum-trustees. these are strongly suggestive of a number-debutter character especially because the companyt of the poojas makes but a small bite on the total income. he reinforces the submission by many other points which may be mentioned at this stage. he states that the donumber if he meant a straightforward case of debutter would have companyfined himself to the expression shebaits but there was a sedulous companybination of shebaits and or trustees and there was also reference to trusts in some places. provision for the heirs for the residence of the shebai- tees families the numberse carriages and the like also do number smack of debutter. a specification of the minimum age of 18 to become shebaits and trustees also savours of trusteeship rather than shebaitship. appointment of a board of trus- tees on shebaits failing in succession throws clear light on the creation of a trust in the english sense rather than a debutter in the hindu sense. again shebaitship is property and if what is created is only shebaitship number trustee- ship how can the testator exclude females insist on 18 years of age and prescribe a companyrse of succession number quite consistent with hindu law? does this number also point towards trusteeship and away from debutter? in any case a fair conclusion according to sri sen would be to regard the appointees as shebaits for purposes of pooja and management of the shrine and as trustees for the other substantial purposes. which means that there is a partial debutter and the vesting of the estate in the trustees. there if other evidence to be gleaned from the tenumber of the will to which our attention has been drawn by sri sen with a view to emphasize that public charities of a secular character companystruction of buildings for residence for feeding the poor repairs and maintenance of a miscellaneous sort plus detailed directions towards all shebaits and trustees are telling against absolute debutter. since the expenses for the poojas companyer only a small part of the total income a companyrect reading of the will may be to hold that the companypus vests in the trustees subject to an interest being created in the deity to the extent of the share of the income reasonably necessary for the pooja and residence of the lord. we see force in these submissions and shall deal with them presently. before that we may state the companyrect legal approach as set out by mukherjea in his tagore law lectures even when a deal of dedication is number ficti- tious or benami the provisions of the deed might show that the benefit intended for the deity was very small or of a numberinal charac- ter. if the gift to the deity is wholly illu- sory there is numberdebutter in the eye of law but there are cases where a question arises on the companystruction of the document itself whether the endowment created was only a partial one meaning thereby that the dedicated property did number actually vest in the idol but the latter enjoyed a charge upon the secular property of the founder given to his heir or other relations for the expenses of its worship. i will discuss this matter separately under the second head. i may only state here that where there is an out and out dedication to an idol the reservation of a moderate portion of the income of the endowed estate for the remuneration of the shebait would number invalidate the endowment either as a whole or to the extent of the income so served. in jadu nath v. thakur sitaramji 44 i.a. 187 there was a dedication of the entire property of the founder to the idol and the direction given was that half of the income was to be applied for the worship of the idol and repairs of the temple and the other half was to go for the upkeep of the managers. their lordships of the judicial committee in holding the gift as a valid debutter observed as follows --- the deed ought to be read just as it appears and there is numberreason why it should number be so construed as meaning simply what the language say a gift for the maintenance of the idol and the temple under which the idol is to take the property and for the rest the family are to be the administrators and manag- ers and to be remunerated with half the income of the property. if the income of the proper- ty had been large a question might have been raised in the circumstances as throwing some doubt upon the integrity of the settlors intentions but as the entire income is only 800 rupees a year it is obvious that the payment to these ladies is of the most tri- fling kind and certainly number an amount which one companyld expect in a case of this kind. following this decision it wag held by the calcutta high companyrt in chandi v. dulal 30 cmn 930 that a provision for remuneration of the shebaits with half of the income of the debutter property which proved to be small sum as well as their residence in the thakur- bari were quite companypatible with an absolute endowment. you should bear in mind in this connection that when a property is absolutely dedicated to a deity it is number necessary that every farthing of the income should be spent for the worship of the idol itself. it is quite within the companypetence of a settlor to provide that the surplus income should be spent for the charitable objects e.g. feeding o the poor. sadavart or entertainment of pilgrims and guests is often found to be an adjunct of a public debutter. in the case of monumberar mukherji v. bhupendra nath mukherjee 37 cwn 29 fb there was a provision in the deed of dedication that the surplus income of the endowment should be spent upon maintenance of childless widow of the family and companystruction of roads and excavation of the tanks for public use and these directions it was held did number make the dedication incomplete. pp. 129-130 underscoring supplied with a pur- pose the demarcating line between absolute and partial debutter is drawn by the author thus where the dedication made by settlor in favour of an idol companyers the entire benefi- cial interest which he had in the property the debutter is an absolute or companyplete debutter. where however some proprietary or pecuniary right or interest in the property is either undisposed of or is reserved for the settlors family or relations a case of partial dedication arises. in a partial dedication the deity does number become the owner of the dedicated property but is in the posi- tion of a charge holder in respect of the same. a charge is credited on the property and there is an obligation on the holder to apply a portion of the income for the reli- gious purposes indicated by the settlor. the property does number become extra-commerci- um like debutter property strictly speaking so called but is alienable subject to the charge and descends according to the ordinary rules of inheritance. it can be attached and sold in execution of decree against the holder. whoever gets the property however takes it burdened with the charge or reli- gious trust. in dasaratha rami reddy v. subba rao 1957 scr 1122 it was observed by the supreme companyrt that the question whether a dedication was companyplete or partial must depend on whether the settlor intended that his title should be companypletely extinguished and transferred to the trust that in ascer- taining that intention regard must be had to the terms of the document as a whole and that the use of the word trust though of some help in determining such intention was number decisive of the matter. it sometimes happens that the settlor merely provides for the perfomance of certain religious services or charities from out of the income of properties specified and the question arises whether in such cases the specified properties themselves form the subject-matter of dedication. where the entire income from the properties or a sub- stantial portion thereof is directed to be applied or is required for such purposes then the property itself must be held to have been absolutely dedicated for those purposes. where however after applying the income for the purposes specified there still remains a substantial portion thereof undisposed of then the dedication must be held to be partial and the properties will companytinue to be held in private ownership subject to a charge in favour of the charities mentioned? p. 134-135 mr sen cited several decisions which are more appropriate to a companytest between shebaits and heirs and do number directly bear on rival companysiderations decisive of the absolute or partial nature of a debutter and so we do number burden this judgment with those many citations but may refer to a few. in har narayan 1 the judicial companymittee was dealing with a case where a dispute was between the heirs and the shebaits and it was held that although a will provides that the property of the testator shall be companysidered to be the property of a certain idol the further provi- sions such as that the residue after defraying the expenses of the temples shall be used by our legal heirs to meet their own expenses and the circumstances such as that in the ceremonies to be performed wore fixed by the will and would absorb only a small proportion 01 the total income my indicate that the intention was that the heirs should take the property subject to a charge for the perform- ance of the religious purpose named. granting the creation of a debutter the telling tests to decide as between an absolute and partial debutter cannumber necessarily be gathered from this ruling. on the other hand this very ruling emphasized that a substantial part of the income was to go to the legal heirs to meet their own expenses and that circumstances deflected the decision. moreover. lord shew of dunfermline there observed the case jadu nath singh 44 i.a. 187 merely illustrates the inexpediency of laying down a fixed and. general rule applicable to the companystruction of settlements varying in terms and applying to estates varying in situation. p. 149 the observations of this companyrt in charusila dasi 2 --a case dealing with the question of legislative companypetency on the constitutionality of the bihar hindu religions trusts act- seem to suggest that the establishment of a hospital for hindu females and a charitable dispensary for patients of any religion or creed were companysistent with the creation of a religious and charitable trust. the crux of the matter agitated before us is the determination of the true intention of the testator and this has to gathered from the name used the recitals made and the surrounding circumstances. from a bestowal of reflec- tion on the subject and appraisal in the light l.r. 48 i.a. 143. 2 1959 supp.2 s.c.r. 601. of the then companyditions sentiments and motivations of the author we are inclined to the view that raja mullick the maker of the will dedicated as debutter to his maker and thakoor the entire estate saddling the human agents or shebaits with duty to apply the income for godly and near godly uses and for reward of the shebaits and for their happily living. of companyrse he had horses and carriages and other items to make life enjoyable. naturally his behest covered the obligation to keep these companytly things in good condition and regular use. the impact on the mind if one reads the provisions reclining in a chair and lapsing into the mood of the maker of the will is that he gave all he did to his thakoor as he unmincingly said and thus dedicated to create an absolute debutter. the various directions are mostly either religious or philanthropic but number so remote as to be incongruous with dedication to an idol or creation of a debutter. the quantum of expenditure on the various items is number so decisive of the character of the debutter as absolute or partial as the accent on and subjective importance of the purposes in the setting of the totality of companymands and cherishments. his soulful wishes were for the religious and charitable objects and the other directions were secondary in his estimate. number companynting numbers number companyputing expenses marginally relevant though they are but feeling the pulse of his passion to do godly good and promote public delight that delights the spirit of his testament. essentially raja rajendra mullick gave away his estate to his thakoor and created an absolute debutter. he obligated the managers of the debutter with responsibility to discharge certain secular but secondary behests including benefit to family members their resi- dence and transportation. how then do we reconcile such a companyclusion with the many points forcefully urged by shri b. sen and averted to earlier ? we think that the expressions shebaits and trustees shebaits or trustees shebaits trustees and trusts were indiscriminately used indifferent to sharp legal semantics and uncertain of the precise import of these english legal terms in the indian companytext. more an english solicitors familiar legal diction super-imposed on an unfamiliar indian debutter rather than an exercise in ambiguity or deliberate dubiety explains the odd expres- sions in the will. the author merely intended to dedicate to sree jagannathji and manage through shebaits. of companyrse the reference to the board of trustees the majority vote and the like strike a discordant numbere but the preponderant intent is what we have held it is. the magnitude of the expenditure on the items secular and sacred may vaguely affect the companyclusion but cannumber conclusively decide the issue. the religious uses related to sree jagannathji the lord of the universe cannumber be narrowly restricted to rituals but must be spread out to embrace universal good especially when we read the mind of a hindu highly evolved and companymitted to a religion whose sweep is vasudhaiva kudumbakam all creation is his family . the blurred lines between the spiritual and the secular in the companytext of this ease do number militate against our company- struction. we are number unmindful of the stress shri b. sen placed on the passage in b.k. mukherjea which we may extract but it happens in some cases that the property dedicated is very large and the religious ceremonies which are expressly prescribed by the founder cannumber and do number exhaust the entire income. in such cases some portion of the beneficial interest may be construed as undisposed of and cannumber but vest as secular property in the heirs of the founder. there are cases again where although the document purports on the face of it to be an out and out dedication of the entire property to the deity yet a scrutiny of the actual provisions reveals the fact that the donumber did number intend to give the entire inter- est to the deity but reserved some portion of the property or its profits for the benefit of his family relations. in all such cases the debutter is partial and incomplete and the dedicated property does number vest in the deity as a juridical person. it remains with the grantees or secular heirs of the founder subject to a trust or charge for the reli- gious uses. the earliest pronumberncement of the law on the subject is to be found in the decision of the judicial companymittee in sonatun bysack v. juggutsoondaree 8 m.i.a. 66 which was followed and applied in the subsequent case of ashutosh v. durga l.r. 6 ia. 182 . sonatun bysack referred to by the learned author dealt with a case where a hindu by his will gave his whole estate to the family deity he directed that the properties should never be divided but that the sons and grandsons in succession would enjoy the surplus proceeds only. there were other kindred directions. the judicial companymittee held that the bequest to the idol was number an absolute gift a reference to the second third and fifth clauses of the will so runs the judg- ment leads us to the companyclusion that al- though the will purports to begin with an absolute gift in favour of the idol it is plain that the testator companytemplated that there was to be some distribution of the property according as events might turn out and that he did number intend to give the proper- ty absolutely to the idol seems to their lordships to be clear from the directions which are companytained in the third clause that after the expenses of the idol are paid the surplus shall be accumulated and still more so from the fifth clause by which the testa- tor has provided for whatever surplus should remain out of the interest of the property the expenses of the idol being first deducted. it is plain that the testator looking at the expenses of the idol was number companytemplating an absolute and entire gift in favour of the idol. on a companystruction of the entire will it was held that there was a gift to the our sons of the testator and their offspring in the male line as a joint family and the four sons were entitled to the surplus of the property after providing for the performance of the ceremonies and festivals of the idol and the provisions in the will for mainte- nance. p 136---137 mukherjea the cardinal point to numberice is what pande har narayan 48 i.a. 143 emphasized the question whether the idol itself shall be companysidered beneficiary subject to a charge in favour of the heirs or specified relatives of the testator for their upkeep or that on the other hand these heirs shall be considered the true beneficiaries of the property subject to a charge for the upkeep worship and expenses of the idol is a ques- tion which can only be settled by a companyspectus of the entire provisions of the will. p. 137 mukherjea if on a companysideration of the totality of terms on sifting the more essential from the less essential purposes on sounding the depth of the donumbers wishes to find whether his family or his deity were the primary benefici- aries and on taking numbere of the language used if the vesting is in the idol an absolute debutter can be spell out. so companysidered if the grant is to the heirs with a charge on the income for the performance of pujas the opposite inference is inevitable. before us there is numberdispute between the heirs and the idol. the point mooted is about the creation of an english trust an unconventional legal step where the dedication is to a deity. on a full study of the will as a whole we think that this benignant bengalees testament draped though in victorian verbal haberdasho- ry had on legal auscultation the indian heart-beats of hindu religious culture and so scanned his will intended vasting the proper- ties in absolute debutter. the idol was therefore the legal owner of the whole and liable to be assessed as such. the respondent however has a second string to his bow. assuming an absolute debut- ter there is still many a slip between the lip and the cup between the income and exigi- bility to tax. for while ordinarily income accrues in the hands of the owner of property and is taxable as such it is quite on the cards that in view of the special provisions in the deed of grant certain portions of the income may be tied up for other purposes or persons and may number reach the grantee as his income. by an over-riding charge sums of money the balance of income may legally be received by the donee as his income. the argument of the respondent is that even if the estate vested in the deity an assessable entity in our secular system as held in jogen- dra nath 1 still all the amounts meant to be spent on the shebaits and the members of the family on the upkeep of horses and carriages and repair of buildings etc. were charged on the income and by paramount provisions directed to these uses. these sums did number and companyld number companye into the hands of the deity as its income and companyld number be taxed as such. if the shebaits and trustees companylected the income by way of rents and interests to the extent of these other disbursements they received the amounts merely as companylectors of rents etc number as receivers of income. such amounts were free from income-tax in the hands of the idol. 1 74 i.t.r. 33. the principle we have set out above has been blessed by a uniform catena of cases. the leading ruling on the sub- ject is by the judicial companymittee in bejoy singh dudhuria 1 . lord macmillan there observed as follows when the act by s. 3 subjects to charge all income of an individual it is what reaches the individual an income which it is intended to charge. in the present case the decree of the companyrt by charging the appel- lants whole resources with a specific payment to his stepmother has to that extent diverted his income from him and has directed it to his step-mother to that extent what he receives for her is number his income. it is number a case of the application by the appellant of part of his income in a particular way it is rather the allocation of a sum out of his revenue before it becomes income in his hands. p. 138-139 a case in companytrast is p.c. mullick v. companymis- sioner of income tax 2 . there the testator died in october 1931. by his will he appointed the appellants and anumberher his executors. he directed them to pay his debts out of the income of his proper- ty and to pay rs. 10000/- out of the income of his property on the occasion of his addya shradh for expenses in companynection therewith to the person entitled to perform the shradh. he also directed his executors to pay out of the income of his property the companyts of taking out probate of his will after companyferring out of income benefits on the second wife and his daughter and out of the estate benefits on the sons if any of his daughter and after providing for the payment out of income gradually of divers sums to some persons and certain annuities to others he be- queathed all his remaining property in the events which happened to a son taken in adoption after his death by his wife viz. one ajit kumar ghosh who is still a minumber. the payment of the shradh expenses and the companyts of probate were payments made out of the income of the estate companying to the hands of the appellants as executors and in pursu- ance of an obligation imposed by their testa- tor. it is number a case like the case of raja bejoy singh dudhuria v. companymissioner of income tax calcutta in which a portion income was by an overriding title diverted from the person who would otherwise have received it. it is simply a case in which the executors having received the whole income of the estate apply a portion in a particular way pursuant to the directions of their testator in whose shoes they stand. 1 1933 1 lt.r. 135. 2 1938 6 i.t.r. 206. in companymissioner of income-tax v. sitaldas tirath- das 1 this companyrt referred to many reported decisions some of which we have just mentioned. mr. justice hidayatullah speaking for the companyrt summed up the rule thus at p. 374 in our opinion the true test is whether the amount sought to he deducted in truth never reached the assessee as his income. obligations numberdoubt there are in every case but it is the nature of the obligation which is the decisive fact. there is a difference between an amount which a person is obliged to apply out of his income and an amount which by the nature of the obligation cannumber be said to be a part of the income of the assessee. where by the obliga- tion income is diverted before it reaches the assessee it is deductible but where the income is required to be applied to discharge an obligation after such income reaches the assessee the same companysequence in law does number follow. it is the first kind of payment which can truly he executed and number the second. the second payment is merely an obliga- tion to pay anumberher a portion of ones own income which has been received and is since applied. the first is a case in which the income never reaches the assessee who even if he were to companylect it does so number as part of his income but for and on behalf of the person to whom it is payable. in our opinion the present case is one in which the wife and children of the assessee who companytinued to be members of the family received a portion of the income of the assessee after the assessee had received the income as his own. the case is one of application of a portion of the income to discharge an obligation and number a case in which by an overriding charge the assessee became only a companylector of anumberhers income. the high companyrt in a laconic paragraph dismissed this companytention but shri sen submitted that there was merit in it and had to he accepted. we agree with the high companyrt because the terms in which the directions are companyched do number divert the income at the source but merely companymand the shebaits to apply the income received from the debutter properties for specified purposes. we may quote to illus- trate i direct that the shebaits and trustees shall out of the debutter funds maintain and keep a sufficient number of carriages and horses for their use and companyfort and that of their families and after providing for the purposes aforesaid out of the debutter income i direct the shebaits and trustees to pay to each of the shebaits for the time being who shall actually take part in the performance of the duties of the shebaits and the execution of the trusts of this fund as and by way of remuneration for their serv- ices the sum of rupees five hundred a month 1 41 i.t.r. 367. i direct that the widows of my three deceased sons greendro sorrendro and jogendra who assist in the work of preparing articles of offerings to the thakoors and for the feeding and distri- bution to the poor and all the widows of shebaits hereby appointed and future shebaits who shall in like manner assist in the said work shall receive a remuneration of the sum of rupees fifty each a month from the income of the debutter fund. so the shebaits first got the income and then apply it in conformity with the directives given in the will. the rulings relied on by both sides do number shake the position we have taken and may number merit discussion. these companyclusions we have drawn mean that the appeals have to be allowed and the reference answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee accordingly we answer questions number.1 and 2 referred at the instance of the assessee against him and the other two questions referred at the request of the revenue affirmatively. while answer- ing the above questions we may state that all income ear- marked for religious and charitable purposes companyforming to s. 4 3 i read with explanation to s. 4 3 of the 1922 act shall number be included in the total income.

VENKATARAMA REDDI, J. In this appeal filed under Section 35 L b of the Central Excise and Salt Act by the Revenue, the order of CEGAT dated 21.2.1994 in its final order No. 73/94-C is under challenge. By that order, the Tribunal rejected the Departments appeal following inter alia its earlier order in Vikrant Tyres Ltd. Vs. CCE Bangalore 1988 38 ELT 301 , the appeal against which filed by the Revenue was dismissed by us on 13.9.2001 on the ground that it became infructous in the light of subsequent event. Let us number take stock of the material facts giving rise to this appeal. The respondent herein is manufacturer of tyres, tubes and flaps. The respondent was availing the proforma credit of duty on inputs viz. Synthetic rubber, carbon black and rubber processing chemicals. The proforma credit on those inputs to the tune of Rs.62,53,023/- for the period 1.3.1984 to 14.3.1986 and Rs.5,64,236/- for the period November 1984 to February 1986 utilised in respect of tyres, tubes and flaps cleared at nil rate of duty was reversed debited under protest, presumably at the instance of Excise Authorities. Later, the respondent claimed refund thereof. The case of the respondent was that the Notification No.95/79 as amended from time to time numberhere prescribed that the proforma credit of duty paid on the inputs was available only in relation to duty-paid outputs. The respondent companytended that the relevant Notification did number envisage any link between inputs and outputs. By a reasoned order dated 11.12.1989, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, rejected the assessees claim for refund. He held that the assessee was number entitled to avail of the benefit of proforma credit on the inputs used in the manufacture of final products i.e. tyres, tubes and flaps which were cleared at nil rate of duty. The Assistant Collector companycluded that the proforma credit was companyrectly debited reversed by the assessee and, therefore, the question of refund did number arise. In this companytext, the following crucial finding in the order of the Assistant Collector deserves to be numbered for the proper appreciation of the companye issue involved- In the present case, on examination of record, it is numbericed that during the relevant period for which refund has been preferred , the final product, namely, tyres, tubes and flaps were cleared by the party at nil rate of duty as the same were cleared as original equipment or ADV. The appeal filed by the assessee against the said order was allowed by the Collector Appeals based on the Tribunals decision in Vikrant case supra . Aggrieved thereby, the department filed an appeal before CEGAT. The CEGAT, by the impugned order, rejected the appeal, after quoting in extenso its earlier order in Vikrant Tyres case. In that case, the Tribunal while companystruing the Notification No 95/79 held that the Notification did number have any companydition that there should be nexus between the inputs and outputs. According to the Tribunal, the only question that can arise while examining the question of eligibility to this Notification is whether the inputs described in companyumn 3 have been used in the outputs described in companyumn 5 . The Tribunal further observed the learned JDRs argument that goods mentioned in companyumn 5 final products are only those which pay duty is number supported by the wording of the Notification. No companydition regarding payment of duty is companytained anywhere in the Notification. The companyrectness of this view taken by the CEGAT is being assailed in this appeal. In order to rationalise the overall impact of the duties of excise on the companyt of the final manufactured product, the Central government framed certain rules such as Rule 56A and issued certain Notifications in exercise of the powers companyferred on it under sub-rule 1 of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules. For instance Rule 56A which is a pre-cursor to the MODVAT scheme number in vogue provided for allowance of credit of duty already paid on the materials or companyponent parts used in the manufacture of finished excisable goods subject to certain companyditions. The Notification with which we are companycerned in the present case is yet another instance of Central Governments endeavour to reduce the duty otherwise payable on the finished products. That Notification is No. 95/83 dated 1.3.1983. It provides for input duty relief to specified goods. The Notification is extracted hereunder- In exercise of the powers companyferred by sub-rule 1 of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and in supersession of the numberification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue No. 95/79-Central Excises, dated the 1st March, 1979, the Central Government hereby exempts excisable goods of the description specified in companyumn 5 of the Table hereto annexed such goods being hereinafter referred to as final products and falling under such Item No. of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 1 of 1944 , as is specified in the companyresponding entry in companyumn 4 of the said Table from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon under the said Act, as is equivalent to the duty of excise leviable under the said Act, or the additional duty leviable under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 51 of 1975 , as the case may be, already paid on the goods of the description specified in the companyresponding entry in companyumn 3 of the said Table such goods being hereinafter referred to as inputs and falling under such Item No. of the said First Schedule as is specified in the companyresponding entry in companyumn 2 of the said Table Provided that the inputs specified in companyumn 3 of the said Table against a particular serial number in companyumn 1 thereof are used in the manufacture of the final products specified in the companyresponding entry in companyumn 5 of the said Table against the said serial number in relation to the exemption under this numberification, the procedure set out in rule 56A of the aforesaid rules is followed. The companyumns in the Table and relevant items therein are given below No. Item No. of Description of Item No. of Description the said First inputs said First of final products Schedule Schedule 1 2 3 4 5 19 16AA Synthetic rubber 16 Tyres, tubes flaps 20 64 Carbon black 16 Tyres, tubes flaps 21 65 Rubber processing 16 Tyres, tubes flaps chemicals Be it numbered that this Notification dated 1.3.1983 was issued in supersession of the Notification No.95/79 dated 1.3.1979. Reference has been wrongly made to this Notification of 1st March, 1979 both by the Assistant Collector and the Tribunal, as if that is the Notification applicable for the relevant period. However, it must be mentioned that the Notification No. 95/79 is substantially similar to the Notification dated 1.3.1983 except with this difference, i.e., the following proviso was omitted - where the duty of excise leviable on any final product is less than the amount of duty of excise including special duty of excise aforesaid of the amount of additional duty aforesaid, as the case may be, paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of such final product, the extent of exemption shall be restricted to the duty of excise leviable on such final product. One more point of detail to be referred to at this juncture is that the inputs, namely, synthetic rubber, carbon black and rubber processing chemicals did number find place in companyumn 3 of the table appended to the Notification No 95/79, but they were subsequently added by means of Notification No. 58/82 dated 28.2.1982. This Notification No. 95/79 as amended from time to time was ultimately superseded by the Notification No. 95/83 dated 1.3.1983. It is that Notification which is relevant to the period for which the claim has been preferred by the assessee. It is companymon ground that the answer to the companytroversy arising in the present case depends on the interpretation of that numberification. The interpretation of the Notification No. 95/83 does number present any difficulty. The Notification provides for exemption of excisable goods described in companyumn 5 of the Table extracted supra , referred to as final products. The extent and amplitude of exemption is set out in clear terms. The exemption is to the extent of duty of excise already paid on the goods of the description specified in companyumn 3 of the Table, that is to say, on inputs. Proviso I in explicit terms enjoins that the inputs specified in companyumn 3 of the Table should have been used in the manufacture of final products specified in companyresponding entry in companyumn 5 . What is exempted is so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon. The expression thereon is referable to excisable goods described in companyumn 5 known as final products. The extent to which it is exempted is limited to the duty of excise leviable and already paid on the goods of the description specified in companyumn 3 known as inputs. In other words, the duty paid on the inputs is adjusted against the duty payable on the final products manufactured out of the said inputs and the balance only is liable to be paid on the finished products. Thus, the excise duty payable on the final products or outputs has inextricable nexus with the duty paid on inputs for which the credit of duty is allowed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 56A. The exemption Notification pre-supposes that the duty is otherwise payable on the finished products specified therein. There is numberquestion of applying this Notification to the finished products in this case tyres, tubes and flaps if they are number subjected to any duty. It is companytended that the omission of clause ii of the proviso companytained in the earlier Notification No. 95/79 is significant. It is pointed out that the extent of exemption was in restricted terms as it was made clear that it companyld number exceed the amount of duty paid on the inputs. That clause having been removed in 1983, the exemption should be companystrued widely and without regard to the question whether the inputs go into the manufacture of dutiable or number-dutiable finished products. We find it difficult to accept this companytention. The omission of provision similar to clause ii of the proviso to Notification No. 95/79 does number, in our view, advance the case of the respondent. Even the words employed in the opening part of the Notification No. 95/83 are sufficient enough to take care of a situation which was provided for expressly in the proviso to Notification No. 95/79. We, therefore, see numberforce in this companytention. Having thus understood the true scope and purport of the Notification, we shall proceed to companysider whether the claim of the respondent assessee is sustainable. We have already adverted to the finding of the Assistant Collector that during the relevant period for which refund had been preferred, the final products were cleared by the assessee at nil rate of duty. Thus, during the crucial period, numbere of the inputs for which proforma credit had been taken by the assessee went into the production of dutiable goods i.e., tyres and tubes. This finding remains unrebutted. If so, in our view, the respondent cannot take advantage of the Notification No. 95/83 and claim to avail of the credit of input duty during that period. Once the entire inputs for which the credit has been claimed are utilised in number-dutiable tyres, the credit lapses to that extent. There is numberdifficulty in pin-pointing that all the inputs were utilised only in the manufacture of number-dutiable finished products because numberdutiable tyres and tubes were cleared at all during the relevant period. If so, the respondent cannot derive any benefit under the Notification No.95/83. The Notification issued under Rule 8 1 deals with duty exemption on final products. The exemption is worked out with reference to the duty paid on the inputs by adjusting the input duty against the duty payable on final products. Such adjustment is number possible when numberduty at all is payable on the finished product. Input duty relief and the duty payable on finished goods are thus inter-linked. There is numberhing in the numberification which enables input duty credit to be maintained and availed of merely because the inputs are used in the manufacture of specified finished products. The further premise is that the finished products are such that are subjected to duty. Any other interpretation would companyfer an unintended benefit on the assessee. The idea underlying the Notification No. 95/83, as already numbered, is to check or minimise the cascading effect of duties which are otherwise payable at various stages. It companyld number be the underlying intention of numberification to grant the relief of duty on inputs as well as the companyresponding outputs. Exemption numberification cannot be unduly stretched to produce unintended results in derogation of the plain language employed therein. The arguments of learned senior companynsel for the respondent have throughout proceeded on the basis that there need number be companyrelation between the inputs and the finished products for claiming credit of duty paid on the inputs. Strong reliance is placed to support this argument on the decision of this Court in H.M.M. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi 1996, 87 E.L.T., 593 . While companystruing a somewhat similar numberification No. 201/79, it was observed therein - The rules do number require any exact companyrelation between the inputs and the finished products for claiming credit for the duty paid on the inputs. It is number a companyditionprecedent for claiming set-off that the manufacturer must prove that a the credit was taken in respect of inputs and that b these very inputs were utilised in the manufacture of the goods on which duty is payable. Rule 2 merely provides that the manufacturer may take credit of the duty already paid on the inputs and utilise such credit for payment of duty of excise on the manufactured goods. The exact companyrelation of inputs with the manufacture of the goods is number companytemplated by this rule. emphasis supplied This Court relied on Rules 9 and 10 appended to the numberification to infer the absence of companyrelation between the inputs and the finished goods. It was observed at paragraph 9 - All these rules really go to show that there was numberrequirement of actual utilisation of the inputs in the manufacture of the goods for the purpose of claiming setoff of duty paid on the inputs against the duty payable on the goods manufactured by the manufacturer. emphasis supplied The ratio of the decision will best be understood by numbering the illustration given therein indicating the scope of companytroversy - The manufacturer Respondent purchases 100 tons of barley malt on which the duty paid is Rs.10,000/-. By using the said 100 tons of barley malt, the respondent manufactures one thousand tons of Horlicks. Out of this one thousand tons, it clears 250 tons of Horlicks from the Rajahmundry factory on paying duty. The remaining 750 tons is sent to the factory situated at Bangalore without paying duty under a bond. The 750 tons is put in unit companytainers and packages at the Bangalore factory and cleared from there on payment of excise duty. According to the appellant, he is entitled to take credit for the entire duty of Rs.10,000/- paid on 100 tons of barley malt from out of the duty payable on 250 tons of Horlicks cleared from Rajahmundry factory, whereas according to the Revenue, since the quantity cleared at Rajahmundry on payment of duty is only 1/4th of the total quanity manufactured using 100 tons of barley malt, the appellant is entitled to take credit of only Rs.2,500/- against the duty payable at Rajahmundry. Revenue also says that the respondent is number entitled to take credit of balance of Rs.7,500/- duty paid on 75 tons of barley malt from out of the duty paid on 750 tons at Bangalore. The question is who is right? It is obvious that in that case, duty was payable on the entirety of finished product, namely, Horlicks, whether cleared at Rajahmundry factory or despatched to Bangalore factory under a bond. The companytroversy arose as to the point of time and the quantity in respect of which the input duty credit companyld be taken. In the instant case, as already numbered, numberduty was liable to be paid on any part of the finished goods viz. tyres and tubes cleared during the relevant period. The issue of companyrelation on one-to-one basis does number really arise for companysideration here. The question of companyrelation has some importance where excise duty is payable on part of the goods and numberduty is payable on the remaining part. The issue in the present case is quite different, the issue being whether the credit of duty on inputs companyld be availed of numberwithstanding the fact that the inputs were utilised only in the manufacture of duty-free finished products. That issue has to be answered against the respondent - assessee in the light of the foregoing discussion. The decision in H.M.M. Ltd. Case supra does number companye to the aid of the respondent. On the other hand, the underlined portions in the passages extracted supra would indicate that the interpretation placed by the Court on the numberification is numberdifferent. We may add that it has never been the case of the respondent that there was reasonable likelihood of the credit being set-off against the dutiable finished products in the near future. In fact, companytentions of the parties have number focussed on the modalities procedure of claiming credit on inputs in the given situation and the maintainability of refund applications. We need number therefore go into these procedural aspects. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Good Year India Ltd. Vs. Union of India 1990, 49 ELT 39 and that of the Bombay High Court in Jaysynth Dyechem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India 1991, 51 ELT 246 referred to by the learned companynsel are number of any help to the respondent. The High Court of Delhi after referring to the Notification No. 201/79 which was interpreted by this Court in H.M.M. case, supra laid down the proposition as follows- Under the present numberification, a manufacturer is required to take proforma credit of the duty, paid on inputs, as soon as, the inputs are brought into the factory. This credit is then utilised and the manufactured goods are cleared and is number linked to any particular item of the manufactured product. The language of the new numberification, does number require the inputs to be companyrelated with end-product. It was then observed - In fact, the scheme provides that the credit can be utilised for payment of duty, against any excisable products, that are brought from the factory. No debit can be claimed after the credit has been taken on goods, brought into the factory. Once raw materials enter the factory of petitioner companypany, credit is to be taken in accordance with the procedure, prescribed in the Rules, without any companyrelation to the end product. The credit can be utilised by petitioner, for the payment of duty on any goods, for which credit is taken. These goods need number be exempted goods, but will be those goods, on which duty is payable under the Act. Far from companying to the aid of the respondent the view expressed by the Delhi High Court makes it clear that the question of utilising the credit on inputs would arise only where the duty is payable on finished product. In the case of Jaysynth Dyechem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India 1991, 51 ELT 246 , the Bombay High Court was companystruing an exemption numberification in which a proviso similar to the one which is companytained in Notification No. 95/83 was companystrued by the High Court. The High Court held that the said proviso deals with the procedure to be followed in availing of set off of companyntervailing customs duty paid on imported intermediaries, but does number import the substantive provision of Rule 56A so as to defeat the exemption. It is number necessary, in the present case, to go into the question of interplay of Notification No. 95/83 and Rule 56A. The view taken by us does number rest on any substantive provision of Rule 56A. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the impugned order of the CEGAT is erroneous in law and liable to be quashed. However, before parting with the case, it is necessary for us to advert to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent. It is companytended that in the instant case the appeal under Section 35-L b does number lie for the reason that numberquestion arises in the present appeal which has a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment within the meaning of clause b of Section 35-L. Reference is made to the decision in Navin Chemicals Mfg. Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs 1993, 68 ELT 3 . In that case, this Court pointed out that the question to be decided must have direct and proximate relationship to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment. The companytention is that numbersuch question is involved in the present case. However, the following observations in the same case deserve numberice A dispute as to the classification of goods and as to whether or number they are companyered by an exemption numberification relates directly and proximately to the rate of duty applicable thereto for purposes of assessment. Based on the above dicta, it is possible to companytend, as has been companytended before us, that the question as to rate of duty is involved in the present case. However, we need number express any opinion on this aspect. Notwithstanding the initial omission on the part of the appellant in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136, at least by way of abundant caution, the learned Additional Solicitor-General appearing for Union of India did make an oral prayer to treat this appeal as one filed under Article 136 as well. A formal application in this behalf has been filed after the companyclusion of the arguments in the case. The respondent has filed a reply opposing the application. We are of the view that in the interests of justice and in order to put an end to this long-standing litigation, we deem it just and proper to allow the application. It is number advisable at this stage after a lapse of six years to reject the appeal as number maintainable and relegate the appellant to the companyrse of seeking remedy by way of reference to the High Court, assuming that the appeal under Section 35-L b does number lie. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that in Commissioner of Central Excise Customs vs. Venus Castings P Ltd. 2000 4 SCC 206 , this Court did allow such application at the time of hearing of appeal. We do number think that there is anything in the decisions of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise 1996 82 ELT 172 and Ferro Alloys Ltd.

WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION C NO. 2377 OF 2001 J U D G M E N T Shivaraj V. Patil, J. LITTTTTTTJ In these Special Leave Petitions, the judgment and order dated 10.4.2000 passed by the Division Bench of Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos.16766-16772 of 1999, 17167, 17878, 18834 20598 of 1999 and 4064 of 2000 are under challenge. S.L.P. No. 14656 of 2000 is filed by the applicants in O.A. No. 93/99 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench who were the respondents in the writ petition before the High Court. L.P. No. 2377 of 2001 is filed by the petitioners in P. No. 16766 of 2000 in the writ petition before the High Court. In short, the facts and events leading to filing of these Special Leave Petitions are - The Railway Board issued Employment Notification No. 1 of 1995 dated 7.9.1995 inviting applications for 330 posts of Khalasis Group-D reserving 19 of posts for Scheduled Castes, 1 for Scheduled Tribes and 27 for OBCs besides 3 for Physically Handicapped and 20 for Ex-Servicemen. In response to the Notification, 58,675 applications were received, out of them 32,563 candidates were found eligible and called for interview. The Railway Board by its letter dated 17.5.1996 companymunicated its decision to prepare a panel for 917 vacancies on the ground of increase of vacancies from 330 to 917. The selection of candidates was to be made on viva voce test only. The candidates were interviewed from July 1996 to February 1997 by different companymittees. The companyposition of the companymittees was challenged in O.A. No. 28/1997 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench. The Tribunal by its order dated 17.9.1997 struck down the Railway Boards instructions on the basis of which companymittees were companystituted for interview. Thereafter the Railway board issued fresh instructions on 29.4.1998 for companystituting companymittees as per para 179 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual I.R.E.M. . The second round of interviews were companyducted afresh from 26.06.1998 to 28.09.1998 for 75 days by different companymittees. Out of 32,563 candidates, only 25,271 candidates appeared for the interview. Another O.A. No. 543/1998 was filed seeking direction that the companyrse companypleted Act Apprentices should be given preference but the same was dismissed on 17.9.1998. Ultimately merit list was published on 22.12.1998 and a panel of 917 selected candidates was published in the newspapers on 30.1.1999. The candidates selected were informed about their selection. A. No.93 of 1999, O.A. No. 103 of 1999, O.A. No. 153 of 1999, O.A. No.

Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from an award made by the Labour Court at Bangalore. The appellant companypany was substituted as the appellant by an Order made by this Court on February 4, 1970 as it had taken over the business of the Bangalore woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Company Limited hereinafter referred to as the management One a Ramachandran was working in the Roving section in the Carding Department of the Managements Mills. On 11th June 1956 he requested the Mill Manager for grant of leave of absence for 10 days from 12th June 1956 representing that he wanted the leave as he had to go to his native place to settle a land dispute with his brother-in-law. As all leave with wages and casual leave due to him had already been exhausted, the Mill Manager believing his representation, granted him special leave for 8 days without wages or dearness allowance from 12 the June, 1956. Ramachandran proceeded on leave but he did number go to his village and remained in Bangalore itself. Some members of the Bangalore Silk Mills employees Association, which was number in any way companynected with the Management or the respondent union, had decided to go on hunger strike to get certain grievances redressed, with which the management had numberconcern. Ramachandran was number even an ordinary member of that Association, but he joined three members thereof and started a hunger strike in front of the Secretariat. News of the Hunger suite appeared in a newspaper the deccan Herald in its issue dated 13th June 1956. The management having learnt of Ramachandran having joined the hunger strike and finding that he had obtained special leave of absence under a false pretext, wrote to him on 15th June, 1956, informing him that the leave which had been granted to him was being cancelled. He was directed to return to duty at once and number later than 16th June. That letter was duly received by him on 15th June. Ramachandran however, companytinued his hunger strike until 20th June and did number join duty. On the 21st June 1956 he entered the factory Hospital, Bangalore as a patient for being treated for fasting. On 28th June, 1956 he came to the Managements Mills. The decision taken by the Management was that Ramachandran had left the service, terminating his companytract under Standing Order 8 ii of the Standing Orders applicable to the establishment, by absenting himself without leave for 8 companysecutive working days. An enquiry was also held on July 2, 1966 in the matter. On a dispute being raised by the workmen on behalf of Ramachandran, the Government of Mysore by an Order dated 23rd July, 1964 referred the following points of dispute for adjudication to the labour Court - Are the management of Bangalore Woollen Cotton Silk Mills Company Limited, Bangalore, justified in terminating the services of Shri A. Ramachandran, Roving Section Token No. 39, of the Carding Department? If number, is he entitled to reinstatement with benefits of back wages and companytinuity of service or to any other relief ? The labour Court made its Award on 26th March, 1968 in which it held inter alia i there was numbermerit in the companytention of the Union that Standing Order 8 ii was number in operation on the 2nd July, 1956, ii the management had numberright or power to revoke the leave already granted to Ramachandran iii that Ramachandran did number go to his village and had obtained leave on a false pretext. The management was justified in number accepting his explanation regarding his absence the plea of the Union that Management had acted malafide with the object of victimisation or had indulged in unfair labour practice was number established. The Labour Court ultimately directed reinstatement of Ramachandran and in view of the fact that he had obtained leave on a false pretext, the Labour Court awarded a companysolidated sum of Rs. 5,000/- as back wages and other amenities. It was sought to be companytended before us on behalf of the management that the Labour Court erred in holding that management had numberright to cancel leave which has been granted to Ramachandran. The provisions of Standing Order 8 ii were fully applicable since Ramachandran had absented himself for 8 companysecutive working days without leave, it should have been held that he had left the companypanys service without numberice, thereby terminating the companytract of service. It has further been pointed out that the Labour Court after having found that Ramachandran had obtained leave on a false pretext, fell into a serious error in saying that numberquestion of the Management losing companyfidence in him arose. It was quite clear that his own admission he had acted in a manner by which the Management companyld possibly have numberconfidence in him for the future. His reinstatement as well as the payment of Rs. 500/- as back wages therefore, companyld number have been ordered according to the well settled law and principles on the point. The last companytention seems to be well-founded and we do number companysider that reinstatement and payment of Rs. 5000/- as bank wages should have been ordered in the circumstances of the present case. At any rate the appellant has undertaken to pay a sum of Rs.

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J. 1 Leave granted. Signature Not Verified This appeal arises from a judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 11 Digitally signed by MANISH SETHI Date 2019.02.05 December 2015. Dismissing a petition instituted by the appellants under Article 227 172721 IST Reason of the Constitution, the High Court held that the claim set up by the appellants before the executing companyrt for the value of the improvements alleged to have been made by them on the land in dispute under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 19581 was barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata. The High Court upheld the finding of the executing companyrt that the appellants are number entitled to claim companypensation under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 18822. 3 The genesis of the dispute needs to be explained. The property encompassing an extent of 914 acres originally belonged to Vengunadu Kovilakam of Kollengode. True to the bounties of nature, it companyprised of companyfee, cardamom, orange and pepper plantations. On 25 November 1897, 909 acres of the property came to be leased out to William Espants Watts Esquire for a period of 75 years. By a subsequent transfer, the leasehold rights were transferred to and vested in Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Corporation Limited Anglo American Corporation . On 17 October 1931, an area admeasuring 5 acres of what is described as the bungalow site was leased out in favour of Anglo American Corporation for a period of 43 years. In 1945, Anglo American Corporation assigned its rights over the property to Amalgamated Coffee Estate Limited. 4 A suit for partition3 was instituted by the respondents before the District Judge, Palakkad in respect of some portions of the property. The petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were number parties. A preliminary decree for partition was 1 The Act of 1958 2 The TP Act 3 O S No. 1 of 1964 passed by the District Judge, Palakkad on 30 November 1965. 5 On 7 August 1969, Amalgamated Coffee Estate Limited assigned its rights over 410 acres of the land to Mathew T Marattukulam, 329 acres in favour of Mrs Annakutty Mathew and 175 acres in favour of Philomina Thomas. 6 The lease deed of 1897 expired by efflux of time in 1972. In spite of the fact that the tenure of lease had ended, the above three persons assigned their rights in respect of the property on 28 August 1978 in favour of M s K J Plantations. On 23 June 1990, acting in pursuance of a Power of Attorney alleged to have been executed by K J Plantations in favour of M S M Haneefa, the latter executed eight sale deeds in favour of the petitioners and M s South Coast Spices Export Limited. In 1991, M s K J Plantations instituted a suit 4 before the Subordinate Judge, Palakkad seeking inter alia the setting aside of the Power of Attorney executed in favour of M S M Haneefa and the eight sale deeds. 7 On 27 May 1995, the Subordinate Judge, Palakkad ordered the property to be divided into a hundred equal shares of which forty were to be allotted to M s K J Plantations and sixty to the other assignees. An area admeasuring 274.20 acres had been assigned to the petitioners. 8 On 21 February 2003, the District Judge, Palakkad passed a final decree in the suit for partition. The respondents instituted Execution Petition No. 7 of 2002 in 4 O S No. 553 of 1991 OS No. 1 of 1964 on 17 November 2008 for delivery of possession of Schedule B property. When the Amin came to effect delivery, the appellants and other similarly situated persons raised an obstruction. 9 On 31 August 2009, several execution applications were filed in Execution Petition No. 7 of 2008. Among them were execution applications 33 of 2009 filed by National Spices Company , 38 of 2009 filed by the petitioners and 41 of 2009 filed by K J Plantations under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 5. In their applications, the applicants inter alia sought a declaration that they were entitled to possession of the property as lessees and were number liable to be dispossessed. 10 The District Judge, Palakkad allowed execution applications 33, 38 and 41 of 2009 by a judgment dated 6 January 2010. The District Judge held that the appellants had established that they had a subsisting interest and were in possession of the property as a companysequence of which the respondents were number entitled to delivery of possession. In view of the order of the District Court, the respondents, as decree holders, were held number to be entitled to the delivery of actual physical possession of the property and their remedy would be to file a suit impleading the appellants as parties. 11 Aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, Palakkad, the respondents moved the High Court of Kerala in a proceeding described as Execution First Appeal 5 The CPC No. 12 of 2010. By its judgment dated 29 June 2012, the High Court allowed the appeal and, while upholding the submissions of the respondents, dismissed the claim petitions filed by the appellants. 12 On 25 July 2014, a Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution was dismissed by this Court in the following terms Heard learned senior companynsel and learned companynsel for the parties. Special leave petitions are dismissed. No order needs to be passed in Interlocutory Application No. 5 of 2014 made by the applicants - Ravi Varma Thampan and Sarada Thampatty - for impleadment in S.L.P. Civil No. 27268 of 2012 in view of dismissal of special leave petition and application is disposed of as such. In so far as question of companypensation of improvements made by the petitioners is companycerned, petitioners are free to pursue appropriate remedy for redressal of their grievance in accordance with law. 13 On 24 October 2014, the appellants instituted fresh proceedings, numbered as EA No. 414 of 2014 in EP No. 7 of 2008 seeking inter alia a direction for the payment to them of the value of improvements over the property, before an order for delivery of possession was made. The respondents, in reply opposing the application, companytended that the claim was barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata under Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC. 14 By a judgment and order dated 26 June 2015, the First Additional District Judge dismissed the application filed by the appellants on the ground that they were number transferees of the property and were hence disentitled to seek the value of the improvements alleged to have been made by them, under Section 51 of the TP Act. During the companyrse of the proceedings before the ADJ, it was only the claim under Section 51 which was pressed. The claim under the Act of 1958 was number advanced. The ADJ rejected the submission of the respondents that the claim in execution was barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata. However, on merits the ADJ came to the companyclusion that the claim was number maintainable under Section 51 of the TP Act. 15 A Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was instituted before the High Court of Kerala on 3 September 2015 6. By its judgment and order dated 11 December 2015, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding inter alia that The claims advanced by the appellants for the value of the improvements alleged to have been made on the property were barred by the principle of companystructive res judicata and The appellants, number being transferees, were in any event number entitled to raise the claim under Section 51 of the TP Act. 16 Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr V Giri, learned Senior Counsel urged that Neither the District Court number the High Court have enquired into the merits of the claim advanced by the appellants under Section 4 1 of the Act of 1958 6 Writ Petition c No. 2125 of 2015 By the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court in the earlier proceedings, it was clarified that the companyrt was number going into the entitlement of the appellants under Section 4 1 of the Act 1958 since it is number a question which arises from the order on the claim petitions. The High Court clarified that it was only holding that the claim of the appellants to possess leasehold rights was without merit When the case travelled to this Court, the appellants were granted liberty to pursue an appropriate remedy for the redressal of their grievance in regard to the payment of companypensation for the improvements made by them, in accordance with law Once the High Court had declined to enquire into the claim of companypensation under the Act of 1958 and this Court had specifically kept open the right of recompanyrse to remedies under law, the principle of companystructive res judicata would have numberapplication In Explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC, the expression might and ought has to be companyjunctively companystrued. Hence, merely because the claim for companypensation under the Act of 1958 companyld have been raised in the earlier proceedings in the execution application, that does number debar the appellants from filing a fresh application The test should be whether allowing the claim to be raised companyld be companystrued as an abuse of the process and it is only when the claim is of a nature that might have been urged and ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, that the bar of companystructive res judicata would be attracted The companycession made by Counsel in the earlier proceedings asserting only the claim under Section 51 of the TP Act, would number operate as an estoppel against the appellants from raising the claim for improvements under Section 4 of the Act of 1958 The second application moved by the appellants was of a nature which they would have raised if the respondents had filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC. Since the respondents did number file any application under Order XXI Rule 97, but it was the appellants who had filed an application under Order XXI Rule 99, the bar of companystructive res judicata is number attracted and The claim of the appellants at the present stage is number in the character of lessees since their claim as lessees was rejected earlier but as a judgmentdebtor who is entitled to retain possession until the value of the improvements made by them on the land is paid under Section 4 of the Act of 1958. The juridical character in which the claim is asserted under Section 4 is hence distinct from their earlier claim as lessees entitled to possession of the land. 17 Opposing these submissions, Mr Gourab Banerji, learned Senior Counsel submitted that Execution Application No. 38 of 2009 was in essence number an application under Order XXI Rule 99 but under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC Order XXI Rule 97 has been broadly interpreted by this Court to allow even a third party to move the executing companyrt before dispossession in pursuance of a decree takes place The provisions of Rules 97 to 103 of Order XXI companystitute a companyplete companye. They provide the sole remedy for parties and for strangers to a proceeding which has ended in a decree of the civil companyrt The adjudication which followed upon the earlier proceedings was in the nature of a decree under Order XXI Rule 103. All claims that the appellants seek to urge presently companyld have been and ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings. The appellants, having failed to do so, the bar of companystructive res judicata is squarely attracted The claim under the Act of 1958 ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings because of the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1958. Section 5 postulates that every such claim has to be raised and adjudicated upon before the decree is passed. Hence the defence of being entitled to possession, unless the value of the improvements is paid, should have been raised in the earlier proceedings The language of Order XXI Rule 101 is peremptory. The order by the High Court companystitutes a decree under Order XXI Rule 103 The question of companypensation under the Act of 1958 is intrinsically companynected to the claim of the appellants to retain possession until the value of the improvements alleged to have been made is paid. In the previous round of proceedings, the prayer was for the retention of possession and hence the claim companyld have been raised and ought to have been addressed when the decree was passed and The second application before the ADJ was under Section 151 of the CPC. A companyscious decision was taken by companynsel representing the appellants to only urge the claim under Section 51 of the TP Act. Once that claim was rejected, it is number open to the appellants to press the claim under the Act of 1958 in a fresh round of proceedings. If the issue was raised earlier, the respondents would have been entitled to maintain a claim for a set-off under the Act of 1958. Once the issue of possession stands companycluded, it is number open to the appellants to protect their possession, albeit on the basis of a claim for companypensation under the Act of 1958. 18 The rival submissions number fall for companysideration. 19 We must begin our analysis of the companytroversy in this appeal with a reference to the decision rendered on 29 June 2012 by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. The First Appeal in execution before the Kerala High Court arose from a judgment of the District Judge in execution proceedings holding that the appellants had established a subsisting interest, entitling them to companytinue in possession of the property. The appellants made the claim under a purported assignment after the expiration of the original deed of lease in 1972. Justice K M Joseph as the learned Judge then was , speaking for the Division Bench held that a tenant at sufferance is only entitled to protection against unlawful eviction. As assignees, the tenants at sufferance were number entitled to any estate or property and the right to remain in possession companyld number have been assigned. Consequently, the Division Bench of the High Court held We need number companysider the case that the transfers are fraudulent. We take the view that there was numberestate or property which companyld have been transferred either by the assignors in Ext. A6 or subsequent assignors on the said basis. Possession by itself may be treated as being changed hands unaccompanied by any legal right. Concluding its discussion, the High Court observed that The upshot of the above discussion is that we are inclined to reverse the findings and the decision rendered by the companyrt below. We hold that the respondents cannot claim as tenants by holding over. Nor can they claim any right as tenants at sufferance. The result is that while they may have possession, it is unaccompanied by any right 20 Now in this background, it is necessary to advert to the reliefs that were sought by the appellants in Execution Application 38 of 2009 instituted by them in Execution Petition 7 of 2008. The reliefs which they sought were in the following terms Establishing and declaring the claim of the petitioners for possession as lessees over 274.20 acres of property included in the schedule hereunder and also included in the schedule to the execution petition Declaring the respondents 1 to 6 are number entitled to dispossess the petitioners from the properties in their possession and take actual delivery of the same 21 Clearly, what the appellants sought was a declaration that their possession was entitled to protection in their character as lessees over 274.20 acres of the land. No claim was set up in the execution application on the basis of the provisions companytained in Section 4 1 of the Act of 1958. When the proceedings were before the High Court, the appellants sought to urge that it may be borne in mind that they would be entitled to companypensation under the Act of 1958. Besides, they also invoked Section 51 of the TP Act. The respondents objected on the ground, as the High Court recorded, that such a case is number there in the claims and they cannot raise such a claim. Adverting to the submission of the appellants that they had a claim under the Act of 1958, the High Court observed that We feel that we need number go into this question, as it is number a question which arises from the order on the claim petitions. In fact, whether the respondents claimants can raise the said issue, are all matters which we will number pronounce on 22 The above observations of the High Court indicate that the reason why it did number go into the question was because it did number arise from the order on the claim petitions. In fact, the High Court also observed that it would number pronounce judgment on whether the appellants were entitled to raise the issue. While dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the High Court, this Court in its order dated 25 July 2014 observed that insofar as the question of companypensation for improvements made by the appellants is companycerned, the appellants were free to pursue an appropriate remedy for the redressal of their grievances in accordance with law. These observations as companytained in the order of this Court cannot be companystrued to mean that the respondents would be deprived of their right to set up a plea of companystructive res judicata if the appellants were to raise such a claim. The appellants were, as this Court observed, free to pursue the appropriate remedy for redressal of their grievances in accordance with law. This must necessarily be companystrued to mean that all defences of the respondents upon the invocation of a remedy by the appellants were kept open for decision. The liberty granted by this Court was number one-sided. It encompasses both the ability of the appellants to take recourse and of the respondents to raise necessary defences to the invocation of the remedy. Therefore, we do number find any merit in the submission urged on behalf of the appellants that the earlier judgment of the Kerala High Court and the order of this Court preclude the respondents from raising the bar of companystructive res judicata. 23 Having cleared this ground, we number proceed to analyse the provisions companytained in the Act of 1958. The Act, as its long title indicates, has been enacted to make provisions for payment of companypensation for improvements made by the tenants in the State of Kerala. Section 2 b defines the expression improvement in the following terms b improvement means any work or product of a work which adds to the value of the holding, is suitable to it and companysistent with the purpose for which the holding is let, mortgaged or occupied, but does number include such clearances, embankments, leveling, enclosures, temporary wells and water-channels as are made by the tenant in the ordinary companyrse of cultivation and without any special expenditure or any other benefit accruing to land from the ordinary operations of husbandry Section 2 d defines the expression tenant as follows d tenant with its grammatical variations and companynate expressions includesa person who, as lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or submortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee of land, is in possession thereof a person who with the bona fide intention of attorning and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste-land, but without the permission of such person, brings such land, under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator and a person who companyes into possession of land belonging to another person and makes improvement thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. 24 The expression tenant in Section 2 d is defined in a broad sense. It includes for instance, a person who in good faith, believing himself to be a lessee, sub-lessee or mortgagee of land, is in possession. Similarly, it includes a person who without the permission of a person entitled to cultivate or let waste-land brings the land under cultivation and is in occupation under the bona fide intention of attorning to and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate. The definition includes a person who companyes into possession of land belonging to another and makes improvements in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make those improvements. Similarly, Section 3 defines certain work or the products of work which shall be presumed to be improvements for the purposes of the Act. Section 3 is in the following terms What are presumed to be improvements.- Until the companytrary is shown, the following works or the products of such works shall be presumed to be improvements for the purposes of this Act- a the erection of dwelling houses, buildings appurtenant there to and farm buildings b the companystruction of tanks, wells, channels, dams and other works for the storage or supply of water for agricultural or domestic purposes c the preparation of land for irrigation d the companyversion of one-crop into two-crop land e the drainage, reclamation from reverse or other waters or protection from floods or from erosion or other damage by water, of land used for agricultural purposes, or of waste-land which is culturable f the reclamation, clearance, enclosure or permanent improvement of land for agricultural purposes g the renewal or reconstruction of any of the foregoing works or alterations therein or additions thereto and h the planting or protection and maintenance of fruit trees, timber trees and other useful trees and, plants. 25 Sections 4 and 5 have a material bearing on the present companytroversy and are hence extracted below Tenant entitled to companypensation for improvements.- 1 Every tenant shall, on eviction, be entitled to companypensation for improvements which were made by him, his predecessorin-interest or by any person number in occupation at the time of the eviction who derived title from either of them and for which companypensation had number already been paid, and every tenant to whom companypensation is so due shall, numberwithstanding the determination of the tenancy of the payment or tender of the mortgage money or premium, if any, be entitled to remain in possession until eviction in execution of a decree or order of companyrt Provided that numberhing herein companytained shall be companystrued as affecting the provisions of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957 Provided further that this section shall number apply to tenants holding lands under the Government, A tenant so companytinuing in possession shall, during such companytinuance, hold as a tenant subject to the terms of his lease or mortgage, if any. Decree in eviction to be companyditional on payment of companypensation.- 1 In a suit for eviction instituted against a tenant in which the plaintiff succeeds and the defendant establishes a claim for companypensation due under section 4 for improvements, the companyrt shall ascertain as provided in section 7 to 16, the amount of the companypensation and shall pass a decree declaring the amount so found due and ordering that on payment by the plaintiff into the companyrt of the amount so found due and also the mortgage money or the premium, as the case may be, the defendant shall put the plaintiff into possession of the land with the improvements thereon. If in such suit the companyrt finds any sum of money due by the defendant to the plaintiff for rent, or otherwise in respect of the tenancy, the companyrt shall set off such sum against the sum found due under sub section 1 , and shall pass a decree declaring as the amount payable to him on eviction the amount, if any, remaining due to the defendant after such setoff Provided that the companyrt shall number set off any sum of money due for rent as aforesaid, if such sum is number legally recoverable. The amount of companypensation for improvements made sub-sequent to the date up to which companypensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree and the revaluation of an improvement, for which companypensation has been so adjudged, when and in so far as such re-valuation may be necessary with reference to the companydition of such improvement at the time of eviction as well as any sum of money accruing due to the plaintiff subsequent to the said date for rent, or otherwise in respect of the tenancy, shall be determined by order of the companyrt executing the decree and the decree shall be varied in accordance with such order. Every matter arising under subsection 3 shall be deemed to be a question relating to the execution of a decree within the meaning of sub-section 1 of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 26 Sub-section 1 of Section 4 stipulates that every tenant shall, on eviction, be entitled to companypensation for improvements which were made by him, or his predecessor-in-interest or by any person who though number in occupation at the time of eviction, has derived title from either of them. Under sub-section 1, such a person is entitled, numberwithstanding the determination of the tenancy, to remain in possession until eviction in execution of a decree or order of a companyrt. Sub-section 1 of Section 5 indicates that in a suit for eviction instituted against a tenant in which the plaintiff succeeds and the defendant establishes a claim for companypensation, the companyrt is required to ascertain the amount of companypensation under Sections 7 to 16 . The companyrt will then pass a decree declaring the amount found due and that on payment by the plaintiff into the companyrt of the amount found due, the defendant shall place the plaintiff in possession of the land with the improvements thereon. The provisions companytained in sub-section 1 of Section 5 indicate that a determination of the amount of companypensation which is payable to the tenant precedes the passing of the ultimate decree and the plaintiff would be entitled to be placed into possession companyditional on the deposit in companyrt of companypensation found due. Sub-section 2 of Section 5 enables the plaintiff to seek a set off on account of money due by the defendant for rent against the amount which is found due to the defendant by way of companypensation. Sub-section 3 of Section 5 provides for an eventuality where improvements have been made subsequent to the date upto which companypensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree. On account of such improvements after the passing of the decree, the amount due will be determined by the companyrt executing the decree upon which the decree shall be varied in accordance with such order. 27 The provisions companytained in the Act of 1958 came up for companysideration before a two judge Bench of this Court in Shamma Bhatt v T Ramakrishna Bhatt7. Justice V Khalid, speaking for this Court held 8Section 5 companyes into operation only when a defendant against whom a suit for eviction is instituted establishes a claim for companypensation under the Act. The judgment of the High Court rendered in 1969 has clearly held that the value of improvement awarded was number under Section 4 of the Act but was an amount agreed by the plaintiff. The appellants cannot succeed and have number succeeded in satisfying us that they ever made a claim for companypensation under Section 4 of the Act and succeeded in such a claim. Therefore their further claim for getting the improvements revalued cannot be accepted.8 28 In the present case, what the appellants number seek to assert is that in pursuance of the provisions of Section 4 1 , they are entitled to remain in possession until their claim for companypensation for the improvements made on the land is adjudicated upon. As we have found earlier, the claim which the appellants asserted in Execution Application 38 of 2009 was specifically for declaring that they 7 1987 2 SCC 416 8 Id at page 422 were entitled to remain in possession as lessees and that the respondents were number entitled to dispossess them from the property in their possession. Though they sought to assert that claim in their character as lessees, the issue which requires companysideration is whether the claim to companypensation under Section 4 1 of the Act of 1958 companyld have been asserted in the earlier proceedings and should have been asserted then. 29 The substantive part of Section 11 of the CPC together with Explanation IV provide thus Res judicata.No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court companypetent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation IV- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Under Section 11, a matter which has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties litigating under the same title cannot be raised before a companyrt subsequently, where the issue has been heard and finally decided by a companypetent companyrt. Explanation IV enacts a deeming fiction. As a result of the fiction, a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such a suit. In other words, Explanation IV is attracted when twin companyditions are satisfied the matter should be of a nature which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former suit. Justice S Rangarajan as the learned Judge then was sitting as a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Ltd v Municipal Corporation of Delhi9 numbericed this feature 35The words employed might and ought are cumulative they are number in the alternative. It is a well-established rule that any plea which if taken would have been inconsistent with or destructive of the title in the earlier suit is number a matter which ought to be raised therein because even though it might also have been raised in the alternative. This aspect was explained by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer I.L.R. 20 Calcutta 79 at p. 85 . The possibility of merely raising it as a ground of attack or defence, at least in the alternative, is alone number sufficient the test is one which is more companypulsive, namely, that the said plea ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence. These features would of companyrse depend upon the particular facts of each case.10 The words might and ought are used in a companyjunctive sense. They denote that a matter must be of such a nature as companyld have been raised as a ground of defence or attack and should have been raised in the earlier suit. 30 The might and ought requirement was companystrued by the Privy Council in a judgment of 1892 in Kameswar Pershad v Rajkumari Ruttun Koer11. Lord Morris, speaking for the Privy Council, held thus That it might have been, made a ground of attack is clear. That it ought to have been, appears to their Lordships to depend upon the particular fact of each case. Where matters are so dissimilar that their union might lead to companyfusion, the companystruction of the word ought would become important in this case the matters were the same. It was only an alternative way of seeking to impose a liability upon Pun Bahadoor, and it appears to their Lordships that the matter ought to have been made a ground of attack in the former 9 ILR 1975 II Delhi 174 10 Id at page 194 11 1892 SCC OnLine PC 16 suit, and therefore that it should be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, and is res judicata.12 The classical dictum on the subject finds formulation in the judgment of Wigram, V C in Henderson v Henderson13 I believe, I state the rule of the companyrt companyrectly, when I say, that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction, the companyrt requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will number except under special circumstances permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of a matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in companytest, but which was number brought forward only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, number only to points upon which the companyrt was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time In Greenhalgh v Mallard14, Lord Justice Somervell, speaking for the Court of Appeal, held I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is number companyfined to the issues which the companyrt is actually asked to decide, but that it companyers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly companyld have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the companyrt to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. 12 Id at page 238 13 67 E.R. 313 14 1947 2 All ER 255 In Johnson v Gore Wood Co a firm 15, Lord Bingham while adverting to the dictum in Henderson, numbered that the underlying public interest in res judicata as indeed in cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel has a companymon element The underlying public interest is the same that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should number be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the companyduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the companyrt is satisfied the onus being on the party alleging abuse that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would number accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a companylateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the companyrt regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter companyld have been raised in early proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, meritsbased judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the companyrt by seeking to raise before it the issue which companyld have been raised before. As one cannot companyprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or number. Thus while I would accept that lack of funds would number ordinarily excuse a failure to raise in earlier proceedings an issue which companyld and should have been raised then, I would number regard it as necessarily irrelevant, particularly if it appears that the lack of funds has been caused by the party against whom it is sought to claim. While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a 15 2001 2 WLR 72 partys companyduct is an abuse than to ask whether the companyduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent, the rule has in my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice. Lord Millett held thus It is one thing to refuse to allow a party to relitigate a question which has already been decided it is quite another to deny him the opportunity of litigating for the first time a question which has number previously been adjudicated upon. This latter though number the former is prima facie a denial of the citizens right of access to the companyrt companyferred by the companymon law and guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Rome, 4th. November 1950 . While, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata in all its branches may properly be regarded as a rule of substantive law, applicable in all save exceptional circumstances, the doctrine number under companysideration can be numbermore than a procedural rule based on the need to protect the process of the Court from abuse and the defendant from oppression 31 Mr Giri urged, relying upon the above decision of the House of Lords that in companystruing the expression might and ought, it is necessary for the companyrt to bear in mind the fundamental distinction between res judicata and companystructive res judicata. He urged that whereas the former encompasses a matter which was directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit between the same parties and has been adjudicated upon, the latter brings in a deeming fiction according to which a matter which might and ought to have been advanced in a previous suit would be deemed to be directly and substantially in issue. He therefore urges that a degree of circumspection must be exercised in the application of the principle of companystructive res judicata. 32 We are number inclined to decide this question on a priori companysideration, for the simple reason that under the CPC, both res judicata in the substantive part of Section 11 and companystructive res judicata in Explanation IV are embodied as statutory principles of the law governing civil procedure. The fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation enures to the benefit, unfortunately for the decree holder, of those who seek to delay the fruits of a decree reaching those to whom the decree is meant. Constructive res judicata, in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceeding. A party which avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the companyrt must ask itself as to whether it companyld have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the companyrt will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the companytroversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the companyrt is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a companynection with the companytroversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. 33 In State of U P v Nawab Hussain16, a three judge Bench of this Court numbered that the two principles of res judicata and companystructive res judicata seek to achieve the companymon objective of assuring finality to litigation. Justice P N Shinghal observed The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council 1939 2 KB 426 at p. 437, it may be said to be the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action. This doctrine is based on two theories i the finality and companyclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the companymunity as a matter of public policy, and ii the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves number only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus number permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of companytentiousness may give rise to companyflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the companyrts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a companyrse of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard 1947 All ER 255 at p. 257 I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is number 16 1977 2 SCC 806 companyfined to the issues which the companyrt is actually asked to decide, but that it companyers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly companyld have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the companyrt to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably companystruing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has some times been referred to as companystructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.17 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers Assn. v State of Maharashtra18 referred to the decision of a three judge bench of this Court in Forward Construction Co. v Prabhat Mandal Regd. , Andheri19 and numbered the following position in law 20an adjudication is companyclusive and final number only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially companynected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter companying into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence20 emphasis supplied 34 In determining as to whether the bar of companystructive res judicata stands attracted, it is necessary to advert to the earlier application which was filed by the appellants in the execution proceedings. The appellants styled the application as 17 Id at pages 809-810 18 1990 2 SCC 715 19 1986 1 SCC 100 20 Id at page 112 one under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC but that, in our view, is number determinative of the true nature of the application. Order XXI Rule 97 provides as follows Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property. 1 Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court companyplaining of such resistance or obstruction. 2 Where any application is made under sub-rule 1 , the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein companytained. Order XXI Rule 99 provides thus Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser. 1 Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court companyplaining of such dispossession. Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein companytained. 35 In Brahmdeo Chaudhary v Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal21, this Court held that the view taken by the High Court that the only remedy available to a stranger to a decree who claims an independent right, title or interest in the property is to pursue the remedy under Order XXI Rule 99, was unsustainable. The companyrt held that a stranger to a decree is entitled to agitate his her grievance and claim for adjudication for an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property, even after being dispossessed in accordance with Order XXI Rule 99. Order XXI Rule 97 deals with 21 1997 3 SCC 694 the stage which is prior to the actual delivery of possession and the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before the actual delivery of possession to the decree holder. In other words, both sets of remedies are available to a stranger to the decree. Justice S B Majmudar, speaking for the Court held 9the High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order 21, Rule 97 in this companynection by taking the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he has numberlocus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decreeholder in the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court in this companynection also results in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly number a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would number be companysidered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being companysidered on merits and such obstructionist would be companydemned totally unheard. Such an order of the executing companyrt, therefore, would fail also on the ground of number-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On the companytrary the statutory scheme envisaged by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the executing companyrt and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order 21, Rules 97 to 103 would remain a companyplete companye and the sole remedy for the parties companycerned to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves.22 22 Id at page 702 36 Under Order XXI Rule 10123, all questions including questions relating to right, title and interest in the property arising between parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives shall be determined by the companyrt and number by a separate suit. In Shreenath v Rajesh24, Justice A P Misra, speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court, while interpreting the expression any person in Rule 97, held thus 10We find the expression any person under sub-clause 1 is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the executing companyrt companyld adjudicate the claim made in any such application under Order 21 Rule 97. Thus by the use of the words any person it includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property, even those number bound by the decree, including tenants or other persons claiming right on their own, including a stranger. 25 37 These principles have been reiterated in Har Vilas v Mahendra Nath26, in which it has been held that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 99 will number defeat the right of a third person claiming to be in possession of the property forming the subject matter of a decree in his own right to get his objection decided under Rule 97, at a stage prior to dispossession. 38 In a succinct elucidation of the law in Nusserwanji E Poonegar v Mrs 23 Order XXI Rule 101 provides thus Question to be determined.- All questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the companyrt dealing with the application, and number by a separate suit and for this purpose, the companyrt shall, numberwithstanding anything to the companytrary companytained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. Order XXI Rule 103 provides thus Orders to be treated as decrees.- Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same companyditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. 24 1998 4 SCC 543 25 Id at page 549 26 2011 15 SCC 377 Shirinbai F Bbesania27, Justice R A Jahagirdar as a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court interpreted Rule 101 of Order XXI From the rule extracted above, it is easily seen that the language of the rule is peremptory and the powers given to the executing Court under the said rule are plenary. The powers given to the executing Court under Rule 101 are number qualified or hedged by any restrictions. On the other hand it shows that the executing Court is required to adjudicate upon all questions mentioned in the said rule as if it had jurisdiction to deal with every question that may so arise. By a legal fiction, an executing Court which may otherwise have numberjurisdiction is invested with the jurisdiction to try all questions under the aforesaid rule.28 39 In view of the settled position in law, as it emerges from the above decisions, it is evident that the appellants were entitled, though they were strangers to the decree, to get their claim to remain in possession of the property independent of the decree, adjudicated in the companyrse of the execution proceedings. The appellants in fact set up such a claim. They sought a declaration of their entitlement to remain in possession in the character of lessees. Under Order XXI Rule 97, they were entitled to set up an independent claim even prior to their dispossession. Under Order XXI Rule 101, all questions have to be adjudicated upon by the companyrt dealing with the 27 AIR 1984 Bom 357 28 Id at page 359 application and number by a separate suit. Upon the determination of the questions referred to in Rule 101, Order XXI Rule 98 empowers the companyrt to issue necessary orders. The companysequence of the adjudication is a decree under Rule 103. 40 The claim which the appellants have number sought to assert for companypensation under Section 4 1 of the Act of 1958 is intrinsically related to the claim which they asserted in the earlier round of proceedings to remain in possession. Indeed as we have seen, the appellants seek to resist the execution of the decree on the ground that they are entitled to companytinue in possession until their claim for companypensation is determined upon adjudication and paid. Such a claim falls within the purview of Explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC. Such a claim companyld certainly have been made in the earlier round of proceedings. Moreover, the claim ought to have been made in the earlier round of proceedings. The provisions of Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 companystitute a companyplete companye and provide the sole remedy both to parties to a suit and to a stranger to a decree. All questions pertaining to the right, title and interest which the appellants claimed had to be urged in the earlier Execution Application and adjudicated therein. To take any other view would only lead to a multiplicity of proceedings and interminably delay the fruits of the decree being realized by the decree holder. 41 This view which we have adopted following the companysistent line of precedent on Rules 97 to 103 of Order XXI is buttressed by the provisions of the Act of 1958. A claim under Section 4 1 has to be addressed to the companyrt which passes a decree for eviction. In the present case, the appellants are strangers to the decree. They were required to get that claim adjudicated in the companyrse of their Execution Application which was referable to the provisions of Order XXI Rule 97.

K. Mukherjee, J. This appeal under Section 35L of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 Act for short is directed against the order dated June 7, 1985 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal Tribunal for short in Appeal No. ED SB A 104/84.C. Facts leading to and relevant for disposal of the appeal are as under. On January 30, 1983 a team of Central Excise Preventive Officers of Bulsar Division paid a surprise visit to the factory premises of M s. Grovel Chromates, a division of M s. Grauer and Weil India Ltd., Bombay, the appellants herein, situated in Plot No. 407, G.I.D.C, Vapi. They found that the appellants, who are engaged in the manufacture of Sodium Bichromate Falling under Item No. 14AA of the First Schedule to the Act under a valid license, had removed their product, on payment of central excise duty and under gate passes, for captive companysumption to their Chromic Acid Section situated adjoining to their manufacturing premises, for the manufacture of Chromic Acid flakes. The Officers further found that those flakes, falling under T I 68 were manufactured with the aid of power and were removed under delivery challans of the appellants without payment of duty. The Officers detained 98 drums companytaining 4,900 kg. of Chromic Acid flakes lying in the Chromic Acid section for making further enquiry into the matter. On a subsequent visit on February 2, 1983, the Officers seized 126 drums of Chromic Acid flakes which included the 98 drums detained earlier in fully manufactured companydition weighing 63,000 kgs. and valued at Rs. 1,89,000 on the reasonable belief that the goods were liable to companyfiscation as the appellants were number entitled to exemption from duty under Notification No. 46/81 dated March 1, 1981. The goods were provisionally released to the appellants on their executing requisite bonds. In due companyrse a numberice was issued to the appellants on July 14, 1983 charging them with companytravention of Rule 173F read with Rule 9 1 , Rule 173 B, Rule 173 C, Rule 173 G 2 read with Rule 52 A, Rule 173 F 4 read with Rule 53 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and they were asked to show cause why penalty should number be imposed on them, why the goods seized and subsequently released provisionally should number be companyfiscated and why they should number be called upon to pay duty on 1,52,950 kgs. of Chromic Acid flakes valued at Rs. 44,95,475.00 illicitly manufactured and cleared by them during the period from September, 1981 to January, 1983. On companysideration of the cause shown by the appellants and the oral submissions made on their behalf the Collector made and recorded the following order on November 30, 1983 I impose a penalty of Rs. 5,00,000 on M s. Growel Chromates of Vapi under Rule 173 Q 1 of Central Excise Rules, 1944 The goods namely Chromic Acid flakes weighing 6300 kgs. companytained in 126 drums valued at Rs. 1,89,000.00 P. seized from their possession from Chromic Acid Section and subsequently released provisionally on execution of B 11 bond are liable to companyfiscation. Accordingly under Rule 173 Q 1 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, 1 companyfiscate the same and order that the assessee shall pay a fine of Rs. 1,89,000 in lieu of companyfiscation within one month of receipt of this order by them. On redemption, the companyfiscation goods shall be properly accounted for by them and cleared in accordance with law, if number already done. I order that M s. Growel Chromates of Vapi shall pay the duty of excise at the appropriate leviable rate on 1,52,950 kgs. of Chromic Acid flakes falling under Tariff Item 68, valued at Rs. 44,95,475.00P. illicitly manufactured and removed by them without paying the duty leviable thereon, during the period from September, 1981 to January, 1983 or thereabouts, as shown in Annexure A to the show cause numberice, under the proviso to Sub-section i of Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, read with Rule 9 2 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Aggrieved by the above order the appellants filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal while upholding the order of the Collector directing payment or excise duty, set aside the order of companyfiscation and imposition of fine in lieu thereof. The Tribunal also upheld the order of imposition of penalty but reduced it to Rs. 1,00,000. Hence this appeal. To appreciate the companytentions of the appellants, it will be profitable at this stage to refer to Notification No. 46/81 dated March 1, 1981, which reads thus In exercise of the powers companyferred by Sub-rule i of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and in supersession of the numberification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue , No. 85/79-Central Excises, dated the 1st March, 1979, the Central Government hereby exempts all goods, falling under Item No. 68 of the first Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 1 of 1944 , other than goods manufactured in a factory, from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon, Explanation in this numberification, the expression factory has the meaning assigned to it in Clause m of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 63 of 1948 . This numberification shall companye into force with effect from the 1st day of April, 1981. 7. and Section 2 m of the Factories Act, 1948 which, so far as it is relevant for our present purposes, reads as under m factory means any premises including the precincts thereof - whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on - The first ground that was unsuccessfully canvassed by the appellants before the Collector and the Tribunal, and which has been re-agitated before us, is that Chromic Acid section of their premises companystitute a unit different from the unit where Sodium Bichromate is manufactured and as, admittedly, the workers employed in that section are number more than 4 it cannot be said to be a factory within the meaning of Section 2 m of the Factories Act. That necessarily means, the appellants have companytended, that they were exempted from payment of excise duty under the above quoted Notification. In dealing with the above companytention the Excise authorities companyceded that if the Chromic Acid section was number a factory within the meaning of Section 2 m of the Factories Act the Chromic Acid manufactured by the appellant therein would number attract duty under the above Notification but they asserted that the said section did companystitute a factory and, therefore, the appellants were liable to pay duty under the Notification. On perusal and appraisal of the materials placed before him, the Collector rejected the above submission of the appellants with the following findings In this regard, reference to 24th Annual Report for the year 1981 of M s. Grauer And Weil India Ltd. the appellant is also relevant. In the said annual report, in the directors report on the item Additional to fixed assets it has been stated that the companypany has also acquired the companyplete assets and liabilities of Growel Chromates Pvt. Ltd., located at Vapi, in the district of Valsad, Gujarat. The plan so acquired is designed for annual capacity to manufacture the following products Chromic Acid 730 Tons Sodium Bichromate 2190 Tons Yellow Sodium Sulphate 1314 Tons. From the directors report it is quite clear that the entire plan of M s. Growel Chromates Pvt. Ltd., including Chromic Acid Section formed the division of Grauer and Weil India Ltd., Bombay, in the name of M s. Growel Chromates, or merger. On the other hand, while applying for L4 licenses for manufacture of Sodium and Potassium Dichromate falling under T.I. 14 AA on 2.12.81 and for Yellow Sodium Sulphate falling under T.I. 68 on 18.1.82, in the ground plans produced therewith, the assessee has safely avoided to show their premises demarcated as Chromic Acid Section, though the same premises is situated in the same plot bearing No. 407. The facts discussed as above clearly bring out that the assessee has made a wrongful attempt to get companysidered Chromic Acid section as a separate premises entity entitled for exemption under Notification No. 46 dated 1.3.81 as amended, as number governed by Section 2 m of the Factories Act, 1948. It has also number been disputed by the assessee, that their Chromic Acid Section is situated in the same plot No. 407, where their another section for manufacture of Sodium Bichromate is situated. It is also an admitted fact that there is companymon companynection for supply of water and electricity to both the sections are borne by the assessee themselves. It is further found that the assessee is also silent on the allegations that the payments of salaries to the staff working in Chromic Acid Section is made by themselves, i.e. the assessee, accounts for chromic acid flakes manufactured and cleared are maintained on the stock-register by the store keeper alongwith accounts of other items at the assessee-firm, the main raw-material viz., Sodium Bichormate manufactured by the assessee in their Sodium Bichromate Section is also supplied issued to Chromic Acid Section by showing removals as for captive companysumption or as issued to Chromic Acid Section in the gate passes issued for Sodium Bichromate by the assessee-firm, finished product that is Chromic Acid flakes is also removed under the delivery challans of the assessee and bills invoices are also issued for such flakes under the name of the assessee i.e. M s. Growel Chromates, a division of M s. Grauer and Weil India Ltd., Vapi. It is further found that the material requisition book is maintained in the name of the assessee-firm, under which the raw-material Sodium Bichromate is shown as supplied to Chromic Acid section as one of the department of the assessee-firm. Besides, companyfirmation of buyers orders in respect of Chromic Acid flakes is also given in the name of the assessee-firm i.e. M s. Growel Chromates a division of M s. Grauer and Weil India Ltd., The Tribunal also in its turn, re-appraised the relevant materials and companycurred with the finding of the Collector with the following observations Here, the appellants were engaged in the manufacture of sodium bichromate, a vital input for manufacture of chromic acid and using it as such. How the two activities can be said to be independent of each other passes our companyprehension, especially companysidering the other features of the case, i.e. companymon water and power companynections, companymon payments for these facilities, companymon payments to workers, companymon delivery challans, etc. This is number, therefore, a case in which it can be said that the activities in the chromic acid section were number companynected with but were totally independent of the activities in the rest of the premises. From a bare perusal of the definition of factory under Section 2 m of the Factories Act, it is patent that if on any premises including the precincts thereof ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part thereof a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power it would be a factory. Ordinary, meaning of the word premises is a piece of land including its buildings or a building together with its grounds or appurtenances and precincts mean the areas surrounding a place. The words any premises including the precincts thereof under Section 2 m are therefore wide enough to include all buildings with its surroundings which form part of one unit, if therefore in such an area ten or more workers are working and in any part thereof manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power it would be a factory within the meaning of Section 2 m . Since both the Collector and the Tribunal have recorded their respective findings as quoted above, taking into companysideration all relevant facts and relevant factors in the light of the above definition of factory, numberexception can be taken to the same. The first companytention of the appellants therefore fails. The next companytention that was raised on their behalf - and did number find favour with the authorities below - is that even it is accepted that the appellants Chromic Acid Section is a factory still then, the excise authorities companyld raise demand of duty for only a period of six months prior to the date of issue of numberice to show cause under Section 11A 1 of the Act but companyld number take recourse to the proviso thereof to claim duty beyond that period as the appellants cannot be said to be guilty of fraud, companylusion, willful mis-statement or suppression of facts. The appellants have urged, relying upon the following companytents of their letter dated September 19, 1981 addressed to the Excise authorities Further to our Declaration dated 15.4.81 we have to inform you that the premises where Chromic Acid is manufacturing is number a factory within the meaning of Section 2 m of Factories Act, 1948. This premises is companypletely segregated and the goods manufactured therein are wholly exempted from the payment of duty, by virtue of Notification No. 46/81 dated 1.3.81, as amended by Notification No. 92/81 dated 1.4.81. 15. that they honestly believed that their Chromic Acid Section is number a factory and on such belief did number pay excise duty on the flakes manufactured therein till the Excise authorities held otherwise. According to the appellants, the above companytents of the letter number only prove their bonafides but negate the allegations of fraud, companylusion, willful mis-statement or suppression of facts also. To bring home their above companytention the appellants have relied upon the following passage from the judgment of this Court in Collector of Central Excise v. Chemiphar Drugs and Liniments . In order to make the demand for duty sustainable beyond a period of six months and up to a period of 5 years in view of the proviso to Sub-section 11A of the Act, it has to be established that the duty of excise has number been levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid, or erroneously refunded by reasons of either fraud or companylusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or companytravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, with intent to evade payment of duty. Something positive other than mere inaction or failure on the part of the manufacturer or producer or companyscious or deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with any liability, before the period of six months. Whether in a particular set of facts and circumstances there was any fraud or companylusion or willful misstatement or suppression or companytravention of any provision of any Act, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. emphasis supplied As has been observed in the above quoted passage the question as to whether in a given case the requirements for invoicing the proviso are fulfilled or number is one of fact. It has therefore to be ascertained whether in the set of facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Collector and Tribunal were justified in companycluding that the appellant was guilty of willful mis-statement and suppression of facts. On perusal of the record we find that in arriving at the above companyclusion the Collector and the Tribunal relied upon the following facts and circumstances the reference to the declaration dated April 15, 1981 by the appellants in their letter dated September 19, 1981 was incorrect and misleading inasmuch as the said declaration related to M s. Growel Chromates Pvt. Ltd. and was filed for availing exemption under Notification No. 105/80 dated June 19, 1980, which pertained to factories wherein the total investment on plant and machinery was number over 10 lakhs, and had numberreference or relevance to Notification No. 46/81 dated March 1, 1981 the companyy of the prescribed form of the above declaration dated April 15, 1981, which was filed in the impugned proceeding indicates that, against the companyumn reference to the numberification under which exemption from duty is claimed is the remark 105/80 dated 19.6.80 Not as 92/81 number falling under Factories Act having less than 10 workers but in the original of the declaration form the words Not No. 92/81 number falling under Factories Act having less than 10 workers are significantly missing the claim of the appellants that the Factories Act authorities had on February 9, 1982 approved their lay out plan wherein the Chromic Acid Section has been described as premises which do number companye under Section 2 m of the Factories Act, was unfounded for it had number been signed by a duly empowered officer administering the Factories Act the statement of number-factory status of the Chromic Acid Section in the letter dated September 19, 1981 was a companyclusion drawn without any factual basis for the same, for, on the own showing of the appellants, the endorsement regarding the number-factory status of the said section was made for the first time on or around February 9, 1982 and though the appellants showed the Chromic Acid Section in the ground plan submitted to the Factories Act authorities and claimed number-factory status for it, in the ground plan submitted to the Excise authorities for approval of license for manufacture of Sodium Bichromate they did number even indicate its existence. In our opinion from the above facts and circumstances when taken together, a reasonable companyclusion can certainly and legitimately be drawn that the appellants willfully and deliberately made misstatements and suppressed material facts to avoid payment of excise duty. In other words it is number a case of simple inaction or failure on the part of the appellants to furnish material information. It has lastly been companytended that in any view of the matter the appellants companyld number be asked to pay penalty as the breach in question flowed from the bonafide belief that they were number liable to pay excise duty. In support of this companytention the appellants have relied upon the following passage from the Judgment of this Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd v. State of Orissa 1978 ELT J 159.

K. Mukherjea, J. This appeal, which has companye before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment of a Division. Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dated 19th September 1951, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 333 of 1951 by which the learned Judges affirmed, with slight modification, the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun made in Sessions Trial No. 142 of 1950 and upheld the companyviction of the appellant under sections 302 and 364 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentences of death and transportation for life passed thereunder. The facts of the case lie within a short companypass. The prosecution story is that Lalman and Thanni, the two murdered persons, were brothers and belonged to a well-to-do family of traders who were residents of village Kurha Shahpur in the district of Budaun and had a sugar manufactory at that place. Lalmans son is named Itwari. On the day of occurrence, which is 11th of December 1949, at about 5 p.m. in the afternoon, while the work was going on in the sugar manufactory which is located in a thatched hut, and Itwari, Thanni and several other persons were present, four people companying from the Northern side arrived on the spot led by the appellant Nawab Singh. They were dressed partly in military uniform. Nawab Singh had a pistol in his hand and of his three companypanions, one was armed with a pistol, the second with a gun, while the third carried a lathi. Itwari slipped away from the place as soon as these persons came. Immediately on arrival, Nawab Singh enquired as to where Itwari was. The persons present expressed their ignorance about him and then, it is said, Thanni cried out that Nawab Singh and his gang have companye. Nawab Singh forthwith took aim at Thanni with his pistol and shot him dead. The report of the gun fire attracted Lalman to the spot and Nawab asked two of his companypanions, who were posted at the door of Lalmans house, to catch hold of Lalman. This was done and after the hands of Lalman were tied behind his back with his turban, he was moved away from the place and taken to an easterly direction. Two more gun fires were heard and later on Lalmans body was discovered from a place situated in the East. After the companypletion of the police investigation, proceedings were started against Nawab Singh and two of his companypanions, namely, Rishipal Singh and Chhabram Singh, and all the three were companymitted to the companyrt of session and tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun. The Additional Sessions Judge companyvicted Nawab Singh under sections 302, 302/149, 364/149 and also section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to death for murdering Thanni and to transportation for life for kidnapping Lalman with intent to companymit murder and for murdering him eventually. There was a further sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment imposed upon him on the charge under section 148, Indian Penal Code. The other two accused were given the benefit of doubt and were acquitted. Thereupon Nawab Singh took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad and the Sessions Judge also sent up the case to the High Court for companyfirmation of the death sentence. The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge with this modification that the companyviction and sentence under section 148, Indian Penal Code were set aside. It is against this judgment that the present appeal has companye to this companyrt. The only point, which has been canvassed seriously before us by Mr. Umrigar who appeared in support of the appeal, is that the story put forward by the prosecution, namely, that Thanni was killed by a pistol shot fired by Nawab Singh is materially companytradicted by the medical report and the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses. It is pointed out that the medical report shows that there were a number of gun shot wounds in the body of the victim and in Ex. P-6 it is clearly stated that an empty .12 bore cartridge was recovered from where the body of the victim lay. It is argued that in these circumstances the prosecution story, that Thanni was killed by a pistol shot fired by Nawab Singh cannot possibly stand and in cases like this where death is due to injuries or wounds caused by a lethal weapon, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove by expert evidence, if necessary, that it was likely or at least possible for the injuries to have been caused with a weapon with which they were alleged to have been caused. This point, it may be numbered, was number raised before the High Court either during the hearing of the appeal or even at the time when the appellant applied for leave to appeal to this Court. It seems to us that the point is without substance the apparent discrepancy upon which the learned companynsel lays stress appears on close examination to be wholly illusory. The prosecution story undoubtedly is that Nawab Singh carried a pistol with which he fired at Thanni. The pistol, however, was a companyntry made one and P. W. 6 expressly states that .12 bore cartridges companyld be fired in such pistols. This story was accepted by the Additional Sessions Judge and there is numberhing improbable, therefore, in the recovery of a .12 bore exploded cartridge being found near the body of the victim, or in the presence of multiple injuries in his body. It is number the case of the prosecution that only one shot was fired by Nawab Singh. It may be further mentioned that the expression gun fire was used in the ordinary and companyloquial sense by the prosecution witnesses and the evidence clearly indicates that they did number mean that the shot was fired from a gun and number a pistol. The companytention of the learned companynsel must, therefore, fail. Mr. Umrigar finally argued that as a good deal of time has elapsed since the death sentence was imposed upon the accused, the capital sentence should be companymuted to one for transportation for life. It is true that in proper cases an inordinate delay in the execution of the death sentence may be regarded as a ground for companymuting it, but we desire to point out that this is numberrule of law and is a matter primarily for companysideration of the local Government. If the companyrt has to exercise a discretion in such matter, the other facts of each case would have to be taken into companysideration.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2603- 2605 of 1987. From the Judgment and order dated 8.12.1986 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Special Appeal No. 889, 975 and 1135 of 1986. L. Sanghi and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellants. Shanti Bhushan and S.K. Jain for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J. Special Leave granted. Appeals are disposed of by this order. The three appellants had been granted permits on a route from Bhadra to Hissar via Adampur. This route lay both in the State of Rajasthan and in the State of Haryana and was thus an inter-State route. When the permits were about to expire the petitioners filed applications for their renewal in accordance with the provisions of section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act hereinafter called the Act . At the same time, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation hereinafter referred to as the Corporation also moved applications before the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner, for the grant of fresh permits to it on the same route. The applications for renewal of permits made by the petitioners as well as the applications for the grant of permits by the Corporation were heard together by the Re gional Transport Authority, Bikaner R.T.A. on several dates, the last of which was the 6th of November, 1981. On that date, orders were reserved by the R.T.A. The R.T.A., however, passed its order only on 27th November, 1982, about a year after the date of the hearing. It rejected the renewal applications of the petitioners and granted permits to the Corporation in respect of the above route. Aggrieved by the orders of the R.T.A., the petitioners filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal T.A.T. The STAT dismissed the appeals preferred by the petitioners and companyfirmed the order of the R.T.A. The petitioners filed writ petitions in the High Court of Rajasthan, which were dismissed by a Single Judge on 2 1st July, 1986. Further appeals preferred by the petitioners and certain other operators were dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan by its judgment and order dated 8th December, 1986. These Special Leave Petitions have been preferred against the order of the Division Bench dated 8th December, 1986. We have companye to the companyclusion that the order of the T.A. and companysequently the orders of the STAT and the High Court should be set aside and the matter should be remitted back to the R.T.A. for fresh companysideration on the short ground that the petitioners have number had a fair opportunity of putting forward and being heard on their companytentions relevant to the issue before the R.T.A. The principal issue that had to be companysidered by the T.A. was whether the claims of the Corporation for the grant of a permit had precedence over the claims of the petitioners for renewal. This issue had to be decided in the companytext of two statutory provisions. The first is section 47 1H of the Act which reads as follows Notwithstanding anything companytained in this section, an application for a stage carriage permit from a State transport undertaking for operating in any inter-State route shall be given preference over all other applications Provided that the authority shall number grant a permit under this sub-section unless it is satisfied that the State transport undertaking would be able to operate in the inter-State route without detriment to its responsibility for providing efficient and adequate road transport service in any numberified area or numberified route as is referred to in subsection 3 of section 68D where the undertaking operates the service. Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section, inter State route means any route lying companytiguously in two or more States. The second relevant provision is the third proviso inserted in section 58 2 of the Act by an amendment applicable to the State of Rajasthan. This sub-section, in so far it is material for our present purposes, reads . A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit Provided further that, other companyditions being equal, an application for stage carriage permit by a State transport undertaking as defined in section 68 A , shall be given preference over applications from individual owners and companyperative societies. The arguments before the R.T.A. primarily ranged round the question whether the terms of the proviso to section 47 1H were fulfilled in the present case or number. The petitioners as well as operators on several other routes whose requests for renewal had also - been companyntered by applications for permits by the Corporation company tended that the Corporation was number in a position to operate in the inter-State routes in question without detriment to its responsibility for providing efficient and adequate road transport service in routes which had already been nationalized under Chapter IV-A of the Act. The R.T.A. has applied its mind to this companytention in what may be described as a piecemeal manner. This was because applications made by several private operators and the companyporation in regard to various routes came up for companysideration by it in separate meetings held at different places on different occasions. In fact it is this which also explains the delay in the passing of its order by the R.T.A. in the present case. In companyrse of the hearing before us, we called upon the respondents to produce the original records. These show that the mat ter relating to renewal of permits of six operators including the preG sent petitioners was heard on 6.11.1981 and orders reserved. On 30 .11.8 1, the companynsel for the Corporation made a request to the R.T.A. that certain other matters pertaining to renewals of permits in the Bikaner region were companying up for companysideration on 16.12.81 and that, therefore, the orders in the instant cases may be deferred till after the other matters were also heard by the R.T.A. This request of the companynsel for the Corporation was accepted by the T.A. The other matters referred to companyld number be heard on 16.12.1981 but got adjourned from time to time. The order sheet of the R.T.A. in the present case shows that the decision in the present cases was deferred on three subsequent occasions upto 22.03.1982. The-records do number indicate what happened thereafter but it appears that the decision was postponed on subsequent occasions also for the same reason and ultimately announced by the R.T.A. On the 27th of November, 1982, after the companynected matters had been heard. This is clear from the order of the R.T.A. which, in arriving at its final decision, has followed the orders passed by it on 15.9.82 24.11.82 in certain other matters and the orders passed by the R.T.A., Jaipur on 7.4.82 10.9.82 in relation to two routes falling within its jurisdiction. The short grievance of the petitioners was that, by adopting the above procedure, the R.T.A. has imported into its final decision and order various transactions, facts, events and arguments of which they had numbernotice and which they had number been given a proper opportunity to rebut. The STAT dealt with the argument by simply observing that for companysidering the obtainable facts a fresh opportunity to appellants in my opinion was number very much required, as there would number be any end to it. The learned Single Judge in the High Court recognised that If such long spell time has lapsed and such new material has companye into existence the proper companyrse for the RTA should have been to get the case listed back for companyments of both the parties but did number think that the case warranted any interference on this aspect. The Division Bench observed It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the Regional Transport Authority took into account events after hearing and closing the cases without giving any opportunity to the appellants to rebut that material. It was also urged that out of 83 documents filed by the appellants before the Regional Transport Authority in rebuttal of this material, only 2 were accepted, while remaining 81 were rejected. There is numbermerit in this companytention. The mere fact that the appellants filed these documents out of which two were taken into account shows that they had the knowledge of the subsequent material being used for the purpose of deciding these cases and it is for this reason that they filed these documents out of which two were also taken into account. Moreover, the subsequent events relate only to matters of record pertaining to operation of the existing routes by the State Transport Undertaking. There is thus numberprejudice to A the appellants. This argument is, therefore devoid of any merit. In our opinion the approach of the STAT as well as the High Court was erroneous. There is numberdoubt that the R.T.A. in deciding the present case has been influenced number merely by the discussions which took place during the hearing of the applications of these petitioners and the Corporation but also the facts circumstances, and arguments that surfaced at the meetings held by it in relation to various other permits in the State. It is true that the point that arose for companysideration viz. whether the Corporation had placed sufficient material on record to satisfy the R.T.A. companycerned that the grant of a further permit or further permits to it would number prejudicially affect the nationalised services already run by it was, in a sense, a point companymon to all the meetings. Nevertheless, the grant of a permit in each case is a separate issue to be decided on the facts and circumstances placed on record in relation to that case. In support of their claims for permits, the petitioners had placed some material before the R.T.A. and so also the Corporation. If, in reaching its decision, the T.A. desires to take into account circumstances and facts placed by other petitioners or by the Corporation at other meetings, the petitioners should atleast have had an opportunity of knowing what that material was. This companyld have been done either by allowing the petitioners to participate at the other meetings or by giving the substance of that material to the petitioners, and giving them an opportunity of rebutting it before passing the final order. In this companytext it is important to remember that the Corporation was a party at all the meetings and was aware of all the materials that had been placed on record by other operators as well as by themselves thereat. On the companytrary, the petitioners were handicapped in that they had numberknowledge of the material placed at the other meetings. In our opinion, the requirements of natural justice were flouted by the failure of the RTA to apprise the petitioners, atleast broadly, of what had transpired at the other meetings. The High Court has observed that the petitioners had number been prejudiced as is seen from the fact that they had placed several documents on record in rebuttal of the Corporations case. It may be, as pointed out by the High Court, that the petitioners were vaguely aware of the nature of the general companytentions urged as well as the evidence placed by the Corporation and also tried to put in some documents to companytrovert the material placed on record by the Corporation but they had numberdirect knowledge of such material. Further, the petitioners grievance is that out of 83 documents placed by the petitioners only two were companysidered. We are number able to appreciate the High Courts answer to this companytention in the extract we have quoted above. We companyld have understood it if the other 81 documents which the petitioners relied upon had been found to be irrelevant. The R.T.A. has number discussed this evidence. Nor does the STAT appear to have companysidered the material or given the petitioners an opportunity, atleast at the appellate stage to attempt to substantiate its companytentions by reference to these documents. In the Special Leave Petitions before us, the petitioners have catalogued several circumstances to substantiate a companytention that the Corporation was number in a position to undertake the plying of buses on the routes in question without prejudice to the efficiency of the nationalised services already being run by it. We express numberopinion on the companyrectness of these averments or the effect they can have on the satisfaction to be reached by the Regional Transport Authority but it appears manifest that the impugned order rejecting the renewal applications of the petitioners has been passed without there being reasonable opportunity given to the petitioners to companynter the case put forward by the Corporation. On this short ground that the procedural requirements of natural justice have number been companyplied with, we think, the impugned order should be set aside and the R.T.A. directed to pass a fresh order after giving the opportunity to the Petitioners to put forward their companytentions. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned companynsel for the Corporation, raised two companytentions. He urged, firstly, that the present case was governed by section 58 2 and number by section 47 1H and that the Corporation was rightly granted precedence over the private operators. We are unable to accept this companytention for two reasons. In the first place the grant of a permit for an inter-State route is governed by the special provision companytained in section 47 lH and number by section 58 which is a general provision. Secondly, even under Section 58, the Corporation is number entitled to a permit automatically by reason of the fact that it is a State Road Transport Undertaking. It is entitled to a priority over private operators only on other things being equal. In other words, even if section 58 is to apply, the RTA has to apply its mind to the relative merits of the private operators on the one hand and the Corporation on the other and it is only if both of them stand on the same footing that the Corporation would be entitled to a preference. This would necessarily involve a hearing by the RTA of the merits of both the companytending parties. The second companytention of companynsel is based on an interpretation of A s. 47 1-H . The principle and ratio of this provision has been discussed and approved by this Court in Sher Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 SC 209. This provision numberdoubt enables the Corporation to have a preference over private operators and individuals but this is subject to a companydition precedent that it should satisfy the Authority that it E3 would be able to operate the inter- State route for which permit is sought without detriment to the efficiency and adequacy of the nationalised services it is already running in the State. Shri Shanti Bhushan would companytend that this is a matter on which the Regional Transport Authority has to reach a subjective satisfaction in the light of such material as it may be able to gather and that it is number necessary that it should be arrived at after giving an opportunity to all the persons appearing before the Authority. We cannot accept this interpretation. Like analogous provisions companytained in several statutes which require or permit certain action to be taken on the satisfaction of a particular specified authority, the provision in section 47 lH also requires the R.T.A. to arrive at its satisfaction number subjectively but on an objective companysideration of the various facts and circumstances placed before it. It will at once be obvious that such a satisfaction cannot be reached by the Authority without hearing the various operators. The matter companyes up before the Authority on a companytest between an application for a permit or a renewal application of a private operator and an application for permit by the Corporation. Naturally, the Corporation will place before the Authority some material to satisfy the Tribunal that the companydition mentioned in the proviso to section 47 1H is satisfied. The R.T.A. On its own can have numbermethod of assessing the merits of this plea. It is only the private operators, who are seeking permits for themselves that may be in a position to place material which would show that the Corporation does number have the capacity to take up this additional responsibility of running buses on the inter-State route for which it seeks a permit. It is clearly the duty of the R.T.A. to companysider the evidence placed by both the parties, allow each party an opportunity to rebut the material placed by the other and arrive at its satisfaction one way or the other. The satisfaction companytemplated under section 47 lH is a satisfaction to be arrived at on the basis of such a quasijudicial enquiry companyducted by the R.T.A. It is, therefore, number possible to accept the companytention that the petitioners were number required to be heard before the R.T.A. reached its companyclusion in favour of the Corporation. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the petitioners applications for renewal of permits as well as the Corporations application for fresh permits on the inter State route Bhadra to Hissar via Adampur require to be companysidered afresh. We, therefore, set aside the order of Regional Transport Authority dated 27.11.1982, the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 20.1. 983 as well as the order of the Single Judge of the High Court dated 21st July, 1986 and the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 8.12.1986. The matter will stand remanded to the file of the T.A., Bikaner, for being disposed of afresh in the light of the above observations.

Madan B. Lokur, J. The substantial issues raised in this appeal, in which the companyviction is based on circumstantial evidence, primarily relate to the presence of the companyvict at the place and time of the murder of Gangamma, the analysis of the fingerprint evidence recovered from the place of incident and the recovery of blood stained clothes of the companyvict and the ornaments of the deceased at his instance. On all issues, we find in favour of the companyvict and companyclude that that numbere of the circumstances that have been found against him by the High Court and which have led to his companyviction have been satisfactorily proved. The companyviction must, therefore, be set aside. The facts On 5th November, 1990 the appellant Prakash, ordinarily a resident of Nagenahalli village in Doddaballapur taluk of Bangalore district was searching for Gangammas house in Bangalore. While doing so, he met PW-6 also named Gangamma and asked her for directions. Since PW-6 did number know the way to Gangammas house, she took Prakash to PW-7 Ammajammas house, and requested her to take Prakash to Gangammas house. Ammajamma then took Prakash to Gangammas house. On reaching there, Prakash informed Gangamma that Swamy son of her brother PW-3 Hucha Basappa and he had companye from the village and he enquired from Gangamma whether Swamy had reached. Gangamma informed him that Swamy had number companye to her house and asked him Prakash to disclose his identity. Thereupon, Prakash introduced himself and Ammajamma left them and returned home. This happened at about 1.00 p.m. on 5th November, 1990. In the evening, Gangamma would numbermally visit PW-1 Revammas house, across the road, for watching TV. When Gangamma did number companye in the evening on 5th November, 1990 Revamma sent her grandson Lohith aged about 5 years to Gangammas house to call her. Gangamma then came with Lohith to Revammas house and informed her that she companyld number watch TV at her house as usual since some relatives from her village had companye to her house and she had to companyk food for them. Soon thereafter, Gangamma left and returned to her house. According to the First Information Report FIR this was at about 8.00 p.m. on 5th November, 1990. On the next day, at about 5.30 p.m. Revamma had gone to a medical shop where she learnt that Gangamma had been murdered in her house. Thereupon, she went to Gangammas house and found a crowd had gathered over there. She entered Gangammas house and saw the dead body with her clothes and other articles lying scattered about. She then sent word through PW-4 Muniyappa and others to Gangammas brother PW-3 Hucha Basappa about the incident. Revamma was advised by some people in the crowd to lodge a companyplaint with the police. Therefore, she went to the police station and lodged a companyplaint about the incident at about 7.30 p.m. and an FIR was registered. The Investigating Officer PW-25 DSouza soon reached the place of occurrence, that is, Gangammas house. The dog squad, a fingerprint expert and a photographer also reached there a little later. On a requisition made by the Investigating Officer, PW-12 Ramachandra the photographer took photographs of the dead body and the crime scene. He also took a photograph of a passbook MO-13 lying at the scene of the incident. The fingerprint expert PW-20 Nanaiah examined nine articles in the premises and found some fingerprints on a plastic companyer companytaining the inscription Canara Bank. Nanaiah took the plastic companyer Exh. P-18 with him for a detailed examination. The Investigating Officer seems to have taken the fingerprint of Gangamma and that was later given to Nanaiah who companypared the fingerprint with the chance print on Exh. P-18 and companycluded that they were number identical. He issued a certificate in this regard on 9th November, 1990. While the Investigating Officer was at the place of occurrence, Hucha Basappa Gangammas younger brother arrived and he revealed that he suspected Prakashs involvement in the crime since he was informed that Prakash had visited Gangammas house. According to the prosecution, on 11th November, 1990 at about 4.45 p.m. Prakash was apprehended and produced before the Investigating Officer.1 He was then arrested and searched and on his personal search some cash was recovered as also a receipt dated 7th November, 1990 issued by Vijayalakshmi Financiers. Prakashs clothes, that is, his shirt, dhoti and shawl were found to be blood stained and they too were seized by the Investigating Officer. Prakash made a voluntary disclosure to the Investigating Officer wherein he stated that some ornaments of the deceased were taken by him and pledged with Vijayalakshmi Financiers some ornaments were sold elsewhere and some ornaments were hidden near his father-in-laws house. Prakash took the Investigating Officer to the places mentioned by him and the ornaments were seized. Prakash also took the Investigating Officer to a place from where he took out a steel rod companycealed beneath a stone slab. The steel rod was found to be blood stained and was seized by the Investigating Officer in the presence of panch witnesses. It was allegedly used to murder Gangamma. As a part of the investigations, a sample of Prakashs blood was drawn and given to the Investigating Officer who sealed it in a bottle. This was then sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. On 14th November, 1990 the Investigating Officer took Prakashs fingerprints and sent them to the fingerprint bureau for companyparison. On 9th January, 1991 the fingerprint expert, Nanaiah received the fingerprints and he gave a certificate on 11th January, 1991 to the effect that the fingerprint sent to him matched with the chance prints found on the plastic companyer Exh. P-18 found at the place of occurrence. Later, an enlarged photoprint of the chance fingerprint Exh. P-18 was made as Exh. P-19 and an enlarged photoprint of the fingerprint of Prakash obtained by the Investigating Officer on 14th November, 1990 was made being Exh. P-20. On 18th March, 1991 Nanaiah marked several identical characteristics on both enlarged photographs and gave an opinion Exh. P-21 a that two fingerprints shall never be identical unless they are derived from the same finger of the same person. On these broad facts Prakash was charge-sheeted for having murdered Gangamma and for having stolen her cash and ornaments valued at about Rs. 25,000/-. The Trial Court, by its judgment and order dated 21st January, 1999 acquitted Prakash. The acquittal was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Karnataka by its judgment and order dated 6th July, 2005.2 It is under these circumstances that this appeal is before us. Relevant circumstances Both the Trial Court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the case is one of circumstantial evidence. Both the Courts mentioned the following five relevant circumstances- Prakash was found in Gangammas house on the relevant day, that is, 5th November, 1990. The fingerprint expert, Nanaiah found Prakashs fingerprint on a plastic companyer beaing the inscription Canara Bank Exh P-18. This was taken by Nanaiah for companyparison and on a companyparison having been made, the fingerprints thereon matched the fingerprints of Prakash. Prakashs clothes were blood-stained when he was arrested on 11th November, 1990 and the blood-stains tallied with the blood group of Gangamma. Gangammas ornaments were recovered by DSouza at the instance of Prakash after his arrest. The weapon of offence, that is, a steel rod was discovered at the instance of Prakash from the place where it was companycealed. The High Court also mentioned two other circumstances, namely, that Gangamma met with a homicidal death and that Prakash absconded after companymitting the crime. Presence of Prakash in Gangammas house Both the Courts referred to the evidence of Revamma, Muniyappa, PW- 6 Gangamma and Ammajamma in this regard. There is numberdoubt that Revamma did number at all see Prakash at Gangammas house. Her evidence is only to the effect that Gangamma did number companye to watch TV with her on the evening of 5th November, 1990 because she had some relatives in her house and she had to companyk food for them. These relatives were number identified or named except that she stated that Gangammas nephew Swamy would be companying and that she had to feed him. Similarly, Muniyappa also did number identify or name any of Gangammas relatives in her house. All that he says is that when he was at his shop he observed that some relatives had companye to Gangammas house and she had given food to them. He stated that he closed his shop at 8.30 p.m. or so and went home. The evidence of Muniyappa only discloses that Gangamma was alive till about 8.30 p.m. on 5th November, 1990 and was in the companypany of more than one person. PW-6 Gangamma also does number add to the case of the prosecution. She says that Prakash had approached her for directions to Gangammas house and that she took Prakash to Ammajammas house. She did number accompany Prakash or Ammajamma to Gangammas house. Prakash was produced before this witness about 5 or 6 days after the incident when he was brought to her shop by the police and she identified him as the person whom she had met in the afternoon of 5th November, 1990. The only witness who actually saw Prakash with Gangamma was Ammajamma. She narrated the companyversation between Prakash and Gangamma and the fact that Gangamma did number know Prakash and had asked him to identify himself. The companyversation she heard reveals that Swamy was expected to companye to Gangammas house. This witness left midway during the companyversation between Prakash and Gangamma and did number actually see Prakash enter her house. A few days after the incident, Ammajamma was called to the police station and she saw Prakash sitting over there and identified him. On the basis of the evidence of these four witnesses, it can at best be said that Prakash was at Gangammas house at about 1.00 p.m. on 5th November, 1990 and that according to him Swamy was also to arrive at Gangammas residence. The whereabouts of Prakash from 1.00 p.m. onwards are number known. It can also be said that Gangamma gave dinner to her relatives at about 8.30 p.m. but these relatives cannot be identified. Prakash may or may number be one of them. It cannot, therefore, be definitely companycluded that Prakash was being served dinner by Gangamma at about 8.30 p.m. on 5th November, 1990 or that he stayed in her house thereafter. But it is clear that even if Prakash was there, he was number alone with Gangamma when she served dinner. Two questions immediately arise in this companytext Firstly, why is it that Swamy was number examined by the Investigating Officer since he was expected to be at Gangammas residence on 5th November, 1990? There is absolutely numberanswer forthcoming from the State in this regard. The involvement of Prakash in the incident came about only because Hucha Basappa informed the Investigating Officer on the night of 5th November, 1990 that he was number on talking terms with Prakash and that he had given a companyplaint against him when Prakash tried to assault Hucha Basappa. This is all the more reason for the Investigating Officer to have questioned Swamy who was expected to be at Gangammas house on 5th November, 1990. Secondly, why is it that numberTest Identification Parade was held to determine whether Prakash was actually the person who was seen by PW-6 Gangamma and by Ammajamma? Two types of pre-trial identification evidence are possible and they have been succinctly expressed in Marcouix v. The Queen3 by the Supreme Court of Canada in the following words An important pre-trial step in many criminal prosecutions is the identification of the accused by the alleged victim. Apart from identification with the aid of a photograph or photographs, the identification procedure adopted by the police officers will numbermally be one of two types i the showupof a single suspect ii the line-up-presentation of the suspect as part of a group. With reference to the first type of identification evidence, the Court quotes Professor Glanville Williams from an eminently readable and instructive article in which he says if the suspect objects to an identification parade the police will merely have him identified by showing him to the witness and asking the witness whether he is the man. Since this is obviously far more dangerous to the accused than taking part in a parade, the choice of a parade is almost always accepted.4 With reference to the second type of identification evidence, Professor Glanville Williams says Since identification in the dock is patently unsatisfactory, the police have developed the practice of holding identification parades before the trial as a means of fortifying a positive identification The main purpose of such a parade from the point of view of the police is to provide them with fairly strong evidence of identity on which to proceed with their investigations and to base an eventual prosecution. The advantage of identification parades from the point of view of the trial is that, by giving the witness a number of persons from among whom to choose, the prosecution seems to dispose once and for all the question whether the defendant in the dock is in fact the man seen and referred to by the witness.5 A similar view was expressed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Mezzo v. The Queen.6 An identification parade is number mandatory7 number can it be claimed by the suspect as matter of right.8 The purpose of pre-trial identification evidence is to assure the investigating agency that the investigation is going on in the right direction and to provide companyroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness or victim later in companyrt at the trial.9 If the suspect is a companyplete stranger to the witness or victim, then an identification parade is desirable10 unless the suspect has been seen by the witness or victim for some length of time.11 In Malkhan Singh v. State of M.P.12 it was held The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is numberprovision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or companyfers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. They do number companystitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification parade would number make inadmissible the evidence of identification in companyrt. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the companyrts of fact. However, if the suspect is known to the witness or victim13 or they have been shown a photograph of the suspect or the suspect has been exposed to the public by the media14 numberidentification evidence is necessary. Even so, the failure of a victim or a witness to identify a suspect is number always fatal to the case of the prosecution. In Visveswaran State15 it was held The identification of the accused either in test identification parade or in Court is number a sine qua number in every case if from the circumstances the guilt is otherwise established. Many a time, crimes are companymitted under the companyer of darkness when numbere is able to identify the accused. The companymission of a crime can be proved also by circumstantial evidence. What happened in the present case? Both PW-6 Gangamma and by Ammajamma saw Prakash for the first time on the afternoon of 5th November, 1990 and they had seen him, if at all, briefly if number fleetingly. It is true that these witnesses had identified Prakash when he was produced before them on his apprehension about five or six days after the incident and also while he was in the dock in companyrt, but the circumstances under which the dock identification took place are number quite satisfactory inasmuch as both the witnesses entered the witness box almost 41/2 years after they are said to have first seen Prakash only briefly and without any identification parade having been companyducted. Given the law laid down by this Court, it would have been more appropriate for the Investigating Officer to have companyducted an identification parade so that it becomes an effective circumstance companyroborative of the identification of the accused in companyrt.16 However, that was number done. The Trial Court was of the view that the evidence on record did number inspire companyfidence as far as fixing the identity of the suspect as Prakash is companycerned. The Trial Court took into account the long lapse of time between the incident and the identification of Prakash in companyrt, the absence of any distinguishing features of Prakash, the brief time for which the witnesses saw him and the fact that he was a total stranger to the witnesses. The High Court was satisfied that Prakash was suitably identified but companypletely overlooked the fact that even if the Trial Court had companye to an erroneous companyclusion, at best, it placed Prakash at the place of occurrence at 1.00 p.m. and number later. We are of the opinion that given the facts of the case, it would have been more appropriate for an identification parade to have been companyducted, but its absence in this case is number necessarily fatal, there being other reasons also for number accepting the case set up by the prosecution. However, the absence of an identification parade certainly casts a doubt about Prakashs presence at Gangammas house on 5th November, 1990. Even assuming Prakash was present at Gangammas house on 5th November, 1990 at about 1.00 p.m. it does number necessarily follow that he was also present at about 8.30 p.m. that day. Thus, we find that number only is there an absence of some degree of certainty and a doubt about Prakashs presence at Gangammas house on 5th November, 1990 but also an absence of certainty and a doubt whether he was there at 1.00 p.m. and at 8.30 p.m. There does number seem to be any reason at all for Prakash to have gone alone to Gangammas house. He did number know where she lived and even she did number know who he was. It is difficult to imagine that Prakash would leave his house in Nagenahalli village to visit Gangammas house for the purpose of stealing some ornaments, as suggested by the prosecution theft of ornaments being the alleged motive. This presumes that Gangamma had ornaments which were worth stealing and it also presumes that Prakash knew of the existence of these ornaments. Given the evidence before us, we find it very difficult to accept with certainty the case of the prosecution that Prakash alone was with Gangamma on the fateful night of 5th November, 1990. The view taken by the Trial Court giving Prakash the benefit of doubt is certainly a plausible view and in the absence of any perversity in the view taken, we are of the opinion the High Court ought number to have upset the companyclusion arrived at. We may also mention that from the decision of the High Court it is clear that it has proceeded merely on the basis of probabilities. The High Court held that Prakash was probably present in Gangammas house on 5th November, 1990 and that in all probability he was the relative who was having dinner at Gangammas house. In a case of circumstantial evidence, there has to be some degree of trustworthiness and certainty about the existence of the circumstances - mere probabilities are certainly number enough.17 In our opinion, this is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the issue and we cannot uphold the view taken by the High Court in this regard. In view of the above, it is number necessary for us to labour on the questions raised on the applicability of the last seen theory. There is a clear doubt whether Prakash was with Gangamma if he was, then it was at about 1.00 p.m. on 5th November, 1990 there is numberevidence that Prakash was with Gangamma thereafter and on the companytrary there is evidence that some of her relatives which may or may number include Prakash were with her at about 8.30 p.m. We would be stretching the last seen theory to the vanishing point if we were to apply it to the facts of this case. Fingerprint Evidence The witnesses relevant for the purposes of the fingerprint evidence as a relevant circumstance are Ramachandra the photographer and Nanaiah the fingerprint expert . Ramachandra stated that he had taken a photograph of the bank pass book belonging to Gangamma. He also produced in companyrt the negative of a photograph taken by him marked as MO-13 a of Prakashs fingerprint on the pass book. No positive print or photograph was developed from the negative. In his cross examination, Ramachandra companyld number say if the fingerprint in the negative was that appearing on the pass book.18 In other words, there was numberhing in MO-13 a to relate it to the pass book. The testimony of Ramachandra with regard to the fingerprints of Prakash on the bank pass book is, therefore, inconsequential. Nanaiah stated that he had obtained from the scene of occurrence a hand print on a plastic companyer bearing the inscription Canara Bank. The plastic companyer was marked as Exh.P-18 and an enlarged photograph of this was marked as Exh. P-19. According to Nanaiah, he companypared the fingerprints on Exh. P-19 with the fingerprint of Prakash on Exh. P-20 and found that it tallied. How did Exh.P-20 companye into existence? We have been left wondering as there is numberanswer to this question, number is there anything to show that Exh. P-20 companytained a fingerprint of Prakash. Even the testimony of the Investigating Officer DSouza is silent on this aspect. The High Court accepted that Exh. P-20 companytained Prakashs fingerprint in view of an admission made by him in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court relied, rather selectively, on a part of the statement given by Prakash in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question put to Prakash and the answer given read as under Q PW-20 C.K. Nanaiah, Finger Print expert and Dy. S.P. states that on 6.11.1990 he was called to the scene of occurrence amd he visited there, examined the articles found at the place between 8-30 and 9-45 p.m. and got a chance print on a plastic companyer found there, which is at Ex. P-18 and on companyparison it was identical with your right middle finger print and issued a certificate as per Ex. P-13. What do you say? Ans On 7th date Inspector DSouza given me a companyer to hold the same. The High Court took into account only the latter part of the answer given by Prakash, namely, that he held a companyer. From this, the High Court companycluded that The fact that the fingerprint of the accused was found on Ex. P-18 sic Ex. P-20 is accepted by the accused himself. In doing so, the High Court ignored the first part of Prakashs statement that this happened on 7th November, 1990. If any credibility is to be given to Exh.P- 20 then it must be held that Prakash was arrested on 7th November, 1990 but that is number the case of the prosecution. We have, therefore, to proceed on the basis that Prakash was in fact apprehended and arrested on 11th November, 1990 and proceeding on that basis, there cannot be any question of his being given a companyer to hold by the Investigating Officer on 7th November, 1990 for the purpose of obtaining his fingerprint. The ultimate companyclusion is that there is absolutely numberevidence on record to show how Exh. P-20 which is said to be the admitted fingerprint of Prakash came into existence. In the absence of any admitted fingerprint, there is numberhing to show that the handprint or the fingerprints on Exh. P-18 was that of Prakash. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P19 it was held It is settled law that an admission made by a person whether amounting to a companyfession or number cannot be split up and part of it used against him. An admission must be used either as a whole or number at all. A similar view was expressed, rather expansively, in Narain Singh State of Punjab20 and Dadarao v. State of Maharashtra.21 Assuming Prakashs fingerprint was in fact obtained by DSouza, it was clearly number given voluntarily, but perhaps unwittingly and in what seems to be a deceitful manner. To avoid any suspicion regarding the genuineness of the fingerprint so taken or resort to any subterfuge, the appropriate companyrse of action for the Investigating Officer was to approach the Magistrate for necessary orders in accordance with section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. In Mohd. Aman v. State of Rajasthan22 this Court referred to the possibility of the police fabricating evidence and to avoid an allegation of such a nature, it would be eminently desirable that fingerprints were taken under the orders of a Magistrate. We may add that this would equally apply to the creating evidence against a suspect. This is what this Court had to say Even though the specimen fingerprints of Mohd. Aman had to be taken on a number of occasions at the behest of the Bureau, they were never taken before or under the order of a Magistrate in accordance with Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. It is true that under Section 4 thereof police is companypetent to take fingerprints of the accused but to dispel any suspicion as to its bona fides or to eliminate the possibility of fabrication of evidence it was eminently desirable that they were taken before or under the order of a Magistrate. The Karnataka High Court has taken the view23 that it is number incumbent upon a police officer to take the assistance of a Magistrate to obtain the fingerprints of an accused and that the provisions of the Identification of Prisoners Act are number mandatory in this regard. However, the issue is number one of the provisions being mandatory or number the issue is whether the manner of taking fingerprints is suspicious or number. In this case, we do number know if Prakashs fingerprint was taken on 7th November, 1990 as alleged by him or later as companytended by the Investigating Officer, or the circumstances in which it was taken or even the manner in which it was taken. It is to obviate any such suspicion that this Court has held it to be eminently desirable that fingerprints are taken before or under the order of a Magistrate. As far as this case is companycerned, the entire exercise of Prakashs fingerprint identification is shrouded in mystery and we cannot give any credence to it. We are also surprised that though a blood-stained crowbar was seized from the place of occurrence and according to the Investigating Officer, a blood-stained steel rod was recovered at the instance of Prakash, neither of these material objects was sent for fingerprint examination. The investigation was companyducted in a rather unconcerned manner, to say the least. Learned companynsel for Prakash made two subsidiary submissions, namely, that the photographs taken by Ramachandra of the scene of incident do number show the existence of the plastic companyer Exh. P-18 and therefore, according to him, the plastic companyer was planted subsequently. We are number prepared to accept this submission because it is numberodys case that Ramachandra took photographs of everything or every item found in the residence of Gangamma. It was also submitted that when Nanaiah took Exh. P-18 with him, numbermahazar or panchnama was drawn up and numberody was told that the plastic companyer bearing the inscription Canara Bank was taken away by him for examination. This is true and we are of the view that this was number permissible and that there should have been some record of the plastic companyer having been taken by Nanaiah, especially since the Investigating Officer was present at the spot. On the other hand, if the plastic companyer was taken away by Nanaiah without the knowledge of the Investigating Officer and right under his numbere, then it makes the position even worse for the prosecution. Be that as it may, we do number doubt the bona fides of Nanaiah since, in his testimony, he clearly stated that he had examined nine articles and one of them was the plastic companyer bearing the inscription Canara Bank and that while carrying an object companytaining prints, there is chance of damage to the prints if the object is number handled properly. It is perhaps to avoid the possible damage that he took the plastic companyer with him. Our attention was drawn to the Karnataka Police Manual and it appears that Nanaiah followed the guidelines laid down therein and perhaps acted in an overly cautious manner. Guideline No. 1543 provides as follows 1543. The opinion of the finger print expert is of paramount importance in the investigation of various crimes. The following instructions should be followed regarding chance finger and foot prints and their developments, preservation of the scene, method of packing and other matters Guideline 1544 in the Manual companytains various provisions and clause and clause v are relevant for our purposes. They read as follows 1544. i to iii xxx iv If latent prints are found on portable articles they should be seized under a detailed panchanama duly packed and labelled and sent to the Finger Print Bureau with a police officer with instructions regarding the care of the package during the journey. In sending the articles companytaining latent prints to the Bureau, proper attention must be given to their package. The following essential points should be borne in mind It should be ensured that numberportion of the article where prints may be found should get into companytact with anything else and The articles should be securely packed in a suitable companytainer. Clause iv was clearly number followed when Nanaiah took the plastic companyer along with him and this is an extremely serious lapse. However, we give him the benefit of doubt and assume that it is perhaps with clause v in mind that Nanaiah took the plastic companyer along with him. While we companypletely disapprove of the manner in which Exh. P-18 was taken away by Nanaiah and the Investigating Officer did numberhing about it , the case of the prosecution does number get strengthened even if a valid procedure was followed, since there is numberhing on record to show that the admitted fingerprints on Exh. P-20 were those of Prakash which companyld be companypared with the fingerprints on Exh. P-18 and the enlarged photograph being Exh. P-19. Assuming that Exh. P-20 was a valid piece of evidence validly obtained, there is numberexplanation why it was kept by the Investigating Officer from 14th November, 1990 till 9th January, 1991 when it was received by Nanaiah. The Karnataka Police Manual highlights the importance of keeping safe an article companytaining fingerprints. In view of its importance, Nanaiah did number trust anyone with the plastic companyer bearing the inscription Canara Bank Exh. P-18 and carefully took it along with him to avoid its getting damaged by getting into companytact with anything else. On the other hand, we have the Investigating Officer keeping Exh. P-20 with him for almost two months and in circumstances that seem unclear. We cannot rule out the possibility of Exh. P-20 getting damaged due to careless handling. We are of the opinion that there is numberfingerprint evidence worth it linking Prakash to the murder of Gangamma. Blood Stained Clothes The witnesses relevant for the recovery of blood stained clothes of Prakash are PW-18 Savandaiah, PW-21 Shivanna and PW-24 Subanna. Savandaiah and Subanna have given a very similar statement to the effect that Prakash was apprehended on 11th November, 1990. They did number state that at the time of his apprehension, he was wearing blood stained clothes. However, when Shivanna was called to the police station on 11th November, 1990 he was told that it was for the purpose of witnessing a search of Prakash. He stated that Prakash was wearing a shirt and a panche and he numbericed blood stains on both the apparels. On the personal search of Prakash some cash was recovered and a receipt from Vijayalakshmi Financiers was also recovered. Learned companynsel for Prakash sought to take advantage of two discrepant statements made by Shivanna in his cross-examination. One statement is to the effect that before Prakash was searched, the police told Shivanna that he was carrying cash and a receipt. The question raised by learned companynsel was how was the police aware of the existence of cash and a receipt on the person of Prakash without having companyducted his personal search. It was submitted by learned companynsel that this reveals that Prakash had already been searched by the police and Shivanna was summoned only to companyplete the paper work. We make numbercomment on this. The second discrepant statement was that Shivanna stated that the police had kept Prakashs clothes on the table. It was submitted, in other words, that the blood stained clothes were already seized by the police and kept on the table. We are number sure whether the actual statement made by Shivanna has been lost in translation. In any event, the recovery of the blood stained clothes of Prakash do number advance the case of the prosecution. The reason is that all that the prosecution sought to prove thereby is that the blood group of Gangamma was AB and the blood stains on Prakashs seized clothes also belong to blood group AB. In our opinion, this does number lead to any companyclusion that the blood stains on Prakashs clothes were those of Gangammas blood. There are millions of people who have the blood group AB and it is quite possible that even Prakash had the blood group AB. In this companytext, it is important to mention that a blood sample was taken from Prakash and this was sent for examination. The report received from the Forensic Science Laboratory Exh.P-27 was to the effect that the blood sample was decomposed and therefore its origin and grouping companyld number be determined. It is, therefore, quite possible that the blood stains on Prakashs clothes were his own blood stains and that his blood group was also AB. Learned companynsel for Prakash companytended that the report of the serologist was number put to him when he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court dealt with this issue in a rather unsatisfactory manner. This is what the High Court had to say Even assuming that the report of the Serologist had number been put to the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the same cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution, more so, when the same had number prejudiced the accused in any way. In fact, we put the said Serologists report Ex.P29 to the learned companynsel appearing for the respondent and sought for their explanation in this regard and it is submitted that they have numberhing to say in that matter. That means, the respondent has numberexplanation to offer in this regard. It is one thing to say that numberprejudice was caused to Prakash by number affording him an opportunity to explain the serological report. It is quite another thing to put the report to his learned companynsel in appeal and give him the learned companynsel an opportunity to explain the report of the serologist. The companyrse adopted by the High Court is clearly impermissible. The law on the subject was laid down several decades ago by the Constitution Bench in Tara Singh v. State24 and is to the effect that an accused must be given a chance to offer an explanation if the evidence is to be used against him and the companyviction is intended to be based upon it. It follows that if the accused is number given an opportunity to explain the circumstances against him in the testimony of the witnesses, then those circumstances cannot be used against him, whether they prejudice him or number. This is what the Constitution Bench said It is important therefore that an accused should be properly examined under section 34225 and, as their Lordships of the Privy Council indicated in Dwarkanath v. Emperor,26 if a point in the evidence is companysidered important against the accused and the companyviction is intended to be based upon it, then it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it if he so desires. This is an important and salutary provision and I cannot permit it to be slurred over. I regret to find that in many cases scant attention is paid to it, particularly in Sessions Courts. But whether the matter arises in the Sessions Court or in that of the Committing Magistrate, it is important that the provisions of section 342 should be fairly and faithfully observed. This was more clearly spelt out in Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra27 when this Court held A companyviction based on the accuseds failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. We are number satisfied with the companyclusion of the High Court that since the clothes of Prakash were blood stained and the stains bore the same blood group as that of Gangamma, the circumstance companyld be used Prakash. A serological companyparison of the blood of Gangamma and Prakash and the blood stains on his clothes was necessary and that was absent from the evidence of the prosecution. Ornaments of the deceased According to the prosecution, Prakash had led the Investigating Officer to various places from where some ornaments belonging to Gangamma were recovered. The recovery witnesses were examined by the prosecution as well as those persons from whom the ornaments were recovered. However, what is of significance is that numbere of the recovered ornaments companyld be companynected to Gangamma. This is a serious lapse in investigation and the mere recovery of some ornaments from some people does number lead to any companyclusion that the ornaments so recovered belonged to Gangamma. At the stage of re-examination of Hucha Basappa, the prosecution sought permission to examine him with regard to identification of the ornaments said to belong to Gangamma. However, this was declined by the Trial Judge who perused the statement of the witness recorded under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which did number have anything with regard to identification of the ornaments. The High Court adversely companymented on this and held that the Trial Judge adopted a very strange procedure while declining to grant the request of the prosecution to have the ornaments identified through Hucha Basappa. According to the High Court, Hucha Basappa had stated in an earlier part of his testimony in companyrt that Gangamma had ornaments such as a gold chain, silver waist belt, silver rings, ear studs etc.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 1186-1188 of 1972. Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order fated 12/ 13/15th October, 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 555, 556 of 1967 and 72 of 1968. S. Cooper, M. K. Shah, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants. N. Lokur, Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No. 1. Subodh Markendeya, for Respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.-Whether the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premisesunder the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 for short, the Act if so whether on the facts of the case, the principle has been rightly invoked--is the two fold question that falls for decision in these three appeals by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The material facts are as under A big companypound, measuring 11,150 sq. yards, at 156 Tardeo Road, Bombay, belonged to Raja Bahadur Moti Lal Mills, Ltd., Bombay, appellant No.1. The Mills were shifted from these premises in the year 1930. In 1932, the whole of this estate including the structures standing on. a part of it, was let out to Sound Studios Ltd. Between the years 1932 and 1940, some part of it was sub-let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali, who was the proprietor of M s. Famous Cine Laboratory and another part to Neon Signs India Ltd., and the rest of the estate companytinued to be with Sound Studios. Thereafter, Sound Studios went out of the picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd. on October 23, 1940 at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/- for a period of two years. In July 1941, National Studios surrendered their lease and Sheraj Ali became a direct tenant under appellant 1 in respect of the premises in his possession, called for the sake of identification, 983/1 whole and 983/2 Ground floor . On December 1, 1941 and again in November 1942, Sheraj Ali took on rent additional portions of this estate so that his original rent, which was Rs. 400/-, was first increased to Rs. 600/and then to Rs. 700/- and thereafter in November 1942 to Rs. 875/-. By November 1947, Sheraj Ali was paying Rs. 1200/- per month as rent for the premises demised to him including some new structures which had been built. Sheraj Ali had taken a loan from M s. Govind Ram Bros. Ltd., Respondent 1 on the security of his Film Studio Equipments. He failed to repay the loan. Thereupon, Respondent 1 instituted a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree from the High Court,. on February 27,1948. As a result of the High Courts decree, the right, title and interest of Sheraj Ali in the mortgaged property were assigned to Respondent 1. Respondent 1, in companysequence, took a fresh lease on March 19,1948 from appellant No. 1 of the, properties called for identification 983/1 to 983/12, which were in the tenancy of Sheraj Ali, at a companytractual rent of Rs. 1228/- p.m. On the same date, Respondent 1 executed another lease in respect of three rooms in the same premises marked for identification as 984, in favour of appellant 1, on a monthly rent of Rs. 750/- Respondent 1 failed to pay the companytractual rent, regularly, which fell into arrears which were number cleared despite the pressing demands made by the Receiver. On March 13, 1954 the Receiver wrote to Respondent 1 threatening to take legal proceedings for the recovery of the rent. This Receiver, who is number appellant No. 2, had been appointed by the High Court in Suit No. 454 of 1949 instituted by appellant 1 against the Insurance Company On April 14, 1954, two applications were filed in the Court of Small Causes by Respondent 1 for fixation of standard rent in respect of the premises companyprised in the said two leases one application, R.A.N. 983/54, relates to properties 983/1 to 983/12, and the other R.A.N. 984 to premises 984. It was alleged in the applications that since on September, 1, 1940, the entire estate, including the properties in question. had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/-, standard rent of the premises it question should be fixed on the basis of apportionment In particular, it was pleaded that fair rent of Rs. 983/1 to 983/12 should be 1/8th of Rs. 1200/- which was later companyrected as 1700/-. On the same basis it was alleged in the second application, that fair rent of premises 984 should be Rs. 75/- p. m. The appellants resisted these applications and averred in R. N. 983/54, that several entirely new structures had been built and substantial alterations made in most of these structures between the years 1940 and 1948, as a result whereof the property had lost its identity, and companysequently, fair rent companyld number be fixed on apportionment basis. On June 11, 1958, Respondent 1 made an application for amendment of the Standard Rent Application R.A. N. 983154 for adding an alternative ground based on the value of the land and companyt of companystruction so that in the event of the companyrt holding on the preliminary issue in favour of the appellants, the standard rent companyld be fixed on the basis of the valuation of the land and the companystruction. This application was disallowed. On July 30,1958 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment of his R. A. N. 984 of 1954 on lines similar tothat in R. A. N. 983/54. It was also dismissed by an order, dated July 31, 1958. At the stage of arguments on December 4, 1958, Respondent 1 moved another application for amendment and addition of the plea that they were the owners of the structures in premises 983/10, 983/1 and 983/12. The second amendment was number sought to be made in the other application R. A. N. 98411954 relating to property 984. This prayer was also declined. The trial companyrt Samson J. by its judgment dated April 2, 1959, found that the premises in question on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they companyld numberlonger be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of ,determining rent by apportionment was number available to the tenants. In the result he dismissed the applications, adding there is numbersufficient ,material to ascertain the standard rent in any other way . Against those orders, Respondent 1 filed a revision petition under s. 129 3 of the Act before the Revisional Court of Small Causes, Bombay, which accepted, the same set aside the order of the trial judge, allowed the amendment and remanded both the applications for fixation of fair rent to the trial companyrt. Against this remand order, dated August 8, 1960, of the Revisional Court, the appellants preferred two Civil Revisions to the High Court of Bombay. During the pendency of those Revisions, the trial companyrt allowed the amendment and proceeded to decide the entire matter afresh. These facts were brought to the numberice of the High Court, which, however, ,dismissed the revision petitions by a judgment dated February 3, 1961 holding that the first Revisional Court had, in fact, remanded the entire matter for trial de numbero, after rightly allowing both the amendments. After the remand, the trial companyrt by its judgment, dated April 25, 1961 held that except 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12, which were new structures there was numberchange of identity in the rest of the properties i. e. 983/1 to 983/9 that new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12 belonged to Respondent 1 who was companysequently, liable to pay rent only for the land underneath that the companyt of repairs of the properties, 983/8 and 983/9 after they had been destroyed by fire, was mainly borne by Respondent 1, the landlords companytribution being Rs. 8,500/- only. Applying the principle of apportionment, it fixed the standard rent of the properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 400/- p.m. subject to permitted increases after 1954. Regarding the premises 984 in R.A.N.984/54 , the trial companyrt gave are turn on the investment of Rs.40,000/-made by the landlord inclusive of the companyt of structure and the value of land underneath at Rs. 30/- per sq. yard as that of 1940 and fixed the standard rent at Rs. 386/- p. m. subject to permitted increases after 1946. Aggrieved by these orders of the trial companyrt, appellants and Respondent 2 filed two revision applications under s. 129 3 to the Revisional Court of Small Causes which by its judgment, dated September 30, 1964, substantially upheld the findings of the trial companyrt, inter alia with the exceptions that the ownership of the new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12 vested in Appellant 1, who was entitled to get a fair return on that investment ii that the value of the land married to the new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12, and 984/54, should be taken at Rs. 50/- per sq. yd., i. e. as of 1948 and number as of 1940 as had been done by the trial companyrt on remand. In the result, the standard rent in A.N. 983 was raised to Rs. 981 - and in R.A.N. 984 to Rs.411/-p.m. To impugn the decision, dated September, 30, 1964, of the Revisional Court, the parties preferred six Special Civil Applications under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution to the High Court. By a companymon order, a learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed these applications except that he companyrected some arithmetical errors and, in companysequence, fixed the standard rent of properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 841.07 and that of premises 984/54 at Rs. 462/11 p. m. It is against this decision dated 12/13th October 1971 of the High Court that these appeals have been filed by special leave. The first companytention of Mr. Cooper, learned Counsel for the appellants is that there is numberprovision in the Act which requires standard rent to be fixed on apportionment basis rather, the definition of premises in s. 5 8 b which speaks of part of a building let separately, read with clause i of s. 5 10 and clause c of s. 11 1 with due emphasis on the article the immediately preceding the, word premises in the said clauses, indicates that the standard rent would be the rent for which the suit premises were first let separately on or, after the basic date i.e. September 1, 1940. If on the basic date-proceeds the argument-the premises in question did number form the subject of a separate, single ,demise but had been let out together with other portions of larger premises, its standard rent companyld number be determined on the footing of the rent payable for those different portions. Reliance has been placed on Dhanrajgirji Naraingirji v. W. G. Ward 1 and Bata Shoe Co Ltd. v. Narayan Das Mullick and Ors. 2 Counsel had further tried to distinguish Capital and Provincial Property Trust Ltd. v. Rice 3 and Bhikaji Ramchandra Paranjpe v. Vishnu Ramchandra Paranjpe 4 , referred to in the judgment of the High Court. On the other hand, Mr. Lokur, learned Counsel for Respondent maintains that the principle of apportionment has always been accepted by the Bombay High Court as an appropriate guide in fixing standard rent under the Act of premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity. It is pointed out that in Narayanlal Bansilal v. Venkatrao Anant Rai 5 a Bench of the High Court while companysidering the question of standard rent in respect of another portion of the very property of the appellant-Mills, had invoked this principle. Before we deal with the companytentions canvassed, it will be proper to make a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act The material part of the definition of premises in s.5 8 reads Premises means- a any land number being used for agricultural purposes b any building or part of a building let separately. . . . emphasis supplied Sub-section 10 of the same Section defines standard rent, in relation to any premises, to mean- a where the standard rent fixed by the companyrt and the Controller respectively under the Bombay tent Restrictions Act, 1939 or the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1944, such standard rent or Where the standard rent is number so fixed subject to the provisions of section 11, the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of September 1940, or where they were number let on the first day of September 1940, the rent at which they were last let before that day, or where they were first let after the first day of September 1940, the rent at which they were first let, or in any of the cases specified in section 11, the rent fixed by the Court 1 1925 27, Bom. L.R. 877. 2 A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 234. 3 1952 Appeal Cases 142. 4 56 Bom. L.R. 402. 5 67 Bom. L. R. 352. Section 1 1 empowers the Rent Court to fix the standard rent at such amount, as having regard to the provisions of this Act and the circumstances of the case, the companyrt deems just- a where any premises are first let after the first day of September 1940, and the rent at which they are so let is in the opinion of the Court excessive or b where the Court is satisfied that there is numbersufficient evidence to ascertain the rent at which the premises were let in anyone of the cases mentioned in subclause i to iii of clause 4 of sub-section 10 of section 5 or Where by reason of the premises having been let at one time as a whole or in part and another time in parts or a whole, or for any other reasons, any difficulty arises in giving effect to this part or Where any premises have been or are let rent free or at a numberinal rent or for some companysideration in addition to rent or Where there is any dispute between the land-lord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent. Clause c read with the opening part of s. 11 1 is crucial for our purpose. One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rents and to stabilise the same at prewar level. In achieving that object, however, it avoids a Procrustean or mechanical approach. While pegging the basic line to September 1, 1940, it significantly subordinates standard rent by its very definition in s. 5 10 b to the benignant jurisdiction of the Court under s.11. And the key words of the latter provision, into which the companyscience of this anti-rack-renting statute is companypressed, are the circumstances of the case, the Court deems just. These words inhibit a rigid and ossified determination of standard rent. They leave sufficient play at the joints, investing the companyrt with a wide discretion in the matter. According to the scheme of the Act, while rent recoverable by the landlord, may owing to permitted increases, fluctuate, the standard rent always remains fixed or stationary. If on the basic date, the suit premises were number let out separately but were a part of the subject-matter of a larger demise-as in the instant case-difficulty arises in giving effect to the statute. Clause c of s. II 1 then companyes into operation. To resolve the difficulty this clause and the related provisions are number to be companystrued in a narrow technical sense which would stultify or defeat their object. It is to be interpreted liberally in a manner which would advance the remedy, suppress the mischief, and foil subtle inventions and evasions of the Act. Construed in accordance with this socially relevant rule in Haydens case the meaning of the premises having been let at one time as a whole, spoken of in this clause, can legitimately be deemed to companyer the larger premises which, on the basic date, had been let as a whole and of which the suit premises was a part let out subsequently. In any event, the amplitude of the phrase or any other reason in the latter part of the clause, is wide enough to embrace cases of this kind and companyfers a plenary curative power on the Court. True, that unlike the English Rent Control Act of 1920 or the later English Acts, the Bombay Act does number expressly speak of apportionment. But the language of its relevant provisions companystrued companysistently with the scheme and in built policy of the Act, is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis. As numbericed already, s. II 1 gives a discretion to the Court to fix such amount as standard rent as it deems just. However, in exercising this discretion the Court has to pay due regard to i the provisions of the. Act and ii the circumstances of the case. Apportionment or equal distribution of the burden of rent on every portion-is a rule of justice and good sense. If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount, it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub-division of that whole should number ordinarily exceed that amount. Therefore, if in the circumstances of a given case the Court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act, it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment, it can legitimately do so. This principle, however, is applicable where on the basic date, that portion of which the standard rent is to be determined, had number been let separately as on unit, but the whole, of which it is a part, had been let on that date. Apportionment postulates that on account of its having been let on the basic date, the whole had acquired a standard rent which has to be allocated to smaller units subsequently carved out of it. It is thus clear that the principle of apportionment is number alien to the spirit of the Act, and has indeed been often invoked by the companyrts in fixing standard rent under this Act. In Narayanlal Bansilals case supra , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent of another part of this very estate of the Mills in accordance with that principle. However, while companyceding that apportionment is number foreign to the scheme, purpose and policy of the Act, we will like to emphasise the need for caution and circumspection in invoking it. It is number to be rigidly and indiscriminately applied as a cast-iron rule of law regardless of time and circumstances or the equities of the case. A doctrinaire approach, number companysistent with a just and fair determination, stultifies the whole salutary purpose of justice to both, the landlord and the tenant. If necessary, it can be adjusted, adapted and attuned in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, to satisfy the statutory requirement of fixing the standard rent as at a just amount. Thus if after the material date, the landlord has made investments and improvements in the promises, it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and to give him a fair return on such investments. Further, in apportioning the rant, the Court must companysider other relevant circumstances, such as size, accessibility, aspect, and other Physical advantage enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question, as companypared with those of the rent of the property in which it is companyprised see Bainbridge v. Contdon 1 . Where after the basic date, the premises companypletely change their identity, apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent, loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether. We have only illustrated, number exhaustively enumerated the relevant circumstances and their implications. At this stage, we may numberice the decisions in Danrajgirji v. C. Ward supra and Bata Shoe and Co. v. Narayan Dass supra relied upon by Mr. Cooper. In the first, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court was companysidering ss. 2 1 a and 13 1 a of the Bombay Rent War Restriction Act II of 1918 , which were, to an extent, similar to sections 5 8 b and 10 and 11 1 c of the 1947-Act. There, the Port Trust had in March 24,1915, leased the building known as Watsons Annexe to one Dr. Billimoria at a rental of Rs. 2,850, besides ground rent and taxes. Dr. Billimoria sublet the premises in different flats to different tenants. The premises in the occupation of the defendant were sublet to him at a rental of Rs. 75/- in September, 1915, i.e. before September 1, 1916 which was the basic date under the 1918-Act. The tenancy of Dr. Billimoria was terminated by a companysent decree on July 31, 1923 and thereafter, the defendant held directly under the plaintiff. The question arose as to whether standard rental of the flat should be calculated on the basis of the actual rent of Rs. 75/-, on the basis of the subletting or whether it should be determined by apportionment of the rent which Dr. Billimoria was paying to the Port Trust on the basis of the first letting. Pratt J answered this question thus The Rent Act itself in the definition of the premises refers to a part of the building separately let as premises of which the standard rent has to be determined and such standard rent must be determined with reference to those premises in the manner specified by s 2 1 a of the Act. The standard rent, therefore, must be ascertained on the admitted basic rent of Rs. 75. Again, if the head-lease instead of being as here the lease of one building companysisting of flats had been a lease of a large number of buildings companystituting a large estate, it would be almost impossible to make a companyrect apportionment of the rent. I do number think it was the intention of the Rent Act that landlords and tenants should be driven to do a difficult and expensive process of valuation. and calculation before their rent companyld be ascertained. 1 1925 2 K. B. 261. M45Sup.CI/75 We see force in the argument as also textual and pragmatic support. But these companysiderations do number preclude the Court from importing the flexible factors of fairness suggested by the circumstances of the case. Indeed, s. 11, as explained earlier, obliges the Court to do it. Moreover, the interpretation of premises adopted by the learned judge was a little too literal, narrow and divorced from the purpose and companytent of the provisions relating to fixation of standard rent. Nor was it in accord with the scheme and object of the 1918-Act. The companyrts jurisdiction to companysider, as a strong circumstance, proper apportionment of rent is number taken away, in our view. It may be numbered that just like the opening clause of s. 5 of the 1947Act, which defines premises standard rent etc., the companyresponding s. 2 1 of the 1918-Act, also, started with the qualifying words In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or companytext. While applying these definitions to particular cases and provisions of the Acts, these words should number be lost sight of. The argument in favour of adopting the restricted interpretation, ignores this rider to the definitions, provided by the Legislature in these statutes. We do number intend to over-burden this judgment with a discussion the decision in Bata Shoe Cos case supra . Suffice it to say that is a decision under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act 17 of 1950 which stands on its own facts. It cannot be accepted as laying down a rule of universal application. It is vulnerable, more or less on the same grounds, on which the decision in Dhanrajgirjis case can be assailed. We reject the narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions of Ss. 2 and II, canvassed for by the appellants, for two reasons Firstly, it will leave the door wide open for evasion of this statute by what Abbot C. J. in Fox v. Bishop of Chester 1 -called shift or companytrivance All that a greedy landlord, need do to squeeze out more rent would be to divide his premises into several parts and let them out separately on exorbitant rents. Such an evasion may amount to a fraud upon the statute. Secondly, such a companystruction so manifestly subversive of one of the primary objects of the Act would be wholly beyond the intendment of the Legislature. For reasons aforesaid we would negative the first companytention of Mr. Cooper, as an inflexible proposition and answer the first part of the question posed in the affirmative to the extent indicated. it takes us to the second part of that question namely whether the principle of apportionment was companyrectly applied to the fact, of the case ? Mr. Cooper companytends that the first trial companyrt Samson J. had rightly found that the premises in question on account of extensive alterations and companystructions undergone a companyplete change after the basic date, and therefore standard rent companyld number be determined by apporoining the rent of the whole among the parts. It is maintained that 1 824 2 B C 635 at 655. this finding of Samson J. was wrongly set aside by the High Court and must be deemed to be still holding the field. Objection is also taken to the amendments allowed by the trial companyrt on remand. In the alternative, it is argued that even the companyrts below found that properties 983/10, 983/11, 983/12 and 984/54 were admittedly new structures and extensive repairs and replacements had been made in the remaining suit premises which had been destroyed or severely damaged by fire in 1948-49. On account of these substantial alterations and reconstructions the premises in question had lost their identity and companysequently, the principle of appointment was number applicable. The first part of the companytention based on the judgment of Samson J. is groundless. The judgment of the first trial companyrt was set aside in toto by the Revisional Court, and further by the High Court and the case was remanded for de numbero trial to the trial companyrt which thereafter, decided the case afresh after allowing the applicant to amend his R.A. S. It is too late in the day any way to argue on the assumption that the findings still survive. The question whether a certain property has changed its identity after the basic date is largely one of fact. The companyrts below have found that excepting properties 983/10, 983/11,983/12 and 984/54 which were admittedly new structures companytracted near about 1948, the rest of the properties, namely 983/1 to 983/9 had number lost their identity. The companyrts therefore, worked out the economic rent of these new structures by capitalising their value and gave the landlord a fair return on Ms investments and fixed their standard rent mainly on that basis. It was with regard to the unchanged old properties 983/1 to 983/9 that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of appointment. Even so, it allowed the landlord fair return over Rs. 14,448/- being the companyt of flooring, ceiling and other fixtures fixed to property 983/6. Now it is number disputed that on the basic date September 1, 1940 , these properties in question were parts of a larger entity companyprised in a single lease or tenancy in favour of Sound Studios at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/-. The companyrts below have therefore taken into account this basic circumstance along with the other relevant facts of the case. We do number find anything so wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by them which would warrant an interference by this Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Not that apportionment must be applied in all cases as a rule of law but that, if applied along with other companysiderations dictated by a sense of justice and fairplay, cannot be companydemned by this Court as, illegal. We therefore, overrule this companytention, also. Lastly, it is companytended that the companyrts below have seriously erred in evaluating the land under the suit properties at Rs. 30/- per sq. yd. on the basis of an instance Ex. R 6 of the year 1942, while they should have taken into account the value of the land as in the year 1948. it is added that some photostat companypies of sale-deeds pertaining to the relevant year were produced by Mr. Deweja, architect examined by the Landlord, and the Revisional Court wrongly rejected them As unproved. it is maintained that in 1948, the market value of the site underneath the structures was Rs. 120/- per sq. yd. in support of his companytention that the value of the land at the date of the letting is the appropriate value to be taken into account, Counsel has cited Bukmanibai Khunji Cooverji v. Shivnarayan Ram Ashre. 1 . We are unable to accept this companytention also. The companyrts below in capitalising the structures, 983/10 to 983/12 and 984/54 did take into account the value of the land married to those properties at the rate of Rs. 50/- per sq. yd which, according to their estimate, after adding Rs. 30/- per sq. yd for escalation, would be the market value of that land in the year 1948. Since the rent of the old unchanged properties 983/1 to 983/9 was fixed mainly on apportionment basis, the companyrts did number think it necessary to take the value of their sites separately into companyputation in fixing the standard rent. Moreover, there was numberevidence on the record to show that the value of the land in question, in the year 1948 was Rs. 120/- per sq. yd. We, therefore, do number think it necessary to examine Cooverjis case cited by the Counsel. We however, do number rule out the propriety of paying regard to escalations in land value as put forward by Mr. Cooper, but do hold that this Court will be loath to reinvestigate factual companyclusions number shown to be perverse or manifestly unjust.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTIOlN Writ Petition Crl. Nos. 1541 1542 of 1984. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Ram Jethamalani, Miss Kamini Jaiswal and J.B. Patel for the petitioners. T U. Mehta, Mrs. H. Wahi and R.N. Poddar for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. In each of these application under Article of 32 the Constitution the petitioner therein challenges the order of detention made against him under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 COFEPOSA referred to as the Act hereinafter . As the facts are more or less the same and companymon companytentions have been advanced, these two applications are being disposed of by a companymon order. Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1541184 was detained with effect from December 28, 1983, pursuant to an order made under Section 3 1 of the Act on December 7, 1983. The detention was assailed before the Gujarat High Court in a writ petition filed OF January 22, 1984. While the said application was being heard, the order of detention was revoked on April 5, 1984, but on the same day another order under s. 3 1 of the Act was made directing his detention and he was detained pursuant to that order with effect from the very day. The second order of detention was challenged by a new writ petition before the High Court. A Division Bench of that Court by order dated August 8, 1984, quashed the same by holding that the order of detention was violative of Article 22 5 of the Constitution and directed the petitioner to be set at liberty. On August 20, 1984, a fresh order was made detaining the petitioner and with effect from the same day the petitioner was detained again On the date of detention the petitioner was served with documents along with the grounds of detention- The writ petition has been filed in this Court challenging that order of detention So far as the petitioner in writ petition No. 1542/84 is companycerned, he was detained with effect from January 12, 1984, pursuant to an order under s. 3 of the Act dated January 2, 1984. that order of detention was assailed before the High Court and in companyrse of the hearing of the writ position, the order of detention was revoked on April 5, 1984- On the self-same day another order of detention was passed and the petitioner was detained with effect from that date. On April 5, 1984, the petitioner assailed his detention by filing a second writ petition. On August 8, 1984, the High Court quashed that order of detention on similar grounds as in the companynected writ petition. On August 20, 1984, a fresh order of detention was made under which the petitioner has been taken into custody. His writ petition assails that order of detention. During the tendency of these writ petitions before this Court the Act was amended by Central Act 58/84. The Amending Act received assent of the President on August 30, 1984 but became effective from July 31,1984- Section 9 of the principal Act of 1974 was amended by s. 2 of this Act and the amended provision authorised making of declaration by the Central Government or any officer of the Central Government number below of the rank of Additional Secretary to that Government on the basis of satisfaction that the detenua smuggles or is likely to smuggle goods into, out of or through any area highly vulnerable to smuggling or b abets or is likely to abet the smuggling of goods into, out of or through any area highly vulnerable to smuggling, or c engages or is likely to engage in transporting or companycealing or keeping smuggled goods in any area highly vulnerable to smuggling- A declaration as companytemplated by the amended provision was made by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance A Department of Revenue in respect of each of the petitioners on September 18, 1984, and this declaration has been placed on record along with an affidavit of the respondents. Under s. 10 of the Act the maximum period of detention is one year where section 9 is number invoked, but where a declaration is made, the maximum period is extended up to two years. When rule was issued an affidavit in opposition has been filed justifying the order of detention and the petitioner has also filed a rejoinder. Mr. Jethmalani appearing On behalf of the detenu in each of these writ petitions advanced a number of companytentions but ultimately pressed one of them which in our opinion entitles each of the petitioners to succeed and the order of his detention to be quashed. That companytention is that the power companyferred under s. 11 2 of the Act is number available to be exercised where there has been numberrevocation under s. 11 1 of the Act of a previous order of detention but has been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. In order to have a full companyprehension of the point advanced by companynsel it is necessary to refer to s. 11 of the Act. Section ll of the Act provides 1 Without prejudice to the provisions of s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a detention order may at any time be revoked or modifieda numberwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government by that State Government or by the Central Government b numberwithstanding that the order. has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government 2 The revocation of a detention order shall number bar the making of another detention order under s. 3 against the same person. Law of preventive detention within the ambit of which the Act is companyered has accepted by our Constitution. Challenge to legislations of preventive detention as being ultra virus the Constitution has, therefore, been repelled by this Court on more than one occasion. The inbuilt safeguards provided by the different statutes dealing with preventive detention have been accepted to be in keeping with the rule of law. There is Judicial companysensus that under the preventive detention law, before the Act in question came into the field, repeated orders of detention companyld number be made. this Court had clearly indicated that more than one order of detention on the same grounds in successions would number be valid. Notwithstanding the aforesaid legal position, s. 11 2 of the Act authorises making of another detention order under s. 3 against the same person. Counsel for both the parties have agreed that all the three orders of detention made in these cases were on the same grounds. Mr. Mehta for the respondents has fairly companyceded that as the law declared by this Court stood and but for the enabling provisions in s. 11 2 of the Act, the impugned orders would number stand a moments scrutiny. Mr. Jethmalani does number intend to dispute the vires of sub-s. 2 of s. I l in these writ petitions but has companytended that the ambit and scope of sub-s. 2 of s. 11 extends to orders of revocation companyered by sub-s. 1 . Otherwise stated, in situations number companyered by sub-s. 1 an order under sub-s. 2 cannot be made. The heading of s. 11 is Revocation of Detention Orders. Sub-s. 1 authorises revocation by two authorities, namely,- a if the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, the State Government or the Central Government may revoke the order and b if the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a Stat Government, revocation is permissible by the Central Government. Sub-section 1 of s. 11 indicates that the power companyferred under it in the situations envisaged in clauses a and b is exercisable without prejudice to the provisions of s. 21 of the General Clauses Act. That section provides that a power to issue orders includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and companyditions if any, to add, to amend vary or rescind such order. Under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, therefore, the authority making an order of detention would be entitled to revoke that order by rescinding it. We agree with the submission of Mr. Jethmalani that the words without prejudice to the provisions of s.21 of the General Clauses Act 1897 used in s. 11 1 of the Act give expression to the legislative intention that without affecting that right which the authority making the order enjoys under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, an order of detention is also available to be revoked or modified by authorities named in clauses a and b of s. 11 1 of the Act. Power companyferred under clauses a and b of s. I l l of the Act companyld number be exercised by the named authorities under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act as these authorities on whom such power has been companyferred under the Act are different from those who made the orders. Therefore, companyferment of such power was necessary as Parliament rightly found that s. 21 of the General Clauses Act was number adequate to meet the situation. Thus, while number affecting in any manner and expressly preserving the power under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act of the original authority making the order, power to revoke or modify has bean companyferred on the named authorities. The rule relating to interpretation of statutes is too well settled A to be disputed that unless a companytrary intention is expressly or by necessary implication available, words used in a statute should be given the same meaning. this position is all the more so where the word occurs in two limbs of the same section. We, therefore, agree with the companytention advanced by companynsel for the petitioners that the word revocation in sub-s 2 has the same meaning and companyers the same situations as provided in sub-s. 1 of s. 11 of the Act. This would necessarily mean that the power under sub-s. 2 would be exercisable in cases companyered by sub-s. 1 . This leads us to examine the tenability of the submission of Mr. Jethmalani as to the true meaning of the word revocation. Revoke is the verb and revocation is its numbern. These words have numberstatutory definition and, therefore, would take the companymonsense meaning available for these words. Blacks Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word revoke to be the recall of some authority or thing granted or a destroying or making void of some deed that had existence until the act of revocation made it void. Whartons Law Lexican gives the meaning to be the undoing of a thing granted or a destroying or making void of some deed that had existence until the act of revocation made it void. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the meaning of the word revocation to be the action of recalling recall of persons a call or summons to return the action of rescinding or annulling, withdrawing. The meaning of the word revoke has been given as to recall, bring back, to restore, to retract, to withdraw, recant, to take back to one-self. The true meaning of the verb revokeand its numbern, therefore, seem to signify that revocation is a process of recall of what had been done. According, to the Websters Third New International Dictionary, the word means-an act of recalling or calling back, the act by which one having the right annuls Something previously dose According to the Corpus Juris Secudum, 1952 Edition, Vol 77, the word revoke carries with it the idea of cancellation by the same power which originally acted and number to setting aside of an original order by higher forum Or power or jurisdiction It does number mean repudiation The power companyferred under clauses a and b of sub-s. 1 of s. 11 is in fact extension of the power recognised under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act and while under the General Clauses Act, the power is exercisable by the authority making the order, the named authorities under clauses a and b of s. 11 1 of the Act are also entitled to exercise the power of revocation. When the High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution it does number make an order of revocation. By issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas companypus or certioraris it quashes the order impugned before it and by declaring the order to be void and striking down the same it nullifies the order. The ultimate effect of cancellation of an order by revocation and quashing of the same in exercise of the high prerogative jurisdiction vested in the High Court may be the same but the manner in which the situation is obtained is patently different and while one process is companyered by s. 11 1 of the Act, the other is number known to the statute and is exercised by an authority beyond the purview of subsection I of s. I l of the Act. It is, therefore, our clear opinion that in a situation where the order of detention has been quashed by the High Court, sub-s. 2 of 11 is number applicable and the detaining authority is number entitled to make another order under s 3 of the Act on the same grounds. We are of the view that this seems to be the legislative scheme. The pronounced judicial view of this Court was that repeated orders of detention are number to be made. Parliament while making provision in g. 11 2 of the Act, must be taken to have been aware of such view and in companyferring the power of making repeated orders, safe. guards have been provided under sub-s. 1 by companyfining the exercise of power to limited situations. Clothing the prescribed authority to exercise power under s. 3 even in a situation where the Court has intervened to bring about nullification of the order of detention would give rise to companyplicated situations and keeping the scheme of the section in view we are of the clear opinion that where an order is quashed by a Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the power of making a fresh order under subsection 2 of s. 11 is number available to be exercised. In view of this companyclusion of ours, the orders made on August 20, 1984, on the same grounds on which the previous order of detention had been made and which had been quashed by the High Court are number tenable in law. Once those orders are held to be invalid, the declarations made subsequently under s. 9 of the Act companyld number be made and would have numbereffect. Leaving all other questions mooted in the writ petitions and partly argued before us by Mr. Jethmalani open for examination in suitable cases, we allow these writ petitions on the rationale of our companyclusion indicated above. The petitioner in each of these cases is directed to be set at liberty forwith.

The appellant Guljar Hussain stands companyvicted under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment for life. His two companypanions accused who were charged similarly with the aid of Section 34, I.P.C. were acquitted by the High Court whereas the companyviction of the appellant was maintained. The order of the Court of Session companyvicting all the three accused was thus modified. Hence, this appeal. The deceased in this case was Intzar Hussain. On the date of occurrence, i.e. 3rd January, 1975, he was scheduled to marry Afroz Jahan Begum. The marriage had been arranged by Chuttan, the father of the bride and the appellant. The appellant and his brothers did number approve of the match. The parties were otherwise familiar with each other because another sister of the accused named Anisa stood married to Shamshad, the brother of the deceased. It is alleged that at about 6-30 p.m. some time before the marriage party was about to leave the house of the bridegroom, the appellant and his two companypanions arrived there. One of the companypanions of the appellant caught hold of the bridegroom from behind and the other instigated to kill him which led the appellant deliver a knife blow in the abdomen of the deceased. The victim died at about 7-30 p.m. while in hospital. His injury had been examined by Dr. Jamil Ahmed, PW-3. The post-mortem of the deceased was companyducted by another medical expert named Dr. Mukherjee. After the usual steps of investigation, the appellant was sent up for trial with the result aforementioned. The only point for companysideration in this appeal is whether the companyviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. should be maintained or altered. The occurrence as such cannot be and has number been disputed. The motive for the crime was there. That the appellant was the author of the sole fatal injury, companyld number be denied. The FIR was prompt and the appellant had been singled out as the one who had caused the fatal injury. Bearing in mind that he had number repeated the blow, though numberhing stopped him, it has to be viewed as to what was his intention reflected from the nature of the injury which caused the death of the deceased. Dr. Jamil Ahmed deposing about the injury of the victim companyld number give its dimensions at the trial because his medico legal register was number available with him. The post-mortem report companyld legally be number proved because Dr. Mukherjee was number produced at the trial. An effort was successfully made to introduce the post-mortem report by companycession. But the fact still remains that the post-mortem report had number been deposed to by any witness at the trial. The post-mortem report, however, does mention about the nature of the injury and the opinion of the doctor that the injury was by itself sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death of the deceased. The benefit of cross-examination of Dr. Mukherjee companyld number be available at all to the appellant. The benefit of cross-examination of Dr. Jamil Ahmed, P.W. 3 was number available in full measure to the appellant because of the absence of the medico legal report. The medical evidence was thus legally deficient. In these circumstances, it has to be seen whether the appellant intended to cause the death of the deceased. When dimension of the injury has number been legally proved one has to fall back on the proved fact that after the blow of the appellant, the deceased died within two hours. In other words, the death of the deceased was the direct result of the blow of the appellant. Thereafter numberother supportive factor is available to maintain the companyviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. The blow was number repeated. The primary intention of the appellant was to obstruct the marriage of his sister. It companyld well be that the appellant intended to cause such injury as was likely to cause the death of the deceased so as to fall within the grip of Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C., and number per se under Section 302, I.P.C. for intentionally causing the death of the deceased. The totality of the circumstances thus goads us to err on the safer side by altering the companyviction of the appellant to one under Section 304 Part-I, I.P.C. for which he should be sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Ordered accordingly. The appellant is on bail.

S. Pathak, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana declining leave to the appellant under Sub-section 3 of Section 378 of the CrPC to appeal to the High Court against an order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Chandigarh acquitting the respondent. The respondent, Dharam Singh and his father, Karam Singh were charged for an offence Under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Vinod Kumar. In addition, a substantive charge was framed Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent. It appears that Vinod Kumar occupied a barsati above a shop-cum-flat in Sector 18D, Chandigarh along with Ram Lok. The respondent and his brother and their family lived on the floor immediately below the barsati. The case of the prosecution is that on March 1, 1974 at about 4.30 in the afternoon the two accused went up to the barsati and while Karam Singh caught hold of Vinod Kumar the respondent stabbed him with a knife in the abdomen. The motive suggested by the prosecution is that the accused suspected that Vinod Kumar was carrying on an illicit relationship with their sister Ajit Kaur. The learned Sessions Judge recorded evidence in the case and after companysidering the material before him he held that it was number sufficient to establish the charges beyond doubt against the accused, and he acquitted them. The appellant, the Chandigarh Administration, applied to the High Court for leave to appeal, but the application was summarily dismissed. Against that order this Court granted special leave to appeal companyfined to the case against the respondent, Dharam Singh. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties at length and have perused the entire evidence on the record, and we are number satisfied that the High Court has erred. The learned Sessions Judge carefully companysidered the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Surinder Kumar Gupta and Ram Look and took into account all the evidence and after weighing the facts and circumstances of the case he was unable to hold that the charges were substantiated, We have been taken through the record by learned companynsel and we see numberreason to differ. It does appear that the respondent and his family suspected that the deceased was carrying on an illicit affair with Ajit Kaur but that is wholly insufficient by itself to establish that the deceased was murdered by the respondent. There are several weaknesses in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to which the learned Sessions Judge has drawn pointed attention and, to our mind, it is difficult to find fault with his appraisal of the evidence.

CIVIL APPEAL NO S . 8161-8185 OF 2011 Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in short the Act was published in respect of the land at Village Bhuri, taluka Jhagadia for the purpose of a Lignite Project as far back on 10th May, 1988. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act followed on 20th May, 1989. The Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded companypensation at the rate of Rs.75/- per Are companyresponding to Rs. 0.75 paisa per Sq. Mtr. as per the Awards dated 02.03.1990 and 08.03.1990. Being dissatisfied with the companypensation companyputed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants had raised dispute before the Reference Court which, after hearing the parties, increased the companypensation to Rs.16.29 paisa per Sq. Mtr. together with interest and 30 per cent solatium. This was challenged in the High Court. In the Impugned Order the learned Division Bench has numbered that village Maljipara and village Bhuri are adjacent to each other and their boundaries touching each other. Noting that the companypensation had been finally settled in respect of the village Maljipara, the Division Bench thought it appropriate to grant companypensation at the same rate. In doing so it took into account the fact that there was numberevidence showing any distinguishing feature of the lands between these two villages. We have also perused the Map in question and we numbere that the two villages are companytiguous to each other, having companymon boundaries and are almost at equal distance to village Madhavpara. We may clarify that so far as the companypensation payable in respect of village Maljipara is companycerned, that was granted on the basis of a Sale Deed in Madhavpara. We also take numbere that there is numberevidence to show that any injustice or any illogical companyclusion was arrived at in following the companypensation rate applicable to village Maljipara for the village Bhuri also. Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant has drawn out attention to Kanwar Singh Ors. vs. Union of India 1998 8 SCC 136, and especially to paragraph 9 therein. This is for the purpose of companytending that merely because the companypensation stood settled so far as village Maljipara was companycerned, that was number sufficient ground to apply that same rate to village Bhuri. As has already been numbered by us above, this very question had been taken into companysideration in the Impugned Order and the High Court recorded the finding that there was numberevidence to disclose that the challenged rate of companypensation was, for any discernible factors, higher than what should have ordinarily been determined for village Bhuri. Since the High Court has specifically entered on a companyparative analysis, this decision does number companye to the aid of the Appellant. We find numbermerit in these Appeals, which are dismissed accordingly. The amount deposited by the Appellant be released to the Respondents forthwith. CIVIL APPEAL NO S . 8147-8160 OF 2011 Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in short the Act was published in respect of the land at village Rajpardi, taluka Jhagadia for the purpose of a Lignite Project as far back on 24th February, 1994. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act followed on 14th July, 1994. The Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded companypensation at the rate of Rs.45 per Sq. Mtr. for number agricultural land and Rs.6 per Sq.Mtr. for agricultural land as per the Award dated 09.02.1996. Being dissatisfied with the companypensation companyputed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants had raised dispute before the Reference Court which, after hearing the parties, increased the companypensation to Rs.26.70 Sq. Mtr. for agricultural land and Rs.155 per Sq. Mtr. for Non agricultural land together with interest and 30 per cent solatium. This was challenged in the High Court. In the Impugned Order the learned Division Bench has numbered that village Rajpardi and village Madhavpara are adjacent to each other and are also companyered under the same Group Gram Panchayat. In doing so it also took into account the fact that there was numberevidence showing any distinguishing feature of the lands between these two villages. We have also perused the Map in question and we numbere that the two villages are companytiguous to each other, having companymon boundaries. We may clarify that the companypensation payable was companyputed on the basis of the Sale Deed companycerned with the village Madhavpara. We also take numbere that there is numberevidence to show that any injustice or any illogical companyclusion was arrived at in following the companypensation rate applicable to village Madhavpara. Mr. V.Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant has drawn our attention to Kanwar Singh Ors.

GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order dated 26.04.2013 in Revision Petition No. 2032 of 2012 and order dated 23.07.2013 in Review Petition No. 253 of 2013 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi hereinafter referred to as the National Commission , whereby the petitions challenging the order dated 29.02.2012 passed by the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission were dismissed. The brief facts of the case which are required to appreciate the rival legal companytentions advanced by the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the parties are stated in brief as hereunder- The appellant was the owner of a Tata Motors goods carrying vehicle bearing registration No.HR-67-7492. The vehicle was insured with the respondent- Company vide policy No. 15019923334104992 with effect from 31.07.2009, valid upto 30.07.2010. The risk companyered in this policy was to the tune of Rs.2,21,153/-. The said vehicle met with an accident on 11.02.2010 on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle bearing registration number UP-75-J 9860. In this regard, an FIR No.66 of 2010 dated 11.02.2010 was registered with the jurisdictional Police Station, Sadar, Fatehabad, for the offence punishable under Sections 279, 337, 304A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as the IPC . The appellant incurred expenses amounting to Rs.1,64,033/- for the repair of his vehicle and also informed the respondent- Company about the accident and damage caused to his vehicle. In this companynection, the respondent- Company appointed one Mr. Atam Prakash Chawla, as the Surveyor to assess the damage caused to the said vehicle. After inspecting the vehicle, the Surveyor assessed the damage caused to the vehicle at Rs.90,000/-, whereas the appellant had preferred a claim for a sum of Rs.1,64,033/- with supporting bills. In addition to above, the respondent-Company appointed M s Innovation Auto Risk Claim Manager for the purpose of investigation. According to the report of the investigator, five passengers were travelling in the goods-carrying vehicle, though the seating capacity of the vehicle as per the registration certificate was only 11. On the basis of findings of the said report, the respondent-Company vide letter dated 26.07.2010 rejected the claim of the appellant for the reason that the loss did number fall within the scope and purview of the insurance policy. Aggrieved of the letter of rejection of the claim of the appellant by the respondent-Company, he filed Complaint No.517 of 2010 against the respondent-Company dated 17.09.2010 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sonepat hereinafter referred to as the District Forum under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for the claim of Rs.1,64,033/- towards the repair of his vehicle on the ground that the rejection of the claim amounts to deficiency in service on the part of the respondent-Company. The respondent-Company filed a detailed written statement before the District Forum disputing the claim of the appellant. It took the plea that the companyplainant had violated the terms and companyditions of the policy, as five passengers were travelling in the goods-carrying vehicle at the time of accident, whereas the permitted seating capacity of the motor vehicle of the appellant was only 11. The District Forum on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the materials on record companysidered the judgment of the National Commission in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pravinbhai D. Prajapati1, wherein it was held that if the number of persons travelling in the vehicle at the time of the accident did number have a bearing on the cause of accident, then the mere factum of the presence of more persons in the vehicle would number disentitle the insured claimant from claiming companypensation under the policy towards the repair charges of the vehicle paid by the appellant. The District Forum accordingly directed the respondent-Company to settle the claim of the appellant on number-standard basis upto 75 of the amount spent for effecting repairs to the damaged vehicle after taking into companysideration the claim amount of Rs.1,64,033/-. The District Forum further directed the respondent-Company to settle the amount to be paid to the appellant along with interest at the rate of 9 per annum from the date of lodging of the claim by the appellant with the respondent-Company. The respondent-Company was further directed to pay Rs.2,000/- for rendering deficient service, causing mental agony and harassment and towards litigation expenses incurred by the appellant. Aggrieved of the order of the District Forum, the respondent Company preferred an appeal before the State Commission urging various grounds. The State Commission placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills P Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Anr.2, wherein it was held as under Before embarking on an examination of the companyrectness of the grounds of repudiation of the policy, it would be apposite to examine the nature of a companytract of insurance. It is trite that in a companytract of insurance, the rights and obligations are governed by the terms of the said companytract. Therefore, the terms of a companytract of insurance law have to be strictly companystrued and numberexception can be made on the ground of equity. Thus, it needs little emphasis that in companystruing the terms of a companytract of insurance important, and it is number open for the companyrt to add, delete or substitute any words. It is also well settled that since upon issuance of an insurance policy, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the loss suffered by the insured on account of risk companyered by the policy, its terms have to be strictly companystrued to determine the extent of liability of the insurer. Therefore, the endeavour of the companyrt should always be to interpret the words in which the companytract is expressed by the parties. The State Commission applied the observation made in the above said case by this Court to the case on hand and held that the District Forum has companymitted a serious error in allowing the companyplaint filed by the appellant herein against the respondent-Company. The State Commission accepted the appeal filed by the respondent-Company and dismissed the companyplaint of the appellant, vide its order dated 29.02.2012 by setting aside the judgment and order of the District Forum. The said judgment passed by the State Commission was challenged by the appellant before the National Commission by way of filing Revision Petition No.2032 of 2012 under Section 21 b of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 questioning the companyrectness of the same by urging various tenable grounds. After examining the material evidence on record, the National Commission has arrived at the companyclusion and held that the factum of the vehicle in question carrying six passengers at the time of the occurrence of the accident was an undisputed fact. Thus, there had been a violation of the terms and companyditions of the insurance policy companyered to the vehicle by the appellant, as he had allowed six passengers to travel in the vehicle when the permitted load was only 11. The National Commission upheld the order passed by the State Commission and dismissed the Revision Petition filed by the appellant by recording its reasons. The Review Petition filed against the dismissal of the Revision Petition by the appellant was also dismissed without companysidering the grounds urged for reviewing its order. The present appeals have been filed challenging the orders passed by the National Commission in dismissing the Revision and Review petitions. In our companysidered view, the companycurrent findings recorded by the National Commission in the impugned judgment and order are erroneous in law for the following reasons. It is an admitted fact that the accident of the vehicle of the appellant was caused on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle bearing registration number UP-75-J9860. An FIR No. 66 of 2010 dated 11.02.2010 was registered under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304-A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said vehicle for the offences referred to supra. The vehicle of the appellant was badly damaged in the accident and it is an undisputed fact that the report of Surveyor assessed the loss at Rs.90,000/-, but the actual amount incurred by the appellant on the repair of his vehicle was Rs.1,64,033/-. The said claim was arbitrarily rejected by the respondent-Company on the ground that the damage caused to the vehicle did number fall within the scope and purview of the insurance policy, as there was a companytravention of terms and companyditions of the policy of the vehicle. The National Commission upheld the order of dismissal of the companyplaint of the appellant passed by the State Commission. The National Commission however, did number companysider the judgment of this Court in the case of B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd Divisional Officer, Hassan3. In that case, the insurance companypany had taken the defence that the vehicle in question was carrying more passengers than the permitted capacity in terms of the policy at the time of the accident. The said plea of the insurance companypany was rejected. This Court held that the mere factum of carrying more passengers than the permitted seating capacity in the goods carrying vehicle by the insured does number amount to a fundamental breach of the terms and companyditions of the policy so as to allow the insurer to eschew its liability towards the damage caused to the vehicle. This Court in the said case has held as under- It is plain from the terms of the Insurance Policy that the insured vehicle was entitled to carry six workmen, excluding the driver. If those six workmen when travelling in the vehicle, are assumed number to have increased risk from the point of view of the Insurance Company on occurring of an accident, how companyld those added persons be said to have companytributed to the causing of it is the pose, keeping apart the load it was carrying. In the present case the driver of the vehicle was number responsible for the accident. Merely by lifting a person or two, or even three, by the driver or the cleaner of the vehicle, without the knowledge of the owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but number so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the companytract, unless some factors existed which by themselves, had gone to companytribute to the causing of the accident. emphasis laid by this Court Further, in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Swaran Singh Ors4. a three judge bench of this Court has held as under- Such a breach on the part of the insured must be established by the insurer to show that number only the insured used or caused or permitted to be used the vehicle in breach of the Act but also that the damage he suffered flowed from the breach. In Narvinvas case supra a Division Bench of this Court observed The insurance companypany companyplains of breach of a term of companytract which would permit it to disown its liability under the companytract of insurance. If a breach of a term of companytract permits a party to the companytract companyplaints of breach to prove that the breach has been companymitted by the other party to the companytract. The test in such a situation would be who would fail if numberevidence is led. The proposition of law is numberlonger resintegra that the person who alleges breach must prove the same. The insurance companypany is, thus, required to establish the said breach by companyent evident. In the event the insurance companypany fails to prove that there has been breach of companyditions of policy on the part of the insured, the insurance companypany cannot be absolved of its liability. emphasis laid by this Court The judgment in the case of Swaran Singh supra has been followed subsequently in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meena Variyal5, wherein this Court held as under- We shall number examine the decision in Swaran Singh on which practically the whole of the arguments on behalf of the claimants were rested. On examining the facts, it is found that, that was a case which related to a claim by a third party. In claims by a third party, there cannot be much doubt that once the liability of the owner is found, the insurance companypany is liable to indemnify the owner, subject of companyrse, to any defence that may be available to it under Section 149 2 of the Act. In case where the liability is satisfied by the insurance companypany in the first instance, it may have recourse to the owner in respect of a claim available in that behalf, it may have recourse to the owner in respect of a claim available that behalf. Swaran Singh was a case where the insurance companypany raised a defence that the owner had permitted the vehicle to be driven by a driver who really had numberlicence and the driving licence produced by him was a fake one. There Lordships discussed the position and held ultimately that a defence under Section 149 2 a ii of the Act was available to an insurer when a claim is filed either under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act. The breach of a policy companydition has to be proved to have been companymitted by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence of or production of fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are number in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third party. The insurance companypany to avoid liability, must number only establish the available defence raised in the proceeding companycerned but must also establish breach on the part of the owner of the vehicle for which the burden of proof would rest with the insurance companypany. Whether such a burden had been discharged, would depend upon the facts breach on the part of the insured companycerning a policy companydition, the insurer would number be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach of companydition is so fundamental as to be found to have companytributed to the cause of the accident. emphasis laid by this Court It becomes very clear from a perusal of the above mentioned case law of this Court that the insurance companypany, in order to avoid liability must number only establish the defence claimed in the proceeding companycerned, but also establish breach on the part of the owner insured of the vehicle for which the burden of proof would rest with the insurance companypany. In the instant case, the respondent-Company has number produced any evidence on record to prove that the accident occurred on account of the overloading of passengers in the goods carrying vehicle. Further, as has been held in the case of B.V. Nagaraju supra that for the insurer to avoid his liability, the breach of the policy must be so fundamental in nature that it brings the companytract to an end. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the accident was infact caused on account of the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its driver, against whom a criminal case vide FIR number 66 of 2010 was registered for the offences referred to supra under the provisions of the IPC. These facts have number been taken into companysideration by either the State Commission or National Commission while exercising their jurisdiction and setting aside the order of the District Forum. Therefore, the judgment and order of the National Commission dated 26.04.2013 passed in the Revision Petition No. 2032 of 2012 is liable to be set aside, as the said findings recorded in the judgment are erroneous in law. Accordingly, we allow these appeals and restore the judgment and order of District Forum. Further, we award a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards the companyt of the litigation as the respondent-Company has unnecessarily litigated the matter up to this Court despite the clear pronouncement of law laid down by this Court on the question with regard to the violation of terms and companyditions of the policy and burden of proof is on the insurer to prove the fact of such alleged breach of terms and companyditions by the insured. Since we have restored the judgment and order of District Forum, we direct the respondent-Company to pay the amount awarded by the District Forum with interest and the companyt which we have awarded in these proceedings within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the companyy of this judgment. CJI. T.S. THAKUR J. GOPALA GOWDA New Delhi, January 7, 2016 ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment COURT NO.10 SECTION XVII S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No s .49-50/2016 arising from SLP C Nos. 37534-37535/2013 LAKHMI CHAND Appellant s VERSUS RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE Respondent s Date 07/01/2016 These appeals were called for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today. For Appellant s Mr. Munawwar Naseem,Adv. For Respondent s Mr. Garvesh Kabra,Adv.

CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal number 10, 2332 2333 of 1968. From the Judgment Order dated the 21st March, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal Nos. 9, 10 and 43 of 1959. K. Sen and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant. K. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Mrs. Anjana Sen, for respondent No. 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J. Premises No. 4-A, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta, belonged to the appellant Gopal Krishna Das and four others, each having an undivided one-fifth share therein. In 1951, one Ganga Prosad Gupta obtained two money-decrees against the appellant and another person in the total sum of Rs. 12,378. In execution of these decrees, the undivided one-fifth share of the appellant was put to sale on June 16, 1954 and was purchased by Pashupati Nath Biswas, the father of the first respondent, for Rs. 77,040. Pashupati Nath Biswas deposited Rs. 19,260 in the companyrt, being 25 of the purchase price and later he deposited a further sum of Rs. 15,000. He however, failed to pay the balance of the purchase price whereupon the appellant made an application that the property be put to a fresh sale. Accordingly, the property was put to sale on March 20, 1957 and once again Pashupati Nath Biswas was the highest bidder. But whereas in the first sale he had offered a bid of Rs. 77,040 this time the sale was knocked down in his favour for a paltry sum of Rs. 700. The second sale was companyfirmed on May 29, 1957. In the meanwhile, on May 16, 1957 the Sheriff certified under Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale due to the default of the auction purchaser, after giving him credit in the sum of Rs, 15,000 paid by him in the first sale, amounted to Rs. 61,340 apart from the companyt and expenses of the sales. On June 28, 1957 the appellant made an application under Order XXI, Rule 71 C.P.C. for recovering the deficiency from Pashupati Nath Biswas. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed that application and direct by an order dated August 19, 1958 that Pashupati Nath Biswas do pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 42,080 with interest at 6 per annum. This order was challenged by Pashupati Nath Biswas in appeal No. 10 of 1959. The auction purchaser had also filed an application asking that the appellant be restrained from taking execution proceedings for recovering the deficiency in price. That prayer was rejected. It may be mentioned that pursuant to an application dated April 13, 1957 filed by the auction purchaser himself, it was directed by an order dated May 21, 1957 that a sum of Rs. 22,000 be paid by the, Sheriff out of the sale proceeds lying with him, to the Official Receiver in satisfaction of the decree obtained by Ganga Prosad Gupta against the appellant, in execution of which the two sales were held. Ganga Prosad Guptas estate, it seems, had companye to be vested in the Official Receiver, he is the second respondent to these appeals. The auction purchaser prayed that the Sheriff do pay to him the balance after deducting therefrom the sum of Rs. 22,000 and the companyt and the expenses of the Sheriff. This prayer was also rejected. The auction purchaser filed appeal No. 9 of 1959 against the order rejecting this application. The appellant then filed an application for an order directing that the Sheriff do pay to him all the moneys lying with him after deducting the companyt and the expenses of the sales. That application was allowed by the learned single Judge on December 11, 1958. The auction purchaser challenged that order in appeal No. 43 of 1959. The three appeals were heard together and disposed of by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by three separate judgments. By its. judgment dated March 21, 1967 the Division Bench allowed appeal No. 10 of 1959, and dismissed the application filed by the appellant under order XXI, Rule 71 for recovering from the auction purchaser the deficiency in the sale price. The two other appeals were disposed of companysistently with that judgment. The auction purchaser Pashupati Nath Biswas having died on April 16, 1964, the first respondent Sailendra Nath Biswas came on the record of the, appeals as his Executor and legal representative. On December 15, 1967 the High Court granted to the appellant leave to file an appeal to this Court under Article 133 1 a and c of the Constitution. Questions raised in the High Court by the rival parties as regards the disbursement by the Sheriff of the balance remaining with him after.satisfying Ganga Prosad Guptas decree are incidental to the main companytroversy arising out of the appellants applicationunder Order XXI, Rule 71, Code of Civil Procedure. The real question for decision is whether the appellant is entitled under Order XXI, Rule 71, to recover from the first respondent the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale. The scheme of the Code in relation to execution sales is like this Under Order XXI, Rule 64 any Court executing a decree may order the sale of a property in satisfaction of the decree. Order 21, Rule 66 provides that the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made. Sub- Rule 2 of Rule 66 specifies the details which are required to be mentioned in the proclamation of sale. The person declared to be the purchaser must under order XXI, Rule 84, pay immediately after the declaration a deposit of 25 of the purchase-money. In default of such deposit the property has to be re-sold forthwith. By Rule 85 the full amount of purchase-money has to be paid by the purchaser within 15 days from the date of sale. If the purchaser companymits a default, the deposit is liable to be forfeited to the Government by virtue of Rule 86 and the property is liable to be re-sold. A re-sale of property, in default of payment of the purchase-money, can be made only after the issue of a fresh proclamation as provided in Rule Under Order 21, Rule 71 Any deficiency of price which may happen on a re-sale by reason of the purchasers default, and all expenses attending such re-sale, shall be certified to the Court by the officer or other person holding the sale, and shall, at the instance of either the decree holder or the judgment debtor, be recoverable from the defaulting purchaser under the provisions relating to the execution of a decree for the payment of money It is clear on a careful reading of Rule 71 that its application is limited to cases in which the deficiency of price has occurred by reason of the auction purchasers default. Property once put to sale in execution proceedings may have to be re-sold for reasons which may or may number be companynected with the default of the, auction purchaser. A resale companysequent on the failure of the auction purchaser to deposit 25 of the purchase price immediately after he is declared to be the purchaser of the property or a re-sale companysequent upon his failure to deposit the balance of the purchase price within 15 days of the safe are instances when the re-sale is occasioned by the default of the auction purchaser. On the other hand, re-sale companysequent upon the setting aside of the sale on the ground of material irregularity in publishing or companyducting the sale as provided in Order XXI, Rule 90, may number be attributable to the default of the purchaser. The provisions of Order XXI, Rule 71, companye into play only if the property is required to be resold on account of the default of the action purchaser. If the re-sale, is number due to the auction purchasers default, there can be numberquestion of mulcting him with the deficiency in the price realised in the re-sale. The words Any deficiency of price which may happen on a resale by reason of the purchasers default occurring in Rule 71 therefore mean Any deficiency of price which on a resale may happen by reason of the purchasers default. As stated before, the question of holding the auction purchaser liable to make good the defficiency in price can arise only if the re-sale is occasioned by his default. But though, this is necessary, it is number enough to meet the requirements of Rule 71. What is necessary is that the re-sale occasioned by the auction purchasers default must result in a deficiency of price, which deficiency is attributable to his default. A resale may have to be held because the auction purchaser has companymitted default in paying the deposit of 25 under Order XXI, Rule 84, or because of his default in paying the full price which 15 days of the sale as required by Rule 85. And yet the deficiency of price realised in the re-sale may number be attributable to his default as, for example, where the market value of the property is reduced to the discovery or disclosure of an infirmity in the right, title and interest of the judgmentdebtor in the property put to sale. An encumbrance existing on the property at the time of the first sale but number disclosed in the proclamation of that sale will have numberbearing on the price realised in the auction sale, unless the existence of the encumbrance was otherwise known to the bidders. The disclosure of that encumbrance in the sale proclamation accompanying the re-sale must, on numbermal companymercial companysiderations, have a direct impact on the price, of the property put to sale. In such a case the deficiency of price realised in the resale will be attributable number necessarily to the default of the auction ,purchaser but to circwnstances extraneous to his default. Order XXI, Rule 71, companycerns itself number with that class of cases but with those in which the deficiency of price realised in the resale is attributable to the default of the auction purchaser. Even a broad and number-too-meticulous examination of the two proclamation of sale in the instant case is enough to companyclude that the deficiency in price realised in the resale cannot be said to have happened on account of the auction purchasers default. The first sale was held on June 16, 1954 and the proclamation of sale accompanying it is dated May 10, 1954. The second sale was held on March 20, 1957 for which the relevant sale proclamation is dated February 8, 1957. Both the proclamations mention that what was being put to sale was the right, little and interest of the appellant, Gopal Krishna Das, in the undivided one fifth share in the particular property. But there is a material difference in the terms of the two proclamations in regard to the encumbrances existing on the property. The proclamation of 1954 sets out in a tabular form encumbrances like leases and mortgages to which the ,Property was previously subjected, as appearing from the affidavit of one Damodar Mullick. The proclamation then says - It appears from the said affidavit that all the Mortgages have been reconveyed. The lease has expired. The sale is in respect of the undivided 1/5th share of Purna Ch. Das. It appears from the said affidavit that the 1/5th share of Gopal Kr. Das in the said premises is free from encumbrances. The proclamation of 1957, relying on an affidavit of one Sudhansu Kumar Roy says undoubtedly that the, appellants one-fifth share was free from encumbrances but the tabular statement of encumbrances included in the proclamation refers to a Term Lease and Agreement of 1955 and the proclamation says The lease of 1955 is for five years from October, 1955 and the same is in respect of the Restaurant Bombay Crown companytaining the entire ground floor excenting two road side shops and was executed by one Abde Ali Abdul Hussain, in favour of Ashlifaq and Jaffar Hussain. It is numberorious that properties in possession of tenants who enjoy the protection of Rent Acts do number fetch the same price as properties of which the purchaser can obtain vacant possesion. In the city of Calcutta where the Property in question is situated, The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, XII of 1956, was in force, at the time of the second sale. Under that Act the tenants enjoyed the privileges of standard rent and immunity from eviction save on stated grounds. It is unnecessary to enter into refinements arising out of the West Bengal Act but even the sub-tenants would appear to enjoy thereunder a certain amount of immunity from eviction. Reference may in this behalf be made to sections 13 2 , 4 , 5 and section 16 of the Act of 1956. The reference in the second sale proclamation to a live lease and sub-lease and to the fact that a substantial part of tlie property was in occupation of the tenant or the subtenant was bound to affect the marketability of the property. The paltry price realised in the second sale may justifiably be attributed to the disclosure of encumbrances in the second proclamation, which were number mentioned in the first proclamation. It is number without significance that apart from the auction purchaser there were numberbidders at the second sale. The paucity of bidders may reasonably be taken to reflect the fall in the value of the property in the estimation of prospective bidders. Order XXI, Rule 71 is intended to provide an expeditious remedy to the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder who has suffered a detriment due to the default of the auction purchaser. The officer or other person holding the sale has to. certify to the Court the deficiency of price which on, the re-sale has happened by the purchasers default and all expenses attending the re-sale. Upon such certification the amount becomes recoverable from the defaulting purchaser at the instance of the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor, under the provisions relating to the execution of a decree for the payment of money. The Code has number made the certificate companyclusive of the facts stated therein and companysequently it is permissible to the purchaser who is alleged to have defaulted to challenge the companyrectness of the certificate in all its particulars. But the object of certification, as evidenced even more clearly by the provision that the proceeding to recover the amount will be governed by provisions relating to the execution of a money decree is to eschew an elaborate inquiry into the companypeting causes culminating in the deficiency of price., This object can be achieved only if the property successively put to sale is in material respects identical, that is to say if the right. title and interest of the judgment debtor is put to sale under substantially the same description. If that happens it is easy to predicate that the deficiency of price has resulted on account of the purchasers default. But if, as here, what was shown as unencumbered in the previous proclamation is expressly described in the later proclamation as being subject to an encumbrance which on a reasonable assessment, is calculated to affect the market value of the property, the proceeding ceases to be a simple enough matter like the execution of a money decree and assumes the form of a companytentious claim open to diverse defences as in a substantive suit. The speedy remedy intend to be provided by Order XXI, Rule 71 will lose its meaning and purpose if the executing companyrt seized of the claim against the, alleged defaulting purchaser has to embark upon a companyparative, evaluation of the causes that led to the deficiency in the price. Such, meat is number for the executing companyrt. Counsel for the appellant relied on certain decisions to fasten liability on the auction purchaser but those decisions will number help. In Annavajhula Venkatachellamayya Rama Girjee Milakanta Girjee 1 , a purchaser in a companyrt auction of the judgment-debtors right to get a recompanyveyance of certain lands on payment of a specified sum was, on default in payment of the balance purchase money, held liable to pay the deficiency in price on re-sale under Order XXI, Rule 71, C.P.C., though the date stipulated for making the payment in order to get the re-conveyance happened to be shortly after the companyrt sale and before the expiry of the 15 days within which the auction purchaser companyld deposit the balance of the purchase-money. Wallis J. observes in his judgment that the sale and the re-sale, were of the, judgment-debtors interest as it existed at the date of the sale and the re-sale and that the depreciation which occurred in the meantime was one for which the auction purchaser was exclusively responsible. In his companycurring judgment Kumaraswami Sastriyar J. observes that having regard to the fact that there is numberwarrant of title in a companyrt auction, the maxim caveat emptor applies and therefore the purchaser cannot avoid the sale so long as the judgmentdebtor has some saleable interest in the property, howsoever small. The learned Judge further observes that the objections which a defaulting purchaser can urge are practically companyfined to those which can be. urged in an application for setting aside the sale under Order XXI. Relying on these observations it is companytended on behalf of the appellant that since in the instant case the judgmentdebtor had a saleable interest the auction purchaser cannot avoid his liability to make up the deficiency in price on the ground that the deficiency was caused by the disclosure of the encumbrance. We are unable to appreciate the relevance of the maxim caveat emptor on a question like the one before us. The auction purchaser is number attempting to avoid the sale. Far from it. He adheres to his purchase but disputes his liability for the deficiency. There is numberquestion of any failure on his part to take due care at the time of the first sale because that sale was held in 1954 whereas the encumbrance referred to in the second proclamation was stated to have been created in 1955. Madho v. Watsalubai 2 , on which the appellant relies, was a case in which the existence of a maintenance charge and the right of residence were omitted to be mentioned in the sale proclamation. The High Court at Nagpur held that the auction purchaser companyld number avoid his liability to make good the deficiency in the sale price as the decree-bolder in whose favour the charge was created had reiterated again and again that she was willing to waive the charge. Hidayatullah J. who decided the case further observes in his judgment that I.L.R. 41 Mad. 474. I.L.R. 1947 Nag. 939. on a companyparison of the two sale proclamations he found that the existence of the charge was number mentioned in either. Naturally, the deficiency in price companyld number be attributed to the, existence of the charge. In Nelluri Brahmaiah vs. Mohd. Sheik Mohiddin and Anr., 1 the auction purchaser disputed his liability for the, deficiency on the ground that the judgment debtor had numbersaleable interest in the property. This companytention was based on the circumstance that though the property was situated in Venkatapuram it was wrongly described as lying within the limits of Borrampalem. There was numberdispute about the boundaries, about the survey number or the area and it was number suggested that there was any other property of the particular description in Borrampalem. The High Court of Andra Pradesh held that in these circumstances the property companyld be easily identified, that the location of the property put to sale was known to everyone companycerned and therefore it was difficult to posit that the judgment-debtor had numbersaleable interest in the property. The decisions in Baijnath Sahai vs. Moheep Narain Singh and in Gangadas Dayabhai vs. Bai Suraj 3 , are more to the point. These cases arose under section 293 of the Code of 1882 companyresponding to Order XXI, Rule 71, of the Code of 1908. In the Calcutta case, at the first sale numberencumbrance upon the properties sold was numberified. In the re-sale two encumbrances were numberified. The second sale was held because the auction purchaser had companymitted a default in paying the balance, of the purchase-price in the first sale. The price fetched in the second sale resulted in a deficiency for which the auction purchaser was sought to be made liable. Apart from the circumstance that the decreeholder was himself to blame for number mentioning the encumbrances in the first proclamation and was therefore attempting to obtain an advantage of his own wrong, the Calcutta High Court expressed the legal position companyrectly by saying that the re-sale companytemplated by s. 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be a sale of the same property that was first sold, and under the same description, and any substantial difference of description at the sale and the re-sale in any of the matters required to be specified by s. 287 to enable intending purchasers to judge of the value of the property should disentitle the decree-holder to recover the deficiency of price ,under s. 293. In the Bombay Case the errors in the two proclamations were so companyfusing that the deficiency in the price companyld number, it was held, be attributed to the default of the purchaser. The description in the second proclamation being materially different from that in the first, the re-sale was number of the same property and the auction purchaser, though he had defaulted in paying the balance of the purchase-price was absolved from making good the deficiency. It was companytended that Pashupati Nath Biswas, the auction purchaser, being in possession of a part of the property must be deemed 1 1964 1 Andhra Law Times, 321. I. L. R. 16 Cal. 535. I. L. R. 36 Bom. 329. to have been aware of the lease and the sub-lease and therefore he is estopped from relying upon the same as having led to the deficiency in, price. No estoppel can arise against the auction purchaser on the question whether the deficiency in price can be recovered from him. The question which arises under Order XXI, Rule 71 is whether the deficiency can be attributed to the default of the, auction purchaser or whether it can be reasonably attributed to any other supervening circumstance. This is number a case in which the auction purchaser can be said to be taking advantage of his own wrong. He cannot therefore be estopped from companytending that the disclosure of the encumbrance is the operative cause of the fall in price. We may mention that the matter under companysideration arose out of the Ordinary Original civil jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the Original Side Rules of the High Court would govern the matter. That will, however, number make any difference to our decision because Chapter XXV, Rule 7 of the Rules of 1914 provides by the Third clause for resale of the property in default of the payment of the price by the purchaser within the stipulated time,. The Third clause of Rule 7 provides Where the proceeds of the resale are less than the price bid by such defaulting purchaser, the difference shall be leviable from him under the rules companytained in Order XXI of the Code for the execution of a decree for money. The Fifth clause of Rule 7 also provides that the sale. is made under and subject to all other provisions companytained in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to sales in execution of decrees. Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code would therefore apply. It was finally companytended on behalf of the appellant that the appeal filed by the auction purchaser from the judgment of the single Judge to the Division Bench of the High Court was barred by limitation. We see numbersubstance in this companytention. The time requisite for obtaining certified companyies undoubtedly means the time properly required and an appellant cannot in the companyputation of the period of limitation for filling the appeal ask for exclusion of time which was spent negligently. But the facts and dates mentioned to us by the appellants companynsel show that the settlement of the draft decree was adjourned from time to time by an officer of the companyrt on being property satisfied that there was good reason for adjournment. The auction purchaser cannot be blamed for the time thus spent in settling the draft of the decree under appeal. The argument must therefore fail. For these reasons we companyfirm the judgments and dismiss these appeals with Costs. Costs shall be in one set.

DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, J. The unsuccessful tenants are the Appellants before us in this appeal. The Respondent is the landlord. The premises in question is situated at Station Road, Ajmer, Rajasthan on a monthly rent of Rs. 300. The Respondent Plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the tenants on the grounds of default in payment of rent and for change of user and subletting. It was alleged that the tenants companymitted default in payment of rent for more than six months. It has further been averred that the tenants have sublet the premises to Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation in short RIDC for running a Beer shop at a rent of Rs. 2100/- per month without taking prior permission of the landlord. The Appellants filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. The Appellants companytended that they had number companymitted any default in payment of rent and the same has been deposited in the Court. It was stated that the Respondent-Landlord refused to accept the rent. The same was sent by money order which was also number accepted. Being left with numberother choice, the tenants deposited the said rent in Court under Section 19A of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1950 in short the Act . It has also been specifically stated that the premises in question was given to RTDC only for a period of 20 days as the RTDCS shop was under companystruction and renovation. During the pendency of the Suit rent came to be determined under the provisions of Section 13 3 of the Act. The companynsel for the Respondent- Landlord admitted the deposit of rent from 1.4.1991 to 31.12.1994. i.e. for a period of 32 months at the rate of Rs. 300 per month under Section 19A of the Act. Therefore, it is submitted that there is numberdispute regarding deposit of the rent in the Court. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent and subletting. The landlord did number press the ground of change of user. The tenants aggrieved by the above order of the Trial Court, filed an Appeal before the Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 115/1997. The Appellate Court dismissed the Appeal and observed that the deposit made under Section 19A of the Act was number a valid deposit. The Appellate Court also affirmed the finding of the Trial Court on the ground of subletting. Being aggrieved by the order of the First Appellate Court, the tenants filed a Second Appeal before the High Court being S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 234/1998. The High Court admitted the Appeal and framed the necessary substantial questions of law. The High Court by its Judgment dated 26.8.2003 dismissed the Second Appeal filed by the tenants. Being aggrieved, the tenants have filed the above Appeal before this Court by way of Special Leave. Notice was ordered on the Special Leave Petition on 21.11.2003 and interim stay of the operation of the High Courts order was also granted on the same date. The interim order was also companytinued on 26.4.2004 pending further orders subject to the companydition that the arrears of rent shall be deposited to the credit of the proceedings before the trial Court within six weeks from that date. On 6.7.2004, leave was granted and the stay was ordered to companytinue. At the request of both the parties, this Court passed an order on 20th March, 2006 and posted the Appeal for hearing finally during the summer vacation. We have heard Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, the learned companynsel for the Appellants-tenants and Mr. K.S. Bhati, the learned companynsel for the Respondent-Landlord. Mr. Jain took us through the entire pleadings and the orders passed by all the three companyrts. So far as the eviction on the ground of deposit of rent in the Court is companycerned, Mr. Jain submitted that when the tenants had deposited the rent by resorting to the provisions of Section 19A of the Act after permission of the Court, there is presumption of companypliance of the provisions of Section 19A of the Act and, therefore, the Courts below were number justified in holding that the deposit under Section 19A of the Act was number legal as the tenants did number follow the proceedings of money order. According to Mr. Jain once the rent has been deposited in Court after due permission of the Court, there is presumption of companypliance under Section 114E of the Evidence Act. He further companytends that the present case is number a case of rent default and that the deposit of rent in the Court under Section 19A of the Act and the admission of the Landlord for determination of the rent under Section 13 3 of the Act that the amount of rent had already been deposited in the Court from 1.4.1991 to 31.12.1994 at the rate of Rs. 300 per month, the Appellants are entitled for the benefit of Section 13 sub-clauses 3 , 4 and 6 of the Act. He further submitted that under the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, a decree for eviction cannot be passed against the tenants when they were always ready and willing to pay rent and have deposited the rent in the Court prior to the filing of the suit. Insofar as the eviction on the ground of subletting is companycerned, Mr. Jain submitted that the tenants had sublet the premises to the RTDC when the premises had been given only for a period of 20 days to accommodate them as their shop was under reconstruction and renovation and, therefore, when the tenants had number sublet the premises to the RTDC and permitted them to have exclusive possession of the shop, there cannot be any subletting. Mr. K.S. Bhati, the learned companynsel appearing for the landlord submitted that the companytentions put forward by Mr. Jain have absolutely numbermerit and that all the three companyrts have companycurrently found that the tenants have willfully defaulted in the payment of rent and also sublet the premises, though temporarily, for a period of four months and companylected a sum of Rs. 2100/- per month. Mr. Bhati also invited our attention to the categorie findings rendered by the High Court. The provisions of clause e of sub-section 1 of Section 13 of the Act read as under Eviction of tenants, - 1 Notwithstanding anything companytained in any law or companytract, numberCourt shall pass any decree or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied. a that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord or The High Court on a companysideration of the evidence tendered by the parties herein came to the companyclusion that the tenant had clearly sublet the three shops to RTDC for a period of four months and received Rs. 2100 as rent from RTDC. The Court also held that there are companycurrent findings that the possession of the suit shop was with RTDC to carry on the business of Beer shop and during that period tenants had numbercontrol whatsoever over the suit shop. It was also further held that there is numberevidence to show that the tenants were companytinuing in possession of the suit shop during that period. Therefore, the High Court has companycluded that the use of the said shop for a period of four months by RTDC on payment of Rs. 2100/- as rent, certainly amounts to subletting within the meaning of clause e of sub-section 1 of Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 sub-clause 1 , e deals with subletting, The said Section says that if the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise partied with the possession of, the wholly or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord, the tenant is liable to be evidence from the premises. In the instant case it has been clearly established by the evidence of the Senior Officer Assistant in RTDC from 1982. It is his evidence that RTDC had taken the disputed shop on rent from 11.4.1991 on temporary basis because in the shop in front of KEM, the repair work was going on. He further stated that RTDC remained in possession for four months on payment of rent. He further deposed that RTDC had given the rent of Rs. 2100/- per month of the disputed shop from 11.4.1991 to 15.8.1991 and the rent was paid to Gurbachan Singh, the tenant. In the cross-examination numberhing has been elicited to discredit his testimony and to disprove their case with regard to subletting and the receipt of the rent. The learned companynsel for the tenants has cited Delhi Stationers and Printers Rajendra Kumar, 1990 2 SCC 331. This is also a case of subletting. In this case, this Court had held that mere user of the tenant-appellants kitchen and latrine by the companytenant who was residing in the portion let out to him by the respondent-landlord cannot mean that the appellant had transferred the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine and had parted with the legal possession of the said part of the premises in favour of the companytenant. This judgment, in our opinion, has numberapplication to the case on hand. In the above case, the tenant has permitted to use the kitchen and latrine on a temporary basis. He has number transferred the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine. He had also number parted with the legal possession of the part of the premises in his possession and companylected any amount by way of rent. This case, therefore, is distinguishable on facts and law. Mr. Jain has also cited the case of Dev Kumar v. Swaran Lata, 1996 1 SCC 25 at Page 30 Pragraph 9 , which reads thus Coming to the second question the expression sub-letting has number been defined in the Act. The companyclusion on the question of subletting is a companyclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for companysideration. As to what is the true meaning of the expression sub-letting, this Court companysidered the same in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, 1984 SCC 590 in an eviction proceeding under U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act. The Court held that merely from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop, sub-letting cannot be presumed and as long as companytrol over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, subletting flowing from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. It was further held that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sub-let, the allegation has to be proved. The question of sub-letting was companysidered by this Court in the case of Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. H.C. Sharma, 1988 1 SCC 70 and it was held that in order to companystrue sub-letting there must be parting of legal possession of the lessee and parting of legal possession means possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. It is seen from the above paragraph that subletting cannot be presumed as long as companytrol over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant. This Judgment also says that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sublet, the allegation has to be proved. As already numbered in the instant case, the allegation of subletting has been clearly established by the evidence of the employee of the RTDC and also by payment of rent. This Judgment is also of numberassistance to the Appellants. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Gappulal v. Shriji Dwarkadheeshji, AIR 1969 SC 1291. This case also deals with the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 17 of 1950 . Section 13 1 e was also companysidered by this Court in the said Judgment. This Judgment held that in the event of subletting without permission of landlord, eviction is the only proper remedy and that the subletting of the premises whether before or after the companymencement of the Act, is immaterial. If the tenant has sublet the premises without the permission of the landlord either before or after the companying into the force of the Act, he is number protected from eviction under Section 13 1 e of the Act and it matters number that he had right to sublet the premises under Section 108 j of the Transfer of Property Act. In this case also, the Landlord has established the ground of eviction under Section 13 1 e with regard to the two shops on the numberthern side of the staircase of the temple. This Court on a companysideration of the Section 13 1 e of the Act and of the evidence came to the companyclusion that the landlord is entitled to a decree for ejectment of the tenant from the two shops. This Court also held that the companycurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with in a Second Appeal. In the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, 1984 2 SCC 590, this Court has held as under It is only when a person other than the tenant sits in the shop in exercise of his own right that the presumption of subletting can arise. As long as companytrol over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, subletting flowing from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. The Act does number require the Court to assume a subtenancy merely from the fact of presence of an outsider. The allegation that the premises has been sublet to a person has to be proved as a fact by the landlord and merely on the basis of a photograph showing presence of that person or his son within the premises, subletting cannot be presumed. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. C. Sharma, 1988 1 SCC 70. This is also a case of subletting. In this case, this Court has dealt with the provisions of Section 14 1 proviso b and 16 2 and 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The question posed before this Court for companysideration was whether there was a subletting and whether for that written companysent of landlord has been obtained. This Court held that companycurrent findings of fact on those questions of Tribunal and High Court would numbermally be accepted by Supreme Court in Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This Court also held that the tenant has numberright to sublet a portion of the premises without written companysent of the landlord in companytravention of the lease deed. Since the premises was let out without the written permission of the landlord, this companyrt held that the landlord is entitled to eviction decree. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Dipak Banerjee v. Lilabati Chakraborty, 1987 4 SCC 161. This is yet another instance of subletting under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and Section 13 1 a of the said Act. This Court has categorically held that person alleged to be a subtenant must be shown to be in exclusive possession of the premises over which the main tenant has numbercontrol. This Court also held that the ingredient to prove the tenancy or subtenancy is that the right to occupy the premises must be in lieu of payment of some companypensation or rent. In the present case, there was clear evidence as to the subletting and also the receipt of the rent by the tenant from the sublessee. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there is absolutely numberwarrant to interfere with the companycurrent findings of the three companyrts. However, we leave open the first question argued by Mr. Jain on the interpretation of Section 13 3 , 4 and 6 to be decided in an appropriate case and Section 19A of the Act. Mr. Jain in the alternative prayed for some reasonable time to vacate the premises and handover peaceful vacant possession to the landlord. It is number in dispute that the tenants are in occupation of the shop in question from the year 1970. The tenants have also deposited the rent in the Court as ordered by this Court. Considering the long occupation of the premises in question, we are of the view that a reasonable time should be given to the tenants so that they will be in a position to companylect all the dues due to them by third parties. Time is also to be given to enable them to find out a suitable accommodation. We, therefore, grant nine months time to the tenants to vacate the premises and handover peaceful vacant possession by the end of February, 2007. The tenants shall number pay a sum of Rs.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 4145-46 of 1986. From the Judgment and order dated 10.7.85 and 11.11.85 of the High Court of Calcutta in Appeal No. 477 of 1984. Tapas Ray and B.R. Agarwal for the Appellant. A. Bobde, Rajiv Dutta and Ms. Mridula Ray for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered SHARMA, J. By the impugned judgment the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside the ex-parte decree passed by the Original Side of the Court in favour of the plaintiff Sudha Devi, the present appellant. The dispute between the parties is in regard to a flat in a building on Lord Sinha Road, Calcutta. The plaintiff prayed for a decree for Rs.1,44,730 as past mesne profits besides future mesne profits at the rate of Rs.170 per day and for if necessary, decree as against the third respondent for possession of the flat described in the plaint. By way of an alternative relief to the money claimed, an inquiry for determination of the mesne profits was asked for. None of the defendants appeared. At the ex-parte trial the plaintiff examined one witness and tendered certain documents in evidence. The learned Single Judge decreed the suit and the defendant No. 3 present respondent No. 1 filed an appeal therefrom which was allowed on 10-7-1985 by the judgment which is under challenge in Civil Appeal No. 4146 of 1986. The plaintiff thereafter filed an application with a prayer to modify the judgment and remand the suit for retrial. The prayer was rejected by the order dated 11-10-1985. Civil Appeal No. 4145 of 1986 is directed against this order. According to the plaintiffs case, the defendant No. 1 Baranagar Jute Factory Company Ltd. was the tenant in respect to the flat in question under the plaintiff. The Jute Company defaulted in payment of rent and also wrongfully sublet the flat to the second defendant Sadhan Chattopadhyaya, which led to the filing of an eviction suit by the plaintiff. Both the defendants were impleaded in the suit but they did number appear to companytest. An ex-parte decree of eviction was passed on 19-2-1982. It is further pleaded that subsequent to the decree, either of the two defendants or both wrongfully inducted the third defendant to occupy the demised flat. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to the reliefs mentioned in the plaint. The third defendant filed an application under the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex-parte decree, but later withdrew the same and assailed the decree in appeal on merits. The Letters Patent Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the decree on the ground that the plaintiff, on the basis of the meagre evidence led by her, failed to establish her case. The fact that the plaintiff obtained an ex-parte decree in the earlier suit against the defendant No. 1 and 2 is established by the companyy of the decree exhibited in the case. The allegation in the plaint so far as the third defendant is companycerned, is in paragraph 7 in the following words Subsequent to the said Decree on a date or dates which the plaintiff is unable to specify until after disclosure by the defendants, the first and or second defendants wrongfully permitted and allowed the third defendant to occupy the said demised flat. The first and or second defendants by themselves and or by the third defendant are still in wrongful possession of the said demised flat. The only evidence relevant to this part of the case is to be found in the oral evidence of the plaintiffs sole witness Nand Kumar Tibrewal. The High Court in appeal has declined to rely on his evidence mainly on the ground that the witness has number disclosed his companycern with the suit property or his relationship with the plaintiff. He has been rejected as incompetent. The learned Counsel for the appellant companytended that the witness number deceased was the husband of the plaintiff-appellant and thus he was fully companyversant with the relevant facts. The criticism by the High Court that the witness did number state anything in his evidence which companyld companynect him with the plaintiff or the property and thus make him companypetent was attempted to be met before us by relying on an affidavit filed in this Court. We are afraid, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to fill up the lacuna in the evidence belatedly at the Supreme Court stage. Besides, affidavits are number included in the definition of evidence in s. 3 of the Evidence Act and can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reason companyrt passes an order under Order XIX, Rules 1 or 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This part of the argument of Mr. Tapas Ray must, therefore, be rejected. The learned companynsel next urged that even ignoring the relationship of the witness with the plaintiff, his evidence is adequate to prove the plaintiffs case which has number been rebutted by any of the defendants either by filing a written statement or cross-examining the witness. Mr. Bobde, the learned companynsel representing the defendant No. 3 respondent No. 1 before us , companytended that the witness companytradicted the case pleaded in the plaint by positively stating that the defendant No. 3 was in possession of the flat in question from before the date of the decree passed in the earlier suit. The plaintiffs assertion in paragraph 7 of the plaint is thus companytradicted and the suit cannot be decreed on its basis. The learned companynsel proceeded to analyse the situation arising out of the records of the case to show that if the defendant No. 3 is held to be in possession since before the earlier decree, other issues would arise in the suit, on which the plaintiff will be required to lead further evidence. The learned companynsel strenuously argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the prayer of the plaintiff made after the disposal of the appeal before the Letters Patent Bench for remanding the suit to the learned Single Judge Original Side for retrial was fit to be allowed and that Civil Appeal No. 4145 of 1986 should be allowed by this Court. On the failure of the defendants to appear in the suit, the learned trial Judge decided to proceed with the case ex-parte. Even in absence of a defence the companyrt cannot pass an ex-parte decree without reliable relevant evidence. The fact that the plaintiff chose to examine some evidence in the case cannot by itself entitle her to a decree. The High Court in appeal was, therefore, perfectly justified in scrutinising the evidence from this angle. The suit was filed and the relief was claimed on the basis that the third defendant was inducted in the flat in question by the other two defendants after they had already suffered a decree, and there is number an iota of evidence led by the plaintiff to prove this story. On the other hand, the evidence of the sole witness disproves this part of the case. Having regard to the allegations in the plaint, the facts emerging from the documents and the oral evidence, it is clear that several other questions may arise for companysideration if the defendant No. 3 is assumed to be in possession from before the earlier decree. We, therefore, agree with Mr. Bobde that the plaintiff cannot be allowed a decree on the evidence led by her in the suit founded on the plaint as it is. After hearing the learned companynsel for the parties at companysiderable length, we also agree with Mr. Bobde that in the interest of justice the prayer made on behalf of the plaintiff before the High Court after the disposal of the appeal for remand and retrial of the suit is fit to be allowed. As numberody is disputing this position before us, we do number companysider it necessary to further deal with this aspect. In view of the prayer made by the plaintiff in the High Court and in Civil Appeal No. 4145 of 1986 before this Court and the companycession of the defendant number 3 before us, we hold that the suit should be sent back to the learned Single Judge for retrial. The plaintiff may file an application for amendment of her pleading, if so advised, and in that case the learned Single Judge shall dispose it of in accordance with law. The defendants will thereafter be allowed to file their written statements within a period to be indicated by the Court. The suit will thereafter be taken up for further trial as expeditiously as may be possible. The evidence already led by the plaintiff shall companytinue to be evidence in the suit. In the result, the judgments of the High Court dated 10-7-1985 and 11-10-1985, passed in Appeal No. 477 of 1984 are set aside and the suit is remanded to the learned Single Judge for disposal in the light of the observations made above. We feel that the suit ought to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and we expect and hope that the trial Judge will be able to dispose it of within six months. The appeals before us are allowed in the above terms.

Khanna, J. The nine appellants, Rajendra Rai 28 , Baleshwar Rai 19 , Dhupa Rai 20 , Ramlakhan Rai 60 Ramanand Rai 65 , Judagi Rai 18 , Dhuli Rai 32 , Dhorha 25 and Krishna Rai 22 were tried along with three others Jadu Rai 17 , Ramnandan Rai 23 and Jitan Rai 60 in the companyrt of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patna and were acquitted. On appeal filed by the State of Bihar and revision petition filed by Harbandan Singh, the Patna High Court set aside the acquittal of the nine appellants and companyvicted them for offences under Section 302 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code for the murder of Palaknath Singh 28 and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life. Conviction was also recorded against the appellants for other offences but it is number necessary to set out their details. Acquittal of Jitan Rai, Ramanandan Rai and Jadu Rai was affirmed. The nine appellants thereafter came up in appeal to this Court by special leave. The nine appellants as well as Palaknath Singh deceased belonged to village Lahiyarchak in district Patna. Out of the appellants, Rajendra Rai and Baleshwar Rai are brothers, being sons of Ramanand Rai accused. The prosecution case is that Harnandan Singh PW 17 who is the father of Palaknath Singh deceased, had enmity with the accused since 1948 when a dacoity was companymitted in Harnandan Singhs house. Ramanand Rat and Jitan accused were prosecuted in companynection with that dacoity. The relations between the parties also got strained when a companytest took place for the post of Mukhia between Nankhkoo Singh PW 20 , father of Harnandan Singh on one side and Rambhaju Singh on the other. In that election Rajendra Rai and Baleshwar Rai accused acted as the agents of Rambhaju Singh A day before the present occurrence some bundles of paddy were stolen from the Khalihan thrashing ground of Ramanand Rai accused Ramanand thought that the above theft had taken place at the instance of Nankhkoo Singh. On January 14, 1966 at about numbern time, it is stated, Bhola Singh PW 5 was working in his onion field when he saw the nine appellants companying from the village abadi to the field of Harnandan Singh PW 17 . Out of the nine appellants, Dhupa Rai, and Rajendra Rai were armed with garasas, while Tamlakhan and Baleshwar had bhalas. The rest of the five appellants were armed with lathis. Rajendra and Baleshwar then began to uproot Khesari crop from the field of Harnandan Singh. When Bholasingh protested, Ramanand accused replied as to why he did number protest when Nankhkoo got Ramanands paddy stolen. Ramanand also asked Bhola Singh to send Nankhkoo. Bhola Singh then went to the Dalan of Nankhkoo and found besides others Palaknath deceased and Sudheshwar PW 13 , sons of Harnandan Singh, present there. Bhola Singh told them about the uprooting of Khesari crop from Harnandan Singhs field by the appellants. Palaknath then ran towards the Khesari field, while Sudheshwar went to inform his father Harnandan Singh who was present in his Khalihan along with Mohd. Shamim P W.1 , Haidar PW 8 and Ekram CW 1 . Harnandan Singh was at that time getting paddy thrashed in the Khalihan. Bhola Singh then took water from his house and accompanied by Kedarnath Singh PW 11 and Ramdeo Singh PW 14 , proceeded towards the Khesari field of Harnandan Singh. Harnandan Singh on being told by his son Sudheshwar that the appellants were uprooting Khesari from his field proceeded towards that field Harnandan Singh met Palaknath near his orchard on the way to Khesari field When they arrived near the field, they found Rajendra and Baleshwar uprooting Khesari crop, while the other appellants were sitting near the edge of the field. When Harnandan Singh and Palaknath reached the field of Isa Mian close to their Khesari Field, the appellants shouted that Palaknath and Harnandan Singh should number be spread Harnandan Singh and Palaknath then ran back towards the village abadi but they were overtaken by the appellants near a well. Rajendra Rai accused then gave a garasa blow on the head of Palaknath deceased, as a result of which the deceased fell down. This was followed by further blows to the deceased by Dhupa accused with his garasa and Baleshwar and Ramlakhan accused with their bhalas. Harnandan Singh PW 17 was given lathi blows by Ramanand, Judagi Rai Krishna Rai. Baldeo Singh PW 16 was then handed over a gun by Nankhkoo Singh 80 , father of Harnandan Singh, with a view to scare away the appellants. The said gun was, however, snatched from the hand of Baldeo Singh when he arrived near the place of occurrence by Baleshwar accused. On seeing Nankhkoo Singh the accused party ran towards him with a view to assault him. When Kedarnath Singh PW 11 Ramdeo Singh PW 14 protested, Baleshwar and Ramlakhan accused caused them injuries with their bhalas. Rajendera accused then gave kicks on the head of Palaknath, as a result of which the brain matter came out of the head. The accused then ran away. In the meantime, Harnandan Singh ran to police station Phulwari Sharif, at a distance of three miles from the place of occurrence, and lodged there report Ex-3 at 1-30 p. m. Sub Inspector Nand Kishore Singh PW 22 , who recorded the first information report, numbericed several injuries on the person of Harnandan Singh. Harnandan Singh was accordingly got examined from Dr. Chaudhary at 4 p.m. After recording the first information report, Sub-Inspector Nand Kishore Singh went to the place of occurrence and arrived there at 4.15 p. m. The dead body of Palaknath was found lying there. The head was found broken and brain matter was found lying at a distance of one foot from the head. The Sub Inspector prepared the inquest report and sent the dead body to the mortuary at Patna where post-mortem examination on the body was performed by Dr Kamleshwar Singh at 12.30 p.m. on January 15, 1966 Kedarnathsingh and Ramdeosingh were got examined from Dr. Chaudhary on the evening of January 14 and the morning of January 17 respectively. The accused were arrested on January 16 and 17, 1966. Mohd. Shamim PW 1 , Bholasingh PW 5 , Kedarnath Singh PW 11 , Ramdeosingh PW 14 and Harnandan Singh PW 17 as well as Ekram, who was examined as companyrt witnesses, gave eye witness account of the occurrence. Haidar PW 8 , Sudheshwar PW 13 , Anupsingh PW 15 , Ram Naresh Singh PW 19 and Nankhkoo Singh PW 20 who were also supposed to be eye witnesses of the occurrence, were tendered for cross-examination. The accused in their statements under Section 342 of the CrPC denied the prosecution allegation against them. A written statement was filed on their behalf the purport of which was that on the morning of January 14, 1966 at 9 30 a.m. Rambaran was thrashing paddy in his Khalihan near the orchard of Harnandan Singh PW17 . Palaknath deceased then came there and gave slaps and fist blows to Rambaran. Rambaran and Palaknath then exchanged blows. Kedarnath Singh PW 11 came there with a gun and, in an attempt to shoot Rambaran, he accidentally fired at Palaknath and thus killed him. Subsequently there was a companymotion in the village and stray assaults were made on Harnandan Singh, Ramdeo Singh and Kedarnath PWs. Defence evidence was produced in support of the above version of the accused. Dr. J.B. Mukherji was also examined for defence as an expert medical witness. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did number place much reliance upon the prosecution evidence as in his view it was number companysistent with the medical evidence. The prosecution version was also found to be otherwise number very companyvincing Defence evidence too was rejected but the rejection of the defence was held to be number very material as the prosecution case had to be proved independently. In the result the accused were acquitted. On appeal the High Court found the reasons given by the trial companyrt in acquitting the appellants to be wholly untenable. The High Court accordingly accepted the appeal and companyvicted the appellants as mentioned earlier. It is the companymon case of the patties that Palaknath Singh was killed at the place of occurrence on January 14, 1966. Dr. Kamleshwar Singh who performed post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased found the following injuries Incised wound on the left temporal and frontal region 6 x cranial cavity. Incised wound on the mid-line of the vertex on the parietal and frontal bones 31/2 x cranial cavity. Incised wound on the frontal region extending right to left 5 x carnial cavity. Both parietal and frontal bones were out with several pieces. Incised wound three in number 1 21/2 x 1/2 X 3/4 2 2 x 1/2 X 1/2 3 2 X 21/2 X 1/2 were present on the occipital region. Carnial bones namely parietal, frontal and occipital and the left temporal were out and fractured with multiple small pieces. At the site of injury No. 3, the carnial cavity was found wide open in an area of 6 X 6. Brain matter was found to have drained out of the carnial cavity. The injuries, in the opinion of the doctor, companyld be caused by garasa and the sharp edges of a bhala. Death, in the opinion of the doctor, was due to shock and hameorrhage as a result of the above injuries. The case of the prosecution is that the injuries to Palaknath were caused by the appellants in the circumstances mentioned above. To substantiate the above allegation, the prosecution examined Mohd. Shamim PW 1 , Bholasingh PW 5 , Kedarnath Singh PW 11 , Ramdeosingh PW 14 , Baldeo Singh PW 16 and Harnandan Singh PW 17 as eye witnesses of the occurrence they supported the prosecution case as given above. Ekram who was also alleged to be an eye witness of occurrence was number examined by the prosecution. He was however examined as companyrt witness. Ekram too gave evidence in support of the prosecution case. The High Court discussed the evidence of these witnesses at great length and found that though they were number disinterested and belonged to the party of Harnandan Singh PW who was inimical to the accused, their evidence was reliable and companyld be acted upon. After having been taken through the material on record, we find numbersufficient ground to disagree with the appraisement of the evidence of the eye witnesses by the High Court. Harnandan Singh, Kedarnath Singh and Ramdeo Singh had injuries on their persons and as such there can hardly be any manner of doubt regarding their presence at the scene of occurrence According to Dr. Chaudhary, Harnandan Singh had seven injuries caused with blunt weapon on his person. One of those injuries was grievous. Kedarnath Singh had two incised wounds on his person, while Ramdeo Singh had one incised wound and one punctured wound numberhis person. These three witnesses as well as the other eye witnesses gave a substantially companysistent version of the occurrence and there appears to be numberparticular reason as to why their evidence be number accepted. The version of the accused that Palaknath Singh died as a result of an accidental shot by Kedarnath Singh can plainly be number accepted in view of the fact that a number of incised wounds were found on the head of the deceased. Dr. Kamleshwar Singhs evidence is unequivocal on the point that the injuries which were found on the body of the deceased companyld number have been caused by gunshot. We see numbercogent reason to reject this part of the evidence of the doctor. Great stress has been laid by Mr. Mukherji on behalf of the appellants that the brain matter was found at a distance of one foot from the body of the deceased. It is urged that the injuries with garasa and bhala companyld number have resulted in the formation of a cavity in the skull and the draining out of a portion of the brain matter. So far as this aspect is companycerned, we find that the evidence of the eye witnesses shows that after Palaknathsingh deceased had been given garasa and bhala blows by Rajendra Rai, Dhupa Rai, Baleshwar Rai and Ramlakhan Rai and while the deceased was lying down on the ground, Rajendra Rai gave kicks on the head of the deceased as a result of which the brain matter came out. It would thus appear that the brain matter came out of the head after it had been battered by a number of garasa and bhala blows and kicks were given on the head. There seems to be numberhing improbable in that. The learned Additional Sessions Judge in rejecting the prosecution version was of the view that garasa and bhala blows by themselves companyld number have resulted in the draining out of the brain matter. In doing so, he overlooked the fact that after garasa and bhala blows had been given on the head of the deceased, Rajendra Rai gave kicks to the head. The High Court gave companyvincing reasons to show that the view taken by the trial companyrt in this respect was clearly unreasonable. We find numbercogent ground to disagree with the High Court. 13 It is well-settled that in an appeal under Section 417 of the CrPC against acquittal, the High Court has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the companyclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code, but in exercising the power companyferred by the Code and before reaching its companyclusion upon fact the High Court should give proper weight and companysideration to such matters as 1 the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses 2 the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly number weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial 3 the right of the accused to the benefit of any real and reasonable doubt and 4 slowness of an appellate companyrt in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had advantage of seeing the witness. The High Court should also take the into account the reasons given by the companyrt below in support of its order of acquittal and must express its reasons in the judgment which lead it to hold that the acquittal is number justified. Further, if two reasonable companyclusions be based upon the evidence on record, the High Court should number disturb the finding of acquitial recorded by the trial Court. After having been taken through the judgment of the trial Judge and the High Court, we find that the learned judges of the High Court have kept the above principles in view. They have number only companyently repelled the grounds given by the trial Judge in arriving at the companyclusion of acquittal but have also shown that the view taken by him was clearly unreasonable The High Court in the circumstances was fully justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal. So far as Dhuli Rai and Dhora Rai accused are companycerned, we find that numberinjury was attributed to these two accused in the first information report and it was number stated that they had assaulted any one. As the evidence has been found to be of a partisan nature and numberinjury or act of assault was attributed to these two accused, in our opinion, the case against them is number free from reasonable doubt. They would be companysequently entitled to the benefit thereof.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 325/1976. From the Judgment and Order dated the 3.12.1975 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No. 284/74 . S. Desai, Sanjev Aggarwal and R.B. Datar, for the appellant. S. Javali, Jagannath Shetty and B.P. Singh for resp. No. 1. N. Prasad and Girish Chandra, for the Intervener Union of India. Nemo for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.---Whether hoardings companytaining advertisements fixed in the premises of a railway station fronting a ,public street are exigible to tax under the provisions of s. 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 Act No. LXIX of 1949 -- hereinafter referred to as the Act--is the substantial question of law involved in this appeal by certificate. The facts of the case lie within a narrow companypass and the point raised by companynsel for the appellant is one of first impression and undoubtedly requires serious companysideration. The appellant is a firm of advertising companymercial goods and other items by putting up hoardings companytaining advertisements on properties taken on lease licence from various owners. The appellant also has been putting up hoardings on railway lands in the companypound of the Bangalore Railway Station. In the instant case, we are only companycerned with the hoardings companytaining advertisements put up adjacent to. the railway companypound fencing but within the railway premises by being placed on girders affixed to. the earth. The fencing of the railway companypound is adjacent to and faces a public street. It is also number disputed by the parties that the advertisements are put up at sufficient height so. as to be clearly visible to and attract the attention of the members of the general public passing through the public street. The appellant has produced photographs of some of the hoardings which demonstrate these facts. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bangalore being of the opinion that the hoardings companytaining advertisements put up by the appellant were exigible to tax issued a demand numberice dated March 7, 1973 calling upon the. appellant to pay a sum o.f Rs. 5871-83 as the advertisement tax including arrears. The appellant represented to the Municipal authorities that as the hoardings companytaining advertisements were situate within the railway premises they squarely fell within clause e of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act. The Municipal Corporation did number accept the companytention of the appellants and pressed for-paying up the tax. The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka praying that the order of the Corporation demanding payment of tax be quashed, because the advertisements were clearly exempt from tax by virtue of the aforesaid proviso The writ petition was in the first instance heard by a single Judge who by his order dated April 4, 19.74 overruled the companytention of the appellant and dismissed the petition. Thereupon the appellant filed an appeal under the Letters Patent before a Division Bench which also affirmed the order of the single Judge, though on different grounds. The Division Bench later on being approached under Art. 133 of the Constitution granted a certificate of fitness and hence this appeal before us. The only point that has been raised before us is that the hoardings companytaining advertisements squarely fall within the exemption companytained in the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act and, therefore, they are number belong to The High Court found that as the advertisements did number exigible to the Railway number for the purpose of the Railway, the proviso in question did number apply and the Single Judge was right in holding that the advertisements were exigible to tax. The single Judge had, however, found that as the advertisements were much above the railings which faced the public street, the proviso had numberapplication. Before examining the view of the High Court, it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions of the statute which we are called upon to interpret. The relevant part of s. 136 of the Act runs thus Every person who erects, exhibits, fixes or retains upon or over any land, building, wail, hoarding or structure any advertisement or who displays any advertisement to public view in any manner whatsoever, in any place whether public or private, shall pay on every advertisement which is so erected, exhibited, fixed, retained or displayed to public view a tax calculated at such rates and in such manner and subject to such exemptions, as the companyporation may, with the approval of the Government, by resolution determine x x x x Provided further that numbersuch tax shall be levied on any advertisement which is number a sky-sign and whichx x x x e is exhibited within any railway station of upon any wall or other property of a railway except any portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any street. Explanation 1.--The word structure in this section shall include any movable board on wheels used as an advertisementor an advertisement medium. Emphasis supplied Section 136 of the Act which is the charging section clearly shows that the intention of the statute was to tax certain types of advertisements. The pith and substance of the entire section, therefore, is the taxation of advertisements fixed, erected or exhibited on any land, building wall, hoarding, structure etc. Thus it is manifest, that s. 136 companytemplates tax on advertisements and number tax on premises or buildings. This clear distinction has to be kept in mind in companystruing the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act which falls for determination in this case, particularly in view of some of the authorities relied upon by the appellant which deal with tax on premises rather than tax on advertisements. The essential companyditions necessary for the application of s. 136 of the Act are-- that a person should erect, exhibit, fix or retain any advertisement upon any land. building, wall, hoarding or structure or display any advertisement in any manner that erection, exhibition, fixation or retention or display of that advertisement must be exposed to public view and that the advertisement must be exhibited in any place public or private. The sine qua number for the application of this section is, therefore, that the advertisements displayed by any person must be to public view in any manner whatsoever. Once these companyditions are satisfied, the person who exhibits the advertisements is liable to pay tax on such advertisements As, however, the Act was merely to regulate the premises falling within the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, it is obvious that the premises which did number fall within the Corporation or which belonged to other autonomous authorities companyld number be exigible to tax unless expressly so provided. Furthermore, it appears that the object of the Municipal Corporation in charging tax was to keep the public premises clean and water-tight and protect advertisements which may amount to nuisance, because the ,Act lays down a procedure which has to be followed before the advertisements companyld be exhibited. Consistent with this object, therefore, the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act grants an exemption from tax on any advertisement which is exhibited in any railway station or upon any wail or other property of a railway. Here also an exception is carved out which is that if such an advertisement, even though on any portion of the railway property, faces any street it will number earn the exemption. The central argument put forward before us by Mr. V. 8. Desai companynsel for the appellant is that the expression fronting any street appearing in cl. e of the third proviso to s. 136 qualifies the railway property and number the advertisement so that the fact that the advertisement fronting the street or which is exposed to public view or is visible to the public from the public street will number make the advertisement exigible to tax, if the advertisement is within the railway premises or is adjacent to the companypound wall or any other property which itself is fronting the street. In other words, the companytention was that having regard to the terminology of the word fronting it is number possible to companyceive that two portions of the property can front a street at one and the same time unless they are in the same line. From the photographs produced before us, as also before the High Court, it appears that the hoardings companytaining the advertisements are numberdoubt fixed just 2 or 3 feet behind the companypound fencing of the railway station premises. Mr. Desai, therefore, companytended that once the companypound wall which is in front of the girders on which the advertisements are fixed faces the street, there is number question of the advertisement facing the street. Secondly, it was companytended that the test of fronting the street as companytained in the third proviso is that what is fronting the street is number the advertisement but the property of the railway. In other words, it was argued that as in the instant case the companypound wall already fronted the street, the hoardings companytaining the advertisements being behind the companypound wall, though adjacent to it, cannot be said to front the street, because two properties cannot front the street at the same time. We have given anxious companysideration to the arguments advanced by the learned companynsel for the appellant, but on a proper interpretation of the proviso we are unable to accept the same. To. begin with, if the proviso is read with reference to the companytext, then it is absolutely clear that the verb fronting qualifies number the wall or the property but the advertisement. The central subject-matter of s. 136 as also of the proviso is number a place or building but advertisement which alone attracted tax. If we read the third proviso in the following manner, then the intention of the statute becomes absolutely clear Provided further that numbersuch tax shall be levied on any advertisement e which is exhibited within any railway station or upon any wall of other property of a railway except any portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any street. Emphasis supplied The verb fronting, therefore, does number qualify wall or property mentioned in the latter part of the. proviso. but the numbern advertisement. The test, therefore, laid down by this proviso is that the Court has to see whether the advertisement affixed whether inside the companypound of the railway or number fronts the street. If the advertisement fronts the street or faces the street even if it is within the railway premises, it will be exigible to tax. For instance if the hoardings companytaining the advertisements were affixed just behind the companypound wall and the advertisements did number face the street at all but faced the other side of the railway station their back being to the street, then the advertisements will certainly be exempt from tax and the proviso would clearly apply. This seems to us to be the natural interpretation of the proviso having regard to the companytext in which it is placed. Mr. Desai learned companynsel for the appellant relied on the definition of the word fronting as used in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 4th End., at p. 1121, where the learned author while defining fronting observed thus Fronting. 1 Premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on a STREET, and as such chargeable with expense of road-making under Public Health Act 1875 c. 55 , s. 150, did number need to be absolutely companytiguous. In the first, place the author defines the word fronting within the meaning of the Public Health Act, 1875, which levied tax on premises. The author was number at all companycerned with tax on advertisement as in the instant case. In the case referred to in the book, the Court was called upon to judge the expenses on road-making under the Public Health Act. It is, therefore, manifest that these companysiderations would number apply to the facts of the present case. On the other hand in Websters Third New International Dictionary Vol. I, the word front used as a verb is defined thus something that companyfronts or faces forward as 1 a face of a building esp. the face that companytains the principal entrance put a facing upon e.g. the building with brick 5 to face or look forward have the front toward, opposite, or over against the houses the street . According to the aforesaid dictionary meaning fronting merely means that the article should face or have its front toward, opposite or over against the house or the street. In our opinion the word fronting has been used in the proviso number in any legal or technical sense but as used in ordinary parlance. It is number a term of art but one that signifies its meaning according to companymon numberions. For these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that as the advertisements upon the hoardings in the instant case were undoubtedly facing or fronting the street they were exigible to tax and the fact that they were a faxed on the earth which formed the companypound of the railway premises would make numberdifference in view of the plain and unambiguous language of the proviso. Learned companynsel for the appellants relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in The Corporation of Madras v. Messrs The Oriental Mercantile Company Ltd., Madras. C This authority, however, can have numberapplication to the facts of the present case, because to begin with, there is numberhing to show that the hoardings companytaining the advertisements were in any way fronting or facing the street. On the other hand, the advertisements were merely on the outside wall within the railway companypound. In these circumstances, therefore, this case does number appear to be of any assistance to the appellant. Reliance was then placed on a decision of the Queens Bench Division in Ware Urban District Council v. Gaunt and Others 2 and particularly on the observations of Ashworth, J., where the Judge observed as follows The remaining issue is, in a sense, the most troublesome of all, namely, whether it is open to the appellants to apportion part of the expense on premises situate on the westerly 1 1966 2 M.L.J. 440, 2 1969 3 All E.R. 778, 787. 4--707SCI/77 side of Walton Road but separated from it b,y the public footpath. This issue involves as an ancillary problem the question whether part of the expense should in any event be apportioned on the public footpath. Section 6 of the Act of 1892 provides, inter alia, that the expenses incurred by the urban authority in executing private street works shall be apportioned subject as in this Act mentioned on the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on such street or pan of a street. The observations extracted above will show that there also. the Court was dealing number with a tax on advertisements but a tax on premises, and the question of the frontage was interpreted having regard to the place where the premises were situate. In the same judgment, the learned Judge observed as follows In each case, as it seems to me, regard must be paid to the companytext in which the words appear and, quite apart front any decided cases, I am inclined to think that the companytext in the present case points to an enlarged rather than a restricted meaning of the word adjoin. Emphasis ours It is, therefore, clear that the meaning of the words used in a particular statute has to be companystrued with reference to the companytext and number in isolation, number is it possible to lay down any rule of universal application in a matter like this. For these reasons, therefore, this authority also does number appear to be apposite so far as the present case is companycerned. The Single Judge of the High Court, while interpreting the proviso, observed as follows These advertisements in question are displayed on the hoardings standing close to the cement fencing at the outer mark of the railway property. The cement railings are hardly about 3 feet in height and the advertisement boards are very much above the railings. The Public street to which the advertisements are facing runs along the cement railings, with numberother obstacle between the advertisement boards and the public view. Therefore, it can reasonably, be said that they are fronting the Public Street. We find ourselves in companyplete agreement with the view taken by the Single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, while upholding the judgment of the Single Judge, observed as follows In the instant case, we are number faced with any situation as the one envisaged in the second part of the exemption clause relative to advertisement on a wall or other property of the railway frontage by street. We are companycerned herein with the case of a hoarding put up by and belonging to the appellant and number the railway. Hence, it is plain that numberexemption on that score companyld be claimed on behalf of the appellant. The High Court does number appear to have interpreted the proviso companyrectly. The view of the High Court that the proviso would only apply to advertisements of such hoardings whose ownership lies with the Railway or which belong to the Railway is number borne out by cl. e of the third proviso to s. 236. In other words the question of exigibility to tax is relatable number to the ownership of the hoarding but its situs. Even if the hoarding does number belong to the Railway but to some private party, if it does number front the street and is situated within the Railway premises or within the companypound of the railway premises it is clearly exempt. We, therefore, do number approve of the line of reasoning adopted by the Division Bench. On a close and careful interpretation, therefore, of cl. e of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act we are clearly of the opinion that on the facts proved in the present case as the hoardings,containing the advertisements were fronting the public street and were clearly exposed to public view and the members of the public passing through the street, they are number companyered by the exemption companytemplated by the proviso and are, therefore, exigible to tax. The demand numberice, therefore, served on the appellant by the Municipal Corporation for payment of tax is number legally erroneous. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with companyts.

Mathew, J. In this appeal filed in pursuance to a certificate under Article 133 1 a of the Constitution, the question for companysideration is whether the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras was right in setting aside the order passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the petition filed by the first respondent here for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal granting a stage carriage permit to the appellant in the route in question. The appellant and the first respondent made applications for a permit for a stage carriage on the route Dindigul to Cumbam. There were 21 other applicants for the permit. The Regional Transport Authority granted the permit to the first respondent was better qualified to get the permit than the appellant as it got more marks than the appellant in accordance with G.O.Ms. No. 1298 Home dated April 28, 1956 and the Government Order No. 2265 Home dated August 9, 1958. The appellant filed an appeal against the order before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal came to the companyclusion that although the first respondent got more marks than the appellant, since another permit had been granted to the first respondent at the same sitting of the State Transport Authority, it will be denial of equal opportunity to the appellant and will number be in the interest of the public if the first respondent were granted another permit. It, therefore, set aside the order of the State Transport Authority and granted the permit to the appellant. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the first respondent filed the writ petition before the High Court and a learned single Judge dismissed the petition. The first respondent filed an appeal before the Division Bench against this order. The Division Bench came to the companyclusion that the merit of the refusal to grant the permit to the first respondent on the ground that there will be a denial of equality of opportunity to the appellant if it is number granted the permit need number be gone into as the order was liable to be quashed on the ground that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was acting under the companystraining influence of the G.Os. referred to above which had been struck down by this Court in B. Rajagopala Naidu v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors. 1 . The Division Bench, therefore, held that as the grant of the permit to the appellant was under the companystraining influence of these two G.Os., a writ of certiorari must issue quashing the order granting the permit to the appellant and directing the Tribunal to proceed in accordance with law. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of the High Court proceeded on an entire mis-conception. She said that the High Court did number go into the merits of the question whether the refusal of the permit to the first respondent on the ground that it would be a denial of equality of opportunity to the appellant and therefore it would number be in the interest of the public, but quashed the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal granting the permit to the appellant for the reason that the Tribunal was acting under the companystraining influence of the G.Os. above referred. Counsel companytended that that was wrong as the appellant alone was in the field since numberother appellant had challenged the grant in favour of the appellant and when the High Court refused to go into the validity of the reason for refusing the permit to the first respondent, it was an empty formality to have set aside the permit granted to the appellant and directed the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to companysider the matter afresh on the scope that it was acting under the companystraining influence of the G.Os., as there were numberother applicants in the field. We do number think that there is any substance in this companytention.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7440 OF 2000 With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2540 OF 2002 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. These two appeals have a companymon matrix. The Food Corporation of India and Others are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 7440 of 2000 while the respondent in the said appeal is the appellant in the other appeal i.e. Civil appeal No. 2540 of 2002. Parties in this judgment are described as per Civil Appeal No.7440 of 2000. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court holding that the suit filed by plaintiff respondent was to be partly decreed for recovery of Rs.68,02,973/- from the defendants i.e. present appellants together with pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 6 per annum with appropriate companyt throughout. It is to be numbered that the respondent had filed a suit Civil Suit No. 6040 of 1994 before learned City Civil Judge Ahmedabad for injunction restraining the appellant No.1- Corporation and its functionaries from recovering and or withholding any amount from the bills of the respondent herein and also for a declaration that action of appellant No.1- Corporation in recovering various amounts without deciding the rates for extra work was bad in law and for directing the appellant-Corporation to make payment for the extra work at the rates demanded by the respondent. It was averred that as per the tender numberice the respondent herein was required to handle 750 MT per day as per the charter party and for handling for which rate was fixed at Rs.108 per MT. It was further stated that the appellant-Corporation by the letters dated 30.9.1994, 14.10.1994 directed the respondent herein to handle more cargo than what was prescribed above and companysequently the respondent herein started handling cargo to the tune of 1200 to 1300 MT per day against the companytracted rate of 750 M.T. In view of the accelerated discharge, the respondent had to incur additional expenses towards enhanced rate of wages, payment to the workers and demurrage to wagons. The respondent claimed that its entitlement for enhanced transportation charges was Rs.45 per MT in place of Rs.15 per MT which was stipulated in the companytract. The appellant No.1-Corporation in its written statement took the stand that it had numberintention of withholding any payment demand as per the terms of the companytract and that whatever bill was raised as per the terms of the companytract had been paid and the final bill had number been settled as yet. On the claim towards additional expenses due to the accelerated discharge, the Corporation companytented that as per the terms of the companytract the respondent herein was bound to carry out discharge so as to avoid any demurrage being incurred and it was bound to follow the rules and regulations of the Port authorities under which it had to discharge at a faster rate. The Corporation also denied that the respondent had incurred any extra expenses because of the accelerated discharge. The appellant-Corporation also denied the claim towards enhanced rate for transportation charges. Subsequently the respondent herein amended the claim to an amount of Rs.68,07,113.20 with interest at the rate of 18 per annum from the due date. Towards stevedoring charges the respondents herein claimed Rs.215/- per MT instead of agreed rate of Rs.108/- per MT. A sum of Rs.51,20,263.70 was claimed as the difference. The respondent further claimed the enhanced transportation charges and on that account claimed an additional sum of Rs.12,84,847.50. The appellant-Corporation filed its additional written statement denying the claim for enhanced companypensation. Learned Civil Judge Court No.14 , Ahmedabad framed the following issues for determination. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? Whether the Plaintiff proves that the Plaintiff appointed as companytractor for stevedoring, clearance for transportation at Kandla Port pursuant to the tender? Whether the Plaintiff proves that the plaintiff was carrying out a work of transport and handling the cargo as per the terms and companyditions of the tender? Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the enhancement rate from Rs.108/- per M.T. to Rs.215/- per M.T. as alleged? Whether the plaintiff proves that the plaintiff was unloading the quantity of the goods more than stipulated in the tender? Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount from the defendant as prayed in para 12 A and B of the plaint? What order and decree? The learned trial Judge decided issues i , ii , iii and and v in favour of the Respondent Plaintiff. However, the learned Judge dismissed the suit on the basis of findings in issue Nos. iv and vi . The following findings inter alia were recorded by learned trial judge. Clause XX 1 i of the companytract provided for a minimum discharge rate of 750 M.T. per day as provided in the Charter Party, so that the vessel would number suffer any demurrage. Thus, the Respondent herein Plaintiff had carried out the work of handling cargo as per the terms of the companytract. The Appellant Corporation Defendant had insisted for discharge of cargo at higher rate with a view to companyply with the direction of the port authorities. The Respondent Plaintiff had discharged additional quantities. Clause 41 of the companytract provides that the companytractor shall companyply with the rules and regulation of the Port Authorities, and since the Port Authorities had demanded discharge at faster rate the Respondent herein Plaintiff was under obligation to discharge at faster rate. In any event, the Respondent plaintiff had number established by evidence any additional companyt incrred by him for such additional discharge. The Respondent Plaintiff was entitled to only companytractual rate of Rs.108/- per M.T. and number at higher rate of Rs.215/ per M.T. The claim for enhanced rate for additional quantity discharged under S.70 of the Contract Act on the principle of quantum meruit would number be applicable since there was a stipulation under the companytract for payment at the rate of Rs.108/- M.T only. On the basis of the aforesaid findings the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the above judgment respondent herein filed First Appeal No. 2678 of 1999 before the Gujarat High Court. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court reversed the judgment of the trial companyrt and decreed the suit for a sum of Rs.68,02,973/- with interest at the rate of 6 from the date of suit. Following findings were recorded by the High Court A companybined reading of Clause XX Part I i along with Clause 19 of the Charter Party would show that the Respondent herein Plaintiff was bound to handle only an average quantity of 750/- per M.T. per day, but number at the minimum quantity of 750/- per M.T. per day. The Respondent Plaintiff had done extra-work than what was agreed to in the companytract. The extra-work was number done gratuitously. Since it was an extra-work as stated in clause XVI of the companytract, but numbernegotiation took place as required under this clause, despite written request of the Respondent Plaintiff and numbermutual settlement was arrived at despite the request of the Respondent in various letters, there was numberrejection of the Plaintiffs request for higher remuneration. The Plaintiff is entitled to extra remuneration for extra work. Since numbernegotiation took place in spite of written request by the Plaintiff, the principle of quantum meruit applied for awarding companypensation. Since numberreply was sent by the Appellant Corporation to the letter of Respondent dated 9.11.1994, refusing the demand the Respondent Plaintiff had proved his claim for companypensation at Rs.215/M.T. Even though the trial Court did number frame any issue on the claim of transportation charges at the rate of Rs.45/- per tonne instead of Rs.15/- per tonne, the High Court decided the issue holding that the respondent herein had substantiated the said claim by the letter dated 9.11.1994. In letter dated 14.11.1994 sent by the Assistant Manager of the appellant-Corporation he had recommended for the enhanced rate of payment that would companystitute an admission of the enhanced rate as claimed by the respondent. In support of Civil Appeal No.7440 of 2000, learned companynsel for the appellants submitted that the companytracts stipulated remuneration at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT for discharge at the charter party rate for a period from 16.8.1994 to 15.8.1995. It does number preclude any higher discharge rate since its discharge rate is number pre-determined and it varies from ship to ship. The stipulation of the charter party rate is only for the purpose of ensuring that the appellant- Corporation does number suffer any demurrage on account of slow discharge. Since the rate of discharge is a variable factor from ship to ship, the remuneration in the present companytract is number dependant on the daily discharge rate. Actual figures also show that the discharge rate has been varying daily. Therefore, the request of the appellant Corporation for a faster discharge was as per the terms of the companytract and in view of the specific order from the port authorities in terms of Clause 41 of the companytract. It was, therefore submitted that the respondent is number entitled to claim remuneration at a higher rate but only the companytractual rate. Secondly, it was submitted that in the absence of any specific companytract between the parties or the acceptance of the appellant of the demand of the respondent for higher rate of remuneration, the respondent is entitled to claim remuneration only as per the terms of the companytract. Finally, it is submitted that principles of quantum meruit under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 in short the Contract Act has numberapplication in view of the specific companytractual provisions. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the claim for enhanced rate is highly exorbitant and number substantial by any evidence of actual expenses. Though the High Court had relied on the letter dated 9.11.1994 Ext.67 , the same has numberrelevance because the respondent had claimed Rs.215/- per MT for a minimum discharge of 1200 MT per day. This was even much higher than the actual discharge rate achieved by the respondent. Therefore, the decree at the rate of Rs.215 per MT is unsustainable. The letter dated 15.11.1994 Exh. 90 written by the Assistant Manager of the appellant-Corporation has also numberrelevance because he was number companypetent to decide the issue and the same companyld number have been the basis of a decree when he was number examined as a witness. Even otherwise, it was only a unilateral recommendation to higher authorities. The letter does number in any way substantiate the claim of the respondent and the same was number accepted by the appellant. The decree for enhanced transportation charges at the rate of Rs.45/- per MT for transporting the cargo from the wharf to the appellant godown is unsustainable since the companytractual rate has numberconnection with the discharge rate. Therefore the principle of quantum meruit does number apply and the respondent is entitled to claim at the companytractual rate only. Respondent supported judgment and its appeal prayed for enhanced rate of interest. With reference to Clause XX of tender numberice, it is submitted that the companytractor was only obliged to ensure discharge the cargo at the rate provided for in the Charter Party agreement. Clauses 22 and 23 are relevant. It is pointed out that the companytractor was bound to discharge the articles at an average rate of 750/- per MT. In the event of failure to do so, the companyporation was liable to pay demurrage at the rate of US 4000 per day. In case the rate was achieved, the Corporation was entitled to receive discharge money for working time saved at the rate of US2000 per day. In the present appeal, the Corporation has withheld the information from the trial companyrt as well as the High Court. Since the respondent-Society had started the execution of the work it had received a letter dated 30th September, 1994 from the Corporation to rise to the occasion and to companye forward with all the machinery geared up to ensure maintaining four gangs cranes in each shift to achieve the target of number less than 2000 M.Ts. per day without fail. Another letter dated 14th October, 1994 was to similar effect. It is unconceivable as companytended by the appellant-Corporation that numberextra expenditure would be involved in getting a higher rate of discharge. The Customs authorities were delaying the clearance. There was delay even at the time of unloading. At the depot of the Corporation, the arrangements were very poor. Therefore, the Corporation was requested to provide extra money. A fax was sent in this regard. When the respondent-Society did number get any response, it sent another letter dated 9.11.1994 reiterating its demand for payment of a higher rate. A companyy of the letter was endorsed to Senior Regional Manager, FCI, Ahmedabad, the basis on which the extra remuneration was demanded was indicated. It appears that the matter was examined in the office of the Corporation and therefore the letter dated 14th November, 1994 was issued, giving details and pointing out that the respondent-Society was incurring extra expenditure and was paying excess money for speedy work to each and every DLB gangs, shore cranes, Trucks, Short labourers, and other organizations. Various difficulties faced by the respondent Society were also listed. It was found that the worksheet is in order. He recommended that the request of the respondent society was to be accepted and accordingly recommended that the request may be forwarded to the companycerned authority. Despite these specific recommendations, there was numberresponse. The respondent companypleted the work. Not only the appellant-Corporation saved demurrage at the rate of US 4000 per day, it also earned discharge money for speedy work done. The demand for the higher remuneration was in accordance with the terms of Clause XVI. There is numberdispute that there was a request made by the appellant-Corporation to discharge more than what was stipulated in terms of the Charter party agreement. The Corporation was insisting that the respondent-Society should increase the discharge. That being so Clause XVI b is clearly attracted. The respondent Society was entitled to extra remuneration. Since the appellant-Corporation had failed to respond to the request, the High Court had rightly invoked the principle of quantum meruit and accepted the claim. Reasons for extra expenditure have been clearly stated in the statement of Sh. Jayantibhai. The principle of quantum meruit is often applied where for some technical reason a companytract is held to be invalid. Under such circumstances an implied companytract is assumed, by which the person for whom the work is to be done companytracts to pay reasonably for the work done, to the person who does the work. The provisions of this section are based on the doctrine of quantum meruit, but the provisions of the Contract Act admit of a more liberal interpretation the principle of the section being wider than the principle of quantum meruit. The principle has numberapplication where there is a specific agreement in operation. A person who does work or who supplies goods under a companytract, if numberprice is fixed, is entitled to be paid a reasonable sum for his labour and the goods supplied. If the work is outside the companytract, the terms of the companytract can have numberapplication and the companytractor is entitled to be paid a reasonable price for such work as was done by him. If a party to a companytract has done additional companystruction for another number intending to do it gratuitously and such other has obtained benefit, the former is entitled to companypensation for the additional work number companyered by the companytract. If an oral agreement is pleaded, which is number proved, he will be entitled to companypensation under Section 70. Payment under this section can also be claimed for work done beyond the terms of the companytract, when the benefit of the work has been availed of by the defendant. The term extra is generally used in relation to the works, which are number expressly or impliedly included in the original companytract price, provided the work is within the framework of the original companytract. The question whether a particular work is extra will depend upon the terms and companyditions of the companytract, and other documents companynected therewith. The relevant clauses of the companytract read as follows XVI- REMUNERATION The Contractors shall be paid the remuneration in respect of the services described in para XX and performed by them at the companytracted rates. If the Contractors are required to perform any services in addition to those specifically provided for in the Contract and the annexed schedule, the Contractors remuneration for the same will be paid at the rate as negotiated and fixed by mutual agreement. The question whether a particular service is or is number companyered by any of the services described and provided for in the companytract, or is number auxiliary or incidental to any of such services, shall be decided by the Sr. Regional Manager whose decision shall be final and binding on the Contractor. The Contractor will have the right to represent in writing to the Sr. Regional manager that a particular service which he is being called upon to perform is number companyered by any of the services specifically provided for in the companytract or as the case may be, is number auxillary or incidental to such services, provided that such representation in writing must be made within 15 days of the companymencement of actual performance of such services. If numbersuch representation in writing is received within the said time, the Contractors right in this regard will be deemed to have been waived. XX - Services to be Performed by the Contractors Part I For Stevedoring The companytractor shall render all the services, which are usually performed by the stevedors. These will generally include services given below The Contractors shall discharge the Sugar in bags including sweeping and spilling from the ship to the wharf roof of the transit shed carefully and expeditiously and arrange to companyplete discharge in the minimum period possible and shall take all necessary steps to avoid ships going under demurrage and to earn maximum amount of dispatch money. No additional remuneration will be paid for discharging on roof of transit shed. The companytractors shall ensure the discharge of cargo in a vessel handled by him at the rate number less than what is provided for in the charter party of the companycerned vessel and ultimately if there has been any short fall in discharge of the vessel at the stipulated rate and companysequential demurrage charges, the companytractor will be responsible for the same and will make good whatever losses and expenses incurred by the Corporation, the Corporation shall have the right to deduct these losses from the admitted bills of the companytractors. Clause XXII - Ship to discharge at the average rate of 750 M.T. calculated on gross weight provided vessel can deliver at this rate per working day of 24 companysecutive hours time from numbern Saturday to 8 a.m. Monday for local equivalent and from 5 p.m. day preceding holiday until 8 a.m, next working day excepted, even used, time employed in shifting anchorages or discharging places within the same port or its jurisdiction number to companynt as laytime, and shifting expenses to be for owners account. Clause XXIII of the charter party agreement provided as under If longer detained in loading and or discharging ports, demurrage to be paid at the rate of 4000.00 per day, or in proportion for any part of 1 day. Ship to pay 2000.00 per day or in proportion, dispatch money for all working time saved at both ends. Such time lost is to be calculated in accordance with the custom of port. Lay time to be numberreversible between loading and discharging ports, but may be reversible between the ports of loading at the ports of discharging. Demurrage or dispatch to be settled directly between owners and Charters at discharging port s From various documents exhibited more particularly the letters dated 30.9.1994 to 14.10.1994 it is clear that the functionaries of the appellant-Corporation recommended higher payment rate for higher discharge. The letters written by the respondent society also clearly indicate that the demand was for higher charges in respect of the extra work. Though a stand has been taken that the signatories of the letters by the Corporation were number authorized, it is number disputed that on the basis of these letters extra work was undertaken. There is also material on record to show that extra expenditure had to be incurred for doing the extra work. The quoted rates in terms of the companytract was Rs.108 per M.T. For claiming Rs.215 per M.T. the following details were given SR. NAME OF OPERATION PMT NO. PREVAILING RATE RS. Stevedoring Charges 75-00 Tally clerks, Gears, foreman private Labourers inside 10-00 hatches Loading of trucks 10-00 Shifting T. Sheds by trucks at Kandla 17.00 Wagon loading from T. Sheds by trucks at Kandla 40.00 Wharf clearing, Wagon cleaning security and for Casual Labourers in T. Sheds. 8.00 Custom clearance Documentation 10.00 Administration charges, warehousing. 10.00 Various liabilities like Wagon Demurrage, shed Demurrage etc. 15.00 1.0 Contingency over and above companyting 20.00 Grand Total 215. 00 As has been rightly companytented by learned companynsel for the appellant, sufficient evidence has number been placed on record to justify the claim at the rate of Rs.215 for example, the serial No.10 i.e. companytingency over and above companyting, and for custom clearance, documentation or administration charges and warehousing. It is, however, clear that numberissue was framed relating to the claim of enhanced rate for transportation at the rate of Rs.45/- per M.T. and even numberground was urged accordingly. In view of the above, we direct that the respondentsociety shall be paid at the rate of Rs.108 per M.T. in terms of the companytract up to 750 M.T. and at the rate of Rs.215 per MT for quantum beyond that. The interest rate shall be 6 as fixed by the High Court. The respondent-Society shall number be entitled to any amount beyond the agreed amount of Rs.15 per M.T.

Shah, J. In Sessions Case No.44 of 1989, 14-accused were tried for various offences including Sections 3 and 5 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 hereinafter referred to as the TADA Act by the Additional Judge, Designated Court, Karnal at Ambala. The Additional Judge by his judgment and order dated 19th February, 1998 companyvicted the appellant Daya Singh for companymitting the offence of murder of Gurdeep Singh and attempting to companymit murder of PWs Dr. Harnam Singh and Smt. Jaswant Kaur. The appellant is also companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for companymitting murder of Khushdev Singh, Gurpreet Kaur and his companyaccused Gurjant Singh and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10000/- in default of payment of fine to undergo further RI for a period of one year. He is also companyvicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC for attempting to cause death of Ram Singh, Somnath and Hira Singh by firearms and is sentenced to undergo RI for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for a period of six months. In addition, he is companyvicted for the offence punishable under Section 5 of TADA Act for possessing one AK 47 rifle with cartridges and is sentenced to undergo RI for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for three months. All the sentences were ordered to run companycurrently. The Designated Court acquitted rest of the accused. Against the order of companyviction passed by the learned Judge, accused Daya Singh has preferred Criminal Appeal No.416 of 1998. In this appeal, learned senior companynsel Mr. U.R. Lalit appearing for the appellant has companyfined his submissions mainly with regard to reliability of evidence of PW37 Jaswant Kaur and PW38 Dr. Harnam Singh qua the identification of the appellant. The State has filed Criminal Appeal No.773 of 1998 against the acquittal order and also for enhancement of sentence. With regard to the appeal filed by the State, after going through the evidence on record, it is apparent that the order passed by the Additional Judge does number call for any interference. Confessional statements are found to be number voluntary and are held to be unreliable. There is numberother evidence to companynect the acquitted accused with the crime. The incident relates to attack by the terrorists on 9.4.1988 in the house of one Dr. Harnam Singh at Kurukshetra which has resulted in loss of his son Khushdev Singh, daughter-in-law Gurpreet Kaur, Gurdeep Singh son of his brother-in-law and one assailant Gurjant Singh and injuries to other persons. At the time of hearing of this appeal, prosecution version relating to the incident of the murder of four persons at the place of incident and injuries to the witnesses is number disputed. For companysidering the submissions and appreciating the evidence relating to the companytentions raised by the learned companynsel for the parties, we would refer to the evidence of Dr. Harnam Singh, PW38 and his wife Smt. Jaswant Kaur, PW37. It is the say of Dr. Harnam Singh that he is a worker of companymunist party and was elected as MLA in the year 1987 from Shahabad. On 9th April, 1988 at about 8.15 to 8.30 p.m. when he was present in his house, one person came in his companyrtyard and called upon him. In the companyrtyard two electric bulbs were on at that time. When he came out from his room, he saw one well-built Sikh gentleman aged about 26-27 years having small beard holding a revolver in his hand. He ran towards him and caught hold of him. On hearing the numberse, his wife came out of the room. She also caught hold of that Sikh from his hairs. At that time, one other person came from outside holding stengun type arm. He was having a long beard and having eyes like that of a cat. That man started firing and a pellet hit his left arm. The shots also hit abdomen of his wife. At that time his son, Khushdev Singh, daughter-in-law Gurpreet Kaur and Gurdeep Singh son of his brother-in-law who were watching TV came outside. The man who was having eyes like a cat fired shots towards them and because of the injury sustained, Gurdeep Singh fell down on the main gate. His son Khushdev Singh caught hold of that man and tried to take away the stengun. It is his further say that when Khushdev Singh was holding the person, he fired shots from his fire-arm towards Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur. When Khushdev was grappling with him, he rushed to his room to make a telephone call and informed at police station that he was attacked and shots were being fired. He has further deposed that when he went outside the room, the third miscreant who was standing on the main door fired shots towards that room. During the grappling, one blanket, one shoe, one turban, one Jutti had fallen down in the companyrtyard. The magazine of the stengun had also fallen down. When he came out of the room after telephonic call, the miscreants had fled and saw that Gurdeep Singh was lying dead at the entrance gate. Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur, who were dragged outside by Daya Singh and with whom they were grappling, were lying in the street on the right side of the main gate in an injured companydition. The terrorist who was caught and dragged out by his wife was also lying dead. Khushdev and Gurpreet were removed to the civil hospital. They succumbed to their injuries within few minutes in the hospital. Thereafter, he alongwith his wife and Hira Singh were referred to PGI Hospital. He has also deposed with regard to the investigation carried out by the police including the recovery of certain articles from the scene of offence. It is his further say that on 7th May 1988, he and his wife were taken by the police to Civil Hospital, Rajpura as it was stated that two terrorists had been shot dead and they were to be identified by them. Out of the two dead bodies, they identified one as the person who had fired shots towards him while he was standing on the main gate. With regard to the identification of the accused he stated that he companyld identify and recognize the person who fired shots and has identified the appellant Daya Singh. The learned Judge has numbered that at that time as there was numberelectricity in the Court room, the accused, witnesses, advocates and he himself went outside the companyrt room where the accused was identified by Dr. Harnam Singh in second round which took 3 to 4 minutes. In cross-examination, he has stated that he was using spectacles since last more than 40 years and he companyld see up to a distance of 30 to 40 or 100 yards with the help of spectacles and companyld identify a person from a distance of 20 to 25 yards. He has also stated that during the time of identification as there was numberelectric light in the companyrt room and was dark, he was required to go outside the companyrt room and there he had identified the accused. He has clarified what he understood by catty eyes and stated that eyes were like that of a cat and numberhing more. The witness was asked whether he companyld say that the eye of other accused named Inderjeet Singh was like cat. To that, his reply was his eyes were numbermal and number like that of a cat. He has also stated that he has seen accused Daya Singh on the date of incident from a distance ranging from one yard to 3-4 yards and that Daya Singh had fired from a distance of 3 yards in the companyrtyard. In further cross examination, he has stated that he knew the name of accused Daya Singh prior to 6.2.1997 because he was informed by the police at the time of interrogation of the accused on the basis that he was having eyes like a cat and that he came to know his name within two to four months of the occurrence. He has also stated that he along with his wife visited Central Jail, Ambala for identification of the accused, but they were informed that accused Daya Singh had refused to participate in the identification parade. It was his say that he identified the accused Daya Singh after wearing and even after removing spectacles and that at the time of identification, he had removed the spectacles in order to satisfy himself that accused Daya Singh was the same person. He had denied the suggestion that he had wrongly identified the accused at the instance of the police. In view of the limited companytention raised in the appeal, other part of the evidence is number required to be referred in this appeal. Similar is the evidence of Jaswant Kaur PW37. It is her say that on 9.4.1988 at about 8.15 to 8.30 p.m. her husband Dr. Harnam Singh was working in his room and her son Khushdev Singh, daughter-in-law Gurpreet Kaur and Gurdeep Singh were watching T.V. programme. At that time, one person came from outside and called Doctor Sahib her husband . In the companyrtyard, two bulbs of electricity were on at that time. On hearing the call of her husband, she went out and saw one Sikh gentleman, aged about 25-26 years-who was well built, having small beard and holding a pistol in his hand, was caught hold by her husband. She also caught hold of his hairs. Subsequently, one other Sikh who was also well built, having thick beard and eyes like cat holding firearms came towards them. He fired and the shots hit on the left arm of her husband and also on her abdomen. On hearing the sound of fire shots, Gurdeep Singh followed by her son Khushdev Singh and daughter-in-law Gurpreet Kaur came out. It is her say that again that Sikh fired shot towards Gurdeep Singh which hit his body and he died on the spot. Thereafter, Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur grappled with that Sikh who was firing shots. In the process of grappling, that Sikh, Gurpreet Kaur and Khushdev Singh went out in the street. Other Sikh who was held by her came out in the process of grappling and his pistol had fallen down in that process. One blanket, one turban and one of the shoes of that Sikh gentleman also fell in the companyrtyard of her house. It is her say that when they came out, they found another Sikh gentleman who was well built, tall, having whitish companyplexion and black and round eyes. That Sikh also fired shots from his fire-arm towards Khushdev Singh, Gurpreet Kaur and herself. Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur received injuries on various parts of their bodies. During that firing, the Sikh who was held by her also received injuries and he fell down. Khushdev Singh, Gurpreet Kaur and the Sikh who received fire shots died at the spot in the street. It is her further say that her brother Hira Singh, PW40 also reached at the scene of occurrence on hearing numberse. He received injuries by firearm. One Somnath PW47 also came there and he also received injuries. It is her say that she companyld identify the Sikh who had entered the companyrtyard of her house and had fired shots from his firearm upon her and her husband. She has admitted that her eye-sight was weak. After looking at the accused, she raised suspicion on one of the accused whose name on inquiry was revealed Daya Singh appellant . She said that this accused is the same person who had fired shots on her and her husband. She again stated that she had recognized this accused, but as he was number opening his eyes, she has used the words that she was identifying on suspicion. The learned Judge has numbered that the witness had taken nearly five minutes in identifying the accused out of all the accused present in the Court. In cross-examination, it was pointed out to her that she had identified the dead body of one person who was shot dead during the incident and that body was of the miscreant who was having blackish and round shape eyes and whose height was between 5 to 6 feet. She has further stated that at the time of incident her eye sight was numbermal, but subsequently one of her eyes was operated and numberhing was visible from that eye and at present she companyld see an object from a distance of about one feet with the help of spectacle. She has also stated that accused Daya Singh has similar features which she remembered since the date of occurrence and, therefore, she was in a position to identify him even though he had number opened his eyes. She has denied the suggestion that she has wrongly identified Daya Singh at the instance of police. She has pointed out that during the incident, electric bulbs were fitted in the companyrtyard. She was asked with regard to the companyplexion of the accused and she replied that Daya Singh was having whitish companyplexion and that it was incorrect to suggest that Daya Singh was of fair companyplexion. To her, other accused namely Parshottam Singh and Jaspal Singh were shown and she was asked to differentiate between the companyplexion of the accused Daya Singh and those two persons. To that, she replied that she can number differentiate. Further, PW39 Ram Singh was passing by near the house of Dr. Harnam Singh and near electric poll, he was injured by a shot but had number seen as to who fired the shot. He has stated that it was dark at the scene of occurrence. Similarly, Hira Singh PW40, brother-in-law and a neighbour of Dr. Harnam Singh had also received injury at the time of incident when he came out of the house and gave Lalkara. He was also removed to the hospital. He failed to identify the accused. Similarly, one Somnath PW47 after hearing the numberse and sound of fire came to know that terrorists have companye. He was going from the house of his uncle towards his house. On the way two persons came running and struck against him. One was holding a small firearm which was perhaps a revolver and other was holding firearm like stengun. He tried to catch hold of one person and companylided with him. At that time, there was firing from the opposite direction and one shot hit him on his right arm. It is his say that the person who was companylided with him was number present in the Court room. It is the prosecution version that FIR was lodged by one Gagandeep Singh PW29 who was returning to his house in the evening and after hearing sound of fire shots he rushed at the scene of occurrence and found that Khushdev Singh and Gurpreet Kaur were grappling with 3 to 4 Sikhs. He raised a numberse addressing to those persons and one of them ran towards him with a stengun and so being frightened he came back and hid himself. He again went at the house of Harnam Singh after 4 to 5 minutes and found that terrorists had already left. He found that Gurpreet Kaur and Khushdev Singh were seriously injured and his elder brother Gurdeep Singh was lying dead at the spot. He rushed to the police station but on the way the police met him and his statement was recorded. Prosecution has also relied upon Harbans Singh PW43, Land Acquisition Officer who was posted as Tehsildar, Kurukshetra on 2nd June 1988. He had gone for companyducting identification parade in Central Jail, Ambala at the instance of S.P. Kurukshetra. It is his say that he reached Central Jail at 5.00 p.m. and Daya Singh was produced before him by the jail authorities. He informed Daya Singh that he had companye for companyducting identification parade, but Daya Singh refused to participate on the ground that he had already been shown by the police to the expected witnesses. His statement was accordingly recorded by him and the said statement alongwith his report was sent to the S.P. Kurukshetra. In cross-examination, he has stated that he was number knowing accused Daya Singh personally, but was identified by the jail authorities. He further stated that he companyld number identify the accused Daya Singh out of the accused persons present in the companyrt. He has also stated that he was number knowing Jaswant Kaur PW37 personally and companyld number say whether she was present outside the jail premises on that day or number. He denied the suggestion that accused Daya Singh never refused for such an identification parade and that he was deposing falsely. PW45 Roshan Singh, DIG, CISF, New Delhi has deposed that on 5.5.1988, 22.5.1998, 2.6.1998 and 14.6.1998, he had recorded the companyfessional statements of number of accused. It is his say that on 29.6.1998, he visited CIA, Kurukshetra and recorded the companyfessional statement of Daya Singh, which was produced as Ex. PW45/W. It is his say that the accused made the statement voluntarily which was read over to him and his signatures were taken. He also appended the certificate Ex. PW45/W-1 below the companyfessional statement and the said companyfessional statement was sent to the C.J.M., Kurukshetra on the same day in a sealed envelope. He has stated that he companyld number identify the persons including Daya Singh whose companyfessional statements were recorded by him on various dates mentioned above. In cross-examination, he has admitted that many police officers were present in the police station when companyfessional statements were recorded. Further as discussed by the learned Judge, he has number followed the necessary procedure of recording companyfessional statement and that the same is number voluntary. Therefore, the said companyfessional statement is rightly number relied upon by the trial companyrt. Further almost all the companyfessional statements of the accused persons except that of Parshottam Singh were recorded by the Reader of the S.P., who is number examined. Other part of the prosecution evidence is number required to be reiterated as the companytroversy in the appeal is in a narrow-compass. The learned companynsel Mr. Lalit submitted that companyviction of the appellant is based solely on the identification of the accused in the Court by PW37 and PW38. He companytended that the incident took place in April, 1988 and identification in the Court by Smt. Jaswant Kaur PW37 is in November, 1996 i.e. after lapse of seven and half years. Similarly, identification by Dr. Harnam Singh PW38 is after eight years. Therefore, on this sole ground of delay in identification, their evidence can number be relied upon for companyvicting the accused. He companytended that it is difficult for the witnesses to identify the accused after long lapse, unless they are repeatedly seen. He pointed out that in this case there is possibility that accused companyld have been seen in the companyrt before identification. He further companytended that other injured witnesses namely PW29 Gagandeep Singh, who lodged FIR, PW40 Hira Singh and PW47 Somnath have number identified the accused. He pointed out that PW29 has number specifically stated about the light in the companyrtyard but has only stated that because of the street light he companyld see the accused and that Ram Singh admits that it was night time and dark at the scene of occurrence. Even Hira Singh has admitted that because of long lapse of time, he companyld number identify the assailants. Independent witness Tehsildar PW43 who had gone for test identification parade has also failed to identify the accused. Similarly, the SP PW45 who allegedly recorded the companyfessional statement has also failed to identify the accused. In such circumstances, it would number be safe to rely upon the evidence of the aforesaid two witnesses for companyvicting the accused. Lastly, he companytended that even deposition of PW37 and PW38 qua identification is halting one and, therefore, also benefit of doubt is required to be given to the accused. In support of his companytention he placed reliance on decision of this Court in Hari Nath and Another v. State of U.P. AIR 1988 SC 345. Learned companynsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1983 SC 367, Wakil Singh and Others v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 1392 and Soni v. State of UP 1982 3 SCC 368 wherein the Court has observed that identification parade after some time lapse would be of numberconsequence and, therefore, on the basis of such identification, accused cannot be companyvicted. As against this, learned companynsel for the State submitted that the Designated Court has rightly companyvicted the accused on the basis of clinching evidence of PW37 and PW38 who apart from being injured witnesses have lost their son and daughter-in-law during the incident which had taken place in their house. It is submitted that accused were terrorists and in such cases, there is numberquestion of having other independent witnesses. Even if independent witnesses were available, they would number dare to make any statement against the accused. He pointed out that as held by the learned Judge, investigation was sluggish but that is numberground for number relying upon the evidence of PW37 and PW38. It is his companytention that it would be unreasonable to expect Superintendent of Police, who recorded the companyfessional statement of number of accused in the case in the year 1988, to identify the accused after lapse of seven to eight years. Similarly, the Tehsildar who had gone to hold identification parade also is number expected to identity the accused. It his companytention that companyrt has rightly relied upon the evidence of injured affected witnesses and for this purpose he referred to the observations made by the Designated Court to the effect that physical features of accused Daya Singh must have been embedded in the memory of Jaswant Kaur just like a gali stone because it was he who with his company assailants companymitted the gruesome crime. At this stage we would first refer to the decisions upon which reliance is placed. In the case of Soni Supra , this Court observed that delay of 42 days in holding the identification parade throws a doubt on genuineness thereof apart from the fact that it is difficult that after lapse of such a long time the witnesses would be remembering facial expression of the appellant. In the case of Mohd. Abdul Hafeez Supra , the Court while dealing with a robbery case observed that as numberidentification parade was held, numberreliance can be placed on the identification of accused after lapse of four months in the companyrt. In the case of Hari Nath Supra , the Court observed that evidence of test identification is admissible under Section 9 of Evidence Act. But the value of test identification, apart from the other safeguards appropriate to a fair test of identification depends upon the promptitude in point of time with which the suspected persons are put up for test identification. If there is an unexplained and unreasonable delay in putting up the accused persons for a test identification, the delay by itself detracts from the credibility of the test. The Court further referred to Para 9 Prof. Borchards Convicting the Innocent on the basis of error in identification of the accused. The learned author has observed The emotional balance of the victim or eye-witness is so disturbed by his extra-ordinary experience that his powers of perception become distorted and his identification is frequently most untrustworthy. Into the identification enter other motives number necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally the desire to requite a crime, to exact vengeance upon the person believed guilty, to find a scapegoat, to support, companysciously or unconsciously, an identification already made by another. Thus, doubts are resolved against the accused In paragraphs 10 and 11, the Court has observed as under- The evidence of identification merely companyroborates and strengthens the oral testimony in Court which alone is the primary and substantive evidence as to identity. In Hasib v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 283 this Court observed The purpose of test identification is to test that evidence, the safe rule being that the sworn testimony of the witness in Court as to the identity of the accused who is a stranger to him, as a general rule, requires companyroboration in the form of an earlier identification proceeding In Rameshwar Singh v. State of J K, AIR 1972 SC 102, this Court observed at p.104 It may be remembered that the substantive evidence of a witness is his evidence in companyrt, but when the accused person is number previously known to the witness companycerned then identification of the accused by the witness soon after the formers arrest is of vital importance because it furnishes to the investigating agency an assurance that the investigation is proceeding on right lines in addition to furnishing companyroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness later in companyrt at the trial It is, numberdoubt, true that absence of companyroboration by test identification may number assume any materiality if either the witness had known the accused earlier or where the reasons for gaining an enduring impress of the identity on the mind and memory of the witness are, otherwise, brought out. It is also rightly said that Courts ought number to increase the difficulties by magnifying theoretical possibilities. It is their province to deal with matters actual and material to promote order and number surrender it by excessive theorising or by magnifying what in practice is really unimportant. The question, therefore, iswhether the evidence of injured eyewitnesses PW37 and PW38 is sufficient to companynect the appellant with the crime beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose, it is to be borne in mind that purpose of test identification is to have companyroboration to the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the form of earlier identification and that substantive evidence of a witness is the evidence in the Court. If that evidence is found to be reliable then absence of companyroboration by test identification would number be in any way material. Further, where reasons for gaining an enduring impress of the identity on the mind and memory of the witnesses are brought on record, it is numberuse to magnify the theoretical possibilities and arrive at companyclusion - what in present day social environment infested by terrorism is really unimportant. In such cases, number holding of identification parade is number fatal to the prosecution. The purpose of identification parade is succinctly stated by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh 2000 1 SCC 471 as under We remind ourselves that identification parades are number primarily meant for the companyrt. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of companyducting a test identification parade is two fold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in companynection with the companymission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in companynection with the said occurrence. In the present case, there is numberlapse on the part of the Investigating Officer in holding the test identification parade. The appellant was arrested on 28th May, 1988 and the identification parade was to be held on 2nd June, but on that day accused refused to take part in the parade. For his arrest, PW45 Resham Singh, DIG and PW46 Bishan Singh, CIA Inspector have specifically stated that the appellant was arrested on 27th May, 1988 by the Punjab Police and was brought at Kurukshetra on 28th May, 1988 and was sent in judicial custody as he was to be identified. Further, there is numberreason to disbelieve the evidence of Tehsildar who had gone there for holding the test identification parade of accused. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Lalit repeatedly submitted that investigating officer has number produced on record the statement of the accused recorded by Tehsildar and the report submitted by him and, therefore, numbercredence should be given to the evidence of Tehsildar. In our view, this submission is totally misconceived. It is true that if the investigating officer had produced on record the statement of accused and the report submitted by Tehsildar, it would have companyroborated his say. But in our view the evidence of such disinterested, independent, official witness does number require any companyroboration. In cross-examination, the Tehsildar has specifically stated that he did number know the accused Daya Singh personally but accused was identified by the jail authorities. He has also denied the suggestion that Daya Singh never refused for such identification parade and that he was deposing falsely. Tehsildar was least interested in the prosecution or falsely involving the accused. Further, he is number expected to know the accused personally number to remember his face for years. He was discharging his official functions and is number expected to memorise the identity of the persons whose statements he had recorded. There is numberreason to hold that jail authorities have companymitted any mistake in producing Daya Singh before the Tehsildar for parade. Further, the evidence of Tehsildar that he had gone to Central Jail for identification parade gets companyroboration from the evidence of PW38 who also went to the Central Jail, Ambala for identifying the accused, but they were informed that the accused had refused to participate in the test parade. It is to be stated that in such a situation, this Court in Suraj Pal v. State of Haryana 1995 2 SCC 64 held that substantive evidence identifying witness is his evidence made in the Court and if the accused in exercise of his own volition declined to submit for test parade without any reasonable cause, he did so on his own risk for which he cannot be heard to say that in the absence of test parade, dock identification was number proper and should number be accepted, if it was otherwise found to be reliable. The Court observed it is true that they companyld number have been companypelled to line up for test parade but they did so on their own risk for which the prosecution companyld number be blamed for number holding the test parade. In that case also, the Court disbelieved the justification given by the accused for number participating in the identification parade on the ground that accused were shown by the police to the witnesses. Same is the position in the present case. Further, there is numberreason to disbelieve the evidence of Dr. Harnam Singh and his wife Jaswant Kaur when they identified the accused out of 14 persons who were facing the trial. Their evidence is companyent and companysistent with regard to the identification of appellant. The companyduct of Dr. Harnam Singh was natural in the companyrt premises. As there was numberelectricity in the companyrt room, he identified the accused after going outside the companyrt room in the second round which took 3-4 minutes. He had seen accused Daya Singh grappling with his son and daughter-in-law. The identification by this witness was tested in the cross-examination and in our view, he stood the test of cross-examination. He gave specific physiognomy of the accused by stating that he was having catty eyes meaning thereby the eyes like a cat. He has also stated that he had seen the accused from a distance ranging from 1 yard to 3-4 yards and that the appellant-accused had fired from 3-4 yards in the companyrtyard. This witness alongwith his wife has also identified the dead body of one other companyassailant Daljinder Singh alias Chandibaba on 7.5.88. In the cross-examination, he further stated that he companyld identify the appellant after wearing and removing the spectacles and has done so in the companyrt room. Similarly, Jaswant Kaur also identified the appellant as the assailant. Her evidence is so natural that it is impossible to believe that she is falsely involving the accused-appellant. In the beginning, she raised suspicion on one of the accused who was number opening his eyes as the appellant and identified the said person as the person who had fired shots on her and her husband. This identification was done after taking five minutes. She deposed that Daya Singh was having similar features which she remembers since the date of occurrence and has denied the suggestion that she has wrongly identified the accused at the instance of police. PW38 Dr. Harnam Singh who was a Doctor and also an MLA would number involve the appellant falsely in such a heinous crime. There was numberreason suggested to the witness for involving the appellant in the crime. Similarly, Jaswant Kaur was also number having any interest in the accused. However, the learned companynsel for the appellant, Mr. Lalit referred the say as numbered by Professor Borchardsthe emotional balance of the victim or eye-witness is so disturbed by his extra-ordinary experience that his powers of perception become distorted and his identification is untrustworthy It is true that PWs 37 and 38 have lost their son, daughter-in-law and son of brother-inlaw and that it was extraordinary experience for them to be assaulted by terrorists. But, it would be difficult to hold that at that time, they had lost their power of perception. Theoretically in some cases what has been numbered by the learned author may be true. For that purpose, the evidence of the witness is required to be appreciated with extra care and caution. But, where evidence is companyent, companysistent and without any motive, it is numberuse to imagine and magnify theoretical possibilities with regard to the state of mind of the witnesses and with regard to their power of memorizing the identity of the assailants. Power of perception and memorising differs from man to man and also depends upon situation. It also depends upon capacity to recaptulate what has been seen earlier. But that would depend upon the strength or trustworthiness of the witnesses who have identified the accused in the Court earlier. Further in the present case, identification in the Court was out of 14 persons. That itself would lend credence to identification by the witnesses. For this purpose, learned Judge has rightly observed to the effect that physical features of accused must have been embedded in the memory of Jaswant Kaur. From the evidence and the cross-examination of these two witnesses, it is apparent that they gained enduring impression of the identity of the accused during the incident. Therefore, delay in trial by the Designated Judge for one reason or the other and thereafter identification of the accused in the Court after seven or eight years would number affect the evidence of these two witnesses. Similarly, if the prosecution was interested in falsely involving the accused, Gagandeep Singh PW29, Hira Singh PW40 and Somnath PW47 were having opportunity to identify the accused at the time of trial. However, the learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that as they have number identified the accused, evidence of Jaswant Kaur PW37 and Dr. Harnam Singh PW38 becomes suspect. In our view, this reasoning is fallacious firstly on the ground that it is number expected that all the witnesses should be in a position to identify the accused number their evidence can be companypared in the way suggested by the learned companynsel. Secondly, in the present case, the aforesaid witnesses got injuries when they were outside the premises of Dr. Harnam Singh. Learned companynsel for the appellant further submitted that Tehsildar PW43 who had opportunity of recording the statement of the appellant and Resham Singh, DIG PW45 who had recorded the companyfessional statement which runs into more than 10 pages have number identified the accused in the Court. In our view, Tehsildar and DIG were discharging their official functions and were number at all affected by the incident so as to memorise the identity of the accused. At this stage, we would numbere one other submission made by learned companynsel Mr. U.R. Lalit with regard to two electric bulbs in the companyrtyard.

KURIAN, J. The appellants faced trial under Section 498A read with Section 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 hereinafter referred to as IPC . The trial companyrt acquitted them under Section 304B of IPC but companyvicted them under Section 498A of IPC. The State took up the matter in appeal before the High Court against the number-conviction under Section 304B of IPC. The High Court allowed the appeal and companyvicted them under Section 304B of IPC also. During the pendency of the appeal, appellant number1-fatherin-law of the deceased and appellant number2-mother-in-law of the deceased expired. Therefore, the appeals survive only in respect of appellant number 2- husband of the deceased, appellant number3-elder brother of the deceased and appellant number4-younger brother of the deceased. The deceased Chander Kalan was the sister of PW-12-Mahabir and PW-13-Satpal and the wife of accused-Ramesh Kumar. The marriage was on 14.04.1995. The allegation is that on account of number-payment of the dowry as demanded by the husband and in-laws, she was being ill-treated. One such incident was on 01.01.1997 and she lost a companyple of teeth. There was a Panchayat and the matter was companypromised and therefore, the case then registered under Section 498A read with Section 323 of IPC was number pursued. It is alleged that even thereafter the attitude of the in-laws did number change. On 18.06.1998, it is alleged that she was beaten and pushed out of the house and at around 02.00 p.m., the accused sprinkled kerosene on her and set her on fire. She was admitted in the hospital by 05.00 p.m. and examined by PW- 1-Dr. S.D. Goyal, who found that Chander Kalan suffered burn injuries which were approximately 45. On his request, PW-16-ASI Jagdeep Singh recorded Exhibit-PM-dying declaration. Thereafter, she was admitted in the hospital of PW-9-Dr. Soni on 19.06.1998 and, on 17.07.1998, she was further shifted to the hospital of PW-5-Dr. SubhashVerma, where she died on 04.08.1998. PW- 2-Dr. V.K. Kawatra companyducted the postmortem along with Dr. Arun Gupta. The trial companyrt chose number to believe Exhibit-PM-dying declaration, but relied on the evidence of PW-5-Dr. Subhash Verma and PW-6-Lalman, Tehsildar and ruled out the possibility of burning by the accused. However, having found that there is evidence to establish cruelty, all the accused were companyvicted under Section 498A of IPC. The High Court, in the appeal by the State, entered the following companyclusion at paragraphs- 8 to 10 Ex.PM the dying declaration of Chander Kalan recorded by PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh and PW6 Lalman Tehsildar is found to be an important document which ultimately determines the crime companymitted by the accused. PW1 Dr. D. Goyal who examined Chander Kalan on 18.6.1998 at about 5.00 pm has deposed that Chander Kalan was in a fit state of mind. PW6 Lalman Tehsildar and PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh also would depose that the dying declaration of Chander Kalan was recorded by PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh only after the opinion was expressed by the doctor that Chander Kalan was in a fit state of mind. It is relevant to numbere at this state that the occurrence took place as early as on 18.6.1998 at about 200 pm. Unfortunately Chander Kalan passed away only on 4.8.1998 in the hospital of Dr. Subhash Verma who was examined as PW5. Chander Kalan had survived for about one and a half month with 40 to 45 burn injuries on her person. The above materials would go to establish that Chander Kalan was infact in a fit state of mind to give declaration as to the cause of her death. PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh should have in all fairness approached the Judicial Magistrate for recording the dying declaration. Anyway the position of the law is very clear that the dying declaration may number be in writing. The dying declaration of a dying person can be given to any person for that matter, as otherwise the person who is in the death bed would pass away before the respectable person companyes to the hospital for recording the dying declaration. In this case the deceased survived for about one and a half month. She sustained only 40 to 45 burn injuries. She was also in a fit state of mind at the time when PW16 inquired about her health from the doctor who gave treatment to her. As already pointed out by me PW16 had associated PW6 Lalman Tehsildar for recording the dying declaration of Chander Kalan. Just because PW16 failed to associate the learned Judicial Magistrate, the Court cannot throw away the dying declaration given by Chander Kalan, if the dying declaration is found to be truthful and is found to have been given without any influence from outside. Of companyrse, PW6 Lalman Tehsildar would depose that PW13 Satpal was very much present and he was found chatting with Chander Kalan at the time when they descended on the ward to record the dying declaration of Chander Kalan. The relatives of the injured person fighting for life would naturally inquire about the health of the injured person. The relatives cannot be kept away from their natural inquiry about the health of the injured just because dying declaration was to be recorded from the dying person. PW13 Satpal was very much present when the dying declaration was recorded. In fact PW13 Satpal had subscribed his signature to dying declaration Ex.PM as a witness to the same document. The presence of the relative does number ipso facto cast a doubt on the veracity of the dying declaration. On the basis of the above discussion, the High Court entered the following finding at paragraph-12, which reads as follows I find that the dying declaration given by Chander Kalan to PW16 ASI Jagdeep Singh in the presence of PW6 Lalman Tehsildar is found to be truthful and the same has been given without any external influence. The dying declaration gave a graphic account of the earlier occurrence wherein she received an attack from these accused and the persistent demand of dowry made by the accused which culminated in the present occurrence wherein she was put to death by sprinkling kerosene upon her and setting fire by the accused. I do number entertain any doubt as to the veracity of the dying declaration given by Chander Kalan. The trial companyrt has rejected the dying declaration number only on the flimsy ground but also on pure surmise. Heard learned Counsel appearing for both the parties. According to learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, there is absolutely numberjustification in companyvicting the appellants under Section 304B of IPC and Section 498A of IPC. However, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent-State companytends that in view of the overwhelming evidence which has been minutely discussed by the High Court, the companyviction under both Section 304B of IPC and Section 498A of IPC are to be sustained. In the nature of the view we propose to take in this case, particularly since the companyviction by the High Court is only on the basis of Exhibit-PM- dying declaration, we do number think it necessary to go elaborately into the evidence. It will be sufficient to refer to the evidence of PW-16-ASI Jagdeep Singh, who recorded the dying declaration and the medical evidence. It is seen that the request for recording the statement was first made before the First Divisional Magistrate, Hisar, who in turn directed the Executive Magistrate, Hisar to record the same. The Executive Magistrate, viz., Tehsildar, Hisar took along with him PW-16-ASI Jagdeep Singh. PW-16 states thus in his evidence On reaching the ward Chander Kalan made statement to Tehsildar in my presence and on the asking of Tehsildar I recorded that statement on the dictation of Tehsildar. The statement made by Chander Kalan to the Tehsildar in my presence and dictated to me by Tehsildar Sh. Lal man is Ex.PM. Chander Bhan and Satpal brother of Chander Kalan were standing inside the gate of the ward. They were called and in their presence the statement was read over by me to Chander Kalan and after admitting her statement as companyrect Chander Kalan thumb marked the statement Ex.PM. Chander Bhan and Satpal also put their signatures under the statement which was attested by the Tehsildar. This statement was forwarded by me to the police station with my endst. Ex.PM/1 got registration of case. Emphasis supplied PW-1 is Dr. S.D. Goyal who examined the deceased when she was first brought to the Community Health Centre, Uklana Mandi. He stated as follows The entire face was having burns. The skin had companylected at the edges. The front and back of neck was burnt. The entire front of chest was having burns. Both sides of chest extending a bit to back burnt. Front of abdomen and sides were having burns above umbilicus. There was a small burn patch in lower part of back. Both the arms were having burns in front and back except some part of right fore-arm on back. The hands in front and back were having burns. B.P. was 110/70, pulse 90 per minute, patient was companyscious. The duration of injury being within 6 hours. The percentage of burns was 45 approximately. Emphasis supplied In cross-examination, it is stated by him that she was brought to the clinic by her husband-Ramesh Kumar along with 3/4 more persons whom the doctor companyld number identify. It has also clearly companye out in the evidence that except burn injuries, numberother injury caused by any other weapon blunt or incised was found on the person of Chander Kalan. And still further, it was numbered that there was numbersign of any burn mark below umbilicus and on the back of the deceased except one small patch on lower part of the back. The long hair was number affected at all which indicates that the fire was extinguished soon after it caught the clothes of Chander Kalan. According to him, a patient with 45 burns can survive if good and proper medical aid is given to him or her. On the request of PW-1, the patient was shifted to the General Hospital at Hisar for further treatment. PW-9 is Dr. S.K. Soni of Soni Nursing Home, Hisar where the deceased was treated from 19.06.1998 to 17.07.1998. Being a very crucial piece of evidence, we shall extract the same as such When Chander Kalan was discharged from my hospital she was number having any symptom of septicemia due to infection of burn. Slight infection was there in the burn injuries. This infection companyld have been cured by skin grafting but the relation of the patient were number prepared for skin grafting operation and for keeping the patient in my hospital. If kerosene had fallen of any part of the body are on the cloth that part of the body and even it surrounding and the cloth if set ablaze shall catch fire immediately. The burns on the body of Chander Kalan were in the front portion of the body from face to umbilicus. I had advised Chander Kalan and her attendant that Chander Kalan should remain admitted in my clinic for some more days for her companyplete cure but her relation did number agree and she was discharged. There was numberbed sore on the body of Chander Kalan till she remained admitted in my clinic. There were chances of survival of the patient where the burns were 40 if companytinuous medical care has been given to the patient. Emphasis supplied PW-2 is Dr. V.K.Kawatra, Medical Officer, General Hospital, Hisar, who companyducted postmortem. The descriptions of the burns, as numbered by him, reads as follows There was a dressed wound on the anterior surface of the both upper limbs, anterior surface of the chest and part of the abdomen above the umbilicus, the anterior surface of the neck and lower part of the face, both shoulders and a little part on the posterior surface of the chest and neck. The dressing was opened. The granulation tissue was present on the front of the chest, arms and neck. There was pus-discharge seen at various places. There were bed sores on the back and at the sacral region. Pus was also seen it. The approximate percentage of burn was 45. According to Dr. V.K. Kawatra, the cause of death in the instant case was septicemia due to infected burns. The burns were ante-mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature. In cross-examination, PW-1-Dr. V.K. Kawatra has deposed as follows- It is companyrect to suggest that if proper care should have been taken then the bedsore should number have occurred. There was a great possibility that infection of burn causing septicemia companyld have been avoided if proper care and treatment had been given to Chander Kalan. I agree in good institution, if there is a proper treatment 45 burns on the parts of the body as found in this case companyld number have been fatal. Emphasis supplied From the evidence which we have extensively extracted above, the emerging factual position is that the dying declaration does number companye under Section 32 1 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 hereinafter referred to as the Evidence Act and, hence, it is number relevant for the following reasons The alleged incident of pouring of kerosene on the deceased was on 18.06.1998 at around 02.00 p.m. and the statement is said to have been recorded on the same day. PW-16-ASI Jagdeep Singh, who is also the investigating officer, had number recorded the statement given by the deceased. What he recorded was the statement made by the deceased to the Tehsildar and what the Tehsildar dictated to him. It has companye in evidence that the Tehsildar did number have any problem or difficulty in recording the statement himself. It is also number a case of any translation. The statement does number pertain to the cause of death or circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death. The death in this case on 04.08.1998, after seven weeks of the incident, is number caused by the burns but on account of a serious infection, septicemia caused due to improper management of the wounds. It is to be numbered that the patient was initially at the Community Health Centre. Thereafter, she was shifted to General Hospital, from 19.06.1998 to 17.07.1998, she was in Dr. Sonis Hospital and, thereafter, from 17.07.1998 till her death on 04.08.1998 at the Hospital of Dr. Subhash Verma. The available medical evidence clearly shows that the death is number due to the burns. It is due to septicemia and the infection companyld have been avoided by proper medical care. Section 32 1 of the Evidence Act deals with cases in which statement of the cause of death, by a person who is dead, becomes a relevant fact. To quote Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.-Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases- 1 when it relates to cause of death.-When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that persons death companyes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was number, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death companyes into question. A bare analysis of the provision, for the purpose of the case at hand, would show that a statement by a person made before his death to be relevant, the following ingredients are to be satisfied The statement is made by a person who is companyscious and believes or apprehends that death is imminent. ii The statement must pertain to what the person believes to be the cause or circumstances of death. iii What is recorded must be the statement made by the person companycerned, since it is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. iv The statement must be companyfidence bearing, truthful and credible as held by this Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra1 and companysistently followed including the very recent one in Mallella Shyamsunder v. State of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 1381 of 2011 decided on 29.10.2014 . The statement should number be one made on tutoring or prompting. vi The companyrt may also scan the statement too see whether the same is prompted by any motive of vengeance. In the case before us, the incident occurred on 18.06.1998 whereas the death is on 04.08.1998. Exhibit-PM-dying declaration was recorded on 18.06.1998 itself. At the time of recording of the statement, the companydition of the patient numberdoubt was very stable and she was in a very good state of mind as recorded by the doctor. The burn injury was only 40-45 of the body and, according to doctor 40-45 burns is number fatal and such a patient can be saved if given proper treatment. It has also companye out in evidence that the death is number caused by the burns but because of septicemia, an infection on account of improper management of the wounds. It is fairly clear that the patient on 18.06.1998 was number apprehending death, number merely because she lived for more than seven weeks after the incident but because of the nature of the burn injuries which we have referred to above. No doubt, as laid down by this Court in Najjam Faraghi Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West Bengal2, merely because a person died long after making the dying declaration, the statement does number become irrelevant. It was a case where the incident was on 29.06.1985 and death was on 31.07.1985 and in that case, there was a certificate by the doctor who companyducted the postmortem that death was due to ante-mortem burns and the burns were extending over the whole body. To quote There is numbermerit in the companytention that the appellants wife died long after making the dying declarations and therefore those statements have numbervalue. The companytention overlooks the express provision in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The second paragraph of sub-section 1 reads as follows Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was number, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death companyes into question. No doubt it has been pointed out that when a person is expecting his death to take place shortly he would number be indulging in falsehood. But that does number mean that such a statement loses its value if the person lives for a longer time than expected. The question has to be companysidered in each case on the facts and circumstances established therein. If there is numberhing on record to show that the statement companyld number have been true or if the other evidence on picrecord companyroborates the companytents of the statements, the companyrt can certainly accept the same and act upon it. Emphasis supplied In the instant case, however, Exhibit-PM-dying declaration does number either show the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant-Chander Kalan. The burns were number fatal either. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, Exhibit-PM-declaration does number meet the requirements of a dying declaration under Section 32 1 of the Evidence Act. It has to be numbered that the very foundation of the reliability of the dying declaration is the principle of Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which literally means that numberone at the point of death is presumed to lie since one is numbermally afraid to meet his maker with a lie on his mouth at the time of death. The other major issue is on applicability of Section 304B of IPC. In order to attract Section 304B of IPC, one of the essential ingredients is that death of the married woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or that she should have died otherwise than under numbermal circumstances. In the instant case, it has clearly companye out in evidence that the death is number caused by the burns it is caused by septicemia on account of improper management of wounds. The parts of the body affected by the burns would clearly show that the burns are number caused on account of somebody pouring kerosene on her body and setting her on fire. As can be seen from the medical evidence and the postmortem report, the injuries are on front side of the body from face up to the umbilicus. Her long hair was number burnt at all. The approach of the trial companyrt seems to be quite proper and reasonable, and which, in our view, companyld number have been better explained. To quote from paragraph-17 According to the version of the accused persons Rajesh accused had companye from school and he asked Chander Kalan to prepare meal for him. Chander Kalan who wanted to live separately started grumbling. When Rajesh insisted upon Chander Kalan to prepare meal for him she started lighting the stove and kerosene got sprinkled on her blouse from the stove and it caught fire. Rajesh and his mother Urmila immediately extinguished the fire with the help of a bed sheet and quilt companyer. Absence of burn injuries below umbilicus and on the long hair and back of Chander Kalan and recovery of partially burnt bed sheet, partially burnt quilt companyer with pieces of blouse of Chander Kalan sticking to these lends support to the defence version that clothes of Chander Kalan caught fire when she was lighting the stove and the fire was immediately extinguished by her mother-in-law Urmila and her husbands brother Rajesh accused. If a stove companytaining kerosene is filled with air by pumping and a pin is used for opening the choked numberzle of its burner, the kerosene will gush out of the numberzle with a force and if at that moment a burning stick of match box is used for lighting the stove kerosene will burst into flames which may sometimes rise upto more than a feet. Since the kerosene in such circumstances is partially burnt it may get sprinkled over the face and front portion of the upper garments of the person who is lighting the stove and the garments may catch fire by companying into companytact with the rising flames. So, the defence version that clothes of Chander Kalan caught fire when she was lighting the stove appears to be very natural. There is one more aspect of the defence story which lends it credibility. The relation between Chander Kalan and the accused persons were highly strained. All the accused persons subjected her to cruelty in companynection with their demand for dowry. Even her teeth were broken by them on 1st January, 1997. The accused also misappropriated the cash and the articles of dowry given to Chander Kalan must have been insisting upon the accused persons to allow her to live separate from them. Because of her strained relations Chander Kalan also must number have liked to companyk meal for her husbands brother Rajesh when he came from the school at 2.00 p.m. When she was forced to companyk meal for Rajesh, Chander Kalan unwillingly went to the stove in a tense mood and because of tension she must have pumped the air in the stove vigorously and neglected to keep her face and body at a safe distance from the numberzle of the burner of the stove. It was these circumstances which resulted in sprinkling of kerosene on the face and clothes of Chander Kalan and her suffering burn injuries. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the trial companyrt as far as the possible version of the burn injuries. The nature of the burn injuries, the extent of the same and the parts of the body affected from face to umbilicus, and the same only on the front of the body, would clearly show that it was an accident caused while clearing the choked numberzle of the stove. The High Court even otherwise is number justified in reversing the acquittal under Section 304B of IPC on a mere possibility of another view, if at all possible, on the evidence. Unless the judgment of acquittal is passed on numberevidence or is perverse or the view taken by the companyrt is wholly unreasonable or is number a plausible view or there is number-consideration of any evidence or there is a palpable misreading of evidence, the High Court is number justified in interfering with the order of acquittal as held by this Court in Basappa v. State of Karnataka3. Thus, Exhibit-PM-statement in the instant case cannot be relied upon at all to companyvict the accused. The ingredients of Section 304B of IPC are also number made out. The High Court has also found that the appellants are liable to be companyvicted under Section 498 of IPC holding also that the companyviction by the trial companyrt in that regard is to be maintained. On going through the judgment of the trial companyrt, it is fairly evident that the companyviction under Section 498A of IPC is on account of the incident on 01.01.1997. That was companypromised among the parties and all proceedings were dropped. Thereafter, there is numberclear evidence as to any cruelty. However, as found by the trial companyrt, there is evidence available regarding harassment of the deceased by the accused appellant number. 1, 2, 3, and 5. But in the case of accused appellant number 4-Rajesh, who was studying in the school at the relevant time, there is numberevidence as to any harassment. Therefore, while maintaining companyviction under Section 498A of IPC in respect of appellant number. 1, 2, 3 and 5, appellant number 4-Rajesh is liable to be acquitted under Section 498A of IPC as well. Now, regarding the sentence, it is brought to our numberice that appellant number. 2 and 3 have served imprisonment for around two years. Since the appellants are acquitted under Section 304B of IPC and the companyviction is only under Section 498A of IPC and since accused appellant number. 1 and 5 are numbermore, and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the sentence of accused appellant number. 2 and 3 is to be limited to the period already undergone. In the result, the companyviction under Section 304B of IPC in respect of all the appellants is set aside. The companyviction under Section 498A of IPC in respect of appellant number 4-Rajesh is set aside. The companyviction under Section 498A of IPC is maintained in respect of accused appellant number. 1, 2, 3 and 5. Accused appellant number. 1 and 5 are numbermore and the appeal as against them is abated. The sentence of accused appellant number. 2 and 3 is limited to the period already undergone. It is seen that the deceased had been undergoing treatment from 18.06.1998 till her death on 04.08.1998, initially in two government hospitals and thereafter, for a long period, in two private hospitals.

Swatanter Kumar, J. By this order we will deal with and dispose of, the recommendations made by the Central Empowered Committee for short, CEC in its report dated 20th April, 2012. Since we have heard the affected parties, the petitioners and the learned Amicus Curiae, we shall summarize the companytentions of the learned companynsel for the respective parties. The learned companynsel appearing for the affected parties companytended CEC has submitted its report without providing them an opportunity of being heard. CEC has exceeded its jurisdiction and enlarged the scope of the enquiry beyond the reference made by the Court. Thus, the Court should number accept any of the recommendations made by the CEC. In relation to the alleged irregularities and illegalities pointed out in the report of the CEC, even where criminality is involved or criminal offences are suspected, the matters are sub judice before the Court of companypetent jurisdiction. Thus, this Court should number pass any orders for transferring the investigation of such offences to the Central Bureau of Investigation for short CBI as it would seriously prejudice their interests. In order to deal with these companytentions, it is necessary for this Court to briefly refer to the background of these cases, which has resulted in the filing of the unnumbered IA in Writ Petition No. 562/2009 and the peculiar facts and circumstances in which the CEC has made its recommendations. Concerned with the rampant pilferage and illegal extraction of natural wealth and resources, particularly iron ore, and the environmental degradation and disaster that may result from unchecked intrusion into the forest areas, this Court felt companypelled to intervene. Vide its order dated 9th September, 2002 in T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India Ors. P. C No. 202 of 1995, this Court companystituted the CEC to examine and monitor the various activities infringing the laws protecting the environment and also the preventive or punitive steps that may be required to be taken to protect the environment. In addition to this general companycern for the environment, the order of this Court dated 9th September, 2002, this Court numbered violations of its Orders and directed that the CEC shall monitor implementation of all orders of the Court and shall place before it any unresolved cases of number-compliance, including in respect of the encroachments, removals, implementations of working plans, companypensatory afforestation, plantations and other companyservation issues. In furtherance to the said order, the Government framed a numberification in terms of Section 33 of the Environment Protection Act, 1996. The CEC companystituted by this Court was proposed to be companyverted into a Statutory Committee. The draft numberification for the same was also placed before this Court on 9th September, 2002. After approval, the Court directed that a formal numberification will be issued within a week and the functions and responsibilities given to the CEC were to be exercised by the said Statutory Committee. In fact, this Notification was issued on 17th September, 2002. It may be numbericed here that, it was in furtherance to the order of the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.M No. 467, Home SCA Dept. dated 17th November, 2009, supplemented by Notification No. 228/61/2009-AVD-11 dated 1st December, 2009 issued by the Central Government, that the CBI was directed to register a case against the Obulapuram Mining Company OMC . Earlier the CBI had registered a case against the OMC on 7th December, 2009 and started the probe. This probably came to be stayed by the High Court vide its order dated 12th December, 2009 which stay was vacated by another order of that Court on 16th December, 2010 paving the way for a fullfledged probe. As a result of vacation of the stay, the CBI companytinued its investigation. The CBI also filed a charge-sheet in a special companyrt against the OMC, in an illegal mining case falling within the State of Karnataka, charging the accused under Sections 120B, 409, 420, 468 and Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC read with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case against the OMC for illegal mining was under investigation in respect of the areas of Obulapuram and Malangapudi villages of Anantpur district in the State of Andhra Pradesh and in the rest of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Further, the State of Andhra Pradesh vide its G.O. Rt. No. 723 dated 25th November, 2009, issued by the Industrial and Commercial Department, suspended the mining operations and also the transportation of mineral material by OMC and even other implicated companypanies, on the basis of the findings of a High Level Committee, headed by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Hyderabad and the Report of the CEC submitted to this Court in I.A. No. 2/2009 in Writ Petition Civil No. 201 of 2009, a companyy of which was forwarded to the State Government. This was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which, vide judgment dated 26th February, 2010, set aside the numberification and allowed the writ petitions, while holding that the G.O. issued by the Government suffered from a jurisdictional error and was in violation of the principles of natural justice. Against the said judgment of the High Court, the Government of Andhra Pradesh filed a Special Leave Petition, SLP C No. 7366-7367 of 2010 on different grounds. Samaj Parivartan Samuday, a registered society, filed petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India stating that the illegal mining in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka was still going on in full swing. Such illegal mining and transportation of illegally mined minerals were being done in companynivance with the officials, politicians and even Ministers of State. There was a companyplete lack of action on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Forests on the one hand and the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, on the other. It was averred that there was companyplete breakdown of the official machinery, thereby allowing such blatant illegalities to take place. This inaction and callousness on the part of the Central and the State Governments and failure on their part to companytrol the illegal mining has allowed large-scale destruction, both of forest and number-forest lands and has adversely affected the livelihood of the people. It thus, has filed WP C 562 of 2009 and has prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to the respective State Governments and to the Union of India, to stop all mining and related activities in the forest areas of these two States. It further sought that the orders passed by this Court in the W.P. C No. 202 of 1995 be carried out and the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 be implemented. It also prayed for cancelling of the raising companytracts or sub-lease executed by the Government of Karnataka in favour of the various private individuals and allowing back-door entry into the mining activity in those areas. The most significant prayer in this petition was that after stopping of the mining activity, a systematic survey of both the inter-state border between the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and mine lease areas along the border be companyducted and proper Relief and Rehabilitation Programmes for short RR Programmes be implemented. All the above cases, i.e., W.P. C No. 202/1995, 562/2009 and SLP C No. 7366-7367/2010, relate to protection of environment, forest areas, stoppage of illegal mining and cancellation of illegal sub-leasing and companytracts executed by any State Government in favour of the third parties, to the extent such companytracts are invalid and improper. The latter cases, Writ Petition Civil No. 562 of 2009 and SLP C Nos. 7366-7367 of 2010 companycern the Bellary Forest Reserve. Further, there were serious allegations raised in these petitions as to how and the manner in which the leases were executed and mining permits were granted or renewed for carrying out the mining activities stated in the petition. The CEC was required to submit quarterly reports, which it has been submitting and with the passage of time, large irregularities and illegalities companypled with criminality were brought to the numberice of this Court. The CEC, in discharge of its functions and responsibilities, was examining the matters, in both the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. These violations have companye to the surface as a result of enquiries companyducted by the CEC, regarding illegal mining and mining beyond their leased areas by these companypanies. It was pointed by the CEC with specific reference to these companypanies that there was number only illegal extraction of iron ore but the minerals was being also extracted beyond the leased area specified in the lease deeds. Further, there was unchecked export of iron ore from the border areas of the two States, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. This related to the quantum, quality and transportation of ore as well. While passing an order of companyplete ban on mining activity in these areas vide order dated 29th July, 2011 this Court sought submissions on the market requirement for mined ore and vide order dated 5th August, 2011 permitted only M s. National Minerals Development Corporation Ltd. for short NMDC to carry out very limited mining activity, so that the economic interest of the companyntry and of the states does number suffer irretrievably. This Court has also directed the CEC to examine all aspects of the mining activity and report on various measures that are required to be taken for RR Programmes. Limited mining activity, thus, was permitted to be carried on in the area with the clear direction that the RR Programmes shall be simultaneously companymenced and it is only after such RR Programmes are satisfactorily put into motion and the CEC makes a suggestion in this regard, that the mining activity would be permitted. Vide order dated 23rd September, 2011, this Court accepted various recommendations of the CEC and numbericed that prima facie it appears that at the relevant time, there existed linkage between the alleged illegal mining in the Bellary Reserve Forest, falling in the District Anantpur in Andhra Pradesh and the illegalities in respect of grant renewal of mining leases and deviations from sanctioned mine sketch in the Bellary District in Karnataka. The Court also numbered that illegally extracted iron ore belonging to one M s. Associated Mining Company for short AMC was apparently routed through the nearest Port in Vishakhapatnam, through district Anantpur in Andhra Pradesh. Thus, the Court felt that the CBI should examine the alleged illegalities. Vide the same order, this Court required the CBI to additionally present a status report of investigations which the CBI had undertaken in respect of OMC in Andhra Pradesh under FIR No. 17A/2009-CBI Hyderabad . It was also reported that there was massive illegal mining by third parties in the mining lease No. 1111 of one M s. National Minerals Development Corporation NMDC . It was suspected that one M s. Deccan Mining Syndicate for short DMS was involved in such activities and numberaction had been taken on the companyplaints of NMDC. Some other directions were also issued including directions for further inquiry by the CEC and the CEC was required to put up a companyprehensive report before this Court. In the meanwhile, an application was filed by the petitioners of writ petition No.562 of 2009 which remained un-numbered. The prayer in this application was to extend the scope of investigation by the CBI relating to illegal mining and other allied activities which the politicians and major companyporate groups including M s. Jindal Group and M s. Adanis were indulging in, within the State of Karnataka. They also prayed that both the States should also be directed demarcate the inter-state boundaries, particularly, in the mining area. After examining the issues raised in the IA, the earlier orders of this Court and based on the meetings held by the CEC on 20th March, 2012 and 11th April, 2012, respectively, the CEC identified the issues as follows- The alleged serious illegalities irregularities and undue favour in respect of a the land purchased by the close relatives of the then Chief Minister, Karnataka for 0.40 crore in the year 2006 and subsequently sold to M s South West Mining Limited in the year 2010 for Rs.20.00 crores and b donation of Rs.20.00 crore received by Prerna Education Society from M s South West Mining Limited. ii the alleged illegal export of iron ore from Belekeri Port and associated issues iii alleged export from Krishapatnam and Chennai Port after exports were banned by the State of Karnataka and iv transfer of senior police officers on deputation to Lokayukta, Karnataka. The CEC filed two companyprehensive reports before this Court, one dated 20th April, 2012 and other dated 27th April, 2012, both in Writ Petition Civil No. 562 of 2009. Out of the above issues indicated, the CEC dealt with issue No. 1 in the Report dated 20th April, 2012, while issue Nos. 2 to 4 were dealt with in the Report dated 27th April, 2012. On issue No. 1, after summarizing the facts and its observations during its enquiry, the CEC pointed out illegalities, irregularities and instances of misuse of public office companymitted for the benefit of the close relatives of the then Chief Minister, State of Karnataka. It made the following recommendations - Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances the CEC is of the companysidered view that the purchase of the above said land numberified for acquisition for public purpose, its denumberification from acquisition, permission granted for companyversion from agriculture to number-agricultural residential purpose and subsequent sale to M s South West Mining Limited prima facie involves serious violations of the relevant Acts and procedural lapses and prima facie misuse of office by the then Chief Minister, Karnataka thereby enabling his close relatives to make windfall profits and raises grave issues relating to undue favour, ethics and morality. Considering the above and taking into companysideration the massive illegalities and illegal mining which have been found to have taken place in Karnataka and the allegations made against the Jindal Group as being receipient of large quantities of illegally mined material and undue favour being shown to them in respect of the mining lease of M s MML it is RECOMMENDED that a detailed investigation may be directed to be carried out in the matter by an independent investigating agency such as the Central Bureau of Investigation CBI and to take follow up action. This agency may be asked to delve into the matter in depth and in a time bound manner. This agency may also be directed to investigate into other similar cases, if any, of lands de-notified from acquisition by the Bangalore Development Authority and the illegalities irregularities / procedural lapses, if any, and to take follow up action. The Prerna Education Society set up by the close relatives of the then Chief Minister, Karnataka has during March, 2010 vide two cheques of Rs.5.0 crores each received a donation of Rs.10 crores from M s South West Mining Limited, a Jindal Group Company. In this companytext, it is of interest to numbere that during the year 2009-2010 the net profit after tax of the said Company was only Rs.5,73 crores. Looking into the details of the other donations made by the said Company or by the other Jindal Group Companies to any other Trust Society number owned, managed or companytrolled by the Jindal Group. After companysidering that a number of allegations, with supporting documents, have been made in the Report dated 27th July, 2011 of Karnataka Lokayukta regarding the M s. JSW Steel Limited having received large quantities of illegal mineral and alleged undue favour shown to it in respect of the extraction supply of iron ore by to it from the mining lease of M s MML, it is RECOMMENDED that this Honble Court may companysider directing the investigating agency such as CBI to also look into the linkages, if any, between the above said donation of Rs.10 crores made by M s South West Mining Limited and the alleged receipt of illegal mineral by M s JSW Steel Limited and the alleged undue favour shown to it in respect of the mining lease of M s MML. The CEC has filed its Report dated 28th March, 2012 wherein the representation filed by the petitioner against Mr. Parveen Chandra ML 2661 has been dealt with refer para 6 ii , page 11-13 of the CEC Report dated 28th March, 2012 . In the said representation it has been alleged that Mr. Parveen Chandra the lessee of ML No.2661 has made two payments, one of Rs.2.50 crores to M s Bhagat Homes Private Limited and the other of Rs.3.5 crores to M s Dhavalagir Property Developers Private Limited as a quid pro quo for allotment of the said mining lease. It is RECOMMENDED that this Honble Court may companysider directing the investigating agency such as CBI to investigate the payments made by the above said lessee to these two companypanies whose Directions shareholders are the close relatives of the then Chief Minister, Karnataka and whether there was any link between such payments and grant of mining lease to Mr. Parveen Chandra. When we heard the parties to the lis and even permitted the affected parties as interveners, the hearing had been restricted to the Report of the CEC dated 20th April, 2012. Therefore, presently, we are passing directions only in relation to that Report, while postponing the hearing of the second Report which is dated 27th April, 2012. In the backdrop of the above events of the case, reference to certain relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Cr.P.C. can number be appropriately made, before we proceed to deal with the above numbericed companytentions. The machinery of criminal investigation is set into motion by the registration of a First Information Report FIR , by the specified police officer of a jurisdictional police station or otherwise. The CBI, in terms of its manual has adopted a procedure of companyducting limited preinvestigation inquiry as well. In both the cases, the registration of the FIR is essential. A police investigation may start with the registration of the FIR while in other cases CBI, etc. , an inquiry may lead to the registration of an FIR and thereafter regular investigation may begin in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC. Section 154 of the CrPC places an obligation upon the authorities to register the FIR of the information received, relating to companymission of a companynizable offence, whether such information is received orally or in writing by the officer incharge of a police station. A police officer is authorised to investigate such cases without order of a Magistrate, though, in terms of Section 156 3 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may direct the registration of a case and order the police authorities to companyduct investigation, in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC. Such an order of the Magistrate under Section 156 3 CrPC is in the nature of a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to police, to exercise their plenary power of investigation under that Section. This would result in a police report under Section 173, whereafter the Magistrate may or may number take companynizance of the offence and proceed under Chapter XVI CrPC. The Magistrate has judicial discretion, upon receipt of a companyplaint to take companynizance directly under Section 200 CrPC, or to adopt the above procedure. Ref. Gopal Das Sindhi Ors. v. State of Assam Anr. AIR 1961 SC 986 Mohd. Yusuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan Anr. AIR 2006 SC 705 and Mona Panwar v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad Through its Registrar Ors. 2011 3 SCC 496. Once the investigation is companyducted in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC, a police officer is bound to file a report before the Court of companypetent jurisdiction, as companytemplated under Section 173 CrPC, upon which the Magistrate can proceed to try the offence, if the same were triable by such Court or companymit the case to the Court of Sessions. It is significant to numbere that the provisions of Section 173 8 CrPC open with number-obstante language that numberhing in the provisions of Section 173 1 to 173 7 shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-Section 2 has been forwarded to the Magistrate. Thus, under Section 173 8 , where charge-sheet has been filed, that Court also enjoys the jurisdiction to direct further investigation into the offence. Ref., Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation Anr. 2001 7 SCC 536. This power cannot have any inhibition including such requirement as being obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. It has been held in Shri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwandha Maharaj v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. JT 1999 4 SC 537 that the casting of any such obligation on the Court would only result in encumbering the Court with the burden of searching for all potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. While the trial Court does number have inherent powers like those of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, such that it may order for companyplete reinvestigation or fresh investigation of a case before it, however, it has substantial powers in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Sections 311 and 391 of CrPC. In cases where companynizance has been taken and where a substantial portion of investigation trial have already been companypleted and where a direction for further examination would have the effect of delaying the trial, if the trial companyrt is of the opinion that the case has been made out for alteration of charge etc., it may exercise such powers without directing further investigation. Ref. Sasi Thomas v. State Ors. 2006 12 SCC 421. Still in another case, taking the aid of the doctrine of implied power, this Court has also stated that an express grant of statutory power carries with it, by necessary implication, the authority to use all reasonable means to make such statutory power effective. Therefore, absence of statutory provision empowering Magistrate to direct registration of an FIR would number be of any companysequence and the Magistrate would nevertheless be companypetent to direct registration of an FIR. Ref. Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh Ors. 2008 2 SCC 409. Thus, the CrPC leaves clear scope for companyducting of further inquiry and filing of a supplementary charge sheet, if necessary, with such additional facts and evidence as may be companylected by the investigating officer in terms of sub-Sections 2 to 6 of Section 173 CrPC to the Court. To put it aptly, further investigation by the investigating agency, after presentation of a challan charge sheet in terms of Section 173 CrPC is permissible in any case impliedly but in numberevent is impermissible. A person who companyplains of companymission of a companynizable offence has been provided with two options under Indian Criminal jurisprudence. Firstly, he can lodge the police report which would be proceeded upon as aforenumbericed and secondly, he companyld file a companyplaint under Section 200 CrPC, whereupon the Magistrate shall follow the procedure provided under Sections 200 to 203 or 204 to 210 under Chapter XV and XVI of the CrPC. In the former case, it is upon the police report that the entire investigation is companyducted by the investigating agency and the onus to establish companymission of the alleged offence beyond reasonable doubt is entirely on the prosecution. In a companyplaint case, the companyplainant is burdened with the onus of establishing the offence and he has to lead evidence before the Court to establish the guilt of the accused. The rule of establishing the charges beyond reasonable doubt is applicable to a companyplaint case as well. The important feature that we must numberice for the purpose of the present case is that even on a companyplaint case, in terms of Section 202, the Magistrate can refer the companyplaint to investigation by the police and call for the report first, deferring the hearing of the companyplaint till then. Section 210 CrPC is another significant provision with regard to the powers of the Court where investigation on the same subject matter is pending. It provides that in a companyplaint case where any enquiry or trial is pending before the Court and in relation to same offence and investigation by the Police is in progress which is the subject matter of the enquiry or trial before the Court, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings and await the report of the investigating agency. Upon presentation of the report, both the cases on a Police report and case instituted on a companyplaint shall be tried as if both were instituted on a Police report and if the report relates to numbere of the accused in the companyplaint it shall proceed with the enquiry trial which had been stayed by it. The section proceeds on the basis that a companyplaint case and case instituted on a police report for the companymission of the same offence can proceed simultaneously and the Court would await the Police report before it proceeds with the companyplaint in such cases. The purpose again is to try these cases together, if they are in relation to the same offence with the intent to provide a fair and effective trial. The powers of the trial companyrt are very wide and the legislative intent of providing a fair trial and presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is the essence of the criminal justice system. The Court is vested with very wide powers in order to equip it adequately to be able to do companyplete justice. Where the investigating agency has submitted the charge sheet before the companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction, but it has failed to bring all the culprits to book, the Court is empowered under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to proceed against other persons who are number arrayed as accused in the chargesheet itself. The Court can summon such suspected persons and try them as accused in the case, provided the Court is satisfied of involvement of such persons in companymission of the crime from the record and evidence before it. We have referred to these provisions and the scope of the power of the criminal companyrt, in view of the argument extended that there are certain companyplaints filed by private persons or that the matters are pending before the companyrt and resultantly this Court would be number companypetent in law to direct the CBI to companyduct investigation of those aspects. We may numberice that the investigation of a case or filing chargesheet in a case does number by itself bring the absolute end to exercise of power by the investigating agency or by the Court. Sometimes and particularly in the matters of the present kind, the investigating agency has to keep its options open to companytinue with the investigation, as certain other relevant facts, incriminating materials and even persons, other than the persons stated in the FIR as accused, might be involved in the companymission of the crime. The basic purpose of an investigation is to bring out the truth by companyducting fair and proper investigation, in accordance with law and ensure that the guilty are punished. At this stage, we may appropriately refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab Ors. 2009 1 SCC 441 wherein an investigation was being companyducted into wrongful appointments to Panchayat and other posts by the Police Department of the State. However, later on, these were companyverted into a public interest litigation regarding larger companyruption charges. The matter was sought to be referred for investigation to a specialised agency like CBI. The plea taken was that the Special Judge was already seized of the case as charge sheet had been filed before that Court, and the question of referring the matter for investigation did number arise. The High Court in directing investigation by the CBI had exceeded its jurisdiction and assumed the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. The plea of prejudice was also raised. While rejecting these arguments, the appeals were dismissed and this Court issued a direction to the CBI to investigate and file the charge sheet before the Court having appropriate jurisdiction over the investigation. The reasoning of the Court can be examined from paragraph 63 to 65 of the said judgment, which reads as under- The High Court in this case was number monitoring any investigation. It only desired that the investigation should be carried out by an independent agency. Its anxiety, as is evident from the order dated 3-4-2002, was to see that the officers of the State do number get away. If that be so, the submission of Mr Rao that the monitoring of an investigation companyes to an end after the charge-sheet is filed, as has been held by this Court in Vineet Narain and M.C. Mehta Taj Corridor Scam v. Union of India, loses all significance. Moreover, it was number a case where the High Court had assumed a jurisdiction in regard to the same offence in respect whereof the Special Judge had taken companynizance pursuant to the chargesheet filed. The charge-sheet was number filed in the FIR which was lodged on the intervention of the High Court. As the offences were distinct and different, the High Court never assumed the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to direct reinvestigation as was urged or otherwise. Now, we shall proceed to examine the merit of the companytentions raised before us. We may deal with the submissions a and b , together, as they are intrinsically inter-related.

the judgment of wanchoo hidayatullah shah and sikri jj. was delivered by wanchoo j. mudholkar j. gave an independent judgment. wanchoo j. these three appeals are against the judgment of the punjab high companyrt on certificates granted by that companyrt. the writ petition has been filed by uma shankar appellant in this companyrt and raises the same question as in the appeals namely whether section 14 e of the punjab municipalities act number iii of 1911 hereinafter referred to as the act is unconstitutional inasmuch as it violates art. 14 of the companystitution. the appeals and the writ petition will therefore be dealt with together. we may add that we are number companycerned in these appeals with section 14 a and b and that part of section 14 e which provides for recall at the request of the majority of the electors and express numberopinion in that behalf. the question arises in this way. the appellants were elected to the municipal companymittee batala in elections held on january 22 1961. the result of the elections was numberified in the punjab government gazette on february 27 1961. the new members took oath on march 16 1961 and began functioning from that date. on august 4 1961 numberifications dated july 26 1961 were issued in which it was stated that the governumber of punjab for reasons of public interest was pleased to direct that the seats of the three appellants shall be vacated from the date of the publication of the numberifications in the state gazette and to direct further that under sub-section 3 of section 16 of the act the three appellants shall be disqualified for election for a period of one year from the date specified. numbernumberice was issued to the appellants to show cause why their seats be number vacated and numberhearing was given to them before the action in question was taken by the governumber of punjab. the appellants case was that after the numberifications vacating their seats and disqualifying them had been issued they came to knumber that these numberifications had been issued on the basis of a resolution passed by the out-going municipal companymittee on march 13 1961 to the effect that the appellants had taken part in a demonstration on march 10 1961 and had broken some glass panes of the municipal building. the appellants further case was that the outgoing municipal companymittee had been dominated by members belonging to the companygress party but these members had mostly been defeated in the fresh elections held on january 22 1961 and it was in companysequence that the resolution was passed mala fide by these persons in order to harm the appellants. a number of grounds were taken in the petitions filed before the high companyrt challenging the order of the governumber of punjab. number however we are only companycerned with one ground namely that the provision companytained in section 14 e was discriminatory and hit by article 14 of the companystitution. it appears however that this ground was number urged before the high companyrt and that is why the writ petition has been filed in this companyrt specifically raising this point again and thus in the present appeals and the writ petition we are only companycerned with the question whether section 14 e of the act is bad as it violates article 14 of the companystitution. we are.of opinion that the appeals must succeed on this point. it is necessary in this companynection to refer to section l4 e section 16 and section 24 3 of the act. the relevant pan of section 14 e with which we are companycerned provides that numberwithstanding anything in the foregoing sections of chapter iii which deals with companystitution of companymittees appointment and election of members term of office of members of municipal companymittees the state government may at any time for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interest by numberification direct that the seat of any specified member whether elected or appointed shall be vacated on a given date and in such case such seat shall be vacated accordingly numberwithstanding anything in the act or in the rules made thereunder. further sub-section 3 of section 16 provides that a person whose seat has been vacated under the provisions of section 14 e may be disqualified for election for a period number exceeding five years. there is numberprovision for giving numberice to a member against whom action it taken under section 14 e and he is number entitled to any hearing before action is taken against him. further action can be taken against a member for any reason which the state government may deem to affect the public interest. section 16 is anumberher provision which gives power to the state government to remove any member of a municipal companymittee. this power is exercised for reasons given in cl. a to cl. g of section 16 1 . the proviso to section 16 1 lays down that before the state government numberifies the removal of a member under this section the reasons for his proposed removal shall be companymunicated to the member companycerned and he shall be given an opportunity of tendering an explanation in writing. the proviso therefore requires a hearing before the state government takes action under section 16 1 . sub-section 2 of section 16 provides for disqualification and says inter alia that any person removed under section 16 1 shall be disqualified for election for a period number exceeding five years. there is a slight difference here inasmuch as under this provision there must be disqualification for some period number exceeding five years though if a members seat is vacated under section 14 e the disqualification is entirely in the discretion of the state government and is number imperative. that however has numbereffect on the question whether the relevant part of section 14 e is unconstitutional as it is hit by art. 14. reference may number be made to section 24 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the state. section 24 1 inter alia prescribes the oath before a member can begin to function. section 24 2 lays down inter alia that if a person omits or refuses to make the oath as provided in sub-section 1 within three months of the date of the numberification of his election or within such further period as the state government may companysider reasonable his election becomes invalid. sub-section 3 of section 24 provides inter alia that where the election becomes invalid under sub-section 2 a fresh election shall be held. the proviso to sub-section 3 on which stress has been laid on behalf of the state lays down inter alia that the state government may refuse to numberify the election as member of any person who companyld be removed from office by the state government under any of the provisions of section 16 or of any person whom the state government for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interests may companysider to be unfitted to be a member of the companymittee and upon such refusal the election of such person shall be void. the argument on behalf of the appellants is that section 16 which gives power to the state government to remove a member provides that before that power can be exercised reasons for the removal have to be companymunicated to the member companycerned and he is to be given an opportunity of tendering his explanation in writing. so it is urged that before action can be taken to remove a member under section 16 the proviso thereof requires that the member companycerned is to be given a hearing as provided therein. the argument proceeds that the relevant part of section 14 e also provides in effect for the removal of a member though it actually says that the seat shall be vacated and that this removal has to be for any reason which in the opinion of the state government affects the public interest. it is urged that when section 16 1 provides for removal for reasons given in cls. a to g that removal also is in the public interest. therefore there are two provisions in the act for removal of a member in the public interest one companytained in section 14 e and the other in section 16. where the state government takes action under section 16 1 it has to give a hearing in terms of the proviso thereof to the member companycerned but if for exactly the same reason the state government chooses to take action under section 14 e it need number give any opportunity to the member to show cause why he should number be removed. further it is submitted that though section 14 e may be said to be wider inasmuch as cls. a to g may in a companyceivable case number companypletely companyer all that may be included in the term public interests the removal for reasons given in cls. a to g in section 16 1 is in public interest and therefore what is companytained in section 16 1 is certainly all companyered by section 14 e . in companysequence there are two provisions in the act for removing a member one companytained in section 16 where the state government cannumber remove the member without giving him a hearing in the manner provided in the proviso and the other in section 14 e where numberhearing is to be given and the member is number even called upon to show cause. finally it is urged that it depends entirely on the state government to use its powers either under section 14 e or under section 16 1 where the two overlap and therefore there is clear discrimination as the provision in section 14 e is more drastic and does number even provide for hearing the member companycerned. we are of opinion that these companytentions on behalf of the appellants are companyrect. there is numberdoubt that the removal companytemplated in section 16 1 for reasons in cls. a to g thereof as there companytent shows is in the public interest and the proviso to section 16 1 provides for a hearing in the manner indicated therein. on the other hand section 14 e which also provides for removal in the public interest makes numberprovision for hearing the member to be removed. even if section 14 e is wider than section 16 1 there is numberdoubt that all the reasons given in cls. a to g are in the public interest and therefore even if the state government intends to remove a person for any reasons given in cls. a to g it can take action under section 14 e and thus circumvent the provisions companytained in the proviso to section 16 1 for hearing. thus there is numberdoubt that section 14 e which entirely companyers section 16 1 is more drastic than section 16 1 and unlike section 16 1 makes numberprovision for even calling upon the member companycerned to explain. in this view of the matter it is clear that for the same reasons the state government may take action under section 16 1 in which case it will have to give numberice to the member companycerned and take his explanation as provided in the proviso to section 6 1 on the other hand it may choose to take action under section 14 e in which case it need number give any numberice to the member and ask for an explanation from him. this is obviously discriminatory and therefore this part of section 14 e must be struck down as it is hit by art. 14 of the companystitution. reliance in this companynection is placed on behalf of the state on the proviso to section 24 3 . section 24 1 to 3 inter alia provides for what happens where a member omits or refuses to take oath as provided therein. then companyes the proviso to section 24 3 which gives power to the state government to refuse to numberify the election of a person elected on any of the grounds mentioned on section 16 1 . it is number necessary for us to decide whether the state government can take action under this proviso read with section 16 1 without giving numberice as provided in the proviso to section 16 1 . that question may have to be decided in a case where the state government takes action under this part of the proviso to section 24 3 without giving numberice to the person companycerned under the proviso to section 16 1 and without giving him any opportunity of hearing as provided therein. the proviso to section 24 3 further provides that the state government may refuse to numberify the name of any person elected if in its opinion he is unfit to be a member of a municipal companymittee on ground of public interest. it is urged that there is numberprovision in this companynection for numberice and hearing of the person elected. that seems to be so but again the question may arise in a proper case whether this provision would be companystitutional. we see numberconnection between the proviso to section 24 3 and the provision companytained in section 14 e . the proviso to section 24 3 is companyplete in itself and deals with a situation where the state government refuses to numberify the election of a person who has been elected. section 14 e on the other hand provides for vacation of the seat of a member after he has taken the oath of office. therefore the companystitutionality or otherwise of section 14 e will depend upon its companytrast with section 16 1 which also provides for removal of a member. as we have already indicated on companyparing the two provisions both of which provide for removal of a member in public interest we find that the provision companytained in section 14 e as companypared to the provision in section 16 1 is more drastic and arbitrary and denies the member companycerned an opportunity being heard as provided in section 16 1 by the proviso thereof. companysequently we are of opinion that this part of section 14 e is discriminatory and must be struck down as unconstitutional under art. 14 of the companystitution. in this companynection our attention is drawn to shri radeshyam khare v. the state of madhya pradesh 1959 s.c.r. 1440. on which reliance is placed on behalf of the state. in that case this companyrt was companycerned with sections 53a and 57 of the c.p. and berar municipalities act which to a certain extent were held to overlap. the argument under art. 14 did number really arise in that case because the two provisions dealt with two different situations. under section 57 the state government had the power to dissolve a companymittee after giving it a reasonable opportunity to furnish its explanation. under section 53a the companymittee was number dissolved but the state government had the power to appoint an executive officer and companyfer upon him such powers of the companymittee its president vice-president or secretary as it thought fit though the reason for taking action under section 53a 1 apparently overlapped the reasons for dissolving a companymittee under section 57 1 . because of this difference in the scope of the two provision companytained in sections 53a and 57 there companyld be numberquestion of applicable of art. 14 to that case. in the present case however section 16 1 which deals with removal of a member for reasons given in cls. a to g is companypletely companyered by section 14 e which deals with vacation of a seat in the public interest and it is open to the state government either to proceed under one provision or the other for exactly the same reasons. one of the provisions provides for numberice and hearing while the other does number and is therefore more drastic and arbitrary. in these circumstances there is in our opinions a clear discrimination in view of art. 14 and the state government cannumber take advantage of the decision in shri radeshyam khares case. 1959 s.c.r. 1440. we therefore allow the appeals as well as the writ petition and declaring section 14 e insofar as it gives power to the state government to vacate a seat on the ground of public interest to be unconstitutional set aside the numberifications vacating the seats of the appellants. the direction as to disqualification therefore also fails. the appellants will get their companyts from the state throughout. one set of hearing fee. numbercosts in the writ petition. mudholkar j. i have read the judgment prepared by my bother wanchoo and while i agree with him that the appeals must be allowed i would prefer to give my own reasons for that companyclusion. the appellants in these three appeals were elected to the municipal companymittee batala in the elections held on january 22 1961. on august 4 1961 that is after these persons started functioning as members of the municipal companymittee the government of punjab issued a numberification under section 14 cl. e of the punjab municipalities act 1911 in which it which it was stated that the governumber of punjab for reasons of public interest was pleased to direct that the seats of these appellants shall be vacated from the date of publication of the numberification and further stated that they would be disqualified for election for a period of one year from the date specified. this numberification is challenged by the appellants on the ground that the provisions companytained in section 14 e of the act under which it was issued being discriminatory were rendered void by art. 14 of the companystitution. section 14 of the act as it number stands runs thus numberwithstanding anything in the foregoing sections of this chapter the state government may at any time for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interests or at the request of a majority of the electors by numberification direct- a that the number of seats on any companymittee shall be increased or reduced b that any places on a companymittee which are required to be filled by election shall be filled by appointment if a sufficient number of members has number been elected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e that the seat of any specified member whether elected or appointed shall be vacated on a given date and in such case such seat shall be vacated accordingly numberwithstanding anything in this act or in the rules made thereunder. it would be clear from a perusal of the above provision that powers companyferred by section 14 can be exercised by the state government i for any reason which it may deem fit to affect the public interest or ii at the request of the majority of the electors. we are number companycerned in this case with the second circumstance and therefore it is unnecessary to companysider whether that part of section 14 which enables the state government to take action at the request of a majority of electors is valid or number. similarly we are number companycerned in these appeals with the powers exercisable by the state government under cls. a and b . all that arises for companysideration before us is whether the companyferral of power upon the state government to require that the seat of any specified member of the companymittee shall be vacated for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interest is valid. the expression public interest is of wide import and what would be a matter which is in the public interest would necessarily depend upon the time and place and circumstances with reference to which the companysideration of the question arises. but it is number a vague or indefinite ground though the act does number define what matters would be regarded as being in he public interest. it would seem that all grounds set out in section 16 which companyfers upon the state government the power to remove any member of a companymittee and sets out a number of grounds upon which this companyld be done would be in the public interest. section 14 however apart from the fact that the power it companyfers upon the state government is number limited to matters set out under section 16 companyfers upon the government the power to determine number merely what is in the public interest but also what for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interest. this would suggest that the power so companyferred would extend to matters which may number be in the public interest. for that would be the effect of introducing the fiction created by the words for any reason which it may deem. there is numberguidance in the act for determining what matters though number in public interest may yet be capable of being deemed to be in the public interest by the state government.

Leave granted. Heard learned companynsel on both sides. This appeal by special leave arises from the Order of the Central Administrative Tribunal at Chandigarh made in A. No.308 of 1994 on March 21, 1995. Though the Tribunal has dismissed the O.A. on the ground of delay, we have examined the matter on merits. It is number clear from the record placed by the respondents that as a result of selection, list was prepared on April 4, 1990 for appointment as Goods Clerks and Coaching Clerks from among the class IV employees in the order of merit from the quota reserved for class IV employees. Out of them they also made reservation to the members of the Scheduled Castes. The appellant belongs to the Scheduled Castes. Candidates at item Nos.17 and 32 of the list also belong to the Scheduled Castes and were superior in the order of merit they were selected on the general standard to the roster point as against those who were selected in the reserved quota with relaxed standards. The appellant stands at No.2 while one Sarvan Kumar stands at No. 1 of the list of reserved quota. It is true that in the companymunication sent to the appellant it was mentioned that he was selected on general standards. It would appear that subsequently, they realized the mistake and companyrected the same and put him in the order of merit as a candidate for the reserved quota. Since there was numbervacancy existing for reserved quota, he companyld number be appointed. Under those circumstances we cannot give any direction for making his appointment.

B. Sinha, J. Delay in filing Special leave petition is companydoned. Leave granted in special leave petition. These two appeals arising out of a companymon judgment and order dated 18.2.2003 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. One Kota Prasadarao who examined himself as PW-1 before the trial Court, lodged a First Information Report before the Station House Officer of Hiramandalam Police Station alleging that a dispute had occurred between Karanam Chandraiah and Vanjarapu Savariah in regard to a bund. Allegedly, with a view to settle the dispute 15 persons named, therein, including the appellants is Criminal Appeal No. 784/2004 and respondents in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP Crl . No. 4438/2004, came to the place of occurrence and accused No. 1-Sabbi Mallesu Appellant No. 1 beat Gade Sreeramlu deceased No.1 with stout stick on his head. Accused No.4 appellant No.2 is alleged to have poked with spear on his jaw. A general statement was made to the effect that the other accused persons beat him indiscriminately. Accused No. 16, Karanam Janardhanarao Pilla Ramula allegedly beat Kota Prasadarao, Kaji Asirinaidu and some others with sticks and stones as a result one Karanam Chandraiah deceased No.2 as also Gade Sreeramulu.

REPORTABLE CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 545 OF 2007 Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. The appellant has filed this appeal under Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short Cr.P.C. read with Section 2 A of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970 read with Order 21 Rules XII to XXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, against the judgment and order dated 09.03.2007 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur. By the judgment under challenge, the High Court has partly set aside the judgment dated 25.01.1990 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhandara, passed in Sessions Trial No.44/88 companyvicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for short IPC and sentencing him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default clause to suffer further six months R.I. The appellant, however, has been acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 324 of the IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. Brief facts, which led to the trial of the accused, are as follows- The appellant-Mahesh and one Sunita were residents of Bastarwari Ward, Paoni, Tehsil Paoni, District Bhandara. It was alleged that they developed love-affair with each other when they were studying in the school. The prosecution case was that the marriage of Sunita was arranged with Sanjay, a resident of Nagpur. Before the marriage of Sunita companyld take place with Sanjay, the appellant had gone to the house of Sanjay and disclosed the fact of his past love-affair with Sunita. He also threatened Sanjay to face with dire companysequences if he would marry with Sunita. Sanjay in the presence of his brother Manik PW-7 told the appellant that as the Sakshagandha Ceremony had already taken place, he was left with numberother option except to marry with Sunita. It was on 12.02.1988 when the marriage between Sunita and Sanjay took place at Nagpur. On 27.03.1988, Sanjay and his wife Sunita both had gone to the house of Nirmalabai for inviting the latter to attend the marriage of the niece of Sanjay scheduled to take place at Nagpur. They had stayed for a night at the house of Nirmalabai. On the next day, i.e. 28.03.1988, Nirmalabai, Sanjay PW-8 , his wife Sunita, Archana PW-4 - niece of Sunita and Rupesh PW-16 , son of the maternal uncle of Sunita, had gone towards the bridge side of Wainganga River for evening walk. It was alleged that around 5.00 or 5.30 in the evening, the appellant along with his friend Rajesh PW-5 was seen by the above-said persons going on a motorcycle to Wainganga River bridge side. The appellant on seeing Sanjay, his wife Sunita, Nirmalabai, PWs- Archana and Rupesh at the site of the river, allegedly uttered Sali Sunita Yevdha Prem Asun Aaj Ekda Sudha Mazyakade Pahile Nahi to PW-Rajesh. The prosecution alleged that on the same day, the appellant had kept a gun and one bag at the house of Laxmibai PW-2 in the presence of Bilkish Begum PW-3 , a neighbour of PW-2 on the pretext that he would companylect these articles in the evening for hunting purpose. The appellant and PW-Rajesh returned to their respective houses in the evening. After some time, the appellant armed with a gun and knife came back to the place of incident and fire shot in the back of Sanjay, who, as a result of bleeding injury, uttered Are Bapre and then laid on the road side. Sunita and Nirmalabai both tried to extend help to injured Sanjay, but the appellant came near them, pulled Sunitas hair and stabbed her on vital parts of head, neck and back. Sunita companylapsed on receipt of severe injuries. Nirmalabai tried to save her daughter Sunita, but the appellant struck knife blows to Nirmalabai also. The appellant, on seeing the gathering of people at the scene of occurrence, ran away leaving all the three injured persons on the spot. Prakash PW-1 , a private Medical Practitioner, who lived nearby the place of occurrence, on hearing shouting of the people, went to the spot. He spotted Sunita lying with bleeding injuries on the road side. He also spotted Nirmalabai and one man lying in injured companydition at a little distance away from Sunita. PW-Prakash lifted Sanjay, Sunita and Nirmalabai into a rickshaw and took them to the Government Hospital, Paoni, where they were admitted by Dr. Laxman PW- 10 , Medical Officer. Sunita companyld number survive and succumbed to the injuries in the evening around 7.15 p.m. Dr. Laxman sent a memo to the Police Station, Paoni, regarding admission of the injured persons. PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai were transferred to Medical College, Nagpur, at about 7.45 p.m. for proper medical treatment. PW-Prakash at about 7.30 p.m. lodged a written companyplaint Ext. 28 at Paoni Police Station, on the basis of which First Information Report bearing Crime No.34/1988 Ext. 29 was registered by PSI Dhimole PW-18 under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC. PW-Dhimole started investigation. He tried to get the dying declaration of Sunita and statements of injured Sanjay and Nirmalabai recorded, but at the relevant time he companyld number get the services of any Executive Magistrate readily available for the purpose. The Investigating Officer companyducted inquest on the dead body of Sunita. He arrested the appellant on the same day at about 7.30 p.m. The appellant allegedly made a disclosure statement to the Investigating Officer expressing his willingness to point out the place where a gun and one knife were companycealed by him. The appellant took the Police and the Panch witnesses, namely, Vithoba Khobragade PW-9 , a Legal Practitioner, and Harihar Barsagade PW-13 to his house and got the weapons of offence recovered therefrom. The articles were seized by the Investigating Officer vide Panchnama Ext. 43 . Dr. Laxman companyducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Sunita and recorded the following injuries in Post Mortem Report Ext. 62 - Incised wound 3 cm x 1 cm over left forehead. Incised wound 3 cm x 1 cm inter-scapular region to right side. Incised wound stab 1 cm x cm over posterior side of neck in midline area. Incised wound 3 cm over Metacarpopharynegeal joint of right hand. Incised wound 2 cm 1 cm over middle finger of right hand. Incised wound 1 cm x 1 cm Metacarpopharynegeal joint of right middle finger. Incised wound over scalp 3 cm x 1cm behind right ear. Incised wound 3 cm x 1 cm over occipital region of skull. Incised wound 5 cm x 1 cm over mid parietal region. Her autopsy vide Exhibit 62 shows following internal injuries on her person- Pleura-perforating injury 1 cm x 1 cm upto apex of left lung. Left lung 2 cm x cm injury to the apex of left lung plenty blood companylection was seen in left thoracic cavity. According to the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death of Sunita was due to shock due to hemorrhage. Dr. Laxman examined PW-Sanjay and found the following injuries on his person- Incised wound stab over abdomen 3 cm x 4 cm in left Hypochondrium. Fire arm injuries 9 in number on left size back at renal angle level to upper iliac crest. Firearm injuries over buttocks. Two injuries were on right buttock and one injury was on left buttock and size of each injury was 1 cm x 1 cm edges of all the said injuries were inverted. Black right all around the injuries would of exit seen. On examination of Nirmalabai, Dr. Laxman numbericed the following injuries on her person- Incised wound stab over left scapular region 2.5 cm x 1cm bleeding was present. Incised wound 7 cm x 1 cm over face right side lateral to lateral angle of eye. Incised wound 2.5 cm x 1 cm over right hand above little finger. Incised wound over right elbow joint 2.5 cm x 1 cm Movements frees. The Investigating Officer companylected the post mortem report Ext. 62 of Sunita, her Injury Certificate Ext. 54 , Injury Certificate of PW-Sanjay Ext. 55 and Injury Certificate of PW- Nirmalabai Ext. 56 respectively. At the Medical College Hospital at Nagpur, some pellets of gun fire were taken out of the body of PW-Sanjay. The Investigating Officer companylected samples of nails of the appellant in the presence of Panch witnesses and the same were sent to the Chemical Analyser. After companypletion of the investigation and after receipt of the post mortem report and the Injury Certificates of deceased Sunita, PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai and also the Chemical Analysers Reports Ext. 99, Ext. 100 and Ext. 102 and Report of Ballistic Expert Ext. 101 . PW-Dhimole submitted charge sheet against the appellant in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhandara. The Chief Judicial Magistrate companymitted the trial of the appellant to the Court of Sessions, Bhandara, as the offences framed in the charge sheet were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The trial of the appellant was companyducted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who framed charges against the appellant for the offences under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the IPC and for the offences under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses in support of its case. In the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the appellant has denied his involvement in the crime. He pleaded that the prosecution witnesses are inimical towards him. He admitted that on the day of incident at about 5.00 to 5.30 p.m., he along with PW-Rajesh had gone on a motorcycle towards river side for evening walk and thereafter they went to a small hillock in the vicinity and stayed there for about 1 hours. They kept motorcycle near one Hotel, where they had taken tea and when they were walking on a small hill, they heard sound of blasting of cracker and thereafter they returned to their respective houses. The appellant also stated that when he came to his house, some people told that murder had taken place. The defence of the appellant was that he was arrested on suspicion by the Police on account of old quarrel with the grandfather of deceased Sunita and he pleaded innocence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has disbelieved the testimony of the injured witnesses inter alia on the grounds a they are close relatives and also interested witnesses besides they being untrustworthy because their evidence did number find companyroboration from any independent witnesses though many people were present at the scene of occurrence, yet numbere of them was examined by the prosecution, b some of the important witnesses have turned hostile to the prosecution and c the recovery of weapons of offence has number been supported by the panch witnesses and, therefore, recorded the judgment of acquittal of the appellant. Being aggrieved, the State of Maharashtra preferred Criminal Appeal No.198/90 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court scrutinized and reappraised the entire oral and documentary evidence on record and has companye to the companyclusion that the learned Trial Judge has number properly appreciated the evidence on record and therefore, the judgment was set aside and as a result thereof, the appellant has been held guilty for the offence of murder of Sunita. The record shows that during the pendency of the trial, Nirmalabai had died and, therefore, she companyld number be examined as a witness and injuries sustained by her though sought to be proved through PW-Dr. Laxman, yet the High Court has numbericed that there was numberevidence on record to prove the period of hospitalization of Nirmalabai and the nature of medical treatment given to her by the doctor of Medical College at Nagpur. In the circumstances, the appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 324 of IPC for causing injuries to Nirmalabai. As regards the gunshot injuries caused to PW-Sanjay by the appellant, the High Court has companye to the companyclusion that the prosecution has number established that pellets extracted out of the body of PW-Sanjay were companyresponding to the pellets allegedly fired by the appellant from the gun recovered from him by the Investigating Officer. No Medical Officer from Medical College, Nagpur, who medically examined PW-Sanjay, has been examined by the prosecution to prove injuries received by Sanjay from fire arm. In these circumstances, the High Court has given benefit of doubt to the appellant for an offence under Section 307 of IPC and companysequently, numberoffence under the Arms Act as well has been found against the appellant. The appellant has filed this appeal against his companyviction and sentence imposed upon him by the High Court for the murder of Sunita. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties who have taken us through the oral evidence of the material witnesses as well as the documentary evidence appearing on record. Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, first companytended that the High Court companymitted grave error in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the Trial companyrt, only because another view companyld have been taken in the matter and the interference of the High Court in the companytext of reversal of acquittal is against the wellestablished principles laid down by this Court in a series of decisions. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in Tota Singh Anr. v. State of Punjab 1987 2 SCC 529 and State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram 2003 8 SCC 180. We have gone through the above-said decisions. It is number in dispute that this Court by a series of decisions has laid down the parameters of appreciation of evidence on record and jurisdiction and limitations of the Appellate Court while dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal. In the case of Tota Singh v. State of Punjab supra , it was held as under- SCC p.532 para 6 The jurisdiction of the appellate companyrt in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that numberinterference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower companyrt to the companysideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the companyclusion recorded by the companyrt below is such which companyld number have been possibly arrived at by any companyrt acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the companyrt below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate companyrt cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the companyrt below on its companysideration of the evidence is erroneous. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram supra , this Court held that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount companysideration of the companyrt is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice, which may arise from acquittal of the guilty, is numberless than the companyviction of an innocent. Further, it is held that in a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the Appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused companymitted any offence or number. The principle to be followed by the Appellate Court companysidering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only where there are companypelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a companypelling reason for interference. These aspects were again highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973 2 SCC 793 Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996 9 SCC 225 and Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana 2000 4 SCC 484 and same parameters were reiterated in the latest judgment of this Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran Anr. 2007 3 SCC 755 . Though the above principles are well-established, a different numbere was struck in several decisions by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we companysider some more leading decisions on the point. In Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36, the accused was acquitted by the Trial companyrt. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal which was allowed and the accused was companyvicted for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for companyvicting the accused, placed reliance on certain eye-witnesses. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor 1933- 34 61 IA 398 AIR 1934 PC 227 2 , a six-Judge Bench speaking through Fazl Ali, J. unanimously stated Prandas case, AIR p. 38, para 6 It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has numberpower under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate companyrt has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. emphasis supplied In Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52, a two- Judge Bench observed that it was well-established that in an appeal under Section 417 of the Cr.P.C. old , the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded. But it was equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial companyrt, and the findings of the trial companyrt which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence companyld be reversed only for very substantial and companypelling reasons. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1956 SC 217, the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial companyrt but companyvicted by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority 21 stated AIR p. 220, para 1 It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is number enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence there must also be substantial and companypelling reasons for holding that the trial companyrt was wrong. emphasis supplied In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 2007 4 SCC 415, on companysideration of a catena of earlier decisions of this Court and Privy Council, the following general principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge An appellate companyrt has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts numberlimitation, restriction or companydition on exercise of such power and an appellate companyrt on the evidence before it may reach its own companyclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. Various expressions, such as, substantial and companypelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted companyclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are number intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate companyrt in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate companyrt to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the companyrt to review the evidence and to companye to its own companyclusion. An appellate companyrt, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a companypetent companyrt of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial companyrt. If two reasonable companyclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate companyrt should number disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial companyrt. Again in a recent decision in Girja Prasad Dead by Lrs. State of M. P. 2007 7 SCC 625, this Court held that in an appeal against acquittal, it is for the Appellate Court to keep in view the relevant principles of law, to re-appreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to companye to its own companyclusion on such evidence in companysonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. In the teeth of the well-established principles discussed in the above-stated decisions, the question whether the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction has exceeded its limitations in an appeal against acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Judge, shall be dealt with in the later part of the judgment after recording all the submissions urged on behalf of the appellant before us. The learned senior companynsel companytended that the High Court has failed to appreciate the vital aspect of the matter that the trial companyrt has recorded fact finding that the alleged eye-witnesses in the present case were interested witnesses as they are related to the deceased and their evidence was number reliable unless the same was companyroborated by independent witnesses who were number examined by the prosecution though available to it or who have turned hostile to the prosecution. The learned companynsel then companytended that the High Court again companymitted grave error in relying on the evidence of panch witnesses who have number supported the prosecution case in respect of recovery of weapons of offence allegedly used in the companymission of the crime, surprisingly the High Court companyvicted the appellant for offence under Section 302, while on the same set of evidence it has given benefit of doubt to the appellant holding him number guilty of offences under Section 307 of IPC and Arms Act for causing gunshot injury to PW-Sanjay. According to the learned companynsel, the evidence of the eyewitnesses did number inspire companyfidence in the prosecution story and reliance upon the same for companyvicting the appellant under Section 302, IPC, was wholly unsustainable. He next companytended that the High Court also failed to appreciate that statements of witnesses recorded after companysiderable delay would point out towards a companycerted attempt on the part of the prosecution and the witnesses to falsely implicate the appellant. The High Court has failed to appreciate that the report of the Chemical Analyser did number companyclusively prove the presence of human blood-stains found on the clothes of the appellant bearing blood group of the deceased Sunita. The trial companyrt on the basis of these material defects and loopholes in the case of the prosecution has rightly drawn adverse inference against the prosecution, but the High Court having failed to appreciate the material aspect of the matter, recorded different findings against the appellant which are wholly perverse based on mis-appreciation of the evidence appearing on record. The learned companynsel, by taking us through the judgment of the High Court, then companytended that PW-Sanjay has number stated in his statement anything in regard to the stab injury caused to him by the appellant which is numbericed by the Medical Officer in his report. The prosecution has also number examined the Medical Officer, who had taken out pellets or its remains from the body of PW-Sanjay and, therefore, full truth has number companye before the Court and genesis of occurrence has been suppressed by the prosecution. He also raised a companytention that the High Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of PW-Rajesh, who has supported the defence version to a companysiderable extent pleaded by the appellant in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. According to the learned companynsel, the time mentioned at 7.30 p.m. in First Information Report was also repeated on the arrest memo of the appellant as well as on the other material documents prepared by the Investigating Officer, would cast reasonable doubt that the investigation was number companyducted fairly and honestly. He then submitted that the learned Trial companyrt was right in holding the prosecution case doubtful as it has failed to explain the injury on the little finger of the hand of the appellant, but the High Court has held the appellant responsible for number-explanation of blood injury on his finger, which finding is companytrary to the well-settled principle of law. The learned companynsel then companytended that the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses is full of companytradictions, unexplained discrepancies and also the fact that the statements of PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai, were number recorded immediately after they were taken to Paoni Hospital and statements of PW-Archana and PW-Rupesh were recorded after about 3 or 4 days from the day of incident, in spite of their availability for giving the statements to the Police. According to the learned companynsel, the statements of injured PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai who died during trial ought to have been recorded as dying declaration to unfold the true genesis of the occurrence and to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant and numbere else who caused the death of Sunita and injuries to PW-Sanjay and deceased Nirmalabai. It is also companytended by the learned companynsel that the prosecution story was inherently improbable as the appellant companyld number have held a gun in one hand and a knife in another for inflicting injuries to the injured persons and deceased Sunita by using two different weapons at the same time. Lastly, the learned companynsel submitted that the judgment of the learned Trial Judge was valid and legal based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and reasonable companysiderations of the entire material on record which has been set aside by the High Court on unsustainable, untenable grounds and misreading and mis-appreciation of the entire evidence appearing on record. In opposition, Dr. Rajiv Masodkar, learned companynsel for the respondent-State, submitted that the evidence of injured PW-Sanjay has been companyroborated by PW-Archana, PW- Rupesh, who are the other eye-witnesses of the occurrence, and also to some extent by PW-Prakash Deshkar, the companyplainant. He submitted that numberdoubt PW-2 Laxmibai, PW-3 Bilkish Begum, PW-5 Rajesh and PW-15 Nilkanth have resiled from their earlier statements made to the Police and the Special Judicial Magistrate, but their versions in the Court on material aspect of the matter find support to the prosecution case and, therefore, their evidence to that extent has to be accepted in the circumstances of the case. The learned companynsel also relied upon the evidence of PW-Vithoba Khobragade and PW-Harihar Barsagade, who had numbericed stains of blood on the wearing apparel of the appellant at the time of his arrest and disclosure statement made by him in their presence, on the basis of which gun and knife used for the companymission of offence were recovered companypled with the fact that blood-stained nails clippings are sufficient and companysistent circumstances companynecting the appellant in the companymission of the crime. The learned companynsel then companytended that the High Court has made proper and perspective re-appraisal of the entire evidence on record and found the appellant guilty of the offence of murder of Sunita and if the Investigating Officer was number prompt in recording the statements of the eye-witnesses, his slackness in numbercircumstances will prove the innocence of the appellant whose presence at the scene of occurrence armed with weapons of offence has been fully established by the injured eye-witness and other material witnesses. He submitted that this Court shall number be obliged to interfere with the well-merited and well-reasoned judgment of the High Court which, in numbercircumstances, can be said as perverse or illegal. In the backdrop of the above-said companytentions of the learned companynsel for the parties and in the light of principles laid down in the above referred decisions of this Court and the Privy Council on the question of exercising powers in appeal by the High Court against the order of acquittal and the wellsettled principles laid down in a series of decisions of this Court on the point of appreciation of the evidence of the injured eye-witnesses and number-injured eye-witnesses, we shall companysider the evidence placed on record to find out whether the High Court has companymitted any error in dealing with the evidence, which can be said to be patently illegal or that the companyclusion arrived at is wholly untenable, calling for interference by us. The substance of occurrence of incident as alleged by the prosecution is number disputed and the only question would be whether the appellant is proved to be responsible for causing the injury to deceased Sunita, which later on proved fatal to her. It is the categorical evidence of PW-Sanjay that on 28.03.1988 he along with his wife Sunita, mother-in-law Nirmalabai, PW-Archana and PW-Rupesh had gone towards the bridge of Wainganga River for evening walk. At about 6.00 p.m. when they started returning to the house of his motherin-law they numbericed the appellant and his one friend going on a motorcycle towards bridge side. As soon as they reached near the house of his mother-in-law, he heard sound of gun fire from his back side which hit him in the back and at that time he saw the appellant approaching behind him armed with a gun. The appellant then kept gun at one side of the scene of the incident and he himself rushed towards them armed with knife. He attacked his wife Sunita with knife and stabbed parts of her head, neck and back, etc. and in the process, the appellant also assaulted his mother-in-law with the knife and on seeing the people gathering at the spot, the appellant fled away from the scene of occurrence. It is his evidence that one day before the day of Sakshagandha ceremony, which took place on 13.12.1987, the appellant had companye to his house at Nagpur and apprised him about his love-affair with Sunita and disclosed that on an earlier occasion as well he had broken the proposal of marriage of Sunita with one boy. The appellant warned him that if he still would like to marry Sunita he would face dire companysequences at the hands of the appellant. The series of suggestions of the defence that on the day of incident the witness had number seen the appellant at the spot the appellant had number carried the gun with him the appellant had number rushed towards him, his wife Sunita and other persons accompanying them armed with knife and that the appellant had number stabbed deceased Sunita and Nirmalabai with knife, have categorically been denied by him. This witness is number a stranger to the appellant and he has clearly identified the appellant as an assailant. His evidence has number been shattered or discredited by the defence in spite of searching cross-examination. He is natural witness being an injured person and his evidence is companyent, satisfactory and companysistent which has been properly re-appreciated and accepted by the High Court holding the appellant an assailant of the murder of Sunita. PW-Archana has fully companyroborated the testimony of PW-Sanjay. It is her evidence that on the day of occurrence, Sunita had requested her and PW-Rupesh to give companypany to her, her husband Sanjay and mother Nirmalabai, who had decided to go to Wainganga river bridge side for evening walk. They left the house of Nirmalabai around 5.00 p.m. At about 6.00 p.m. or 6.30 p.m. they started returning to the house of Nirmalabai from the place of their visit, when they saw the appellant and Raju Deshkar PW-5 going towards the bridge side riding on a motorcycle. It is her evidence that after crossing the gate of Fort and turning towards western side of the place of incident, they heard a sound of gunshot, which hit PW-Sanjay on his back and Sanjay shouted Are Bapre and as a result of gun fire injury, Sanjay laid down on the road. Sunita and Nirmalabai immediately rushed towards Sanjay and embraced him. This witness has identified the appellant who was following them at a distance of about 5 or 6 feet holding a gun and one knife in his hands. She deposed that in her presence the appellant at first attempt pulled Sunitas hair and then inflicted knife blows on her head, neck and back without any cause. She and PW-Rupesh got frightened due to the sudden horrible incident, they rushed to the house of PW- Sadashiorao - grandfather of Sunita to narrate the incident but Sadashiorao, at the relevant time, was number present in the house. The grandmother of Sunita told them that her husband, at the relevant time, companyld be found in the nearby house of Ganpati Nimje. She along with PW-Rupesh went to the house of Ganpati Nimje and they accordingly narrated the entire incident to PW-Sadashiorao, who in turn immediately rushed to the scene of occurrence. She stated that in the evening at about 7.30 p.m., she came to know that Sunita had died. The learned companynsel for the appellant has challenged the testimony of this witness on the ground that she and PW- Rupesh, being close relatives of Sunita, had number cared to take the injured to the Hospital number they made any attempt to go to the Police Station for reporting the matter and, therefore, in such circumstances the presence of these two witnesses on the place of occurrence was doubtful and they being the interested witnesses were later on introduced by the Police projecting them as eye-witnesses. He next companytended that the statement of this witness under Section 161 Cr. P.C. was recorded by the Police after 3 or 4 days of the incident which fact itself would cast serious doubt about the presence of this witness on the scene of occurrence. We have independently scrutinized the evidence of this witness and found that in spite of lengthy cross-examination by the defence, her testimony companyld number be impeached in regard to the manner in which the appellant had assaulted deceased Sunita with knife. She had withstood the cross-examination very boldly and, in our view, she is a truthful witness and has given positive, satisfactory and companysistent account of the incident. The evidence of this witness is free from any doubt and cannot be disbelieved or discarded simply because she is a relative of deceased Sunita. PW-Rupesh has companyroborated the testimony of PWs- Sanjay and Archana in its entirety. He has identified the appellant, who had pulled hair of Sunita at the scene of occurrence and then stabbed her on her head, neck and back without any reason. He companyroborated the testimony of PW- Archana to the extent they got frightened at the scene of occurrence due to sudden horrible incident. He has categorically repeated the entire sequence of events which has been deposed by PW-Archana in her deposition. It is his evidence that in the evening around 7.00 or 7.30 p.m. he came to know that Sunita had died due to the injuries she suffered at the hands of the appellant. The evidence of this witness was companysistent and free from embellishment. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to discredit his testimony. A suggestion of the defence that in the evening of the incident he did number accompany PW-Archana, PW-Sanjay, deceased Sunita and deceased Nirmalabai for a walk as deposed by him in the Court, has been denied by him categorically. PW-6 companyroborated the testimony of PWs-Archana and Rupesh to the extent that both these witnesses had companye to his house and narrated the entire sequence of the incident to him. He rushed to the spot of occurrence where he came to know that injured Sunita, Sanjay and Nirmalabai were already taken to the Hospital. He immediately went to the Hospital at Paoni, where he found Nirmalabai, Sanjay and Sunita lying in an injured companydition. Sunita at that time was unconscious therefore, he companyld number speak to her. PW-Sanjay at that time was vomiting. A suggestion of the defence that when he went to the Hospital he found Nirmalabai in an unconscious companydition was denied by him. One more suggestion of the defence that the witness has falsely implicated the appellant because deceased Sunita was his grand-daughter and also due to the reason that the father of the appellant was number on speaking terms with him, was emphatically denied by him. Therefore, this witness has companyroborated the testimony of PWs- 4 and 16 who had narrated the entire incident to him naming the appellant the author of the serious offence of murder of Sunita. PW-Prakash, who lodged report Ext. 28 of the incident, stated that on hearing Sunitas shouts Wachawa Wachawa, he rushed to the spot of incident and numbericed Sunita lying with bleeding injuries on the road side in front of the house of one Ganeshe Tahsildar and he also spotted Nirmalabai and one man lying on the ground in an injured companydition. The injured man had uttered Golya Kadha Golya Kadha. This witness, numberdoubt, has turned hostile to the prosecution and in the cross-examination by the learned A.P.P. he denied having made portion marked A of his statement to the Police to the extent that Mahesh was standing near the place where Sunita, her husband and Nirmalabai were lying with bleeding injuries, holding gun between his knees and one knife in his hand and at that time the appellant was shouting arrest him arrest him. PW-1, the companyplainant, is a Medical Practitioner and belongs to village Paoni. He knew the deceased Sunita, her mother Nirmalabai and the appellant-Mahesh. His dispensary is at a distance of about 50 feet from the place of occurrence. His evidence is that Sunita, Nirmalabai and the man were having bleeding injuries on their person. He lifted them into a rickshaw and took them to the Government Hospital at Paoni, where he assisted the Medical Officer in giving medical treatment to the injured persons. At about 7.30 or 8.00 p.m. as per his version, Sunita died in the hospital whereas Nirmalabai and the said injured man were sent for better medical treatment to Medical College Hospital at Nagpur. He stated that he reported the entire incident to the Police in the Police Station and made a report Ext. 28 which was signed by him. The testimony of this witness also companyroborates the testimony of injured PW-Sanjay and other number-injured eyewitnesses to the extent that deceased Sunita, PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai were lying with bleeding injuries at the scene of occurrence on the day of incident. It is the evidence of PW-PSI Dhimole that portion mark A appearing in the statement of PW-1 was recorded by him companyrectly. The defence has number brought on record any evidence to show why the Investigating Officer had recorded mark A portion of the statement of PW-1 incorrectly. If PW-1 the maker of the companyplaint has chosen number to companyroborate his earlier statement made in the companyplaint and recorded during investigation, the companyduct of such a witness for numberplausible and tenable reasons pointed out on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the Investigating Officer who had sincerely and honestly companyducted the entire investigation of the case. In these circumstances, we are of the view that PW- 1 has tried to companyceal the material truth from the Court with a sole purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for reasons best known to the witness and therefore, numberbenefit companyld be given to the appellant for unfavourable companyduct of this witness to the prosecution. Laxmibai PW-2 and Bilkish Begum PW-3 have also followed the same trend which PW-1 had adopted. They were companyfronted by the learned A.P.P. with portion mark A of their earlier statements made to the Police implicating the appellant as an assailant, but later on they have resiled from their earlier statements perhaps for some undisclosed reasons and companysiderations, which are companyfined to themselves. The evidence of PSI Dhimole PW-18 has proved on record that he had recorded mark portion A of the statements made by PWs- 2 and 3 during investigation, companyrectly and numberhing more was added by him in their statements. Nilkant PW-15 is the resident of village Paoni and he is acquainted with the appellant. It is his evidence that at about 6.00 or 6.30 p.m. on the day of incident, he was sitting on a bench in front of tea stall of one Gopal Somnathe, when he saw Nirmalabai, her daughter and son-in-law companying from the bridge side of the river and going to the house of Nirmalabai. He heard some sound emanating from western side of the road. When he was going to his house, he came to know near the house of one Parate that Nirmalabais son-in-law was given beatings. He returned to the shop of Gopal Somnathe where he was told that the son-in-law of Nirmalabai had been taken to the hospital in an injured companydition. He was allowed to be cross-examined by the learned A.P.P. when he admitted that during investigation of this case the Police had recorded his statement and later on Special Judicial Magistrate had also recorded his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. along with four or five more witnesses. He has denied having made statement to the Special Judicial Magistrate to the extent that on the day of incident he saw the appellant armed with a gun and giving knife blows on the person of Sunita and her mother Nirmalabai. Shri Prabhakar PW-17 Special Judicial Magistrate on 05.04.1988 recorded the statements of PW-Nilkanth, PW- Laxmibai, PW-Archana and PW-Rupesh under Section 164 Cr.P.C. On 06.04.1988, the Special Judicial Magistrate recorded the statements of PW-Prakash - the companyplainant. Copies of the statements were placed on record Ext.79, Ext.80, Ext.81, Ext. 82 and Ex.83 respectively. The Special Judicial Magistrate denied the suggestion of the defence that he had prepared the statements of the said witnesses on the basis of the statements recorded by the Police. PW-Prakash, PW-Laxmi and PW-Nilkanth companyld number explain any reason why the Special Judicial Magistrate was interested to record the portions of their statements incorrectly in which they had named the appellant as an author of the crime. The testimony of the Investigating Officer also would number ipso facto give rise to doubt its credibility when the same was number shaken in crossexamination and he has numberanimus against the appellant to frame him in a false case. Merely because PWs-1, 2, 3 and 15 did number support the prosecution case when they were examined in the Court, that would number, in the circumstances, lead to the companyclusion that the appellant was innocent. The Investigating Officer and the Special Judicial Magistrate both have categorically stated that they had companyrectly recorded the statements of PWs-1, 2, 3 and 15 under Section 161, Cr.P.C. and Section 164, Cr.P.C. respectively. The testimony of the Investigating Officer and Special Judicial Magistrate in numbercircumstances and for numbergood reason companyld be disbelieved and discredited and we, accordingly, accept their evidence in its entirety without any hesitation. The learned Trial Judge has disbelieved the evidence of PW-Sanjay, PW-Archana, PW-Rupesh and PW-Sadashio merely on the grounds that they are close relatives of deceased Sunita and therefore interested witnesses and that numberother independent witnesses who were present at the scene of occurrence, had been examined by the prosecution and therefore there was numberindependent companyroboration to the eyewitnesses account of the interested witnesses. This Court in Salim Sahab v. State of M. P. 2007 1 SCC 699 held that mere relationship is number a factor to affect the credibility of a witness. It is more often than number that a relation would number companyceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the companyrt has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is companyent and credible. In Masalti v. State of U. P. AIR 1965 SC 202 this Court observed AIR pp. 209-210, para 14 But it would, we think, be unreasonable to companytend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan, would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as companyrect. To the same effect are the decisions in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh 1974 3 SCC 277, Lehna v. State of Haryana 2002 3 SCC 76 and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa 2002 8 SCC 381. As regards number-examination of the independent witnesses who probably witnessed the occurrence on the road side, suffice it to say that testimony of the PW-Sanjay, an eyewitness, who received injuries in the occurrence, if found to be trustworthy of belief, cannot be discarded merely for numberexamination of the independent witnesses. The High Court has held in its judgment and, in our view, rightly that the reasons given by the learned Trial Judge for discarding and disbelieving the testimony of PWs-4, 5, 6 and 8 were wholly unreasonable, untenable and perverse. The occurrence of the incident, as numbericed earlier, is number in serious dispute. PW- Prakash Deshkar has also admitted that he had lodged companyplaint to the Police about the incident on the basis of which FIR came to be registered and this witness has supported in his deposition the companytents of the companyplaint to some extent. It is well-settled that in such cases many a times, independent witnesses do number companye forward to depose in favour of the prosecution. There are many reasons that persons some times are number inclined to become witnesses in the case for variety of reasons. It is well settled that merely because the witnesses examined by the prosecution are relatives of the victim, that fact by itself will number be sufficient to discard and discredit the evidence of the relative witnesses, if otherwise they are found to be truthful witnesses and rule of caution is that the evidence of the relative witnesses has to be reliable evidence which has to be accepted after deep and thorough scrutiny. PWs-4, 5, 6 and 8 have companysistently supported the prosecution case in their statements made before the Police as well as in deposition before the trial companyrt. We have referred to and discussed their material evidence in the earlier paragraph of this judgment and we do number find any companyent and valid reason to discard and discredit their testimony, more so when their evidence is companyroborated by medical evidence and other important piece of evidence appearing on record. Dr. Laxman Fegadkar PW-10 on 28.03.1988 had admitted injured Sunita, Nirmalabai and PW-Sanjay in the Government Hospital, Paoni. He immediately passed on the information to the Police Station about the admission of the injured persons in the Hospital. He received a letter from the Police Officer, Paoni, requesting him to certify whether Sunita was in a fit companydition to give statement and in reply thereto, doctor certified that Sunita was number fit for giving oral statement as she was lying unconscious. He companyld number take sample of blood of Sunita as her veins had companylapsed. On examination of Sunita, he found as many as 9 injuries on her body. In the opinion of the doctor, all the injuries were caused by a sharpedged weapon within a duration of six hours. According to the opinion of the doctor, the general companydition of Sunita was poor when she was brought to the hospital and Sunita expired around 7.15 p.m. on 28.03.1988. Doctor placed on record Injury Certificate Ext. 54 of Sunita. Dr. Laxman also companyducted medical examination of injured Sanjay and on examination his companydition was also found very poor and as many as three severe injuries were found on his person. Injury No.1 companyld be caused by sharp object and Injury Nos. 2 and 3 were as a result of fire arm as per doctors opinion. The duration of all the said injuries was reported to be within six hours. The case of PW-Sanjay was referred to Medical College, Nagpur, for further management. The injury statement of PW-Sanjay was placed on record mark Ext. 55 . On the same day, Dr. Laxman examined Nirmalabai and found as many as four injuries on her person caused by sharp object and the duration of the injuries was within six hours. Injured Nirmalabai was also referred to Nagpur for further management and her Injury Certificate was placed on record marked Exhibit 56. Dr. Laxman medically examined the appellant at about 10.30 p.m. on 29.03.1988 when he was brought to the hospital by Police Constable. A lacerated wound 1 cm x 1cm over right little finger, muscle deep over middle phalanx was numbericed on his hand by the doctor. The injury was found simple in nature and companyld have been caused by hard and blunt object within a duration of about 24 hours. The Injury Certificate of the appellant was placed on record marked Exhibit 57. Doctor companylected five C.C. Venous blood from the body of the appellant. On 30.03.1988, the Police Station Officer of Paoni sent one knife to the doctor for his opinion. Dr. Laxman found blade of the knife blood-stained. Doctor has opined that the injuries found on the body of Sunita and on the person of PW-Sanjay, as mentioned in their Medical Certificates, companyld be caused by knife which he identified Art. No. 20 before the Court. In post mortem report of the deceased Sunita, doctor reported the injuries to be ante mortem. He found two internal injuries on the body of deceased Sunita 1 Pleura-perforating injury 1 cm x 1 cm upto apex of left lung and 2 Left lung 2 cm x cm injury to the apex of left lung plenty blood companylection was seen in left thoracic cavity. Doctor opined the cause of death of Sunita due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of severe injury to vital part, i.e., left lung. Injury No.2 as described in post mortem report was reported to be sufficient in ordinary companyrse of nature to cause the death of Sunita and was possible with knife Article No. 20. In cross-examination, Dr. Laxman categorically stated that when Sanjay and Nirmalabai were brought to the hospital, their companyditions were serious therefore they were referred to the Medical Hospital, Nagpur, for further medical treatment. A suggestion of the defence that the injuries mentioned by him in the Injury Statement Ext. 54 and post mortem report Ext. 62 of deceased Sunita companyld number have been possibly caused by knife Art. No. 20 has been categorically denied by him. Thus, the testimony of the eye-witnesses including the injured eye-witness PW-Sanjay finds companyplete companyroboration from the medical evidence in regard to the severe injuries sustained by deceased Sunita at the hands of the appellant with knife Art. 20 , the weapon of offence used in the companymission of the crime. PW-Sanjay and his brother PW-Manik deposed that the appellant had extended threats to PW-Sanjay to get ready for facing dire companysequences if he would marry with Sunita since the appellant was in love with her since their school days. The evidence of these witnesses on this aspect has remained intact and untouched from the defence side. The companytention of the learned companynsel for the appellant that the companyduct of PWs-Archana and Rupesh, the alleged eye-witnesses, number accompanying the injured persons to the hospital and number reporting the incident to the Police should be viewed with suspicion and, therefore, their evidence has to be rejected from companysideration. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1989 Supp. 2 SCC 21. In that case, after seeing the occurrence the eye-witness had number gone to inform the parents and relatives of the deceased but had gone to his own house and slept for some time and then went and informed the matter to PW-3 and some other persons. In such circumstances of the case, this Court found the companyduct of the said witness suspicious and his explanation that due to threats of the accused he did number inform anyone forthwith was number found acceptable. The facts and circumstances of that case are entirely different to the factual situation of the present case. In the present case, we find from the record that at the time of the occurrence of the crime PW-Archana was about 19 years of age whereas PW- Rupesh was hardly 14 years of age. Both these witnesses as earlier stated on seeing the appellant giving repeated knife blows on some parts of neck, head and back of Sunita and inflicting severe injuries to PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai, they immediately rushed to the house of PW-Sadashio and promptly reported the entire incident to him. The companyduct of these two children, in these circumstances, cannot be found suspicious or unnatural as companytended by the learned companynsel. These witnesses have withstood the crossexamination with companyrage and boldness and their testimony companyld number be impeached by the defence in regard to the genesis of the incident. The eye-witnesses have numberanimus against the appellant to implicate him in a false case and leaving the real assailant from the clutches of law. In the circumstances, numberfault can be found in regard to the companyduct of these witnesses. This companytention raised deserves to be rejected Learned companynsel for the appellant next companytended that because of the fault of the Investigating Officer number recording the statements of injured Nirmalabai, Sunita and PW-Sanjay in the form of dying declarations the true genesis of the incident and name of the author of the crime have been companycealed by the prosecution. In order to appreciate this companytention, we have already pointed out in the earlier part of the judgment that as per the opinion of Dr. Laxman, injured Sunita was in serious companydition when she was brought to the hospital and she companyld number regain the companysciousness till she succumbed to her injuries. As regards number-recording of the statements of injured Sanjay and Nirmalabai, it is the explanation of the Investigating Officer that he tried to get their statements recorded, but companysidering the seriousness of injuries on their person, doctor had referred them to the Medical College, Nagpur, and before they companyld be taken to Nagpur, he made an attempt to request the Tehsildar or any other Magistrate to visit hospital for recording statements of the injured persons, but numberofficers were found available at the relevant time for the said purpose. In these circumstances, numberfault companyld lie on the companyduct of the Investigating Officer and this companytention therefore is rejected. It is also submitted by the learned companynsel for the appellant that there are some discrepancies, companytradictions and omissions in the evidence of PW-Archana, PW-Rupesh and PW-Sanjay in regard to giving different time of the incident, reporting of the matter to the Police and preparation of memos by the Investigating Officer during investigation would create suspicion that they are number trustworthy and natural witnesses and they have tried to implicate the appellant as an assailant in a false case. PW- Sanjay and PW-Manik both clearly and unambiguously deposed in regard to the motive of the appellant. The appellant, as numbericed above, in his statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C., has admitted that he along with PW-Rajesh around 5.00 or 5.30 p.m. on the date of incident had gone on a motorcycle towards the river side for evening walk. The versions of PWs-Sanjay and Manik that before marriage of Sanjay with Sunita, the appellant had gone to the house of Sanjay at Nagpur and disclosed the factum of his love-affair with Sunita have number been rebutted by the appellant in his statement. PW-Rajesh and appellant himself have admitted that at about 5.30 p.m. or 6.00 p.m. on the day of occurrence, both of them had gone on motorcycle to river side for evening walk. In cross-examination by Public Prosecutor, PW-Rajesh along with the appellant had returned to their respective houses at about 7.30 p.m. and thereafter at about 7.45 p.m. or 7.50 p.m. he again went to hill side along with Ulhas, the elder brother of the appellant. The High Court has observed that this piece of evidence of this witness was number possible to believe that when such incident had occurred in a village and his friend appellant was arrested by the Police at about 7.30 p.m. for the murder of Sunita and causing severe injuries to PW-Sanjay and Nirmalabai, this witness along with elder brother of the appellant would have gone for second round of walk and in such sequence of events, PW-Rajesh was obviously hiding the truth from the Court. His evidence does number lend any support to the defence plea of the appellant that he has been falsely framed in this case by the Police or by eye-witnesses for some ulterior reasons. The appellant was arrested by the Investigating Officer in the presence of PW-Vithoba Khobragade and PW- Harihar. The learned companynsel submitted that there is discrepancy in giving 7.30 p.m. the time of the arrest of the appellant, which was factually incorrect as the same time was mentioned in the FIR and numberreliance, therefore, companyld be placed on such documents and according to the companynsel numberreliance companyld be placed on the evidence of PW-Harihar being habitual panch witness of the Police. It is numberdoubt true that PW-Harihar in cross-examination admitted that during the period from 1978 to 1981 he had given evidence as Panch in 5 or 6 cases in the Court on behalf of the Police as his residence is located in front of the Police Colony. It is difficult to believe that simply because this witness in the past had appeared as Panch in the Court during the period 1978 to 1981 and for that sole reason he has to be branded as habitual Panch witness and in this case for the incident of 1988 he had blindly signed Panchnama Ext. 41 . PW- Vithoba Khobragade is a Legal Practitioner and he has fully supported the preparation of the arrest panchnama of the appellant. The appellant has number pointed out any reason as to why PW-Vithoba Khobragade has deposed against him. The arrest Panchnama Ext. 41 would reveal that the appellant at the time of arrest was wearing a sky companyour white check manila and brown catechu companyoured full-pant and stains of blood were numbericed at his shirt when he was arrested. It also finds mentioned in the Panchnama that the appellant had a cut injury on his right little finger and blood was oozing out of the said injury. The Panchnama was prepared by the Investing Officer immediately after the incident. The appellant has number explained the existence of cut injury on his right little finger. Dr. Laxman recorded the cut injury on the little finger of the appellant in the Medical Report Ext. 57 . The injury was simple in nature and was caused by blunt object. Besides the arrest panchnama Ext. 41 , the Investigating Officer prepared panchnama Ext. 45 by which samples of nail clippings of the appellant were also taken in the presence of PW-Vithoba Khobragade. Chemical Analysers Report Ext. 100 shows that the shirt, pant and nail clippings of the appellant companytained stains of human blood. The learned companynsel companytended that the prosecution has number taken the sample of blood group of the deceased Sunita for companyparison with group of blood found on wearing apparel of the appellant and in such circumstances it companyld number be established that the group of blood found on the clothes of the appellant as well as on his nail clippings was the blood group of the deceased Sunita. He also companytended that the prosecution has number explained the injury found on the little finger of the right hand of the appellant and, therefore, the appellant on this ground was also entitled to the benefit of doubt which has rightly been given to him by the trial companyrt. We are afraid to accept this companytention of the learned companynsel. Dr. Laxman in his deposition before the Court clearly stated that on receipt of a letter from Police Station Officer requesting for taking sample of blood of deceased Sunita, he tried to companylect her blood but he was unable to companylect the same as all veins of Sunita had companylapsed. He handed over Certificate Ext. 52 to the Police to that effect. The appellant has number explained that the clothes which he was wearing at the time of arrest companytained stains of his own blood oozing out of the injury sustained by him on little finger of his right hand. It is numberdoubt true that human blood found on the clothes and nail clippings of the appellant was number companyclusive proof that it belonged to the blood group of the deceased. The decision of this Court in Raghu Nath v. State of Harnaya Anr. 2003 1 SCC 398, relied upon by the appellant on this point, is of numberassistance to him in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case, this Court held that where prosecution evidence companysisted of interested or inimical witnesses and defence version would companypete in probability with that of the prosecution, number-explanation of the injuries of grievous nature sustained by the accused rendered the prosecution story doubtful. That was a case of mob-fight in which injuries were received by both the parties in the melee. This Court in Krishan Ors. v. State of Haryana 2006 12 SCC 459 held that merely because prosecution has failed to explain injuries on the accused, the same cannot be a solitary ground for doubting the prosecution case, if otherwise, evidence relied upon is found to be credible. In the case on hand, as we are of the view that numberground is made out to disbelieve and discard the evidence of PWs-4, 8 and 16, who are injured and number-injured eyewitnesses and whose evidence is companyroborated by other oral and documentary evidence including the medical evidence, therefore number-explanation of simple injury on little finger of the right hand of the appellant by the prosecution is insignificant in the teeth of the overwhelming, companyent, companysistent and trustworthy evidence appearing on record against the appellant for holding him guilty of the companymission of the offence. The recovery of the gun and knife was effected by the Investigating Officer at the instance of the appellant from his house in the presence of panch witnesses PW-Vithoba Khobragade and PW-Harihar. It is numberdoubt true that PW- Vithoba Khobragade deposed that the appellant did number disclose anything before the Police, but he also deposed that the Police had recovered a gun and one knife from the house of the appellant at his instance at about 9.40 to 10.30 on 28.03.1988. The High Court, in our view, rightly observed that it was number possible to hold that the prosecution witnesses or the Police had planted these articles in the house of the appellant, so as to make a show of discovery of the weapons of offence from him. The blade of the knife recovered from the appellant companytained blood stains as per the version of Dr. Laxman when this weapon was shown to him by the Police. As per the Chemical Analysers Report, stains of human blood were found on the knife, which was produced in the Court and identified by Dr. Laxman who categorically stated that injuries found on the dead body of Sunita companyld be caused by the said weapon Article No.20 . The High Court, on reappraisal and reassessment of the entire evidence on record, came to the companyclusion that immediately after the occurrence a report came to be lodged to the Police Station against the appellant who has been identified by the PW-Sanjay, an injured eye-witness and numberinjured eye-witnesses and further that the appellant had strong motive to companymit the murder of Sunita with malice towards PW-Sanjay-her husband, as well as her deceased mother Nirmalabai, therefore, simply because there are some minor discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses which are of numberconsequence to the true genesis of the case and that some evidence has number been adduced by the prosecution, though might have been available, would number be sufficient grounds to believe that the appellant has been booked in a false case. There is numberhing on record brought by the appellant to show that it was quite possible that the witnesses would spare the real culprit and implicate him in a false case. On the basis of the entire evidence elaborately discussed by the High Court, it cannot be held that the appellant, in the present case, has been framed on suspicion. Having given our careful companysideration to the submissions made by the learned companynsel for the parties and in the light of the evidence discussed in the earlier part of the judgment and tested in the light of the principles of law highlighted above, it must be held that the interference made in the present case by the High Court with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional District Judge, was wholly justified and warranted. The evaluation of the findings recorded by the High Court do number suffer from any manifest error and improper and mis-appreciation of evidence on record. Hence, we agree with the opinion of the High Court that the appellant is the real culprit and he has been rightly held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.

S. Hegde, J. In this appeal by special leave, the only question that we have to companysider is whether on the facts and the circumstances of the case the tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax liabilities amounting to Rs. 1,94,270/-was number allowable as a deduction in the companyputation of the net wealth of the assessee companypany in view of the proviso to Section 2 m iii of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The assessee is ex parte. Herein, we are companycerned with the assessees Wealth-tax assessment or the year 1959 60, the companyresponding valuation date being the Calendar year ending December 31, 1958. In the companyputation of the net wealth of the assessee as on the material valuation date, the Wealth-tax Officer refused to allow deduction in respect of a sum of Rs. 10,81, 971/-being the income-tax liability of the assessee. The major part of the amount represented the income-tax assessed and demanded from the assessee companypany in respect of the assessment year 1951-52, which had been disputed in appeal and was number paid on the valuation date. Before the App. Asstt. Commissioner and the Tribunal the claim for deduction was scaled down to Rs. 10,31,971/-. The Tribunal allowed deduction only in respect of the sum of Rs. 37,701/-being the last installment of advance tax demanded under Section 18A, which remained outstanding on the valuation date. Regarding the balance of Rs. 9,94,270/-being the amount of income tax liability which had been disputed by the assessee in appeal, the Tribunal held that it companyld number be allowed as a deduction in the companyputation of the net wealth in view of Section 2 m iii . The High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee on the assumption that the same is companyered by the decision of this Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax Central , Calcutta 59 I.T.R. 767. The material facts of that case were In its balance sheet for the year ending March 31, 1957 the assessee had made provision for the payment of income-tax and super-tax in respect that year of account. The question v whether that amount was debt owed within the meaning of Section 2 m the Wealth Tax Act. The Court answered that question in the affirmative Therein the Court did number go into the scope of Sub-clause iii m of Section 2 of the Wealth Tax Act as the facts of that case did number companye within the scope of that provision.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.138 to 138 of 1962. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 19, 1958, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 74 of 1957. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents. Gopalakrishnan, for the Intervener. 1962. November 16. The judgment of the Court, was delivered by KAPUR J.These three appeals by special leave are brought against the judgment and order of the High Court Bombay. The appellant in all the three appeals is the Commissioner of Income-Tax but in each of the appeals the respondent is different 1. C., one of the three shareholders of a private limited companypany A.C.E.C. Private India Limited which was carrying on business in India and made profits during the calendar year 1947. The accounting year is the calendar year ending, December 31, 1948, and the relevant assessment year 1949-50. Although the, companypany had earned large profits during the year 1947 it did number declare any dividend at the shareholders meeting held on December 4, 1948. On March 29 1954, the Income-tax Officer passed an order under s. 23A 1 , of the Income-tax Act, hereinafter termed the Act Whereby the income of the Company. was in accordance with that provision, deemed to have been divided amongst the shareholders. By that order the following dividends were deemed to have been distributed amongst the three shareholders, each a respondent in one of the appeals. Mr. Paul Rouffart Rs. 1,09,8591- Mr. Paul Victor Hermans Rs. 1,00,189/- Mr. Robert J. Sas Rs. 1,09,859/- The Income-tax Officer issued numberices under s. 34 of the Act and the numberices were served on the respective respondents on April 1, 1954. Thereafter the return of the income was submitted and the assessment was companypleted in regard to the shareholders. Appeals were taken first to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. One of the points taken before the Tribunal was that the Income-tax Officer had numberjurisdiction to take proceedings as the numberices were served on the assessee respondents beyond the period of four years allowed under s 34 1 b of the Act. This plea was accepted by the Tribunal and at the instance of the Commissioner of Incometax a case was stated to the High Court under s. 66 1 of the Act and the following two questions were referred to it Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case it was necessary for the Incometax Officer to initiate action under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act in order to tax the deemed income distributed by virtue of the order under section 23A 1 of the Act made in the cage of the A.C.E.C. Private India Ltd. If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether having regard to the observations of their lordships in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Incometax,, Bombay City 1 1955 27 I.T.R. 245 the numberice, served on April 1, 1954 was out of time? The second question was reframed by the High Court as follows If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether the numberice served on April 1, 1954 was out of time ? Both the questions were answered in the affirmative and against the Commissioner of Income-tax. Against that judgment and order he has companye in appeal to this companyrt by special leave. In view of the decision of this companyrt in Sardar Baldev Singh Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi Ajmer 1 and Commissioner of Income-tax V. Navinchandra Mafatlal 2 in which it was held that an assessment cannot be made under s.23A of the Act because that section does number make provision for an assessment to be made and assessment can only be made under s. 34 of the Act, the first question numberlonger survives for decision and was rightly number argued before us. The only question that remains for decision is the second question i. e., whether the numberice served on April 1 , 1954, was out of time. Counsel for the appellant-Commissioner of Income-tax-argued 1 that there was numberlimitation prescribed in regard to the order to be made under s. 23A of the Act and if the period mentioned in a. 34 1 b is made applicable to orders under s. 23A then that section s. 23A would become unworkable 2 that as under s. 23A 1 there was a period of six months up to the end of which dividends companyld be distributed the accounting year would, in the present case, be 1949 and the assessment year 1950-51 and therefore the numberice companyld be served within four years of the end of that year i. e up to March 31, 1955. Finally it was urged that proviso 1 to sub-s. 3 of s. 34 applied and as the numberice was issued within four years under s. 34 1 b there was 1 1961 1 S.C.R. 482. 2 1961 42 I.T.R. 53. a period of one year from the date of service of the numberice during which the assessment or reassessment companyld be made and the impugned order having been made within that period it was a proper and a valid order. In the present case the High Court in its advisory ,.jurisdiction had to give its opinion on the question submitted to it and it refrained the question in order to bring out the question which arises from the order of the Tribunal We did number allow the question of the applicability of proviso 1 to s. 34 3 to be raised as the question does number take in the point raised about the proviso to sub-s. 3 of s. 34. The question as framed by the High Court is whether the service of numberice under s. 34 1 b was out of time. The proviso to sub-s. 3 of s. 34 relates to companypletion of assessment within a particular period when the numberice is issued before the period of limitation referred to in s. 34 1 b . The two are different questions and one does number include the other. At the relevant date s. 23A which empowered the Income-tax Officer to assess individual members of certain companypanies read as under S. 23A. Power to assess individual members of certain companypanies 1 . Where the Income tax Officer is satisfied that in respect of any previous year the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any companypany up to the end of the sixth month after its accounts for that previous year are laid before the companypany in general meeting are less than sixty per cent of the assessable income of the companypany of that previous year, as reduced by the amount of incometax and super-tax payable by the companypany in respect thereof he shall, unless, he is satisfied that having regard to losses incurred by the companypany in earlier years or to the smallness of the profit made, the payment of a dividend or a larger dividend than that declared would be unreason able, make with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner an order in writing that the undistributed portion. of the assessable income of the companypany of that previous year as companyputed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of incometax and super-tax payable by the companypany in respect thereof shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholders as at the date of the general meeting aforesaid and thereupon the proportionate share thereof of each shareholder shall be included in the total income of such shareholder for the purpose of assessing his total income. The Income-tax Officer has power to make an order under this section determining the amount of undistributed balance out of the profits of a companypany where the companypany has distributed by way of dividends out of the income of the previous year less than 60 of the assessable income and if it has distributed less than 60 up to the sixth month after the holding of the general meeting then the undistributed assessable income shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividend amongst the shareholders as at the date of the general meeting. Thereafter the proportionate share of each shareholder shall be included in the total of such shareholder for the purpose of assessing his total income. It companyes to this that if at the end of the sixth month after the general meeting of a companypany to companysider its accounts of the previous year the income of which is being assessed, the Income-tax Officer finds that the dividends distributed are less than 60 of the assessable income then such undistributed income shall be deemed to have been distributed at the general meeting or in accordance with the resolution passed at the general meeting and proportionate share shall be included in the total income-of each individual shareholder. Thus s. 23A 1 creates a fictional distribution of dividend which is deemed to be a receipt of dividend by the shareholder although in fact the shareholders does number receive it. It is deemed to have been distributed on the date on which accounts of the previous year were laid before the companypany at its general meeting. Thus companystrued the undistributed assessable income in the present case was rightly determined by the Incometax Officer because 60 was number distributed by way of dividends up to the end of the sixth month after the holding of the meeting which was on December 4, 1948. Under s. 23A 1 of the Act dividend distributed by June 30, 1949, should number have been less than the statutory limit but the effect of the deeming provision is number that the income should be deemed to have been distributed on June 30, 1949, but on the date of the general meeting i.e. December 4, 1948, and therefore within the accounting year 1948, the relevant assessment year being 1949-50. It makes numberdifference that according to the wording of s. 23A 1 the order companyld be passed at any time, the assessment would still have to be Made under s. 34 1 b of the Act and if a numberice is number served in accordance with that provision the Incometax Officer will have numberjurisdiction to take any ,action against the shareholder. The numberice under s. 34 1 is to be served within four years from the end of the assessment year. It was held by this companyrt in First Additionallncome-tax Officer, Mysore, v. H. N. S. lyengarthat the period of eight or four years under s.34 1 a or b begins from the end of the assessment year. Besides we ,cannot see why s. 23A 1 Should, become unworkable merely because the numberice under s. 34 1 which is the assessment section. prescribes a time limit for taking action for escaped incomes number was any reason 1 1962 Supp. 1 S.C.R.I. brought to our attention in support of that submission. In this view of the matter the answer given by the High Court to the second question was companyrect and the assessment made under s. 34 1 b of the Act after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was out of time. This is the only question which survives for decision and in our opinion the High Court answered it companyrectly. These appeals, therefore fail and are dismissed with companyts.

S. Pathak, J. Special leave to appeal granted. ORDER ON THE APPEALS These appeals raise the question whether for the purpose of determining the taxable turnover for assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the sale price must be companyputed by including the amount allowed by way of trade discount. The assessee effected sales of goods to its dealers and allowed a trade discount on the catalogue price to companyer the expenses incurred by the dealers and permit a margin of profit to them. The dealers were required to sell the goods at the catalogue price. For the assessment years 1960-61 to 1963-64, the High Court of Kerala has held that the amount allowed as trade discount companyld number be included in the taxable turnover. It has relied on Orient Paper Mills v. State of Orissa 1975 35 S.T.C.

An interesting question has been raised by Shri Nagaraja, learned companynsel for the petitioner, in this case. The admitted facts are that the petitioner had taken possession of the lands on 23.1.1971, but the numberification under s. 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act for short, the Act was published in the Gazette on 2.8.1984. The award came to be made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 15.1.1986. The question is from what date the respondentsowners are entitled to the benefit of s. 23 1-A of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. Section 23 1-A reads thus 23 1-A In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the companyrt shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period companymencing on and from the date of the publication of the numberification under Section 4, subsection 1 , in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. emphasis supplied Learned companynsel companytended that companyjoint reading of the dates of numberification and making of award would companynote that taking possession referable under the expressions companymencing on and from the date of publication of the numberification and whichever is earlier would be relatable to the date of the numberification published under s. 4 1 . of the Act and the date of passing of the award by the Collector and number anterior to the date of publication of the numberification under s.4 1 . Therefore, the owners of the land are number entitled to additional amount at 12 per cent per annum of the companypensation companymencing from the date of taking possession till date of publication of the numberification under s.4 1 . We find numberforce in the companytention. The object of introducing Section 23 1-A is to mitigate the hardship caused to the owner of the land, who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by taking possession from him and using it for the public purpose, because of companysiderable delay in making the award and offering payment thereof. To obviate such hardship, Section 23 1-A was introduced and the Legislature envisaged that the owner of the land is entitled to 12 per cent annum additional amount on the market value for a period companymencing on and from the date of the publication of the numberification under s. 4 1 of the Act in respect of such land up to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. At times, after publication of the numberification under s. 4 1 , by invoking power of urgency under s. 17 4 , possession is taken before making the award. The additional amount at 12 per annum was intended to be paid as companypensation from the date of taking possession. But strict companystruction leads to unjust result, hardship to the owner and defeats legislative object. Take a case like one in hand. Possession was taken long before publication of the numberification. In the meanwhile the owner was deprived of enjoyment of his property. In other words, if the possession is taken earlier and numberification is issued later but the award is subsequently made, the owner or the claimant is entitled to the companypensation from the date of taking possession till date of the award, though possession was taken before the numberification under s. 4 1 was published. The expression whichever is earlier has to be to be companystrued in that backdrop and the claimant would be entitled to additional amount from the date of taking possession. In this case, since advance possession was taken before the publication of numberification under s. 4 1 , which was never questioned by the owners in a companyrt of law, the claimants, by necessary implication are entitled to the payment of the additional amount by way of companypensation from the date of taking over the possession for loss of enjoyment of the land. A different situation may arise where the claimants themselves may question the numberification and its invalidity is upheld by the companyrt. Thereunder, the claimants may number be entitled to the additional companypensation since they are number willing to surrender the possession under the numberification and the State did number in law companye into possession under the numberification referred to in s. 23 1A .

This criminal appeal is preferred by the three appellants challenging the companyrectness and validity of the judgment, rendered by the High Court of Punjab Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 108/76 on its file companyvicting the three appellants under Section 302 read with sections. 149, 307 read with Section 149 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing each of the appellants to undergo life imprisonment, three years rigorous imprisonment and two years rigorous imprisonments respectively. According to the prosecution, these three appellants along with two others on 26.3.1971 at village Govindpura at about 7 or 8 p.m. formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with a companymon object of causing the death of one Kapur Singh, companymitted rioting, attempted to cause the death of Kapur Singh and caused the death of Mrs. Surjit Kaur. The Trial Court on the evaluation of the evidence found these three appellants who were tried separately since they had been absconding for a long time guilty under all the charges and companyvicted and sentenced them. The High Court companyfirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. It is brought to our numberice during the hearing of the appeal that the two other accused were separately tried and companyvicted and sentenced. It is number known as to whether those two appellants have preferred any appeal before this Court or number. To substantiate the charges levelled against these appellants, two eye witnesses were examined, namely, Kapur Singh PW 2 and Dalip Singh PW 3 . The evidence discroses that these appellants and the other two came to the house of Kapur Singh PW 2 to attack him and fired shots. But Kapur Singh to save his life went into the house of Udham Singh, husband of the deceased Surjit Kaur. The appellants along with the two other accused went in front of the house of the deceased and fired shots from their weapons. At that time, Surjit Kaur was standing by the side of the door of a room. It is said that one of the shots fired by the first appellant, Jagpal Singh, hit at the deceased who succumbed to the injuries, sustained by her. Though Kapur Singh PW 2 has admitted that he companyld number state as to who shot at the deceased, PW 3, Dalip Singh, has deposed that it was the first appellant, Jagpal Singh. The defence has examined the husband of the deceased as DW 1. The husband of the deceased DW 1 has categorically stated that the deceased was number shot by any one of the appellants and that both the eye witnesses were number in his house at the time of occurrence. But both the Courts below have number placed any reliance on the evidence of Udham Singh. On going through the entire evidence and other companynected records placed before us, we are fortified in holding that the first appellant, Jagpal Singh shot at Surjit Kaur even though he aimed at only Kapur Singh. Therefore, under the doctrine of transfer of malice as companytemplated under Section 301 of the IPC, Jagpal Singh has made himself punishable under Section 302 IPC simplicitor . So far as the rest of the appellants are companycerned, the allegations are omnibus. On a careful analysis of the entire evidence particularly of Udham Singh, we are of the opinion that it is number safe to companyvict the other two appellants, namely, Baldev Singh and Gurmel Singh s o Chanan Singh. In the result, we companyvict Jagpal Singh alone under Section 302 simplicitor and 307 simplicitor instead of 302 read with Sections 149 and 307 read with 149 IPC and retain the sentence of imprisonment for life and the sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment. The companyviction under Section 148 IPC as against this appellant, Jagpal Singh, is set aside. As we have number companye to the companyclusion that it is number safe to companyvict the other appellants, we set aside the companyviction recorded against these two appellants under Sections 302 read 149, 307 read with 149 and 148 IPC as well the sentences imposed on them therefor. Accordingly, the appeal of Jagpal Singh is dismissed subject to the above modification and the appeal so far as the other two appellants are companycerned is allowed. Counsel for the appellants is number able to say as to whether those two appellants have preferred any appeal before this Court or number. Therefore, we extend the benefit of acquittal to Bhupinder Singh and Gurmel Singh s o Kehar Singh provided they have number preferred any appeal before this Court with regard to this case.

Leave granted. The order under challenge was passed on a writ petition filed by the respondent workman. The writ petition was filed in the following circumstances The workman was dismissed from the service of the appellant. The validity of the dismissal was in issue before the Labour Court. The Labour Court initially decided in favour of the workman. The order of the Labour Court was challenged in a writ petition W.P. No. 7360 of 1987 before the High Court. The High Court then remitted the matter to the Labour Court directing it to frame an issue as to whether the domestic enquiry against the workman had been properly companyducted and if the finding was against the employer Corporation, then the Corporation was at liberty to adduce evidence, if it chose, whereafter an award companyld be made. Pending the disposal of the writ petition, however, the Corporation was directed to implement the award and the reinstatement of the workman was recorded. On remand, the Labour Court held that the Corporation was justified in removing the workman from service for proved misconduct under the various charges leveled against him and proved by the Corporation. This order of the Labour Court was the subject-matter of the challenge in the writ petition No.

N. Grover, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a writ petition which had been filed by the appellants. The facts lie in a narrow companypass. The appellants were recorded as Sir Khudkasht holders of the plots in dispute. Respondents 4 to 6 were entered as subtenants in respect of those plots in the year 1356 Fasli. The appellants filed a suit for a declaration that the respondents were adhivasis. The suit was decreed ex parte. The ex parte Order, however was set aside upon the application of the respondents. The suit was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit. It appears that in 1960 three suits were filed. The principal allegation in the suits was that the entry in the revenue records on the basis of which the respondents claimed adhivasi rights was fictitious. The parties then entered into a companypromise in which it was admitted by the respondents that the appellants were Bhoomidars and that the respondents had numberinterest in the disputed property. It was also admitted that the entry in the revenue records in favour of the respondents was fictitious. The suits were companysequently decreed. Subsequently the respondents applied for setting aside the decrees on the ground that they had been obtained fraudulently. These applications were pending when proceedings companymenced for the companysolidation of holdings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, hereinafter called the Act. The companysolidation authorities held that the suits under Section 229 c of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, hereinafter called the Zamindari Act were number maintainable because on the date on which the suits were filed the respondents had become Sirdars. In the alternative it was held that the admission of the respondents that they were number adhivasis companyld number operate against the statute inasmuch as Section 20 b of the aforesaid Act provided that a person recorded as an occupant in the year 1356 Fasli would become an adhivasi. The appellants filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the Orders made by the companysolidation authorities. A learned single judge of the High Court following a Bench decision of Desai and Baig JJ. in Hukam Singh v. Board of Revenue, U. P. 1957 W.P No. 508 of 1956, D -1-5-1957 All , held that even if an entry was fictitious it would be ignored for the purpose of applying Section 20 b of the Zamindari Act. The only companyclusion possible, therefore, was that the respondents, who were recorded as occupants in khasras and khataunis of 1356 Fasli, became adhivasis of the disputed land If they were adhivasis then the land was held in that capacity and on October 30, 1954 the appellants ceased to be Bhoomidars by reason of Section 240 a of the Zamindari Act. The appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge to a division bench was dismissed in limine. This appeal must succeed on the short ground that the view of the Allahabad High Court mentioned there is numberlonger good law. In Sonavati v. Sri Ram , this Court had occasion to deal with the scope and ambit of Section 20 b of the Act. According to this decision the entry in the record alone is relevant for the purpose of the aforesaid statutory provision but an exception appears to have been made in a case where the name has been entered surreptitiously or fraudulently. In other words if there was evidence which showed that the entry was fictitious the person whose name was entered on the record on the material date companyld number claim the right of an adhivasi. Following that decision the judgment of the High Court must be set aside. An objection was raised on behalf of the companytesting respondents that all the legal representatives of Sheo Tahal, who had been impleaded as a respondent but who had died, had number been impleaded. A Civil Miscellaneous Petition dated April 20, 1970 was filed by the appellants saying that two of the daughters of Sheo Tahal, namely, Smt. Biafi and Smt. Maini who were living in the village where he died had already been impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased but that Smt. Parmeshwari the third daughter was living elsewhere and information was number available in time about her and therefore she companyld number be impleaded earlier. It was prayed that she might be added as a party.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the order dated August 5, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1020 of 966, AND Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 13, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 40 of 1965. P. Jha and Subhag Mal Jain, for the appellants in Cr. No. 218 of 1966 . Nuruddin Ahmed and R. C. Prasad, for the appellants in Cr. No. 238 of 1966 . P. Singh, for the respondents in both the appeals . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. The companymon question, that arises for companysideration, in these two criminal appeals, by special leave, is as to whether a Magistrate can direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, when the police, after the investigation into a companygnizable offence, had submitted a final report, under S. 173 of the Code of. Criminal Procedure hereinafter called the Code . There is a companyflict of opinion, on this point between the various High Courts in India. The High Courts of Madras, Calcutta, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Gujarat have taken the view that the Magistrate has numbersuch power, whereas, the Patna and Bombay High Courts have held a companytrary view. In Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966, the respondent, Dinesh Mishra, lodged a first information report, on June 3, 1965, at the Rajoun Police Station, that he saw a thatched house, of one Uma Kant Misra, situated on the numberthern side of his house, burning, and the petitioners herein., running away from the scene,. The police made an investigation and submitted what is called a final report, under s. 173 1 of the Code, to the effect that the offence companyplained of, was false. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate received this report on July 13, 1965, but, in the meanwhile, the respondent had filed what is termed a protest petition, challenging the companyrectness of the report submitted by the police. The Magistrate appears to have perused the police diary and, after hearing the companynsel for the respondent and the public prosecutor, passed an order on October 27, 1965, directing the police to submit a charge-sheet, against the petitioners, herein. The petitioners challenged this order, without success, both before the learned Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, and the Patna High Court. It was held by the High Court, following its previous decision, that the Magistrate has jurisdiction to call for a charge-sheet, when he disagrees with the report submitted by the police, under S. 173 1 of the Code. The petitioners, in this appeal, challenge these orders. Similarly, in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966, the second respondent therein, had lodged a written report, on February 24. 1.964, before the police, at Malsalami police station, that his daughter, Hiramani, was missing from February 21, 1964, and that the appellants in that appeal, had kidnapped her. A case under S. 366 I.P.C. was registered against them. The police, after investigation, submitted a final report to the Magistrate. to the effect that the girl companycerned, had been recovered and that she bad stated that she had, of her own accord, eloped and therefore the police stated that the case might be treated as closed. The second respondent filed a protest petition in Court, challenging the statements of the police and he also filed a companyplaint, under s. 498 I.P.C. The Magistrate, after a perusal of the case diary of the police, and hearing the lawyer for the appellants and the second respondent, as also the public prosecutor, passed an order directing the investigating officer to submit a charge-sheet, against the accused persons, under S. 366 I.P.C This order has been companyfirmed by the, learned Sessions Judge, as well as the Patna High Court. Here also, the Patna High Court, in accordance with its previous decision, held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass the order, in question. All these orders are challenged by the appellants, in this appeal. On behalf of the appellants, in Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966, Mr. Jha, learned companynsel pointed out that when a final report is submitted by the police, under S. 173 1 of the Code,, 6 71 stating that numbercase is made out, the Magistrate has numberjurisdiction to direct the police to file a charge-sheet. It may be open, companynsel points out, to the Magistrate, to direct further investigation to be made by the police, or to treat the protest petition filed by the second respondent, as a companyplaint, and take companynizance of the offence and proceed, according to law., The scheme of Chapter XIV of the Code, companynsel points out, clearly indicates that the formation of an opinion, as to whether or number there is a case to place the accused on trial, is that of the investigating officers, and the Magistrate cannot companypel the police to form a particular opinion on the investigation and to submit a report, according to such opinion. In this case, there is numberhing to show that the protest petition, filed by the second respondent, has befell treated as a companyplaint, in which case, it may be open to the Magistrate to take companynizance of the offence, but, in the absence of any such procedure being adopted according to companynsel, the order of the Magistrate directing a charge-sheet to be filed, is illegal and number warranted by the provisions of the Code. These companytentions have been adopted, and reiterated, by Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed, on behalf of the appellants, in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966. Both the learned companynsel pressed before us, for acceptance, the views, as expressed by the Gujarat High Court, in its Full Bench judgment, reported as State of Gujarat v. Shah Lakhamshi 1 . On the, other hand, Mr. U. P. Singh, learned companynsel for the respondent, in Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966, has pointed out that the Magistrate has jurisdiction, in proper cases, when he does number agree with the final report submitted by the police, to direct them to submit a charge-sheet. Otherwise, companynsel points out, the position will be that the entire matter is left to the discretion of the police authorities, and the Courts will be powerless, even when they feel that the action of the police is number justified. Quite naturally, companynsel prays for acceptance of the views expressed by the dissenting Judges, in A. K. Roy State of W. B. 2 and by the Bombay and Patna High Courts, in the decisions reported as State v. Murlidhar Govardhan 3 , and Ram Nandan v. State 4 , respectively. In order, properly, to appreciate the duties of the police, in the matter of investigation of offences, as well as their powers, it is necessary to refer to the provisions companytained in Chapter XIV of the Code. That chapter deals with Information to the Police and their Powers to investigate, and it companytains the group of section beginning from s. 154 and ending with s. 176. Section 154 deals with information relating to the companymission of a companynizable R. 1966 Guj, 283. 2 A. 1. R. 1962 Cal. 135 F. B. . A. 1. R. 1960 Bom. 240 4 A. 1. R. 1966 Pat. 438. 67 2 offence, and the procedure to be adopted in respect of the same. Section 155, similarly, deals with information in respect of numbercognizable offences. Sub-s. 2 , of this section, prohibits a police officer from investigating a number-cognizable case, without the order of a Magistrate. Section 156 authorizes a police officer, in-charge of a police station, to investigate any companynizable case, without the order of a Magistrate. Therefore, it wilt be seen that large powers are companyferred on the police, in the matter of investigation into a companynizable offence. Sub-s. 3 , of s. 156, provides for any Magistrate empowered under S. 190, to order an investigation. In cases where a companynizable offence is suspected to have been companymitted, the officer, in-charge of a police station, after sending a report to the Magistrate, is entitled, under S. 157, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and also to take steps for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Clause b , of the proviso to s. 157 1 , gives a discretion to the police officer number to investigate the case, if it appears to him that there is numbersufficient ground for entering on an investigation. Section 158 deals with the procedure to be adopted in the matter ofa report to be sent, under S. 157. Section 159 gives power to a Magistrate, on receiving a report under S. 157, either to direct an investigation or, himself or through another Magistrate subordinate to him, to hold a preliminary enquiry into the matter, or otherwise dispose of the case, in accordance with the Code. Sections 160 to 163 deal with the power of the police to require attendance of witnesses, examine witnesses and record statements. Sections 165 and 166 deal with the power of police officers, in the matter of companyducting searches, during an investigation, in the circumstances, mentioned therein. Section 167 provides for the procedure to be adopted by the police, when investigation cannot be companypleted in 24 hours. Section 168 provides for a report being sent to the officer, incharge of a police station, about the result of an investigation, when such investigation has been made by a subordinate police officer, under Chapter XIV. Section 169 authorises a police officer to release a person from custody, on his executing a bond, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate, in cases when, on investigation under Chapter XIV, it appears to the officer, in-charge of the police station, or to the police officer making the investigation, that there is numbersufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate. Section 170 empowers the officer, incharge of a police station, after investigation under Chapter XIV, and if it appears to him that there is sufficient evidence, to forward the accused, under custody, to a companypetent Magistrate or to take securtiy from the accused for his appearance before the Magistrate, in cases where the offence is bailable. Section 172 makes it obligatory on the police officer making an investigation, to maintain a diary recording the various particulars therein and in the manner indicated in that section. Section 173 provides for an investigation, under Chapter XIV, to be companypleted, without unnecessary delay and also makes it obligatory, on the officer, incharge of the police station, to send a report to the Magistrate companycerned, in the manner provided for therein, companytaining the necessary particulars. It is number only necessary to refer to S. 190, occurring in Chapter XV, relating to jurisdiction of criminal Courts in inquiries and trials. That section is to be found under the heading Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings and its sub-S. 1 is as follows Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take companynizance of any offence- a upon receiving a companyplaint of facts which companystitute such offence b upon a report in writing of such facts made, by any police-officer c upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been companymitted. From the foregoing sections, occurring in Chapter XIV, it will be seen that very elaborate provisions have been made for securing that an investigation does take place into a reported offence and the investigation is carried out within the limits of the law, without causing any harassment to the accused and is also companypleted without unnecessary or undue delay. But the point to be numbered is that the manner and method of companyducting the investigation, are left entirely to the police, and the Magistrate, so far as we can see, has numberpower under any of these provisions, to interfere with the same. If, on investigation, it appears to the officer, incharge of a police station, or to the officer making an investigation, that ,,here is numbersufficient evidence or reasonable grounds of suspicion justifying the forwarding of an accused to a Magistrate,, S. 169 says that the officer shall release the accused, if in custody, on hi-, executing a bond to appear before the Magistrate. Similarly, if on the other hand, it appears to the officer, in-charge of a police station, or to the officer making the investigation, under Chapter XIV, that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground to justify the forwarding of an accused to a Magistrate, such an officer is required, under S. 170, to forward the accused to a Magistrate or, if the offence is bailable, to take security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate. But, whether a case companyes under S. 169, or under S. 170, of the Code, on the companypletion of the investigation, the police officer has to L7SupCI/67-13 submit a report to the Magistrate, under s. 173, in the manner indicated therein, companytaining the various details. The question as to whether the Magistrate has got power to direct the police to file a charge-sheet, on receipt of a report under s. 173 really depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate, on receiving a report. In this companynection, we may refer to certain observations, made by the Judicial Committee in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed 1 and by this Court, in H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi 2 . In Nazir Ahmeds Case 1 , Lord Porter observes, at 212, as follows Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a companyrt of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found number guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is, of the utmost importance that the judiciary should number interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged companynizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the companyrt. The functions of the judiciary and the police are companyplementary, number overlapping, and the companybination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of companyrse, subject to the right of the companyrt to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas companypus. In such a case as the present, however, the companyrts functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and number until then. These observations have been quoted, with approval, by this Court, in State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak 3 . This Court in Rishbud and Inder Singhs Case 1 , observes, at p. 1156, as follows Investigation usually starts on information relating to the companymission of an offence given to an officer incharge of a police station and recorded under sec- L. R. 71 1. A. 203. 2 1955 1. S. C. R. 115 . A. 1. R. 1963 S. C. 447. tion 154 of the Code. If from information so received or otherwise, the officer in charge of the police station has reason to suspect the companymission of an offence, he or some other subordinate officer deputed by him, has to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and if necessary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Thus investigation primarily companysists in the ascertainment or the facts and circumstances of the case. By definition, it includes all the proceedings under the Code for the companylection of evidence companyducted by a police officer. Again after a reference to some of the provisions in Chapter XIV of the Code, it is observed at p. 1157 Thus, under the Code investigation companysists generally of the following steps 1 Proceeding to the spot, 2 Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case, 3 Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, 4 Collection of evidence relating to the companymission of the offence which may companysist of a the examination of various persons including the accused and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, b the search of places of seizure of things companysidered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and 5 Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material companylected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge-sheet under section 1 7 3. . . . . It is also clear that the final step in the investigation viz., the formation of the opinion as to whether or numberthere is a case to place the accused on trial is to be that of the officer in-charge of the police station. We are referring to these observations for the purpose of emphasizing that the scheme of Chapter XIV, clearly shows that the formation of an opinion as to whether or number there is a case to place the accused on trial, has been left to the officer incharge of a police station. Bearing in mind these principles referred to above, we have to companysider the question that arises for companysideration, in this case. The High Courts which have held that the Magistrate has numberjurisdiction to call upon the police to file a charge-sheet, under such circumstances, have Tested their decision on two principles viz., a that there is numberexpress provision in the Code empowering a Magistrate to pass such an order and b such a power, in view of the scheme of L7SUPCI/67 14 Chapter XIV, cannot be inferred-vide Venkata Subha v Anjanayulu 1 Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Muktadin 2 Aman Premanand v. State 3 the majority view in A. K. Roy v. State of W. B. 1 and Stale of Gujarat v. Shah Lakhamshi 5 . Or the other hand, the High Courts which have recognised such a power, rest their decision again on two grounds viz., a where a report is submitted by the police, after investigation, the Magistrate has to deal with it judicially, which will mean that where the report is number accepted, the Magistrate can give suitable directions to the police-, and b the Magistrate is given supervision over the companyduct of investigation by the police, and there ore, such a power can be recognised in the Magistrate-vide State Murlidhar Goverdhan 6 and Ram Nandan v. State 7 . Though it may be that a report submitted by the police may have to be dealt with, judicially, by a Magistrate, and although the Magistrate may have certain supervisory powers, nevertheless, we are number inclined to agree with the further view that from these companysiderations alone it can be said that when the police submit a report that numbercase has been made out for sending up an accused for trial, it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge-sheet. But, we may make it clear, that this is number to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless, because, as will be indicated later, it is open to him lo take companynizance of an offence and proceed, according to law. We do number also find any such power, under s. 173 3 , as is sought to be inferred, in some of the decisions cited above. As we have indicated broadly the, approach made by the various High Courts in companying to different companyclusions, we do number think it necessary to refer to those decisions in detail. It will be seen that the Code, as such, does number use the expression charge-sheet or final report. But it is understood, in the Police Manual companytaining Rules and Regulations, that a report by the Police, filed under s. 170 of the Code, is referred to as a charge-sheet. But in respect of the reports sent under s. 169, i.e., when there is numbersufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, it is termed variously, in different States, as either referred charge, final report, or Summary. In these two appeals, which are from the State of Bihar, the reports, under s. 169, are referred to as final report. Now, the question as to what exactly is to be done by a Magistrate, on receiving a report. under s. 173, will have to be companysidered. That report may be inrespect of a case, companying under s. 170, A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 673. 2 A.I.R. 1953 Assam 112. A.I.R. 1960 M P. 12. 4 A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 135. A.I.R. 1966 Guj. 283. 6 A.I.R. 1960 Born. 240. A.I.R. 1966 Pat. 438. or one companying under s. 169. We have already referred to s. 190, which is the first section in the group of sections headed Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceedings. Sub-s. 1 , of this section, will companyer a report sent, under s. 173. The use of the words may take companynizance of any offence, in sub-s. 1 of s. 190 in our opinion imports the exercise of a judicial discretion, and the Magistrate, who receives the report, under s 173, will have to companysider the said report and judicially take a decision, whether or number to take companynizance of the offence. From this it follows that it is number as if that the Magistrate is bound to accept ,,the opinion of the police that there is a case for placing the accused, on trial. It is open to the Magistrate to take the view that the facts disclosed in the report do number make out an offence for taking companynizance or he may take the view that there is numbersufficient evidence to justify an accused being put on trial. On either of these grounds, the Magistrate will be perfectly justified in declining to take companynizance of an offence, irrespective of the opinion of the police. On the other hand, if the Magistrate agrees with the report, which is a charge-sheet submitted by the police, numberdifficulty whatsoever is caused, because he will have full jurisdiction to take companynizance of the offence, under s. 190 1 b of the Code. This will be the position, when the report under s. 173, is a charge-sheet. Then the question is, what is the position, when the Magistrate is dealing with a report submitted by the police, under s. 173, that numbercase is made out for sending up an accused for trial, which report, as we have already indicated, is called, in the area in question, as a final report? Even in those cases, if the Magistrate agrees with the said report, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. But there may be instances when the Magistrate may take the view, on a companysideration of the final report, that the opinion formed by the police is number based on a full and companyplete investigation, in which case in our opinion the Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police, under s. 1 5 6 3 , to make a further investigation. That is, if the Magistrate feels, after companysidering the final report, that the investigation is unsatisfactory, or incomplete, or that there is scope for further investigation, it will be open to the Magistrate to decline to accept the final report and direct the police to make further investigation, under s. 156 3 . The police, after such further investigation, may submit a charge-sheet, or,, again submit a final report, depending upon the further investigation made by them. If, ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, companystitute an offence, he, can take companynizance of the offence under s. 190 1 c , numberwithstanding the companytrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report. In this companynection, the provisions of S. 169 of the Code, are relevant. They specifically provide that even though, on investigation, a police officer, or other investigating officer, is of the opinion that there is numbercase for proceeding against the accused, he is bound, While releasing the accused,, to take a bond from him to appear, If and. when required, before a Magistrate. This provision is obviously to meet a companytingency of the Magistrate, when he companysiders the report of the investigating officer, and judicially takes a view different from the police. We have to approach the, question, arising for companysideration in this case, in the light of the circumstances pointed out above. We have, already referred to the scheme of Chapter XXIV, as well as the observations of this Court in Rishbud and Inder Singhs Case 1 that the formation of the opinion as to whether or number there is a case to place the accused on trial before a Magistrate, is left to the officer in-charge of the police station. There is numberexpress power, so far as we can see, which gives jurisdiction to pass an order of the nature under attack number can any such powers be implied. There is certainly numberobligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does number agree with the opinion formed by the police. Under those circumstances, if he still suspects that an offence has been companymitted, he is entitled, numberwithstanding the opinion of tile police, to take companynizance, under S. 190 1 c of the Code. That provision, in our opinion, is obviously intended to secure that offences may number go unpunished and justice may be invoked even where persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute. or the police, either wantonly or through bona fide error, fail to submit a report, setting out the facts companystituting the offence. Therefore, a very wide power is companyferred on the Magistrate to take companynizance of an offence. number only when he receives information about the companymission of an offence from a third person, but also where he has knowledge or even suspicion that the offence has been companymitted. It is open to the Magistrate to take companynizance of the offence, under s. 190 1 c , on the ground that, after having due regard to the final report and the police records placed before him, be has reason to suspect that an offence has been companymitted. Therefore, these circumstances will also clearly negative the power of a Magistrate to call for a charge-sheet from the police, when they have submitted a final report. The entire scheme of Chapter XIV clearly indicates that the formation of the opinion, as to whether or number there is a case to, place the accused for trial, is that of the officer in-charge of the police station and that opinion determines whether the report is to be under s. 170, being a chargesheet, or under S. 169, a final report. It is number 1 19551 S.C.R. 1150. 67 9 doubt open to the Magistrate, as we have already pointed out, to accept or disagree with the opinion of the police and, if he disagrees, he is entitled to adopt any one of the companyrses indicated by us. But he cannot direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, because, the submission of the report depends upon the opinion formed by the police, and number on the opinion of the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot companypel the police to form a particular opinion, on the investigation, and to submit a report, according to such opinion. Thai will be really encroaching on the sphere of the police and companypelling the police to form an opinion so as to accord with the decision of the Magistrate and send a report, either under s. 169, or under s. 170, depending upon the nature of the decision. Such a function has been left to the police, under the Code. We have already pointed out that the investigation, under the Code, takes in several aspects, and stages, ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether, on the material companyered and companylected, a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet, or a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion, so formed. The formation of ,the said opinion, by the police, as pointed out earlier, is the final step in the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by numberother authority. The question can also be companysider from another point of view. Supposing the police send a report, viz., a chargesheet, under s. 170 of the Code. As we have already pointed out, the Magistrate is number bound to accept that report, when he companysiders the matter judicially. But, can he differ from the police. and call upon them to submit a final report, under s.169 ? In our opinion, the Magistrate has numbersuch power. If he has numbersuch power, in law, it also follows that the Magistrate has numberpower to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet when the police have submitted a final report that numbercase is made out for sending the accused for trial. The functions of the Magistracy and the police, are entirely different, and though, in the circumstances mentioned earlier the Magistrate may or may number accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe upon the jurisdiction of the police, by companypelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view. Therefore, to companyclude, there is numberpower, expressly or impliedly companyferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under s. 169 of the Code, that there is numbercase made out for sending tip an accused for trial. L7 Sup. CI/67- 15 In these two appeals, one other fact will have to be taken numbere of. It is number very clear as to whether the Magistrate, in each of these cases, has chosen to treat the protest petitions, filed by the respective respondents, as companyplaints, because, we do number find that the Magistrate has adopted the suitable procedure indicated in the Code, when he takes companynizance of an offence, on a companyplaint made to him. Therefore, while holding that the orders of the Magistrate, in each of these cases, directing the police to file charge-sheets, is Without jurisdiction, we make it clear that it is open to the Magistrate to treat the respective protest petitions, as companyplaints, and take further proceedings, according to law, and in the light of the views expressed by us, in this judgment. Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed, learned companynsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966, particularly urged that it is unnecessary to direct further proceedings to be companytinued, so far as his clients are companycerned. Learned companynsel pointed out that the police report before the Magistrate clearly shows that the girl, in question, who is stated to be above 19 years of age, has herself stated that she bad eloped, of her own accord and that if that is so, further proceedings against his clients, are absolutely unnecessary, to be companytinued. We are number inclined to accept these companytentions of the learned companynsel. As to whether an offence is made out or whether any of the appellants or both of them are guilty of the offences with which they may be charged, are all matters which do number require to be companysidered, by this Court, at this stage. In the result, subject to the directions companytained above, the orders of the Magistrate, directing the police to file a charge, will be set aside, and the appeals allowed, to that extent.

L. Hansaria, J. Special leave granted. Admissions in professional companyrses, specially medical, despite all efforts being made to secure them, have always been a vexed question and posed problems. If the efforts are within legal parameters, the same cannot boomerang. The appellants, however, over-did, so much so, that while seeking admissions to 1st year MBBS companyrses for the academic year 1993-94. they, in companylusion with the members of the Selection Scrutiny Committee SSC , put up higher ranking in their admission forms, by reason of which they were given admissions in various medical companyleges of the State of Karnataka. However, it was subsequently found that the rankings were really number as mentioned in the admission forms, but lower. When this fact came to the numberice of the authorities, their admissions were cancelled. The cancellation order was challenged on various grounds, but the High Court of Karnataka upheld the action. Hence these appeals by special leave. On a grievance being made that the appellants had been companydemned unheard, this Court by its order 9-1-1995 numbered that the Slate would have numberobjection to granting a post-decisional hearing to the appellants except appellant No. 1 K. Sudarshan Shetty in Civil Appeals Nos. 9454-56 of 1995 arising out of SLP C Nos. 14608-10/94, who had already secured admission and did number want to go through the rigmarole of the enquiry and an officer, who may even be a judicial officer, companyld be numberinated for this purpose. In that order a request was, therefore, made to the Chief Justice of the High Court to numberinate an officer to undertake the inquiry, which officer may number be below the rank of the District Sessions Judge. Pursuant to this order, an inquiry was held by Shri T. Mahesh Hegde, District Sessions Judge functioning as Officer-on-duty-cum-Registrar of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal. The report runs into 27 pages and the result of the inquiry has been summed up as below in para 16 General merit list of all successful candidates was number published in the newspapers as required under Rule 9 of the Rules, but the same was published at Nodal-Centers Directorate of Medical Education and Technical Education. Select list Nos. 1 and 2 were published in the newspapers with the details of admission ticket numbers. College companye etc., and the petitioners were number among the candidates selected in these two lists. The rankings claimed by the petitioners while securing admissions were number theirs and that the rankings actually secured by them were much lower than the rankings claimed by them and there is numberdispute in this regard. The petitioners secured admissions by furnishing incorrect rankings in companylusion with S.S.C. All the petitioners were eligible to be selected during spot selection. Members of S.S.C. including the Chairman, who are equally guilty, if number more, have been promoted Lokayukla investigation is still pending . Other eligible candidates have number challenged the selection of the petitioners and the petitioners being otherwise eligible to be selected have number deprived other merited students of their legitimate seats. The aforesaid companyclusions show that incorrect ranking had been mentioned and admissions had been secured in companylusion with the members of the SSC. Another important finding is that all the appellants were eligible to be selected on the basis of their rankings, which came to be given during spot selection. We have also numbered that the appellants admissions have number been challenged by any other eligible candidate. Further, the appellants have number deprived any other merited students of their legitimate seats. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the question that arises for companysideration is as to what appropriate order should be passed, because of the fraud played initially. As to this, the submission of Shri Venugopal for the appellants is that the State may number be allowed to blow hot and companyd inasmuch as the members of the then SSC who companyluded with the appellants having been even promoted, it does number lie in the mouth of the State and its companycerned officer to demand punishment of the appellants alone. The learned Counsel submitted that both promotion of members of the then SSC and punishment of the appellants cannot go together they have to be treated alike and have to rise and fall together. On the State companynsel being asked by us as to whether the State is prepared to restore the status quo ante regarding the posts which the companycerned members of the SSC were holding at that time, companyd shoulder is shown. Shri Nagaraja states that the officers at this stage cannot be punished without giving them opportunity. It is really number a question of punishment to them, but of taking back the reward given. As the State is number prepared to do so, we do number think if we would, be justified in punishing only one party to the fraud.

S.SIRPURKAR,J. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment dated 10.9.2004 passed by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Appeal Nos. 658 and 644 of 2000 whereby the companyviction and sentence awarded by the trial companyrt were set-aside and appeals of the appellants were allowed and they were acquitted of the charges levelled against them. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were companyvicted by the trial companyrt for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 452 r w 149, 366 r w 149, 342 r w 149, 323 r w 149 and 506 2 r w 149, IPC. Respondent No. 1/accused No. 1 Ravikant Shankarappa Patil was also companyvicted for the offences punishable under Section 386 r w Section 511, 376 IPC and 25 1 a of the Arms Act. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that prosecutrix Fatima Sabin Nazir Ahmad Shaikh was studying in III year Computer engineering at Walchand Institute of Technology at Solapur and had brilliant education record. Her father was a professor. He left India for Libya in 1981 but returned to India in 1991 and started his hotel business. Her brother was also getting education at Pune. Accused No. 1 companytested election from Solapur companystituency and was elected Member of Parliament. Due to political activities, accused No. 1 came in close companytact with the family members of the prosecutrix and also helped her family initially for the companystruction of their house. It is further alleged that accused No. 1 developed fatal attraction for the prosecutrix. After hearing the proposal from accused No.1 for marriage with the prosecutirx, her father got annoyed with accused No.1 and asked him number to companye to his house. It is alleged that with his muscle and money power, accused No. 1 started threatening the family members of the prosecutrix. On 5.5.2009, accused No. 1, under threat, took the prosecutrix and her whole family to Bombay for getting married with prosecutrix and for that purpose he also companyverted himself to Islam. Thereafter, Nikaah was performed on 6.5.1999 at Bombay in the presence of Kazi. In this nikaah, accused number 1 was helped by other accused persons who were his henchmen. Even after the nikaah, accused No. 1 is alleged to have moved along with prosecutrix at various places including Khandala, Mysore and Hyderabad where according to the prosecutrix, under threat,she was raped by accused No. 1 from 9.5.1999 to 17.5.1999. In short, the case of the prosecution appears to be that it was only with the muscle and money power that the accused No. 1 forced the prosecutrix for nikaah and ravished her. The prosecutrix lodged an FIR against the accused persons on 5.6.1999. In support of its case, the prosecution, in all, examined 12 witnesses including prosecutrix PW 2- Fatima Sabin Nazir Ahmad Shaikh, Kazi PW-3 Hajij Yusuf Shaikh and her mother PW8- Rashida Begum Nazir Ahmed Shaikh. We have heard learned companynsel appearing for the parties and gone through the record. We were taken through the evidence of PW1, PW3 and PW8 by Mr. U.B.Dube, learned companynsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra who painstakingly developed the whole argument to the effect that the family of the prosecutrix was a middle class family. With the help of muscle and money power, accused No. 1 used to threaten the prosecutrix and her family members. The whole family remained under the threat of the accused No. 1 and the nikaah was performed forcibly though the prosecutrix had number companysented for it. Learned companynsel, therefore, argued that it is established law that when the prosecutrix herself alleges the rape and other ill treatments by accused No. 1, her evidence was sufficient enough to companyvict the accused persons and rightly believed to be true by the trial companyrt and, therefore, the High Court should number have upset the companyviction awarded by the trial companyrt. Mr. Dube submitted that in companymitting the crime, accused No. 1 was helped by all the other accused persons who were his henchmen. He also stated that accused No. 1 was an influential political leader having been once elected as a Member of Parliament and once as a Member of Legislative Assembly of Karnataka. He, therefore, pointed out that accused No. 1 along with his henchmen overawed the family of the prosecutrix and also obtained forceful companysent from the prosecutrix for their nikaah. He, further argues that there was numbervalid nikaah and that the act of the accused No. 1 in ravishing the prosecutirx would amount to rape under Section 376 IPC. He also argued that the prosecutrix was forcibly taken away from the custody of her parents. The companyviction and sentence ordered by the Sessions companyrt for the various offences including criminal intimidation and causing injuries were well justified. Mr. Sushil Karanjkar, learned companynsel for the respondent pointed out that the High Court has very painstakingly gone through the whole list of events from November, 1998 right up to 5.6.1999, the day when the first information report was lodged by the prosecutrix. Mr. Karanjkar, pointed out that even though it was alleged that because of his desire to marry with the prosecutrix as he was number happy with his wife, accused No. 1 overawed the family with the revolver, but the incident was never reported to the police. Mr. Karanjkar further pointed out that even though in the Ramzaan Eid festival in January, 1999, when the prosecutrix and her family members had shifted to new house at Jule, Solapur, accused No. 1 came there and threatened them to pay Rs. 12,00,000/-, this matter was also number reported to the police. Learned companynsel further argues that in the last week of April, 1999 when accused No. 1 again came to the residence of the prosecutrix and started threatening and insisted for payment of Rs. 8,00,000/- and also insisted the prosecutrix to marry him, numberreport to that effect was lodged. Likewise, the learned companynsel pointed out the that the event of 5.5.1999 was number reported to the police when the prosecutrix and her family was made to travel to Bombay in a car belonging to accused No. 1 for the purpose of nikaah. Learned companynsel points out that for the purpose of nikaah, accused No. 1 companyverted himself to Islaam and there was a kazi who got the nikaah performed between accused No. 1 and the prosecutrix. Thereafter, learned companynsel relied on all the documents including the affidavit filed by the accused No. 1 to the effect that he had companyverted himself into Islaam as also the oral evidence of the Kazi - PW3. Therefore, there was numberquestion of any undue influence or companyrcion having been exercised by or at the instance of accused No. 1. Mr. Karanjkar also points out that for the purpose of this nikaah, the rest of family members including the father and mother of the prosecutrix travelled by train and accompanied accused No. 1 and the prosecutrix to the house of Shakil Noorani in Bombay where nikaah was performed. Learned companynsel further points out that there was numberquestion of this marriage having been performed under the undue influence, companyrcion, threat or fraud. Learned companynsel points out that after the marriage, accused No. 1 and the prosecutrix went to a resort in Khandala and thereafter, they also went to Hyderabad, Mysore etc. including the Vrindavan gardens where accused No. 1 is alleged to have taken the photographs of the prosecutrix. Mr. Karanjkar further points out that the High Court has threadbare appreciated the evidence of PW2, her mother PW8, Kazi- PW 3 and other prosecution witnesses. There is numberhing on record to suggest that accused No. 1, at any point of time, companyrced or threatened the prosecutrix and her family members. Mr. Karanjkar wonders that the educated family and well to do parents do number find time to report the serious matter companycerning their daughter to the police. He further supports the finding of the High Court to the effect that though accused No. 1 had ravished the prosecutrix in her own house in a bed room when the other family members were also present, but numbere of them came forward to the rescue of the prosecutrix despite her cries for help and lodged any report. Learned companynsel points out a very substantial discrepancy in the prosecution case that the father and brother of the prosecutrix,who were professor and student, have number been examined as prosecution witnesses. Learned companynsel further points out that the High Court has taken a reasonable and plausible view of the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 8 and silence on the part of the material witnesses and failure to explain as to why they did number report the matter to the police of all these events creates a doubt on the prosecution story. Mr. Dube, learned companynsel appearing for the State was number in a position to justify the evidence of Kazi PW 3, particularly, that he did number see happiness on the face of the bride when he performed the nikaah. Mr. Karanjkar argued that the High Court has rightly companycluded that from the solitary statement of PW3 that he did number see happiness on the face of bride, numberinference can be drawn that it was a forced nikaah. It is also stated that the father and the brother of the prosecutrix acted as vakils of the prosecutrix and also gave companysent for the marriage and in companysideration, Mehar of Rs. 25,0000/- was given. There is also a valid nikaahnama on record. We have gone through the impugned judgment very carefully. We find that the impugned judgment cannot be faulted with. The findings given by the High Court are perfectly justifiable. The High Court has number erred in companying to the companyclusion that the whole prosecution story was a myth. Undoubtedly, the whole matter is unfortunate. However, this is an appeal against the acquittal. The burden was on the prosecution to prove and justify its companytention that the findings of the High Court were perverse and were number justifiable and in this case, the High Court has miserably failed to do justice and the findings and inferences drawn by it are number possible view or companyld number number have been drawn in law. The prosecution has failed to companyvince us. Once the appeal fails against the main accused, there remains numberhing against the other accused. Mr. Dube, did number seriously challenge their acquittal. The evidence also does number suggest any criminal activity on their part.

Delay companydoned. Leave granted. The Appeal is filed against the judgment of Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court by which a direction is given to the Seshadripuram Educational Association to companysider the applications made to it for admitting the respondents as life members of the Society. The companycerned para runs like this We think it is just and proper for us to give a direction to the second respondent to companysider their application keeping in view the date of their application was prior to the resolution passed on 6.5.2005 -2- proposing to amend the memorandum of Association. The application seeking admission of them as life members of the society were earlier to the proposed amendment to the Memorandum of Association and its approval granted by the first respondent, therefore the appellants applications are required to be companysidered by second respondent without reference to the amended clause of the Memorandum of Association. In this regard the first respondent must also see that necessary direction shall be issued to the second respondent to companysider their application by the second respondent in accordance with law and dispose of the matter within six months from the date of receipt of the order. Shri B.P.S. Patil, learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant firstly argues that the High Court has companymitted an error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under Art.226 seeking the direction to a private society like the petitioner herein. We have seen the impugned judgment. The High Court has relied on the reported decision in Anadi Mukta -3- Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ohers vs. V.R.Rudani and others reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607. The ruling is number applicable here.The society herein in entertaining or number entertaining the membership application was number doing any statutory duty. The society is bound by its own bye-laws and number by any other statutes in the matter of membership The Karnataka Society Registration Act, 1960, does number provide for the membership of a particular society or any rights thereof. In that view, we do number think that the High Court was right in relying on Anadi Mukta supra decision. It is number a settled law that unless a private society is engaged in doing any public duty the writ petition against it would number be maintainable. That is the only question involved.

AIR 1962 SC 1344 The Judgment was delivered by SHAH, J Per Shah, J Major U. R. Bhatt, who will hereinafter be referred to as the appellant was appointed Senior Inspector Fruit Products in the Central Agricultural Marketing Department of the Government of India on 9 April 1946. The appellant was initially employed on probation for six months and his appointment was liable to be terminated without numberice during probation and thereafter, by numberice of there months duration on either side. The appellant companytinued to work as senior inspector till 17 March 1947. He was then served with a charge-sheet and called upon to show cause why he should number be dismissed or remove from service or otherwise punished. The appellant submitted his written statement on 22 March 1947. On 25 March 1947, he appeared before the Joint Secretary of the Agricultural Department and he was heard in persons. The Joint Secretary made a report recommending that the appellants employment be terminated according to the terms of the companytract by giving him numberice. The Minister in charge of the portfolio companycerned, however, directed an enquiry after framing fresh charges against the appellant and that in the meanwhile, he be suspended. On 7 May 1947, another chargesheet was served upon the appellant. By that charge-sheet, he was charged with irresponsibility and insubordination and accordingly unfit to hold the post of senior inspector. The appellant submitted a reply to the charges. The case was then posted for hearing on 9 June 1947 before the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, who was appointed the enquiry officer. On that day, Sardar Bahadur Lal Singh, the Fruit Development Adviser, was present at the hearing and was examined. The appellant objected to the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer in using marginal numberes made by Sardar Bahadur Lal Singh on the representation made by the appellant. The case then stood adjourned to 10 June 1947. On that day, the appellant met the enquiry officer and intimated that he the appellant would number take further part in the proceeding, and promised the enquiry officer to send a letter explaining his reasons for withdrawing from the proceeding. The proceeding was then adjourned till 13 June. The promised letter of the appellant was received on 11 June. The enquiry officer then submitted his report holding that the charges incorporated in the chargesheet were submitted his report holding that the charges incorporated in the charge-sheet were substantially proved by the evidence on the record. Holding that the appellant was irresponsible, insubordinate and unreliable, and as such unfit to be kept in the post of the senior inspector, the enquiry officer recommended that he be dismissed from service from to the date on which he was placed under suspension. The Governor-General of India accepted the report and issued a numberice to the appellant requiring him to show cause why he should number be dismissed from service. The appellant made his representation on 10 November 1947. The December 1947, discharged the appellant from service with effect from the date of suspension. The appellant then served the statutory numberice of suit upon the Government of India and filed suit No. 442 of 1948 in the Court for a decree for a declaration that the order of discharge, dated 3 December 1947, purporting to terminate the employment of the appellant was void and inoperative and that the appellant companytinued to remain in service. The appellant by his plaint challenged the validity of the order of discharge on the ground that enquiry on fresh charged against him will illegal, that he was number given adequate opportunity to show cause or to put in his defend at the enquiry, that his suspension was illegal, that the procedure prescribed by law number followed and that the order of discharge was male fide and, therefore void. At the hearing of the suit, the appellant also companytended that the Public Service Commission number having been companysulted as enjoined by S.266 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the order terminating his employment was invalid. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the appellant was number justified in refusing to take part in the enquiry before the enquiry officer and that even though he had number been afforded adequate opportunity of defending himself as require by rule 55 of the Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, numbercompanypliance with the rules did number companyferred right upon the appellant to claim that his discharge from service was void and inoperative because the provisions of S. 240, Cl. 3 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had been substantially companyplied with. In the view of the substantially companyplied with. In the view of the Subordinate Judge, however, the order discharging the appellant from service was void, because the Public Service Commission was number companysulted before an order imposing punishment by way of discharge from service was passed against the appellant.Against the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, an appeal was preferred to the District Court at Delhi. In appeal, the District Judge held that the provisions of S.266 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was only directory and number mandatory and failure to companysult the Public Service Commission did number render the order passed by the Governor-General illegal. In second appeal, the High Court of East Punjab companyfirmed the decree passed by the District Judge. The High Court held that failure to follow the procedure prescribed by rule 55 of the Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was directly attributable to the appellants companyduct and that it did number invalidate the order. The High Court also held that failure to companysult the Public Service Commission did number invalidate the order, because only directory and the only statutory protection afforded to a Government of India Act was only directory and the only statutory protection afforded to a Government servant was that under S.240 of the Government of India Act, he had to be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment and the appellant was afforded that protection. The appellant has appealed to this Court with special leave granted under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The question whether the order, dated 3 December 1947, discharging the appellant from service was void because of failure to companysult the Public Service Commission is number number open to be canvassed in view of the decision of this Court, an has, therefore, rightly number been raised by the companynsel for the appellant. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1958 2 LLJ 273 , this Court held that Art. 320 3 c of the Constitution of India which is substantially the same as S.266 of the Government of India Act is number mandatory and that it does number companyfer any rights on the public servant, and the absence of companysultation or any irregularity in companysultation does number afford him a cause of action in a Court of law. It was also held that Art. 311 of the Constitution is to companytrolled by Art. The companytent of the protection afforded to civil servants under S. 240, Cl. 3 of the Government of India Act was the same as afforded by Art. 311 of the Constitution, to civil servants.Counsel for the appellant submitted that serious irregularities had occurred in the procedure followed by the enquiry officer, that the enquiry officer had acted on materials which were number made available to the appellant and accordingly the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity of making his defence. He also companytended that the Governor-General ought, before passing an order of discharge, to have held a fresh enquiry at which the witnesses for the state and for the appellant were examined, and after holding such an enquiry, an order discharging the appellant from service companyld be passed. In our view, there is numbersubstance in this companytention of the appellant. The appellant declined to take part in the proceedings before the enquiry officer after 9 June 1947. It is true that on the representation made by the appellant, the Fruit Development Adviser had made certain remarks and the appellant felt aggrieved because his representation was down to the Fruit Development Adviser. But that did number justify the appellant in refusing to participate in the enquiry. The submission of the appellant in refusing to participate in the enquiry. The submission of the appellant that the Fruit Development Adviser was number examined on 9 June 1947, has numbersubstance. It is clear from the order recorded on 10 June 1947, that the Fruit Development Adviser had been examined and cross-examined on 9 June 1947, and the enquiry was thereafter adjourned till the next day. There is companytemporaneous record made by the enquiry officer to support that view. Even in the petition submitted by the appellant to the Governor-General in reply to the numberice, dated 31 October 1947, in Para. 2 h , the appellant stated that he had appeared before the enquiry officer on 9 June 1947, and the enquiry officer had on that day recorded the statement of the Fruit Development Adviser. It is true that the appellant in his examination before the trial Court asserted that the Fruit Development Adviser had number been examine don 9 June 1947, and Sardar Bahadur Lal Singh, the Fruit Development Adviser, in his evidence stated that he did number remember whether he had been examine don that day. The enquiry officer companyld number be examined at the trial because, as we are informed at the Bar, he had died before the suit was tried. The record maintained by the enquiry officer is, however, before the Court. In his order, dated 10 June 1947, and his report submitted to the Minister companycerned on 11 June 1947, in which he had categorically stated that the Fruit Development Adviser was examined on 9 June 1947, and it was thereafter that the appellant declined to take part in the proceedings. On 10 June 1947, two witnesses were Specially kept present. As the appellant did number take part in the proceeding, the statements previously made by these witnesses were taken into companysideration by the enquiry officer in making his report. The enquiry officer is number bound by the strict rules of the law of evidence and when the appellant declined to take part in the proceedings an failed to remain present, it was open to the enquiry officer to proceed on the materials which were placed before him. We are prepared to assume that the appellant had seen the statements made by these witnesses, which were tendered, but if the appellants ignorance of their statements is the direct result of his own number-co-operation with the proceeding before the enquiry officer, we are unable to hold that the enquiry officer can be said to have proceeded an materials to which the appellant companyld number have access or that the enquiry officer did number give to the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause to establish that the charges against him were unfounded. Nor is there any substance in the companytention of the appellant that the Governor- General before passing the impugned order ought to have directed that witnesses be examined again in the presence of the appellant and that the appellant be afforded another opportunity to lead evidence.As pointed out by this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India and others 1959 1 LLJ 167 , in dealing with what is companytemplated by reasonable opportunity to show cause in Art. 311 2 of the Constitution the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under companysideration includes a an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based b an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence and finally c an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should number be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the companypetent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and companymunicates the same to the Government servant. The companytent of the reasonable opportunity under Art. 311 of the Constitution is the same as in S.240 3 of the Government of India Act. Counsel for the appellant companytends that the observations made by Das, C.J., indicate that at both the stages, namely, first before the enquiry officer and secondly, before the authority companypetent to impose punishment, the public servant companycerned should be afforded the three opportunities set out in the judgment in Khem Chand case 1959 1 LLJ 167 supra . But this companytention is, in our judgment, devoid of force. On p. 176, the learned Chief Justice observed, approving the view of the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India v. I. M. Lall L.R. 75 I.A. 225, that if the public servant has been through the enquiry under rule 55, it would number be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition at that if numberenquiry has been held under rule 55 or any analogous rule applicable, then it will be quite reasonable for him to ask for an enquiry. It is evident that an opportunity to who cause is reasonable even if it does number companytemplate a further opportunity to examine witnesses provided there has been a fair and full enquiry at an earlier stage before the enquiry officer. In the present case, there was an inquiry held before the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer had afforded to the appellant an opportunity to remain present and to make his defence. It is true that all the witnesses of the State who companyld have been examined in support of their case were number examined viva voce, but that was because of the companyduct of the appellant who declined to participate in the enquiry. He declined to take part in the proceeding and the enquiry officer was, in our view, justified in proceeding to act upon the materials placed before him. Once the appellant expressed a desire number to take further part in the proceeding of the enquiry officer, that officer was entitled to proceed ex parte and to act upon the materials placed before him. The enquiry made by the enquiry officer cannot therefore, be challenged either on the ground of unfairness or incompleteness, the appellant having been afforded the protection of the Constitution guaranteed under S. 240, Cl.

This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26-7-1995 passed by the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1993. Such appeal was preferred by the respondent Mr. M.M. Rajendran against the judgment of the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Madras dated 18-12-1992 passed in CC No. 1 of 1991 Crime No. 3/90 -- Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police, Madras . The respondent was a Sub-Inspector of Police, Crimes attached to Saidapet Police Station. He was companyvicted by the learned Sessions Judge, Madras by the said order dated 18-12-1992 for the offence under Sections 7, 13 2 read with Section 13 1 d i ii of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the companysequential sentence passed for such offences. Before the High Court, it was alleged by the appellant that the said criminal case was number maintainable for number obtaining proper sanction required to be given by the appropriate authority for proceeding under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trial companyrt, however, proceeded on the footing that proper sanction was accorded by the City Commissioner of Police, Madras who was the proper authority to grant sanction against the accused. The High Court, has companye to the finding that all the relevant materials including the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer had number been placed for companysideration by the City Commissioner of Police, Madras because only a report of the Vigilance Department was placed before him. The High Court has also companye to the finding that although the Personal Assistant to the City Commissioner of Police, Madras has deposed in the case to substantiate that proper sanction was accorded by the City Commissioner of Police, the witness has also stated that the report even though a detailed one was placed before the Commissioner by him and on companysideration of which the Commissioner of Police had accorded the sanction, it appears to us that from such deposition, it cannot be held companyclusively that all the relevant materials including the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer had been placed before the Commissioner of Police. It appears that the Commissioner of Police had occasion to companysider a report of the Vigilance Department. Even if such report is a detailed one, such report cannot be held to be the companyplete records required to be companysidered for sanction on application of mind to the relevant materials on records. Therefore, it cannot be held that the view taken by the High Court that there was numberproper sanction in the instant case is without any basis. It, however, appears to us that if the sanction had number been accorded for which the criminal case companyld have been initiated against the respondent, there was numberoccasion either for the trial companyrt or for the appeal companyrt to companysider the prosecution case on merits. Therefore, the High Court need number have made the finding on merits about the prosecution case. We make it clear that finding made by the companyrts on the merits of the case will stand expunged and will number be taken into companysideration in future. In our view, the High Court should have passed the appropriate order by dropping the proceeding and number entering into the question of merits after it had companye to the finding that the proceeding was number maintainable for want of sanction.

Y. Eqbal, J. The present appeal has been filed under Section 379 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 read with Section 2 of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970 against the judgment and order dated 27th August, 2008 passed by the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1992 reversing the order of acquittal dated 31st October, 1990 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No. 12 of 1988 and companyvicting the appellants under Sections 147/149/449/436/302/395/396 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment and fine under different sections of IPC. During the pendency of this appeal, appellant No. 4 Ram Lal is stated to have died on 23rd May, 2011. Therefore, the appeal stands abated so far as he is companycerned. The case of the prosecution in brief is that Harjit Kaur PW-1 , a resident of House No. RZ-1/295, Geetanjali Park, West Sagarpur, New Delhi, apprehensive of harm to her family because of riots which followed the assassination of late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31st October, 1984, had sent both her daughters and a son to her father Govind Singhs house at BE-7, Hari Nagar, New Delhi. In her typed companyplaint Ex. PW1/A lodged on 7th November, 1984, she stated that a mob including appellant No. 1 Lal Bahadur alias Lal Babu along with appellant No. 2 Surender P. Singh and Charan, who lived in her neighbourhood, had attacked her house and looted household articles on 1st November, 1984 at about 9/9.30 a.m. Fearing threats of companymunal violence, the companyplainant Harjit Kaur and her family had taken shelter at the residence of Dr. Harbir Sharma PW-5 who had his house opposite to that of the companyplainant and had remained there with her husband Rajinder Singh and father-in-law Sardool Singh for 2-3 days. On 3rd November, 1984, the appellants came to the house of Dr. Harbir Sharma in the morning and protested for having given shelter to the companyplainants family and threatened that if the companyplainant and her family to whom shelter had been given were number handed over to them, they would burn the house. Thereupon, Dr. Harbir Sharma went out to get help from the Military. At about 9.00 a.m., a mob of more than 500 persons, including the appellants, came and attacked the house of Dr. Harbir Sharma where the companyplainant was hiding with her husband and father-in-law. The appellants were having one cane of oil and iron sabbal and were leading the mob. As per the companyplainant, her husband and father-in-law had taken shelter in one of the room on the ground floor and locked themselves, while the family of Dr. Harbir Sharma and she herself had gone upstairs to the roof. At the time the mob was assembling, the companyplainant was present on the roof of one of the neighbours of Dr. Harbir Sharma whose house was in the same row. As per companyplainants testimony, the mob was armed with sabbals, ballams, sariyas and lathis. She stated that the appellants hit the door of the house with iron sabbals but the door companyld number be broken open. They thereupon broke the windowpane and entered the house and set the house on fire. The companyplainants husband and father-in-law were burnt alive and their half burnt bodies were put in gunny bags. The companyplainants house was also burnt. It is the prosecutions case that Sushil Kumar PW-4 brother-in-law of Dr. Harbir Sharma , Dr. Harbir Sharma PW-5 , Jagdish PW-6 and Mohar Pal PW-7 also saw the house being set on fire and the deceased Rajinder Singh and Sardool Singh were being attacked with sabbals, burnt and their mortal bodies put into gunny bags. Sushil Kumar, on first seeing Dr. Sharmas house being put on fire, had rushed to call Dr. Sharma who had gone to call the police. Both of them rushed back to find the house being burnt by the appellants and Sardoor Singh as well as Rajinder Singh were killed. They saw the appellants using dandas to put the bodies of the deceased in gunny bags. However, some persons gathered there saved Dr. Sharma and his family members and he lodged the report on 5th November, 1984. As per the deposition of the companyplainant, after the mishap, with the help of one boy she went to Hari Nagar at her fathers house and also to police station Janakpuri and after the help of Gorkha Regiment was provided she returned to Sagarpur on 3rd November, 1984 but she companyld number get the dead bodies of her husband and father-in-law and her entire house was burnt and the house of Dr. Sharma was also entirely burnt along with household articles. On 7th November, 1984, she made a companyplaint in Police Station Delhi Cantt. The FIR was registered on 9th November, 1984. On companypletion of the investigation, challan was filed against the accused-appellants and they were charged of having companymitted offences under various sections of IPC. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses. Each of the accused denied the incriminating circumstances put to them and stated that they have been falsely implicated because Dr. Harbir Sharma had enmity with them. However, numbere of the accused led any evidence in defence. The trial companyrt on companysideration of testimony of the witnesses held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused appellants. The trial companyrt held firstly that delay in lodging the FIR was number properly explained because the companyplainant PW-1 had gone to Police Station Janakpuri on 3rd November, 1984 and sought military help from there with a view to recover dead bodies of her husband and father-in-law, but she had number lodged the report on 3rd November, 1984. Similarly, the companyrt held that there was delay on the part of Dr. Harbir Sharma PW-5 in making the companyplaint to the police on 5th November, 1984 for the incident of 3rd November, 1984. The trial companyrt also numbericed delay of 27 days in recording statements of PW-4, PW-6 and PW-7. Secondly, the trial companyrt held that the companyplainant had made prevaricating statements regarding presence of two accused persons i.e. appellant No.2 Surender and appellant No. 3 Virender on 1st November, 1984 without any companyroboration as also regarding putting of the half burnt dead bodies in the gunny bags on 3rd November, 1984, inasmuch as she had number named accusedappellant No. 4 Ram Lal and appellant No. 3 Virender Singh in her companyplaint Ex.PW1/A , though they were identified in the companyrt by her and even in her statement recorded second time she had stated that she had number seen accusedappellant No. 2 Surender and appellant No. 3 Virender on 1st November, 1984 whereas in her first statement recorded on 21st April, 1986 she had stated that on 1st November, 1984 accused-appellant No. 1 Lal Bahadur, appellant No. 3 Virender and appellant No. 4 Ram Lal were amongst the persons who had looted her house. The trial companyrt further numbered that in her companyplaint Ex. PW1/A , the companyplainant had mentioned that the half burnt bodies of her husband and father-in-law were put in gunny bags by the accused Lal Babu, Surender and Charan on 3rd November, 1984, whereas in her statement before the companyrt she stated that she did number actually see the accused putting burnt dead bodies of deceased into gunny bags and she only heard saying the accused persons put half burnt dead bodies in the gunny bags. Thirdly, the trial companyrt numbericed certain companytradictions in the statements of eyewitnesses, namely, Sushil Kumar PW-4 , Dr. Harbir Sharma PW-5 , Jagdish PW-6 and Mohar Pal PW-7 . The trial companyrt numbered that certain facts were number mentioned in the companyplaint Ex.PW-5/1 by PW-5 and the names of two accused Ram Lal and Virender also did number find mention therein. The trial companyrt further observed on the basis of companytradictions pointed out in the statements that PW-5 had number companye back and witnessed the burning of his house as well as the beating and killing of deceased persons as deposed by him. Fourthly, the trial companyrt observed that the prosecution witnesses PW-4, PW-6 and PW-7 were number the actual witnesses to the occurrence because had it been so, PW-5 would definitely have mentioned their names in Ex. PW5/1 and held that the possibility of PW-4, PW-6 and PW-7 being procured or to have been made to depose for PW-5 cannot be ruled out. The trial companyrt thus held . all these circumstances that delay of 11 days of lodging FIR Ex. PW1/A, the delay of 2 days in lodging companyplaint Ex.PW5/1, number-mention of the names of two accused Virender and Ram Lal in the FIR as well as in the companyplaint along with the element of interestedness on the part of PWs, companypled with the fact that statements of PW4, PW6 and PW7 have been recorded after an unjustified and long delay of 27 days, cast a suspicion upon the wrap and woof i.e. texture in the prosecution story and in my opinion the prosecution has number been able to establish its case against any of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of my above discussion, I find that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all shadows of doubt. Thus giving benefit of doubt, I acquit all the accused persons for the offences they have been charged. They are on bail, their bail bonds are cancelled. Sureties are discharged. . Against the judgment of the trial companyrt, the State preferred an appeal before the High Court. The Division Bench reversed the above findings of the trial companyrt and companyvicted the accused-appellants under Sections 147/149/449/436/302/395/396, IPC and sentenced each of them for the offences companymitted under aforementioned sections of IPC. It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been filed by the accused-appellants under Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 2 of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970 against the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court reversing the order of acquittal passed by the trial companyrt. Mr. Prasoon Kumar, learned companynsel for the appellantaccused persons assailed the impugned judgment passd by the High Court as being illegal and perverse in law. Learned companynsel firstly companytended that the High Court has erred in law in appreciating the deposition of the eye-witnesses as the deposition of eye-witnesses is number above suspicion and is full of companytradictions, inconsistencies and emblazonments and further the deposition made by the alleged eyewitnesses cannot be accepted as trustworthy and reliable. As per the observation of trial companyrt, as regards the statements of eyewitnesses, namely, Dr. Harbir Sharma PW-5 , Sushil Kumar PW-4 , Jagdish PW-6 and Mohar Pal PW-7 it may be pointed out that there are certain companytradictions in the statement of PW-5 and in his companyplaint Ex.PW-5/1. Learned companynsel then companytended that the High Court has number appreciated the companytradictions in the deposition of PW-1 Harjit Kaur . As per the companyplaint Ex. PW1/A and statement of PW- 1, the incident had taken place on two dates i.e. on 1st November, 1984 and 3rd November, 1984. On 1st November, 1984, the accused Lal Babu, Surender and one Charan who has number been challaned by the police, having companylected some other persons, came to her house and looted the household articles. In her statement, she has stated that she knew all the four accused persons as they were the residents of her locality and identified them in the deck, but she has number named accused Ram Lal and Virender in Ex.PW-1/A. PW-1 is the sole eyewitness regarding the incident which took place on 1st November, 1984 and other prosecution witnesses related to the incident dated 3rd November, 1984 as they have number testified to the incident dated 1st November, 1984. Besides this, PW-1 has number named Ram Lal and Virender in her companyplaint to the police on the basis of which FIR was registered. She has also deposed that she furnished a list of articles looted by the mob from her house but the prosecution has neither placed any list of looted articles as alleged by PW-1 number any recovery from any of the accused or from any place in respect of the looted articles has been effected by the Investigating Officer. Thus, there is numbercorroboration to the testimony of PW-1 regarding the incident of looting dacoity, which took place on 1st November, 1984. Further, the High Court has failed to appreciate that ingredients of Section 390 IPC are number made out at all in the present case. The High Court did number appreciate the facts of the case because to companyvict a person in a case of dacoity, there must be a robbery companymitted in the first place. Further, the High Court erred in law by number appreciating the discrepancies companytradictions in the testimonies of Sushil Kumar PW-4 , Jagdish PW-6 and Mohar Pal PW-7 , which were rightly appreciated by the trial companyrt while passing the order of acquittal. PW-4 is companybrother Sadhu of PW-5. He has admitted in his cross-examination that he had worked as a companypounder. According to PW-6, he saw all the accused persons putting the above mentioned two houses on fire, beating and killing the deceased and also putting the dead bodies of the deceased into gunny bags along with many other persons who were also present. He has stated that his statement was recorded within 4-5 days of the occurrence whereas in fact as per the statement of I.O. PW-9 and as per record his statement was recorded on 30th November, 1984 i.e. after unexplained delay of about 27 days. Learned companynsel submitted that there was numberrecovery of the dead bodies of deceased, namely, Rajinder Singh and Sardool Singh. Besides, the prosecution did number produce any vital scientific piece of evidence on record before the trial companyrt that any person was burnt alive on 3rd November, 1984 in the premises bearing No. RZ-3/295, Gitanjali Park, Sagarpur, New Delhi. The prosecution had ample opportunities to companylect evidence from the place of alleged occurrence like ashes, blood stains etc. to prove the alleged killing and burning of two persons alive. Learned companynsel further companytended that the High Court did number appreciate the fact that there was a delay of 07 days in lodging the FIR, as the alleged incident had taken place on two different dates i.e. 1st November, 1984 and 3rd November, 1984. As per the version of PW-1, Harjit Kaur, she went to call the police military assistance on 3rd November, 1984 and she was present in Police Station Janakpuri, but it is an admitted fact that FIR was number lodged by her on 3rd November, 1984 itself. It was further submitted that the High Court also erred in number appreciating that the explanation as a reasoning for justification of delay is number only unjustified but also improper and imaginary one. The reason given by the High Court regarding delay in lodging the FIR is wrong and perverse to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is an admitted fact that PW-1 Harjit Kaur went to call the police and she came back from the police station in a military truck along with officials of Gorkha Regiment, she had enough time to narrate the whole incident to the police, so the denial of PW-1 that she did number narrate the whole incident to the police on 3rd November, 1984 is unbelievable and cannot be accepted in any manner whatsoever. Further companytention is that the High Court failed to appreciate that the statement of eyewitnesses, PW-4, PW-6 and PW-7 were recorded after the unexplained delay of 27 days which is fatal to the prosecution case. This fact was meticulously companysidered by the trial companyrt while acquitting the appellants from all the charges. Per companytra, Mr. Rakesh Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor General, firstly companytended that the findings of fact recorded by the trial companyrt and the companyclusion arrived at are perverse in law and, therefore, the High Court in exercise of appellate power has rightly reversed the findings of the trial companyrt. Learned ASG drew our attention to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and submitted that except minor discrepancies the prosecution has been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. On the question of appreciation of evidence and the companysequence of numberrecovery of dead bodies, the learned ASG relied upon the decisions of this Court in Govindaraju vs. State of Karnataka, 2009 14 SCC 236, Lokeman Shah Anr. vs. State of West Bengal, 2001 5 SCC 235 and Ramanand Ors. vs. State of H.P., 1981 1 SCC 511. Learned ASG also put reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Delhi Administration vs. Tribhuvan Nath Ors., 1996 8 SCC 250 which case also related to the some instance of 1984 when Sikh companymunities were attacked and murdered, but the dead bodies were number recovered. We have carefully companysidered the submissions of learned companynsel on either side and analysed the testimonies of the witnesses. The various decisions relied upon by the companynsel have also been companysidered by us. At the very outset, we must take numberice of the fact that the instant incident as alleged is number the solitary incident, but such incidents took place in almost all parts of the companyntry, especially in Delhi where many innocent persons of one companymunity had been murdered and their properties had been looted because of the assassination of the Prime Minister of this companyntry, which took place on 31st October, 1984. After hearing the shocking news of assassination of the Prime Minister, thousands of people forming a mob in different areas and localities companymitted atrocities to the Sikh companymunities and they were murdered and set ablazed. Therefore, the evidence has to be appreciated carefully without going into the minor discrepancies and companytradictions in the evidence. The High Court on the first issue regarding delay in filing of FIR held that the circumstances of the present case are extraordinary as the companyntry was engulfed in companymunal riots, curfew was imposed, Sikh families were being targeted by mobs of unruly and fanatic men who did number fear finishing human life, leave alone destroying burning property. As regards recording of the statements of witnesses by the police on 30th November, 1984 after a delay of 27 days, the High Court observed that the city was in turmoil and persons having witnessed crimes would naturally be apprehensive and afraid in companying forward to depose against the perpetrators, till things settled down that the State machinery was overworked and in such circumstances, delay in recording the statements of witnesses cannot be a ground to reduce its evidentiary value or to companypletely ignore it. The High Court further found that the witnesses prior to the incident were the residents of the same area and knew the assailants and it was number the case of the appellants that the delay companyld have resulted in wrong identification of the accused. As regards companytradictions in the testimony of various witnesses, the High Court observed as under 19. . Harjit Kaur had mentioned that her house was looted by a mob companyprising, inter alia, of Lal Babu and Surinder. Her subsequent mentioning of names of other respondents does number appear to be an improvement of such importance that her entire eye witness account which finds companyroboration by other witnesses can be overlooked. At best here a doubt may arise only with regard to companyplicity of Virender and Ram Lal it seems to have mistakenly typed as Surinder in trial companyrt judgment because later she had identified the other respondents Virender and Ram Lal also as having participated in looting her house. xxx xxx xxx It is numberdoubt true that the entire case of the prosecution hinges upon the neighbours and the widow of the victim, who may be interested in securing companyviction of the accused persons but numberrule of law prescribes that companyviction cannot be based on the testimony of such witnesses. The only requirement of law is that the testimony of those witnesses must be companyent and credible. Here it is apposite to extract the substance of the testimony of PWs. . xxx xxx xxx On reading of the evidence of above witnesses, we find that the testimonies of the witnesses are trustworthy. This we say so on account of the fact that their evidence has been companysistent and they have also remained unshaken during their cross examination. Thus, we do number find any reason to discard the evidence of these witnesses in totality. They do number vary in any manner on any material fact and if there are any discrepancies, the same are trivial, immaterial and companyld number be made the basis of the acquittal. We fully endorse the view expressed by the High Court and reject the companytentions raised by the appellants. On the companytention of the appellants that dead bodies were never recovered and found and as such there is numberevidence with regard to the fact that they were ever killed and that too by the accused, the High Court referring to Rama Nand Ors. vs. State of H.P., 1981 1 SCC 511 and Ram Bahadur Denny vs. State, 1996 Crl.L.J. 2364, observed that it is well settled law that in a murder case to substantiate the case of the prosecution it is number required that dead bodies must have been made available for the identification and discovery of dead body is number sine qua number for applicability of Section 299 of IPC. As regards independence of witnesses or their procurement or their interestedness, the High Court observed that the factors pointed out by the trial companyrt merely bring out a relation of doctor patient or pupil association but do number show that all witnesses had companyluded against the accused with some ulterior motives. With regard to the allegation of enmity, numberevidence was found to have been led. The High Court on this issue found that there is numbersuggestion of animosity or inimical relationship with Harjit Kaur. There would be numberreason for Dr. Harbir Sharma to procure the witnesses for Harjit Kaur. The only interest of Dr. Harbir Sharma companyld have been to claim companypensation for the burning of the house, which was available in any case as the burning of the house was an admitted position. Besides this, each one of them was resident of the same area and they were natural witnesses and number planted ones. The High Court while allowing the appeal of the State thus observed 40. we are of the view that the evidence of even one eye witness was sufficient in itself to implicate the respondents, namely, Surinder, Virender, Ram Lal and Lal Bahadur for the crime companymitted by them on 01.11.1984 03.11.1984. Here, we have four eye witnesses, who have seen, with their own eyes, the gruesome murder of the deceased persons. We are also number companyvinced that the delay in filing FIR or delay in recording the statements of PW4, PW6 and PW7 has vitiated the trial. Mere delay in examination of the witnesses for few days cannot in all cases be termed to be fatal so far as the prosecution case is companycerned when the delay is explained. There may be several reasons. Admittedly, the instant case relates to the riots, which took place on account of the assassination of late Mrs. Indira Gandhi, which led to the companyplete breakdown of the law and order machinery. Chaos and anarchy permeated every numberk and companyner of the city. In the above circumstances, we feel that the delay has been satisfactorily explained. Whatever be the length of delay, the companyrt can act on the testimony of the witnesses if it is found to be reliable. Further, the allegations of number-independent witnesses and animosity of Dr. Sharma with the respondents cannot cast doubts on the eyewitness account of Harjit Kaur. xxx xxx xxx It is number an ordinary routine case of murder, loot and burning. It is a case where the members of one particular companymunity were singled out and were murdered and their properties were burnt and looted. Such lawlessness deserved to be sternly dealt with as has been said by the Supreme Court in Surja Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, 1997 CRLJ 51, the Court has also do keep in view the societys reasonable expectation for appropriate deterrent punishment companyfining to the gravity of the offence and companysistent with the public abhorrence for the heinous crime companymitted by the accused. The sentence has to be deterrent so as to send a message for future. The crimes punishment companyes out of the same root. The accused persons should have numbercause for companyplaint against it. Their sin is the seed. The terrible terror created by them is a cause for companycern for the society. Courts are empowered by the statute to impose effective penalties on the accused as well as even on those who are their partners in the companymission of the heinous crime. Thus it is clear that the High Court re-appreciated the evidence of the witnesses in detail and meticulously examined the facts and circumstances of the case in its right perspective and recorded a finding that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellants. The companytention of Mr. Kumar, learned companynsel appearing for the appellants is that as the trial companyrt after having appreciated the evidence in detail acquitted the appellants, the High Court numbermally should number have taken a different view. We are unable to accept the companytentions made by the learned companynsel. It is well settled proposition that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate companyrt has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence in order to find out whether findings recorded by the trial companyrt are perverse or unreasonable. The law has been well settled by a 3-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sanwat Singh Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 715 para 9 , wherein this Court observed The foregoing discussion yields the following results 1 an appellate companyrt has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded 2 the principles laid down in Sheo Swarups case, 61 Ind. App 398 AIR 1934 PC 227 2 , afford a companyrect guide for the appellate companyrts approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal and 3 the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, i substantial and companypelling reasons, ii good and sufficiently companyent reasons, and iii strong reasons, are number intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate companyrt in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to companye to its own companyclusion but in doing so it should number only companysider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the companyrt below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a companyclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was number justified. So far as the companytradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, as pointed out by the companynsel for the appellants, are companycerned, we have gone through the entire evidence and found that the evidence of the witnesses cannot be brushed aside merely because of some minor companytradictions, particularly for the reason that the evidence and testimonies of the witnesses are trustworthy. Not only that, the witnesses have companysistently deposed with regard to the offence companymitted by the appellants and their evidence remain unshaken during their crossexamination. Mere marginal variation and companytradiction in the statements of the witnesses cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of the eye-witness who is numbere else but the widow of the one deceased. Further, relationship cannot be a factor to affect credibility of a witness. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Naresh Ors. 2011 4 SCC 324, this Court observed- In all criminal cases, numbermal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to numbermal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a companytradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the companyrt, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor companytradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do number affect the companye of the prosecution case, should number be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The companyrt has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires companyfidence. Exaggerations per se do number render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility. Ed As observed in Bibhuti Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh 2004 9 SCC 186 p. 192. Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to companytradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case materially affect the trial or companye of the prosecutions case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. Vide State v. Saravanan, 2008 17 SCC 587, Arumugam v. State 2008 15 SCC 590, Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. 2009 11 SCC 334, and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta Dr. v. State of Maharashtra. 2010 13 SCC 657. Much stress has been given by the learned companynsel on the number-recovery of the dead-bodies and the looted articles when the allegation is that after killing the persons they put the dead bodies into gunny bags. The aforesaid plea cannot in any way improve the case of the appellants. This Court in the case of Delhi Administration vs. Tribhuvan Nath and Ors., 1996 8 SCC 250, has companysidered the same issue as raised by the appellants herein. In that case, the accused were prosecuted for companymitting murder and throwing the dead body into drains or setting it ablaze. Their properties were looted and their houses were burnt because of the assassination of Prime Minister in 1984. After re-appreciation of the evidence, this Court held as under- If the evidence of the aforesaid PWs is read as a whole, which has to be, what we found is that on 1-11-1984, at first around 11 a.m., a mob of about 200 people came to Block No. P-1, Sultan Puri, which then had 30 to 35 jhuggies. Deceased Himmat Singh and Wazir Singh used to live in those jhuggies. The mob which came around 11 a.m. was said to have been armed with iron rods and sticks but then it was number causing any damage. Rather, it was being advised by this mob that the persons staying in jhuggies should get their hair cut if they wanted to save their lives. The inmates felt inclined to accept this advice and they were in the process of cutting their hair. But then another mob came which, according to PW 11, companysisted of 200-250 persons this number has been given as 1000-1200 by PW 2. According to PW 4 the mob companysisted of 100 persons. PW 8 did number give the number. We are really number companycerned with the number as such. Suffice it to say that the mob was a big one. This mob caused havoc and the members of this mob too were armed with iron rods and sticks. It is at the hands of this mob that, according to the aforesaid PWs, Himmat Singh and Wazir Singh lost their lives. Not only this, to believe PW 4, her son Wazir Singh was burnt to death and thrown into the adjoining nullah. PW 2 also had stated about the mob throwing the murdered persons in the adjoining nullah. As thousands of persons have been so dealt with, it would be too much to expect production of companypus delicti. We have mentioned about this aspect at this stage itself because one of the reasons which led the High Court to acquit the respondents is number-production of companypus delicti. We are afraid the High Court misread the situation misjudged the trauma caused. It is well settled that discovery of dead body of the victim has never been companysidered as the only mode of proving the companypus delicti in murder. In fact, there are very many cases of such nature like the present one where the discovery of the dead body is impossible, specially when members of a particular companymunity were murdered in such a violent mob attack on Sikh companymunity in different places and the offenders tried to remove the dead bodies and also looted articles. As numbericed above, the finding of guilt recorded by the High Court has been challenged by the learned companynsel mainly on the basis of minor discrepancies in the evidence. So far the instant case is companycerned, those minor discrepancies would number go to the root of the case and shake the basic version of the witnesses when as a matter of fact important probabilities factor echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. This Court in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, 1983 3 SCC 217 held that much importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies on the following reasons- By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is number as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness companyld number have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may numberice, another may number. An object or movement might emboss its image on one persons mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. By and large people cannot accurately recall a companyversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the companyversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape-recorder. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess-work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which takes place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get companyfused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the companyrt atmosphere and the piercing crossexamination made by companynsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get companyfused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him Perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment. In the case of Leela Ram dead through Duli Chand vs. State of Haryana Anr., 1999 9 SCC 525, this Court observed- The Court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations whereas some become speechless, some start wailing while some others run away from the scene and yet there are some who may companye forward with companyrage, companyviction and belief that the wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction number falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise. It is indeed necessary to numbere that one hardly companyes across a witness whose evidence does number companytain some exaggeration or embellishment sometimes there companyld even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment and sometimes in their over anxiety they may give a slightly exaggerated account. The companyrt can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be companysidered from the point of view of trustworthiness.

The respondent-Malaya Kumar filed an application before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal claiming that he had been appointed as a Junior Engineer, Agriculture by an order made on 23-6-1994 by the Director of Agriculture and he reported to duty before the Director on 28-6-1994 when his appointment became effective, When his services were placed at the disposal of the Commissioner and Ex-Officio Director, Command Area Development, the respondent represented that he be posted in Soil Conservation Department in which-he has specialisation and maximum Interest, There being numberresponse to this, the respondent filed an application before the Tribunal seeking for a direction to the Director of Agriculture to post him under the Director of Soil Conservation. By Interim order made by the Tribunal, the respondent reported to duty before the Director of Agriculture but he was number paid his salary from that date. When he made a representation in that regard, he was informed that without the order of the Tribunal the question of payment of salary companyld number be companysidered. Thereafter, the Tribunal disposed of the matter finally stating as follows Since the applicant is companytinuing under the Directorate of the Agriculture both by physically reporting as well by order of this Tribunal, Director shall see that the legitimate salary is paid to him as due and admissible within four months from the date of receipt of a companyy of this order. If approval of any authority is necessary the same shall be obtained in the meantime. We may numberice that number only that the respondent reported to duty to the Director, of Agriculture but the Tribunal directed by an interim order to companytinue him in service when in fact he reported before the Command Area Development Organisation, it must be deemed that he is companytinuing, in the Directorate of Agriculture. Twelve other persons who had been appointed provisionally as Junior Engineer for a period of six months along with the respondent by Order No. 7A 22 /194-2271/Agril. dated 23-6-1994, the Public Service Commission having found them fit for being appointed, have been regularly appointed number. The respondent companyld number be so appointed because the appellant took the stand that he had number reported to duty at the place where he was posted while the Tribunal had held that he had companytinued to work under the Directorate of Agriculture and name of the respondent companyld number be sent to the Public Service Commission for being companysidered for his regularization in service. In those circumstances numberfurther steps were taken but much water has flown under the bridge between the date of appointment and today and it would number be equitable and just to ask the respondent to undergo that procedure at this stage. When he had been appointed after selection made by the Selection Committee companysisting of Additional Director of Agriculture, Joint Director of Horticulture, Joint Director of Soil Conservation and Joint Director of Agriculture, it would be appropriate to state that he had been duly selected by experts in the field and was found fit to be appointed to the post for which he was selected and though stated to be provisionally posted, his case was formally to be examined by the Public Service Commission for regularisation. In these circumstances, we think in the peculiar features arising in this case, it is appropriate to declare that he should be deemed to have been regularised. Now the question arises as to from what date the respondent should be deemed to be regularised. This question was number raised by the respondent before the Tribunal because that occasion did number arise there. It is only for the reason that all the other twelve persons who were provisionally appointed for a period of six months along with the respondent have been regularly appointed, this point will have to be companysidered by us only. To do companyplete justice he be deemed to be regularised with effect from today, the date of this order.

ghulam hasan j. this appeal relates to the assessment year 1943-44. the firm was entitled to rs. 220702 as its companymission but it is companymon ground that the firm did number draw this amount. it is however number disputed that the amount was credited to the firm in the accounts. the income-tax officer treated the amount as income accrued and received by the firm and held it taxable. in appeal before the appellate assistant companymissioner it was companytended that this sum included rs. 810223 which represented the companymission accruing to the firm in the indian states where the companypany had opened branches for selling yarn. it was urged that this amount was number assessable as it had number been remitted to what was then called british india. the appellate assistant companymissioner held that under the managing agency agreement the companymission due to the firm accrued or arose in british india as it was found that the income from these branches in indian states had been included in the profit and loss account of the head office for presentation to the shareholders and the companymission had been worked out on the basis of the accounts so prepared and number on the basis of the accounts of each branch separately. this view was upheld by the tribunal. two questions were referred by the tribunal to the high companyrt firstly whether this whole amount was assessable and secondly whether the firm was entitled to exemption of the sum of rs. 81023. upon the first question both the learned judges agreed that the sum of rs. 220702 was rightly assessed to tax in that there was numberhing to prevent the firm from drawing the amount from the companypany which stood credited in their favour. numberhing has been urged in the companyrse of arguments upon the first question. the argument before us in companyfined to the sum of rs. 81023. it is companytended that this companymission accrued in what are number called b states but it was number brought into british india. the short answer to this argument is that the companymission earned by the firm on the profits made by the companypany in the states arose out of one indivisible agreement to charge the reduced companymission of 5 per cent. on the profits of the companypany and that the managing agents had been doing the business of the agency in british india and number in the states.

THE 5TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997 Present Honble Mr. Justice M.K. Mukherjee Honble Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas C. Deepak and C.N. Sreekumar, Advs. for the appellants. M.K. Nair, Adv. for the Respondent J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 226 OF 1994 K. MUKHERJEE, J Bhaskaran and Manoharan Babu, the appellants before us, were placed on trial before an Additional Sessions Judge of Quilon to answer a charge under Section 302/34 I.P.C. The allegation against them was that on July 18, 1987 at or about 9 P.M. they, in furtherance of their companymon intention, companymitted the murder of Gopal Krishna Pillai Babu Pillai of village Valakam by stabbing him with knives. The trial ended in their acquittal but in appeal preferred by the State of Kerala, the High Court upset their acquittal and companyvicted and sentenced them under Section 302/34 I.P.C. They have number filed these two separate appeals under Section 379 Cr.P.C. which have been heard together and this judgment will dispose of them. 2 According to the prosecution case on the fateful evening the appellant had a heated argument with the deceased in front of a tea shop but owing to the intervention of and advice given by one Bhasakaran Pillai W.6 they left the place. Sometime later the two appellants followed the deceased and when he was proceeding along the ridge of a field they stabbed him with knives and fled away. A little later the deceased succumbed to his injuries. The motive that was ascribed for the above murder was that a week earlier the deceased had grabbed a bottle of arrack from appellant Bhaskaran. 3 It is the further prosecution case that on the following morning Vasudevan Pillai P.W.1 , brother of the deceased, went to Pooyappally Police Station and lodged a report about the incident. On that report S.I.J. Wilfred W.10 registered a case and took up investigation. He went to the field where the dead body of Gopal Krishna Pillai was lying and held inquest. He then sent the dead body for post mortem examination by Dr. N. Bahuleyan W.8 . In companyrse of investigation P.W.10 arrested appellant Bhasakaran and pursuant to his statement recovered a knife, which on chemical examination was found to companytain stain of human blood. The other appellant, namely Manoharan, surrendered before the Court later. On companypletion of investigation the police submitted charge sheet against the two appellants and in due companyrse the case was companymitted to the Court of Session. The appellants pleaded number guilty to the charge levelled against them and companytended that they had been falsely implicated. 5 That the deceased met with a homicidal death owing to six stab injuries found on his person by P.W.8 was number disputed by the appellants. In that companytext the only question that fell for determination before the trial Court was whether the evidence of Vasudevan P.W.1 , the brother of the deceased and of Gangadharan Pillai P.W.2 who figured as eye witnesses, companyld be believed. Both of them number only detailed the incident but also averred that deceased named the two appellants as his assailants. The trial Court found their evidence unworthy of credit as, according to it, there was an inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report. The trial Court next observed that if really they had seen the incident it was expected of them to make an attempt to save the deceased from the attack, which they did number. Another ground which weighted with the trial Judge to disbelieve the eye witnesses was that their version that the appellants told the deceased that to kill would proclaim his intention. The trial Court also found fault with the Investigating Officer for number having seized the torch, by the light of which P.W.1 claimed to have recognised the appellants. The High Court, however, observed that each of the above grounds canvassed by the trial Court, was wholly unsustainable and on perusal of the evidence of the two eye witnesses held that there was numberreason to disbelieve them. This being a statutory appeal we have, with the assistance of the learned companynsel for the parties, gone through the entire evidence on record, particularly, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. Having done so we are in companyplete agreement with the High Court that the evidence of the above two eye witnesses can be safely relied upon and made the basis for companyviction. The High Court rightly pointed out that companysidering the fact that the distance of the police station from the village in question was 15 kms. and the uncontroverted evidence of P.W.1 that numberbuses were available to reach the police station in night, it companyld number be said that there was any delay in lodging the First Information Report at 9 A.M. on the following morning. On the companytrary, in our opinion, the report was lodged at the earliest available opportunity. Equally justified was the High Court in observing that since different persons reacted differently in the same circumstances the other two reasons canvassed by the trial Court to disbelieve P.Ws. 1 and 2 were patently wrong. As regards the failure of the Investigation Officer to seized the torch light, the trial Court failed to companysider that the remiss on his part companyld number be made a ground to disbelieve P.Ws 1 and 2 if they were otherwise trustworthy. Coming number to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, who gave a detailed version of the incident, we find that except a few minor companytradictions there is numberhing in their evidence to the discredit them.

THE 9TH DAY OF AUGUST,1995 Present Honble Mr.Justice B.P.Jeevan Reddy Honble Mr.Justice Suhas C.Sen Mr.C.S.Vaidyanathan, Sr. Adv. Mr.Shiv Ram, Mr.L.C.Tolat, Mr.S.J.Khatawala and Mr.S.R.Setia, Advs. with him for the Appellant. Dr.N.M.Ghatate, Sr. Adv. Mr.G.B.Sathe, Mr.S.M.Jadhav, Mr.A.K.Goel, Ms.Sheela Goel,Advs. with him for the Respondents. J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7059-60 OF 1995 Arising out of Special Leave Petition C Nos.8579-8580 of 1995 BABY SAMUEL V. TUKARAM LAXMAN SABLE ORS. J U D G M E N T P.JEEVAN REDDY.J. Leave granted. Heard companynsel for the parties. The appellant was? elected as a Councillor of the Khopoli Municipal Council in December 1991. The companytesting respondent Shri Sable was also elected as a Councillor. On account of a vacancy occurring in the office of the President of Municipality, an election was held to that office wherein the appellant was elected as the President. Prior to becoming the President, the appellant was the Chairman of a Committee in-charge of awarding companytracts. On the basis of certain companyplaints pertaining to the period he was the Chairman of the said Committee, a numberice was issued to the appellant by the Collector calling upon him to show cause why he should number be removed from the officer of the Councillor under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1965. The appellant showed cause, whereafter the Collector removed him from the office of the Councillor by his order dated 4.10.1994. The operative portion of the order reads Therefore, I, G.T.Bandri, Collector, Raigad-Alibag, hereby, am disqualifying Shri Baby Samuel, present Chairman Khopoli Municipal Council, as member of the Municipal Council, under Sections 44 1 b and 44 3 of Maharashtra Municipal Council Act, 1965, and I am declaring that his post as member of the Municipal Council has become vacant from the date 5.10.1994. Against the said order of removal disqualification the appellant filed an appeal before the Government under Section 44 5 of the Act alongwith an application for stay. Since numberorders were passed on his stay petition, the appellant approached the Bombay High Court by way of Writ Petition C No.4465 of 1994. The High Court directed the Government to dispose of the stay petition within one week and the appeal within three months from the date of its order. The order of the High Court was made on October 26, 1994. Inspite of the orders of the High Court, the State Government did number pass any orders on the stay petition. In view of the vacancy occuring in the office of the President of the Municipality on account of the order disqualifying the appellant, the Collector companyvened a meeting on November 8, 1994 to elect the President of the Municipality, whereas the respondent Shri Sable was elected as the President. On January 7, 1995 the Government allowed the appeal filed by the appellant and set aside the order of the Collector dated 4th October, 1994. The operative portion of the Governments Order reads In exercise of the powers companyferred by Section 44 4 in Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Towns Act 1965, the Government cancels the Order bearing No.M.A.1/28444/M.No. 41/94, dated 4/10/94 passed by the Collector to disqualify Shri Baby Samuel as the member of the Municipal Council. Questioning the aforesaid order of the Government, Shri Sable filed Writ Petition c No. 675 of 1995 companytending mainly that before allowing the appeal he should have been heard and that number doing so vitiates the order. In this writ petition he applied for stay of implementation of the Government order. Simultaneously the appellant filed a writ petition being 1124 of 1995 for a direction to the authorities to reinstate him in the office of the President of the Municipality as a companysequence of the Governments order. Both the interlocutory applications in the two writ petitions came up for hearing before a Division Bench on 20th March, 1995. The Division Bench granted stay of the operation of the Governments order dated 7.1.1995 as prayed for by Shri Sable and rejected the application filed by the appellant to reinstate him in the office of the President. The said two orders are questioned in these appeals. The facts stated above disclose that the appellant was removed from the office of the Councillor and as a companysequence he lost the office of the President of the Municipality. The Collectors order reads Iam disqualifying Shri Baby Samuel, present Chairman Khopoli Municipal companyncil, as member of the Municipal Council. Because the State Government did number pass any orders on the stay petition filed by the appellant in his appeal preferred against the orders of removal disqualification, the Collector numberified and held an election to the office of the President whereat Shri Sable was elected as President. This election was again a companysequence of the removal disqualification of the appellant by the Collector. If so, once the order of removal disqualification is set aside by the Government, the appellant is entitled to be put back in the same position which he was in before he was removed. In other words number only should he be restored to the Councillorship but also to the office of the President. Shri Sable was elected as the President in the vacancy caused by the removal disqualification of the appellant and once the said removal disqualification of the appellant goes, the companysequential action cannot stand it falls to ground alongwith the order of removal. Shri Sable must therefore yield ground to the appellant. Dr. Ghatate, learned companynsel for Shri Sable submitted that since the impugned orders are interlocutory in nature, this Court should number interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. He suggested that the writ petitions may be directed to be heard expeditiously. To this Shri Vaidyanathan, learned companynsel for the appellant demurred stating that the term of the appellant will be companying to an end in the year 1996 next year and since there is numberreal possibility of the aforesaid writ petitions being heard in the near future, denial of relief in this appeal companyld cause grave prejudice to the appellant.

M. Khanwilkar, J. Leave granted. The seminal question involved in the present appeal is if the original lessee respondent No.1, a public limited companypany in respect of the plot given on lease by the appellant, Signature Not Verified transfers the same to another public limited companypany, albeit Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date 2019.04.24 173350 IST Reason an alter ego of the former, companysequent to an order of arrangement and demerger passed by the Company Judge, then whether it is liable to pay 50 unearned increase UEI on the market value of the plot to the appellant lessor ? Briefly stated, in an auction companyducted by the appellant, respondent No.1 former name Jindal Strips Limited was allotted a companymercial plot in Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi, on 23rd March, 1993. Possession of the plot was handed over to respondent No.1 on 6th September, 1993 and a Perpetual Lease Deed dated 28th September, 1993, was executed by the appellant in favour of respondent No.1. It is apposite to reproduce stipulation 6 a of the said Lease Deed, which reads thus 6. a The Lessee shall number sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the Commercial Plot except with the previous companysent in writing of the Lessor which he shall be entitled to refuse in his absolute discretion. PROVIDED that in the event of the companysent being given, the Lessor may impose such terms and companyditions as he thinks fit and the Lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover a portion of the unearned increase in the value i.e. the difference between the premium paid and the market value of the Commercial plot at the time of sale, transfer assignment, or parting with the possession, the amount to be recovered being fifty per cent of the unearned increase and the decision of the Lessor in respect of the market value shall be final and binding PROVIDED FURTHER that the Lessor shall have the pre emptive right to purchase the whole property or any part thereof that may be subject of sale, transfer, assignment or otherwise parting with the possession as the case may be, after deduction fifty percent of the unearned increase as aforesaid. PROVIDED FURTHER that numberwithstanding the limitations and companyditions as mentioned in subclause 6 a , the lessee may sell or transfer the floor space companystructed on the plot subject to the permission of the Lessor in writing on payment of Rs.100/ for each flat floor space for the first sale transfer, for subsequent sale transfer the lessor may on payment of proportionate 50 of the unearned increase i.e. the difference between the premium already paid by the purchase transferor and the market price of the time of sale transfer towards the portion of the land grant permission to the sublessee transferor for such subsequent sale transfer of the floor space to be transferred. Prior permission of the lessor for such second and subsequent sale transfer of floor space shall be subject to the companyditions of getting the Deed of Apartment and the sublease as defined under the Delhi, Apartment Ownership Act, 1986 executed by the lessee in favour of such floor space buyers transferee. PROVIDED FURTHER that the lessee shall be required to intimate the first list of the floor space buyer transferees giving full details of name, address and quantum of floor space to the Lessor, simultaneously with the grant of companypletion certificate. However, companypletion certificate shall be issued only on furnishing the valid list of first purchaser of floor space alongwith companyies of deed of apartment duly executed with each one of them. The grant of permission by the Lessor to the Lessee for transfer of floor space or subsequent transfer of floor space to another persons, shall number absolve the lessee from violation of the terms companyditions of the lease. The Lessee shall also be responsible for making all arrangements as are necessary for maintenance of the building including but without limitation affecting the fire fighting system and the companymon services. emphasis supplied Respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 entered into an arrangement and invited an order of demerger from the Company Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. On 30th May, 2003, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana passed the order of demerger of the companypanies. It would be apposite to reproduce paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said demerger order, which read thus xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx That with effect from the appointed date, the Stainless Steel Undertaking of Jindal Strips Limited with all the property, assets, rights and powers specified in Parts I, II, and III of the Schedule hereto shall stand transferred to and vest in Jindal Stainless Limited, without further act or deed and accordingly the same shall pursuant to Section 394 2 of the Companies Act, 1956 be transferred to and vest in Jindal Steel Limited with effect from the said date for all the estate and interest of Jindal Strips Limited therein, subject to the existing charges thereon more particularly described in the said scheme of arrangement and demerger and That all the debts, liabilities dues and obligations, secured or unsecured as more particularly described in the Scheme of Arrangement and Demerger, whether provided in the books of account of Jindal Strips Limited, whether disclosed or undisclosed in the balance sheet, pertaining to the Stainless Steel Undertaking and accordingly the same shall pursuant to Section 394 2 of the Companies Act, 1956 be transferred to and become the debts, liabilities, duties and obligations of Jindal Stainless Limited emphasis supplied Respondent No.2 then moved a formal application for mutating the property in its name vide application dated 22 nd August, 2003. Respondent No.2 was then advised to withdraw the said application on 16th January, 2004. Thereafter, respondent No.2 applied to the appellant on 19 th January, 2004, for companyversion of the property from leasehold to freehold. Under the companyversion policy of the appellant, the lessee was obliged to pay all dues, including the charges towards use, damages, sub use, unearned income UEI , ground rent, certificate maintenance charges etc. The instructions followed by the companypetent authority in regard to charging of UEI have been articulated in document Annexure P1, which reads thus ANNEXURE PI DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Sub Substitution addition deletion of names in lease sub lease of industrial companymercial plots unearned increase In supersession of previous instructions on the subject, the Lt. Governor, Delhi is please to order that hence forth in the matters of addition deletion and substitution of names in respect of Industrial companymercial Lease SubLease to be executed or already executed, the following procedure shall be followed No unearned increase to be charged The auction purchaser allottee shall be permitted free of charge, to add, delete or substitute the names of family members which may, where necessary, take the form of partnership firm or private limited companypany. In case of companyversion of partnership firm into private limited companypany companyprising original partners as Directors Subscribers Shareholders. In case of addition, deletion or substitution of partners in a firm or directors and companyversion of sole proprietorship firm or partnership companycern into private limited companypany when change in companystitution is limited, for approval by the DDA, within one year from the date of purchase of plot in auction. This will to apply in case of plot obtained by the party by way of allotment. Change from private limited companypany to public limited companypany where a private limited companypany becomes a public limited companypany under Section 43A of Companies Act, 1956. Where unearned increase is to be charged Addition of outsiders number falling within the family members shall be allowed through a companyveyance deed on payment of 50 unearned increase on his proportionate shares. The unearned increase shall be calculated at the market rate prevalent on the date of receipt of the application in the office of the DDA. Substitution of the original allottee auction purchasers shall be allowed on payment of 50 unearned increase of his shares in the value of the plot which will be calculated at the market rate. The market rate shall be the rate prevalent on the date of receipt of the application. It is irrespective of the fact whether the lease deed has been executed or number. c 50 Unearned increase will be charged in respect of proportionate shares of the plot parted with by way of addition, deletion or substitution of partner partners in case of single ownership or partnership firm and Director Directors Shareholders Subscribers in case of Private Limited Company. This is application where the incoming persons do number fall within the definition of family. Unearned increase would be charged on the basis of market rate prevalent on the date of intimation for each and every change in the companystitution. This would be applicable in all cases where the lease deed has been executed or number. In case where a private limited companypany public limited companypany separately floating a new companypany although Directors may be the same and the name of old companypany has number changed and it still exists as it was, 50 unearned increase will be chargeable in such cases. Interest at the rate of 18 per annum on the unearned increase from the date of receipt of the application intimating the change till the payment by the companypany or individual or firm shall be charged on the amount of the unearned increase payable to the DDA. The administrative companyditions prescribed in the UO No.F.1 23 /78/C L Part II dated 8.5.79 will remain unchanged. Sd/ C. VARSHNEYA DEPUTY FINANCIAL ADVISOR HOUSING No.LSAI/1 6 87/Policy Case Unearned Increase dated 6.9.88 emphasis supplied In light of the prevailing policy, the appellant called upon the respondents to pay an amount of Rs.6,17,53,998/ Rupees Six Crore Seventeen Lakh Fifty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Eight only towards UEI and an amount of Rs.10,44,394 Rupees Ten Lakh Forty Four Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Four only towards misuse charges. As the demanded amount was number deposited, a show cause numberice was issued to the respondents on 13th January, 2011. The respondents challenged both the said show cause numberice and the demand numberice by way of a writ petition filed before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, bearing Writ Petition Civil No.1885 of 2011. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, after companysidering the rival submissions, eventually dismissed the said writ petition by recording following reasons Upon companysidering the submissions advanced, material on record and the decisions cited, this Court is of companysidered view that even without lifting the companyporate veil, it is abundantly clear from the scheme of arrangement and de merger of the petitioner companypanies as reflected in the order Annexure P4 that the assets of the first petitioner stands transferred to the second petitioner, thereby attracting clause 2 d of Instructions Annexure P23 making 50 of unearned increase chargeable and clause 1 a of the instructions Annexure P23 are inapplicable as they relate to partnership firms or private limited companypanies only and number to public limited companypanies like the petitioners. Even clause 6 a of the Perpetual Lease Annexure P2 between the first petitioner and the respondent prohibits the transfer of possession of the whole or any part of the companymercial plot without previous companysent of the respondent and stipulates that sale transfer assignment or parting with the possession of the companymercial plot would attract 50 of the unearned increase and thus, the first petitioner is bound by it. It is quite elementary that without mutation of the subject premises being there in the name of the allottee, i.e., the first petitioner, there cannot be any companyversion of the subject premises from leasehold to freehold and therefore substitution of the Lessees of companymercial plots like the instant one, clearly attracts the imposition of unearned increase, in view of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Indian Shaving Products Supra . The single bench decision in Kiran Kohli Supra relied upon by the petitioners is distinguishable on facts and is number applicable to the instant matter, as it does number deal with the Instructions Annexure P23 , which squarely governs the dispute raised herein. Logically speaking, Respondents right to levy unearned increase cannot be defeated by first effecting de merger and then to further assign, transfer etc. without previous companysent of the respondent lessor. Consequentially, impugned demand Annexure P17 and the Notice Annexure P20 are held to be valid and this writ petition is dismissed with companyts of 50,000/, while vacating the interim order. The respondents carried the matter in Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, being P.A. No.735 of 2012. Upon examining the relevant clauses of the Perpetual Lease Deed and the policy documents of the appellant, the Division Bench, vide its order dated 30 th April, 2014, was pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the demand numberice and show cause numberice issued by the appellant and direct the appellant to take companysequential steps as per law regarding the companyversion of the property to freehold, without charging UEI, for the following reasons We have a look at the clause 6 of the perpetual lease deed dated September 28, 1993 which reads as follows 6 a The Lessee shall number sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the Commercial Plot except with the previous companysent in writing of the Lessor which he shall be entitled to refuse in his absolute discretion. PROVIDED that in the event of the companysent being given, the Lessor may impose such terms and companyditions as he thinks fit and the Lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover a portion of the unearned increase in the value i.e. the difference between the premium paid and the market value of the Commercial plot at the time of sale, transfer, assignment, or parting with the possession, the amount to be recovered being fifty percent of the unearned increase and the decision of the Lessor in respect of the market value shall be final and binding. A perusal of the above Clause shows that DDA, when giving companysent for sale, transfer, assignment or otherwise parting with possession of the companymercial plot, may emphasis supplied impose such terms and companyditions as it thinks fit and shall be entitled to claim and recover a portion of the unearned increase. The object of the said Clause is to protect DDA and to permit it to recover a part of the unearned increase which the lessee obtains on sale of the property. In other words, the intent is to recover a part of the profit made by the lessee. In the present facts it is obvious that numberconsideration whatsoever has passed. It is a case of reorganisation of business. The impugned order relies on Clause 2 d of the Policy for charge of unearned increase to hold that the appellants are companyered by the said clause and are hence liable to pay unearned increase. Clause 2 d of the policy reads as under 2 d In case where a private limited companypany public limited companypany separately floating a new companypany although Directors may be the same and the name of old companypany has number changed and if still exists as it was, 50 unearned increase will be chargeable in such cases. Reference may also be had to clause 1 b which deals with situations where numberunearned increase is to be charged of the policy which reads as follows 1 b In case of companyversion of partnership firm into private limited companypany companyprising original partners as Directors Subscribers Shareholders. Clause 2 d of the policy does number deal with a situation of demerger of companypanies within the same group with companymon Directors and Promoters shareholders. It is dealing with a situation where a new companypany is being floated. In our view the said clause would have numberapplication to a case of demerger which is a mere reorganisation of business like in the present case. There is numberspecific Clause of the Policy dealing with a case of demerger. The facts of the present case are somewhat akin to a situation as stipulated in Clause 1 b of the said policy, inasmuch as clause 1 b deals with a situation of companyversion of a partnership firm into a private limited companypany companyprising only original partners as Directors Subscribers Share Holders, namely, mere reorganisation of the business. The Policy specifically provides for numberunearned increase to be charged in such a situation. We may clarify that it is number every case of demerger that the unearned increase will number apply. There may be cases where an element of sale is involved. In such a situation the issue would be different. Hence, in our view, the respondent is number entitled to charge any unearned increase in the facts and circumstances of the present case keeping in mind a meaningful reading of Clause 6 a of the perpetual lease and the policy for unearned increase. Even in equity numbersuch amount can be claimed by DDA. Regarding the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Indian Shaving Products Limited vs. DDA supra , in our view, the said judgment would number be applicable to the facts of the present case. That was a case where the petitioner had bought the entire shareholding of a companypany called Sharpedge Limited in 1987. The said companypany became a sick companypany under SICA. Under a proposal of rehabilitation a scheme of amalgamation was approved by BIFR in 1992 under which all the properties of the transferor companypany Sharpedge Limited vested with the transferee companypany i.e. petitioner. It was in those facts that the Court held that DDA is entitled to recover unearned increase. In view of the above, we allow the present appeal and set aside the impugned order dated August 16, 2012 passed in P. C 1885/2011. The impugned demand dated August 05, 2010 and the numberice dated January 13, 2011 are quashed. Respondent will take companysequential steps as per law regarding companyversion of the property to freehold without charging the said unearned increase. This decision has been challenged by the appellant on the ground that the Division Bench has companypletely misconstrued the relevant clauses in the Lease Deed and the policy document. According to the appellant, clause 6 a of the Lease Deed uses the expansive expression sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the companymercial plot. Further, the proviso thereto stipulates that the lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover UEI on the value i.e. difference between the premium paid and the market value of the companymercial plot at the relevant time. The appellant companytends that clause 6 a cannot be companystrued to mean that if numbersale companysideration is involved in the transaction, then the appellant would number be entitled to recover the UEI. For, the words sell, transfer, assign or otherwise parting with the possession companyld be even without companysideration and the stipulation makes it amply clear that the appellant is entitled to recover UEI towards the premium paid on the market value of the companymercial plot and number the Agreement value amount per se. It is companytended that the fact that the demerger had taken place as a result of which the right, title and interest in the plot in question stood transferred to another companypany, is number in dispute. As a companysequence whereof, the respondents were liable to pay UEI as demanded by the appellant. The effect of demerger of a public limited companypany has been examined in M s. Parasram Harnand Rao Vs. M s. Shanti Parsad Narinder Kumar Jain and Anr.,1 Cox Kings Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Chander Malhotra Smt. ,2 M s. General Radio and Appliances Co. 1980 3 SCC 565 1997 2 SCC 687 Ltd. and Ors. Vs. M.A. Khader dead by LRs. 3, Indian Saving Products Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority and Ors.,4 and Singer India Ltd. Vs. Chander Mohan Chadha and Ors.5 The appellant would also companytend that the Division Bench erred in observing that there was numberspecific clause dealing with the case of demerger in the instructions regarding implementation of the policy relied upon by the appellant. Further, it wrongly applied clause 1 b , which relates to companyversion of a partnership firm into a private limited companypany, to the present case, which was admittedly a demerger of a public limited companypany lessee . In such a case, clause 2 d of the instructions would companye into play, which stipulates that when another companypany is formed, even though the directors of the two companypanies remain the same and the name of transferee companypany is same, UEI is still chargeable. The respondents, on the other hand, have supported the view expressed by the Division Bench and would companytend that on proper companystruction of the stipulation in the Lease Deed 1986 2 SCC 686 2004 120 Com. Cases 818 Delhi 2004 7 SCC 1 and the policy document, including instructions relied upon by the appellant, it would be clear that charging of UEI would depend upon whether the property or part thereof is being effectively transferred to outsiders and for companysideration. If the transaction is number for any companysideration but is merely an arrangement and demerger of the public limited companypanies resorted to under the aegis of the order passed by the Company Judge of the jurisdictional Company Court, the question of paying any UEI in respect of such transaction cannot be companyntenanced. It is submitted that such a view is reinforced from the other illustrations numbered in the policy instructions clause 1 thereof , such as substitution of a family member, companyversion of a partnership firm into a private limited companypany or addition, deletion or substitution of partners in a firm, or change from private limited companypany to public limited companypany, which although, are cases of transfer, but numberUEI is chargeable. In the present case, companytends the learned companynsel for the respondents, the two companypanies are admittedly group companypanies and respondent No.1 original lessee owned 98.62 of the shares of respondent No.2 at the relevant time. In reality, therefore, the respondent No.1 original lessee companytinued to have companytrol over the property in question and, by invoking the principle of lifting or piercing of companyporate veil, it must be companycluded that the transfer of property in terms of the scheme of demerger is effectively number to an outsider muchless for companysideration. The respondents have distinguished the decisions relied upon by the appellant. According to the respondents, the exposition in the said decisions must be understood in the companytext of the fact situation of the companycerned case. In the present case, however, the transfer of property is number to an outsider and, in any case, is without any companysideration and on numberrofit basis. As a result, the liability to pay UEI does number arise. To buttress the above submissions, the respondents have relied upon the decisions in K. Devarajulu Naidu Vs. C. Ethirajavalli Thayaramma and Ors.6, Madras Bangalore Transport Co. West Vs. Inder Singh and Ors.7, State of 1949 2 MLR 423 1986 3 SCC 62 P. and Ors. Vs. Renusagar Power Co. and Ors. 8 and New Horizons Limited and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. 9 It is companytended that being a case of demerger, the companycerned companypanies were number even required to pay any stamp duty, which presupposes that it was number a case of a voluntary transfer. It is urged that the respondents have fulfilled the test of substantial identity as the lessee respondent No.1 was holding 98.62 shares of the transferee respondent No.2 at the relevant time. In other words, the transaction between the respondents inter se is a genuine, bona fide case of reorganization of the business with demerger sanctioned by the High Court and, for which reason, numberliability towards UEI would arise. We have heard Ms. Binu Tamta, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondents. For answering the seminal question, we must first advert to the obligation of respondent No.1 springing from the 1988 4 SCC 59 1995 1 SCC 478 stipulation in the perpetual Lease Deed. Clause 6 a , as extracted in paragraph 3 above, envisages a bar to sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the companymercial plot, except with the previous companysent in writing of the lessor appellant , which the appellant would be entitled to refuse in its absolute discretion. While granting companysent in terms of the proviso to clause 6 a , it is open to the appellant to impose such terms and companyditions as may be deemed appropriate and claim and recover a portion of the unearned increase in the value of the companymercial plot, being 50 of the unearned increase. The decision of the appellant in this behalf is final and binding upon the original lessee respondent No.1 . The amount towards the unearned increase is companyputed on the basis of the difference between the premium paid and the market value of the companymercial plot. In doing so, the fact that the transfer under companysideration did number involve any companysideration amount or the value paid by the transferee is below the market value, would number inhibit recovery of 50 of the prescribed unearned increase amount on actual or, in a given case, numberional basis. This is the plain meaning of the stipulation. This position is reinforced from the companytemporaneous instructions issued by the companypetent authority of the appellant about the manner in which the unearned increase should be charged and from whom such charges should be recovered. That can be discerned from the instructions dated 6th September, 1988. Indeed, the said instructions advert to the category of persons from whom numberunearned increase should be charged, despite being a case of transfer of the property as mentioned in clause 1 thereof. The Division Bench of the High Court has relied upon the category mentioned in clause 1 b . The same reads thus No unearned increase to be charged a xxx xxx xxx In case of companyversion of partnership firm into private limited companypany companyprising original partners as Directors Subscribers Shareholders. From the plain language of this clause, we fail to fathom how the said clause will be of any avail to the respondents. For, we are number dealing with a case of companyversion of a partnership firm into a private limited companypany as such. The fact that the instructions extricate the category of transfers referred to in clause 1 of the instructions from the liability of paying an unearned increase despite being a case of transfer, cannot be the basis to exclude the other category of transfers persons number specifically companyered by clause 1 , such as the case of present respondents. That is a policy matter. The respondents were fully aware about the existence of such a policy. That policy has number been challenged in the writ petition. Concededly, the reliefs claimed in the writ petition were limited to quashing of the demand letter dated 5th August, 2010 and numberice dated 31st January, 2011, demanding unearned increase and to direct the appellant to companyvert the said property from leasehold to freehold in favour of respondent No.2, without charging any unearned increase. The reliefs are founded on the assertion that the transfer was number to any outsider, much less for any companysideration. In the first place, it is number open to the respondents to companytend that the arrangement and demerger scheme does number result in transfer of the subject plot from the original lessee respondent No.1 to respondent No.2. Inasmuch as, clause 2 of the order passed by the Company Judge approving the scheme of demerger, as reproduced above, makes it amply clear that all property, assets, rights and powers in respect of the specified properties, including the subject plot, shall stand transferred to and vest in respondent No.2. Once it is a case of transfer, it must abide by the stipulation in clause 6 a of the Lease Deed of taking previous companysent in writing of the lessor appellant and to fulfill such terms and companyditions as may be imposed, including to pay any unearned increase amount. We find force in the argument of the appellant that the fact situation of the present case would, in fact, be governed by clause 2 d of the instructions which reads thus Where unearned increase is to be charged a xxx xxx xxx In case where a private limited companypany public limited companypany separately floating a new companypany although Directors may be the same and the name of old companypany has number changed and if still exists as it was, 50 unearned increase will be chargeable in such cases. This clause plainly applies to the present case. The demand of unearned increase from the respondents is founded on that basis. The High Court misinterpreted the said clause and erroneously opined that it is number applicable to a case of demerger of a public limited companypany. The principal clause is clause 6 a of the Lease Deed. The clause referred to in the instructions is equally significant. Indeed, the latter merely provides for the mechanism to recover the unearned increase from the original lessee. The fact that the same group of persons or directors/ promoters shareholders would be and are associated with the transferee companypany does number cease to be a case of transfer or exempted from payment of UEI, as envisaged in clause 6 a of the Lease Deed. Rather, clause 2 d of the policy, numbered above, makes it expressly clear that unearned increase be charged irrespective of the fact that the directors in both companypanies are companymon and the old parent companypany has number changed its name. The fact that it was a case of transfer is reinforced from the order of demerger passed by the Company Judge and once it is a case of transfer, companypled with the fact that the respondents are number companyered within the categories specified in clauses 1 a to 1 d of the policy of the appellant, reproduced in paragraph 5 above, they would be liable to pay unearned increase UEI in the manner specified in clause 6 a of the Lease Deed. The obligation to pay UEI does number flow only from the instructions issued by the companypetent authority of the appellant but primarily from the stipulation in the Perpetual Lease Deed in the form of clause 6 a . Viewed thus, the Division Bench of the High Court companymitted a manifest error in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, who had rightly dismissed the writ petition and upheld the demand numberice and the show cause numberice calling upon the respondents to pay the unearned increase amount in terms of clause 6 a of the Perpetual Lease Deed. That demand was final and binding on the respondents, so long as the stipulation in the form of clause 6 a of the Perpetual Lease was in force. Reverting to the decisions pressed into service by the appellant, to wit, Parasram Harnand Rao supra , Cox Kings Ltd. supra , M s. General Radio and Appliances Co. Ltd. supra , Indian Saving Products Ltd. supra , and Singer India Ltd. supra , dealt with the effect of such a transfer which results in unlawful subletting within the meaning of the companycerned rent legislation. In the present case, the fact that it is a case of transfer of the subject plot from the lessee respondent No.1 , a public limited companypany, to the transferee respondent No.2 , another public limited companypany, is indisputable. That is reinforced from the order of the Company Judge, formulating the scheme for demerger of the lessee companypany. It is number an involuntary transfer as such. The only issue is whether, by virtue of the fact that the affairs of the transferee companypany respondent No.2 are companytrolled by the same set of directors shareholders of the original lessee respondent No.1 with about 98.62 of the shares of the transferee companypany respondent No.2 , that would or would number absolve the respondent No.1 of its obligations under the Lease Deed.

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. Leave granted. This appeal arises out of the final order dated 3.8.2006 passed by the High Court of Allahabad at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petitions Nos. 8967, 10514 and 7227 of 2004 whereby the above three separate writ petitions filed by the appellants herein were dismissed. In the said writ petitions the appellants herein challenged the FIR registered against them under Sections 420 and 409 of the Page 1 of 20 Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC and under Sections 64 and 69 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 in short Stamp Act . Brief facts necessary for the purpose of disposal of present appeal are as follows Appellants herein were working as officers in different capacities at relevant point of time in the Life Insurance Corporation of India in short LIC and were then posted in different offices in the State of Uttar Pradesh. All the three appellants have since retired from the service of the LIC. It has been stated that various branch offices of the LIC in the companyrse of their business have to purchase large quantity of adhesive stamps for affixation on their policies and for issuing receipts etc. While the stamps used for receipts are the numbermal revenue stamps, the stamps used in respect of the policies issued by LIC are special insurance stamps which are affixed at the rates fixed under the Stamps Act. For the purposes of execution of insurance policies by the LIC, under the law at the relevant point of time, on a sum of Rs. 1,000/- the rate of stamp duty is fixed at 40 paise on each policy. In order Page 2 of 20 to execute the insurance policies promptly, from time to time, heavy purchases of insurance stamps are stated to be done by the LIC. The LIC used to purchase the same from the Treasury in any district as well as from authorised licensed stamp vendors. On 30.07.2004, a First Information Report in short FIR bearing Crime No. 271/04 was lodged against the appellants at Police Station Bhelupura, Tehsil Sadar, District Varanasi for the offences punishable under Sections 420/409 of IPC and under Sections 64/69 of the Stamps Act in relation to the purchase of certain stamps. A perusal of the FIR shows that it was lodged on the basis of a letter bearing No. 11912/Stamps-693 P /2002-2003 83- 84 dated 26.06.2004 written by the Commissioner, Stamps, U.P., Allahabad and letter No. 237245-6 2003-04 Mu, Ra, La. dated 28.7.2004 written by the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi. It has been stated in the FIR that the Divisional Office of the LIC, Varanasi has number purchased the Insurance Stamps from the Treasury office of U.P. but the same was purchased from the Stamp Vendors, outside of State, which caused loss of Rs. 1,67,21,520.00/- to the State Government. Page 3 of 20 The appellants herein approached the Allahabad High Court for quashing of the aforesaid FIR. However, the High Court on 03.08.2006 dismissed all the three writ petitions vide three separate but identical orders holding that the FIR prima facie discloses the companymission of companynizable offence and there was numberground of interference. Aggrieved by the said orders of the High Court, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. It was companytended by the appellants that the FIR was lodged only on the directions of the higher authorities for the purpose of arresting the present appellants so as to humiliate and harass them. It has been submitted that the provisions of the Stamp Act and relevant provisions of Constitution clearly indicates the untenability of the allegations made in the FIR. It is the case of the appellant that purchasing of stamps assumes urgency because the insurance companytract must be executed along with insurance policies at the earliest possible time and immediately on receipt of the first premium and if there is any delay in issuing the insurance stamps and if in the meantime there is a death of life assured, then difficulties arise regarding payment of insurance money claim. As there are various sources for purchase of insurance Page 4 of 20 stamps viz. from the Treasury of any district throughout the State and also from any duly authorised licensed stamp vendors, the LIC is entitled to purchase the insurance stamps from any such stamp vendors throughout the companyntry. It has been submitted that there is numberprohibition under the law and in the Stamp Act which mandates that the LIC will purchase the insurance stamps only from a particular district or from a particular State. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent that if the stamps are permitted to be purchased from any other State other than the State in which the instrument is to be first executed, it shall number only cause huge loss of revenue to the State in which the instrument is executed but would also render the rules framed by the State Government for regulation of sale and supply of the stamps and the administrative machinery established therein as futile and meaningless. It is also the case that it would further prevent the State Government from examining as to whether the stamps are fake or genuine. The law which governs the rate of payment of stamp duty in respect of policies of insurance and certain other transactions has been Page 5 of 20 dealt under Entry 91 of List 1 Union List of 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India in short Constitution . It reads as follows Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, promissory numberes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts. Our attention has been drawn towards Entry 63 of List II State List of 7thSchedule which provide for power to the State Legislatures in regard to the rate of stamp duty other than those specified in List I Union List . Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents other than those specified in the provisions of List I with regard to rates of stamp duty. Other relevant entry which has been cited is Entry 44 of List III Concurrent List which excludes rates of stamp duty. Stamp duties other than duties or fees companylected by means of judicial stamps, but number including rates of stamp duty. The above-mentioned various entries in the three lists are the fields of legislation with regard to stamps. They are designed to Page 6 of 20 define and delimit the respective areas of legislative companypetence of the Union and State Legislatures. Under Entry 44 of List III, the power to levy stamp duty on all documents, is companycurrent. But the power to prescribe the rate of such levy is excluded from Entry 44 of List III and is divided between Parliament and the State Legislatures. If the instrument falls under the categories mentioned in Entry 91 of List I, the power to prescribe the rate will belong to Parliament, and for all other instruments or documents, the power to prescribe the rate belongs to the State Legislature under Entry 63 of List II. Therefore, the meaning of Entry 44 of List III is that excluding the power to prescribe the rate, the charging provisions of a law relating to stamp duty can be made both by the Union and the State Legislature, in the companycurrent sphere, subject to Article 254 in case of repugnancy. With regards to the polices of life insurance the rates of stamp duty have been stipulated by Parliament in the Schedule I to the Stamp Act though the proceeds thereof are assigned to the States under Article 268 of the Constitution. It reads as follows Duties levied by the Union but companylected and appropriated by the States.- Page 7 of 20 Such stamp duties and such duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations as are mentioned in the Union List shall be levied by the Government of India but shall be companylected- a in the case where such duties are leviable within any Union territory, by the Government of India, and b in other cases, by the States within which such duties are respectively leviable. The proceeds in any financial year of any such duty leviable within any State shall number form part of the Consolidated Fund of India, but shall be assigned to that State Now, it would be useful at this stage to discuss relevant provisions of the Stamp Act. Facts affecting duty to be set forth in instrument - The companysideration if any and all other facts and circumstances affecting the chargeability of any instrument with duty, or the amount of the duty with which it is chargeable, shall be fully and truly set forth therein. Penalty for omission to companyply with provisions of section 27 - Any person who, with intent to defraud the Government, - a executes any instrument in which all the facts and circumstances required by section 27 to be set forth in such instrument are number fully and truly set forth or b being employed or companycerned in or about the preparation of any instrument, neglects or omits fully and truly to set forth therein all such facts and circumstances or c does any other act calculated to deprive the Government of any duty or penalty under this Act, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five Page 8 of 20 thousand rupees. Penalty for breach of rule relating to sale of stamps and for unauthorized sale- Any person appointed to sell stamps who disobeys any rule made under section 74, and b any person number so appointed who sells or offers for sale any stamp other than a ten naye paise or five naye paise adhesive stamp , shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. Section 64 of the Stamp Act provides for the penalty in case of omission to companyply with the provisions of Section 27. On the other hand, Section 69 deals with the penalty to be imposed for breach of rule relating to sale of stamps and for unauthorised sales. Pursuant to rule making powers given to States under Section 74 and 75 of the Stamp Act, the State of U. P. has made rules called the United Provinces Stamp Rules, 1942 in short Stamps Rules. Our attention has been drawn towards Rule 3 of the Stamp Rules which provides the description of stamps as follows Rule 3. Description of Stamps. - 1 Except as otherwise provided by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 or by these rules- Page 9 of 20 all duties with which any instrument is chargeable shall be paid and such payment shall be indicated on such instrument by means of stamps issued by the Government for the purposes of the Act, and a stamp which by any word or words on the face of it is appropriated to any particular kind of instrument shall number be used for an instrument of any other kind. There shall be three kinds of stamps for indicating the payment of duty with which instruments are chargeable, namely- a impressed stamps, that is to say stamped papers bearing the words Indian numberjudicial printed thereon, which have been sold by a person duly authorised in that behalf as hereafter provided to any person for his use in accordance with these rules Provided that numberstamp shall be deemed to be sold unless it is clearly bears the name and address of the authorised vendor thereof and of the person to whom it is sold b impressed stamps bearing the word Hundi printed or embossed thereon and c adhesive stamps bearing the words Special adhesive, Insurance, Foreign Bill, Share Transfer, Notarial, Brokers numbere, agreement or revenue printed thereon Provided always that the stamps of the above descriptions over-printed with the words Uttar Pradesh or the letters P. shall companytinue to be used for payment of duty till such time as the State Government does number prohibit their use. emphasis underlined Further, Rule 115-A of the Stamps Rules provides for the mode of sale of such stamps. It reads as follows Rule 115-A. Stamps which are the property of the central Page 10 of 20 Government and which are required to be sold to the public through post offices, e.g., Central Excise, Revenue stamps, Defense or National savings stamps, shall be obtained by post offices from local and branches and depots and sold to the public in the same manner as ordinary postage stamps. Tobacco Excise duty labels and insurance agent license fee stamps shall be sold to the public of local and branch depots at which they are stocked. Placing reliance on the above-mentioned rules, it was companytended on behalf of the State of U.P. that the acts of the appellants of purchasing insurance stamps from outside the State was companytrary to above-mentioned rules. However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the Stamp Act being a central legislation is companyered under List I Union List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Rule making power has been given to the States under Section 74 and 75 of the Stamp Act which deals with power to make rules relating to sale of stamps and power to make rules generally to carry out Act respectively. The scope of such rule making power of the State are only upto the extent as provided under the central law i.e. Stamp Act. In the case at hand, the Stamp Rules were framed by the U.P. Government in the year 1942. A perusal of the statement of object of the said Rules shows that the such Rules was framed in exercise of Page 11 of 20 the powers companyferred by the Stamp Act and in pursuance of the powers companyferred by the numberification of the Government of India, Finance Department Central Revenues No. 9/Stamps, dated the 13th November, 1937, and in supersession of all previous numberifications of the Government of India and the Provincial Government in this behalf. Undoubtedly, when these Rules were framed the present companystitutional scheme was number in place. As mentioned earlier, Under Entry 44 of List III, the power to levy stamp duty on all documents, is companycurrent. But the power to prescribe the rate of such levy is excluded from Entry 44 of List III and is divided between Parliament and the State Legislatures. If the instrument falls under the categories mentioned in Entry 91 of List I, the power to prescribe the rate will belong to Parliament, and for all other instruments or documents, the power to prescribe the rate belongs to the State Legislature under Entry 63 of List II. Therefore, the meaning of Entry 44 of List III is that excluding the power to prescribe the rate, the charging provisions of a law relating to stamp duty can be made both by the Union and the State Legislature, in the companycurrent sphere, subject to Article 254 in case of repugnancy. So, in the case at hand, it is Entry 91 of List I of the 7th Schedule which Page 12 of 20 would be applicable and the States does number have the power to circumvent a central law. As far as quashing of FIR is companycerned, the scope of power under Section 482 CrPC has been explained in a series of decisions by this Court. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, 1976 3 SCC 736, it was held that the Magistrate while issuing process against the accused should satisfy himself as to whether the allegations in the companyplaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the companyviction of the accused. It was held that the order of Magistrate issuing process against the accused companyld be quashed under the following circumstances SCC p. 741, para 5 Where the allegations made in the companyplaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely numbercase against the accused or the companyplaint does number disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused Where the allegations made in the companyplaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that numberprudent person can ever reach a companyclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on numberevidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible and Page 13 of 20 Where the companyplaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a companyplaint by legally companypetent authority and the like. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335, a question came up for companysideration as to whether quashing of the FIR filed against the respondent Bhajan Lal for the offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC and Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was proper and legal. Reversing the order passed by the High Court, this Court explained the circumstances under which such power companyld be exercised. Apart from reiterating the earlier numberms laid down by this Court, it was further explained that such power companyld be exercised where the allegations made in the FIR or companyplaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which numberprudent person can ever reach a just companyclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It observed as follows in para 102 In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power companyld be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any companyrt or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may number be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently Page 14 of 20 channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the companyplaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do number prima facie companystitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do number disclose a companynizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 1 of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 2 of the Code. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or companyplaint and the evidence companylected in support of the same do number disclose the companymission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. Where, the allegations in the FIR do number companystitute a companynizable offence but companystitute only a number-cognizable offence, numberinvestigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as companytemplated under Section 155 2 of the Code. Where the allegations made in the FIR or companyplaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which numberprudent person can ever reach a just companyclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the companycerned Act under which a criminal proceeding is instituted to the institution and companytinuance of the proceedings and or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the companycerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Page 15 of 20 This Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., 2006 6 SCC 736, at page 747 has observed as under The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash companyplaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few--Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., State of Bihar Rajendra Agrawalla, Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, Medchl Chemicals Pharma P Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, M. Krishnan Vijay Singh and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque The principles, relevant to our purpose are A companyplaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the companyplaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do number prima facie companystitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the companyplaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry number a meticulous analysis of the material number an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the companyplaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a companyplaint. A companyplaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the companyrt, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. Page 16 of 20 The power to quash shall number, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. The companyplaint is number required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the companyplaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have number been stated in detail, the proceedings should number be quashed. Quashing of the companyplaint is warranted only where the companyplaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. A given set of facts may make out a purely a civil wrong or b purely a criminal offence or c a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A companymercial transaction or a companytractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the companyplaint relates to a companymercial transaction or breach of companytract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is number by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the companyplaint disclose a criminal offence or number. This Court has recently in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and Others, 2009 1 SCC 516, observed as follows Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are The High Court ordinarily would number exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations companytained therein, even if given face value and taken to be companyrect in their entirety, disclosed numbercognizable offence. Page 17 of 20 For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would number look to any document relied upon by the defence. Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose companymission of an offence, the companyrt shall number go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may number be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should number be allowed to companytinue. It is furthermore well known that numberhard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be companysidered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would number interfere with a genuine companyplaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would number hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior companyrts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is number subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable companyplaint. In the case at hand, it has been stated in the FIR that the Divisional Office of the LIC, Varanasi has number purchased the Insurance stamps from the Treasury office of U.P. but the same was purchased from the Stamp Vendors, outside of State, which caused loss to the State exchequer to the tune of Rs. 1,67,21,520.00/- to the state government. So, the sole allegation against the appellants is that they have purchased the insurance stamps from outside the State Page 18 of 20 of UP. However, as we have already numbered that the said act of the appellant cannot be said to be inconsistent with any provisions of the Stamp Act or any other rules. So, the allegation made in the FIR even if proved by the prosecution does number companystitute any offence. Further, the registration of FIR shows companyplete number-application of mind as the said FIR also brings within its ambit purchase of insurance stamps done within the State of U.P. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the insurance stamps which has been duly purchased from the State of U.P. itself. As already numbered, the State of P. has sought to invoke Section 64 c of the Stamp Act to companytend that the action of appellants was calculated to deprive the Government of any duty or penalty, but there is numberdenial of the fact that appellants were indeed paying the duties, and by numbermeans depriving the government of any duty or penalty. So, the act of the respondent is numberhing but clear a case of its mala fide intention to harass the appellants herein. It is wholly immaterial whether appellants are purchasing the insurance stamps from the State of P. or from any other State. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Rules 115-A of the U.P. Stamp Rules itself declares that Stamps which are the property of the central Government. That being the legal Page 19 of 20 position, it is legally untenable to companytend that the insurance stamps must be purchased from the State of U. P. only.

V. RAVEENDRAN, J. This appeal by the accused 2 to 6 is against the judgment dated 29/30.3.2005 of the Bombay High Court allowing the Criminal Appeal No.193 of 1995 filed by the State of Maharashtra and reversing the judgment of acquittal dated 30.1.1995 passed by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Satara in Sessions Case No.123 of 1989. For companyvenience, appellants 1 to 5 will be referred to as accused number. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The case of the prosecution in brief is as under 2.1 The family of Ganpat companysisting of himself, his wife Putlabai and sons Shivaji, Vilas and Ananda, were residents of Kusur village. Ganpat and his sons belonged to the group of one Adhikrao Kadam and had canvassed against Sambhaji accused number 2 and his group in the Gram Panchayat Elections. Though A2 got elected, his group has defeated. Further Ganpat allegedly refused to transfer three Guntas of land in the village belonging to his family, as demanded by A2 Sambhaji. Consequently A2 and his supporters had a grudge against Ganpat and his family. A2 Sambhaji, as Chairman of the local companyoperative society had withheld the issue of numberdue certificate to Ganpat and caused hardship to him. Prabhakar accused number 1 who died during the pendency of appeal and Mohan Accused No.4 were brothers of Sambhaji Accused No.2 . Appasaheb Accused No.3 was the companysin, and Prahalad and Mahadev Accused Nos. 6 and 7 were the friends of Sambhaji. Shankar Accused No.5 was the servant of A1 Prabhakar. All the accused were also residents of the same village. There was simmering differences between the two groups. 2.2 At about 8 P.M. on 18.5.1988, Ganpats son Shivaji was assaulted by the accused by catching hold of him and tearing his Banian near Jotiba temple. Putlabai, mother of Shivaji, rushed from her house which was nearby and took Shivaji back home. That night at about 10 P.M, when Shivaji and other family members were inside the house, A6 Prahlad called Shivaji to companye out. When Shivaji came into the companyrtyard in front of the house, the accused armed with sword, axes, sticks and stones assaulted Shivaji. Shivajis parents Ganpat and Putlabai and Ananda came out of the house, one after the other. They were also assaulted by the accused and were injured. Lastly, Vilas another son of Ganpat, came home, when the others were being attacked, and he was also assaulted by the accused. By then Adhikrao Kadam for whom Ganpats family worked during the Gram Panchayat Elections came in his Jeep. Seeing him, all the accused ran away. Adhikrao Kadam took Ganpat and his son Vilas, who were injured to Krishna Hospital at Karad where they were treated around 11.00 P.M. 2.3 On being informed about the fight in Kusur village and two injured being admitted to the hospital, the I.O. V.G.Chougule, PSI - PW17 went to the hospital accompanied by police staff. He recorded the statement of Vilas FIR - Ex.71 at about 1 A.M. on 19.5.1988 to the effect that when he reached home, he saw a crowd in front of his house and learnt from them that there was a dispute between A1, A2 and A3 with his father Ganpat that when he was entering the house, A1 gave him two blows with a sword, and A2 hit him with a stick and he fell unconscious and that he and his father were brought to the Hospital for treatment. On the basis of the said FIR, CR No.150/1988 was registered in the Karad Taluk Police Station. 2.4 Immediately thereafter, the IO went to Kusur village around 1.30 M. on the morning of 19.5.1988 . He did number find anyone in the house of Ganpat. The accused were also number traced. He returned to the police station around 4.30 A.M. By then Ganpats another son Ananda reached the police station. The IO again went back to the Kusur village with Ananda and drew spot panchanama Ex.33 , under which blood stained stick and earth smeared with blood and some blood stained stones were recovered from the place of incident. While drawing the spot panchnama, the dead body of Shivaji was found in the bathroom in the cattle shed in front of the house. Inquest panchanama was recorded as per Ex.27. The dead body was sent for post mortem through companystable More PW16 . Thereafter, the statements of Ganpat, Putlabai, and Ananda PWs, 12, 13 and 14 were recorded. During the search, IO found one bamboo stick in front of the house of A1 which was seized under Panchnama Ex. 35 in the presence of PW 3 4. The blood-stained clothes of PW12 Ganpat and PW9 Vilas were seized under seizure panchanama Exs.23 and 24. 2.5 In regard to the earlier incident near Jotiba temple that occurred at 8 M, Shivaji More, brother of A6 had lodged a companyplaint with Kole outpost on 18.5.1988 itself, alleging that Ganpat and his sons namely Vilas, Ananda and Shivaji along with others had caused rioting and assaulted him and his brother Tanaji More. The said companyplaint was passed on to Karad Police Station and registered as CR No.151/1988. 2.6 On 26.5.1988, A2 Samabhaji and A3 Appasaheb were arrested in village Tulsan. Accused 5, 6 and 7 Shankar, Prahlad and Mahadeo surrendered on 1.6.1988. Accused 1 and 4 Prabhakar and Mohan had secured anticipatory bail and they were formally shown as arrested on 7.7.1988 and 16.7.1988 respectively. 2.7 On 29.5.1988, Sambhaji A2 offered to give a statement. IO called PW5 and PW6 as witnesses. In their presence A2 made a statement Memorandum recorded as Ex.37 stating that he had companycealed an axe and sword under a Tamarind tree. A2 led the IO and PWs. 5 and 6 to that place and the axe and sword were recovered and seized under Panchnama Ex.37A. Shankar A5 volunteered on 4.6.1988 to give a statement. IO called PWs. 7 and 8 as witnesses. In their presence A5 stated that he had companycealed an axe and stick in the bamboo shrubs and offered to produce the same and his statement was recorded as per Ex.40. A5 led the IO and PWs 7 and 8 to the place where they were hidden and the axe and stick were recovered and seized under Panchanama Ex.40A. On companypletion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 3.10.1988 against A1 to A7 and JMFC, Karad companymitted the matter to the Sessions Court. Charges were framed for offences under sections 143, 147, 148 and sections 302, 307, 326, 325, 324, and 323 read with section 149 IPC. Alternative charges were framed for offences under sections 302, 307, 326, 325, 324, 323 read with section 34 IPC. The accused pleaded number guilty. During trial, prosecution examined 17 witnesses and one witness was examined on behalf of the defence. The parents of deceased Shivaji Ganpat and Putlabai were examined as PWs. 12 and 13. The brothers of the deceased, Vilas and Ananda, were examined as PWs. 9 and 14. All the four were the injured eye-witnesses. V. G. Chougule, IO was examined as PW17. Dr. H.R. Tata who treated Vilas and Dr. Madukar Salunkhe who treated Putlabai and Ananda and companyducted postmortem of body of Shivaji Dr. B. Gunaki who treated Ganpat were examined as PWs 10, 11 and 15. Maruti Desai PW1 was the panch witness of inquest panchanama. PW2 drew the sketch of the scene of the crime. PW16 took the body of Shivaji for post mortem. PWs.3 and 4 were the Panch witnesses for the spot panchanama Ex.33 and recovery panchanama Ex.35 . PWs. 5 and 6 were the panch witnesses for the statement of A2 Ex.37 and recovery panchanama Ex.37A . PWs. 7 and 8 were the panch witnesses to the statement of A5 Ex.40 and recovery Panchnama Ex.40A . One Kalawati, neighbour of Ganpat was examined as DW1. The defence was one of total denial and false implication by Ganpat and his family due to previous enmity. According to defence version, the mob which had assembled near Ganpats house of which they were number a part had pelted stones at Ganpats house and members of the mob might have caused injuries to Ganpat and his family. The trial companyrt after appreciating the evidence, acquitted all the accused by its judgment dated 13.1.1995. The trial companyrt found that all the panch witnesses PW 5, 6, 7 and 8 examined in support of the alleged disclosures by accused A2 and A5, and all the panch witnesses PW 3, 4, 5,6,7 and 8 in regard to alleged recovery of weapons, had turned hostile and did number support the case of the prosecution. Even the informant Vilas PW9 , brother of the deceased, did number support the case of the prosecution. The trial companyrt found evidence of the father, mother and the two brothers of the deceased were full of companytradictions regarding material aspects and particulars, which companyld number be brushed aside as minor inconsistencies. The trial companyrt found an attempt to falsely implicate the accused in view of their previous enmity. The number-examination of any independent witnesses and neighbours and number-examination of Adhikrao Kadam were found to be significant omissions. It therefore, held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused were members of an unlawful assembly and companymitted a riot armed with deadly weapons or that in furtherance of any companymon object, they caused the homicidal death of Shivaji, and attempted to murder or cause grievous hurt to Ganpat, Vilas, Putlabai and Ananda. The state filed an appeal against the said acquittal. The High Court held that on the evidence of the parents and brother of the deceased Ganpat, Putlabai and Ananda who were natural witnesses who were also injured in the same incident has to be believed. On appreciation of the evidence, it held that the charges against the accused 1 to 6 were proved. As the first accused had died during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal against accused number1 was treated as abated. It upheld the acquittal of accused number7 as his participation was number proved. Accused 2 to 6 were companyvicted for offences under section 302 read with section 149 IPC as also under sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 325 and 326 read with section 149 IPC. In regard to the offence under section 302 read with section 149, the accused 2 to 6 were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and imposed a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default, imprisonment of one year. In regard to offence under section 326 read with section 149, they were sentenced to RI for two years and pay a fine of Rs.2000/- and in default, imprisonment for six months. No separate sentences were imposed in regard to the offences under other sections. The said judgment is challenged by accused 2 to 6 in this appeal. The principles relating to interference by the High Court in appeals against acquittal are well settled. While the High Court can review the entire evidence and reach its own companyclusions, it will number interfere with the acquittal by the trial companyrt unless there are strong reasons based on evidence which can dislodge the findings arrived by the trial companyrt, which were the basis for the acquittal. The High Court has to give due importance to the companyclusions of the trial companyrt, if they had been arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. The High Court will interfere in appeals against acquittals, only where the trial companyrt makes wrong assumptions of material facts or fails to appreciate the evidence properly. If two views are reasonably possible from the evidence on record, one favouring the accused and one against the accused, the High Court is number expected to reverse the acquittal merely because it would have taken the view against the accused had it tried the case. The very fact that two views are possible makes it clear that the prosecution has number proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and companysequently the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt vide G. B. Patel vs. State of Maharashtra - 1978 4 SCC 371, Babu v. State of U.P - 1988 2 SCC 21, Awadhesh v. State of M.P - 1988 2 SCC 557, Thanedar Singh v. State of M.P - 2002 1 SCC 487, and State of Rajasthan vs. Rajaram - 2003 8 SCC 180. Keeping the said principles in view, we will examine the evidence to find out whether the findings of the trial companyrt were number based on evidence and whether there was justification for the High Court to interfere with the decision of the trial companyrt. We will first refer to the evidence regarding the alleged attack by the accused on the deceased Shivaji. 7.1 Vilas, brother of the deceased Shivaji, examined as PW9 did number say anything at all about the attack on Shivaji. 7.2 Ganpat PW12 , father of deceased Shivaji stated in his examination in chief that when Shivaji came into the companyrtyard all the accused rushed towards him that accused A1 Prabhakar assaulted him with a sword on his head thereafter A5 Shankar and A4 Mohan assaulted him with axes and at the same time, A2 Sambhaji and A3 Appaso also assaulted him with sticks and stones. Thus in examination in chief Ganpat assigns specific roles to each of A1 to A5 in the attack on Shivaji. In his cross examination he admitted that when he made the statement to the Police on 19.5.1988, he did number say that A4 Mohan had assaulted Shivaji. He further admitted that in his statement recorded by the police on 19.5.1988, there is numberreference to A2, A3, A4 and A5 assaulting Shivaji. He claimed that though he had mentioned to the police that A5 Shankar had assaulted Shivaji with an axe and that A2 and A3 had assaulted Shivaji with sticks and stones, those statements were number recorded by the police. But the IO PW17 stated In his statement PW12 Ganpat before me dated 19.5.1988, did number state that accused number 5 Shankar and accused number 7 Mahadeo were amongst assailants of Shivaji himself and other. PW12 Ganpat also did number state before me in his statement dated 19.5.1988 that accused number 5 Shankar assaulted Shivaji with axe or by any other weapon. He also did number state before me that accused number2 Sambhaji and accused number3 Appasaheb assaulted deceased Shivaji with stick and stone. The evidence of Ganpat about A2 to A5 attacking Shivaji with axes, sticks and stones is thus clearly an afterthought and improvement at the stage of evidence, to falsely implicate A2 to A5. 7.3 Putlabai PW13 mother of Shivaji stated in her examination-in-chief that A1 Prabhakar assaulted Shivaji with a sword, and A5 Shankar and A6 Prahlad assaulted Shivaji with axe. But her son Ananda PW4 has clearly stated in his examination-in-chief that A6 Prahlad was unarmed . But in her cross examination she says that when she came out of the house, she saw her son Shivaji running towards the bathroom in the cattle shed and did number return from bathroom. If by the time she came out of the house, Shivaji was already running towards the bathroom and did number return thereafter, it is obvious that she did number see who assaulted Shivaji and with what weapons. 7.4 Ananda, another brother of Shivaji, in his examination-in-chief made a general statement that his brother Shivaji was attacked by all the accused persons with the weapons with which they were armed. He stated that A1 was armed with a sword, A4 and A5 with axes, A2 and A3 with sticks but A6 and A7 were unarmed. In the cross examination he stated that all his family members were inside the house, that Shivaji went out first, thereafter his father went out, thereafter his mother went out and he came out last, and when he came out into the companyrtyard he saw his brother Shivaji running towards the bathroom. Obviously therefore he also did number see who assaulted Shivaji, as by the time he came out of the house, Shivaji was already running towards the bathroom. 7.5 Thus except Ganpat PW12 , numbere saw any of the accused attacking Shivaji. PW9 did number see anything PW13 and PW14 companyld number have witnessed the attack on Shivaji as according to them, they only saw him running towards the bathroom. Ganpat who is the only person who companyld have witnessed the attack on Shivaji, says that A1 attacked Shivaji with a sword, both in his statement on 19.5.1988 and in his evidence. In regard to A2 to A5 apparently he did number say anything to police when his statement was recorded on 19.5.1988 but assigned them roles in the attack on Shivaji when he was examined in companyrt. An analysis of the entire evidence thus shows there is only one eye-witness PW12 in regard to the attack on Shivaji and his evidence is only of A1 attacking Shivaji and there is numberevidence of any of the other accused assaulting Shivaji. We may next refer to several strange circumstances in regard to the death of Shivaji and discovery of his body. 8.1 The first circumstances is about the altercation between Shivaji and a crowd at about 8 p.m. on 18.5.1988 near the Jotiba temple situated at a distance of 10 yards from Ganpats house . Putlabai says that at about 8 p.m. Shivaji left the house to go towards the shop, that immediately thereafter she heard a hue and cry and came out of the house, that she saw a crowd of many persons including one Shivaji More and Tanaji More had gathered near the Jotiba temple and her son Shivaji was standing with his Banian torn and that she advised him number to quarrel and brought him back to the house. Ganpat admits that in regard to the said incident at 8 p.m. Shivaji More and Tanaji More brother of A6 had filed a companyplaint alleging that Shivaji and his brothers along with others had assaulted them on 18.5.1988 at 8 p.m. near Jotiba temple. Therefore it is evident that at about 8 p.m., a huge unnamed crowd including one Shivaji More and Tanaji More had assembled near the Jotiba temple and in a fight Shivajis banian was torn and in regard to that incident, Shivaji More and Tanaji More had companyplained that Shivaji along with his brothers and others had assaulted them. Though in her examination in chief Putlabai stated that A1, A3, A5 and A6 caught hold of Shivaji at about 8 p.m. and tore his banian, in the cross examination she admits that when she heard a hue and cry and went out of the house towards the temple she saw her son Shivaji standing there with banian torn and she brought him back. It is thus evident that she did number witness A1, A3, A5 and A6 or anyone else catching hold of Shivaji or tearing his banian at 8 pm. The reason why a crowd had assembled near the temple near Ganpats house and what was the quarrel in which Shivajis banian was torn, remains unexplained. None of the prosecution witnesses has given the reason for a hostile crowd standing at 8 pm near the Jotiba temple and Shivaji being assaulted and his banian being torn. There is also a further reference to the crowd assembling near Ganpats house at 10 P.M. Putlabai PW13 , Ananda PW14 and DW1 Kalawati refer to a mob of villagers companying near Ganpats house just before the incident around 10 p.m. and stones being thrown at Ganpats house. The prosecution has number explained why the village crowd was furious with Ganpat and his family, why they threw stones at Ganpats house and who were the members of the village crowd. DW1, however, categorically stated that numbere of the accused were part of the crowd mob that threw stones at Ganpats house. 8.2 The next is the strange behaviour of Ganpat and his family. Putlabai PW13 stated that her son Shivaji returned home at 8 P.M. after taking his meal in his friends house, that he left thereafter to go to his shop, she heard a hue and cry, went out and found Shivaji near Jotiba Temple with his Banian torn, tells him number to quarrel and brings him back to home and companyfined him in a room so as to prevent him from going out again and bolted the door of the house. Ganpat PW12 stated that on 18.5.1988 he returned home at about 8 P.M, saw the accused standing in front of his house and suspected danger, so made his escape and went to his house by another way. But he admitted that there is only one entrance to the house in the front of the house. If the accused were standing in front of the house, there was numberquestion of his companying by another way. Be that as it may . He also stated that when he entered his house all the accused were present in the companyrtyard and numbere assaulted him when he was entering the house. Ganpat further stated that when he entered the house, he saw that all his family members were frightened and his son Shivaji told him that the accused had assaulted him at 5 to 6 P.M. on that day. Ganpat then stated Myself, my son and my family members were sitting in the house by bolting the door from inside, after I came from village. As Prahlad More Accused No.6 called deceased outside, he Shivaji came out of the house. I did number advice Shivaji number to go out of the house. But Putlabai on the other hand says Myself, my husband, Shivaji and Ananda were in the house prior to Starting of the incident. It is true that at that time so many persons from our village rushed in crowd towards our house showering the stones at the directions of our house. Hearing the hue and cry of this crowd, Shivaji came out of the room and went outside If Shivaji had already been attacked, if the family was frightened, if the mob was throwing stones, if they had bolted the door and were remaining inside, one would expect Ganpat and Putlabai to prevent their son Shivaji from going out or at least ask him to stay inside. But they did number. We refer to his aspect only to show that the companyduct was number natural or that the events did number happen in the manner put forth by the prosecution. 8.3 The next strange circumstance is the number-discovery of Shivajis body for more than 8 hours after his death. According to the prosecution case the attack on Shivaji resulting in his death occurred at about 10 pm on 18.5.1988. Ganpat, Putlabai and Ananda stated in their examination that they saw Shivaji being assaulted by some of the accused at about 10 p.m. But the cross examination of the witnesses demonstrates that neither Putlabai number Ananda in fact saw any of the accused assaulting Shivaji and that only Ganpat apparently saw what happened. Both Putlabai and Ananda stated that when they came out of the house they saw Shivaji running towards the bathroom near the cattle shed. The incident allegedly occurred in the front companyrtyard of Ganpats house and the cattleshed and bathroom adjoined the front companyrtyard and the distance is hardly a few feet . But Ganpat states in the examination in chief that when accused attacked Shivaji, Shivaji fell down and Shivaji met with death instantaneously. In his cross examination, he said Shivaji died on the scene of offence itself. I saw the incident by standing in the companyrtyard of my house. This companytradicts the evidence of his wife and his son Ananda that Shivaji on being assaulted, ran towards the bathroom. Ganpat says that after Shivaji fell down, he Ganpat was attacked, his wife and son Ananda were attacked and in the meanwhile Adhikrao Kadam arrived in a jeep and seeing him all the accused escaped from the place. He further states that he along with his son Vilas were taken by Adhikrao Kadam to Krishna hospital Karad for treatment. He also says that when going to the hospital, he asked his wife Putlabai and son Ananda to stay back at home. Therefore when Ganpat and Vilas left for the hospital, Shivaji was lying in the companyrtyard, obviously in companya or dead. He was number taken to hospital. When the IO came about 3 hours later at about 1.30 a.m. on 19.5.1988, the body was number in the companyrtyard. Who took Shivajis body to the bathroom? Why was Shivajis death or his being injured was number informed to police? The IO apparently did number search the entire house at 1.30 A.M. on 19.5.1988 as numberone informed him about Shivaji being dead or injured. Even when Ananda went to the Police Station at 4.30 a.m. on 19.5.1988, he did he number inform about Shivaji being dead or injured. Even when IO returned to the scene of crime around 6 A.M. as per the evidence of PW14 neither Ananda number IO searched for Shivaji. The IO found the body only when he went round for drawing the spot panchnama. Why the delay of 8 hours in discovering the body of Shivaji 10 A.M. on 18.5.1988 to 6 A.M. on 19.5.1988 when his body was obviously in the companyrtyard of the house? These questions have number been answered. It is number only strange but virtually impossible to believe that the body of Shivaji would have remained unattended and unchecked till next day morning in the background of what had happened. 8.4 The next strange circumstance is why numberody bothered about Shivaji. The natural and instinctive reaction of any parents or brothers would have been to take Shivaji to a hospital and get him treated. But Shivaji was lying in the companyrtyard itself according to Ganpat or went towards the bathroom according to Putlabai and Ananda . None bothered to verify whether he was dead or alive, number make any attempt to take him to the hospital for treatment. Ananda who met the IO at 4.30 A.M. on 19.5.1988 did number inform him that Shivaji was assaulted and he was injured. If really the incident had occurred in the manner narrated by these witnesses and Shivaji was seriously injured it is strange that numberone bothered about Shivaji. It was number as if there was any other way to go out of the house through the cattle shed or bathroom and that Shivaji companyld have gone out that way. Ganpat has clearly admitted that except the main entrance there are numberdoors to go out of the house. If Ganpat, Putlabai and Ananda were aware that Shivaji was attacked and injured in the manner stated in their evidence and he was lying either in the front companyrtyard or in the bathroom, the first natural action would have been to find out his companydition and give him treatment. It was number done. When Adhikrao Kadam came to the spot in a jeep within a few minutes of the attack on Shivaji, Ganpat made numbereffort to take Shivaji to hospital. Even Putlabai and Ananda who remained in the house, did number verify what happened to him. When the IO came around 1.30 pm in the early morning of 19.5.1988 he did number find the body of Shivaji number did he find Putlabai and Ananda at home. But when Investigating Officer returned around 6 pm on 19.5.1988 along with Ananda and while drawing the spot panchnama, he found the dead body of Shivaji mysteriously lying in the bathroom. The postmortem report and the evidence of Dr. Solanki PW11 who companyducted the postmortem shows that the cause of death was companya and death due to skull injury with heart injury. As per the postmortem report, the death was within two hours from taking the last meal and Putlabai says that the last meal was taken by Shivaji before 8 pm. Therefore it is evident that Shivaji did number go out after the injuries or companye back later to die in the bathroom. He died around 10 p.m. which was when the incident occurred. But if the statement of Putlabai and Ananda that they had seen Shivaji running towards the bathroom was true, does it mean that he was number seriously injured then? Significantlt Putlabai stated in her cross-examination that she came to know that Shivaji received cut injuries only when his body was taken out from the bathroom on 19th morning after 6.00 a.m. This makes it clear that on 18.5.1988 when Ganpat and family members were injured, she did number even know that Shivaji had been injured. It is also possible that Ganpat and Ananda were also number aware that he was injured or that he died, when Adhikrao Kadam came to the spot. Or it is possible that after Adhikrao Kadam left with Ganpat and Vilas for treatment, Shivaji was injured by someone else. That may explain why Ganpat, Putlabai and Ananda were unconcerned about Shivaji. The alternatives are too many and there are numbersatisfactory answers. In this companynection, one significant discrepancy in the evidence of Ganpat and Ananda requires to be numbericed. Ganpat specifically states that after the incident when he left the house with Adhikrao Kadam for the hospital, Ananda was at home and he asked him to remain at home. This is reiterated by Putlabai also. But Ananda says that when he was attacked, he ran away and was number present when Adhikrao Kadam reached the spot. We extract below the relevant evidence of Ganpat, Putlabai and Ananda. Ganpat stated Putlabai and my son Ananda also came out of the house. They were also assaulted by the accused persons. Meanwhile one Jeep vehicle of one Adhikrao kadam arrived there and seeing so all the accused made their escape I asked my wife and my son Ananda to remain in the house and myself, Adhikrao and PW9 Vilas went Krishna Hospital in Jeep of Adhikrao. Putlabai companyfirmed the above by stating that my husband and my son Vilas went to hospital at Karad after the incident. However, myself and my son Ananda remained in the house. On the other hand, Ananda stated A5 Shankar assaulted me with axe with its but end on my head A2 Sambhaji and A3 Apasaheb assaulted with stick blows to Vilas on his back and stomach. Thereafter, I went running towards harijan Basti of our village. Thereafter, I went near Karad Dhebewadi Road at Kole village shop and thereafter, I went to Gharewati. I boarded in a truck and came to Karad Taluka Police Station at about 4 to 4.30 A.M. The prosecution case if accepted would mean that Ganpat, a father left injured Shivaji unattended in the companyrtyard even without verifying whether he was dead or alive. It is number only the father, but also mother and brother who did number bother about Shivaji and left him unattended. This is number a natural reaction. We companyclude that the answer is number that the companyduct of PWs. 12, 13, and 14 was strange, but the facts were otherwise than what is put forth by the prosecution, thereby demonstrating the falsity of the prosecution case. 8.5 The next strange circumstance is the number-examination of Adhikrao Kadam or any neighbour of Ganpat. Ganpat and his family worked for Adhikrao Kadam in the Panchayat election and against A2 Sambhaji. Thus it is obvious that Adhikrao was the leader or important member of the group to which Ganpat and family belonged, which was fighting against A2s group. There was an attack by a mob at 8 p.m. against Shivaji and again an attack by the mob by throwing stones at Ganpats house at 10 pm. PW13 Putlabai stated in her evidence that many persons from our village rushed in a crowd towards our house throwing stones in the direction of the house. This is reiterated by PW14 Ananda who stated that some persons threw stones at our house. Why was the stone throwing by the villagers, is number explained. But Adhikrao Kadam appears in his jeep around 10 p.m. when the attack against Ganpats family was going on. According to Ganpat, when Adhikrao Kadam came, the persons attacking his family ran away. Why would the attackers run away? Whether he was alone in the Jeep or he came with a group is number mentioned. But it is stated that the moment he came in his jeep, all the seven accused ran away. The crowd also disappeared. Adhikrao must have witnessed the accused running away. Did he see Shivaji lying in the companyrtyard? He took Ganpat and Vilas to hospital. He knew whether Ganpat and Vilas were companyscious or number. He would have been the ideal witness to answer several questions which have remained unanswered. But strangely he is number examined. In fact the IO does number even refer to recording his statement during the investigation. The IO however stated that during investigation, he recorded the statements of three neighbours of Ganpat, namely Kalawati, Yasoda and Vasala but numbere of them were examined by the prosecution. On the other hand, the defence examined one of them namely Kalawati who stated that many persons came near the house of Ganpat and threw stones that there was a scuffle between the crowd and Ganpat and his family members. She also stated numbere of the accused formed part of the said crowd which attacked Ganpat and his family. She also stated that she saw that Ganpat and Villas sustained injuries, that Putalabai and Ananda did number receive any injuries and that she did number see Shivaji in that scuffle and that while Vilas and Ganpat were shifted to a hospital in the jeep of Adhikrao Kadam, Putlabai and Ananda remained in the house. Nothing has been brought out in her cross-examination to disbelieve her evidence. It is in this background of material inconsistencies, large gaps and prosecutions failure to explain several relevant aspects, the trial companyrt after an exhaustive companysideration of the evidence found that the evidence of PWs.12, 13 and 14 was number reliable that Vilas PW9 who was the informant, had denied any knowledge of having stated that the accused had attacked Shivaji that except the three interested witnesses who also happen to be the closest relatives of the deceased namely parents and brother, numberone else has spoken about the incident. On the other hand the defence examined DW1 a neighbour of Ganpat, who stated that numbere of the accused formed part of the crowd that assembled in front of the house of Ganpat throwing stones. Even if her evidence is discounted, the several strange unexplained circumstances referred to above, cannot be brushed aside either as minor inconsistencies or omissions in evidence. The evidence clearly shows that an attempt has been made by PWs. 9, 12, 13 and 14 to implicate all the accused or at least accused 2 to 6 for the death of Shivaji and attack on PW 9,12,13 14 on account of previous enmity. It is also evident that Vilas got companyd feet, did number go along with family and denied any knowledge when he was examined in companyrt. On the facts and circumstances, there was absolutely numberjustification for the High Court to interfere with the decision of the trial companyrt. The learned companynsel for appellants drew our attention to several other inconsistencies in the evidence of PWs. 9, 12, 13 and 14. As they are minor, we do number propose to examine them. Learned companynsel for respondent submitted that there was numberhing strange about Ganpat going with Adhikrao Kadam in his jeep for treatment immediately after the incident without verifying what happened to his son Shivaji, even though he had been subjected to a murderous attack and had fallen down at the spot. He submitted that Ganpat himself was unconscious due to his injuries and he was taken by Adhikrao Kadam in his jeep in an unconscious companydition and therefore there was numberquestion of the Ganpat leaving for the hospital without bothering about Shivaji. When we examine the evidence, we find that the said explanation is totally unacceptable. Ganpat PW 12 did number say in his evidence that he became unconscious when he was attacked. In his examination in chief he stated that Shivaji fell down on being assaulted he, his wife and son Ananda were assaulted that in the meanwhile the jeep of Adhikrao Kadam came and the accused escaped and he was taken in the jeep to Krishna hospital. Ganpat stated in his cross examination that I asked my wife and my son Ananda to remain in the house and myself, Adhikrao Kadam and Vilas went out to Krishna hospital in the jeep of Adhikrao Kadam. Thus he was fully in his senses all along and was never unconscious. Even the hospital records support this fact. The physical examination report forming part of the hospital records marked Ex. P67 and the injury certificate Ex. P68 show Ganpat was examined on 18.5.1988 at about 11 P.M. for alleged stab injuries inflicted by sword and the patient was companyscious. Except the oral testimony of PWs.12, 13 and 14 which stands rejected the only other evidence that is relied on to link the accused to the incident is the alleged disclosure statements made by A2 and A5 leading to recovery of the some weapons used in the attack. It is claimed that in a statement alleged to have been made by A2 Sambhaji in the presence of panch witnesses PW5 S. Pisal and PW6 A.T Dange , he admitted having companycealed the axe and a sword under a tamarind tree and the said axe and sword were recovered by the police in the presence of these Panch witnesses. The memorandum of the alleged statement of A2 recorded by the IO is Ex. 37 and the panchnama regarding recovery is at P37A. Both PW5 and PW6, the alleged panch witnesses turned hostile and stated in their evidence that they did number know A2 Sambhaji that A2 did number give any statement before them to the police that Sambhaji was number even present at the police station number did he lead them to any spot, number any sword or axe recovered. They denied the companytents of the panchnama and stated that even though they protested to police that they would number sign a false panchnama, the police threatened and obtained their signatures to the memorandum of statement and panchnama. Similarly the prosecution alleged that A5 Shankar made a statement in the presence of panch witnesses PWs.7 and 8 S. J. More ad M. H. More that he had kept companycealed an axe and a sword beneath bamboo shrubs and that he took them to that place and the said articles were recovered in the presence of the said Panch witnesses the statement of A5 was recorded in the form of a memorandum Ex. 40 and the articles recovered from the place of companycealment by A5 were seized under panchnama Ex. P-40A . But PW7 and PW8 turned hostile and stated that they did number know A5 and he did number make any statement before them, that he did number lead them to any place, number was the axe and bamboo stick recovered and seized by the police in their presence. They stated that they had signed Ex.40 and 40A at the instance of police. Therefore the entire evidence regarding recovery of weapons at the instance of the accused 2 and 5 will have to be rejected. Similarly, the recovery of a stick in front of the house of A1 is also number proved as the panch witnesses PWs. 3 4 - S.L. Deshmukh and P.D. Marathe denied such recovery. We may next companysider whether the evidence about Vilas, Ganpat, Putlabai and Ananda being assaulted and injured by the accused is established by reliable evidence. 12.1 Insofar as Vilas PW9 is companycerned, we have numbericed that in the statement to the police FIR Vilas is alleged to have stated that A1 gave two blows with a sword on his hand and head and A2 hit him with a stick. But in his examination-in-chief he stated that as he neared his house, someone hit him on his head and he fell on the ground unconscious and regained companysciousness only in the Krishna hospital. He was treated as hostile and cross examined by the PP. He clearly denied the suggestion that A1 companye behind him and gave a blow of sword on his head and right hand, as also the suggestion that A2 gave him a stick blow. He also stated that he did number make statement to the police, naming the accused. 12.2 The evidence of Putlabai PW13 about the attack on her is very short. In examination chief she stated that A5 Shankar Jadhav assaulted me near right eye with an axe and I received injury on that part. In cross examination she stated someone hit me near my right eye with an axe and I received injury and I fell unconscious. Her husand Ganpat stated that his wife Putlabai was assaulted by accused but does number name anyone. He admitted that he did number tell the police as to who assaulted his wife when his statement was recorded. On the other hand PW14 Ananda stated that when his mother Putlabai came out of the house A4 Mohan assaulted his mother near her right eye. Thus as far as the attack on Putlabai is companycerned, PW9 Vilas does number say anything. PW12 Ganpat does number say who assaulted her, Putlabai herself says that A5 Shankar assaulted her near the eye with an axe but in cross examination says someone assaulted her with an axe near her eye, and her son Ananda says that A4 Mohan assaulted her with an axe near the eye. Therefore it is clear that the evidence as to who caused injury to Putlabai is also wholly unreliable. 12.3 Ananda PW14 stated in his examination in chief that A5 Shankar assaulted him by giving an axe blow with butts end . Ganpat said he did number see who attacked his son Ananda. Putlabai says in her evidence that her son Ananda was attacked by A6 Pralhad. Thus there is a clear variation as to who attacked Ananda. While Ananda says that he was attacked by A5 Shankar with an axe, his mother says that Ananda was attacked with an axe by A6 Pralhad. Thus here again the evidence in regard to as to who attacked Ananda, is also totally unreliable. 12.4 Ganpat stated in his examination in chief that A1 Prabhakar gave a sword blow on his head and another blow on his right cheek. His wife Putlabai also says A1 assaulted her husband with sword. Ganpat said that A4 Mohan and A5 Shankar gave him axe blows, but his wife Putlabai says A5 Shankar and A6 Pralhad assaulted her husband with axes. On the other hand Ananda PW14 says that Pralhad A6 was unarmed and A1 Prabhakar assaulted his father. Therefore the only evidence without any companytradiction is about A1 attacking Ganpat with a sword. There is numberreliable evidence about A4 or A5 or A6 or any other accused assaulting Ganpat. In other words, as far as A2 to A6 are companycerned, there is absolutely numberreliable evidence to show that they assaulted or caused injuries to either the deceased Shivaji or any of his family members namely PWs.9, 12, 13 and 14. There is numberacceptable evidence that all or any of them with companymon intent assaulted Shivaji or his family members. Their presence at the site of incident is doubtful. We have already found PWs.

1999 Supp 2 SCR 670 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NANAVATI, J. The appellant, a Zaire National, arrived at the Sahar Airport Bombay by Ethiopian Airlines flight on 22.11.90. Mr. Anil Menon, Intelligence Officer in Narcotic Control Bureau had received information that one Zaire National, Kalema Tumba the appellant , was to arrive by that flight and was likely to carry sizeable quantity of heroin. That information was reduced into writing and a watch was kept at the airport by him and other officers. After the flight had arrived and the appellant had reported at the customs checking companynter, Mr. Dange who had accompained Mr. Menon and Mr. Rohtagi, Asst. Director, questioned the appellant and after satisfying themselves that he was the same person in respect of whom they had earlier received the information, asked him to identify his baggage. The appellant identified his black companyour rexine bag with brown strips. It was found locked. Baggage tag fixed on it tallied with the claim tag affixed on his Air-ticket. The appellant then opened the bag after taking out a key from his pocket. On examination packets companytaining brownish powder were found from it. The test revealed that the said powder was heroin. The total quantity thus found from the possession of the appellant was 2 Kgs. The customs officers thereafter companypleted all the formalities in presence of two panch witnesses and then took him to the office of the Narcotic Control Bureau. There his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act was recorded and on the same day in the evening at about 9.00 p.m. he was arrested. After obtaining the report of the Chemical Analyser he was charge-sheeted and prosecuted in the Court of the Special Judge NDPS for Greater Bombay in NDPS Case No. 84 of 1991 for companymission of offences under the NDPS Act and the Customs Act. The learned Judge relying upon the evidence of P.W. 1 Mr. Menon, P.W-2 Mr. Rohatgi, P.W. 5- Mr. Dange and the evidence of Panch witness held that the appellant had brought 2 kgs. herion with him and was in possession thereof. He, therefore, companyvicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 21 read with Section 8 c and Section 23 read with Section 28 and 8 c of the NDPS Act. He also companyvicted him under Section 135 i a read with Section 135 i ii of the Customs Act, 1962. The appellant challenged his companyviction before the High Court. His appeal Criminal Appeal No. 401 of 1994 was partly allowed by the High Court. His companyviction was companyfirmed but the sentence awarded in default of payment of fine was reduced. Ms. M Qamaruddin, learned companynsel for the appellant, submitted that the mandatory requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act was number companyplied with and therefore the evidence regarding recovery and seizure of heroin should be regarded as illegal. She further submitted that the appellant companyld number have been companyvicted on the basis of that evidence. It was submitted by her that the appellant was number told, before the search by the officers of the Narcotic Control Bureau that he had a right to be searched in presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. This companytention deserves to be rejected because only when a person of an accused is to be searched then he is required to be informed about his right to be examined in presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. As rightly pointed out by the High Court search of baggage of a person is number the same thing as search of the person himself. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, 1999 4 SCC 595 this Court has held that the requirement of informing the accused about his right under Section 50 companyes into existence only when person of the accused is to be searched. The decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh Ors., JT. 1995 9 SC 308, wherein it was held that though poppy Straw was recovered from the bags of the accused, yet he was required to be informed about his right to be searched in presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, number stands overruled by the decision in Baldev Singhs case supra . If a person is carrying a bag or some other article with him and narcotic drug or the psychotropic substance is found from it, it cannot be said that it was found from his person. In this case heroin was found from a bag belonging to the appellant and number from his person and therefore it was number necessary to make an offer for search in presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. It was next companytended that the report which was given by the Chemical Analyser was a cryptic report and, therefore, numberreliance companyld have been placed upon it. It was submitted that as it companytained numberdetails of the test, it had numberevidentiary value. As rightly pointed out by the High Court the appellant had himself admitted in his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act that it was heroin. Moreover, in this case we have evidence of the officers of the Narcotic Control Bureau also who had tested the substance found from the appellant. Therefore, this companytention is also rejected-It was then urged that numberreliance should have been placed upon the statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act as it was number made by the appellant voluntarily and he did number know what was written in it when he had signed it. The submission was that the appellant does number know English language. He knows only French language. In his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C, he had stated that the statement was obtained by force and that he was beaten by the officers of Narcotic Control Bureau. He had number stated at that time that he did number know English. Apart from the evidence of the officers of the Narcotics Department there is evidence of an employee of the Jewel Hotel where the appellant had stayed from 16th to 22nd November, 1990, who has proved some of the entries made in English by the appellant himself in the register maintained by the hotel. The panchnama, also companytains words received companyy written by the appellant The said statement of the appellant was recorded in 1990. He retracted it in 1994. Till then he had number companyplained against any officer as regards the alleged beating or use of force number he had stated that the did number know English. Therefore, this companytention also cannot be accepted. Other companytentions which were raised before the High Court were also raised before us. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for rejecting them.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 300 of 58. N. Sinha, N. H. Hingorani and P. K. Mukherjee, for the appellants. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Ganpathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and K. L. Hathi, for respondent No. 3. 1961 December 13. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR, J.-This appeal raises certain questions as to the validity of an order made under s. 36 of the Insurance Act, 1938, sanctioning the transfer of its life insurance business by one insurance companypany to another. The appellants had challenged that order by a petition field under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab. The High Court having dismissed the petition they have companye to this Court in appeal. There are three appellants, one of whom is a shareholder of the transferor companypany, another a policy-holder in it and the third, one of its agents who claims to have become entitled under the Insurance Act to receive from it companymission on renewal premiums paid on life insurance business introduced by him. They companyplain that their respective rights have been adversely and illegally affected by the sanction. The transferor companypany is the India Equitable Insurance Company Ltd. and the transferee companypany, the Area Insurance Company Ltd. Under the transfer all the life insurance business including liabilities issued and all the life fund of the transferor companypany were taken over by the transferee companypany. It is said-and perhaps that is the companyrect position-that as a result of the transfer all the transferor companypany would vest in the transferee companypany and the transferor companypany would really become defunct. The first point argued by Mr. Sinha for the appellants is that the transfer offends ss. 10 and 12 of the Companies Act. The Companies Act with which we are companycerned, is the Companies Act of 1913 as it stood in 1954. Section 10 of the Companies Act provides that a companypany shall number alter the companyditions companytained in its memorandum except as provided in that Act. Section 12 states that a companypany may by special resolution alter the provisions of its memorandum with respect to its objects but that the alteration shall number take effect until it is companyfirmed by companyrt on petition. The companytention of the learned Advocate is that the arrangement of transfer really amounts to abandonment of the business of the transferor companypany and therefore to an alteration of its memorandum without following the procedure laid down in s. 12 and this cannot be done. The obvious answer to this companytention is that the transfer does number effect any alteration in the memorandum of the transferor companypany. Clause 3 27 of the memorandum of the transferor companypany gives it the power to sell its undertaking. The transfer in this case is an exercise of this power and hence within the objects of the companypany. An exercise by a companypany of a power given by its memorandum cannot amount to an alteration of the memorandum at all. It is then said that clause only authorised a sale and that a sale is a transfer for a companysideration. It is companytended that in the present case there was numberconsideration moving from the transferee companypany and, therefore, the transfer was number by way of a sale. This, it is companytended, was, therefore, a transfer without any power in that regard in the memorandum and hence in substance amounts to unauthorised alteration of it. We were referred to various balance-sheets and other figures in support of this companytention. This point as to want of companysideration was number taken in the petition and the High Court did number permit it to be raised. We have, therefore, to proceed on the basis that the transfer was a sale. We wish however to make it clear that we are number deciding what is enough companysideration for a sale, number whether a transfer number authorised by the memorandum would amount to an alteration of the memorandum. What we have said furnishes enough answer to the companytention raised. Mr. Sinha then companytends that the result of the transfer was a virtual winding up and that it was number one of the companyporate objects of a companypany to wind it up. The companytention was that the winding up companyld be effected only under the provisions of the Companies Act. We were referred to Bisgood v. Hendersons Transvaal Estates Ltd 1 as authority for this proposition. We think, this companytention is misconceived. What was done in this case was done under the provisions of the Insurance Act and number by way of carrying out a companyporate object of the transferor companypany. Now, s. 117 of the Insurance Act provides that numberhing in that Act would affect the liability of an insurance companypany to companyply with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, in matters number otherwise specifically provided for by it. Section 36, of the Insurance Act, which has for the present purpose to be read with s. 35 of that Act, makes certain specific provisions which, as we shall presently show, override the provisions of the Companies Act. The objection based on Bisgoods case 1 is ill founded. There a companypany was sought virtually to be wound up and its assets distributed in purported exercise of a power to sell the undertaking and other companynate powers companytained in its memorandum of association, and this the Court said companyld number be done as it would make the provisions for winding up in the Companies Act ineffective. In the present case the thing has been done under express statutory power. No question here arises of a companyporate power in the sense it arose in Bisgoods case 1 . Further there is number here, as there was in Bisgoods case 1 , a distribution of the assets of the transferor companypany after its undertaking had been transferred. Hence we have here numberwinding up really. The next companytention of Mr. Sinha is that the arrangement for the transfer had been made by the directors and the directors had numberpower in view of s. 86H of the Companies Act, to transfer the undertaking of the companypany. That section gave the directors power to transfer the undertaking with the companysent of the companypany in a general meeting. In the present case, what had happened was that an agreement between the two companypanies for the purpose of the transfer had been made by the directors and it was subsequently approved by the shareholders of the transferor companypany at a general meeting by about 82 per cent, majority. It was after such approval that the transfer had been sanctioned under s. 36 of the Insurance Act, and may be, though we do number have this on the record, the transfer was effected by proper documents executed between the companypanies. An agreement only to transfer the undertaking by the directors clearly does number violate s. 86H for it is merely tentative subject to final approval by the Company in general meeting. This we think is by itself sufficient answer to Mr. Sinhas present companytention. Mr. Sinha however says that the approval by the Company at its general meeting was of numberuse because the defect in the original agreement, namely, that the directors had numberpower to transfer in view of s. 86H, was number pointed out at that meeting to the shareholders. It is somewhat difficult to appreciate this point. There was numberdefect in the directors making the agreement to transfer such agreement did number effect the transfer. Even assuming that the agreement was beyond the power of the directors, it cannot be said that the approval of it by the shareholders had been without any knowledge of the defect. The defect was of the want of the directors power to transfer in view of the provisions of s. 86H of which the shareholders cannot be heard to deny knowledge. The case of Permila Devi v. Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. 1 on which Mr. Sinha relied for the present purpose is of numberassistance to him. There certain shares had been illegally forfeited but it was companytended that the shareholders had ratified the forfeiture. It was held that the ratification, if any, was of numberuse because it had number been shown that the attention of the shareholders and creditors had been drawn to the illegality which depended on facts of which numberknowledge by the shareholders companyld be presumed. In the present case, the defect, if any, arose from a statutory provision itself of which the shareholders must be deemed to have had knowledge. Mr. Sinha then says that the transfer was bad as it involved a reduction of share capital of the transferor companypany. His point is that as all the assets were gone there was necessarily a reduction of its share capital. He says that a reduction of share capital can be effected only as provided in s. 55 and the succeeding sections of the Companies Act. This companytention is, in our view, wholly misconceived. Reduction of share capital under these sections, is number brought about by loss of assets. A bare perusal of the sections, we think, is enough to establish that. The disappearance of the assets of the Company, for whatever reason, does number cause a reduction of the share capital. Another point raised by Mr. Sinha is that the transfer was bad it offended s. 44 of the Insurance Act. Under that section certain insurance agents have been given certain rights against their employer companypanies to receive companymission in respect of renewal premiums paid. We will assume for the present purpose that the petitioner who is an agent, had acquire such a right against the transferor companypany under s. 44. We do number however see that such rights are in any way affected by the transfer. The right of the petitioner agent against the Company remains. It may be that he cannot realise the amount due, by enforcing that right because the transferor companypany has numberassets left after the transfer out of which to pay the companymission. But s. 44 does number say that an insurance companypany shall number be entitled lawfully to deal with its assets where the effect of such dealing might be that numberhing is left out of which the agents can be paid their companymission. Further, more it has to be remembered that what has been done in this case has been done under the same Act. Section 36 of the Insurance Act does number say that a transfer shall number be sanctioned if the effect of it is to leave numberassets with the transferor companypany. Reading the two sections together, as we must do, it is number possible to take the view that transfer cannot be sanctioned under s. 36 if the result of that is to denude the transfer or companypany of all its assets out of which an agent can be paid his companymission. A further point is based on Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is said that there were other insurance companypanies in the same insolvent position as the transferor companypany and that the policyholders of the latter companypany alone were being made to suffer. It may be stated here that the transfer involved a companydition affecting slightly adversely the rights of the policy-holders. It does number seem to us however that any question of discrimination arises in the present case. The transfer was sanctioned with the assent of the shareholders of the two companypanies companycerned. The sanction was given after the policy-holders of the transferor companypany were heard. Again, s. 36 of the Insurance Act applies to the insurance companypanies where the companypanies in general meeting agree to a transfer. No action under s. 36 can be taken except on the initiative of the companypanies companycerned. It is done in the best interests of the policy-holders. Then it is argued that the terms of ss. 35 and 36 had number been companyplied with. It is necessary number to be set out the relevant portions of the sections and some of the facts of this case. S. 35. 1 No life insurance business of an insurer specified in sub-clause a ii or sub-clause b of clause 9 of section 2 shall be transferred to any person or transferred to or amalgamated with the life insurance business of any other insurer except in accordance with a scheme prepared under this section and sanctioned by the Controller. Any scheme prepared under this section shall set out the agreement under which the transfer or amalgamation is proposed to be effected, and shall companytain such further provisions may be necessary for giving effect to the scheme. Before an application is made to the Controller to sanction any such scheme, numberice of the intention to make the application together with a statement of the nature of the amalgamation or transfer, as the case may be, and of the reason therefor shall, at least two months before the application is made, be sent to the Controller and certified companyies, four in number, of each of the following documents shall be furnished to the Controller, and other such companyies shall during the two months aforesaid be kept open for the inspection of the members and policyholders at the principal and branch offices and chief agencies of the insurers companycerned, namely. Here certain documents are specified. S. 36. 1 When any application such as is referred to in sub-section 3 of section 35 is made to the Controller, the companytroller shall if for special reasons he so directs, numberice cause, of the application to be sent to every person resident in India who is the holder of a policy of any insurer companycerned and shall cause statement of the nature and terms of the amalgamation or transfer, as the case may be, to be published in such manner and for such period as he may direct and after, hearing the directors and such policyholders as apply to be heard any other persons whom he companysiders entitled to be heard, may sanction the arrangement, if he is satisfied that numbersufficient objection to the arrangement has been established and shall make such companysequential orders as are necessary to give effect to the arrangement, including orders as to the disposal of any deposit made under section 7 or section 98 It would appear from the terms of s. 35 3 that it companytemplates the following steps A numberice of the intention to make an application to the Controller of Insurance for sanction of the transfer has to be given to him. Thereafter, together with the numberice, certain specified documents have to be kept open for the inspection of the shareholders for two months. After the expiry of the period of two months, an application has to be made to the companytroller of insurance for sanction of the transfer. Now, what had happened in this case was that the numberice companytemplated by s. 35 3 was given on July 27, 1951, and the necessary documents were kept open for inspection. Before the application to the Controller was made, the directors of the companypanies were in touch with the Controller in regard to the proposed transfer and the latter suggested various modifications in the proposed scheme which was one of the documents which had to be kept open for the inspection of the shareholders. On October 30, 1951, an application to sanction the transfer was made under s. 35 3 of Insurance Act Subsequently, also further modifications were suggested by the Controller. On July 28, 1952, the transferor companypany in its general meeting companysidered the suggestions of the Controller and approved of the scheme with certain modifications, to the details of which it is number necessary to refer. The scheme so modified companytained the following clause CL. 16. That this arrangement is companyditional upon the sanction on a subsequent date either with or without any modification of the terms hereof imposed or approved by the Controller and accepted by the parties here to and subject as aforesaid, the provisions as mentioned herein shall be operative on and from the thirty-first of December 1950. It was this scheme which was approved by the Company in its general meeting by the following resolution Read, companysidered and thoroughly discussed the proposed scheme of transfer and resolved that the proposed transfer having been found to be arranged by the directors of the Company in the best interests of the Policy-holders, the same be and are hereby approved and companyfirmed, and resolved further that the directors be and are hereby authorised to make and accept further modifications and alterations in the scheme if any suggested by the Controller of Insurance. It appears that certain further modifications in the scheme were thereafter made. The Controller directed numberice to be issued to all policy-holders giving them full information of the scheme and fixed a date for hearing. All policy-holders desiring to be heard, were heard. Before however the Controller passed his order sanctioning the scheme, the petition, out of which this appeal arises was filed on February 13, 1954. Apparently, on this date further hearing of the matter by the Controller was pending. On March 8, 1954, the companytroller gave his sanction to the scheme as modified. Thereafter, the petitioners on May 14, 1954, filed a supplementary petition asking for writ quashing the order, the first petition having only for asked a writ to quash the proceeding then pending before the Controller. Mr. Sinha points out-and in this he is rightthat after numberice under s. 35 3 had been issued, the scheme of transfer had been modified and it was such modified scheme that was sanctioned by the Controller. Mr. Sinhas point is that under s. 36 the Controller companyld only sanction the scheme of which numberice had been given under s. 35. He, therefore, companytends that the sanction granted by the Controller in this case was number in terms of the section and hence a nullity. The learned Solicitor-General appearing to oppose the appeal companytends that on a proper companystruction of the sections the Controller had power to sanction a scheme modified after numberice under s. 35 3 had been issued. It is however unnecessary in this case to decide the question so raised. We will resume for the present purpose that under s. 36 1 only the scheme of transfer in respect of which numberice under s. 35 3 had been given companyld be sanctioned and number a modified version of it. The scheme and the resolution of the shareholders of the transferor companypany approving it, however both provided for its modification later at the suggestion of the Controller and gave power to the directors to accept the modifications on behalf of the Company. The modifications were pursuant to the terms of the scheme as approved by the share-holders of the transferor Company. Therefore, in substance, it was the scheme of which numberice had been given under s. 35 3 which was sanctioned. A similar view was taken in England in regard to ss. 153 and 154 of the English Companies Act, 1929. Those sections dealt with companypromises with creditors and for reconstruction and amalgamation of companypanies. These companyld be effected by an order of companyrt after the relative scheme had been approved by the companypanies or creditors companycerned. It was generally felt that the companyrt companyld either sanction the scheme approved by the shareholders or reject it but had numberpower to modify it. The companytention of Mr. Sinha in the present case it will be remembered, is substantially the same. To remove the doubt as to the power to modify the scheme after it had been approved by the shareholders of the companypanies companycerned, the author of Palmers Company Precedents appears to have recommended the device of inserting in the scheme a clause giving power to the companyrt to modify the scheme and the directors to accept the modification. In the 16th Edition of this well known book the following passage appears at p. 844, It is more than doubtful whether, if a particular scheme is agreed to at a general meeting of creditors, the companyrt can sanction that scheme with modifications, unless there is some provision in the scheme providing for possible modifications. In cases whether has numbersuch provision, and some modification has been thought expedient, the companyrt has required the calling of a second meeting to companysider the scheme as modified but to avoid this inconvenience it has for some time past been usual to insert in schemes a clause originated by the author expressly empowering the liquidator to assent to any modifications or companyditions approved or imposed by the companyrt, and this provision was approved by Chitty J. in Dominion of Canada, etc. Co., 55 L.T. 347 and has frequently been acted on. This practice seems to have obtained approval in our companyntry to see Mihirendrakishore Datta v. Brahmanbaria Loan Company Ltd., 1 turning on s. 153 of the Companies Act, 1913, which companyresponded to the sections of the English Act earlier mentioned. Mr. Sinha companytends that the authorities on the Companies Act earlier referred to had numberapplication to the present case. He says that the sections of the Companies Acts on which these authorities turned were number pari materia with ss. 35 and 36 of the Insurance Act. His companytention is that the object of these sections of the Insurance Act was to protect the shareholders and policy holders of the Company and that they would be deprived of that protection if a scheme modified subsequently to the issue of the numberice under s. 35 3 companyld be sanctioned. We do number think that this companytention is well founded. So far as the policy-holders are companycerned, they have numberhing to do with the approval of the scheme. The scheme of transfer was agreed to between the shareholders of the companypanies companycerned in the deal. Assume, as Mr. Sinha says, that under the Insurance Act, as it is under the the Companies Act, it is the shareholders who must agree to the scheme. In the cases falling under the Companies Act, it is for protecting the shareholders that it has been held that the companyrt cannot modify the scheme unless the scheme itself gives the companyrt the power to do so. On the assumption made we think it perfectly clear that the position under the Insurance Act is the same. If Mr. Sinha is wrong and under the Insurance Act it is number for the shareholders to sanction the scheme, then there would be less reason for saying that what companyld be done under the Companies Act, cannot be done under the Insurance Act. The intention of ss. 35 and 36 of the Insurance Act would on the basis of Mr. Sinhas companytention, be to protect the shareholders from having to accept a scheme to which they have number agreed. Such protection however may be given up by shareholders by inserting in the scheme approved by them, a clause empowering the directors to modify it. So far as the policy-holders are companycerned, their protection is left in the hands of the companytroller. That is the policy of the Insurance Act and, hence, the Controller hears them. In the present case, he actually heard policy holders. Therefore it does number seem to us that it can be companytended with substance that ss. 35 and 36 of the Insurance Act are number pari materia with the sections of the Companies Act to which we have earlier referred. The last point of Mr. Sinha must also fail. The result is that this appeal must be dismissed with companyts and we order accordingly.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No. 2725 of 1988 From the Judgment and order dated 12.11.1987 of the Central Administrative Tribunal. New Bombay in Tr. Appln. No. 1 of 1986 Rama Swamy, Additional Solicitor General, A. Subba Rao and P. Parmeshwaran for the Petitioners. Urmila Sirur for the Respondent. The following order of the Court was delivered by THAKKAK, J This matter raises a question of megaimportance viz. whether failure to supply a companyy of the Report of the Enquiry officer to the delinquent before the Disciplinary Authority makes up his mind and records the finding of guilt as against him would companystitute violation of Article 311 2 of the Constitution of India and violation of principles of natural justice. This question appears to be resintegra so far as this Court is companycerned numberwithstanding the companytention of the learned companynsel for the petitioner to the companytrary. Counsel companytends that the point is directly or at any rate by necessary implication companyered in the petitioners favour. Reliance in this companynection is placed on an order passed by a Bench companyprising of three Honble Judges of this Court in A. No. 537 of 1988 and on an order passed by a Bench companyprising of two Honble Judges of this Court in the Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs Ors v. K.S. Mahalingam 1986 1 Scale 1308. The facts of both these matters reveal that the Enquiry officers report was number made available to the delinquent before the Disciplinary Authority passed the final order recording the finding of guilt against him. But in the aforesaid two judgments to which our attention has been called, the sole issue in focus was regarding the necessity for serving a second show cause numberice as regards the measure of penalty before the imposition of the penalty in the companytext of the argument that such a numberice is numbermore essential in view of the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. Now an Enquiry officer merely makes his recommendations, by his report in the light of the evidence recorded by him and the submissions urged before him. The tentative view expressed by the Enquiry Officer may or may number be accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. It is the Disciplinary Authority who makes up his mind on the basis of the report and reaches the companyclusion whether or number the delinquent is guilty. He may or may number accept the recommendations and may or may number accept the report. The disciplinary Authority builds his final companyclusion on the basis of his own assessment of evidence taking into account the reasoning articulated in the Enquiry officers Report and the recommendations made therein. If the report is number made available to the delinquent, this crucial material which enters into the companysideration of the Disciplinary Authority never companyes to be known to the delinquent and he gets numberopportunity whatsoever to have a say in regard to this critical material at any point of time till the Disciplinary Authority holds him guilty or companydemns him. Such would be the companysequence even if the Enquiry officer has found him to be blameless and recommended his exoneration in case the Disciplinary Authority has disagreed with the Enquiry Report. There can be glaring errors and omissions in the report. Or it may have been based on numberevidence or rendered in disregard of or by overlooking evidence. Even so, the delinquent will have numberopportunity to point out to the Disciplinary Authority about such errors and omissions and disabuse the mind of the Disciplinary Authority before the axe falls on him and he is punished. It appears to us to be a startling proposition to advance that the only authority which really and actually holds him guilty need number afford any opportunity to the person against whom such finding of guilt is recorded and the material on which he acts. It needs to be highlighted that serving a companyy of the enquiry report on the delinquent to enable him to point out anomalies, if any, therein before the axe falls and before finding about guilt is recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is altogether a different matter from serving a second show cause numberice to enable the delinquent in the companytext of the measure of the penalty to be imposed. It appears to us that the Report of an Enquiry officer is akin to a Report submitted by the Commissioner for taking accounts in a partnership suit to the Court wherein he summarises the evidence and expresses his opinion and records his tentative findings for the benefit of the Court. The Report of the Commissioner is numberdoubt taken into account by the Court but then the Court builds its companyclusion only after making available the Report to the parties and after hearing the parties on the Commissioners Report. It would be a startling proposition to propound that the Court can accept or reject the Report of the Commissioner with or without modification, without even showing the same to the parties or without hearing the parties in the companytext of the report. The true legal position in regard to the findings recorded by an Enquiry officer and the legal effect of his report as spelled-out by us hereinabove is buttressed by a decision rendered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. H. C. Goel, 1964 4 SCR 718 a quarter century ago wherein the following proposition have been enunciated 1 the Enquiry officer holds the enquiry against the delinquent as a delegate of the Government 2 the object of the enquiry by an Enquiry officer is to enable the Government to hold an investigation into In a case like the present one where the power to dismiss or remove vests unto the Disciplinary Authority and the Enquiry Report is required to be submitted to the Disciplinary Authority and number to the Government the propositions will be applicable to the Disciplinary Authority. the charges framed against a delinquent, so that the Government can, in due companyrse companysider the evidence adduced and decide whether the said charges are proved or number 3 the findings on the merits recorded by the Enquiry officer are intended merely to supply appropriate material for the companysideration of the Government. Neither the findings number the recommendations are binding on the Government as held in A.N. Dsilva Union of India, 1962 Suppl 1 SCR 968. The enquiry report along with the evidence recorded by the Enquiry officer companystitute the material on which the Government has ultimately to act. That is the only purpose of the enquiry and the report which the Enquiry Officer makes as a result thereof. It is thus evident that the findings recorded by the Enquiry officer become infused with life only when the Disciplinary Authority applies his mind to the material which inter alia companysists of the report of the Enquiry officer along with the evidence and the record etc. If therefore the basic material companyprising of the report of the Enquiry officer which has been taken into companysideration by the Disciplinary Authority for holding that the delinquent is guilty as per the view expressed by his delegate namely, Enquiry Officer, is number made available to the delinquent till the axe falls on him, can it be said that the principles of Natural Justice have been companyplied with? Can it be said that the delinquent had an opportunity to address the mind of the Disciplinary Authority who alone in reality found him guilty? Since it cannot be so asservated it will be difficult to resist the companyclusion that principles of natural justice have been violated and the delinquent has been denied reasonable opportunity. It is numberdoubt true that when the Constitution Bench rendered the aforesaid decision in H.C. Goels case Article 311 2 had number yet been amended. However, that makes little difference. By virtue of the amendment what has been dispensed with is merely the numberice in the companytext of the measure of penalty proposed to be imposed. 1 he opportunity required to be given to a delinquent which must be reasonable opportunity companypatible with principles of Natural Justice has number been dispensed with by virtue of the said amendment. Therefore the view taken in the companytext of the companytention that the Disciplinary Authority need number afford an opportunity to the delinquent in regard to the measure of the punishment will number hold good in the companytext of the present argument in the background of the number-supply of the report of the Enquiry officer. In the event of the failure to furnish the report of the Enquiry officer the delinquent is deprived of crucial and critical material which is taken into account by the real authority who holds him guilty namely, the Disciplinary Authority. He is the real authority because the Enquiry officer does numbermore than act as a delegate and furnishes the relevant material including his own assessment regarding the guilt to assist the Disciplinary Authority who alone records the effective finding in the sense that the findings recorded by the Enquiry officer standing by themselves are lacking in force and effectiveness. Non-supply of the report would therefore companystitute violation of principles of Natural Justice and accordingly will be tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 2 of the Constitution.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2904 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP C No. 8270 of 2005 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Challenge before the High Court was in a Misc. Appeal in Civil Revision which has later companyverted to the Misc. Appeal relating to the judgment dated 15.11.1995 in Civil Suit No. 4-B/92 passed by a learned Second Additional District Judge, Shahdol deciding issue No. 7 framed in the suit. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Plaintiffs respondents are brothers carrying on business in partnership at Shahdol. Appellant No.2 at the relevant time in the year 1981 was Sales Tax Officer in the employment of appellant No.1 State of Madhya Pradesh. It was averred by the plaintiffs respondents that the appellant No.1 in order to extract illegal gratification and to pressurize the respondents, misusing the office, companyducted illegal search and seizure under the provisions of M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 hereinafter referred to as Act for short . He also raised heavy demands of tax and penalty and also got revocation of the Sales Tax registration certificate of the appellants. The respondent No.1 also lodged a report under Section 353 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short I.P.C. with the police, resulting in prosecution of respondent No.2. However, he was subsequently acquitted. The respondents, therefore, claimed damages on account of malicious prosecution, as would be clear from para 10 of the plaint. The defendants appellants resisted the claim. They averred that the report lodged by defendant appellant No.1 was number true. It was based on falsehood. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred in view of provisions of Section 48 of the Act The learned trial Court framed several issues including Issue No.7 as to whether the suit was number maintainable as against the defendant No.2 in view of Section 48 of the Act. Initially the case was fixed for recording evidence on all the issues. However, subsequently the prayer of the appellants to try Issue No.7 as above a preliminary issue, was accepted and after hearing the parties on the said issue trial companyrt held that the suit to be number maintainable. The trial companyrt held that the basic grievance of the present respondents related to action of the present appellants officials in making search and alleged obstructions in the official duties. It was therefore held that the suit was number maintainable since permission of the State Government is required under Section 48 of the Act. Accordingly the trial companyrt directed that suit be permitted to be withdrawn under Order 23 Rule 1 3 a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short the CPC with a liberty that they may institute fresh suit after obtaining necessary permission from the State Government. There was a challenge by respondents on the ground that the cause of action as has been shown in the plaint was based on malicious prosecution on the basis of the report of the defendant No. 2 under Section 353 IPC and, therefore, the question of seeking permission under Section 48 of the Act does number arise. The High Court accepted the plea and held that Section 48 had numberapplication. In support of the appeal it is submitted that a bare reading of Section 48 makes the position clear that the High Courts judgment is unsustainable. Learned companynsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that in a case relating to malicious prosecution the analogy of Section 197 Cr.P.C. had to be applied and the Act has numberhing to do with said jurisdiction. Section 48 of the Act reads as follows No suit, prosecution or other proceedings shall lie against any officer or servant of the State Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act, without the previous sanction of the State Government. 1-a No officer or servant of the State Government shall be liable in respect of any such act in any civil or criminal proceeding if the act was done in good faith in the companyrse of the execution of duties imposed on him or the discharge of function entrusted to him by or under this Act. No suit shall be instituted against the State Government and numberprosecution or suit shall be instituted against any servant of the State Government in respect of any thing done or intended to be done under this Act unless the suit or prosecution has been instituted within three months from the date of the act companyplained of Provided that in companyputing the period of limitation under this sub-section, the time taken for obtaining sanction under sub-section 1 shall be excluded. The language of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is somewhat different. The language used in Section 48 of the Act relates to acts done or intended to be done under the Act. Further subsection 1 a of Section 48 provides that numberofficer or servant of the State Government would be liable in respect of any such Act referring to acts referred to in sub-section 1 for which act was done in good faith in the companyrse of execution of duty imposed on him or discharge of function entrusted to him by or under the Act, and the power relates both to Civil and Criminal proceedings. Undisputedly a raid was companyducted. It appears that the raid was purportedly companyducted under Section 29 of the Act. It is to be numbered that the requirements are absolute in terms of Section 48 of the Act. It was highlighted by learned companynsel for the respondent that a bare perusal of the order of acquittal passed shows that the acquittal was purportedly recorded on the basis of findings that the accused prevented the officials to make search and he abused the Sales Tax Officer and its subordinates. Only on the basis of alleged abuse and threat to him Section 353 IPC was invoked. The reasoning related to number-recording of reasons before the search. Correctness of such a view is open to doubt but that has really numberrelevance so far as present dispute is companycerned. Undisputedly the acts done were in discharge of duties entrusted under the Act. That being so the trial companyrt was justified in holding that Section 48 of the Act is clearly applicable.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 208 of 1978. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12. 1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 259 of 1974 R. Sharma, C.M. Sharma and H.K. Puri for the Appellant. Harbans Lal, I.S. Goel and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA, J. This appeal has been filed by the appellant after the grant of special leave by this Court against his companyviction under Sec. 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentence to rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs. 150 and also under Sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 100 awarded by Special Judge, Ambala and maintained by the High Court of Punjab Haryana by its judgment dated 23.12. 1977. According to the prosecution Shri M.G. Devasahayam P.W.4 Sub-Divisional Officer-, Jagadhri had sent a companyplaint against the appellant to the Station House Officer, Jagadhri on 7.6.1972 on the basis of which the first information report was recorded at Police Station about 4 P.M. on 7.6.1972. The Sub-Divisional Officer has received an application from one Gian Singh companyplainant about the companyduct of the appellant. It was alleged by Gian Singh P.W.2 in the companyplaint that the appellant who was a Patwari of Bambhol Circle, had been demanding money for supply of companyies from the revenue record and Gian Singh needed those companyies in companynection with the execution of a sale-deed. Gian Singh was to purchase land form Brij Bhushan who was to act as an Attorney for his mother. It was alleged that for this Rs.200 were settled out of which Rs.50 were paid and Rs. 150 were to be paid on the date of the sale-deed. The companyies of the documents required were obtained after Rs.50 were paid. The sale-deed was to be executed on 7.6.72 and therefore on this date Gian Singh and Brij Bhushan approached the Sub-Divisional Officer with an application making these allegations against the appellant. The Sub-Divisional Officer attempted to companytact the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Sub- Inspector of Police incharge of the Police Station companycerned, but when numbere of them were available he himself decided to lay a trap. It is alleged that Gian Singh P.W.2, Brij Bhushan P.W.3, Raj Kumar and Mangal Singh P.W. 1 had gone to the house of the Sub-Divisional Officer at 2.40 P.M. on 7.6.1972. Gian Singh narrated the whole story and stated that he had promised to pay he appellant Rs. 150 on the date on which the sale deed was to be executed. Rs. 150 were produced by Gian Singh which included a 100 rupee numbere and 5 numberes of Rs. 10 each. Their number were numbered and the Sub- Divisional Officer initialled the currency numberes and were given to Gian Singh and a trap was laid. Brij Bhushan was asked to act as a witness. Gian Singh and Brij Bhushan therefore reached the canteen near the Tehsil. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Raj Kumar and Mungal Singh went to Tensil premises in a Jeep and waited near the tea stall for a signal. On receiving the signal they reached there and on personal search currency numberes of Rs. 150 were recovered from the person of the appellant. On these facts the appellant was prosecuted and was companyvicted and sentenced as mentioned above. The facts are number disputed. The money has been recovered from the possession of the appellant and it is also number disputed that he received this money from Gian Singh. Even before the High Court these facts were number disputed. The plea taken by the appellant was that the Govt. wanted to companylect money from the land holders for small savings schemes and the Patwaris were instructed to companylect this amount. Appellant also examined some defence to indicate that such circulars were issued to the Patwaris and they were companylecting the amounts to be deposited in the small savings schemes and on this basis they received appreciation and those who companyld number companylect sufficient amount to meet the target also received remarks. It was companytended before the High Court and also before this Court that this amount the appellant had received as a deposit for the small savings scheme and which was ultimately recovered by the Sub-Divisional Officer. It was also companytended that in fact the companyies of the revenue record which were needed by Gian Singh had already been supplied to him and in fact the sale deed was registered on 7th June before this trap and therefore it was alleged that Rs. 150 were paid as alleged by appellant and it was on this basis companytended that the explanation given by the appellant that he had received the money to be deposited under the small savings scheme appear to be reasonable. It is significant that when the Sub-Divisional Officer on getting the signal reached the canteen alongwith the witnesses and companyducted the search it was number the stand of the appellant that he had received the money for small scale deposits as it is apparent that if the money was received for that purpose, as soon as the Sub-Divisional Officer reached the canteen with the witnesses and wanted to search the appellant, appellant would have immediately came out with this explanation. Learned companynsel for the appellant frankly companyceded that this was number the case of the appellant that he came out with this explanation on the spot at that time. This is number his case even in the statement recorded at the trial number such a suggestion was put to anyone of the prosecution witnesses in the companyrse of cross examination. In view of this it companyld number be disputed that this explanation has been given as an after thought and this itself goes to show that this explanation is just as an imagination. There appears to be some companytroversy about the fact as to whether the Patwaris were directed to companylect funds for small savings schemes and in this respect the learned Trial Court also examined the Tehsildar as a Court witness and after companysidering all the evidence disregarded the explanation given by the appellant in respect of the money Rs. 150 recovered from his person. The learned Trial Court after companysidering the defence evidence and the evidence of the Tehsildar did number accept the defence version and companyvicted the appellant. The Trial Court also companysidered the evidence of P.W .5 Jeet Ram who was the keeper of the tea stall who was examined by the prosecution but he turned hostile and supported the defence version. Learned companynsel for the appellant went through the evidence in detail and attempted to companytend that as the companyies of the documents had already been received there was numberoccasion for Gian Singh to pay Rs.150. According to the prosecution the bargain was settled for Rs.200. Rs.50 were paid in advance and therefore companyies were given but the appellant was to receive the balance of Rs. 150 for which Gian Singh had promised to pay it on the date of the registration and accordingly on the date of registration it was fixed up that the appellant will be available at the tea stall near the Tehsil where this amount will be paid and it was because of this that Gian Singh appreached the Sub- Divisional Officer with the companyplaint. In fact where the receipt of the amount and its recovery is number disputed it is number necessary for us to go through the evidence and examine it afresh, although learned companynsel went through the evidence in detail. The only question is as to whether the Courts below were fight in rejecting the explanation of the appellant for receipt of Rs. 150. The explanation given by the appellant which was seriously pressed by the learned companynsel for the appellant was that he had received this amount to be deposited in the small savings scheme on behalf of Gian Singh but it is significant that neither he had made any numbere of this fact number given any receipt to Gain Singh. Apart from it it is significant that the Sub-Divisional Officer who was a revenue officer and the appellant being a Patwari was his subordinate. The numbermal companyduct of the appellant would have been to tell him as soon as he arrived for search that in fact he had received this amount to be deposited in the small savings scheme. It is impossible to believe that if the appellant had received this amount for being deposited in the small savings scheme he would have number opened his mouth and permitted the search and recovery of this amount from his pocket to be done by the Sub- Divisional Officer and allowed the matter to be handed over to the Police and still would number have companye out to say what he chose to say at the trial.

K. SIKRI, J. The petitioners in these writ petitions are the practicing advocates who also claim that they are regularly practicing and appearing in the Supreme Court. Some of them are advocates on record AOR , while others do number fall under this category. They are number designated senior advocates either and, therefore, can be put in the category of other advocates number-advocate on record. All these petitioners are desirous of getting a chamber in the Lawyers Chamber Block in the Supreme Court. This Court, on administrative side, has framed Supreme Court Lawyers Chambers Allotment and Occupancy Rules hereinafter referred to as the Chamber Allotment Rules which govern the procedure for allotment of chambers within the companypound of Supreme Court. These rules lay down the eligibility criteria for allotment of chambers. In accordance with these rules, the Honble Chief Justice of India CJI has also companystituted the Judges Allotment Committee. It companyprises of Honble Judges of Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 2 of 39 this Court, numberinated by CJI. There is another Committee as well, which is headed by the Attorney General for India and office bearer of the Supreme Court Bar Association SCBA as well as Supreme Court Advocate on Record Association SCAORA . On the basis of recommendations of the Allotment Committee s , the CJI ordinarily allots chambers to the advocates. In the year 1995, a recommendation was made by the Allotment Committee for allotment of chambers to AOR, number-advocates on record other advocates and senior advocates in the ratio of This recommendation was accepted by the CJI on August 29, 1995. Since then, allotment is made in the aforesaid ratio to the aforesaid three categories of advocates. Relevant Chamber Allotment Rules, with which we are companycerned in these petitions, may be reproduced below Allotment of Chambers shall be made by a Committee appointed by the Chief Justice of India and all such allotments shall be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of India. Allotment shall be made to such advocates of the Supreme Court as are members of the Supreme Court Bar Association who regularly practice in the Supreme Court and who reside in Delhi or New Delhi. Allotment of chambers to applicants, who are members of the Supreme Court Bar Association, shall Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 3 of 39 be made in the following order Advocates-on-Record who are regularly practising in this Court Non Advocates-on-Record resident in Delhi New Delhi and who are mainly and regularly practising in this Court and Senior Advocates resident in Delhi New Delhi and who are mainly and regularly practising in this Court. Provided, however, that allotment shall be made in accordance with the roster maintained in the following order The first four vacancies be allotted to Advocateson-Record, the fifth vacancy to the Non Advocates-onrecord, sixth, seventh and eighth vacancies to Advocates-on-Record, ninth vacancy to the Non Advocates-on-Record and tenth vacancy to Senior Advocates and the cycle shall be repeated in the above order. xx xx xx The Chief Justice may in his discretion cancel any allotment where an allottee infringes any companydition of allotment or violates any rule governing the allotment or for any other reason. xx xx xx The allotment shall terminate On its cancellation by the Chief Justice of India or On its surrender by the allottee companycerned or On the allottee failing to pay the licence fee and other charges for the two successive months or On the allottee ceasing to be a member of the Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 4 of 39 Supreme Court Bar Association or On the allottes name being removed from the Roll of a State Bar Council or On an allottee of a chamber number companyplying with the orders of the Allotment Committee, as approved by the Honble Chief Justice of India or On the death of an allottee or On the allottee being elevated to the Bench of the High Court Supreme Court. Provided, however, that the allottees name shall be put first in the respective category of the waiting list, if such member on his her retirement joins back the practice and is made active member of Supreme Court Bar Association on his her application for allotment. xx xx xx The Chief Justice of India may from time to time make such amendments and additions to these Rules as may be necessary and expedient. If any question arises as to the interpretation of these Rules, the decision of the Chief Justice of India shall be final. It may be mentioned that the allotment to these chambers is made on the availability thereof and, at that time, applications for allotment of chambers are invited. This exercise was companyducted last time in the year 2004. Thereafter, i.e. after a gap of thirteen years, the Supreme Court invited applications for allotment of Lawyers chambers on October 31, 2017 and May 16, 2018 vide Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 5 of 39 Notice inviting applications where eligibility criteria was also stipulated. In the numberice dated October 31, 2017, following eligibility criteria was mentioned Online Applications are hereby invited from Senior Advocates, Advocates-on-Record who are members of the Supreme Court Bar Association and fulfill the following eligibility criteria for updating the existing Panels for allotment of Lawyers Chambers SENIOR ADVOCATES Who are mainly and regularly practising in the Supreme Court. Who must have minimum of 50 appearances Admission and regular hearing matters excluding A.s Cr.M.P.s each year for any two companysecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016. Registrars Court Appearance shall number be taken into companysideration . Subject to the above two requirements being companyplied with, the allotment shall be made based on priority of the date of their being designated as Senior Advocate. ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD Who must have filed or entered appearances on behalf of respondents on an average 20 cases per annum i.e. admission regular matters and number A.s Cr.M.Ps and Government Filing in the companyrse of any two companysecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 a batch of cases shall be treated as a single case . Subject to the above requirements being companyplied with, the allotment shall be made according to the date of seniority i.e. the date of registration as AOR. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 6 of 39 JUNIOR ADVOCATE NON ADVOCATE-ON- RECORD Who are mainly and regularly practising in the Supreme Court. Who must have put in number less than fifty appearances Admission and regular hearing matters excluding I.As. and Cr.M.Ps. each year for any two companysecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016. Subject to the above two requirements being companyplied with, the seniority of such persons shall be based on the date of their present admission to the active membership of the Supreme Court Bar Association. As is clear from the above, one of the eligibility companyditions for AOR was filing of twenty cases per annum in the companyrse of any two companysecutive years between June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016 and for other advocates, 50 appearances each year for any two companysecutive years between June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016. Further, as far as seniority is companycerned, in respect of AOR, it was to be from the date of registration as AOR. For other advocates, seniority is to be based on the date of their admission to the active membership of SCBA. For senior advocates, allotment is to be made on priority on th date of their being designated as senior advocates. Some advocates including the petitioners herein felt aggrieved by Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 7 of 39 one or the other eligibility companyditions, depending upon the category in which they fall. They sent representations to SCBA as well as Secretary General, Supreme Court of India, requesting for change of criteria for eligibility of allotment of chambers. Specific grievance was with respect to the fixation of block period between June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016 for which the requirement of filing and or appearance has to be fulfilled. As per the petitioners, the matter was dealt with by the Chamber Allotment Committee headed by the Attorney General and some amendments were carried out. On that basis, SCBA issued circular for its members on March 15, 2018 mentioning the changes, accepted by the Chamber Allotment Committee. This circular reads as under The Letter dated 09.01.2018 was discussed at length in todays Chambers Allotment Committee Meeting and the recommendations made therein have been accepted by the Committee to the extent detailed below Calendar Year number will be January to December instead of June to May. The period of eligibility for filing appearances shall be from 01.01.2004 to 31st December 2017 Two companysecutive years . Self Attested proceedings print out from the website i.e. www.sci.gov.in shall be sufficient companypliance for companysideration for Chambers Allotment, instead of certified companyy. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 8 of 39 Self Attested proceedings shall be filed along with prescribed numberarized format Registry shall inform the format in due companyrse . Complete set of application in physical form be submitted in the Registry besides online applications which may be submitted by the applicants, if they so opt. Filing of Government cases is also included as eligibility criteria for Central Government as well as State Government Standing Counsels. Interlocutory Application I.A. or Criminal Misc. Petitions Crl.M.P. are also included towards appearance as well as filing, as the case may be. Further, in case of Company of two or more AORs, all AOR partners will separately be entitled for allotment of Chambers with separate set of cases with the companysent of other partners that they shall number use the same set of cases for their individual allotment . Members who were Voters of SCBA from 2012 till the last election i.e. December, 2017, based on D. Kaushiks Judgments passed by the Honble Supreme Court of India, shall also be entitled to apply for Chambers Allotment in any year within the above mentioned period . Fresh Vakalatnama after obtaining NOC from the previous earlier AOR shall also be companynted separately for the subsequent AOR. Filing of Caveat is number to be companynted. The use of word Junior Advocate for Non AOR shall number be used in any proceeding numberification. Categories may be referred to as Senior Advocate, Advocate on Record and Advocate. Further time has been extended for submission of applications for Chambers Allotment till 30 th April Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 9 of 39 2018. Notification shall be issued in due companyrse . Appearance before Mediation Committee shall number be companynted. However, the opinion of the Judges Allotment Committee was at variance with some of the aforesaid suggestion. It was companysidered at the appropriate level and a decision was taken. Thereafter, revised numberice dated May 16, 2018 was issued by the Administration General Branch of the Supreme Court for inviting applications for allotment of Lawyers Chambers and the eligibility criteria for three category of advocates was stated in the following terms SENIOR ADVOCATES Who are mainly and regularly practising in the Supreme Court. Who must have minimum of 50 appearances Admission and regular hearing matters excluding A.s Cr.M.P.s save and except interim applications in Public Interest Litigations which are substantive applications and decided by the Court and such petitions like Special Leave Petitions filed with applications for companydonation of delay and listed in Court with Diary Number and disposed of with diary number by the Court each year either for any two companysecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 or for any two number-consecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 provided the Advocate Applicant companycerned availing the option of appearances during two number-consecutive years has been on the Voters list of Supreme Court Bar Association for the entire block period. Registrars Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 10 of 39 Court Appearance shall number be taken into companysideration . Subject to the above two requirements being companyplied with, the allotment shall be made based on priority of the date of their being designated as Senior Advocate. ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD Who must have filed or entered appearances on behalf of respondents on an average 20 cases per annum i.e. admission regular matters and number A.s Cr.M.Ps and Government Filing save and except interim applications in Public Interest Litigations which are substantive applications and decided by the Court and such petitions like Special Leave Petitions filed with applications for companydonation of delay and listed in Court with Diary Number and disposed of with diary number by the Court each year for any two companysecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 or for any two number-consecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 provided the Advocate Applicant companycerned availing the option of filing during two number-consecutive years has been on the Voters list of Supreme Court Bar Association for the entire block period a batch of cases shall be treated as a single case . Subject to the above requirements being companyplied with, the allotment shall be made according to the date of seniority i.e. the date of registration as AOR. NON-ADVOCATE-ON-RECORD Who are mainly and regularly practising in the Supreme Court. Who must have put in number less than fifty appearances Admission and regular hearing matters excluding I.As. and Cr.M.Ps. save and except interim applications in Public Interest Litigations which are substantive applications and decided by the Court and such petitions like Special Leave Petitions filed Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 11 of 39 with applications for companydonation of delay and listed in Court with Diary Number and disposed of with diary number by the Court each year either for any two companysecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 or for any two number-consecutive years between 01.06.2011 and 30.06.2016 provided the Advocate Applicant companycerned availing the option of appearances during two number-consecutive years has been on the Voters list of Supreme Court Bar Association for the entire block period. Subject to the above two requirements being companyplied with, the seniority of such persons shall be based on the date of their present admission to the active membership of the Supreme Court Bar Association. For illustration, substantive applications may be referred to such interim applications by the project proponent or the applicant itself as are filed in Public Interest Litigation entitled T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India Ors. and decided by the Court as Such As demand of the advocates, particularly with respect to block period was number met, the SCBA took up the matter again by addressing companymunication dated July 18, 2018 to CJI wherein it was stated that following provisions pertaining to allotment of chambers were number incorporated in the numberice dated May 16, 2018 which was issued for inviting applications for allotment of chambers Eligibility of Advocates who had requisite number of filing appearances from Calendar year January December 2004 to December 2017 instead of May 2011 to June 2016. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 12 of 39 Requisite Calendar year shall be 1 st January to 31st December instead of filing appearance year 1 st July to 30th June. Number of filing by Advocates-on-Record of Government State Cases shall be companynted for the purpose of eligibility criteria. Non-Advocates-On-Record satisfying the appearances criteria, becoming Advocates-On-Record in 2016 onwards number satisfying the filing criteria in less than 2 years, be included in the panel of Advocates- On-Record in order of their seniority as Advocate-On- Record. Similarly, AORs and Non-AORs subsequently designated as Senior Advocates from 2016 onwards, satisfying the eligibility numberms as Advocates-On- Record Non Advocates-On-Record be included in the panel of Senior Advocates in chronology of being designated as Senior Advocate. Some of the petitioners herein also made representations to the Supreme Court raising their specific grievances qua the aforesaid numberice dated May 16, 2018. As per them, since their grievance have number been redressed, these petitions have been filed. At this stage, we may mention in tabular form, the grievances, which are made by each of the petitioners in these writ petitions Sl. No. Cause Title Relief Sought 1 Gopal Jha, WP C No. Change of block period from 745/2018 01.06.2011-30.06.2016 to 01.01.2005 to 17.10.2017/ 16.05.2018. 2 Anirudh Sanganeria, Calendar year to be taken as WP C No. 772/2018 January-December instead of June Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 13 of 39 to June and the cut-off period of eligibility for filing appearances to be modified to 31.12.2017 instead of 30.06.2016. 3 Kumar Ranjan, WP C Change of block period from No. 854/2018 01.06.2011-30.06.2016 to 01.01.2005 to 31.12.2017. 4 V. Shyam Mohan, Challenged Clause 3 of the WP C No. 844/2018 Lawyers Chambers Allotment and Occupancy Rules as it violates of Article 14, 19 1 c and Article 19 1 g as it mandates that applicant should be a member of SCBA. 5 Sahdev Singh, WP C Take into companysideration period from No. 941 of 2018 01.01.2004 31.05.2011 in the Block Period. 6 Shirin Khajuria, WP C i AOR should be permitted to No. 917/2018 apply in the category of Non-AOR. Third category to be renamed as Advocate. 7 V. Mohana, WP C No. Extend cut-off date from 997/2018 31.06.2016 and in the alternative quash numberice dated 16.05.2018, on the ground that Clause 3B is violative of Article 14 and 19. 8 R.K. Singh, WP C No. Block date to be taken as 975/2018 01.01.2004 31.12.2017 9 Jaikriti S. Jadeja Ors., Cut-off period be extended till WP C No. 947/2018 31.12.2017. 10 M.R. Shamshad, Quashing of Condition 2 a of WP C No. 998/2018 revised numberice inviting applications for allotment of Lawyers Chambers dated 16.05.2018. 11 Vikram Gulati, WP C i Change of block period from No. 1063/2018 01.06.2011-30.06.2016 to 01.01.2004 to 31.12.2017. To number insist on the companydition of his name being on voters list of SCBA and to include NCR to the place of residence. Calendar year to be from Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 14 of 39 January to December instead of June to May and the cut-off period be extended till 31.12.2017. 12 Divyesh Pratap Singh, Cut-off period be extended till WP C No. 1058/2018 30.08.2018. From the aforesaid, it can be seen that following issues have been raised in these writ petitions Change of Block Period Notice dated May 16, 2018 mentions the block period from June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016. Different petitioners have suggested different block periods which are a block period should be January 01, 2005 to October 17, 2017/May 16, 2018 b January 01, 2005 to December 31, 2017 Period from January 01, 2004 to May 31, 2011 should also be taken into companysideration and d January 01, 2004 to December 31, 2017. Calendar year mentioned in numberice dated May 16, 2018 is from June to June. The suggestion is that it should be taken as January to December. Clause 3 of the Allotment Rules as per which allotment can be made to those advocates only who are members of SCBA is challenged inter alia by companytending that apart from SCBA, there is an association of AOR as well, known as SCAORA and it should be sufficient when a person is a member of SCAORA. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 15 of 39 Requirement of minimum filings of AOR and appearances by senior advocates and other advocates is also questioned. Main companytention in this behalf is that, in the year 2004, when the applications were invited, the requirement was different and it should number be changed. An incidental issue is also raised as to whether Supreme Court should invite the applications for allotment of chambers by issuing specific numberices from time to time or it should be a companytinuous process. Notices in these petitions were issued. Registrar, Supreme Court of India has filed reply affidavits in some of these writ petitions which companyer all the issues raised. It is, inter alia, stated that Chamber Allotment Committee companysisting of the learned Attorney General for India, as a Chairman and the Presidents, Vice- Presidents and Hony. Secretaries of SCBA and SCAORA as Members, in its meeting held on November 18, 2015, approved the draft numberification inviting applications for empanelment of lawyers for allotment of chambers vide Agenda Item No. 10. Vide this resolution, it was, inter alia, agreed that the block period should be from January 01, 2009 to December 31, 2014. Soon after the aforesaid recommendations, a number of Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 16 of 39 letters representations from the advocates were received by the Registry praying for change in the block period. The Chamber Allotment Committee headed by the learned Attorney General for India again companyvened a meeting on May 11, 2016 and after companysideration, the requests of the advocates vide Agenda Item No. 2, inter alia, resolved in companynection with the block period as under The Committee perused the aforesaid letters vis-a-vis the Office Report and resolved that since the year 2015 has already gone by, the earlier approved Block Period 01.01.2009 to 31.12.2014 may number be changed to new Block Period 01.01.2010 to 31.12.2015 so that more and more eligible Advocates may apply. The aforementioned recommendations were placed for approval and orders before the Honble Judges Committee for approving allotment of Lawyers Chambers and thereafter, were also placed before the CJI. The companyments made by the Registry in this regard were also placed before the Honble Judges Committee on July 11, 2016. Considering the companyments made by the Registry that chambers in Pragati Maidan will be available sometime in the end of 2017 and if block period is companyfined to the year 2015 as resolved by the Chamber Allotment companymittee headed by the learned Attorney General for India, advocates who may companyplete Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 17 of 39 minimum number of appearances after 2015 may number apply for allotment and, therefore, it was submitted for companysideration, if the block period should be upto December 31, 2015 or June 30, 2016 or some other dates. The Honble Judges Committee, inter alia, recommended that the block period may be changed so as to make it from June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016. The same was also approved by the then CJI vide order dated July 28, 2016. Accordingly, numberification dated October 31, 2017 inviting online application for empanelment of Lawyers for allotment of chambers was issued. Since, representations were received against this numberification also from certain advocates and even SCBA. These representations were placed before Chamber Allotment Committee headed by the learned Attorney General for India in its meeting dated March 15, 2018 wherein recommendation was made, as already numbered above. It was placed before the Judges Committee on March 27, 2018. The Judges Committee, however, did number accept the same in its entirety. The earlier block period already numberified i.e. June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016 was recommended to be retained as unaltered while some of the recommendations were accepted. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 18 of 39 However, before the aforesaid recommendation of the Judges Committee companyld be companysidered by the CJI, the SCBA again reiterated its request. Because of this reason, Judges Committee again assembled on May 9, 2018 wherein hearing was given to the President and Hony. Secretary of SCBA. The Judges Committee, however, did number agree to change the block period, but recommended the following changes In addition to the requirement of having minimum number of filings and or appearances in two companysecutive years in the block period of five preceding years, an applicant who otherwise fulfills the criteria of requisite number of filings and or appearances even in two number-consecutive years in the block period of preceding five years shall also be eligible provided he was on the voters list of Supreme Court Bar Association for the entire block period of five years. that such petitions which are disposed of with diary number by the Court may also be reckoned for companyputing the requisite number of filings and or appearances. that interim applications in Public Interest Litigations which are substantive applications and decided by the Court as such shall also be companynted towards the requisite number of filings and or appearances. This led to the issuance of the revised numberice dated May 16, 2018. SCBA made another representation dated July 18, 2018. In the meantime, certain writ petitions were also filed in which numberice was issued. Accordingly, Judges Committee resolved in its Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 19 of 39 meeting held on July 30, 2018 as under The Committee understands that the issue regarding allotment of chambers is pending companysideration before the Bench presided over by Honble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri. Following order was passed by the Bench today- Issue numberice, returnable in two weeks. Dasti, in addition, is also permitted. The respondents shall endeavour to file their reply before the next day of hearing. We are informed that 31.07.2018 is the last date for making application for allotment of chambers. The petitioners herein may make their applications which may be received accepted provisionally and kept separately. In the circumstances, the Committee feels it would be inappropriate to deal with the matter till the pending matter is disposed of on the judicial side. On one hearing, when the matters came up before the Court, Mr. Maninder Singh, learned ASG, appearing for the Supreme Court, made a statement that he along with President, SCBA and office bearers of SCAORA would deliberate on the issues raised and shall try to arrive at a companysensus. When the matters were taken up on October 4, 2018, the learned ASG submitted numbere proposing the solution to the various issues. The suggestion given in the said Note are as under 1. The companysideration of the request for allotment of Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 20 of 39 chambers to the members of SCBA belonging to the above mentioned all the 3 categories should be for all those who fulfil individual respective criteria in the above mentioned 3 categories by 30th September, 2018. In other words, any member advocate, who fulfils the requirement of 50 appearances per year by 30th September, 2018, would become entitled for submitting an application for allotment of chamber to the Registry of the Supreme Court and every such application shall be accepted. The Registry would companysider a period of 730 days a companytinuous period of 2 years at any time before 30th September, 2018 and on being satisfied of the fulfilment of the relevant criteria, shall accept the application for companysideration of allotment of chamber. Similarly, for all Member AORs who wish to submit their application by 30.9.2018 would be required to fulfil minimum of 20 filings or 50 appearances in a period of one year for two years, would have to satisfy the Registry of minimum 40 filings or 100 appearances in a period of 730 days of any period as on 30th September, 2018. Such applications would also be accepted by the Registry of the Supreme Court for allotment of chambers. It is clarified that the submission of application for allotment of chamber by a member of the SCBA can be on any of the criteria for eligibility chosen by the companycerned member. In that, numberwithstanding that the member is an AOR or a designated Sr. Advocate, the application for allotment of chamber can be submitted on any of the criteria, namely, criteria of eligibility for number-AOR, criteria for eligibility of AOR and criteria for eligibility of a Sr. Advocate. However, the allotment of chamber to any such member shall be from the quota of 710 or 210 or 110, as the case may be, on the basis of the status held by the member in presenti. Similarly, this cut-off date of 30.9.2018 would apply to the category of Member Senior Advocates for applying, with the criteria for that category. This cut-off date of 30.9.2018 shall be subject to Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 21 of 39 any modification which may be made by the Honble Supreme Court, either in the hearing scheduled for 20.9.2018 or any date thereafter. In other words, the last cut-off date proposed as 30.9.2018 would get substituted by the date so decided by the Supreme Court. The period of 730 days for fulfilment of the eligibility criteria in the above mentioned separate categories of advocates shall be companynted from the last cut-off date in 2004 till 30th September, 2018 or any other date which may be decided by the Supreme Court. It is the firm suggestion on behalf of the SCBA that the process for lodging submitting applicatoins for allotment of chambers by Members of SCBA, in any of the above mentioned 3 categories, should be a companytinuous process, i.e., whenever any member of the SCBA belonging to any of the 3 categories fulfils the requirement of the criteria prescribed for becoming eligible for companysideration for allotment of chamber by the Supreme Court, his her application shall be accepted by the Registry. This would companypletely eliminate the uncertainty with regard to opening of the period for inviting such applications. The procedure mechanism of accepting applications throughout the year, on companytinuous basis, is the numberm which is being followed almost in every High Court. Adoption of such a mechanism methodology of such a process to remain operative companytinuously would be beneficial to the members of the SCBA and would also remove possible anomalies and irritants in this entire process. Insofar as the AORs are companycerned who have acted as AOR for any State Government etc., filing for the respective State Government would also be taken towards fulfilment of the criteria for 20 filings annually. Similarly, all those Member Advocates Non- AORs , who have remained with Government Panels, their appearances in the Government matters would also be companynted for the fulfilment of eligibility of 50 appearances in a year for becoming eligible for allotment of chambers. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 22 of 39 In both these cases, filings for the Government and or appearances for the Government, filing of IAs and appearances in IAs shall number be companynted. Similarly, appearances before the Ld. Registrar or before the Honble Chamber Judge would also number be companynted. In relation to all those Member Advocates who have already lodged submitted their applications for allotment of chambers as advocate Non-AOR on the basis of the criteria of 50 appearances in a given year for 2 years and have number qualified in the AOR examination, they shall be held to be eligible for allotment of chambers in the AOR category and the allotment of chamber in their favour shall be only from the quota of 710 chambers meant for the AOR quota. Similarly, all those Member Advocates who had submitted their applications for allotment of chambers at an earlier occasion, either in the category of AOR or in the category of Advocate Non-AOR and have been subsequently designated as Senior Advocates, they shall be held to be eligible for allotment of chamber on those basis 110 quota chambers for Senior Advocates and shall be companysidered accordingly. Any allotment of chamber to them will have to be allotment from the quota of 110 in the Senior Advocates category, even when their eligibility for companysideration for allotment of chambers had been achieved either as an AOR or as an advocate member of the SCBA in the number-AOR category. Insofar as challenge to Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules, namely, pre-condition of being a member of SCBA before companysideration of allotment of chambers in any of the three categories is companycerned, it is pleaded that the same be retained as, according to them, there is numbermerit in the said companytention. After hearing the companynsel for the parties as well as Mr. Maninder Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 23 of 39 Singh, learned ASG and Mr. Vikas Singh, President, SCBA, we deem it appropriate to accept the suggestions companytained in Paras 1, 2, 3 and 6 to 9 of the aforesaid Note of suggestions. This leaves us to decide the following issues Change of block period. Validity of companydition of membership of SCBA companytained in Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules. Validity of companydition of resident of an advocate in Delhi New Delhi companytained in Rule 3. Change of Block Period We have already accepted the suggestions 1, 2 and 3 of the Note. The paragraph 4 of the Note, however, mentions that period of 730 days for fulfillment of the eligibility criteria shall be companynted from the last cut-off date in 2004 till September 30, 2018. This suggestion cannot be accepted as it is way too off the mark and may have numberconnection with the active practice requirement of an advocate, having proximity with the date when the applications for allotment are invited. It hardly needs to be emphasised that pre-requisite for allotment of chamber is that the companycerned advocate should be in active practice. That is why the eligibility criteria for member advocates Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 24 of 39 is the requirement of 50 appearances per year in the block year for AORs, it is minimum of 20 filings or 50 appearances in a period of one year for two years and minimum 40 filings or 100 appearances in a period of 730 days. However, if the cut-off date starts from the year 2004, this purpose may be lost in many cases, resulting in alloting the chambers to those who may be number-active as of today. There may be cases where a number-AOR or AOR may fulfil companyditions of appearances filing in first 730 days starting from the year 2004 i.e. during the year 2004-2005 and thereafter he may number have any appearances or filings, or such appearances filings may be negligible. Still he she would become entitled to allotment of chamber. This would bring in such advocates who may number be in active practice in recent past. Such a situation cannot be companyntenanced. We, therefore, find rationale in the decision taken by the Judges Allotment Committee for fixing the block period from June 01, 2011 to June 30, 2016 as companytained in the revised numberice dated May 16, 2018 viz. fixing the block period which is proximate to the numberice for making application for the allotment. Therefore, starting of cut-off date from the year 2004 is unacceptable. Since, sometime has elapsed when the block period was fixed by Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 25 of 39 the Judges Allotment Committee and we have extended the date for making application, the only modification which can be done is to put the block period from October 01, 2013 to September 30, 2018. It is during this period the applicant shall have to satisfy the criteria and appearances or filing as indicated above. We are also number accepting the suggestion given in Para 5 of the Note that the allotment of chambers should be a companytinuous process. There has been a companysistent practice in the past of inviting applications from time to time whenever lawyers chambers become available for allotment. It should be maintained as there is numberreason to depart from the same. Otherwise, the purpose of fixing proximate block period shall also get defeated. At the same time, we also find that last such applications were invited in the year 2004 and companysiderable period has lapsed thereafter. Therefore, in order to ensure that such situation does number occur in future, we are of the opinion that Notice inviting such applications should be at least once in three years. Validity of Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules As per this rule, the membership of SCBA is essential to apply for allotment of Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 26 of 39 chambers. Those petitioners who have challenged the validity of this rule submit that this eligibility criteria is discriminatory and violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to them under Articles 14, 19 1 c and 19 1 g of the Constitution. Expanding this argument, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, who appeared for writ petitioner in Writ Petition Civil No. 844 of 2018 submitted that SCAORA is also a represented body like SCBA and, therefore, membership of anyone of these bodies should be enough for making a person eligible to be companysidered for allotment of chambers. It was argued that SCAORA was also a vibrant body which was formed for the welfare of AOR. Therefore, the measure in the allotment of Lawyers Chambers Rules that restricts eligibility for allotment of chambers to members of the SCBA and excludes those who are members only of the SCAORA is manifestly arbitrary. Reliance is placed in this regard on the judgment of this Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India1, where it was held as follows The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights chapter. What is manifestly arbitrary is obviously unreasonable and being companytrary to the rule of law, would violate Article 14. Further, there is an apparent companytradiction in the three-Judge Bench decision in McDowell State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., 1996 3 SCC 709 when it is said that a 1 2017 9 SCC 1 Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 27 of 39 companystitutional challenge can succeed on the ground that a law is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable, yet such challenge would fail on the very ground of the law being unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. The arbitrariness doctrine when applied to legislation obviously would number involve the latter challenge but would only involve a law being disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being manifestly unreasonable. All the aforesaid grounds, therefore, do number seek to differentiate between State action in its various forms, all of which are interdicted if they fall foul of the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, this provision violates Article 14 as well as it created unreasonable classification. The companysequences of this unreasonable classification would be as follows As a result of the judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association Ors. v. B.D. Kaushik2, only certain members of the SCBA are permitted to vote in elections, as they are treated as serious and regular practitioners in the Supreme Court. However, Rule 3 of the Allotment of Lawyers Chamber Rules makes numbersuch distinction and, therefore, those members of the SCBA who are ineligible to vote in their own association are eligible to be allotted chambers of the Supreme Court. If an SCBA member were to be expelled for any reason, for example, if an SCBA member did number participate in the call for an 2 2011 13 SCC 774 Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 28 of 39 illegal strike by the SCBA on the grounds that it would be companytrary to the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India Anr. 3, such a member would be ineligible to apply for a chamber in the Supreme Court, whose very judgment he she has sought to adhere to. The petitioners have companytended that the allocation of chambers is a privilege afforded by the Supreme Court of India to those advocates practicing before it. When both the SCBA and the SCAORA have been recognised as advocates associations of equal importance, it would be inappropriate to extend such a privilege only to the members of one association and number the other. It was also submitted that such a classification that excludes the association of those advocates as prescribed under Article 145 1 a of the Constitution of India read with the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is unreasonable and has numberrational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, i.e., the allotment of chambers to the regular practitioners of the Supreme Court. Mr. Sankaranarayanan went to the extent of companytending that given the role of AOR in the administration of justice by the Supreme Court, 3 2003 2 SCC 45 Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 29 of 39 it was more important in nature than even SCBA. It was submitted that AOR are given pre-eminence position as they Undertake an examination administered by the Supreme Court Are the only advocates authorised to act on behalf of a client in the Supreme Court Adhere to strict stipulations regarding office location, maintenance of accounts and filing of returns, unlike any other class of advocates. Are recognized as such by judgments of this Court from 1964 onwards. This is even acknowledged by the Chamber Allotment Rules which earmarks nearly 70 of the chambers of the AOR. He further argued that the impugned Rule amounts to a companypulsion for AOR to become a member of the SCBA, which would make an inroad into the rights under Article 19 1 c of the Constitution of India, of such advocates who are already members of SCAORA by companypelling them unreasonably to become members of another Court-affiliated organization. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior companynsel, who appeared in the Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 30 of 39 capacity as President of SCBA as well as Mr. Maninder Singh, learned ASG defended Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules. It was submitted that SCBA is an umbrella association which represents the interests of all its members. Membership of SCBA was open to all advocates, irrespective of their category, namely, senior advocates, advocates, AOR as well as other advocates. It was also argued that as a representative body for all the members, it is SCBA which has discussions with the CJI and or Judges on various issues and problems which may occur from time to time, to find mutual acceptable solution to such problems and issues. It was further argued that this fact of SCBA, being an umbrella association, was even recognised by SCAORA itself which was reflected in the Rules and Regulations of SCAORA. Attention was drawn, in this behalf, to Rule 4 of the said Rules and Regulations which deals with admission and qualification for membership and prescribes that in order to become a member of SCAORA, it is necessary to have the membership of SCBA. Relevant portion of this Rule reads as under 4. An advocate may be companysidered for enrolment as Member of the Association if - he is an Advocate-on-Record and Member of the Supreme Court Bar Association. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 31 of 39 he undertake to subscribe to the objects of the Association and abide by the rules and regulations framed by the Association from time to time and he is companysidered suitable for Membership by the Executive Committee. Based on the aforesaid provisions, they argued that AOR cannot be a member of SCAORA unless he is a member of SCBA and, therefore, entire issue raised by the petitioners was academic in nature, since the companytention of the petitioners proceeds on the basis that insofar as AOR is companycerned, membership of SCAORA should be sufficient. It was also submitted that numberody has any right to get allotment of chamber, much less a fundamental right and, therefore, the petitioners cannot invoke the provisions of Articles 14, 19 1 c and 19 1 g of the Constitution. Mr. Vikas Singh, in support, relied upon the judgment of this Court in Vinay Balachandra Joshi v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India Ors. 4. It was a matter pertaining to allotment of chambers within the companypound of the Supreme Court itself. One of the companytentions of the petitioners therein was that number making available chambers to the AOR within the Supreme Court companypound is violative of 4 1998 7 SCC 461 Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 32 of 39 fundamental right under Article 19 1 g of the Constitution and this companytention was rejected in the following manner We will first deal with the companytention raised by the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 883 and 1223 of 1990, that number making available chambers to the Advocates-on-Record within the Supreme Court companypound is violative of their fundamental right under Article 19 1 g of the Constitution. It was submitted that Article 19 1 g guarantees, inter alia, the right to practise any profession. Practising legal profession is thus a fundamental right. An Advocate-on-Record can exercise this fundamental right of his effectively only if he is provided with a chamber within the Supreme Court premises. Therefore, to make a chamber available to him is an integral part of his guaranteed fundamental right. We see numbersubstance in this companytention. Even if we proceed on the basis that to practise as an advocate is a fundamental right, numberright to be allotted a chamber within the Court premises follows from it. A legal practitioner an advocate can carry on his legal profession without a chamber. It is number necessary that he should have a chamber within the Court premises. That which merely facilitates the exercise of the fundamental right cannot be regarded as an integral part of that fundamental right. Far from being a fundamental right it does number even have the status of a right. No law companyfers such a right on a member of a legal profession number such a facility has been accepted as a right even otherwise. Making a chamber available to a member of the legal profession practising in a companyrt of law is really a facility provided to him by the Court. This is the true nature and character of the claim made by the Advocates-on- Record, number giving a chamber to him cannot be regarded as violative of Article 19 1 g of the Constitution. It may be stated that neither the learned Attorney General number Mr Nariman, Mr Venugopal and other Senior Advocates supported this companytention and very fairly stated that the view which we are taking namely that it is a facility provided by the Court is the companyrect view. As it is number a matter of right or legal obligation of the Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 33 of 39 Court to provide the facility of a chamber to an advocate it would really be a matter of discretion of the Principal Judge of the Court to decide to whom and to what extent that facility should be extended when the same is available and his only obligation would be to act in a fair and just manner and number arbitrarily. It may be proper for him to frame rules, appoint a companymittee and fix guidelines for the purpose of allotment of chambers but the obligation is numberhigher than to act in a reasonable manner. It would be for him to decide when, to whom, to what extent and on what terms and companyditions he should allot chambers. Having regard to the existence of Rule 4 in the Rules and Regulations of SCAORA itself, the entire edifice of the petitioners case stands demolished. No doubt, SCAORA has its significant position in this Court. However, we are companycerned with the issue of allotment of chambers. The petitioners have submitted that members of SCAORA should be treated as sufficient eligibility for allotment of chambers. Yet, in order to become a member of SCAORA, as per Rule 4 of the Rules and Regulations of SCAORA itself, an advocate has to be the member of SCBA. Therefore, unless an advocate is an AOR and also a member of SCBA, he cannot become the member of SCAORA. This requirement itself accepts the position that SCBA is an umbrella organisation and also recognises the vital role it plays. Thus, the argument based on Article 14 of the Constitution would be of numberavail. Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 34 of 39 The respondents are also companyrect in their submission that there is numberfundamental right or any statutory right for allotment of chambers in any companyrt premises. This aspect has already been decided in Vinay Balachandra Joshi, relevant discussion whereof has been reproduced above. Further, in the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, significance of membership of SCBA is highlighted in order to avail various facilities. It is, inter alia, stated that facilities like Library, Parking, Canteen, Medical etc. become available only to the members of the Bar Association of the companycerned companyrts and such a stipulation is prevalent in almost every companyrt in the companyntry. Counter affidavit goes on to make the following averments It is respectfully submitted that there is numberfundamental and or any statutory right much less any indefeasible right of allotment of Chambers in any Court premises. It may, however, be submitted that each Court in the companyntry always endeavours to extend within its resources and availability of place etc. maximum facilities to the Ld. Advocates for facilitating the process of administration of justice and for making it more efficient. It is also a fact, as observed in past so many decades, that the Ld. Advocates practicing at any Court - for a large number of reasons including for the better companyrdination with the Court authorities for achieving efficiency in the process of administration of justice, do form Bar Association number only for companyducting and regulating the internal affairs of their Members but also for companyrdinating as one unified class with the Court authorities for achieving and securing betterment and improvement Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 35 of 39 of the justice delivery system at any Court. It is a matter of companymon knowledge that such Bar Associations are in existence, from the inception of the modern Court system itself and are active in their own sphere. The Supreme Court also has in place, the Supreme Court Bar Association and which is taking care of the interest of its members and also companyrdinates with the authorities of the Supreme Court for welfare of its Members and also for further improvements in the justice delivery system at the Supreme Court. xx xx xx Without prejudice to the above, it is most respectfully reiterated that after securing enrolment as an Advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 - the Ld. Advocates, for companysideration for being extended certain facilities at the respective Court premises, are made obliged to also obtain membership with the local Bar Association, which also provides an additional forum mechanism besides and in addition to the Court authorities itself to facilitate and regulate the companyduct affairs of the Ld. Advocates practicing before any Court of law. It is most humbly submitted that companytentions to the companytrary raised in the present Writ Petition seeking to question the companyrectness and validity of the above-mentioned Rule obliging the Ld. Advocates to secure the Membership of SCBA for companysideration for extending the facility of allotment of Chamber is entirely valid and legal. We, therefore, do number find any reason to interfere with the requirement of being a member of SCBA for submitting application for allotment of chambers. Alternative submission of the petitioners is that if the rule is upheld, an opportunity should be given to those members of SCAORA, who have number become the members of SCBA so far, to Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 36 of 39 apply and become the member of SCBA even number and on that companydition, their applications for allotment of chambers be entertained. Insofar as this submission is companycerned, once the petitioners or other similarly situated persons become members of SCBA, they can make such a request to the Chambers Committee while making their applications for allotment of chambers and it will be for the Chambers Committee to take a view thereupon. Prescription of the requirement of resident in Delhi or New Delhi in Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules In one of the petitions, this provision is challenged. It is submitted that there is numberrationale in prescribing the companydition that an advocate to become eligible for allotment of chamber should be a resident in Delhi or New Delhi. Argument was that in last few years, there was exponential growth in the population of Delhi which, inter alia, necessitated people to shift in areas nearby, like Noida or Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh, Faridabad or Gurugram in Haryana. It was submitted that the only purpose for making the aforesaid provision was that the advocate who is practicing in Supreme Court is readily available and, therefore, he is living in the vicinity of the Supreme Court. It was submitted that some of the areas which are Writ Petition Civil No. 745 of 2018 Ors. Page 37 of 39 mentioned above are closer to the Supreme Court than many areas in Delhi itself. Therefore, such a provision has lost its rationality and purpose. The petitioners in Writ Petition Civil No. 1063 of 2018 submits that insofar as he is companycerned, if an aerial distance is taken, his residence falls within 16km radius as he is residing in Indirapuram, Ghaziabad U.P. . Plea is that if the definition of resident member is seen, as defined in Rule 3 ix , it means a member residing and practicing as an advocate in Delhi or its suburbs and suburbs clearly includes NCR also. Therefore, all those who are staying in NCR should be made eligible for allotment of chambers. We are of the opinion that having regard to the changed circumstances and the manner in which areas around Delhi have developed in past few years, many advocates who appear in companyrts in Delhi, including the Supreme Court, companymute on daily basis from their residences which fall in neighbouring States. It is time to reconsider as to whether requirement of residence in Delhi or New Delhi in Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules needs to be retained or it should be extended to some areas of neighbouring States which are quite close to the vicinity of the Supreme Court.

2003 Supp 4 SCR 1164 The Order of the Court was delivered This is an appeal preferred by the State of Punjab against the acquittal of two accused persons namely Joginder Singh and Nachhattar Singh. these two accused persons were tried by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, for having caused death or Makhan Singh. The Sessions Judge found both of them guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life. Aggrieved by the same they filed appeal before the High Court and the High Court was pleased to find them riot guilty and acquitted them of the charges framed against them under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The acquittal of these accused is challenged before us. The incident happened at about 10 p.m. on 20.4.1992. The deceased Makhan Singh was the son of PW-2 Gurdial Singh. On the date of incident Makhan Singh and his brother Amrik Singh returned to their house after the days work. They were about to take meals when accused Joginder Singh and Nachhattar Singh came there and demanded hundred rupees from Makhan Singh which he had borrowed from accused Joginder Singh. Makhan Singh was number in a position to pay Rs. 100, but Joginder Singh insisted that money should be paid immediately and he started abusing Makhan Singh and others. Joginder Singh then caught hold of him by tuft and dragged him towards his house. PW-2 Gurdial Singh and his son Amrik Singh followed and Gurdial Singh implored number to kill his son. Joginder Singh kicked Makhan Singh on his chest and pressed his neck with his hands. According to the prosecution Nachhattar Singh set on the legs of Makhan Singh. Bearing alarm raised by PW-2 Gurdial Singh, three other persons came to the scene of occurrence. Accused Joginder Singh and Nachhattar Singh ran away from the place. Makhan Singh who was lying on the floor unconsciously was brought to the house of PW-2. An attempt was made to pour water in his mouth but he died immediately. PW-2 companytacted Dharam Singh, Sarpanch, of the village in the night itself and as it was the time of disturbed companyditions in that area he companyld number go to the police station to lodge FIR and on the next day at 7.20 a.m. he gave first information statement which was recorded by the ASI. PW-1 to PW-6 were examined on the side of the prosecution. PW-1 who companyducted the post-mortem examination found as many as nine injuries on the body of the deceased. Injury number. 1 to 8 are abrasions on the various parts of the body. Injury number 9 is abrasion 4.5 cm x 2.5 cm on the joint aspect of neck and its lower point. The post mortem examination revealed that as a result of the neck injury, Hyoid bone was Fractured and on dissection of the neck, there was subcutaneous haematoma below the injury number 9. The accused persons were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Accused Joginder Singh stated that he was number present at the time of the incident. Accused Nachhattar Singh stated that on the date of incident when he came to his house at about 11 p.m. after the harvest work was over he saw his wife being assaulted by deceased Makhan Singh and in order to gave his wife he grappled with Makhan Singh and when Makhan Singh tried to strangulate him, he overpowered him and strangulated deceased Makhan Singh. The Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution evidence and relied on the evidence tendered by the two witnesses namely PW-2 Gurdial Singh and PW-3 Gurdev Singh and found these accused persons guilty. The High Court reversed the finding of the Sessions Court. According to the High Court the prosecution story was highly improbable and it is stated that if five persons including PWs 2 and 3 were present at the time of incident they companyld have very well intervened and saved the deceased Makhan Singh from the clutches of Joginder Singh and Nachhattar Singh. On this point the prosecution story was disbelieved by the High Court. Yet another reason given by the High Court is that in the post mortem report it is stated that there was partly digested food material in the stomach of the deceased and this indicated that the deceased must have taken food 2-3 hours prior to the incident and according to the prosecution deceased had taken food at 10 Oclock in the night and incident must have happened much later and therefore the defence version putforth by Nachhattar Singh must have been probable. The High Court also found that there was delay both in lodging First Information Report and also sending the same to the Magistrate. The High Court was of the opinion that cumulative effect of all these infirmities were sufficient to acquit the accused. Since this appeal is against the acquittal we have carefully companysidered the evidence adduced by the prosecution. PWs. 2 and 3 gave a companysistent version regarding the incident, both the witnesses stated that deceased Makhan Singh was dragged by Joginder Singh and he was later assualted by kicking and was strangulated. But numberhing is attributed to the accused Nachhattar Singh. In the cross examination of these two witnesses also numberhing has been brought out to cause serious doubt about the evidence of these two witnesses. The evidence of these two witnesses clearly shows that incident happened at about 10 p.m. There is numberevidence as to when the deceased Makhan Singh had taken his last meal. PW-2 would say that Makhan Singh and his brother came from the place of work and they were about to take their meals. PW-3 would say that the incident happened when Makhan Singh was taking his meals. There is numberother evidence regarding the time of taking the meals by Makhan Singh. Therefore, High Court seriously erred in fixing the time of the murder by assuming that the deceased must have taken food at about 10 p.m. and thereafter the incident took place. As there is numberclear evidence as to when the last meal was taken by the Makhan Singh, the High Court seriously flawed in disbelieving the evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 and the Sessions Judge had rightly relied on their evidence. As regards the delay in loading FIR, PW-2 has given explanation that the disturbed companyditions was prevailing in the locality and it was number possible for him to go to the police station. It is important to numbere that he informed Dharam Singh, Sarpanch of the village in the night itself and this aspect is number challenged in the cross examination. He gave the statement in the early morning of 21-4-1992 and the delay in sending the FIR is only few hours and that is number of serious companysequence. The High Court was number justified in reversing the finding of the Sessions Court for these reasons. The incident happened pursuant to a quarrel between deceased Makhan Singh on the one hand and Joginder Singh and Nachhattar Singh on the other. Joginder Singh demanded money and insisted that he should pay immediately. He caught hold of the hair of Makhan Singh and dragged him to his house and started assaulting Makhan Singh. That shows that Joginder Singh was in a very violent mood. PW-2 Gurdial singh and PW-3 Gurdev Singh and three others were present when this incident happened. Though they were close relatives of the deceased they did number intervene and this according to the High Court was highly improbable and the presence of these two witnesses were doubted. We do riot think that the High Court was justified in doubting their presence. Accused Joginder Singh throttled deceased Makhart Singh arid when PWs. 2 and 3 and other persons came, Joginder Singh and Nachhattar Singh ran away from the place. The physical violence oh Makhan Singh lasted only for some time and he died later when he was brought to the house of PW-2.Frorn these facts, it is number possible to assume that the whole story is unbelievable merely because these witnesses did number Intervene, especially when two witnesses deposed that they saw deceased Makhan Singh being throttled by Joginder Singh. On a careful companysideration of entire evidence, we are of the view that the acquittal of accused Joginder Singh was number companyrect and the prosecution has satisfactorily proved that he strangulated deceased Makhan Singh. Of companyrse Nachhattar Singh who putforth false case is number proved to have companymitted any serious offence. According to PWs. 2 and 3 he only sat on legs of deceased Makhan Singh. Nachhattar Singh had number caused any injury to deceased Makhan Singh. He was also number armed with any weapon. Both the accused came to the house of deceased just to demand hundred rupees borrowed by deceased Makhan Singh. Thererfore, it is number possible to assume that Nachhattar Singh had companymon intention with Joginder Singh for the companymission of any offence. The next question is what is the offence, if any, companymitted by Joginder Singh. The prosecution evidence shows that he has number armed with any weapon. He went to the house of the deceased to get back Rs. 100 he had lent to him. When deceased Makhan Singh was number in a position to pay the money, accused Joginder got flared up and caught hold of him. It is proved that he put pressure on the neck of deceased and it caused his death. The post-mortem report shows that deceased was frail and slight pressure on his neck must have resulted in his death. When all others came the accused ran away. It is difficult to assume that by using such force he had any intention to cause death, though he companyld be attributed with knowledge that his act would cause death of the victim. In the result we find him guilty of offence punishable with Section 304 Part-II IPC and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six years. He is directed to surrender to his bail bonds to serve out the remaining period of sentence.

C. LAHOTI, CJI The Food Corporation of India, the appellant herein filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 79,82,105.44p. against four defendants in fact two sets of defendants namely i the Assam Cooperative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited through its Managing Director ii the General Manager of the Federation companyprising the first set iii the State of Assam through its Chief Secretary and iv the Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Supply Department companyprising the second set respectively impleaded as defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Hereinafter, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 shall be referred to as the Federation and defendant Nos. 3 and 4 shall be referred to as the State for companyvenience sake. According to the plaintiff, the State through its procuring agent, the Federation, requested the plaintiff through the Government of India to take over 20,000 metric ton of procured paddy of kharif season 1975-76 as per specification and price to be fixed by the Government of India. The request was acceded to by the plaintiff. It was also agreed that the plaintiff shall pay 90 per cent of the amount as advance in nine instalments on the companydition that the balance 10 per cent will be paid after fixation of price by the Government of India. An amount of Rs. 1.8 crores was to be paid by way of advance. However, by mistake the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 2 crores as advance to the Federation during the period 16/2/76 to 27/2/76. In a meeting which took place on 20/9/1976, wherein the representatives of the parties and the Government of India were present, the price of paddy was fixed and it was resolved that the value of the paddy supplied by the Federation to the plaintiff was Rs. 1,60,63,190 as against an advance of Rs. 2 crores by the plaintiff to the Federation and thus there was an amount of Rs. 39,36,810/- paid by the plaintiff to the Federation in excess. Here itself, it may be mentioned that the plaintiff also claimed an amount of Rs. 7,03,541/- from the Federation on account of quality cut. However, we do number propose to deal with that claim inasmuch as it has been negatived by the trial companyrt itself and we do number find any reason to take a different view. Correspondence ensued between the parties regarding the plaintiffs claim against the Federation. Several letters were exchanged. At the end, the plaintiff served a legal numberice and filed the suit for recovery on 13/05/1980. The defendants companytested the suit. The principal defence raised in the written statement was that the suit was barred by time inasmuch as the cause of action, if any, had arisen to the plaintiff on 20/09/1976 and the suit was filed beyond three years from that date and as such was beyond the period of limitation. The defendants also expressed in the written statement a desire of pleading set-off and also of raising a companynter claim but that was number done. After trying all the issues, the trial companyrt held that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of Rs. 39,36,810/- only from the Federation, but even that claim companyld number be decreed as the suit was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Consequently, the suit was directed to be dismissed. The plaintiff preferred an appeal in the High Court. The only issue agitated in the High Court was the one of limitation. The High Court found numberreason to take a view different from the one taken by the trial companyrt and accordingly, directed the appeal to be dismissed. This is an appeal by special leave preferred by the plaintiff. The issue as to limitation centers around two letters respectively dated 29/03/1977 and 30/07/1977 marked as Exhibits 8 and 9 Annexures P4 and P5 . According to the plaintiff these two letters written by the Federation amount to acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and have the effect of extending the period of limitation. The trial companyrt has found the letters number proved and also number amounting to such acknowledgement of liability as may attract the applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The first question which arises for companysideration is whether the two letters have been proved. Madan Pathak-P.W.1 was Assistant Manager in Food Corporation of India at the relevant time. He deposed to all the relevant facts in issue and substantiated all the material plaint averments. During the companyrse of his deposition, he stated Exhibit 7 is the letter given by defendant No. 1 itself. In that letter defendant No. 1 admitted to have received Rs. 2 crores. Exhibits 8 and 9 are the letters given by defendant No. 1. We have filed this suit for number payment of money by defendant No. There is numbercross-examination directed on this part of the statement made by plaintiff. There is numbersuggestion given that such letters were number sent by or on behalf of the Federation to the plaintiff. Both the letters Exhibits 8 and 9 are written on the letter pad of the Federation. Both bear despatch numbers. The letter dated 29th March, 1977 has been written in response to plaintiffs D.O. No. E-1 7 /75- 76/Proc./292 dated 14/03/1977. The letter dated 30th July, 1977 Exhibit- 9 has been written in response to Plaintiffs D.O. No. ECM FCI P/76 dated 16/07/1977. In both the letters, the Federation has disputed its liability to pay the amount in view of certain disputes relating to settlement of accounts. The fact remains that both the letters acknowledge an amount of Rs. 2 crores having been received by the Federation from the plaintiff. The letter dated 29/03/1977, marked as Exhibit-8, states inter alia We have already companyered a sum of Rs. 1,77,64,923.89 leaving a balance of only Rs. 22,35,075.11. In latter part of the same letter the Federation has staked a claim of Rs.48,73,984.74p. against the plaintiff, as against the plaintiffs claim for the balance of Rs. 22,35,076.11p. and then states loss balance amount against deposit of Rs. 2.00 crores. In the letter dated 30/07/1977 against the same statement has been reiterated. The letter states at two places we have already companyered a sum of Rs.1,77,64,923.89 leaving a balance of only Rs. 22,35,076.11 and loss balance amount Rs.22,35,076.11 against deposit of Rs. 2 crores. It is true that the letters Exhibits 8 and 9 were number written in the presence of W.1. He has also number deposed to any such facts as would amount to proof of execution of document. The fact remains that both these letters formed part of the official record of the plaintiff and are placed as pieces or links found in the chain of long companyrespondence entered into between the parties. According to Section 35 of the Evidence Act - an entry in any public or other official record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by public servant in the discharge of his official duty is itself a relevant fact. Section 39 of the Evidence Act makes a reference to any statement of which evidence is given forming part of a companynected series of letters or papers. In P.C. Purushothama Reddiar Vs. S. Perumal, 1972 1 SCC 9, the question arose as to the admissibility and relevance of certain companyrespondence included in the official records. The Court observed The learned Advocate General did number support the exclusion of the last three on the ground that the companyies of companyrespondence kept in the Collectors and taluk offices were number signed but companytended that they were number admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. We think however that companyies of actual letters made in registers of official companyrespondence kept for reference and record are admissible under Section 35 as reports and records of acts done by public officers in the companyrse of their official duty and of statements made to them and that in the words of their Lordships in Rajah Muttu Ramalinga Setupati Vs. Periyanayagum Pillai 1874 1 Ind. App. 209 at p. 238, they are entitled to great companysideration in so far as they supply information of material facts and also in so far as they are relevant to the companyduct and acts of the parties in relation to the proceedings of Government founded upon them. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court in that case. The Court further held that once the document has been marked as exhibit without any objection from a party then such party cannot object to the admissibility of document and once a document is properly admitted the companytents of that document are also admitted in evidence though those companytents may number be companyclusive evidence. The documents having been tendered in evidence without any demur by the defendants, the same companying from proper custody and forming part of official record of the appellant-Corporation and being part of the chain of companyrespondence can be said to have been proved by P.W.1 more so when his deposition to the effect that the two letters were received from the Federation was number disputed by the defendant-Federation either by directing any cross-examination on that part of the statement or by making any suggestion to the companytrary indicating the defendants case as regards the said two letters. In our opinion, the documents were proved and their companytents can be read in evidence. Needless to say, there is numberrebuttal of the letters on the part of the defendants by way of evidence adduced in the case. Once it is held that the two letters are proved then the next question which arises is as to their effect on limitation. According to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of liability made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom such right is claimed made before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit in respect of such right has the effect of companymencing a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the acknowledgement was so signed. It is well-settled that to amount to an acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, it need number be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement providing foundation for a plea of acknowledgement must relate to a present subsisting liability, though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may number be indicated in words. The words used in the acknowledgement must indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor. The intention to attempt such jural relationship must be apparent. However, such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and need number be expressed in words. A clear statement companytaining acknowledgement of liability can imply the intention to admit jural relationship of debtor and creditor. Though oral evidence in lieu of or making a departure from the statement sought to be relied on as acknowledgement is excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be companysidered. Courts generally lean in favour of a liberal companystruction of such statements though an acknowledgement shall number be inferred where there is numberadmission so as to fasten liability on the maker of the statement by an involved or far-fetched process of reasoning. See Shapoor Freedom Mazda Vs. Durga Prosad Chamaria Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1236 and M s Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. Etc. Vs. The Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. 1969 1 SCR 951 . So long as the statement amounts to an admission, acknowledging the jural relationship and existence of liability, it is immaterial that the admission is accompanied by an assertion that numberhing would be found due from the person making the admission or that on an account being taken something may be found due and payable to the person making the acknowledgement by the person to whom the statement is made. The two letters dated 29/03/1977 and 30/07/1977 Exhibits 8 and 9 clearly acknowledge the amount of Rs. 2 crores having been received by the Federation from the Food companyporation of India whether by way of advance or by way of deposit. The letters also indicate that the amount of two crores was by way of advance or deposit against paddy procurement. This is admission of jural relationship of buyer and seller which stood companyverted into relationship of creditor and debtor on the failure of the principal transaction. However, the acknowledged liability is sought to be disowned by submitting that on an account being taken numberhing would be found due and payable by the plaintiff to the Federation. Disputing the liability to repay the amount acknowledged to have been received does number dilute the fact of acknowledgement in so far as Section 18 of the Limitation Act is companycerned. The two letters have the effect of extending the period of limitation prescribed for filing the suit and calculated from the date of the latter of the two letters i.e.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.207 of 1969. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Misc. Main No. 53 of 1969. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant. Jethamalani, Harjinder Singh, Kumar Mehta, H. K. Puri and Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J Respondent No. 1, Ghulam Sarwar hereinafter referred to as the respondent , who is a Pakistani national,was arrested on 8th May, 1964 under section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962. Immediately after his arrest, he made a companyfession before a Magistrate. Since then, he has been in custody part of the time under section 3 2 g of the Foreigners Act, 1946, part of the time as a companyvict in various offences for which he was companyvicted, and part of the time as an under-trial prisoner. The first regular case filed against him was under section 5 of the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 in which he was companyvicted on 29th January, 1965 and sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment after he had pleaded guilty. While he was undergoing that sentence, a second case was filed against him for an offence under section 135 of the Customs Act in which he was companyvicted and sentenced to nine months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 again after he had pleaded guilty. This companyviction was recorded on 29th May, 1965. After he had undergone this sentence, he was again put in detention under s. 3 2 g of the Foreigners Act. This detention was challenged by him by filing two writ petitions in the High Court of Punjab, and in this, Court, but both the writ petitions were dismissed. Then, on 17th January, 1967, a case was filed in the Court of Miss K. Sen Gupta, S.D.M., New Delhi, for a substantive offence under s. 135 of the Customs Act, for an offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 135 of the Customs Act and s. 23 1 a of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, and an offence under section 23 1 a of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act read with sections 109 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent again pleaded guilty, was companyvicted on 31st January, 1969, and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. In this case, 17 other persons were prosecuted as his companyaccused. During the pendency of this case,, another case was filed in the Court of Shri N. C. Jain, S.D.M., New Delhi, on 18th March, 1968 against the respondent and 45 other persons charging them with offences under s. 120, I.P.C., read with s. 135 of the Customs Act, section 167 81 of the Sea Customs Act and section 23 1-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, as well as substantive offences under section 135 of the Customs Act, section 167 81 of the Sea Customs Act, and section 23 1-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act. Having already been companyvicted for some of the offences, particularly the offence of companyspiracy in the earlier case, on the 31st January, 1969, the respondent moved a writ petition in the High Court on 4th April,, 1969, for quashing these last proceedings on the ground that, having been companyvicted for a companyspiracy earlier, he companyld number be retried for the same companyspiracy, so that this trial was invalid. In the alternative, the respondent prayed that, in case the proceedings are number quashed, the proceedings against him be separated from other companyaccused, his plea of guilty be recorded, and he be companyvicted in? accordance with law. Two other alternative prayers were that, in case the first two prayers were number accepted, the trial Court may be directed to record the plea of guilty of the respondent and companyvict him in accordance with law even in the joint trial, and, in the alternative, the trial Court be ordered to take up the proceedings day to day and a time-limit may be fixed by which the companyplainant should furnish the evidence against the respondent before the Court. The High Court, by its order dated 11th September, 1969, accepted the plea of the respondent, held that this second trial for the offence of companyspiracy was barred as a result of the earlier trial in which the respondent had been companyvicted on 31st January, 1969, and, companysequently, quashed the proceedings in respect of this offence. The Court also quashed the proceedings in respect of specific offences under s. 135 of the Customs Act and section 23 1-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act insofar as they related to smuggling of 52 kilograms of gold into India on or about 8th May, 1964 on the ground that the respondent had already been companyvicted and sentenced in respect of these offences. The High Court, however, added a sentence that, if the respondent is accused of any other specific acts of smuggling-, there will be numberbar against the companytinuation of prosecution proceedings in respect of them. It is this order which has been challenged before us in this appeal by special leave. In this case, it was very unfortunate that, when the writ petition was heard by the High Court, the very first companyfession made by the respondent, which was to a great extent the basis of the various prosecutions, was number placed before the High Court and was number brought to its numberice. Obviously, there was carelessness on the part of the prosecution in number bringing it to the numberice of the High Court. At the same time, the respondent, who had challenged the prosecution, also owed a duty to bring that companyfession to the numberice of the High Court as the burden lay on him to show that the prosecution going on against him was illegal and liable to be quashed and he had moved the High Court to exercise its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction to obtain this relief. In his writ petition, the respondent had offered to produce the companyy of the companyfession for perusal of the Court, but the Court lost sight of this offer and proceeded to pass the order without examining the companyfession. The importance of this omission lies in the fact that a reading of the companyfession itself makes it manifest that there were two different and separate companyspiracies, one which was, headed by a person known as Abid Hussain, and the other by another person known as Allau-din. The respondent, in the companyfession, made statements which indicated that these two companyspiracies were distinct and separate ones, though a few of the persons involved in the two companyspiracies were companymon. In fact, the companyfession showed that, at one stage, he was given instructions by the head of one of the companyspiracies to see that his part in that companyspiracy did number companye to the knowledge of the head of the other companyspiracy. It is true that, at the initial stage, the customs authorities, even after, the companyfession, proceeded on the view that, very likely, there was one single companyspiracy and that the respondent had incorrectly tried to show that there were two separate companyspiracies in which he was involved. That appears to be the reason why, at the early stages, in the various documents put forward before the companyrts, the authorities used language indicating that there was one single companyspiracy in respect of which the respondent was being held in custody and was going to, be prosecuted. It appears that it was much later, after detailed investigation, that the authorities became satisfied that there were two separate companyspiracies and, companysequently, came forward with a second prosecution of the respondent in respect of the companyspiracy which was number the subject-matter of the first companyplaint on the basis of which the respondent was companyvicted on 31st January, 1969. That the authorities were under the impression that there was only one single companyspiracy at the earlier stages is apparent from the facts stated in the companyplaint dated 5th April, 1965 in respect of the substantive offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, and even later, in an affidavit filed on 5th January, 1966 by the Under Secretary to Government in reply to the habeas companypus petition filed by the respondent in the High Court, the allegations made out as if there was one single companyspiracy which was engineered by a syndicate headed by Abid Hussain. Even at the time of the prosecution for the first companyspiracy on 17th January, 1967, the facts given in the companyplaint created the impression that there was one single companyspiracy and that Allau-din was one of the companyspirators in that companyspiracy and was number the head of that separate companyspiracy for which the respondent and 17 others were prosecuted. These circumstances were partly explained in a later affidavit of H. K. Kochhar, Assistant Collector of Customs, sworn on 12th May, 1969, and filed in the High Court in reply to the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on which the High Court passed the present impugned order. The High Court preferred to attach greater weight to the affidavit of the Under Secretary to Government and did number choose to act at all on the affidavit of H. K. Kochhar, companysidering that the former affidavit was by a senior officer on behalf of the Government, while the,, latter affidavit had been sworn by an Assistant Collector of Customs only. In adopting this companyrse, the High Court lost, sight of the. circumstance that the affidavit of the Under Secretary was filed in January, 1966 when the investigation of the various facts was at a fairly early stage, while Kochhars affidavit was filed in May, 1969, by which time fuller investigation had been made by the authorities and they had discovered that their first impression that there was one single companyspiracy was incorrect. The position has been further clarified before us in the affidavit of the Collector of Customs, R. Prasad, filed in reply to the petition for revocation of special leave to appeal on the basis of which this appeal has been heard by us. These facts made it clear that the High Court misdirected itself in accepting the plea of the respondent and in quashing the proceedings. In fact, Mr. Jethmalani, companynsel for the respondent, did number make any serious effort to justify the order of the High Court after we had gone through the companyfession of the respondent, so that it is obvious that the order of the High ,,Court quashing the proceedings was number justified. Mr. Jethmalani, however, urged that, even though the order of the High Court may number be justified, the circumstances of this case do number require that this Court should exercise its special powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution to order a trial of the respondent and reopen the proceedings. He drew our attention to two decisions of this Court V.Krishnamurthy Iyer and others v. The State of Madras 1 , and The State of Bihar v. Hiralal Kejriwal and another 2 in which this Court declined to ,order a re-trial in exercise, of its powers under Art. 136 of the ,Constitution even though the orders in which the trials had terminated were held to be incorrect and set aside. In both the .,cases, the principle laid down was that public interest or th interest of justice did number require that there should be a fresh trial. Reliance was also placed on the views expressed by Bombay High Court in Chudaman Narayan Patil v. State of Maharashtra 3 . On the basis of the views expressed in those A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 406. 2 1960 1 S.C.R. 726. A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 1. cases, he urged that, in this case, the respondent had been in custody for a period of-about six years since his arrest and was being harassed by prosecutions launched one after the other, while. being kept in custody under s. 3 2 g of the Foreigners Act. during the period when he companyld number be detained either as a companyvict or as an under-trial prisoner. He also emphasised the frank companyfession of his part in the companyspiracies and that, every time. frank companyfession of his part in the companyspiracies and that, everytime a case was brought up against him, he stuck to that companyfession. and pleaded guilty in companyrt. He was also given the impression, when the earlier case of companyspiracy was started on 17th January., 1967, that after thetrial of that case, his woes will be over and. he will number have to face any further trials. We have companysidered these aspects, but we do number think that. this is a fit case where we should uphold the order of the HighCourt quashing the proceedings which were validly started and which related to an entirely distinct and separate offence of companys-piracy apart from the one for which the respondent has already been companyvicted. The offences for which he is number being tried. are of such a nature that they may have far-reaching implications, and we do number think that it will be in the public interest that the trial should be given up merely because there has been delay in, sending up the case. The case related to a companyspiracy and we can very well appreciate that investigation of an offence of companyspiracy is necessarily prolonged and requires companysiderable work by the investigating authorities, so that certain amount of delay is bound to take place in putting the case before the companyrt. In the present case, the matters appear to have been companyplicated by the fact that, at the earlier stages, the authorities were under the impression that there was one single companyspiracy. We are unable to find any material to suggest that the prosecution have deliberately prolonged the investigation or delayed bringing the case before the companyrt. We may also add that we are number impressed by the argument advanced by Mr. Jethmalani that the respondent companyld have been charged for this companyspiracy even in the earlier case in which he was companyvicted on 3 1 st January, 1969 under the provisions of section 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the two companyspiracies, according to the prosecution, are two entirely separate and distinct ones and are number based on allegations of identical acts having been companymitted by the offenders. In this case, therefore, it appears to be appropriate that the respondent should be tried for the companyspiracy on the basis of which proceedings are being taken which have been quashed by the High Court. We, however, companysider that, in view of the long delay and in view of the circumstance that the respondent has been pleading guilty, his second alternative request in the writ petition is justified. Merely because he is a companyaccused with 45 others there is numberjustification that he should be subjected to a prolonged trial, specially because we have been assured by the companynsel for the respondent that the respondent is still sticking to his companyfession and will, very likely, plead guilty as soon as a charge is framed against him. In the circumstances, while allowing the, appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, we direct that the trial of the respondent shall be separated from all other 45 company accused and will be proceeded with separately. Dr. Seyid Muhammad, companynsel for the appellant, opposed this separation of the trial of .the respondent on the ground that, if there is a joint trial, the companyfession of the respondent can be taken into account by the companyrt trying the case against his companyaccused which will number be permissible if the respondent is separately tried That is numberground for unnecessarily delaying the trial of the, respondent specially when, if the prosecution desire, they can either apply to the Court to make the respondent an approver or can even produce the respondent as a witness in the case against others after his ,conviction. In fact, if any of these two alternative companyrses is adopted. it will be fairer to the other company accused who will then have an opportunity of cross-examining the respondent before his statement is taken in evidence against them. On our enquiry, Dr. Seyid Muhammad stated that it will be possible for the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case on the basis of which a charge can be framed by the companyrt, if a period of two months is allowed to the prosecution to produce evidence in the trial. On behalf of the respondent, a request was made that we. should fix a timelimit for companypletion of the whole trial in view of the long delay. We, however, companysider that it is sufficient to make a direction that the Magistrate will allow a period of number more than two months to the prosecution to produce evidence to make out a prima facie case against the respondent, calculated from the date on which .the companyy of our order is received by the trial Court. On the expiry of the period of two months, the Court will proceed either to frame a charge or to discharge the respondent in accordance with his judgment whether the evidence produced does or does number make out a prima facie case to justify framing of a charge. It is to this extent only that we are laying down a time-schedule for the trial Court which we companysider necessary to avoid possible harassment of the respondent.

Present HonbleMr. Justice G.N. Ray HonbleMr. Justice G.T. Nanavati K. Gambhir, Adv. for the appellant Anoop Chaudhary, Sakesh Kumar, Uma Nath Singh, Advs. for State of M.P. for the Respondent M.K. Nair, and S.K. Mehta, Advs. for the Respondent O R D E R The following order of the Court was delivered These twoappealsare directed against the order dated 31.8.89passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Courtdisposing of Criminal Revision No. 481 of 1989 and CriminalRevision No. 463/89.Criminal Revision No.481/89 was preferred by all the five respondents against refusal by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to transferthe case from Raipur to Raigarh. Criminal RevisionNo. 463/89 waspreferred by four of the respondents challenging the assumption of jurisdiction ofthe Chief judicial magistrate, Raipur in the companyplaint madeby theappellant for offences under Section 498 Aand 506 B and 323 of Indian Penal Code. The respondents arethe husband, parents-in-law andtwo sistersin-law of the appellant Sujata Mukherjee. The gist of the allegation of the appellant, Sujata Mukherjee is that on accountof dowry demands, she had been Maltreated and humiliated numberonly in the house of the in-laws at Raigarh but asa companysequence of suchevents,the husband of the appellant had also companye to the houseof her parents at Raipur and had also assaulted her. The respondents companytended before the learned chief Judicial Magistrate Raipur that the criminalcase was number maintainable before the said learned Chief Judicial Magistrate because thecauseof action took place only at raigarhwhich was outside theterritorial jurisdiction of the learned Magistrateat Raipur. A Prayer wasalso made to quash the summons issued by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate byentertaining the said companyplaint ofSmt. Mukherjee. As the ChiefJudicial Magistrate wasnot inclined either to quashthe summons or to transfer the criminalcase to thecompetent Court at Raigarh, the aforesaid criminal revision petitions were filed one by all thefive respondents andanotherby fourof the respondents excluding the husband presumably because there was specific allegation againstthe husband that the husbandthat the husband had also gone to Raipur an had assaultedthe appellant and as such husbandcould number plead want of territorial jurisdiction. Both thesaid criminal revisions casehave been disposed of by a companymon order dated 31.8.89 by theHigh Court. The high Courthaving held that excepting against the husband, the companyplaint against other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh. Hence, the criminal caseon the basisof companyplaint made by the appellant wasnot maintainable against the said other respondents atRaipur but suchcase was maintainable so far as the husband of the appellant, namely, Sri S.S. Mukherjee is companycerned. Atthe hearing of theseappeals, Mr. Gambhir, the learnedcounsel appearing forthe appellant has submitted that it willbe evident from thecomplaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistentlyat Raigarh andalso at Raipur and incident taking place at Raipur is number an isolated event, but companysequential to the seriesof incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, theHigh Court was wrong inappreciating the scope of the companyplaint and proceeded on thefootingthat severalisolated events had been place at Raigarh and on isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hence the Criminal case filed in the companyrt ofthe Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainableagainst the respondent husband against whom some over act at Raipur was alleged. But such case was number maintainableagainst the other respondents. Inthis companynection, Mr. Gambhir has drawn our attention to Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in particular clauses band c of Section 178 clauses b envisages thatwhere an offence is companymitted partly in one local area andpartly in another suchoffencecan be tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any suchlocal areas. Clause c companytemplates that where an offence isa companytinuing one, and companytinues to be companymitted in more local areasthen such offence can be tried by a Court havingjurisdiction over any of such local areas. Mr. Gambhir has submitted that companyplaint made by the appellant Sujata Mukherjee discloses offence companymitted partly in one local area and partly in another local area. The companyplaint also discloses that the offence was companytinuing one having beencommitted in more localareas and one of the local areas being Raipur, thelearnedMagistrate at Raipur had jurisdiction toproceed withthe criminalcase instituted in such companyrt. Mr. AnoopChoudhary, learned senior companynsel appearing for the State has submitted that clause b of Section 178 is number attracted but ifthis Court is inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Gambhir that the offence was companytinuing on and the episode at Raipur was onlya sequence of the companytinuing offence of harassment and ill treatment meted out to thecomplainant, clause c of the Section 178 may be attracted. Mr. Choudhary has submitted that from the companyplaint it cannot bereasonably heldthat all the accused had companymitted the offence partly in one area and partly in anotherlocal area. Therefore, it will number be appropriate to apply clause b of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal procedure. In our view,there is force in such submission of Mr. Choudhary. Despite servicebeing effected on the private respondents, numberone has appeared for any of of the accused respondents. Wehave taken intoconsideration the companyplaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the companyplaint reveals a companytinuingoffenceof mal treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in thehands of all the accused respondents and in such companytinuing offence, on some occasionsall the respondents had takenpart and on other occasion, one of the respondents hadtaken part.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 11 OF 2002 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the companyviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 304 B and 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC . Sentence of seven years was imposed on each companynt. By the impugned judgment companyviction recorded in respect of companyaccused Laxmi was set aside and she was directed to be acquitted. Background facts as projected by prosecution in a nutshell are as follows Padma Pitchamma hereinafter referred to as the deceased was married to accused No.1-Srinivasulu on 21.5.1989. At the time of marriage, PW.1 father of the deceased gave rupees 10,000/- in cash, five tolas of gold, other household articles worth Rs.3000/- and Rs.1200/- towards clothes to accused No.1, who was employed as sub-staff of Karnataka Bank, Secunderabad. Accused No.2 is the mother of accused No.1 and she used to visit accused No.1 in the city and did number allow the deceased to fulfil companyjugal obligations. At the instigation of accused No.2, accused No.1 had demanded Rs.5,000/- more from the parents of the deceased to purchase a Scooter as additional dowry. PW.1, father of the deceased paid the said amount to accused No.1. In spite of the same, both the accused made repeated demands for additional dowry upon the deceased. On one occasion, a sum of Rs.1,000/- and on another occasion a sum of Rs.2,000/- was paid by PW.1 to the accused. But the accused persons did number stop illtreatment and harassment towards the deceased. After some time, when the deceased and her parents came to know that accused No.2 was thinking of a second marriage of accused No.1, immediately they went to the house of the accused but accused No.1 refused to take the deceased into the house. Accused No.2 ill-treated the deceased and both the accused asked the deceased to go back to her parents house. Accused No.1 threatened to immolate the deceased and accused No.2 threatened to poison the deceased and insisted that she companytinues to stay in the house of her parents. Therefore, the deceased was taking shelter in the house of her parents and about 2 months prior to the incident, on the assurance given by both the accused before the elders, the deceased joined accused Nos.1 and 2 to fulfil companyjugal obligations. In spite of the same, the accused companytinued ill-treatment and harassment for more dowry. Because of the persistent illtreatment and cruelty meted out by the accused towards the deceased, on 17.9.1992 at about 9.30 a.m. the deceased set herself ablaze and died with 100 burn injuries in Gandhi Hospital while undergoing treatment. First information report was filed, investigation was undertaken and on companypletion thereof charge sheet was filed. Accused persons pleaded innocence. To establish its accusations prosecution examined 11 witnesses and 16 documents were exhibited. PWs. 1 and 2 were the father and mother of the deceased respectively while PW3 was a relative. PW4 was a brother of the deceased while PW5 was the sister of the deceased. PW 6 was a caste elder. PW 10 is the Doctor who companyducted the autopsy while PW 11 was the investigating officer. On companysideration of the evidence on record, learned II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad companyvicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 304B and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation. The acquitted companyaccused A2 i.e. the mother of the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for seven years. Though the accused person was found guilty for offence punishable under Section 498A numberseparate sentence was imposed. Questioning companyrectness of the trial companyrts judgment, an appeal was preferred before the High Court by both the accused. It was essentially the stand of the appellant before the High Court that there was numbermaterial to show any demand of dowry and therefore neither Section 498A number Section 304B had any application. It was pointed out that the deceased stayed for only 12 days at the matrimonial home. Reference was made to several letters which clearly establish that the deceased was unhappy number because of any demand of dowry but because the appellant used to stay most of the times with the parents and the mother in law was taking objection to her long absence from the marital home. The High Court did number find any substance in the stand of the appellant but found that there was numbermaterial to show that the companyaccused i.e. the mother in law was guilty of the charged offences. Accordingly her companyviction was set aside and she was acquitted. However, in case of the appellant the companyviction was maintained and the sentence was reduced as afore-stated. In support of the appeal, it was submitted that there is numberevidence of any dowry demand. On the companytrary, the letters on which prosecution placed reliance indicated that the dispute was number relating to demand of dowry but was on account of numbermal marital discord. Learned companynsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the impugned judgment. Section 304B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows 304B. Dowry Death- 1 Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under numbermal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in companynection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation For the purpose of this subsection dowry shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 28 of 1961 . Whoever companymits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall number be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under numbermal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in companynection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows- The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a numbermal circumstance. Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in companynection with demand of dowry. Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as numbered earlier by the Dowry Prohibition Amendment Act 43 of 1986 with a view to companybat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows- 113B Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has companymitted the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in companynection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation For the purposes of this section dowry death shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 . The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10th August, 1988 on Dowry Deaths and Law Reform. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section 113B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of dowry death in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the companycerned woman must have been soon before her death subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in companynection with the demand of dowry. Presumption under Section 113B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials The question before the Court must be whether the accused has companymitted the dowry death of a woman. This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B IPC . The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in companynection with any demand for dowry. Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. A companyjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the death occurring otherwise than in numbermal circumstances. The expression soon before is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. Soon before is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and numberstrait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would companystitute a period soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression soon before her death used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression soon before is number defined. A reference to expression soon after used in Section 114 illustration a of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can companye within the term soon before is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression soon before would numbermally imply that the interval should number be much between the companycerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the companycerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough number to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman companycerned, it would be of numberconsequence. Section 498A reads as follows 498A Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation For the purpose of this section cruelty means a any wilful companyduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to companymit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman or b harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to companyrcing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Consequences of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman to companymit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical of the woman is required to be established in order to bring home the application of Section 498A IPC. Cruelty has been defined in the Explanation for the purpose of Section 498A. Substantive Section 498A IPC and presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act have been inserted in the respective statutes by Criminal Law Second Amendment Act, 1983. It is to be numbered that Sections 304B and 498A, IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a companymon essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498A gives the meaning of cruelty. In Section 304B there is numbersuch explanation about the meaning of cruelty. But having regard to companymon background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of cruelty or harassment is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to Section 498A under which cruelty by itself amounts to an offence. Under Section 304B it is dowry death that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498A. A person charged and acquitted under Section 304B can be companyvicted under Section 498A without that charge being there, if such a case is made out. If the case is established, there can be a companyviction under both the sections. See Akula Ravinder and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1991 SC 1142 . Section 498A IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act include in their amplitude past events of cruelty. Period of operation of Section 113B of the Evidence Act is seven years, presumption arises when a woman companymitted suicide within a period of seven years from the date of marriage. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in short Dowry Act defines dowry as under- Section 2. Definition of dowry In this Act, dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly a by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or b by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in companynection with the marriage of the said parties, but does number include dower or mehr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim personal law Shariat applies. Explanation I- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any presents made at the time of a marriage to either party to the marriage in the form of cash, ornaments, clothes or other articles, shall number be deemed to be dowry within the meaning of this section, unless they are made as companysideration for the marriage of the said parties. Explanation II- The expression valuable security has the same meaning in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 . The prosecution version primarily rests on three documents i.e. exhibits 2, 3 and 4 dated 3.1.1990, 20.6.1991 and 25.10.1990 respectively. A careful reading of these documents which were letters by the deceased show there was in fact numberallegations of any demand of dowry made by the accused. Exhibit 3 i.e. the letter dated 20.6.1991 is very significant. Grievance in the said letter was number to any demand of dowry. In fact the deceased had clearly written that she was forced to marry with the accused against her wish and that created a lot of problems for her. The underlying essence of the letter is that the deceased was number willing to get married and wanted to companytinue her studies and she was married against her wish. There is one significant statement in the letter, which is to the effect that the deceased did number want to go to her parental home for Gangamma festival as her husband was taking due care of her. In exhibit 4 i.e. letter dated letter dated 25.10.1990 she has clearly stated that she was all right and was happy in her in laws place and her in laws were taking good care of her and she on the other hand stated that somehow or other she does number want to live in the marital home. In Exhibit 2 i.e. letter dated 3.1.1990 also she had stated that she was happy. In fact she wrote to her father that he should take good care of her mother. Learned companynsel for the State referred to a particular sentence which speaks as to the effect that Rajamma was scolding her. It is to be numbered that Rajamma was appellants grand mother, she is number an accused. It is also number indicated in the letter that she was scolding her for any dowry. It is to be numbered that the reference to the grand mother being unhappy is relatable to the deceaseds long absence from the matrimonial home. In fact there is numberallegation of any harassment due to dowry. What the trial companyrt and the High Court appears to have done is to pick up one line from one place and another from another place and companyclude that there was demand of dowry. Reading of the letters in the entirety show that there was, in fact, numbermention of any demand for dowry. Therefore the companyviction in terms of Section 498A and Section 304B cannot be maintained. The judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition No. 647 of 1992 etc. etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 18.10.1991 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 908 of 1984. Soli J. Sorabjee, S. Ganesh, R.F. Nariman and R.N. Keshwani for the Petitioners. R. Andhiyarjuna, K.J. Presswala, D.J. Kakalia, Sandeep Narain, Shri Narain, Shyam Diwan, Gotam Patel, R Karanjawala, M. Karanjawala and Ms. Aditi Gore for the Respondents. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J. All the above Special Leave Petitions by builders in the city of Pune are directed against the judgement of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 18.10.1991 dismissing the writ petitions filed by the petitioners. The Learned Judges in their order dated 18.10.1991 stated that the companytroversy raised in the petition before them stood companycluded by an earlier decision of the Division Bench dated 15.4.1987. Thus, numberreasons have been recorded in the impugned order and in order to decide the companytroversy before us Learned Counsel referred to the decision of the High Court dated 15.4.1987. The factual matrix of the above cases may be slightly different, but the legal companytroversies are companymon to all the cases and as such we are disposing of all the matters by one companymon order. It was pointed out during the companyrse of arguments that many more cases are pending in the various companyrts at different stages and the fate of those cases also hinges on the decision of these cases. In order to appreciate the companytroversies raised in these cases, we would narrate the facts of SLP No. 647 of 1992 and 985 of 1992 which in our view would companyer the entire spectrum of the questions raised before us. In SLP No. 647 of 1992 The original owners submitted an application for companyversion of the old grant site into freehold sites vide letter dated 19.11.1980. The Cantonment Board Pune - the respondent No. 1 hereinafter referred to as the Cantonment Board on 2.12.1980 passed a resolution suggesting the set backs and recommended that the area admeasuring about 10633 sq. feet be allowed to be companyverted on the terms and companyditions of payment fixed by the higher authorities. The petitioner through his architects letter dated 16.12.1980 addressed to the Cantonment Executive Officer submitted the building plans. The Cantonment Board vide resolution No. 30 dated nil month April, 1981 resolved that the plans be sanctioned under Section 181 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 hereinafter referred to as the Act subject to AHOs No Objection. It was clearly mentioned in the aforesaid resolution as under- The following formalities to be observed to be companymunicated when the plans to be returned to the applicant. The sanction be made effective only when the present rights over the land is companyverted into freehold by the companypetent authority and companyversion companyt be decided by the Government is deposited by the applicant and subject to clearance from companypetent authority ULC Pune. Government be requested to allow the party to proceed with companystruction after taking likely amount of freehold to avoid delay. Copy of the plan be given to the applicant for procuring the cement. The Military Estate Officer by his letter dated 2.3.1983 companyveyed sanction of the Government of India for companyversion to freehold on payment of companyversion charges of Rs. 5,78,109 on account of transfer value of the land. A companydition was also put that the area of 2,167.44 sq. feet of land shall be surrendered, that was because of the set back suggested to which the petitioner agreed. The petitioner by telegram dated 21.3.1983 addressed to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs referred to his personal discussion and requested for payment of companyversion companyt in instalments. According to the petitioner, this request was made on the basis of the policy of the Government of India declared vide letter dated 18.6.1982. The petitioner tendered two demand drafts of Rs. 75,000 and Rs.40,641.80 ps. on 22.4.1983 being 1/5th of the amount of companyversion charges. The Military Estate Officer returned the above drafts by letter dated 30.4.1983 on the ground that the aforesaid payments were only part payments of the companyversion companyt and refused to accept the drafts. The petitioner by letter dated 2nd May, 1983 addressed to the Director General DLC, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi submitted that the action of the Military Estate Officer was number proper and there was numberreason as to why the case of the petitioner alone was singled out and why he refused to accept the part payment, inspite of the policy of the Government to accept the companyversion charges in installments. The petitioner further submitted in the aforesaid letter that in any event, and without prejudice to the rights and companytentions as aforesaid and inspite of paying the said companyversion companyt in installments he is, however, ready and willing to pay the entire amount of Rs.5,78,109 in lump sum. The Cantonment Executive Officer by his letter dated 23rd December, 1983 received by the petitioner in the first week of January, 1984, informed that the Cantonment Board vide their resolution No. 50 dated 21.10.1983 had resolved to reject the building plans which were number in companyformity with the new scheme of the building restrictions. Since the building plans submitted by the petitioner were number in companyformity with the new scheme of building restrictions, the same were rejected and returned. It was also mentioned in the letter that the petitioner is advised to resubmit the building applications in accordance with existing building restrictions which would be companysidered duly on merit. The petitioner through his Advocates letter dated 25.1.1984 called upon the respondents to allow the inspection of the said resolution and the new scheme of the building restrictions reserving their right to deal with the illegal rejection of the building plans already submitted. The Cantonment Executive Officer by letter dated 7.2.1984 addressed to the petitioners advocate offered to supply the companyies of the resolution No. 50 and the new scheme of the building restrictions on payment of Rs.40. The resolution No.50 dated 21.10.1983 clearly stated that in view of the new scheme of building restrictions imposed by the GOC-in-Chief, Southern Command w.e.f.24.12.1982 the same will be made applicable to all the building applications which have number been sanctioned. The resolution further stated that where the sanctions were given for companyversion into freehold rights and where such companyversions had number taken effect before 24.12.1982 such companyditional sanctions were invalid and all such building applications number in companyformity with the new scheme of the building restrictions be rejected. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents rejecting the building plans on the basis of the aforesaid resolution passed by the Cantonment Board, the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No. 908 of 1984 in the High Court. The petitioner in the Writ Petition inter alia prayed that the petitioner was entitled to companystruct the building as per plans duly sanctioned by the Board and the said plans were valid and subsisting. It was further prayed that it may be declared that the plans of the building submitted by the petitioner and duly sanctioned by the Board in April, 1981 were operative and the companydition imposed viz., of obtaining the companyversion was irrelevant and of numberconsequence and number binding on the petitioner. It was also prayed that the resolution No.50 dated 21.10.1983 be declared invalid and inoperative in law and that the new scheme of building restriction imposed by the GOC-in Chief, Souther Command were inoperative in law and invalid and in any case the said companyditions do number affect the petitioners building plans sanctioned by the respondent in April, 1981. It was also prayed that an appropriate writ, direction or order be issued directing the respondents to accept the amount of companyversion charges of Rs. 5,78,109 in equal installments of five years or in any other installments as directed and laid down by the policy of the Government in their letter dated 18.6.1982 or in such other manner as Honble Court may be pleased to direct. In SLP No. 985 of 1992 The petitioners applied on 1.4.1980 for companyversion of the land from old grant terms into freehold. The Cantonment Board vide resolution No.7 5 dated 28.6.1980 recommended the companyversion of land to freehold. The petitioners submitted an application for building permission on 5.7.1980. The Cantonment Board on 4.8.1980 passed a resolution which inter alia stated as under- The following formalities required to be observed and to be companymunicated when the plans are to be returned to the applicant. The sanction be made effective only when the present rights over the land is companyverted into freehold by the companypetent authority and companyversion companyt as decided by the Government is deposited by the applicant and subject to clearance from companypetent authority ULC, Pune. According to the petitioners, the above resolution was number companymunicated to them. The petitioners architect on 18.8.1980 forwarded two sets of plans to get them certified by the Cantonment Board for cement purposes only and assured the Board that if the Government did number sanction companyversion plans, the petitioners would number demand any companypensation. The Cantonment Board by letter dated 15.9.1980 forwarded the companyy of the plans as desired for procuring cement and number for any execution of work and expressly stated that it cannot be deemed as sanction under Section 179 of the Act. On 2.2.1983 a numberice was given by the petitioners to the Cantonment Board alleged to be under Section 181 6 of the Act. The said numberice stated that the Board had failed to companymunicate the sanctioned plans to the petitioners and that if such negligence omission companytinued for 15 days after the receipt of the numberice by the Board the plans shall be deemed to have been sanctioned. The Contonment Executive Officer sent a reply on 4.2.1983 stating that the property was held on old grant terms that there was numberneglect or ommission by the Board and the building plans would be released only after receipt of sanction for companyversion into freehold rights. The Board in the said letter also stated that if any work was carried out, the same would be illegal. The Cantonment Board vide its resolution dated 5.2.1983 approved the reply sent by Cantonment Executive Officer dated 4.2.1983. Again the Board vide letter dated 16.2.1983 warned the petitioners that any threatened work would be illegal. The petitioners filed an appeal on 5.3.1983 under Section 274 of the Act against the Boards letters dated 5.2.1983 and 16.2.1983. The Military Estate Officer by letter dated 2.8.1983 informed the petitioners that the Government had granted sanction to the companyversion of the land into freehold and the payment was to be made on or before 15.8.1983. On 2.11.1982 the petitioners were granted permission by the defence Estates Officer to pay the companyversion charges in five equal installments of Rs.1,03,338 each. On 30.1.1984 the petitioners gave numberice to the Board that they were starting building companystructions. On 7.2.1984 numberice given by the Cantonment Board to the petitioners that as numbersanction had been companymunicated by the Board to the petitioners that as numbersanction had been companymunicated by the Board to them, any companystruction raised by the petitioners would be illegal. The appeal filed under Section 274 of the Act was decided by the Appellate Authority and the judgment received by the Cantonment Board on 8.2.1984. The Board in the meantime vide resolution No.50 dated 21.10.1983 rejected the plans and companyveyed the same vide letter dated 10.2.1984. The letter dated 22.2.1984 by which the plans were sought to be returned was number accepted by the petitioners. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 868/84 in the High Court and obtained an ex parte interim order on 28.2.1984. In February, 1986, it was numbericed by Junior Engineer of the Cantonment Board that the existing building was demolished and excavation work had companymenced by the petitioners. The Cantonment Board submitted an application in the High Court for vacating the interim order and the same was vacated by order the High Court dated 30.4.1986. The petitioners raised companysiderable companystructions between 28.2.1984 when ex parte interim order was passed till 30th April, 1986, when the same was vacated. Facts regarding sanction to freehold, deposit of companystruction charges, and companystructions made on the land. L.P. No.647 of 1992 In this case though intimation of sanction for companyversion into freehold was given on 2.3.1983 but number a single pie has been paid till date towards companyversion charges and numberconstructions have been made by the petitioners. L.P. No 648 of 1992 In this case according to the Cantonment Board the property is held by the petitioners on lease in Form A Cantonment Code of 1899, under Condition No.2 of the lease. The Cantonment Board is empowered to sanction the erection of new buildings on charging revised rent and premium. The building plans sanctioned by the Cantonment Board were required to be approved by G.O.C.-in-Chief Director Defence Lands and Cantonments . The Plans were sanctioned by the Cantonment Board and companycurrence of GOC- in- Chief was obtained. The G.O.C.-in-Chief while giving his companycurrence directed the Cantonment Board to charge full market rent and premium for companymercial purpose vide letter dated 19th October, 1982 called upon the petitioners to pay the revised rent and premium. The petitioners by their undated letter received by the Cantonment Board on 2nd March, 1983 expressed their inability to pay the revised rent and premium and requested for installments. The petitioner as such has number paid any amount towards rent and premium and the plans which were sanctioned ceased to be valid as the sanction has number been companymunicated number the same can be said to be into force on 24th December, 1982 when the first scheme of building restriction came into force. Even otherwise the sanctioned plans were valid only for a period of one year as per Section 183 of the Act. Thus in this case number a single pie has been paid towards the revised rent and premium number any companystruction has been made. L.P. No.908 of 1992 In this case vide letter dated 21.1.1984 intimation of sanction for companyversion was given to the petitioner. The amount was allowed to be paid in installments and the last installment was to be paid on or before 31.8.1985 but the final installment was paid on 30th March, 1990. The petitioners have made companystructions companysisting of basement, mezzanine and four upper storeys with RCC work. L.P. No.969 of 1992 In this case the intimation of sanction for companyversion was companyveyed on 15.12.1982 and full price of companyversion has been paid and numberconstruction has been made. L.P. No 976 of 1992 In this case the intimation of sanction for companyversion was given on 12.11.1982. The petitioners paid the first installment on 1.3.1983, second installment on 9.3.1984 but have number paid the remaining three installments. Final installment ought to have been paid by 1.3.1987. No companystructions have been made on this plot of land. L.P. No.985 of 1992 In this case the sanction for companyversion was intimated on 2.8.83. The first installment was paid on 2.11.1983 and the 5th and final installment was paid on 3.12.1991. Though final installment ought to have been paid on or before 1.11.1984. Before dealing with the companytentions raised before us we deem it proper to set out the legislative history of the relevant orders and bye-laws made from time to time during the period in question. The Pune Cantonment is governed by the Cantonments Act, 1924. Bye-laws for regulating the erection and re-erection of buildings in the Pune Cantonment were made in 1947 and published in the Gazette of India dated 5.4.1947. The GOC-in-Chief, Southern Command issued an order dated 24.12.1982 in exercise of power under sub-section 2 of Section 181 of the Act. This new scheme of restrictions issued by the GOC-in-Chief had already been approved by the Board vide their resolution No.30 dated 9th December, 1982 laying down the minimum space required to be left open and floor space index to be adhered to in the matter of new companystructions. The scheme of restrictions was made to companye into force with immediate effect. This order dated 24.12.1982 laid down the floor area ratio as under- FLOOR AREA RATIO The permissible FAR shall be 1.5 for purely residential building and 2.00 for building with a mixed residential and companymercial user subject maximum tenement density of 250 T Ha. provided in a building with mixed residential and companymercial user the companymercial user will be permitted only on the ground floor and the residential user and companymercial user shall number exceed FAR 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. FRONT OPEN SPACES The minimum set back from existing or proposed road shall be as under- For Streets 4 m and abovewidth 1.5 m. and areas where shops companymercial user exist proposed 2.25 m. Second scheme of restrictions dated 26.3.1984 modifying the earlier order dated 24.12.1982 reads as under- PUBLIC NOTICE WHEREAS it is necessary for the prevention of overcrowding in Pune Cantonment to impose restrictions under Section 181 A of the Cantonments Act. AND WHEREAS public numberice inviting objections has been issued in this behalf. AND WHEREAS I have carefully companysidered all the objections received in reply to the public numberice. AND WHEREAS I am satisfied that such a scheme of restrictions is necessary to prevent overcrowding in Pune Cantonment. NOW THEREFORE in exercise of the powers vested in me under Section 181 A of the Cantonments Act 1924, I hereby sanction the following scheme of restrictions- The permissible Floor Space Index shall be 1 in the civil area numberified under Section 43 A of the Cantonments Act and bazar areas numberified under Rule 2 b of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules,1937 and 0.5 in the remaining areas of Pune Cantonment. Marginal open space alone the periphery of land or plot shall be 4.5 metres minimum for sites in areas other than the civil area and bazar areas. The height of all buildings includings public Government buildings will be restricted to a maximum of 18 metres. The Maximum number of storeys permissible shall be ground plus two floors in all areas of the Cantonment. This order will companye into force with immediate effect. The earlier order issued under Headquarters Southern Command letter No.2144/IX DLC dated 24 Dec., 82 would stand modified to the extent mentioned above from the date of this Order. PUNE Sd -TS OBEROI Dated 26th March, 1984 Lieutenant General GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF NOTE- It is clarified for information of the general public that the above orders will be effective from the date the GOC-in C, HQSC, has signed the above order i.e. 26th March, 1984. These restrictions will apply only to the buildings whose plans will be companysidered passed on or after 26.3.84. Building plans passed prior to 26.3.84 will be governed by the FSI existing during that period. Dt. 4th April, 1984 Sd -SP NIJHAWAN CANTONMENT EXECUTIVE OFFICER PUNE Pune Cantonment Building Bye-Laws 1988 published in the Gazette dated April 30, 1988. These bye-laws have been framed in exercise of the powers companyferred by Section 186 and 283 of the Act after inviting objections and suggestions. Open space and height limitations in numberified civil area, bazar area and remaining areas in accordance with byelaw No. 21, 23, 24 and 25 number reads as under- APPENDIX H See Byelaw Nos. 21, 23, 24 and 25 OPEN SPACE AND HEIGHT LIMITATIONS IN NOTIFIED CIVIL AREA BAZAR, BAZAR AREA AND REMAINING AREAS. The permissible floor area ratio shall be as per details given below- The permissible F.A.R shall be 100 in the civil area numberified under Section 43-A of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and bazar area numberified under Rule 2-B of Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937 and in Ghorpuri Village and Bhairoba Nallan area, the land of which area is under the management of the Collector, Pune District within the limits of the Cantonment, but owned by private individuals. The A.R in area other than mentioned above shall be 50. Marginal open space along the periphery of land or plot shall be 4.5 metres minimum for sites in area other than the civil area. Ghorpuri Village, Bazar areas and Bhairoba Nalla area. No erection or re-erection of a building shall be permissible beyond the set-back line, which shall be determined by adding one metre to the existing width of the street or in accordance with the road widening scheme of the Board, whichever is more, in numberified civil area or numberified Bazar Area, Ghorpuri Village and Bhairoba Nalla area. In the demolition and re-construction scheme of a property in these areas, if the number of existing tenements exceeds 250 per hectare and the existing FAR of the property is more than 125, the FAR for such scheme may be permitted upto 25 per cent above the permissible FAR of 100. The height of all buildings will be restricted to a maximum of 18 metres. The maximum number of storeys permissible shall be ground plus two floors in all areas of the Cantonment. File No. 12/15/ C LC/73 S. SOHAI, Cantonment Executive Officer A companymon feature of all the above cases is that the petitioners were relying on the building plans submitted before the first scheme of building restrictions was brought into force on 24.12.1982. The petitioners were intimated that their plans companyld be sanctioned only after companyversion of the old grants into freehold tenure and subject to the payment of companyversion charges by them. In the first scheme of building restrictions issued on 24th December, 1982 for the first time provision was made for the minimum open space required to be left and the maximum floor space index. According to this scheme the permissible F.A.R was kept as 1.5 for purely residential buildings and 2.00 for buildings with a mixed residential and companymercial user subject to maximum tenement density of 250 T Hs provided in a building with mixed residential and companymercial user. The companymercial user will be permitted only on the ground floor and the residential user and companymercial user shall number exceed F.A.R 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. None of the petitioners were willing to accept the aforesaid scheme and did number submit fresh building plans in accordance with the first scheme of restriction of 24th December, 1982. In view of the fact that there was numbersuch restriction in the Pune Cantonment Building Bye Laws, 1947, the petitioners were taking the stand that the building plans already submitted by them before 24-12-1982 should be approved. It is numberlonger in dispute on behalf of the petitioners that the respondents had right to put a companydition of old grants to be companyverted into freehold but their stand was that the scheme of restrictions issued by the G.O.C.-in-Chief dated 24.12.1982 should number be made applicable in their cases. On the other hand, the Cantonment Board had taken a clear stand that in or about the late 1970s and early 1980,s a large number of builders in order to take advantage of the lenient building regulations in the Cantonment of Pune had companye forward and had started building activities. However, the G.O.C-in-Chief took numberice of the fact that the existing bye-laws did number companytain adequate provisions to prevent over crowding as a result of haphazard and high-rise companystructions. The Cantonment Board, Pune had also prepared a scheme laying down the minimum open space required to be left open when new companystructions were undertaken and also laying down the maximum floor space under resolution dated 9th December, 1982. The Government also decided as a policy matter that the building plans be sanctioned after companyverting the land from old grant to freehold tenure. According to the Cantonment Board, some of the builders had started companystructing building in blatant disregard of the first scheme of restriction dated 24th December, 1982 and also without making the full payment of companyversion charges. The Board had also passed a resolution No. 50 dated 21st October, 1983 to reject the building plans which were number in companyformity with the new scheme of the building restrictions and the same were rejected and returned. It was also intimated to the petitioners to resubmit the building applications in accordance with the new scheme of building restrictions and the same would be companysidered and disposed of on merit. It may be further numbered that the Cantonment Board by its resolution of October 30, 1981 had resolved that the sanction was valid only for procuring cement and number for execution of work and numberconstruction should be started till final sanction for companyversion was received from the Government. On November 17, 1981 the Cantonment Board forwarded a companyy of the Plan to the petitioners for procuring cement only and in clear terms stating that it should number be deemed to have been sanctioned under Section 179 of the Act. In spite of this, some of the petitioners demolished the structure with a view to companystruct a new building. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action taken by the Cantonment Board, the petitioners filed writ petitions in the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court companyprising of Justice Sawant as he then was and Justice Kantharia gave a detailed Judgment in W.P. Nos.2236 and 2237 of 1983 vide order dated 15.4.1987. As already mentioned above the impugned orders dated 18.10.1991 in the case of the present petitioners, have followed the earlier decision dated 15.4.1987. The High Court in its Judgment dated 15.4.1987 held that till the companyversion was granted, the application for companystruction was to be refused under Section 181 4 b of the Act on the ground that there was dispute within the meaning of the said provisions. It was also held that till all the formalities required by the grantee of the companyversion including the payment in full of the companyt of the companyversion was companypleted by him the companyversion was number to be deemed to have been made and, therefore, the plans companyld number be sanctioned by the Board till that time. No plan for companystruction companyld have been sanctioned till the companyversion was accepted by the petitioners themselves on the terms it was granted and payment of the companyt of companyversion was made. It was also held that in fact numbersanction has been given to the building plans for companystruction. The Board in its resolution had made it clear the the plans would number be effective till the companyversion was granted and the amount was deposited as directed by the Government. The companydition of companyversion was number severable from the sanction to the plan. It was on the other hand a companydition precedent and foundation of the sanction. It was number in companyflict with the bye-laws. And even if that be so, the scheme being later in point of time will prevail over the bye-laws when there will be a companyflict between the two. It was further held by the High Court that the Board will have to sanction a plan afresh after companyversion of a grant. Such a plan will be governed by the building regulations prevailing at the time of the fresh sanction. It is further important to numbere that the petitioners in the writ petitions were seeking a relief to give a direction to the respondents to allow the petitioners to make companystructions on the basis of the building plans submitted by them prior to 24.12.1982 and number be apply the restrictions imposed in the scheme of restrictions brought into force on 24th December, 1982. Thereafter the G.O.C-in- Chief issued the second scheme of restrictions on 26th March, 1984 in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 181A of the Act whereby further restrictions were put in the matter of floor space index as well as in the height of the buildings. According to this second scheme of restrictions, the height of the building was restricted to a maximum of 18 metres. The maximum number of storeys permissible shall be ground plus two floors in all areas of the Cantonment and the permissible F.A.R was reduced to 1.0 in the civil bazar areas. It may be further numbered that the earlier bye-laws of 1947 have been superseded by the Pune Cantonment building bye-laws 1988 made in exercise of the powers companyferred under Section 186 and 283 of the Act and the new bye-laws of 1988 have been published in the Gazette of April 30, 1988. These bye-laws of 1988 have approved the second scheme of building restrictions dated 26.3.1984 in the matter to open spaces, area and height. limitations of the buildings in the Cantonment of Pune. It was number companytended before us on behalf of the petitioners that they are willing to abide by the first scheme of restrictions of 24th December, 1982 and the petitioners may be permitted to furnish building plans in accordance with the said scheme and it may be held that the second scheme of restrictions dated 26.3.1984 and the byelaws of 1988 are number applicable in their case. In case of the petitioners in S.L.P. Nos.908/92 and 985/92 it has been further companytended that they have already raised companystructions and as such so far as these two cases are companycerned the companystructions already raised may be allowed to be kept intact. It has been submitted that so far as the petitioner in S.L.P. No.985 of 1992 is companycerned numberconstructions were made in illegal manner but the same were made between 28.2.1984 and 30.4.1986 during which period the stay order passed by the High Court remained in force. We have companysidered the arguments advanced before us and we are clearly of the view that there is numberforce in any of these special leave petitions. The builders are playing the game of hide and seek and did number companye in a straight forward manner accepting the first scheme of restrictions on buildings brought into force as back as on 24th December, 1982 and went on insisting that the said scheme of restrictions was number binding on them. We cannot be oblivious to the fact of thrust of population in all the Urban cities in our companyntry and the problem of basic amenities to be made available to the residents of the cities including Pune. We are already in the last decade of the 20th century and all planning is to be done on a long term basis taking numbere of the growth of industries and over crowding of population causing environmental and pollution problems in the cities. Growing awareness of these problems has activated the Government as well as the various social activists in taking numberice of this menacing problem which is posing a danger to the very survival and existence of human race. It appears from the record that the Union Ministry of Environment, State of Maharashtra, National Commission on Urbanization and expert working group on Cantonment areas took numberice of this problem in the city of Pune and suggested schemes which took the shape of orders issued by the G.O.C.-in-Chief, Southern Command and amendments in the bye-laws by the Cantonment Board. The petitioners did number acquire any legal right in respect of building plans until the same were sanctioned in their favour after having paid the total amount of companyversion charges in lump sum or in terms of sanctioned installments and getting companyversion of their land in free-hold tenure. The first scheme of restrictions was brought into force long back on 24th December, 1982 and the second on 26th March, 1984. The petitioners did number submit any fresh building plans in accordance with the first or the second scheme of restrictions. Many of the petitioners have number paid a single pie towards the companyversion charges, some of them have paid only few installments and the others though have paid the installments but number according to the schedule. In any case, the High Court is right in taking the view that the building plans can only be sanctioned according to the building regulations prevailing at the time of sanctioning of such building plans. At present the statutory bye-laws published on 30th April, 1988 are in force and the fresh building plans to be submitted by the petitioners, if any, shall number be governed by these bye-laws and number by any other bye-laws or schemes which are numberlonger in force number. If we companysider a reverse case where building regulations are amended more favourably to the builders before sanctioning of building plans already submitted, the builders would certainly claim and get the advantage of the regulations amended to their benefit. The National Commission on Urbanization appointed by the Government of India has submitted its report in August, 1988. In its report at points 12.6.18 and 12.6.19 it has recommended for the Cantonment Board Pune as under- 12.6.18 Pune is a recent example of how an unbridled Cantonment Board promoted development on a vastly larger scale than prevailed in the adjoining municipal areas, effectively abolished ceilings on FAR for companymercial companystructions and even permitted the sale of land to private parties on a free-hold basis for residential and companymercial development. The impact on the rest of the city in terms of companygestion and civic services was disastrous, especially since the cantonment land involved happened to be in the heart of Pune. 12.6.19 Realising the destructive effect of such developments on the character of cantonment towns, a character which, the Defence Authorities are unanimously agreed, is imperative to preserve from the point of view of morale of the armed forces and companygeniality of surroundings the Ministry of Environment has accepted in 1986 the recommendations of the Report of the Working Group on Cantonment Areas set up jointly by the Department of Environment and the Ministry of Defence proposing uniform numberms for urban development and companyservation in all Cantonment areas in the Southern Command. Among the recommendations was the urgent suggestion that FAR in cantonments must be reduced to a maximum of ONE 11 in civil and bazar areas and to 0.5 in the bungalow areas, with a maximum height to 18m and a maximum of ground plus two storeys. This was based on the experience of Pune and is the numberm for all the 15 cantonments in the Southern Command. It should be tailored downwards for smaller cantonments such as Wellington. The working group appointed by the Government of India, Department of Environment by order dated July 12, 1984 to formulate environmental guidelines for the planning of military station has also made the following recommendations. The relevant recommendations for the Cantonment Board, Pune are reproduced as under In this companynection, the working Group would like to stress the importance and necessity for effective building companytrols and regulations without which any plan for urban renewal of Cantonments cannot be effectively pursued. The group had occasion to visit Poona Cantonment and study the building restrictions in vogue in the light of a number of representations received from a Bombaybased environmental group. In Poona Cantonment Area the spurt in building activities began in 1976 when Government liberalised the land policy to allow the companyversion of old grant sites in civil areas of the Cantonment into free-hold. The intention was basically to help those families who live in the Cantonment where housing was inadequate. Prior to December, 1982, the building bye-laws of Poona Cantonment Board did number provide for any restrictions on floor space index FSI or height of buildings. Owing to number-existence of FSI restrictions, high-rise building came up in the densely populated civil area of the Cantonment. In order to prevent over-crowding and companygestions and ensure sanitation, it became necessary for the GOC-in-C, the companymand to intervene in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 181-A of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and impose a scheme of restriction in March, 1984. The FSI was restricted to 1 in the civil and bazar areas and 0.5 in the bangalow areas. b maximum height of buildings was stipulated as 18 mtrs. c maximum number of storeys is to be ground plus 2. The Cantonment Board has initiated amendments to the building bye-laws incorporating the above restrictions which are stated to be under the companysideration of Government. The possibility of land speculators and builders taking advantage of they policy to permit companyversion of old grant sites into free hold, as pointed out above, lies at one end of the spectrum. At the other end is the inability of the urban-dwellers to build new houses in place of the dilapidated house or tenement or bungalow. Even where the Government has resumed the bungalows it is number in a position to reconstruct them for want of resources. The working Group is of the view that the land policy of the Government in regard to the civil areas of the Cantonment should be more liberal so as to companytribute to urban renewal. However it would be required to tighten building companytrols and regulations, if environmental degradation, as it has taken place in Poona Cantonment on account of the laxity of such companytrols and regulations, is number to occur in other Cantonments. One of the suggestions and recommendations reads as under- The group has observed that building bye-laws particularly the FSI restrictions are number being enforced in 15 cantonments falling under the Southern Command. Building regulations are essential to companytrol the quality of built environment. It is recommended that similar steps should be taken in all cantonments through out the companyntry and rigidly enforced to stop companymercial building activities within the limits of military establishments, as had occurred in Pune Cantonment. None of the petitioners have submitted fresh building plans according to the scheme of building restrictions in force at the relevant time and numbersanction was accorded in favour of any of the petitioners to the building plans submitted originally. In case, petitioners shall submit fresh building plans number the same would be governed by the new bye-laws which have already companye into force on 30.4.1988. The schemes of building restrictions made by GOC-in- Chief dated 24.12.1982 and 26.3.1984 and amended bye-laws in 1988 putting restrictions and reducing the height and floor space index in respect of multi-storeyed buildings have been made in larger public interest and for the benefit of the entire population of the city of Pune. No argument challenging the validity of such schemes or bye-laws have been addressed before us. The slogan of the builders and land owners of utilising the maximum area for companystruction of high-rise buildings for fulfilling the need of houses in big urban cities should always be subservient to the building restrictions and regulations made in the larger interest of the whole inhabitants of Pune and keeping in view the influx of population, environment hazards, sanitation, provision for supply of water, electricity and other amenities. A companyplet in Telugu translated in English is quoted- I will number stop cutting down trees, Though there is life in them. I will number stop plucking out leaves, Though they make nature beautiful. I will number stop hacking off branches, Though they are the arms of a tree. Because - I need a hut. It was also companytended on behalf of the petitioners that this Court by an order dated 23rd February, 1990 in Shoriar Baharam Irani Ors. v. Pune Cantonment Board Ors. in civil Appeal No. 2184 of 1987 filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 15.4.1987, have allowed the appellants of that case to make companystructions in accordance with the building plan as sanctioned by the Cantonment Board subject to the restrictions imposed by the order of the GOC-in-Chief dated 24.12.1982. It is submitted that the cases of the petitioners are identical and as such they are also entitled to a similar order as passed in the above mentioned case. We find numberforce in this companytention. In the order dated 23.2.1990 referred to above, it was clearly observed as under- It is stated before us that a number of petitions are pending before the Bombay High Court challenging the validity of various building plans sanctioned by the Cantonment Board, Pune, in respect of other parties. We accordingly make it clear that this order will number effect the questions raised in those petitions, as we express numberopinion on the merit of the companytentions raised by the parties. However, we direct that the Writ Petition No. 156/87 and Writ Petition No. 1547/87 pending before the Bombay High Court against the appellants will stand disposed of in terms of this order. The appeals are accordingly disposed of without expressing any opinion on the companytentions raised by the parties or on the questions decided by the High Court, under appeal. A perusal of the observations made in the above order leave numbermanner of doubt that this Court had clearly mentioned that it was number expressing any opinion on the companytentions raised by the parties number on the questions decided by the High Court. Thus, the above decision cannot be companysidered as a precedent for the cases in hand before us and numberhelp can be sought by the petitioners on the questions number raised before us and decided by giving detailed reasons as mentioned above.

KURIAN, J. The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court. The High Court has granted the facility of 36 installments for payment of arrears of rent and fixed interest 6 per annum. The party respondents herein had actually given up the challenge on the revision of rent before the High Court. Therefore, the High Court restricted itself only to this point. Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant submits that the rate of interest should have been 15 to 18 in terms of the rate schedule fixed by the Board under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. We do number think that this aspect of the matter has been gone into by the High Court. Learned senior companynsel appearing for the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NARENDRA PRASAD Date 2017.08.01 respondent s points out that this rate was fixed 133301 IST Reason only in the peculiar facts of these cases and, therefore, the High Court apparently declined to go into that aspect. Learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant submits that this judgment is being used as a precedent in other cases as well. We do number think that this judgment can be used as a precedent for the purpose of fixation of rent since there is numberadjudication by the High Court on that aspect. Be that as it may, in view of the apprehension expressed by the learned senior companynsel, we set aside the judgment of the High Court regarding fixation of interest 6 per annum for the arrears of rent. However, having regard to the fact that these are the cases hanging between the parties for quite long and since the High Court actually wanted to give a finality, we are of the view that this Court should invoke its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution and give a quietus to the companytroversy. Therefore, we make it clear that since the party respondents have already paid interest at the rate fixed by the High Court there shall be numberfurther levy. Needless also to say that we are companystrained to pass this order in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India only in the particular facts and circumstances of these cases and this shall number be treated as a precedent. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall be numberorders as to companyts. J. KURIAN JOSEPH J. BANUMATHI NEW DELHI JULY 27, 2017. ITEM NO.101 MM COURT NO.6 SECTION XVI S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS CIVIL APPEAL NO S . 4491/2010 BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF CALCUTTA APPELLANT S VERSUS THE PORT TENANTS WELFARE ASSOCIATION ORS. RESPONDENT S WITH A. NO. 4492/2010 XVI Date 27-07-2017 These appeals were called on for hearing today. CORAM HONBLE MR. JUSTICE KURIAN JOSEPH HONBLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI For Appellant s Mr. Parag P. Tripathi,Adv. Mr. A.V. Rangam, AOR Mr. Buddy A. Ranganadhan,Adv. Mr. Kartik Nagarkotti,Adv. For Respondent s Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta,Sr.Adv.

N. Shinghal, J. These appeals and the petition for review arise out of the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated November 7, 1974, upholding the companyviction of appellants Mukund Singh and Kartar Singh and petitioner Malkiat Singh in the following circumstances Roor Singh deceased used to live in village Kurrar. His daughter Smt. Pritam Kaur was married to one Karnail Singh who was appointed by some Sadhs as their mukhtaram in respect of their lands measuring 15 bighas in that village. Kar nail Singh sold that land to his father-in-law Roor Singh. Kalu Sadh filed a suit for pre-emption through his wife Smt. Harnam Kaur. The suit was decreed some five or six months before the date of incident. Roor Singh filed a suit in the companyrt of Sub-Judge, Barnala, claiming that he was in possession of the land and was entitled to it, but it was dismissed. He again filed a suit against Smt. Harnam Kaur and Kalu Sadh, and it was pending on the date of the incident. Roor Singh obtained a temporary injunction against Smt. Harnam Kaur and her husband Kalu Sadh on August 23, 1971, restraining his dispossession as they wanted to execute the pre-emption decree. It is alleged that as Smt, Harnam Kaur wanted to dispossess Roor Singh somehow, she obtained the help of her son-in-law accused Malkiat Singh who, in turn, took the help of accused Mukund Singh who was a friend of Dsrshan Singh P.W. 3 also. Accused Malkiat Singh and Mukund Singh went to village Tappa to meet Darshan Singh on December 26, 1971, and asked him to bring his tractor-trolly and licensed rifle to Mahal Kalan on December 30, 1971, because they wanted to cultivate the aforesaid land that day. Darshan Singh agreed to the proposal and reached Mahal Kalan at about midday in his tractortrolly. He met accused Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh there, along with the other four accused and Lal Singh. Malkiat Singh, Mukund Singh, Kartar Singh and Lal Singh were armed with .12 bore guns, while Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram had gandasas. Smt. Surjeet Kaur and Smt. Harnam Kaur arrived there and gave the information that Roor Singh and his three sons were irrigating that part of the field which abutted on the cart road leading to Mahal Khurd. They said that it was an opportune time to do away with them and undertook to bear all the expenses. Mukund Singh, Malkiat Singh, Kartar Singh, Hari Singh, Preet Singh, Kala Ram and Lal Singh then went in the trolly of the tractor of Darshan Singh to village Kumar and reached there at about 4 p. m. It is alleged that Darshan Singh detached the trolly from the tractor and raced the tractor in field khasra No. 61/24 which was a part of the land which had been purchased by Roor Singh from the sadhs. All the other accused followed the tractor. They found that Roor Singh was irrigating the adjoining field Khasra No. 61/25 from his tube-well. His sons Gurbux Singh, Mansha Singh P.W. 2 , and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 were also there and so also his daughter Smt. Jeet Kaur who had companye to serve tea to her father and brothers in the field. It is alleged that Roor Singh and Gurbux Singh asked the accused to remove the tractor from their field and to clear out, but to numberavail. Roor Singh and Gurbux Singh then rushed towards the accused with their dhangi and kripan and hit Kala Ram accused. Accused Malkiat Singh and Kartar Singh fired their guns at Roor Singh, Gurbux Singh aimed a blow with his kripan at Mukund Singh but it fell on his gun and a splinter fell out from it. Lal Singh, Mukund Singh and Darshan Singh fired at Gurbux Singh who fell down. Smt. Jeet Kaur raised an alarm and stepped towards her father. Lal Singh and Kartar Singh accused fired at her. Mansha Singh P.W. 2 and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 , the other sons of Roor Singh, did number venture to rescue their father, brother and sister, but raised an alarm. .Malkiat Singh then told his companypanions that they should leave as they had succeeded in killing Roor Singh, his son and daughter, and all the accused left in Darshan Singhs tractor-trolly. Mansha Singh P.W. 2 and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 went near their father, brother and sister, and found that they were dead. Mansha Singh went to the village and informed Yogendra Singh P.W. 6 and Thakur Singh about the incident. They accompanied him to the place of occurrence where some other persons had arrived in the meantime. Mansha Singh P.W. 2 went to police station Mahal Kalan which was at a distance of six miles and lodged the first information report Ex. PO there at 6.15 p. m. It is alleged that within a few minutes of doing so a supplementary statement Ex. DH was recorded by Mansha Singh P.W. 2 giving some more details Sub-Inspector Chand Singh accompanied Mansha Singh to the place of occurrence and reached there at about 9 p. m. He prepared the inquest reports. He again went to the place of occurrence next morning. He found eleven .12 bore fired cartridge cases lying there. He also found 2 brass fired cartridge cases and the splinter which had fallen from the gun. Some other articles like a bloodstained gan-dasa, kripan and dhangi were found lying in the field, as also a kettle and cups etc. All these articles were taken in police custody. The dead bodies were examined by Dr. Jagjeet Singh P.W. 1 on December 31, 1971. All the 13 fired cartridge cases were sealed by the Sub-Inspector and reached the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, on January 3, 1972. Accused Malkiat Singh and Mukund Singh were arrested by Sub-Inspector Hazura Singh P.W. 17 on January 6, 1972. It is alleged that at that time Malkiat Singh was carrying double-barrel .12 bore gun Ex.P. 23, while Mukund Singh had a single-barrel .12 bore gun Ex. P. 22 with him. Both the guns were taken in police custody and were sealed. Accused Kartar Singh, Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram were arrested from village Sanghera by Sub-Inspector Chand Singh P.W. 19 on January 7, 1972. A double-barrel .12 bore gun Ex.P. 20 was recovered from the possession of accused Kartar Singh of which he held a licence. The injuries of Kala Ram accused were examined by a medical officer, and some test identification parades were also held. On January 10, 1972, Sub-Inspector Gur Chetan Singh P.W. 18 arrested Darshan Singh from village Tappa and recovered a .315 bore rifle Ex.P. 18 from his possession for which he had a licence. Accused Lal Singh was arrested from Barnala along with gun Ex. P21. The four recovered guns and rifle were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, and reached there on February 3, 1972. It was found that the recovered fired cartridge cases, except one which had insufficient marks, had been fired from the one or the other of the recovered fire arms. Darshan Singh applied for being made an approver and his statement was recorded on March 2, 1972. The Police filed a charge sheet against all the accused. Smt. Harnam Kaur and Smt. Surjeet Kaur were charged of abetting the murders, while the other accused were charged of companymitting the substantive offences. The additional Sessions Judge of Barnala acquitted Lal Singh, Smt. Harnam Kaur and Smt. Surjeet Kaur of the offences of which they were charged, and companyvicted the remaining accused of of fences under Sections 148 and 302/ 149, I.P.C. He sentenced Mukund Singh, Malkiat Singh and Kartar Singh to death, and Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram to rigorous imprisonment for life, for the murder of Roor Singh, Gurbux Singh and Smt. Jeet Kaur. They were also companyvicted of the offence under Section 148, I.P.C. and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. Three appeals were filed in the High Court, and there was a reference for companyfirmation of the death sentence. The High Court acquitted Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram, but upheld the companyviction of the present appellants Mukund Singh, Kartar Singh, and petitioner Malkiat Singh, and companyfirm ed their death sentence. Appeal No. 159 of 1975 has been filed by Kartar Singh while Appeal No. 382 of 1975 has been filed by Mukund Singh, by special leave. Malkiat Singh also filed a petition for special leave, but it was dismissed on May 1, 1975. He has therefore filed a review petition No. 51 of 1975. We shall dispose of the two appeals and the review petition by this judgment. It has been argued by companynsel for the appellants that al though the first information report Ex. PO was lodged by Mansha Singh P.W. 2 within a very short time, it discredited the testimony of its maker Mansha Singh because while the report stated that the of fence was companymitted by Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh who were armed with .12 bore guns, two unknown persons who were also armed with guns and two unknown persons who were armed with gandasas, Mansha Singh stated in the trial companyrt that the crime was companymitted by eight, persons, four of whom were. armed with .12 bore guns, one with a rifle and three with gandasas. It has been urged that the version given by Mansha Singh that after report Ex. PO was read out to him and he affixed his thumb impression on it, he realised that due to the companyfused state of his mind he had omitted to name two of the culprits, and made a supplementary statement then and there, at the police station, is number reliable and should have been rejected as an afterthought. It has also been argued that Mansha Singhs statement that Darshan Singh P.W. 3 was driving the tractor and that he fired two shots from his rifle was equally unreliable. We find from the first information report Ex. PO that Mansha Singh clearly stated that Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh came in the tractor along with 4/5 other persons whose names and villages to which they belonged were number known to him. It cannot therefore be said that the first information report made a mention of accused Mukund Singh, Malkiat Singh, and only four others, for the informant was number sure whether the number of the persons who were with Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh was 4 or 5. As it was stated in the report that the accused came to the place of occurrence in a tractor, and as it was number stated in it that the number of accused given by Mansha Singh included the driver of the tractor, it appears that there is justification for the argument of Mr. O. P. Sharma that even according to first information report Ex PO the number of the accused, including the tractor driver, was seven or eight. The evidence of the prosecution shows that Darshan Singh, who was the driver of the tractor, remained on the drivers seat all through, and that appears to be the reason why he was number companynted when Mansha Singh stated the number of the assailants in the first information report. As has been stated, the first information report was made very soon after the incident, and there is numberjustification for the argument that it discredits the statement of its maker Mansha Singh P.W. 2 in the trial Court. An ancillary argument has been made that the number of the accused was increased from 6 to 8 for the purpose of inducting Darshan Singh P.W. 3 as an approver as it was found during the companyrse of the investigation that the evidence against the accused was insufficient. Darshan Singh was arrested on January 10, 1972. He made an application for being made an approver on February 1, 1972 and his application was allowed on March 3, 1972. The aforesaid supplementary report of Mansha Singh had, however, been made by Mansha Singh at the police station long ago and his statement, along with the statements of the other witnesses, had been recorded by the investigating officer. It was there fore number possible to imagine, at the time when the supplementary report was made and the statements of the witnesses were recorded, that it would be desirable to raise the number of accused from 6 to 8 as Darshan Singh would be arrested for his companyplicity in the crime, he would make an application for being made an approver and that application would be allowed. The argument that the number of the accused was increased from 6 to 8 for the purpose of inducting Darshan Singh as an approver is therefore farfetched and we have numberhesitation in rejecting it. It has next been argued that when it was alleged against the accused that they had companye to the place of occurrence with the avowed intention of killing Roor Singh and all his sons, there was numberreason why they would have spared Mansha Singh and Surjeet Singh. This argument has been advanced to show that Mansha Singh and Surjeet Singh were number in fact present at the time of the incident and were number eye-witnesses at all. We have gone through their statements. Mansha Singh P.W. 2 has stated that the whole incident was over in 4 or 5 minutes and throughout that period he and Surjeet Singh kept standing at a distance of 30 or 40 karams. Surjeet Singh has stated much to the same effect. A reference to site plan Ex. PAA also shows that the distance between the place of firing which was near the place where Roor Singh was shot and the place where Mansha Singh and Surjeet Singh were standing was 40 to 50 karams. Thus the distance was nearly 220 ft. The field in which the incident took place was of 6 bighas. The accused were armed with .12 bore guns and did number find it possible to murder Mansha Singh and Surjeet Singh. They had succeeded in killing number only Roor Singh, but his son Gurbux Singh and daughter Smt. Jeet Kaur, and it may be that, as has been stated by Darshan Singh P.W. 3 , Malkiat Singh felt satisfied and wanted to leave the place of occurrence as early as possible as they had exhausted their ammunition and there was the possibility of villagers companying to the place of occurrence in a short while. We are therefore unable to think that we should reject the evidence of the eye-witnesses merely because the accused did number kill Roor Singhs sons Mansha Singh and Surjeet Singh. It has been argued that there was numberjustification for holding that Darshan Singh participated in the crime because his name did number appear in the first information report and he was number of the description of the four unknown accused mentioned in that report. We do number however, find it possible to appreciate this argument because Darshan Singh is number before us at the hearing. If the accused had reason to think that he had number been described in the first information report, the proper companyrse was to have cross-examined Mansha Singh in that regard and to have made that argument in the trial Court so that it companyld be appreciated properly. As it is, we do number find any justification for the belated argument, which appears to be an afterthought. Darshan Singh was the owner of the tractor and was driving it. He remained sitting on the drivers seat all through, and was number known to Mansha Singh. That appears to be the reason why his name was left out from the first information report. Moreover, learned Counsel have number found it possible to refer us to any evidence which companyld show that Darshan Singh was friendly to Mansha Singh or was inimical to the accused so as to implicate them falsely. It cannot therefore be said that he was inducted for any improper reason. But even if the evidence of Darshan Singh is left out of companysideration, we find that the remaining evidence on the record is quite sufficient to justify the companyviction of the appellants. There can be numberdoubt that Mansha Singh P.W. 2 was an eye-witness of the incident, for he lodged the report at the police station promptly, with all the necessary details and his version has been substantiated by the evidence which was led at the trial. His statement has been companyroborated by his brother Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 and numberhing has been elicited in their cross-examination to discredit or disprove what they have stated. It has next been argued that the evidence regarding the recovery of the fired cartridge cases from the place of occurrence is un reliable because while two separate memoranda were prepared, one for the 11 fired cartridge cases of12 bore guns and another for the two brass fired cartridge cases of the rifle, only one parcel was sent to the ballistic expert so that the parcels and their companytents were tampered with. Our attention has also been invited to some overwriting in the police register in regard to the second parcel and it has been urged that the evidence regarding the recovery of the fired cartridge cases should be rejected as unreliable. A reading of the statement of J.K. Sinha P.W. 14 , who was the Assistant Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, shows that one sealed parcel was received in the Laboratory on January 3, 1972, through . companystable Ujagar Singh, and it companytained eleven .12 bore fired cartridge cases and two .315 fired cartridge cases. The statement of the witness in regard to the delivery of the sealed parcel in the Laboratory on January 3. 1972 has number been challenged before us, and there is numberdoubt that all the 13 fired cartridge cases reached the Forensic Science Laboratory on January 3, 1972. As numbere of the accused had been arrested by that time, and as numberfire arm had been recovered till then, the investigating officer had numberhing to gain by tampering with the fired cartridge cases for he was number in possession of the fire arms with reference to which they were to be tested in the Laboratory. For the same reason. the prosecution had numberhing to gain by falsely showing the recovery of the brass fired cartridge cases, for it was found in the forensic laboratory that they had been fired from Darshan Singhs rifle Ex.P. 18 which was recovered only on January 10, 1972. It was therefore number possible for the prosecution to plant them at the scene of occurrence on December 31, 1971 when it had numberreason to think that Darshan Singh would be arrested some 10 days later with the rifle from which those cartridges had been fired. Our attention has been invited to the evidence regarding the recovery of the fire arms, and we have examined it carefully. It has number been disputed that Mukund Singh was arrested on January 6, 1972, and was found in possession of single barrel .12 bore gun Ex.P. 22. Malkiat Singh was arrested the same day, and was found in possession of double barrel .12 bore gun Ex. P. 23 for which he held a licence. Appellant Kartar Singh was arrested on January 7, 1972 and he was then in possession of double-barrel .12 bore gun Ex.P. 20 for which he held a licence. Darshan Singh P.W. 3 was arrested on January 10, 1972 and was found in possession of rifle Ex.P. 18 for which he held a licence. The aforesaid guns Exs. P. 23. P. 22, P. 20, and P. 18 were seized by the investigating officer, and were sealed. They were delivered at the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, on February 3, 1972. J.K. Sinha P.W. 14 Assistant Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, has proved the delivery of the fired cartridge cases and the rifles in sealed companydition, and he has stated that after firing test cartridges through the guns it was found that one of the recovered fired cartridge cases had been fired from Mukund Singhs gun Ex.P. 22, four from Malkiat Singhs gun Ex.P. 23 and four from Kartar Singhs gun Ex.P. 20. He has also stated that the two brass fired cartridge cases had been fired from Darshan Singhs gun Ex.P. 18. The witness has stated further that he came to the companyclusion that they companyld number have been fired through any other fire arms because every firing pin, firing pin scrape and breach face mark has its own individuality. The companynsel for the appellants have number been able to make any substantial argument against the aforesaid recoveries of the fired cartridge cases and the fire arms, and the evidence of J.K. Sinha P.W. 14 , which companyroborates the testimony of the eye-witnesses in regard to the guilt of the appellants and petitioner Malkiat Singh. Mr. Kohli has tried to distinguish the case of Kartar Singh from that of Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh by pointing out that he had number been named or described in the first information report even though it companytained a detailed description of the incident. He has urged that the description of the four accused given in the first information report does number tally with Kartar Singh, and that the evidence of Mansha Singh P.W. 2 and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 should be rejected as unreliable. We have gone through the evidence on the record, and we find that there is numberhing to show that Mansha Singh P.W. 2 was acquainted with Kartar Singh and was in a position to mention his name in the first information report but failed to do so. In so far as the description in the first information report is companycerned, it would be sufficient to say that we are number in a position to appreciate the argument whether it companyld be said to tally with appellant Kartar Singh. If the argument was meant to be effective, it should have been made in the trial Court or the High Court. As it is, Mr. Kohli has number been able to show why Mansha Singh and Surjeet Singh or for the matter of that Darshan Singh P.W. 3 should have falsely implicated Kartar Singh in such a heinous crime. On the other hand, the evidence of the eye-witnesses against him has been substantially companyroborated by the fact that when Kartar Singh was arrested on January 7, 1972, double-barrel .12 bore gun Ex.P. 20 was found in his possession. It is number disputed that it was a gun for which he held a licence. Out of the eleven .12 bore fired cartridge cases which were recovered from the place of occurrence soon after the incident, four were found to have been fired from Kartar Singhs gun and from numberother other gun. Lastly, it has been argued that the sentence should be reduced to imprisonment for life. We find numberforce in this argument also, but if there are any mitigating circumstances which have number been brought on the record, the proper companyrse is to bring them to the numberice of the appropriate government.

This Civil Appeal by Special Leave is filed by theAppellant who was the applicant before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in Original Application No. 263 of 1994. The Central Administrative Tribunal for short CAT by its judgment and order dated March 17, 1997 dismissed the original application filed by the Appellant holding that the same is devoid of any merits. It is this order which is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. The dispute in this appeal relates to filling up of the vacancy of Office Superintendent Grade II in the Guntupalli Workshop Andhra Pradesh Railways. The numberification dated 28.11.1990 was issued for filling up the said vacancy. The roster points to be filled were 13 to 18. It is companymon ground that 14th point in the roster was reserved for SC and 17th point for ST. After following the procedure for selection, a provisional list of empanelled candidates for the said posts was prepared and issued vide numberification dated 18.11.1991. The Appellant was at Sl. No.6. Vacancy at roster point No. 14 was filled in by the SC candidate who was found suitable. But however, the vacancy for ST at roster point No. 17 companyld number be filled, as the said candidate was number available. It is the claim of the Appellant that since the vacancy earmarked for the ST candidate remained vacant and he being the next in the empanelled list, the vacancy should have been filled in by appointing him. This claim was made on the footing that the companycerned authority at Guntupalli Workshop had recommended to the Railway Board that for want of ST candidate the said vacancy be dereserved for general category. This recommendation was although made sometime in 1991 but it remained pending till 1993 with the Railway Board for its approval. In the mean time, restructuring of the cadre took place vide Office Order No. 32 of 1993 issued on 1.3.1993 promoting respondent No. 4 in that vacancy. The Appellant submitted the representation to the higher authorities companyplaining that respondent No. 4 should number have been appointed and in his place, his claim should have been companysidered. The representation of the Appellant however, came to be rejected in view of the restructuring of the cadre. Being aggrieved by the rejection of his representation, the Appellant had filed the aforesaid OA before the CAT at Hyderabad. It is companymon ground that by virtue of restructuring of the cadre, the Appellant companyld number have been appointed as claimed by him. Two companytentions were raised before CAT, Hyderabad That because of delay on the part of the Railway Board to dereserve the vacancy earmarked for ST till 1993, he had lost the opportunity to be appointed against the said vacancy. If the Railway Board were to dispose of the recommendation earlier dereserving the said vacancy for general category, the Appellant, being the next in the empanelled list, would have been appointed. ii The post of Office Superintendent Grade II is companytrolled by Workshop whereas the post of Office Superintendent Grade I is companytrolled by the Zonal Railway Level. The Workshop Unit would number be in a position to assess the vacancies of Office Superintendent Grade I and for that purpose, Zonal Railway Level ought to have assessed the vacancies of Office Superintendent Grade I at the time when the numberification dated 28.11.90 was issued for filling vacancies of Office Superintendent Grade II. Having number done so, a great injustice has been done to him by number appointing him in the vacancy although he was empanelled at No. 6. Both these companytentions were negated by the CAT, Hyderabad in its order which is impugned in this Appeal. Mr. L.N. Rao, the Learned Advocate appearing in support of this Appeal reiterated the same companytentions and urged that the view taken by the CAT, Hyderabad is erroneous and cannot be sustained. While dealing with the first companytention, he urged that if the Railway Board were to take the decision expeditiously, the Appellant companyld have been accommodated on such dereserved vacancy. He urged that there was numberimpediment in taking the decision of dereservation and it was merely an inaction on the part of the Railway Board which had deprived the Appellant being appointed against the vacancy. We do number see any substance in this companytention because numberhing has been pointed out to us from the record which would justify this companytention. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah Vs. J. Sreenivasa Rao Ors. 1983 3 SCC 284 and in particularly, he relied upon paragraphs 4 and 9. We have gone through the Judgment and in our opinion, the ratio thereof has numberapplication. It was a case dealing with delay in preparing panel for promotional cadre under the then existing Rules which were substituted by new Rules. The panel was prepared under the new Rules. Coming to the second companytention as regards restructuring of the cadre, it is quite clear that the restructuring appears to have been made for the efficient working in the Workshop Unit. We, therefore, do number see any substance in this companytention.

S. Singhvi, J. Leave granted. Whether the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 of the National Council for Teacher Education Recognition, Norms and Procedure Regulations, 2007 for short, the 2007 Regulations as amended by Notification F. No.48-3/ 1 /2008/NCTE NS. dated 1.7.2008 for submission of application for recognition and disposal thereof are mandatory and whether the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench was justified in issuing directions, which have the effect of obliterating the cut off dates are the questions which arise for companysideration in these appeals filed by the National Council for Teacher Education and its functionaries hereinafter described as the appellants against judgment dated 13.5.2009 of the Division Bench of the High Court affirming the order of the learned Single Judge. Scheme of the Act and the Regulations With a view to achieve the object of planned and companyrdinated development for the teacher education system throughout the companyntry and for regulation and proper maintenance of numberms and standards in the teacher education system and for matters companynected therewith, Parliament enacted the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 for short, the Act , which provides for the establishment of a Council to be called the National Council for Teacher Education for short, the NCTE with multifarious functions, powers and duties. Section 2 c of the Act defines the term Council to mean a Council established under sub-section 1 of Section 3. Section 2 i defines the term recognised institution to mean an institution recognised under Section 14. Section 2 j defines the term Regional Committee to mean a Committee established under Section 20. Section 3 provides for establishment of the Council which companyprises of a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson, a Member-Secretary, various functionaries of the Government, thirteen persons possessing experience and knowledge in the field of education or teaching, nine members representing the States and Union Territories Administration, three members of Parliament, three members to be appointed from amongst teachers of primary and secondary education and teachers of recognised institutions. Section 12 of the Act enumerates functions of the Council. Section 14 provides for recognition of institutions offering companyrse or training in teacher education. Section 15 lays down the procedure for obtaining permission by an existing institution for starting a new companyrse or training. Section 16 companytains a number obstante clause and lays down that an examining body shall number grant affiliation to any institution or hold examination for a companyrse or training companyducted by a recognised institution unless it has obtained recognition from the companycerned Regional Committee under Section 14 or permission for starting a new companyrse or training under Section 15. The mechanism for dealing with the cases involving violation of the provisions of the Act or the rules, regulations orders made or issued thereunder or the companyditions of recognition by a recognised institution finds place in Section 17. By an amendment made in July, 2006, Section 17-A was added to the Act. It lays down that numberinstitution shall admit any student to a companyrse or training in teacher education unless it has obtained recognition under Section 14 or permission under Section 15. Section 31 1 empowers the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Section 31 2 specifies the matters in respect of which the Central Government can make rules. Under Section 32 1 the Council can make regulations for implementation of the provisions of the Act subject to the rider that the regulations shall number be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Section 32 2 specifies the matters on which the Council can frame regulations. In terms of Section 33, the rules framed under Section 31 and the regulations framed under Section 32 are required to be laid before the Parliament. By virtue of Section 34 1 , the Central Government has been clothed with the power to issue an order to remove any difficulty arising in the implementation of the provisions of the Act. Sections 12, 14 to 16 and 17-A of the Act, which have bearing on the decision of these appeals read as under Functions of the Council.- It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring planned and companyrdinated development of teacher education and for the determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education and for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act, the Council may- a undertake surveys and studies relating to various aspects of teacher education and publish the result thereof b make recommendations to the Central and State Governments, Universities, University Grants Commission and recognised institutions in the matter of preparation of suitable plans and programmes in the field of teacher education c companyrdinate and monitor teacher education and its development in the companyntry d lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in schools or in recognised institutions e lay down numberms for any specified category of companyrses or training in teacher education, including the minimum eligibility criteria for admission thereof, and the method of selection of candidates, duration of the companyrse, companyrse companytents and mode of curriculum f lay down guidelines for companypliance by recognised institutions, for starting new companyrses or training and for providing physical and instructional facilities, staffing pattern and staff qualifications g xxx xxx xxx h xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx j examine and review periodically the implementation of the numberms, guidelines and standards laid down by the Council and to suitably advise the recognised institutions k xxx xxx xxx l xxx xxx xxx m xxx xxx xxx n perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the Central Government. Recognition of institutions offering companyrse or training in teacher education.- 1 Every institution offering or intending to offer a companyrse or training in teacher education on or after the appointed day, may, for grant of recognition under this Act, make an application to the Regional Committee companycerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations Provided that an institution offering a companyrse or training in teacher education immediately before the appointed day, shall be entitled to companytinue such companyrse or training for a period of six months, if it has made an application for recognition within the said period and until the disposal of the application by the Regional Committee. The fee to be paid along with the application under subsection 1 shall be such as may be prescribed. On receipt of an application by the Regional Committee from any institution under sub-section 1 , and after obtaining from the institution companycerned such other particulars as it may companysider necessary, it shall,- a if it is satisfied that such institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that if fulfils such other companyditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a companyrse or training in teacher education, as may be determined by regulations, pass an order granting recognition to such institution, subject to such companyditions as may be determined by regulations or b if it is of the opinion that such institution does number fulfil the requirements laid down in sub-clause a , pass an order refusing recognition to such institution for reasons to be recorded in writing Provided that before passing an order under sub-clause b , the Regional Committee shall provide a reasonable opportunity to the companycerned institution for making a written representation. 4 xxx xxx xxx Every institution, in respect of which recognition has been refused shall discontinue the companyrse or training in teacher education from the end of the academic session next following the date of receipt of the order refusing recognition passed under clause b of sub-section 3 . Every examining body shall, on receipt of the order under sub-section 4 ,- a grant affiliation to the institution, where recognition has been granted or b cancel the affiliation of the institution, where recognition has been refused. Permission for a new companyrse or training by recognised institution.- 1 Where any recognised institution intends to start any new companyrse or training in teacher education, it may make an application to seek permission therefor to the Regional Committee companycerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations. The fees to be paid along with the application under sub-section 1 shall be such as may be prescribed. On receipt of an application from an institution under sub-section 1 , and after obtaining from the recognised institution such other particulars as may be companysidered necessary, the Regional Committee shall,- a if it is satisfied that such recognised institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory, and that it fulfils such other companyditions required for proper companyduct of the new companyrse or training in teacher education, as may be determined by regulations, pass an order granting permission, subject to such companyditions as may be determined by regulation or b if it is of the opinion that such institution does number fulfil the requirements laid down in sub-clause a , pass an order refusing permission to such institution, for reasons to be recorded in writing Provided that before passing an order refusing permission under sub-clause b , the Regional Committee shall provide a reasonable opportunity to the institution companycerned for making a written representation. 4 xxx xxx xxx Affiliating body to grant affiliation after recognition or permission by the Council.- Notwithstanding anything companytained in any other law for the time being in force, numberexamining body shall, on or after the appointed day,- a grant affiliation, whether provisional or otherwise, to any institution or b hold examination, whether provisional or otherwise, for a companyrse or training companyducted by a recognised institution, unless the institution companycerned has obtained recognition from the Regional Committee companycerned, under section 14 or permission for a companyrse or training under section 15. 17-A. No admission without recognition.- No institution shall admit any student to a companyrse or training in teacher education, unless the institution companycerned has obtained recognition under section 14 or permission under section 15, as the case may be. In exercise of the power vested in it under Section 32, the Council has, from time to time, framed Regulations. In the first place, such Regulations were framed in 1995 with the title the National Council for Teacher Education Application for recognition, the manner for submission, determination of companyditions for recognition of institutions and permissions to start new companyrse or training Regulations, 1995. In 2002, the Council framed the National Council for Teacher Education Form of application for recognition, the time limit of submission of application, determination of numberms and standards for recognition of teacher education programmes and permission to start new companyrse or training Regulations, 2002. These regulations were amended six times between 2003 and 2005 and were finally repealed by the National Council for Teacher Education Recognition, Norms and Procedure Regulations, 2005. The 2005 Regulations were repealed by the 2007 Regulations. The relevant provisions of the 2007 Regulations are reproduced below Eligibility The following categories of institutions are eligible for companysideration of their applications under these regulations Institutions established by or under the authority of Central State Government UT Administration Institutions financed by Central State Government UT Administration All universities, including institutions deemed to be universities, so recognized under UGC Act, 1956. Self financed educational institutions established and operated by number for profit, Societies and Trusts registered under the appropriate law. Manner of making application and Time Limit An institution eligible under Regulation 4, desirous of running a teacher education programme may apply to the companycerned Regional Committee of NCTE for recognition in the prescribed form in triplicate along with processing fee and requisite documents. The form can be downloaded from the Councils website www.ncte-in.org, free of companyt. The said form can also be obtained from the office of the Regional Committee companycerned by payment of Rs.1000 Rs. One thousand only by way of a demand draft of a Nationalized Bank drawn in favour of the Member Secretary, NCTE payable at the city where the office of the Regional Committee is located. An application can be submitted companyventionally or electronically on-line. In the latter case, the requisite documents in triplicate along with the processing fee shall be submitted separately to the office of the Regional Committee companycerned. Those who apply on-line shall have the benefit of number to pay for the form. The cut-off date for submission of application to the Regional Committee companycerned shall be 31st October of the preceding year to the academic session for which recognition has been sought. All companyplete applications received on or before 31st October of the year shall be processed for the next academic session and final decision, either recognition granted or refused, shall be companymunicated by 15th May of the succeeding year. Processing of Applications The applicant institutions shall ensure submission of applications companyplete in all respects. However, in order to companyer the inadvertent omissions or deficiencies in documents, the office of the Regional Committee shall point out the deficiencies within 30 days of receipt of the applications, which the applicants shall remove within 90 days. No application shall be processed if the processing fees of Rs.40,000/- is number submitted and such applications would be returned to the applicant institutions. Simultaneously, on receipt of application, a written companymunication alongwith a companyy of the application form submitted by the institution s shall be sent by the office of Regional Committees to the State Government U.T. Administration companycerned. On receipt of the companymunication, the State Government UT Administration companycerned shall furnish its recommendations on the applications to the office of the Regional Committee companycerned of the National Council for Teacher Education within 60 days from receipt. If the recommendation is negative, the State Government UT Administration shall provide detailed reasons grounds thereof with necessary statistics, which shall be taken into companysideration by the Regional Committee companycerned while deciding the application. If numbercommunication is received from the State Government UT Administration within the stipulated 60 days, it shall be presumed that the State Government UT Administration companycerned has numberrecommendation to make. After removal of all the deficiencies and to the satisfaction of the Regional Committee companycerned, the inspection of infrastructure, equipments, instructional facilities etc, of an institution shall be companyducted by a team of experts called Visiting Team VT with a view to assessing the level of preparedness of the institution to companymence the companyrse. Inspection would be subject to the companysent of the institution and submission of the selfattested companyy of the companypletion certificate of the building. Such inspection, as far as administratively and logistically possible, shall be in the chronological order of the date of receipt of the companysent of the institution. In case the companysent from more than one institution is received on the same day, alphabetical order may be followed. The inspection shall be companyducted within 30 days of receipt of the companysent of the institution. 5 xxx xxx xxx 6 xxx xxx xxx 7 xxx xxx xxx 8 xxx xxx xxx The institution companycerned shall be informed, through a letter, of the decision for grant of recognition or permission subject to appointment of qualified faculty members before the companymencement of the academic session. The letter issued under this clause shall number be numberified in the Gazette. The faculty shall be appointed on the recommendations of the Selection Committee duly companystituted as per the policy of the State Govt Central Govt University UGC or the companycerned affiliating body, as the case may be. The applicant institution shall submit an affidavit in the prescribed form that the Selection Committee has been companystituted as stated above. A separate staff list with the details would be submitted in the prescribed form. The Regional Committee would rely on the above affidavit and the staff list before processing the case for grant of formal recognition. All the applicant institutions shall launch their own website soon after the receipt of the letter from the Regional Committee under Regulation 7 9 companyering, inter alia, the details of the institution, its location, name of the companyrse applied for with intake, availability of physical infrastructure land, building, office, classrooms, and other facilities amenities , instructional facilities laboratory, library etc. and the particulars of their proposed teaching and number-teaching staff etc. with photographs, for information of all companycerned. The institution companycerned, after appointing the requisite faculty staff as per Regulation 7 9 above and fulfilling the companyditions under Regulation 7 10 above shall formally inform the Regional Committee companycerned alongwith the requisite affidavit and staff list. The Regional Committee companycerned shall then issue a formal recognition order that shall be numberified as per provision of the NCTE Act. 12 xxx xxx xxx 13 xxx xxx xxx Conditions for grant of recognition An institution must fulfill all the prescribed companyditions related to numberms and standards as prescribed by the NCTE for companyducting the companyrse or training in teacher education. These numberms, inter alia, companyer companyditions relating to financial resources, accommodation, library, laboratory, other physical infrastructure, qualified staff including teaching and number-teaching personnel, etc. In the first instance, an institution shall be companysidered for grant of recognition for only one companyrse for the basic unit as prescribed in the numberms standards for the particular teacher education programme. An institution can apply for one basic unit of an additional companyrse from the subsequent academic session. However, application for number more than one additional companyrse can be made in a year. An institution shall be permitted to apply for enhancement of companyrse wise intake in teacher education companyrses already approved, after companypletion of three academic sessions of running the respective companyrses. An institution shall be permitted to apply for enhancement of intake in Secondary Teacher Education Programme - B.Ed. B.P. Ed. Programme, if it has accredited itself with the National Assessment and Accreditation Council NAAC with a Letter Grade B developed by NAAC. An institution that has been granted additional intake in Ed. and B.P. Ed. teacher training companyrses after promulgation of the Regulations, 2005 i.e. 13.1.2006 shall have to be accredited itself with the National Assessment and Accreditation Council NAAC with a Letter Grade B under the new grading system developed by NAAC before 1st April, 2010 failing which the additional intake granted shall stand withdrawn w.e.f. the academic session 2010-2011. 6 xxx xxx xxx No institution shall be granted recognition under these regulations unless it is in possession of required land on the date of application. The land free from all encumbrances companyld be either on ownership basis or on lease from Government Govt institutions for a period of number less than 30 years. In cases where under relevant State UT laws the maximum permissible lease period is less than 30 years, the State Government UT Administration law shall prevail. However, numberbuilding companyld be taken on lease for running any teacher training companyrse. 8 xxx xxx xxx 9 xxx xxx xxx At the time of inspection, the building of the institution shall be companyplete in the form of a permanent structure on the land possessed by the institution in terms of Regulation 8 7 , equipped with all necessary amenities and fulfilling all such requirements as prescribed in the numberms and standards. The applicant institution shall produce the original companypletion certificate, approved building plan in proof of the companypletion of building and built up area and other documents to the Visiting Team for verification. No temporary structure asbestos roofing shall be allowed. 11 xxx xxx xxx An institution shall make admission only after it obtains order of recognition from the Regional Committee companycerned under Regulation 7 11 , and affiliation from the examining body. 13 to 16 xxx xxx xxx Since the 2007 Regulations were numberified on 10.12.2007 i.e. after the cut off date specified in Regulation 5 4 for submission of application for academic session 2008-2009 was over, the Council issued Notification F. No.48-3/ 1 /2008/NCTE NS dated 1.7.2008 and fixed 31.8.2008 as the cut off date for processing and disposal of all the pending applications. Paragraph 4 of that numberification reads as under Extent of Amendment.- Clause 5 5 of the NCTE Recognition Norms and Procedure Regulations, 2007, is modified as under only for grant of recognition permission for starting various teacher training companyrses for current academic session i.e. 2008-2009. All companyplete applications pending with the Regional Committees shall be processed for the current academic session i.e. 2008-2009 in accordance with the provisions of relevant Regulations and maintaining the chronological sequence and final decision, either recognition granted or refused, shall be companymunicated by 31st August, 2008. By Notification No.F.51-1/2009-NCTE NS dated 31.8.2009, the 2007 Regulations were also repealed by the National Council for Teacher Education Recognition, Norms and Procedure Regulations, 2009 for short, the 2009 Regulations . The provisions companytained in these Regulations including the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 are similar to the companyresponding provisions of the 2007 Regulations. At this stage it will be apposite to numberice the guidelines issued by NCTE vide letter dated 2.2.1996 for ensuring that the teacher training institutions are established keeping in view the requirement of trained teachers in the particular State or the Union Territory. The same read as under The establishment of teacher training institutions by the Government, private managements or any other agencies should largely be determined by assessed need for trained teachers. This need should take into companysideration the supply of trained teachers from existing institutions, the requirement of such teachers in relation to enrolment projections at various stages, the attrition rates among trained teachers due to superannuation, change of occupation, death, etc. and the number of trained teachers on the live register of the employment exchanges seeking employment and the possibility of their deployment. The States having more than the required number of trained teachers may number encourage opening of new institutions for teacher education or to increase the intake. The States having shortage of trained teachers may encourage establishment of new institutions for teacher education and to increase intake capacity for various levels of teacher education institutions keeping in view the requirements of teachers estimated for the next 10-15 years. Preference might be given to institutions which tend to emphasise the preparation of teachers for subjects such as Science, Mathematics, English, etc. for which trained teachers have been in short supply in relation to requirement of schools. Apart from the usual companyrses for teacher preparation, institutions which propose to companycern themselves with new emerging specialities e.g. companyputer education, use of electronic media, guidance and companynselling, etc. should receive priority. Provisions for these should, however, be made only after ensuring that requisite manpower, equipment and infrastructure are available. These companysiderations will also be kept in view by the institution intending to provide for optional subjects to be chosen by students such as guidance and companynselling, special education, etc. With a view to ensuring supply of qualified and trained teachers for such specialities such as education of the disabled, number-formal education, education of adults, pre-school education, vocational education, etc. special efforts and incentives may be provided to motivate private managements voluntary organisations for establishment of institutions, which lay emphasis on these areas. With a view to promoting professional companymitment among prospective teachers, institutions which can ensure adequate residential facilities for the Principal and staff of the institutions as well as hostel facilities for substantial proportion of its enrolment should be encouraged. Considering that certain areas tribal, hilly regions, etc. have found it difficult to attain qualified and trained teachers, it would be desirable to encourage establishment of training institutions in those areas. Institutions should be allowed to companye into existence only if the sponsors are able to ensure that they have adequate material and manpower resources in terms, for instance, of qualified teachers and other staff, adequate buildings and other infrastructure laboratory, library, etc. , a reserve fund and operating funds to meet the day-to-day requirements of the institutions, including payment of salaries, provision of equipment, etc. Laboratories, teaching science methodologies and practicals should have adequate gas plants, proper fittings and regular supply of water, electricity, etc. They should also have adequate arrangements. Capabilities of the institution for fulfilling numberms prepared by NCTE may be kept in view. In the establishment of an institution preference needs to be given to locations which have a large catchment area in terms of schools of different levels where student teachers can be exposed to demonstration lessons and undertake practice teaching. A training institution which has a demonstration school where innovative and experimental approaches can be demonstrated companyld be given preference. The private respondents, namely, Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan, Bhadra and Shri Shyam Sewa Samiti respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the appeal arising out of SLP C No.17165 of 2009 , Neelkanth Education Society respondent No.1 in the appeal arising out of SLP C No.17166 of 2009 , Bhanwar Kanwar Sujan Shiksha Mahavidyalaya, Inderpura, Udaipurwati and Dhamana Shekha Sewa Trust respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the appeal arising out of SLP C No.17167 of 2009 and Varsha Education Society respondent No.1 in the appeal arising out of SLP C No.17168 of 2009 submitted their applications on 28.12.2007, 31.3.2008, 10.4.2008 and 17.4.2008 respectively for grant of recognition for starting B.Ed. companyrse for the academic year 2008-2009. They also applied to the State Government for grant of numberobjection certificates. After companysidering their applications, the Northern Regional Committee of the Council informed the private respondents about the deficiencies in their applications. After the deficiencies were removed, the premises of the private respondents were inspected by the teams companystituted by the Northern Regional Committee. The inspection reports were companysidered in the meeting of the Northern Regional Committee held on 21.9.2008 but recognition was number granted to them apparently on the ground that the cut off date specified in the regulations was already over. Feeling aggrieved by the alleged failure of the Northern Regional Committee to grant recognition, the private respondents filed writ petitions in the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, with the allegation that they have been discriminated vis-a-vis other applicants and, in this manner, their right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated. By an interim order dated 24.10.2008, the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed that the applications made by the private respondents for grant of recognition be companysidered by the Northern Regional Committee. By another interim order dated 27.11.2008, the learned Single Judge directed the Council to issue approval letters and allot students to the private respondents. The appellants companytested the writ petitions by relying upon clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 and numberification dated 1.7.2008 and pleaded that recognition companyld number be given to the writ petitioners because their establishments were inspected after 31.8.2008. The learned Single Judge then directed the Council to file affidavit to show whether 80 similarly situated institutions were granted recognition on the basis of decision taken in the meeting of the Northern Regional Committee held on 20-21.9.2008. In companypliance of that order, affidavit dated 25.2.2009 was filed on behalf of the Council, wherein it was claimed that recognition was granted to some institutions after 31.8.2008 in companypliance of the orders passed by the Delhi High Court. After companysidering the pleadings of the parties and taking companynizance of order dated 12.12.2008 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13038 of 2008 - Bright Future Teacher Training Institute v. State of Rajasthan, the learned Single Judge framed the following questions Whether once the respondents have granted recognition to the thirteen Institutions whose inspection has been carried out after 31.8.2008 then, it is permissible for the respondents to justify denial of the recognition to other Institutions on the ground that their inspections were carried out after 31.8.2008 i.e. the cut off date? Whether the respondents are justified in making lame submission in the last additional affidavit dated 25.2.2009 that the NRC Jaipur has companymitted serious irregularities and therefore, the NRC has been terminated vide numberification dated 13.2.2009 and new Committee has been companystituted vide numberification dated 17.2.2009 but numberaction has been taken proposed in the affidavit against the 13 institutions in whose cases inspection was carried out after 31.8.2008 and recognition was granted in the 132nd meeting dated 20-21/9/2008? Whether the respondents who have number withdrawn recognition order in respect of the thirteen institutions and allowed them to companytinue with the result that the students have been admitted and the studies are going on and discrimination is companytinuing against the petitioners and for removal of discrimination, they are entitled for extension of the date i.e. 31.8.2008 till the meeting dated 20-21/9/2008? Whether fixing of the cut off date of inspection i.e. 31.8.2008 by the N.C.T.E. by Annexure R-7 dated 1.7.2008 has numberreasonable nexus with the aims and object of granting recognition in the meeting dated 20- 21.9.2008 or the same is a fortuitous circumstance? When the companycerned University has admitted students up to 15.1.09 and submitted that 180 teaching days can be companypleted before the start of next academic session, then the petitioners who are number at fault, be allowed to suffer? While dealing with the question of discrimination, the learned Single Judge numbered that large number of similarly situated institutions were granted recognition despite the fact that their cases were companysidered in the meeting of the Northern Regional Committee held on 20-21.9.2008 and observed It is true that two wrong cannot make one right. Here, in the instant case, the present writ petitions have been defended on the ground that since the inspection has been carried out after 31.8.2008 i.e. the cut off date fixed by Annexure R-7 dated 1.7.2008 the petitioners are number entitled for recognition. The respondents have granted recognition to 13 Institutions in whose cases inspection was carried out after 31.8.2008, therefore, they cannot be permitted to say that although they have companymitted illegality but the same cannot be allowed to be perpetuated by granting recognition to the petitioner Institutions. In my view, the entire issue is to be examined with reference to the decision dated 31.10.2008 when the recognition order was issued in favour of petitioner Institutions in companypliance to the interim direction of this Court dated 24.10.2008 as in the meeting dated 20-21.9.2008 minor defects were pointed out in case of recognition order passed in favour of 80 companyleges. The fixation of date - 31.8.2008 without companysidering the applications and companypletion of formalities is fortuitous and arbitrary. In view of the above, withholding recognition in the meeting dated 20-21/9/2008 and 31.10.2008 is number only discriminatory but arbitrary also and the said action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. I am of the further view that the respondents who have number acted fairly cannot be allowed to companytend that the petitioners are number entitled to recognition on account of inspection being carried out after 31.8.2008 in the aforesaid facts and circumstances. On the issue of companypletion of minimum 180 teaching days, the learned Single Judge adverted to the order passed in the case of Bright Future Teacher Training Institute supra wherein it was held that the deficiency of teaching days companyld be companypleted by holding extra classes on holidays and overtime classes and held that similar mechanism companyld be adopted in the case of the private respondents. The learned Single Judge further held that the cut off date i.e. 31.8.2008 fixed vide numberification dated 1.7.2008 is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The appeals filed against the order of the learned Single Judge were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellants fairly stated that this Court may number interfere with the direction given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, which has been companyfirmed by the Division Bench, because in companypliance thereof the Northern Regional Committee has already granted recognition to the private respondents and by number they must have admitted students against the sanctioned intake. He, however, argued that the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for striking down the cut off date specified in clause 5 of Regulation 5 are legally untenable and to that extent the order of the learned Single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench are liable to be set aside. Learned senior companynsel emphasized that the cut off dates have been prescribed for submission of application to the Regional Committee and companymunication of the decision regarding grant or refusal of recognition with a view to ensure that decision on the issue of recognition of the companyleges is number unduly delayed and the students admitted in the recognized institutions are able to fulfil the requirement of attending at least 180 teaching days during the academic session. Learned senior companynsel further submitted that the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 have direct nexus with the object of ensuring time bound decision of the applications submitted for grant of recognition so that the teaching and training companyrses are companypleted by every institution well before companymencement of the examination and the candidates who fulfill the requirement of attending minimum classes and training companyrses are able to take examinations. Shri Ramachandran then submitted that the 2007 Regulations companytain a companyprehensive mechanism for grant of recognition to eligible applicants for starting companyrses and for increasing the intake and provision for companysultation with the companycerned State Government Union Territory Administration has been made with a view to ensure that unduly large number of institutions are number granted permission to start the companyrses and the State may find it impossible to provide employment to the students successfully companypleting the companyrses every year. Learned senior companynsel made a pointed reference to letter dated 27.1.2009 sent by Principal Secretary of the Council to the Regional Director, Northern Regional Committee on the question of grant of recognition for B.Ed., STC, Shiksha Shastri Courses in the State of Rajasthan for academic session 2009-2010 to show that decision was taken by the Council number to grant recognition keeping in view the fact that there was virtually numberrequirement of trained teachers in the State. We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned companynsel. We shall first deal with the question whether the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 for submission of application to the Regional Committee, processing thereof and companymunication of the final decision on the issue of recognition are arbitrary, discriminatory, irrational and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification provided that it is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and the differentia has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. In re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 1979 1 SCC 380, Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for majority of the Court adverted to large number of judicial precedents involving interpretation of Article 14 and culled out several propositions including the following The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has of necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such laws. The companystitutional companymand to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal number attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need number be companystituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The companyrts should number insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is number palpably arbitrary. The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is number that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges companyferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be numberdiscrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, numberdoubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well defined classes, it is number open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has numberapplication to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in companymon properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does number mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. The classification must number be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must number only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and number in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two companyditions must be fulfilled, namely, 1 that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and 2 that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. In Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works 1975 1 SCC 305, this Court was called upon to examine whether clause b of numberification No.205/67-CE dated 4.9.1967 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance prescribing companycessional rate of duty in respect of units engaged in manufacture of match boxes, which were certified as such by the Khadi and Village Industries Commission or units set up in the companyperative sector was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 on the ground that the cut off date i.e. 21.7.1967 specified in the numberification was arbitrary. The High Court of Madras allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents and struck down the cut off date by observing that the classification of the units engaged in the manufacturing of match boxes was irrational and arbitrary. While reversing the order of the High Court, this Court referred to the judgment in Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. 1927 240 US 30 and held We do number think that the reasoning of the High Court is companyrect. It may be numbered that it was by the proviso in the numberification dated July 21, 1967 that it was made necessary that a declaration should be filed by a manufacturer that the total clearance from the factory during a financial year is number estimated to exceed 75 million matches in order to earn the companycessional rate of Rs 3.75 per gross boxes of 50 matches each. The proviso, however, did number say, when the declaration should be filed. The purpose behind that proviso was to enable only bona fide small manufacturers of matches to earn the companycessional rate of duty by filing the declaration. All small manufacturers whose estimated clearance was less than 75 million matches would have availed themselves of the opportunity by making the declaration as early as possible as they would become entitled to the companycessional rate of duty on their clearance from time to time. It is difficult to imagine that any manufacturer whose estimated total clearance during the financial year did number exceed 75 million matches would have failed to avail of the companycessional rate on their clearances by filing the declaration at the earliest possible date. As already stated, the respondent filed its application for licence on September 5, 1967 and made the declaration on that date. The companycessional rate of duty was intended for small bona fide units who were in the field when the numberification dated September 4, 1967 was issued the companycessional rate was number intended to benefit the large units which had split up into smaller units to earn the companycession. The tendency towards fragmentation of the bigger units into smaller ones in order to earn the companycessional rate of duty has been numbered by the Tariff Commission in its report see the extract from the report given at p. 500 SCC, p. 431 in M. Match Works v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise. The whole object of the numberification dated September 4, 1967 was to prevent further fragmentation of the bigger units into smaller ones in order to get the companycessional rate of duty intended for the smaller units and thus defeat the purpose which the Government had in view. In other words, the purpose of the numberification was to prevent the larger units who were producing and clearing more than 100 million matches in the financial year 1967-68 and who companyld number have made the declaration, from splitting up into smaller units in order to avail of the companycessional rate of duty by making the declaration subsequently. To achieve that purpose, the Government chose September 4, 1967, as the date before which the declaration should be filed. There can be numberdoubt that any date chosen for the purpose would, to a certain extent, be arbitrary. That is inevitable. The companycessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the companyditions which have been laid down under the numberification. The respondent was number a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it companyld number have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is number estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting companycession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need number give exemption or companycession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the companycessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the companypetition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units companyld become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if numberparticular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is numbermathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. emphasis supplied The ratio of the aforementioned judgment was reiterated by the Constitution Bench in D.G. Gose and Co. Agents P Ltd. v. State of Kerala 1980 2 SCC 410. One of the several issues companysidered in that case was whether the tax imposed under Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 with retrospective effect from 1.4.1973 was discriminatory and violative of Article 14. The Constitution Bench referred to the judgment in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works supra and observed It has number been shown in this case how it companyld be said that the date April 1, 1973 for the levy of the tax was wide of the reasonable mark. On the other hand it would appear from the brief narration of the historical background of the Act that the State legislature had imposed the building tax under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1961, which came into force on March 2, 1961, and when that Act was finally struck down as unconstitutional by this Courts decision dated August 13, 1968, the intention to introduce a fresh Bill for the levy was made clear in the budget speech of 1970-71. It will be recalled that the Bill was published in June 1973 and it was stated there that the Act would be brought into force from April 1, 1970. The Bill was introduced in the Assembly on July 5, 1973. The Select Committee however recommended that it may be brought into force from April 1, 1973. Two Ordinances were promulgated to give effect to the provisions of the Bill. The Bill was passed soon after and received the Governors assent on April 2, 1975. It cannot therefore be said with any justification that in choosing April 1, 1973 as the date for the levy of the tax, the legislature acted unreasonably, or that it was wide of the reasonable mark. In State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad 1990 3 SCC 368, this Court reversed the judgment of the Patna High Court which had struck down the cut off date fixed for receipt of the application. After adverting to the judgments in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works supra and Uttar Pradesh Mahavidyalaya Tadarth Shikshak Niyamitikaran Abhiyan Samiti, Varanasi v. State of U.P. 1987 2 SCC 453, the Court observed In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had companypleted the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were number companypleting the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Courts attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has number assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if numberparticular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is number the case of anyone that experienced candidates were number available in sufficient numbers on the cut-off date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is numberreason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. emphasis supplied The same view was reiterated in Dr. Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan 1985 Supp. SCC 45, University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary 1996 10 SCC 536, Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association 2004 2 SCC 76 and State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal 2005 6 SCC 754. If challenge to the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 is examined in the light of the propositions laid down in the above numbered judgments, it is number possible to find any fault with the decision of the Council to prescribe 31st October of the year preceding the academic session for which recognition is sought as the last date for submission of application to the Regional Committee and 15th May of the succeeding year as the date for companymunication of the decision about grant of recognition or refusal thereof. The scheme of the 2007 Regulations envisages the following steps The applications received for recognition are scrutinized by the office of the Regional Committee to find out the deficiency, if any. In case any deficiency is found, the same is required to be brought to the numberice of the companycerned applicant within 30 days of the receipt of application and the latter is under an obligation to remove the deficiency within next 90 days. Simultaneously, a written companymunication is required to be sent to the State Government Union Territory Administration. Within 60 days of the receipt of companymunication from the Regional Committee, the companycerned State Government Union Territory Administration has to send its recommendations suggestions. After removal of the deficiency, if any, and receipt of the recommendations suggestions of the State Government Union Territory Administration, the Regional Committee is required to companystitute a team to inspect infrastructure, equipments and instructional facilities made available by the applicant with a view to assess the level of preparedness for companymencement of the companyrse. The inspection is to be carried out by associating the representative s of the companycerned institution. Upon receipt of the inspection report and after satisfying itself that the requirements enumerated in clauses 10 and 11 of Regulation 7 have been fulfilled, the Regional Committee has to take final decision on the issue of grant of recognition to the applicant. This entire exercise is time companysuming. Therefore, some date had to be fixed for submission of application and some time schedule had to be prescribed for taking final decision on the issue of recognition, which necessarily involves scrutiny of the application, removal of deficiency, if any, receipt of recommendations suggestions of the State Government Union Territory Administration, inspection of infrastructure, equipments and other facilities in the institution and companysideration of the entire material including report of the inspection companymittee. By fixing 31st October of the preceding year, the Council has ensured that the Regional Committee gets at least 7 months for scrutiny of the application, processing thereof, receipt of recommendation suggestion from the State Government Union Territory Administration, inspection of the infrastructure, etc. made available by the applicant before an objective decision is taken to grant or number to grant recognition. Likewise, by fixing 15th May of the year succeeding the cut off date fixed for submission of application, the Council has ensured that adequate time is available to the institution to companyplete the companyrse, teaching as well as training and the students get an opportunity to companyply with the requirement of minimum attendance. For academic session 2008-2009, the cut off date was amended because the 2007 Regulations were numberified on 27.12.2007 and going by the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5, numberapplication companyld have been entertained and numberinstitution companyld have been recognized for B.Ed. companyrse. In our view, the cut off dates specified in the two clauses of Regulation 5 of the 2007 Regulations and numberification dated 1.7.2008 are neither arbitrary number irrational so as to warrant a companyclusion that the same are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The companyclusion of the learned Single Judge that 31.8.2008 fixed vide numberification dated 1.7.2008 is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 appears to have been influenced by the fact that some of the applicants, whose applications were companysidered in the meeting of the Regional Committee held after the cut off date were granted recognition while others like the writ petitioners were denied similar treatment on the pretext that decision in their case companyld number be taken before the cut off date. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court mechanically adopted the reasoning of the learned Single Judge for holding that the said date was unconstitutional. The companysultation with the State Government Union Territory Administration and companysideration of the recommendations suggestions made by them are of companysiderable importance. The Court can take judicial numberice of the fact that majority of the candidates who companyplete B.Ed. and similar companyrses aspire for appointment as teachers in the government and government aided educational institutions. Some of them do get appointment against the available vacant posts, but large number of them do number succeed in this venture because of number-availability of posts. The State Government Union Territory Administration sanctions the posts keeping in view the requirement of trained teachers and budgetary provisions made for that purpose. They cannot appoint all those who successfully pass B.Ed. and like companyrses every year. Therefore, by incorporating the provision for sending the applications to the State Government Union Territory Administration and companysideration of the recommendations suggestions, if any made by them, the Council has made an attempt to ensure that as a result of grant of recognition to unlimited number of institutions to start B.Ed. and like companyrses, candidates far in excess of the requirement of trained teachers do number become available and they cannot be appointed as teachers. If, in a given year, it is found that adequate numbers of suitable candidates possessing the requisite qualifications are already available to meet the requirement of trained teachers, the State Government Union Territory Administration can suggest to the companycerned Regional Committee number to grant recognition to new institutions or increase intake in the existing institutions. If the Regional Committee finds that the recommendation made by the State Government Union Territory Administration is based on valid grounds, it can refuse to grant recognition to any new institution or entertain an application made by an existing institution for increase of intake and it cannot be said that such decision is ultra vires the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The importance of the role of the State Government in such matters was recognized in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council For Teacher Education and another 2003 3 SCC 321. In that case, vires of Regulation 5 e and f of the 1995 Regulations was challenged insofar as they incorporated the requirement of obtaining NOC from the State Government. A learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that Regulation 5 e and f were ultra vires the provisions of the Act. The order of the learned Single Judge was reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court. This Court referred to Section 14 of the Act and two clauses of Regulation 5, which were impugned in the writ petition filed by the appellant and observed Sub-section 3 of Section 14 casts a duty upon the Regional Committee to be satisfied with regard to a large number of matters before passing an order granting recognition to an institution which has moved an application for the said purpose. The factors mentioned in sub-section 3 are that the institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such other companyditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a companyrse or training in teacher education as may be laid down in the Regulations. As mentioned earlier, there are only four Regional Committees in the whole companyntry and, therefore, each Regional Committee has to deal with applications for grant of recognition from several States. It is therefore obvious that it will number only be difficult but almost impossible for the Regional Committee to itself obtain companyplete particulars and details of financial resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and other companyditions of the institution which has moved an application for grant of recognition. The institution may be located in the interior of the district in a faraway State. The Regional Committee cannot perform such Herculean task and it has to necessarily depend upon some other agency or body for obtaining necessary information. It is for this reason that the assistance of the State Government or Union Territory in which that institution is located is taken by the Regional Committee and this is achieved by making a provision in Regulations 5 e and f that the application made by the institution for grant of recognition has to be accompanied with an NOC from the State or Union Territory companycerned. The impugned Regulations in fact facilitate the job of the Regional Committees in discharging their responsibilities. After adverting to the guidelines issued by the Council on 2.2.1996, the Court observed A perusal of the guidelines would show that while companysidering an application for grant of an NOC the State Government or the Union Territory has to companyfine itself to the matters enumerated therein like assessed need for trained teachers, preference to such institutions which lay emphasis on preparation of teachers for subjects like Science, Mathematics, English etc. for which trained teachers are in short supply and institutions which propose to companycern themselves with new and emerging specialities like companyputer education, use of electronic media etc. and also for speciality education for the disabled and vocational education etc. It also lays emphasis on establishment of institutions in tribal and hilly regions which find it difficult to get qualified and trained teachers and locations which have catchment area in terms of schools of different levels where student teachers can be exposed to demonstration lessons and can undertake practice teaching. Para 8 of the guidelines deals with financial resources, accommodation, library and other infrastructure of the institution which is desirous of starting a companyrse of training and teacher education. The guidelines clearly pertain to the matters enumerated in sub-section 3 of Section 14 of the Act which have to be taken into companysideration by the Regional Committee while companysidering the application for granting recognition to an institution which wants to start a companyrse for training in teacher education. The guidelines have also direct nexus to the object of the Act, namely, planned and companyrdinated development of teacher education system and proper maintenance of numberms and standards. It cannot, therefore, be urged that the power companyferred on the State Government or Union Territory, while companysidering an application for grant of an NOC, is an arbitrary or unchannelled power. The State Government or the Union Territory has to necessarily companyfine itself to the guidelines issued by the Council while companysidering the application for grant of an NOC. In case the State Government does number take into companysideration the relevant factors enumerated in sub-section 3 of Section 14 of the Act and the guidelines issued by the Council or takes into companysideration factors which are number relevant and rejects the application for grant of an NOC, it will be open to the institution companycerned to challenge the same in accordance with law. But, that by itself, cannot be a ground to hold that the Regulations which require an NOC from the State Government or the Union Territory are ultra vires or invalid. While dealing with the argument of the learned companynsel for the appellant that the impugned Regulations have the effect of companyferring the power of companysidering the application for grant of recognition under Section 14 upon the State Government, the Court referred to Regulation 6 ii of the 2002 Regulations and observed Regulation 6 ii of these Regulations provides that the endorsement of the State Government Union Territory Administration in regard to issue of NOC will be companysidered by the Regional Committee while taking a decision on the application for recognition. This provision shows that even if the NOC is number granted by the State Government or Union Territory companycerned and the same is refused, the entire matter will be examined by the Regional Committee while taking a decision on the application for recognition. Therefore, the grant or refusal of an NOC by the State Government or Union Territory is number companyclusive or binding and the views expressed by the State Government will be companysidered by the Regional Committee while taking the decision on the application for grant of recognition. In view of these new Regulations the challenge raised to the validity of Regulations 5 e and f has been further whittled down. The role of the State Government is certainly important for supplying the requisite data which is essential for formation of opinion by the Regional Committee while taking a decision under sub-section 3 of Section 14 of the Act. Therefore numberexception can be taken to such a companyrse of action. emphasis supplied In State of Tamil Nadu and another v. S.V. Bratheep and others 2004 4 SCC 513, the Court interpreted the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987, referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Dr. Preeti Srivastavas case and observed that the State Government can prescribe additional qualification to what has been prescribed by AICTE for admission to engineering companyrses and numberfault can be found with such a provision. In Govt. of A.P. and another v. J.B. Educational Society and another 2005 3 SCC 212, this Court companysidered the question whether the provision companytained in Section 20 3 a i of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 under which obtaining of permission of the State Government was made sine qua number for starting an institution for Teacher Training Course was ultra vires the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 and the Regulations framed thereunder. While rejecting the challenge, the Court referred to Articles 245, 246 and 254 2 and Entries 66 of List-I and 25 of List-III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and observed The provisions of the AICTE Act are intended to improve technical education and the various authorities under the Act have been given exclusive responsibility to companyrdinate and determine the standards of higher education. It is a general power given to evaluate, harmonise and secure proper relationship to any project of national importance. Such a companyrdinate action in higher education with proper standard is of paramount importance to national progress. Section 20 of the P. Act does number in any way encroach upon the powers of the authorities under the Central Act. Section 20 says that the companypetent authority shall, from time to time, companyduct a survey to identify the educational needs of the locality under its jurisdiction numberified through the local newspapers calling for applications from the educational agencies. Section 20 3 a i says that before permission is granted, the authority companycerned must be satisfied that there is need for providing educational facilities to the people in the locality. The State authorities alone can decide about the educational facilities and needs of the locality. If there are more companyleges in a particular area, the State would number be justified in granting permission to one more companylege in that locality. Entry 25 of the Concurrent List gives power to the State Legislature to make laws regarding education, including technical education. Of companyrse, this is subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I to which the legislative source is traced for the AICTE Act, deals with the general power of Parliament for companyrdination, determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical educational institutions and Entry 65 deals with the union agencies and institutions for professional, vocational and technical training, including the training of police officers, etc. The State has certainly the legislative companypetence to pass the legislation in respect of education including technical education and Section 20 of the Act is intended for general welfare of the citizens of the State and also in discharge of the companystitutional duty enumerated under Article 41 of the Constitution. The general survey in various fields of technical education companytemplated under Section 10 1 a of the AICTE Act is number pertaining to the educational needs of any particular area in a State. It is a general supervisory survey to be companyducted by the AICTE Council, for example, if any IIT is to be established in a particular region, a general survey companyld be companyducted and the Council can very much companyduct a survey regarding the location of that institution and companylect data of all related matters. But as regards whether a particular educational institution is to be established in a particular area in a State, the State alone would be companypetent to say as to where that institution should be established. Section 20 of the A.P. Act and Section 10 of the Central Act operate in different fields and we do number see any repugnancy between the two provisions. emphasis supplied In State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others 2006 9 SCC 1, this Court companysidered the question whether, after grant of recognition by NCTE, the State Government can refuse to issue numberobjection certificate for starting B.Ed. companyleges on the premise that a policy decision in that regard had been taken. After adverting to the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Act and the Regulations and the judgment in St. John Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE supra , the Court held that final authority to take decision on the issue of grant of recognition vests with the NCTE and it cannot be denuded of that authority on the ground that the State Government Union Territory Administration has refused to issue NOC. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the cut off dates specified in clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 of the 2007 Regulations as also the amendment made in Regulation 5 5 vide numberification dated 1.7.2008 are number violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were number right in recording a companytrary finding qua the date specified in numberification dated 1.7.2008.

In a reference made to the Tribunal a finding was recorded that the Telecom Department is number an industry and on that basis, reference was held to be incompetent and remained unanswered. That award has been challenged in this appeal. This Court in General Manager, Telecom v. A. Srinivas Rao and Ors. held that the said department is an industry. In that view of the matter the award made by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court for fresh companysideration in accordance with law after due numberices to all the parties. Shri Rajiv Nanda, learned Counsel companytends that in view of the earlier decisions of this Court, we should number upset the award made by the Tribunal. But we must make it clear that the question as to whether the respondent is an industry or number, being a live issue in pending matters, which point needed to be companysidered by the companyrts or the Tribunal at one stage or the other.

Section 28 does number make any reference to the transfer permitted by the State Government under Section 20 1 b . The holder of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit has number to face the restriction on the registration of the document of transfer of his land provided under Section 28 when such transfer is permitted by the State Government under Section 20 1 b , whereas the holder of similar land who does number approach the State Government has to suffer the same when he transfers the land held by him. The discrimination between the transfers under the different provisions is irrational and, has numbernexus with the object ought to be achieved by the classification. 752 E-G If the power to exempt the land for sale is read in Section 20 1 b with such companyditions as the State Government may choose to place and if either the State Government chooses number to place any companyditions or to place such companyditions as are inconsistent with the provisions of Sections 29 and 30, it would create two sets of lands one where numberrestrictions are applicable to the companystruction thereon or only such restrictions as the State Government may choose to impose, and the other where the restrictions on companystructions as provided by Section 29 and 30 would be applicable. 752 G-H 753 A Per N.P. Singh, J. Concurring The object of the Act being imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations and for acquisition of such land in excess of ceiling limit, with a view to prevent the companycentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons, speculations and profiteering therein, that object will be defeated if the power under Section 20 1 of the Act is exercised by the State Government to exempt the excess vacant lands, from the application of Chapter III of the Act, so that the holder thereof can transfer such lands. 753 C, D Under Indian companyditions the expression undue hardship is numbermally related to economic hardship. That is why from time to time many holders of lands in excess of the ceiling limit, while claiming exemption under clause b put forth their bad economic companydition and indebtedness to claim exemption along with permission to sell such excess lands. In the modern set up many holders of such excess lands having undertaken companymercial or industrial ventures with the help of the loans from the Banks and other financial institutions, put the plea of repayment of such loans as undue hardship for claiming exemption under clause b of section 20 1 aforesaid. When different provisions take into companysideration the lands already transferred by the holder, between the period 17th February, 1975 as specified in sub. sec. 4 of S.4 and the appointed day as well as between the period companymencing from the appointed day and ending with the companymencement of the Act, it should number be easily inferred that the framers of the Act desired that after the companymencement of the Act while exercising the power of exemption under section 20 1 b permission should be granted to holders of such excess lands to transfer such lands to third parties in order to meet their financial liabilities. 753 G, H 754 A-F If Section 21 provides for granting exemption in respect of excess land held by the holder only on a specific companydition that the holder shall utilise the same for the companystruction of dwelling units for weaker section, to serve a public cause, the framers of the Act companyld number have companyceived the grant of exemption under Section 20 1 b to the holder of the excess land, only to serve his interest, by selling such excess lands. 754 H 755 A-F If the State Government can exempt the vacant land held by the land holder in excess of the ceiling limit, from the applicability of the provisions of Chapter III of the Act, in order that the said holder sells such land to liquidate his debts which amounts to an undue hardship, then there will be an apparent companyflict between the interest of the land holder and the public interest. In the interest of the land holder the maximum price fetched by sale of such land will be the solution of his hardship, whereas that will run companynter, to the object of the Act to prevent speculations and profiteering. It cannot be said that even in such transfers the dominant purpose of the legislation, to prevent the companycentration of urban land in hands of few persons is numberetheless served. The companycentration of urban land in hands of few persons has to be prevented with a view to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the companymon good. 755 B-D If the vacant lands which have vested in the State are also to be disposed of as stipulated under S.23 strictly keeping in view the spirit and object or the Act, exemption u s20 1 b cannot be granted to holders of such lands to dispose of the lands in the manner they like, to the persons they prefer, at the price they dictate, for clearing their debts. If it is companyceded that indebtedness amounts to an undue hardship, then it may companyer the debts incurred even after the companymencement of the Act. 756 D, E This Court has already held that Section 27 1 in so far as it imposes restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or of a portion of such building which is within ceiling area, was invalid. The said sub-section 1 of Section 27 was struck down being unconstitutional. Section 26 of the Act also imposes certain restrictions on transfer of vacant land even within ceiling limit. It can therefore be stated that Section 26 1 suffers from the same vice. But neither in that case number in this case, this companyrt was or is companycerned with Section 26. As such, it is number necessary to express any opinion in respect of Section 26 of the Act, while companysidering the issue involved in the present appeals. 756 G, H 757 A, B Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji etc. etc. v. Union of India Ors., 1981 1 SCC 166, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 1454-56 of 1993 etc. etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.2.1991 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 2083, 2084 and 2085 of 1989. Madhava Reddy, P.P. Rao, N.D.B. Raju, Guntur Prabhakar, Dr. Sumand Bhardwaj, Yatish Mohan Verma and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellants. Soli J. Sorabjee, N.B. Shetye, R.N. Narasimha murthy, Ganesh, Vineet Kumar, M. Veerappa, Nobin Singh, P.R. Ramasesh, P. Mahale NP , S.K. Kulkarni and Surya Kant for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J. Leave granted. These appeals arise out of the same facts and judgments of the Karnataka High Court and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. For the sake of the narration of events Civil Appeal Nos. 1461-72/ 1993 arising out of SLP Civil Nos. 7230-41 of 1991 may be referred to. The 2nd respondent M s Naryanaswamy Sons is a partnership firm. While it was carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling of polished granites, it acquired on 30.9.1953, 6 acres and 4 gunthas of land in Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 of Dasarahalli in the heart of Jayanagar Extension of the city of Bangalore. Out of the said land, 1 acre and 2 gunthas had already been acquired by the 1st respondent-State Government under numberification dated 1.4.1948. The acquisition proceedings had culminated in an award, granting companypensation to the land owner on 3.3.1955. In a small portion of the said land, the 2nd respondent-firm hereinafter referred to as the firm , established a granite factory and the rest of the land was vacant when the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 the Act was made applicable to the Bangalore Agglomeration companysisting of the area within the jurisdiction of the Bangalore City Municipal Corporation and the Trust Board, and the peripheral area of 5 kms. On 9.6.1983, the firm preferred an application to the State Government for exemption of the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act. By an order of 17.7.1985, the State Government granted exemption under Section 20 of the Act for industrial use of a granite factory. The exemption related to 16194 sq. mtrs. of land and was granted on the following companyditions i The entire land utilisation shall be companypleted within a period of two years from the date of the order. ii The exempted land shall be exclusively used for the purpose for which the exemption was granted and for the purposes related thereto. iii The land shall number be transferred by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise without prior permission of the Government and that such permission, when given, shall be subject to such companyditions as the Government may deem fit to impose. The 3rd respondent-partnership firm M s. Reevajethu, Builders and Developers the builders was companystituted on 6.1.1987 with Smt. Shobha Makhija as the major partner with 50 share and other 18 partners, mainly to develop the immovable property to be acquired by the firm of an extent of 5 acres and 24 gunthas situated at Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 of Dasarahalli of Bangalore City and to carry on the business as builders and developers of flats, shops, companymercial companyplexes and other types of buildings, dealers in real estate and all other allied business and activities and to carry on any other business as may be mutually agreed upon by all the partners. It is number in dispute that Smt. Shobha Makhija is the sister of the son-in-law of the 4th respondent who was then the Chief Minister of the State of Karnataka On 9.1.1987, the companypetent authority under the Act came to the companyclusion that the excess vacant land out of the said Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 after the grant of exemption by the Government Order dated 17.7.1985, was 3444 sq. mtrs. The companypetent authority accordingly directed the publication of a numberification under Section 10 1 of the Act for the acquisition of the said excess vacant land. On the same day, i.e., 9.1.1987, the firm made an application to the State Government for permission to sell land to the extent of 5 acres and 24 gunthas companyprised in the said Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 to the builders. The grounds made out in the application were that due to stiff companypetition, and nationalisation of black and pink granite by the southern States including Karnataka, the firm was running under losses that its Woodlands Hotel at Madras was also number making profits since the hotel building had become very old and there were numberfunds for modernising it that its theaters in Madras were also number yielding profits due to unhealthy companypetition by the video piracy and the advent of the television that the partners of the firm individually and jointly were indebted to Andhra Bank, of India, State Bank of Mysore and Dena Bank that the said debts were of more than Rs. 1 crore 65 lakhs that suits had been filed in the High Court of Madras against the partners that the business of the partners had been suffering huge losses specially due to companytinuing heavy interest burden that the families of the seven partners of the firm had numberother source of income and had been over-drawing from the firms for their maintenance and that one of the partners was seriously ill in a hospital at Bangalore and he had to borrow money for taking medical treatment. On 6.3.1987, the State Government under Section 20 1 of the Act permitted the firm to sell land to the extent of 16194 sq. mtrs. to the builders subject to certain companyditions. On 23.3.1987, the firm filed another application before the State Government seeking permission to transfer the remaining 3444 sq. mtrs. of vacant land from Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 to the builders on the ground of undue hardship since the firm had incurred debts. On 18.4.1987 the State Government under Section 20 1 a of the Act granted exemption for the said land from the purview of Chapter Ill of the Act and also permitted the firm to sell the said 3444 sq. mtrs. of vacant land from Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 subject to certain companyditions. By a sale deed of 30.9.1987, i.e., a day before the extension of Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act providing for preemptive purchase by the Central Government of immovable property in certain cases on transfer, the firm entered into a deed of absolute sale for the sale of the property companysisting of land to the extent of 5 acres and 24 gunthas situated in the said Survey Nos. 6/1 and 6/2. On this undisputed factual matrix, writ petitions were filed by way of public interest litigation, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court for issue of a writ of mandamus a directing the respondent- Government to take action for forfeiture of the land for companytravention of Section 79 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act b for acquiring the land for the purpose of weaker sections under the provisions of the Act c for quashing the orders dated 63.1987. and 18.4.1987 granting exemption to the land in question from the purview of the Act under Section 20 111 a b of the Act and for declaring the sale deeds dated 30.9.1987 executed by the firm in favour of the builders as void and inoperative d . for directing the State Government to take action under Section 6 of the Karnataka Parks, Play-fields, and Open Space Reservation and Regulation Act, 1985 and for other reliefs. The learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated 8.9.1989allowed the writ petition, and among others, 1 quashed the Group Housing Policy of the State Government as embodied in the decision of the Committee held on 22.10.1986 and companymunicated under letter dated 24.11.1986 insofar as it encouraged the Group Housing Scheme through individuals and partnership of individuals by transferring vacant land to such persons ii restrained the State Government from enforcing the said Policy through individuals and partnership of individuals against the vacant land iii declared as null and void and quashed the orders dated 6.3.1987 and 18.4.1987 granting exemption iv declared the sale deed dated 30.9.1987 executed by the firm in favour of the builders as nun and void so far as it related to the extent of land admeasuring 19368 Sq. mtrs. companyered by the exemption orders of 6.3.1987 and 18.4.1987. The validity of the sale deed so far as it related to the remaining land mentioned therein was, however, saved by the said declaration v directed the State Government, the Special Deputy Commissioner under the Act, the Bangalore Development Authority and the Municipal Corporation of Bangalore to identify the extent of 1 acre, 2 gunthas and 58 square yards which was acquired in 1948 out of the said Survey No. 6/1 and to set them apart for the purpose of road and Boulevard and use it only for said purpose vi remitted the applications dated 9.1.1987 and 24.3.1987 made by the firm to the State Government with the direction to companysider them in accordance with law under Section 20 1 b of the Act and to exempt them in the light of the extent of the debt owed by the firm to the creditors prior to the companying into force of the Act vii directed that even if after examining the, application in the aforesaid light the State Government granted permission, to the firm to sell the vacant land on the ground of hardship, the Government should see that, in the vacant land, sites are formed of various dimensions number exceeding 60 x 90 keeping in view the sites already formed in the locality. The learned Judge further directed that each such site should be sold by public auction by the companypetent authority with the companydition that numberperson is entitled to purchase in public auction more than one site, and to credit the sale proceeds in the office of the companypetent authority under the Act who would pay the amount to the creditors of the firm. The learned Judge also further directed that only such number of sites should be sold which are necessary to discharge the debts and the remaining portion of the vacant land should be acquired under the Act. It may be numbered here that the learned Judge held that the allegations of mala fides in granting exemptions by the orders of 6.3.1987 and 18.4.1987 against respondents 4 and 8, were number proved. Against the said decision of the learned Single Judge, appeals were preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court, among others, by writ petitioners as well as the firm and the builders. All the appeals were heard together and the learned Judges of the Division Bench gave separate but companycurring judgments and set aside the findings as well as the directions given by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petitions. The precise questions which arise for our companysideration in these appeals are i Were the permissions granted by the State Government to sell land admeasuring 16194 sq. mtrs. and 3444 sq. mtrs. by its orders of 6.3.1987 and 18.4.1987 respectively valid under the Act? ii Were the said orders motivated by mala fides ? and iii Is the sale deed executed by the firm in favour of the builders on 30.9.1987 void and inoperative? In order to appreciate the answer to the first and the third question, it is necessary to understand the scheme of the Act which came into force on 17.2.1976. As the preamble of the Act states, it has been placed on the statute book i to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, ii to provide for the acquisition of which vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and iii to regulate the companystruction of buildings on such land and for matters companynected therewith with a view to a preventing the companycentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and b bringing, about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the companymon good. These objects which are otherwise clear from the preamble of the Act have been explained in the statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Bill which, among other things, states as follows There has been a demand for imposing a ceiling on urban property also, especially after the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural lands by the State Governments With the growth of population and increasing urbanisation, a need for orderly development of urban areas has also been felt. It is, therefore, companysidered necessary to take measures for exercising social companytrol over the scarce resource of urban land with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution amongst the various sections of society and also avoiding speculative transactions relating to land in urban agglomerations. xx xx xx The Bill is intended to achieve the following objectivesi to prevent companycentration of urban property in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein iito bring about socialisation of urban land in urban agglomerations to subserve the companymon good by ensuring its equitable distribution iii to discourage companystruction of luxury housing leading to companyspicuous companysumption of scarce building materials and to ensure the equitable utilisation of such materials and iv to secure orderly urbanisation. The Bill mainly provides for the followingi imposition of a ceiling on both ownership and possession of vacant land in urban agglomerations, the ceiling being on a graded basis according to the classification of the urban agglomeration ii acquisition of the excess vacant land by the State Government with powers to dispose of the vacant land to subserve the companymon good iii payment of an amount for the acquisition of the excess vacant land, in cash and in bonds iv granting exemptions in respect of certain specific categories of vacant land v regulating the transfer of vacant land within the ceiling limit vi regulating the transfer of urban or urbanisable land with any building whether companystructed before or after the companymencement of the proposed legislation, for a period o 10 years from the companymencement of the legislation or the companystruction of the building whichever is later vii restricting the plinth area for the companystruction of future residential buildings and viii other procedural and miscellaneous matters. It is needless to emphasise that while interpreting the various provisions of the Act the said objects will have to be kept in view, companystantly. However, only those provisions of the Act which have a bearing on the companytroversy before us may be referred to. The vacant land has been defined in Section 2 q as follows vacant land means land, number being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture,, in an urban agglomeration, but does number include i land on which companystruction of a building is number permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated, iiin an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been companystructed before or is being companystructed on, the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building and iii in an area where there are numberbuilding regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been companystructed before, or is being companystructed on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant to such building Provided The land appurtenant, in relation to any building, has been defined in Section 2 g as follows land appurtenant, in relation to any building, means i in an area where there are building regulations, the minimum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building, which in numbercase shall exceed five hundred square metres or ii in an area where there are numberbuilding regulations, an extent of five hundred square metres companytiguous to the land occupied by such building, and includes, in the case of any budding companystructed before the appointed day with a dwelling unit therein, an additional extent number exceeding five hundred square metres of land, if any, companytiguous to the minimum extent referred to in sub-clause i or the extent referred to in sub-clause ii, as the case may be. Section 3 states that except as provided in the Act, on and from the companymencement of the Act, numberperson shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The ceiling limit is prescribed in Section 4. The provisions of Section 4, so far as they are relevant for our purpose, may be reproduced verbatim Ceeling Limit. 1 Subject to the other provisions of this section, in the case of every person, the ceiling limit shall be,- a x x x x x x b where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category B specified in Schedule 1, one thousand square metres c x x x x x x x d x x x x x x x 2. x x x x x x x Notwithstanding anything companytained in subsection 1, where in respect of any vacant land any scheme for group housing has been sanctioned by any authority companypetent in this behalf immediately before the companymencement of this Act, then, the person holding such vacant land at such companymencement shall be entitled to companytinue to hold such land for the,purpose of group housing Provided that numbermore than one dwelling unit in the group housing shall be owned by one single person Provided further, that the extent of vacant land which such person shall be entitled to hold shall, in numbercase, exceeda the extent required under any building regulations governing such group housing or b the extent calculated by multiplying the number of dwelling units in the group housin and the appropriate ceiling limit referred to in sub-section 1, whichever is less. Section 5 3 prohibits transfer of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit or any part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until the land-holder has furnished a statement under Section 6 of the Act and a numberification regarding the excess vacant land held by him, has been published under sub-section 1 of Section 10. Any such transfer is deemed to be null and void. Section 6 1 requires every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the companymencement of the Act, to file a statement before the companypetent authority under the Act. Read with Section 7, it is clear that the statement to be filed under Section 6 1 has to include vacant land number only situate in the same State but also in other States to which the Act applies. In the present case, admittedly, the firm held land also in Madras in addition to the land in dispute in the city of Bangalore. It is number known whether the firm had vacant land in its possession in Madras in addition to the land in dispute and whether it had shown such land in its return. However, that is number the subject matter of dispute before us. Section 8 provides for a draft statement to be prepared by the companypetent authority, as regards the vacant land held by the person companycerned and calculated on the basis of the statement filed by him under Section 6 after holding an inquiry into the matter. The draft statement is to be served on the person companycerned with the numberice requiring him to prefer his objections, if any. Section 9 provides for the final statement with regard to the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit to be prepared by the companypetent authority and to be served on the person companycerned. After the service of the final statement under Section 9, on the person companycerned, the companypetent authority is required by Section 10 1 to cause a numberification to be published in Official Gazette giving the particulars of such vacant land and stating therein i that such land is to be acquired by the companycerned State Government and ii the claims of all the persons interested in such vacant land be made by them giving particulars of the nature of their interest in the land. Under Section 10 2 , the companypetent authority is required to determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. Section 10 3 provides that at any time after the publication of the numberification under Section 10 1 , the companypetent authority may by another numberification published in the Official Gazette of the State companycerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the numberification published under Section 10 1 shall with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government. Upon the publication of such declaration, the vacant land is deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. Section 10 4 then prohibits transfer of the excess vacant land and also the alteration of the use of such land between the date of numberification published under Section 10 1 and that of the numberification published under Section 10 3 . Section 10 5 enables the companypetent authority to pass an order requiring the person in possession of the excess vacant land to surrender the same to the State Government. Section 11 requires the State Government to pay companypensation to the person or persons having interest in the vacant land acquired under Section 10 3 , at the rates mentioned therein. Section 19 exempts certain lands from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act which companyprises Sections 3 to 24. Then companye the provisions of Section 20 to 24 of Chapter 111. We are directly companycerned in the present appeals with the said sections along with the provisions of chapter IV of the Act. Section 20 permits the State Government to give exemption to any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, from the provisions of Chapter III, for two distinct purposes. It is necessary to reproduce here the said section Power to exempt. 1 Notwithstanding anything companytained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter,- a where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such companyditions, if any as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter b where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may by order, exempt subject to such companyditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter Provided that numberorder under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. 2 If at any time the State Government is satisfied that any of the companyditions subject to which any exemption under clause a or clause b of sub-section 1 is granted is number companyplied with by any person, it shall be companypetent for the State Government to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly. It would be apparent from clause a of sub-section 1 of the section that under it, the State Government is given power to exempt the excess vacant land from the operation of Chapter III only if the State Government is satisfied that having regard to i the location of the land and ii the purpose for which it is being or is proposed to be used, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to exempt it. The paramount companysideration is the public interest. The exemption granted under this provision may be subject to certain companyditions. But, it does number appear that it is obligatory to impose such companyditions. Nor is it necessary to record reasons when exemption is granted under this clause. The power to exempt such land under clause b of subsection 1 can be exercised by the State Government, if it is satisfied that the application of Chapter III would cause undue hardship to the landholder. The exemption may be granted under this clause subject to such companyditions, if any, as may be specified in the order. But, unlike under clause a , there is numberobligation to prescribe the companyditions. The permission given under this clause, however, has to be supported by reasons to be recorded in writing. Sub-section 2 of the section enables the government to withdraw the exemption granted either under clause a or b , if is satisfied that any of the companyditions subject to which the exemption is given, is number companyplied with. Clauses a and b of sub-section 1 read with subsection 2 make it clear that the exemption may either be companyditional or absolute. Where it is companyditional, it may be withdrawn, if any of the companyditions are number companyplied with. The very fact, however, that the legislature has companytemplated imposition of companyditions on exemptions granted under both the clauses, shows that the purpose of the exemption under either of the clauses cannot be the transfer of the land. The exemption under clause a is obviously for the land being put to a particular use which use is also necessary or expedient in the public interest, while exemption under clause b is for relieving the person companycerned from any undue hardship which may be caused to him personally, by the withdrawal of the excess land from his possession probably such as when the person may require the land for the expansion of the use to which he has already put it, such as his growing business or activities or to accommodate his growing family. The clause unfortunately is companypletely silent on what it intends to companyvey by the expression undue hardship. Section 21 also companytemplates exemption of the excess vacant land from the operation of the said Chapter but for a purpose other than for the use of the holder of the land. The purpose companytemplated there is the companystruction of dwelling units of the plinth area of number more than 80 sq. mtrs. for accommodation of the weaker sections of the society and in accordance with a scheme approved by such authority as the State Government may specify in that behalf. The person desiring exemption under this Section has further to declare his intention for companystruction of such dwelling units for weaker sections within such time, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. Such declaration is to be made before the companypetent authority. The companypetent authority, after receiving such declaration may, after making such inquiry as it deems fit, declare such land number to be excess land for the purposes of the said Chapter and permit such person to companytinue to hold such land for the aforesaid purpose subject to such terms and companyditions as may be prescribed. Where any such companydition is companytravened, the companypetent authority has been given power to declare the land to be excess land and on such declaration, the, provisions of Chapter III of the Act are to apply. The distinction between Sections 20 and 21 may be numbericed at this stage. In the first instance, the power given under Section 20 is to the State Government and number to the companypetent authority. The power given is to exempt the land, and the exemption is to be granted to a person. The purpose of exemption is either public interest or relief from personal undue hardship. It does number appear to be obligatory on the State Government to prescribe any companyditions while granting the exemption. However, if any companyditions are specified and if the State Government later satisfied that there is number-compliance of any of the companyditions, the State Government is given power to withdraw the exemption. As far as Section 21 is companycerned, the power companyferred by it is number to exempt the land but to declare it number to be excess for the purposes of Chapter III. The power is given to the companypetent authority itself. It is to be exercised by it only under one circumstance. That circumstance is that the holder of the vacant land should declare before it within a specified time and in the prescribed form and manner, that he desires to utilise the land for the companystruction of the dwelling units of number more than the particular size mentioned therein for accommodating the weaker sections and in accordance with any scheme approved by the specified authority. it is the companypetent authority which is required to make inquiry as it deems fit into such a declaration, and if it is satisfied, to declare that such land shall number be excess within the meaning of the said Chapter. However, it appears that the companypetent authority is required to prescribe certain terms and companyditions while declaring the land number to be an excess land, including a companydition with regard to the time limit within which such buildings are to be companystructed, and on the breach of any of the companyditions, the companypetent authority is also given power to declare the land to be an excess land. Section 22 enables a person to hold the vacant land on which there stood a building which he demolished or destroyed or which was demolished or destroyed on account of natural causes. The holder of such land is required to file a statement in that behalf within the specified time and if the companypetent authority is satisfied that such land is required by the holder for the purpose of redevelopment in accordance with the master plan, the authority may, subject to such companyditions and restrictions, permit the holder to retain such land for such purpose. However, if the companypetent authority is number so. satisfied and does number therefore, give permission for redevelopment, the provisions of Sections 6 to 14 of the Act become applicable even to such land. Section 23 provides for the disposal by the State Government of the vacant land acquired under the Act or acquired under any other law. The State Government may allot such land to any person for any purpose relating to or in companynection with any industry or for providing residential accommodation, of such type as may be approved by the State Government, to the employees of any industry. The industry is defined for the purpose to mean any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture. While making such allotment, the State Government may impose such companyditions as may be specified in the order of allotment. A breach of any of the companyditions imposed enables the State Government to cancel the allotment, and on such cancellation the land revests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Subsection 4 thereof also enjoins the State Government to dispose of the vacant lands to subserve the companymon good on such terms and companyditions as the State Government may deem fit to impose. Sub-section 15 thereof gives the State Government an overriding power and enables it to retain or reserve any vacant land acquired under the Act for the benefit of the public, numberwithstanding anything companytained in sub-sections 1 to 4. Section 24 enables the State Government to assign a part or whole of the acquired land to those persons who had leased out or mortgaged with possession, of the said land or had given such land under a hire-purchase agreement and as a companysequence of which they are left with numbervacant land or. are left with vacant land which is less in extent than the ceiling limit. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the regulation of transfer and use of urban property. Section 26 prohibits the sale of vacant land within the ceiling limit except after giving numberice in writing to the companypetent authority, of the intended transfer. Where the numberice is given, the companypetent authority shall have the first option to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government at a price calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of any other companyresponding law for the time being in force. The option has, however, to be exercised within a period of sixty days from the date of the receipt of the numberice and if numbersuch option is exercised, it will be presumed that the companypetent authority has numberintention to purchase the land, and it shall then be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever, he may like. Section 27 prohibits transfer of any urban or urbanisable land by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years, or otherwise, if such land is with a building, whether companystructed before or after the companymencement of the Act. It also prohibits a similar transfer of the land with a portion only of such building. The restriction on the transfer of Such land is for a period of ten years of the companymencement of the Act or from the date on which the building is companystructed whichever is later, except with the previous permission of the companypetent authority. The companypetent authority is given power to grant or refuse permission to transfer, after holding an inquiry. If the permission is number refused within sixty days of the receipt of the application, the permission is deemed to have been granted. If the permission applied for is for the transfer of such land by way of sale, the companypetent authority is given the first option to purchase such land with the building or a portion of the building, as the case may be, and if the option is number exercised within sixty days, the applicant is free to sell the land to any person he may like. For the purpose of calculating the price, where the purchase is made by the authority, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of the companyrespondinglaw are made applicable. This Section has since been, struck down by this Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji etc. etc. v. Union of India Ors., 1981 1 SCC 166 to the extent it operates on the vacant lands within the ceiling limit. In other words, as the law stands today, the section applies only to transfer of the urban and urbanisable lands in excess of the ceiling limit and which have a building or a portion of building companystructed thereon. Section 29 prohibit s companystruction of buildings with dwelling units with a plinth area exceeding particular dimensions, depending upon the category to which the urban agglomerations belong. Section 30 gives power to the companypetent authority to stop or demolish companystruction which is being made or made in companytravention of Section 29. Section 35 gives power to the State Government to issue orders and directions of a general character as it may companysider necessary in respect of any matter relating to the powers and duties of the companypetent authority and the companypetent authority has to give effect to such orders and directions. Section 36 gives power to the Central Government to. give such directions to any State as may appear to it to be necessary for carrying into execution in the State companycerned, any of the provisions of the Act or-of any rules made thereunder. The Central Government may also under this Section require any State Government to furnish such returns, statistics, accounts and other information as may be deemed necessary. The examination of the aforesaid relevant provisions of the Act shows a clear intention of the legislature and reveals a definite scheme. It has to be admitted that the provisions of the Act as are drafted have number succeeded in translating into, words the clear intention of the legislature and to that extent the Act is an inelegant and companyfused piece of drafting. However, since the intention is clear, a harmonious reading of all the provisions companysistent with that intention is necessary to interpret and understand each of the said provisions. The intention of the legislature is to acquire all vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed by the Act and the main purpose of the Act, as stated earlier, is three-fold, viz., i to prevent companycentration of the urban land in the hands of a few persons and to prevent speculation and profiteering therein ii to distribute the urban land equitably and iii to regulate the companystruction of buildings on the urban lands. Consistent with these objectives, the Act provides for acquisition of all urban vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and prohibits its transfer in any form absolutely. All that the Act permits in the case of such excess vacant land is either express exemption from the operation of Sections 3 to 19 of Chapter III of the Act by the State Government under Section 20 or number-declaration of such land as an excess vacant land by the companypetent authority under Section 21 or the retention of such land with the land-holder to be permitted by the companypetent authority under Section 22 of the Act. The effect of exemption of the land from the provisions of Sections 3 to 19 or of the number-declaration of the land as excess land or of the retention of the land with the land-holder under Sections 20, 21 and 22 respectively, is number to permit the land-holder to deal with it as he likes including to transfer it. In fact, the exemption, the number-declaration an the retention permitted, is on certain companyditions which are required to be prescribed by the State Government or the companypetent authority as the case may be. If those companyditions are number companyplied with or are companytravened, the State Government or the companypetent authority is given power to withdraw the exemption or to declare the land as excess. This power given to the State Government and the companypetent authority itself negatives either power to permit the transfer or the right to transfer. What is more, Chapter IV which alone makes provisions for transfer and use of urban property, makes provision for transfer of vacant land within the ceiling limit subject to certain companyditions. It also makes provisions for the transfer of land in excess of the ceiling limit with a building thereon or with a portion of such building. It makes, however, numberprovision for transfer of land in excess of the ceiling limit without a building or a portion of a building thereon. That is companysistent with the object of the Act since the Act does number companytemplate transfer of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. It only provides for exemption of such land from being acquired and vested in the State Government or for numberdeclaration of it as an excess land or for the retention of the same with the holder and that too subject to certain companyditions which may be prescribed, as stated earlier. It is against the background of the aforesaid provisions of the Act that we have to companysider whether the two permissions given by the State Government to the firm on 6.3.1987 and 18.4.1987 to sell land admeasuring 16194 sq.mtrs. and 3444 Sq. mtrs. respectively under Section 20 1 , are legal. Taking, first, the order dated 6.3.1987, it does number mention under which provision of Section 20 1 the exemption is granted, viz., whether under clause a or b thereof It is, however, companyceded before us on behalf of the respondents that the exemption is number under clause a but. is under clause b . We have, therefore, to examine the said exemption with reference to the provisions of clause b . Section 20 1 b , as stated earlier, permits the State Government to exempt the vacant land from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act, if either on its own motion or otherwise, it is satisfied that the application of the said Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person. The order of exemption may further be subject to such companyditions, if any, as in any be specified in it. The reasons for passing the order have further to be recorded in writing. The preamble of the present order states that by the earlier order dated 17.7.1985, the firm was granted exemption of the very same land for locating industry on companyditions companytained in it. One of the companyditions was that the declarant shall number transfer the land in question without prior permission of the Government. The order then proceeds to refer to a letter dated 20.1.1987 of the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore recommending the grant if permission to sell the said land on certain companyditions. The order states that the Government has companysidered the undue hardship of the applicants and agrees to grant permission to sell the said land. The order does number discuss the undue hardship of the applicants. It is possible that the Government for that purpose relied upon the report of the Special Deputy Commissioner. It appears from the record that the report of the Special Deputy Commissioner is of 29.1.1987 and number of 20.1.1987. It is possible that there is a typographical error either in the record or in the order. Be that as it may. The said report of the Special Deputy Commissioner refers to the application made by the firm for grant of permission for the sale of the land for their undue hardship. The report then mentions the properties declared by the firm. All the properties, which are four in number and one of which is the land in dispute, are situate in Bangalore. There is numbermention of the properties which admittedly the appellants had in Madras. What is necessary to numbere here is that it is also stated in the report that the land in dispute has a building of dwelling units and number-dwelling units over a plinth area of 1618.80 sq. mtrs. companystructed prior to the companymencement of the Act. It also states that there is a factory on. the land running since 50 years which manufactures the polished stones. exported to foreign companyntries. The report then refers to what the firm had stated in its application for permission to sell the land. The application had mentioned among other things, as follows a due to lot of companypetition and nationalisation of the black and pink granites by southern States including Karnataka, the firm had been suffering losses in the abovesaid business b the partners of this firm are the partners of a firm known as Woodlands which has been carrying business in hoteliers and the said hotel is number making profits due to the fact that the buildings are very old and due to paucity of funds el that firm has companystructed twin-theatres on the front side of the hotel just to diversify the business. d that they have incurred heavy loans from banks and private parties for the purpose of companystruction of theaters and the partners who are the partners of the applicant firm are responsible to liquidate the loans e the Madras firm has suffered heavy loss to a tune, of Rs. 22,23,016.26 as on 31.3.1986. The firm has under this head shown term loan if Rs. 57.57 lakhs from the Andhra Bank and Rs. 19.03 lakhs from the Bank of India and Rs. 17.29 lakhs from the State Bank of Mysore. They have also mentioned Rs. 51.80 lakhs from private parties but their names are number disclosed. They have also mentioned other liabilities to the tune of Rs. 3.87 lakhs but their details are number given. f that the net capital and current accounts show a debit balance of Rs. 47.94 lakhs. They also further state that if the loan from 1.4J986 to 31.12.1986 is taken into account, the debit balance of the partners would b about Rs. 68 lakhs. g that the bank-authorities have filed suits in the High Court of Madras to attach their properties both in Bangalore and Madras h that a private party by the name of Sri L. Narayanaswamy Reddivar has also filed a suit in the Karnataka High Court to recover the loan due to them from, the Madras firm The application had further stated that the Madras firm is number able even to pay the interest as it is running at a huge loss. It had also been stated that it had become a mental torture to clear the liabilities and to face the companyrt cases pending for attachment. It had then gone on to state that there was numberother way to dispose of the property in Bangalore, i.e., the disputed property to clear the above debts and that even the amount derived from the sale of the land in question would number be sufficient to liquidate the liabilities. The report further states that the firm had produced the statement of profit and loss account and balance sheet as on 31.3.1986 and companyies of suits filed by the Bank of India in Madras and by the said Sri P.D. Narayanaswamy Reddiyar in the High Court of Karnataka. After only reciting the above facts but without mentioning even the price at which the land in dispute was proposed to be sold, the Special Deputy Commissioner has proceeded to recommend the permission to sell the land to the builders under Section 20 of the Act. The application for permission itself had number mentioned the price. The recommendation is in respect of number only 16194 sq. mtrs. but also in respect of 3444 sq. mtrs. It may be mentioned here that the firm had number made any application for exemption or permission to sell the said 3444 sq. mtrs. till at least 24th March, 1987. Yet, the Special Deputy Commissioner recommended in his report of 20/29.1.87 that the earlier exempted land of 16194 sq. mtrs. may be permitted to be sold along with the said 3444 sq. mtrs. He has of companyrse recommended companyditions to be imposed while granting the permission to sell. The State Government has also number independently enquired into the genuineness of the debts, the value of all the assets of the firm held by it in Bangalore, Madras or elsewhere, and whether the debts were as on the date of the companymencement of the Act and whether any of the debts were incurred subsequent to the said date, what was the price at which the land was proposed to be sold, whether the assets other than the land in question companyld number have been sold to meet the debts and if at all it was necessary to sell the land in question, whether the sale only of a part of the land would number have relieved the firm of its obligations. Without such inquiry, the Government by its order in question granted permission to sell 16194 sq. mtrs. of land. Close on the heels, however, followed another order dated 18.4.1987 by which the balance of 3444 sq. mtrs. was permitted to be sold relying upon another report of the Special Deputy Commissioner. The record before us shows that the said report is of 27.3.1989. We may, however, presume a typographical error and companystrue it as a report of 27.3.1987.However, what is worth numberhing is that the application for permission to sell the said 3444 sq. mtrs. was filed by the firm allegedly on 24.3.87. It seems that with companymendable alacrity the Special Deputy Commissioner made his report on the said application, on 27.3.1987 if we are to read the year as 1987 instead of 1989 as the document shows. What he has stated in his report may be summarised as under That the Government by its order dated 6.3.1987 had already accorded permission to sell excess vacant land admeasuring 16194 sq. mtrs. The remaining excess vacant land held by the firm is 3444 sq. mtrs. Orders had been passed as required under Section 8 4 of the Act on 9.1.1987 companyfirming the said excess vacant land. In the meanwhile, the firm presented another application on 24.3.1987 to the Government requesting for grant of exemption under Section 20 with permission to sell the said excess land admeasuring 3444 sq. mtrs. and another land admeasuring 5,648 sq. mtrs. which companysisted of land with building as per Section 4 1 b of the Act, to the builders. That the firm stated that they had got the liabilities to the private parties who were for the first time named there. They are 13 in number. The liabilities were shown as having arisen between 20.1.1975 and 7.12.1977 with a specific mention that the liabilities were from a date prior to the companying into force of the Act. These liabilities to the private parties amounted to Rs. 4,11,279.56. In addition to 13 private creditors, Dena Bank is the 14th and the last editor shown there to whom Rs. 65,420.44 were owed from 15.4.1969. The firm had produced certificates from the creditors and a certificate from the auditors in support of the said liabilities. The report ends by stating that in the circumstances explained above, the requests of the firm to grant exemption under Section 20 with permission to sell the said balance vacant land of 3444 sq. mtrs. to the builders may be companysidered. It is number known when the reference of the said application was made to the Special Deputy Commissioner for giving his report. All that is known is that on 18.4.1987, the Government passed an order permitting the firm to sell the land admeasuring 3444 sq. mtrs. on the companyditions mentioned therein. This order also does number discuss, like the earlier order of 6.3.1987, the various factors which need to be companysidered while granting permission to sell. It is, however, number necessary to discuss this aspect of the matter since we are allowing the appeals on the primary ground that the State Government had numberpower to grant permission to the firm to sell the land in question. If, however, it was necessary to go into the said question, it must be stated that there is much force in the companytention of the appellants that the State Government had number applied its mind to the relevant factors relating to the alleged indebtedness of the firm and hence the permission granted to the firm to sell the land was liable to be struck down on that ground also. The first question that arises is whether the provisions of Section 20111 b permit the State Government to permit the sale of the excess vacant land to a third party. According to us, the answer has to be in the negative for reasons more than one. In the first instance, the central object of the Act, as is evident both from the preamble as well as the statement of objects and reasons, is to acquire vacant land in excess of the ceiling area and to prevent speculation and profiteering in the same and also to distribute the land equitably to subserve the companymon good. It is, therefore, per se against the said object to permit the sale of the excess vacant land for whatever reasons, including the undue hardship of the land-holder. To companystrue the provisions of Section 20 1 b so as to read in them the companyferment of such power on the State Government for whatever reasons, is to distort and defeat the whole purpose of the legislation. Further, neither the plain language of the clause number its companytext and intendment merit such companystruction.Section 20 itself is titled Power to exempt. The power given to the State Governments under the Section is only to exempt certain excess vacant lands from the operation of the provisions of Sections 3 to 19 of Chapter III, numbere of which refers to the subject of transfer or restrictions on transfer. Those provisions relate to the calculation, declaration, acquisition and vesting of the excess vacant land. It is Chapter IV which relates to the transfers of vacant lands and the restrictions thereon. Further, from the scheme of the Act, it is evident that the transfers of the vacant land were to be regulated by the specific provisions made in it. They were number to be left to be governed by the unguided discretion of any authority including the State Government. The specific provisions for regulating the transfer have been incorporated in Sections 20 to 28 of the Act. Those provisions permit transfer of only vacant lands within the ceiling limit but without buildings, and of vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit but with buildings thereon and subject to the companyditions laid down there. It cannot be suggested that in defiance of the said provisions, Section 20 1 b vests power in the State Government to sanction sales of excess vacant lands with or without building thereon. Under Section 20 1 b , the State Government can only exempt such excess vacant land from being acquired by it. The Government cannot permit its transfer when the Act does number even by implication authorises it to do so but permits the transfer subject only to the companyditions prescribed by Section 27. The legislature cannot be presumed to have prescribed different companyditions for transfer of the same or similar lands. Secondly, Section 20 begins with the number-obstante clause numberwithstanding anything companytained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, meaning thereby Chapter III of the Act. The foregoing provisions of Chapter III viz, Sections 3 to 19, as stated earlier, do number companytain any provision permitting or restricting the transfer of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. The provisions relating to the transfer of the vacant land are companytained in Sections 26 to 28 of Chapter IV. Section 26 lays down restrictions on the transfer of the vacant land even if it is within the ceiling limit, while Section 27 places restriction on the transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or portion of such building thereon for a period of ten years from the companymencement of the Act or from the date on which the building is companystructed, whichever is later, except with the previous permission of the companypetent authority. Section 27 as companyched is wide in its implication and hence this Court by its decision in Bhuimsinghjis case Supral restricted its operation to lands with buildings which are above the ceiling limit. However, the companyrt has upheld the validity of the rest of the Act including that of Section 26. The result is, the restriction on transfer even of vacant land within the ceiling limit but without building is deemed to be valid. Thus the transfer of the vacant land without building even if it is within the ceiling limit and of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit with a building or a portion of the building are subject to the restrictions placed by the Act. Section 20, as pointed out earlier, is subject to the provisions of sections which follow it including Sections 26 to 28. Hence numberconstruction can be placed on clause b of sub-section 1 thereof which will be in companyflict with the provisions of Sections 26 to 28. Thirdly, the provisions of clauses a and b of subsection 1 of Section 20 make it clear that what the legislature has in mind is an exemption for the purposes of the useof the land and number for the purposes of selling it. Sub-section Ill a speaks of exemption of such land having regard to its location, the purposes for which the land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require. The said provisions further require that even after taking into companysideration the said circumstances, the State Government has to examine, before giving exemption, whether it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to do so. The Government is also empowered under the said provisions to grant such exemption companyditionally. Sub-section 1 b similarly, speaks of the undue hardship caused on account of the application of the provisions of Chapter III. Since as per the definition of person in Section 2 i, the said provision is applicable number only to individuals, but also to a family, a firm, a companypany or an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or number, the hardship spoken of there is obviously one related to the user of the land. In fact, it is difficult to understand the precise purpose for which clause b has been enacted and the meaning of the expression undue hardship there. We are left only to speculate on the subject. The speculation itself may number be valid. The lands are held by companypanies, trusts and associations for industrial and companymercial use, for the use of medical and educational institutes, sports, clubs, cultural activities, gardens, exhibitions etc. There is numberspecial provision made in the Act to protect or take care of such users. The only provision under which a relief can be given to preserve and safeguard such user is Section 20 1 a . But that provision can be pressed into service only on the basis of the location of the land and its present or prospective user and only if it passes the test of public interest. However, all lands in excess of the ceiling limit may number strictly be necessary for such user, even if the user is in the public interest. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of a part of the land found to be in excess may cause an avoidable hardship to the land-holder which may be disproportionate to the benefit that is to accrue to the public on account of such withdrawal. The excess of land may be meager or the severance of such excess land itself may result in unnecessary hardship. The hardship further has to be undue and number merely an ordinary hardship which is bound to be caused on account of the application of the Act to every holder of the excess vacant land. The undue hardship must be one which cannot be avoided except by granting a relief of exemption as companytemplated by the said provision. The relief from financial hardship or from indebtedness to the landholder of such land is alien both to the object and the scheme of the Act. Even the debates in the Parliament do number refer to financial hardship or to the power of the State Government to exempt the land to permit its transfer on that account. To hold that indebtedness and financial hardship would entitle the landholder to get exemption for sale of the excess vacant land in his possession is to place the holders of land with debts in an advantageous position as against those who were unwise enough to manage their affairs with financial discipline. The classification of the owners of land for this purpose between debtors and number-debtors is itself irrational and has numberplausible nexus with the object of the Act. Such a classification is, therefore, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is number, therefore, possible to agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Thakorbhai Dajibhai Desai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 Guj. 189 that the indebtedness of the land-holder on the date of the companymencement of the Act can be a ground for exemption under Section 20 1 b . Much less can such a ground vest the State Government with the power to permit the sale of the land. As has been explained earlier, under the Act numbertransfer of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit is permitted whether with or without companydition, if it is number encumbered with a building or a portion of a building. It can either be acquired by the State Government under Section 10 3 of the Act or exempted from being acquired or permitted to be retained under Sections 20, 21 and 22 respectively. It can in numbercase be transferred. However, if it is so encumbered, the provisions of Section 27 become applicable to the transfer of the land and numbertransfer of such land can be effected in companytravention of the provisions of the said section. There is numberhing either in Section 20 or Section 27 which exempts the transfer of such land from the operation of the provisions of Section 27, assuming that Section 20 1 b gives power to the State Government to permit the sale of such land. Fourthly, the exemption which is granted under Section 20 1 b has to be supported by reasons to be recorded in writing. This requirement also companytemplates an exemption which is related to and prompted by the use or better use of the land. If it is the financial hardship which was under the companytemplation of the legislature, there was numberhing easier than to make a reference to the same in clause b itself and to lay down guidelines for the inquiry into such hardship. Fifthly, the provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 20, directly negative either exemption on account of financial hardship or for the purpose of the transfer of the land, since that sub-section empowers the State Government to withdraw the exemption already granted if the State Government is satisfied that any of the companyditions subject to which the exemption is granted either under clause a or clause b of sub-section 1 is number companyplied with. It is inconceivable that the legislature had in mind the cancellation of the transfer including sale, which cannot be done when it has already taken place. Sixthly, as pointed out earlier, when the legislature wanted to provide for sale or transfer of the vacant land, it has done so specifically in Chapter IV which exclusively deals with the Regulation of transfer and use of urban property. Sections 26,27 and 28 of the said Chapter together provide for sales of vacant land and for the registration of such sales. Section 26 restricts the sale of land even if it is within the ceiling limit except after giving numberice in writing of the intended transfer to the companypetent authority. When such numberice is given, the companypetent authority has the first option to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government and at a price calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of any other companyresponding law for the time being in force. It is only when the companypetent authority does number exercise its option to purchase the land within sixty days from the date of receipt of the numberice, that it is lawful for the holder of the land to transfer the same to whomsoever he may like. The provisions of Section 26 further show that the price to be calculated for the purchase of the land when the companypetent authority exercises its option is on the basis that the numberification under sub-section 1 of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act or under the relevant provision of any other companyresponding law had been issued on the date on which the numberice was given of the intended transfer by the holder of the land, to the companypetent authority. This provision makes it abundantly clear that the exemption to be granted under Section 20 1 11 b is number for the sale of the excess vacant land. It is difficult to hold that the legislature which places restrictions on the transfer of the land within the ceiling limit would at the same time give a carte blanch for the sale of the land in excess of the ceiling limit. For it would mean, firstly, that the State Government cannot have an option to purchase such land and secondly the sale can be made by the holder of the excess land at any price that he chooses. In the first instance, such a reading of Section 20 Ill b would militate against one of the objects of the Act, viz., to prevent speculation and profiteering in the sale and purchase of land. Secondly, it would be patently discriminatory. Whereas the holder of vacant land within the ceiling limit would have to suffer the restrictions placed by Section 26, the holder of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit has number to do so. He would in fact be in a better position. The provisions with regard to granting such exemption subject to certain companyditions companytained in Section 20 1 b do number in any way mitigate the discrimination. Firstly, when the statute itself places specific restrictions under Section 26 on the sale of land within the ceiling limit, it is number possible to hold that the companyditions on which the State Government is empowered to permit the sale can be left to the discretion of the State Government. In fact, such discretion given to the State Government would itself be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution the same being unguided and untrammeled. This also shows that the legislature has number given power to the State Government under Section 20 ill b to permit exemption for sale of the land. Otherwise it would have provided in the section itself for the companyditions on which the permission to sell can be given and such companyditions companyld number be less onerous than those provided under Section 26 of the Act. Secondly, if the power to permit sale of the land was intended to be given only for relieving the land-holder of his financial hardship, the section companyld very well have provided for sale of such land under Section 26 of the Act or made provision in Section 20 ill b itself for the first option of the State Government to purchase it. It is number suggested that by number making such provision either in Section 20 111 b or Section 26, the legislature intended to permit the sale of such land at a price above the fair market price payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the companyresponding law and thereby encourage speculation and profiteering, the very evils which the Act intended to curb. Seventhly, section 27 in Chapter IV is another provision which prohibits the transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building whether companystructed before or after the companymencement of the Act or a portion only of such building, for a period of ten years from the companymencement of the Act or from the date on which the building is companystructed, whichever is later, except with the previous permission of the companypetent authority. Sub-section 151 thereof again gives the first option to the companypetent authority to purchase such land and at a price either as agreed upon between the companypetent authority and the land-holder or where there is numbersuch agreement at a price to be calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other companyresponding law for the time being in force. It is only if the option is number exercised within sixty days or the companypetent authority has number refused permission to sell the land that the holder of the land can legally transfer the same to whomsoever he may like. These provisions of Section 27 also militate against the companyferment of the power on the State Government to permit exemption of land for the purpose of its transfer for the same reasons as are based on the provisions of Section 26 discussed above. The provisions of Section 27 refer to any urban or urbanisable land with a building. The vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit may be with or without a building. In fact, the provisions of Section 27 directly negative the companyferment of such power, for the said provisions show, firstly, that the legislature did number want the sale of any urban or urbanisable land with a building whether it is within or without the ceiling limit except in accordance with the provisions of Section 27. For Section 27 speaks of transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion only of such building, only with the permission of the companypetent authority and on the terms mentioned therein. This Court, as stated earlier, has invalidated the provisions of the said section to the extent they apply to the vacant land with a building when the land is within the ceiling limit. But it does apply to land in excess of the ceiling limit and with a building or a portion of it thereon. It is number possible to hold that there are two provisions, viz. Section 20 ill b and Section 27 operating at the same time in the same area. For the land permitted to be transferred under Section 20 1 b may also be a land with a building or a portion of a building thereon. In one case the restriction imposed by Section 27 on the transfer would number apply and the State Government will be deemed to have been given power to permit the sale even in companytravention of the provisions of Section 27. In another case, the holder of similar land will have to suffer the restrictions placed by Section 27. There is numberhing either in Section 20 1 b or Section 27 to exclude the operation of the section, as pointed out earlier. Eighthly, the provisions of Section 28 require a special procedure to be followed by the registering officer under the Registration Act, 1908 while registering documents under Section 17 1 a to e of that Act when the transfer of the land is either under Section 26 or Section 27. Section 28 does number make any reference to the transfer permitted by the State Government under Section 20 1 b . In other words, the holder of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit has number to face the restriction on the registration of the document of transfer of his land provided under Section 28 when such transfer is permitted by the State Government under Section 20 1 b , whereas the holder of similar lend who does number approach the State Government has to suffer the same when he transfers the land held by him. The discrimination between the transfers under the different provisions is irrational and has numbernexus with the object ought to be achieved by the classification. Lastly, if the power to exempt the land for sale is read in Section 20 1 b with such companyditions as the State Government may choose to place and if either the State Government chooses number to place any companyditions or to place such companyditions as are inconsistent with the provisions of Sections 29 and 30, it would create two sets of lands-one where numberrestriction are applicable to the companystruction thereon or only such restrictions as the State Government may choose to impose, and the other where the restrictions on companystructions as provided by Sections 29 and 30 would be applicable. It is, therefore, more than clear that the provisions of Section 20 11 b do number permit the State Government to exempt vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit for the purposes of transfer. P. SINGH, J. I agree with brother Sawant, J. that it is number possible to hold that State Government can grant exemption under Section 20 1 b of the Act, to the holder of the excess vacant land, so that he may transfer the same in the manner he desires. The object of the Act being imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations and for acquisition of such land in excess of ceiling limit, with a view to prevent the companycentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons, speculations and profiteering therein, will that object be number defeated if it is held that power under Section 20 1 of the Act can be exercised by the State Government to exempt the excess vacant lands, from the application of Chapter III of the Act, so that the holder thereof can transfer such lands? Sub-section 1 of section 20 is in two parts. The exemption under clause a of the said sub-section is to be granted in the public interest whereas under clause b the exemption is to be granted taking into companysideration the undue hardship of the holder of the land in excess of the ceiling limit. Both the expressions public interest and undue hardship are companyprehensive in nature. But at the same time, it is number easy even for companyrts to say as to whether under different circumstances the exemption was in the public interest or was necessary in the interest of the holder of the .land because of his undue hardship. Under Indian companyditions expression undue hardship is numbermally related to economic hardship. That is why from time to time many holders of lands in excess of the ceiling limit, while claiming exemption under clause b put forth their bad economic companydition and indebtedness to claim exemption along with permission to sell such excess lands. In the modern set up many holders of such excess lands having undertaken companymercial or industrial ventures with the help of the loans from the Banks and other financial institutions, put the plea of repayment of such loans as undue hardship for claiming exemption under clause b of section 20 1 aforesaid. How the holders of excess lands having incurred losses or having failed to discharge their debts can claim exemption on the ground of undue hardship in such a situation? Section 4 while fixing the ceiling limit, under subsection 3 takes numbere of the fact that where in respect of any vacant land any scheme for group housing has been sanctioned by an authority companypetent in this behalf immediately before the companymencement of this Act, then, the person holding such vacant land at such companymencement shall be entitled to companytinue to hold such land for the purpose of group housing. But at the same time under sub-section 4 of section 4 it has been specified that if on or after the 17th day of February, 1975, but before the appointed day, any person has made any transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise other than a bona fide sale under a registered deed for valuable companysideration of any vacant land held by him and situated in such State to any other person, whether or number for companysideration, then, for the purposes of calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person the land so transferred shall be taken into account, without prejudice to the rights or interests of the transferee in the land so transferred. Similarly in section 5 it has been provided that where any person who had held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at any time during the period companymencing on the appointed day and ending with the companymencement of this Act, has transferred such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise, the extent of the land so transferred shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person. When different provisions take into companysideration the lands already transferred by the holder, i between the period 17th February, 1975 and the appointed day ii as well as between the period companymencing from the appointed day and ending with the companymencement of the Act, it should number be easily inferred that the framers of the Act desired that after the companymencement of the Act while exercising the power of exemption under section 20 1 b permission should be granted to holders of such excess lands to transfer such lands to third parties in order to meet their financial liabilities. Section 21 is yet another provision in the Act under which excess vacant land is number to be treated as excess. Under the said Section exemption is to be granted in respect of such excess vacant land, if the holder undertakes to utilise the same for the companystructions of dwelling units for accommodation of the weaker sections of the society in accordance with the scheme approved by the companypetent authority or the State Government subject to such terms and companyditions as may be prescribed. If Section 21 provides for granting exemption in respect of excess land held by the holder only on a specific companydition that the holder shall utilise the same for the companystruction of dwelling units for weaker section, to serve a public cause, how the framers of the Act companyld have companyceived the grant of exemption under Section 20 1 b to the holder of the excess land, only to serve his interest, by selling such excess lands. If it is held that the State Government can exempt the vacant land held by the land holder in excess of the ceiling limit, from the applicability of the provisions of Chapter III of the Act, in order that the said holder sells such land to liquidate his debts which amounts to an undue hardship, then there will be an apparent companyflict between the interest of the land holder and the public interest. In the interest of the land holder the maximum price fetched by sale of such land will be the solution of his hardship, whereas that will run companynter to the object of the Act to prevent speculations and profiteering. It is futile to urge that even in such transfers the dominant purpose of the legislation to prevent the companycentration of urban land in hands of few persons is numbere the less served. The companycentration of urban land in hands of few persons has to be prevented with a view to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the companymon good. Section 23 prescribes the priorities for disposal or distribution of excess vacant lands after such lands vest in the State under the provisions of the Act. In the case of Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, 1981 1 SCC 166, it has been said- The definition of the word industry in clause b of the Explanation to that section is undoubtedly unduly wide since it includes any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture. If sub-section 1 of Section 23 were to stand alone, numberdoubt companyld have arisen that the Urban Land Ceiling Act is a facade of a social welfare legislation and that its true, though companycealed, purpose Is to benefit favored private individuals or associations of individuals. But the preponderating provision governing the disposal of excess vacant land acquired under the Act is the one companytained in sub-section 4 of Section 23 whereby all vacant lands deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under the Act shall be disposed of to subserve the companymon good. The provisions of sub-section 4 are subject to the provisions of sub-sections 1 , 2 and 3 but the provisions of sub-section 1 are enabling and number companypulsive and those of sub-sections 2 and 3 are incidental to the provisions of sub-section 1 . The disposal of excess vacant lands must therefore be made strictly in accordance with the mandate of sub-section 4 of Section 23, subject to this, that in a given case such land may be allotted to any person, for any purpose relating to, or in companynection with, any industry or for the other purposes mentioned in sub-section 1 , provided that by such allotment, companymon good will be subserved. The governing test of disposal of excess land being social good, any disposal in any particular case or cases which does number subserve that purpose will be liable to be struck down as being companytrary to the scheme and intendment of the Act. If the vacant lands which have vested in the State are also to be disposed of strictly keeping in view the spirit and object of the Act, how under section 20 1 b exemption can be granted to holders of such lands to dispose of such lands in the manner they like, the persons they prefer, the price they dictate, for clearing their debts? If it is companyceded that indebtedness amounts to an undue hardship, then it may companyer the debts incurred even after the companymencement of the Act. The ceiling limit has been fixed by section 3 with reference to the date of the companymencement of the Act, but exception can be granted till such excess lands vest in the State Government under sub-section 3 of section 10, after publication of the numberification, in terms of the said subsection. Although it was number possible even for the framers of the Act to exhaustively indicate as to what shall be deemed to be undue hardship within the meaning of section 20 1 b but it would have been better, if it had been illustratively indicated, leaving the rest for the companyrts to decide. 20.1 have made numberreference to Section 26 or Section 27 of the Act, while companysidering the question whether on the ground of undue hardship the holder of the excess vacant land can be granted exemption and then permission to sell such excess land, because he is financially crippled or burdened with liabilities. In the case of Blim Singhji v. Union of India supra this companyrt held that Section 27 1 in so far as it imposes restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or of a portion of such building which is within ceiling area, was invalid. The said sub-section 1 of Section 27 was struck down being unconstitutional. Section 26 of the Act also imposes certain restrictions on transfer of vacant land even within ceding limit. It can be urged that Section 26 1 suffers from the same vice which was pointed out in respect of sub-section 1 of Section 27 of Act, in the aforesaid case of bhim Singhji v. Union of India supra by this Court. But neither in the aforesaid case number in this case this companyrt was or is companycerned with Section 26 and as such, according to me, it is number necessary to express any opinion in respect of Section 26 of the Act, while companysidering the issue involved in the present appeals. ORDER For the reasons given by us above, we are of view that the provisions of Section 20 1 b of the Act do number permit the State Government to give exemption to the vacant in excess of the ceiling limit for the purposes of transferring the same. In view of our companyclusion as above, it is number necessary to go into the further question, viz., if the State Government has such power, in which circumstances it can be exercised and whether financial hardship such as the indebtedness of the land-holder is sufficient to warrant such exemption or number and with respect to which date such indebtedness is to be assessed and in what manner, and whether in the present case, the said aspects of the indebtedness were investigated or properly investigated or number. For this very reason, we also do number propose to go into the other question regarding the mala fides on the part of the authorities while granting permission to the firm to sell the land to the builders in question. 23, Since we have companye to the companyclusion that the State Government has numberpower to grant permission to sell the land under Section 20 1 b , the orders dated 6.3.87 and 18.4.87 granting exemption and permission to the firm for sale of the land are void ab initio having been passed without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the sale-deed dated 30.9.1987 executed by the 2nd respondent firm in favour of the 3rd respondent-builders is held invalid and inoperative, as the respondent-firm had numberlegal right to transfer the land in favour of the builders. We accordiigly allow the appeals and set aside the impugned order of the High Court.

V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted. IA 5/2007 for bringing on record an additional document certificate relating to employment of first respondent with another employer from 1985 is allowed. Heard. The appellant entered into a security service agreement dated 2.12.1975 with the second respondent, for its Mills premises, governed by the provisions of Contract Labour Regulation Abolition Act, 1970 CLRA Act for short . The first respondent was one of the persons appointed by the second respondent, and he was deployed for guard duties at the appellants Mill on 15.12.1980. The second respondent discharged the first respondent from service on 27/28.7.1982. The appellant terminated the security service agreement with the second respondent on 16.8.1982. Five years after his termination, in the year 1987, the first respondent filed an application under section 31 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 for short MPIR Act for a declaration that his termination from service was illegal. He also sought a companysequential direction to the appellant and second respondent to extend all the benefits which the employees of the appellant were being extended, from the date of termination, alleging that he was unemployed and without income. The appellant companytested the claim and the second respondent remained ex parte. The Labour Court by order dated 28.10.1991 allowed the application in part and directed the appellant to reinstate the first respondent in his previous post and pay him all arrears. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the Industrial Court against the said award of the Labour Court. While admitting the appeal, the Industrial Court directed the appellant to companyply with section 65 3 of the MPIR Act which required the employer to pay to the employee the full wages last drawn by him, during the pendency of the appeal. The appellant issued a letter dated 25.2.1992 offering reinstatement from 30.12.1991 on a salary of Rs.1000/- per month, though he was getting only a salary of Rs.200/- from second respondent at the time of his disengagement. Shortly thereafter the appellants mills were closed on 31.10.1992 and it was declared to be a sick industry by the Board for Industrial Financial Reconstruction on 6.5.1993. The Industrial Court heard and dismissed the appellants appeal by judgment dated 19.5.2001. The Industrial Court held that after the CLRA Act came into force, it would number be possible to rely upon the definition of employee under Section 2 13 of MPIR Act to companytend that a workman employed by the companytractor was a workman of the principal employer. The Industrial Court also held that first respondent was appointed by the second respondent. However it held that the agreement between appellant and second respondent was sham numberinal and the first respondent should be treated as a direct employee of appellant for the following reasons i the appellant failed to establish by adducing necessary evidence that the salary of first respondent was number directly paid by it and that it was being paid by the second respondent and therefore it should be deemed that the appellant was directly paying wages to the first respondent and ii the officers of appellant were assigning duties directly to the first respondent and therefore it should be deemed that he was working under the direct companytrol and supervision of the appellant. The appellant challenged the order of the Industrial Court by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court by judgment dated 12.1.2006 dismissed the writ petition without examining the companytentions of the appellant on merits, merely on the ground that the appellant did number companyply with section 65 3 of the MPIR Act and the scope of interference under Article 226/227 was very limited. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The appellant relied upon the decisions of this Court in National Thermal Power Corporation v. Badri Singh Thakur 2008 9 SCC 377 where this companyrt held that the provisions of CLRA Act would override the provisions of the MPIR Act and Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vs. K.V. Shramik Sangh 2002 4 SCC 609 where this companyrt observed that merely because the principal employer and companytractor have number companyplied with the provisions of the CLRA Act in regard to registration, the system of carrying out work through labour companytract companyld number be termed as sham. In this case, the Industrial adjudicator has granted relief to the first respondent in view of its finding that he should be deemed to be a direct employee of the appellant. The question for companysideration is whether the said finding was justified. It is number well-settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds that companytract between the principal employer and companytractor to be sham, numberinal or merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there was in fact a direct employment, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the direct employee of the principal employer. Two of the well-recognized tests to find out whether the companytract labour are the direct employees of the principal employer are i whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of the companytractor and whether the principal employer companytrols and supervises the work of the employee. In this case, the Industrial Court answered both questions in the affirmative and as a companysequence held that first respondent is a direct employee of the appellant. On a careful companysideration, we are of the view that the Industrial Court companymitted a serious error in arriving at those findings. In regard to the first test as to who pays the salary, it placed the onus wrongly upon the appellant. It is for the employee to aver and prove that he was paid salary directly by the principal employer and number the companytractor. The first respondent did number discharge this onus. Even in regard to second test, the employee did number establish that he was working under the direct companytrol and supervision of the principal employer. The Industrial Court misconstrued the meaning of the terms companytrol and supervision and held that as the officers of appellant were giving some instructions to the first respondent working as a guard, he was deemed to be working under the companytrol and supervision of the appellant. The expression companytrol and supervision in the companytext of companytract labour was explained by this companyrt in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers Union 2009 13 SCC 374 thus If the companytract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the companytractor will work under the directions, supervision and companytrol of the principal employer but that would number make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by companytractor, if the right to regulate employment is with the companytractor, and the ultimate supervision and companytrol lies with the companytractor. The principal employer only companytrols and directs the work to be done by a companytract labour, when such labour is assigned allotted sent to him. But it is the companytractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being the employee of the companytractor, the ultimate supervision and companytrol lies with the companytractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what companyditions. Only when the companytractor assigns sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and companytrol of the principal employer but that is secondary companytrol. The primary companytrol is with the companytractor. Therefore we are of the view that the Industrial Court ought to have held that first respondent was number a direct employee of the appellant, and rejected the application of the first respondent. There is a yet another reason why the first respondent should be denied any relief as there is sufficient material to infer that he deliberately suppressed and misrepresented facts. The first respondent was careful enough number to disclose his address either his residence or place of work at any stage of the proceedings before the Labour Court or Industrial Court or the High Court or this Court. He all along gave his address as care of his companynsel Sri Harish Chandra Rishi, Advocate, Rajnandgaon, Chattisgarh. In the application before the Labour Court as also before the Industrial Court and the High Court, he asserted that he was unemployed. Even in the companynter affidavit dated 29.4.2008 filed in this companyrt, he stated that he is suffering from unemployment and mental agony since 1987, thereby giving an impression that he has been companytinuously unemployed. The appellant has produced before us an employment certificate issued by the current employer of the first respondent. The appellant has stated that it companyld number earlier ascertain whether the first respondent was otherwise employed as it did number have his particulars as he was number its employee and his whereabouts were number known and that only after the filing of the special leave petition, it companyld trace the place of employment of the first respondent and secure the particulars. The certificate produced is a companymunication dated 17/18.1.2007 from Western Coalfields Ltd., a Govt. of India Undertaking, Nagpur, addressed to the appellant, stating that the first respondent took up employment under Western Coalfields Ltd. on 5.6.1985 and that in January, 2007 he was working in Wani area in WCL in Maharashtra and was being paid a gross salary of Rs.12435/-. This has number been denied or companytroverted by the first respondent. The proviso to section 65 3 of the MPIR Act makes it clear that if the employee had been otherwise employed and receiving adequate remuneration during the pendency of the appeal or subsequent periods, the companyrt shall order that numberwages shall be payable under section 65 3 . As numbericed above the first respondent approached the Labour Court only in the year 1987, five years after his disengagement by the second respondent.

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2416 of 1981 from the judgment and order dated 21.1.1981 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in r.s.a. number 2985 of 1980. rajinder sachar and r.s. sodhi for the appellants. k. ramamurthy n.k. agarwala and s.k. puri for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray j. this appeal by special leave is against the judgment and decree passed in regular s.a. number 2868 of 1980 by the high companyrt of punjab haryana whereby the appeal was dismissed. the respondent manumberar lal who was at the relevant time working as sub-inspector in the police line gurdaspur was companypulsorily retired by order number 9754-b dated 24.9.1975 issued by shri m.m. batra senior superintendent of police gurdaspur in public interest. the said order of compulsory retirement has been challenged by the respondent by filing a suit being case number 86 of 1977 praying for a declaration that the aforesaid order of companypulsory retire- ment is illegal. mala fide. unconstitutional against the rules of natural justice and the plaintiff-respondent shall be deemed to be in service of the punjab state to the post of sub-inspector till his retirement at the age of 58 years i.e. on 13.2.1986. there is also a prayer for a direction to the defendent-appellant for payment of the balance of the salary for the period from 5.9.1974 to 23.9.1975 i.e the suspension period after deducting therefrom the subsistence allowance paid by the defendent and also the increment that had accrued to him under the rules from time to time during that period. this amount was stated to be rs. 3446 for the said period. the said suit was heard by the subordinate judge gurdaspur who by his order dated 27th january 1979 held that the impugned order was number passed at the instance of sardar harjit singh ahluwalia deputy inspector general of police number the same was vitiated by malice or any mala fides. it was further held that the order was made innumberu- ously by the senior superintendent of police in public interest in accordance with the provisions of punjab civil services premature retirement rules 1975. the subordinate judge also held that so for as the pay for the period of suspension is companycerned the plaintiff was entitled to have recovery of rs. 3446 as arrears of pay during the suspen- sion period. the suit was accordingly decreed in part. against the said judgment and decree two appeals were filed one by the plaintiff--respondent manumberar lal being c.a. number 169/308 of 1979 and anumberher by the state of punjab regis- tered as c.a. number 170 of 1979 and 12 of 1980. both these appeals were heard together and were disposed of by a companymon judgment by the additional sessions judge gurdaspur. de- creeing the civil appeal number 169/308 of 1979 it was held that the order of companypulsory retirement was made by an officer namely senior superintendent of police gurdaspur who was below the rank of inspector general of police who is the appointing authority of the petitioner. it was also held that the judgment and decree as regards the payment of the balance of emoluments during the period of suspension after the reinstatement of the petitioner was legal and valid and the said decree was affirmed and the appeal was allowed decreeing the suit. in that view of the matter the appeal filed by the state was dismissed. against the said judgment and decree the state of punjab preferred the instant appeal being r.s.a. number 2868 of 1980 before the high companyrt of punjab and haryana. the high companyrt dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. against this judgment and decree the present appeal was filed before this companyrt with an application for special leave under article 136 of the companystitution. the only question that arises for companysideration in this appeal is whether the order of companypulsory retirement made by the senior superintendent of police gurdaspur is illegal and invalid being passed by an authority lower in rank than the appointing authority which according to the respondent is the deputy inspector general of police. it appears that the government of punjab framed rules under proviso to article 309 of the companystitution and these rules are termed as the punjab civil services prema- ture retirement rules 1975. in rule 2 1 the appropriate authority has been defined as meaning the authority which has power to make substantive appointments to the post or service from which the government employee is required or wants to retire or any other authority to which it is subor- dinate. rule 3 reads as follows-- 3 1 a the appropriate authority shall if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so have the absolute right by giving an employee prior numberice in writing to retire that employee on the date on which he completes twenty-five years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the numberice. the period of such numberice shall number be less than three months provided that where at least three months numberice is number given or numberice for a period less than three months is given the employee shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to amount of his pay and allow- ances at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the date of retirement for a period of three months or as the case may be for the period by which such numberice falls short of three months. the relevant excerpt of rule 12.1 is quoted herein below-- the following table summarises the directions given by the provincial government under clause b of sub-section 1 of section 241 of the government of india act 1935 in regard to the authorities companypetent to make appointments to the numbergazetted ranks. ---------------------------------------------------- -------- class of authority to whom the power the extend of government of appointment is delegated the delegation servants ---------------------------------------------------- -------- inspectors deputy inspector-general of full powers police assistant inspector subject to rules -general government governing the railway policeassistant conditions of inspector general provincil service as defi- additional police designated ned in police as companymandantprovincil rules. additional police and the assistant inspector-general police traffic sergeants superintendents of police sub-inspectcompanymandants of p.a.p vide number ors and ass- 155 dated 2nd june1964 and istant subdeputy superintendent admi- inspectors. nistrative government railway police and assistant superintentend government railway police ---------------------------------------------------- -------- rule 13.3 2 also provides that substantive promotions to the rank of sub inspector and assistant sub-inspector shall be made by the superintendent of police and the assistant superintendent government railway force. on companysidering the provisions of the aforesaid rules it is quite clear and apparent that the senior superintendent of police gurdaspur being the companypetent authority to make the appointment to the number-gazetted ranks of sub-inspectors is also legally companypetent to pass the order of companypulsory retirement of the plaintiff respondent in public interest in accordance with the provisions of rule 3 1 a and b of the said rules. it has been tried to be companytended by referring to the provisions of rule 13.9 sub-rule 2 by the respondent wherein it has been provided that substantive promotion to the rank of assistant sub-inspector is to be made by the deputy inspector general of police in accordance with the principles prescribed in rule 13.1 that the superintendent of police is number the companype- tent authority to make the impugned order. it is only the deputy inspector general of police who is companypetent to make the order of companypul- sory retirement in question. this argument cannumber be sustained in view of the specific provisions made in rule 12.1 wherein it has been provided that the superintendent of police is companypetent to make the appointment to the number-gazetted ranks of sub inspectors of police and assistant sub-inspectors of police. on a reading of both these provisions of the rules 12.1 and 13.9 2 it is clear and appar- ent that the senior superintendent of police gurdaspur is legally companypetent to make the impugned order of companypulsory retirement of the plaintiff respondent from service in public interest after his attaining 50 years of age in accordance with the provisions of rules 3 1 a of the punjab civil services premature retirement rules 1975. in view of the reasons stated hereinbefore we do number find any merit in the companytention made on behalf of the respondent and therefore we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the high companyrt in part in so far as it affirms the judgment and decree of the lower appellate companyrt setting aside the order of companypulsory retirement. the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt is hereby affirmed and the decree of the lower appellate companyrt as regards the payment of rs.

Leave granted. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. When the respondent failed to be represented pursuant to the numberice issued by this Court, we requested the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee to assign the companynsel. Accordingly, Smt. K. Sarda Devi has been assigned the case. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Administrative Tribunal, Madras, made on April 22, 1996 in O.A. No.159/90. The admitted facts are that the respondent was initially appointed in a companytingent establishment on November 20, 1942 and was later appointed on regular basis as an Attendant on February 18, 1945. He tendered voluntary resignation by letter dated June 6, 1970 which was accepted by the Government w.e.f. March 19, 1970. As per the pre-existing rules, the Government servant was required to put in 30 years of qualifying service for pensionary benefits. Rules came to be amended by G.O.Ms. No.1537 which came to be effective from November 13, 1972. It was stated therein that the Government may, be giving him numberice of number less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such numberice, after he has attained the age of fifty years on after he has companypleted twenty five years of qualifying service retire any Government servant. Any Government servant who has attained the age of 50 years or who has companypleted 25 years of qualifying service may also likewise retire from service by giving numberice of number less than three months in writing to be appropriate authority. This rule has companye into force, as stated earlier, w.e.f March 1, 1972. The respondent has voluntarily retired on March 20, 1970 and since then, he has already joined another institution.