text1
stringlengths 7
2.5k
| labels
stringlengths 9
100
|
|---|---|
This is a classic RAT that can download, upload, execute commands on the victim host and, finally, perform keylogging | ['T1056', 'T1105'] |
This is performed by checking if the following libraries are loaded on the victim machine.SbieDll.dll (sandboxie library)Dbghelp.dll (Microsoft debugging tools)Api_log.dll (threatAnalyzer / GFI SandBox)Dir_watch.dll (threatAnalyzer / GFI SandBox)We were able to uncover some other techniques used by this variant of ROKRAT to make analysis difficult, Group 123 used an anti-debugging technique related to NOP (No Operation).nop dword ptr [eax+eax+00h] is a 5 byte NOP | ['T1574.001', 'T1574.002'] |
This log contains the external IP, the geographic location, the machine name, the time the machine was infected, as well as fields to be logged in the threat actor’s database | ['T1070', 'T1124'] |
This particular sample connected to the CnC domain accounts.serveftp[.]com, which resolved to an IP address previously used by the threat group, although the IP had not been used for some time prior to this most recent activity: MD5 0beb957923df2c885d29a9c1743dd94b accounts.serveftp.com 59.188.0.197 BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured backdoor that is set to run when the system boots, and can communicate using HTTP, HTTPS, or a SOCKS proxy | ['T1071', 'T1016'] |
This plugin provides the attacker with the ability to both list files and download/upload files on the victim machine | ['T1083', 'T1105'] |
This shortcut file points to ‘C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe “%APPDATA%\cnagnt.dll”,Sd’ One of the exceptions to the installation routine above is in the event Symantec is detected | ['T1218.011', 'T1547.009'] |
This task is executed every 25 minutes and will repeat the actions described above – recreating the JavaScript code which later will create and execute a PowerShell script (described below) | ['T1064', 'T1059.001'] |
Thread Name Description Key logger Logs key strokes for configured processes and sends them to the command and control (C2) server Form grabber Monitors HTTP traffic for form data and sends it to the C2 server POS monitor Monitors for changes to logs stored in C:\NSB\Coalition\Logs and nsb.pos.client.log and sends parsed data to the C2 server PST monitor Searches recursively for newly created Outlook personal storage table (PST) files within user directories and sends them to the C2 server HTTP proxy monitor Monitors HTTP traffic for requests sent to HTTP proxies, saves the proxy address and credentials for future use | ['T1071', 'T1090', 'T1041', 'T1132', 'T1486'] |
Threat actor using appcmd to delete logs and disable logging | ['T1562.001', 'T1070.004'] |
To create the scheduled task, the PowerShell payload starts by writing the following to a VBScript file with the same name as the task name (ex | ['T1053.005', 'T1036'] |
To install the payload, the script will create a file %APPDATA%\OneDrive.bat and save the following string to it: powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -exec bypass -File “%APPDATA%\OneDrive.ps1” The script then writes a modified copy of itself to %APPDATA%\OneDrive.ps1, with the code that performs this installation omitted | ['T1036', 'T1064'] |
To set up persistence, the loader creates a folder named “c:\temp”, sets its attributes to be a hidden and system folder to hide the folder from view in Windows Explorer | ['T1547.001', 'T1564.001'] |
Tweets by second account @dookhtegan1 providing a Telegram channel with the leaked files Data Dump Contents The contents of the data dump includes various types of datasets that appear to be results from reconnaissance activity, initial compromises, and tools the OilRig operators use against target organizations | ['T1003', 'T1041'] |
Unpacking routine for SWF exploit The exploit is a memory corruption vulnerability that exists in the “com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.BufferControlParameters” class. If the exploit is successful, it will gain arbitrary read / write operations within memory, thus allowing it to execute a second stage shellcode | ['T1068', 'T1203'] |
Upon execution, the “Windows Folder.exe” file copies itself to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming and creates a Windows shortcut (LNK) file in the victim’s Startup directory as a persistence mechanism | ['T1074', 'T1547.009'] |
Upon execution, this command extracted, decrypted, and executed the PowerShell backdoor payload stored in the HiveUploadTask text property of the RacTask class | ['T1140', 'T1059.001'] |
Variable Name Description gdu Google Drive URL for downloading files to the Google Drive account gduu Google Drive URL for uploading files to the Google Drive account gdue Google Drive URL for updating a file on the Google Drive account gdo2t Google Drive URL used to get the OAUTH access_token client_id The client_id for the OAUTH application cs The client_secret for OAUTH r_t The refresh_token for OAUTH Table 6 Variables used to store settings needed to use Google Drive as a C2 To obtain an OAUTH access token to authenticate to the actor provided Google account, the Trojan sends an HTTP POST request to a URL stored in the gdo2t variable with grant_type, client_id, client_secret, and refresh_token fields added to the HTTP header and in the POST data | ['T1102'] |
Victims are targeted by watering hole attacks, and emails with links to malicious websites or with malicious attachments | ['T1598.003', 'T1189'] |
Watch on Fox News: Hackers may use fake Netflix app to spy on users As users have become more attached to their mobile devices, they want everything on those devices | ['T1120', 'T1087'] |
We are still analyzing this Trojan to determine the specific structure of the data sent between the Trojan and the C2 server; however, it does appear that the Trojan is using the RC4 algorithm to encrypt data sent to the C2 server within HTTP POST requests | ['T1573', 'T1041'] |
We are unsure of the shellcode hosted at this URL, but it is possible that additional shellcode-based payloads like Meterpreter could have been served by this shellcode | ['T1064', 'T1105'] |
We determined this by following the process in which the TwoFace++ loader webshell uses the actor provided password to authenticate and decrypt the embedded webshell: Append a string to the password that acts as a salt Obtain the SHA1 hash of the resulting string containing the password and salt Base64 encode the SHA1 hash Compare the encoded hash with hardcoded base64 string If the encoded hash matches hardcoded base64 string then the inbound request is authenticated Generates the SHA256 hash of the password string Base64 encodes the SHA256 hash and uses the first 24 characters as a key Uses 24-character key and the 3DES cipher to decrypt the embedded webshell Now let’s look at how this works with the values in the TwoFace++ loader sample | ['T1573', 'T1140', 'T1027', 'T1550.002', 'T1132'] |
We found two obfuscation techniques applied to the script: the first one changing the representation of variables; the second one changing the representation of strings in the script | ['T1562.001', 'T1027'] |
We have gathered three samples of the default loader associated with this group and extracted the following configurations: SHA256 of Sample Configuration 82779504d3fa0ffc8506ab69de9cb4d8f6415adbb11a9b8312828c539cf10190 LAUNCHER_ARGS=[‘–host’, ‘www1.chrome-up[.]date:4443’, ‘-t’, ‘obfs3’] db453b8de1a01a3e4d963847c0a0a45fb7e1a9b9e6d291c8883c74019f2fc91f LAUNCHER_ARGS=[‘–host’, ‘www1.chrome-up[.]date:4443’, ‘-t’, ‘obfs3’] 7e57e35f8fce0efc3b944a7545736fa419e9888514fcd9e098c883b8d85e7e73 LAUNCHER_ARGS=[‘–host’, ‘139.59.46[.]154:3543’, ‘-t’, ‘obfs3’] These configurations show that this group uses both fully-qualified domain names and IP addresses to host their Pupy C2 servers | ['T1016', 'T1102', 'T1008'] |
We have observed the following capabilities of this payload: Get drive information Read files Write files Delete files Move files Spawn processes Create directories Reaver TCP Payload The malicious CPL payload of Reaver has the following three exported functions: ServiceMain CPlApplet DllEntryPoint When the malware is initially loaded, DllEntryPoint will be called, which in turn will call a function that is responsible for decompressing a blob of data | ['T1005', 'T1070.004', 'T1083'] |
We observed the threat group issue the following commands: @echo off dir c:\ >> %temp%\download ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download net user >> %temp%\download net user /domain >> %temp%\download ver >> %temp%\download del %0 @echo off dir "c:\Documents and Settings" >> %temp%\download dir "c:\Program Files\ " >> %temp%\download net start >> %temp%\download net localgroup administrator >> %temp%\download netstat -ano >> %temp%\download These commands allow the threat group to gain information about the compromised computer and the network to which it belongs | ['T1007', 'T1105', 'T1059.001'] |
We’ve seen two onion addresses used in different samples: g5wcesdfjzne7255.onion (Down) r2elajikcosf7zee.onion (Alive at time of writing) The HTTP resource always starts with /api/osx/ and contains actions such as: /api/osx/started to report the bot has just started /api/osx/keychain to exfiltrate the content of the keychain /api/osx/get_task?bot_id={botid}&version={version} to request a task (described below) /api/osx/cmd_executed to report a the output of a command that was executed /api/osx/task_complete?bot_id={botid}&task_id={taskid} to report a task was completed HTTP POST content has two fields: bot_id and data | ['T1071', 'T1106'] |
When communicating with its C2 server, the downloaders use multiple protocols, specifically HTTPS, HTTP or DNS, each of which provide a fallback channel in that order | ['T1071', 'T1008'] |
When comparing the provided timestamps of the delivery documents to the timestamps for the remote template documents from Table 2, we find that the time to attack is directly correlated to the last time the templates are modified | ['T1070.006', 'T1124'] |
When executed, the .NET Framework wrapper will first check if VMware tools is running in background, this is done via a simple process check, searching for any process named “vmtoolsd.” Provided there are no matching processes running, the malware continues execution, creating a registry entry with the name ‘MSASCuiLTasks’ in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce for persistence | ['T1057', 'T1547.001'] |
When generating the URL for the HTTP requests issued to the C2 server, the Trojan chooses a random folder from the following to include within the URL path: watch/? search/? find/? results/? open/? search/? close/? XAgent also will choose several parameters names from the following list when finishing the construction of the C2 URL: itwm= text= from= | ['T1071', 'T1083'] |
When one PlugX succeeds to infect a host, it then accesses to every IP address in the local network one-by-one and communicate with any connectable nodes, using one of the following protocols listed in Table 2 | ['T1016', 'T1008'] |
When the actor modifies the file and changes the modification_time, the Trojan downloads the contents from the file by creating an HTTP request to a URL structured as follows: <Google Drive URL in ‘gdu’> + <file identifier in ‘f_id’> + “?alt=media” The Trojan processes the downloaded data within the file the same way it would to obtain a job from data received from the DNS tunneling channel using the TXT query mode, specifically by searching the data using the following regular expression: ([^r-v\\s]+)[r-v]([\\w\\d+\\/=]+).(<domainList[0]>|<domainList[1]>|<domainList[n]>) The Trojan function splits the matching data, specifically the subdomain on a separator that is a character between r and v and uses the data before the separator to get the sequence number and a Boolean value (0 or 1) if more data is expected | ['T1074', 'T1041', 'T1048', 'T1486'] |
While the seller specifies that HawkEye Reborn should only be used on systems with permission, they also explicitly forbid scanning of HawkEye Reborn executables using antivirus software, likely an attempt to minimize the likelihood that anti-malware solutions will detect HawkEye Reborn binaries.Following these changes, the new developer of HawkEye Reborn has continued to make changes and we expect this to continue as long as the developer can monetize their efforts.As with other malware that we wrote about last year, while the developer claims that the software should only be used on systems with permission, or "for educational purposes," malicious attackers have been continuously leveraging it against various targets around the world.Distribution campaignsFor several months during the last half of 2018 and continuing into 2019, Cisco Talos has observed ongoing malicious email campaigns that are being used to distribute versions of the HawkEye Reborn keylogger/stealer | ['T1518.001', 'T1018'] |
Year Country Industry Malware 2014 Vietnam Network Security WINDSHIELD 2014 Germany Manufacturing WINDSHIELD 2015 Vietnam Media WINDSHIELD 2016 Philippines Consumer products KOMPROGO WINDSHIELD SOUNDBITE BEACON 2016 Vietnam Banking WINDSHIELD 2016 Philippines Technology Infrastructure WINDSHIELD 2016 China Hospitality WINDSHIELD 2016 Vietnam Media WINDSHIELD 2016 United States Consumer Products WINDSHIELD PHOREAL BEACON SOUNDBITE Table 1: APT32 Private Sector Targeting Identified by FireEye APT32 Interest in Political Influence and Foreign Governments In addition to focused targeting of the private sector with ties to Vietnam, APT32 has also targeted foreign governments, as well as Vietnamese dissidents and journalists since at least 2013 | ['T1068'] |
استطلاع.docx https://0utl00k[.]net/docs Table 1 Additional DarkHydrus Word documents used to steal credentials Both of these related documents use the attachedTemplate technique to steal credentials by sending them to a URL https://0utl00k[.]net/docs | ['T1003', 'T1552.001'] |